【剑桥哲学指南系列】黑格尔与19世纪哲学

【剑桥哲学指南系列】黑格尔与19世纪哲学

thecambridgecompaniontoHEGELANDNINETEENTH-CENTURYPHILOSOPHYTheCambridgeCompaniontoHegelandNineteenth-CenturyPhi-losophyexaminesHegelwithinhisbroaderhistoricalandphilo-sophicalcontexts.CoveringallmajoraspectsofHegel’sphilosophy,thevolumeprovidesanintroductiontohislogic,epistemology,philosophyofmind,socialandpoliticalphilosophy,philosophyofnature,andaesthetics.Itincludesessaysbyaninternationallyrec-ognizedteamofHegelscholars.ThevolumebeginswithTerryPinkard’sarticleonHegel’slife–aconspectusofhisbiographyonHegel.ItalsoexploressomenewtopicsmuchneglectedinHegelscholarship,suchasHegel’shermeneuticsandrelationshiptomys-ticism.AimedatstudentsandscholarsofHegel,thisvolumewillbeessentialreadingforanyoneinterestedinnineteenth-centuryphilosophy.Theup-to-datebibliographyincludesthemostimpor-tantEnglish-languageliteratureonHegelwritteninthelastfifteenyears.FrederickC.BeiserisProfessorofPhilosophyatSyracuseUniver-sity.HeistheauthorofTheRomanticImperative,GermanIdeal-ism,andHegelandistheeditorofTheCambridgeCompaniontoHegel.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nothervolumesintheseriesofcambridgecompanions:ABELARDEditedbyjeffreye.browerandkevinguilfoyADORNOEditedbythomashuhnANSELMEditedbybriandaviesandbrianleftowAQUINASEditedbynormankretzmannandeleonorestumpARABICPHILOSOPHYEditedbypeteradamsonandrichardc.taylorHANNAHARENDTEditedbydanavillaARISTOTLEEditedbyjonathanbarnesATHEISMEditedbymichaelmartinAUGUSTINEEditedbyeleonorestumpandnormankretzmannBACONEditedbymarkkupeltonenBERKELEYEditedbykennethp.winklerBRENTANOEditedbydalejacquetteCARNAPEditedbyrichardcreathandmichaelfriedmanCRITICALTHEORYEditedbyfredrushDARWINEditedbyjonathanhodgeandgregoryradickSIMONEDEBEAUVOIREditedbyclaudiacardPICODELLAMIRANDOLA:NEWESSAYSEditedbym.v.doughertyDESCARTESEditedbyjohncottinghamDUNSSCOTUSEditedbythomaswilliamsEARLYGREEKPHILOSOPHYEditedbya.a.longEARLYMODERNPHILOSOPHYEditedbymichaelrutherfordFEMINISMINPHILOSOPHYEditedbymirandafrickerandjenniferhornsbyFOUCAULT2ndeditionEditedbygaryguttingFREUDEditedbyjeromeneuGADAMEREditedbyrobertj.dostalGALENEditedbyr.j.hankinsonGALILEOEditedbypetermachamerGERMANIDEALISMEditedbykarlameriksGREEKANDROMANPHILOSOPHYEditedbydavidsedleyHABERMASEditedbystephenk.whiteHAYEKEditedbyedwardfeserContinuedaftertheIndexDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheCambridgeCompaniontoHEGELANDNINETEENTH-CENTURYPHILOSOPHYEditedbyFrederickC.BeiserSyracuseUniversityDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\ncambridgeuniversitypressCambridge,NewYork,Melbourne,Madrid,CapeTown,Singapore,SaoPaulo,Delhi˜CambridgeUniversityPress32AvenueoftheAmericas,NewYork,ny10013-2473,usawww.cambridge.orgInformationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9780521539388!cCambridgeUniversityPress2008Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress.Firstpublished2008PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmericaAcatalogrecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationDataTheCambridgecompaniontoHegelandnineteenth-centuryphilosophy/editedbyFrederickC.Beiser.p.cm.–(Cambridgecompanions)Includesbibliographicalreferences(p.)andindex.isbn978-0-521-83167-3(hardback)–isbn978-0-521-53938-8(pbk.)1.Hegel,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich,1770–1831.I.Beiser,FrederickC.,1949–II.Title:CompaniontoHegelandnineteenth-centuryphilosophy.III.Series.B2948.C2832008193–dc222008021176isbn978-0-521-83167-3hardbackisbn978-0-521-53938-8paperbackCambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyofurlsforexternalorthird-partyInternetWebsitesreferredtointhispublicationanddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchWebsitesis,orwillremain,accurateorappropriate.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nContentsPrefacepageixContributorsxiIntroduction:ThePuzzlingHegelRenaissance1frederickbeiser1Hegel:ALife15terrypinkard2AncientSkepticism,ModernNaturalism,andNihilisminHegel’sEarlyJenaWritings52paulfranks3Hegel’sPhenomenologyasaSystematicFragment74jonstewart4TheIndependenceandDependenceofSelf-Consciousness:TheDialecticofLordandBondsmaninHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit94paulredding5Hegel’sLogic111stephenhoulgate6Hegel’sIdealism135robertstern7HegelandHermeneutics174michaeln.forster8Hegel’sSocialPhilosophy204frederickneuhouser9Hegel’sPhilosophyofReligion230peterc.hodgson10HegelandMysticism253glennalexandermageeviiDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nviiiContents11PhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject281kennethr.westphal12Hegel’sCriticismofNewton311edwardc.halper13TheLogicofLife:Hegel’sPhilosophicalDefenseofTeleologicalExplanationofLivingBeings344jameskreines14HegelandAesthetics:ThePracticeand“Pastness”ofArt378allenspeight15TheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics394robertpippinBibliography419Index423DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPrefaceInthespringof2002,thelateTerryMooreproposedthatIproduceaneweditionofTheCambridgeCompaniontoHegel,theoriginalofwhichhadappearedin1993.Whatpreciseformtheneweditionshouldtakewaslefttomydiscretion.AfterdiscussionwithPaulGuyer,whoreceivedasimilarrequestaroundthesametimeregardingTheCambridgeCompaniontoKant,Idecidedtoproduceacompletelynewcollectionofessaysratherthanre-editingtheolderones.AlthoughIhadnomisgivingsaboutthefirstedition,IthoughtthataneweditionwouldbemorefruitfulforHegelscholarship.ItwasoneoftheaimsoftheCompanionseries,asconceivedbyTerryMoore,thatitshouldbeinthevanguardofdiscussioninthefield.Inthatspirit,itseemedthatacompletelyneweditionwasbetterthanjustarevisedversionoftheolderone.Thisgaveopportunityforoldercontributorstowriteonnewtopicsaswellasfornewcontributorstojoininthediscussion.Thisneweditionisnotmeanttoreplacetheolderonebuttocom-plementit.Liketheolderedition,thisonestrivestoprovideabroadintroductiontoHegel’sphilosophy.ButitalsoattemptstocoverareasofHegel’sphilosophythatwereomittedorunderrepresentedintheolderedition.ThepreviouseditioncontainedlittleaboutHegel’sphilosophyofreligionandNaturphilosophie,whereasthiseditionhastwoessaysonHegel’sphilosophyofreligion(thosebyMageeandHodgson)andthreeonHegel’sphilosophyofnature(thosebyWestphal,Halper,andKreines).Thiseditionalsofocusesmoreontheaesthetics(theessaysbyPippinandSpeight)andtheepistemologicalissuessurroundingHegel’sphilosophy(theessaysbyFranksandForster).Ithankthemanycontributorstothisvolumefortheirpatienceforitsslowanddelayedproduction.LikeallvolumesintheCompanionseries,thisoneisatributetoTerryMoore.FrederickBeiserSyracuse,May2008ixDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nContributorsfrederickbeiserisProfessorofPhilosophyatSyracuseUniversity.HeistheauthorofTheFateofReason:GermanPhilosophyfromKanttoFichte(HarvardUniversityPress,1987);Enlightenment,Revolution&Romanticism(HarvardUniversityPress,1992);GermanIdealism:TheStruggleagainstSubjectivism(HarvardUniversityPress,2002);TheRomanticImperative:TheConceptofEarlyGermanRomanticism(HarvardUniversityPress,2003);andSchillerasPhilosopher(OxfordUniversityPress,2005).HewasalsotheeditorofTheCambridgeCom-paniontoHegel(CambridgeUniversityPress,1993).michaeln.forsterisGlenA.LloydDistinguishedServiceProfes-sorinPhilosophyandtheCollegeattheUniversityofChicago.HehaspublishedfivebooksonGermanphilosophy:HegelandSkepti-cism(HarvardUniversityPress,1989),Hegel’sIdeaofaPhenomenol-ogyofSpirit(UniversityofChicagoPress,1998),Herder:PhilosophicalWritings(CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),WittgensteinontheArbi-trarinessofGrammar(PrincetonUniversityPress,2004),andKantandSkepticism(PrincetonUniversityPress,2008).HeisalsotheauthorofanumberofarticlesonGermanphilosophy,ancientphilosophy,andothersubjects.paulfranksisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofToronto.HeistheauthorofAllorNothing:Systematicity,TranscendentalArgu-mentsandNihilisminGermanIdealism(HarvardUniversityPress,2005),associateeditoroftheInternationalYearbookofGermanIde-alism,andtheauthorofmanyarticlesonKantianandpost-Kantianthemesinbothanalyticandcontinentaltraditions.edwardc.halperisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofGeorgia.Althoughmuchofhisworkisinancientphilosophy,hehaspublishedanumberofarticlesonHegelincluding:“TheLogicofHegel’sPhilosophyofNature:Nature,Space,andTime,”inEssaysonHegel’sPhilosophyofNature,editedbyS.Houlgate(Albany:StateUniversityofxiDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nxiiContributorsNewYorkPress,1998);“Hegel’sFamilyValues,”ReviewofMetaphysics54(2001),815–858;“TheIdealismofHegel’sSystem,”TheOwlofMin-erva34(2002),19–58;and“PositiveandNegativeDialectics:Hegel’sWissenschaftderLogikandPlato’sParmenides,”inPlatonismusimIdealismus:DieplatonischeTraditioninderklassischendeutschenPhilosophie,editedbyB.MojsischandO.F.Summerell(Munich:K.G.SaurVerlag,2003).HehasbeenparticularlyinterestedinunderstandingthesystematicdimensionofHegel’sphilosophyandinshowinghowHegelusescategoriesfromhisLogictotreatothertopics.peterc.hodgsonisCharlesG.FinneyProfessorofTheology,Emeri-tus,DivinitySchool,VanderbiltUniversity.Hecoordinatedanewedi-tionandtranslationofHegel’sLecturesonthePhilosophyofReligion(1984–1988),whichwasrecentlyreprintedbyOxfordUniversityPress.Hismonograph,HegelandChristianTheology(2005),andhisedi-tion/translationofHegel’sLecturesontheProofsoftheExistenceofGod(2007)havebeenpublishedbyOxfordUniversityPress.stephenhoulgateisaprofessorofphilosophyattheUniversityofWarwick.HeistheauthorofHegel,NietzscheandtheCriticismofMetaphysics(CambridgeUniversityPress,1986);AnIntroductiontoHegel:Freedom,TruthandHistory(2nded.Blackwell,2005);andTheOpeningofHegel’sLogic:FromBeingtoInfinity(PurdueUniversityPress,2006).HeisalsotheeditorofHegelandthePhilosophyofNature(SUNYPress,1998),TheHegelReader(Blackwell,1998),andHegelandtheArts(NorthwesternUniversityPress,2007).HehasservedasvicepresidentandpresidentoftheHegelSocietyofAmericaandwaseditoroftheBulletinoftheHegelSocietyofGreatBritainfrom1998to2007.jameskreinesisAssistantProfessorofPhilosophyatClaremontMcKennaCollege.Hehaswrittenarticlesonmetaphysics,epistemol-ogy,andphilosophyofscienceinKantandHegel,including“BetweentheBoundsofExperienceandDivineIntuition”inInquiry(2007);“TheInexplicabilityofKant’sNaturzweck”inArchivfurGeschichteder¨Philosophie(2005);and“Hegel’sCritiqueofPureMechanismandthePhilosophicalAppealoftheLogicProject”inEuropeanJournalofPhi-losophy(2004).HiscurrentworkaimstointerpretthedifferentformsofidealismdefendedbybothKantandHegelandtouncoverthedifferentphilosophicalstrengthsofbothviews.glennalexandermageeisAssistantProfessorofPhilosophyattheC.W.PostCampusofLongIslandUniversity.HeistheauthorofHegelandtheHermeticTradition(CornellUniversityPress,2001;revisedDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nContributorsxiiipaperbackedition2008)andTheHegelDictionary(forthcomingfromContinuum)andeditorofTheCambridgeHandbookofWesternMysti-cismandEsotericism(forthcomingfromCambridgeUniversityPress).frederickneuhouserisProfessorofPhilosophyatBarnardCollege,ColumbiaUniversity.HeistheauthorofRousseau’sTheodicyofSelf-Love(Amour-propre):Evil,Rationality,andtheDriveforRecognition(OxfordUniversityPress,2008);FoundationsofHegel’sSocialTheory(HarvardUniversityPress,2000);andFichte’sTheoryofSubjectivity(CambridgeUniversityPress,1990).terrypinkardisProfessorofPhilosophyatGeorgetownUniversity.HeistheauthorofHegel(CambridgeUniversityPress,2000)andGermanPhilosophy,1760–1860:TheLegacyofIdealism(CambridgeUniversityPress,2002).HealsoeditedandwrotetheintroductionforHenrichHeine:OntheHistoryofReligionandPhilosophyinGermany(CambridgeTextsintheHistoryofPhilosophy,CambridgeUniversityPress,2007).robertpippinisEvelynStefansonNefDistinguishedServiceProfes-sorintheCommitteeonSocialThought,UniversityofChicago.HeistheauthorofmanybooksonKantandGermanIdealism,amongthemKant’sTheoryofForm(YaleUniversityPress,1982);Hegel’sIdealism:TheSatisfactionsofSelf-Consciousness(CambridgeUniversityPress,1989);IdealismasModernism(CambridgeUniversityPress,1997);andThePersistenceofSubjectivity:OntheKantianAftermath(CambridgeUniversityPress,2005).paulreddingisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofSydney.HeistheauthorofHegel’sHermeneutics(CornellUniversityPress,1996),TheLogicofAffect(CornellUniversityPress,1999),AnalyticPhiloso-phyandtheReturnofHegelianThought(CambridgeUniversityPress,2007),andContinentalIdealism:LeibniztoNietzsche,tobepublishedbyRoutledgein2009.allenspeightisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophyatBostonUniver-sity.HeisarecipientofFulbright,DAAD,andNEHfellowshipsandistheauthorofHegel,LiteratureandtheProblemofAgency(CambridgeUniversityPress,2001)andThePhilosophyofHegel(Acumen/McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,2008).Heistheeditorandtranslator(withBradyBowman)ofHegel:HeidelbergWritings(CambridgeUniversityPress,2009).HehaspublishednumerousjournalarticlesonaestheticsandethicsinGermanIdealismandRomanticism.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nxivContributorsrobertsternisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofSheffield.HeistheauthorofHegel,KantandtheStructureoftheObject(Routledge,1990);HegelandthePhenomenologyofSpirit(Routledge,2002);andHegelianMetaphysics(OxfordUniversityPress,forthcom-ing).jonstewartisAssociateResearchProfessorattheSorenKierkegaardResearchCentreattheUniversityofCopenhagen.HeistheauthorofTheUnityofHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit(NorthwesternUni-versityPress,2000),Kierkegaard’sRelationstoHegelReconsidered(CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),andAHistoryofHegelianisminGoldenAgeDenmark(C.A.Reitzel,2007).HeisalsotheeditorofTheHegelMythsandLegends(NorthwesternUniversityPress,1996).kennethr.westphalisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofKent,Canterbury.HehaspublishedwidelyonbothKant’sandHegel’stheoreticalandpracticalphilosophies.HisbooksonHegelincludeHegel’sEpistemologicalRealism(Kluwer,1989);Hegel,HumeunddieIdentitatwahrnembarerDinge¨(Klostermann,1998);andHegel’sEpis-temology:APhilosophicalIntroductiontothePhenomenologyofSpirit(Hackett,2003).HeiseditorofTheBlackwellGuidetoHegel’sPhe-nomenologyofSpirit(Blackwell,2008)andiscompletingabooktitledFromNaiveRealismtoUnderstanding:Hegel’sCritiqueofCognitiveJudgment.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nthecambridgecompaniontoHEGELANDNINETEENTH-CENTURYPHILOSOPHYDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:09:06WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.018CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nfrederickbeiserIntroduction:ThePuzzlingHegelRenaissanceNoonewholooksatthebibliographytothisneweditionofTheCam-bridgeCompaniontoHegelwillbeunimpressedbytheremarkablegrowthofinterestinHegel.Thebibliographycoversonlythelastfif-teenyears–roughlythosesincetheappearanceofthefirsteditionofthisbook–anditdealswithbooksinEnglishalone.Topreventitfrombal-looningtotwice,thrice,orfourtimesitssize,theeditorhadtoexcludeFrench,German,andItalianbooksonHegel.Suchasurgeininterestisremarkableforanyphilosopher,butespeciallyforonewho,somefiftyyearsearlier,wouldhavebeentreatedasapariah.HowdoweexplainthegreatcontemporaryinterestinHegel?Itisnecessarytoadmitthatitisratherpuzzling.Aftertheriseofanalyticphilosophyinthe1920s,andduetothegrowinginfluenceofpositivisminthe1930s,Hegel’sreputationfellintosteepdeclineinBritain.ThepatronsaintofBritishIdealismhadbecometheogreofpositivismandtheverymodelofhownottodophilosophy.Hegel’sfortunesbegantochangeinthe1960sastheresultofthegrowthofinterestinMarxism.Forthestudentrebellionandtradeunionmovementsofthe1960s,Marxbecametheguidingspirit;buttheMarxthatinspiredthemwasnotsomuchthematureMarxofDasKapitalbuttheearlyMarxofthe1844Parismanuscripts.TheconceptsandterminologyoftheearlyMarx–“alienation,”“self-consciousness,”“mediation”–madeMarx’sdebtstohisgreatforbearobvious.ItwasclearthatonecouldunderstandtheprecisemeaningoftheseimportantbutstrangeconceptsonlyifonemadeanintensivestudyofHegel,whohadnotbeenstudiedinBritainsincetheearly1900s.AlthoughMarxclaimedthathebrokewithHegel–thathestoodHegelonhishead–itwasobviousthatonecouldappreciatethisonlywithagoodgraspofHegel.AndsoHegelwasonceagainontheagenda,someoneworthstudying,talking,andwritingabout,evenifhewastreatedonlyasafootstoolforMarx.Notsurprisingly,thestudyofHegelwasmainlyfocusedonhismoresocialandpoliticalworks,especiallythePhenomenologyofSpirit,Philosophy1DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n2frederickbeiserofRight,andPhilosophyofWorldHistory.1NoonebotheredwiththestudyofHegel’ssystemasawhole,stilllessanyofitsintegralparts:thePhilosophyofNature,PhilosophyofSpirit,and,leastofall,theScienceofLogic.Yet,whatissopuzzlingaboutthecontemporaryinterestinHegelishowmuchithasoutlivedtheoriginalsourceofitsinspiration.WiththefalloftheBerlinWallandthecollapseoftheSovietEmpire,Marxismhassuffered–forbetterorworse–asteepdeclineinprestige.ButasMarx’sstarfell,Hegel’sonlyrose.Somehow,theservanttoMarxbecameamasterinhisownright.Noweveryaspectofhisphilosophybecameofinterest.Hegelwasrestoredtothepantheonofgreatphilosophers,takinghisplacealongsideLeibnizandKant.Soouroriginalquestionreturns:WhythecontemporaryinterestinHegel?HowhasitmanagedtooutliveitsinitialdebttoMarxism?ThemysteryonlydeepenswhenweconsiderthesubsequentcourseoftheHegelrenaissance.TheapexoftheAnglophoneHegelrevivalwasthepublicationin1975ofCharlesTaylor’sHegel.2Withgrace,preci-sion,andremarkableerudition,TaylorsurveyedthedepthandbreadthofHegel’sentiresystemandshowedittobeanedificeofgreatintellec-tualsubtletyandsophistication.Unlikeearlierscholars,TaylordidnotlimithimselftoHegel’ssocialandpoliticalthought;hetreatedeveryaspectofHegel’ssystemandexaminedindepthitscentralcoreandfoundation:itsmetaphysics.Thecentralthemeofthatmetaphysics,Taylorargued,wastheconceptofself-positingspirit.Whatheldeverypartofthesystemtogether,whatmadeitintoaunifiedwhole,wastheideaofanabsolutespiritthatpositsitselfinandthroughhistoryandnature.Becauseofitsremarkableclarity,Taylor’sbookprovedtobeagreatsuccess,goingthroughseveraleditionsandtranslations.Yet,itisdifficulttounderstandhowTaylor’sbookcouldleadtoagrowthininterestinHegel.Theideaofself-positingspirit,whichTaylormadetheveryheartofHegel’sphilosophy,issospeculative,sometaphysical,1ThechiefmonographswereShlomoAvineri,Hegel’sTheoryoftheModernState(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1972);G.D.O’Brian,HegelonRea-sonandHistory(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1975);B.T.Wilkins,Hegel’sPhilosophyofHistory(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1974);BernardCullen,Hegel’sSocialandPoliticalThought(Dublin:Gill&Macmillan,1979);andRay-mondPlant,Hegel(London:George,Allen&Unwin,1971).Alsomuchdiscussedinthe1970swereGeorgeArmstrongKelly,Idealism,PoliticsandHistory:SourcesofHegelianThought(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniverityPress,1969),JohnPla-menatz’stwochaptersonHegelinManandSociety(London:Longman,1963),II,pp.129–268;andZ.A.Pelczynski’ssubstantial“Introduction”toHegel’sPoliticalWritings(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1964),pp.5–137.2CharlesTaylor,Hegel(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1975).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nIntroduction:ThePuzzlingHegelRenaissance3andsoreligiousthatitishardtounderstandhowitcouldconvincemodernreadersofHegel’sintellectualmerits.Thesereadershadbeenraisedinamuchmoresecularandskepticalage,inaphilosophicalcul-turesuffusedwithpositivism,andsotheideaofaself-positingspiritprovedveryproblematic.WhenTaylor’sbookappeared,theacademicestablishmentinBritainandtheUnitedStateswasalreadydominatedbyanalyticphilosophy,whichneverhadmuchtimeformetaphysics.So,ironically,giventheemphasisitplacedonHegel’smetaphysics,andgiventheanti-metaphysicalatmosphereinAnglophoneacademia,Taylor’sbookwasmorelikelytoburythanreviveHegel.Yet,interestinHegelonlygrew.Why?Forallitsmerits,thishadlittletodo,Ibelieve,withTaylor’sbook.Instead,ithadmuchmoretodowiththefactthatscholarsbegantoignoreorunderplaythataspectofHegel’sphilosophythatTaylorhadplacedcenterstage:metaphysics.SomescholarsfullyadmittedthemetaphysicaldimensionofHegel’sphilosophy;nevertheless,theyinsisteditisnotimportantforeveryaspectofhisphilosophy,especiallyhissocialandpoliticalthought.Sincetheearly1960s,manyscholarsofHegel’ssocialandpoliticalthoughtclaimedthatitcouldbeunderstoodwithouthismetaphysics.3Hegelwasappreciatedforhiscritiqueoflib-eralism,hisconceptionoffreedom,andhistheoryofthestate,allofwhichseemedtohavepointandmeaningindependentoftherestofhissystem.ToseevalueinHegel’scritiqueofsocialatomismorcontracttheory,forexample,onedidnothavetoaccepthistheoryofself-positingspirit.Otherscholars,however,begantoquestionthemetaphysical3ThefirstofthesescholarswasZ.A.Pelczynskiin“AnIntroductoryEssay”tohiseditionofHegel’sPoliticalWritings,trans.byT.M.Knox(Oxford:Claren-donPress,1964).Sincethen,manyotherscholarshavefollowedhisleadandthenonmetaphysicalapproachhasbeenthedominantoneintheinterpretationofHegel’ssocialandpoliticalthought.SeeStevenSmith,Hegel’sCritiqueofLib-eralism(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1989),p.xi;AllenWood,Hegel’sEthicalThought(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990),pp.4–6;MarkTunick,Hegel’sPoliticalPhiosophy(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1992),pp.14,17,86,99;MichaelHardimon,Hegel’sSocialPhilosophy(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994),p.8;andAlanPatten,Hegel’sIdeaofFreedom(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999),pp.16–27;PaulFranco,Hegel’sPhilosophyofFreedom(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1999),pp.83–84,126,135–136,140,151–152,360–361;JohnRawls,LecturesontheHistoryofMoralPhilosophy(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2000),p.330.Forsomerecentprotestsagainstthisapproach,seeYirmiahuYovel,“Hegel’sDictumthattheRationalistheActualandtheActualistheRational,”inTheHegelMythsandLegends,ed.byJonStewart(Evanston,IL:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1996),pp.26–41;andAdrianPeperzak,ModernFreedom:Hegel’sLegal,MoralandPoliticalPhiosophy(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,2001),pp.5–19.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n4frederickbeiserinterpretationofHegel’sphilosophy,claimingthathisentiresystemisbestunderstoodapartfrom,orevenasareactionagainst,traditionalmetaphysics.Taylor’sinterpretationwasrejectedbecauseitseemedtomakeHegel’sthoughtmuchtoometaphysical.Sincethe1970stherehavebeenatleastthreekindsofnonmetaphysicalinterpretations.FirstamongthemwasthecategorytheoryofKlausHartmannandhisschool.4AccordingtoHartmann,Hegel’sphilosophyisnotspeculationaboutmysteriousentities,suchastheabsoluteorspirit,butanattempttodevelopasystemofcategories,themostbasicconceptsbywhichwethinkabouttheworld.ItisonlyinametaphoricalsensethatHegel’sScienceofLogicisabout“theessenceofGodbeforethecreationoftheworld”;intheproperliteralsenseitisonlyaboutthestructureofourmostbasicconcepts,thosenecessarytothinkaboutbeingassuch.AnothernonmetaphysicalinterpretationwasthatdevelopedbyRobertPippininhisHegel’sIdealism.5PippinplacesHegel’sidealismessentiallyintheKantiantradition,asatheoryaboutthenecessarycon-ditionsofpossibleexperience.ThesubjectthatisattheheartofHegel’sidealismliesnotinanyconceptionofaself-positingspiritbutinKant’sunityofapperception,theprinciplethatself-consciousnessisaneces-saryconditionforallexperience.YetanothernonmetaphysicalapproachhasbeenworkedoutmorerecentlybyRobertBrandom.6“Themas-terideathatanimatesandstructuresHegel’smetaphysicsandlogic,”Brandomwrites,is“hiswayofworkingouttheKant–Rousseauinsightaboutafundamentalkindofnormativitybasedonautonomyaccordingtothemodelofreciprocalauthorityandresponsibilitywhoseparadigmismutualrecognition.”7BrandomseesHegelasfundamentallyatheo-ristaboutthenormativedimensionoflife,experience,anddiscourse,andclaimsthatallhistalkaboutspirithastobeunderstoodintermsofthemutualrecognitionimplicitinsuchnorms.Sowenowhavesomethingofanexplanationforourmystery,forwhytheHegelrevivalsurvivedthedeclineofMarxismandTaylor’smetaphysicalinterpretation.InterestinHegelenduredbecausethemostdifficultandtroublingaspectofhisphilosophy–hismetaphysics–waseitherignoredorreadoutofhissystem.Thenonmetaphysicalreadings4SeeKlausHartmann,“Hegel:ANon-MetaphysicalView,”inHegel,ed.byA.MacIntyre.NewYork:Doubleday,1972),pp.101–124.Seealsotheanthologyofhisstudents,HegelReconsidered,ed.byTerryPinkard(Dordrecht,TheNether-lands:Kluwer,1994).5RobertPippin,Hegel’sIdealism:TheSatisfactionsofSelf-Consciousness(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989).6RobertBrandom,TalesoftheMightyDead(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2002).7Ibid,p.234.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nIntroduction:ThePuzzlingHegelRenaissance5ofHegelhavebeenactsofenormousinterpretativecharity:theyhaveinterpretedHegelinawaytomakehimacceptabletothestandardsofamoresecularandpositivisticage.TheyhaveworkedsowellbecausetheyhavemadeHegelconformtotheimageofwhatwethinkaphiloso-phershouldbe.Yet,despitetheirsuccess,theseinterpretationshavenotbeenabletosuppressanaggingdoubt:AreweinterestedinHegelonlybecausewehavemadehimreflectourinterests?Dowefindhimacceptablenowonlybecausewehavere-createdhiminourimage?Ifthatisso,itleavesuswithanevenmoretroublingquestion:IstheHegelrevivalperhapsamistake?AreweinterestedinHegelonlybecausewehaveafalseimageofhim?Althoughthenonmetaphysicalinterpretationsareinterestingandilluminating,theyhaveneversucceededinconvincingmanyHegelscholars.TheproblemisthatthemetaphysicaldimensionofHegel’sthoughthasprovenstubbornlyirreducible.Whenpushcomestoshove,allthosewhoadvocateanonmetaphysicalreadinghavetoadmitthattheyhavenotrevivedtherealhistoricalHegelbutonlysomeaspectofhimthatreflectsourowncontemporaryinterestsandvalues.Onerespectwherethenonmetaphysicalinterpretationsareespeciallyprob-lematicconcernsthereligiousdimensionofHegel’sthought.Therecanbenodoubtthat,eversincehisFrankfurtyears,acrucialpartofHegel’sprogramwastodemonstratethefundamentaltruthsofChristianity.8WehavetotakeHegelathiswordwhenhetellsusinhislecturesonthephilosophyofreligionthatGodisthealphaandomega,theendandcenterpointofphilosophy.9Ofcourse,Hegel’sGodisnotthetheisticGodoforthodoxChristianity,andstilllessthedeisticGodoftheeighteenth-centuryphilosophers.Nevertheless,whateverthepre-cisenatureofhisGod,hestillansweredtothegeneralconceptoftheinfiniteorabsolute,andstillcompliedwiththeSt.AnselmsclassicaldefinitionofGodas“idquonihilmaiuscogitaripossit”(thatofwhichnothinggreatercanbeconceived).WecannotexplainawaytheHegelianabsoluteintermsofthecompletenessofasystemofcategories,thesub-jectoftheKantianunityofapperception,orthestructureofmutualrecognitioninvolvedinnorms.ForalltheseinterpretationsgiveusonlyonehalfoftheHegelianequation:themannerinwhichwethinkabouttheuniverse;theydonotgiveustheotherhalf:theuniverseitself.The8SeemyHegel(London:Routledge,2005),pp.124–152.9SeeHegel,VorlesungenuberdiePhilosophiederReligion,¨inWerkeinzwanzigBanden¨,ed.byE.MoldenhauerandK.Michel(Franfurt:Suhrkamp,1969),XVI,28,32–33,94.FortheroleofreligioninHegel’sphilosophy,seethearticlebyPeterHodgsoninChapter9inthisvolume.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n6frederickbeiserHegelianabsolutewasalwaysmeanttobetheuniverseasawhole,theidentityofsubjectandobject,notonlyhowwethinkabouttheworldbuttheworlditself.AnotherrespectinwhichthenonmetaphysicalinterpretationshaveprovenproblematiciswithregardtoHegel’sNaturphilosophie.ThiswasanintegralpartofHegel’ssystem,indeed,itsveryheartandcenter,themiddlepartofthethree-partEncyclopediaofphilosophicalSci-ences.Butitsverylargepresencehasalwaysbeenanembarrassmentforhisnonmetaphysicalexpositors.InhisNaturphilosophie,Hegelspec-ulatesaboutthenatureofthelivingandmaterialuniverse,andheemploysanapriorimethodologyveryunlikethemethodofobservationandexperimentofcontemporarynaturalscience.Hegel’sNaturphiloso-phieisexplicitlyandemphaticallyametaphysics.Itisimplausibletointerpretitasonlyasystemofcategories,forHegelispatentlyandexplicitlyattemptingtotellusaboutnatureitself,notonlyhowweshouldthinkaboutitorthenormativestructurefordiscourseaboutit.Insum,Hegel’sNaturphilosophiescarcelyfitsintothemoderncon-ceptionofnaturalscience,anditisfarremovedfromanycontem-poraryconceptionofwhatphilosophyshouldbe.Yetthereitis,intheveryheartofhissystem,all538pagesofitintheWerkausgabeedition.ItmightnowseemasiftheHegelrevivalhasbeenindeedamistake.ThepremisebehindthatrevivalisthatHegelhassomethinginterestingtosaytousnowfromthestandpointofourownphilosophicalcul-ture,thathecansomehowaddressourphilosophicalconcernsintheearlytwenty-firstcentury.ButthemoreweexaminetherealhistoricalHegel,themorewecansaythathischiefinterestsandgoalswerefarremovedfromourown.ForHegelwasfirstandforemostametaphysi-cian,someoneintentonprovingtheexistenceofGod,someoneeagertoestablishapriorithefirstprinciplesofNaturphilosophie.Nothingbetter,itseems,showshimtobeatypicalearlynineteenth-centurythinker.So,unlessweareinterestedinthenineteenthcenturyforitsownsake,itwouldseemwehavenoreasontostudyHegel.Acontem-poraryphilosopherhasnomorereasontostudyHegel,itwouldseem,thanhehasreasontostudyNapoleon’sstrategyatthebattleofJenaorthecostumeoftheearlyromanticage.AtthispointHegelscholarshipconfrontsadilemma.Ifourscholar-shipishistoricallyaccurate,weconfrontaHegelwithprofoundmeta-physicalconcernsalientothespiritofcontemporaryphilosophicalcul-ture,whichmistrustsmetaphysics.ButifwecontinuetointerpretHegelinanonmetaphysicalmanner,wehavetoacceptthatourinterpre-tationismoreaconstructionofourcontemporaryintereststhantheDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nIntroduction:ThePuzzlingHegelRenaissance7realhistoricalschool.Thisisjustoneversionoftheclassicaldilemmathatplaguesallhistoryofphilosophy:thatbetweenanachronismandantiquarianism.Themoreweinterprethistoricalfiguresfromourstand-pointandaccordingtoourinterests,themorewecommitanachronism,imposingthepresentuponthepast;butthemoreweinterpretthemfromtheirstandpoint,themoreweengageinantiquarianism,asifanyhistoricalfactswereinterestingfortheirownsake.Isthisdilemmainescapable?Itisnotsoinprinciple.Wecanimagineamorereligious,lesspositivisticcultureforwhichtheoriginalHegelianprogramwouldbeaninspiration.Forthisculture,themoreitdelvesintotherealhistoricalHegel,themoreitsphilosophicalinterestgrows,becausethepastverymuchreflectsitsowninterests.Such,indeed,wasthescenariobehindtheHegelrenaissanceinEnglandandNorthAmericainthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies.Hegelwasthenmuchmorepopularandpervasivethanheistoday;10indeed,itisonlywhenwerealizethisthatwecanunderstandthedeepaversiontoHegelthathaspersistedinEnglishphilosophyfordecades;thataversionwastheproductofaprofoundreaction.Sincethatculturewasmuchmorereligiousthanourown,philosophershadamuchlessanachronisticandantiquarianinterestintherealhistoricalHegel.Forthinkersinthisepochwerestilltroubledbytheconflictbetweenreasonandfaith,theveryconflictthathadoncetroubledHegelhimself.TheproblemfortheHegelrevival,ofcourse,isthatourcultureisnolongersoreligious.Forourownmoresecular,scientific,andskepticalage,thedilemmadoesappearutterlyinescapable.Wemightthinkthatthedilemmaisescapableafterallifweresorttoastrategyoftenusedbysomescholars.11Althoughtheyadmitthattheirnonmetaphysicalinterpretationdoesnotconformexactlytothe“letter”orappearinthetextsofHegel,theystillclaimthatitrepresentshis“spirit”orintention.ItisasiftheirinterpretationwerewhatHegelreallymeanttosayafterall,evenifheneverdidsayitexpressisverbis.IfwetalkaboutwhatHegel“reallymeant”orwhathe“intendedtosay,”itseemsasifwegetaroundthegulfbetweentherealhistoricalHegelandourcontemporaryphilosophicalinterests.Butthisstrategyengagesinaformofself-deception.Itconflatesthefactualwiththenormative,10TogetasenseofjusthowpopularHegelwasinlatenineteenthcenturyBritain,seeWilliamJames1908HibbertLecturesAPluralisticUniverse(NewYork:Longmans&Green,1909),pp.52–54.11Formoreonthisstrategyandthosewhoemployit,seemy“DarkDays:AnglophoneScholarshipsincethe1960s,”inGermanIdealism:ContemporaryPerspectives,ed.byEspenHammer(London:Routledge,2007),pp.77–80.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n8frederickbeiserwhatHegelreallydidsaywithwhatwethinkheoughttohavesaidifhewerereasonablelikeus.Ultimately,wehavetoadmit:itisahypostasisofourowncontemporaryphilosophicalintereststhathaslittletodowithactualhistoricalreality.Whilethedilemmabetweenantiquarianismandanachronismdoesseeminescapable,atleastforournonmetaphysicalage,itdoesnotfol-lowthattheHegelrevivalisamistake.Itwillbeamistakeonlyifwecontinuetodeludeourselves,thatis,toassumethattherealhis-toricalHegelisessentiallythesameasourcontemporaryphilosophicalinterests.Butthereisnoneedtomakethisassumption.WecanadmitthatHegel’sphilosophicalprogramwasessentiallymetaphysical,andthatmuchofthehistoricalHegelisoflittleinteresttoustoday.Nev-ertheless,havingmadethisadmission,wedonothavetoacceptthedilemmaineveryrespect,asifitweretrueacrosstheboardorforeveryaspectofHegel.Therearestillmanyotheraspectsoftherealhistori-calHegelthatarestillofphilosophicalinterestforustoday,andthatwecanproceedtoreconstructwithoutfearofeitheranachronismorantiquarianism.HistoricalresearchonHegelisnotdoomedtophilo-sophicalirrelevance;andphilosophicalreconstructionofHegelneednotbecondemnedtoanachronism.Buttoavoidtheseextremes,thephilosophicalhistorianhastobeskillful;hehastoworkbackandforthbetweenthedemandsofhistoryandphilosophy;hemustknowenoughhistorytoavoidanachronism,enoughphilosophytoavoidantiquarian-ism.Ifheissuccessfulinnegotiatingbetweenthedemandsofhistoryandphilosophy,hecansometimesfindthatmiddlepathwheretherealhistoricalHegelandourcontemporaryinterestscoincide.Thishasindeedsometimeshappenedwiththenonmetaphysicalinterpretations.Althoughtheseinterpretationshavebeenslowtoacknowledgethedis-tancebetweentherealhistoricalHegelandtheirownreconstructionsofhim,theyhavesometimesbroughtoutaspectsoftherealhistoricalHegelthatarephilosophicallyimportantandinteresting.Innegotiatingbetweenthedemandsofphilosophyandhistory,thephilosophicalhistoriancanproceedintwodifferentways.HecanbeginfromhisowncontemporaryphilosophicalinterestsandhopethatthereissomethingansweringtotheseinterestsintherealhistoricalHegel;orhecanstartfromtherealhistoricalHegelandhopethatsomethingphilosophicallyinterestingderivesfromhim,somethingwhichmightormightnotanswertocontemporaryphilosophicalinterests.Whileeitherapproachworksandhasitsadvantages,theyalsobothhavetheirrisksanddisadvantages.Theformerbringswithittheriskofanachronism,thelatterthatofantiquarianism.Onthewhole,scholarsintheAnglophoneworldhavepreferredtheformerapproach,andsotheyDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nIntroduction:ThePuzzlingHegelRenaissance9haveoftenruntheriskofimposingtheirownphilosophicalinterestsonthetextsandconfusingtheirphilosophicalreconstructionwiththerealhistoricalHegel.ThecoincidencebetweentherealhistoricalHegelandourcontemporaryinterestsisthenonlyforcedandartificial.WethinkthatHegelanswerstoourinterestsonlybecausewereadtheseinterestsintohim.Toavoidthiscommonpitfall,andcontrarytothedirectionofmostAnglophonescholarship,Iwouldliketosayawordhereinbehalfofthelatterapproach,thepathlesstravelled.ThereisastrongcasetobemadeforbracketingourowncontemporaryphilosophicalinterestsandexaminingHegelinhishistoricalcontext.Inthiscase,werecon-structHegel’spositionasacontributiontoapastconversation.WewillfullyunderstandthepointandmeaningofHegel’sphilosophyonlywhenweseeitindiscussionwiththepositionsofothers.Ifweignoreitspreciseplaceinthepastconversation,weruntheriskofconfus-ingHegel’spositionwiththoseofothersorwefailtoseehispreciseintentions.ThisapproachhastheadvantageofbeingclosertotherealhistoricalHegel;andithasrealphilosophicalcontentinsofarasitseesHegel’spositioninaphilosophicaldiscussion.Whilethereisnoapri-origuaranteethatcloserhistoricalstudywillbringresultsansweringtoourcontemporaryinterests,itdoeshaveapossiblegreaterbenefit:thatwewidenourphilosophicalhorizonsanddiscoverissuesthatareinterestingfortheirownsakeeveniftheyanswertonocontemporaryconcern.Inthenextsection,IwillsuggestsomeofthewaysinwhichthisapproachmighttakeHegelscholarshipinnewandinterestingdirections.GrantedthattheHegelrenaissanceisnotamistake,oratleastneednotbeone,thequestionremainswhereitshouldgo?Primafacie,itwouldseemthatthereisnowherefurtherthatitcango;suchhasbeenthesheervolumeofwritingsonHegelthatitwouldseemthatnostonehasbeenunturnedandnocornerunexplored.Indeed,repetitionhasbecometheorderoftheday:thesamegroundisgoneoveragainandagain,oftenwithlittlevariation.TherearesomanycommentariesonHegel’sPhenomenology,somanystudiesofthePhilosophyofRight,thatthereseemsnopointindoinganother.Iftherewereeveracasetobemadefortoomanyscholarschasingtoofewtexts,itwouldseemtoapplytoHegel’sbodyofwork.Nevertheless,despitealltheworkdoneonHegel,Iwouldliketosuggestthatthereisstillmuchtodo;indeed,insomerespects,workhasbeenscarcelybegun.LetmejustbrieflyindicateheresomeofthefewplaceswhereHegelresearchneedstogoifitistomakeanyprogressinthenearfuture.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n10frederickbeiserOneofthemostspectaculardevelopmentsinresearchonGermanidealisminthelastdecadeshasbeentheKonstellationsforschungini-tiatedbyDieterHenrich.12Crudely,KonstellationsforschungmeansthedetailedinvestigationintothenetworkofintellectualrelationshipsbetweenwritersduringthefamousWunderjahreinJenaandWeimar(1790–1800).Thisresearchattemptstogetbeyondtheusualnarrowfocusonafewmajorwritingsofafewfamouscanonicalfigures,whichfailstoprovideanaccuratepictureofaperiodasawhole.Instead,itstrivestoacquireabroaderperspectivebyreconstructing,asfaraspos-sibleorasthesourcespermit,thediscussionsbetweenallthethinkersinaperiod,whethermajororminor,thattookplaceinletters,arti-cles,reportsonconversations,andsoon.Aftertheselostconversationshavebeenreconstructed,itisthenpossibletoseemajorworksintheirprecisehistoricalandphilosophicalcontext,tounderstandtheirpointandmeaningthroughtheirspecificplaceinadiscussion.Theproblemwiththeolderapproach,whichwasorientedtowardtheanalysisofafewtexts,isthatitoftengaveafalseimpressionabouttheperiodasawhole.If,forexample,oneweretogeneralizefromastudyofthemainwritingsofReinhold,Fichte,andSchelling,onewouldthinkthatthisperiodischaracterizedbythepredominanceoffoundationalism,byasearchfortheself-evidentfirstprinciplesofphilosophyfromwhichalltheresultsofKant’sphilosophycouldbededuced.Butacloserexami-nationofthediscussionsbetweenthemanymore“minor”thinkersofthisperioddemonstratessomethingmuchmoreinteresting:thatmostthinkerswerehighlycriticalofReinhold,Fichte,andSchelling’sfounda-tionalistproject,andthatfoundationalismwasinfactaminorityviewonthedefensive.Thisresultisofthegreatestimportanceforanunder-standingofthegenesisofearlyromanticism,whoseaestheticgrewoutoftheantifoundationalistepistemologyoftheperiod.AlthoughitisoftheutmostimportanceforHegelresearch,Kon-stellationsforschungonHegelhasscarcelybegun.WhenHegelarrivedinJenain1801,theheadycreativeyearswereover;still,theireffectswereafreshmemory.Seenincontext,Hegel’searlyJenawritingsshowthemselvestobecontributionstotherecentconversationsamonghiscontemporaries.WeneedtoreconstructHegel’sphilosophyintheJena12SeeDieterHenrich,Konstellationen:ProblemeundDebattenamUrsprungderidealistischenPhilosophie(1789–1795)(Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta,1991);DerGrundimBewußtsein:UnterscuhungenzuHolderlinsDenken(1794–1795),¨(Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta,1992);andGrundlegungausdemIch:Unterscuhun-genzurVorgeschichtedesIdealismus,Tubingen-Jena,1790–1794¨(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,2004).SeealsoManfredFrank,UnendlicheAnnaherung:DieAnf¨ange¨derphilosophischenFruhromantik¨(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1997),andViolettaWaibel,HolderlinundFichte1794–1800¨(Paderborn:Schoningh,¨2000).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nIntroduction:ThePuzzlingHegelRenaissance11years–someofthemostformativeforhisintellectualdevelopment–aspartsofthoseconversations.NowhereisthismoreevidentthanwithregardtoHegel’sPhenomenology,thecrowningworkofhisJenaphase.ThemethodologyoutlinedinitsfamousintroductionshouldbeseenasHegel’sresponsetothedisputeaboutfoundationalisminthe1790s.Whenplacedinthiscontext,weshouldhaveamuchclearerandaccurateunderstandingofHegel’saimsinthePhenomenology.13IntegrationwithKonstellationsforschungisonlyoneoftheunful-filleddesiderataofcurrentHegelresearch.ThereareotheraspectsofHegel’sphilosophythatareindesperateneedoffurtherinvestigation.OneoftheseisHegel’sNaturphilosophie,thedarkestterraincognitaoftheHegelianworld.Fordecades,thisrealmremainedshroudedinutterobscurity,becauseNatrphilosophiehadbecomesodiscreditedwiththeriseoftheempiricalsciencesinthelatterhalfofthenineteenthcen-tury.Forthepositivists,Naturphilosophiebecametheverymodelofhownottodoscience.Itwasspeculative,usedapriorireasoningratherthanpatientempiricalinvestigation;anditseemedanthropocentric,revivingfinalcauses,occultpowers,andessences.14YetthepositivistconceptionofNaturphilosophieisscarcelytenable.Themorewestudythecontextoflateeighteenth-andearlynineteenth-centuryscienceinGermany,themorewefindthatNaturphilosophiewasnotadistinctdisciplinefromtheempiricalsciences;itwasrather“thenormalsci-ence”ofitsday.15AttheveryleastSchellingandHegeldidnotviolatethestandardwaysofpursuingscienceintheirday.Theydidnotscornempiricalresearchbutwenttopainstoinformthemselvesaboutitandtomaketheirthinkingconformtothelatestfindings.Thosewhoweremoreactiveempiricalresearchers–Goethe,Ritter,andAlexandervonHumboldt–werenolessphilosophicalthanSchellingorHegel.ThedistinctionbetweenNaturphilosophieandempiricalscience,whichhasbeenthecornerstoneofthepositivistinterpretation,isnotonlyanachro-nisticbutdeeplyquestion-begging,becausemostNaturphilosophenwouldnothaveacceptedthedistinctionbetweentheaprioriandtheempiricalthatbecamesoprevalentinnineteenth-centuryscienceandphilosophy.SchellingandHegelwouldhaverefusedtodistinguishphi-losophyfromnaturalsciencebecausephilosophyseemedessentialto13SeethearticlebyPaulFranksinChapter2inthisvolume,whichtakesaninter-estingstepinthisdirection.14OnthesecriticismsofNaturphilosophie,seethearticlesbyKennethWestphal,EdHalper,andJamesKreines,Chapters11–13inthisvolume.15Ihavedefendedthisargumentelsewhere.Seemy“KantandtheNatur-philosophen,”inTheRomanticImperative(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1993),pp.153–170.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n12frederickbeisermakesenseoftheremarkabledevelopmentsinphysics,geology,andthelifesciences.Thefinaldecadesoftheeighteenthcentury,whenNaturphilosophiewasborn,weresomeofthemostexcitingandturbu-lentinthehistoryofscience.Itwasintheseyearsthatthemechanicalworldpicturecollapsedutterly,thatthereigningpreformationtheoryinbiologywasreplacedwithepigeneisis,thatgeologymadeitsfirststepstowardasystematicinvestigationoftheagesoftheearth.OnemajorresultofthenewdynamicconceptionofmatterandtheriseofepigenisiswasthecollapseoftheCartesiandualismsandtheemergenceofanewparadigmtoexplainmental–physicalinteraction.Ratherthandistinctsubstances,themindandbodycouldnowbeunderstoodasdifferentdegreesoforganizationanddevelopmentoflivingforce.LikeeveryNaturphilosophoftheirgeneration,SchellingandHegelstrug-gledtomakesenseofthesedevelopments,torestorethelostunitythathaddisappearedafterthedemiseofthemechanisticworldview.Undertheseconditions,whatcouldanythinkerdothanspeculateandattempttoformulatenewparadigms?OnceweadmitthatNaturphilosophiewasthenormalscienceofthelateeighteenthcentury,andonceweacceptthatNaturphilosophiewascentraltoHegel’sphilosophy,wefindourselvesstandingbeforeavastunexploredjungle.HowdoweunderstandtheconceptsofHegel’sNaturphilosophie,howdowerelatethemtotheempiricalresearchofhisday,andhowdoweindividuatetheminthelightofopposingthe-ories–theseareamongsomeofthebasicquestionsthatcryoutforanswers.Itshouldbeobvious,however,thatwecanbegintoanswerthemonlyifwehaveagoodunderstandingofHegel’sphilosophyaswellasadetailedknowledgeoftheempiricalsciencesofhisday.Sincethe1970s,muchprogresshasbeenmadetowardthestudyofHegel’sNaturphilosophie.TheworkofM.J.Petry,GerdBuchdahl,DietrichEngelhardt,HeinzKimmerle,andBrigitteFalkenberghashelpedtoopenthisvastfieldofinvestigation.16Theydeservenolittlecreditforstart-inginvestigationintoareasthathavebeenmadetaboobypositivisitprejudices.Yet,allthesescholarswouldbethefirsttoinsistthatmuchremainstobedoneinthisarea,whereeventhemostbasicquestionsremainunanswered.Theprevalenceandpopularityofnonmetaphysical16SeeM.J.Petry,ed.byHegelunddieNaturwissenschaften(Stuttgart:Frommann-Holzboog,1986)andHegelandNewtonianism(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,1993);GerdBuchdahl,“Hegel’sPhilosophyofNatureandtheStructureofScience,”RatioXV(1973),1–27;DietrichEngelhardt,HegelunddieChemie(Wiesbaden:Pressler,1976);HeinzKimmerle,“HegelsNaturphilosophieinJena,”Hegel-StudienIV(1967),125–167;BrigitteFalkenberg,DieFormderMaterie:ZurMetaphysikderNaturum1800.(Frankfurt:Athenaum,¨1987).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nIntroduction:ThePuzzlingHegelRenaissance13interpretationsofHegel,unfortunately,hasdonenothingtoencouragetheseinvestigations.Therecentappearanceofseveralnewanthologiesandmonographsis,however,awelcomesignthatthetimesarechang-ing.17OfallareasofHegel’sphilosophyitwouldseemthathissocialandpoliticaldoctrinesareleastinneedoffurtherinvestigation.Sincetheyhavebeensocontroversialandleastsubjecttopositivistopprobrium,theyhavebeenthemostintensivelystudiedpartofHegel’sphilosophy.Butheretoosomeofthemostbasicissuesremaintobeexploredandinvestigated.Onthewhole,thestudyofHegel’ssocialandpoliticalthoughthasbeenmuchtooabstractedfromitshistoricalcontext.TheworksofFranzRosenzweigandJacquesD’Hondthavebeenmajorstepsintherightdirection;18butmuchstillneedstobedone.Oneofthemostbasic–andleastunderstood–aspectsofHegel’ssocialandpoliticalishistheoryofnaturallaw.ThatitwasfundamentaltoHegelweknowfromtheverysubtitleofthePhilosophyofRight:“NaturalLawandPoliticalScienceinOutline.”Despitethis,Hegelhasbeenconstantlyportrayedasaradicalhistoricistwhowantstomakeallrightdependonhistoricaldevelopment.Seenmoreclosely,Hegel’stheoryofnaturallawwashisattempttorehabilitatethenaturallawtraditionwhiletakingintoaccountthecriticismsofthehistoricalschool.Toappreciatehistheory,wehavetolocateitinitsprecisehistoricalcontext,seeingitasHegel’scontributiontoseveralimportantcontroversiesinhisday.Oneofthesewasthefamoustheory–practicedisputeinthe1790sconcerningtheroleofreasoninpolitics:therationalists(KantandFichte)heldthatmoralprinciplesgovernedthepoliticalworld,thatpracticemustcon-formtotheory;theempiricists(Burke,Gentz,Rehberg,Moser)claimed¨thatmoralprincipleshavetoadapttoparticularcircumstances,thattheorymustconformtotheory.Anotherwasthecelebratedcontro-versybetweenFriedrichSavignyandA.J.Thibautin1814concerningthesourceofthelaw:whetheritshouldbearationalplanimposedbythestateoranhistoricallegacyderivedfromtheVolksgeist.Hegel’sthe-oryofnaturallawwashisattempttosteeramiddlepathbetweentheextremesinthesedebates.ButexactlyhowHegeldoesso,howthetheoryworksandtakesissuewiththem,hasstillbeeninsufficientlyexplainedinHegelscholarship.Yet,withoutasoundinterpretationof17SeetheworkscitedinthebibliographyundertheheadingPhilosophyofNature.18SeeFranzRosenzweig,HegelundderStaat(Berlin:Oldenbourg,1920);JacquesD’Hondt,Hegelsecret(Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance,1968);andJacquesD’Hondt,Hegelensontemps(Berlin1818–1831)(Paris:EditionsSociales,1968).ItisanenormouspitythatRosenzweig’sbook,stillthemostauthoritativeonitssubject,hasnotbeentranslatedintoEnglish.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n14frederickbeiserHegel’stheoryofnaturallaw,wehaveverylittleunderstandingoftheveryfoundationofhissocialandpoliticalthought.TherearemanyotherareasofHegel’sphilosophythatstandinneedofmuchfurtherresearch.ButtheseexamplesshouldsufficetoconvinceeventhemostjadedandtiredHegelscholarthattherestillremainsmuchtodo.HoweverquestionableHegel’sphilosophymightbe,itremainsofgreatsignificanceforitsvasthistoricalinfluenceinthepasttwocenturies.Allmodernschoolsofthought–existentialism,Marxism,pragmatism,analyticphilosophy,neo-Kantianism–haveeitherbuiltonhimorreactedagainsthim.Self-consciousandself-criticalphilosophersarethosewhoknowtheirplaceinhistory;andinfindingthatplacetheywill–eventuallybutinevitably–bumpupagainstHegel,grand-fatherofallvirtuesandvices.LikeastageofconsciousnessinHegel’sPhenomenology,wewillunderstandourselvesonlywhenweknowthestoryofourbecoming;andanessentialpartofthatstorywillbeaboutHegel.ItisnoteasytoappropriateHegel;butthatwemustdotounder-standourselves.OfHegel,theoldGoetheandictumisespeciallytrue:“WasduvondeinemVaternhast,erwerbes,umeszubesitzen¨.”DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.001CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nterrypinkard1Hegel:ALifeHegel’sbirthplace,Stuttgart,layintheDuchyofWurttemberg,the¨SwabianspeakingareaofsouthGermany.1Inonesense,Wurttemberg¨lookedlikesomanyotherLander¨inGermanyatthetime.TheuseoftheGermanterm,Landanditsplural,Lander¨,ishereintentional;itwasnotastate,notaprovince,notadepartment,notevenapolit-icalunityofelementsthatwouldbeimmediatelyrecognizabletoday;instead,itwassuigeneris,aLand.2AtthetimeofHegel’sbirthinWurttemberg,peopledidnotspeakofgeneral“rights”(thecommondis-¨courseofourcontemporarypolitics);therewereonlyparticularrights,particularliberties,andthelike,whichwererestrictedtoparticulargroupsandalmostnoneofwhichappliedtothepopulaceatlarge.(Thisorthatguildhadtherighttousemetalnailsinitscarpentry,thisorthatgrouphadtherighttobeexemptfromacertaintaxthatothergroupshadtopay,andsoon.)Allinall,Wurttemberghadvirtually¨allthefeaturesofwhatthehistorianMackWalkercalledtheGerman“hometowns,”theoddearlymodernentitieskeptalivebythesingu-laroddnessoftheexistenceoftheHolyRomanEmpire:Asasetof“hometowns,”theEmpirewasgovernedbyamostlyunwrittensetofcustomsandmoresthatincludedasenseofvariouscommunitiesbothhavinganobligationtotakecareoftheirownmembersandtherighttopolicethemoresoftheirmembersinfinegrainedways(includingtheprohibitionofmarriagebya“hometowner”toanunseemly“for-eign”spouse).Itwas,aboveall,structuredbyastrongsenseofwhodidanddidnotbelongtothelocalcommunitiesandbythenearlyabsoluterightofthecommunitytodecidewhomtoadmitandnottoadmit.Theelaborateritualsandceremoniesofeach“hometown”werecenteredonkeepingthatcommunityintact;itwassuspicious1ThematerialinthisarticleisdistilledfromTerryPinkard,Hegel:ABiography(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000).2SeeJamesSheehan,GermanHistory:1770–1866(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1989).15DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n16terrypinkardofoutsidersandquicktodenouncethosememberswhobroketherules.3However,inanothersenseWurttembergwastheoddduckamong¨almostalltheotherGermanLander¨.IntermsoftheTreatyofAugsburgof1555,religioustolerationwastobeestablishedinGermanyunderthedoctrinethatthelocalprincehadtherighttoimposehisownreligiononthepopulationhegoverned(impose,thatis,theCatholicorLutheranversionofChristianity,withotherProtestants,suchasAnabaptistsandCalvinists,beingalmostentirelyexcludedfromsuchtoleration).Yetforalongtime,Wurttemberg,withitsmostlyProtestantpopulation,¨hadbeengovernedbyasetofCatholicdukes,whoalthoughcertainlywantingtoimposetheirreligiononthepopulation,hadnonethelessateverystagebeenpreventedfromdoingsobypopularresistance,whichincludedarelianceonwhatWurttembergerscalledtheirconstitution¨andthe“goodoldlaw”thatembodiedtheirtraditionalrightsandpriv-ileges.Moreover,becauseofthepeculiaritiesofWurttemberg’shistory,¨thenobility,insteadofansweringimmediatelytothedukehimself,werealmostallimmediatetotheemperoroftheoxymoronicallynamedHolyRomanEmpire,andthustooknopartinpoliticallifeinWurttemberg.¨Fillingthevacuum,theProtestantshadaestatecalledtheEhrbarkeit,the“non-noblenotables,”intowhichonehadtobeborn(eventhoughtherewerenotitlesthatwentthatstatus,aswasthecasewiththenobility),whomostlyranWurttembergaffairsandandwhoreserved¨certainkeypositionsintheWurttemberggovernmentandinimportant¨institutionsforthemselves.In1770,theyearofHegel’sbirth,therewasinfacta“constitutionalsettlement”inWurttembergbetweentheProtestantestatesandthe¨Catholicdukethatreaffirmedthetraditionalrightsofthoseestates(andwhichwasenforcedagainsttheCatholicdukebytheCatholicHolyRomanEmperorinlightofpressurefromtheProtestantPrussianruler,againstwhomtheWurttembergdukehadearlieralliedhimselfinawar).¨In1770,thatis,itseemedthatWurttemberghadsettledforeveritsodd¨statusaswhatithadalwaysbeen.Thatwassoontochange,andtheindicationsofthatchangewerealreadypresentinHegel’schildhood.stuttgart:1770–1788Hegel’sownfamilywasanup-and-comingmiddleclassfamilyinWurttemberg,althoughtheywerenotpartofthe¨Ehrbarkeit.Hegel’s3MackWalker,GermanHometowns:Community,State,andGeneralEstate1648–1871(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1971).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife17father,whohadtakenadegreeinlawfromTubingen,wasaminoroffi-¨cialattheRoyalTreasury,andhismothercamefromadistinguishedbackgroundofSwabianProtestantreformers.TheyseemtohavebeenWurttembergersproudoftheirProtestanttradition(andprobablyshared¨thewidelyheldWurttembergviewoftheirlandasthatofheroicProtes-¨tantsdefendingtheirtraditionsandtruefaithagainstthepredationsofanabsolutizingCatholicmonarch),buttheywerealsomodernizers,subscribingtotheEnlightenment-orientedjournalsoftheirday.Asout-siderstotheEhrbarkeit,butnonethelessup-and-comingmembersofthemiddleclass,theybasedtheirclaimstorankandpromotiononlearn-ingandability,notonfamilyconnections.ThishadnosmallpartinformingHegel’sownconceptionofhimselfandhisplaceintheworld.Fromwhatwecantell,Hegel’sfatherputagooddealofemphasisonpracticalmattersandsocialuprightness,whereasHegel’smotherstressedlearning.WhenHegelwasthirteen,bothheandhismotherweregravelyill,andshediedonSeptember20,1783.Hegelsurvivedandseemedtocarrysomeofthatsurvivor’sguiltwithhim.Aboutayearafterhismother’sdeath,Hegel’sfatherdecidedthattheyoungHegelwouldfollowhismother’swishesandpursuestudiestobecomeathe-ologianandapastor.However,insteadofsendinghimofftooneoftheseminarypreparatoryschools(“cloisterschools,”astheywerecalled)aswasusuallythecaseforyoungmen,hewassenttothelocaluniversitypreparatoryschool,theGymnasiumIllustre(averyshortwalkfromthefamily’shouse),which,althoughnotexactlyahotbedofEnlight-enmentideas,wasnonethelessaforward-orientedschool,mixingnewEnlightenmentidealswithanolderGermanrenaissancetraditioninlearning.(ItismostlikelythatHegel’sfatheractuallywantedtosendhimtosomekindofmorevocationallyorientedschool,suchastheKarlsschuleinStuttgart,butcompromisedwithHegel’smother’sdesirethathebecomeamanoflearning,atheologian.)AttheGymnasiumIllustre,Hegelreceivedagoodbackgroundinliterature,ancientandmodernlanguages,mathematics,andthenaturalsciences(thelatterbeinghisfavoritesubjectsatthetime),andhecameintocontactwithsomeaccomplishedteacherswhorecognizedhisnativetalentsandgavehimtheencouragementheneeded.Hegelreciprocated,becamethestarstudent,andgraduatedfirstinhisclass.(Hegel’sonlysurvivingbrother,bornin1776,wasinfactsenttotheKarlsschule.)Likemanyyoungmenofhisday,Hegelkeptakindofdiaryinwhichhedutifullynotedwhathewasthinkingabout.Likeallsuchdiarists,hekeptnotsomuchafactualrecordofhisthoughtsbuttriedtopresentapictureofhimselfashewantedtoimaginehimselftohisimaginary“dearreader.”TheadolescentHegelthatemergesintheentriesisaratherearnestyoungfellow,akindofself-describedyoungfogy,althoughDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n18terrypinkardheisalsoavoraciousreader,andsomeonededicatedtosomethinglikeanoblecareerasanenlightenedpastorandoccasionalwriter,a“teacherofthepeople.”Butdespitehisattemptsatprescribingforhimselfastudiousnessbeyondhisyears,inthosediaries,Hegelalsogiveshimselfawayasamoretypicaladolescent,whosuccumbstosentimentality,heapspraiseonpopularnovelsofnoparticularmerit,andnoteshowheandfriendsliketopassthetimelookingattheprettygirls.Healsorevealsthealienationhesurelyfeltatthetime;forexample,henoteshowhelikestospendasmuchtimeaspossibleatthepubliclibrary(whichwasquiterichinitsholdings);thiswasobviouslyintendedtoshowhimselfto“dearreader”asabuddingyoungmanoflearning,butinsteaditmorepoignantlyindicatedhowhetookmeasurestogetoutofthehouseandoutfromunderhisfather’sdiscipline.Atthetime,hewasquitetakenwiththefigureofGottholdEphraimLessing,awriterandliterarygiantofthetime,probablyevendaydream-ingabitabouthowhisowncareermightfollowthatofLessing’s.(Less-ingwasalsooriginallytrainedasatheologian.)TheadolescentHegelwasparticularlystruckbyLessing’s1779novel,NathantheWise,ataleofEnlightenmentreligioustoleration,whosebasicthemewasthatallpeopleseekGodintheirownwayandthuswhatmakesNathanagoodJewiswhatmakesothercharactersgoodChristians:Itisthecharacterandcommitmentofapersonthatmakeshimworthyofadmiration,notthedoctrinalorcultural(orethnic)backgroundfromwhichhecomes.Butmostparticularly,thecharacterofNathanseemedtoshowthatonecouldcombineakindofEnlightenmentcommitmenttouniversalismwithanequallypassionatecommitmenttoone’sowntraditions.ForayoungWurttembergerbroughtuptobeproudofthetraditionsand¨the“goodoldlaw,”justbecauseitwasthe“Wurttemberg”tradition,¨andwhowasbecomingequallycaughtupinthegrowingEnlighten-mentfeverandcommitmenttoanew,universalizedvisionofhumanity,NathantheWisewasheadystuff.tubingen:1788–1793¨In1788,HegelwassentofftotheProtestantSeminaryattachedtotheuniversityinTubingen(justafewkilometerssouthofStuttgart).The¨universityatTubingenhadforsometimebeeninasteepdeclinefrom¨itsearliergloryyears,and,bythetimeHegelarrived,itwasmoreofanappendagetotheratherdistinguishedProtestantSeminarythantheotherwayaround.ThestudentsattheSeminarywererequiredtowearlongblackcoatsresemblingcassocksborderedwithwhitecuffsandcollars;ineffecttheywereexpectedtolivelikeProtestantmonks.MostDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife19oftheseminarianscamefromoneofthecloisterschoolsinWurttemberg¨wheresimilarrestrictionshadbeeninplace;Hegel,whohadlivedwithhisfamily,whohadexperiencedafairamountofindependence,andwhowasintentonfollowingouthismother’simageofhimselfasamanoflearning,foundtheenvironmentcompletelystifling.Thestarscholaranddutifulsonquicklybecameasullenandrebelliousstudent.OnhisentryintotheSeminary,hehadbeenrankedthefirstinhisclass.Inarelativelyshortperiodoftime,Hegelcombinedsomeassiduousdrinkingwithconstantviolationsofallkindsofpettyrules,and,togetherwithhisgenerallyignoringwhathewassupposedtobestudying(andinsteadreadingvoraciouslyaboutotherthings),hemanagedtolowerhisclassrankingrathersteeplyandratherrapidly.HegelseemstohavedecidedalmostimmediatelyonarrivingatTubingenthathewasnotgoingtobeapastor.Inhisfirstyearthere,¨hemanagedtomakesomeverygoodfriendswhowerejustasalienatedfromtherequirementsoftheseminaryashewasandfeltjustaspassion-atelyashedidaboutthebigideascirculatinginGermanyatthetime.AmongthemwasFriedrichHolderlin,bornthesameyearasHegel,with¨whomHegelsharedaroom.In1789,theFrenchRevolutionbroughttoaboilingpointwhatthoseyoungalienatedseminariansfoundunaccept-able.TheinfluenceofPietismledmanyyoungGermansatthetimetoseetheRevolutionasthenextstepinthatprocess,heraldinganewspiritualreformoftheworld.(PietismwasaProtestantreligiousmove-mentinGermanythatstressedanimmediate,emotionalconnectiontoGodcoupledwithbothadeepskepticismabouttheneedfortheolo-gianstointerpretthatwordforbelieversandanequallystrongbeliefthatalthoughtheReformationhadreformedtheChurch,theworldremainedascorruptaseverandinevenmoreneedofreform.)SomelandsinAlsacebelongedtotheWurttembergduke,andthat¨meantthatintheconduitprovidedbytheFrenchstudentsattheSemi-nary,newsoftheRevolutionsweptintotheSeminarywithevenmorespeedandregularitythanitdidelsewhere.In1790,HegelandHolderlin¨cametosharearoomwithanewlyadmittedseminarianwhowasfiveyearsyoungerthanthembutwhocamewithareputationforbeingayounggenius:FriedrichSchelling.ThethreesharedaroomattheSem-inary,andtheybecamethebestoffriends–reading,arguing,anddis-cussingamongthemselvesthenewworksinphilosophy(particularly,RousseauandKant,althoughHegelseemednottohavebeensoenam-oredofKantastheothertwowere),witheachreinforcingtheother’santipathytothestaidwaysofseminarylifeandwitheachsharingtheirjointenthusiasmfortheRevolutionanditsprogress.(SchellingeventranslatedtheMarseillaiseatthistime.)Hegel’sownloveofthelocaltavernsduringthisperiodseemstohavegainedmomentum,andhewasDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n20terrypinkardnotinfrequentlycitedfordisciplinaryinfractionsduringthisperiod.Hisyoung-fogypersonality,however,didnotentirelydeserthim,andevenwithhisratherjovial,pub-crawlingpersonality,heacquiredthenick-name,“theoldman,”fromhisfellowstudents.Amidstalltheintellectualrevelry(andthehijinksthathavealwaysbeenapartofstudentlife),therewas,however,afundamentalanxietyplaguingHegelandhisfriends:AllthestudentsattheSeminaryhadtheircostssubsidizedbyakindof“fellowship”fromtheConsistoryinStuttgart,andtheywerethuslegallyrequiredtoserveaspastorsifapositionforthemopenedup.Thesilverlininginthatcloudwasthattherewerefartoomanyapplicantsforsuchpositionsthantherewereactualpositions,soneitherHegel,norHolderlin,norSchellingreally¨hadtoworrytoomuchaboutsuddenlyfindingthemselvesassignedtoministertoasmallconservativecongregationinSwabianGermany.Still,thethreatwasthere,anditalsomeantthattheyhadtoreceivepermissionfromtheWurttembergconsistorytodoanythingelseother¨thanserveasapastor(ortoleaveWurttembergtogosomeplaceelse¨foranyemployment).ThepathofstudiesattheSeminaryrequiredthestudentstostudyphilosophyforthefirsttwoyears(whichwasjustfinewithHegel,evenifhedidfindthequalityofinstructiontobeabitbelowthemark),followedbythreeyearsoftheologyandbiblicalinstruction.(Philosophywasconsideredtobeonlyapropaedeutictotherealobjectofstudy,theology.)However,toavoideventhechanceofsuccumbingtothefateofbeingapastor,Hegeltriedtoswitchtothelawfacultyafterhisfirsttwoyears,buthisfatherrefusedtolethimdoit.(Thedecisionprobablyhadtodowithhisfather’ssensethatHegelhadpromisedtostudytheology,hehadtokeephisword,andthefearthatifHegelswitched,hemighthavetorepaythefullstipendhissonhadreceivedfromtheConsistory.)However,thenextthreeyearsattheSeminaryprovedtobecrucialforHegel’sdevelopment.ThecontinuedfriendshipandjointdevelopmentofideasamongHegel,Holderlin,andSchellingweretransformative¨forthethreeofthem.TogethertheycameundertheinfluenceofCarlImmanuelDiez,anolderstudentattheSeminarywhowasresponsibleforassistingintheinstructionoftheyoungerstudents.DiezhadbeenatheologianwhohadturnedintosomethinglikeanantireligiousagnosticundertheinfluenceofKant’swritings;and,combiningacommandingintellectwithapersonalcharisma,DiezmixedtogetheraheadysenseofphilosophicalmissionbyusingKantianideastothinkthroughhowtoputanendtothedogmasandconformismstranglingGermanlife.Diez’sinspiringuseofKant,andthewayinwhichKantiandoctrinesofauton-omy(seenunderDiez’slight)seemedtomergecleanlyintothecallsforliberty,equalityandfraternityemanatingfromFranceclearlycapturedDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife21theimaginationofthethreeyoungSeminarianfriends.4Nonetheless,HegelhimselfatfirsthadsometroubleacceptingDiez’sradicalizedKantianism;everthegoodWurttemberger,hethoughtthattheKantian¨appealsto“purepracticalreason”leftnoroomforthe“hometown”appealtotraditionandtotheimpulsescomingnotfromreasonbutfromthekindofembodiedwisdomcaughtintraditionandthe“goodoldlaw.”Thatparticularproblemstayedwithhimtherestofhislife.ThethreefriendsalsoweredeeplyinterestedinwhathadbeentheverypublicdisputebetweenF.H.JacobiandMosesMendelssohnoverthestatusofSpinozaincontemporarythought.Spinoza’sargumentstotheeffectthatthattherecouldonlybeonesubstanceofwhichboththementalandthephysicalweremerelydifferentattributesstruckthemasexactlytherightdoctrinetocombinewiththeKantianideaofasharpseparationbetweenthedeterministicworldofexperienceandthefree-domwehadtopracticallypresupposeforourselves(whichKantlocatedinthe“noumenal”world,thatis,theworldconceivedapartfromtheconditionsunderwhichwecouldexperienceit).TheirtendencyinthisdirectionwasaugmentedbytheirnegativereactiontowhattheywerebeingtaughtbyoneoftheleadingtheologiansattheSeminary,GottlobStorr,whoargued,moreorless,thatKant’sargumentsreallypointedthewaytoasupernaturalistdoctrineofthebibleastherevelationofatruththatreasoncouldnotestablish.Theirjointandgrowinginterestinallthings“ancientGreek”helpedtofleshoutthisevolvingcommonposition.Together,theyformedaroughideaofanewnondoctrinalformofreligionthatwouldresemblewhattheytookbetheancientGreekreligion.Intheirimaginations,theysawitasareligionofbeauty,justliketheiridealizedGreekreligion,andasrestingonakindofinsightintotheonesubstanceoftheworld–thatis,asexpressingtheSpinozisticGod.Moreover,itwouldbe,asKantwastoputitinthe1790CritiqueofJudgment,thesupersensiblebasisofbothnatureandfreedomwhichorientedaestheticjudgmentsintheexperienceofthebeautiful.InHegel’syearbookin1791,infact,HolderlinenteredtheGreekphrase,“Henkaipan,”the“oneandall”¨toindicatetheiremergingviewofakindofsynthesisofKantianism,4Amongtheseminarians,DiezwasknownasaKantianenrage´,akindofKan-tianwhoalsoaJacobinatheart.Diezultimatelylefttheology,studiedmedicine,hadanimportantimpactonthephilosophicaldevelopmentofsomeofthepost-KantianphilosophersatJena,anddiedin1796inViennawherehehadbeentreatingtyphusvictims.SeeDieterHenrich,Konstellationen:ProblemeundDebattenamUrsprungderidealistischenPhilosophie(1789–1795)(Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta,1991).SeealsoDieterHenrich,GrundlegungausdemIch(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,2004),vols.1–2.(HenrichmakesanespeciallystrongcaseforDiez’sinfluenceinthelatterbook.)DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n22terrypinkardSpinozism,andan(idealized)Greekviewoftheworld.TheybegantothrowaboutKant’sspecialuseoftheterm“theinvisiblechurch”asakindofcodeamongthemselvestoindicatetheirjointcommitmenttoarevolutionarynewworldbasedonvirtue,notdogma,andunderstoodbythemtobepartofamodernprocessofmoralandspiritualrenewal–arevivaloftheGreekdemocraticandreligiousideals.DuringhisSeminaryyears,Hegelapparentlyhadboutsofbadhealth,andheusedoneofthemtofinagleanextendedreturntoStuttgartforhislastsemesterinorderto“recover.”Mostlikelybytheendofhisseminarystudies,hehaddecidedonsomekindofvaguecareerasa“manofletters”;theissuewasonlyhowtofindtherightformatandthemetomakehismarkontheworld.(Atthatpointhehadvirtuallynointerestinbecomingaprofessor;theuniversities,soitseemed,wereaboutthelastplaceinGermanyatthetimetotryoutnewideas.)HeusedhistimeinStuttgarttowritealongmanuscriptonthenatureofreligion(posthumouslycalled,oddlyenough,the“TubingenEssay”),¨inwhichhedividedreligioninto“subjective”and“objective”religion,thedistinctionroughlyamountingtothatbetweenreligionthatmesheswiththewholeofhumanexistence,whichmotivatespeoplebyappealtotheirheartasmuchashead,andthe“objective”religiontaughtinclassesinDogmaticsthatspellsouttheinstitutionalizedconditionsunderwhichonecancountasaChristian(orasCatholicorProtestant).TheissuelyingjustbelowthesurfaceofthisyouthfulmanuscriptwastheunsettlingoneastowhetherChristianityhadalreadyplayedoutitsroleonthehistoricalstageandcouldnolongerserveasa“modern”religionthatcouldeffectivelyplayaroleinthenewworldemergingoutoftheshockoftheRevolution–thiswasanissuethatcontinuedtofermentinHegel’smindforagoodpartofhisadultlife.berne:1793–1796Ontakinghisfinalexam(whilestillinStuttgart)fromtheConsistoryin1793,Hegelmanagedtolandajobasahouse-tutortoafamilyinBerne(thevonSteigerfamily).HewasrequiredtogetpermissionfromtheWurttembergConsistorytotakethejobandtoleaveW¨urttemberg,¨butthepermissionwasquicklygranted.Thelifeofhouse-tutorswasnotoriouslydifficult,anditprovedtobenolesssoforHegel.However,thestayinBernewasintellectuallyfruitfuleventhoughhispersonallifesufferedthere.Berne,atthetime,wasanoutmodedoligarchyrunbyasmallsetofpatricianfamilies,ofwhichthevonSteiger’swereone.CaptainvonSteiger,theheadofthefamily,wasvehementlyopposedtotheFrenchRevolutionandadvocatedanalliancewithPrussiaandAustriathatwouldgotowaragainstFrance.Notunsurprisingly,HegelDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife23andCaptainvonSteigerquicklyhadafallingout,andtherestofhistimetherewasfilledwithtension.However,thefamilyhadoneofthebestprivatelibrariesinEurope,andthat,togetherwiththemassiveBernesepubliclibrary,gaveHegelhisintroductionstoScottishEnlight-enmentthought,inparticulartothewritingsofAdamSmith.Duringthisperiod,Hegelhadbecomeakindof“appliedKantian”whowantedtoworkoutthepracticalimplicationsofKantianmoralandpoliticalphilosophy;asheemphaticallyputitinoneofhisletterstoSchelling:“FromtheKantianphilosophyanditshighestcompletionIexpectarevolutioninGermany.Itwillproceedfromprinciplesthatarepresentandthatonlyneedtobeelaboratedgenerallyandappliedtoallhithertoexistingknowledge.”5Ifanythingelse,Hegel’sBerneexperienceturnedhimforeveragainstallso-called“aristocratic”constitutions.AlthoughinretrospectHegel’ssojourninBerneturnedouttobeimmenselyintellectuallyfruitful,forhimatthetimeitwassimplydepressing.Aswasthecasewithallhouse-tutors,hedidnothavemuchfreetimeforhimself,andhelamentedinletterstoSchellinghowlit-tletimehehadtoworkouthisownideas,howisolatedhefelt,andhowlittleprogresshewasmaking.Evenworse,hehadSchelling’sownexamplestaringhimintheface.AfterSchellinghadlefttheSeminary,hehadstagedameteoricriseintheGermanphilosophicalworld,becom-ingan“Extraordinarius”professor–an“extra”professoronthefacultybeyondwhatthenormalfundingallowed–atJenainhisearlytwentiesandpublishingtractaftertractonhisownideasaboutthenewpost-KantianidealismemergingatthetimeinJena.ThecontrastbetweentheabsenceofanypublishedworkbyhimandthespectacularcareerhisoldfriendSchellingwascarvingoutforhimselfcouldnothavebeenstarker.Nonetheless,itwasduringhisstayinBernethatheconsolidatedhisKantianism,strengthenedhisdistasteforecclesiasticalorthodoxy,wasopeneduptotheideasoftheScottishEnlightenment(particularly,AdamSmith’swork),andheprobablyreadGibbonforthefirsttimewhilethere.Hegel’sownpersonaldisdainfortheBernesearistocracyandforthevonSteigerfamilyinparticular,did,however,leadtohisfirstpublishedbook,eventhoughitwasyearslaterthatanybodyreallyknewaboutit.HetranslatedarevolutionarytractfromFrenchintoGermanabouttheoppressionoftheFrench-speakingVaudbytheGerman-speakingBernese;healsoprovidedacommentaryonthetract,drawingoutthe5BriefevonundanHegel,ed.byJohannesHoffmeister(Hamburg:FelixMeinerVerlag,1969),vol.I,no.11;Hegel:TheLetters,trans.byClarkButlerandChristianeSeiler(Bloomington:UniversityofIndianaPress,1984),p.35.(hereaftercitedasBriefe,volumenumber;andLetters,pagenumber.)DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n24terrypinkardthemesoftheabsolutevalueoffreedomversuseconomicgain.(HegelpraisedtheAmericansforputtinglibertybeforesuchprosaiceconomicmatters.)Hepublisheditanonymouslyin1798,afterhehadleftBerne;athisdeath,evenhisownfamilydidnotknowthatitwashisownbookandthoughtitwasonlyayouthfulsouvenirofhistimeinBerne.Hegel’sletterstoSchellingbemoaninghowlittleprogresshewasmakingonlyshowhowhighHegelhadsetthebarforwhatcountedasprogress.WhileinBerne,Hegelwasalsobusydraftingsomefragmentsforaproposedphilosophical“system”andevenwrotetwobook-lengthmanuscriptsthatheneverpublished.Onewasthe“LifeofJesus,”aninsightfulredescriptionofJesus’lifeandteachingsfairlymuchinlinewithKant’sviewson“religionasmorality.”Healsowroteoutalongmanuscripttitled,“ThePositivityoftheChristianReligion”thatbothreprisedhis1793TubingenessayaboutwhetherChristianitywasthe¨appropriatereligionformodernlife(especiallyinlightoftheRevolu-tion)andextendedHegel’sownattempttomeshKantianismwithhisadmirationforGreekpoliticalandreligiouslife.Init,JesusisportrayedasaKantianprophetstrivingtogethisfollowerstobefreeandtoachievevirtuebytheirownefforts;butthecorruptionofthetimemeantthatinsteadoffoundingthereligionoffreedomthathesoughttofound,Jesuswasinsteadtakenbyhisfollowerstobeadivinepersonalitylay-ingdownsomethinglikepositivelawbackedupdivineauthority(hencethetitleoftheessay),andwiththat,Jesus’nonauthoritarianreligionoffreedominevitablyturnedintoanauthoritarianreligionofdogma.Inthemanuscript,clearlydiscernibleHegelianthemesandproblemsbegantoappear,particularlytheideathatitisthe“spiritofthetimes”thatmovesgreatworldrevolutions,notfailuresofwillorself-imposedtutelage,andtheissueofwhetherareligion’sbeautyisincompatiblewithitstruth.Intheend,however,themanuscriptwasnotsentoffforpublicationbecauseitdidnotanswerthecrucialquestionHegelputtoChristianityinit:CanChristianitybecomeafree,modernreligion?Itfailedtoanswerthatquestionbecause,atthatpoint,Hegelhadsimplynotmadeuphismind.Fortunately,hisfriend,Holderlin,whoatthattimewaslivingin¨Frankfurtasahousetutor,sensinghisfriend’sdepressionandfeelingsofisolation,managedtomaneuveranoffertoHegelforapositionasahouse-tutorforawealthywinemerchantinFrankfurt.Holderlin’s¨letterstoHegelatthispointgivetestamenttojusthowmuchhevaluedtheirfriendship,andHegelevenrepliedwithalongpoemwritten(sortof)inHolderlin’sownstyle.Theideaofrejoiningacenterofintellectual¨lifeandofbeingtogetheragainwithhisbestfriendfromSeminarydaysmadeHegel’sfinaldaysinBernepassable.Forhispart,Holderlintold¨Hegel:“Iwouldstillhavemuchtotellyou,butyourcomingheremustDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife25betheprefacetoalong,long,interesting,un-highbrowbookbyyouandme.”6frankfurt:1797–1800In1797,HegelmovedtoFrankfurt,elatedathischancetoescapeBerneandthevonSteiger’s.(Asalways,hehadtogetpermissionfromtheWurttembergConsistorytomakethismove;butHegelwassosure¨ofreceivingitthathebeganworkinFrankfurtbeforeheactuallyhadreceivedpermissiontodoso.)OnthewaytoFrankfurt,HegelstoppedoffinStuttgarttovisithisfamily.Whilethere,hehadabriefflirtationwithayoungwomanboardingwiththeHegelfamily,NanetteEndel,whowaslivingwiththemwhileshedidherstudiestobecomeamilliner.NanetteEndelteasedhimendlesslyabouthisseriousness(sooutofplaceforayoungman),evensuggestingthathewaschoosinganasceticlifeforhimself,whileheteasedheraboutherdevotiontoCatholicismanditsrigorousmorality.(NanetteEndelhadalsobecomegoodfriendswithHegel’ssister,Christiane,whowasnotpleasedwiththeattentionthetwowerepayingtoeachother.)Whilehewaspursuingtheseeroticinter-ests,though,the“oldman”foundhimselfincreasinglypreoccupiedwiththeratherrapidlyunfoldingsetofpoliticaleventsinWurttemberg.After¨theRevolutionhadbothfallenintotheJacobinTerrorandthenextri-cateditselffromit,theFrenchhadbeguntotakemoreandmoreincur-sionsintoGermanytoprotectthenewrepublic.Wurttembergitselfwas¨invadedbyFrenchforcesin1796.Inthetumult,Wurttembergbeganto¨bemoreandmoreungovernable,andtheEhrbarkeitsawtheirchancetofinallywrestlargepartsofpoliticalpowerfromtheduke.(Thestruggleforsupremacybetweenthedukeandtheestateswasinfacttolastmanyyears;itendedwhenbyvirtueofNapoleon’spower,thedukebecameakingandwastherebyabletoemaciatewhatremainingrightsunderthe“goodoldlaw”theEhrbarkeithad–butnoneofthatwasforeseeableatthetimeHegelwasthere.)AnexplosionofpoliticalpamphletsonvarioussubjectsfilledStuttgart,andHegeltriedhisbesttogetoneofhisownintothefray.Hisfriendsdissuadedhimfromthis,claimingthathisinvocationoftheFrenchRevolutioninhisownprojectedpamphletwouldonlyalienatethepeopleofWurttemberg,who,hewasassured,¨hadlongsinceturnedagainsttheRevolution.Dismayedbythis,HegelpublishedhistranslationofthepamphletagainsttheBernesearistocracyinstead.6Briefe,I,19;Letters,pp.48–49(“un-highbrow”translates“ungelehrten”).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n26terrypinkardHegel’sarrivalinFrankfurtliftedhimfromhisBernesedepression,andhisletterstoNanetteEndel(whilefullofthemutualteasingtheybothindulgedin)showedhimtobegreatlyenjoyingtheurbanlifeofballsandconcerts,andtohavefinallythrownoffhisratheryouthfulmoralistictoneofwantingtoreformtheworld.Hegeleventoldher(hoping,nodoubt,foralittlefrissononherpart)thathedidn’tevengotochurchanymore.(ItseemslikelythatHegel’ssons,whoturnedouttobemuchmoremoralisticthantheirfather,destroyedNanetteEndel’sletterstoHegel,alongwiththelettersfromsomeothers;onlyhisletterstohersurvive.)HegelenteredintoaratherintensephilosophicalcircleoffriendsinFrankfurtand,truetohischaracter,hecontinuedtoworkonvariousmanuscripts,althoughnoneofthemwereeverpublished.(ThereisnorecordofHegelactuallytryingtogetanyofthempublished;hedidnotthinkanyofthemmetthehighstandardsforpublicationthatheimposedonthem.)Hisconversations,however,withHolderlin,Isakvon¨Sinclair,JacobZwilling,andasetofothers,whoformedaratherintense“Frankfurtintellectualcircle,”broughtHegelintocontactwithFichte’swritingsandforcedhimtoseethathisownideaofbeingan“appliedKantian”dependedontakingtoomanydeeperissuesforgranted.TheinternalproblemsofKant’sowntheoryandthepossibilitiesofworkingoutagenuineversionofKantianism(or“idealism”)begantoseemmoreandmoretothepoint,andthisledHegeltoalterhisprogramforhislifeconsiderably.In1799,anothereventintervenedinHegel’slifethathadjustasmuchanimpact.Hegel’sfatherdied,and,likeallpeoplesufferingthelossofparent,Hegelwasmovedtothinkabouthisownlifeandhisownfutureprospects.Ithadtobecleartohimthathewasalmostthirtyandhadnothingreallytoshowforhimself.In1799,Schelling,bycontrast,hadbecome,afterFichte’sdismissalfromJenaUniversityonspuriouschargesofatheism,Fichte’ssuccessorasprofessorthere.WhenHegelarrivedinFrankfurt,Holderlinwasenteringoneofhismostproductive¨periods,beingonthevergeofestablishinghimselfasoneofEurope’sgreatpoets,andatthesametimewasbeginningapassionateandulti-matelytragicaffairwiththebeautiful,giftedwife(SusetteGontard)oftheratherphilistinebankerforwhosefamilyhewasthehouse-tutor.By1799,however,Holderlin’saffairwithSusetteGontardhadbecome¨trulytragic,andHolderlinwasbeginningtoshowthesignsofthemad-¨nessthatwouldeventuallyovertakehimbyaround1803;theclosenessofthetwofriendswasnowundergreatstrain,anditwasclearthatthey,whohadoncebeeninseparable,werenowgoingindifferentdirections.Afterhisfather’sestatewasdivided,Hegelcameintoasmallinheri-tanceonwhichhecould(ifhewerefrugal)liveforafewyears,andDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife27so,afteratriptoMainzin1800(whichearlierhadevenbrieflyjoinedtheFrenchRepublic),HegelswallowedhisprideandwrotetoSchelling(withwhomhehadnotbeenincontactforawhile),askinghimforrec-ommendationsonwherehemightgotogethisphilosophicalaffairsinorder.Mentioningthathesincerelyhopedtheycouldbefriendsagain,HegelineffectconfessedtoSchellingthathe(Hegel)hadbeenwrongandSchellingbeenrightallalongaboutwhatwasatstakeinalltheintellectual,literary,andpoliticalupheavalsgoingonaroundthem.HeinformedSchellingthat“inmyscientificdevelopment,whichstartedfrommoresubordinateneedsofman,Iwasinevitablydriventowardscience,andtheidealofyouthhadtotaketheformofreflectionandthusatonceofasystem.”7Hegel’stoneofseekinganinvitationtoJenaintheletterisnothardtomiss,and,ashehoped,Schellingrepliedwithjustthat,invitingHegeltostaywithhimuntilhefoundhisownplace.jena:1801–1807In1801,HegelarrivedinJena.Jenawasatthattimeasmalltownofabout4,500people,whoseonlyrealclaimtofameupuntil1785hadbeenitsuniversityofnoparticulardistinction.Inthe1780sand1790s,thatchanged.Foravarietyofcontingentreasons–importantamongwhichwastheappointmentofGoetheastheministertotheprinceinWeimarwhohaddefactooversightovertheuniversity–theuniversitysuddenlybecamefamous.Atthetime,universitieshadaparticularlylowstandinginEurope,beingseenbymanyasoutmodedinstitutionsstaffedbytenuredprofessorsteachingoutmodedknowledgeandpopu-latedbystudentswhocaredonlyaboutgettingasdrunkastheycould.Better,itwasthought,toabolishthesemedievalholdoversaltogetherandreplacethembothwithmorevocationallymindedinstitutestoteachthestudentsusefulknowledgeandtosetuptheequivalentofresearchinstitutes(likethevariousroyalsocieties)forpeopletopur-suenewtheoreticalknowledge.TheuniversityatJenachangedallthat.Offeringintellectualfreedom(althoughnotmuchmoney)tointellectu-alsinGermany,ithadby1785gatheredastellarcrowdarounditself.ItbecamethecenterforthepropagationoftheKantianphilosophy,andtheJenaGeneralLiteraryNewspaper(AllgemeineLiteraturZeitung),adefactoorganoftheKantianmovement,becameoneofthemostsuc-cessfulandwidelyreadjournalsinGermany.FichtetookKantianismastepfurtherinhislecturesthere,andtheentiremovementofearlyRomanticismformedaroundandinreactiontoFichteatthattimein7BriefeI,29;Letters,p.64.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n28terrypinkardJena.Theuniversity’ssuccesschangedthepictureoftheuniversityandhadafar-reachinginfluenceonthedevelopmentofotheruniversitiesinthenineteenthcentury.Itbroughtanewideaintothediscussionofuniversityeducation,thatoftheunionofteachingandresearch,thatis,ofbringingthebestyoungmindstostudywiththeleadingintellectualfiguresoftheday,whowouldinturnteachthemaboutthecuttingedgedevelopmentsintheirfields.Italsobroughttopreeminencethefac-ultyofphilosophy(whichinAmericanuniversitieseventuallysplitupintosomethinglikethecontemporaryformoftheCollegeofArtsandSciences)vis-a-visotherfaculties(suchastheology,law,andmedicine).`BythetimeHegelarrivedin1801,however,theuniversity’snewflamewasflickeringout.ThefalloutfromthenastydustupoverFichte’sallegedatheism,whichhadledtoFichte’sresignationanddismissalfromtheuniversity,hadsouredmanyofthefacultyandledmanyofthemtopackupandgoelsewhere.EventheprestigiousAllgemeineLiteraturZeitungdepartedfromJena.Nonetheless,Hegelassiduouslysethimselftowork,havingmanagedtogethisMagisterfromTubingen¨countedasadoctorate,andbytheendofAugust,hehad“habilitated”(theGermanrequirementofsomethinglikeaseconddissertation,whichofficiallygivesonetherighttoteachattheuniversity).BythenextWin-terSemester,hewasofferingcoursesinphilosophy.Assuchalecturer,Hegelwasgivennosalarybytheuniversity,althoughhewasallowedtochargeadmissionstohislectures(allprofessorsdidthis)andtochargestudentsforexaminingthem(fortheirdegree,asallprofessorsdid).This,ofcourse,amountedtolittlemorethanpocketchange,andHegelwasthusforcedtoliveonhisinheritance.SchellingsuggestedthatheandHegelfoundandeditajournal(TheCriticalJournalofPhilosophy)moreorlesstopropagatetheemergingSchellingianturninpost-Kantianphi-losophyandtobringinsomeextracash;in1801,Hegelalsopublishedhisfirstrealbook,TheDifferenceBetweenFichte’sandSchelling’sSys-temsofPhilosophy,adefenseofSchellingagainstFichtebutinwhichsomethingmoreresemblingthematureHegeliansetofideasfirstmadetheirappearance,evenifonlyinthebackground.TherewereobviousstressesintherelationshipbetweenHegelandSchellingbythispoint;Schellingwasfamous,HegelwasatbestknownasSchelling’sfriendanddefender,andSchellingseemedtohavehadnoproblemtreatingHegelasakindofhiredhandtofurthertheSchellingiancause(whilestillofficiallyposingasmakingacommonprojectwithHegel).SchellingscandalizedJenasocietywhenhefirsthadanaffairwithanolderandhighlyintellectualwoman(CarolineMichaelisBohmerSchlegel),whoatthetimewasmarriedtothegreat¨critic,aesthetician,andtranslator,AugustSchlegel,whichledtoherdivorceandtohermarriagetoSchelling.(CarolineherselfwasanDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife29independent,free-thinkingwomanwhocausedcontroversybysimplyterrifyingsomeofthemenaroundJenawithherwit,intellect,andinde-pendence;Schiller,forexample,referredtoheras“DameLucifer”;butothersadoredher.)PartofthescandalhadtodowithSchellinghavingbeenfirstengagedtoCaroline’sdaughterbyherfirstmarriage;afterthedaughterhaddiedofamysteriousillness,rumorsimmediatelybegantocirculatethatCarolinehadkilledherowndaughtertowinSchellingforherself.WhenthepossibilityaroseforapositionatthenewlyreformeduniversityofWurzburgin¨1803,Schellingdeparted,asdidseveralotherJenaluminaries.Hegelwasleftbehind,thejournalfolded,hedidnothaveajob,andtheuniversitywasfallingapartaroundhim.Moreover,hisreputationinGermanintellectuallifeatthatpointwasthatofbeingSchelling’sspearcarrier,soitwasvirtuallyimpossibleforhimtogetajobelsewhere.Withhisinheritancedwindling(andbeingprogressivelydevaluedbytherisinginflationallaroundhim),Hegelbecamequitedepressed.Still,inthatperiodfrom1803–1806,hemanagedtowriteseveraldifferentdraftsofseveraldifferent“systems”ofphilosophy(eachsimilartothepreviousonebutdifferinginmanydetails),andby1805,hebeganworkonhisepochal,PhenomenologyofSpirit,finishingitin1806.8ThatHegelwasabletowritesomuchandtorefusetosubmititforpublication(becauseinhisminditjustwasnotgoodenough)isatestamentbothtoHegel’sownself-confidence(whichmanyofhisdetractors,notwithoutsomejustification,alwayssawasarrogance)andtohisstubbornness.(Hegel’sphilosophicaldevelopmentinJenawasinfactsostartlingandtheamounthewroteanddidnotpublishinthatperiodsolargethatithasmanagedtosustainakindofcottageindus-tryinHegelstudiesforalmostone-hundredyears.)AshewasfinishinguphisPhenomenologyin1806,Napoleon(nowthe“EmperoroftheFrench”)tookonthevauntedPrussianarmyinJenaandwithinthirtyminuteshadtheminafullrout,avictorythatputthefinalnailinthecoffinoftheoldHolyRomanEmpire.Afterthebattle,Hegel’sownapartmentwasransackedbyFrenchsoldiers.Evenworse,forHegel,hislandlady,marriedtoamanwhohadabandonedher,wasthenpreg-nantbyHegel.Hisillegitimateson,Ludwig,wasbornFebruary5,1807.8ForthePhenomenologyofSpirit,seethisvolume.Ihavegivenalengthycommen-taryonthePhenomenologyofSpiritinTerryPinkard,Hegel’sPhenomenology:TheSocialityofReason(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994)andrepriseditinshorterform(withsomesmallchangesofemphasis)intherelevantsectionsofHegel:ABiography,andGermanPhilosophy1760–1860:TheLegacyofIdealism.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n30terrypinkardbamberg:1807–1808ThebattleofJenamadewhathadbeenaverybadsituationinJenaintosomethingapproachingacollapse.Needlesstosay,thestudentshadallfled,andfewofthemreturnedforthenextsemester.Financesfortheuniversitycontinuedtodryup,andHegelwaswritingtojustabouteverybodyheknewinhislastcoupleofyearsatJenapleadingforsomekindofemployment,especiallyuniversityemployment.(HeevenproposedtotheofficialsinJenathathewouldbeanexcellentprofessorofBotanyandcaretakeroftheBotanicalGarden.)Outoftheblue,oneofhisoldSwabianfriends,ImmanuelNiethammer(olderthanHegelbutafellowgraduateoftheSeminary,whohadalsobeenatJenabuthadsincemovedtoWurzburg)foundhimajobeditinganewspaperinBamberg.¨Withnootheroptions,Hegelreluctantlyacceptedtheoffer(writingtoSchellingthathisnewpositionwas,although“notevencompletelyrespectable...atleastnotdishonest”9).Atthispoint,Hegel’sconsciencewasstillbotheredbythefactofhisnewson,andhearrangedtoborrowmoneytohelpsupporttheboy.How-ever,hemadethemovetoBambergwithapparentlyfewregretsasfarasLudwigandhismotherwereconcerned,andthereneverseemstohavebeenanyintentiontobringthetwowithhim.ThenewspaperHegeledited,theBambergerZeitung,waspro-Napoleonicinorientation,inpartbecauseBavaria(whereBambergwaslocated)wasofficiallyalliedwithNapoleonandinpartbecausethatwasthenewspaper’sshorttradi-tion.ThatorientationfitHegeljustfine.Hegelrelishedtheideaofbeingapublicpersonage,andhetooktohisdutieswithmorefervorthancouldhavebeenexpected.Hepledgedtomaintainacertainimpartiality(andtoagoodextent,hesucceeded),buthealsomadesurethatthereportageincludedaccountsofFrenchvictories,coveredtheestablishmentofthekingdomofWestphalia(withNapoleon’sbrotheronthethrone),andsoforth.Healsobecameabitofthemanabouttown,attendingvari-ousballsandgreateventsandconsortingwithsocietyallaroundhim.(Heevenattendedacostumeballdressedasavalet,anironicgesturefromsomeonewhohadclaimedinhisPhenomenologythatnomanisaherotohisvaletbecausethevaletis,afterall,onlyavalet,somebodyfocusedonthehereandnowinsteadofonthegreatermeaningoftheeventssurroundinghim;thepassagewaswellknown.)Asalways,healsocontinuedtowritetoanybodyheknewaboutlandingapostatauniversitysohecouldfurtherhischosencareerasaphilosopher.Hegel’sstayinBambergwas,however,morethanamereinterludeforhim.HewasabletoseeupclosehowthereformersinBavaria9Briefe,I,90;Letters,pp.75–78.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife31werehandlingthings(reformhavingbeenfoistedonmanyGermanLander¨asaresultoftheNapoleonicthreataroundthem.)Itbecamemoreandmoreclearthatreformcouldnotsimplybemandatedfromabovebutrequiredacorrespondinginstitutionalreform.The“Kantian”idealofsimplysettinguplawsofjusticethatabstractedawayfromthereal,empiricalintereststhatpeoplehadbegantoshowitselfmoreandmoreasineffective;andHegel’sideasaboutthenecessityforatypeofinstitutionalizedmorestogiveakindofsubstantialitytowhatwouldotherwisebemerelygeneralizedandineffectivemoralitybegantobeworkedoutinHegel’sthoughtmoreandmoreduringthisperiod.(ThiscametofruitioninhisreworkingafewyearslateroftheancientGreekidealofaharmoniousSittlichkeit,orsuchinstitutionalizedmores,intoamodernformofSittlichkeit.)Journalism,however,wasnottheplacewhereHegelwantedtobe,evenifithadbeenoneofhisyouthfulideals.Whenin1808,hefoundhimselfbeinginvestigatedbytheauthoritiesforpublishinginformationaboutFrenchtroopmovementsthathadalreadybeenpublishedinothernewspapers,hewasoutraged.Notonlydidthisthrowhislivelihoodintoquestion,italsothrewthelivelihoodofthepeoplewhoworkedforhimintodanger.HebeganhammeringawayatNiethammerwithhisstandardplea:Getmeoutofhereandhelpmefindauniversitypost.InOctober,1808,Niethammerwrotehimtoofficiallyofferhimpartofwhathewanted:HehadfoundapostforHegelinNurembergrunningandteachingatauniversitypreparatoryschool(aGymnasium,astheGermanscallit),andhewastobeinchargeofphilosophicalexaminationsforthekingdomofBavaria.Disappointedbynothavingmanagedtolandaprofessorshipatauniversity,Hegelnonethelesswasdelightedtobegettingoutofjournalism,andhesetofftoassumehisGymnasialprofessorshipinNurembergattheendof1808.nuremberg:1808–1816NiethammerwasabletodothisfavorforHegelbecauseby1808,hehadbecomethecommissionerinchargeofeducationalreforminBavaria.NiethammeralsowantedanallyinhiseffortstoreformBavarianedu-cation.Hebelongedtothe“neohumanist”campinGermany,whichaimedatproducingthrougheducationacertainidealofaself-directing,learnedindividualpossessinggoodtasteandasenseofthe“deeper”thingsinlife.Theiropponentsfellintotwocamps:Those(misleadinglycalled“utilitarians”atthetime)whowantedtofocusonvocationalskillsineducation;andconservatives,whowantedtouseeducationtoproducethetypesofindividualswhowouldstaywithintheirtra-ditionalrolesandclassboundaries.HegelandNiethammerwereonDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n32terrypinkardthesamesideoftheissue,andtheirshared,curiousWurttembergpast¨gavethemalegupinthedebate.Wurttembergeducationhadlong¨hadmoreunitytoitthandidothersystemsinGermany,andtheper-sistenceoftheProtestantEhrbarkeitalliedagainsttheCatholicdukehadmeantthatacertaintraditionofRenaissancehumanismhadneverdisappearedfromtheWurttembergcurriculum;theneohumanistsin¨turnhadfusedallofthatwithasenseofthesuperiorityofancientGreekculture.Asformerstudentsoftheology,bothHegelandNietham-merwereschooledinancientGreek,notalanguageonewouldnor-mallylearnattheuniversity,andthistoogavethemalegupinthedebate.Hegelwas,however,steppingintoapoliticalminefieldinNurem-berg.Thecityitself,whichhadbeenself-rulingforcenturies,hadrecentlylostitsindependenceintheNapoleonicwarsandhadsuf-feredundervariousoccupationsbydifferentarmies.ItwasgivenbytheFrenchtoBavariain1806(withnoinputfromtheNurembergersthem-selves),andtheformerlyfreecity,Protestantinpopulation,nowfounditselfsubjecttoaCatholicking.Moreover,theparticularGymnasiumtowhichHegelwasgoinghadformerlybeenaprestigious,forwardlook-ingcenterofeducationbut,likemanysuchinstitutionsinGermany,ithadfailedtokeepupandhadbecomeyetonemorepoolofmediocrity.NiethammerwasdeterminedtousethisProtestantinstitutionasthecenterpieceandshowpieceofhiseducationalreforms,andhethusputalotofresponsibilityonHegel’sshoulders.Thebeginningwasnotauspicious.ThereformersinBavaria,likemanymodernreformers,weremoreorlesshavingtomakeupmoderneconomicfinanceastheywentalong.Thus,atfirstandforquiteawhile,theyactuallyhadnorealideahowmuchthingscostandhowthecostsofmanydifferentthingsimpactedoneachother.Asaresult,theywereforeverissuingdecreesthattheyfailedtobackupwithmonetaryresources,leavingpeoplelikeHegeltopickupthepieces.Hegel’sownsalarywouldgoformonthswithoutbeingpaid,hefoundhimselfhavingtotakeoutloansuntilhewaspaid,hehadtopayschoolexpensesoutofhispocket,andthevariouspromisesaboutreconstructingthephysicalinfrastructurewentunfulfilledforlongperiodsoftime.WhenHegellearnedthataftersomerebuilding,therelevantauthoritieshadthenfailedtoputintoiletsinabuildinghousingall-daypreteentoteenageboys,HegelruefullyremarkedtoNiethammerthat“thisisanewdimensionofpubliceducation,theimportanceofwhichIhavejustnowdiscovered–sotospeak,itshindside.”1010Briefe,I,145;Letters,p.190.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife33Butheputhimselftothetaskandbroughtordertotheschool.Hemanagedtoreorganizeademoralizedteachingstaff,shiftingunproduc-tiveprofessorsintootherareaswheretheycoulddolittleharm(suchasmovingunproductivemathematicsteachersintoteachingreligion),andhedidthisnotonlywithoutantagonizingthefacultybutinawaythatearnedhimapplause.(Anyonewhohasspentevenalittletimearoundeducationalinstitutionsknowshowimprobablethatis.)Heinstilledorderanddisciplineintheschoolandearnedboththerespectandtheaffectionofthestudents.Inadditiontoteachingphilosophyforsixteenhoursaweek,writinghisScienceofLogic,carryingoutallhisotheradministrativeduties(withoutacopyist–theequivalentthesedaysofhavingnosecretaryorwordprocessor),healsoreviewedonceayearalloftheworkofthestudents(includingtheirhomework),hadapersonalchatwitheachofthemabouttheirstudies,whatbookstheywereread-ingoutsideofclass,whattheirfutureplanswere,givingthemadviceonhowtodobetter,andthelike.11ItwasclearthatHegelwasbothdedicatedtoandmorethanuptothetask,andthepeopleofNurembergrespondedwarmly.Hegelsawhimselfandhisphilosophyaspartoftheprocessoftheemergingmodernworld,andhewasfirmlydedicatedtotheneo-humanistidealsofeducation;hequiteclearlysawhimselfasaneducatortryingtoinstillthemodernidealsoffreedomintohisstudents,andsawhisphilosophicalworksaspartandparcelofthatproject.Oneofhismostferventlyheldbeliefswashisbeliefintheideaof“careersopentotalent”(asloganoftheFrenchRevolution);hisWurttembergbackgroundandhisfamily(who¨werenotmembersoftheEhrbarkeitbutwerebettereducated)playedmorethanjustasmallrole.Hegelmadeitapointinhisyearlyaddressestothepublicastherectorthatoneofthekeyissuesinsuchaprogramhadtodowithprovidingpoorbutgiftedstudentsthemeanstoprocureaneducationforthemselves.IthadbeenpartofhisprogramatJena,andinNuremberg,hehadachancetoputitintopractice;hecontinuedtoharponthistheme,evenmakingitapointofpridewhenhebecameseveralyearslatertheRectoroftheBerlinUniversity.(InHegel’sday,infact,professorsreceivedsomeoftheirincomebythefeesstudentspaidtoattendlecturesandtobeexaminedfordegrees;fromhisdaysinJenatoBerlin,Hegelalwayswaivedsuchfeesforthosestudents.)ItalsoseemedcleartoHegelbythetimehereachedNurembergthathispredilectionfortheFrenchRevolutionandforNapoleon’smodern-izingtendencieshadputhimontherightsideofhistory.TheFrench11FortheScienceofLogic,seethisvolume.IhavegivenashortaccountoftheScienceofLogicintherelevantsectionsofHegel:ABiographyandGermanPhilosophy1760–1860:TheLegacyofIdealism.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n34terrypinkardseemedunstoppable,andNapoleonicGermany(thosepartsalliedwithandundertheinfluenceoftheFrenchregime)wasinaprocessofmodernizingitselfinawaythattheanti-NapoleonicpartofGermanyseemedtobelacking.However,therecontinuedtobestrainswithintheBavariangovern-mentamongthedevoteesoftheolderorderandthereformers.SincemanyoftheopponentsofthereformswereCatholic,theseriesofeventstheyinitiated(includingalmostshuttingdowntheGymnasiumonafabricatedlegalpretexttoseizeitsmoney)reinforcedwithinHegelaviewthatmodernfreedomwaspossibleonlyinProtestantregimesandthatCatholicism,asareligionofauthorityanddogma,wasincompat-iblewithmodernfreedom.Heneveragainabandonedthatview,anditgothimintotroubleoffandoninBerlin,wherehisanti-Catholicoutburstswerenottakenkindly.FrustratedwiththeprevaricationsoftheCatholicsintheBavariangovernment,HegelconfidedtoNietham-merthathehadcometoseethedifferencebetweenProtestantismandCatholicismasbeingcrystallizedintheirattitudestoeducation:ForProtestants,itisuniversitiesandallcentersofinstructionthatareimportant,and“allProtestantslookupontheseinstitutionsastheirRomeandcouncilofbishops....Thesoleauthority[forProtestants]istheintellectualandmoralBildung[educationandculturalformation]ofall,andtheguarantorsofsuchBildungaretheseinstitutions...ToCatholics,however,it[Bildung]issomethingoptional,sincewhatissacredisinthechurch,whichisseparatedoffinaclergy.”12Hegel’snewlyelevatedstatusinNuremberglifeevenledtohismar-riagetoadaughterofoneoftheoldestaristocraticpatricianfamiliesinNuremberg:thevonTucherfamily.ThecourtshipleadinguptothemarriagewasnotitselfwithoutalltheusualupsanddownsandtwistsandturnsthatalwaysseemedtoaccompanyHegel’slife,MariewasinfacttwentyyearsyoungerthanHegel,andtherewasthefactthatHegel,acommonerwithno“von”inhisname,wasmarryingintoafamilymuchabovehissocialestate.Therewas,ofcourse,onehitchinHegel’sbackgroundthatmighthavederailedthispartofhissocialascension:HisillegitimatesonbackinJena,aboutwhichHegelseemsnottohavethoughtmuchaboutduringhisinitialyearsinNuremberg.(Infact,thereissome,butnotverytrustworthyevidence,thatthemotheroftheboymadeabitofafussaboutthewedding,claimingthatHegelhadearlierpromisedtomarryherwhenhegotasettledposition.)Inanyevent,thematterwassettled,andthemarriagewentforward.OnSeptember15,1811,heandMarieHelenaSusannavonTucherweremarried.12Briefe,II,309;Letters,p.328.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife35Thenewarrangementswerealsonotwithouttheirownbitoffamilyromance.Marie’sfatherdiedshortlythereafter,andhermother,whowasonlyoneyearolderthanHegel,tookanobviouslikingtohim,makinghimineffectintothetitularheadofthefamilyandexpendinglotsofenergyonprojectstopleaseherillustriousson-in-law(includingalargeyearlyproductionofLebkuchen¨forHegel’senjoyment).HegelandMarie,moreover,hadtodealnotonlywithMarie’sfather’searlydeath,theyalsohadtodealwiththetragedyofthedeathoftheirfirstchild,adaughter,afteronlyafewmonths;moreover,Hegel’sonlysurvivingbrotherwaspartoftheNapoleonicarmythatinvadedRussia,andhediedduringthatcampaign.(TheHegelsdidmanagetohavetwomoresonswhobothlivedtoripeoldages.)In1814,Hegeldidwhatwasexpectedofapersoninhispositionandinvitedhissister,Christiane,tocomestaywiththem.Christiane,giftedandstrongwilled,whoreceivednohighereducation(butmightwellhavebeenasnaturallygiftedashercelebratedbrother)hadnevermarried(althoughshehadturneddownsomeproposalsofmarriage),andhadinsteadelectedtostayhomeandcareforherfather.Sincethegreatfearofanymiddleclasswomanwashavingtobecomeaservantinsomebodyelse’shouse,themoresofthetimeheldthattheonlydecentthingtodowastoinvitehertocometolivewithone’sownfamily(afteronehadmarried),usuallyonthepretextof“helpingout”aroundthehouseasthechildrenarrived.Christianealsohadastrongattachmenttoherbrother,andwhenHegelwasawayonatrip,hecamebacktofindthathiswifeandChristianeweremoreorlessateachother’sthroats.Christianewas“required”toleave,andsheexpressedintensefeelingsofhatredforMarietooneofhercousinsaftersheleft.TheestrangementbetweenHegelandhissisterwasneverreallyovercome;theyneversaweachotheragain,althoughtheycontinuedtocorrespondintermittently.(HerletterstohimareanothermissingpartofHegel’slettersandwereprobablyamongthestackofdocumentsthatoneofHegel’ssonslaterdestroyed.)Inadditiontothesepersonaldifficulties,HegelalsohadtodealwiththeshockofNapoleon’ssuddenfallafterthedisasteroftheRussiancam-paign.ItthrewintoquestionwhethertheNapoleonicreformswouldcontinue,andHegelwatchedwithmorethanalittlenervousnessastheCongressofViennamet.Hewas,ofcourse,greatlyrelievedtoseethatvirtuallynoneofNapoleonicGermanywasgoingtobechanged(thenewlyestablishedkingsofWurttembergandBavaria,althoughconser-¨vative,certainlydidnotwanttoturntheclockbackandreturnallthelandstheyhadreceivedforearlierallyingwithNapoleon.)HegelcontinuedtoflourishasRector.HeinfacttookonadditionaldutiesastheschoolinspectorforBavaria(withasubstantialraise),andDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n36terrypinkardhemanagednotonlytogetateacher’scollegeestablishedinNuremberg,healsomanagedtogetpermissionfortheestablishmentofaneduca-tionalschoolsforgirlsthatfunctioneduntil1831,whenitwasabsorbedintothelargerNurembergschoolsystem.heidelberg:1816–1818In1816,Hegel’slongheldwishfinallycametrue:TheuniversityatHeidelbergofferedhimapositionasprofessorofphilosophy.Berlinexpressedinteresttoo,buttherewerecomplicationswiththeoffer,andHegel’swifemadeitclearthatshedidnotwanttomovesofarawayfromherfamily.HegelacceptedtheofferfromHeidelberg,andaboutsixmonthsaftermovingthere,thefamilytookHegel’sillegitimateson,LudwigFischer,intothefamily.(Whytheyhadnotdonesoearlierisabitunclear,butitisclearthatithadsomethingtodowiththestandingofthevonTucher’sinthatcity,andsomeevidencepointstoitbeingmoreofamatterofreluctanceonMarie’spartthanreluctanceonherfamily’spart.)LudwighadmanyproblemsfittingintotheHegelfamily.Hehadafterallbeenabandonedbyhismother,effectivelyabandonedbyhisfather,andheclearlyhadsomeissuesheneededtoworkout.ItalsoseemsclearthattheHegelfamilywasnotentirelysympathetictotheobviousstressesinhiscondition,andHegel’stwosons(KarlandImmanuel)alsodidnotmakemuchofasecretofseeingLudwigasaninterloperontheirterritory.OnLudwig’sownaccount,MarieHegelwaslessthankindtowardhim,andLudwigseemstohavebeenregardedmoreorlessasa“fosterchild”bytheHegelfamily.ForHegel,though,noneofthosestressescountedasmuchasfinallysettlingdownasaprofessorataprestigiousinstitution,happilymarriedandwithafamily.IthadtakenHegeluntiltheageofforty-sixtofinallyachievehisgoal,andhesettleddownrapidlyintoaproductiveprofes-sionallifeand,moreorless,ahappyfamilylife.HeandMarietraveledinthearea,entertainedquiteabit,andHegelmadeanynumberofnewper-sonalandprofessionalfriends,amongthem,thegreatlegaltheorist,A.F.J.Thibaut;heparticipatedin“musicalevenings”atThibaut’shouseandoftenvolunteeredhisownhousefortheoccasion.(Thibautwasalsoanaccomplishedmusicologistandwasinterestedinearlypolyphonicmusic.)ThatandtheacquaintancehemadewiththeBoissereebroth-´ers(andtheirvauntedcollectionof“oldGerman”paintingsandprints,whichincludedmanyDutchpaintings)helpedtoformHegel’saesthetictaste,whichwastofindfruitioninhisextremelypopularandepochallecturesonaestheticsinhisBerlinperiod.HegelwasabletorenewhisacquaintancewithGoethe,thistimemoreasanequalthanasapoorsupplicantbeggingforapositionatJena,andhemadetheacquaintanceDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife37ofotherliterarycelebrities,suchasJeanPaul.Inallofthattumult,healsomanagedtofinishandpublishthefirsteditionofhisEncyclope-diaofthePhilosophicalSciences(1817),andheworkedoutinlecturesthedetailsofwhatwasbecomehisfinalbook,thePhilosophyofRight,publishedinBerlinin1820.ThebackgroundtoHegel’slecturesonpoliticalphilosophyhadtodowithseveraldisputesthatwereeruptinginpost-NapoleonicGermany,oneofthembeingthedisputebetweenThibautandKarlFriedrichvonSavignyoverthecodificationofGermanlaw.Ineffect,Thibautarguedthatforsuchacodifiedlawtobenormativelybinding,ithadtoberatio-nalinasenseKantwouldhaverecognized;Savigny,ontheotherhand,arguedthatwhateveritisthatdefactobindsapeopletogetherisreallybindingforit.(HegeltookThibaut’sside.)Savigny’spointaboutanormsbeingbindingsimplybecausetheyweretheestablishednormsofapeo-plefoundexpressioninthegrowingmovementofGermannationalismandtheappealtobeingauthenticallyGerman.Hegelwouldhavenoneofit;ashewasfondofsaying,theappealtoDeutschtum(German-dom)isjustbeingDeutschdumm(German-dumb).13Hegel’sownintenseinterestinshapingthemodernworldalsoledhimtothrowhishatintotheringaroundabitterpoliticaldisputeinWurttembergin¨1817.Ineffect,theWurttembergKingandtheestates¨foundthemselvesatoddsoveraproposednewconstitutionthatwouldhaveeffectivelytakenpowerawayfromtheoldEhrbarkeitandthenobility(who,afterthecollapseoftheHolyRomanEmpire,hadnoemperortowhomtheywere“immediate”).Partofthedisputehadtodowithpowergrabsonbothsides,andpartofthedisputehadtodowiththeforcesoftraditionversusakindofrationalizingmodernity.(Theking’sproposedconstitutiongrantedlibertyofthepressandfullrightstoJewsbutkeptthepowerandpursestringsinhisownhands.)Inanarticlepublishedwhilethedisputewasstillinfullforce,Hegelsidedwiththeking,arguingthattheviewsputforthbytheproponentsofthe“goodoldlaw”wereantiquated,toomuchlike“socialcontract”viewsofstatepower(exceptthatthecontractwasnotbetweenindividualsbutdistinctsocialestatesandclasses),andthattheso-calledgoldenagetowhichthedefendersoftraditionappealedwasamyth.HeconcludedthattheEhrbarkeitandtheirallieswerelikethedeposedFrencharisto-cratsaftertheRevolution,for“theyhaveforgottennothingandlearntnothing.[TheWurttembergestates]seemtohave¨sleptthroughthelasttwenty-fiveyears,possiblytherichestthatworldhistoryhashad,andforusthemostinstructive,becauseitistothemthatourworldandour13Briefe,II,241;Letters,p.312.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n38terrypinkardideasbelong.”14(AlmostallofHegel’sfriendstookumbrageathisessay,sinceitseemedtothemthathewassidingwiththeratherautocraticinclinationsofthekingratherthantakingamorenuancedviewoftheneedforchecksagainsttheking,anditcosthimcertainlong-standingfriendships.)In1817,BerlincamethroughwithaveryattractiveofferforHegeltotakeoverFichte’slongabsentchairinphilosophy.Marie’sreluctancetomovewasovercomebyhermother’sinterventiononHegel’ssideoftheargument,andonOctober5,1818,theHegelfamilyarrivedinBerlin.berlin:1818–1831Prussia,whichhadbeenindangerofvanishingasagreatpower(orper-hapsvanishingaltogether)duringtheNapoleonicperiod,hademergedasstrongerthaneverandsubstantiallylargerthanithadbeenpriortothatperiod.Pushedtoreformbynecessityandnotanykindofforwardthinking,thePrussiankinghadinstitutedacoupleofdifferentreformmovementsthathadtriedtoputinplaceamorerational,“universal-ist”governmentandsociety(with“careersopentotalent”)toreplacetheantiquated“particularist”structuresoftheearlymodernGermany.However,thebureaucraticallyinstalledreformersweretryingtoputintoplaceanenlightenedsystemofbureaucraticgovernmentwithouthavingvirtuallyanypopularsupportfortheircause.(Theirconstituencyconsistedofahandfulofministersandthekinghimself.)BythetimeHegelarrivedinBerlin,thereformmovementhadslowedtoacrawl,althoughmany,includingHegel,thoughtthatthiswasatbestatemporarylossofmomentuminwhatwouldbeaninevitablecomingtotermswiththemodernworld.Itwas,infact,duringthisperiodofreformthatthenewBerlinuniversitywasfounded(in1809),includ-ingwithinitselfmanyoftheidealsoftheshort-livedJenaexperiment.Berlin’sownversionwas,ofcourse,destinedtosetthemodelforvir-tuallyalluniversitiesaroundtheworldasitestablishedaninstitutionorientedtowardtheunityofteachingandresearch,withitsgoalbeingtoturnoutthewell-educatedyoungmenwhowouldbenecessarytostaffthenewlyemergingprofessionswithintheinstitutionsofthemodernworld.14Hegel,“ProceedingsoftheEstatesAssemblyintheKingdomofWurttemberg¨1815–1816,”inHegel’sPoliticalWritings,trans.byT.M.Knox(Oxford:OxfordattheClarendonPress,1964),p.282;alsoinWerkeinzwanzigBanden¨,ed.byEvaMoldenhauerandKarlMarkusMichel(FrankfurtamMain:SuhrkampVerlag,1971),vol.4,p.507.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife39Hegel’sarrivalinBerlinwasaccompaniedbythecuriosityamongtheeducatedeliteastohowhewouldfare.Bythattime,Hegelhadestab-lishedhimselfastheleadingvoiceofthenewpost-Kantianmovementinphilosophy,withhisonlyrealcompetitorstothattitlebeingSchellingandJ.F.Fries.15HegelwasinvitedtojoinoneoftheexclusiveclubsinBerlin,andheandMariemadetheroundsatvarioussocialeventsandattheopera.Thateasy-goinglife,however,wasquicklycloudedoverbymoredistressingevents.Theassassinationofaconservativelit-eraryfigureinAugust,1819fueledtheoveractiveimaginationsofthePrussiankingandmanyoftheconservativefiguresaroundhim,allofwhombegantoseeJacobinplotseverywhere.Thisinturnledthemintoahuntforthesesupposed“demagogues”(or“subversives”),andbytheendofAugustin1820,the“Karlsbaddecrees”hadbeenpromulgatedfortheGermanConfederationwhichcodifiedthehuntfordemagoguesandmadeitimpossible,forexample,foranyprofessordismissedasademagoguefromateachingpostinoneuniversitytoattainateachingpostatanotheruniversityintheGermanconfederationofstates.HegelfoundhimselfquicklyembroiledinthesedisputeswhenoneofhisHeidelbergstudents,GustavAsverus(whowasthesonofHegel’slawyerinJenaandwhohandledHegel’snegotiationswithLudwigFis-cher’smotherabouthismarriagetoMarievonTucher)wasarrestedandheldincommunicadoasa“demagogue.”Hegelintervened,wrotetotheministrywithoutavail,andendeduphiringalawyertointerveneforAsverus;asaconditionofAsverus’srelease,Hegelwasrequiredtopurchaseastatebond(costingroughlyone-thirdofhisannualsalary).Thepersecutionofthe“demagogues”pickedupitspace,andsoonaBerlinprofessor,WilhelmdeWette(atheologian),losthispositionbecauseofit.(J.F.Fries,whowasafriendoftheBerlintheologianandwhodetestedHegelandwhomHegeldetestedinreturn,alsolosthispositioninJena–aneventinwhichHegeltookwithnosmallmeasureofSchadenfreude).Atthistime,Hegeltriedtohaveoneofhisgiftedstudents,FriedrichWilhelmCarove,acceptedashisteachingassistant,´butCarovelackedthe´Habilitation,andthefacultydeniedtherequest.AsCarovewasworkingonthe´Habilitation,hewasbroughtundersuspicionofbeinga“demagogue”andinvestigated.AlthoughCarove´15IexamineKantandthepost-KantianmovementuptoandbeyondHegelinTerryPinkard,GermanPhilosophy1760–1860:TheLegacyofIdealism(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002).ThemovementfromKantuptobutnotinclud-ingHegelisadmirablytreatedinFrederickBeiser,GermanIdealism:TheStrug-gleagainstSubjectivism1781–1801(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2002).Forthecomplementtothatvolume,seealsoFrederickBeiser,Hegel(Lon-don:Routledge,2005).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n40terrypinkardwasinitiallyclearedofthecharges,heremainedundersuspicion.By1820,however,thediewascast,andCarovewasofficiallybannedasa´demagoguefromallteachingintheGermanconfederation.Hegelconfidedtofriendsthatalthoughhestillbelievedinprogress,onehadtoadmitthatthingsseemedonlytobegettingworse,andheexpressedgreatanxietyaboutthecurrenttrends.Hissecondchoiceforhisassistant,anaristocratwhohadfoughtinthewarsagainstNapoleon,L.D.vonHenning,alsocameundersuspicion,asdidsomeotherstu-dentsofHegel’s.HenningwasarrestedandputintojailinacellfacingtheSpreeRiver.Hegelandsomeotherstudentswentoutatmidnightinaskiffontheriverandfacingthewindowofhiscell,theyspokewithhimandtriedtocheerhimup;fromtheskiff,Hegelconductedaconver-sationwithvonHenninginLatin(sothatiftheguardsoverheard,theycouldnotunderstand).Aftersevenweeks,vonHenningwasreleased,buttheauthoritiesrequiredhimtotaketheassistantshipforoneyearatnopayinordertoprovehisworthiness.In1820,inthemidstofallofthis,withHegel’sstudentsbeingarrestedallaroundhim,hemetwithsomestudentsinDresden,andatdinneronJuly14,heturneddownthelocalwine,purchasinginsteadforhimselfandstudentsabottleofthemostexpensivechampagneinEurope.Onfillingtheirglassesanddowningthechampagnewiththem(andwiththestudentsratherastoundedthattheoldfellowwasdoingthisforthemandhavingnoideawhyhewasdoingthis),heexplainedthereasonforhisgenerosity:Hegelturnedtotheminmockastonishmentandwithraisedvoicedeclared,“Thisglassisforthe14thofJuly,1789–tothestormingoftheBastille.”16ThetensionsintheworseningpoliticalsituationinfactbroughtoutmanyofthecompetingqualitiesinHegel’spersonality.Ontheonehand,hehadanangrypublicargumentwithSchleiermacherovertheproprietyofthegovernment’sbanningprofessorsfromteachingin1819,inwhichHegeldefendedtheprinciple,providedthatthegovernmentcontinuedtopaytheprofessor’ssalary;heandSchleiermacherbecamethereaftersomewhatbitterantagonists.Hegelnonethelesspaidintothesecretfundtosupportthebannedtheologian(whoseideashefoundclosetononsense)whennosuchsalarywasforthcoming.Aspreviouslymen-tioned,heriskedgoingoutinaskiffatnighttotalkwithanimprisonedstudent;buthealsoledaratherunpretentious,Biedermeierlife;yet,healsodidthingslikeattendFaschingballsinaVenetiancapeandmask(lookingnodoubtlikesomefigureoutofthemusical,Amadeus).HegelhadbeenbroughtupasaproudStuttgarterwhowasnotamemberof16GuntherNicolin,ed.,¨HegelinBerichtenseinerZeitgenossen(Hamburg:FelixMeinerVerlag,1970),no.323,p.214.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife41theEhrbarkeit,and,liketherestofhisfamily,heremainedabitpricklyaboutallegedaffrontstohisstatus.Manycontemporariesdescribedhimassimple,unpretentious,andgregarious;manyothersdescribedhimasarrogant,wooden,andstuffy.Infact,hewasallthosethingsatonce.Helovedplayingcardswithnonacademictypes(suchastheroyalstable-master),andhemaintainedfriendshipswithboththeartisticandthemorebohemianelementsofBerlinsociety.OneofhisbestfriendswastheheadoftheBerlinmusicalchoralacademy(theSingakademie),K.F.Zelter,whowasthesonofamason;togetherheandHegelhadaclearsensethattheywereboththeproductsoftheideaofa“careeropentotalent,”andbothenjoyedeachother’sratherdowntoearthways.Infact,thekindofsupremeself-confidencethathadtakenhimthroughtheyearsofdepressionandbleaknessinJenaandhadledtohisPhenomenologyofSpiritoftentendedtogetplayedoutinBerlinasakindofarrogance.Hegelhadafearsomeangerwhenhethoughtsomekindoflinehadbeencrossed(particularlywhenitconcernedhisstatusasaprofessor),andhisironyandsarcasm(usuallymoreofthelatter)expresseditselfnotalwaysinthemostflatteringways.Thatsameself-confidence,however,alsoallowedhimtomaintainakindofequanimityandlight-heartednessinmanyofhisdealingswithpeople,andtobeajovialandwittycompaniononmanysocialoccasions.HegelfinallypublishedhisPhilosophyofRightin1820.17AlthoughthebookreconstructedanddefendedwhatHegeltooktobetheratio-nalunderpinningsofthekindofsocialandpoliticalordersoughtbythereformers,alongwithideasofhisownthatincorporatedotheridealsaris-ingoutoftheBritishandFrenchmodels,itwasvirtuallyimmediatelytakenbyreviewerstobeanapologyfortheexisting,repressivePrussianregime.Hegelhadonlyhimselftoblame:HeincludedintheprefaceabitterattackonJ.F.Fries,whichwastakenbymanyasanuncalledforpieceofaggressionagainstaleadingthinkerwhohadjustlosthisjobbecausehewasdeclaredtobeademagogue;healsoinsertedanindirectattackondeWette,theBerlintheologianwhohadalsolosthispositionforbeingconvictedofbeingademagogue,andheconcludedwiththeinfamousHegelian“doubleproposition”thatwhatisrationalisactual,andwhatisactualisrational,whichmanyreviewerstookatfacevaluetobesayingthatwhatis,isright,andwhatisrightiswhathappenstobethecase;orinotherwords,thePrussianregimeisinpower,andthatmakesitrightandrational.Hegelwastakenabackatthisinterpretation,andheevenplayedaroleinhavingalater“BrockhausEncyclopedia”entryabouthimspecificallydenythatheevermeantsuchathingat17ForthePhilosophyofRight,seemyownaccountinGermanPhilosophy1760–1860:TheLegacyofIdealism.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:40WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n42terrypinkardall;underHegel’sguidance,thewriteroftheentryonHegelevenwentsofarastosay“totheextentthatHegel’sviewonthestateareknowntousthroughhiswritings,[thatphrase]wasinnowayemployedlateronforthebenefitoftherulingclassesbutaroseoutofthefounda-tionsofhisphilosophy,whicheverywherecombatsemptyidealsandseekstoreconcilethoughtsandactualityintheabsoluteIdeathrough,asitwere,theIdeaitself.”18Hegel’sownongoingdisputeswiththelib-eralreformer,Schleiermacher,andhisfriendshipwithsomeofthefewremainingreformersinthegovernmentgavehimtheundeservedrepu-tationthathewasalackeyoftheexistingregime(despitethefactthatleadingmembersofthegovernmentfoundhimsuspiciousandactuallyadvisedstudentsagainstgoingtohisnowfamouslectures).By1821–1822,Hegelhadcomeunderalotofstress.Thearrestofhisstudents,hiswife’sonagain,offagainstateofhealth–Mariesuf-feredfromseveralmiscarriagesduringtheirmarriage–hisworkload(hehadtakenonsomeextraduties),togetherwithhisnormalactivities(researchingforhislecturesandtryingtowritemoreforpublicationwhiledoinghispartinuniversityservice)putastrainonhishealthandhismood.Moreover,amembershipintheBerlinAcademyoftheScienceswasconsistentlydeniedhim,almostentirelyduetothebadbloodbetweenhimandSchleiermacher,whoblackballedHegeleverytimehisnamewasproposedforinclusion;hisexclusionfromthegroupwasnotonlyawoundtohispride,italsomeantanotinconsiderablelossofincomeforhim.TheattacksonthePhilosophyofRightaccusinghimofobsequiousnessvis-a-vistherulingpowersdidnothelpthings.`HegelwasstungbySchleiermacher’santipathytohim,andin1822inaprefacetoabookonthephilosophyofreligionbyoneofhisfor-merstudents,Hegelinsertedaphrasetotheeffectthatiftheviewsofsometheologians(Schleiermacher,althoughnotspecificallynamed)weretakenseriously,namely,that“ifreligiongroundsitselfinapersononlyonthebasisoffeeling,thensuchafeelingwouldhavenootherdeterminationthanthatofafeelingofhisdependence,andsoadogwouldbethebestChristian,foritcarriesthisfeelingmostintenselywithinitselfandlivesprincipallyinthisfeeling.Adogevenhasfeelingsofsalvationwhenitshungerissatisfiedbyabone.”19ForSchleiermacherandhisallies,thiswasthelaststraw;theattacksonHegelincreased.However,itdidnothingtostophisgrowing18CitedanddiscussedbyFriedhelmNicolin,“DerersteLexicon-ArtikeluberHegel¨(1824),”inFriedhelmNicolin,AufHegelsSpuren:BeitragezurHegel-Forschung¨,p.212.19G.W.F.Hegel,“VorredezuHinrichsReligionsphilosophie,”Werke,vol.11,pp.43,58.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:41WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife43celebrity.Bythemid-1820s,hehadbecomeperhapsthedominantintel-lectualfigureinBerlin.OneparticipantintheBerlinsceneputitthisway:“Whetheranewandfamouspictureemergedfromtheworkplacesofafamouspainterorwhetheranew,verypromisinginventionhaddirectedtheattentionoftheindustrialiststoit,whethersomethoughtofgeniusinthesciencesmadeitswayintothelearnedworld,orMissSontagsanginaconcert,inallcasesBerlinasked:WhatdoesHegelthinkaboutit?”20Someofthereform-mindedfiguresinthegovernmentmanagedtogetHegelanextrastipendtocompensatepartiallyforhisexclusionfromtheAcademyoftheSciences.Hegelusedsomeofthemoneytotakethreemajortrips.Hegel’stravelswerealwaysforself-improvement;asamiddleclassWurttembergerwhoprized¨Bildungaboveallandassome-onewhohadneverhadtheopportunitytotravelmuch,Hegelvaluedseeingthevariousmuseums,architecturalfeatures,anddailylifeoftheplaceshevisited.In1822,hewenttoHolland,arichand“modernizing”country.OnthewaytoHolland,hemanagedtostopoffinMagdeburgtovisitwithoneofhisyouthfulheroes,theFrenchmathematician-engineer-politician,Carnot,whohadplayedsuchabigroleintheRevo-lutionandtheNapoleonicperiodandwhohadbeenlivingunderhousearrestinMagdeburgafterthefallofNapoleon.HollanditselfprovedtobearealeyeopenerforHegel;cosmopolitan,tolerant,andrich,itgavehimanideaofwhatGermanycouldandshouldturnouttobe.In1824,hetookanothertriptoVienna.Itissafetosaythathesimplylovedtheplace;heattendedoperaafteropera,visitedpicturegalleryafterpicturegallery,tookinthewonderfulViennesecuisine,tookinevenmoreViennesewine,and,ingeneral,reflectedonthedifferencesbetweenthetwogreatGermanpowers:ProtestantPrussiaandCatholicAustria.HegelclearlyvaluedtheculturalrichnessofViennaoverthemorestaidandlessvibrantBerlin;buthealsosawAustriaasalandofthepast;thefuturebelonged,hethought,tothegreatProtestantpowers,BritainandPrussia.WhenHegelarrivedbackhomefromtheViennatrip,hefoundoutthatanoldfriend(andaformerstudentofsorts),VictorCousin,hadbeenarrestedbythePrussiansforbeinga“demagogue.”CousinwasaliberalreformerinFranceandafriendofHegelsincehisHeidelbergdays;thechargeswerealsoclearlyfraudulent.(ItlaterturnedoutthePrus-siangovernmentwasineffectdoingafavorfortherestorationFrenchpolice.)Evenworse,Cousin’sallegedcoconspiratorsincludedafriendofLudwigFischerHegelandJuliusNiethammer(thesonofHegel’s20HegelinBerichtenseinerZeitgenossen,no.558,p.378.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:41WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n44terrypinkardfriend,ImmanuelNiethammer).HegelcourageouslywrotealettertothePrussianinteriorministrytestifyingtoCousin’sinnocenceandrequest-inganaudiencewithCousin(whichwasdenied).HegelwasjoinedintheprotestbypeoplelikeSchleiermacher(foroncetheywereonthesameside),andHegel’scelebrityandcontinuingpressureforCousin’sreleasewasinstrumentalinobtaininghisreleasesomemonthsafter-ward.CousinwasforevergratefultoHegelafterward.ThisraisedHegel’scelebrity,butitdidnottampdowntheattacksonhim;and,ifnothingelse,itraisedHegel’sownsomewhataggressiveandsarcasticattacksagainsthisopponentsupanothernotch.(HemanagedtogethimselfintotroubleagainwhenherepeatedinhislecturesanoldProtestantcanardaboutCatholicbeliefsintheEucharistrequiringCatholicstoworshipamousewhohadeatenaconsecratedwafer;theCatholiccommunitywas,simplyput,outragedoverthatremark.)ItwasatthistimethatHegelalsobecameverygoodfriendswiththeverygiftedyoungJewishjurist,EduardGans,whohimselfbecameaconverttoHegelianism.Thetwobecamequiteclose;inAugust,1826,HegelwrotetoMarie(whowaswiththechildrenvisitingfamilyinNuremberg)that“I’mlivingveryquietly;IseevirtuallyonlyGans,mytruefriendandcompanion.”21HegelsupportedGans’sapplicationtobecomeaprofessoroflaw;butmanyinthelawfaculty,ledbyvonSavigny,objectedtoaJewobtainingsuchapositioneventhoughtheEmancipationEdictof1812clearlyopenedupsuchpossibilitiesforJews.ThedebateoverwhethertoappointGansbecamequiteheated,butGans’sopponentsmanagedtogettheearoftheking,who,inordertostopGansfrombecomingaprofessor,revokedtheentireEdictin1822.Thus,inordertostopaJewishHegelianfrombecomingaprofessor,JewishemancipationinPrussiawaseffectivelyabolished.In1825,whileinParis,GansquitecynicallyconvertedtoChristian-ity.(Ganswassaidtohaveclaimedabouthisconversionthat“ifthestateissostupidastoforbidmetoserveitinacapacitywhichsuitsmyparticulartalentsunlessIprofesssomethingIdonotbelieve–andsomethingwhichtheresponsibleministerknowsIdonotbelieve;allrightthen,itshallhaveitswish.”22)Theployworked,andGansbecameaprofessoroverSavigny’sobjections;healsoimmediatelybecameoneofthemostpopularprofessorswiththestudentsandwasinstrumentalinfurtheringtheHegelianlineofthought.(Ganshimselflaterhadaveryfamousstudent:KarlMarx.)21Briefe,III,520,Letters,p.506.22CitedinS.S.Prawer,Heine’sJewishComedy:AStudyofHisPortraitsofJewsandJudaism(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1983),p.12.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:41WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife45ItwasalsoalmostcertainlytheclosefriendshipbetweenGansandHegelthatledHegelinBerlintoreversehisviewsonJudaismthathehadheldallhisadultlife.FromatleastTubingenonward,Hegelhad¨viewedJudaismasareligionofegoismandservility,butafterbecomingfriendswithGans,Hegelcompletelychangedhisview,claiminginhislecturesthatJudaismwasthefirstreligionoffreedom,areligionthatputgoodnessandwisdomintotheconceptofdivinityandwhichstoodonahigherplaneeventhanthereligionoftheGreeks.(Priortohisconversion,GanshadalsobeenthepresidentoftheshortlivedbuthistoricallyinfluentialSocietyforJewishCultureandScience.)23WithGans’shelp,Hegelfoundedanewjournalthatbroughttogethervariousluminariestowriteon“scientific”subjects(inthesenseofGermanWissenschaft).ThejournalwasneverthesuccessHegelhopeditwouldbe,butitreflectedhiscommitmenttobemorethanjustauniversityprofessor;hewantedtoestablishapublicforumthatthegraduatesofthenewBerlin-styleuniversities(withtheiridealofthe“unityofteachingandresearch”)couldstayabreastofthetrendsinthoughtinvariousfields,rangingfromliteraturetotheologyandthenaturalsciences.Hegelhimselfcontinuedtoconsortwithpeopleofalllevelsofsociety,onceevenhavingtointerveneinapurportedduelbetweenafriend,theJewishsatirist,MoritzSaphir,andanotheracquaintance,anouveau-richelotterywinnerwhohadfelthimselfgrievouslyinsultedbyoneofSaphir’switticisms.(HegelwassupposedtohavebeenSaphir’s“second”attheduel,andhiscomicalpresenceatsuchanotherwisedireoccasionledbothpartiestocalloffthefeud.)In1826,Hegel’sfriendshadasurprisebirthdaypartyforhimthatwentonallnight.Theeventwasreportedinthenewspapers,andtheking,whosebirthdaywasacoupleofweeksearlier,becamequitepeevedthatHegel’sbirthdaygotmoreattentioninthepressthandidhisown.However,hehadasolution:Hesimplybannedthereportingofsuchprivatebirthdaycelebrationsinthenewspapers.ItdidnottakemucheffortforHegel(oranyoneelse)toreadbetweenthelinesandseethethreatcontainedtherein.Aroundthesametime,VictorCousinpraisedHegelintheprefacetoatranslationofPlato’sGorgias,citingHegel’s“nobleconduct”duringthe“Cousinaffair”andhiscourageinrunningsucharisk;whenthedirectorofpoliceinBerlinlearnedofCousin’sbook,hewas,toputitsimply,outraged.Realizingthatbeingonthebad23EduardGanshasundeservedlylanguishedinsomeobscurityasakindoffootnotetotheHegelianmovement.Fortunately,thatisbeginningtochange.SeeespeciallythecrucialworkbyNorbertWaszek,EduardGans(1797–1839):Hegelianer-Jude-Europaer.TexteundDokumente¨(FrankfurtamMain:PeterLang,1991).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:41WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n46terrypinkardsideofboththekingandthedirectorofpolicewasnotexactlytheidealsituationtobein,Hegellaidlowforawhile.TomakemattersworseforHegel,thelong-standingfrictionbetweenLudwigFischerHegelandtheothermembersoftheHegelfamilyfinallycametoahead.HegeltoldLudwigthatKarlandImmanuelweregoingtouniversitybutthathewasnot;therewereassimplynotenoughfam-ilyfinancesforthat.(ThatHegelmighthavecutbackonotherthingstoprovideforLudwig’seducationwasapparentlynotupfordiscus-sion.)Ludwig,whowascertainlyqualifiedforuniversityeducation,wasinsteadapprenticedforacareerinbusiness.Ludwigrebelled,and,ononeaccount,ranaway.(Onanotheraccount,hewasthrownoutofthehouse.)HejoinedtheDutcharmy,butHegeldidtrytofindouthowtodosomethingforhimbyspeakingwithDutchfriends.(LudwiglaterdiedofafeverinBataviain1831.;Hegel,whoalsodiedin1831,neverlearnedofLudwig’sdeathand,nordidLudwigeverlearnofhisfather’sdeath.)AfterHegel’sdeath,hissonsapparentlytriedverydili-gentlytoeraseLudwig’smemory;forexample,allofthelettersHegelwrotetohisfriend,F.Frommann,inJenaaboutLudwig(FrommannandhissisterwereinchargeofcaringforLudwig)survived,whereasallofFrommann’sresponses(apparentlycontainingreferencestoLudwig)vanished.In1827,VictorCousininvitedHegeltovisithiminParis.ThiswasnotonlysomethingHegelhadlongwantedtodo;italsoofferedhimaconvenientexcusetobeoutoftownforhisbirthdayandavoidanycomplicationsonthatdaythatmightirritatethekingagain.Morethananyofhisothertrips,thevisittoPariswasaneye-opener.Paris,theseatoftheRevolution,towhichHegeldrankatoasteveryJuly14,wasallthatHegelcouldhavehopedforamoderncity.HewrotetoMarie,exclaimingabouttheculturalriches,thecosmopolitanatmosphere,andthewealthandvibrancyofthecity;hewas,hetoldher,inthe“capitalofthecivilizedworld.”24Hemetvariousleadingpoliticalfiguresandintellectuals,hegottotraveltoaRousseausite(whichrequiredhimtorideonadonkeyinthesunonahotdaybutwhich,henoted,waswellworththetrip),hetookinthetheater,theopera,andthemuseums.Hegel,alife-longFrancophilewhountilthenhadneverbeentoFrance,wasentrancedbytheFrenchwayoflife.“WhenIreturn,”hewrotetoMarie,“weshallspeaknothingbutFrench.”25Unfortunately,theFrenchcuisineprovedtoomuchforHegel’smorepedestrianGermanstom-ach;afteronlyalittlewhile,hecontractedaseverecaseofindigestion24Briefe,III,559;Letters,p.649.25Briefe,III,562;Letters,p.656.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:41WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife47andhadtofindatabled’hotethatservedGermanfoodfortherestofhisˆstay.Hegel’slifegraduallysettleddownintotheroutineofbeingattackedbyallkindsofdetractors,beingnominatedforapositionattheAcademyofSciences,andbeingimmediatelyblackballedbySchleiermacher,allthewhilebeingaleadingintellectualcelebrityinBerlin,besiegedbyadmirers,askedforfavors,evenaskedfortheequivalentofcelebrityendorsementsforproducts.Hecontinuedhiscardgameswithhisless-exaltedfriendsandhiscontinuedassociationswiththeBohemianele-mentofBerlin.HegelhadbecomebythenaBerlinfixture;thepic-tureofHegelfinishinghislecturesearlyintheevening(around5:00pm)andwalkingacrossthestreettotheRoyalOperaHousetocatchthatevening’sperformancewaspartofBerlinlife.Hisstudents,suchasHeinrichHeineandFelixMendelssohn-Bartholdy,werethemselvesbecomingcelebrities,andtheattendanceathislecturescontinuedtorise,withpeoplecomingfromallaroundtohearhimexpoundhisviewsonthenatureofartandthephilosophyofhistory.Hegelpublishedverylittleafter1820;indeed,partofthemostinfluentialsetofhiswritingswerehisBerlinlectures,compiledbyhisstudentsandpublishedafterhisdeath.InatriptotheKarlsbadspain1829(forhealthreasonshavingtodowithchestpains),HegelunexpectedlyencounteredSchelling.Therehadcertainlybeenafallingoutbetweenthetwoovertheyears;SchellinghadnottakenkindlytoHegel’sreferenceinthe1807PhenomenologytoSchelling’s“identityphilosophy”asthe“nightinwhichallcowsareblack.”(Inaletter,HegelhaddenieditwasareferencetoSchelling,insistingthatitreferredonlytohismisguidedfollowers,butSchellingdidnot,withsomeright,believeit.)Schellingwassomewhatbitteroverhowhisoldfriendhadeclipsedhiminfame,andhewasconvincedthatHegelhadborrowedfarmorefromhimthanHegelhadeveradmittedinprintorinprivate.Theybothreportedbackontheirencountertotheirwives;Hegelsaiditwasjustlikeoldtimes,butSchellingwasfarmorecircumspectandcoldaboutthemeeting.ItwasclearthatHegel,whonowthoughtofhimselfasanoldmaninfactandnotjustinnickname,andwhowasnotinthebestofhealth,feltanemotionalholeinhislifethathadfollowedthebreakupofhimself,SchellingandHolderlin¨aseachhadgonetheirseparateways.Hewasreadyforareconciliation;Schellingwasnot(oratleastnotyet).Inrecognitionofhisstatus,hewasmadeRectoroftheuniversityfor1829to1830.In1830atalunchwiththeroyalfamily,Hegelwasremindedbythewifeoftheking’sbrotherthatherfatherwastheprinceofHomburgvorderHohe,apostage-stampprincipalityoutside¨ofFrankfurtwhereIsakvonSinclairhademployedHolderlinafter¨DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:41WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n48terrypinkardHolderlin’sdismissalfromtheGontardhousehold.SheandHegeldrifted¨offintoreminiscencesofthosedays,especiallyofHolderlin,nowliving¨inTubingeninastateofnon-violentbutnonethelesscompletemadness.¨Hegel,caughtupagaininhismemoriesashehadbeenwithSchelling,begantospeakatlengthabouthisoldfriend(astheprincessnotedinherdiary,takingonanalmostProustianvoiceavantlalettre,:“Atthatpoint,hebegantospeakofHolderlin,whomtheworldhasforgotten–¨ofhisbook,Hyperion–allofwhichhadconstitutedanepoque´formeonaccountofmysisterAuguste’srelationtothem–andIfoundbythesoundingofthisnameatruejoy–awholelostpastwentthroughme...itwasaremembranceawakenedasotherwisewouldbedonethroughasmellormelodyorsound.”26)Hegel’shealthcontinuedtodeteriorate;thegastrointestinalailmentthateventuallykilledhimin1831wasactingupthroughouttheyearof1830;hehadtoconfinehimselftoblandfoodsandabandonmanyofthethingsheliked,suchasdrinkingtea;hiswifenoticedhowhisnormallycheerytemperamentwasnotsomuchinevidence,andHegelrarelyfeltgoodenoughtogooutintheevening,eventohisbelovedopera.Ashishealthdeteriorated,hisoutburstsoftemper,whichcouldtakeonakindofgaleforceattimes,begantoaccelerate.Hebecamemoredogmaticabouthisownviews,quicktotakeoffense,andmorelikelybothtostartanargumentandrefusetobackdownevenwhenitwasclearthathewaswrong.ButevenHegelhimselfknewsomethingwaswrongwithhim;heconfessedtohisfriend,Zelter,thathehadbecometoocaughtupindealingwithhisopponents,andafteroneviolentargumentwithagoodfriend,VarnhagenvonEnse,HegelrespondedtoVarnhagen’sofferofahandshakewithanembrace,tearsinhiseyes.Hegelhimselfseemednottolikethepersonhisillnessandstressesweremakinghiminto.WhentheFrenchin1830stagedanewrevolution,drivingouttherestorationkingandinstallingLouisPhilippe,the“bourgeoisking,”Hegel’sstudentswereecstatic,andtheythoughthewouldbetoo.Instead,theyfoundhimwithagrumpyresponse,akindofdismissalofthenewRevolution’sseriousness,andevenadislikeofitassomekindofadolescent,RomanticreplayofthefirstRevolution,onlythistimewithagreatdangertotheEuropeanpeaceandthemovementofEuropeanreformthanhadbeenthehardwonprizeofthefirstRevolutionandtheNapoleonicwars.Tohisbaffledstudents,Hegel,thegregariousmanwhoeachyeartoastedthestormingoftheBastille,seemedtobefadingintoanoldman,fearfulofthefuture.26CitedinOttoPoggeler,“Einleitung,”inChristophJammeandOttoP¨oggeler,eds.,¨HomburgvorderHoheinderdeutschenGeistesgeschichte:StudienzumFreun-¨deskreisumHegelundHolderlin¨(Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta,1986),p.15.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:41WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife49Thiswas,however,notquitetrue.Forthefirsttime,Hegeltookupthemeaningofmoderneventsinhislecturesonthephilosophyofhistory,andwhenhecametotheRevolution,hevirtuallyechoedWordsworth’slines(aboutwhichhedidnotknow)ofthegloryofbeingyoungatthattimewhenhetoldthestudents,“Theprincipleofthefreedomofthewillthereforevindicateditselfagainstexistingright...Thiswasaccordinglyagloriousdawn.Allthinkingbeingsjointlycel-ebratedthisepoch.Sublimeemotionruledatthattime,aspiritualenthusiasmpeeredintotheheartoftheworld,asifthereconciliationbetweenthedivinewiththesecularwerenowfirstaccomplished.”27Inadditiontotheselectures,healsoembarkedonalengthycritiqueoftheupcomingEnglishReformBillthenbeingdebatedintheEnglishparliamentandwhichwasbeingfollowedwithintenseinterestacrossEurope,particularlyamongthereformmindedinGermany.HebitterlyattackedtheEnglishsystemofawardingofficeonthebasisofaristo-craticfamilyconnections(claimingthatinEngland,insteadofvaluinguniversityeducationandscience,theyvaluethe“crassignoranceoffox-hunters”28),andhegaveaneloquentdescriptionandmoraldenun-ciationoftheEnglishtreatmentoftheconqueredIrish.WhatwasatworkinEngland,hethought,wasthedarkersideofmodernlife,thetendencyforpropertyandmonetaryintereststotakeover,suchthatonlyindividual“rights”(thatis,propertyrights)cometocount.Indeed,theEnglishconstitution,ratherthanbeingthemodelforallEuropeandevelopment(asmanyGermanreformersseemedtothink)wasinfactasystemflawedinitscore.Theproposalsofthereformbill,heargued,willonlyacceleratetheweakeningofcommunaltiesandthethickstructureofmediatinginstitutionsneededtokeeptheforcesofmoderncommercialsocietyincheckandpresentEnglandwithwhatitoughttofearmost:Violentrevolution.(ThatEngland,theothergreatProtestantpower,besidesPrussia,wasapparentlyheadingdownthispathwas,ofcourse,immenselytroublingtoHegel.)TheoutbreakofacholeraepidemicinEasternEuropethatspreadtoGermanybythesummerof1831ledtheHegelfamilytoretreattothecountrysideoutsideofBerlin(inKreuzberg,todayasmuchapartoftheinnercityasanywhereelse).Hegelhadhisbirthdaycelebrationthere,andallseemedtobewell.Thefamilymovedbackintotheirquartersinthecityasthenewtermbegan,andHegelbeganlecturingonthephilos-ophyofright.Bynow,however,Hegel’sstarhadbeguntosetwiththe27Hegel,PhilosophiederGeschichte,Werke,12,p.529;PhilosophyofHistory(NewYork:DoverPublications,1956),p.447.28Hegel,“UberdieenglischeReformbill,”¨Werke,11,p.103;“TheEnglishReformBill,”inHegel’sPoliticalWritings,p.310.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:41WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n50terrypinkardstudents;hisdismissaloftheJulyRevolutionof1830,andhisincreasingfrailtyledthemtootheryoungermorepopularteachers.(Hegelresentedthis.)OnSunday,November13,1831,HegelandMariewerelookingfor-wardtohavingsomefriendsoverfordinner;duringtheday,however,Hegeltookillandgotprogressivelyworse.Thenextday,hisconditionworsened,andthedoctorsthoughtitmightbecholera.Hegel,whowasveryfearfulofcontractingthedisease(thinkingthatwithhisbaddiges-tivesystem,hewasparticularlyatrisk),musthavesuspectedtheworstwhenhesawthenextdaythatnotonebuttwodoctorswereattend-ingtohim(twodoctorsbeingrequiredbyPrussianlawifcholerawassuspectedinapatient).Notwishingtodistresshisfamily,heretainedasangfroidaboutthematter.Around5:00intheafternoon,MariesentforHegel’snext-doorneighborandgoodfriend,JohannesSchulze.BythetimeSchulzearrivedattheHegelhouseafewminuteslater,Hegelwasdead.Hegel’ssuddendeathcameasagreatshocktotheBerlincommu-nity.HisfuneralonNovember16wasattendedbyamassiveaudience.Thefuneralorationsbythetheologian,F.Marheineke,andhisfriend,FriedrichForster,likenedhimtoamodernsaviorwhohadcometo¨explainthemodernworldtoitself.EventhoughHegelandhissister,Christiane,hadnotseeneachothersinceearlyinHegel’sNurembergdays,Christianetookthenewsofhisdeathverybadly;afterashortcorrespondencewithMarie,ChristianewenttotheNagoldRiveramonthafterHegel’sdeathanddrownedherself.TheHegelianschoolthatimmediatelyformed(andimmediatelydedicateditselftoputtingoutacompleteeditionofhisworks,includingtheunpublishedlectures)beganalsoalmostimmediatelytofightamongthemselvesastowhowasthetruebeareroftheHegelianphilosophy.Beforethe1840shadevenbegun,theHegelianschoolhadsplitintoseveraldifferentfactions,andthewingknownasthe“left”Hegelians(aphraseoriginallymadeasajestbyDavidFriedrichStrauss)begantotakeHegel’sthoughtinanunanticipatedrevolutionarydirection,muchtothealarmofthePrussiangovernment(andlatertothealarmofallthereigningpowers).Themostgiftedofthem,KarlMarx,claimedtohavetransformedHegel’s“idealism”intoascientificmaterialismthatwassupposedtoprovideboththecritiqueoftheoldorderandtheblueprintforanewsocialistorder.Inthelate1830s,SchellingintroducedhimselftooneofHegel’ssonswhowasattendinghislecturesinMunich;neverhavingreconciledwithHegelwhilebothwerestillalive,SchellingsoughthisreconciliationwithHegel’sson,andthetwobecamefriends.Afewyearslater,intheensuinguproaroverthe“left”Hegelians,thegovernmentofferedaspe-cialchairtoSchelling,specifyingthatamongotherthingshehadadutyDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:41WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel:ALife51to“stampoutthedragonseedofHegelianisminBerlin.”OnNovember15,1841–almosttenyearstothedayafterHegel’sdeath–SchellinggavehisinaugurallectureinBerlin.SittinginhisaudiencethatdaywereSørenKierkegaard,MichaelBakunin,andFriedrichEngels–theearlyexponentsofwhatwouldlaterbecalledexistentialism,anarchism,andMarxism.ThelongmarchofHegel’sposthumousinfluenceonEuropeanhistoryhadbegun.Holderlin,thinkingofHegel,diedin¨1843.Schellingdiedin1854.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:41WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.002CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\npaulfranks2AncientSkepticism,ModernNaturalism,andNihilisminHegel’sEarlyJenaWritingsi.introductionHegelhasoftenbeenportrayedasadogmaticmetaphysician,uninter-estedinepistemologicalissuesandindefendinghisphilosophyagainstepistemicchallenges.Indeed,theveryideaofepistemologyasadis-tinctphilosophicalfocusordisciplinewasframedinpartbythosewhoopposedHegelianism.1Buttheportrayalisacaricature.Hegelisinterestedinepistemolog-icalissuesand,asseveralinterpretershaverecentlyobserved,hasasophisticatedviewoftheepistemicstatusofhisphilosophy.2CentralhereisHegel’srelationtoskepticism,arecurringthemethroughouthiscareer.ThischapterisconcernedwiththeviewofskepticismexpressedinHegel’searlyJenawritings–notonlyinhisessayonancientandmodernskepticism,thetopicofrecentdiscus-sion,butalsoinhiswritingsaboutJacobi.Othershaveexplored,togreateffect,Hegel’spreferenceforancientovermodernscepticism.IwillarguethatthemodernskepticismdisparagedbyHegelshouldbeunderstoodasakindofnaturalism,andthat,notwithstandinghisviewAllHegelreferencesarecitedfromGesammelteWerke(GW),ed.byRhenisch-WestfalischeAkademiederWissenschaften(Hamburg:Meiner,¨1968-);TheorieWerk-Ausgabe(TW-A),ed.byEvaMoldenhauerandKarl-MarkusMichel(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1970);andthepertinentEnglishtranslation.Unascribedtranslationsaremyown.1SeeKlausChristianKohnke,¨EntstehungundAufstiegdesNeukantianismus:DiedeutscheUniversitatsphilosophiezwischenIdealismusundPositivismus¨(FrankfurtamMain:Suhrkamp,1986),partiallytrans.byR.J.HollingdaleasTheRiseofNeokantianism.GermanAcademicPhilosophybetweenIdealismandPos-itivism(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991).2SeeMichaelForster,HegelandSkepticism(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1989)andHegel’sIdeaofaPhenomenologyofSpirit(Chicago,IL:UniversityofChicagoPress,1998);also,KennethWestphal,Hegel’sEpistemologicalRealism(Dordrecht:Kluwer,1989)andHegel’sEpistemology(Indianapolis,IN:Hackett,2003).Itshouldbenotedthathavingepistemologicalinterestsdoesnotofitselfrenderone’sphilosophynonmetaphysical.52DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nAncientSkepticism,ModernNaturalism,andNihilism53ofitsphilosophicalmerits,itremainsincompetitionwithhisownphilosophicalproject.IwillalsoarguethattheancientskepticismtakenbyHegeltobeofphilosophicalimportanceisnotmerelyretrievedfromthepagesofancientbooks,forHegelviewsitasintimatelyconnectedtomodernphilosophy’snihilism,thematizedbyJacobi.WhileHegel’sviewsaboutskepticismandotherimportantmattersshiftssignificantlyafterSchelling’sdeparturefromJenain1803,hisearlyviewsconsti-tutetheindispensablebackdropagainstwhichtounderstandthePhe-nomenologyandhislaterwritings.Nowhereisthismoretruethaninthecaseofskepticism.ii.modernskepticismandpost-kantiannaturalismThreequestionscanhelpustoexamineaphilosopher’sinterestinskep-ticism.First,whichelementofknowledgedoesthepertinentskepticismtarget?RecallingPlato’saccountofknowledgeastruebeliefpluslogos,wemightask,forexample,whetheraspersioniscastupontruth,belief,orreason.Second,whatdoesthephilosopherwanttodotothisskep-ticism?Doesshewant,forexample,torefuteit,ortouseitasafilter,takingherstandonwhatsurvives?Doesshewanttochangetheques-tionfrom“Doweknowanythingatall?”to“Howdoweknowwhatweknow?”Ordoesshewant,say,topreemptskepticism,byavoid-ingwaysofthinkingthatletskepticaldoubtsarise?Third,whatdoesthephilosophertaketheupshotofskepticismtobe?ForDescartes,ourpowertodoubtrevealshumanfreedom:theinfinityofthewilloutrunsthefinitudeofourknowledge.ForKant,ourskepticismaboutsyntheticaprioriprinciplesshowsthatweconstitutetheempiricalworldthroughapriorisynthesis.WhatdoesHegeltakeskepticism’supshottobe?Here,wemustaskthesequestionstwice,sinceHegeldistinguishestwokindsofskepticism,inwhichhetakesdifferentinterests.IwillconsiderfirstthemodernskepticismthatHegeldisparages,andthentheancientskepticismhevalorizes.Hegel’sexplicittargetisGottlobErnstSchulze.AlreadyfamousforhispseudepigraphiccriticismofthefirstGermanidealistprojectin1792,3SchulzeistakenbyHegeltorepresentmodernskepticism.This,however,isinfact,accordingtoHegel,notscepticismatall,butrather3SeeSchulze,Aenesidemus,oderUberdieFundamentedervondemHerrnProfessor¨ReinholdinJenageliefertenElementar-Philosophie,nebsteinerVerteidigungdesSkeptizismusgegendieAnmassungenderVernunftkritik,ed.byManfredFrank(Hamburg:Meiner,1996).AselectionistranslatedinBetweenKantandHegel:TextsintheDevelopmentofPost-KantianIdealism,trans.anded.byGeorgediGiovanniandH.S.Harris(Indianapolis,IN:Hackett,2000),hereafterBKH.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n54paulfranksaversionofdogmatismthattakesspecificaimatthespeculative–thatis,atwhatHegelconsidersgenuinelyphilosophical.Incharacterizingthispseudo-skepticism,HegeldoesnothaveSchulzealoneinview.IntheEncyclopediaof1827and1830,herefersreaderstotheearlieressayforacomparisonwithancientskepticismofmodernskepticismandHumeanskepticisminparticular.4Accord-ingly,MichaelForsterseekstogeneralizeHegel’starget.First,Forsterarguesthat,whereasancientskepticismisbasedonamethod,modernskepticismincontrast:isfoundedonaclusterofspecificproblems–inthecorrelativethreefoldsenseofproblemswhichariseforsomekindsofclaimsorbeliefsbutnotforothers,whichareraisednotintheserviceofanypositivegoalbutsimplybecausetheyseemtodemandsolutions,andwhichessentiallyrelyonthepresuppositionofthecorrectnessofcertainotherclaimsorbeliefs.Typicallythemodernskeptic’sspecificproblemsconcernthelegitimacyofproceedingfromclaimsaboutacer-tainkindofsubjectmatter,theknowledgeofwhichisassumedtobeabsolutelyorrelativelyunproblematic,toclaimsaboutasecondkindofsubjectmatter,theknowledgeofwhichisnotfelttobeunproblematicinthesameway.Atonetime,theunproblematicsubjectmattermightbeone’sown(current)mentalstates,andtheunproblematicsubjectmattermightbetheexternalphysicalworld,andtheproblematicsubjectmattertheobjectsofreligiousbelief.Schulze,themodernskepticwithwhomHegelisdirectlyconcernedinTheRelationofSkepticismtoPhilosophy,isunderstoodbyHegeltoemphasizethelatterkindofskepticalproblem,whileHume’swritingscontainexamplesofbothkindsofexamples.5Forsterthenproceedsto“focusononeofthoseproblems,theproblemofourknowledgeoftheexternalworld,orwhatBerkeleycalledtheproblemofa“veilofperception.”6ForsterisrighttogeneralizeHegel’starget.However,tocharacterizeHegel’stargetinthisparticularwayisproblematic.First,Schulzeisnothimselfa“veilofperception”skeptic.Infact,heisadirectrealist.InhisKritikdertheoretischenPhilosophie–theworkdiscussedbyHegel–SchulzefollowsThomasReidinrejectingwhathecalls“thegroundlesshypothesisthatallourknowledgeofobjectsismediatedbyrepresentations”.74Hegel,GW,19:57,20:77;TW-A,8:112;TheEncyclopediaLogic,trans.byT.F.Geraets,W.A.SuchtingandH.S.Harris(Indianapolis,IN:HackettPublishing,1991),p.80,§39A.5MichaelForster,HegelandSkepticism(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1989),p.11.6Forster,HegelandSkepticism,p.13.7Schulze,KritikdertheoretischenPhilosophie(Hamburg:Bohn,1801),2:7.ForsterisawarethatSchulzeisnota“veilofperception”skeptic.SeeFootnote6aboveandForster,HegelandSkepticism,188,note10,wherehenotesthatSchulzeexemptsDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nAncientSkepticism,ModernNaturalism,andNihilism55Second,ifwepaymoreattentiontothespecificdetailsofSchulzeandhisallies,wewillfindthatmodernskepticismisindeed,contrarytoForster,basedonamethod.Tobesure,thismethodisquitedifferentfromthatofancientskepticism,anditsuseinphilosophyisvirulentlyopposedbyHegel.Itisthemethodofthenaturalsciences.Schulzeisinfactarepresentativeofalargertendencythatmaybecharacterizedassharingtwocommitments:post-Kantiannatural-ismandpost-Jacobianfoundationalism.8OthersincludeCarlChristianErhardSchmid–thetargetofFichte’sinfamousannihilation–JohannFriedrichFries–Hegel’sacademicrivalandphilosophical/politicalenemy–andFriedrichEduardBeneke–whomHegelhelpedtopushoutoftheUniversityofBerlinandagainstwhomtheaccusationof“psychologism”wasfirstlevelled.9Post-KantiannaturalismistheviewthatwhatismostvaluableinKant’srevolutionisthecontinuationofHume’sdemolitionofrational-istmetaphysics.Kant’stranscendentalmethod,however,isregardedasanunfortunateresidueofKant’sownrationalistmetaphysics.Onthisview,whatphilosophyrequires,ifitistobesetonthesurepathofascience,isthemethodofthenaturalsciences,whichisalonecapableofattainingknowledge.Philosophyshouldthereforebecome,inFries’words,“psychologicalor,better,anthropologicalcognition.”10Post-Kantiannaturalismis,then,amethodologicalnaturalism.Someversionsare,however,substantivelynonnaturalist.Forexample,Friesmaintainsthat,althoughwecannotknowthingsinthemselves,wecanandshouldhavefaithinthenoumenalrealm.Incontrast,Schulzeisnotonlyamethodologicalbutalsoasubstantivenaturalist.Hearguesthatweshouldbewhollyagnosticaboutthingsinthemselves,andevenaboutwhetherhumanknowledgeisinprinciplelimitedtoappearances.ThisisSchulze’sversionofskepticism:wecanknowobjectsgivenbyfromskepticismthemodernnaturalsciences,specificallyphysicsandastronomy.Yet,formostofhisdiscussion,Forstersetsthispointaside.8SeeFranks,“SerpentineNaturalismandProteanNihilism:TranscendentalPhilosophyinAnthropologicalNeo-Kantianism,GermanIdealism,andNeo-Kantianism,”inOxfordHandbookofContinentalPhilosophy,ed.byBrianLeiterandMichaelRosen,(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),pp.252–256.9JohannEduardErdmann,GrundrissderGeschichtederPhilosophie,2nded.,(Berlin:Hertz,1870),2:646,seemstohaveusedthetermfirst,tocriticiseBeneke,inwhoseforceddeparturefromtheUniversityofBerlinHegelhadapparentlybeeninvolved.WilhelmWindelband,GeschichtederneuerenPhilosophie(Leipzig:Breitkopf&Hartel,¨1880),pp.386–397extendsthetermtootherswhosemethodisnottranscendental,forexample,Fries.10Fries,NeueoderanthropologischeKritik,textofthe1828–1831,2ndedition,whichrevisedthe1807edition,reprintedinSamtlicheschriften¨,ed.byGertKonigand¨LutzGeldsetzer(Aalen:ScientiaVerlag,1967),1:29.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n56paulfranksmeansofthesenses,butwecannotknowanythingaboutthingsinthemselves,andsowecannotknowwhethertheobjectsweknowareappearancesofthingsinthemselves.ThoughhardlyKantian,itiscer-tainlypost-Kantian.ThesecondfeatureofthebroadertendencyrepresentedbySchulzeiswhatIcallpost-Jacobianfoundationalism.Thisisaversion–or,rather,afamilyofversions–ofthethesisthatanybodyofgenuineknowledgehasfoundationalelementsthateithercannotorshouldnotbedoubted.Thesefoundationalelementsaretermed“mattersoffact”(Tatsachen).11NobodyismoreidentifiedwiththisapproachthanJacobi,whomHegelcharacterizesaspossessedby“holyzealforthegoodcauseofactualthings”.12Jacobiarguesforcefullythatthephilosophicaltra-ditionsinceAristotle,withitsassumptionthatjustificationconsistsindemonstrationfromfirstprinciples,canneverrefuteskepticism–andindeedcannotavoidnihilism,towhichIwillreturnlater.Theonlyescapeistopreemptscepticismbyinsistingonthefoundationalstatusofindemonstrablemattersoffact.Now,Jacobiisneithera11ThisneologismwascoinedbyJoachimJohannSpaldinginhispartialtranslationofBishopButler’sTheAnalogyofReligion,NaturalandRevealedtotheConstitutionandCourseofNature(London:Knapton,1736),asanequivalenttotheEnglish“mattersoffact”,itselfatranslationoftheLatin“resfacti”.SeeBestatigung¨dernaturlichenundgeoffenbartenReligionausihrerGleichf¨ormigkeit¨,trans.bySpalding,inAbrißvondemneuestenZustandderGelehrsamkeitundeinigenwichtigenStreitigkeiteninderPolitischenWelt(Gottingen:Schmid,¨1739),8:176–200.TheEnglishphrasehasitsoriginalhomeinlegaldiscourse,whereitisusedtodesignateanactoreventacceptedbythecourtashavingoccurred,onthebasisofstipulationorofevidencesuppliedbywitnesses.RobertBoylehaddeployedthisnotionofafact–thatis,aneventverifiedbywitnesses–inhisdefenceoftheepistemicstatusofexperimentalreports,whichwerecrucialtothenewnaturalsciencebutwhichdidnotfitthemodelofdemonstrationfromfirstprinciplesstillchampionedby,forexample,ThomasHobbes.SeeRose-MarySargent,TheDiffidentNaturalist:RobertBoyleandthePhilosophyofExperiment(Chicago,IL:UniversityofChicagoPress,1995),pp.49–50,131–138.Later,Butlerhadusedtheverysamenotiontoarguethat,ifnaturalsciencecouldrelyontheevidenceofwitnesses,thensocouldChristianity.InitsnewGermansetting,cutofffromitsoriginsincommonlaw,theterm“Tatsache”spreadquickly,comingtosignifythatwhichanyreasonablepersonshouldacknowledge,evenifitoriginatesinanepistemicsourceunrecognizedbyphilosophicaltradition.12Hegel,GW,4:378;T-WA,2:380;FaithandKnowledge(hereafter,FK),trans.byWalterCerfandH.S.Harris,(Albany,NY:SUNYPress,1988),p.140.Ihavemodi-fiedtheCerfandHarristranslation,sinceHegeldoesnotusetheterm“Tatsachen”intheoriginal.ButCerfandHarrishaveunderstoodHegel’sintention.SeeGW,4:371;T-WA,2:370;FK,131:“Koppen...expressesJacobi’sconceptionofknowl-¨edgeinaneasilyintelligibleway:wehumanbeingsreceivethethingsasmattersoffact[Thatsachen]throughsenseandthroughthesupernaturalrevelationofseeing,perceivingandfeeling.”DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nAncientSkepticism,ModernNaturalism,andNihilism57methodologicalnorasubstantivenaturalist.Asweshallsee,hetendstoseemodernnaturalscienceaspartofmodernphilosophy,henceaspotentiallynihilistic.Healsothinksthatwehavetheabilitytoperceivenotonlysensiblebutalsosupersensibleobjects.But,asHegelnotes,Jacobibeginsaround1800tomoderatehisanti-philosophicaltalk,call-ingforphilosophytoberenewedratherthanabandoned.13After1805,JacobiallieshimselfwithFries,hencewithpost-Kantianmethodologi-calnaturalism,whichisnottosaythatheadoptsthisposition.14WecannowmakesenseofSchulze’sspecificpositionastargetedbyHegelin1802.AccordingtoSchulze:theexistenceofthatwhichisgivenaspresentwithinthedomainofourcon-sciousnesshasentirelyundeniablecertainty.Forsinceitispresentinconscious-ness,wecoulddoubtitsexistencejustaslittleasconsciousnessitself;towanttodoubtconsciousnesshoweverisabsolutelyimpossible,becausesuchadoubt,sinceitcannotoccurwithoutconsciousness,wouldthereforebenothing.Nowonecallsthatwhichisgiveninandwithconsciousnessafactofconsciousness.Consequentlythefactsofconsciousnessaretheundeniableactualitytowhichallphilosophicalspeculationmustrelateitself,andwhichistobeexplainedormadegraspablethroughthesespeculations.15WhatisthecontentofthefactsofconsciousnessappealedtobySchulze?Forstersuppliesthefollowinggloss:Modernskepticssupposethatnoskepticaldifficultiescanariseabouttheirown(current)mentalcontents,andsofeelthemselvesjustifiedinretainingbeliefsaboutthemaspartofthebasisoftheirskepticalattackonbeliefsabouttheexternalworld.16But,asIhavementioned,ForsterhimselfwouldadmitthatSchulze’sfactsofconsciousnessarenotbeliefsaboutmycurrentmentalcontents.InSchulze’swords,citedbyHegel:Thosefactsareeithercognitionsofobjects,orexpressionsofvolitions,orfeelingsofpleasureanddispleasure....1713Jacobi,“UbereineWeissagungLichtenbergs”,in¨TaschenbuchfurdasJahr1802¨,ed.byJ.G.Jacobi(Hamburg:Perthes,1802),p.40n,citedbyHegel,GW,4:374n;T-WA,2:374n;FK,135n.14See,forexample,Jacobi’smanycitationsofFriesinhis1815prefacetothereprintofDavidHumeinvol.2ofFriedrichHeinrichJacobi’sWerke,ed.byJ.F.Koppen¨andC.J.F.Roth(Leipzig,Fleischer,1812–1825);MPW,537–590.15Schulze,Kritik,1:51.16Forster,HegelandSkepticism,p.14.17Schulze,Kritik,1:52,citedbyHegel,GW,4:200;T-WA,2:218;“OntheRelation-shipofSkepticismtoPhilosophy,ExpositionofitsDifferentModificationsandComparisonoftheLatestFormwiththeAncientOne”(hereafterRSP),trans.byH.S.Harris,indiGiovanniandHarris,BKH,317.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n58paulfranksNotethatfactsofthefirstkind,whichunderlietheoreticalphiloso-phy,arecognitionsofobjects,notofmentalrepresentationsofobjects.Specifically,theyarewhatSchulzecalls“immediate(intuitive)cogni-tions”,thatis,statesorepisodesinwhichtheknownobjectisitselfpresenttotheknowingI,andthatobjectcomesintothedomainofconsciousness,oristhatinwhichconsciousnessextendstotheobjectwithoutthemediationofsomethingdistinctfromtheobject.18Inotherwords,theimmediacyoffactsofconsciousnessconsistsneitherintheirmentalcharacternorinthenonconceptualityoftheircontent.Itconsistsratherintheirbeingdirectpresentationsofexternalobjects.Factsofconsciousness,inthissense,groundmodernnaturalsciencessuchasphysicsandastronomy,whicharewell-groundedinsofarastheyexplainthesensibledataintermsofnaturallaws.Similarly,thetaskoftheoreticalphilosophyistoexplainhowthehumanmindiscapableoftheseimmediatecognitions.Iturnnowtothethreequestionsannouncedearlier.First,post-Kantiannaturalismisskepticalaboutjustificationorlogos–morespecifically,whatHegelcalls“therational”ortheAbsolute,thethemeoftrueorspeculativephilosophy.Inthisrespect,itisadescendantofthenaturalisticskepticismthatawokeKantfromhisdogmaticslumber,whichcouldfindnoroomforreasoninwhatittooktobethenatu-ralworld.Anditdiffersfromexternalworldskepticism,whichques-tionswhetherknowledge-claimsmeetthetruthcondition–whether,forexample,mentalrepresentationscorrespondtoexternalthings.Second,asweshallsee,whatHegelwantstodotothemodernskepti-cismhedisparagesistosubjectittotheancientskepticismhevalorises,sodiscussionispremature.However,third,wecanalreadyanticipatetheupshotofHegel’sdiscussionofSchulze’sso-calledskepticism.Itisthatthemethodofspeculativephilosophymustnotbethemethodofnaturalscience.iii.ancientskepticismIn1802,Hegelisnotyetinapositiontomakethepositiveclaimthatthenonnaturalisticmethodofspeculativephilosophyisintimatelyrelatedtoancientskepticism.Forthisdevelopment,thePhenomenologymustbeconsulted.Butheisalreadyinapositiontosaythatthemethodofancientskepticismisindispensabletospeculativephilosophy–asa18Schulze,Kritik,1:56.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nAncientSkepticism,ModernNaturalism,andNihilism59weaponinthestrugglewithunphilosophy,includingSchulze’spseudo-skepticism.Hegeldistinguishesthreekindsormomentsofancientskepticism:Pyrrhonian,Platonic,andAgrippan.Onwhathecallstheirnegativesides,allaredirectedagainstsomeversionofwhatHegeltermsdog-matism.Theirpositivesides–inmyterminology,theirupshots–are,however,quitedifferent.Whatconcernsme,onceagain,isinthefirstplace,thequestionofidentification.However,whereasinPartIIofthischapter,wehadthecontemporaneousinstanceandneededtoformulatethegeneralkindofscepticism,wehaveherethegeneralkindandneedtoidentifythecontemporaneousinstance.Hegel’sfocusonthemethodofAgrippanskepticism,alongwithhisdefinitionofdogmatism,givesusaspecificationofancientskepticismasanattackonlogosorthejustificatoryelementofknowledge.TheAgrippanmethodisencapsulatedinthefiveAgrippantropes:1.diver-sity/discrepancy,2.infiniteregress,3.relativity,4.arbitrarypresuppo-sition/hypothesis,and5.circularity.RobertFogelingivesthefollowing,helpfulcharacterizationofhowthetropesoperate:TwoofAgrippa’smodes,discrepancyandrelativity,triggerademandforjusti-ficationbyrevealingthattherearecompetingclaimsconcerningthenatureoftheworldweperceive...Thusthemodesofdiscrepancyandrelativityforceanyonewhomakesclaimsbeyondthemodestexpressionofopiniontogivereasonsinsupportoftheseclaims...Thetaskoftheremainingthreemodes–thosebasedonregressadinfinitum,circularityand(arbitrary)hypothesis–istoshowthatitisimpossibletocompletethisreason-givingprocessinasatisfactoryway.IfthePyrrhonistsareright,noargument,oncestarted,canavoidfallingintooneofthetrapsofcircularity,infiniteregress,orarbitraryassumption.19ThesethreetrapshavecometobeknowncollectivelyastheAgrippantrilemma.Thepictureisthatthedogmatistmakesaclaim;theskepticthentriggersademandforjustificationbyshowingtheclaimeithertobeoneamongmany,orelsetoberelativetosomecontextorother;inresponse,thedogmatistattemptstoprovidealogosorjustificatoryaccountoftheclaim,anaccountthattheskeptictriestoimpaleononeofthethreehornsofinfiniteregress,circularityandarbitraryhypothesis;andtheskepticconcludesthatthedogmatist’sclaimamountsnoteventojustifiedbelief,letaloneknowledge.19RobertFogelin,PyrrhonianReflectionsonKnowledgeandJustification(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1994),p.116.HegelagreeswithFogelinindistinguishingthetrilemmafromtheothertwotropes.Hediffersonlyinsofarashetakesdis-crepancyandrelativity,notonlyaspossibletriggers,butalsoaspossibleskepticalconclusions.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n60paulfranksHegeldefinesthetargetofancientskepticismasfollows:Theessenceofdogmatismconsistsinthisthatitpositssomethingfinite,some-thingburdenedwithanopposition(e.g.,pureSubject,orpureObject,orindual-ismthedualityasopposedtotheidentity)astheAbsolute”.20“TopositsomethingastheAbsolute”meanshere,Isuggest,totreatagroundasescapingtheAgrippantrilemma.WhatHegeladdsisadiagno-sis:nogroundcanescapethetrilemmaifitis“finite”or“burdenedwithopposition”.Conversely,hethinks,unlikeanAgrippanskeptic,thataproperly“infinite”grounddoesescapetheAgrippantrilemma.Thecon-temporaneoussignificanceofHegel’sparenthesisisclear:Fichte’sabso-luteI(“puresubject”),Spinoza’ssubstance(“pureobject”)andKant’stranscendentalunityofapperception(“duality”ofsubjectandobject)areallfiniteandhencevulnerabletoAgrippanskepticism.Incontrast,thespeculativeprincipleofSchelling’sandHegel’sidentityphilosophyisinfiniteandhenceabsolute.AlsoimplicithereisHegel’sviewthatanyattempttopositsomethingastheAbsolutebymeansofconceptsoftheunderstandingisboundtopositsomethingfiniteastheAbsolute,evenifthepositedsomethingcanmakesomeclaimtobeinfinite–asisthecasewithFichte,SpinozaandKant.Thisisbecauseallconceptsoftheunderstandingoperateaccordingtoalawforwhichitishardtofindabetterformulation–thoughHegeldoesnotciteit–thanBishopButler’swell-knownstatementthat“Everythingiswhatitis,andnotanotherthing.”21Thismeansthateverythingisthedeterminatethingthatitisinvirtueof1.itspositiveaspectoridentity,typicallyspelledoutintermsofintrinsicproperties,and2.itsnegativeaspectordifferencefromotherthings,typicallyspelledoutintermsofrelationalproperties,where3.thereisbetweenidentityanddifferenceanunqualifieddifferenceandinnosenseanidentity.Anydeterminationofagroundbymeansofaconceptgovernedbythislawwillipsofactoburdenthegroundinquestionwithopposition,sincethegroundisinpartdeterminedbymeansofadifferencethatisinnosenseanidentity.Forpresentpurposes,weneednotdeterminepreciselywhat,in1802,Hegelmeansby“infinite”.WemayalsopassquicklyoverPyrrhonianskepticism.Thisfirstkindormomentofancientskepticismis“directed,likeallphilosophygenerally,againstthedogmatismofordinarycon-sciousnessitself”,whileitspositivesidelies“whollyandonlyinchar-acter”–thatis,inawayoflifecharacterizedby“neutralitytowards20Hegel,GW,4:219;T-WA,2:245;RSP,inBKH,335.21JosephButler,“PrefacetotheSecondEdition,”FifteenSermonsPreachedattheRollsChapel(London:Knapton,1729),p.39.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nAncientSkepticism,ModernNaturalism,andNihilism61thenecessityofnature.”22AfterthediscoveryoftheNewWorld,wemodernsarewellawarethatourparticularwaysoflifearenottheonlyones,andsoweneednoparticularcontemporaneousequivalent.For“Platonicskepticism”,ontheotherhand,Hegelevidentlythinksthatthereisacontemporaneousequivalentwhoseidentificationpresentsnochallenge.Inastrikingpassage,hewrites:Whatmoreperfectandself-sustainingdocumentandsystemofgenuineskepti-cismcouldwefindthantheParmenidesinthePlatonicphilosophy?Itembracesthewholedomainofknowledgethroughconceptsofunderstanding,anddestroysit.ThisPlatonicskepticismisnotconcernedwithdoubtingthesetruthsoftheunderstanding...;ratheritisintentonthecompletedenialofalltruthtothissortofcognition.Thisskepticismdoesnotconstituteaparticularthinginasystem,butisitselfthenegativesideofthecognitionoftheAbsolute,anddirectlypresupposesReasonasthepositiveside...ifinanyonepropositionthatexpressesacognitionofReason,itsreflectedaspect–theconceptsthatarecontainedinit–isisolated,andthewaythattheyareboundtogetheriscon-sidered,itmustbecomeevidentthattheseconceptsaretogethersublated,orinotherwordstheyareunitedinsuchawaythattheycontradictthemselves;otherwiseitwouldnotbeapropositionofReasonbutonlyofunderstanding.23ThecontemporaneousequivalentisclearlyHegel’searlyversionoflogic.LikePlatonicskepticism,itisintendedtobe1.notmerelydoubtfulbutdestructiveofknowledgethroughconceptsoftheunderstanding,2.andcomprehensiveinsofaras3.itpresupposesasystematicaccountofthecategoriesandthesyllogism,anaccounttakenfromaspecula-tivemetaphysicsthatemploysthemethod,notofskepticaldestruc-tion,butratherofconstructioninintuition.24CloselyrelatedtotheearlyJenalogicistheprojectofcritique,undertakenintheCriticalJournalinwhichHegel’searlywritings,includingtheessayonskep-ticism,appear.Critiqueisalsodestructiveanditalsoassumes“theIdeaofphilosophy”as“thepreconditionandpresuppositionwithoutwhichitwouldonlybeabletosetonesubjectiveviewagainstanotherforeverandever,andneversettheAbsoluteagainsttheconditioned.”25UnlikePlatonicskepticismandlogic,however,critiquemerelyrespondstocontemporaneouscasesofunphilosophy,makingnopretensiontocomprehensiveness.22Hegel,GW,4:214;T-WA,2:238–239;RSP,inBKH,331.23Hegel,GW,4:207-208;T-WA,2:228-229;RSP,inBKH,323-324.24Forahelpfulaccount,seeForster,Hegel’sIdea,pp.110–114,167–177.25Hegel,GW4:117;T-WA2:171;“IntroductionontheEssenceofPhilosophicalCriticismGenerally,anditsRelationshiptothePresentStateofPhilosophyinParticular”,trans.H.S.Harris,inBKH,275.OncritiqueinHegel’searlyJenathinking,seeWilliamBristow,HegelandtheTransformationofPhilosophicalCritique(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n62paulfranksFormypurposes,theinterestingandchallengingquestionofidenti-ficationis:whatisthecontemporaneousequivalentofAgrippanskepti-cism?LikePlatonicskepticism,Agrippanskepticismiscomprehensiveinitsdestructiveness.Butitdoesnotattaincomprehensivenessbecauseitissystematic,invirtueofpresupposingthespeculativeprincipleofidentity.Rather,itattainscomprehensivenessbecauseithasnopresup-positionsofitsown.Itsubjectsdogmatismtoanimmanentcritiquethatprovisionallyassumesonlythepresuppositionsofthedogmatiststhemselves.OfAgrippanskepticismHegelwrites:Thefivelatertropesofskepticism,whichmakeupthegenuinearsenalofitsweaponsagainstphilosophicalcognition,arewhollyandexclusivelyrelatedtothiscompleteseparationofphilosophies,andthecompletefixationoftheirdogmasanddividinglines,andlikewiserelatedtothecontemporaryorientationofskepticismagainstdogmatismononeside,andagainstphilosophyitselfontheother.26Thephrase“thecontemporaryorientationofskepticism”[nunmehrigeRichtung]couldreferonlytotheroleofskepticismwithinlateancientphilosophy,withitscompetingschools.ButitcouldalsorefertotheroleofskepticisminHegel’sday,withitscompetingsystems.IhavealreadynotedHegel’sparentheticalreferencetoFichte,SpinozaandKantasexamplesofdogmatism.NowIwanttoproposethatAgrippanskep-ticismhasnotonlycontemporaneoustargets,butacontemporaneousequivalent,whichshouldbeidentifiedwithwhatJacobicallsnihilism,orsomethingveryclosetoit.iv.modernnihilismFirst,anobjectionmustbepreempted.FarfrombeingamoderntendencycorrespondingtoAgrippanskepticism,whatJacobicallsnihilismis,accordingtoBeiser,aradicalversionofexternalworldskepticism–exactlythemodernskepticismthat,onForster’sview,Hegeldisparages:ThemostimportantpointtonoteaboutJacobi’suseoftheterm[‘nihilism’]isthatheusesittodesignateaspecificallyepistemologicalposition.Thetermisvirtuallysynonymouswith,althoughslightlybroaderthan,anothertermofJacobi’s:‘egoism’(Egoismus).AccordingtotheearlyJacobi,theegoistisaradicalidealistwhodeniestheexistenceofallrealityindependentofhisownsensations.Heisindeedasolipsist,butasolipsistwhodisputesthepermanentrealityofhisownselfasmuchastheexternalworldandotherminds.Inhislaterwritings,however,Jacobitendstoreplacetheterm‘egoist’with‘nihilist’.Liketheegoist,thenihilistissomeonewhodeniestheexistenceofeverythingindependentofthe26Hegel,GW,4:218;T-WA,2:243;RSP,inBKH,334.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nAncientSkepticism,ModernNaturalism,andNihilism63immediatecontentsofhisownconsciousness,whetherexternalobjects,otherminds,God,orevenhisownself.Allthatexistsforthenihilististhereforehisownmomentaryconsciousstates,hisfleetingimpressionsorrepresentations;buttheserepresentationsrepresent,itisnecessarytoadd,nothing.27Thoughnihilismis“aspecificallyepistemologicalposition”accordingtoBeiser,itneverthelesshasethicalramifications:TheethicalelementofJacobi’susagebecomesperfectlyexplicitwhenhesaysthatthenihilistdeniestheexistencenotonlyofthings,butalsoofvalues.Sincehedeniestheexistenceofanexternalworld,otherminds,asoul,andGod,thenihilistdischargeshimselffromallobligationstosuchpseudo-entities.28Now,BeiseriscertainlycorrectaboutonestrandofJacobi’sthinking.Jacobiexplicitlyconnectsnihilism–ofwhichhespeaksfirstinhis1799openlettertoFichte(519)–withwhathehadearliercalledegoism;andwhathehadearliercalled“egoism”seemstobearadicalized,externalworldskepticism.29However,thereisalsoanotherstrandofJacobi’sthinkingthatgivesrisetoadifferentconceptionofnihilism.WhatIwanttoidentifyasthecontemporaneousversionofAgrippanskepticismisthisothercon-ception–quitedifferentfromBeiser’s,butequallygroundedinJacobi’sthinking.Earlyinhis1799openlettertoFichte,Jacobisaysthathe“firstfoundentryintotheWissenschaftslehrethroughtherepresentationofaninvertedSpinozism.”30Healsorefersexplicitlytoapassagefromthesecondedition(1789)ofhisSpinozabook,apassagethatheactuallyreprintsasSupplementItotheletter.Iwillcommentonthisimportantpassageshortly.Fornow,mypointisjustthat,whereasBeisermentionsonlytheconnectionbetweenwhatJacobicallsnihilismandhiscriticismofKant’sidealismasegoism,thereisalsoaconnectionbetweenwhatJacobicallsnihilismandhiscriticismofSpinozism.WhateverelseJacobimayfindtocriticizeinSpinoza,hedoesnotregardhimasanegoist.27Beiser,FateofReason(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1987),p.82.28Beiser,FateofReason,p.82.SeealsoBeiser,Hegel(London:Routledge,2005),pp.27–29,175,fortheviewthatHegelisdeeplyconcernedwithnihilisminthissense.29ForJacobi’searlierreferenceto“speculativeegoism”inthecontextofhiscriticismofKant,seehis“SupplementonTranscendentalIdealism”,DavidHumeuberden¨Glauben,oderIdealismusundRealismus.EinGesprach¨(Breslau:Lowe,¨1787),p.228;Jacobi,TheMainPhilosophicalWritingsandtheNovelAllwill,trans.anded.byGeorgediGiovanni(MontrealandKingston,ON:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,1994)(henceforthMPW),p.338.Jacobifirstusestheterm“nihilism”inJacobianFichte(Hamburg:Perthes,1799),p.39;MPW,519.Earlierintheletter,heusestheterm“egoism.”SeeJacobianFichte,3;MPW,502.30Jacobi,JacobianFichte,4;MPW,502.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n64paulfranksInstead,JacobicommentsonSpinoza’srealismandevenclaimstohavelearnedsomethingfromSpinozaabouthowtobearealist!31How,then,isAgrippanskepticismconnectedtobothSpinozismandnihilism?First,InotethatJacobiseemstohavebeendeeplytroubledbyAgrippanskepticisminhisyouth.Heclaimstohavebeenafflicted,fromtheageofeightornine,bytwohorrifyingvisions:thethoughtofeternityaparteantemadehimcryoutloudandfall“intoakindofswoon”;whilethethoughtofannihilation,whichhadalwaysbeendreadful,nowbecameevenmoredreadful,norcouldhebearthevisionofaneternalforwarddurationanybetter.”32Althoughhemanagedtofreehimselffromtheassociated“stateofunspeakabledespair”,heclaimedin1789thathestilltookconstantcaretoavoidit,andwrote:IhavereasontosuspectthatIcanarbitrarilyevokeitinmeanytimeIwant;andIbelievethatitisinmypower,wereItodosorepeatedlyafewtimes,totakemylifewithinminutesbythismeans.33AccordingtoJacobi’sownanalysis–whichHegelmocks–temporalityandcausalityareintimatelyconnected,andthecause-effectrelationshipisalmostalwaysconflatedwiththeground-consequencerelationship.34SoitisplausibletointerpretJacobi’sdespairasarisingfromtwoofthetropesthatconstitutetheAgrippantrilemma:infiniteregressandarbitrarypresuppositionorhypothesis.Hedespairs,inshort,becausehe31ForJacobionSpinoza’srealism,see,forexample,UberdieLehredesSpinozain¨BriefenandenHerrnMosesMendelssohn(Breslau:Lowe,¨1785),p.142;MPW,223:“XXVII.Animmediateconcept,consideredinandforitselfalone,iswith-outrepresentation.[AsdiGiovanninotes,“InthesecondeditionJacobiadds:“–isafeeling!”]XXVIII:Representationsarisefrommediatedconcepts,andrequiremediatedobjects,thatis,wheretherearerepresentations,theremustalsobesev-eralindividualthingsthatrefertooneanother;withsomething‘inner’theremustalsobesomething‘outer.’”JacobicreditsSpinozawith“theseminalideas”forhisrealisticdeductionofcausalityinafootnoteaddedtoDavidHumein1815.SeeDavidHume,pp.215–216n;MPW,297,note25.OnJacobi’sdeduction,seeHegel,GW4:349–350;T-WA2:339–340;FK,101.32Jacobi,UberdieLehredesSpinoza.NeuevermehrteAusgabe¨(Breslau:Lowe,¨1789),328;MPW,362–363.33Ibid.34InUberdieLehredesSpinoza¨(1785),p.17;MPW,188,Jacobiclaimsthatacon-sistentrationalismmusttreattimeasillusory;andinDavidHume,pp.93–102;MPW,287–290,hearguesfortheneedtodistinguishthecause-effectrelationship,whichcanbegraspedconceptually,fromtemporalsuccession,whichcannotbegraspedconceptually,butwhichcanbeknownthroughthelivingexperienceofaction.Thisisadistinctionthat,inJacobi’sview,therationalistphilosophicaltra-ditioncannotmake.SeeHegel,GW,4:348–350,352–357,359;T-WA,2:335–339,341–349,353;FK,98–101,104–110,114.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nAncientSkepticism,ModernNaturalism,andNihilism65lacksanabsoluteprinciplethatwouldserveasasatisfyingresponsetotheAgrippanskeptic.Whataboutcircularity,thetrilemma’sthirdhorn?Ihavearguedelse-wherethat,inhisseminalSpinozabookof1785,JacobireconstructsthefirstbookofSpinoza’sEthicsasanargumentthatonlyaspecifickindofsystemcanescapetheAgrippantrilemma:whatIhavecalledaHolisticMonistsystem.35Suchasystemis(a)holistic,insofaraseveryfiniteelementiswhatitisonlyinvirtueofitsrolewithinthewhole.And(b)itismonisticinthesensethatthewholeisconstitutedasawhole–asopposedtoamereaggregate–byasingle,immanent,absolute,andinfi-nitefirstprinciple.Ihaveconstructedtheargumentelsewhereandwillnotgooveritnow.Forpresentpurposes,whatmattersisthataHolisticMonistsystemisintendedtobevirtuouslycircular:thetotalityofthefiniterequirestheinfinitefirstprincipleasitsground,buttheimma-nenceoftheinfinitefirstprinciplemeansthatitcannotbewithoutthetotalityofthefinite.AsJacobiputsit,“thesumofallfinitethings...isoneandthesameastheinfinitethingitself.”36AlltheGermanidealists,fromReinholdtoHegel,acceptineffectJacobi’sSpinozisticargumentthatHolisticMonistsystematicityaloneoffersthehopeofescapingAgrippanskepticism.Jacobi,however,thinksthatHolisticMonismistantamounttonihilism.Thefundamentalpointcanbeputintermsofthelawgov-erningconceptsoftheunderstandingdiscussedearlier.Finitethingswhosedeterminacyconsistssolelyinnegation,lackingpositiveidenti-tiesaltogether,are“nonentia”.Thismightsuggestthattheinfinite“istheonesingletrueensreale”.37But,sincethisinfiniteis,inLessing’sfavouritephrase,henkaipan,oneandall,itlacksanycontrastbyvirtueofwhichitcouldbedeterminate,soitisoudenkaipanta,nothingandallthings.38AsJacobiremarks,parentheticallybutpithily,inafootnotetohis1785Spinozabook:(...anabsoluteindividualisjustasimpossibleasanindividualAbsolute.Deter-minatioestnegatio,Op.Posth.,p.558)3935Franks,AllorNothing:Systematicity,TranscendentalArguments,andNihilisminGermanIdealism(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2005),pp.85–86.36Jacobi,UberdieLehredesSpinoza¨(1785),pp.121–123;MPW,217.37Jacobi,UberdieLehredesSpinoza¨(1785),p.131;MPW,220.38Jacobi,EduardAllwillsBriefsammlung(Konigsberg:Nicolovius,¨1792),p.295;MPW,488.39Jacobi,UberdieLehredesSpinoza¨(1785),p.20n;MPW,190.JacobiisreferringtoSpinoza’sLetter50,toJarigJelles,2June1674,OperaPosthuma,ed.byJarigJelles(Amsterdam:Riewertsz,1677),p.558;CompleteWorks,trans.bySamuelShirley,ed.byMichaelMorgan(Indianapolis,IN:Hackett,2002),p.892:“itisobviousthatmatterinitstotality,consideredwithoutlimitation,canhavenofigure,andDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n66paulfranksHence,nomatterwhatSpinozasaysaboutGod,hissystemisathe-istic.And,nomatterwhathesaysabouthumanfreedom,hissystemisfatalistic.Moreover,thesameistrueofanyHolisticMonistsystem:nomatterhowitdiffersindetailfromSpinoza’s,itcannotmakeroomforindividuality,whetherdivine,human,ornatural.40In1789,JacobilocateshisinterpretationofSpinozismwithinabroaderviewofthemethodofmodernnaturalscience.Itbecomesclearthat,accordingtoJacobi,Spinozaisprovidingametaphysicalfounda-tionformodernnaturalsciencebyemployingthemethodofnaturalscience,andthatnihilismisaccordinglyaconsequenceofthephilo-sophicalemploymentofthatmethod.HereisthepassagethatJacobirepeatstenyearslater,inhisopenlettertoFichte:Wecomprehendathingwheneverwecanderiveitfromitsproximatecauses,orwheneverwehaveinsightintotheorderofitsimmediateconditions.Whatweseeorderiveinthiswaypresentsuswithamechanisticcontext.Forinstance,wecomprehendacirclewheneverweclearlyknowhowtorepresentthemechanicsofitsformation,oritsphysics;wecomprehendthesyllogisticformulas,when-everwehavereallycognizedthelawstowhichthehumanunderstandingissubjectinjudgmentandinference,itsphysics,itsmechanics;ortheprincipleofsufficientreason,wheneverweareclearaboutthebecomingorconstructionofaconceptingeneral,aboutitsphysicsandmechanics.Theconstructionofaconceptassuchistheaprioriofeveryconstruction;andatthesametimeourinsightintoitsconstructionallowsustocognizewithfullcertaintythatitisnotpossibleforustocomprehendwhateverwearenotinapositiontoconstruct.Forthisreasonwehavenoconceptofqualitiesassuch,butonlyintuitionsorfeelings.Evenofourownexistence,wehaveonlyafeelingandnoconcept.Conceptsproperweonlyhaveoffigure,number,position,movement,andtheformsofthought.Wheneverwesaythatwehaveresearchedaquality,wemeannothingelsebythat,savethatwehavereducedittofigure,number,position,andmovement.Wehaveresolveditintothese,hencewehaveobjec-tivelyannihilatedthequality.Fromthiswecaneasilyperceive,withoutfurtherargument,whatmustineachcasebetheoutcomeoftheeffortsonthepartofthatfigureappliesonlytofiniteanddeterminatebodies.Forhewhosaysthatheapprehendsafigure,therebymeanstoindicatesimplythis,thatheapprehendsadeterminatething,andthemannerofitsdetermination.Thisdeterminationthereforedoesnotpertaintothethinginregardtoitsbeing;onthecontrary,itisitsnonbeing.Sosincefigureisnothingbutdetermination,anddeterminationisnegation,figurecanbenothingotherthannegation,ashasbeensaid.”ThepassageisofimportanceforHegel’slateraccountofdeterminatenegation.40ItisimportanttonotethatthisargumentcanbemadeindependentlyofJacobi’sownpositiveviews,notablyhisversionoffoundationalism.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nAncientSkepticism,ModernNaturalism,andNihilism67reasontogenerateadistinctconceptofthepossibilityoftheexistenceofourworld.41By“mechanism”,Jacobilaterexplains,hemeansanyconcatenationofnecessaryconditions,whetherphysicalornot.42Tocomprehendsome-thing–zubegreifen,toconceptualize–isthustorepresentthenecessaryconditionsforthething’sformationorconstruction.Comprehension,sounderstood,involvesabstractingfromqualitativefeatures–or,rather“objectivelyannihilating”them–andfocusingsolelyonconstructibleorquantitativefeatures:“figure,position,numberandmovement.”AsJacobiseesit,theconceptualizingmethodofmodernnaturalscienceisessentiallyinstrumental.Itshouldbesubordinated,eithertopracticalends,ortothescientist’send–whichisnottoexplain,butrather“tounveilexistence,andtorevealit.”43Theerrorlies,then,notinnaturalscientificmethoditself,butintheconfusionoftheconceptualizedmechanismwithnatureitself.Notonlydoesmodernrationalismcommitjustthismistake,butalso,initszealtoescapeAgrippanskepticism,itemploysexactlythesamemethodinthemetaphysicsbymeansofwhichitseekstogroundmodernnaturalscience.ThusSpinozismis“speculativematerialism”:itcontextualizesmodernnaturalsciencewithinaHolisticMonistsystem,construedmaterialistically.Consequently,itannihilatesnotonlythequalitativefeaturesofnature,butalsotheindividualityofthehumanmindandofGod.ThisshedslightonJacobi’ssuggestionthatwethinkofFichte’sWis-senschaftslehreas“aninvertedSpinozism”.44LikeSpinozism,FichteanidealismaspirestoaHolisticMonistsystem,anditconsequentlyannihi-latesindividuality.However,FichteanidealismisdeeperthanSpinoza’smaterialism:Speculativematerialism,orthematerialismthatdevelopsametaphysics,mustultimatelytransfigureitselfintoidealismofitsownaccord;sinceapartfromdualismthereisonlyegoism,asbeginningorend,forapowerofthoughtthatwillthinktotheend.45Onemightthinkthatamaterialisticmetaphysicswouldprovideanappropriatefoundationforphysics,amongwhosefundamentalnotionsisthatofmatter.ButJacobiappearstothinkthat,sincethemethod41Jacobi,UberdieLehredesSpinoza¨(1789),pp.419–420n;MPW,373–374,note28.SeealsoJacobianFichte,pp.62–64;MPW,528.42Jacobi,JacobianFichte,pp.62–63n;MPW,528.43Jacobi,UberdieLehredesSpinoza¨(1785),p.31;MPW,194.44Jacobi,JacobianFichte,p.4;MPW,502.45Jacobi,JacobianFichte,p.3;MPW,503.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n68paulfranksconsistsinidealization,itisbetterunderstoodinidealisticratherthaninmaterialisticterms.AttheheartoftheprojectofHolisticMonistsystematizationlieswhatJacobicalls“thewillthatwillsnothing”.46Fichte’ssystemexposesthiswillmoretransparentlythanSpinoza’s.Observe,first,thatthisconceptionofnihilismpertains,notonlytoepistemology,butalsotoontologyandethics.AnyHolisticMonistsys-temisnihilistic,onthisconception,whetherthefiniteelementsinquestionarebeliefs,things,or,say,ethicaljudgments.Indeed,Jacobimakeshiscaseinallthreearenas.Thus,wecanseehiscriticismofKant’stranscendentalidealismasarguing,ineffect,thatitcontainsaconflictbetween,ontheonehand,thedemandforanHolisticMonistsystemofbeliefswiththetranscendentalunityofapperceptionasabso-luteandimmanentprinciple,and,ontheotherhand,thedemandforwhatwemightcallepistemicindividuality–thatis,forimmediate,per-ceptualbeliefsformedindependentlyofthesubject’ssystemofbeliefs.47Jacobi’scriticismofSpinozacanbeseenasmakinganontologicalver-sionofthecasethatHolisticMonismistantamounttonihilism.AndanethicalversionofthethesiscanbefoundinJacobi’snovel,Allwill.ThereJacobiisconcernedaboutthenonrelationalcharacterwithoutwhichnovirtuousdispositionscanbeacquired.EdwardAllwill,thenovel’ssuitablynamedprotagonisthasawillthatisentirelyrelational,andthatflowsconstantlyintopassionsthatarerelativetogivensitua-tions.ThusAllwilllacksanygenuineindividualcharacter.Withoutanyrestrictingconditions,hispassionsarehighlyseductive.Buttheimpas-sionedsubjectisallwill,andtherefore,ethicallyspeaking,nothing–justasSpinoza’sGodisallbeing,andtherefore,ontologicallyspeaking,nothing.Thesubjectwhoisallreasonisnobetter:Aslittleasinfinitespacecandeterminetheparticularnatureofanyonebody,solittlecanthepurereasonofmanconstitutewithitswill(whichisevenlygoodeverywheresinceitisoneandthesameinallmen)thefoundationofaparticular,differentiatedlife,orimparttotheactualpersonitsproperindividualvalue.48SomeonewhoachievedKantianautonomywould,inJacobi’sview,bejustasincapableofethicalagencyastheprotoromanticAllwill.Notealsothat,tosaythatHolisticMonistsystemsarenihilisticisatleasttosaythattheyleavenotheoreticalroomforindividuality,butitmaybetosaymorethanthat.Itmaybetosaythat,ifsomeonewere46Jacobi,JacobianFichte,p.32;MPW,515.47IhavearguedelsewherethatJacobi’scriticismmisfires,butthiscanbesetasideforpresentpurposes.SeeAllorNothing,pp.154–158.48Jacobi,EduardAllwillsBriefsammlung,p.295;MPW,488.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nAncientSkepticism,ModernNaturalism,andNihilism69toliveinaccordancewithaHolisticMonisticsystem,individualityofthepertinentkindwouldactuallybeannihilatedforthatperson.Thisseemsmostplausibleintheethicalcase:Allwilllacksethicalcharacter,anecessaryconditionforthedevelopmentofvirtuousdispositions.HediffersradicallyfromtwomoralheroestakenbyJacobifromHerodotus:theunreflectivebutvirtuousSpartans,SperchisandBulis,whowillinglysacrificedthemselvesfortheirland,lawsandfellow-Spartans:Theydidnotappealtotheirunderstanding,totheirfinejudgment,butonlytothingsandtheirdesireforthem.Nordidtheyboastofanyvirtue;theyonlyprofessedtheirheart’ssentiment,theiraffection.Theyhadnophilosophy,orrather,theirphilosophywasjusthistory.49Ifthepointseemslessclearintheepistemologicalandontologicalcases,itisbecauseitseemsmoreplausiblethatthenihilistcanlivehisethi-calviewsthanthathecanlivehisepistemologicalorontologicalviews.Thisissubjecttodebateinthe1790s.SchellingarguesthatSpinozacouldanddidlivehisontologicalnihilism,insofarasitgaverisetoanethicsoftheannihilationofindividuality.Fichteresponds,onthecontrary,thatonlythetrueidealist–thatis,theadherentoftheWis-senschaftslehre–canliveherphilosophy.But,ofcourse,FichterejectsthechargethattheWissenschaftslehreisnihilistic.50v.hegelonnihilismInowreturntotheclaimthat,inhis1802essay,Hegelconsidersnihilism–asjustcharacterized–tobethecontemporaryequivalentofAgrippanskepticism.NotefirstthatthetargetsofcontemporaryAgrippanskepticismimplicitlyidentifiedbyHegelintheskepticism49Jacobi,UberdieLehredesSpinoza¨(1785),pp.181–183;MPW,238.AsdiGiovanniobserves(MPW,637,note38)Jacobigivesthewrongreference,butmustmeanHerodotus,ThePersianWarsIII:BooksV-VII,trans.byA.D.Godley(Cambridge,MA:LoebClassicalLibrary,1922),7:133–136.ForHegel’scriticismofJacobi’ssubjectivizationofthisepisodeandofethicallifeingeneral,seeGW,4:381–382;T-WA,2:385–386;FK,145–146.50SeeSchelling,PhilosophischeBriefeuberDogmatismusundKriticismus(¨1795),inSchelling,SammtlicheWerke¨,ed.byK.F.A.Schelling(Stuttgart:Cotta,1856–1861),1:29–244,trans.byFritzMartias“PhilosophicalLettersonDog-matismandCriticism,”inSchellingTheUnconditionalinHumanKnowledge:Fourearlyessays1794–6(Lewisburg,PA:BucknellUniversityPress,1980),pp.155–196;andFichte’stwointroductionstotheVersucheinerneuenDarstellungderWissenschaftslehre(1797),inFichte,SammtlicheWerke¨,ed.byI.H.Fichte(Berlin:Veit,1845),1:419–520,trans.byDanielBreazeale,inFichte,IntroductionstotheWissenschaftslehreandOtherWritings(Indianapolis,IN:Hackett,1994),pp.2–105.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n70paulfranksessay–Fichte,Spinoza,andKant–areexactlyidenticalwiththeexplicittargetsofJacobiinhiswritingsaboutnihilism.Moreover,HegelalsorefersexplicitlytoJacobi,notinghissuperioritytoSchulze.ThusheciteswithapprovalLeibniz’sattitudetowardsphilosophicalcontro-versy,andnotesthatthispassageisanepigraphtoJacobi’sSpinozabook.51HealsocitesJacobi’sopenlettertoFichte,sayingthat:Jacobi’sopinionaboutknowledgeingeneral,comestruehere[i.e.,inthecaseofSchulze’sso-calledskepticism]:theNurembergcaprice-gameisplayedoverandover,‘sothatwegetsickofit,onceallthemovesandturnsareknownandthoroughlyfamiliartous.’52Inshort,Jacobi’scriticismisexactlywhatSchulzeneeds.JacobiplaysadistinctiveroleinHegel’swritingsfrom1801to1803.WhereasHegelregardsKantandFichteasachievingpositiveinsightintothespeculativewhich,however,theybetrayinthedevelopmentoftheirpositions,HegelportraysJacobiasattainingaprimarilynegativeinsightintothespeculative.53ThisisexpressedinJacobi’snegativeresponsetothenihilismhefindsinphilosophy:51Hegel,GW,4:199;T-WA,2:216;RSP,BKH,315.52Hegel,GW,4:224;T-WA,2:253;RSP,BKH,341,referringtoJacobi,JacobianFichte,p.24;MPW,511–512:“Takensimplyassuch,oursciencesaregamesthatthehumanspiritdevisestopassthetime.Indevisingthesegames,itonlyorganizesitsnon-knowledgewithoutcomingasinglehair’sbreadthclosertoacognitionofthetrue.Inasenseitrathermovesfromitthereby,forinthusbusyingitselfitdistractsitselffromitsnon-knowledge,ceasestofeelitspressure,evengrowsfondofit,sincethenon-knowledgeisinfinite,andthegamethatitplayswiththehumanspiritbecomesevermorevaried,engrossing,extended,andintoxicating.Ifthegamethusplayedwithournon-knowledgewerenotinfinite,andnotsoconstitutedthatatitseveryturnanewgamearose,wewouldfarewithsciencejustaswiththeso-calledcapricegameofNuremberg:wewouldbesickofitonceallitsmovesand¨possibleturnsareknownandfamiliartous.Thegameisspoiledforusbecauseweunderstanditentirely,becauseweknowit.”AsHarrisnotesinBKH,360,note85,“TheNu¨renbergerGrillenspielisaformofsolitaire.”AccordingtotheDeutschesWorterbuch,ed.byJakobandWilhelmGrimm(Leipzig:Hirzel,¨1854–1960),9:332,thegameinvolvesthirtythreecones,whichmustberemovedfromaboardinarule-governedmanner.IhavemodifiedthetranslationofdiGiovanni,whooptsfor“tic-tac-toe”,whichisatwo-playergame,albeitapredictableone.53WhateverpositiveinsightintothespeculativeJacobiattains,hecanexpressonlyinwhatHegelconsiderstheinappropriatelysubjectiveformofanaphorism.SeeGW,4:361-362;T-WA,2:356;FK,117:“Presentedasaphoristicesprit,Reasonguardsitselfagainstliftingitselfupintotheinfinityoftheconcept,againstbecomingacommongood,andscience.Instead,itremainsaffectedbysubjectivity,itremainssomethingpersonalandparticular.Attachedtothering,whichitoffersasasymbolofreason,thereisapieceoftheskinfromthehandthatoffersit;andifReasonisscientificconnection,andhastodowithconcepts,wecanverywelldowithoutthatpieceofskin.”DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nAncientSkepticism,ModernNaturalism,andNihilism71Hisabhorrenceofthenullification[Vernichtung]ofthefiniteisasfixedashiscorrespondinglyabsolutecertaintyofthefinite;andthisabhorrencewilleverywhereshowitselftobethebasiccharacterofJacobi’sphilosophy.54HegelclearlythinksthatJacobi’sascriptionofnihilismtothephiloso-phiesofKantandSpinozaiscorrect.WhatherejectsisonlyJacobi’snegativeattitudetonihilism:AccordingtoKant,alltheseconceptsofcauseandeffect,succession,etc.,arestrictlylimitedtoappearance;thethingsinwhichtheseformsareobjectiveaswellasanycognitionofthemaresimplynothingatallinthemselves.ThisistheveryresultwhichgivesKanttheimmoralmeritofhavingreallymadethebeginningofaphilosophy.YetitispreciselyinthisnothingnessoffinitudethatJacobiseesanabsolute-in-itself.WiththisdreamashisweaponhefightsSpinozawideawake.55Herenihilismisatoncebothontologicalandepistemological:boththingsandcognitionsofthethingsaresaidtobenothinginthemselves.AndJacobi’sabhorrenceofnihilism–ofthenullificationofthefinite–issaidtoresultfromhisabsolutizationofthefinite:fromwhat,intheskepticismessay,Hegelcallsdogmatism.HegelcontraststhefalsefaithsofKant,JacobiandFichtewithwhathecalls:...truefaith[inwhich]thewholesphereoffinitude,ofbeing-something-on-one’s-[own]-account,thesphereofsensibilitysinksintonothingbeforethethink-ingandintuitingoftheeternal.Thethinkingherebecomesonewiththeintu-iting,andallthemidgesofsubjectivityareburnedtodeathinthisconsumingfire,andtheveryconsciousnessofthissurrenderandnullificationisnullified.56Whattruefaithandspeculativephilosophyhaveincommon,then,istheannihilationofthewholesphereoffinitude,includingsubjectivity.Indeed,farfromdefendingFichteagainstJacobi’schargeofnihilism,HegelarguesthatJacobiisright!TheproblemwiththeWissenschaft-slehreisonlythatitisnotnihilisticenough,asthefollowingpassagesshow:WehavealreadyshownwhyJacobisoviolentlyabhorsthenihilismhefindsinFichte’sphilosophy.AsfarasFichte’ssystemitselfisconcerned,nihilismiscertainlyimplicitinpurethoughtasatask.Butthispurethoughtcannotreachitbecauseitstaysononeside,sothatthisinfinitepossibilityhasaninfiniteactualityoveragainstitandatthesametimewithit...Thefirststep54Hegel,GW,4:351;T-WA,2:340;FK,103.55Hegel,GW,4:350;T-WA,2:338–339;FK,101.56Hegel,GW,4:379;T-WA,2:382;FK,141.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n72paulfranksinphilosophyistorecognizetheabsolutenothing.Fichte’sphilosophydoesnotachievethis,howevermuchJacobimaydespiseitforhavingdoneso.57ThusFichte’ssystemofknowledgeisaslittleabletotranscenddualismasJacobicouldpossiblywant.TherealitythatisnotdualisticexistsforFichteonlyinfaith,andtheThirdthatistrulytheFirstandtheOnlyOneisnottobefoundinhissystem;norcanthenegativitywhichisnotdualistic,infinity,thenothing,bepureinit.Itoughttobepure,butitdoesnotbecomepure.Rather,itgetsfixedagain,sothatitbecomesabsolutesubjectivity.Jacobi,whofocusedhisattentionononesideoftheantithesis,oninfinity,onformalidentity,feltthatthisnihilismoftranscendentalphilosophywouldteartheheartoutofhisbreast.Butheonlyneededtoreflectontheothersideoftheantithesis,whichispresentwiththesameabsoluteness.58Inotherwords,Jacobiwouldnothavebeensohorrified,hadheonlyrealizedthatFichtefailstogroundphilosophyin“purenothingness”,andthat,becauseFichteemploysthereflectiveconceptoftheI,whatFichtepositsasAbsolutefailstoescapefinitude.IfagenuineAbsoluteistobeposited,then,whatisneededisamoreradicalnihilism,amorethoroughgoingannihilationofjusttheindi-vidualitythatJacobiholdssacred.ThiswouldreducetheopinionsofSchulzeandotherunphilosopherstonothingness,anditwouldradical-izethelegacyofKantandFichte,eliminatingtheresidualsubjectivity.ItfollowsthatwhatHegelwantstodowithAgrippanskepticism,andwithitscontemporarydescendant,nihilismisnottorefutethem,buttosurvivethem.Putanotherway,hewantstousethemtofilteroutalltheunphilosophiesandphilosophicaldogmatisms,lettingthroughonlytheonetruephilosophy.Asnotedearlier,inSchulze’sview,“todoubtconsciousness...isabsolutelyimpossible,becausesuchadoubt,sinceitcannotoccurwithoutconsciousness,wouldthereforebenoth-ing.”59Hegelconsiderssuchaself-annihilationofconsciousness,orofreflective-dogmaticun-philosophy,tobenotonlypossiblebutrequired.WhatdoesHegelthinkistheupshotofAgrippanskepticismandofcontemporarynihilism?Arigorousanswerwouldbe:nothingatall.Thatistosay,seenfromthereflectivestandpoint,nihilismshowsonlythatphilosophy’sbestefforttoescapetheAgrippantrilemmaisnobet-terthanfallingintotheskeptic’strap.AfurtherstepisrequiredifwearetoreachJacobi’sconclusionthatweshouldreturntoprephilosophicalcommonsenseandrefusetheAgrippanskeptic’sdemandforjustifica-tion.AfurtherstepisalsorequiredifwearetoreachHegel’sconclusion57Hegel,GW,4:398;T-WA,2:410;FK,168.58Hegel,GW,4:399;T-WA,2:412;FK,170.59Schulze,Kritik,1:51.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nAncientSkepticism,ModernNaturalism,andNihilism73thatweshouldadoptthespeculativestandpoint.Nihilismaloneleavesuspreciselynowhere.However,oneofthemajordevelopmentsthatseparatesHegel’sthink-ingin1801–1803fromhisthinkingin1804–1806istherealizationthatnihilismhasapositiveupshotafterall.Inadditiontoapresupposition-lessnihilismthatcaneffectuponreflectivephilosophyanoperationofabstractnegationthatleadspreciselynowhere;andinadditionalsotoaPlatonicskepticismthatderivesspeculativelogicfromthedestructionofreflectivephilosophybypresupposingspeculativemetaphysics;Hegelcomestothinkthatthereisanotherversionofskepticismthatcanbothannihilatereflectivephilosophyandanticipatespeculativelogic–notbymeansofanypresupposition,butratherbythedeterminatenegationofreflectivephilosophy.60WhatHegelcomestocallphenomenologyistheoffspringofthismarriagebetweennihilismandPlatonicskepticism.FromHegel’slaterperspective,then,theupshotofnihilismconsistsnotonlyintheannihilationofnaturalism,butalsointhefulfillmentofphilosophy’sneedforanonnaturalisticmethod.In1802,thisviewofnihilism’supshotstillliesinHegel’sfuture.Buthisearlyconsiderationofthecomparativemeritsofmodernandancientskepticismhasanenduringconsequencenevertheless.ForHegelhasalreadyrealizedthat,ifhisownphilosophicalprojectistosucceed,methodologicalnaturalismmustbeovercome,andthatitcanbeover-comeonlywiththehelpofnihilism.6160SeeForster,Hegel’sIdea,pp.152–160,177–184,285–287;Bristow,HegelandtheTransformation,pp.105–168.61IgratefullyacknowledgethehelpfulconversationandcommentsofJayBernstein,FredBeiser,StephenHoulgate,FredRush,HindyNajman,andaudiencesatthe2006AnnualMeetingoftheHegelSocietyofGreatBritain,theNewSchool,andtheJointInitiativeforGermanandEuropeanStudiesattheUniversityofToronto.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:10:54WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.003CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\njonstewart3Hegel’sPhenomenologyasaSystematicFragmentTheinherentproblemwithanyphilosophywhichclaimstobesys-tematicisaseasytoposeasitistroublesometosolve;namely,howdothepartsofthesystemhangtogether?Ofallthegreatsystemsinthehistoryofphilosophy,perhapsnonehasbeensubjecttoasmuchcriticismasHegel’s.OneauthorbaldlyclaimsthatitmakessensetodismissHegelentirely“ifoneemphasizestheLogicandHegel’srhetoricabout‘system’and‘Wissenschaft.’”1Likewise,asJohnDewey,agreatadmirerofHegel,writes,“Theform,theschematism,ofhis[sc.Hegel’s]systemnowseemstomeartificialtothelastdegree.”2Theten-dencytoshyawayfromHegel’sownstatementsaboutthesystematicnatureofhisphilosophyisdoubtlessduetothecomplexityandopac-ityoftheHegeliansystemwhichhavebaffledscholarssinceHegel’sowntime.AcommonreactiontotheseproblemshasbeensimplytoabandonanyattempttounderstandHegel’sphilosophyasasystematicwhole.DuetotheseproblemsanddespiteHegel’sownstatementstothecontrary,thePhenomenologyofSpirithasoftenbeencriticizedasanunsystematictext.Inthewordsofonescholar:ThePhenomenologyisindeedamovement,orratherasetofmovements,anodyssey,asHegellatersaiditwas,awandering,likeFaust,withskipsandjumpsandslowmeanderings.ThosewhotakeHegelathiswordandlookfora“ladder”orapathoryellowbrickroadtotheAbsoluteareboundtobedisappointed.ThePhenomenologyisaconceptuallandscape,throughwhichHegelleadsussomewhatathiswhim.31RichardRorty,“PhilosophyinAmericaToday,”inhisConsequencesofPragmatism(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1982),p.224.2JohnDewey,“FromAbsolutismtoExperimentalism,”inContemporaryAmericanPhilosophy,vols.1–2,ed.byGeorgeP.AdamsandW.P.Montague(NewYork:MacmillanCo.,1930),vol.2,p.21.3RobertC.Solomon,IntheSpiritofHegel(NewYorkandOxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1983),p.236.74DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhenomenologyasaSystematicFragment75Anothercommentatorechoesthisview:“ThePhenomenologyofSpiritisaprofoundlyincongruousbook.”4Finally,thesuggestionhasbeenmadethatthePhenomenologybereadnotasa“single-mindedargu-ment”butratherasadisconnected“panoramicpainting,”5whichhasnobonafidesenseofunityorcoherence.Theworkisthusseensimplyasanoddcollectionofatomicanalysesonsundrytopics.Thisviewhasbeendubbedthe“poetic”conceptionoftheworkbysomecommenta-tors,anditsbasicpresuppositionisasfollows:“ThePhenomenologyisalooseseriesofimaginativeandsuggestivereflectionsonthelifeoftheSpirit.”6Thisview,however,disregardsHegel’sownstatedintentandreflectsafailuretounderstandthegeneralconceptionofthework.ScholarsholdingthisviewhavebeenabletosatisfythemselvesbytryingtounderstandindividualsectionsofthePhenomenologyinwhichHegelanalyzesissues,suchasalienation,religion,Greektragedy,andtheEnlightenment,whileignoringtheschematicconnectionsbetweentheseissuesthathisphilosophicalsystemseekstodemonstrate.TheresultisanalysesandinterpretationsofindividualsectionsofHegel’stexttakenoutoftheirlargersystematiccontext.ThismethodseemstoofferaconvenientwaytopresentHegel’sthoughtsonspecificissues,butitsusenecessarilymisrepresentshispositions,whichcanonlybefullyunderstoodwithintheframeworkofhissystem.AgoodexampleofthisdistortionofHegel’ssystematicintentinthePhenomenologyisprovidedbyAlexandreKojeve’sMarxistreading,`whichalmostentirelyignoresthe“Consciousness”chapter7andinter-pretsthegoalnotonlyofthe“Self-Consciousness”chapterbut,indeed,oftheentirePhenomenologyasovercomingthevariouslordshipandbondagerelationsthatheseesmirroredinclassstructures.Kojevesim-`plyignoressectionswhichfailtoaccordwithhisMarxistagenda.Onecansaywithoutexaggerationthat,forKojeve,theimportanceofthe`entirePhenomenologyislimitedtothe“Self-Consciousness”or“Spirit”4WalterKaufmann,Hegel:AReinterpretation(NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1978),p.142.Cf.“Ishouldprefertospeakofcharades:nowatableau,nowaskit,nowabrieforation”(ibid.,p.127).In“Hegel’sConceptionofPhe-nomenology,”(inPhenomenologyandPhilosophicalUnderstanding,ed.byEdoPivcevic(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1975),p.229),Kaufmannwritesinasimilarvein,“OnereallyhastoputonblinkersandimmerseoneselfincarefullyselectedmicroscopicdetailstoavoidthediscoverythatthePhenomenol-ogyisinfactanutterlyunscientificandunrigorouswork.”5RobertC.Solomon,IntheSpiritofHegel,op.cit.,p.221.6WalterKaufmann,“Hegel’sConceptionofPhenomenology,”op.cit.,p.220.7Hegivesitonlythefollowingshortpages:pp.43–48.SeeAlexandreKojeve,`Intro-ductionalalecturedeHegel`(Paris:Gallimard,1947).Cf.PhilipT.Grier,“TheEndofHistoryandtheReturnofHistory,”TheOwlofMinerva,vol.21(1990),p.133.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n76jonstewartchapters,whilethe“Consciousness,”“Reason,”and“Religion”chap-tersaremoreorlessirrelevanttowhatheperceivesasthedesiredgoalofthetext.InordertosaveHegel,accordingtothisstrategy,onemustfirstapologizeforhisexcessivesystematicpretensions,whichamounts,inmostcases,toforsakingthesystemaltogether.Clearly,onecannotdoawaywiththesystematicstructureofHegel’sPhenomenologyinsuchanoffhandedmannerandstillhopetounderstandthetextasHegelintendedittobeunderstood.Hegelisfirmlycommittedtoasystematicconceptionofphilosophy,andthusifoneistoattempttointerprethimbywhollyabandoninghisexpresslystatedintentionsinthisregard,thenonemusthaveverycompellingreasonsfordoingso.i.hegel’sviewofsystematicphilosophyFromthepassagescitedearlier,itisclearthatoftennodistinctionismadebetweenthenotionof“systematic”intheeverydaysenseof“orderly”or“well-organized”andinthetechnicalsenseinwhichitisusedinGermanidealism.ThisconfusionevincesthefactthatmanyscholarsarenotevenawareofthetechnicaluseofthisconceptinthisphilosophicaltraditionandthusarenotsensitivetoHegel’sappropria-tionofit.Withrespecttothequestionofsystematicphilosophy,Hegelisatyp-icalrepresentativeoftheentireGermanidealisttradition,whichaimedatofferingasystematicandexhaustiveaccountofthecognitivefacul-ties.Kant,forinstance,saysofhisownphilosophy,“itisnothingbuttheinventoryofallourpossessionsthroughpurereason,systematicallyarranged.”8Kant’stranscendentalphilosophycanthusbeseenasacat-alogueofthevariousfunctionsoftheintellectbymeansofwhichwecometoknowandunderstand.Thisinventory,heclaims,isorderedinanecessary,systematicfashion:“Asasystematicunityiswhatfirstraisesordinaryknowledgetotherankofscience,thatis,makesasystemoutofamereaggregateofknowledge,”heexplains,“architectonicisthedoctrineofthescientificinourknowledgeandthereforenecessarilyformspartofthedoctrineofmethod.”9ForKant,itistheensembleororganicunityofknowledgethatmakesitatruescience,andwhatdoesnotbelongtothissystematicunityisa“mereaggregate”orcollectionoffacts.Onemightbeabletomakespecificobservationsabouttheopera-tionoftheintellect,but,toadequatelyaccountforit,onemustconsider8Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,trans.byN.KempSmith(NewYork:St.Martin’sPress,1929),p.14,Axx.9Kant,ibid.,p.653,A832–B860.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhenomenologyasaSystematicFragment77allofthecognitivefacultiesandtheirinterconnections,orotherwisetheobservationsremainincomplete.InthePrefacetothesecondeditionoftheCritiqueofPureReason,Kantwrites,“Forpurespeculativereasonhasastructurewhereineverythingisanorgan,thewholebeingforthesakeofallothers....Anyattempttochangeeventhesmallestpartatoncegivesrisetocontradictions,notmerelyinthesystem,butinhumanreasoningeneral.”10Tochangeorremovetheaccountofoneindividualcognitivefacultywoulddestroythesystemsincetherewouldthenbesomethingopen-endedaboutourcognitivefunctionswhichthesystemcouldnotexplainwiththeremainingfaculties.Itisthusreasonitself,forKant,whichdemandsthissystematicunity.11Kant’ssuccessorsaccepted,withoutseriousqualification,hisinsis-tenceonsystemasanorganicunity.Fichte,forinstance,inthe“FirstIntroduction”oftheScienceofKnowledgeclaims,“Assurelyastheyaretobegroundedintheunitarybeingoftheintellect,theintellect’sassumedlawsofoperationthemselvesconstituteasystem.”12Likewise,Schelling,inhisSystemofTranscendentalIdealism,statesthathisgoalinphilosophyisnottoaddanythingtowhathasalreadybeensaidbuttorearrangetheinformation(alreadyprovidedbyKantandFichte)intoagenuinesystem.“Nowthepurposeofthepresentworkissimplythis,”hewrites,“toenlargetranscendentalidealismintowhatitreallyshouldbe,namelyasystemofallknowledge.”13Giventhisunanimousinsis-tenceamongtheGermanidealistsonthesystematicityofphilosophy,Hegelcanhardlyberegardedasamaverickonthispoint.Ifoneassumesadismissivestancetowardhimonthisissue,thenonemightjustaswelldismisstheentiretraditionofGermanidealism.Hesimplyinher-itsthisapproachfromhispredecessorsandexpandsitinhisownway.Onecan,ofcourse,stillraisethequestionofhowsuccessfulHegelwasatcarryingouthissystematicprogram,buttherecanbenodoubtthatthiswasakeyelementinhisgeneralapproach.Likehisforerunners,Hegelbelievedthattheverynotionoftruthwasnecessarilyboundupwithitssystematicform.14Insomewaysitis10Kant,ibid.,Bxxxvii–xxxviii.11SeeKant,ibid.,p.33,A840/B869.12Fichte,“FirstIntroductiontotheScienceofKnowledge,”inTheScienceofKnowl-edge,trans.byPeterHeathandJohnLachs(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982),p.22.13Schelling,SystemofTranscendentalIdealism,trans.byPeterHeath(Char-lottesville:UniversityPressofVirginia,1978),p.1.Cf.p.15:“Itwillbeassumedasahypothesis,thatthereisasysteminourknowledge,thatisthatitisawholewhichisself-supportingandinternallyconsistentwithitself.”14See,forexample,EL,§14;Jub.,vol.8,p.60.PhS,p.11;Jub.,vol.2,p.24.Cf.EL,§16;Jub.,vol.8,pp.61–63.PhS,p.3;Jub.,vol.2,p.14.PhS,13;Jub.,vol.2,p.27.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n78jonstewartoddthatanglophonephilosophershavebeensoquicktodismissHegel’sconceptionofsystematicphilosophygiventhefactthatincontempo-rarythought,hisconception,albeitundernames,suchasthe“networktheoryoftruth,”“ascientificparadigm,”or“holism,”remainsquitepopular.Whilethenamesusedtodaytodesignatethiswayofthink-ingdifferfromHegel’sdesignationof“speculativephilosophy,”theideaunderlyingthemisfundamentallythesame:individualpartsofthesys-temhavetheirmeaningonlyintheirnecessaryrelationtotheotherpartsandthusaspartsofalargerwhole.Hegel’smethodologicalinvestmentinthisviewisdemonstratedinthePhenomenology.Heportraysthenotionofasystematicphilosophybymeansofanorganicanalogy.Thedevelopmentofaplantatitsdif-ferentstagesisnecessaryfortheplantasawhole,andnosinglestagerepresentstheplant’sentirehistory.Hewrites,Thebuddisappearsinthebursting-forthoftheblossom,andonemightsaythattheformerisrefutedbythelatter;similarly,whenthefruitappears,theblossomisshownupinitsturnasafalsemanifestationoftheplant,andthefruitnowemergesasthetruthofitinstead.Theseformsarenotjustdistinguishedfromoneanother,theyalsosupplantoneanotherasmutuallyincompatible.Yetatthesametimetheirfluidnaturemakesthemmomentsofanorganicunityinwhichtheynotonlydonotconflict,butinwhicheachisasnecessaryastheother;andthismutualnecessityaloneconstitutesthelifeofthewhole.15Justaswhenaplantgrowsanddevelops,eachofitsindividualstagesisnecessaryforthesucceedingstages,individualconceptsinaphilo-sophicalsystemhavetheirmeaninginthecontextofotherconceptsfromwhichtheyweredeveloped.Justasthedifferentstagesofitsdevel-opmentchangetheplant’sappearancesoradicallythatitappearstobecomeanother“contradictory”species–contradictoryconceptscancontributetothedevelopmentofasinglephilosophicalsystem.Whatthissimilemakesclearisthatthesystem,forHegel,involvesthesumtotaloftheindividualpartsastheydevelopthemselvesorganically.Thus,justastheplantisnotmerelythesumtotalofitspartsata(EL:TheEncyclopaediaLogic.PartOneoftheEncyclopaediaofthePhilosophicalSciences,trans.byT.F.Gerats,W.A.Suchting,andH.S.Harris(Indianapolis:Hackett,1991).Jub.:SamtlicheWerke¨.Jubilaumsausgabein¨20Banden,ed.by¨HermannGlockner(Stuttgart:FriedrichFrommannVerlag,1928–41).PhS:Hegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit,trans.byA.V.Miller(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1977).15Hegel,PhS,p.2;Jub.,vol.2,p.12.Hegelusesthesamemetaphorinhislecturesonthephilosophyofhistory:“Andasthegermbearsinitselfthewholenatureofthetree,andthetasteandformofitsfruits,sodothefirsttracesofSpiritvirtuallycontainthewholeofthathistory.”Phil.ofHist,p.18;Jub.,vol.11,p.45.Phil.ofHist:ThePhilosophyofHistory,trans.byJ.Sibree(NewYork:WileyBookCo.,1944).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhenomenologyasaSystematicFragment79givenmomentinitsdevelopment,butrathertheorganicwholeofitsdevelopmentalstages,soalsoaphilosophicalsystemisthecompletedevelopmentorunfoldingofindividualconcepts.InthePrefaceofthePhenomenology,Hegelflatlyclaims,“Thetrueshapeinwhichtruthexistscanonlybethescientificsystemofsuchtruth.”16Alittlelater,hesays,“knowledgeisonlyactual,andcanonlybeexpounded,asScienceorassystem.”17Surely,onecouldaskfornoclearerstatementoftherelationoftruthtoasystem;hence,howeveropaqueHegelmaybeaboutthedetailsofthesystem,heiscrystalclearthatasystematicapproachisnecessarytoreachthetruth.TounderstandHegel’ssystematicpretensionsmerelyasasimplematteroftheorderlypresentationofideasistomisshisphilosophicalpoint.18Thesystematicwholeisessentiallyboundupwiththenotionoftruthitselfandcannotbesunderedfromit.Thisconceptionofanetworkofinterrelatedbeliefsimpliesacertainkindofphilosophy,namely,onethatexaminesthetotalityofbeliefs,concepts,institutions,andsoforth,insteadofconcentratingonlyoncertainindividualisolatedones.ThekindofphilosophythatexaminesthewholeiswhatHegel,followingtradition,calls“speculativephi-losophy.”Hecontrastsittowhathecalls“dogmatism,”whichtreatsconceptsindividuallyandthusabstractedfromtheirorganicunity:Butinthenarrowersensedogmatismconsistsinadheringtoone-sideddetermi-nationsoftheunderstandingwhilstexcludingtheiropposites.Thisisjustthestrict“either-or,”accordingtowhich(forinstance)theworldiseitherfiniteorinfinite,butnotboth.Onthecontrary,whatisgenuineandspeculativeispre-ciselywhatdoesnothaveanysuchone-sideddeterminationinitandisthereforenotexhaustedbyit;onthecontrary,beingatotality,itcontainsthedetermina-tionsthatdogmatismholdstobefixedandtrueinastateofseparationfromoneanotherunitedwithinitself.19HereHegelreferstoKant’s“FirstAntinomy,”whichpresentstheuni-verseasbothfiniteandinfinite.20Bychoosingthisexample,HegeltherebyimplicitlypraisesKant’sspeculativetreatmentoftheissue.The16Hegel,PhS,p.3;Jub.,vol.2,p.14.17Hegel,PhS,p.13;Jub.,vol.2,p.27.18See,forexample,WalterKaufmann,Hegel:AReinterpretation,op.cit.,p.243:“Thecentralpointofourphilologicalexcursusis,ofcourse,toshowhowHegelhimselfhandledhissystem:notassomuchanecessarytruth,deducedonceandforallinitsinexorablesequence,butratherasveryneatandsensiblewayofarrangingthepartsofphilosophy–noteventheneatestandmostsensiblepossible,butonlythebesthecoulddointimetomeettheprinter’sdeadline.”19Hegel,EL,§32,Addition;Jub.,vol.8,p.106.20Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,op.cit.,pp.399–402,A426/B454-A433/B461.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n80jonstewartkeypointforourpurposesisthatspeculativephilosophyremovescon-ceptsfromtheisolationofabstractionandputsthemintheirappropriatesystematiccontextwheretheycanbeproperlyanalyzed.“Thespecula-tiveorpositivelyrational,”saysHegel,“apprehendstheunityofdeter-minationsintheiropposition,theaffirmativethatiscontainedintheirdissolutionandintheirtransition.”21Inasimilarpassagefromtheintro-ductiontotheScienceofLogic,hewrites,“Itisinthisdialecticasitishereunderstood,thatis,inthegraspingofoppositesintheirunityorofthepositiveinthenegative,thatspeculativethoughtconsists.”22Spec-ulativephilosophyinvolvesexaminingthewholeuniverseofthought,whichinvariablyinvolvescontradictions.Insteadofinsistingononesideofacontradictionortheotherorstoppingonceacontradictionhasbeenreached,itobservesthedynamicmovementinpairsofoppositesandlooksbeyondtheimmediatecontradictorytermstowardahighertruththatarisesfromthedialecticaldevelopmentofthecontradiction.Onecan,ofcourse,continueforthesakeofpedagogicalexpediencetocutandspliceHegeltomakehimfitintothecustomaryundergradu-atecourse,butinsodoingonemustrecognizethatsuchaprocedureisentirelycontrarytohisownmethodologyandthoroughlygoesagainstthegrainofhisconceptionofphilosophy.Hegelconceivedofhisphi-losophyasasystem,anditisinthiscontextthathisthoughtmustbeunderstood.Evenifonenolongerfindssystematicphilosophyplausible,oneisnonethelessobligedtoattempttounderstandHegelinthiswayinordertobeabletograsphisphilosophicalmotivationsandintuitions.IfonechoosesinsteadtosimplypurgeHegel’sworkofitssystematicelements,thenoneineffectlosesHegelintheprocess.23ii.theambiguousroleofthephenomenologyOneoftheearliestcommentatorstopointouttheambiguousnatureoftheargumentationinthePhenomenologywasRudolfHayminhis21Hegel,EL,§82;Jub.,vol.8,p.195.22Hegel,SL,p.56;Jub.,vol.4,p.54.23Othercommentatorshave,ofcourse,alsoattemptedtounderstandHegelinasys-tematicfashion,forexample,L.BrunoPuntel,Darstellung,MethodeundStruk-tur.UntersuchungzurEinheitdersystematischenPhilosophieG.W.F.Hegels(Bonn:Bouvier,1973);GerdKimmerle,SeinundSelbst.Untersuchungzurkate-gorialenEinheitvonVernunftundGeistinHegelsPhanomenologiedesGeistes¨(Bonn:Bouvier,1978);DavidLamb,Hegel:FromFoundationtoSystem(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1980);Pierre-JeanLabarriere,`Structuresetmouvementdialec-tiquedanslaPhenom´enologiedel’espritdeHegel´(Paris:Aubier,1968);andMeroldWestphal,HistoryandTruthinHegel’sPhenomenology(AtlanticHighlands,NJ:HumanitiesPress,1979).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhenomenologyasaSystematicFragment81HegelundseineZeitfrom1857.Haympointedoutthattheworkcontainstwokindsofargument.Thefirstiswhathedesignatesas“transcendental-psychological.”24Thisischaracteristicoftheanalysesinthefirstpartofthework,whichtracestheformsoftheindividualconsciousnessonitsroadofdiscoveryandself-knowledge.Bycontrast,thereisalsoa“historical”25formofargumentation,inwhichtheindi-vidualformsofconsciousnessaresuddenlytransformedintohistoricalepochs.Thus,apparentlywithoutexplanation,thedevelopmentofcon-sciousnessbecomesthedevelopmentofhistoricalpeoples.Haymarguesthatthesetwodifferentformsofargumentationmaketheworkdisuni-fied.Usingametaphorfromclassicalphilology,heclaimsthattheworkisapalimpsest,onwhichonetextwasoriginallywrittenonlytobeeclipsedbyanothertextwithadifferentconception,whichwassubse-quentlywrittenoverthefirsttext.26Thesetwodifferenttextsreflectdifferentconceptionsoftheworkitself.Inacelebratedpaperdeliveredatthe1933HegelCongressinRome,27TheodorHaeringtookupthisview,arguingthatthePhenomenologywasadisunifiedworkduetothefactthatHegelchangedhismindabouttheconceptionofitsphilosophicaltaskduringthecompositionofthetextitself.Thechangeconcernsspecificallywhatphilosophi-calworkthePhenomenologyisintendedtodo.AccordingtoHaering’saccount,thePhenomenologywasoriginallyconceivedasanintroduc-tiontoaphilosophicalsystemandasthe“experienceofconsciousness.”Throughthebeginningofthe“Reason”chapter,sotheargumentgoes,theworkproceededasplanned.Butthenthechaptersbecamemuchlongerandmuchlessunifiedanddepartedfromtheoriginalargumen-tativestructureoftheworkestablishedinthe“Consciousness”and“Self-Consciousness”chapters.Inthemiddleofthe“Reason”chapter,theaccountofthedevelopmentoftheformsofindividualconscious-nessgrewintoanaccountoftheformsof“Spirit”orgroupconscious-ness.Atthispoint,theworkcouldnolongerbeconsideredamereintroductionbutratherhadgrownintoasubstantivepartofthesys-teminitsownright.Thisviewispurportedlyconfirmedby,amongotherthings,Hegel’sownambiguousstatementsabouttheroleofthe24RudolfHaym,HegelundseineZeit.VorlesungenuberEnstehungundEntwick-¨elung,WesenundWerthderHegel’schenPhilosophie(Berlin:VerlagvonRudolphGaertner,1857),pp.235–236.25RudolfHaym,HegelundseineZeit,ibid.,pp.236–238.26RudolfHaym,HegelundseineZeit,ibid.,p.238.27TheodorHaering,“EntstehungsgeschichtederPhanomenologiedesGeistes¨,”inVerhandlungendesIII.InternationalenHegelKongresses1933,ed.byB.Wigersma(Haarlem:N/VH.D.TjeenkWillink&Zn.andTubingen:J.C.B.Mohr,¨1934),pp.118–136.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n82jonstewartPhenomenologyandvariousbitsofbiographicalinformationsurround-ingitscomposition.InhisPreface,HegelindicatesthatthePhenomenologyistobeunder-stoodasthefirstpartofthesystem:“Further,anexpositionofthiskindconstitutesthefirstpartofScience,becausetheexistenceofSpiritquaprimaryisnothingbuttheimmediateorthebeginning–butnotyetitsreturnintoitself.”28Moreover,theEncyclopaediaLogic,writtentenyearslater,stillreferstothePhenomenologyas“thefirstpartofthesystemofscience.”29Thus,Hegelappearsatthislaterdatestilltocon-siderthePhenomenologytobethefirstpartofasystem.However,inalettertoSchellingshortlyafterthepublicationofthework,hewrites,“Iamcuriousastowhatyouwillsaytotheideaofthisfirstpart,whichisreallytheintroduction–forIhavenotyetgotbeyondtheintroducingrightintotheheartofthematter.”30ThisseemstoindicatethatthePhe-nomenologyisamereintroductionandtheactualsubjectmatterofthesystemhasnotyetbeenbroached.ThisambiguityhasbeeninterpretedasevidenceofHegel’sownconfusionaboutthestatusandphilosophicaltaskofthetext.InadditiontotheargumentsofferedbyHaymandHaeringconcern-ingtheambiguousroleofthePhenomenology,therehasbeenconfusionconcerninganintermediatetitlepagethatappearedaftertheprefaceinthework’sfirstedition.31TheoriginaltitlewasTheScienceoftheExperienceofConsciousness,whichwasapparentlyreplacedatthelastminute,indeedaftersomecopieshadalreadybeenprinted,bythetitleScienceofthePhenomenologyofSpirit.Thisamendmenthasbeeninter-pretedasevidencethatHegeloriginallyintendedtogiveanaccountoftheexperienceofconsciousnessbut,duringthecourseofthework,changedhismindandaddedsocialandhistoricalformswhichwentbeyondindividualconsciousness;hethenaccordinglyalteredthetitle28Hegel,PhS,p.20;Jub.,vol.2,p.36.Cf.alsoPhS,p.15;Jub.,vol.2,p.30:“Itisthiscoming-to-beofScienceassuchorofknowledge,thatisdescribedinthisPhenomenologyofSpirit.Knowledgeinitsfirstphase,orimmediateSpirit,isthenon-spiritual,i.e.sense-consciousness.”Cf.Hegel,Phil.Prop.,p.56;Jub.,vol.3,p.102:“TheScienceofconsciousnessis,therefore,calledThePhenomenologyofMind[orSpirit].”[Phil.Prop.:ThePhilosophicalPropaedeutic,trans.byA.V.Miller,ed.byMichaelGeorgeandAndrewVincent(Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1986).]29Hegel,EL,§25;Jub.,vol.8,p.98.30HegeltoSchelling[95],Bamberg,May1,1807,Letters,p.80;Briefe,vol.1,pp.159–162.[Letters:Hegel:TheLetters,trans.byClarkButlerandChristineSeiler(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1984].BriefeI–III=BriefevonundanHegel,vols.1–3,ed.byJohannesHoffmeister(Hamburg:Meiner,1951–54;3rded.,1969).)31SeeFriedhelmNicolin,“ZumTitelproblemderPhanomenologiedesGeistes¨,”Hegel-Studien,vol.4(1967),pp.113–123.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhenomenologyasaSystematicFragment83toreflectthechangeincontent.ThenewtitlethenrefersnotmerelytoconsciousnessbutrathertoSpirit.AlthoughtheseargumentsofferevidencethatthePhenomenologyservesatleasttwodistinctphilosophicalagendas,theyarenotsuffi-cienttojustifytheconclusionthatitisadisunifiedtext.Manyworksofphilosophyandliteraturehavechangeddirectionduringthecourseoftheircomposition,withoutnecessarilybeingdisunified.Itdepends,ofcourse,ontheindividualtextandthenatureofthechanges.Inonecase,theauthormaybesooverpoweredbythediscontinuousstrandsoftheworkthatthefinalproductisindeedchaotic,butinanothertheauthormaysucceedinincorporatingthenewconceptionintothematerialwhichhadbeenwrittenupuntilthatpoint.Thenewelementmaythenbeseenasanimprovement,anexpansion,orasupplementandneednotnecessarilyimplythatthefinalproductisdisunified.Itcannotbeassumedthatachangeintheconceptionofaworkduringitscompositionalwaysresultsinadisunifiedtext.Hegelappearstohaverealizedthathistranscendentalargument,whichgivesanexhaustiveaccountofthenecessaryconditionsofthepossibilityofobjectivethought,wouldbeincompletewithoutanaccountofthesocialinteractionsandhistoricalinfluenceswhichcon-stitutethemediuminwhichtruthclaimsaredetermined.Hewasabletoincorporatetheseanalysesintohisoverallplanforatranscendentalargumentwithoutdamagingtheunityoftheworkasawhole.Tobesure,theseanalysesdifferedfromthosegiveninthe“Consciousness”and“Self-Consciousness”chapterswithrespecttocontent,buttheaimoftheanalysesandtheirdialecticalformremainedthesame.Thus,theconceptionofthePhenomenologyasatranscendentalargumentneverchanged,although,duringthecompositionofthetext,Hegeldiscoverednewaspectsandelementsofthisargumentthathehadnotconsideredwhenhestartedonthework.iii.thecoherenceproblemingeneralHaym’sthesisaboutthedisunityofthePhenomenologyhasbeenreworkedwithmorephilologicaldetailbysubsequentauthors.Mostnotably,OttoPoggelerinhisinfluentialessayonthecompositionofthe¨workconfirmsthemainpointsofHaym’sandHaering’sdiscontinuitythesisalthoughdifferingfromitinsomedetails.32Othercommentators32OttoPoggeler,“DieKompositionder¨PhanomenologiedesGeistes,¨”inHegel-TageRoyaumont1964.BeitragezurPh¨anomenologiedesGeistes¨,ed.byHans-GeorgGadamer.Hegel-Studien,Beiheft3(Bonn:Bouvier,1966),pp.27–74.CitedfromthereprintinMaterialienzuHegelsPhanomenologiedesGeistes¨,ed.byHansDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n84jonstewartusethisthesisasapointofdepartureorpresuppositionfortheirowninterpretationofindividualpartsofthetextasatomicunits.Theques-tionofthePhenomenologyasanintroductionorasafirstpartofasystemhasfallensomewhatintothebackground,whilethethesisthatitisdisunifiedremainsasstrongasever.ThemainargumentsusedbyPoggelerandlatercommentatorscanbe¨brokenintotwointerrelatedgroups.ThefirstlineofargumentationisexternaltothetextitselfandusesasevidencebiographicalinformationaboutHegelduringtheperiodofthecompositionofthePhenomenology.ThissortofargumentbeginswithsomefactaboutHegel’slifeorthecir-cumstancesofthecompositionoftheworkandthenproceedstoaclaimaboutthepatchworknatureofthetext.Thesecondlineofargumenta-tionisinternaltothetext.Inthisview,thetextofthePhenomenologyonitsowntermscannotbemadesenseofasasystematicwork.Thetransitionsbetweentheindividualchaptersareseenasunclear,andtheradicaldiversityofthemestreatedisseentoundermineanycontinuity.A.TheArgumentsBasedonHegel’sBiographyThereare,aboveall,biographicalreasonstobelievethatthePhe-nomenologycouldnotbeacarefullyorganizedandunifiedargument.Hegelpurportedlywrotethework,oratleastalargepartofit,duringanextremelyshortperiodoftime.AlthoughhehadalreadysentoffthefirsthalfofthetextshortlyafterEasterof1806,hewasundertremendouspressuretocompletethemanuscriptbyOctober18ofthatyear.Thiswasthedeadlinesetbyhispublisher,Goebhardt,whowasappeasedonlyafterHegel’sfriendNiethammerofferedtopersonallypaytheprintingcostsifHegelfailedtodelivertherestofthemanuscriptontime.33OnOctober8,Hegelsentapartofthesecondhalfofthemanuscriptandhadtofinishtherestoftheworkingreathastetomeetthedeadline.Yetevenifthecompositionofthefinalpartofthetextwasquitehurried,itdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthatthetextisdisunified.ThereisevidencethatHegelusedmuchofthesubjectmatterfoundinthePhenomenologyinhislecturecoursesthroughouttheJenaperiod,34FriedrichFuldaandDieterHenrich(Frankfurta.M.:Suhrkamp,1973),pp.329–390.33ForHegel’sproblemswithhispublisher,seehisletterstoNiethammer[67],[68],[70],[72],[73],[76];Briefe,vol.1,pp.112ff.34Forexample,Hegel’s“SystemofEthicalLife”(1802–1803),“FirstPhilosophyofSpirit”(1803–1804),andhis“ThePhilosophyofSpirit”(1805–1806).ThesetextsareavailableinEnglishinHegel,SystemofEthicalLifeandFirstPhilosophyofSpirit,ed.andtrans.byH.S.HarrisandT.M.Knox(Albany:SUNYPress,1979)andHegelandtheHumanSpirit.ATranslationoftheJenaLecturesonthePhilosophyDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhenomenologyasaSystematicFragment85whichsuggeststhathehadbeenworkingwiththesamematerialforsomeyears.Aworkwhichhehadalreadythoughtoutandworkedthroughinhislectureswouldpresumablyhaverequiredmuchlesstimetocomposethanaworkthathadtobeconstructedfromthegroundup.ArelatedbiographicalargumentisthatthethreateningapproachoftheFrencharmyandtheconfusionanddisordersurroundingtheBattleofJenadistractedanddistressedHegelduringthecompositionofthePhenomenology.35First,theBattleofJenacompelledhimtofinishtheworkquickly,thusprovidingyetanotherexternalpressurethatmagni-fiedthedifficultieshewasalreadyhavingwithhispublisher.Second,hehadtofearforhispersonalsafety.Frenchsoldierswhocametohishousehadtobeappeasedwithfoodandwine,andHegel,thencom-pletelydestitute,ultimatelyhadtoseekrefugeinthehomeofafriend.Again,however,thefactthataworkiscomposedinchaoticcircum-stancesdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatthefinishedproductmustbedisunified.Anumberofphilosophicalmasterpieceswerewrittenundersimilarlytryingcircumstances.BoethiuswrotetheConsolationofPhi-losophywhileawaitingthedeathsentencetobecarriedout;Condorcetwrotehissystematicmasterpiece,SketchofaHistoricalDescriptionoftheProgressoftheHumanSpirit,undersimilarcircumstances.TheGoldenAgeofRomanliteraturecorrespondstotheperiodofthebloodyCivilWars.Examplesofwritersandphilosopherswhowereactivedur-ingtheWorldWarsinthetwentiethcenturyaretoonumeroustolist.Therefore,thissortofargumentagainsttheunityofthePhenomenologyseemstobesimplyanonsequitur.AfinalversionoftheargumentreliesonHegel’sownremarksthatsuggestthathehadhisowndoubtsabouttheunityofthetext.InalettertoSchelling,helaments,“Workingintothedetailhas,Ifeel,damagedtheoverviewofthewhole.Thiswhole,however,isitselfbynaturesuchaninterlacingofcross-referencesbackandforththatevenwereitsetinbetterrelief,itwouldstillcostmemuchtimebeforeitwouldstandoutmoreclearlyandinmorefinishedform.”36ThispassageisoftencitedasevidencethatHegel’stextisdisunified.37However,acloserreadingofitshowsthatHegel’sfrustrationarisesnotbecausehisworkofSpirit(1805–6),byLeoRauch(Detroit:WayneStateUniversityPress,1983).SeealsoHegel,TheJenaSystem,1804–5:LogicandMetaphysics,ed.andtrans.byJohnW.BurbidgeandGeorgediGiovanni(KingstonandMontreal:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,1986).35See,HegeltoNiethammer[74],Letters,pp.114–115;Briefe,vol.1,pp.119–122.36HegeltoSchelling[95],Bamberg,May1,1807,Letters,p.80;Briefe,vol.1,pp.159–162.37SeeOttoPoggeler,“DieKompositionder¨PhanomenologiedesGeistes,¨”inMate-rialienzuHegelsPhanomenologiedesGeistes¨,op.cit.,pp.330,373.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n86jonstewartisdisunifiedbutbecausetimeconstraintsprecludedhimfrommakingitsunitymoreexplicit.Here,Hegelclearlyindicatesthat,infact,histextdoeshaveaunifiedstructureandadevelopedplan,but,sincehehadsobusiedhimselfwiththedetailsoftheindividualarguments,hesimplyneglectedtogivehisreaderssufficientinstructionabouttheoverallstructure.FurtherevidencethathebelievedthebooktobeunifiedmaybefoundinhisadvertisementfortheworkwhichappearedinOctober1807.Therehewrites,“ThewealthoftheappearancesofSpirit,whichatfirstglanceseemschaotic,isbroughtintoascientificorderwhichpresentsthemaccordingtotheirnecessity.”38AnotherpassagewhichhasbeencitedinsupportofargumentsthatthePhenomenologyisadisunifiedtextcomesfromaletterwrittenlongaftertheoriginalpublicationofthework.Hegel’soldpublisherGoeb-hardthadbeenboughtout,andhissuccessorWeschehadobtainedtheremainingcopiesofthefirsteditionofthePhenomenologyandwasputtingintomotionplanstoprintasecondeditionwithoutsecuringHegel’sapprovalorsolicitinghissuggestionsforcorrectionsorotherchanges.Hegel,upsetbythiseffrontery,wrotetovonMeyer,“His[sc.Wesche’s]attitudehereseemedtobethatheconsidersmyconsentandagreementtoconditionsforaneweditiontobestrictlyunnecessary.HedoesnoteventakeintoaccountthatIregardrevisionoftheworktobenecessary.”39ThiscommentappearsatfirstglancetoimplythatHegelregardedthePhenomenologyasaconfusedworksinceitrequiredrevision,andthisseemstosupportthedisunitythesis.Thepassage,however,failstosupportthelackofunityargumentbecauseitoffersnoinsightwhatsoeverintothenatureoftherevisionsHegeldeemsneces-sary.Hemighthavewishedtomakethebook’ssystematicconnectionsmoreexplicitor,forthatmatter,tosimplycorrectsomegrammaticalortypographicalerrors.Thebiographicalandtext-externalargumentsasawholethusremainunpersuasive.B.TheText-InternalArgumentsManyargumentsagainsttheunityoftheworkarebasedontheapparentheterogeneityofthethemesandanalysesitcontains.Hegeltreatstra-ditionalepistemologicalissuesandhistoricalfigures,andhealsogivesaccountsofscientificcommunities,variousformsofsociallife,andhis-toricaltimeperiods.ThechallengeistotrytobringalltheargumentsofthePhenomenology,manyofwhichappeartohavelittleincommon38MiscellaneousWritingsofG.W.F.Hegel,ed.byJonStewart(Evanston:North-westernUniversityPress,2002),p.282.39HegeltovonMeyer[605a],Berlin,August9,1829,Letters,p.121;Briefe,vol.4,pp.30–32.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhenomenologyasaSystematicFragment87withoneanother,underthesameroof.Mostsuchargumentsconcernthemselveswiththetransitionsbetweentheindividualchapters,whichseemtocontaindisparateanalyses.Onecelebratedtensionconcernsthecontinuityproblemofthefirsttwochapters:“Consciousness”and“Self-Consciousness.”Onecom-mentatorsuccinctlywrites,“thereappearstobelittleconnectionbetweenthetopicsofchapterfour[sc.Self-Consciousness]andthetheo-reticalissuesaddressedinthefirstthreechapters[sc.Consciousness].”40Anotherwrites,“OneofthemoremysterioustransitionsinthePhenomenologyisthetransitionfromthepurelyepistemicchapteron‘understanding’inwhichthetopicunderdiscussionisNewtonianforcesandvariousproblemsinthephilosophiesofLeibnizandKant,toadiscussionof‘life’and‘desire.’”41Inthe“Consciousness”chap-terHegelseemstoconcernhimselfwithwhatareusuallyconsideredtobestandardepistemologicalissues.Heconsidersobjectsviewedaspureundifferentiatedbeing,assubstanceswithpropertiesandfinallyasappearancescausedbyunseenforces.Butthen,bycontrast,inthe“Self-Consciousness”chapter,wefindthelordshipandbondagedialecticandHegel’saccountofalienation,followedbydiscussionsofStoicism,Skepticism,andtheunhappyconsciousness.42Thetraditionalepistemologicalinquiryofthepreviouschapterappearstohavebeenabandonedaltogether.43Findlaywritesthatwiththetransitiontothe“Self-Consciousness”chapter,“thedialecticsuddenlyswingsoverintothesocialsphere.”44Hefurtherclaimsthatthemovementis“fromtheepistemologicaltothepractical,sociallevel.”45Asaresultofthisview,40RobertPippin,Hegel’sIdealism:TheSatisfactionsofSelf-Consciousness(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989),p.143.41RobertC.Solomon,“TruthandSelf-Satisfaction,”ReviewofMetaphysics,28(1975),p.723.42SeeIvanSoll,AnIntroductiontoHegel’sMetaphysics(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1983),p.4:“Themagnificentlyambitious,ifquixoticandunful-filled,programofthePhenomenologyofSpiritrequiredorderingallformsofcon-sciousnessintoasingleascendingseries....Butalsoincludedintheseriesaresuchapparentlynon-epistemologicalandonlypartiallyepistemologicalformsasthemaster-servantrelation,theconflictbetweenhumananddivinelawasexem-plifiedinSophocles’Antigone,themoralviewofKant’sethics,andvariousformsofartandreligion.”43Preuss,forinstance,arguesthatthe“Self-Consciousness”chapterbetraysthetruegoalsofthePhenomenologywitharadicalbreakfromthe“Consciousness”chap-ter.P.Preuss,“SelfhoodandtheBattle:TheSecondBeginningofthePhenomenol-ogy,”inMethodandSpeculationinHegel’sPhilosophy,ed.byMeroldWestphal(AtlanticHighlands,NJ:HumanitiesPress,1982),pp.71–83.44JohnFindlay,ThePhilosophyofHegel:AnIntroductionandRe-Examination(London:GeorgeAllenandUnwin,1958),p.93.45Ibid.,p.94.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n88jonstewartmostcommentatorstakethischangeoftopicforgrantedandargueaboutthespecificsofthecontentofthetwosectionswithoutmuchconcernfortheircoherenceasacommonphilosophicalproject.Mostofthedis-agreementisabouttheinternalcontinuityofthetwosectionstakenindividuallyandnotaboutwhattheirrelationtooneanothermightbe.Hegel’sunambiguousclaimsaboutthesystematicconnectionsinhisphilosophyaresimplycastaside.Anothertransitionwhichhasbeenconsideredproblematicistheonefrom“Self-Consciousness”to“Reason.”Withrespecttothistransition,onecommentatorwrites,Thereaderforgetstheimageoftheladderandwonderswhichofthemanyfea-turesofthistableauareinanysensenecessaryandessentialtothisstage;andtheauthortoo,hasplainlylostsightoftheideaandplanofhisbook,andfarfromcompressinghisexpositionseverely,dwellsatunnecessarylengthonirrelevan-cies....Hegelobviouslywasunabletocontinuethedevelopmentthathehadtracedsobrilliantlythroughseveralstages,beyondthispoint,toanotherstage.46Intheliteratureithasbeenextremelydifficulttomakeoutanysortofmeaningfulconnectionbetweentheanalysisofreligiousconsciousnessin“UnhappyConsciousness”andthenaturalscientificunderstandingoftheworldin“ObservingReason”thatwouldserveasabridgeorconnectinglinkbetweenthesetwochapters.Theoriginalcontroversiesabouttheunityoftheworkfocusedonthe“Reason”chapter,thelengthofwhichappearsentirelydisproportionatetothe“Consciousness”and“Self-Consciousness”chapters.47ThiswasinterpretedasevidencethatHegelchangedhisagendainthecourseofcomposingthe“Reason”chapter.Onecommentatorwrites,“Thetableofcontentsbearsoutthattheworkwasnotplannedpainstakinglybeforeitwaswritten,thatpartsVandVI(ReasonandSpirit)grewfarbeyondtheboundsoriginallycontemplatedandthatHegelhimselfwasalittleconfusedaboutwhathehadactuallygotwhenhewasfinished.”48Inthe“Reason”chaptertheepistemologicalanalysesof“Consciousness”areapparentlyabsent,andtheconfrontationofthetwoself-conscioussubjectsfromthe“Self-Consciousness”chapterisnowheretobefound.Instead,wefindananalysisofHegel’sphilosophyofnatureandvariousconceptionsofvirtuousandmoralliving.Thus,withrespecttocon-tent,theearlierchaptersseemtohavelittleincommonwith“Reason,”46WalterKaufmann,Hegel:AReinterpretation,op.cit.,p.141.47SeeJohannesHoffmeister,“EinleitingdesHerausgebers,”inGeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel,SamtlicheWerke,KritischeAusgabe¨,vol.11,Phanomenologie¨desGeistes(Leipzig:FelixMeiner,1937),p.xxxv.Cf.alsoTheodorHaering,“EntstehungsgeschichtederPhanomenologiedesGeistes¨,”op.cit.,pp.129ff.48WalterKaufmann,Hegel:AReinterpretation,op.cit.,p.135.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhenomenologyasaSystematicFragment89and,moreover,thereseemstobelittlecontinuityamongtheindividualanalysesfoundwithinthechapter.Yetanotherproblematictransitionisthatbetweenthe“Reason”andthe“Spirit”chapters.“Reason”endswithacriticismofmoralitycon-ceivedasanemptysetofformallaws,while“Spirit”beginswithadiscussionofSophocles’tragedyAntigone,usedtoillustratetheshort-comingsoftheformofsocialliferesultingfromindividualswhoimme-diatelyandunreflectivelyidentifythemselveswithlargerinstitutions.Needlesstosay,thistransitionraisesmanyquestions.IsthisanalysisoftheGreekpolissupposedtobehistorical?Ifso,thenwhydoesitstartherewithAntigoneandnotearlier,forexample,withHomer?49Whatistherelationbetweenthisseeminglyhistoricalaccountandtheanalysisofthemorallawsinthepreviouschapter(“Reason”)?Isthe“Spirit”chapteritselfmeanttobehistorical?Ifso,whydoesitpassovercertainperiodsandkeyevents?Thetransitionfrom“Spirit”to“Religion”50andthecontentof“Reli-gion”itselfarenolessproblematic.Isthe“Religion”chapteralsoahis-toricalaccount?Ifso,thenwhyisitnotsimplyincorporatedintothehistoricalaccountofthe“Spirit”chapter?However,ifitisacompleteaccountofreligiousconsciousnessfrombeginningtoend,thenwhyareformsofreligiousconsciousnesstreatedinearlierchapters,forexam-ple,inthe“UnhappyConsciousness”section?Isit,asoneauthorsays,“eccentric”51totreatformsofartinthe“Religion”chapter?WhydoesHegelheretreatnon-Europeanreligions,whereasin“Spirit”hegavenoaccountofnon-Europeanhistory,butratherstarted,asistraditionallydone,withtheGreeks?iv.thesolution:theparallelismsinthetextAlthoughthesetransitionsmayseemabrupt,thekeytounderstandingthemistograspthecomplicatedseriesofcorrespondinganalysesintheindividualsectionsofthework.Itwould,ofcourse,requireafull-lengthcommentarytoexplorealloftheseindetail,52butthepointcanbeillustratedinaverygeneralwaybymeansofabriefoverview.49SeeRudolfHaym,HegelundseineZeit.VorlesungenuberEntstehungund¨Entwicklung,WesenundWerthderhegel’schenPhilosophie(Berlin:RudolfGaert-ner,1857;reprint,Hildesheim:Olms,1962),p.242:“Theselection[sc.ofhistoricalforms]isabsolutelyarbitrary.”50SeeJosephC.Flay,“ReligionandtheAbsoluteStandpoint,”Thought,56(1981),pp.316–327.51WalterKaufmann,“Hegel’sConceptionofPhenomenology,”op.cit,p.214.52IhaveattemptedsuchacommentaryinmyTheUnityofHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit(Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2000).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n90jonstewartIneachofthesubordinatelevelsofthePhenomenologyconsciousnessseeksacriterionfortruthinan“other”whichitbelievestoexistinde-pendentlyofitself.In“SenseCertainty,”theinitialanalysisofthe“Con-sciousness”chapter,naturalconsciousnesshasyettoprogressbeyondthelevelofcommonsenserealism.Assubject,itseeksacriterionfortruthinthegivenobjectwhichitperceives.Thisanalysisparallelstheanalysisgiveninthesection,“TheObservationofNature,”inthe“Rea-son”chapter.Therethevariousobjectsofperceptionhavebeenconsol-idatedintothemoreabstractconceptofnature,which,nonetheless,isstillconceivedasexistingindependentlyfromandofferingatruthcrite-rionforthescientificobserver.Theyaretakentobeobjectivelytrueinthemselvesapartfromtheinterferenceorobservationofthescientificobserver.Thisistakentoanevenhigherlevelin“TheEthicalWorld”analysisinthe“Spirit”chapter.Reasonhasnowprogressedtoview-ingitselfinthecontextofahistoricalandmoralworld.Itsotherisnowmoralitywhichistosocietywhatnatureanditslawsaretounconsciousobjects.Morallawsareassumedtobepre-existentfactsabouttheworld.IntheAntigone,onereadsoftheethicallaws:“Theyarenotofyesterdayortoday,buteverlasting./Thoughwheretheycamefrom,noneofuscantell.”53Thefinalparallelanalysisinthisseriesisthefirstdiscussionof“Religion,”namely,“GodasLight.”Althoughtheobjectinquestionhaschanged,thegeneralconceptionofitremainsthesame.Heretheotherhasprogressedtoaconceptionofthedivineunderstoodasfireorlight,whichcombineselementsoftheobject,nature,andmorality.Ittooisconceivedasastraightforwardlyexistingotherofnature,withnoconsciouselement.Thisisconceivedasimmediatelygivenandtrue,independentofanyhumaninfluence.Aparallelmovementtothisonetakesplaceonthesideofthesubject,beginningwith“TheTruthofSelf-Certainty”inthe“Self-Consciousness”chapter.Accordingtothisconception,self-consciousnesstakesitselftobethecriterionfortruthandthusdeniesthetruthandvalidityoftheobjectsphere.Atthesimplestlevelofself-consciousness,thismeansdestroyingandappropriatingobjectsofnatureforitsownsatisfaction.Thisisfurtherdevelopedin“PleasureandNecessity”inthe“Reason”chapter,wherethesubjectisnolongeranatomicagentbutratherentersthemoralsphere.Heretheself-conscioussubjectreducestheexternalworld,includingotherhumanbeings,toobjectsofitsownpleasure.Theyhavetruthandvalueonlyinsofarattheycanservethehedonisticendsofthepleasure-seekingsubject.Thehistoricalmanifestationofthisistreatedin“TheWorldof53Hegel,PhS,p.261;Jub.,vol.2,p.333.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhenomenologyasaSystematicFragment91Self-AlienatedSpirit”inthe“Spirit”chapter.IncontrasttotheworldofAntigone,wheremorallawswereeternallygivenfactsabouttheexternalworld,theself-alienatedspiritdeniesthevalidityofallsuchpositivelaws,regardingthemasirrational,arbitrary,andoppressive.Againthetruthissoughtonthesideofthesubject,whichbymeansofreasonalonecandeterminenewlawsthatcanpassthestricttestofrationalscrutiny.Finally,thisaccountappearsagaininthe“Reli-gion”chapterin“TheAbstractWorkofArt.”Insteadofthedivinitybeingconceivedasanobjectofnaturesuchasfire,nowthedivine,inGreekpolytheism,isconceivedasaself-conscioussubject.ThegodshaveahumanformasisseeninvariousportrayalsinGreekart,suchassculpture.Whatalloftheseviewshaveincommonisthepositingofthecriterionfortruthonthesideofthesubject.Hegelexhauststhisconcept,runningthroughallitsformsfromthemostabstractformofasingleself-consciousagentconfrontedwiththeworldofnaturetothesubjectconceivedasaself-conscious,anthropomorphicgod.Parallelsofthiskindrunthroughtheentiretextandconstituteitsintendedsystematicunity.Increasinglycomplexobjectmodelsaresys-tematicallyappliedtoincreasinglycomplexkindsofsubjectmatter.Thesystematicstructureconsistsinthedialecticalmovement,whichpositsthetruthfirstonthesideoftheobject,initsmanydifferentforms,andthenonthesideofthesubject,initsmanydifferentforms,andthenfinallyintheunityofthetwo.Thisdialecticalmovementistracedwithunflaggingconsistencythroughevermoresophisticatedcontexts.ThisisthesystematicstructurethatHegelintendedtomakeappar-entinthedifferentanalyses.Oncethereadergraspstheseparallelsandthisdialecticalmovement,theseeminglyheterogeneousdiscussionswithinthetextareseentobeorganizedinaregularandsystematicmanner.v.thephenomenologyasfragmentaryIthasoftenbeennotedthatsomeofHegel’sanalysesinthelatterpartofthePhenomenologyseemperfunctory.Inparticularithasbeenarguedthat“Religion,”thefinalchapterbefore“AbsoluteKnowing,”showsclearsignsofahurriedcomposition.Hegel’sanalysesofnaturalreligionareonlyafewpageslonganddonotseemfullydeveloped.(Thesamehasbeensaidoftheshort“AbsoluteKnowing”chapter.)Inconjunctionwiththebiographicalinformationaboutthestressfulcircumstancesofthecompositionofthelatterpartofthetext,thispositionhasoftenledtotheclaimthatthePhenomenologyisfragmentaryratherthansystematic.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n92jonstewartThisargument,likethosecitedabove,issimplyanonsequitur.InthelettertoSchellingmentionedabove,Hegelstateshewasnotabletoworkoutalloftheanalysesandtheirparalleldiscussionstohissatisfaction.Itisthusnosurprisetofindthatsomeofhischaptersorsectionsarerathercursory.However,itbynomeansfollowsthatthereisnosystematicconceptbehindtheworkasawholeorbehindthesespecificanalyses.Thesystematicstructureisthere,evenifHegeldidnotfilloutalloftheindividualanalysesinsatisfactorydetail.TheideathatHegelhadaclearviewofthesystematicwholeofthe“Religion”chaptercanbeseenfromthefactthathisextensiveLecturesonthePhilosophyofReligionretainsthesamebasicstructurefromthePhenomenology.Sincehegavetheselecturesoverseveralsemesters,hewasabletoworkouttheindividualanalysesinmuchmoredetailthanhehadbeenabletodoinhisearlybook.Butthekeypointisthattheanalysesgiveninhislectures,whichheexplicitlyclaimsrepresentasystematicaccountofreligion,correspondfairlystraightforwardlytothoseofthePhenomenology.Inhislectures,Hegelbeginswithapurelyconceptualaccountofwhatreligionis.Inthesecondparthemovesontoahistoricalaccountofthedevelopmentofdifferentformsofreligion,whichcorrespondstotheanalysesinthePhenomenology.Thefirstmainsectioninbothworksis“NaturalReligion.”InthePhenomenologythisconstitutestheseriesofZoroastrianism(“GodasLight”),Hinduism(“PlantandAni-mal”),andEgyptianpolytheism(“TheArtificer”).TheLecturesonthePhilosophyofReligionexploresthesesametopicsinfargreaterdetail.Hegeltinkerswithsomeaspectsoftheanalysis,forexample,reversingtheorderofhistreatmentofZoroastrianismandHinduism,butthesechangesarelessimportantthantheoverallstructuralcontinuities.Thesecondsectionof“Religion”inthePhenomenologyis“ReligionintheFormofArt,”whichisananalysisofGreekpolytheism.Thiscorre-spondstotheseconddivisioninHegel’slectures,whichhecalls“TheReligionofSpiritualIndividuality.”Finally,thethirdandfinalsectionof“Religion”inthePhenomenologyisChristianityor“TheRevealedReligion.”Thiscorrespondsstraightforwardlytowhatiscalled“TheAbsoluteReligion”inthelectures.Tobesure,newanalysesandexamplesareaddedinthelectures,butthebasictriadof“NaturalReligion,”and“TheReligionofBeauty”and“TheRevealedReligion,”establishedinthePhenomenology,contin-uestoserveastheguidingparadigm.ThismeansthatHegelknewthesystematicstructurethathewastofollowbutsimplyhadinsufficienttimetoexecuteeveryanalysisinitsdetails.Thus,thesystematicstruc-tureofthePhenomenologydoesexist,atleastinoutlineforminthe“Religion”chapter.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhenomenologyasaSystematicFragment93Thisconclusion,thatthePhenomenologyisafragmentbutyetalsoasystem,willdoubtlessstrikesomeasparadoxicalanduntenable.How-ever,thereisnointrinsiccontradictioninthenotionofasystematicfragment.Theideaissimplythatthereisasystematicstructurepresentbehindthescenes.Tobesure,thisstructureisattimesskeletal,butthatdoesnotundermineHegel’ssystematicintent.Itmerelymakesitmoredifficulttoperceiveandunderstand.Theworkisafragmentwithregard,nottothestructureitself,buttothedevelopmentoftheindi-vidualanalysesanddialecticalarguments.Duepresumablytothehastycompositionofthesecondhalfofthework,someoftheanalysesthatappeartherearenotfullyworkedoutandthusremaininfragmentaryform.TheyonlyreceivetheirfullanalysisyearslaterinHegel’slec-tures.ThisunderstandingofthePhenomenologyasasystematicfrag-menthelpstodojustice,ontheonehand,tothebeliefthatthetextdoesnotalwaysworkoutallthedetailsand,ontheotherhand,toHegel’sexplicitclaimsforasystem,whichareusuallycastasideasaresultofthatintuition.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:09WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.004CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\npaulredding4TheIndependenceandDependenceofSelf-Consciousness:TheDialecticofLordandBondsmaninHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit“Self-consciousnessexistsinandforitselfwhen,andbythefactthat,itsoexistsforanother;thatis,itexistsonlyassomethingacknowl-edged.”1Thissentencecommences,andanticipatesthekeylessonfrom,whatisperhapsthemost-readsectionofanyofHegel’stexts:theeightorninepagestitled,“IndependenceandDependenceofSelf-Consciousness:LordshipandBondage,”whichisembeddedwithinchapter4ofthePhe-nomenologyofSpirit.Thechapteritself,whichistitled“TheTruthofSelf-Certainty,”istheonlychapterofasectionthatislabeled“B:Self-Consciousness”andthatfollowsthethree-chaptered“A:Conscious-ness”andprecedes“C:Reason.”Thegeneralideasummarilyintroducedhere–thatwearethesortsofbeingswearewithourcharacteristic“self-consciousness”onlyonaccountofthefactthatweexist“for”eachotheror,morespecifi-cally,arerecognizedoracknowledged(anerkannt)byeachother,anideawemightrefertoasthe“acknowledgmentcondition”forself-consciousness–constitutesoneofHegel’scentralclaimsinthePhe-nomenology.Thisisasubstantialclaimindeed,andisattheheartofthethesisof“thesocialityofreason”.2Itis,however,introducedinaseeminglyarbitrarilywayintheparagraphpriortothe“IndependenceandDependence”section,andattheconclusionofadiscussionexam-ining“desire”asamodelforself-consciousness.Exactlywhywearemeanttoaccepttheacknowledgmentconditionis,tosaytheleast,far1G.W.F.Hegel,PhanomenologiedesGeistes¨(WerkeinzwanzigBanden¨,ed.byEvaMoldenhauerandKarlMarkusMichel(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1969),vol.3),p.145;EnglishtranslationbyA.V.MillerHegel’sPhilosophyofSpirit(Oxford:OxfordUni-versityPress,1977),§178.(Occasionallythetranslationhasbeenmodifiedashere.)Henceforth,referencestoHegel’sPhenomenologywillbegivenparenthetically,thepagenumberoftheGermaneditionfollowingtheparagraphnumberoftheEnglishtranslation.2Cf.,TerryPinkard,Hegel’sPhenomenology:TheSocialityofReason,(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994).94DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheIndependenceandDependenceofSelf-Consciousness95fromclear,andwhileevenacursoryreadingofthefamouslordandbondsman“dialectic”thatfollowsenablesonetogetthegeneralpic-ture,thephilosophicalsignificancewearemeanttoextractfromitisnotobvious.InHegel’sexplorationofthenatureandconditionsofself-consciousnessinthesepages,muchhangsonhisuseoftheterms“beinginitself,”“beingforitself,”and“beingforanother,”butaswithsomanyofHegel’scharacteristicexpressions,whileitiseasyenoughtogetanimpressionofwhathemeanstoconveywiththeseexpressions,itisfarfromeasytomakethatimpressionexplicit.Thisisaneffortthatreallycannotbeavoided,however,ifwearetoappreciateboththenatureandgroundsofHegel’sclaims.“beinginitself,”“beingforitself,”and“beingforanother”Inoureverydayunreflectiveexperienceoftheworldweoftenseemtopresupposethattheobjectsweareexperiencingarepresentedtousjustasthey“really”are“inthemselves.”Thatis,weassumethatweretheynotbeingexperiencedtheywouldstillbejustastheyforusinourexperience.Thiseverydayattitudeistheattitudeof“consciousness,”theexperienceofwhichhadbeentracedinsection“A:Consciousness”;andintheopeningparagraphof“B:Self-Consciousness,”Hegelreiter-ateswhathasbeenlearntfromconsciousness’searlierexperience.Whiletheinitialorientationofconsciousnesshadbeentotakesomethingotherthanitself,theseeminglyindependent“initself”presentedtoit,tobereality,whathadbeenrevealedwithinthecourseofitsexperiencewasthatthissupposedlyindependentin-itselfisinfact“amanner[Weise]inwhichtheobjectisonlyforanother”(§166,p.137).Perhapstheeasiestwaytogetagriponconsciousness’sterminatingattitudeistodescribeitasatypeofradicalizedKantianism.Kanthadconceivedoftheobjectsexistingforconsciousness–“appearances”–ashavingaformcontributedbytheconscioussubjectitself,andhaddistin-guishedsuchappearancesfromthatthingasitwas“initself.”ButwhileKanthadretainedtheideaofsuchanunknowable“thinginitself”tocontrastwiththesubjectivelyconstitutedappearanceknown,herecon-sciousnesshasarrivedatthepositionthatwhatispresentedtoit(Kant’s“appearance”)isthereal,buthasnowequatedthatwithitselfasthatwhichconstitutesitasknown.3Thatis,whatithadoriginallytakentobeanindependentthing“in-itself,”isnowgraspedassomethingentirelyofitsownmaking,an“appearance”whollydependentuponit.3TheclaimthatthismoreradicalviewwasimpliedbyKant’smoremoderatepositionwasfirstmadebyJacobi.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n96paulreddingAsHegelcrypticallyputsit,now“thein-itselfisconsciousness”(ibid.).Inbeingconsciousofitsobject,consciousnessisthusconsciousofitself.Buthowarewetothinkofthisself-consciousness?Onetemptingwaymightbetothinkofself-consciousnessassometypeofimmediateself-reflectionalongthelinesfoundinDescartes’scogito,andthiscanseemtobeessentiallyhowFichteconstruedthe“for-itself”inhis“FirstIntroductiontotheWissenschaftslehre”:“Athing...maypossessavarietyofdifferentfeatures;butifweask,“Forwhomisitwhatitis?”noonewhounderstandsourquestionwillanswerthat“itexistsforitself.”Instead,anintellectalsohastobethoughtofinthiscase,anintellectforwhichthethinginquestionexists.Theintellect,incontrast,necessarilyisforitselfwhateveritis,andnothingelseneedstobethoughtofinconjunctionwiththethoughtofanintellect.”4ButtheCartesianconceptionisnotsufficienttocapturetheinitialorientationofself-consciousness;neitherisFichte’sconception.InadeparturefromDescartes’snotionofthemindasathinkingthingorsubstance,Fichtecategorizedtheselfwiththeneologism“Tathandlung”–a“fact-act”–incontrastwith“Tatsache”–amerethingorfact.ThusonFichte’saccount,itwasimportantthattheselfbeconsciousofitselfasitactuallyis,thatis,asactivity.TheIis“forit-selfwhateveritis.”Itis,wemightsay,consciousofitself,orforitself,asitisin-itself.ThusFichtecharacterisedtheself-consciousintellectasan“immediateunityofbeingandseeing,”5suggesting,animmediateunityofawayofbeing(asactivity)andawarenessofthiswayofbeing.ThisFichteancharacterizationofself-consciousnessseemsclearlyrelevanttotheorientationfromwhichChapter4starts,“Self-certainty,”6butwhenHegel,in§178,speaksoftheconditionsofaself-consciousnessbeingboth“foritself”and“initself”wemightseeahintoftherebeingsomethingotherthanan“immediateunity”involved.Thatis,Hegel’s“and”mightbetakentosuggestthatself-consciousnessmustsomehowcombinethesetwoaspectsagainstthebackgroundofthepossibilityofitsbeingconsideredintermsofonemodeortheother.Indeed,aswewillsee,inthestoryofthelordandhisbondsman,bothlordandbondsmanwillbeportrayedasrealizingeachoftheseone-sided4J.G.Fichte,IntroductionstotheWissenschaftslehreandOtherWritings,trans.anded.byDanielBreazeale,(Indianapolis:Hackett,1994),p.21.5Ibid.6AlthoughitistruethatHegelisherenotconcernedwithparticularphilosophicaltheoriesasheisinlatersectionsofthePhenomenology,itseemsclearthatwith“thetruthofself-certainty,”Hegelintendsamodelofself-consciousnessthatfindsitsmostexplicitanddevelopedphilosophicalaccountinFichte.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheIndependenceandDependenceofSelf-Consciousness97modes.Moreover,this“and”willbeimportantmethodologicallyforHegel,because,whilethereisstillaCartesianelementintheimmediacyofSelf-certainty’sknowledge,itiscrucialforHegel’sepistemologythatweprogressbylearningfromourfailures.Theformofself-consciousnessmanifestingthisinitialcertaintyofbeinginitselfasitisimmediatelyforitselfwillcometoamoredevelopedconceptionofitselfbywayofpassingthroughaconceptionofitselfinwhichitscomplementaryin-itselfcharacterisbroughttothefore.Moreover,wehavealreadyseensomethingofhowthis“both”istobeachieved,astheexperienceofconsciousnessitselfhadrevealedthattohavethecharacterofan“in-itself”wasreallytobe“for-another.”WiththedialecticbetweenlordandbondsmanHegelwilltrytobringouthowcrucialthisexistence“for-another”is.self-consciousnessasdesireBytheendofsection“A,”consciousness(thatattitudethathadtakenthestatusofsomething’sgivennesstoitasindicatingitsindependentexistence)hadlearnedthatwhatwasapparentlygivenwasreallycon-stitutedbyitsmodeofconstructing,andhadhadtherebybecomeself-consciousness.Butconstructingisanactivity,andsothetransitionfromconsciousnesstoself-consciousnesshasalsobeenachangefromaprimarilycontemplativeformofthoughttoonethatisessentiallypractical.Itshouldnotthenbetoosurprisingthattheshapeofself-consciousnessfirstencounteredinthissectionisanovertlypracticalorientation–desire.Infact,desireseemstoprovideagoodinstantia-tionoftheideaofaselfgraspingitselfastheessenceofitsapparentlygivenobject.Whilewetendtothinkofdesiresasworld-directedmen-talattitudes,onreflectionitmightbethoughtthatsincethedesiredobjectispickedoutexclusivelybythefactthatonedesiresit,itcanequallybeconsideredasaprojectionorconstructionofone’sownstate.Hegelseemstohavesomethinglikethisinmindwhenhesaysat§167thatconsciousness“asself-consciousness...hasadoubleobject:oneistheimmediateobject...which...hasthecharacterofanegative;andthesecond,namely,viz.itself,whichisthetrueessenceandispresentinthefirstinstanceonlyasopposedtothefirstobject”(§167,p.139).IhavesuggestedthatHegelportraystheinitialorientationofself-consciousnessingenerally“Fichtean”terms,butthisneedsquali-fication:Hegel’swordfordesirehere,Begierde,suggests“appetite,”andFichte’sessentiallyKantianconceptionofmoralself-consciousnesswasanythingbutapracticalorientationbasedonappetite.Fichtehadappealedtotheideaofthemind’sbasicorientationtotheworldasaDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n98paulreddingtypeofstrivingorendeavouringratherthanapassivelycontemplativeknowing,butsuch“striving”isclearlyfarfromreducibletoanynaturalistic“appetite-driven”process.ForFichteasforKant,itwastheindependenceorautonomyofmoralactionthathadbeenthekeycon-cern,thusFichteconsideredthefiniteegoasstrivingagainstallthatwhichlimitsanddeterminesit,includingitsownapparentlygiveninclinationsandappetites.Assuch,theprimacyofpracticalreasonwasforFichtetheprimacyofthepracticalormoralfacultythat,followingKant,hecalledthefacultyofBegehrung,alsotranslatedas“desire,”butusedinthissensewithoutthecorporealconnotationsof“Begierde.”Wemightstarttosee,however,howfromHegel’sperspectivesuchmoralintentionalitystillhasanunderlyingstructuremostobviouslymanifestedinBegierde.Begierdeisfundamentallyanegatingattitudetoanythingthatisgiventoit,andthisistheattitudeoftheFichteanmoralsubjecttowhateverthreatenstodetermineitfromwithout.Moraldesire,itmightbesaid,isadesiretobefreedfromanyfirst-orderdesiresornaturalinclinations,andittreatstheminthewaythattheytreattheirobjects.Inthenextsection,IwillfurthersuggestthatHegel’suseofBegierdeisboundupwithhisintroductionofthetopicofappetite’snat-uralcontext,therealmoflife,butwhatshouldbenotedhereisthewaythatforHegeltheinadequacyofdesireasamodelforself-consciousnessisconnectedtoitsimmediacy.IthadbeenFichte’sassumptionoftheimmediateunityoftheego’sin-itselfnessandfor-selfnessthatprecludedthepossibilityofSelf-certaintybeingmistakenaboutitsviewofitself.Incontrast,fromHegel’sperspec-tive,itisthedifferencebetweenthewaythattheegoisimmediatelyforitselfandthewaythatitisin-itselfthatcreatesthespacethatitcantra-verseinitsexperientialjourneytothetruthofitsself-understanding–itsbeingin-and-for-itself.Butthereareotherconsequencesofthisini-tialgapwhicharecrucialtoHegel’sapproach,asthefactthatwecanalwayscounterthequestionofhowself-consciousnessisimmediatelyfor-itselfwiththatconcerninghowitisin-itselfintroducestheissueofhowaself-consciousnesscanbefor-another.Oneconsequenceofthisconcernstheplaceitprovidesfortheconsciousnessorviewpointsharedby“we”observersofthejourneyofconsciousness,theso-calledphenomenologicalwe.7Anotheristhatitintroducesaplaceforacer-tain“nature-philosophical”inflectionintothe“Fichtean”dimensionofHegel’saccount.7AswithmanycomponentsofHegel’saccountthistooseemstohaveitsorigininFichte’sphilosophy,asFichtedistinguishedphilosophicalconsciousnessasatypeofhigher-orderconsciousnessawareoftheactivityoffirst-levelconsciousness.SeeFichte,IntroductionstotheWissenschaftslehre,pp.48–49.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheIndependenceandDependenceofSelf-Consciousness99desireinthecontextoflifeInhisearlier“Differenzschrift”of1801,writteninamoreSchellingianidiom,8HegelhadcriticizedFichteforbeinglimitedinhisaccounttoa“subjective,”andaslackingacomplementary“objective”–thereatypeofnature-philosophical–conceptionoftheautonomousself-conscioussubject,theso-calledsubject-object.ThatFichtehadbeenrestrictedtoa“subjective”conceptionofthe“subject-object”(orwhatHegelwaslatertolabel“Idea”as“whatistrueinandforitself,theabso-luteunityofConceptandobjectivity”)9wastoremainHegel’sbasiccomplaintagainsthim.10InthePhenomenology,thischargeeffectivelyhadbecometheideathatinthedesiremodelofself-consciousness,the“for-self”(subjectiveandindependent)aspectofself-consciousnesspredominatesoveroreclipsesthe“in-itself”(objectiveanddependent)aspect.Moreover,thenature-philosophicalviewpointtowhichHegelhadappealedintheDifferenzschrifthadprovidedanewsensetothenotionofwhatitistobe“foroneself,”asensefreedfromthemoreCartesianaspectsofFichte’susagewithwhichwestarted.Self-maintainingandself-directingorganismsmanifestaformof“for-selfness”inthoseveryactivities.Butanorganismis,ofcourse,anobjec-tivelyexistingthing–an“in-itself”which,incontrasttoaCartesianmind,canexistassomethingforanother.11Throughoutsection“A,”becausewehadtakenaconsciousnessthatwasforusasan“in-itself,”wephenomenologicalobservershadbeenabletograspsomethingaboutthenatureofconsciousnessthateludedconsciousnessitself:itsactiveroleinconstitutingitsobject.Now,in8G.W.F.Hegel,DifferenzdesFichte’schenundSchelling’schenSystemsderPhilosophie,(Werke,2),translatedasDifferencebetweenFichte’sandSchelling’sSystemsofPhilosophy,trans.byH.S.HarrisandWalterCerf,(Albany:StateUni-versityofNewYorkPress,1973).Hegel’scomplaintagainstFichteoutlivedhisallegiancetoSchelling.Infact,evenintheDifferenzschrift,HegelhaddepartedfromSchellingincrucialways.9EnzyklopadiederphilosophischenWissenschaftenimGrundrisse1830¨,ErsterTeil:DieWissenschaftderLogikMitdenmundlichenZus¨atzen¨,(Werke,8),trans-latedasTheEncyclopaediaLogic,trans.byT.F.Geraets,W.A.Suchting,andH.S.Harris,(Indianapolis:Hackett,1991),§213.Hegelfurthercharacterizestheideaas“theSubject–Object”on§214.10SuchananalysisofthefailingsofFichte’ssystemisfullyapparent,forexample,inHegel’scommentsintheLecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy:Volume3,MedievalandModernPhilosophy,trans.byE.S.HaldaneandFrancesH.Simson,(Lincoln:UniversityofNebraskaPress,1995),((Werke,20):§3,C1).11ThusasSchellinghadasserted:“Everyorganicproductexistsforitself;itsbeingisdependentonnootherbeing.”F.W.J.Schelling,IdeasforaPhilosophyofNature,trans.byErrolE.HarrisandPeterHeath,(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995),p.30.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n100paulreddingthechapteronself-consciousness,whereSelf-certaintygraspsitselfassubjectiveactivityanditsobjectasdependentonitandsoa“nothing,”thesituationisinsomesensereversed.Weobserveaself-consciousnessthatisimmediatelyfor-itselfasatypeofactiveself-movingobject,andwegraspitasactingonobjectsthat,althoughitregardsasnoth-ings,mustforusessentiallybelongtothesameobjectiveorderasthisself-consciousnessitself.Tobeobservedtoact,oneneeds,asitwere,somethinguponwhichtoact.Thatis,weunderstandhowtheobjectswithwhichitinteractshavemoretothemthanwhatself-consciousnessitselfintendsforthem–wecanseehowself-consciousness’sactivityisitselfdependentontheseobjects,andthisiswhatself-consciousnessmustitselflearnthroughitspracticalexperience.12Ittoomustlearnthattheypossessanecessaryindependence(§168,p.139).Itisinthisway,then,thatHegelintroducesthethemeoflifein§168whenhenotes:“Butforus,orinitself,theobjectwhichforself-consciousnessisthenegativeelementhas,onitsside,returnedintoitself,justasontheothersideconsciousnesshasdone.Throughthisreflectionintoitself,theobjecthasbecomeLife”(ibid.).Fromthesub-jectiveorfirst-personpointofview,desiremightbeexperiencedimmedi-atelyasthedesiretonegatesomeobject;butfromanexternal,objectivepointofview(thatof“we”phenomenologicalobservers),desireisthesortofthingthatisexpressedintheteleologicalactionofanorganisminteractingwithothersinordertopreserveitselfortakeforitself,asitwere,thelifethattheypossess.Butwhilewemayseesuchdesireasaimedatauniversallifeitself,thisuniversalaspectmustbepre-sentabletothedesiringsubjectitselfasadistinctobject;itsdesiremustbedirectedatthe“livingthing”whoselifeitwillattempttoappropri-ate.Andwiththisweseehowself-consciousnessmustincorporatethemultifaceteddevelopmentcharacteristicofconsciousness,suchthatitsmediatingobjecthasthecharacteristicsofobjectsofthoseshapesofconsciousnessexploredinchapters1–3:Sense-certainty(diesinnlicheGewissheit),Perception(dieWahrnehmung),andUnderstanding(derVerstand).“Whatself-consciousnessdistinguishesfromitselfashavingbeing”notesHegel,“alsohasinit,insofarasitispositedasbeing,notmerelythecharacterofsense-certaintyandperception,butitisbeingthatisreflectedintoitself,andtheobjectofimmediatedesireisalivingthing[einLebendiges]”(ibid.).ItcanseemasifHegelsimplypresupposesthis“nature-philosophical”accountthatisintroducedhere,butoncloserinspec-tionitisclearthatHegelbelievesheisentitledtosolocatingdesirein12Asdesire“self-consciousness,byitsnegativerelationtotheobject,isunabletosupersede[aufzuheben]it”(§175,p.143).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheIndependenceandDependenceofSelf-Consciousness101thelivingrealmfromwhathasbeenlearnedthroughoutchapters1–3.13Consciousnesshadstartedouttakingtheimmediatequalitativelydeter-mined“this”ofSense-certaintyasthetruthofitsobjectandhadcometolearnthatsuchimmediatelyperceivablequalityisjustanaspectofthemorecomplexobjectofPerception.Incontrasttothesimplicityofthe“this”ofsensecertainty,theperceivedobjecthasaninternalstructuresuchthatanunderlyingsubstancehaschangeablephenomenalproper-ties.But,inturn,Perceptionlearnstoothatthatitsobjectisintruthmorecomplicatedagain,thedistinctionbetweenitandtheUnderstand-ingroughlyenactingthedistinctionbetweentheeverydaycommonsen-sicalandscientificor“nomological”viewsoftheworld.WhilefromthepointofviewofPerceptionwemightthinkoftheworldassimplyanassemblageofpropertiedobjects,fromthepointofviewoftheUnder-standing,suchobjectswillbeintegratedasinteractingcomponentsofasingle,unified,law-governedworld.“Self-certainty,”theimmediateformofself-consciousness,isthepracticalanalogueofSense-certainty.Hereafeltappetiteisdirectedtosomeparticularsensuouslypresented“this”inwhichdesiringself-consciousnessisawareofitself.Atitsmostbasic,mydesireisdirectedtothissensuousthingbeforeme–asucculentripepineapple,say–butpresentedtomeasthisbaresingularthingknownonlyintermsofanappealingsensuousqualitythatdeterminesitassomethingtobe,literally,negatedasanindependentexistence.Butthisisonlytheimmediateforminwhichthemediatingdesiredobjectispresented;anditmustinfactbefarmorecomplex,asitisafundamentalprinci-pleofHegel’smethodthateachsubsequentphaseofconsciousnessorself-consciousnessretainsinnegated,or“aufgehoben,”formallaspectsrevealedinpreviousstages.Self-certaintymustlearnthattheimmediate“this”isnotthetruthofitsobject,butwephenomenologicalobservers,whoknowthatitsobjectisnotamerenothing,knowthisobjectasalsohavingtheaspectsrevealedtoPerception(thedesiredobjectmusthavethepropertyofbeingliving)and,crucially,theUnderstanding.Alittle13LudwigSiep(DerWegderPhanomenologiedesGeistes¨,(FrankfurtamMain:Suhrkamp,2000),p.100)raisesthequestionastowhetherHegelsimplyassumesmetaphysicalnature-philosophicalnotionshere.JonStewart(TheUnityofHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit:ASystematicInterpretation,(Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2000),p.117))defendsHegelagainstanysuch“vitalist”inter-pretationbyconstruing“life”asapurelylogicalcategory,whileRobertWilliams,(Hegel’sEthicsofRecognition,(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1997),p.48))interprets“life”hereinessentiallypracticalterms.H.S.Harris(Hegel’sLadder1:ThePilgrimageofReason,(Indianapolis:Hackett,1997),ch.7)hasanextensiveaccountofHegel’suseofthisnotionhere,groundingitsintroductionintheearlieraccountof“Understanding.”DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n102paulreddingbackgroundisneededinordertoappreciatewhatHegelthinksgraspingobjectsinthisthirdwayentails.First,inrelationtotheUnderstanding,wemustnotetheparticulardynamicistinterpretationthatHegel,essentiallyfollowinginthetradi-tionofLeibnizandKant,hadgiventotheNewtonianviewoftheworld.Incontrasttotheprevalentmechanisticinterpretations,thedynami-cistsconceivedofNewton’slawsasnotholdingofmovinglumpsofinertmatterbutof“movingforces”whichinteractviaattractionorrepulsion.Thesemovingforceswilleffectivelyformthetemplatesfortheself-moving,thatis,organicelementsofthenature-philosophicalaccountinchapter4.Indeed,Fichtehimselfhaddevelopedsuchacon-ceptionoftheorganicrealmbasedonadynamicaccountofphysicsinhis1794–1795FoundationsoftheEntireWissenschaftslehre,14butitwasaspartofhisfoundationforpractical,nottheoreticalknowl-edge,andso,inHegel’sterms,conceivednegativelyasarealmtobestrivenagainst.Next,forHegel“theUnderstanding”representsaformofepistemicrelationtotheworldwhichislockedintothefinitecog-nitiveformsthatKanthadopposedto“reason”(“dieVernunft”),andwhichisrestrictedtotherealmof“appearance.”ThusforKant(andalsoforFichte)explanatorypositssuchasforcescouldneverrepresenttheultimateconstituentsoftheworld“in-itself,”butonlytheworldasitisforasubject.Inscientificexplanationaforcemightbepositedtoexplainsomeempirical,law-governedregularity,thepositedexplanansthusbeingdistinguishedfromthephenomenabeingexplained.ButtheKantianideaoftheunknowabilityofrealityasitisinitselfimpliesforHegelthat“thisdifferenceisnodifference”andthattheexplain-ingforceandexplainedlaware,rather,“constitutedexactlythesame”(§154,p.125).ThusHegeldescribestheUnderstandingaspositingadifferenceonlytowithdrawit:toitsinitialclaimtoknowtheworlditthenaddsthemetaclaimthatwhatisknownisanappearancethatit-itselfconstitutes(§163,p.133).TheUnderstandingissoconstitutedtopositadifferenceandthendenyit,butwecanseethatthisactivityinwhichadifferenceispositedonlytobethensomehowreabsorbedwithinasubsequentidentityischaracteristicofthisformofconceptu-allyarticulatedconsciousnessitself.(Weseethisexplicitly,forexam-ple,inwhat“desire”doesinpositingthedesiredobjectthatmediatesitquaself-consciousness.)“Whatis,fortheUnderstanding,anobjectina14GrundlagendergesamtenWissenschaftslehre,translatedas“FoundationsoftheEntireScienceofKnowledge,”inJ.G.Fichte,TheScienceofKnowledge,trans.byPeterHeathandJohnLachs(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982),partIII,p.7.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheIndependenceandDependenceofSelf-Consciousness103sensuouscovering,isforusinitsessentialformasapureconcept”(§164,p.134).WiththiswemightnowstarttoglimpsehowHegelatleastbelievesthathehaspurchasedthenature-philosophicalposition(andmuchelsebesides)thatseemstobepresupposedinChapter4.The“Aufhebenprin-ciple”impliesthattheessentialobjectthatmediatesself-consciousnessmust,despiteself-consciousness’sinitialwayofconceivingit,behavesomethinglikethosereciprocallyinteractingforcespositedbytheUnderstanding.Theactionofadesiringorganismonanotherwillbemetbyareciprocalactionofanother,opposed,desiringorganism.Further-more,weknowthesedynamicandself-movingobjectstohaveastruc-tureexhibitedbytheUnderstandingitself.Thismovement(whichisimplicitlyself-consciousness)involvesthepositingofdifferenceswhicharethenovercomeorsuperseded.Butthisisjustthetypeof“movement”canbeseenintheinteractionsofthoseself-movingforcesorpowersoftheorganicworld.Thenaturalworld,understoodinthisway,willthusprovideamodelforthedynamiccontextwithinwhichself-consciousnessispossible.However,self-consciousnesscannotbeunderstoodaspossiblewithinthemerelylivingworld.Wecanseehowthatwhichisexpressedinanorganism’sbehaviourmightberegardedasa“desire”notonlyfortheparticularthingwithwhichitinteracts,butforthe“living”propertythatitbears(quaobjectofPerception),andhowthismightbeextendedtodesiretobeaparticipantintheroundof“life”itself,quaconcreteuni-versal,theimplicitobjectofthesystematicUnderstanding.However,themereorganismcannotlearnthisbecausethemerelylivingsystemisunabletoproducethepointofviewfromwhichtheuniversalcouldberecognizedasanend:thedynamicgenusoflife“doesnotexistforitself”but“pointstosomethingotherthanitself,namely,toconsciousness,forwhichlifeexistsasaunity,orasgenus[Gattung]”(§172,p.143).15Andwiththisinabilitytograsptheuniversal,naturaldesirecannotbeanade-quatemodelforself-consciousness:caughtintheproblemofacontradic-toryrelationtoitsimmediateobject,desireisdependentuponitsobjectinordertoshowitsindependenceinitsactofnegatingit.Thiscon-ceptualproblemwillequallyafflictFichteanmoralself-consciousness,conceivedasitisasametadesire.Moralself-consciousnessstrivestofreeitselffromdependenceonobjectsbynegatingitsowninclinations;buthere“satisfaction”willdepriveself-consciousnessoftheresourcesnecessaryforitsexistence.15EffectivelyhereHegelfollowsAristotle:merelyliving,nonhumananimalscanrecognizeonlyparticulars.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n104paulreddingNeitherdesirenorthemoralself-consciousnessmodeledonitcanthereforeberegardedasself-sufficient.Self-consciousnesscan,Hegelsays,achievesatisfaction,notbynegatingtheobject,but“onlywhentheobjectitselfeffectsthenegationwithinitself.”Butofcourseself-negationis,aswehaveseen,justwhatFichteanself-consciousnessasmetadesireitselfdoes.Thusthenewmodelisoneinwhich“self-consciousnessachievessatisfactiononlyinanotherself-consciousness”andwiththisHegelhasintroducedthethemeofrecognition/acknowledgement(Anerkennung).Self-consciousnessexistsin-and-for-itself“onlyassomethingacknowledged”byanotherself-consciousness.Nowtherealmofmerelifewillbereplacedbyanotherconcreteuni-versal,whichHegelcalls“spirit”(Geist),theuniversalwithinwhichdistinctivelyhumanlivesarelivedoutwithinpatternsofintersubjec-tiveandconceptuallymediatedrecognition,arealmofself-consciouslife.life,recognition,andspiritFarfrombeingoriginaltoHegel,thenotionofAnerkennungisagaintakenoverfromFichte,specificallyfromhistheoryofrightsinthe1796–1797FoundationsofNaturalRights.16Indeed,intreatingthesub-ject’srecognitionofrightsofothersasanecessaryconditionforself-consciousness,Fichtehadmaderecognitioncentraltohismodelofself-consciousness.HegelwastoemployFichte’srecognitiveconceptionofrightsinhislaterPhilosophyofRightwheretherelationofcontractwastobetreatedasamatterofthemutualrecognitionbythecontractorsofeachother’sabstractrightsasproprietors.17ButforHegelthislegalisticapproachtorecognitiondoesnotgetatitsessence:infact,initsformalcharacterFichte’sconceptionofrecognitiontestifiedtothefactofitsstillbeinginthethrallsofthedesiremodelofself-consciousness.Intheformalrecognitionoftheother’sright,recognitionisjusttheothersideofanactofnegationorannihilationofone’sowndesire.Toacknowledgeanother’srighttoanobjectisjusttolimitone’sowninterestedactionstowardthatobject.Justasintherealmoflife,theconcreteuniversalor“genus”oflifeitselfpointedtoaconsciousness“forwhichlifeexistsasaunity,orasagenus”(§172,p.143),intherealmofabstractrightasHegeltreatsitin16J.G.Fichte,FoundationsofNaturalRight,ed.byFrederickNeuhouser,trans.byMichaelBaur(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000).17G.W.F.Hegel,GrundlinienderPhilosophiedesRechts,(Werke,7),translatedasElementsofthePhilosophyofRight,ed.byAllenW.Wood,trans.byH.B.Nisbet,(Cambridge,UK:Cambridge1991),p.71,Zusatz.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheIndependenceandDependenceofSelf-Consciousness105thePhilosophyofRight,theabstract,legalisticsphereoftherecognitionofrightsfoundin“civilsociety”isdependentonanotherrealmwithinwhichthecircleofrecognitionitselfcanbegraspedasagenus–thefam-ily.Inthefamily,membersareconsciousofthegenusastheiressence(theretheparticipantsgraspthemselvesprimarilyasfamilymembers),andrecognitionisnotopposedtofeltimpulsesoraffectionsbutisinimmediateidentitywiththem.18And,ofcourse,thefamily,asamoreimmediateformofobjectifiedspirit,isclosertotherealmofnaturallife.Inthisway,then,theopposedrecognitiverealmsoffamilyandcivilsocietyinHegel’slaterphilosophyinstantiatethecategoriesofthe“initself”andthe“foritself,”withbothbeingincorporatedintothemoreself-sufficientexpressionofspiritobjectifiedinnature(objectivespirit),thestate,whichincontrasttothefamilyandcivilsociety,is“in-and-for-itself.”ButtherootsofthislatertreatmentarealreadydiscernableinthePhenomenology’streatmentofrecognition.19Theprotagonistsofamerelylivingsphere,aswehaveseen,cannotgrasptheirdesiredobjectintermsoftheuniversalthatwecanseeittobe:thiscapacityisavailableonlytoagenuinelyorfullyself-consciousbeing.Andifwenowreflectonthiswecanquicklygraspthetypeofconsequencesthatcouldflowfromthepossessionofthecapacitytorecognizetheuniversalbyaself-consciousmemberofarealmofstruggle.Ifonecouldgraspthatbeyondthedesiredannihilationoftheother’sindependenceliesthedesireforauniversal,suchaslifeitself,onecouldthengraspthepossibilityoftherebeingalternatewaysofrealizingthatdesire.Andthisisindeedwhatisgraspedbyoneantago-nistofthesortofstrugglethatHegeldescribesamongself-consciouslylivingbeings.Struggleinthisrealmcanendinthesubmissionofoneantagonisttotheother,therebyestablishingarelationoflordtobondsman.20Hegel’sactualstoryitselfisreasonablyclear,atleastinitsbroadoutlines.Againstthecontrastingbackgroundofthestrugglingorganicworld,therealmofnature“redintoothandclaw”–perhapsHobbes’s“stateofnature”–weseeanothertypeofstrugglewithapossibleres-olutionotherthanthatofannihilationofoneoftheantagonists.Themovementinthissphere,Hegelsays,“repeatstheprocesswhichpre-senteditselfastheplayofForces,”buttheprocessobtainingwithinthe18Hegel,PhilosophyofRight,pp.158–180.19OntheunityofHegel’searlyandlaterapproachestorecognitionseeRobertR.Pippin,“WhatistheQuestionforwhichHegel’sTheoryofRecognitionistheAnswer?”EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy,8,2(2000),pp.155–172.20“Inthisexperience,self-consciousnesslearnsthatlifeisasessentialtoitaspureself-consciousness”(§150,p.189).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n106paulreddingconcreteuniversaloflifeis“repeatednowinconsciousness,”thatis,theelementsintheirfulllogicalarticulation(quaobjectsofSense-certainty,Perception,andUnderstanding)arenowavailablefortheprotagoniststhemselves.Incontrasttothesphereofmerelife,theprotagoniststhushaveamorecomplexlynegatingattitudetoeachother,foreachhastheotherbeforeitnot“merelyasitexistsprimarilyfordesire,butassome-thingthathasanindependentexistenceofitsown,which,therefore,itcannotuseforitsownpurposes,ifthatobjectdoesnot,ofitsownaccorddowhatthefirstdoestoit”(§182,p.146).Theminimalprotosocietyoflordandbondsmanthatresolvessuchself-consciousstrugglesisaconventionalformoflifeinwhichtwoindi-vidualsliveoutdistinctiveexistencesviathedifferentiatedandcoordi-natedsocialrolesofvictorandvanquished–lordandbondsman.“Theyexistastwoopposedshapesofconsciousness;oneistheindependentconsciousnesswhoseessentialnatureistobeforitself,theotheristhedependentconsciousnesswhoseessentialnatureissimplytoliveortobeforanother.Theformerislord,thelatterisbondsman”(§189,p.150).thedynamicsoflordshipandbondageInthismodeleachmemberhastakenononesideofthe“in-and-for-itself”structurewhichistheessenceofself-consciousness:thelordmaintainstheorientationofanindependentdesiring“for-self”whilethebondsman,byhavingabandoneditsowndesireandacceptedtheroleofamereobjectorinstrumentoftheother’swill,optsforthestatusofadependent“initself,”anobjectusedbythelordforthesatisfac-tionofhisdesire.Butitisimportantthatthebondsman’srolehasbeenchosen,ratherthansimplyacceptedas“given.”Hisexistenceisimplicitlyindependent–thelordcannotusethebondsman“forhisownpurposes”unlessthebondsmandoes“ofitsownaccordwhat[thelord]doestoit”(§182,p.146).Thebondsmanhas,wemightsay,committedhimselftothisidentityinexchangeforhislifeandheholdshimselftothiscommitmentinhiscontinualacknowledgementoftheotherashislordbytreatinghimassuch.21Thisstructureofholdingandbeingheldtosuchcommitmentsisconstitutiveofsuchsocialrolesandis,forHegel,fundamentallyconceptualorrule-governed,theinteractionsoflordandbondsmanbeingmediatedbythelinkedpairofaction-guidingconcepts,“lord”and“bondsman.”Becauseofthisparticipationofconceptuality,21Thusthebondsman“setsasideitsownbeing-for-self,andinsodoingitselfdoeswhatthefirstdoestoit,”theactwhichHegeldescribesasthefirst“momentofrecognition”(§152,p.191).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheIndependenceandDependenceofSelf-Consciousness107thisprimitiveformofsocialityisaninstantiationofreasonwithintherealmoflife,albeitaprimitiveone.Thesocietyoflordandbondsmanthusinstantiates,althoughinanimmediateandinadequateway,thetypeofstructurewhoseessentialshapeHegelhaspositedasthatwhichrespondstotheinadequaciesofthemodelofself-consciousnessasdesire.“Self-consciousnessachievesitssatisfactiononlyinanotherself-consciousness”(§175,p.144),andthisiswhatthelordhasfoundinhisbondsman,aself-consciousnessthatinrenouncinghisdesire“effectsthenegationwithinitself”.Andsowiththissphere“wealreadyhavebeforeustheconceptofSpirit”(§177,p.144–145),arealmnotabstractlyopposedtomerelifebutoneinwhichlife’sdynamichasbeenintegrated(aufgehoben)withinit:arealmofself-consciouslife.Infact,toignorethisfactandthinkofspiritandlifeassimplyopposedwouldbetoremain,likeFichte,inthegripofthedesiremodel.22Butwhilesuchtruthsaboutspiritcanatthispointberecognizedby“we”phenomenologicalobservers,“theexperienceofwhatspiritis–thisabsolutesubstancewhichistheunityofthedifferentindependentself-consciousnesseswhich,intheiropposition,enjoyperfectfreedomandindependence:“I”thatis“We”and“We”thatis“I,”asyet“liesaheadforconsciousness”(ibid.).Intheensuingpageswelearnhowthisembryonicsocietyoflordandbondmanisunstableandhoweachmemberactuallycomestotakeonthecharacteristicsoftheother.Thisdialecticaldevelopmentfol-lowsfromtheinitialnonreciprocaldistributionofindependenceanddependence,“onebeingonlyrecognized,theotheronlyrecognizing”(§185,p.147);asconditionofself-consciouslife,thissocialarrange-mentdoesnotliveuptoitsessence.Aswehaveseen,thebondsman,byhisself-denial,effectsnegationwithinhimself,butthesamecannotbesaidforthelord.Thelord,asvictor,hasnothadhisimmediately“for-self”charactershaken.Hisself-consciousnessstillremainsmodeledondesire,andthismeansthatasastructureofrecognition,thatobtainingbetweenlordandbondsmanwillberentbycontradiction.Thelordcan-notbecomeadequatelyconsciousofhimselfasaself-consciousindivid-ualintherecognitionofthebondsman,because,treatinghimasathing,hedoesn’texplicitlyrecognizethebondsmanasaself-consciousness.Andsoquaobjectforthelord,thebondsman“doesnotcorrespondtoitsconcept”(§192,p.152),andinfailingtorecognizethebondsmanas22Thistendencythatmay,infact,bemanifestinthepopularinterpretationthatseesatthecentreofHegel’saccounta“struggleforrecognition,”whichisabstractlyopposedtothemorenaturalisticHobbesianaccountsofanoriginalstruggleoversurvival.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n108paulreddingaself-consciousness,thelordnegatestheveryconditionsforhisownself-consciousness.Asforthebondsman,“justaslordshipshowedthatitsessentialnatureisthereverseofwhatitwantstobe,sotooservitudeinitscon-summationwillreallyturnintotheoppositeofwhatitimmediatelyis”(§193,p.152).Intheworkperformedforthelord,thebondsmanhimself,byworkingonandtransformingtheobjectsoftheworld,learnstomas-terit.Heattainsthenegatingorientationtotheobjectiveworldthatgoesbeyondthemoreprimitive“for-self”orientationofthelordwhosenegationsessentiallyaretiedtothesatisfactionsofimmediatedesire.Itisthusthebondsmanwho“throughhisservice...ridshimselfofhisattachmenttonaturalexistenceineverysingledetail;andgetsridofitbyworkingonit”(§194,p.153).Moreover,inthetransformationsofnaturalobjectsbroughtaboutbyhiswork,thebondsmanhasthechancetorecognizehisownnegatingactivity:“Throughhiswork...thebondsmanencountershimself[kommt...zusichselbst]”(§195,p.153).Withthisthen,wecanseethebeginningsofadynamicprocessinternaltothisprotosocietythatputsitonadevelopmentalpath.Itwillbetheservileconsciousnessmarkedbyformativeactivityand“inhib-iteddesire[gehemmteBegierde]”(§195,p.153),andnotthelord,whowillinherittheearth.Withthisweseethebeginningsofhistoryasaprocessinwhichtheconditionsofreciprocalrecognitionessentialtothedevelopmentofself-consciousnessaregraduallybroughtabout;butHegel’sfinalparagraphofthissectionsignalsawarningconcerninghowtounderstandthelabor-ingself-consciousness’finalvictory.“Infashioningthething”Hegelremarks,“thebondsman’sownnegativity,hisbeing-for-self,becomesanobjectforhimonlythoughhisnegatingtheexistingshapeconfrontinghim”(§196,p.154).Thatis,ultimately,itwouldseem,asavehicleforormodelofself-consciousness“fashioning”self-consciousnesssuffersfromthesamelimitationsasdesire.Thebondsman’sinitialorientationwasthatoffear–fearofthelord,butalsofearofsomethingmoregeneralthathadbeenrepresentedbythelord,“thefearofdeath,theabsoluteLord”(§194,p.153).Thiswastheattitudeofthebondsmanasitinitiallyhadbeen“initself,”butitsconcludingattitude,itsexplicitly“for-self”moment,isthattheshapesoftheexternalrealmconfrontinghimarenegated.Again,thetruthofself-consciousnesscanonlybeunderstoodastheunityofthesetwomoments.“Ifconsciousnessfashionsthethingwithoutthatinitialabsolutefear,itisonlyanemptyself-centredatti-tude;foritsformornegativityisnotnegativityperse,andthereforeitsformativeactivitycannotgiveitaconsciousnessofitselfasessentialbeing”(§196,p.154).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheIndependenceandDependenceofSelf-Consciousness109theplaceofrecognitioninhegel’sphenomenologyofspiritHegel’scommentsconcerningthelimitsofthebondsman’s“fashioning”self-consciousnessmaybetakenasawarningagainstreadilyaccept-ingasHegel’sownviewthereading(orperhaps“creativemisreading”)givenbyAlexandreKojeveinhisinfluential`IntroductiontotheRead-ingofHegel.23InKojeve’saccount,whichprojectsintoHegel’sstory`conceptsderivedfromtheearlyMarxaswellasfromHeidegger,thelord–bondsmanepisode,andthe“struggleforrecognition”whichitexemplifies,aretakenastheinterpretativekeytoareadingofHegel’sPhenomenologyasatypeofphilosophicalanthropologydescribingthebondsman’s–effectivelyhumanity’s–historicalself-liberationthroughthecollectivelyachievedconsciousfashioningoftheworld.RegardlessofthevalueofKojeve’sworkasanoriginalpieceofpoliticalphilosophy,`itisquestionableasanaccuraterenderingofHegel’sownaccount.InthePhenomenologythelord–bondsmandialecticisjustoneofaseriesofsimilardialecticswithinwhichthenotionof“recognition”playsacentralrole.Moreover,neitherwoulditseemthattheconceptofrecog-nitionisafundamentallypracticalnotionrestrictedtoaconstitutiveroleintheinstitutionalrealmof“objectivespirit.”AsH.S.Harrishaspointedout,24Hegel’sfirstuseoftheideaof“reciprocalrecognition”hadappearedinhisearly“critical”treatmentoftheconflictsbetweenantitheticalphilosophicalviews.25“Recognition,”thiswouldseemtosuggest,wouldthusplayaroleintherealmofabsolutespirit–therealmsofart,religion,andphilosophy–andnotonlythoseofobjectivespirit.23AlexandreKojeve,`IntroductiontotheReadingofHegel,ed.byAllanBloom,trans.byJ.H.Nichols,Jr.,(NewYork:BasicBooks,1969).Kojeve’sreadingwas`crucialinshapingthe“Hegel”thatwasfirstembracedinFranceinthe1940sand1950sandpopularisedbySartre,butlaterdenouncedbystructuralistsandpoststructuralists.24In“Skepticism,DogmatismandSpeculationintheCriticalJournal,”inGeorgediGiovanniandH.S.Harris,eds.,BetweenKantandHegel(Albany,NY:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1985),pp.253–254.25Inthe“Introduction”toTheCriticalJournalofPhilosophy,1,1,(1802),“UberdasWesenderphilosophischenKritik¨uberhauptundihrVerh¨altniszum¨gegenwartigenZustandderPhilosophieinsbesondere”(¨Werke,2,p.173),trans-latedindiGiovanniandHarris,BetweenKantandHegel,p.276.Hegeldescribesthepolemicalsituationbetweenaphilosophyandan“unphilosophy”thatdoesnotself-consciouslygraspitsviewsasphilosophical.Becausetheynolongersharethe“Idea”ofphilosophy,reciprocalrecognitionherehasbeen“suspended[aufgehoben].”DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n110paulreddingWiththisinmind,itmightbeconjecturedthattheconceptofrecip-rocalrecognitionisimplicitwithintheveryfabricofHegel’sPhe-nomenology.Aswehaveseen,Hegelreliesontheexistenceofadis-tinctphilosophicalpointofview,thatofthe“phenomenologicalwe”atwhichthereaderislocatedandforwhicheachshapeofconscious-nessorself-consciousnesscanbepresentedasan“in-itself.”Itmightbeasked,however,howoneistostopathreateninginfiniteregressofmetaconsciousnesseshere?Isnotafurtherconsciousnessrequiredforwhichourconsciousnesscouldbedescribedobjectivelyasan“initself”?Hegel’ssolutiontothisproblemseemsboundupwiththecen-tralinsightofchapter4–recognition.TowardstheconclusionofthePhenomenologyandonthethresholdof“AbsoluteKnowledge”–thestandpointof“science”itself–Hegelbrieflyreviewsthedevelopmentthathasunfoldedinthebooktothatpoint.Withthisheseemstobeinvitingus,asphilosophicalreaders,torecognizeourselvesinthehistoryofdevelopingformsofconsciousness:itisourhistory,andingraspingthiswereturnfromthis“meta”positiontotheworlditself.Withthis,thecircleofspiritasself-consciouslifeisfinallyclosed.QuareadersofthePhenomenologywesupposedlyhavenowbeenbroughttothestandpointofscience–philosophy–itself.2626IwouldliketothankFrederickBeiser,Jean-PhilippeDeranty,SimonLumsden,GeorgeMarkus,EmmanuelRenault,andRobertSinnerbrinkforveryhelpfulcom-mentsonanearlierversionofthisessay.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.005CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nstephenhoulgate5Hegel’sLogicHegel’sScienceofLogicdoesnotenjoythebestofreputations.Itisinvariablycriticizedforbeingobscureandimpenetrable,oritissimplyignoredaltogether,asifithadneverbeenwritteninthefirstplace.AllenWoodspeaksformanywhohavereadsomeofHegel’sdenseanddifficulttextwhenhemaintainsthatthephilosophicalparadoxesexploredinitarefrequentlybasedon“shallowsophistries”andthattheresolutiontosuchparadoxessuppliedbyHegel’ssystemisoften“artificialandunilluminating”.WithevenfriendsofHegel,suchasWood,dismissingtheLogicinthisway,itishardlysurprisingthat(asWoodnotes)“Hegel’ssystemofdialecticallogichasneverwonacceptanceoutsideanisolatedanddwindlingtraditionofincorrigibleenthusiasts”.1Intheeyesofsuchenthusiasts,however–whoinclude,forexam-ple,Hans-GeorgGadamer,DieterHenrich,JeanHyppolite,andJohnBurbidge–Hegel’sLogicisbynomeansshalloworsophistical,butisoneofthemostsubtleandprofoundworksofphilosophyeverproduced.MyaiminthischapteristoshedlightonthedistinctivepurposeandmethodofHegelianlogicinthehopeofenablingmanymorereadersthanhithertotodiscoverthatsubtletyandprofundityforthemselves.thecategoriesofthoughtHegel’sspeculative,dialecticallogicissetoutintwotexts–themon-umentalScienceofLogic(ortheso-calledGreaterLogic)2andthemore1AllenW.Wood,Hegel’sEthicalThought(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990),pp.4–5.2SeeHegel’sScienceofLogic,trans.byA.V.Miller(Amherst,NY:HumanityBooks,1999)(hereafterSL);G.W.F.Hegel,WissenschaftderLogik,ed.byE.MoldenhauerandK.M.Michel,2vols.,WerkeinzwanzigBanden¨,vols.5,6(FrankfurtamMain:SuhrkampVerlag,1969)(hereafterWerke,5or6).TheScienceofLogicwasfirstpublishedbetween1812and1816.Thefirstpartofthetext,“thedoctrineof111DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:30WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n112stephenhoulgatetruncatedEncyclopaediaLogic(ortheso-calledLesserLogic)3–butitspurposeisineachcasethesame:toderiveandclarifythebasiccategoriesofthought.FollowingKant(andincontrasttoLocke),Hegelarguesthatourfundamentalcategoriesarenotdrawnfromsensoryexperiencethroughaprocessofabstraction,butaregeneratedaprioribytheunderstandingandarethenemployedtocomprehendandmakesenseofwhatweperceive.SuchcategoriesaredistinguishedbyHegelfrommerewords:categoriesare“formsofthought”(Denkformen)withalogicalstructureoftheirown,whereaswordsaresounds(orwrittensigns)bymeansofwhichsuchformsofthought(aswellasotherrepresentations)aregivenexpression.Hegelinsists,however,thattheuseofcategoriesisinseparablefromtheuseoflanguage:“wethinkinnames”.4Conversely,languageisitselfshotthroughwithaprioricategories:“everythingthat[thehumanbeing]hastransformedintolanguageandexpressesinitcontainsacategory[Kategorie]–concealed,mixedwithotherformsorclearlydeterminedassuch,somuchislogichisnaturalelement”.5Sincelanguageinformsandconditionsallourconsciousperceptions,whatweperceiveisthusalwaysunderstoodintermsofcategories.InHegel’sview,humanbeingshavenounconceptualizedperceptions(oratleastnoneofwhichwecanbeaware).6LikeKant,Hegeldistinguishesbetweenfundamentalcategoriesandempiricalconcepts,suchas“dog”or“chair”.Categoriesaremuchmoregeneralandabstractthanempiricalconceptsandcontainnoperceptualelement.Yetcategoriesarenotabstruseoresotericconceptsknownonlybeing”,wasrevisedtowardstheendofHegel’slifeandwasreissuedposthumouslyin1832.3SeeG.W.F.Hegel,TheEncyclopaediaLogic,trans.byT.F.Geraets,W.A.Suchting,andH.S.Harris(Indianapolis:Hackett,1991)(hereafterEL);G.W.F.Hegel,EnzyklopadiederphilosophischenWissenschaftenimGrundrisse(1830).¨ErsterTeil:DieWissenschaftderLogik,ed.byE.MoldenhauerandK.M.Michel,WerkeinzwanzigBanden¨,vol.8(hereafterWerke,8).Hegel’sEncyclopaediawasfirstpublishedin1817andthenrevisedandreissuedin1827and1830.OnthelimitationsoftheEncyclopadiaLogic,seeEL,1,39,Prefacetofirsteditionand§16;Werke,8:11,60.4Hegel’sPhilosophyofMind,trans.byW.Wallace,togetherwiththeZusatze¨inBoumann’stext,trans.byA.V.Miller(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1971)(hereafterEPM),p.220,§462remark;G.W.F.Hegel,Enzyklopadiederphilosophischen¨WissenschaftenimGrundrisse(1830).DritterTeil:DiePhilosophiedesGeistes,ed.byE.MoldenhauerandK.M.Michel,WerkeinzwanzigBanden¨,vol.10(here-afterWerke,10),p.278.5Hegel,SL,31;Werke,5:20.6SeeHegel,EL,57,§24addition1;Werke,8:82:“inallhumanintuitingthereisthinking”.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:30WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sLogic113tophilosophers;categoriesarethegeneralconceptsthroughwhichallofus–allofthetime–makesenseofourworld.Indeed,Hegelwrites,theyare“whatwearemostfamiliarwith[dasBekannteste]:being,nothing,etc.;determinacy,magnitude,etc.;[...]one,many,andsoon”.7AswelearninthecourseofHegel’slogic,othercategoriesinclude“some-thing”,“other”,“form”,“content”,“whole”,“part”,“substance”,“cause”,and“object”.Categoriesarethusthebasic,everydayconceptsthatallowustosaythesimplestthings,suchas“thereissomethingonthefloor”,“thedogcausedthechildtocry”or“thisleafisgreen”.8Thefactthatcategories“passourlipsineverysentencewespeak”,andsoaredeeplyfamiliartous,doesnot,however,meanthatwealwaysusethemappropriatelyorfullyunderstandtheirlogicalstructureormeaning.AsHegelremindsus,“whatisfamiliar[bekannt]isnotforthatreasonknownorunderstood[erkannt]”.9Indeed,Hegelthinksthatforthemostpartweemploycategorieswithoutaclearconsciousnessofallthattheyentail.Furthermore,preciselybecausethecategoriesaresofamiliartous,wedonotseetheneedtoexaminethemdirectlyandtherebyensurethatweunderstandtheirlogicalstructureproperly.AsHegelnotes,“being,forexample,isapurethought-determination;butitneveroccurstoustomake‘is’[dasIst]thesubjectmatterofourinquiry”.10Categoriespermeatealloureverydayexperience;inHegel’sview,however,ourveryfamiliaritywiththemblindsustothepossibil-itythatwemaynotactuallyunderstandthemaswellaswethinkwedo.ThetaskofHegel’slogicistodiscovertherightwaytounderstandthecategoriesbydeterminingtheirintrinsicandnecessarystructure.Inthisway,Hegel’slogicaimstocorrectanymisunderstandingofthemtowhicheverydayconsciousnessfallsprey:Atfirst[categories]enterconsciousnessseparatelyandsoarevariableandmutu-allyconfusing;consequentlytheyaffordtomindonlyafragmentaryanduncer-tainactuality;theloftierbusinessoflogicthereforeistoclarify[reinigen]thesecategoriesandinthemtoraisemindtofreedomandtruth.11Thisprocessofconceptual“clarification”isundertakenpartlyforitsownsake–simplytoallowustocontemplateinpeaceandfreedomthetruecharacterofourownfundamentalconcepts–butalsototrainustothinkproperlyineverydaylife.Hegelbelievesthatphilosophical7Hegel,EL,45,§19remark;Werke,8:67.8Hegel,EL,27,§3remark;Werke,8:45.9Hegel,SL,33;Werke,5:22,translationaltered.10Hegel,EL,59,§24addition2;Werke,8:85.AsimilarconcernislaterexpressedbyHeidegger;seeMartinHeidegger,BeingandTime;trans.byJ.MacquarrieandE.Robinson(Oxford:Blackwell,1962),p.23.11Hegel,SL,37;Werke,5:27.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:30WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n114stephenhoulgatecomprehensiondoesnothavetoremaincutofffrom,butcanpenetrate,everydaylife.12Philosophycan,therefore,performapracticalfunctionbytransformingthewaywethinkinourpersonal,social,orreligiousactivity.AsHegelwritesintheScienceofLogic,“thestudyofthissci-ence[i.e.speculativelogic],todwellandlabourinthisshadowyrealm,is[thus]theabsoluteeducationanddiscipline[BildungundZucht]ofconsciousness”.13Hegelpointsoutthatthecategoriesdonotjustinformoureverydayconsciousness,buthavealsobeenemployedbypreviousphilosopherstocomprehendtheworld.MetaphysicianssuchasSpinoza,Leibniz,andWolffmadeself-conscioususeofcategoriestounderstandtheworldintermsof“substanceandattributes”,“causality”,or“force”.Theprob-lem,inHegel’sview,isthatsuchphilosophersdidnotfirstundertakeathoroughexaminationofthesecategoriesinordertoestablishpreciselyhowtheyaretobeconceived.Theysimplyassumedthatthecategorieshadacertainlogicalstructureandthenusedthemtointerprettheworld.Hegeldoesnotdenythatdifferentphilosophershaveconceivedcate-goriessuchas“substance”insubtlydifferentways;buthebelievesthatsincethecategorieswerefirstrenderedexplicitbyPlatoandAristotletheyhaveneverbeensubjectedtotrulyradical,criticalscrutiny.WhatHegelcalls“formermetaphysics”thus“incurredthejustreproachofhavingemployedtheseformsuncritically[ohneKritik]”.14TheaimofHegel’slogic,therefore,willbenotonlytoclarifythecategoriesthatinformeverydayconsciousnessbutatthesametimetoprovideacriti-cal“reconstruction”ofthecategoriesofmetaphysics.Ordinaryconsciousnessandpreviousmetaphysicshaveoften–thoughnotalways–presupposedthatcertainfundamentalcategoriesareclearlydistinctfromoropposedtooneanother,thatis,“thatinfinityisdifferentfromfinitude,thatcontentisotherthanform,thattheinnerisotherthantheouter,alsothatmediationisnotimmediacy”.Accord-ingtoHegel,however,thetaskoflogicistoconsiderwhethersuchdistinctionsandoppositionsareinfactsustainable–withoutassuminginadvancethattheyareorthattheyarenot.Thatistosay,itistherequirementandthebusinessoflogicalthinkingtoenquireintojustthis,whethersuchafinitewithoutinfinityissomethingtrue,orwhethersuchanabstractinfinity,alsoacontentwithoutformandaformwithoutcontent,aninnerbyitselfwhichhasnoouterexpression,anexternalitywithoutaninwardness,whetheranyoftheseissomethingtrueorsomethingactual.1512Hegel,EL,48,§19addition3;Werke,8:71.13Hegel,SL,58;Werke,5:55,translationaltered.14Hegel,SL,64;Werke,5:61.15Hegel,SL,41–42;Werke,5:33.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:30WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sLogic115kant’scontributionWhatpromptsHegeltoundertakethiscriticalinvestigationofthebasiccategoriesofthoughtis,ontheonehand,asimpleinterestintruthandaconcernthatwenotbemisledbywhatismostfamiliartous.Ontheotherhand,heisalsoinfluencedbythemodernspiritofcriticalfreedom.InHegel’sview,wemodernsliveinaworldinwhichtheauthorityoftra-ditionshouldnolongerbetakenforgranted,buteverything–includingourmostcherishedbeliefsandtheconceptsandprincipleswithwhichwearemostintimatelyfamiliar–shouldbeexaminedwithafreeandcriticaleye.Thisdoesnotmeanthatoureverydayandtraditionalphilo-sophicalassumptionsshouldnecessarilybeabandoned;butitdoesmeanthattheyshouldnolongerbetakenontrustasgivensthatgovernourlives.HegelcreditsKantinparticularwithfocussingcriticalattentiononthecategoriesemployedinphilosophy,science,andeverydaylife.Yetdespiteinauguratingthe“criticalturn”inphilosophy,Kantisnotascriticalasheshouldbe,inHegel’sview,forheconfineshimselftocon-sideringtheepistemicstatusofthecategories–thatis,theirrangeofvalidity–butdoesnotexaminetheirinternallogicalstructureandseektodeterminewhetherthatstructurehasbeenproperlyunderstoodbypreviousphilosophers.AsHegelputsitintheEncyclopaediaLogic,Kant’scriticalphilosophy“doesnotinvolveitselfwiththecontent[...]orwiththedeterminatemutualrelationshipofthesethought-determinationstoeachother;instead,itconsidersthemaccordingtotheantithesisofsubjectivityandobjectivityingeneral”.16Kantarguesthatthecategoriesyieldknowledgeonlywithintherealmofempiri-calexperience–onlywithintherealmofwhatHegelherecalls“sub-jectivity”–andshouldnotbeheldtodiscloseanythingaboutwhatliesbeyondsuchexperience.YetKantdidnotchallengethewaythecategorieshavetraditionallybeenconceived.Aristotleunderstoodsub-stance,forexample,tobe“thatwhichisneithersaidofasubjectnorinasubject”,andKantdefineditinasimilarwayas“somethingthatcanbethoughtasasubject(withoutbeingapredicateofsomethingelse)”.17Thedifferencebetweenthe“precritical”Aristotleandthe“crit-ical”KantthusdoesnotlieinthewaytheyconceivethecategoriesbutmerelyinthefactthatKantrestrictedthecategories’rangeoflegitimateapplication.16Hegel,EL,81,§41;Werke,8:113.SeealsoSL,47;Werke,5:40.17SeeTheCompleteWorksofAristotle,ed.byJ.Barnes,2vols.(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1984),vol.1,p.4;I.Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,trans.byP.GuyerandA.W.Wood(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997)(hereafterCPR),p.277[B186].DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:30WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n116stephenhoulgateKantfurtherbelieshiscriticalintentionsbysimplyassumingthatallactsofunderstandingareactsofjudgmentandthatallconcepts,includ-ingourbasiccategories,are“predicatesofpossiblejudgments”.18ForKant,thepurposeoftheconceptof“substance”isnottostandaloneasanindependentobjectofcontemplationbuttobeappliedtosomethinginajudgmentsuchas“Xisasubstance”.(Itshouldberemembered,however,thatwhenXisjudgedinthiswaytobea“substance”,itisjudgedtobeanirreduciblesubjectandnotaqualityor“predicate”ofanythingelse).Havingassumedthatthoughtisminimallyjudgment,Kantthenproceedstoderivethebasiccategoriesofthoughtfromthevar-iousformsofjudgmentswithwhichwearefamiliarfromformallogic.Theaffirmativejudgment,“SisP”,yieldsthecategoryof“reality”,thenegativejudgment,“SisnotP”,yieldsthecategoryof“negation”,theproblematicjudgment,“SmightbeP”,yieldsthecategoryofpossibil-ity,andsoon.Thecategoriescan,ofcourse,serveaspredicatesinanyformofjudgment:onecanequallywellsaythat“Sispossible”,or“Sisnotpossible”,orthat“Smightbeasubstance”.Eachcategory,however,hasitsorigininaparticularformofjudgment(or,moreprecisely,inthespecificwayinwhichthesubjectandpredicateareunitedinaparticularformofjudgment).19Eachjudgmentformthusgivesrisetoaspecificcategorythatcanthenserveasapredicateinseveraldifferentformsofjudgment.Kant’sdeductionofthecategoriesisclearandlogical.InHegel’sview,however,thatdeductionisproblematicbecausethecategoriesarederivednotfromtheverynatureofthoughtassuchbutfromwhatKantsimplyassumestobethought’sfundamentalactivity,namely,judg-ment.SinceKantneverprovesthatjudgmentisessentialtothought,orthatjudgmentmusttakecertainforms,butjusttakesallofthisforgranteduncritically,hecannotprove–atleasttoHegel’ssatisfaction–thathehasdiscoveredallthebasiccategoriesofthoughtorthathehasconceivedofthemproperly.HegelseesmoremeritinFichte’sapproach,sinceFichtederivedthecategoriessequentiallyandnecessarilyfromwhatappearsmoreobvi-ouslytobeanirreduciblefeatureofthought:thefactthattheIthinksor“posits”adistinctionbetweenitselfandwhatisnotitself.YetFichte’swayofproceedingremainsproblematic,because–likeDescartes–hesimplyassumesfromthestartthatthoughtistheactivityofan“I”.HethusbeginsfromwhatHegelconsiderstobe“asubjectivestandpoint”whoselegitimacyisneverproperlyestablished.2018Kant,CPR,205[B94].19Kant,CPR,211[B104–105].20SeeHegel,EL,84,§42remark;Werke,8:117,andSL,47;Werke,5:41.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:30WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sLogic117BothKantandFichte,therefore,taketoomuchforgrantedintheirderivationofthecategoriesandstartfromunwarrantedassumptionsaboutthought.TheaimofHegel’slogicwillbetomakeupforthedefi-cienciesofKantandFichtebyendeavouringto“deduce[thecategories]fromthinkingitself”withoutmakingunwarrantedassumptionsaboutthoughtorthecategories.21Ifthisdeductionissuccessful,itwill,inHegel’sview,bethefirstgenuinelycriticalandself-criticalstudyofthecategories.Assuch,itwillrevealnotonlywhichcategoriesaremadenecessarybytheverynatureofthoughtbutalsohowthosecategoriesareproperlytobeunderstood.Hegel’slogicmaybedismissedbysomeasobscureandimpenetrable.Itisimportanttoremember,however,thatitwasintendedbyHegelhimselftobetherigorous,unprejudicedderivationandclarificationofthebasiccategoriesofthought.Itwasintendedtobeamodern,post-Kantiansciencethatwouldtransformforthebetterbothphilosophyandoureverydaypractices.logicandmetaphysicsSpeculativelogicisconceivedbyHegelasthedisciplineinwhichhumanthoughtistoachievefullself-understandingandself-consciousness.YetisthatallthatisgoingoninHegel’slogic?Isthislogicsimplythought’saccountofitsownbasiccategories?Fortheadvocatesofthe“nonmetaphysical”interpretationofHegelianlogic–inspiredbyKlausHartmann–theansweris“yes”.22TerryPinkard,forexample,insiststhat“theScienceofLogicisareconstructionnotofthemovementofthingsinthecosmosbutisinsteadoneofconceptions”.Itexplains“howtheseconceptionsrelatetoeachotherandwhatprinciplesunderliethem”.23RobertPippin’sinterpretationofHegel’slogicissubtlydifferentfromPinkard’s.PippinmaintainsthatHegelgivesanaccountnotjustofourbasicconceptionsandtherelationsbetweenthembutofthe“conditionsnecessaryforobjectstobeobjectsatall”.24Thatistosay,Hegeldescribesnotmerelyhowwemustthinkifwearetothinkcoherently,buthowobjectsintheworldaretobeconceivediftheyaretoberegardedas21Hegel,EL,59,§24addition2;Werke,8:85.22SeeKlausHartmann,“Hegel:ANon-MetaphysicalView”,inHegel:ACollectionofCriticalEssays,ed.byA.MacIntyre(1972)(NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1976),pp.101–124.23TerryPinkard,Hegel’sDialectic.TheExplanationofPossibility(Philadelphia,PA:TempleUniversityPress,1988),pp.12,14,myemphasis.24RobertB.Pippin,Hegel’sIdealism.TheSatisfactionsofSelf-Consciousness(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989),p.176.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:30WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n118stephenhoulgategenuineobjects.ItbecomesclearinthecourseofPippin’sdiscussion,however,thathisinterpretationofHegel’slogicremainsfirmlylodgedinthenonmetaphysicalcamp.ForPippin’sHegeldoesnotsetoutthelogicalconditionsrequiredforobjectstoexistortobeobjectsintheirownright,butratherarticulatestheconceptualconditionsrequiredforsomethingtobean“objectofcognition”oran“objectofapossiblyself-consciousjudgment”.25Thatistosay,Hegel’slogicanalyses“whatisrequiredinorderforasubjecttojudgeself-consciouslyaboutobjects”.26Hegel’sproofthatthecategoriesof“negation”and“opposition”arenecessarydoesnot,therefore,establishthat“beingsactuallyopposeandnegateeachotherand[...]couldnotbewhattheyareoutsidesucharelation”.Itshowsonlythattheyhavetobe“characterized‘contrastively’”bypotentiallyself-consciousthoughtiftheyaretobeconceivedbysuchthoughtasdeterminateobjects.27OnPippin’sreading,therefore,Hegel’slogicismerelyatranscen-dentalphilosophythatshowstheconditionsneededforobjectstobedeterminateobjectsofthought.Itisnotametaphysicsorontologythatdisclosestheintrinsicstructureofthingsthemselves(orthe“condi-tions”requiredforthemtobethethingstheyare).Inmyview,however,the“nonmetaphysical”interpretationofHegel’slogic–aspresentedbyPinkardorPippin–tellsonlyhalfthestory:forHegelmakesitclearthatthecategoriessetoutinhislogicareboththenecessaryconceptsofthoughtandtheintrinsicdetermi-nationsofbeingsthemselves.Thatistosay,Hegel’slogic,byhisownadmission,isbothalogicandametaphysicsoranontology.ThisisstatedinbothversionsofHegel’slogic.IntheScienceofLogicHegeldescribesthe“logicalscience”as“metaphysicsproper[dieeigentlicheMetaphysik]orpurelyspeculativephilosophy”;andintheEncyclopae-diaLogichewritesthat“logiccoincideswithmetaphysics,withthescienceofthingsgraspedinthoughtsthatweretakentoexpresstheessentialitiesofthethings”.28Hegelconceivesofhislogicasbothalogicandametaphysicsoranontologybecauseheunderstandsthefundamentalconceptsofthoughttobeidenticalinlogicalstructuretothefundamentaldeterminationsofbeingitself.ThisistrueofallthecategoriesanalysedintheScienceofLogic.Thelogicalstructureoftheconceptof“something”–aconceptthatwemustemploy–isatthesametimethelogicalstructureofwhateverissomethingintheworld.Theconceptof“something”is25Pippin,Hegel’sIdealism,pp.176,250.26Pippin,Hegel’sIdealism,p.248.27Pippin,Hegel’sIdealism,p.188.28Hegel,SL,27;Werke,5:16,andEL,56,§24;Werke,8:81,translationaltered.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sLogic119inseparablylinkedtothatof“other”,“being-in-itself”,and“being-for-other”and,correspondingly,whateverissomethingintheworldisalsoinseparablyrelatedtowhatisotherthanit.(PacePippin,Hegel’sclaimisthusthatbeingsdo“actuallyopposeandnegateeachother[...]andcouldnotbewhattheyareoutsidesucharelation”.)Similarly,thelogicalstructureoftheconceptsofquantity,measure,causality,objectivity,andlifeisthelogicalstructureofthoseaspectsofbeingthemselves.Thisiseventrueof“judgment”and“syllogism”,whichHegel,unlikeKant,provestobeimmanentin–andtherebyneces-saryto–thought.Thesearenotonlyformsofhumanthought,forHegel,butalsologicalstructuresintheworld.The“syllogisticform[FormdesSchließens]isauniversalformofallthings”,Hegelwrites;“allofthemareparticularsthatunitethemselves[sichzusammenschließen]assomethinguniversalwiththesingular”.29InHegel’sview,there-fore,everycategoryanalyzedinhislogic,however“subjective”itmightappear,isbothanecessaryconceptofthoughtandafundamentaldeter-minationofbeing.NonmetaphysicalinterpretersofHegel,suchasPinkardandPippin,havedonemuchtoilluminatethecomplexitiesofHegel’slogicandtodemonstratethatitisarigorous,moderndiscipline.Inmyview,however,JeanHyppoliteisrighttomaintainthatphilosophicalknowl-edge,forHegel,isjustasmuch“knowledgeofbeing”asitis“self-knowledge”.30Hegel’slogicisnotonlyapost-Kantiandisciplinethatundertakesafullycriticalstudyofthecategoriesofthought;italsocontinuesthemetaphysicallaboursofParmenides,Plato,andSpinozabyendeavouringtounderstandthetruenatureofbeingitself.HegelnotesintheScienceofLogicthat“ancientmetaphysicshad[...]ahigherconceptionofthinkingthaniscurrenttoday”.Heexplains:thismetaphysicsbelievedthat[...]thingsandthethinkingofthem[...]areexplicitlyinfullagreement,thinkinginitsimmanentdeterminationsandthetruenatureofthingsformingoneandthesamecontent.31InboththeScienceofLogicandtheEncyclopaediaLogicitismadeclearthatthismetaphysicalunderstandingofthoughtisonethatHegel–evenafterKant–continuestoshare.29Hegel,EL,59,§24addition2;Werke,8:84,translationaltered.SeealsoSL,586;Werke,6:257.30JeanHyppolite,LogicandExistence,trans.byL.LawlorandA.Sen(Albany,NY:SUNYPress,1997),p.71.31Hegel,SL,45;Werke,5:38.SeealsoAlfredoFerrarin,HegelandAristotle(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),p.131.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n120stephenhoulgateYethowisitpossibleforHegel,asacommittedpost-Kantian,toadoptthisstance?Didn’tKantarguethatthecategoriesyieldknowledgeonlyoftheobjectsofpossibleempiricalexperience,andthattheygrantusnoknowledgeofthingsastheyareinthemselves?Isnottheveryideaofapost-Kantianmetaphysicsorontologyinthestrong,Spinozansensesimplyanoxymoron?Hegelthinksnot,becauseheconsiderstherecognitionthatthoughtisimmediatelyawareofbeingtobethedirectconsequenceofthemod-erndemandthatphilosophyberadicallyself-critical.Bycontrast,heconsidersKant’sideathatthought’spropercognitivefunctionismerelytounderstandwhatisgiveninempiricalexperience,andthatbyitself,withouttheaidofempiricalintuition,thoughtcanconceiveonlyofwhatispossible,ratherthanwhatis,tobeanuncriticalassumptionof“reflectiveunderstanding”.32Hegelbelievesthatamodernscienceoflogicthatseekstoderiveandclarifythebasiccategoriesofthoughtwithoutmakingunwarrantedassumptionsaboutthoughtmustabstractfromallthatthoughtanditscategorieshavetraditionallybeenheldtobeandmustconsiderthoughtatitssimplestandmostminimal.Aradicallyself-criticalscienceoflogic,heargues,“shouldbeprecededbyuniversaldoubt,i.e.,bytotalpresuppositionlessness[Voraussetzungslosigkeit]”.Thisrequirementisfulfilled“bythefreedomthatabstractsfromeverything,andgrasps[...]thesimplicityofthinking[dieEinfachheitdesDenkens]”.33Atitssimplestandmostminimal,however,thoughtisnotthethoughtofwhatispossible,necessary,substantial,orobjective,butsimplythethoughtofbeing;itisthesimpleawarenessthat“thereis...“.Feelingandimaginationdonotassertthatwhattheybringtomindisthereorisreal;butthoughtisdistinguishedpreciselybyitsunderstand-ingthat“whatisthought,is,andthatwhatis,onlyisinsofarasitisthought[Gedanke]”.34Therefore,afullyself-criticalphilosophythatseekstotakeaslittleaspossibleforgrantedaboutthoughtmuststartoutbyrecognizingthatthoughtisminimallytheawarenessofbeing.Furthermore,afullyself-criticalphilosophycannotassumeattheoutsetthatbeingisanythingbeyondwhatthoughtisminimallyawareof.Itcannotassumethatbeingisintruthnatureorspirit;norcanitassumethatbeinginanywayexceedsthereachofthought.Ifitistomakenounwarrantedassumptionsaboutbeing,suchaphilosophy32Hegel,SL,45;Werke,5:38.33Hegel,EL,124,§78remark;Werke,8:168.SeealsoSL,70;Werke,5:68–69.34Hegel,EPM,224,§465;Werke,10:283,translationslightlyaltered.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sLogic121mustbeginwiththeideathatbeingissimplywhatthoughtisminimallyawareof–nomoreandnoless.Afullyself-criticalphilosophymustthusstartfromthetwofoldideathat(a)thoughtistheawarenessofbeingand(b)beingisitselfsimplywhatthoughtdiscloses.Thismeansthatthescienceoflogiccannotbeanythingotherthanontology:becausethestudyofthoughtmustbe,atthesametime,thestudyofbeing.Inthisontologythestructureofbeingwillbefoundnotthroughsenseperceptionorobservationofnaturebutsimplybyanalysingthestructureofthethoughtofbeing.Thestructuresofbeingandthoughtthuscannotbutbeidentical.TheargumentaboveclearlyconflictswithKant’sconceptionofthematter.FromKant’spointofview,aproperlycautiousandcriticalphi-losophyshouldrecognisethathumanthoughtbyitselfentertainsnomorethanthepossibilityofthings.35Accordingly,theclaimthatourthoughtbyitselfdisclosesthenatureofbeingorof“thingsinthem-selves”isanuncriticalandunjustifiedassumptionthatattributestoourthoughtacapacityfor“intellectualintuition”itcanneverenjoy.FromHegel’spointofview,however,“possibility”isitselfahighlycomplexconceptthatstandsinrelationtotheequallycomplexconceptsof“actuality”and“necessity”.36Significantly,forHegel,thereismuchmorecomplexity–notless–inthethoughtof“mere”possibilitythaninthethoughtofbeing.Possibilityisnot,therefore,theleastthatthoughtcanthink.Itisthatwhichwecometothinkwhenwereflectonthebeingofwhichweareinitiallyaware.Thoughtthattakesitselftobeawareonlyofpossibilitythusactually(thoughunwittingly)claimsmoreforitselfthandoesthoughtthattakesitselftobeawareofsimplebeing,eventhoughthelatter,fromtheKantianperspective,appearstobemorepresumptuous.Hegelinsiststhatafullyself-criticalscienceoflogicmustbeginwiththeleastthatthoughtcanbe.Atitssimplestandmostminimal,hebelieves,thoughtisnotthethoughtof“mere”possibilitybutthethoughtofsimplebeing.Itisthuswiththisideathatthoughtistheawarenessofbeing–ofwhatis–thatHegel’sscienceoflogicmustbegin.ForHegel,therefore,thereisnocontradictionintheideaofapost-Kantianontology,becausethepost-Kantiandemandthatphilosophy35I.Kant,CritiqueofJudgment,trans.byW.S.Pluhar(Indianapolis,IN:Hackett,1987),p.284,§76.36ForHegel’sextendeddiscussionofpossibility,actualityandnecessityintheLogic,seeSL,542–550;Werke,6:202–213.SeealsoStephenHoulgate,“NecessityandContingencyinHegel’sScienceofLogic”,TheOwlofMinerva27,1(Fall1995),pp.37–49.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n122stephenhoulgatebefullycriticalandself-criticalrequiresthatwetakethoughtatthestartoflogictobetheawarenessofbeing.HegelthusrejectsKant’sunderstandingofthoughtanditslimitations,andheretainstheancientconvictionthatthoughtdisclosesthecharacterofbeing,becausehewishestobemoreself-criticalandtotakelessforgrantedaboutthoughtthanKanthimself.Itispreciselybecauseheembracesthe“criticalturn”moreconsistentlythanKantthatHegelcontinuesinthewakeofKanttobeametaphysicianinthestrongAristotelianandSpinozansense.Hegelalsobelievesthatthestandpointofspeculativelogic–inwhichthoughtisunderstoodtodisclosethenatureofbeing,andbeinginturnisunderstoodtobeidenticalinstructuretothought–isjustifiedbytheanalyseshecarriesoutinhisPhenomenologyofSpirit.Contrarytosomecommentators,IdonotthinkthatHegelregardsphenomenologyastheindispensablepreconditionofspeculativelogic.Aswesawabove,HegelstatesintheEncyclopaediaLogicthatsuchlogicpresupposesnothingbutthewillingnessfreelytosuspendone’sfavouredassump-tionsaboutthoughtandtoconsideronly“thesimplicityofthought”.AsimilarclaimismadeintheScienceofLogic.Allthatisrequiredtobeginspeculativelogic,Hegelwrites,is“theresolve[Entschluss],whichcanalsoberegardedasarbitrary,thatweproposetoconsiderthoughtassuch”.Actingonthisresolveandactuallysettingallpresuppositionstoonesideleadsdirectlytothethoughtofpurebeingwithwhichspecula-tivelogicstarts.“Toenterintophilosophy,therefore,callsfornootherpreparations,nofurtherreflectionsorpointsofconnection”.37Therearethose,however,whoarenotquitesoreadytosetasidetheirinheritedbeliefsandwhoareespeciallyweddedtotheassumptionsofordinary,everydayconsciousness.Suchconsciousnessdoesnotdenythattheworldisknowable,butitunderstandstheworldtobesome-thingclearlydistinctfromitself:“consciousness[...]knowsobjectsintheirantithesis[Gegensatz]toitself,anditselfinantithesistothem”.38Itthusbelievesthatitgainsknowledgeoftheworldthroughperceptionandobservationof,orpracticalengagementwith,thatwhichisotherthanit.Asaconsequence,everydayconsciousnesscannotbutconsiderthestandpointofspeculativelogic,inwhichthestructureofbeingisdis-coveredsimplybyexaminingthestructureofthought,tobe“perverse”[verkehrt].TheroleofHegel’sPhenomenologyistopersuadereaderswhoarereluctanttoletgooftheassumptionsofeverydayconsciousnessthat37Hegel,EL,124,§78remark;Werke,8:168,andSL,70,72;Werke,5:68,72.38G.W.F.Hegel,PhenomenologyofSpirit,trans.byA.V.Miller(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1977),p.15;G.W.F.Hegel,PhanomenologiedesGeistes¨,ed.byE.MoldenhauerandK.M.Michel,WerkeinzwanzigBanden¨,vol.3,p.30.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sLogic123thestandpointofspeculativelogicisinfactbynomeansasperverseastheythinkitis.ThePhenomenologycarriesoutitsprolongedactofpersuasionbydemonstratingthatthedifferentconceptionsoftheworldadoptedbyconsciousnessthemselvesleadlogicallytothestandpointofspeculativelogic.Consciousnessmayholdtoitseverydaybeliefsasstronglyasitlikes;Hegelshows,however,thatwhentheimplicationsofthosebeliefsarefullyworkedoutandtakentotheirlogicalconclu-sion,thestandpointtowhichconsciousnessfindsitselfcommittedispreciselythatofspeculativelogic.Everydayconsciousnessitselfmakesspeculativelogicnecessary,therefore,despiteitsownbestintentions.39Phenomenologyexamines“everyformoftherelationofconscious-nesstotheobjectandhastheconceptofscience[i.e.speculativelogic]foritsresult”.40Speculativelogicor“purescience”inturnpresupposesthe“liberationfromtheoppositionofconsciousness”thatisbroughtaboutbyphenomenology(or,alternatively,bythefreeactofsuspend-ingone’sfamiliarassumptions).Suchlogicunderstands,therefore,thatthoughtbyitselfdisclosesthetruenatureofbeingand,conversely,thatthelogicalstructureofbeingisidenticaltothatofthought(properlycon-ceived).InHegel’sownwords,itunderstandsthat“theabsolutetruthofbeingistheknownconcept[Begriff]andtheconceptassuchistheabsolutetruthofbeing”.41Hegelclearlytakeshisspeculativelogictobenotjustalogicoratran-scendentalphilosophy,butametaphysicsandanontologyinthestrong,Spinozansense.Atthesametime,however,hislogicisnonmetaphysi-calinsofarasitisaself-criticaldisciplinethatacceptsnoneofthedeter-minateassumptionsaboutbeingmadebypre-Kantianmetaphysicians.Speculativelogicdoesnotbeginwiththeideathatbeingis“substance”,“nature”,“actuality”or“form”,butstartsfromthesimpleideaofbeingassuch,ofbeing“withoutanyfurtherdetermination”.42Similarly,suchlogicdoesnotretainthetraditionalmetaphysicalpresuppositionthatbeingisan“object”(orrealmofobjects)aboutwhichthephilosopherhasthoughts:“whatwearedealingwithinlogic”,Hegelwrites,“isnotathinkingaboutsomethingwhichexistsindependentlyasabaseforourthinking”.43Thefullyself-criticalspeculativephilosopherhasno39ForamoredetailedstudyoftheroleofHegel’sPhenomenology,seeStephenHoulgate,“G.W.F.Hegel(1770–1831)”,inTheBlackwellGuidetotheModernPhilosophersFromDescartestoNietzsche,ed.byS.Emmanuel(Oxford:Blackwell,2001),pp.278–305.40Hegel,SL,48;Werke,5:42.MillertranslatesBegriffas“notion”ratherthan“concept”.41Hegel,SL,49;Werke,5:43.42Hegel,SL,82;Werke,5:82.43Hegel,SL,50;Werke,5:44.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n124stephenhoulgatewarrantattheoutsettoassumethatbeingissuchan“object”,anymorethanhecanassumebeingtobesubstanceornature.Allhecanclaimatthebeginningoflogicis(a)thatthereisbeingand(b)thatthestructureofbeingitselfcanbediscoveredinthestructureofthecategoriesofthought.Thefullyself-criticalspeculativephilosopherdoesnot,there-fore,lookoutintotheworldinordertodiscoverthenatureofbeing,butsetsouttoderiveandclarifythecategoriesofthoughtinordertodis-coverthenatureofbeinginthem.Forsuchaphilosopher,“thenecessaryformsandself-determinationsofthoughtare[thus]thecontentandtheultimatetruthitself”.44Sincethisisthecase,speculativemetaphysicsorontologyisnecessarilyequivalenttologic.Thislastpointiscrucial,inmyview,andisworthrepeating.Hegel’sspeculativemetaphysicsisamodern,post-Kantian,andthereforefullyself-criticaldisciplinethatsuspendsthedeterminateassumptionsaboutbeingandthoughtthatarefoundinpre-Kantianmetaphysics.Conse-quently,itdoesnottakebeingattheoutsettobean“object”outsideoroveragainstthought.Allitisentitledtoclaimtostartwithisthattheintrinsiccharacterofbeing–whateverthatwillturnouttobe–willbedisclosedinthecategoriesofthoughtitself.Sinceitlookstothecategoriesofthoughtinordertodiscoverthenatureofbeing,Hegel’spost-Kantianmetaphysicsnecessarilytakestheformoflogic.PacePinkardandPippin,Hegel’slogicis,indeed,ametaphysics;butitisametaphysicsintheformoflogicbecauseitisamodern,“nonmeta-physical”metaphysicsthatassumesnothingaboutbeingexceptthatitstruenaturewillbediscoveredinthestructureofthoughtitself.themethodofhegel’slogicHegelinsiststhatafreeandfullyself-criticallogicshouldstartbysus-pendingallpresuppositions(apartfromtheconvictionthatthoughtdis-closesthenatureofbeing):“all[...]presuppositionsorassumptionsmustequallybegivenupwhenweenterintotheScience,whethertheyaretakenfromrepresentationorfromthinking”.45Speculativelogicshouldthusbepresuppositionless.Thisclaim,however,iseasytomis-understand.Hegeldoesnotdenythatspeculativelogicpresupposesaninterestonthepartofthephilosopherindiscoveringthetruecharacterofthoughtorbeing.46Equally,suchlogicpresupposesaninterestinensuringthat44Hegel,SL,50;Werke,5:44,myemphasis.45Hegel,EL,124,§78;Werke,8:167.46Hegel,EL,24,§1;Werke,8:41.ForamoredetailedstudyofthepresuppositionsofHegel’spresuppositionlessphilosophy,seeStephenHoulgate,TheOpeningofDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sLogic125philosophicalthoughtbefreeandunencumberedandacorrespondingreadinesstosettoonesidethegoverningassumptionsoftraditionalmetaphysicsandeverydayconsciousness(or,atleast,awillingnesstoreadthePhenomenologyandpossiblybepersuadedbyit).Speculativelogicalsopresupposestheabilitytouselanguage–since,aswehavealreadyseen,“wethinkinnames”47–andtheabilitytoabstractandholdinmindpureandoftenhighlycomplexconcepts.(Inthislatterrespect,Hegelmaintains,“[Aristotelian]formallogicundoubtedlyhasitsuse.Throughit[...]wesharpenourwits;welearntocollectourthoughts,andtoabstract”.)48Finally,Hegel’slogicpresupposesacer-tainfamiliarityonourpartwiththebasicconceptsofthought:49forifwelackedthisfamiliarity,wecouldnotrecognisethattheconceptsdevelopedinthatlogicareinfactrevisedand“clarified”versionsoftheconceptsweuseineverydaylife.Inalltheserespects,therefore,speculativelogicisclearlynotpresuppositionless.Intwootherrespects,however,speculativelogicistobepresupposi-tionless.First,thephilosophershouldnotassumeattheoutsetofsuchlogicthatthecategoriesofthoughtaretobeunderstoodinaspecificway,orindeedthatthoughtentailsanyparticularcategoriesatall.Heshouldkeepinthebackofhismindthefamiliarsensesofthecategories,butinthescienceoflogicitselfheshouldstartfromscratchbyconsid-eringthesheer“simplicityofthinking”assuchandwaittodiscoverwhichcategories,ifany,areinherentinthinkingandhowtheyaretobeconceived.Asnewcategoriesarederivedinthecourseofspeculativelogic,thelogiciancancomparethemwiththecategorieswithwhichheisfamiliarandsodeterminetowhatextentoureverydayunderstandingofthecategoriesisadequate.50Thateverydayunderstandingshouldnot,however,playanyroleinthelogicalderivationofthecategoriesthem-selves.Inspeculativelogicitselfthecategoriesmustbederivedpurelyimmanently–withoutpresuppositions–fromthesheer“simplicity”ofthought.Theaimoflogic,asHegelputsit,is“toexhibittherealmofthought[...]initsownimmanentactivityorwhatisthesame,initsnecessarydevelopment”.51Second,thephilosophermaynottakeforgrantedattheoutsetanyspecificrulesorlawsofthought.HemaynotpresupposethatthoughtHegel’sLogic.FromBeingtoInfinity(WestLafayette,IN:PurdueUniversityPress,2006),pp.54–71.47Hegel,EPM,220,§462remark;Werke,10:27848Hegel,EL,52,§20addition;Werke,8:76,translationslightlyaltered.49Hegel,EL,24,§1;Werke,8:41.50SeeHegel,SL,708–709;Werke,6:406–407.51Hegel,SL,31;Werke,5:19.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n126stephenhoulgateshouldabidebytherulesofsyllogisticinferenceorthatitshouldbegov-ernedbythelawofnoncontradiction,andsomaynotfindthoughtwant-ingifitfailstorespecttheseprinciples.Nor,indeed,mayhepresupposethatthoughtshouldbe“dialectical”(andcertainlynotthatitshoulddevelopaccordingtothepatternof“thesis–antithesis–synthesis”).Thespeculativelogicianmaynotpresupposesuchrulesandlawsbecauseitisthetaskoflogicitselftodiscoverwhetheranyrulesorlawsareactuallymadenecessarybythe“simplicity”ofthought.InHegel’sownwords,the“formsofreflectionandlawsofthinking[...]constitutepartof[logic’s]owncontentandhavefirsttobeestablishedwithinthescience”.52Untilthishasbeenachieved,norulesorlawsofthoughtcanbeassumedtobevalid.Howthenisthespeculativelogiciantoproceed?Isthereanymethodthatsuchalogicianmustfollow?Yes,indeed.Themethodhemustfol-lowissimplytoletthe“simplicity”ofthoughtunfoldanddetermineitselfbeforeourveryeyesaccordingtowhateverprinciplesprovetobeimmanentinit.Heideggeristhephilosopherwithwhomtheideaof“lettingbe”isusuallyassociated.53ManyyearsbeforeHeidegger,however,Hegelarguedthat“letting”liesattheheartofgenuinelyfree,modernphilosophizing.“WhenIthink”,Hegelexplains,“Igiveupmysubjectiveparticularity,sinkmyselfinthematter,letthoughtfollowitsowncourse[lassedasDenkenfursichgew¨ahren¨];andIthinkbadlywheneverIaddsomethingofmyown”.Myroleasphilosopheristhusnottopassjudgmentonthisorthatpropositionorargumentaccordingtocertainpresupposedrulesandcriteria,butsimplyto“lettheinher-entlylivingdeterminations[ofthought]taketheirowncourse[fursich¨gewahrenlassen¨]”.54Ifonedoesthis,Hegelclaims,onewilldiscoverwhatthought(andbeing)provelogicallytobeoftheirownaccord.Theunderstandingofthecategoriesthatemergesinthiswaymayormaynotagreewiththatoftraditionalmetaphysicsoreverydayconscious-ness;butitisthetrueunderstandingofthecategories,becauseitistheunderstandingthatismadenecessarybytheverynatureandmovementofthought.Ourroleasphilosophers,therefore,ispredominantlypassive.AsW.T.Staceputsit,“itis,infact,notwewhodeducethecategoriesatall.Theydeducethemselves”.55Wesimplylookonasthecategoriesemergeimmanentlyfromthevery“simplicity”ofthought.Yetweare52Hegel,SL,43;Werke,5:35.53See,forexample,Heidegger,BeingandTime,p.405.54Hegel,EL,58–59,§24addition2;Werke,8:84–85.55W.T.Stace,ThePhilosophyofHegel.ASystematicExposition(1924)(NewYork:Dover,1955),p.85.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sLogic127notcompletelypassiveobserversofthisprocess.Firstofall,wearetheoneswhothinkthroughthought’simmanentdevelopment:thatdevel-opmentdoesnotoccuroutsideofus,likeafilmoraplay,buttakesplaceinourthinkingofit.Second,althougheachcategoryismadenec-essarybytheonethatprecedesitandisnotsimplydreamtupbyus,wenonethelesshavetorenderexplicitthecategoriesthatareimplicitinthoughtatanyparticularpointinitslogicaldevelopment.Thededuc-tionofthecategories,Hegelmaintains,isanalyticinthatitinvolvesnothingmorethanthe“positing[Setzen]ofwhatisalreadycontainedinaconcept”;56butwearetheoneswhoactuallyhavetocarryoutthisactof“positing”orrendering-explicit.Thespeculativelogicianwholetsthoughtdetermineitselfisthusbothpassiveandactive:heallowshisownthinkingtobeguidedanddeterminedbywhatisimmanentinthoughtandplaysanactiveroleinbringingwhatisimmanentinthoughtoutintotheopen.Indeed,Hegelnotes,thereisadegreeofactivityinourverypassivityitself:forwecanallowourthoughttobeguidedbythematterathandonlyifweactivelyfocusonthatmatterandholdourownbrightideasatbay.Hegelmakesthispointintheseimportant,butrarelynoted,lines:Philosophicalthinkingproceedsanalyticallyinthatitsimplytakesupitsobject,theIdea,andletsitgoitsownway[dieselbegewahrenl¨aßt¨],whileitsimplywatches,sotospeak[gleichsamnurzusieht],themovementanddevelopmentofit.Tothisextentphilosophisingiswhollypassive[passiv].[...]Butthisrequirestheefforttobewareofourowninventionsandparticularopinionswhichareforeverwantingtopushthemselvesforward.57OnemightbeforgivenforsuspectingthatHegel’smethodofsimply“letting”thoughtdetermineitselfisarecipeforlazy,vague,andundis-ciplinedthinking.This,however,isfarfromthetruth.Hegel’smethoddemands“thateachthoughtshouldbegraspedinitsfullprecision[Prazision¨]andthatnothingshouldremainvagueandindeterminate”.58Italsodemandsthatonepaycloseandsubtleattentiontothelog-icalstructureofcategoriesandrenderexplicitonlywhatisimplicitineachcategory.Indeed,inmyview,Hegel’smethodrequiresgreatermentaldisciplinethananyotherphilosophicalmethodinhistory.Italsorequiresgreatermentalflexibility:forthespeculativephilosopherhasnotonlytoachieveahighdegreeofprecisioninhisunderstanding56Hegel,EL,141,§88remark;Werke,8:188.57Hegel,EL,305,§238addition;Werke,8:390–391,translationslightlyaltered.58Hegel,EL,128,§80addition;Werke,8:171.SeealsoJohnBurbidge,OnHegel’sLogic.FragmentsofaCommentary(AtlanticHighlands,NJ:HumanitiesPress,1981),p.42.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n128stephenhoulgateofcategoriesbutalsotoallowthosecategoriestomutateintonewonesbeforehisveryeyesasherenderstheirnecessaryimplicationsexplicit.being,nothing,becomingAfullyself-criticallogicthatsuspendsallinheritedassumptionsaboutthoughtmustbeginwiththoughtatitsmostminimal,thatis,withthoughtasthesimpleawarenessofbeing.59ThefirstcategorytobeconsideredinHegel’slogicisthusthatof“being”itself(dasSein).Suchbeingisconceivednotassubstanceornaturebutassheer,indeterminatebeingassuch:“being,purebeing,withoutanyfurtherdetermination”.60Thetaskofthespeculativelogicianisthustothinkthiscategoryanddiscoveranyothercategoriesthatmaybeimplicitinit.Thelanguageusedtoconceiveofpurebeingis,ofcourse,repletewithterms,suchas“without”,“any”,and“further”,thathaveafamiliar,determinatemeaning.Yetthesetermsareemployedtoholdatbayalldeterminatethoughtsandallowustofocusonacategorythatisitselfwhollyinde-terminate.61Asweconsiderthatinitial,indeterminatecategory,however,some-thingstrangeandsurprisinghappens:for,duetoitssheerandutterindeterminacy,pure,featurelessbeingactuallyvanishesbeforeourveryeyesintonothing.Purebeingis“pureindeterminatenessandempti-ness”.Accordingly,Hegelwrites,thereisnothingtobeintuitedinit,ifonecanspeakhereofintuiting[...].Justaslittleisanythingtobethoughtinit,oritisequallyonlythisemptythinking.Being,theindeterminateimmediate,isinfactnothing,andneithermorenorlessthannothing.62Thereisanimmediateandobviousdifferencebetweenbeingandnoth-ing;butwhenbeingisthoughtinitspurityassheer,indeterminatebeing,thatdifferenceimmediatelydisappearsandbeingevaporatesintonothingwhatsoever.Yetthisdoesnotbringspeculativelogictoanend,becausethethoughtofnothingimmediatelyturnsbackintothethoughtofbeing.Thisisbecausesheerandutternothinghasanirreducibleimmediacy59Hegel,SL,70;Werke,5:68–69.60Hegel,SL,82;Werke,5:82.61SeeDieterHenrich,“AnfangundMethodederLogik”,inHenrich,HegelimKontext(FrankfurtamMain:SuhrkampVerlag,1971),p.85.62Hegel,SL,82;Werke,5:82–83.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sLogic129ofitsown.Nothing,initsutterpurity,ispreciselynothingandcan-notbethoughtexceptasbeingthenothingthatitis.Nothingthusimmediatelyslipsbackintobeingassoonasitisthought.Thisisnotjustatrickoflanguage.Purenothingproveslogicallytobeindetermi-natebeingbecauseitsverypurityasnothingparadoxicallygivesitanimmediacyandbeingofitsown.Logically,nothingthusturnsouttobe“thesamedetermination,orratherabsenceofdetermination,andthusaltogetherthesameas,purebeing”.63AccordingtoHegel,therefore,thethoughtofpure,indeterminatebeingvanishesimmediatelyintothatofnothing,andthethoughtofpurenothingvanishesimmediatelyintothatofpurebeing.Eachprovestobelogicallyunstableandtodisappearintotheoppositeofitself.Indeed,Hegelpointsout,eachprovestobenothingbuttheprocessofitsowndisappearance.WhatwediscoveratthestartofHegel’slogicisthusnotonlythatbeingandnothingvanishintooneanother,butthateachsimplyisitsownvanishing.Assuch,eachisimmediatelythecoming-to-beoftheother.Withthisinsightwereachanewcategory:neitherbeingnornothingispurelyitselfbecauseeachisnothingbutthebecomingoftheother.InHegel’sownwords:theirtruthis[...]thismovementoftheimmediatevanishingoftheoneintheother:becoming,amovementinwhichbotharedistinguished,butbyadifferencewhichhasequallyimmediatelydissolveditself[sichaufgelost¨].64ThisisthefirstmajorlessonofHegel’slogic:paceParmenides,beingisnotjustpureandsimplebeingafterall,butbecoming.Theconceptof“becoming”doesnot,however,simplyreplacethatof“being”,andthelatterisnotrevealedtobeamerefiction(asNietzschewilllaterargue).65Hegel’spointisthatthereisbeing,butthatsuchbeingitselfproveslogicallytobebecoming.Thisisametaphysicalclaimaboutwhatthereis,butonethatisestablishedsolelybyconsideringthecategoryof“being”.SeveraldistinctivefeaturesofHegel’slogicbecomeevidentintheseopeningmoves.First,althoughHegeldoesnotpresupposethatspec-ulativethoughtshouldbedialectical,suchthoughtdoesinfactprovetobedialecticalofitsownaccord.Dialectic,forHegel,isnotarela-tionbetweendifferentthings(forexample,betweenanindividualand63Hegel,SL,82;Werke,5:83.64Hegel,SL,83;Werke,5:83,translationaltered.65SeeFriedrichNietzsche,TwilightoftheIdols/TheAntichrist,trans.byR.J.Hollingdale(Harmondsworth:PenguinBooks,1968),p.36(inTwilightoftheIdols,“‘Reason’inPhilosophy”,§2).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n130stephenhoulgatesociety),butistheprocesswherebyonecategoryorphenomenonturnsintoitsownopposite:“thedialecticalmomentistheself-sublation[Sichaufheben]ofthesefinitedeterminationsontheirownpart,andtheirpassingintotheiropposites”.66Thecategoriesofbeingandnoth-ingprovetobedialecticalbyvanishingintooneanother,andallsub-sequentcategorieswillturnouttoexhibitasimilardialecticoftheirown.DialecticisthusnotamethoddevisedbyHegelandbroughttobearoncategoriesfromtheoutside,butbelongstothosecategories(andcorrespondingaspectsofbeing)themselves.Itis“theinwardnessofthecontent,thedialecticwhichitpossesseswithinitself”.67Second,Hegel’slogicprogressesbysimplythinkingthroughthepro-cesswherebycategoriestransformthemselveslogicallyanddialecti-callyintonewcategories.Thisprocessiswhollyimmanentinthatitisdrivenbynothingbutthelogicalcharacterofthecategoriesthemselves.Newcategoriesarenotintroducedbythephilosopherinordertoavoidcontradictionsinthecategoriesunderconsideration(asPinkardargues)ortomoveusonfromlessadequatetomoreade-quateconcepts(asSchellingappearstosuggest).68Theyaregeneratedautonomouslybythecategoriesthatprecedethem.Itisthus“thenatureofthecontentalonewhichmovesitself[sichbewegt]inscientificcognition”.69Third,thedevelopmentofthecategoriesisnonteleologicalinthatitisnotpropelledforwardbyanydesireonthepartoftheindividualphilosopherorthoughtingeneraltoreachsomegoal(suchas“theIdea”or“spirit”).Nor(asSchellingclaims)arethecategoriesjudgedtobeinad-equatebycomparisonwiththeprojectedgoalofconcreteknowledgeoftheworld“atwhichsciencefinallyistoarrive”.70Thespeculativelogi-cianisnotaimingtoreachanyparticularendpoint,butsimplyseekstounderstandthespecificcategorythatisinview.Equally,thecategoriesthemselvesarenotsecretly“striving”tobecomemomentsofagreaterwhole,buttransformthemselvesintonewcategoriessimplybybeing–and,asitwere,“tryingtoremain”–whattheyare.Fourth,Hegeldescribesaprocessof“sublation”orAufhebeninwhichtheopposedcategoriesof“being”and“nothing”losetheirinde-pendenceandbecomemere“moments”ofaunity,“becoming”.71That66Hegel,EL,128,§81;Werke,8:172.67Hegel,SL,54;Werke,5:50.68SeePinkard,Hegel’sDialectic,pp.26,29,andF.W.J.vonSchelling,OntheHistoryofModernPhilosophy,trans.byA.Bowie(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994),p.143.69Hegel,SL,27;Werke,5:16,translationaltered.70Schelling,OntheHistoryofModernPhilosophy,p.138.71Hegel,SL,105–107;Werke,5:112–114.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sLogic131unity,however,isnotinanywayseparatefromor“prior”tothecate-goriesthatcometobeitsmoments.Itistheunitythatthosecategoriesconstitutethroughtheirowndialectic.Categories,suchasbeingandnothing,arethusthemselvesresponsibleforgeneratingtheveryunityofwhichtheyaremoments.Theprocessofsublationisnot,therefore–asissometimessuggestedbyHegel’sdeconstructivecritics–comparabletotheprocessofeatinganddigestinginwhichindependentelementsareassimilatedorabsorbedinto,andtherebysubordinatedto,agreaterwholethatistacitlyorexplicitlypresupposed.Nordoesthisprocesshaveanysinister,“totalitarian”politicalconnotations.72Itistheautonomousprocesswherebycategoriesunitetogetheroftheirownaccord.Itisclear,then,thatmuchcanbelearnedaboutspeculativelogicfromHegel’sinitialaccountofthecategoriesofbeing,nothing,andbecoming.Itshouldbeborneinmind,however,thatthefurtherdevelopmentofthecategoryofbecoming,andofthesubsequentcategoriesthatemergefromit,willnottakepreciselythesameformasthedevelopmentofpure,indeterminatebeing.Allfurtherdevelopmentwillremainimma-nent,nonteleological,anddialectical;butpreciselybecauseitwillbeimmanentandthusrootedinthespecificlogicalstructuresofthecate-goriestocome,itwilltakeasubtlydifferentformineachcase.frombeingtotheideaIntheremainderofHegel’slogicthereemergenumerouscategoriesthatfallintothreeoverallgroups:thecategoriesof“being”,“essence”,and“concept”.Thecategoriesof“being”include“determinatebeing”(Dasein)–whicharisesdirectlyfrom“becoming”–“something”,“other”,“being-in-itself”,“being-for-another”,“finitude”,“infinity”,“quantity”,and“measure”(Maß).Eachofthesecategoriesprovestobedialecticalinitsowndistinctivewayandtherebydisclosesthedialec-ticalstructureofthecorrespondingaspectofbeingitself.Determinatebeing,forexample,turnsouttoentailbothrealityandnegation;sothingsaredeterminate,forHegel,notonlythroughbeingwhattheyare,butalsothroughnotbeingwhattheyarenot.Similarly,somethingprovestobenotonlysomethinginitsownrightbutalsootherthansomethingelse.Everysomethingisthusnecessarilyrelatedtootherthingsandvulnerabletotheireffectsonit.AsHegelputsit,“itisthe72OnesuchcriticisChristinaHowellswhospeaksbothof“theall-devouringrigourofHegel’ssearchforSavoirAbsolu”andof“Hegeliantotalitarianism”inher(oth-erwiseexcellent)book,Derrida.DeconstructionfromPhenomenologytoEthics(Oxford:PolityPress,1998),pp.85,90.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n132stephenhoulgatequalityofsomethingtobeopentoexternalinfluences”.73Hegel’sanal-ysisofthecategoryof“something”thusleadshimtoametaphysicalpositionthatdirectlycontradictsLeibniz’sdoctrinethattheworldismadeupof“windowless”monads.Thecategoriesof“being”turndialecticallyintooneanother,buttheynonethelessretainadegreeofindependence.74Thus,eventhoughsomethingisalwaysotherthan–andsorelatedto–somethingelse,itremainssomethinginitsownrightwithitsownintrinsiccharacter.(This,indeed,iswhatenablesphilosopherssuchasLeibniztooverlooktheinherentvulnerabilityofthingstoexternalinfluence.)Similarly,qualityandquantityremaintoacertainextentindependentofoneanother,althoughathingmaywellundergoqualitativechangeifitgetstoobig,toosmall,toohot,ortoocold(asoccurs,forexample,whenwaterreachesacertaintemperatureandturnsintosteamorice).Bycontrast,thecategoriesof“essence”–andtheaspectsofbeingitselftowhichtheycorrespond–enjoynoindependenceatall,becauseeachcomestobewhatitisonlythroughthemediationofitsopposite.Identity,forexample,emergesonlythroughdifference;forcecomestobeforceonlyinitsexpression;andthecausebecomesthecauseonlyinproducingitseffect.Noneofthesedeterminationshasaseparatecharacterofitsown,buteachisconstitutedatitscorebyitsrelationtoitsopposite.ThelogicaldistinctiondrawnbyHegelbetweenthecategoriesof“being”and“essence”thusleadstoasignificantmetaphysicalclaim:athing’squalitiesarerelatedtoandpartlydeterminedby,butalsoseparatefrom,thoseofotherthings;bycontrast,athing’sidentityisestablishedsolelythroughitsdifferencesfrom,relationsto,andcausalinteractionwithotherthingsandsoisutterlyinseparablefromthem.75Notethat,inHegel’sunderstanding,“essential”determinationsthatarelogicallypriortoothersdonotsimplyandunambiguouslyprecedethosetowhichtheygiverise.Thecauseproducestheeffectandinthatsenseis“prior”toit.Yetthecausecomestobeacauseonlywiththeemergenceofitseffect.Itisthusonlyacausethankstoitseffect.Itcannot,therefore,beacauseonitsownandexistassuchbeforeitseffect.Itis,rather,thattowhichitseffect–oncethelatterhasemerged–necessarilypointsback.Likethegroundandforce,thecauseisthatwhichonlyturnsoutattheendtocomefirst.76Theevidently73Hegel,SL,124;Werke,5:133.74Hegel,SL,123;Werke,5:133.75Onthegeneraldifferencebetweenthedoctrinesofbeingandessence,seeHegel,EL,237,306,§161,240;Werke,8:308,391.76ForamoredetailedstudyofHegel’saccountofcausality,seeStephenHoulgate,“Substance,Causality,andtheQuestionofMethodinHegel’sScienceofLogic”,DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sLogic133paradoxicalcharacterofdeterminationssuchascauseandforcedoesnot,however,renderthemanylessreal.TogetherwithallthedeterminationsanalysedinHegel’slogic,theyconstitutenecessaryaspectsofbeing.77ByHegel’sownadmissionthedoctrineofessenceisthemostdif-ficultsectionofspeculativelogic.78Thingsgetalittleeasierinthedoctrineof“theconcept”,inwhichcategoriesarenolongerheldtobethepriorgroundofothersandatthesametimetobemediatedbythosetheyground.The“universal”,forexample,isnotthegroundorcausetowhichthe“particular”and“individual”pointback,butratherthatwhichdevelopsintoandcontinuesitselfintheparticularandindi-vidual.79Likeallcategories,theuniversalturnsdialecticallyintonewones.Insodoing,however,itpreservesitsownidentity.Theparticularandindividualarethusnotsimply“other”thantheuniversal,noraretheymerelyits“effects”;theyaretheuniversalitselfintheformofpar-ticular,individualthings.Subsequentcategories,suchasmechanism,chemism,andlife,preservethisinterpenetrationofuniversal,particu-lar,andindividual.Livingbeingsarethusnotsimplyindividuals,butindividualsofacertainspeciesandgenus.ThefinalcategoryofHegel’slogicisthatofthe“absoluteIdea”.Thisistheconceptionofbeingasaself-determiningtotality.80Thistotalityincludesallthedeterminationsthathavebeenanalysedinthecourseofspeculativelogic:quality,quantity,identity,difference,causality,mech-anism,chemism,andlife.ThefinallessonofHegel’slogicisthusthatbeingisnottobeequatedwithanyoneofitsconstituentdeterminationsbutunitesallofthemintooneself-determiningwhole.OnthelastpageoftheScienceofLogic(andinthelastparagraphoftheEncyclopaediaLogic),Hegelthenconsidersonelastdialecticalmove:heshowsthattheself-determiningtotalityor“absoluteIdea”thatbeingprovestobeactu-allyexistsintheformofnature.Atthispoint,speculativelogicendsandthesecondpartofHegel’sphilosophy,thephilosophyofnature,begins.conclusionWhatHegelshowsinhislogicisthatbeingnecessarilyentailsawholerangeofdifferentwaysofbeing:beingsomething,beingfinite,beinginTheReceptionofKant’sCriticalPhilosophy.Fichte,SchellingandHegel,ed.byS.Sedgwick(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),pp.232–252.77Hegel,SL,440;Werke,6:75:“anabsolutedeterminationofessencemustbepresentineveryexperience,ineverythingactual”.78Hegel,EL,179,§114remark;Werke,8:236.79Hegel,SL,602;Werke,6:276.80Hegel,SL,825,843;Werke,6:550,573.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n134stephenhoulgatecausal,beingmechanical,beingalive,andsoon.Noteveryobjectintheuniversewillexhibiteachwayofbeing(asStaceclaims),81sincenoteveryobjectis,forexample,alive;buteveryobjectwillincorporatesomeofthewaysofbeingdiscussedineachofthethreepartsofHegel’slogic:thelogicsof“being”,“essence”,and“concept”.Forexample,thepenwithwhichIwrite–orHerrKrug’srathermorefamousone–issomethingandsoisintrinsicallyrelatedtootherthingsthatcanaffectitinvariousways.Ithasacertainidentityofitsownandcausesmarkstoappearonpaper.Itisalsoanindividualofacertainkind,namely,amechanicalobject.WhatHegel’slogicshowsisthateachofthesedifferentwaysofbeinghasitsownspecificlogicalstructure,andthatanobjectsuchasapencannotbeproperlyunderstoodexceptbyunderstandingthoselogicalstructures.Ofcourse,suchstructuresalonedonotsufficetoexplaineverythingaboutapen:onealsoneedstounderstanditsphysicalcharacteristics(suchasitscolourandtexture),itsmodeofconstruction,andthesocialandpersonalusestowhichitisput.Nevertheless,thepeniswhatitisatleastinpartbecauseitexhibitssomeofthewaysofbeingthatareanalysedinspeculativelogic.Onecan,therefore,deduceaprioricertainfundamentalontologicalfeaturesofapen,ifnot–asHegelfamouslyinsists–everyaspectofitsmake-up.82Hegeldemonstratesthenecessityofthefundamentalwaysofbeingbyprovingthatthethoughtorcategoryofbeingturnsdialecticallyintoalltheothercategoriesheanalyses.Hisontologyisthusestablishedthroughlogic.Aswehaveseen,Hegel’slogicisafullyself-criticalsci-encethatpresupposesnothingaboutthought(orbeing),exceptthatthoughtbyitselfcandisclosetheinherentlogicalstructureofbeing.Thisscienceis,asHegelhimselfacknowledges,difficultandcomplex.83Inmyview,however,itcontainsthemostprofoundandsubtleinsightsandiswellworthprolongedandcarefulstudy.Indeed,IwouldarguethatHegel’sdetailedpresentationofthatscience–theScienceofLogic–shouldbecountedtogetherwithKant’sCritiqueofPureReasonasoneofthetwogreatestworksofmodernphilosophy.81Stace,ThePhilosophyofHegel,p.128.82SeeHegel’sPhilosophyofNature,trans.byA.V.Miller(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1970),p.23,noteto§250remark;G.W.F.Hegel,Enzyklopadiederphilosophischen¨WissenschaftenimGrundrisse(1830).ZweiterTeil:DieNaturphilosophie,ed.byE.MoldenhauerandK.M.Michel,WerkeinzwanzigBanden¨,vol.9,p.35.83Hegel,SL,31,42;Werke,5:19,33.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:31WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.006CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nrobertstern6Hegel’sIdealismInaninfluentialarticleonthistopic,KarlAmeriksposedthequestion:“ButcananinterestingformofHegelianidealismbefoundthatistruetothetext,thatisnotclearlyextravagant,andthatisnotsubjecttothe[charge]oftriviality...?”,1andconcludedbyansweringthequestioninthenegative:“Insum,wehaveyettofindasimultaneouslyaccurate,substantive,andappealingsenseinwhichHegelshouldberegardedasanidealist”.2Othercommentatorsonthisissuehavetendedtobemorepositive;butthenthefactthatthesecommentatorshavedifferedsharplybetweenthemselvesmaysuggestthatanotherconcernisoverthecoherenceofHegel’sposition,andwhetheraconsistentaccountispossibleofitatall.Inthisarticle,Iwillconsiderthechargesofinaccuracy,triviality,andextravagancethatAmeriksandothershaveraised.Ofthesecharges,thefirsttwoareobviouslydamaging;butitmightreasonablybefeltthatthatlastislessclearlyso(whyshouldn’taphilosophicaltheorybeextravagant?),andalsothatitisopentodifferentreadings(forexample,doesitmean“notconsistentwith‘commonsense’”,or“notconsistentwiththefindingsofthesciences”–butwhatdotheseinclude?).Thecon-textforaconcernofthissort,however,mightwellbewhetherHegel’spositioncanbemadeconsistentwithKantianobjectionsagainstthepretensionsofmetaphysics,eitherbyrespectingthoseobjections,oratleastbysatisfactorilyaddressingthem.Theinterpretativeissuehereisthusoneofcharity:Hegel’spositionwillseemreactionaryandill-informedifitappearstobeconceivedinignoranceoftheworkofhisgreatpredecessor.Oneprominentrecentinterpreterhasputtheworryasfollows:Moretothegeneralandmoreobviouspoint,however,muchofthestandardviewofhowHegelpassesbeyondKantintospeculativephilosophymakesverypuzzling,tothepointofunintelligibility,howHegelcouldhavebeenthe1KarlAmeriks,“HegelandIdealism”,TheMonist,74(1991),pp.386–402,atp.397.2Ibid.,p.398.135DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n136robertsternpost-Kantianphilosopherheunderstoodhimselftobe;thatis,howhecouldhaveaccepted,ashedid,Kant’srevelationsaboutthefundamentalinadequaciesofthemetaphysicaltradition,couldhaveenthusiasticallyagreedwithKantthatthemetaphysicsofthe“beyond,”ofsubstance,andoftraditionalviewsofGodandinfinitywereforeverdiscredited,andthencouldhavepromptlycreatedasystematicmetaphysicsasifhehadneverheardofKant’scriticalepistemol-ogy.JustattributingmoderatephilosophicintelligencetoHegelshouldatleastmakeonehesitatebeforeconstruinghimasapost-Kantianphilosopherwithaprecriticalmetaphysics.3Inconsideringtheissueofextravagance,then,Ishallconceiveitprimar-ilyinthismanner,asconcerningtherelationbetweenHegel’spositionandKant’s“criticalturn”inmetaphysics.IwillarguethataviewofHegel’sidealismemergesfromAmeriks’criticisms,whichisdefensi-bleagainsthisthreecharges;however,tomakesenseofitwehavetoseethatHegel’sconceptionofidealismhasaspectsthatareunusualintermsofthecontemporarydebate,whilenonethelesshispositionstillhasadirectbearingonit.i.hegelasakantianidealistTheaccountofHegel’sidealismwhichAmerikschargeswithtextualinaccuracyistheoneputforwardbyRobertPippininhisbookonthistopic,4whichhasbeenwidelydiscussed.53RobertB.Pippin,Hegel’sIdealism:TheSatisfactionsofSelf-Consciousness(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989),p.7.4Pippin,Hegel’sIdealism.5AswellasthepaperbyAmeriksmentionedinFootnote1above,seealso:TerryPinkard,“TheCategorialSatisfactionofSelf-ReflexiveReason”,BulletinoftheHegelSocietyofGreatBritain,19(1989),pp.5–17;H.S.Harris,“TheProblemofKant”,BulletinoftheHegelSocietyofGreatBritain,19(1989),pp.18–27;TerryPinkard,“HowKantianWasHegel?”,ReviewofMetaphysics,43(1990),pp.831–838;LudwigSiep,“Hegel’sIdeaofaConceptualScheme”,Inquiry,34(1991),pp.63–76;KarlAmeriks,“RecentWorkonHegel:TheRehabilitationofanEpistemologist?”,PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch,52(1992),pp.177–202;KennethR.Westphal,“Hegel,Idealism,andRobertPippin”,Inter-nationalPhilosophicalQuarterly,33(1993),pp.263–272;SallySedgwick,“PippinonHegel’sCritiqueofKant”,InternationalPhilosophicalQuarterly,33(1993),pp.273–283;FrankB.Farrell,Subjectivity,RealismandPost-modernism:TheRecoveryoftheWorld(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994),pp.20–29.RepliesbyRobertPippintosomeofthesepiecescanbefoundin“Hegel’sIdealism:Prospects”,BulletinoftheHegelSocietyofGreatBritain,19(1989),pp.28–41and“Hegel’sOriginalInsight”,InternationalPhilosophicalQuarterly,33(1993),pp.285–295.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism137PippinarguesthatHegel’sidealismshouldbeseeninthelightofKant’sturnfromtraditionalmetaphysicstocriticalmetaphysics,aturnwhichHegelfollowedandwhichledbothhimandKanttowardsidealism.Simplyput,Kantbelievedthatmetaphysicscouldnotbecar-riedoutinthetraditionalrationalistmanner,ofclaiminginsightintothefundamentalfeaturesofrealityonthebasisofapriorispeculation;rather,wemustdirectourinquirytotheconceptsweusetothinkabouttheworldandwhicharenecessaryforustohaveexperienceofitasself-conscioussubjects,sothat(asPippinputsit)“[t]hereafter,insteadofanaprioriscienceofsubstance,ascienceof‘howtheworldmustbe’...aputativephilosophicalsciencewasdirectedtothetopicofhowanysubjectmust‘foritself’takeorconstrueorjudgetheworldtobe”.6Thehopewasthatthiscriticalturnwouldmakemetaphysicsmoretractableandlessvainglorious:wewouldnowbeproceedingbyinvestigatingthenecessaryconditionsofourexperience,ratherthanthingsingeneral.7However,anobviousdifficultywiththisenterpriseisthescopeitleavesopenforscepticism:whyshouldwethinkthattheconceptswhicharenecessarytoenableustohaveexperienceactuallycorrespondtotheworld?Surely,itmightbeobjected,“[a]ninquiryintothestructureofhumanthoughtis...somethingquitedifferentfromaninquiryintothestructureoftheworldthoughtisabout”,8sohowcantheKantianapproachclaimtobedoingmetaphysicsinanysenseatall?Now,oneKantianresponsetothisworryistorejecttherealistassumptiononwhichitisbased,namely,thatsuchagapbetweenmindandworldcouldarise,andthusthatthereisanycoherentnotionof“world”onthebasisofwhichtheproblemcouldbeposed;rather,itisargued,notionslike“object”,“representation”,“truth”,“knowledge”,andsoononlyapplywithintheconceptualschemeweareconsider-ing.Thisoutlookisoftencharacterisedas“antirealism”or“internal6RobertB.Pippin,“HegelandCategoryTheory”,ReviewofMetaphysics,43(1990),pp.839–848,atp.839.7Cf.Pippin,“Hegel’sOriginalInsight”,p.286.Cf.alsoP.M.S.Hacker’scharacter-izationofthemotivationofP.F.Strawson’sturnfrommetaphysicsas“limningtheultimatestructureoftheworld”to“sketchingthestructureofourconceptualscheme”:“Theconceptionofaformofnecessitythatisnotlogical,butnolessadamantinethanlogicalnecessity,thatisanobjective,language-independentformofnecessitythatcanneverthelessbeapprehendedaprioribyreasonaloneis,surelyrightly,dismissedasafiction”(P.M.S.Hacker,“OnStrawson’sRehabilitationofMetaphysics”,inHans-JohannGlock,ed.,StrawsonandKant(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2003),pp.43–66,atp.55).8MichaelJ.Loux,Metaphysics:AContemporaryIntroduction(London:Routledge,1998),p.9.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n138robertsternrealism”,insofarasitrejectstherealist“external”standpointthatappearstomakescepticismaboutconceptualschemesofgenuinecon-cern,butwithoutthemorestronglyidealistcommitmenttotheclaimthatthingsintheworldare“mental”or“minddependent”inanyphe-nomenalistsense.9Now,accordingtoPippin,HegelfollowedKantintakingthiscrit-icalturn,andthusinattemptingtodeterminethecategoriesnec-essaryforaconceptualscheme,basedontheconditionsforunifiedself-consciousness(whatKantcalled“apperception”).However,whereKanthadunderminedhisownpositionbyallowingroomforthereal-istnotionof“things-in-themselves”aspossiblylyingoutsideourcon-ceptualframework,PippintakesHegel’sprojecttobethatofdevel-opingamorethorough-goingantirealism,whichwouldcloseoffanysuchpossibility.Thus,forPippin,HegelfollowsKantinsofaras“theissueofthe‘determinationsofanypossibleobject’(theclassicalAris-toteliancategoryissue)hasbeencriticallytransformedintotheissueof‘thedeterminationsofanyobjectofapossiblyself-consciousjudg-ment’”;buthegoesbeyondKantinsofaras“hehas,contraKant,hisownreasonsforarguingthatanyskepticismaboutsuchresults(abouttheirholdingonlyfor‘our’world,forself-consciousjudgers‘likeus’)is,althoughlogicallycoherent,epistemicallyidle”.10PippinthusgivesHegel’sidealismastrikinglyKantianinterpretationandrationale:acceptingthelessonofKant’scriticalturnthat“contrarytotheratio-nalisttradition,humanreasoncanattainnonempiricalknowledgeonlyaboutitself,aboutwhathascometobecalledrecentlyour‘concep-tualscheme’”.11Hegelnonethelessclaimsalsotobeinvestigatingthenatureofrealityitselfinsofarasnocontentcanbegiventothereal-istorscepticalthoughtthatrealitymight,infact,lie“outside”oftheschemealtogether,byshowingthattherecanbenosuch“external”standpoint:“[W]hatHegelisafterisawayofdemonstratingthe‘ulti-mate’orabsoluteobjectivityoftheNotionnotbysomedemonstrationthatbeingasitisinitselfcanbeknowntobeasweconceiveittobe,butthataNotionallyconditionalactualityisallthat‘being’couldintelligiblybe,evenforthemostcommittedrealistskeptic.Or,ifyoulike,Hegel’sskepticisco-optedintotheidealistprogram,notsimply‘refuted’”.129PippincharacterisesHegel’spositionasaformofantirealismatseveralplaces,forexample,Hegel’sIdealismp.99,p.262note15,andp.267note23.10Ibid.,p.250.11Ibid.,p.8.12Ibid.,p.98.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism139ThereareundoubtedlymanyaspectsofPippin’saccountofHegel’sidealismthatmakeitprofoundandattractive.Byplacingsuchempha-sisonitsKantianbackground,andhowmuchHegelsharedintheKan-tiancritiqueoftraditionalmetaphysics,PippinoffersareadingthatshowsHegeltobeintunewiththeprogressiveintellectualforcesofhistime,ratherthanthereactionaryphilosophicalfigureofsomestandardinterpretations.PippinalsoarguesthatHegel’spositionfollows“imma-nently”fromKant’sown,suggestingthatinthesecondeditionversionofthetranscendentaldeductionintheCritiqueofPureReason,Kanthimselftookbackhisearlierstrictdistinctionbetweenintuitionandunderstanding,sothathenowarguesthatnorepresentationcouldbegiventousinsensuousintuitionunlessitweresubjecttothecate-gories.13This,accordingtoPippin,opensupthewayforHegel’sownradicalizationofKant’stranscendentalapproach,sothat“itiswiththedenialthatafirmdistinctioncaneverbeusefullydrawnbetweenintu-itionalandconceptualelementsinknowledgethatdistinctlyHegelianidealismbegins,andHegelbeginstotakehispeculiarflight,withlan-guageaboutthecompleteautonomy,evenfreedomof‘thought’sself-determination’and‘self-acutalization’”.14BylinkingHegeltoKantinthisway,PippinshowshowcontemporarydevelopmentsfromKanthaveeveryreasontotakeHegelseriously.Pippin’sreadingalsocastsfreshlightonmanyofthedarkeraspectsofHegel’stexts,particularlyhisintroductoryremarkstoBookIIIoftheScienceofLogic,whereHegelidentifieshisownaccountoftheConceptorNotion[Begriff]withKant’sdoctrineofapperception,andintermsthatseemtofitPippin’stranscen-dentalinterpretation.15Moreover,Pippinisabletoofferachallenging13Cf.ibid.,pp.29–32.FordoubtsaboutPippin’sreadingofKant,seeSedgwick,“Pip-pinonHegel’sCritiqueofKant”,withareplyfromPippininhis“Hegel’sOriginalInsight”.14Pippin,Hegel’sIdealism,p.9.15Pippin,Hegel’sIdealism,pp.18,232.PippinhasthefollowingsortofremarkfromHegelinmind:“ItisoneoftheprofoundestandtruestinsightstobefoundintheCritiqueofPureReasonthattheunitywhichconstitutesthenatureoftheNotionisrecognizedastheoriginalsyntheticunityofapperception,asunityoftheIthink,orofself-consciousness”(G.W.F.Hegel,ScienceofLogic,trans.byA.V.Miller(London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin,1969),p.584;WerkeinzwanzigBanden¨,ed.byEvaMoldenhauerandKarlMarkusMichel,20vols.andindex(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1969–1971),VI,p.254).However,PinkardhasarguedthatcommentssuchastheseshouldnotbetakentoimplythatHegelistakingthetranscendentalturn,butratherthatheisdrawingattentiontothewayinwhichthestructureoftheNotionresemblesthestructureoftheunityofapperception,sothatitisthestructuralsimilaritybetweentheNotionandthe“Ithink”thatisherebeinghigh-lighted:“Thus,inHegel’seyes,whatisimportantintheKantianphilosophyisnotitsattempttoderiveeverythingfromtheconditionsofself-consciousness,butitsDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n140robertsternaccountofhowHegel’ssystemworksingeneral,particularlyhowthePhenomenologyrelatestotheLogic.Nonetheless,Pippin’sreadingremainscontroversialwithHegelscholars,whereAmeriksandothershavequestioneditstextualaccu-racy,andhowfaritdoesjusticetoHegel’sactualpositionandproce-dures.Itisnotpossibletogointoallthedetailshere,butoneissueisfundamental,namely,whetherPippinisrighttoclaimthatHegelfollowedKantinattemptingtodeducethecategoriesfromthecondi-tionsofself-consciousness,to“‘ground’theminthe‘I’”.16ForPippin,aswehaveseen,such“grounding”isessentialtothecriticalturninmetaphysics,asnootherbasisformetaphysicsasthenonempiricalinquiryinto“howtheworldmustbe”canbetakenseriouslyafterKant.Nonetheless,asPippinrecognizes,inpresentinghisaccountofthecategoriesintheLogic,Hegelseemstogofurtherthanthis,infram-inghisargumentinmorestraightforwardlyontologicalterms,andso“slipsfrequentlyfroma‘logical’toamaterialmode,goingfarbeyondaclaimaboutthoughtorthinkability,andmakingadirectclaimaboutthenecessarynatureofthings,directinthesensethatnoreferenceismadetoa‘deduced’relationbetweenthoughtandthing”.17Now,Pippinarguesthatthese“slips”aremerelyapparent.18However,criticsofattempttoconstructaself-subsuming,self-reflexiveexplanationofthecategories.Self-consciousnessisonlyaninstanceofsuchareflexivestructure”(Pinkard,“TheCategorialSatisfactionofSelf-ReflexiveReason”,p.8).Cf.Hegel,ScienceofLogic,p.583(Werke,VI,p.253),whereHegelsaysthat“theIisthepureNotionitselfwhich,asNotion,hascomeintoexistence”becausetheIisliketheNotion,incombiningthemomentsofuniversalityandindividuality,andthusofbeingaunitythatcontainsdifferencewithinit:“Thisabsoluteuniversalitywhichisalsoimmediatelyanabsoluteindividualization,andanabsolutelydeterminedbeing,whichisapurepositednessandisthisabsolutelydeterminedbeingonlythroughitsunitywiththepositedness,thisconstitutesthenatureoftheIaswellasoftheNotion;neithertheonenortheother[i.e.theIandtheNotion]canbetrulycom-prehendedunlessthetwoindicatedmoments[ofuniversalityandindividuality]aregraspedatthesametimebothintheirabstractionandalsointheirperfectunity”.HenrichexplainswhatHegelisgettingathereasfollows:“Bysaying‘Ithink,’theselfassertsitsdistinctiveexistence;buttheselfalsoknows,withrespecttothestructureofthisact,thatitdoesnotdifferfromotherselves....Forreasonsthatnowmaywellbeevident,HegelsaysthattheontologicalconstitutionoftheselfisthestructureoftheNotion”.(DieterHenrich,BetweenKantandHegel:LecturesonGermanIdealism,ed.byDavidS.Pacini(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2003),p.323).16Pippin,Hegel’sIdealism,p.33.17Ibid.,p.187.18See,forexample,ibid.,p.193:“Thus,ifthereisalogicalprobleminHegel’sintroductionoffinitude,itdoesnotlieincarelesslyconfusingtheconceptualwiththerealorder.IhavetriedtoshowthattheissuesareconceptualthroughoutanddeterminedbytheoverallconceptualstrategyoftheLogic”.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism141Pippin’sapproachareunconvincedandargueinsteadthatHegel’sposi-tionisnontranscendental,inthatherejectsanyKantianrestrictionofmetaphysicstoamethodbasedaroundtheconditionsofself-consciousnessratherthanof“beingassuch”.19Ofcourse,PippinmightwellreplythatfromaproperlyKantianper-spective,thewholeideaisthatthereisnosuchdistinction,whichiswhyHegelcouldbehappyconductinghismetaphysicsinatranscendentalmanner,byarguingfromthenecessaryconditionsofself-consciousness.But,itwouldseemthatPippin’scriticscouldrespondbysayingthatiftherereallyisnosensetoaradicalmind-worlddichotomy,whythinkofaninvestigationintothecategoriesasaninvestigationintothecon-ditionsofself-consciousnessatall,andsowhytreatthe“I”(ratherthan“being”)asthe“ground”oftheinquiry?AccordingtoPippin,aswehaveseen,Kanthimselfmadehiscriticalturntothe“I”becausehebelievedhehadreasontothinkthatherewecouldestablishgenuinelynecessaryclaims:butwhyisthissoobviouslyso?Whyisthereanyreasontothinkthatthenecessaryconditionsforapperceptionareanyeasiertoestablishthanthenecessaryconditionsforrealityassuch?Oreven,ifonehasnaturalisticorscepticaldoubtsabouttheintelligibilityofnecessaryconditionsforthelatter,thatthesedoubtscanberemovedconcerningnecessaryconditionsfortheformer?Infact,doesn’tanysuchexpectationrevealaCartesianprivilegingofthe“inner”overthe“outer”,or“self-knowledge”over“worldlyknowledge”,ofthekindthatHegelhimselfseemstohaverejectedassuspect.20Thus,criticsofPippin’stranscendentalreadingofHegelcanagreethatHegelisapost-KantianinacceptingimportantelementsofKant’scritiqueoftra-ditionalmetaphysics,particularlyasametaphysicaspecialiswithitsfocusontranscendententitieslikeGodandthesoul,whilestillarguingthatHegelisclosertoAristotlethanKantinconductinghisinquiryontologically,asametaphysicageneralis,forwhich“[t]hecategories19Cf.Pinkard,“TheCategorialSatisfactionofSelf-ReflexiveReason”,pp.7–10;Pinkard,“HowKantianWasHegel?”,pp.832–834;Ameriks,“HegelandIdealism”,p.391;Siep,“Hegel’sIdeaofaConceptualScheme”,pp.71–72;StephenHoulgate,“G.W.F.Hegel(1770–1831)”,inStevenM.Emmanuel,ed.,TheBlackwellGuidetotheModernPhilosophers:FromDescartestoNietzsche(Oxford:Blackwell,2001),pp.278–305,atp.282;StephenHoulgate,TheOpeningofHegel’sLogic(WestLafayette:PurdueUniversityPress,2006),esp.pp.137–143.20Cf.G.W.F.Hegel,LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,trans.byE.S.HaldaneandFrancesH.Simson,3vols.(London:K.Paul,Trench,Trubner,¨1892–1896;reissuedLincolnandLondon:UniversityofNebraskaPress,1995),III,p.486(Werke,XX,p.392):“[ForDescartesandFichte]Theegoiscertain,itcannotbedoubted;butPhilosophydesirestoreachthetruth.Thecertaintyissubjective,andbecauseitismadetoremainthebasis,allelseremainssubjectivealsowithouttherebeinganypossibilityofthisformbeingremoved”.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n142robertsternanalysedintheLogicareallformsorwaysofbeing...;theyarenotmerelyconceptsintermsofwhichwehavetounderstandwhatis”.21Nonetheless,evenifitisacceptedthatPippiniswrongtoclaimthatHegelfollowedKantinattemptingto“ground”thecategoriesinthe“I”asconditionsforself-consciousness,itisstillpossiblethatheisrighttotreatHegel’sidealismasaformofantirealism,forthetwopositionsarelogicallydistinct.However,muchofthemotivationforthelattercomesfromtheformer,asitisantirealismthatgivesthetranscendentalinquirymetaphysicalteeth.Andyet,withoutantirealismasablocktorealistscepticism,howcanHegelclaimthathisLogicisametaphysics?22Onwhatbasiscanheshowthatheisestablishingthefundamentalnatureofbeing,inawaythatwillsilencescepticaldoubts?Hereitmightbetemptingtoreintroduceaformofantirealism,andthustoreturntosomethinglikePippin’sviewofHegel’sidealism,asawayofenablingHegeltoseeoffthesceptic.ItisofcoursethecasethatHegelhadeveryconfidenceinhisinquiriesandthattheLogicshowsthatitispossibletoarriveatametaphysicalpictureoftheworldthathasalegitimateclaimtotruth.Butisthatconfidencebasedonacommitmenttoantirealism,orthemoretra-ditionalgroundsthatthispicturehasbeenthoroughlytestedagainstallalternativesandshowntobethemostcomprehensive,cohesive,andcoherent?Ofcourse,theantirealiststrategyismoreradicalthanthisbecauseitmakes(ortriestomake)scepticaldoubtsenselessorunassertible,byclosinganypossiblegapbetweenhowwethinkabouttheworldandhowitis.23Butwhatiswrongwiththelessradical,but21Houlgate,“G.W.F.Hegel”,p.282.Onthemovefromametaphysicspecialistoametaphysicageneralis,cf.Hegel,ScienceofLogic,pp.63–64(Werke,V,p.61),whereHegelnotesthattheLogicwillnotconcernitselfwith“particularsub-stratatakenprimarilyfromfigurateconception[ausderVorstellunggenommenenSubstrate],namelythesoul,theworldandGod”,butconsiderthe“formsofpurethought”(i.e.thecategories)“freefromthosesubstrata,fromthesubjectsoffigu-rateconception”.22Cf.Hegel,ScienceofLogic,pp.27,63(Werke,V,pp.16,61);G.W.F.Hegel,TheEncyclopaediaLogic:PartIoftheEncyclopaediaofPhilosophicalSciences,trans.byT.F.Geraets,W.A.Suchting,andH.S.Harris(Indianapolis:Hackett,1991),§24,p.56(Werke,VIII,pp.80–81).23Cf.Pippin,Hegel’sIdealism,pp.98–99:“...whatHegelisafterisawayofdemon-stratingthe‘ultimate’orabsoluteobjectivityoftheNotionnotbysomedemon-strationthatbeingasitisinitselfcanbeknownasweconceiveittobe,butthataNotionallyconditionalactualityisallthat‘being’couldintelligiblybe,evenforthemostcommittedrealistskeptics....Hegel’sresolutionoftheobjectivityandskep-ticismproblemsraisedbyhisidealismmustinvolveawayofarguingthatsuchaself-knowledgebySpirit,althoughnot‘metaphysicallyidentical’with‘whatthereis,intruth,’neverthelessinsomewaydefinesortranscendentallyconstitutesthepossibilityof‘objects’”.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism143alsolessdemandingstrategyofaskingthesceptictocomeupwithsomegroundsforthinkingthatthegapreallyexists,byshowingthatwehavereasontothinkourworld-viewisflawedinsomeway,wheretheaimwouldbetoshowthescepticthatnosuchflawcanbefound,sothatinthismoremodestsensethesceptichasnoplacetostand?Wouldn’tthisrenderscepticism“epistemicallyidle”,butwithoutanycommit-menttoantirealism,astheviewthatanysuch“external”questioningisunintelligiblesimplybecauseitis“external”?Onthisview,Hegelhasnoconceptualargumenttoruleoutscepticisminadvance,but,ontheotherhand,thescepticmustdomorethanraisejusttheabstractpossibilityoferror:groundsfordoubtmustbegivenbyshowinghowthepicturebeingputforwardofrealityismistaken,wheretheinquiryissuccessfullyconcludedifandwhenanysuchgroundshavebeendealtwithandexcluded.Seenfromthisperspective,bothantirealismandscepticalrealismmakethesamemistake,asbothattempttoestablishthenecessityorimpossibilityofknowledgetooearly,byclaimingtoshowpriortostartingthatwecanorcannotsucceedincomingtoknowhowthingsare:inthefaceofapriorirealistscepticism,theantirealistprovidesapriorireassurance.Itmightbeargued,however,thatHegelsimplysetsoutonthepathofinquiryaimingtoestablishhowthingsare(forwhyshouldwebelieveinadvancethatwecannot?)butwithoutseekinganysortofguarantee(forwhyisthisneeded,unlesswehavesomereasonforsuchadoubt?).IwouldthereforequestionPippin’sclaimthatHegelcouldnotpos-siblybearealist,butmustbecommittedtosomeformofantirealism,becauseheisa“modernphilosopher”whofeelscompelledtomakethe“criticalturn”asaresponsetoscepticism:“ThisallleadsHegelintoawhollynewwayofresolvingthegreatproblemofpost-Cartesianphi-losophy–howcanwereassureourselvesthatwhatinitiallycanonlybeourwayoftakingup,discriminating,categorizingtheworld,andourcriteriaforevaluatingdeeds,canalsoultimatelybecriticallyandreflectivelytransformed,securedfromrealistskepticism,andsomehowpassfrom‘ours’to‘Absolute’status”.24WhatPippinignores,Ibelieve,isHegel’sinsightthatitisfatal(andquiteuncalledfor)tobeginwithanythingliketheKantian“instrument”modelofcognition,andthuswiththepresuppositionthatthecategoriesare“onlyourwayoftak-ingthingsup,discriminating,categorizingtheworld”:forthisapproach“presupposesthattheAbsolutestandsononesideandcognitionontheother”,25whilevainlystrugglingtoclosethegap.Tomakethis24Pippin,‘Hegel’sOriginalInsight’,p.287.25G.W.F.Hegel,Hegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit,trans.byA.V.Miller(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1977),p.47(Werke,III,p.70).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n144robertsternanythingmorethanapresupposition,wemustbeshownwhereitisthatthereissomethingwrongwithourwayofthinking,whichraisesthereal(andnotjustabstract)doubtthatitismerely“ours”,andsonotrelatedtotheworld;buttodothat,weneedtobeshownagenuinecasewherethatthinkingbreaksdown,otherwisescepticismisjustaformofparanoia,“wherebywhatcallsitselffearoferrorrevealsitselfratherasfearofthetruth”.26ThePhenomenologythusjustifiestheprojectoftheLogicbyshowingthataseriesofparticularargumentsascepticmightgivetosuggestthattheworldisunknowablearebasedonquestionableepistemologicalandmetaphysicalassumptions–fromthe“supersensiblebeyond”oftheUnderstandingtothetranscendentGodofcertainformsofreligiousconsciousness–sothatinremovingthesescepticalgroundsfordoubt,“purescience[i.e.theLogic]presupposesliberationfromtheoppositionofconsciousness”,27andthusliberationfromtheworrythatifforexamplewefind“purebeing”incoherentasanidea(becauseitseemsindistinguishablefromnothing)thisjusttellsussomethingaboutus,andnotthenatureoftheworld(namely,thatifanythingis,itmustbedeterminate):butthereisnothinginthis“liberation”thatcommitsHegeltoantirealism.But,itmightbesaid,evenifHegelseesnoneedtoturntoantire-alismattheoutsetofhisinquiry,surelythenatureofthatinquiryshowsthatweneedtobeantirealistsattheend,becausehowdoweotherwiseexplainthesuccessofourmetaphysicalinvestigationsintothefundamentalnatureofreality?Afterall,hadn’tKantbeenbroughttoseethattherewassomethingdeeplymysteriousaboutmetaphysicalknowledge,amysteryheencapsulatedinthequestion“howissyntheticaprioriknowledgepossible”?Kant’sconcernwasthatwhenwereachametaphysicalconclusion(suchas“everyeventmusthaveacause”),wecannotdosoeitherbyknowingthemeaningoftheconceptsinques-tion(becausethesemetaphysicalpropositionsarenotanalytic),or“byreadingitoff”theworldinanydirectsense(becauseouronlydirectcon-frontationwiththeworldisinsensibleexperience:andthisexperiencetellsusjustthatthingsarethusandso,butnotthattheycouldnotbeotherwise).28Themetaphysicalrationalistmightarguethatwereachourmetaphysicalconclusionsbyfindingthatwecannotcontemplatehowthingscouldbeanyotherway(e.g.aneventoccurringwithoutacause).But,ifourmetaphysicalconclusionsarereachedonthebasisofwhatwefindconceivable,whatwecanenvisage,whataccountcanwegiveofhowtheseconclusionscometoconformtotheworld?Kant26Ibid.27Hegel,ScienceofLogic,p.49(Werke,V,p.43).28Cf.Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,B3.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism145arguedthatitisunsatisfactorytoofferasanexplanationsomesortofpreestablishedharmonybetweenthelimitsofwhatwefindconceiv-ableandthelimitsofhowthingscanbe,asifGodorsome“thirdthing”ensuredthattheformercorrespondtothelatter,becausethisleavesopenthequestionofwhyGodshouldhavearrangedthingsthisway,andwhyweshouldexpecthimtocontinuetodoso.29Rather,Kantargued,wemustmakethe“Copernicanturn”,andacceptthatitisbecausethingsmustconformtoourconceptualstructuresthatthelimitsofthelattercantellusaboutthelimitsoftheformer(althoughthisknowledgeonlyextendsasfarasthingsastheyappearwithinthosestructures,nottothingsastheyareinthemselves).So,ifHegelistoclaimthathisLogicisametaphysics,doesn’thehavetoexplainthisinantirealistterms?However,itisnotclearthatthemetaphysicianneedfeelobligedtoacceptthisKantianwayout,becausehemaynotfeelcompelledtoacceptthetermsinwhichtheproblemisposedinthefirstplace.For,thisrestsontheassumptionthatwhenweacceptametaphysicalpropositiononthebasisofourinabilitytoconceiveofitsnegation,thereissomespecialdifficulty,whichisthatwearemovingfromthelimitsofourthoughttothelimitsoftheworld.Butthisassumes,Hegelwouldargue,thatinmetaphysicalthinkingwearelimningthelimitsofwhatwecanconceiveratherthanwhatisconceivableassuch.Butcanweacceptthisrestriction,unlesswecanmakemoresenseoftherebeingotherwaysofconceivingthingsthanKantcanproperlyallow?For,thereisadilemmaherefortheKantian:Eitherhearguesthatitisbecauseofthelimitsonwhatwecanconceivethatwefindsomewaysofbeingtobeunthinkable,whereheconvincesusthatthisisreallydowntosomefactaboutus–butthenwhywouldwesticktothemodalclaimandnotratherabandonit?Orheconvincesustostaywiththemodalclaim,byarguingthatitisimpossible,ingeneral(notjustforus),toconceiveofthingsanyotherway:butthenifallmindsmustthinkin29TheseedsofthisdissatisfactioncanbefoundinthefamouslettertoMarcusHerzof21February1772;andforlaterexpressionsofthepointsee,forexample,CritiqueofPureReason,B167andProlegomenatoAnyFutureMetaphysics,§36.Cf.alsoJohnStuartMill,CollectedWorksofJohnStuartMill,editedbyJohnM.Robson(LondonandToronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,1963),IX,p.68:“evenassumingthatinconceivabilityisnotsolelytheresultoflimitedexperience,butthatsomeincapacitiesofconceivingareinherentinthemind,andinseparablefromit;thiswouldnotentitleustoinfer,thatwhatwearethusincapableofconceivingcannotexist.Suchaninferencewouldonlybewarrantable,ifwecouldknowapriorithatwemusthavebeencreatedcapableofconceivingwhateveriscapableofexisting:thattheuniverseofthoughtandthatofreality,theMicrocosmandtheMacrocosm(asoncetheywerecalled)musthavebeenframedincompletecorrespondencewithoneanother....”DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n146robertsternthisway,andthereisnowayofconceivingtheworlddifferently,isn’tthisnowanextraordinaryfact,thebestexplanationforwhichliesintheimpossibilityofthingsbeinganyotherway,therebyprovidinganargumentforrealismratherthanantirealism?Asaresult,wecannowseewhyHegelmightsaythat“logic”,as“thescienceofthingsgraspedinthought”,coincideswith“metaphysics”,whichhasbeen“takentoexpresstheessentialitiesofthethings”.30Wehavefound,therefore,thatthereareinterpretativeandphilosoph-icalreasonstobedoubtfulaboutPippin’saccountofHegel’sidealism:Hegel’stextssuggesthedidnotfeelcompelledbyKant’sargumentstotakeanantirealistturninmetaphysics,andtheargumentsthattheKantianmightgivetomakethisseemnecessarycanbereasonablyresisted.WecannowproceedbylookingatotherwaysofunderstandingHegel’sidealism.ii.hegelasamentalisticidealistAswehaveseen,Pippin’streatmentofHegel’sidealismwasinpartareactionagainstotheraccountsthathetakestoraiseAmeriks’concernof“extravagance”,whichtreatHegelasanidealistinthesenseofa“spiritmonist”,“whobelievedthatfiniteobjectsdidnot‘really’exist(onlytheAbsoluteIdeaexists),[and]thatthisOnewasnota‘substance’buta‘subject,’ormental”.31ToPippinandothers,thiskindofidealismappearstobeareturntothe“metaphysicsofthe‘beyond’”,whichtreatstheabsolutemindasthetranscendentcauseorgroundoftheworld,inathoroughlyprecriticalmanner;theyargueweshouldthereforehesitatebeforeattributingthispositiontoHegel.Now,onewaytorespondtothischargeofprecritical“extravagance”mightbetotrytolicenseHegel’spositionasanaturalextensionofKant’s,andthustoclaimthatthisinterpretation(likePippin’s)alsobuildsonHegel’sKantianheritage,butinawaythatisclosertofull-bloodedmentalisticorBerkeleyanidealismthanantirealism.Thus,accordingtotheseinterpretationsofHegel’sidealism,Kantheldthattheempiricalworld–everythinginspaceandtime–ismind-dependent,sothattheworldasweknowitisnothingbutanappearance.How-ever,Kantretainedaresidualelementofrealisminhisconceptionofthings-in-themselves[noumena],whichexistindependentofourmindsandoutsidetheboundariesofourknowledge.ItisarguedthatHegelthencametorejectthisrealismasincoherent,andsoradicalizedKant’smentalisticidealism,therebyarrivingatthedoctrineofanabsolute30Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§24,p.56(Werke,VIII,p.81).31Pippin,Hegel’sIdealism,p.4.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism147mind,inwhichallrealityiscontainedastheexperienceofasupra-individualsubject.Onthisaccount,then,Hegelisanidealistinthesensethathetreatstheworldasthoroughlymind-dependent,atrans-formationofKant’smerely“subjective”idealismintoaformofabsoluteidealism.32However,onedifficultywiththisapproach,isthatinordertoclaimthatthiskindofHegelianidealismisanextensionofKant’s,itisnec-essarytobeginwithamentalisticaccountofKant’sidealism,whichisitselfproblematicbecauseitignoresthefullcomplexityofKant’stalkof“appearances”and“things-in-themselves”andhisdistinctionbetweenempiricalrealismandtranscendentalidealism.Thus,ifitisclaimedthatHegelderivedhisidealismfromaBerkeleyanreadingofKant,itwillseem,tomany,thatthispositionisfoundedonasimplisticmisun-derstandingofKantianism,andonethatwenolongerhaveanyreasontotakeseriously.3332ForinterpretationsofHegelalongtheselines,seethefollowing:RobertC.Solomon,ContinentalPhilosophysince1750(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1988),p.57:“ThedialecticisnotsomuchamethodasitisthecentralideaofHegel’sphilosophy,anditspurpose,ineachofhisworks,istodemonstratetheulti-matenecessityofanall-encompassingacceptanceoftheselfasabsolute–whichHegelcalls‘Spirit’(Geist)s...[Hegel]acceptedthegeneralmoveofKant’sfirstCritique,regardingobjectsasbeingconstitutedbyconsciousness,buthealsosawthemanifestabsurdityofmakingthisanindividualmatter,asifeachofuscreateshisorherownworld;itisconsciousnessingeneralthatdoesthis,collectivelyandnotindividually,throughthesharedaspectsofaculture,asociety,andaboveallthroughasharedlanguage”;PeterSinger,Hegel(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1983),pp.72–73:“Hegelrejectstheviewthattherearecountlessdifferent‘reali-ties’correspondingtothecountlessdifferentmindsthatexist.Hecallsthisformofidealismabsoluteidealismtodistinguishitfromsubjectiveidealism.ForHegelthereisonlyonereality,because,ultimately,thereisonlyoneminds...[Hegel]needstheconceptionofacollectiveoruniversalmindnotonlytoavoidasub-jectiveformofidealism,butalsotomakegoodhisvisionofmindcomingtoseeallofrealityasitsowncreation”;WilliamH.Walsh,“SubjectiveandObjectiveIdealism”,inDieterHenrich,ed.,KantoderHegel(Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta,1983),pp.83–98,atp.95:“[Hegel]wantedtoarguethatthingsarenotjustcolouredorinformedbymind,butpenetratedandconstitutedbyit...Toputitcrudely,mindcouldknowtheworldbecausetheworldwasmindwritlarge”.33Cf.ArthurW.Collins,PossibleExperience:UnderstandingKant’sCritiqueofPureReason(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1999),p.25:“ThethingsthatKantsaysprominentlyandrepeatedlyaboutspaceandtimeandappearances...makeiteasytounderstandhowhisprincipalGermansuccessorscouldhavetakenhistranscendentalidealismtobeanidealistphilosophyliketheirown.Buttheyarenonethelessmistaken.ThustheGermanidealistsareamongthosewho,inanessentiallyCartesianspirit,equateKant’ssubjectivismwithidealismandimaginethatheascribesamentalstatustoobjectsinsofarashesaysthattheyare,asappearances,irreduciblysubjective”.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n148robertsternAswellastheissueof“extravagance”,thereare,moreover,textualreasonstoresistthisaccountasareadingofHegel.For,thisaccountseemstomisunderstandHegel’snotionof“absolutemind”,whichismindthatisableto“freeitselffromtheconnectionwithsomethingwhichisforitanOther”,where“[t]oattainthis,mindmustliberatetheintrinsicallyrationalobjectfromtheformofcontingency,single-ness,andexternalitywhichatfirstclingstoit”.34Thus,mindforHegelbecomesabsolutewhenitfindsitself“athomeintheworld”,andthusisabletomaketheworldintelligibletoitself;butthisconceptioninnowayentailsthatasabsolute,mindsomehow“contains”orconsti-tutestheworld,andsoinvolvestreatingthelatterasdependentontheformerinanymentalisticsense.Hegelwouldseemtorejectjustthisposition,whenatonepointinhislectureshecharacterizesas“spiritu-alism”theviewwhichholdsthat“spiritiswhatisindependent,true,thatnatureisonlyanappearanceofspirit,notinandforitself,nottrulyreal”,andcommentsofthisviewthatitwouldbe“utterfoolishnesstodenyits[nature’s]reality”.35Andofcourse,insystematicterms,thefactthatNaturecomesbeforeSpiritcreatesdifficultiesforthementalisticreading.Butsurely,itmightbeargued,howcanHegelbesoconfidentthattheKantian(orthescepticalrealist)iswrongtotalkofthings-in-themselvesasoutsideourcognitivecapacities,unlesshehasbroughttheworld“within”themindandsocollapsedthedistinction?Toexcludetalkof“things-in-themselves”,doesn’tHegelhavetobelievehehassomesortofguaranteethatthemindwillconformtotheworld,andisn’ttheonlywaytoprovidethatguaranteesomesortofmentalisticidealism?36Itisnotclear,however,thatthiskindofguaranteeissomethingthatHegelneededorsought,andthusthathefeltthiskindofmoti-vationtowardsmentalisticidealism.For,Hegel’sobjectiontoKant’s34G.W.F.Hegel,Hegel’sPhilosophyofMind:PartThreeoftheEncyclopaediaofthePhilosophicalSciences,trans.byWilliamWallaceandA.V.Miller(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1971),§441addition,p.182(Werke,X,p.233).35G.W.F.Hegel,VorlesungenuberdiePhilosophiedesGeistes.Berlin1827/1828,¨NachgescriebenvonJohannEduardErdmannundFerdinandWalter,ed.byFranzHespeandBurkhardTuschling(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1994),p.17.Itshouldbesaid,however,thatpassagescanbefoundwhichareclosertothetraditionalreading:cf.Hegel,PhilosophyofMind,§448addition,p.198(Werke,X,p.253):“Butwhenwesaidthatwhatissensedreceivesfromtheintuitingmindtheformofthespatialandtemporal,thisstatementmustnotbeunderstoodtomeanthatspaceandtimeareonlysubjectiveforms.ThisiswhatKantwantedtomakethem.Butthingsareintruththemselvesspatialandtemporal;thisdoubleformofassundernessisnotone-sidedlygiventhembyourintuition,buthasbeenoriginallyimpartedtothembytheintrinsicallyinfinitemind,bythecreativeeternalIdea”.36Cf.Singer,Hegel,pp.70–71.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism149conceptionof“things-in-themselves”isthatitsetsupanabsolutelimittoourcognitivecapacities,tellingusthatthegapbetweenmindandworldcannotbebridged;buthowcansuchapositiveclaimbemade,unlesssomethingisalreadyknownabouttheworldontheothersideofthegap?Thedifficultyisthatthislookslikeaformofskepticismthatisnonethelessbasedonametaphysicalclaimaboutwhatissupposedtobeunknowable,andwhichcanbeansweredbypointingoutthisinco-herence.Or,ifKantrefusestomakeanysuchmetaphysicalclaim,howcanhisblockonourinquiriesbemotivated,asnothingcannowbesaidaboutwhatitiswedonotknow?37However,inremovingtheskepticalworryhere,Hegelisnottherebycommittinghimselftotheoppositeview,thatknowledgeoftheworldisguaranteed,andthatbeforewesetoutinourinquiries,wecanbesuretheywillsucceed;heisjustobjectingtoanyattempttosetanabsolutebarriertothatinquiryattheoutset.38Ourresponseherethusparallelstheresponseweofferedtothesimilarworryintheprevioussection:justaswefoundtherenoreasontothinkHegel’sepistemicoptimismrequiresacommitmenttoantire-alism,soherewehavefounditalsodoesn’trequireanycommitmenttomentalisticidealism.WehavethusfoundreasontoacceptAmeriks’criticalclaimsregard-ingthiskindofidealismasareadingofHegel:notonlyisit“extrava-gant”andsoobjectionableonthatscore,butitisalsotextuallyunwar-ranted,asAmeriksalsorecognizes.3937Cf.Hegel,ScienceofLogic,p.36(Werke,V,pp.25–26):“Thewayinwhichthecriticalphilosophyunderstandstherelationshipofthesethreetermsisthatweplaceourthoughtsasamediumbetweenourselvesandtheobjects,andthatthismediuminsteadofconnectinguswiththeobjectsrathercutsusofffromthem.Butthisviewcanbecounteredbythesimpleobservationthattheseverythingswhicharesupposedtostandbeyondusand,attheotherextreme,beyondthethoughtsreferringtothem,arethemselvesfigmentsofsubjectivethought,andaswhollyindeterminatetheyareonlyasinglethought-thing–theso-calledthing-in-itselfofemptyabstraction.”Cf.alsoHegel,TheEncyclopaediaLogic,§44,p.87(Werke,VIII,pp.120–121),andHegel,PhenomenologyofSpirit,pp.46–48(Werke,III,68–70).38ItmightbearguedonKant’sbehalfthatitmischaracterizetheKantianpositiontodescribeitintheseterms,asthelimitsKantclaimstodiscernarenotsetinadvance,butthrougharecognitionoftheintractabledifficultiesfacedbyourinquiriesintocertainmetaphysicalquestions;buthere,ofcourse,HegelismoreoptimisticthanKantoverourcapacitytoresolvethesequestions,andsowouldalsorejectthisKantianmotivationforscepticismasungroundedandpremature.Forfurtherdiscussionofthisissue,seeRobertStern,HegelandthePhenomenologyofSpirit(London:Routledge,2002),pp.36–41.39KarlAmeriks,“Introduction:InterpretingGermanIdealism”,inKarlAmeriks,ed.,TheCambridgeCompaniontoGermanIdealism(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),pp.1–17,esp.pp.7–10.ForamoredetaileddiscussionthatDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n150robertsterniii.hegelandtheidealismofthefiniteInthefaceoftheseexegeticaldifficulties,itistemptingtoreturntoHegel’sownwritings,andlookthereatwhatHegelsaysaboutidealismasaphilosophicaldoctrine,andseehowthisrelatestohisownposition.ThisisastrategyAmeriksalsotries,buthethinksiteitherleadsusbackinto“extravagance”,orintothethirdofhisinterpretativevices,namely,“triviality”.IfonelooksatthewayinwhichHegelhimselfcharacterizesideal-ism,theresultsarecertainlystriking.Hereisonepassagewherethecharacterizationseemsclear:40Thepropositionthatthefiniteisideal[ideell]constitutesidealism.Theidealismofphilosophyconsistsinnothingelsethaninrecognizingthatthefinitehasnoveritablebeing[wahrhaftSeiendes].Everyphilosophyisessentiallyanidealism,oratleasthasidealismforitsprinciple,andthequestionthenishowfarthisprincipleisactuallycarriedout.Thisisastrueofphilosophyasofreligion;forreligionequallydoesnotrecognizefinitudeasaveritablebeing[einwahrhaftesSein],assomethingultimateandabsoluteorassomethingunderived,uncreated,eternal.Consequentlytheoppositionofidealisticandrealisticphilosophyhasnosignificance.Aphilosophywhichascribedveritable,ultimate,absolutebeingtofiniteexistencesassuch,wouldnotdeservethenameofphilosophy;theprinci-plesofancientormodernphilosophies,water,ormatter,oratomsarethoughts,universals,idealentities,notthingsastheyimmediatelypresentthemselvestous,thatis,intheirsensuousindividuality–noteventhewaterofThales.Foralthoughthisisalsoempiricalwater,itisatthesametimealsothein-itselforessenceofallotherthings,too,andtheseotherthingsarenotself-subsistentorgroundedinthemselves,butarepositedby,arederivedfrom,another,fromwater,thatistheyareidealentities.41countersanymentalisticconceptionofGermanIdealismgenerally,butwhichdoesnotincludeanyextendeddiscussionofHegelhimself,seeFrederickC.Beiser,GermanIdealism:TheStruggleAgainstSubjectivism1781–1801(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2002).40Pippinhasarguedthatweshouldnotreadtoomuchintothispassage,becauseitscontextisalimitedone,insofarashere“Hegelis...quiteself-consciouslyappropriatingthelanguageofapre-criticalmetaphysicsandmakinghispointinpassingwithintheassumptionsofsuchaframework...Ingeneral,dippingontoBookOneoftheLogicfor‘definitions’ofwhatHegelmeansby‘idealism’...andsoforthisveryunwise”(Pippin,“Hegel’sOriginalInsight”,p.289,note6).However,asweshallsee,thisisbynomeanstheonlyplacewithinthesystemwhereHegeluses“idealism”,“ideal”,andsooninthewaysuggestedinthispassage,andinfactthisuseturnsouttobefairlytypicalthroughoutHegel’sworks;soPippin’swarningseemsmisplaced.41Hegel,ScienceofLogic,pp.154–155(Werke,V,p.172).ForanequivalentpassageintheEncyclopaediaLogic,see§95,p.152(Werke,VIII,p.203):“[F]initude...isunderthedeterminationofrealityatfirst.ButthetruthofthefiniteisratherDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism151CananythingbegainedinourunderstandingofHegel’sidealismbyconsideringpassagessuchasthese?Amerikscautionsagainstoptimismhere,becausehethinkthatbytakingthispassageatfacevalue,wewillendupmakingHegel’sideal-ismmerelytrivial,asHegelseemstobesayingonlythat“immediateappearancespointtosomethingelse,somenon-immediatethingsorrelations”:“Thealternativetoidealism[inthissense]issuchastrawmanthatheretherealissuebecomessimplywhatspecificvarietyofide-alismoneshoulddevelop”.42ThechargeoftrivialityarisesifbyidealismHegelmerelymeansthattheworldasitpresentsitselfimmediatelytothesensesisnothowtheworldactuallyis,sothattheformercannotbeascribedanyultimatetruth–the“booming,buzzingconfusion”ofmeresensibleexperienceisnotaveridicalrepresentationofreality(assuming,indeed,thatthisnotionofexperienceisevencoherent).Now,itwouldcertainlyseemrightthatifthisisallthatHegelissay-inghere,Amerikscanjustifiablyarguethatheisnotsayingverymuch.But,inclaimingthat“finiteexistences”lack“veritable,ultimate,abso-lutebeing”,Hegelwouldappeartobetalkingnotabouttheephemeralphenomenapresentedtousinsensation,butordinaryconcreteobjects,suchasthistable,thistree,andsoon;43Ameriksisthereforewrongtoidentify“immediateappearances”withtheformerandnotthelatter.ThereisthusenoughinHegel’spositionheretoovercomethechargeoftriviality,ifwetakehis“finiteexistences”tobeconcreteindividualobjectsandnotjustsensoryappearances.However,Ameriksarguesthatifwetrytoescapetrivialityinthisway,weexposeHegeltotheoppositedanger,whichisextravagance.ItisthethreatofthisdangerthatInowwishtoexplore,asitarisesfromdifferentreadingsofthispassage.Onereadingofthepassage,whichwouldreturnustothekindofextravagantpositiondiscussedintheprevioussection,wouldbetotakeHegelheretobecharacterizingidealisminmentalisticterms,asclaim-ingthat“thefinitehasnoveritablebeing”becausefiniteexistencesquaitsideality...Thisidealityofthefiniteisthemostimportantpropositionofphilosophy,andforthatreasoneverygenuinephilosophyisIdealism”.42Ameriks,“HegelandIdealism”,pp.387–388.43Cf.G.W.F.Hegel,ElementofthePhilosophyofRight,trans.byH.B.Nisbet(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991),§44addition,p.76(Werke,VIII,p.107):“Thefreewillisconsequentlythatidealismwhichdoesnotconsiderthings[Dinge],astheyare,tobeinandforthemselves,whereasrealismdeclaresthemtobeabsolute,eveniftheyarefoundonlyintheformoffinitude.Eventheanimalhasgonebeyondthisrealistphilosophy,foritconsumesthings[Dinge]andtherebyprovesthattheyarenotabsolutelyself-sufficient”.Cf.alsoHegel,PhenomenologyofSpirit,p.65(Werke,III,p.91).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n152robertsternindividualobjectsaredependentonanabsolutemind.But,infactthischargeofextravaganceisobviouslymisplaced,asinrealitythispassagecountsagainstamentalisticconceptionofHegel’sidealism.For,wecanseeherethatHegeldidnotmeananythingmentalisticbyidealism,becauseifhedid,itwouldsurelyhavebeenanabsurdexaggerationtosaythat“[e]veryphilosophyisessentiallyanidealism”,asmentalis-ticidealismisapositionheldbyfewphilosophers,andnotbythoseclassicalphilosophersdirectlyandindirectlyreferredtohere,suchasThales,Leucippus,DemocritusandEmpedocles,nottomentionPlatoandAristotle.Hegelclearlyrecognizedthis,44andsoishardlylikelytohaveclaimedthat“[e]veryphilosophyisessentiallyanidealism”ifthisiswhathemeantbytheposition.AnotherreadingofthepassageseesHegelasofferingapictureofide-alismherenotasmentalistic,butasholistic.45Onthisaccount,Hegelclaimsthatfiniteentitiesdonothave“veritable,ultimate,absolutebeing”becausetheyaredependentonotherentitiesfortheirexistenceinthewaythatpartsaredependentonotherpartswithinawhole;andidealismconsistsinrecognizingthisrelatednessbetweenthings,inawaythatordinaryconsciousnessfailstodo.46Theidealistthusseesthe44Hegel,LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,II,pp.43–44(Werke,XIX,pp.54–55):“[T]heidealismofPlatomustnotbethoughtofasbeingsubjectiveidealism,andasthatfalseidealismwhichhasmadeitsappearanceinmoderntimes,andwhichmaintainsthatwedonotlearnanything,arenotinfluencedfromwithout,butthatallconceptionsarederivedfromoutofthesubject.Itisoftensaidthatidealismmeansthattheindividualproducesfromhimselfallhisideas,eventhemostimmediate.Butthisisanunhistoric,andquitefalseconception;ifwetakethisrudedefinitionofidealism,therehavebeennoidealistsamongstthephilosophers,andPlatonicidealismiscertainlyfarremovedfromanythingofthiskind”.45Cf.KennethR.Westphal,Hegel’sEpistemologicalRealism(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,1989),p.143:“Hegel’sidealismisthusanontologicalthe-sis,athesisconcerningtheinterdependenceofeverythingthereis,andthusisquiterightlycontrastedwithepistemologicallybasedsubjectiveidealism”,andhis“Hegel’sAttitudetowardJacobi”in“TheThirdAttitudeofThoughtTowardObjectivity”,SouthernJournalofPhilosophy,27(1989),pp.135–156,atp.146:“ThebasicmodelofHegel’sontologyisaradicalontologicalholism”.Cf.alsoThomasE.Wartenberg,“Hegel’sIdealism:TheLogicofConceptuality”,inFred-erickC.Beiser,ed.,TheCambridgeCompaniontoHegel.(Cambridge,UK:Cam-bridgeUniversityPress,1993),pp.102–29atp.107:“[Hegel’s]mannerofcharacter-izinghisidealismemphasizesthatitisaformofholism.Accordingtothisview,individualsaremerepartsandthusarenotfullyrealorindependent”.46Cf.Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§45addition,p.88(Werke,VIII,p.122):“Forourordinaryconsciousness(i.e.,theconsciousnessatthelevelofsense-perceptionandunderstanding)theobjectsthatitknowscountasself-standingandasself-foundedintheirisolationfromoneanother;andwhentheyprovetoberelatedtoeachother,andconditionedbyoneanother,theirmutualdependenceupononeanotherisregardedassomethingexternaltotheobject,andnotasbelongingDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism153worlddifferentlyfromtherealist,notasapluralityofseparateentitiesthatare“self-subsistentorgroundedinthemselves”,butaspartsofaninterconnectedtotalityinwhichtheseentitiesaredependentontheirplacewithinthewhole.Itturnsout,then,thatidealismforHegelispri-marilyanontologicalposition,whichholdsthatthethingsofordinaryexperienceareidealinthesensethattheyhavenobeingintheirownright,andsolacktheself-sufficiencyandself-subsistencerequiredtobefullyreal.Now,thisisanaccountofHegel’sidealismthatAmeriksalsoconsid-ers,butdismissesonthegroundsofextravagance.For,ifHegelistakentobesuggestingthatfiniteexistenceslack“veritable,ultimate,absolutebeing”,itmayseemheisbasingthisontheclaimtohavefoundacandi-dateforabsolutestatuselsewhere–inthe“world-whole”,whichas“aself-standing,self-realizingstructure”constitutesalimittoexplanationinthewaynofiniteentitycan,becauseasatotality“thereisnothingelseitcoulddependon”.47Butifitinvolvestheorizingabouttheworld-wholeinthisway,itmayappearthatHegel’sidealismisguiltyofjustthekindofpre-KantianmetaphysicalirresponsibilitythatPippinandothershavesoughttoescape.48Ascontemporaryphilosophers,itcouldbeargued,weshouldtreatthisprojectwithcaution.49Itisnotclear,however,thatthisaccountofHegel’sidealismshouldbedismissedonthesegrounds,becausenotallformsofholismofthiskindneedbeseenasextravagant,atleastfromaKantianperspective.For,whilesuchatheorywillrequiretheabandonmentofapurelytotheirnature.Itmustcertainlybemaintainedagainstthisthattheobjectsofwhichwehaveimmediateknowledgearemereappearances,i.e.,theydonothavethegroundoftheirbeingwithinthemselves,butwithinsomethingelse.”Cf.alsoPhilosophyofMind,§420addition,pp.161–162(Werke,X,p.209);translationmodified:“Althoughperceptionstartsfromtheobservationofsensuousmaterialsitdoesnotstopatthese,doesnotconfineitselfsimplytosmelling,tasting,seeing,hearing,andfeeling(touching),butnecessarilygoesontorelatethesensuoustotheuniversalwhichisnotobservableinanimmediatemanner,tocognizeeachthingasinitselfaconnectedness:inforce,forexample,tocomprehendallitsmanifestations;andtoseekouttheconnectionsandmediationsthatexistbetweenseparateindividualthings.Whilethereforethemerelysensuousconsciousnessmerelyshowsthings,thatistosay,exhibitsthemintheirimmediacy,perception,ontheotherhand,apprehendstheconnectednessofthings,demonstratesthatwhensuchandsuchcircumstancesarepresentsuchandsuchathingfollows,andthusbeginstodemonstratethetruthofthings”.47WillemA.deVries,Hegel’sTheoryofMentalActivity(IthacaandLondon:CornellUniversityPress,1988),pp.13,15.48Cf.Ameriks,“HegelandIdealism”,p.397.49Cf.deVries,Hegel’sTheoryofMentalAcitivity,p.13:“WehavetobeextremelysuspiciousofHegel’sratherdogmaticbeliefthattheworld-wholedoesformaunitarytotality”.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n154robertsternnaturalisticexplanatoryframework,whichissuspiciousofexplana-tionswhichhaveglobalscopeandhaveareflexiveor“free-standing”structure,thisabandonmentisarguablyalreadyafeatureofKant’stran-scendentalturn,wheretheaimis(asDavidBellhasputit),topro-videa“genuinelyself-subsistent,self-warrantingframeworkofexpla-nation”.50WherethetheorywouldbecomeobjectionableinKantianterms,wouldbeifitledtoatranscendentclaim,andsotoaformofexplanationbasedonappealtosomemetaphysicalgroundoutsideorbeyondtheempiricalworld–forexample,aself-positinginfiniteAbso-lutethatgivesrisetofiniteexistentsastheircreator.ButitseemsclearthataproponentofHegelasanholistic,absolute-theoristcouldplau-siblyclaimthatHegel’saimwastoavoidanytranscendenceofthiskind,51whilenonethelessholdingthattheworld-wholeconstitutesasatisfactorylimittoexplanation;soproponentsofthisreadingwillchar-acteristicallyarguethatHegel’spositionwasdesignedtoshowthattheworldisakindoftotalitythatmakesnotionsof“cause”and“ground”inapplicableatthislevel,ratherthantobringtheregressofexplanationtoanendbypositingatranscendentstarting-point.52Thus,theholisticstrategyisarguablytoclaimthatthepressuretowardstranscendenceonlyarisesbecauseweareoperatingwithanincompletepictureoftheworldwhichdrivesusintoaregressofexplanationswhichthistranscen-dentfirstcauseisthendesignedtoblock;butonceweseetheworldasatotalityinitself,nosuchtranscendentanswertothequestionofexpla-nationwillbeneeded.Theaimofthisapproach,then,is“toarticulateanalternativevisionofreality–andnotavisionofsomealternative50DavidBell,“TranscendentalArgumentsandNon-NaturalisticAnti-Realism”,inRobertStern,ed.,TranscendentalArguments:ProblemsandProspects(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999),pp.189–210,atp.199;seealsoDavidBell,“IsEmpiricalRealismCompatibleWithTranscendentalIdealism?”,inRalphSchumacher,ed.,IdealismusalsTheoriederReprasentation?¨(Paderborn:Mentis,2001),pp.167–180.51Cf.Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§94addition,p.150(Werke,VIII,p.200):“Philoso-phydoesnotwastetimewithsuchemptyandotherworldlystuff.Whatphilosophyhastodowithisalwayssomethingconcreteandstrictlypresent”.52Cf.G.W.F.Hegel,Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature:PartTwooftheEncyclopae-diaofthePhilosophicalSciences,trans.byMichaelJohnPetry,3vols.(London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin,1970),§247addition,I,p.208(Werke,IX,pp.26–27),translationmodified:“Toourordinarythinking[Vorstellung],theworldismerelyacollectionoffinitudes[Endlichkeiten],butifgraspedasuniversal,asatotal-ity,thequestionofabeginningatoncedisappears”.Forfurtherdiscussionofthis“negative”strategy,which(Iclaim)canalsobefoundintheworkofsomeoftheBritishIdealistswhocommentedonHegel,seeRobertStern,“BritishHegelianism:ANon-MetaphysicalView?”,EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy,2(1994),pp.293–321.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism155reality”,53sothatfarfrombeingaformofpre-Kantianmetaphysicsthattriestoclaimaccesstosomeextramundaneabsolute,Hegel’sidealismisaformofabsolute-theorythatcanbetreatedasinlinewiththetran-scendentalturn,ofgivingusaconceptionoftheworldthatwillshowhowtheneedforexplanationcanbesatisfiedwithoutgoingbeyondit.However,evenifitisrighttosaythatholismcanbethoughtofasanoptionthatfollowsnotjustfrommetaphysicalextravaganceonHegel’spart,butfromaconcernwiththelimitsofnaturalisticexplanationthatwasalsosharedbyKant,thesuspicionmaynonethelessberaisedthatHegelgoesfurtherherethanKantwouldallow,inthatKantdidnotwanthis“alternativevisionofreality”toundercutourordinary,“empirical”,conceptionoftheworld,54whileHegel’sformofholismbycontrastthreatenstoundermineitcompletely.For,itisoftenheldthatHegel’sholismisSpinozistic,andbasedaroundtheprinciplethat“omnisdeterminatioestnegatio”[“alldeterminationisnegation”],55understoodastheideathateverythingdependsonitsdifferencefromotherthingstobeitself.Ifthisisso,itmayappearthatthestatusofindividualswithinthisholismislost:foraconsequenceseemstobethatnothinghasanyintrinsicpropertiesaseachiswhatitisthroughitsrelationtoothers,sothereareonlyrelationalproperties,andinsuchapurelyrelationalsystem,howcantherelatabesaidtobeentitiesintheirownright,eventotheextentofbeingparts–sothatintheend,thewholebecomestheOne.56Byposingathreattothestatusof53Bell,“IsEmpiricalRealismCompatibleWithTranscendentalIdealism?”,p.177.54Cf.ibid,p.177:“Ifthegoalofatranscendentaltheoryistoarticulateanalternativevisionofreality–andnotavisionofsomealternativereality–thenclearlyitisaconditionofsuccessthattheremustbesomesenseinwhichthenotionofrealityremainsconstantthroughout.Theremust,thatis,beasenseinwhich‘philosophyleaveseverythingasitis,’inwhichit‘leavestheworldalone’andrefrains,say,fromcontestingthefindingsofnaturalscienceasifthosefindingsweresimplyfalse”.55Cf.Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§91addition,p.147(Werke,VIII,pp.196–197).Aswashiswont,HegelwasslightlymisquotingSpinozahere;inhisLetter50(toJarigJelles,2June1674),Spinozawrites“determinationegatioest”.SeeOnTheImprovementoftheUnderstanding,TheEthics,Correspondence,transbyR.H.M.Elwes(NewYork:DoverPublications,1955),p.370:“Thisdetermination[i.e.figure]thereforedoesnotappertaintothethingaccordingtoitsbeing,but,onthecontrary,isitsnonbeing.Asthenfigureisnothingelsethandetermination,anddeterminationisnegation,figure,ashasbeensaid,canbenothingbutnegation”.WhetherHegelisrighttointerpretSpinoza’sremarksinthewayhedoescanbequestioned:seePierreMacherey,HegelouSpinoza,2ndedn.(Paris:EditionsLa´Decouverte,´1990),ch.4.56ThisconcernwasraisedbyJacobi,inhiscriticaldiscussionofSpinozathat(inad-vertently)didsomuchtointroduceSpinozaintothethinkingoftheperiod.SeeF.H.Jacobi,ConcerningtheDoctrineofSpinozainLetterstoHerrMosesMendelssohn,DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n156robertsternindividualsinthismanner,Hegel’sholismmayappeartoberevisionaryinawaythatKantclaimedhisidealismwasnot(aswellashavingtroublingethicalconsequences,ofthesortalsosometimesattributedtohim,concerningthelowmoralvalueofindividualitywithinHegel’ssystem).Now,therearepossiblerepliesthatmightbegiventothiskindofconcernfromtheperspectiveofaholisticreadingofHegel,suchasquestioningwhetherthiscanindeedbederivedfromtheideaofdeter-minationthroughnegation,ortheassumptionthatevenifthismeanstherearerelations“allthewaydown”,thisleavesnoroomforindivid-uals.However,anotherresponseistoquestiontheholisticreadingasanaccurateaccountofHegel’sposition.For,infact,thisreadingsuffersfromatextualdifficulty,whichcanbeexplainedasfollows.Thepas-sagewearediscussingcomesaspartofa“Remark”appendedtothesecondchapterofBookIoftheScienceofLogic,wherethischapterisdividedintoanaccountof“DeterminateBeing(Dasein)assuch”,“Finitude”and“Infinity”,sothatthepassageformspartofasequeltoHegel’sdiscussionoftherelationbetweenthefiniteandtheinfinite.Thisisimportant,becauseitstronglysuggeststhatwhenHegelwritesthatfinitethingslack“veritablebeing”andsoareidealbecausenot“self-sufficientorgroundedinthemselves”,hedoesnotmeanthattheyarerelatedtootherfinitethings(asontheholisticreading),butratherthattheyarerelatedtotheinfinite,whichistheconclusionhehasbeentryingtoestablishinthepartofthechaptertowhichthisRemarkisappended.ImmediatelybeforetheRemark,Hegelmakesthisclearbysaying:“idealbeing[dasIdeelle]isthefiniteasitisinthetrueinfi-nite–asadetermination,acontent,whichisdistinctbutisnotanindependent,self-subsistentbeing,butonlyamoment”.57inTheMainPhilosophicalWritings,trans.byGeorgediGiovanni(MontrealandKingston:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,1994),p.220,whereJacobiglossesSpinoza’sremarkinLetter50asfollows:“Individualthings,therefore,sofarastheyonlyexistinacertaindeterminatemode,arenon-entia[non-entities];theindeterminateinfinitebeingistheonesingletrueensreale,hocest,estomneesse,&praeterquodnullumdaturesse[realbeing;itistheallofbeing,andapartfromitthereisnobeing]”.ThequotationinthelastpartofJacobi’sremarkcomesfromSpinoza’sOnTheImprovementoftheUnderstanding,p.29.57Hegel,ScienceofLogic,pp.149–150(Werke,V,p.165).Cf.alsoibid.,pp.151–152(Werke,V,p.168):“Theresolutionofthiscontradiction[thatfiniteandinfiniteareboththesameanddifferent]isnottherecognitionoftheequalcorrectnessandequaluncorrectnessofthetwoassertions–thisisonlyanotherformoftheabidingcontradiction–buttheidealityofboth,inwhichasdistinct,reciprocalnegations,theyareonlymoments...Inthisbeingwhichisthustheidealityofthedistinctmoments[offiniteandinfinite],thecontradictionhasnotvanishedabstractly,butDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism157ThatthiscontextisimportanttounderstandingHegel’sconceptionofidealismisequallyclearintheequivalentdiscussionintheEncy-clopaediaLogic,whereagainHegel’sstrikingclaimthat“everygen-uinephilosophyisidealism”ismadeinthecourseofhisdiscussionoftheconnectionbetweenthefiniteandtheinfinite.Herehearguesthatwhile“finitude...isunderthedeterminationofrealityatfirst”becausefinitethingsareseentohavetherealityof“being-there”orDasein,itnowbecomesclearthattheyarenotmerelyself-relatedbutcontaintheir“other”,wherethisotheristheinfinite,whichislikewiseessentiallyrelatedtothefiniteinarelationHegelcalls“being-for-itself”[Fursichsein¨],wherebytheoneis“sublated”[aufgehoben]intheother:Inbeing-for-itselfthedeterminationofidealityhasentered.Being-there,takenatfirstonlyaccordingtoitsbeingoritsaffirmation,hasreality(§91);andhencefinitude,too,isunderthedeterminationofrealityatfirst.Butthetruthofthefiniteisratheritsideality...Thisidealityofthefiniteisthemostimportantpropositionofphilosophy,andforthatreasoneverygenuinephilosophyisIdeal-ism.EverythingdependsonnotmistakingfortheInfinitethatwhichisatoncereducedinitsdeterminationtowhatisparticularandfinite.58ThedetailsofHegel’spositionandterminologyherearedifficult,butthebasicideaisfairlystraightforward:theinfinitecannotbe“beyond”thefiniteassomethingexternaltoit,asthiswouldbetolimittheinfiniteandthusmakeitfinite;theinfinitemustthereforebeincorporatedwithinthefiniteinsomeway,sothatthefiniteisnottobeviewedassimply“being-there”,butasrelatedtoits“other”whilepreservingitsdifferencefromitsotherandremainingfinite,sothatthedistinctionbetweentheonesideandtheotheris“sublated”,inHegel’ssenseofbeingboth“cancelled”and“preserved”.59Itwouldappearfromthis,then,thatwhatHegelmeansbyclaimingthatthefiniteisideal,isnotthatfinitethingsdependononeanotheraspartsofawhole(asontheholisticreading),butthatthesethingsstandinacomplexdialecticalrelationtotheinfinite.Now,atfirstsight,noneofthismayappeartohelpusmuchwiththeworrythatHegel’sidealismposesathreattothestatusofindividualsandsodoesnot“leavetheworldalone”inaproperlyKantianmanner;foritmaynowseemthatweareobligedtomovefromholismtomonismasanaccountofHegel’ssystem,andwhiletheformercanatleastinprincipleallowforthestatusofindividuals(evenifinHegel’shandsitseemsitisresolvedandreconciled,andthethoughtsarenotonlycomplete,buttheyarealsobroughttogether”.58Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§95,p.152(Werke,VIII,pp.202–203).59Cf.Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§96addition,p.154(Werke,VIII,pp.204–205)andScienceofLogic,pp.106–107(Werke,V,pp.113–114).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n158robertsternmightnot),monismcannotdosoeveninprinciple.For,whileholismstressesthedependenceoffinitethingsononeanother,initsmodestformitcanstillrespecttheindividualityoffinitethingsinsofaraspartscanbeindividuals,totheextentofhavingidentityconditionsthatmakeitintelligibletotreatapartasthesame,andsoaspersistingovertime;butmonismdeniestheindividualityoffinitethingsintheserespects,treatingthemas“accidents”or“modifications”or“appearances”ofaunifiedsubstanceorgroundorunderlyingrealitythattakesontheseforms,inthewaythatasinglepieceofpapermayhavemanywrinkles,orafacemayhavemanyexpressions,wherethepaperorthefaceconstituteindividualsofwhichthewrinklesandtheexpressionsaremodifications,lackinginanyofthecontinuityoridentityconditionsthatmakethemindividuals(e.g.itdoesn’tmakesensetoask“isthesmileyouhavegottodaythesameastheoneyouhadyesterday?”,whereasitdoesmakesensetoaskofalimbthathasbeensownbackontoabody“isthatthearmyouhadbefore,orsomeoneelse’s?”).60Whileofcoursemonismhashaditsphilosophicaldefenders,itisclearlymorerevisionaryofourcommon-senseontologythanamodestholism,andsowouldmakeHegel’sidealismproblematicinthesamewasasitwasontheearlierholisticreading,ifthisiswhatithasturnedouttoinvolve.Thequestionis,then,ifwetakeHegel’sidealismtoamounttotheclaimthatthefiniteandinfinitearedialecticallyrelated,doesthiscom-mitustogivingamonisticreadingofthisposition?Infact,Idonotbelievethisisso,forthiswouldbetooverlookthecomplexityofHegel’sthinkinghere.AsHegel’sdiscussionlaterintheLogicshows,heholdsthatcategorieslikesubstanceandaccidentorgroundandexistencecanbemisleadinginthekindofmetaphysicalpicturetheygiveriseto:butthisiswhathappensonthemonisticreading,wheretheinfiniteistreatedasifititselfmustbeaself-standingindividualorsubstance,andbecauseitcannotbeoneindividualamongstothers,thismeansthattheindividualityoffiniteexistentsistherebylost.Hegel’spreferredmodel,bycontrast,istothinkoffiniteexistentsasembodimentsoftheinfinite,butnotinawaythatrobsthemoftheirindividuality61–justasThalestooktheprincipleofeverythingtobewater,whichispermanentand60Thiswayofcharacterisingmonismistotreatitasananswertothequestionofhowmanyindividualsthereare(sometimescalled“substancemonism”),ratherthanasananswertothequestionofhowmanytypesorvarietiesofthingsthereare(sometimescalled“kindmonism”).61Thus,whilecommentingthat“tobeafollowerofSpinozaistheessentialcom-mencementofallPhilosophy”(Hegel,LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,III,p.257(Werke,XX,p.165)),HegelmakesitveryclearthathecouldnotacceptthemonismhefoundinSpinoza:“AsalldifferencesanddeterminationsofthingsandofconsciousnesssimplygobackintotheOnesubstance,onemaysaythatintheDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism159eternal,butwhichhasitsexistenceinindividualthings,whileDem-ocritusthoughtthesameofatomsandEmpedoclesofthefourmaterialelements.FromHegel’sperspective,therefore,thepictureoftheinfi-nite/finiterelationthatmightleadtoamonisticworryisreallybasedonasimplisticmodelofthatrelation,andonethathebelievedweoughtnottotakeup.62WecannowseewhyforHegel,apositionlikeThales’isidealisticinhissense,withhisdoctrinethat“theprincipleofalliswater”.Ontheonehand(atleastfollowingAristotle’saccount),Thalestreatedtheworldascontainingordinaryfiniteobjects,whileontheotherhand,herecognizedintheseobjectsaneternalandimperishablematerialsub-stance–water–whichconstitutestheseobjectsthroughaprocessofchange,asittakesonnewforms.Objectsarethustransientandperish-able,butinthistransiencewaterremainsaspermanentandunchang-ing,sothatthefinitecontainstheinfinitewithinit.Atthesametime,waterisrequiredtotakeonthesechangingmanifestationsaspartofitsnature:ithasnobeingsimplyaswater,sothatinthissensetheinfinitealsorequiresthefinite.Similarly,atomsormatteraretheinfi-nitecontainedwithinthefinite,asisalawwithinitsinstances,orauniversalwithinitsinstantiations.AllsuchpositionsareidealisticinHegel’ssense;andonceweseethis,wecanalsoseethatHegel’side-alismisneitherstraightforwardlyaformofmonismorholism,thoughitisrelatedtoboth.Hisidealismisnotmonisticinthesensewehavediscussed,becausethefiniteentitiesretaintheirstatusasindividuals,andarenotmereattributesofasinglesubstance.Andhisidealismisnotholistic,becausethefactthatafinitethingisconstitutedbysomething“ultimateandabsolute”,likewateroratoms,doesnotmakeitapartofawholewithothersuchthings,anymorethantwohousesthatarebothmadefrombricksaresorelated.However,whilethisshowsthatidealismforHegeldoesnotentailholism,itisnoaccidentthatHegelwilltalkofthepartsofawholeas“ideal”:63forHegelbelievedthatasystemofSpinozaallthingsaremerelycastdownintothisabyssofannihilation.Butfromthisabyssnothingcomesout”(ibid.,p.288(Werke,XX,p.166)).62Anotherroutefromholismtomonism,adoptedafterHegelbyF.H.Bradley,istoarguefromtheunrealityofrelationstothenonexistenceofanykindofpluralityofindividualthings,evenaspartswithinawhole:butthereisnoreasontothinkthatHegelwouldhaveendorsedthisargumenteither.Forfurtherdiscussion,seeRolf-PeterHorstmann,OntologieundRelationen:Hegel,Bradley,RussellunddieKontroverseuberinterneundexterneBeziehungen¨(Konigstein:Athen¨aum,¨1984).63See,forexample,G.W.F.Hegel,Hegel’sAesthetics:LecturesonFineArt,trans.byT.M.Knox,2vols.(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1975),I,p.120(Werke,XIII,pp.162–163):“Theprocessoflifecomprisesadoubleactivity:ontheonehand,thatofbringingsteadilyintoexistenceperceptiblytherealdifferencesofalltheDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n160robertsternproperpartmustbeseenasalimitedreflectionofthetotalitytowhichitbelongs,wherethisrelationmakesthewhole“infinite”inrelationtothepartsas“finite”.Thus,forexample,Hegeldescribesthestateas“infinitewithinitself”becauseitcanbeviewedholisticallyinthisway:“thisdividedwholeexhibitsafixedandenduringdeterminacywhichisnotdeadandunchangingbutcontinuestoproduceitselfinitsdis-solution”.64WecanthereforeseethatwhileidealisminHegel’ssensemaynotentailholism(cf.Thalesandtheancientatomists),nonethe-lessholismmayentailidealismforHegel,inthattobeapartistobealimitedaspectofatotality,aswhenthepartsofabodymanifestthelifeofthewhole,orthestateasaunityismanifestedinitsdifferentconstitutionalelements,muchinthewaymatterisrealizedthroughdifferentfiniteindividuals.Ofcourse,ametaphysicalpositionofthiskindisnotwithoutitsdif-ficulties;andHegeldoesnotattempttoworkthemthroughhere,atthestageoftheLogicwhichwehavebeendiscussing:rather,hegoesontodosointhethirdbookoftheLogic,inhis“DoctrineoftheConcept”.There,weareintroducedtothedialecticallyinterrelatedstructureofuniversality,particularityandindividuality,wherebyeachcategoryisseentoimplytheothers,sothattheConceptassuchformsaself-containedsystemthatabolishestheproblemofanexternal“ground”:for,anindividualisnomorethanaparticularizeduniversal(I[individual]amahumanbeing[universal]ofsuchandsuchaheight,weight,andsoon[particular]);particularizationisnomorethantheindividualizationoftheuniversal(myheight,weightetcpertaintomeasanindivid-ualhumanbeing,andnotasa“bareindividual”);andtheuniversalisdistinguishedfromotheruniversalsbythewayitisparticularizedintoindividuals(“humanbeing”differsfrom“lion”quauniversal,bythewayinwhichitbelongstoonegroupofdeterminateindividuals,membersandspecificcharacteristicsoftheorganism,but,ontheotherhand,thatofassertinginthemtheiruniversalideality(whichistheiranimation)iftheytrytopersistinindependentseverancefromoneanotherandisolatethemselvesinfixeddifferencesfromoneanother.Thisistheidealismoflife.Forphilosophyisnotatalltheonlyexampleofidealism;nature,aslife,alreadymakesamatteroffactwhatidealistphilosophybringstocompletioninitsownspiritualfield”;andHegel,PhilosophyofRight,§276addition,p.314(Werke,VII,pp.441–442):“Thisidealityofthemoments[inthestate]islikelifeinanorganicbody:itispresentateverypoint,thereisonlyonelifeinallofthem,andthereisnoresistancetoit.Separatedfromit,eachpointmustdie.Thesameappliestotheidealityofalltheindividualestates,powers,andcorporations,howevermuchtheirimpulsemaybetosubsistandhavebeingforthemselves.Inthisrespect,theyresemblethestomachofanorganismwhichalsopositsitselfasindependent[fursich¨]butisatthesametimesupersededandsacrificedandpassesoverintothewhole”.64Hegel,PhilosophyofRight,§270addition,pp.302–303(Werke,VII,p.429).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism161andnotothers).ThiscanbeseenasHegel’sownattempttocompletetheprojectwhichhethoughtbeganwithThalesandwhichhetakestobedistinctiveofphilosophyitself,offindingawayofthinkingthatwillarticulatethekindofself-reflexivestructureneededtounderstandtherelationshipbetweentheconditionedandtheunconditioned,whichrecognizesthelimitednatureoftheformerwithoutmakingthelat-tertranscendent–justaseachofthecategoriesoftheConceptrequiretheothersinordertobeexplainedandunderstood,withoutanyhavingpriorityovertheothersasan“external”ground.65iv.hegel’sidealismasaconceptualrealismWehaveseen,then,thatanaccountofHegel’sidealismwhichtreatsitprimarilyasametaphysicalposition–astheclaimthatfiniteexistentsshouldnotbetreatedas“ultimateandabsolute”–neednotnecessarilyleadintoabsurdextravagancewhileitcanalsoavoidtrivialityandhavesomeclaimtotextualaccuracy.However,thisaccountmayseemtosufferfromafourthvice,namely,akindofirrelevance,becausetobetoldthatthisiswhatHegel’sidealismamountstoistobepresentedwithaformofidealismthatisrathersuigenerisandhardtoconnecttocontemporarydebatesthatsurroundtheidealism/realismissue,whichessentiallyconcernhowthemindrelatestothingsoutsidethemind,andwhatthesethings(ifany)are.Ofcourse,itwouldbewrongtocriticizeHegelhimselfonthisscorealone;butitwouldnonethelesssuggestthatthereislesstobegainedfromconsideringHegel’sideal-ismthanwemightatfirsthavehoped.Hegelmayseemmerelytobeclaimingthefollowing:Finitethingsarenotthemselvesinfinite,butarelimitedformsinwhichtheinfiniteisrealized;theythereforelack“veri-tablebeing”,becausetheyarenotinthemselves“ultimateandabsoluteor...underived,uncreated,eternal”;theyarethereforeideal,while“itisnotthefinitewhichisrealbuttheinfinite”.66EvenifwegrantHegelthisconclusion,itishardtoseehowthiswouldestablish“idealism”inawaythatrelatestocurrentconcerns.However,thoughIthinkweshouldtakethewayHegelcharacterizes“idealism”seriously,andtakenoteoftheontologicalusehegivesit,itis65ItisofcourseprofoundlydifficulttoassesswhetherthisdistinctiveHegelianconceptionoftheAbsoluteisultimatelycogent,asitformsthebasisforthecritiqueofHegelfromlateSchellingonwards:itisimpossibletoconsiderthisdebateinanyfurtherdetailhere,butindifferentwaystheworkofDieterHenrich,MichaelTheunissen,ManfredFrank,Rolf-PeterHorstmann,andVittorioHosle¨wouldallberelevant.AmongauthorsworkinginEnglish,thecontributionsofJ.N.Findlay,StanleyRosen,andAndrewBowiealsobearonthisissue.66Hegel,ScienceofLogic,p.149(Werke,V,p.164).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n162robertsternalsoclearthatHegeltakeshispositionheretohavewiderimplications,whichmaymakewhathesaysofgreatercontemporaryrelevanceandinterest.Toseewhattheseimplicationsmightbe,weshouldfocusonHegel’sclaimthat“[e]veryphilosophyisessentiallyanidealism”,wherehereHegelissuggestingthatanyproperlyphilosophicalpositionmustendorseidealismasheconceivesit.Hisimpliedcontrasthere,Ithink,isnotjustwith“commonsense”or“ordinaryconsciousness”,whichrecognizesthatobjectsare“notself-subsistentorgroundedinthem-selves”,butcannotreconcilethiswithitsstrongersensethatobjectsareindividualsandthus(itsupposes)“self-standingandself-founded”,andsothisformofconsciousnesscannotgraspthecomplexphilosophi-caloutlookHegelisproposingwhichissupposedtoaccommodatebothinsights;67anadditionalcontrast,Ibelieve,isalsowithnonphilosophy,whichforHegelisapositionassociatedwiththeempiricisttraditionasitexistedinGermany,particularlyintheworkofF.H.Jacobi.68ForHegel,Jacobicountsasafollowerof“thoseradicalarch-empiricists,HumeandLocke”becauselikethem,hehas“positedtheparticularassuchastheAbsolute”,69ratherthanseeingthatfiniteparticularslack“veritablebeing”inHegel’ssense,thatis,thattheyare“notself-subsistentorgroundedinthemselves”;Jacobihasthusendedupwithapositioninwhich“thefiniteispositedasabsolute”,70andsowithapositionthatcountsasanexampleofrealism,inHegel’suseofthisterm.Thus,whileHegelbelievesthatasfarasphilosophyisconcerned,“theoppositionofidealisticandrealisticphilosophyhasnosignificance”,hedoesnotexpectittohavenosignificanceforordinaryconsciousnessor(moreimportantly)nonphilosophyofthesortpropounded(Hegelthinks)byJacobi.Intracingoutthisissuefurther,wewillseethatHegel’side-alismisrelevanttocontemporaryissuesafterall,becauseofthewiderquestionsthisraises.67Cf.Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§45addition,p.88(Werke,VIII,p.122).Hegelofcoursebelievedthatthiskindofdifficultyischaracteristicof“ordinaryconscious-ness”,whichoscillatesbetween‘one-sided’viewsthatitisunabletoreconcile.68Jacobihimselfcharacterisedhisownpositionasa“nonphilosophy”:seeJacobi,JacobitoFichte,intheMainPhilosophicalWritings,p.501,p.505,p.519.Cf.Hegel’sremarkthat‘theonlyphilosophyacknowledged[byJacobiandhisfollowers]isnotaphilosophyatall!’(Hegel,LecturesontheHistoryofPhiloso-phy,III,p.477(Werke,XX,p.384)).69G.W.F.Hegel,FaithandKnowledge,trans.byWalterCerfandH.S.Harris(Albany:SUNYPress,1977),p.137(Werke,II,pp.376–377).70Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§74,pp.120–121(Werke,VIII,p.163):“Theformofimmediacygivestotheparticularthedeterminationofbeing,orofrelatingitselftoitself.Buttheparticularispreciselytherelatingofitselftoanotheroutsideit;[but]throughthatform[ofimmediacy]thefiniteispositedasabsolute”.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism163WhatthisdisputewithJacobibringsout,isthatforHegelhisidealismrequiresarepudiationofempiricism,andthusaricherconceptionoftherelationbetweenthoughtandworld.IdealismforHegel,aswehaveseen,isapositionthatdoesnottreatfinitethingsas“ultimateandabsolute”inthemselvesbutrelatesthemtoanenduringandinfinite“ground”ofsomekind,ofwhichthesefinitethingsarelimitedrealizations;butwhatidealisminthissenserequires,Hegelthinks,isthatwemovebeyond“empiricalcognition”.Thisisbecausethisinfinitegroundisnotsomethingthatisapparenttousinexperience,butcanonlybesomethingwearriveatthroughreflection.71Theidealistmustthereforebepreparedtotreatthisnonobservableformofbeingasrealinthewaythattheempiricistrefusestodo,becausetheempiricistcannotallowsuch“idealentities”intohisontology.Now,Hegeltakesittobecharacteristicofthephilosopherthatheispreparedtotakethisstepandtotakesuch“idealentities”tobereal,becauseheispreparedtotrustinthosecapacitiesofthoughtthatgobeyondthedirectevidenceofoursensesthroughaprocessoftheorizingandintellectualreflectionthatarrivesatadeeperlevelofexplanationandunderstanding.Thisiswhy,then,Hegelbelieveshecanclaimthat“[e]veryphilosophyisessentiallyanidealism”inhissense:forinhisviewthephilosopherischaracteristicallydriventoseekmoresatisfactoryformsofexplanationthancanbegivenattheleveloftheobservablephenomena,whilebeingarealistabouttheentitiessuchexplanationsrequire,whethertheseareThales’water,Democritus’atoms,orthelawsandgeneraofnaturalscience,inwhich“thingsastheyimmediatelypresentthemselvestous”haveamorestablegrounding:Natureoffersusaninfinitemassofsingularshapesandappearances.Wefeeltheneedtobringunityintothismanifold;therefore,wecomparethemandseekto[re]cognisewhatisuniversalineachofthem.Individualsarebornandpassaway;inthemtheirkindiswhatabides,whatrecursinallofthem;anditisonlypresentforuswhenwethinkaboutthem.Thisiswherelaws,e.g.,thelawsofthemotionoftheheavenlybodies,belongtoo.Weseethestarsinoneplacetodayandinanothertomorrow;thisdisorderisforthespiritsomethingincon-gruous,andnottobetrusted,sincethespiritbelievesinanorder,asimple,constant,anduniversaldetermination[ofthings].Thisisthefaithinwhichthespirithasdirectedits[reflective]thinkinguponphenomena,andhascometoknowtheirlaws,establishingthemotionoftheheavenlybodiesinauniversal71Cf.Hegel,LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,III,p.445(Werke,XX,pp.352–353):“Itiscertainlycorrecttosaythattheinfiniteisnotgivenintheworldofsensuousperception;andsupposingthatwhatweknowisexperience,asynthesisofwhatisthoughtandwhatisfelt,theinfinitecertainlycannotbeknowninthesensethatwehaveasensuousperceptionifit.Butnoonewishestodemandasensuousproofinverificationoftheinfinite;spiritisforspiritalone”.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n164robertsternmanner,sothateverychangeofpositioncanbedeterminedand[re]cognisedonthebasisofthislaw...Fromalltheseexampleswemaygatherhow,inthinkingaboutthings,wealwaysseekwhatisfixed,persisting,andinwardlydetermined,andwhatgovernstheparticular.Thisuniversalcannotbegraspedbymeansofthesenses,anditcountsaswhatisessentialandtrue.72This,then,explainsHegel’sincongruous-lookingclaiminthemainpas-sagewehavebeenconsidering,that“theprinciplesofancientormodernphilosophies,water,ormatter,oratomsarethoughts,universals,idealentities”,whenthismayseemhardtosquarewiththesortofmateri-alismthatHegelisherereferringto.Theexplanationforthisclaim,wecannowsee,isthatevenamaterialistlikeThalesaswellasamoremodernmaterialistmustagreethattheirconceptionofmatterisnotmatterasitisgiventousinexperience(notjustempiricalwater),andthusthat“thereisnotruthinthesensibleassuch”,73because“matterisitselfalreadysomethingabstract,somethingwhichcannotbeperceivedassuch”.74ItisforthisreasonthatHegelbelievesthat“[w]ithThaleswe,properlyspeaking,firstbeginthehistoryofPhilosophy”,75becauseThalesstartstheprocessoflookingforanexplanationforthenatureoffiniteexistentswhileatthesametimeseeingthatthisexplanationmustgofurtherthanour“sensuousperception”inwhatever“firstprinciple”itcomesupwith,asnothingrevealedtousbythesensescanbe“ulti-mateandabsolute”inawaythatisrequiredtomakethisexplanationsatisfactory:“ThesimplepropositionofThales[thattheprincipleofallthingsiswater]therefore,isPhilosophy,becauseinitwater,thoughsen-suous,isnotlookedatinitsparticularityasopposedtoothernaturalthings,butasThoughtinwhicheverythingisresolvedandcompre-hended”.76Thalesisthereforeresponsibleforallowing“theworldof72Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§21addition,p.53(Werke,VIII,pp.77–78).Cf.Hegel,LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,III,p.440(cf.Werke,XX,p.347):“Theques-tionofwhetheracompletedsensuousnessortheNotionisthehighermay...beeasilydecided.Forthelawsoftheheavensarenotimmediatelyperceived,butmerelythechangeinpositiononthepartofthestars.Itisonlywhenthisobjectofimmediateperceptionislaidholdofandbroughtunderuniversalthoughtdeter-minationsthatexperiencearisestherefrom,whichhasaclaimtovalidityforalltime.Thecategorywhichbringstheunityofthoughtintothecontentoffeel-ingisthustheobjectiveelementinexperience,whichreceivestherebyuniver-salityandnecessity,whilethatwhichisperceivedisratherthesubjectiveandcontingent”.73Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§76,p.122(Werke,VIII,p.166).74Ibid.,§38,p.79(Werke,VIII,p.111).75Hegel,LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,I,p.171(Werke,XVIII,p.195).76Ibid.,p.179(Werke,XVIII,p.202).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism165Thought[dieGedankenwelt]”tobefound,withoutwhich“thereisasyetnopureunity”.77Now,whileHegeltakesittobecharacteristicofaclassicalphiloso-pherlikeThalestoacceptthathisnonempiricalconceptionofwaterisvalidonpurelytheoreticalgrounds(becauseitprovidesaunifyingformofexplanation),herecognizesthatinmodernphilosophy“thepresup-positionoftheoldermetaphysics,namely,thatwhatistrueinthingsliesinthought”78hasbeenradicallyquestioned;initsplacehascomeakindofempiricistpositivism,whichtrustsonlyexperiencetotellusabouttheworld,andsotreatsasrealonlywhatisobservable:Ancientmetaphysicshadinthisrespectahigherconceptionofthinkingthaniscurrenttoday.Foritbaseditselfonthefactthattheknowledgeofthingsobtainedthroughthinkingisalonewhatisreallytrueinthem,thatis,thingsnotintheirimmediacybutasfirstraisedintotheformofthought,asthingsthought.Thusthismetaphysicsbelievedthatthinking(anditsdeter-minations)isnotanythingalientotheobject,butratherisitsessentialnature,orthatthingsandthethinkingofthem–ourlanguagetooexpressestheirkinship–areexplicitlyinfullagreement,thinkinginitsimmanentdeterminationsandthetruenatureofthingsformingoneandthesamecontent.Butreflectiveunderstandingtookpossessionofphilosophy....Directedagainstreason,itbehavesasordinarycommonsenseandimposesitsviewthattruthrestsonsensuousreality,thatthoughtsareonlythoughts,mean-ingthatitissenseperceptionwhichfirstgivesthemfillingandrealityandthatreasonlefttoitsownresourcesengendersonlyfigmentsofthebrain.Inthisself-renunciationonthepartofreason,theNotionoftruthislost;itislimitedtoknowingonlysubjectivetruth,phenomena,appearances,onlysomethingtowhichthenatureoftheobjectitselfdoesnotcorrespond:knowinghaslapsedintoopinion.7977Ibid.,p.178(Werke,XVIII,p.203).AdornomayhavehadthispassagefromHegelinmindwhenhewrote:“[I]nthethoughtofsuchearlyso-calledanti-metaphysiciansandmaterialistsasLeucippusandDemocritus,thestructureofthemetaphysical,oftheabsoluteandfinalgroundofexplanation,isneverthelesspreservedwithintheirmaterialisticthought.Ifonecallsthesematerialistsmetaphysicalmaterialists,becausematterforthemistheultimategroundofbeing,onedoesnotentirelymissthemark”(TheodoreW.Adorno,Metaphysics:ConceptsandProblems,editedbyRolfTiedemann,translatedbyEdmundJephcott(Cambridge:PolityPress,2000),p.9).78Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§38addition,p.79(Werke,VIII,p.110);translationmodified.79Hegel,ScienceofLogic,pp.45–66(Werke,V,p.38).Cf.alsoibid.,p.160(Werke,V,p.178):“However,tocallthought,spirit,God,onlyanidealbeing,presupposesthestandpointfromwhichfinitebeingcountsasreal,andtheidealbeingofbeing-for-onehasonlyaone-sidedmeaning”;ibid.,p.590(WerkeVI,p.262):“Wouldoneeverhavethoughtthatphilosophywoulddenytruthtointelligibleentitiesbecausetheylackthespatialandtemporalmaterialofthesensuousworld?”;ibid.,DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n166robertsternInhiswork,HegeltreatsJacobiasatypicalproductofthismodernturn,anduseshimtoillustrateitsconsequences.ThebasisonwhichJacobitakesthisturnisahostilitytoanysearchforexplanationofthesortthatphilosophygoesinfor,whichhefearsleadsintoemptyabstractions:asJacobifamouslyputsit,“Inmyjudgmentthegreatestserviceofthescientististounveilexistence,andtorevealit....Obsessionwithexplanationmakesusseekwhatiscommontoallthingssopassionatelythatwepaynoattentiontodiversityintheprocess;weonlywantalwaystojointogether,whereasitwouldoftenbemuchmoretoouradvantagetoseparate....Moreover,injoiningandhangingtogetheronlywhatisexplainableinthings,therealsoarisesinthesoulacertainlustrethatblindsusmorethanitilluminates”.80Asaresultofthisfearofabstractionism,Hegelargues,Jacobinolongertreatsourintellectualcapacitiesasasourceofknowledge,andinsteadprioritizesthe“facultyp.707(Werke,VI,p.404):“Aphilosophizingthatinitsviewofbeingdoesnotriseabovesense,naturallystopsshortatmerelyabstractthought,too,initsviewoftheNotion;suchthoughtstandsopposedtobeing”;EncyclopaediaLogic,§21,p.52(Werke,VIII,p.76):“In§5wementionedtheoldbeliefthatwhatisgenuineinobjects,[their]constitutions,orwhathappenstothem,[i.e.,]whatisinner,whatisessential,andthematterthatcounts,isnottobefoundinconsciousnessimme-diately;thatitcannotbewhatthefirstlookorimpressionalreadyoffersus,butthatwemustfirstthinkitoverinordertoarriveatthegenuineconstitutionoftheobject,andthatbythinkingitoverthis[goal]isindeedachieved”;ibid.,§22addition,p.54(Werke,VIII,p.79):“...ithasbeentheconvictionofeveryagethatwhatissubstantialisonlyreachedthroughthereworkingoftheimmediatebyourthinkingaboutit.Ithasmostnotablybeenonlyinmoderntimes,ontheotherhand,thatdoubtshavebeenraisedandthedistinctionbetweentheproductsofourthinkingandwhatthingsareinthemselveshasbeeninsistedon...Thesicknessofourtime,whichhasarrivedatthepointofdespair,istheassumptionthatthatourcognitionisonlysubjectiveandthatthisisthelastwordaboutit”;Hegel,PhilosophyofMind,§465addition,p.224(Werke,X,p.286):“Thosewhohavenoconceptionofphilosophybecomespeechless,itistrue,whentheyhearthepropositionthatThoughtisBeing.Nonetheless,underlyingallouractionsisthepresuppositionoftheunityofThoughtandBeing.Itisasrational,thinkingbeingsthatwemakethispresupposition...Purethinkingknowsthatitalone,andnotfeelingorrepresentation,iscapableofgraspingthetruthinthings,andthattheassertionofEpicurusthatthetrueiswhatissensed,mustbepronouncedacom-pleteperversionofthenatureofmind”;Hegel,“AphorismsfromtheWastebook”,inJonStewart,ed.,MiscellaneousWritingsofG.W.F.Hegel(Evanston,IL:North-westernUniversityPress,2002),p.246(Werke,II,p.542):“ThepeasantwomanliveswithinthecircleofherLisa,whoisherbestcow;thentheblackone,thenthespottedone,andsoon;alsoofMartin,herboy,andUrsula,hergirl,etc.Tothephilosopher,infinity,knowledge,movement,empiricallaws,etc.arethingsjustasfamiliar”.80F.H.Jacobi,ConcerningtheDoctrineofSpinozainLetterstoHerrMosesMendelssohn,inTheMainPhilosophicalWritings,pp.194–195.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism167ofperception”overthe“facultyofreflection”.81Theconsequenceofthisposition,Hegelclaims,isthatJacobicannotdoanythingotherthantreatfiniteentitiesas“self-subsistentandgroundedinthemselves”,becausetoofferanydeeperexplanationofthemwouldrequireviolatingthe“immediacy”ofperceptionandgoingbeyond“sensuousreality”.Hegelthereforewrites:“Inthisdeclaration...Jacobiexplicitlyrestrictsfaithandeternalveritiestowhatistemporalandcorporeal”.82Wecansee,then,howHegelmightreasonablyassociatephilosophyasheconceivesitwithidealisminhissense,andwhyhemightthinkofJacobiasillustratingthelinkbetweentheabandonmentofthisidealismandtheturntononphilosophy.83Now,asamatterofinterpretation,itmightbesaidthatHegel’sviewofJacobihereisrathercurious:for,ifoneconsidersthetheologicalsideofJacobi’sposition,Jacobiwasnostraightforwardempiricist,asherecognizedahigherfacultythatgivesusaccesstoGodasasupernaturalentity–afacultywhichJacobicametocall“reason”.84Hisclaimwas81F.H.Jacobi,PrefacetoDavidHumeonFaith,inTheMainPhilosophicalWritings,p.541.Cf.alsoDavidHumeonFaith,inTheMainPhilosophicalWritings,p.303:“Itfollowsthat,withrespecttoallcreatedbeings,theirrationalcognitionwouldhavetobetested,ultimately,againsttheirsensibleone;theformermustborrowitsvalidityfromthelatter”.82Hegel,FaithandKnowledge,p.139(Werke,II,p.379).Cf.alsoibid.,p.169(Werke,II,p.410):“JacobireproachestheKantiansystemforbeingamishmashofidealismandempiricism.Ofthesetwoingredients,however,itisnottheempiricism,buttheidealisticside,thesideofinfinity,whichincurshisreproach.Althoughthesideofinfinitycannotwinthroughtotheperfectionofthetruenothing,stillJacobicannotbearitbecauseitendangerstheabsolutenessoftheempirical...”;andibid.,p.125(Werke,II,p.363):“Jacobibecomesasabusiveaboutthenullificationofthisempiricaltruthandoffaithinsense-cognition[byKant]asifitwereanactofsacrilegeoratemplerobbery”.83ArelateddiagnosisinformsHegel’sdiscussionofscepticism,andinparticularhiscontrastbetweenancientandmodernscepticism:forwhereashesawtheformerasapreludetophilosophyinitsquestioningofexperienceasasourceforknowl-edge,hesawthelatterasaformofnonphilosophy,becauseitleavesexperienceunquestioned,andsoabandonsallattemptstogobeyondit.SeeG.W.F.Hegel,“RelationshipofSkepticismtoPhilosophy:ExpositionofitsDifferentModifica-tionsandComparisontotheLatestFormwiththeAncientOne”,trans.byH.S.Harris,inGeorgediGiovanniandH.S.Harris,eds.,BetweenKantandHegel(Albany:SUNYPress,1985)(Werke,II,pp.213–272).Cf.alsoHegel,Encyclopae-diaLogic,§39,p.80(Werke,VIII,p.112):“InHumeanscepticism,thetruthoftheempirical,thetruthoffeelingandintuition,istakenasbasic;and,onthatbasis,heattacksalluniversaldeterminationsandlaws,preciselybecausetheyhavenojustificationbywayofsense-perception.Theoldscepticismwassofarremovedfrommakingfeeling,orintuition,intotheprincipleoftruththatitturneditselfagainstthesensibleintheveryfirstplaceinstead.”84Jacobi,PrefacetoDavidHumeonFaith,MainPhilosophicalWritings,p.569.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n168robertsternthattogettoanawarenessofGod,wecouldnotusetheunderstanding,whichmerely“hoversabovetheintuitionsofthesenses”85bylookingforcausalexplanationsinawaythatcannotleadustotheunconditionedbutonlytoaninfiniteregress:sowhilereasonisakintothesensesinbeingimmediate,itgivesusaccesstoaverydifferentkindofbeing,onethatisinfiniteratherthanfinite;and,inviewofthis,howcanHegel’scharacterisationofJacobiaspositing“thefinite...asabsolute”beconsideredappropriate?Itcouldbereplied,however,thatifthereisadifficultyhere,itisJacobi’sandnotHegel’s.For,ofcourse,HegelwasfullyawareofthistheologicalsidetoJacobi’sthinking,andwascriticalofitinitsturn,inwaysthatneednotconcernushere.ButthefactthatthissideofJacobi’spositionisintensionwithhisattempttogiveexperienceofordi-naryobjectspriorityoverthe“abstractions”ofphilosophy(fordoesn’tJacobi’s“reason”alsothreatenthestorewesetbythatexperience?)86doesnotshowthatHegeliswrongtoidentifyelementsofempiricist“commonsensism”inJacobi’sthinking,evenifthesemayseemtocon-flictwithaspectsofhistheologicalposition.87WecannowalsounderstandthewayinwhichHegelcompareshisidealismtoKant’s.Ontheonehand,KantisanidealistinHegel’ssense,becausehetreats“things...intheirsensuousindividuality”aslessthanthefullstoryaboutreality,andsogoesbeyondempiricism,whichtakesthesethingstobeallthatisreal:“CriticalPhilosophyhasincommonwithEmpiricismthatitacceptsexperienceastheonlybasisforourcog-nitions;butitwillnotletthemcountastruths,butonlyascognitionsofappearances”.88Whilethisgoesagainst“ordinaryconsciousness”,whichholdsthatwhatexists“canbeperceivedbythesenses(e.g.,this85Ibid.,p.568.86Cf.ibid.,p.569,whereJacobitalksofreasonasa“differentfacultyofperception”fromordinaryexperience,whichisa“spiritualeye”thatgivesusaccessto“spiri-tualobjects”;butthisdoesnottellushowitisthese“spiritualobjects”standinrelationtothe“visibleandtangible”ones,andthushowourfaithinthelattercanremain“immediate”,onceour“spiritualeye”isopened.87HegelhimselfseemstoremarkonthisconflictwhenhenotesthatJacobispeaksoffaith(Glaube)inrelationtoGod,butalsoinrelationtoourawarenessofourbodiesandouterobjects(cf.Jacobi,ConcerningtheDoctrineofSpinoza,inMainPhilo-sophicalWritings,p.231),andcomments:“Hencetheexpressionfaith,whichhadadeepsignificanceinreligion,ismadeuseoffordifferentcontentsofeverykind;thisinourtimeisthepointofviewmostcommonlyadopted”(Hegel,LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,III,p.419(Werke,XX,p.324)).88Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§40,p.80(Werke,VIII,p.112).Cf.alsoHegel,FaithandKnowledge,p.103(Werke,II,p.341):“...Kant’smostimportantresult[asagainstJacobi]willalwaysremainthis:theserelationsofthefinite(whethertheyarerelationswithinthesphereofthesubjectalone,orrelationsofthingsaswell)areDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism169animal,thisstar)”because“thisappearstoitaswhatsubsistsonitsownaccount,oraswhatisindependent”,HegelendorsesKant’sposi-tionhere,agreeingwithwhathetakestobetheKantianpoint,that“whatcanbeperceivedbythesensesisreallysecondaryandnotself-standing”.Now,againstthisviewheldby“ordinaryconsciousness”,aswehaveseen,Hegelwantstoarguethatrealitydoesnotfullyrevealitselftousinperception,butalsorequiresustousethought,whichisabletoarriveatagraspofthe“idealentities”whichconstitutethe“enduringandinwardlystable”basisofreality.AccordingtoHegel,Kantwasunabletotakethissecondstepofgrantingobjectivetruthtosuch“idealentities”,becauseheheldthat“thoughts,althoughtheyareuniversalandnecessarydeterminations,arestillonlyourthoughts,andarecutofffromwhatthethingisin-itselfbyanimpassablegulf”.Thus,whileKantrecognizedthatthoughtwasrequiredinordertograsptheworldasmorethanthe“fleetingandtransient”objectsofexperience,hedidnotacceptthatthisthoughtgaveusaccesstotheworldassuch;hethereforedidnotrecognize“thetrueobjectivityofthinking...:thatthoughtsarenotmerelyourthoughts,butatthesametimetheIn-itselfofthingsandofwhateverelseisobjective”.89ToHegel,therefore,Kantnothinginthemselves,andcognitioninaccordancewiththemisonlyacognitionofappearances,(eventhoughitbecomesabsolutebecauseitisnottobetranscended).”89Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§41addition,pp.82–83(Werke,VIII,pp.115–116).Cf.alsoHegel,PhilosophyofNature,§246addition,I,pp.200–201(Werke,IX,p.19),translationmodified:“Intelligencedoesnotofcoursefamiliarizeitselfwiththingsintheirsensuousexistence.Inthatitthinksthem,itsetstheircontentwithinitself,andtopracticalideality,whichforitselfismerenegativity,itaddsform,universalitysotospeak,andsogivesaffirmativedeterminationtothenegativeofparticularity.Thisuniversalityofthingsisnotsomethingsubjectiveandbelongingtous;itis,rather,thenoumenonasopposedtothetransientphenomenon,thetruth,objectivity,andactualbeingofthethingsthemselves.Itresemblestheplatonicideas,whichdonothavetheirbeingsomewhereinthebeyond,butwhichexistinindividualthingsassubstantialgenera.Proteuswillonlybecompelledintotellingthetruthifheisroughlyhandled,andwearenotcontentwithsensuousappearance.TheinscriptionontheveilofIsis,‘Iamwhatwas,is,andshallbe,andmyveilhasbeenliftedbynomortal’,meltsbeforethought”;G.W.F.Hegel,IntroductiontotheLecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,trans.byT.M.KnoxandA.V.Miller(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1985),p.90(EinleitungindieGeschichtederPhilosophie,ed.byJohannesHoffmeister(Hamberg:Meiner,1940),p.121):“Athoughtistheuniversalassuch;eveninnaturewefindthoughtspresentasitsspeciesandlaws,andthustheyarenotmerelypresentintheformofconsciousness,butabsolutelyandthereforeobjectively.Thereasonoftheworldisnotsubjectivereason.Thoughtiswhatissubstantiveandtrue,incomparisonwiththesingularwhichismomentary,passing,andtransient.Knowledgeofthenatureofthoughtremovesthesubjectivemodeofitsappearance,andthenthismeansthatthoughtisnotsomethingparticular,subjective,belongingtoourconsciousnessmerely,butistheuniversal,objectiveabsolutely”.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n170robertsternremainsamerelysubjectiveidealist,incontrasttohisownobjectiveidealism,becauseKantisnotpreparedtotreat“whatisuniversalandnecessary”asreallyanythingmorethan“whatisonlythoughtbyus”,andsonotasultimatelyreal.IfthisistheviewthatHegel’sidealismleadsto,however,isn’titstillguiltyofprecriticalextravagance,whensetagainstthekindofepistemo-logicalandmetaphysicaloutlook(ofwhichKantispart)whichabandons“thepresuppositionoftheoldermetaphysics,namely,thatwhatistrueinthingsliesinthought”,90andsotriestogonofurtherthantheempir-icalphenomena?91Infact,however,Hegelwouldclaimthatinfindingsomethingintheclassicaltraditionthatstillneedstobetakenseriously,hewasbuildingonthereallessontobelearnedfromKant(evenifitwasnotlearnedbyKanthimself).Thisisthattherecanbenoworkabledistinctionbetween“immediate”experienceand“mediated”thought,asconceptualisationrunsthroughallcognitivelyrelevantlevels,mak-ingitimpossiblefortheempiricisttoquestionourfaithinthinkingwithoutendingupintotalscepticism:92fortoclaimthatweshouldnot90Cf.Pippin,“Hegel’sOriginalInsight”,p.288,note5:“...suchaninterpretation[ofHegelasaconceptrealist]stillmakesHegelafundamentallypre-criticalphiloso-pher,committedtothebasicrationalistdreamshatteredbyKant.Hegel’smanyremarksabout‘completing’theKantianrevolution,orcelebratingthemodern‘principlesofsubjectivity,’areveryhardtounderstandonsuchareading.ItisasifHegelsimplymissedthepoint,themassive,unavoidablepoint,oftheCritiqueofPureReason”.91ThereislittleindicationthatHegelhadanypatienceforappealstomodestyofthiskind.Cf.Hegel,LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,I,p.277(Werke,XVIII,p.318):“Itshowsexcessivehumilityofmindtobelievethatknowledge[dasErkennen]hasnovalue;butChristsays,‘Areyenotbetterthanthesparrows?’,andwearesoinasmuchaswearethinking;assensuousweareasgoodorbadassparrows”;andLecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,I,p.xliii(Werke,XVIII,pp.13–14):“Theloveoftruth,faithinthepowerofmind,isthefirstconditioninPhilosophy.Man,becauseheisMind,shouldandmustdeemhimselfworthyofthehighest;hecannotthinktoohighlyofthegreatnessandthepowerofhismind,and,withthisbelief,nothingwillbesodifficultandhardthatitwillnotrevealitselftohim.TheBeingoftheuniverse,atfirsthiddenandconcealed,hasnopowerwhichcanofferresistancetothesearchforknowledge;ithastolayitselfopenbeforetheseeker–tosetbeforehiseyesandgiveforhisenjoyment,itsrichesanditsdepths”.92Cf.Hegel’sclaimagainstJacobi,thatthelattersetsupanunworkableantithesisbetweenimmediacyandmediation:cf.EncyclopaediaLogic,§§65–67,pp.114–116(Werke,VIII,pp.155–158),andLecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,III,p.421(Werke,XX,p.328):“Thisoppositionbetweenimmediacyandmediacyisthusaverybarrenandquiteemptydetermination;itisaplatitudeoftheextremesttypetoconsideranythinglikethistobeatrueopposition;itproceedsfromamostwoodenunderstanding,whichthinksthatanimmediacycanbesomethingonitsownaccount,withoutamediationwithinitself”.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism171trustourconceptualcapacitieswhenitcomestotheorizingabouttheworldistoimplythatweshouldnottrustourexperienceofiteither,asKantshowedthatthesecapacitiesareinvolvedinthelatterasmuchasintheformer.93Thisinterpretation,then,drawsonthesamelineofargumentasPippin’sKantianone,whichalsorecognizes(aswehaveseen)that“itiswiththedenialthatafirmdistinctioncaneverbeuse-fullydrawnbetweenintuitionalandconceptualelementsinknowledgethatdistinctivelyHegelianidealismbegins”;butittakesthisargumentinadifferentdirection,thatattemptstodogreaterjusticetotheotherimportantinfluenceonHegel,whichistheclassicaltradition.InsofarasKanthimselfpointsbeyondempiricism,therefore,Hegelcanclaimnottohavemadeamerelyregressivemove.94AmerikshimselfofferstwoobjectionstothekindofaccountofHegel’sidealismthatIhaveoffered.Thefirstisthattheimplieddif-ferencefromKantismisleading,95apointthatwecannotconsiderinthedetailitrequireshere;andtheseconditthat“[this]notionofide-alismdoesnotmarkacontrastwithtraditionalrealism”,96forwhileitholdsthat“whatistrueinthingsliesinthought”,thisdoesnot93Cf.EncyclopaediaLogic,§47,p.90:“...Kanthimselfmakescognitioningeneral,andevenexperience,consistinthefactthatourperceptionsarethought,i.e.thatthedeterminationswhichfirstbelongtoperceptionaretransformedintothought-determinations”(Werke,VIII,p.125).Cf.alsoEncyclopaediaLogic,§20and§24addition,pp.51,57–58(Werke,VIII,p.74,p.83):“Kantemployedtheawkwardexpression,thatI‘accompany’allmyrepresentations–andmysensations,desires,actions,etc.,too...‘I’istheexistenceoftheentirelyabstractuniversality,theabstractlyfree.Therefore‘I’isthinkingasthesubject,andsinceatthesametimeIaminallmysensations,notions,states,etc.,thoughtispresenteverywhereandpervadesallthesedeterminationsas[their]category..../Inthe‘I’thereisamanifoldinnerandoutercontent,and,accordingtothewayinwhichthiscontentisconstituted,webehaveassensing,representing,remembering,[beings],etc.Butthe‘I’isthereinallofthese,or,inotherwords,thinkingispresenteverywhere.Thusmanisalwaysthinking,evenwhenhesimplyintuits”.ThisisarguablyalsothemoralofHegel’sdiscussionofsense-certaintyinthePhenomenology,whereonceagainthetargetmayplausiblybetakentobeJacobi’sempiricism,whichperimpossibiletriestoavoidallcomprehensioninfavourofsheerapprehension:seeHegel,PhenomenologyofSpirit,pp.58–66(Werke,III,pp.82–92).94Cf.Hegel,LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophyIII,p.176(Werke,XX,p.79);translationmodified:“Theempiricalisnotmerelyanobserving,hearing,feeling,etc.,aperceptionoftheindividual;foritreallysetstoworktofindthespecies,theuniversal,todiscoverlaws.Nowbecauseitdoesthis,itcomeswithintheterritoryoftheNotion–itbegetswhatpertainstotheregionoftheIdea....Thedemandofaprioriknowledge,whichseemstoimplythattheIdeashouldconstructfromitself,isthusareconstructiononly”.95Ameriks,“HegelandIdealism”,pp.394–395.96Ibid.,p.395.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n172robertsternmeanthatthingsaremind-dependent,butthattheyarefundamen-tallyconstitutedinawaythatisaccessibletothoughtratherthansense,by“universals,idealentities,notthingsastheyimmediatelypresentthemselvestous”.Idonotseethissecondpointasadiffi-culty,however:forwhyshouldanycontrastbeexpectedorrequired?Tothinkthattheremustbeacontrastbetweenidealismandrealismistoseeidealismashavingonlyitsmodernsense,accordingtowhichtheformertreatsthingsasmind-dependentandthelatterasmind-independent.Butonceitisrecognizedthatidealismcanalsobeunder-stoodinamoreclassicalmanner,wherethedisagreementiswhethertheworldcontains“idealentities”(andthuswithpositivismandnom-inalism)andnotwhetherthesubjectconstitutestheworld(andthusnotwithrealism),wecanseehowHegelcouldhavequiteproperlycalledhimselfanidealistwhilstremainingarealist,sonocontrastneedtobedrawnheretomakesenseofhispositioninthewaywehavedone.97Wehavethusfoundtwo(related)sensesinwhichHegelisanide-alist,andoneinwhichheisarealist,andshownhowthesepositionsarecompatible:heisanidealistinhisspecialsense,ofholdingthatthe“finiteisideal”,and(therefore)anidealistinthemoreclassical(antinominalist)senseofholdingthattakenasmerefiniteindividuals,thingsintheworldcannotprovideasatisfactoryterminusforexpla-nation,butonlywhentheyareseentoexemplify“universals,idealentities”(inthemannerofThales’wateronwards)whicharenotgiveninimmediateexperience,butonlyin“[reflective]thinkinguponphe-nomena”.Hegel’sidealism,inotherwords,amountstoaformofcon-ceptualrealism,understoodas“thebeliefthatconceptsarepartofthestructureofreality”.98However,noneofthisimpliesthatHegelisanidealistinthemodern(subjectivist)senseofclaimingthattheworldismind-dependent,forindividualscanbeunderstoodasinstantiationsofsuch“universals,idealentities”,whichtheninturnexplainshowsuch97Inhislaterarticle,“Introduction:InterpretingGermanIdealism”,p.8,Amerikshimselfseemstorecognizethelegitimacyofthinkingofidealisminthisway.Forfurtherdiscussion,seemyHegel,KantandtheStructureoftheObject(London:Routledge,1990),ch.5.98MichaelRosen,“FromVorstellungtoThought:Isa‘Non-Metaphysical’ViewofHegelPossible?’,inDieterHenrichandRolf-PeterHorstmann(eds),MetaphysiknachKant?(Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta,1988),pp.248–262,atp.262;reprintedinRobertStern(ed.),G.W.F.Hegel:CriticalAssessments,4vols.(London:Routledge,1993),III,pp.329–344,atp.343.ForfurtherdiscussionofthiswayoftakingHegel’sidealism,seeRobertStern,Hegel,KantandtheStructureoftheObject,esp.ch.V,andtheotherpaperscollectedinRobertStern,HegelianMetaphysics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sIdealism173individualsareaccessibletominds,withouttheneedforthissubjec-tivistturn.99AndIhavealsotriedtosuggestthatthiscanbepresentedasmorethanjustareversiontoaprecriticaloutlook,insofarastheKantianobjectiontothecogencyofempiricismplaysavitalroleatacrucialpoint,albeititinawaythatKantdidnotenvisageandwouldnodoubthavetriedtoresist–sothisisacaseof“reculerpourmieuxsauter”,wheretheintentionisnotjusttogoback,buttogobackinorderalsotogetfurther,andgo“beyondKant”aswell.Intheend,therefore,wehavearguablyreachedanaccountofHegel’sidealismthatmeetsAmeriks’originaldesiderata,ofbeingtextuallyaccurate,philo-sophicallyinteresting,andnotdubiouslyextravagant.10099Cf.Hegel,ScienceofLogic,p.51(Werke,V,p.45):“Thoughtisanexpressionwhichattributesthedeterminationscontainedthereinprimarilytoconsciousness.Butinasmuchasitissaidthatunderstanding,reason,isintheobjectiveworld,thatmindandnaturehaveuniversallawstowhichtheirlifeandchangesconform,thenitisconcededthatthedeterminationsofthoughtequallyhaveobjectivevalueandexistence”;Hegel,EncyclopaediaLogic,§24addition,p.57(Werke,VIII,p.82):“Justasthinkingconstitutesthesubstanceofexternalthings,soitisalsotheuniversalsubstanceofwhatisspiritual...Ifweregardthinkingaswhatisgenuinelyuniversalineverythingnaturalandeverythingspiritual,too,thenitovergraspsallofthemandisthefoundationofthemall”.100IamgratefultoDavidBell,FredBeiser,PaulFranks,SebastianGardner,Rolf-PeterHorstmannandJamesKreinesforveryhelpfulcommentsonearlierversionsofthispaper.IwouldalsoliketoacknowledgethesupportoftheArtsandHumani-tiesResearchCouncil,forfundingtheresearchleaveduringwhichthispaperwaswritten.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:46WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.007CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nmichaeln.forster7HegelandHermeneuticsHegelplayedalargeroleinthedevelopmentofmodernhermeneutics(orinterpretation-theory),inheritingrichlyfromitspast(especiallyfromHerder)andbequeathingcopiouslytoitsfuture(especiallytoDiltheyandGadamer).CertainofHegel’scontributionsinthisareaconcernwhatonemightcallthescopeandsignificanceofhermeneutics,andare,Ithink,ofunquestionablevalidityandimportance.Inthisconnection,heinpar-ticularchampionedseveralideaswhichweretosomeextentalreadyintheair,buttowhichhelentanewforceandinfluence.Amongtheseideasarethefollowing:First,heplausiblyidentifiedasexpres-sionsofmindormeaningrequiringinterpretationnotonlylinguistictextsandutterances,butalsononlinguisticarts(especiallyarchitec-ture,sculpture,painting,andinstrumentalmusic),1abroadsetofsocialinstitutionsandactivitieswhichhecalls“objectivemind,”andindivid-ualactions.Forthesepositions,see,forexample,respectively,Hegel’sAesthetics,hisEncyclopaediaofthePhilosophicalSciences,andhisLecturesonthePhilosophyofWorldHistory.Subsequenthermeneu-ticshaslargelytakenoverthisbroadeningoffocus.Forexample,thematureDiltheyandGadamertakethemeaningfulness,andhenceinter-pretability,ofnonlinguisticartforgranteds;DiltheyadoptsaversionofHegel’sconceptionof“objectivemind”(explicitlysinglingthisoutas1MuchofthehermeneuticaltraditionbeforeandevencontemporaneouswithHegeltendedtodenythis:inparticular,onesideofHerder,whointheearlierpartsofhisCriticalForestshadtreatedsuchartsasmerelysensuousratherthanmeaningful;Kant,withhisfamoustheoryofthenonconceptualnatureofbeauty;andonesideofSchleiermacher,who,despitehisexplicitprojectofdevelopinghermeneuticsintoauniversaldiscipline,generallyexcludedthenonlinguisticarts,insteadtreatingtheminacentralstrandofhisAestheticslecturesasmerelysensuousratherthanmeaningful(justasHerderhaddone).Ontheotherhand,Herder’smatureposition,whichhebegantodevelopinthelaterpartsofhisCriticalForests,Hamann’sMetacritique,andalaterstrandinSchleiermacher’sAestheticslecturesdidaccordmeaningtothenonlinguisticarts.SoHegel’spositionwasbynomeansentirelywithoutprecedenthere.174DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics175oneofHegel’smostimportantcontributions;2andDiltheystressesthatinadditiontointentionalexpressionsofmindandmeaning(suchaslinguistictextsandutterances,artworks,andsocialinstitutions),therearealsounintentionalones,especiallypeople’sactions,whichconse-quentlystandjustasmuchinneedofinterpretationinordertobeunderstood.3Second,Hegelrecognizedthathistoryisthereforeaprocesswhichcentrallyinvolvesexpressionsofmindandmeaning,andthatthehisto-rianmustconsequentlydeployinterpretationashismaintool.4DiltheysubsequentlytakesoverthispositionofHegel’s.Accordingly,hepraisesHegelinhisDieJugendgeschichteHegelsasa“founderofthehistoryoftheinnernessofthehumanspirit,”5andhehimselfmakesmindanditsexpressionsthecentralsubjectmatterofhistory,consequentlyiden-tifying(psychologyorlateron)hermeneuticsasthecentralmethodofthehistorian.6Third,Hegelalsorecognizedthattheinterpretationofhistoricaloth-ersisessentialforaproperself-understanding.7Onereasonforthisisthatitisonlybycomparingone’sownoutlookwiththedifferentoutlooksof(historical)othersthatonecanbecomefullycognizantofitscharacter.8Anotherreasonisthatperceivinghowone’sownoutlookhasdevelopedoutofotheroutlookswhichwereitshistoricalantecedents2See,especially,W.Dilthey,TheFormationoftheHistoricalWorldintheHumanSciences(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2002),p.170ff.3See,especially,ibid.,p.226.ConcerningsomeimportantlaterincarnationsofthisideainGadamerandintheanthropologistGeertz,seeG.B.Madison,“Hermeneu-tics’ClaimtoUniversality,”inThePhilosophyofHans-GeorgGadamer,ed.byL.E.Hahn(Chicago,OpenCourt,1997),p.353.4ThispositionofHegel’swasnotentirelywithoutprecedent,however.VoltaireandespeciallyHerderhadalreadyarguedforshiftingthehistorian’sfocusawayfromtraditionalpolitical–militaryhistoryandtowardthehistoryofcul-ture,andhenceforaccordinginterpretationacentralroleinthedisciplineofhistory.5W.Dilthey,GesammelteSchriften(Leipzig/Berlin,VandenhoeckandRuprecht,1914–),vol.4,p.157.6See,forexample,Dilthey,TheFormationoftheHistoricalWorldintheHumanSciences,esp.p.299.7Thisideawasagainbynomeansentirelywithoutprecedent,buthaditsrootsinHerder’s“geneticmethod.”8See,forexample,Hegel’s1808speech“OnClassicalStudies,”inG.W.F.Hegel,EarlyTheologicalWritings(Philadelphia,UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1981),esp.pp.327–328.Forahelpfuldiscussionofthisidea,andofitscentralitytoHegel’sconceptionofculture[Bildung],seeH.-G.Gadamer,TruthandMethod(NewYork,Continuum,1982),p.13ff.;cf.A.Berman,L’epreuvedel´’etranger´(Paris,Gallimard,1984),ch.3.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n176michaeln.forsterenablesonetocomprehenditmorefully.9Inonevariantoranother,thiswholeconceptionhasremainedcentraltohermeneuticalthoughtsinceHegel.Forexample,itreappearsinNietzsche’sprojectofa“genealogyofmorals”andinFoucault’sofan“archaeologyofknowledge.”Inthischapter,IwillnotpursuetheseimportantHegeliancontribu-tionsconcerningthescopeandsignificanceofhermeneuticsanyfurther,however.Instead,Iwouldliketoconsiderhisideasconcerningtheverynatureofinterpretationitself.Forinthisconnectiontoohehadideaswhichexercisedaverystronginfluenceonthesubsequentdevelopmentofhermeneutics–thoughwhetherforgoodorillinthiscaseisaquestionwhichwewillneedtoconsider.iTwopositionswhichwerecentraltopre-Hegelianhermeneutics–bywhichImeanprimarilythehermeneuticsofHerder,assubstantiallycontinuedbyHegel’sfamouscontemporarySchleiermacher–10werethefollowing:Position(1).Interpretationofalinguistictextorutteranceisamatterofrecoveringanauthor’soriginalmeaning–whichissomethingthathadthecharacteritdidindependentlyofwhat-everhistory,and,inparticular,historyofinterpretation,mayhavetakenplacesince.Becauseconcepts,beliefs,andsoforthvaryfromagetoage,culturetoculture,andevenindividualtoindividualinbothsubtleandnot-so-subtleways,thisrequiresthattheinterpreterresistaconstanttemptationtoassimilatetheconceptsandbeliefsexpressedbyatextorutterancetohisown(ortootherswithwhichhehappenstobeespeciallyfamil-iar).Inparticular,heshouldnotassumethatwhatisexpressedwillturnouttobetruebyhisownlights.Instead,henormally9ThisideaisespeciallyprominentinHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit.Forafullerdiscussionofbothideasastheyappearinthatwork,seemyHegel’sIdeaofaPhenomenologyofSpirit(Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress,1998),pp.430–446.10IamherepresupposingasomewhatunorthodoxconceptionofHerder’slead-ingroleindevelopinghermeneuticsinthisperiodforwhichIhavearguedelsewhere.Seeespeciallymy“FriedrichDanielErnstSchleiermacher,”inTheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(availableonline:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schleiermacher/);J.G.Herder:PhilosophicalWritings(Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),“Introduction”;and“Schleiermacher’sHermeneutics:SomeProblemsandSolutions,”HarvardReviewofPhilosophy,13(2005).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics177needstouseasetofcarefulinterpretivemethodsinordertoarriveatanaccurateunderstanding(e.g.,carefulscrutinyofthepassagesinwhichaparticularwordisusedaimedatdiscerningtherulegoverningitsuseandhenceitsmeaning).11Position(2).Meaningconsistsinword-usage,andaccordingly,thoughtessentiallydependson(Schleiermacherwouldevensay,albeittoostrongly:isidenticalwith)language.Therefore,totheextentthatapparentlynonlinguisticartssuchasarchitecture,sculpture,painting,orinstrumentalmusicexpressmeaningsandthoughts,theymustinfactdosoinvirtueofapriorlinguisticarticulationorarticulabilityofthosemeaningsandthoughtsbytheartist–sothatinterpretationofthemeaningsandthoughtsinquestionmustproceedviainterpretationoftheartist’slanguage.12AprominentstrandofHegel’sthoughtrejectedthesetwopositions,however,andindoingsoexercisedanenormousinfluenceonthesub-sequentcourseofhermeneutics–especiallyinGadamerandDilthey.Thus,asGadamerpointsoutandtakesashismodelinTruthandMethod,aprominentstrandinHegelrejectsposition(1)infavorofaformofinterpretationwhich(likethatadvocatedbyGadamerhimself)involvesasignificantmeasureofassimilationtotheinterpreter’sown11Itshouldbementionedthatthisfairlyconventionalpictureofwhatinterpreta-tionislikeforHerderandSchleiermacherhasbeensubjectedtocertainchallengessinceGadamer’sascriptionofsuchapicturetothem,andattackuponit.Inpar-ticular,Irmischerhasattemptedtoretrieveacontrary,proto-GadamerianpictureofinterpretationfromsomeofHerder’stexts(seeH.D.Irmischer,“Grundzuge¨derHermeneutikHerders,”inBuckeburgerGespr¨ache¨uberJ.G.Herder1971¨(Buckeburg,Grimme,¨1973)),andFrankhasattemptedtodosomethingsimilarforSchleiermacher(seeM.Frank,DasindividuelleAllgemeine(FrankfurtamMain,Suhrkamp,1985),especiallylaterpartsofthebook).Theseattemptsseemtomerelativelyimplausibleinexegeticalterms(especiallywhereSchleiermacherisconcerned).Butmoreimportantly,theirpotentialinterestmainlyderivesfromanassumptionofthevalidityofGadamer’sownpositionwhich,aswillbecomeclearinthisarticle,seemstometobeill-grounded.12ThisisthepositionatwhichHerderarrivedinhismaturestandbestreflectionsonthesubject,beginninginthelaterpartsoftheCriticalForests.ItisalsoapositiontowhichSchleiermacherwasstronglyattractedinhisfinalreflectionsonthesubjectinhisAestheticslectures.ForamoredetailedaccountofHerder’sandSchleiermacher’s(somewhatunstable)positionsinthisarea,seemy“Gods,Animals,andArtists:SomeProblemCasesinHerder’sPhilosophyofLanguage,”Inquiry,46(2003);“HegelandSome(Near)Contemporaries:NarroworBroadExpressivism?”inW.WelschandK.Vieweg,eds.,DasInteressedesDenkens(Munich,WilhelmFinkVerlag,2003);and“Schleiermacher’sHermeneutics:SomeProblemsandSolutions.”DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n178michaeln.forsterviewpoint,includingtheinterpreter’sownconceptsandconvictions.13Forexample,asGadameremphasizes,14Hegelsupportssuchanalterna-tiveapproachtointerpretationwhenhewritesinthe“Religion”chapterofthePhenomenologyofSpiritof1807concerningthetransitionfrompolytheisticGreekandRomanculturetothemoremodernstandpointofmonotheisticChristianity:TheworksoftheMusenowlackthepoweroftheSpirit,fortheSpirithasgaineditscertaintyofitselffromthecrushingofgodsandmen.Theyhavebecomewhattheyareforusnow–beautifulfruitalreadypickedfromthetree,whichafriendlyFatehasofferedus,asagirlmightsetthefruitbeforeus.Itcannotgiveustheactuallifeinwhichtheyexisted,notthetreethatborethem,nottheearthandtheelementswhichconstitutedtheirsubstance,nottheclimatewhichgavethemtheirpeculiarcharacter,northecycleofthechangingseasonsthatgovernedtheprocessoftheirgrowth.SoFatedoesnotrestoretheirworldtousalongwiththeworksofantiqueArt,itgivesnotthespringandsummeroftheethicallifeinwhichtheyblossomedandripened,butonlytheveiledrecollectionofthatactualworld.Ouractiveenjoymentofthemisthereforenotanactofdivineworshipthroughwhichourconsciousnessmightcometoitsperfecttruthandfulfillment;itisanexternalactivity–thewiping-offofsomedropsofrainorspecksofdustfromthesefruits,sotospeak–onewhicherectsanintricatescaffoldingofthedeadelementsoftheiroutwardexistence–thelanguage,thehistoricalcircumstances,etc.intheplaceoftheinnerelementsoftheethicallifewhichenvironed,created,andinspiredthem.Andallthiswedo,notinordertoenterintotheirverylifebutonlytopos-sessanideaoftheminourimagination.But,justasthegirlwhooffersusthepluckedfruitsismorethantheNaturewhichdirectlyprovidesthem–theNaturediversifiedintotheirconditionsandelements,thetree,air,light,andsoon–becauseshesumsallthisupinahighermode,inthegleamofherself-consciouseyeandinthegesturewithwhichsheoffersthem,so,too,theSpiritoftheFatethatpresentsuswiththoseworksofartismorethantheethicallifeandtheactualworldofthatnation,foritistheinwardizinginusoftheSpiritwhichinthemwasstill[only]outwardlymanifested;itistheSpiritofthetragicFatewhichgathersallthoseindividualgodsandattributesofthe[divine]substance13Gadamer,TruthandMethod,pp.147–150.ForGadamerHegelisthusanimpor-tantforerunnerandinspirationofsuchcentralprinciplesofhisownasthatininterpretationtheinterpretermusteffecta“fusionofhorizons”(ibid.,p.273ff.),accept(ameasureof)hisowndistinctive“prejudices”(ibid.,p.245ff.),andinpar-ticularassumethattheinterpretedtextorutteranceistruebyhisownlights(ibid.,pp.259–260,264,270–271).(Gadameralsobelievestheretobesomeimportantdif-ferencesbetweenhisownpositionandHegel’s–forahelpfuldiscussionofwhich,seeP.Redding,Hegel’sHermeneutics(Cornell,CornellUniversityPress,1996),esp.pp.48–49.)14TruthandMethod,pp.149–150.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics179intoonepantheon,intotheSpiritthatisitselfconsciousofitselfasSpirit.15(para.753)Moreover,asIhavearguedelsewhere,16the“Religion”chapterofthePhenomenologyofSpiritisalsostrikingforactuallyimplementinganapproachtointerpretationwhichassimilatestheinterpretedmate-rialtoHegel’sownstandpoint.Forexample,insharpcontrasttotheearlier“UnhappyConsciousness”sectionofthework,whichhadinter-pretedChristianityinascrupulouslynon-assimilatingwayasapositionthatfailedtorecognizewhatHegelbelievestobeGod’sidentitywithmankind,the“Religion”chapterinsteadinterpretsChristianityasapositionthatexpressedtheinsightthatGodandmankindareidentical.NorissuchanalternativeapproachtointerpretationbyanymeansconfinedtolaterpartsofthePhenomenologyofSpirit:itiseitherthe-oreticallyespousedorimplementedorbothinmanyotherHegeliantextsaswell,includingsomeofHegel’searliestandsomeofhislatest.Forexample,alreadyinTheLifeofJesusofearly1795,wefindHegelassumingthatthestandpointofKantianmoralphilosophyisbasicallycorrect,17andinterpretingtheJesusofthegospelsasexpressingthatstandpointaswell.Again,inhis1802essayOntheNatureofPhilo-sophicalCritiqueHegeladvocatesinterpretingpastphilosophyinsuchawayastomaximizeintheinterpretationtherecoveryofwhatiscor-rectortruebyhisownlights,andinotheressaysfromthesameperiodsuchasFaithandKnowledgeheactuallyimplementsthatinterpretiveapproach.Finally,andmostfamously,Hegel’slaterlectureseriesonart,religion,andphilosophyself-consciouslyemploysuchanapproachaswell.1815G.W.F.Hegel,PhenomenologyofSpirit,trans.byA.V.Miller(Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1979).IcitepassagesbymeansofMiller’shelpfulparagraphnumbers.16SeemyHegel’sIdeaofaPhenomenologyofSpirit,pp.417–418.17Hegelwouldofcoursesoonafterwardsgiveupthisassumption.18SomerelevantmethodologicalstatementsfromtheLecturesonthePhilosophyofReligion:“Thesedefinitereligions...areincludedinoursasessential...moments,whichcannotmisshavinginthemabsolutetruth.Thereforeinthemwehavetodonotwithwhatisforeigntous,butwithwhatisourown...Thethoughtofincarnation,forexample,pervadeseveryreligion”;ininterpretingthedefinitereligionswemust“recognizethemeaning,thetruth...;inshortgettoknowwhatisrationalinthem...Wemustdothemthisjustice,forwhatishuman,rationalinthem,isourown,too,althoughitexistsinourhigherconsciousnessasamomentonly...WelookatthesedefinitereligionsinaccordancewiththeConcept[i.e.,theprincipleofHegel’sownphilosophy]”(OnArt,Religion,Philosophy,ed.byJ.G.Gray(NewYork,HarperTorchbooks,1970),pp.198–200).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n180michaeln.forsterLikewise,especiallyinhismatureAestheticslectures,Hegelrejectsposition(2)infavorofapositionaccordingtowhich,whilemeaningandthoughtdoindeedessentiallydependonthepossessionofsomesuitablematerial-perceptiblemediumofexpressionorother,19thisneednotbelanguagebut,incertaincases,maybeadifferentexpressivemedium,suchasarchitecture(asinthecaseoftheancientEgyptians)orsculpture(asinthecaseoftheancientGreeks).20(Tobealittlemorespecific,Hegel’smovetothispositiontakesthelessradicaloftwopossibleforms:hebelievesthatincertaincasesapersoncan,byusingsuchalternativeexpressivemedia,expressmeaningsandthoughtswhichthepersonhimselfcannotexpresslinguistically,buthedoesnotbelievethatthepersoncantherebyexpressmeaningsandthoughtswhichareinexpressiblebylanguagetoutcourt.21)Thismovehasagainhadamajorimpactonthesubsequentdevelop-mentofhermeneutics,especiallyinDilthey.Untilaround1900Diltheywasstronglyattractedtoposition(2).Forexample,hefavorsthisposi-tionin“TheDevelopmentofHermeneutics”(1900),whereheassociatesitwithsuchpredecessorsasSchleiermacherandPreller.22However,in1905hewrotehisclassicstudyoftheearlyHegel,DieJugendgeschichteHegels,andapparentlyinthecourseofdoingsofellundertheinfluenceofthealternativeHegelianpositionjustdescribed.Forhehenceforthtreatednotmerelylanguagebutabroaderclassof“expressions”asfun-damentaltomeaningandthought,23inparticular,forexample,argu-inginhislittleessayMusicalUnderstandingthatinstrumentalmusic,whileitdoessometimesexpresslinguisticallyarticulablethoughts,initshighestformsalsoexpressesthoughtswhicharenotlinguisticallyarticulable.24Similarly,Gadamergenerallyseemsinclinedtorejectposi-tion(2),andtoacceptinsteadaversionofHegel’salternativeposition.2519Seemy“HegelandSome(Near)Contemporaries:NarroworBroadExpressivism?”pp.168–170.20Seeibid.,pp.168–171.21Seeibid.,p.174note53.22See“TheDevelopmentofHermeneutics,”inDilthey’sSelectedWritings,ed.byH.P.Rickman(Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,1979),esp.pp.248–249.23See,forexample,TheFormationoftheHistoricalWorldintheHumanSciences,pp.168,173,230–231.24Seeibid.,p.245.Dilthey’spositionhereisnotastraightforwardborrowingofHegel’s,however.Foronething,unlikeHegel,Diltheyseemsattractedtothemoreradicalversionofthealternativeposition(thataccordingtowhichthecontentexpressedbyanonlinguisticmediumissometimesinexpressiblebylanguagetoutcourt).Foranotherthing,aswewillseebelow,Hegeldidnothimselfconsiderinstrumentalmusicacounterexampletoprinciple(2).25SeeespeciallyGadamer,TruthandMethod,pp.360–363;GesammelteWerke(Tubingen,J.C.B.Mohr,¨1993),vol.8,pp.4–5.LikemuchoftheGermantra-dition,however,Gadamerseemstovacillateonthisquestion(concerningsuchDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics181Inshort,aprominentstrandofHegel’sthoughtrejectedpositions(1)and(2),andbydoingsopreparedthegroundforthesubsequenthermeneuticalpositionsofGadamerandDilthey.iiButarethesetwoHegelianturnsinhermeneuticsprogress?Asapre-ludetoaddressingthatquestion,itisworthnotingthatHegelhimselfactuallyseemsquitetornaboutthem,thatmuchofthetimehehimselfinsteadseemsinclinedtostayfaithfultopositions(1)and(2).Thus,counterbalancingthepassagesfromlaterpartsofthePhe-nomenologyofSpiritwhichbespeakarejectionofposition(1),thereareearlierpartsofthetextwhichseemrathertobespeakitsacceptance.Forexample,inapassagefromtheintroductionwhichechoesHerderbothconceptuallyandverbally,Hegelwritesconcerningthework’sinvesti-gationintothehistoryofshapesofconsciousness:“Wedonotneedtoimportstandards[Maßstabe],ortomakeuseofourownbrightideasand¨thoughtsduringthecourseoftheinquiry;itispreciselywhenweleavetheseasidethatwesucceedincontemplatingthematterinhandasitisinandforitself”(para.84).26AndasIhavealreadymentioned,whilethework’slate“Religion”chapterinterpretsChristianityinanassim-ilationistmannerasexpressingtheHegelianinsightofGod’sidentitywithmankind,theearlier“UnhappyConsciousness”chapteronthecontraryinterpretsChristianityinthespiritofposition(1)asfailingtorecognizeGod’sidentitywithmankind.27Likewise,theotherwritingsofHegel’scitedearlierwhichseemtobespeakarejectionofposition(1)arecounterbalancedbywritingswhichseemrathertobespeakitsacceptance.Forexample,asearlyas1788wefindHegelarguingthattheancients,andinparticulartheGreeks,hadconceptsdifferentfromours,andthatitisconsequentlyoneofvacillationselsewhereintheGermantradition,seemy“HegelandSome(Near)Contemporaries:NarroworBroadExpressivism?”pp.169–175).Forexample,insomepassagesheseemsonthecontrarytofavorposition(2)(e.g.,TruthandMethod,pp.72–73,360,433),andindeedhisfrequentemphasisonthelinguisti-calityofallunderstandingseemstocommithimtodoingsoaswell.Moreover,whilethepassagescitedatthebeginningofthisnoteseemtosupportHegel’smod-erateversionofhisalternativeposition,otherpassagesseemtosupportthemoreradicalalternative,namelythatnonlinguisticartcansometimesexpressmeaningsandthoughtswhicharenotlinguisticallyexpressibleatall(e.g.,ibid.,pp.xii–xiii;GesammelteWerke,vol.8,p.388).26Cf.Redding,Hegel’sHermeneutics,pp.81–82.ConcerningtheechoesofHerderinthispassage,seemyHegel’sIdeaofaPhenomenologyofSpirit,p.414.27Seeibid.,pp.417–418.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n182michaeln.forsterthemainadvantagesoflearningtheirlanguagesthatwecantherebyenrichourconceptualresources.28Again,unlikeTheLifeofJesus,thelaterpartsofThePositivityoftheChristianReligionfromjustshortlyafterwardarewrittenverymuchinthespiritofposition(1).Forexample,theyemphasizethesharpdifferencesbetweenancientJudeo-ChristianmoralandreligiousthoughtandwhatHegeltakestobethecorrectmoral-religiousoutlook,andtheygotoconsiderableinterpretivepainstodepicttheformerasitactuallywas.Again,the1808speech“OnClassicalStudies”stressestheimportanceofpenetratingancientGreekandRomanthoughtinitsaliennesstoourownbymeansofascrupulousstudyoftherelevantlanguagesandtexts.Finally(andperhapsmoststrikingly),inalongandthoughtfulreviewarticlefromaslateas1826onaworkbyWilhelmvonHumboldt,29HegelshowsgreatrespectfortwoassociatesoftheHerder–Schleiermachertraditioninhermeneutics,namely,vonHumboldthimselfandAugustWilhelmSchlegel;HegelstronglypraisesvonHumboldt’sapproachofscrupulouslygoingbacktotheancientIndians’originaltextsandlanguageinordertodiscovertheiroutlookinits“distinctiveness[Eigentumlichkeit],”andofrefusingtogo¨beyondthestrictsenseoftheoriginal;30andHegelhimselfmercilesslyhuntsdownandrejectsaseriesoffalseassimilationsofancientIndianconceptsandbeliefstomodernEuropeanones.31Similarly,counterbalancingHegel’sprominentrejectionofposition(2)inhisAestheticslectures,thereareseveralfeaturesofvariousHegeliantextswhichseemrathertobespeakacommitmenttoposi-tion(2).Foronething,hisearliertreatmentofaestheticmattersinthePhenomenologyofSpiritseemsmuchmorestronglyinfavorofposition(2)thanopposedtoit.Itisnodoubtpossibletoreadtheshort,cryp-ticstatementsconcerningancientarchitectureandsculpturenearthestartofthe“Religion”chapterasalreadyimplyingHegel’slaterposi-tionconcerningtheseartforms(namely,insofarastheyseemtotreatancientarchitectureandsculptureasartformswhichwerenonlinguis-ticbutwhichnonethelessatleastinsomewayexpressedreligiousfactsnotyetexpressedorexpressibleinanyotherfashion).Butthemain28Seeibid.,p.360note2.29RezensionderSchrift“UberdieunterdemNamenBhagavad-Gitabekannte¨EpisodedesMahabharata.VonWilhelmvonHumboldt,”inG.W.F.Hegel,Werke(FrankfurtamMain,Suhrkamp,1986),vol.11.30Ibid.,pp.132–133.31Ibid.,pp.141,184,203,andsoforth.Thereis,however,anothersideofHegel’sarticlewhichsomewhatqualifiesthiswholestrongidentificationwiththeexistinghermeneuticaltradition:athesistotheeffectthatthereisnonethelesssomethingwhichallhumanmindsshareincommon,namelyourmostgeneralconcepts(ibid.,pp.149,184,203).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics183thrustofthetextisinsteadsupportiveofposition(2).32Thus,tobeginwithsomeearlierpartsofthetext,Hegel’sstrategyofargumentinthe“Sense-certainty”chapterpresupposesthatthoughtessentiallyrequiresarticulabilityinlanguage(orbypointing).Andinthe“PhysiognomyandPhrenology”sectionhewritesevenmoreexplicitlythat“althoughitiscommonlysaidthatreasonablemenpayattentionnottothewordbuttothethingitself,...thisisatonceincompetenceanddeceit,tofancyandtopretendthatonemerelyhasnottherightword,andtohidefromoneselfthatreallyonehasfailedtogetholdofthethingitself,i.e.theconcept.Ifonehadtheconcept,thenonewouldalsohavetherightword”(para.328;emphasisadded).33Accordingly,whenwereachthetreatmentofancientEgyptianarchitectureandsculptureinthe“Reli-gion”chapter,Hegelseemstowanttosaythatbecausetheseartformslackedlanguage,theywerenotreallymeaningful:Onaccountofthemerelyabstractintelligiblenessoftheform,thesignificanceoftheworkisnotintheworkitself,isnotthespiritualself.ThuseithertheworksreceiveSpiritintothemonlyasanalien,departedspiritthathasforsakenitslivingsaturationwithrealityand,beingitselfdead,takesupitsabodeinthislifelesscrystal[i.e.thepyramid];ortheyhaveanexternalrelationtoSpiritassomethingwhichisitselfthereexternallyandnotasSpirit–theyarerelatedtoitastothedawninglight,whichcastsitssignificanceonthem[i.e.thesun/AmunRa]...Buttheworkstilllackstheshapeandouterrealityinwhichtheselfexistsasself;itstilldoesnotinitsownselfproclaimthatitincludeswithinitaninnermeaning,itlacksspeech,theelementinwhichthemeaningfillingitisitselfpresent.Thereforethework,evenwhenitiswhollypurgedoftheanimalelementandwearsonlytheshapeofself-consciousness,isstillthesoundlessshapewhichneedstheraysoftherisingsuninordertohavesoundwhich,generatedbylight,iseventhenmerelynoiseandnotspeech,andrevealsonlyanouter,nottheinner,self...Thesoulofthestatueinhumanshapedoesnotyetcomeforthfromtheinnerbeing,isnotyetspeech,theouterexis-tencethatisinitsownselfinward.(paras.692–697;cf.paras.697–698,709–710,713)NoristhistensionmerelyonebetweentheearlyHegelandthelateHegel,foreventhelateHegelisstillatpointsstronglyattractedtoposition(2).OnesymptomofthisisthefactthatwithintheAestheticslectures,although,aswehaveseen,heinterpretscertainnonlinguisticarts,namely,ancientarchitectureandsculpture,ascounterexamples32Iamheremodestlyrevisingwhatnowseemstomeahastyimplicationat“HegelandSome(Near)Contemporaries:NarroworBroadExpressivism?”pp.172–173thatHegel’spositiononthismatterinthePhenomenologyofSpiritisthesameashispositionintheAestheticslectures.33Cf.“HegelandSome(Near)Contemporaries:NarroworBroadExpressivism?”p.173.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n184michaeln.forstertoposition(2),heinsteadinterpretsothernonlinguisticarts,namely,Christian-erapaintingandinstrumentalmusic,asconformingtoposition(2):totheextentthattheyexpressmeaningorthoughtatall,thishasapriorlinguisticarticulationorarticulability.34Tobealittlemoreprecise,sometimesintheAestheticslectureshecommitshim-selftothenaıveanduntenableviewthatthesetwononlinguisticarts¨simplydonotexpressmeaningsorthoughtsatall,butinmorecon-sideredremarksherathersuggeststhattheydoso(atleastinsomecases),butthatthemeaningsandthoughtsinquestionareparasiticonapriorlinguisticarticulationorarticulability.Thiswholepositioncanbeseenfromthetextintwomainways:First,forHegel,whereasancientarchitectureandsculptureareparadigmatically“symbolic”and“clas-sical”arts,respectively,Christian-erapaintingandmusic(alongwithpoetry)areparadigmatically“romantic”arts.ButaccordingtoHegel“romantic”artsaregroundedin,andexpress,theoutlookoftheChris-tianreligion,i.e.anoutlookwhoseprimaryexpressionislinguistic.35Second,Hegel’sspecificinterpretivecommentsonChristian-erapaint-ingandinstrumentalmusicreinforcethemoralthatheunderstandswhatevermeaningsandthoughtstheyexpresstohaveapriorlinguis-ticarticulationorarticulability.Totakepaintingfirst,thatiscertainlytrueofhisinterpretationsofChristianreligiouspainting.Forexample,whenheinterpretsRaphael’scontroversialpaintingtheTransfigura-tionhedoessointermsofideasfromthebible,andindeedactuallyquotesfromMatthew’sgospelwhathetakestobethecentralbiblicaltextexpressedinthepainting:“Wheretwoorthreearegatheredinmyname,thereamIinthemidstofthem.”36ButthesameisalsotrueofHegel’sinterpretationoftheothermaincategoryofpaintingonwhichhefocuses:Dutchgenrepainting.Occasionallyhetreatsthisnaivelyaslackingmeaningsandthoughtsaltogether,asmerelyimitativeoftheDutchlandscapesandotheraspectsoflifewhichitdepicts.However,inhismoreconsideredremarksheinsteadtreatsitasindeedexpressing34IdonotmeantosuggestthatthisstrikingasymmetryinHegel’streatmentofdif-ferentnonlinguisticartsintheAestheticslecturesinitselfamountstoanincon-sistencyorthatitismerelyinadvertent.Tosaythatcertainnonlinguisticartsexpresscontentinanoriginalwaywhereasothernonlinguisticartsonlydosoinawaythatisparasiticonlanguageisnotinconsistent.Moreover,farfrombeinginadvertent,thisasymmetryplaysanimportantsystematicroleforHegel,consti-tutingthefoundationforhisfamousthesisoftheendofart,thatis,hisfamousthesisthatartlosesitsimportanceinthemodernperiod.35See,forexample,Hegel’sAesthetics(Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1998),p.526.36Ibid.,p.860.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics185meaningsandthoughtsbutinsuchawaythattheywereoneswhichhadapriorlinguisticarticulationorarticulability,pointingout–veryperceptively,Ithink–thatDutchgenrepaintingdoesnotinfactmerelyimitate,butalsoexpressessuchthought-imbuedsentimentsastheDutch’sprideintheirhard-wonpoliticalautonomy,intheirhard-wonreligiousautonomy(Protestantism),andinalandscapewhichislargelytheirowncreation.37Similarly:Hegelsometimesnaivelythinksofinstrumentalmusicasnotexpressingmeaningsorthoughtsatallbutonlycontentlesssubjectivityorfeeling38–whatevermeaningsorthoughtsitmaycausetooccurbeingcausedtooccuronlyaccidentally.39Butinmoreconsideredremarksheinsteadimpliesthatitsometimesdoes,andmoreoveroughtto,conveymeaningsandthoughts(albeitvaguely),andheevidentlyunderstandsthemeaningsandthoughtsinquestiontobeoneswhichwerealreadylinguisticallyexpressedorexpressiblebythecomposerratherthanamonopolyoftheinstrumen-talmusicinquestion.40Moreover,inanevenstrongerlatecommitmenttoposition(2),HegelinhisEncyclopaediarepeatstheclaimofthought’sessentialdepen-denceonlanguagewhichwerecentlysawhimcommittedtointhePhenomenologyofSpirit:Itisinnamesthatwethink...We...onlyhavedeterminate,genuinethoughtswhenwegivethemtheformofobjectivity,ofbeingdistinguishedfrominward-ness,i.e.theformofexternality,andindeedofsuchanexternalityasatthesametimebearstheimprintofthegreatestinwardness.Onlythearticulatedsound,theword,issuchaninwardexternalthing.Towanttothinkwithoutwords,asMesmeroncetriedto,isthereforeclearlyanabsurdity...Theinexpressibleisintruthonlysomethingdark,fermenting,whichonlyachievesclaritywhenitisabletoattainverbalexpression.41(para.462,Zusatz)37See,forexample,ibid.,pp.597–600.ItissomemeasureofHegel’sperceptivenessherethatevensuchagreatmodernarthistorianasPanofsky,whoisnormallyany-thingbutreluctanttofindmeaningsandthoughtsexpressedinpaintings,implau-siblydeniesthemtothissortofpainting(E.Panofsky,MeaningintheVisualArts(Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress,1982),p.32).38See,forexample,Hegel’sAesthetics,pp.28,626,891–894.39Ibid.,pp.899–900.40Ibid.,pp.902,932,954.PassagessuchastheseshowthatreadingsofHegel’sposi-tiononinstrumentalmusicwhichemphasizehisconceptionofitascontentless–forexample,E.Hanslick,OntheMusicallyBeautiful(Indianapolis,Hackett,1986),pp.77,83,andP.Moos,DiePhilosophiederMusikvonKantbisE.v.Hartmann(Berlin,1902),pp.148–149–tellonlyhalfofthestory.41Cf.my“HegelandSome(Near)Contemporaries:NarroworBroadExpressivism?”p.173.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n186michaeln.forsterInshort,asignificanthereticalsideofHegelbothbeginsandremainsstronglyinclinedtostayfaithfultopositions(1)and(2).iiiNowitmayjustpossiblybethecasethatHegelhaswaysofreconcilingtheseapparentconflictsinhisposition.Forexample,concerningtheapparentconflictbetweenrejectionofandcommitmenttoposition(1)inthePhenomenologyofSpirit,Ihavearguedelsewherethatthisconflictisprobablyonlyapparentratherthanreal–duetoatransitionthatoccurswithinthetextbetweensignificantlydifferenttheoreticalcontextswhichrequiredifferentconceptsofmeaningand,accordingly,differentapproachestointerpretation.42Andinhis1826reviewarticleonvonHumboldt,Hegelhimselfdevelopsanotherpotentialstrategyofreconciliation(onewhichmaybecompatiblewiththatjustmentioned):TorecasthisideaslightlyintermsofamoderndistinctionofFrege’s,heineffectsuggeststhatinterpretationinconformitywithposition(1)iswhatisneededinordertospecifypeople’smeanings,butthatanassimilatingsortofinterpretationwhichviolatesposition(1)iswhatisneededinordertospecifytheirunderlyingreferents(i.e.,thefeaturesofrealitywhichtheyaretryingtoexpress,howeverinadequately).43Again,oneauthorwhohasnotedaversionofHegel’sapparentlyconflictingcommitmenttoandrejectionofposition(2)withinthePhenomenologyofSpirithasattemptedtoprovideasystematicreconciliationforthiscasetoo.44However,Iwillleavethisquestionasidehere,sinceitislikelytobeofmoreinteresttoHegelscholarsthantomoregeneralreaders.Instead,Iwouldliketoconsiderthe(primafacie)conflictssimplyassuch,andsaysomethingtowardtheiradjudication.ivItseemstomethatpositions(1)and(2)areinfactbasicallycorrect,andthattheprominentstrandinHegeland(underhisinfluence)subsequenthermeneuticswhichattacksthemismisguided.Considerfirstposition(1).ItisnotaltogethereasytodiscernHegel’sreasonsforrejectingthispositioninfavorofinterpretingviewpointsfromthepastinawaywhichassimilatesthemtohisownconceptsand42Hegel’sIdeaofaPhenomenologyofSpirit,pp.418–419.43RezensionderSchrift“UberdieunterdemNamenBhagavad-Gitabekannte¨EpisodedesMahabharata.VonWilhelmvonHumboldt,”p.184.44S.Hahn,“HegelonSayingandShowing,”JournalofValueInquiry,28:2(1994).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics187principles,butIwouldsuggestthatthefollowingthreeconsiderationsallplayimportantrolesforhim:Argument(a).OnelineofargumentwhichseemsprominentinOntheNatureofPhilosophicalCritiqueandthePhenomenologyofSpiritisessentiallythis:Itturnsout,Hegelbelieves,thatwhenoneinterpretsnon-Hegelianviewsinthescrupulousmannerofposition(1),theyallprovetobeimplicitlyself-contradictory(indeed,atthefundamentalleveloftheirveryconcepts,ortheveryperspectives–thevery“shapesofconsciousness”–withinwhichtheyarearticulated);thatonlyHegel’sownviewpointisself-consistent,andthatitaloneprovestobejustifiedandtrue.Oncethishasbeenshown,furtherinterpretationofnon-Hegelianviewsinthemannerofposition(1)consequentlyseemsratherpointless;itnowseemsmorefruitfultotrytointerprettheminacharitablemannerwhichaimstomaximizetherecov-eryofHegel’sownstandpointfromthem.45Argument(b).Asecond,closelyrelated,lineofargumentisthis:History,includinginparticularthehistoryofexpressionsofmeaningandthought(inart,religion,andphilosophy),canulti-matelybeseentohavebeenteleologicalincharacter,tohavebeenaimingattheachievementofthestandpointofHegelianphilosophyinthemodernworld,astandpointwhich(incontrasttothosewhichprecededit)isatlastself-consistent,justified,andtrue.ThisimplicitteleologyagainwarrantsinterpretingviewsfromthepastasattemptstoexpressthestandpointofHegelianphilosophy.Argument(c).Afurtherandquitedifferentlineofargumentisthis:AsIhaveexplainedinmoredetailelsewhere,46Hegeltakesthenovelandradicalpositionthatmentalstatesingeneral,includ-ingstatesofmeaninginparticular,areconstitutedbyphysicalbehavior,butinanopen-endedwaysuchthataslongasaper-sonisstillaliveandsocanengageinfurtherbehaviorhecancontinuetomodifyevenhis“past”mentalstatesorstatesofmeaning(whichiswhyinthePhenomenologyofSpiritHegelwritesapprovinglyof“Solon,whothoughthecouldonlyknow[someone’sparticularindividuality]fromandafterthecourseofthewholelife”[para.315],andmakesthecorrespondingpointconcerningthesupra-individualabsolutemindthat“oftheAbsoluteitmustbesaidthatitisessentiallyaresult,that45Cf.myHegel’sIdeaofaPhenomenologyofSpirit,pp.418–419.46Seeibid.,pp.93–102.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n188michaeln.forsteronlyintheendisitwhatittrulyis”[para.20]).Also,asIhaveagainexplainedelsewhere,47Hegeltakesthefurtherpositionthatmeaningisessentiallysocial,thatitisofitsverynatureconstitutedbythelinguisticbehaviornotmerelyofanindivid-ualbutofawholecommunityorcommunaltradition.Nowifoneputsthesetwopositionstogether,theyseemtoimplythataslongastherelevantcommunityorcommunaltraditioncon-tinuestoexist,eventhemeaningsofadeadindividualfromthepastaregoingtobesubjecttomodificationbythatcommunityorcommunaltradition.SoIwouldsuggestthatthisisafurtherlineofargumentwhichinclinesHegeltoarejectionofposition(1)infavorofhiscontraryproto-Gadamerianpositionconcern-inginterpretation.Nowafirstpointtonotehereisthatitisbynomeansclearthattheseargumentsareconsistentwitheachother.Inparticular,arguments(a)and(b)seemtoimplythatthereissuchathingasthesortoforigi-nalmeaningaimedatbytheinterpretivemethodofposition(1)(theproblembeingmerelythatitalwaysturnsouttobesayingsomethingself-contradictory,unjustified,anduntrue)whereasargument(c)seemstoimplythatthereisnot.However,sinceeachoftheargumentsalsofacesindependentproblems,Iwillnotpursuethisproblemofmutualinconsistencyanyfurtherhere.Noneoftheargumentsseemstomecompellingintheend.Theplau-sibilityofargument(a)dependsontheplausibilityofHegel’sattemptsinhisLogicandhisPhenomenologyofSpirittodemonstratethatallnon-Hegelianconceptsorallnon-Hegelian“shapesofconsciousness”areimplicitlyself-contradictory.Butsurely,onlythemosthardbittenanduncriticalofHegelianswouldwanttoclaimthatthoseattemptsaresuccessful.Itseemsveryunlikelyindeedthatallnon-Hegelianviews(orindeed,allnon-anythingviews)areafflictedwithimplicitinconsistency.Argument(b)faresnobetter.Foritissurelyintheendquiteimplau-sibletosupposethatitisthecase,letalonethatHegelhasshownittobethecase,thatthewholeofhumanhistory,includinginparticu-larthewholehistoryofthought,hasbeenteleologicallydirectedattheattainmentofHegelianphilosophyinthemodernworld(orindeed,attheattainmentofanyothermodernviewpointforthatmatter).Hegel’sattempttoprovethatithasrestsontwomainpillars:first,hisdemon-strationofthestandpointofhismatureLogicbymeansofthePhe-nomenologyofSpiritandbymeansoftheinternalargumentofthe47Ibid.,p.205ff.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics189Logicitself;andsecond,hisdemonstrationinhislaterlectureseriesonart,religion,andphilosophythattheviewpointswhichhavearisenintheseseveralareasofcultureoverthecourseofpasthistorycanplausi-blybeinterpretedasprogressivelymoreandmoreadequateexpressionsofthatstandpoint.Butitwouldbeimplausibletosuggestthateitherofthesepillarsstandsuptocriticalscrutinyintheend.Nor,Ithink,doesargument(c)work.OnewayinwhichtoseewhynotistoexcavateoneofthelinesofthoughtwhichprobablyledHegeltoembracehisradicalopen-endedbehavioristconceptionofthemindandmeaninginthefirstplace.48Hegel’spredecessorHerderhadconceivedmentalstates,includingstatesofmeaning,as“forces[Krafte],”whichheconceivedinarealistmannerasunderlyingcon-¨ditionsaptforproducingcertainpatternsofbehavior(notinanantire-alistmannerassimplyreducibletothosepatterns).However,HegelinhisearlyLogic,Metaphysics,andNaturePhilosophy,andthenagainmorefamouslyinthe“ForceandUnderstanding”chapterofthePhe-nomenologyofSpirit,subjectedsucharealistconceptionofforcetoacritiquewhichledhimtoreconceiveforceinantirealistterms.Implic-itlyretainingHerder’sgenericconceptionofmentalstates,includingstatesofmeaning,asforces,butnowreconceivingthelatterinthisantirealistmanner,leftHegelwithhisopen-endedbehavioristtheory.NowtheimportantthingtonotehereisthatifHegel’sargumentsagainsttherealistconceptionofforcecanbesatisfactorilyanswered(asIwillnottrytoargueherebutassumetheycan),thentheHerderianposi-tionhasplausibleresourcesforunderminingbothHegel’sopen-endedbehaviorismandhissocialtheoryofmeaning,andhenceforundermin-ingargument(c)intwoways.First,itpromisestoundermineHegel’sopen-endedbehaviorismbyprovidinganattractivecontrarytheorythatmentalstates,includingstatesofmeaning,areunderlyingconditionsaptforproducingpatternsofbehavior,conditionswhichmoreovermayverywelloccurdetermi-natelyatspecifictimeswithinanindividual’slife.Butsecond,italsopromisestoundermineHegel’sargumentforhissocialtheoryofmeaning.Thatargument,whichhedevelopsinthePhe-nomenologyofSpirit,takestheformofattemptingtoshowthatnoneofthevariouswaysinwhichonemighttrytovalidateourcommonsenseintuitionthatmeaningissomethingwhichcouldinprinciplebepurelyindividual,andwhichcanbeachieveddeterminatelybyanindividualataparticularpointwithinhislife,isdefensible.49Herder’sconcep-tionofstatesofmeaningasrealist“forces”promisestoundermine48Foramoredetailedtreatmentofthissubject,seeibid.,ch.2andp.338note109.49Foranaccountofthisargument,seeibid.,p.207ff.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n190michaeln.forsterthatargumentbyshowinghowmeaningcouldbeapurelyindividualachievement,andmoreoveroneachieveddeterminatelyataparticularpointwithintheindividual’slife.50Furthermore,notethattheHerderianconceptionofmentalstatesandstatesofmeaningasrealist“forces”hasseveralcompellingintuitiveadvantagesoverHegel’salternativeconceptionofthem:UnlikeHegel’sconception,Herder’scanmakesenseofstrongcommonsenseintuitionswehavethatpeopleareofteninmentalstateswhichhappentoreceivenobehavioralexpressionatallthatthefactofbeinginamentalstateisconstitutedsolelybysomethingthathappensatthetimetowhichweassignit(notinadditionbyfuturebehavior);thatamentalstateisoftenthecauseofcorrespondingbehavior(notmerelyconstitutedbyit);thattherecould,inprinciple,verywellbepurelyindividualactsofmeaning,forexampleifacosmicRobinsonCrusoeweretostartkeepingtrackofhisgoatsbydevelopingasystemofchalkmarksonhiscavewallsignifyingthegoatsandtheirnumbers;andthatwhatapersonmeantisafactconstitutedsolelybywhathappenedatthetimetowhichweassignhishavingdoneso(notinadditionbyhisownfuturebehaviorandthatofacommunityorcommunaltraditiontowhichhebelongs).Inshort,itseemstomelikelythatargument(c)breaksdownattwokeypoints,andmoreoverforreasonswhichoneofthechampionsofposition(1)intheprevioushermeneuticaltradition,namely,Herder,hadessentiallyalreadysupplied.However,itmayalsobeworthconsideringGadamer’sargumentsforrejectingposition(1),sincetheseturnouttobesignificantlydifferentfromHegel’s.AsfarasIcansee,Gadameroffersfourmainarguments,asfollows:51Argument(a).Bothinthecaseoftheartsandinthecaseoflinguis-tictextsandutterances,interpretationschangeovertime,andthesechanginginterpretationsareinternaltothemeaningofthe50Forafullerstatementofwhatisessentiallythesamephilosophicalpoint,seemyWittgensteinontheArbitrarinessofGrammar(Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress,2004),ch.4,whereIinvokearealistconceptionofdispositionsverysimilartoHerder’srealistconceptionofforcesinordertodefeatWittgenstein’smuchmorefamousanalogueofHegel’sargument.51Idonotconsidertobe,andthereforewillnottreatas,argumentsalargefamilyofGadamerianurgingsthatweshouldassimilateinterpretation(inthesenseofachievinganaccurateunderstandingofatext,utterance,orwhatnot)tovariousothersortsofactivitiesfromwhich,primafacieatleast,itisinfactessentiallyandcruciallydifferent–inparticular,there-presentationofaworkof(theatricalormusical)art;legal“interpretation”;textualexplicationandapplication;conver-sationaimedatachievingagreement;andtranslationintoanotherlanguage.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics191art,text,orutteranceinquestion,sothatthereisnosuchthingasanoriginalmeaningindependentofthesechanginginterpre-tations.52Argument(b).Theoriginalmeaningofartisticorlinguisticexpres-sionsfromthepastisalwaysstrictlyspeakingunknowablebyusduetotheessentialroleinallunderstandingofahistoricallyspecificformof“pre-understanding”or“prejudice”whichonecanneverentirelyescape.53Argument(c).Theoriginalmeaningissomething“dead,”some-thingnolongerofanypossibleinteresttous.54Argument(d).Allknowledgeishistoricallyrelative,sointerpretiveknowledgeissoinparticular.55Nowafirstpointtonoteaboutthiswholecaseisthatarguments(a)–(c)seemtobeinconsistentwitheachother:argument(a)seemstosaythatthereisnosuchthingasan“originalmeaning”whereasarguments(b)and(c)seemtosaythatthereis(butthatitisunknowableand“dead”);argument(b)seemstosaythatitisunknowablewhereasargument(c)seemstoimplythatitisknowable(but“dead,”ofnopossibleinteresttous).However,Gadamermightperhapsbeabletocopewiththisproblembyrecastingthesethreeargumentsintheform:thereisnosuchthingasan“originalmeaning”...;moreover,eveniftherewere,wecouldnotknowit...;andfurthermore,evenifwecouldknowit,itcouldbeofnopossibleinteresttous....56Andaswewillsee,theargumentsfaceindependentproblems.SoIwillnotdwellfurtheronthisproblemofmutualinconsistency,butwillinsteadconsidereachoftheargumentsseparately.Argument(a)seemstobeimplicitlyincoherent:Considerthecaseoftexts,forexample.Tosaythatinterpretationsofatextchangeovertimeispresumablytosay,roughly,thattheauthorofthetextmeantsomethinginparticular,thattherethenaroseaninterpretationAwhichmeantsomethingabitdifferentfromthat,thattherethenaroseafurtherinterpretationBwhichmeantsomethingabitdifferentagain,52See,forexample,TruthandMethod,pp.304,350.53See,forexample,ibid.,p.218ff.,261,269,235–274.AlsoGesammelteWerke,vol.2,p.475;vol.8,p.377.54See,forexample,TruthandMethod,p.149;cf.GesammelteWerke,vol.8,p.377(whereGadameralludesrevealinglytoNietzsche’sfamousargumentalongsimilarlines).55See,forexample,TruthandMethod,pp.175,203ff.56Cf.Gorgias’streatiseConcerningNatureorWhatisNot:thereisnothing;eveniftherewere,onecouldnotknowaboutit;evenifonecouldknowaboutit,onecouldnotcommunicatethatknowledgetoanyoneelse.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n192michaeln.forsterandsoon.Inotherwords,theverynotionofchanginginterpretationsseemstopresupposeanoriginalmeaning(indeed,awholeseriesoforig-inalmeanings,onebelongingtothetext,andthenonebelongingtoeachofitssubsequentinterpretations).57Moreover,asfarasIcansee,Gadameroffersnorealargumentforhisverycounterintuitiveclaimthatsubsequent(re)interpretationsareinternaltoanauthor’smeaninginthefirstplace.Inparticular,themerefactsthat(re)interpretationsoccur,andthatauthorsoftenanticipateandevenwelcomethis,bynomeanssufficetoshowthis.Argument(b)runsintoanepistemologicalproblem:Ifoneisalwayslockedintoamodifyingpre-understanding,thenhowcanonepossiblyknowthatotherperspectiveswhicharebeingmodifiedexist?(Inonefor-mulationofhispositionwhichespeciallypromptsthissortofobjection,Gadamerwritesthat“thediscoveryofthehistoricalhorizonisalwaysalreadyafusionofhorizons.”58)Moreover,asIhavearguedelsewhere,thissortofepistemologicalproblemeventuallyleadstoaconceptualproblemaswell:aproblemaboutwhetherinthatcaseitevenmakessensetospeakofsuchperspectives.59Furthermore,Gadamer’sassump-tionthatpre-understandingisinternaltounderstandingandthatitisalwaysinsurmountablyhistoricallyspecificseemsveryquestionabletobeginwith.Onepossibleobjectiontoit,whichmanycontempo-raryAnglophonephilosopherswouldbelikelytofindattractive,isthatthenotionthatpre-understandingisinternaltounderstandingviolatesanantipsychologisticinsightconcerningmeaningandunderstandingwhichweowetoFregeandWittgenstein.60However,Ibelievethatone57Gadamer’sstrangesuggestionatonepointthattheinterpreter’scontributionalwaysgetsreabsorbedintothemeaningandsovanishes(TruthandMethod,pp.430–431)seemstobeasymptomofthisincoherenceinhisposition.Whatheisreallytryingtosayhereisthattherebothisandisnotareinterpretationinvolved,buthemasksthiscontradictionfromhimselfandhisreadersbycastingitinthemorepicturesqueandlesstransparentlyself-contradictorymetaphoricalformofaprocessofprecipitationfollowedbyreabsorption.58GesammelteWerke,vol.2,p.475.ForafullerdevelopmentofthissortofobjectionagainstarelevantlysimilarpositionofWittgenstein’s,seemyWittgensteinontheArbitrarinessofGrammar,ch.7.59Seeibid.Theargumentiscomplicated,soIwillnotgointoithere.60Gadamerwouldnodoubtrejectthecharacterizationofhistheoryofpre-understandingas“psychologistic,”onthegroundthatpre-understandingisratherafeatureofadeeperHusserlianlife-worldorHeideggerianDasein,orwhatnot.Indeed,atonepointhehimselfexpressessympathywithaformofantipsychol-ogism,namelyHusserl’s(GesammelteWerke,vol.2,p.197).However,itcouldplausiblybearguedthatthesortofantipsychologismwhichweowetoFregeandWittgensteinconflictsnotonlywithseeingrun-of-the-millpsychologicalprocesses(e.g.,havingsensationsorimages)asinternaltomeaningandunderstanding,butDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics193shouldbeskepticalaboutthisantipsychologism.61SoitisnotonthisgroundthatIwouldquestionGadamer’sassumption.Instead,Iwouldsuggestthatwhatiswrongwithitisitsimplicationthatitisimpos-sibletoabstractfromone’sownpre-understandingandrecapturethepre-understandingofahistoricalother.Indeed,IwouldsuggestthatHerder’sconceptionoftheessentialroleofEinfuhlung¨intheinterpre-tationoftextsfromthepastalreadyquiteproperlypointedtowardanabilitywhichwepossesstoperformjustthissortofimaginativefeat,andtotheessentialcontributionwhichexercisingthisabilitymakestoourachievementofanexactunderstandingofpasttexts’originalmeanings.62Argument(c)isperhapstheweakestpartofGadamer’scase.Farfrominevitablybeing“dead,”orofnopossibleinteresttous,theoriginalmeaningsoftextsandutterancesfromthepast,andfromcontemporary“others,”canbeofgreatinteresttous,andformanydifferentreasons.Onereason(whichHerderandDiltheybothalreadyproperlystress)issimplythatdiscoveringsuchmeaningssatisfiesourcuriosityandenrichesourexperience.Anotherreason(againalreadyimportanttoHerder)isthatsuchdiscoveriesbothexpressandpromoterespectandsympathyfor“others.”Anotherreason(againalreadydeartoHerder)isthatitisreasonabletohopethatsuchdiscoverieswillacquaintuswithconcepts,convictions,values,techniques,andsoonwhichhelpustoimproveourowninvariousways.Anotherreason(againonealreadyimportantforHerderandDilthey,butalso,asImentionedearlier,forHegel)isthatsuchdiscoveriespromisetomakeessentialcontributionstowardourself-understanding,bothbyenablingustosituateourownperspectiveinacomparativecontextandbyenablingustounderstandhowitarose.Andnodoubttherearefurthergoodreasonsaswell.Finally,argument(d)doesnotseemcompellingeither.Oneprob-lemwithitliesinthewell-knownfactthatthethesisofrelativismseemstorunintoproblemsofself-contradictioninconnectionwiththequestionofwhetherthisthesisisitselfofmerelyrelativevalidity.Gadamertouchesonthisproblematvariouspoints,buthisanswerstoitarenaıveandunconvincing:Atonepointheconcedesthata¨self-contradictionarises,butrespondsthatthismerelyshowsthealsowithseeingGadamerianpre-understandingasinternaltomeaningandunder-standing.61Foralittlediscussionofthismatter,seemy“Herder’sPhilosophyofLanguage,Interpretation,andTranslation:ThreeFundamentalPrinciples,”pp.354–356.62Formoreaboutthis,seeibid.,andalsomy“Herder’sImportanceasaPhiloso-pher,”inVonderLogikzurSprache,ed.byR.BubnerandG.Hindrichs(Stuttgart:Fromann-Holzboog,2007).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n194michaeln.forsterweaknessofthesortof“reflection”thatrevealsthisandobjectstoit!63Atanotherpointhearguesthatthethesisofrelativismisnota“proposition”butmerelysomethingofwhichonehas“conscious-ness,”sothatitanditsownsubjectmatterare“notatallonthesamelogicallevel.”64Butsurelytheallegedfactthatwhatisinvolvedismerelyaconsciousnessthatrelativismistrue,ratherthan,say,anout-rightassertionthatitistrue,wouldnotdiminisheitherthefactortheunacceptabilityoftheself-contradictiononewhit.65Anotherproblemwithargument(d)isthat,contrarytoGadamer’sevidentintentiontoholdthatmeaning’srelativitymakesitdistinctivevisavisothersub-`jectmatters,andhenceresistanttothesortsofmethodswhichcanlegitimatelybeusedinconnectionwiththem,inparticularthe“posi-tivist”orobjectivity-presupposingmethodsofthenaturalsciences,thisargumentwouldleavemeaningnoless(ifalsonomore)objectivethananythingelse.Inshort,itseemstomethatneitherHegelnorGadamerhasprovideduswithanycompellingargumentagainstposition(1).vLetusturnnowtoposition(2).Aswasmentionedearlier,inhisAestheticslecturesHegeltreatsancientEgyptianarchitectureandancientGreeksculptureascounterexamplestothisposition,asexpres-sionsofmeaningsandthoughtswhichwerenotyetexpressiblebytheartistsinquestioninanyotherway,andinparticularnotinalinguisticway.However,aswasalsomentioned,Hegelintheverysamelecturesinterpretsothernonlinguisticarts,inparticularthepaintingandinstru-mentalmusicoftheChristianera,asconformingtoposition(2),asexpressingwhatevermeaningsandthoughtstheyexpressinawaythatisparasiticonapriorlinguisticarticulationorarticulability.Nowitseemstomethattheformersideofthiswholeaccountisimplausible,butthatthelattersideisplausible,sothat,tothisextentatleast,posi-tion(2)intheendappearsmoreplausiblethanitsrejection.Letmesaysomethingtojustifyeachhalfofthisassessmentinturn.Consider,tobeginwith,thesideofHegel’saccountwhichconflictswithposition(2).Torepeat,thissideofhisaccountmainlyappealsto63TruthandMethod,pp.308–309.64Ibid.,pp.406–407.65Foradiscussionofabroaderrangeofpossiblerelativistpositionsandanexpla-nationofwhatiswrongwitheachofthem,seemy“HegelianversusKantianInterpretationsofPyrrhonism:RevolutionorReaction?”(longversionforthcom-ing).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics195twocases,namely,thearchitectureoftheancientEgyptiansandthesculptureoftheancientGreeks;insharpcontrast,hisintuitionsaboutlaterpaintingandinstrumentalmusicconformtoposition(2).Nowitshould,Isuggest,immediatelyarouseone’ssuspicionherethatitistheoldermaterials,forwhichhisknowledgeofrelevantlinguistic,textual,cultural,andbiographicalcontextisnaturallythinner,whichreceivetheformertreatment,whereasthemorerecentmaterials,forwhichhisknowledgeofsuchcontextisnaturallyricher,receivethelatter.Thatistosay,itseemsreasonabletosuspectthatwhereashisassessmentofthemorerecentmaterialsasconformingtoposition(2)isevidentiallywell-grounded,hisassessmentoftheancientmaterialsasincompatiblewithposition(2),hisdenialofalinguisticortextualbasistothemeaningsandthoughtswhichtheyexpress,ismerelyaresultofhisrelativeignoranceofrelevantevidence.Thatgeneralsuspicionis,Ithink,borneoutbycloserscrutinyofhisaccount.Consider,first,thecaseofancientEgyptianarchitecture.Itdoesseembeyondseriousdoubtthatthisexpressedreligiousmeaningsandthoughts,asHegelbelieves(thoughwhether,ashealsobelieves,thethoughtsinquestionweretrueonesisofcoursequiteanothermat-ter).ButwhyshouldonetakethemeaningsorthoughtsinquestiontohavebeenlinguisticallyunexpressedandinexpressiblebytheEgyptiansratherthanlinguisticallyexpressedorexpressiblebythem?IsHegel’sinclinationtodosonotsimplyanerrorresultingfromthefactthatinhisdaypeopledidnotyethavethemeanstoidentifytheEgyptians’lin-guisticexpressionsof,orlinguisticmeansforexpressing,themeaningsorthoughtsinquestionbecauseEgyptianhieroglyphicshadnotyetbeenproperlydeciphered,norEgyptologyyetestablishedasaproperacademicdiscipline?66Inotherwords,Hegelseemssimplytohavemisinterpretedtherealsituationthatthebuildingsinquestionclearlyexpressedreli-giousmeaningsandthoughtsbuthehappensnottoknowanyEgyptianlinguisticexpressionsof,orlinguisticmeansforexpressing,theseduetohislackofrelevantinformationasasituationinwhichthebuildingsinquestionclearlyexpressedreligiousmeaningsandthoughtsbutthesewerenotlinguisticallyexpressedorexpressiblebytheEgyptians.6766ChampollionfirstdecipheredEgyptianhieroglyphicsinthe1820s,thedecadeinwhichHegeldeliveredhisAestheticslectures,butreallyonlypublishedtheresultsin1832inhisGrammaireegyptienne´andDictionnaireegyptien´.AcademicEgyp-tologyreallyonlybeganafterRichardLepsius’sexpeditionof1842.67Cf.Bungay,BeautyandTruth(Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1984),p.102.BungayoffersasimilardiagnosisofHegel’sgeneralinclinationtoseetheEgyptiansasintrinsicallymysterious,butdoesnotbringthisgeneralpointtobearonthemorespecificissuewithwhichIamconcernedhere.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n196michaeln.forsterWhataboutGreeksculpture?Primafacieatleast,onewouldsurelythinkthatthesalientpointtomakeherewasonewhichHerderhadalreadymadeforcefullyandrepeatedly,namely,thatGreeksculpturewasdeeplygroundedin,andexpressiveof,ideasfromGreekpoetryandmyth,thatis,ideaswhichwerealreadylinguisticallyexpressible,andindeedexpressed–sothatthecaseofGreeksculptureconformswellwithposition(2).68Hegel’scontraryassessmentofGreeksculpturerestsonhisjudg-mentthatitwastheGreeks’highestexpressionoftheAbsolute,thatitexpressedsomethingabouttheAbsolutewhichnootherareaofGreekculture,andinparticularnolinguisticareaofGreekculture,yetexpressedorwasabletoexpress(atleast,notasclearly).Whatwasthissomething?Hegel’sanswerisnotexactlyobviousfromhistexts,butitseemstobethatGreeksculpturealreadyexpressedGod’sidentitywithmankind,69andthatinthiswayitalreadyanticipatedChristian-ity’ssubsequentmoreexplicit,linguisticexpressionofsuchaniden-tity.70ThisisanimportantpartoftheforceofhisremarkthatGreek“sculpture...individualizesthecharacterofthegodsintoanentirelyspecifichumanformandperfectstheanthropomorphismoftheclassi-calIdeal,”71andalsoofhisfrequentcharacterizationofGreeksculptureascombininguniversalitywithindividuality–whichinessentialpartmeans:divinitywithhumanity.However,itseemstomethatthisHegelianinterpretationofGreeksculptureagainprovestobequitedubiousoncloserinspection.Therearetwomainproblemswithit(standinginmildtensionwitheach68ConcerningHerder’sstatementsofthisposition,seemy“Gods,Animals,andArtists:SomeProblemCasesinHerder’sPhilosophyofLanguage,”pp.78,91note72.69NotmerelyGod’squalitativesimilaritywithmankind,note.InHegel’sview,thatwassomethingwhichhadalreadybeenwellexpressedbyotherareasofGreekcul-turebesidessculpture,forexample,bypoetry.ThusalreadyinhisearlytheologicalwritingshehademphasizedthattraditionalGreekpoetryandmythhadalreadyexpressedthegods’qualitativesimilaritywithmen(incontrasttoatleastapromi-nentstrandofthesubsequentJudeo-Christiantradition,whichinsteadstressedGod’squalitativedissimilaritywithmen).70See,forexample,Hegel’sAesthetics,p.435.Strictlyspeaking,Hegel’spositionmust,Ithink,bealittlemorecomplicated.ItcouldbeobjectedtothepositionwhichIhavejustattributedtohimthateveniftheGreekshadnotyetlinguis-ticallyexpressedsuchanidentity,suchanidentitywassurelyatleastalreadylinguisticallyexpressiblebythem(afterall,theyhadthelinguisticconceptstheos,anthroposˆ,andesti!).Hegel’sresponsetosuchanobjectionwould,Ithink,bethat,strictlyspeaking,whatGreeksculptureexpressedwasnotmerelytheidentityofGodandmankindbuttheir“absoluteidentity”ortheir“identityindifference,”andthatthisisaconceptwhichtheGreeksdidnotyetpossessinalinguisticform.71Ibid.,p.490.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics197other):First,itseemsvulnerabletoanobjectionthatitinvolvesanerroneousreading-inofameaningorthoughtthatwasnotyetintendedbytheGreeksculptors.TheGreeks’pervasiveandclearexpressionsintheirtraditionalliteratureofasharpnumericaldistinctionbetweengodsandmen(coincidentwiththequalitativedistinctionbetweendivineimmortalityandhumanmortality)provideagoodprimafaciereasonforrejectingthisHegelianinterpretationoftheirsculpture.Forexample,didnotPhidiasmakehisstatueofZeusatOlympia–orevenmuchlater,ChareshisstatueofHeliosatRhodes(the“ColossusofRhodes”)–ashugeashefamouslydidinimportantpartpreciselyinordertoaccordwithsuchatraditionalconceptionofasharpdistinctionbetweengodsandmen?Second,someonemight,though,reasonablyrespondtothisobjec-tiononHegel’sbehalfthatthehistoricalsituationisnotsoclear-cut.Inparticular,suchapersonmightreasonablypointtothegeneralexal-tationofthehumanincomparisonwiththedivinewhichoccurredinfifth-centuryAtheniandemocraticculture,takingasecularforminPro-tagoras,anda(forpresentpurposes,evenmorerelevant)religiousforminAeschylus(whosePrometheushassometimesbeeninterpretedasreallymankinditself,forexample);andalsototheOrphicandPythagoreantra-ditionwhichculminatedinPlato’sPhaedo,withitsownverydifferentwayofeffacingthedivisionbetweenthehumanandthedivine(namely,byclassifyingthehumansoulasimmortalandhencedivine).Hegelmayindeedhimselfhavesuchevidenceinmind,forhesinglesoutashumanembodimentsofGreeksculpture’sidealbothfifth-centuryAthe-niandemocraticleaders,suchasPericles,Thucydides,andXenophon,ontheonehand,andSocratesandPlato,ontheother.72However,sucharesponseonHegel’sbehalf,ratherthanhelpinghim,infactleadstoseri-ousdifficultiesofitsown.Foronething,itisbynomeansclearthatthisevidencecanoverturntheanti-HegelianinterpretationoftheintendedsignificanceofGreeksculpturebasedontraditionalliterature(perhapsthesculptorsweremorerootedinthatthaninthismoreavant-gardephilosophyandliterature).Foranotherthing,andmoreimportantly,thisresponseisself-defeating,becausethetwostrandsofAtheniancul-turetowhichitappealswerebothlinguisticoneswhichpre-existed(oratleastco-existedwith)thesculptureinquestion.Inotherwords,ironicallyenough,theveryexistenceofsuchevidencefortheideasinquestionposesaproblemforHegel;histheorycouldinprinciplehave72SeeBungay,BeautyandTruth,p.113.Concerningthesecondofthetwotraditionsjustmentioned,notethatHegelsaysofalltheseindividualsthatthey“standlikeimmortal,deathlessimagesofthegods,beyondthereachofdeathandtempo-rality.”DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n198michaeln.forsterwithstoodtheabsenceofanyindependentevidenceforsuchideasatthetimeinquestion,since,aswesaw,itispartofhispositionthatsculptureleadstherestofthecultureindevelopingthem,buthistheorycannotwithstandthepresenceofphilosophical-literaryevidenceforthem,fortheverylinguisticnatureofsuchevidenceentailsthat,insuperficiallyseemingtosupportthetheory(byshowingthatthesculptorsmayhavehadtherelevantideasinmind),itintruthratherrefutesthetheory(byshowingthetheory’sclaimoftheideas’autonomyoflanguagetobeerroneous).73Intheend,therefore,asinthecaseofEgyptianarchitecture,Hegel’sinterpretationofGreeksculptureasincompatiblewithposition(2)looksimplausible.Insum,themainevidenceonwhichHegelbaseshisdenialofposi-tion(2)seemsnotinfacttosupportthatdenial.Hisconvictionthatitdoessoresultsfromhismistakenlyreading-outlinguisticmeaningsandthoughtswheretheywereprobablyinfactpresent(especiallyinthecaseofEgyptianarchitecture)andfromhismistakenlyreading-innot-yet-linguisticmeaningsandthoughtswheretheywereprobablyinfacteithersimplyabsentorelsealreadylinguistic(especiallyinthecaseofGreeksculpture).74Concerning,next,Hegel’sexplanationofpaintingandinstrumentalmusicinamannerwhichconformstoposition(2):AsIhintedear-lier,Hegel’smostconsideredobservationsonpaintingandinstrumentalmusicinthisspirit–namely,thoseinwhichheispreparedtoseethese73Thisproblemisnot,Ithink,significantlyreducedif,followingasuggestionImadeinFootnote70,oneunderstandssculpture’smessagetobe,forHegel,morestrictlythe“identityindifference”ofGodandmankind.Thetwostrandsofphilosophical-literarycultureinquestionherecouldinfactfairlyplausiblybeinterpretedasexpressingsomesuchconception,butinthatcase,onceagain,inthusseemingtosupportHegel’stheoryontheonehand,theywouldtothesameextentbeunderminingitontheother.74AhardboiledHegelianmight,perhaps,respondtothissortofcriticismthatthenatureoftheAbsoluteandofitsnecessaryself-developmenthasbeenindepen-dentlyprovedbyHegel’sLogicandthatitisthereforelegitimateforHegeltoimputecorrespondingnonlinguisticmeaningsandthoughtstothehistoricalartinquestiondespitetheabsenceofsupportingevidenceoreveninthefaceofcon-traryevidence.However,sucharesponsewouldnotbeveryconvincing.First,itseemsquiteunlikelythatHegelreallyprovedanysuchthinginhisLogic(thoughitwouldofcourserequireadetailedexaminationofhisLogictoshowthathedidnot).Second,itisanimportantpartofHegel’sownofficialmethodology–onwhichheprideshimselfincomparisonwithSchelling,forexample–thatinapplyingtheLogictoempiricalevidenceonemustnot,sotospeak,strongarmthelatter(see,forexample,theprefacetothePhenomenologyofSpirit,andtheintroductiontotheEncyclopaedia’sPhilosophyofNature).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics199artsasexpressingmeaningsandthoughts,butunderstandsthemean-ingsandthoughtsinquestiontobelinguisticinnature–aregenerallyplausibleandperceptive.ThisisstrikinglytrueofhisaccountofDutchgenrepainting,forexample.Still,hisrefusaltoseeanycounterexampletoposition(2)intheseartformsrequires,butfortunatelyalsoadmitsof,furtherdefense.AlthoughHegelhimselfevidentlyfeelsotherwise,paintingandespe-ciallyinstrumentalmusicareunusuallypotentsourcesofatemptationtodenyposition(2).Forincontemplatingtheseartforms,especiallyinstrumentalmusic,onesurelyoftendoesgetapowerfulsensethatmeaningsandthoughtsarebeingexpressedwhichitisbeyondthecapac-ityof(existingorperhapsevenany)languagetocapture.Accordingly,theoriesoftheseartforms,especiallyofinstrumentalmusic,whichattributetothemsomesortofineffablemeaningandthoughtabound.Herearetwoexamples:Version(a).Aswasmentionedearlier,thelaterDiltheyinhisessayMusicalUnderstandingtreatsinstrumentalmusicasaprimeexampleofthefalsehoodofposition(2).Specifically,hearguesthatwhilesuchmusicdoesindeedoftenmerelyexpresslinguis-ticthoughts,initshighestformsitalsoexpressesnonlinguisticones,inparticularonesaboutthenatureofLifeitself.75Version(b).Hanslickarguesthatmusicexpressesstrictlymusicalideas.76And,followingthislead,StephenBungayargues–inexplicitrejectionofHegel’sapproachtoinstrumentalmusic–thatitisjustobviousthattherearenonlinguisticmusicalideasandthinking.77Despitetheadmittedseductivenessofsuchintuitionsaboutpaintingandespeciallyinstrumentalmusic,IstronglysuspectthatHegelisintheendrighttojudgethattheseartformsshouldbeexplainedinconformitywithprinciple(2).Letmethereforemakeafewpointsinsupportofsuchanassessment,focusingprimarilyontheespeciallyinterestingcaseofinstrumentalmusic.(Correspondingpointswouldapplytopainting,andprobablyalsotoothernonlinguisticarts.)Thesensethatinstrumentalmusicconveysmeaningsandthoughtswhichitisbeyondthepowerof(existingorperhapsevenany)languagetoexpresscanindeedseemverycompelling,andIdonotwanttosuggestthatitshouldbedismissedlightly.Nonetheless,itseemstomeprobablethatitisillusory.(Itmaybesalutaryinthisconnectiontoremindoneself75SeeTheFormationoftheHistoricalWorldintheHumanSciences,p.245.76Hanslick,OntheMusicallyBeautiful,pp.10,28.77Bungay,BeautyandTruth,p.137.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n200michaeln.forsterofthe–presumable–illusiontowhichweoftenfallvictiminwakingfromadreamthatwehaveentertainedmeaningsandthoughtsinthedreamwhicharelinguisticallyinexpressible.)Consider,first,Dilthey’sattempttovindicatethatsense.Diltheybelievesthatinstrumentalmusicinitshigherformsexpressessomesortofmetaphysicalorquasi-religiousthought(about“Life”).78Thisisacommonenoughconviction,andisindeednodoubtcorrect.Butwhyshouldonetakethethoughtinquestiontobelinguisticallyinex-pressibleratherthan–asHerderandHegelhadbothalreadyimplied–linguisticallyexpressible(andperhaps,moreover,actuallyderivedfromlinguisticallyexpressedmetaphysicsorreligion)?79Admittedly,thesortofthoughttowhichDiltheyrefersheremayonlyberathervaguelyexpressibleinlanguage.Butistherereallyanyreasontosupposethatthemusicexpressesitanylessvaguely?Bungay’sattempttovindicatethesenseinquestionisdifferent.Hisclaimisnotthatinstrumentalmusicexpressesmetaphysicalorreli-giousthoughtswhichtranscendlanguage,butratherthatitexpressesdistinctivelymusicalideasandthoughtswhichdoso.Thisclaimstrikesmeassomewhatmoreplausible,butstillintheendveryquestionable.Itseemsimportanttodistinguishbetweentwosortsofcaseshere.First,therearecasesinwhichtherelevantperson,sayacomposer,possessesalinguisticornotationalmeansofexpressingtheputativemusicalideasorthoughtsinquestion.Insuchcases,itdoesseemtomeappropriatetospeakofhishavingmusicalideasandthoughts.Butthen,thesearealsocasesinwhichhecanexpressthemlinguistically(evenmusicalnotationbeingplausiblyconsideredapartoflanguage).Second,therearecertainlyinadditioncasesinwhichapersondevelopsputative78Thecharacterizationof“Life”asametaphysicalorquasi-religiousprincipleismineratherthanDilthey’sown.79ForadiscussionofthematureHerder’scommitmenttothissortofpositioncon-cerninginstrumentalmusic’sexpressionofmetaphysicalorreligiousthoughts,seemy“Gods,Animals,andArtists:SomeProblemCasesinHerder’sPhilosophyofLanguage,”pp.78–79.ConcerningHegel’scommitmenttosuchaposition:(1)Hegel’simplicationthatinstrumentalmusicsometimesexpressesametaphysi-calmeaningisespeciallyclearatHegel’sAesthetics,p.932,wherehenotesthatsuchmusicsometimesdevelopsdissonancesandoppositionsandtheirresolu-tioninharmonyandmelody,thatis,aself-developingstructureanalogoustothatoftheAbsoluteasheconceivesit.(ForahelpfuldiscussionofthisaspectofHegel’saccountofinstrumentalmusic,seeH.Heimsoeth,“HegelsPhilosophiederMusik,”HegelStudien,2(1963),pp.197–201.)(2)Givenhisgeneralaccountofthenatureofinstrumentalmusic,andinparticularhisconceptionofitasa“romantic”artfoundedonChristianity’smessage,suchametaphysicalmeaningmustpresumablyinhisviewultimatelybelanguage-based.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics201musicalideasorthoughtswithouthavinganycorrespondinglinguis-ticornotationalmeansforexpressingthem.(Think,forexample,ofthenotuncommonphenomenonoftheskilledjazzorbluesmusicianwhodoesnotreadmusicandisverballyinarticulatetoboot.)However,isitreallysoclearthatinsuchcasesoneshouldspeakliterallyoftheperson’shavingmusicalideasandthoughtsratherthan,say(anappeal-ingalternative),ofhiscreating/perceivingcomplexsound-patternsand-relationships?Tomylinguisticear,atleast,suchacharacterizationwouldsoundoutofplaceifmeantliterally(thoughnodoubtalrightifonlymeantmetaphorically).Inshort,itseemstomethatnonlinguisticmusicalideasandthoughtsmaywell,onceagain,beawill-o’-the-wisp.However,toturnfrommererefutationtodiagnosis,Isuspectthattherearealsosomedeepersourcesfeedingthedelusivetemptationtosupposethatinstrumentalmusicexpresseslinguisticallyinexpressiblemeaningsandthoughts.Inparticular,Iwouldsuggestthatthistempta-tionarisesfrominstrumentalmusic’speculiarcombinationofacertainsortofinarticulatenesswithacertainsortofarticulateness–namely,relativeinarticulatenessinexpressingmeaningsandthoughtsandrela-tivearticulatenessinexpressingnuancesoffeelingandemotion(inbothcases,relativeascomparedtolanguage).80Thiscombinationoffeatures80Insuggestingthatinstrumentalmusicexpressessomethingaboutfeelingoremo-tionwhichcannotbeasaccuratelyexpressedbylanguage(alone),Iaminbroadagreementwithatraditionwhichincludesbothcomposersandphilosophers.Forexample,thecomposerMendelssohnsaysthatmusicalfeelingisindescribablebecauseitistoopreciseforwords(seeJ.W.N.Sullivan,Beethoven:HisSpiritualDevelopment(NewYork,Vintage,1960),pp.20–21;R.Scruton,TheAestheticsofMusic(Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1999),p.165,andthephilosopherS.Langerarticulatesasimilarpositioninseveralworks,includingFeelingandForm(NewYork,CharlesScribnerandSons,1953),ProblemsofArt(NewYork,Pantheon,1957),andPhilosophyinaNewKey(Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,1978).Thesuggestionthatinstrumentalmusicexpressesfeelingoremo-tion,andthatitconveysnuancesthereofmorepreciselythanlanguage(alone)can,requiressomedefenseandqualification,however.Foritisbynomeansalwaysconcededthatinstrumentalmusicexpressesfeelingoremotionatall,letalonethatitdoessomorepreciselythanlanguage–forexample,Hanslickfamouslydeniesthis.PerhapsthemostseriousobjectiontosuchaviewisonewhichwasfirstraisedbyHanslickhimself(OntheMusicallyBeautiful,pp.8–10):feelingsandemotionsoftheirverynatureincorporateintentionalobjects,whichseembeyondthereachofmusicalexpression.Scruton(TheAestheticsofMusic,p.165ff.)hasprovidedaveryperceptivetwo-partresponsetothissortofobjectionwhichwecantakeoverandbuildonhere.First,hepointsoutthatinstrumentalmusicoftendoesinfactexpressintentionalobjects(e.g.,churchmusicexpressesthethoughtofGod).Second,henotesthat,despitethefactthatemotionsessentiallyincludeintentionalobjects,itisinanimportantsensepossibletoidentifyemotionswith-outpinningdowntheirintentionalobjects–thatif,forexample,onecomesuponanunknownwomanweepinginapark,onemaybeablebyobservingherbehaviorDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n202michaeln.forstercaneasilygiverisetoillusionsthatinstrumentalmusicexpresseslin-guisticallyinexpressiblemeaningsandthoughtsinatleasttwodistinctways:First,instrumentalmusicoftenexpressesacomposer’slinguisti-callyexpressiblemeaningsandthoughtsbutinwayswhicharevague,makingithardforalistenertopindownthemeaningsandthoughtsinquestionwithanyprecision(fromthemusic).Thisgenuinepresenceofdefinitelinguisticallyexpressiblemeaningsandthoughtswhich,how-ever,thelistenerfindshimselfunabletopindownlinguisticallywithanyprecisioneasilygetsmisconstruedbyhimasapresenceofdefinitemeaningsandthoughtswhichcannotbelinguisticallyexpressed.81Sec-ond,musicoftenexpressesandcommunicatesmorepreciselythancouldbedonebylanguage(alone)certainnuancesoffeelingandemotion–thatis,certainpsychologicalstateswhichareotherthanmeaningsandthoughtsbutwhichcaneasilybemistakenforthem(especiallygiventhattheydoinvolvethem,82andthatothermeaningsandthoughtsareexpressedinthemusicaswell).83Ithereforesuggestthatwhenonethinksthroughtheseveralpos-sibleformsandsourcesofthetemptingintuitionthatinstrumentaltoidentifythecharacterofheremotionwithoutknowingtheintentionalobjectinvolved(e.g.,whethersheisweepingoverthedeathofaparent,thethanklessnessofachild,abandonmentbyahusband,orwhatnot).Third,Iwouldaddthatinsuchcasesitmayalsoinacertainsensebepossiblebyobservingtheperson’sbehaviortoidentifytheemotionmorepreciselythancouldbedonefromaverbaldescription,thattheperson’scomplexbehaviorinitscontextmayconveytoonethequalityoftheemotioninawaythatcouldnotbeachievedbyamereverbaldescriptioneitherofthebehavioranditscontextoroftheemotionitself(thoughonly“inacertainsense”becauseofcourseinanothersense,namelythatofpinningdowntheintentionalobject,theidentificationisexhypothesilessprecise).Thissituationsuggeststhat,similarly,nuancesofemotionmayinacertainsensebeexpressedmorepreciselybyinstrumentalmusicthancouldbeachievedbylanguage(alone)(eventhough,onceagain,inanothersense–thatconcernedwiththeidentificationoftheintentionalobject–theycanusuallyonlybeexpressedlessprecisely).81Avariantofthisillusioncanariseinconnectionwithacomposer’stechnicalmeaningsandthoughts,whicharecapableoflinguisticornotationalexpressionbyhim.Thesewillbepreciselygraspablebyalistenerwhohastechnicalexpertiseinmusic.However,alaymanwillagainoftensensetheirpresencebutfindhimselfunabletopinthemdownlinguisticallywithanyprecision,andsobeencouragedtoimaginethatlinguisticallyinexpressiblemeaningsandthoughtsareinvolved.82Concerningthispoint,seeFootnote80.83Theremaywellbefurthersourcesofthedelusivetemptationtoascribeineffa-blemeaningsandthoughtstomusicinaddition.Forexample,Raffmansomewhatplausiblydiagnosessuchatemptationintermsoftheexistenceofasortofmusicalgrammar,whichleadstoafalseexpectationofamusicalsemanticsduetothecon-junctionofgrammarwithsemanticsinthelinguisticcase(D.Raffman,Language,Music,andMind(Cambridge,MA,MITPress,1993),pp.40–41).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandHermeneutics203musicexpresseslinguisticallyinexpressiblemeaningsandthoughtsinthisway,theintuitionintheendprovestobeillusory.AsIimpliedearlier,analogouspointsholdforpaintingaswell(andprobablyalsoforothernonlinguisticarts).Forpaintingtoosome-timesexpresses(vague)metaphysicalor(quasi-)religiousthoughts;ittooinvolvestechnical“ideas”and“thoughts”whicharesometimeslinguisticallyexpressiblebytheartistandsometimesnot(e.g.,onesconcerningperspectiveorcolor);andittootendstocombinerelativeinarticulatenessintheexpressionofmeaningsandthoughtswithrela-tivearticulatenessintheexpressionofnuancesoffeelingandemotion(theformerpartofwhichpointisperhapsobvious;inconnectionwiththelatter,thinkforexampleofthenuancesoffeelingandemotionexpressedbyRembrandt’sself-portraits).Insummary,whereasHegel’sinterpretationofancientarchitectureandsculptureascounterexamplestoposition(2)intheendseemsimplausible,hisinterpretationofsubsequentpaintingandinstrumentalmusicasconformingtoposition(2)intheendseemsplausible.Tothisextentatleast,position(2)intheendlookslikethecorrectpositiontoadopt.84viInconclusion,then,IwouldsuggestthatHegeldeserveshighpraiseforhavingchampionedseveralvalidandimportantprinciplesconcerningthescopeandsignificanceofhermeneutics,butthathiscontributionsconcerningtheverynatureofinterpretationitselfweremuchmoreambiguous.Inthisconnection,hewasinparticularresponsiblefortwodramaticandinfluentialturnswhichoccurredinthedevelopmentofhermeneutics,buthewashimselfambivalentaboutbothofthem,andtheybotharguablyonreflectionprovetohavebeenmistakes(albeitimportantandinterestingones).Wheretheverynatureofinterpreta-tionitselfisconcerned,therefore,itisintheendtemptingtoproposetheslogan:BacktotheHerder–Schleiermachertradition,andtothehereticalstrandinHegelhimselfwhichremainedfaithfultoit!84Fortwoimportantqualificationsofthisassessment(whichdonot,though,over-turnit),seemy“HegelandSome(Near)Contemporaries:NarroworBroadExpres-sivism?”pp.178–191.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:11:55WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.008CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nfrederickneuhouser8Hegel’sSocialPhilosophyHegel’ssocialphilosophy,asarticulatedinhisPhilosophyofRight(1821),1presentsavisionoftherationalsocialorderthat,despitecertainobviousarchaisms,isstillofrelevancetoanyoneinterestedinreconcil-ingthebestaspectsofliberalsocialthought,includingitsconcernfortherightsanddignityofindividuals,withthehumanneedfordeepandenduringcommunalattachments.Hegel’sfundamentalclaimisthatasingleidea,properlyunderstood–theideaoffreedom2–providesthephilosophicalresourcesneededtogroundacomprehensiveaccountofthegoodsociety:whatmakessocialinstitutionsgood,onHegel’sview,isthattheyplayanindispensablerolein“realizing”freedom(PR,§4).3Theaimofthispaperistoexplainthisbasicthoughtbyexamininghow1AhelpfulguidetothetextisDudleyKnowles,HegelandthePhilosophyofRight(London:Routledge,2002).2Moreprecisely,itispracticalfreedom–freedomrealizedthroughaction–thatisatissueinHegel’ssocialphilosophy.Hegeldistinguishesthisfromspeculativefreedom,whichisreconciliationthatresultsfromcomprehendingtheworldphilo-sophicallyandaffirmingitasgood.3“PR”referstoG.W.F.Hegel,ElementsofthePhilosophyofRight,ed.byAllenW.Wood,trans.byH.B.Nisbet(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991),followedbysection(§)number.Hegel’sremarks(Anmerkungen)areindicatedby“A”andhisadditions(Zusatze¨)by“Z.”‘§151+Z”referstobothparagraph151anditsaddition.OtherworksofHegelarecitedasfollows:E=Hegel’sPhilosophyofMind,trans.byWilliamWallace(Oxford:OxfordUni-versityPress,1971),whichisPartIIIoftheEnzyklopadiederphilosophischen¨Wissenschaften;EL=EncyclopediaLogic,translatedasHegel’sLogic,trans.byWilliamWallace(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1975);PhG=PhenomenologyofSpirit,trans.byA.V.Miller(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1977);VPR1=DiePhilosophiedesRechts:DieMitschriftenWannenmann(Heidelberg1817/18)undHomeyer(Berlin1818/19),ed.byKarl-HeinzIlting(Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta,1983);VPR2=PhilosophiedesRechts:DieVorlesungvon1819/20ineinerNachschrift,ed.byDieterHenrich(FrankfurtamMain:Suhrkamp,1983).204DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sSocialPhilosophy205Hegelunderstandsandemploystheidealoffreedominjustifyingthethreeinstitutionsheregardsasessentialtoarationalsocialorder:thenuclearfamily,civilsociety(themarket-governedrealmofproductionandexchange),andthemodernconstitutionalstate.YetarticulatingHegel’sconceptionoffreedomisconsiderablymorecomplicatedthanthischaracterizationofhispositionsuggests.4Thisisbecausethereisnotjustoneconceptionoffreedomatworkinhissocialphilosophybutthree:personalfreedom,thefreedomofmoralsubjec-tivity,and“substantial”freedom(PR,§§149,257)or,asIwillcallit,“social”freedom.EachoftheseconceptionsoffreedomgroundsoneofthePhilosophyofRight’sthreemajordivisions:(i)personalfreedomisthebasisof“AbstractRight”(PR,§§34–104);(ii)moralfreedomisthetopicof“Morality”(PR,§§105–41);and(iii)socialfreedomistheconcernof“EthicalLife”(Sittlichkeit)(PR,§§142–360).5Clearly,understandingHegel’ssocialphilosophydependsondifferentiatingthesethreeconcep-tionsoffreedom.Butmoreisrequiredaswell.Sinceintherationalsocialorderthesethreetypesoffreedomarerealizedtogether–andsincesocialfreedomitselfincludesrealizingtheconditionsthatmaketheothertwopossible–understandingHegel’sviewrequiresustograsphowthethreeconceptionsfittogethertoconstituteasingle,thoughcomplex,idealoffreedom.Hegel’ssocialphilosophy,then,canbeviewedasanattempttodemonstratethecompatibilityofthreedistinctconceptionsoffreedomthatHegeltakeshiscontemporaries(andus)toregardasimportant.Inundertakingthisproject,Hegelthinksofhimselfasartic-ulatingphilosophicallywhathistoryitselfhasalreadydemonstrated.ForitisHegel’sviewthatthedistinctivesocialachievementofpost-Enlightenmentmodernity(inWesternEurope)isthecreation,inbasicoutline,ofacomplexlyorganizedyetcoherentsocialorderthatallowsfreedominallitsformstobefullyrealized.Letusbegin,then,byexam-iningthethreeconceptionsoffreedomthatHegel’ssocialphilosophydistinguishes.threeconceptionsoffreedomThesimplestoftheseconceptionsispersonalfreedom,whichservesasthefoundationofHegel’stheoryofindividualrights,themaincon-cernof“AbstractRight.”Thetypeoffreedomatissuehereisthefree4AcomprehensiveaccountofHegel’sconceptionoffreedomisprovidedbyAlanPatten,Hegel’sIdeaofFreedom(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999).5IexpandontheseandotherissuesconcerningHegel’sconceptionoffreedominFrederickNeuhouser,FoundationsofHegel’sSocialTheory:ActualizingFreedom(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2000).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n206frederickneuhouser(undetermined)choosingofends.Personsareconceivedofaspossessingasetofgivendrivesanddesiresthathavethecapacitytomotivatethemtoact,buttheyarepersonsinvirtueofthefactthattheyarenotdeter-minedtoactonthedrivesanddesirestheyhappentohave.Personshavetheabilitytorejectsomeoftheirdesiresandtoembraceothers;theyareable,inotherwords,to“stepback”fromtheirgiveninclina-tionsandtodecidewhichtosatisfyandhowpreciselytodoso(PR,§12).Hegelsometimescallsthewillthatdefinespersonhoodan“arbitrarywill”[Willkur¨](E,§492)inordertoemphasizethataperson’swillisconsideredfreesimplybyvirtueofhavingchosenwhichendstoactupon,regardlessofitsreasonsforhavingchosenasitdid.Thedoctrinesofabstractrightarearrivedatbyconsideringhowthesocialordermustbestructuredifpersonalfreedomistobesystem-aticallyrealized(realizedbyallitsmembers).Hegel’sansweristhatpersonalfreedomisrealizedwhenanindividualexercisescontroloveradeterminatesetofwilllessentities,or“things”(PR,§42),thatconsti-tutehisproperty.Overthatspecificportionoftheexternalworldthepersonhasunlimitedsovereignty,includingtherighttobeunimpededbyothersinthepursuitofhisownchosenends.Thepurposeofabstractright,then,istodefineandprotectforeachpersonanexclusivedomainforactionthatissubjectonlytohisownarbitrarywill.Abstractrightaccomplishesthisbyascribingtopersonsasetofrightsguaranteeingthemthelibertytodoastheypleasewiththeirproperty–theirlives,theirbodies,andthematerialthingstheyown.Individualsrealizeper-sonalfreedom,then,whentheyinhabitasocialworldthatsecuresforthemaprivatesphereofactionwithinwhichtheyareunhinderedbyothers–bybothotherindividualsandthestate–frompursuingwhat-everendstheychoose.MoralfreedomisamorecomplextypeoffreedomappropriatetowhatHegelcallsthe“moralsubject.”6Moralsubjectsarefree,orself-determining,notbecausetheymerelychoose(arbitrarily)whichamongtheirgivendesirestheywanttotakeasendsforactionbutbecausetheychooseinaccordancewithprinciplesthat“comefromthemselves.”Moreprecisely,moralsubjectssetendsforthemselvesinaccordancewiththeirownunderstandingofwhatis(morally)good.(Kant’sconcep-tionoftheautonomousagent,whodecideshowtoactbyconsultingwhatherownreason–viathecategoricalimperative–tellshertodo,istheparadigmofamoralsubject.)Theself-determinationassoci-atedwithmoralsubjectivityismorecomplexthanthatascribedtoper-sonsnotonlybecauseitinvolveswillinginaccordancewithnormative6Hegeloftenusesjusttheterm“subject”inthiscontext,butIuse“moralsubject”inordertoavoidconfusingthisideawithotherusesof“subject”inHegel’sphilosophy.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sSocialPhilosophy207principlesbutalsobecausethoseprinciplesare“thewill’sown”inthesensethatthemoralsubjecthasthecapacitytoreflectrationallyontheprinciplesitfollowsand,onthatbasis,toaffirm,reject,orrevisethem.Individualsrealizemoralfreedom,then,whentheysubscribetoaratio-nallyheldvisionofthegood,determinetheirendsinaccordancewithitandsuccessfullyrealizetheirvisionofthegoodthroughtheirownactions.7Onewaysocialinstitutionsareimplicatedintherealizationofmoralfreedomderivesfromtherequirementthatmoralsubjectsbeboundonlybyprinciplestheythemselvesrecognizeasgood.ThisimpliesthattherationalsocialordermustsatisfywhatHegelcallsthemostimportantrightofmoralsubjects(PR,§132),namely,thatallpracticaldictatesgoverningtheirlives,includingthelawsandnormsofsociallife,beacceptedandaffirmedasgoodbythesubjectswhoseactionstheygovern(E,§503A).Itisnotenough,however,thatsocialmem-bersinfactregardtheirsocialorderasgood;theidealofmoralfreedomalsorequiresthattheirattitudeberationallydefensible,thatthesocialordertheyaffirmbegenuinelyworthyofaffirmation.Asetofinstitu-tionsthatrealizesmoralfreedom,then,mustbeabletowithstandtherationalscrutinyofitsmembers.Asocialorderthatprohibitsrationalcriticismorwhoseappearanceofgoodnesscouldnotsurvivesuchques-tioningmightbeabletowintheactualassentofitsmembers,butitwouldfailtosatisfythedemandsplacedonitbytheidealofmoralfreedom.Incontrasttopersonalandmoralfreedom,wheretheemphasisisonthefreeindividualconceivedofasindependentofothers,socialfreedomconsistsincertainwaysofbelongingtoandparticipatinginthethreeprincipalsocialinstitutionsofmodernity(thefamily,civilsociety,andthestate).ThestartingpointforHegel’sconceptionofsocialfreedomishisunderstandingofthefreedomthat(free,male)citizensenjoyedintheancientGreekcity-state.Accordingtothisunderstanding,citizensinancientGreecehadsodeepanattachmenttotheirpolisthattheirmembershipinitconstitutedacentralpartoftheiridentities.FortheancientGreeks,participatinginthelifeofthepoliswasvaluableforitsownsake(notsimplyasameanstoachievingother,egoisticends),aswellasaprincipalsourceofthegoals,projects,andsocialrolesthatwerecentraltotheirunderstandingofthemselves.HegelregardsthesubjectiverelationthatGreekcitizenshadtotheirpolisasakindoffreedomfortworeasons.First,thefactthatcitizensdidnotregardthe7AsHegelputsit,themoralsubjectstrives“[i]tohaveinsightintothegood,[ii]tomakethegooditsintention,and[iii]tobringaboutthegoodthroughitsactivity”(E,§507,emphasesomitted).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n208frederickneuhousergoodoftheircommunityasdistinctfromtheirownenabledthemtoobeythelawsthatgovernedthem–lawsdirectedatthecollectivegood–withoutexperiencingthelawsasexternalconstraintsontheirwills.Second,theclassicalpoliswasthesourceofadistinctiveanddeepsatis-factionforitsmembers.Itprovidedasocialframeworkthatgavemean-ingtotheirlivesandservedastheprimaryarenawithinwhich,byful-fillingtheirrolesascitizens,theyachievedtheir“senseofself”throughtherecognitionoftheirfellowcitizens.(Aswewillsee,theformofsocialfreedomthatHegelespousesincludestwofurtherelements:first,theinstitutionsthatindividualssubjectivelyembracemustalsoobjectivelypromotetheirpersonalandmoralfreedom;second,thesocialorderasawhole–notjusttheindividualswhocompriseit–mustrealizeakindof“self-determination,”insofarasitconstitutesateleologicallyorganized,self-sustainingsystem.)AsthesereferencestoancientGreecesuggest,Hegel’sprojectinthePhilosophyofRightcanbeunderstoodasanattempttoreconcilethreedistinctvisionsoffreedom–personalfreedom,moralfreedom,andsocialfreedom–thatmodernityhasinheritedfromthepast.Hegelhimselfendorsesthisreadingofhisprojectbyidentifyingeachcon-ceptionoffreedomwithaparticularhistoricalerainwhichitaroseandwasdominant.Accordingtothisview,theideaofpersonalfree-domcomestousfromancientRomeandisexpressedintheRomanlegalpracticethatrecognizedallcitizensoftheempire(thoughnotslaves)aspersonae,bearersofspecificpersonalandpropertyrights.Theideaofmoralfreedom,incontrast,isaproductofthemodernworld.ItappearsfirstinthetheologyoftheReformation(intheviewthatGod’swordispresentintheheartofallbelievers),butitismostclearlyarticulatedinKant’sconceptionoftheautonomousmoralsub-ject,whoisboundonlybyprinciplesthatderivefromhisownrationalwill.ImplicitinthishistoricalunderstandingofHegel’sprojectistheviewthat,asinheritorsofthistradition,wemodernscouldnotregardasocialorderthatexcludedanyoftheseformsoffreedomasafullyrational,satisfyingworld.Fromthisperspective,then,therationalsocialordercanbedefinedasonethatfulfillsitsmembers’aspirationtobefreeinallthreeofthesesenses.Hegel’ssocialphilosophyisanattempttoshowthat,contrarytoappearances,thethreeprincipalsocialinsti-tutionsofmodernity,workinginconcert,canaccommodateeachoftheseideals.Theideaofsocialfreedomplaysacentralroleinthisargument,forinitsmodernformitintegratesthefreedomofancientGreecewiththetwoformsoffreedomthatsucceedithistorically,anditdoessointworespects.First,sociallyfreeindividualshaveasubjectiverelationtotheirsocialorderthatissimilartotheoneGreekcitizensDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sSocialPhilosophy209hadtotheirsbutthatisalsocruciallydifferent:inthemodernworldhavingidentity-constitutingattachmentstoone’scommunityismadecompatiblewithconceivingofoneselfasanindividual–thatis,asapersonwithrightsandinterestsseparatefromthoseofthecommunity,andasamoralsubjectwhoisbothableandentitledtopassjudgmentonthegoodnessofsocialpractices.8Second,theinstitutionswithinwhichmodernindividualsachievetheirparticularidentitiesalsopro-motepersonalandmoralfreedombybringingaboutthesocialcon-ditions(explainedbelow)withoutwhichthosefreedomscouldnotberealized.Thereis,atthesametime,aphilosophicallymorerigorouswayofdefiningtheprojectofthePhilosophyofRight.ThethreedivisionsofHegel’stext,togetherwiththeconceptionsoffreedomeachisbasedon,canbeunderstoodasstagesofaphilosophicalargumentwhoseaimistoarticulateacomprehensive,fullyadequateconceptionof(practi-cal)freedom.Thisconceptual(ratherthanhistorical)argumentbeginswiththesimplestconceptionofaself-determinedwill–thearbitrarilychoosingwillthatcharacterizespersons–anddemonstratestheneces-sityofsupplementingthatconceptionwithamorecomplexideaoffreedom(moralfreedom)byshowinghowpersonalfreedombyitselfisincomplete.Aconceptionoffreedomisshowntobeincompletewhentheattempttothinkaworldinwhichitisrealizedrevealsthatsuchaworldfailsinsomewayfullytoembodythecoreidealoffreedom,thatofawilldeterminedonlybyitself.Hegel’sconceptual(or“logical”)argumentinthePhilosophyofRightisobscuredbythefactthatitisnotarticulatedinthestraightforwardlydeductiveformthatphilosopherstraditionallyemploy.Instead,itscentralclaimsareembedded(implicitly)inthefamous“dialectical”transitionsthatmarkthetext’sprogressionfrom“AbstractRight”to“Morality”to“EthicalLife.”Hegel’sargumentinthefirstofthesetransitionscanbereconstructedasfollows.AsIhavenoted,personalfreedomisrealizedwhenanindi-vidualisgrantedexclusive,arbitrarycontroloveracertainportionoftheworldthatconstituteshisproperty.Theincompletenessofthiscon-ceptionoffreedomcomestolightbyconsideringtheconditionsunderwhichpersonalfreedomcanberealizeduniversally–thatis,byeverybeingwiththecapacityforfreechoice(whichistosay,everyhumanbeing).Hegel’sclaimisthatwhenweattempttothinkaworldinwhichpersonalfreedomisrealizeduniversally,weseethatitcannotbethe8ThecompatibilityofindividualityandsocialmembershipisaprominentthemeinMichaelO.Hardimon,Hegel’sSocialPhilosophy:TheProjectofReconciliation(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n210frederickneuhouseronlykindoffreedomthattheinhabitantsofsuchaworldenjoy.Moreprecisely,personalfreedomcannotbetheonlyfreedomsuchbeingsenjoy,ifthegoalofcompleteself-determinationistobeachieved.Thethoughthereisthatapersonlivinginaworldwherethepersonalfree-domofallindividualsisguaranteedcouldnotbefullyself-determinedifhepossessedonlyanarbitrarilychoosingwill,fortherewouldbearespectinwhichhisactionswouldhavetobeconstrainedbylawsthatdonotthemselvescomefromhisown(merelyarbitrary)will.Thisisbecauseinordertorealizethepersonalfreedomofeveryone,theactionsofallmustbesubjecttoconstraints.Thatis,everyone’sactionsmustbeboundbythoseprinciples–theprinciplesofabstractright–thatspecifywhichofanindividual’sactionsareinconsistentwiththepersonhoodofothers.Thus,oneoftheconditionsofthesystematicrealizationofpersonalfreedomisthatindividuals’actionsconformtothefundamentalcommandofabstractright:“Respectothersasper-sons”(PR,§36).Therationalsocialorderwillcodifytheprinciplesofabstractrightintoasystemoflawsandusethethreatofpunishmenttoenforcethem,butifthepersonswhoinhabitsuchaworldaretobefullyself-determined,theymustbeabletograsptherationalpurposebehindthoselawsandaffirmthem;thatis,theymustbeabletowilltheprinciplesthatconstraintheiractions.Butthisisjusttosaythatper-sonswhoarefullyself-determinedmustalsopossessthemorecomplexconfigurationofwillthatHegelascribestothemoralsubject(whichtakesitselftobeboundbymoralprinciplesthatcomefromitsownwill).What,then,arethedeficienciesofmoralfreedomthatnecessitatethemoveto“EthicalLife”anditsdistinctiveconceptionoffreedom(socialfreedom)?Here,too,theinadequaciesofmoralfreedomcometolightbyenvisagingtheconditionsunderwhichitcanberealizedintheworld.Theproblemsassociatedwithrealizingmoralfreedomareoftwotypes.First,realizingmoralfreedomdependsonsomethingoutsidetheindividualsubject’swillinthesensethatbecomingamoralsubjectpresupposesvarioussocialprocessesofcharacterformation,or“educa-tion”[Bildung].Amongotherthings,moralsubjectsmustbesocializedtoregardtheiractionsasconstrainedbynormativeprinciples,toreflectontheprinciplesthatoughttoguidetheiractions,andtowillinglyobeytheprinciplestheyrecognizeasgood.Second,moralsubjectsfallshortofcompleteself-determinationinthesensethat,consideredontheirown–apartfromtheplacestheyoccupyinthebasicinstitutionsofsociety–moralsubjectslacktheresourcestheyneedtogiveconcrete,nonarbi-trarycontenttotheideaofthegood.Whilesociallydetachedmoralsubjectsmaysincerelydesiretorealizethegood,withoutaconcretevisionoftheprojectsandformsoflifethatbestpromotethefreedomDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sSocialPhilosophy211andwell-beingofall(thegood),theycannotknowwhatspecificactionstheirallegiancetothegoodrequiresofthem.InHegel’swords,moralsubjectivityis“abstract,”“empty,”and“formal”(PR,§§134–137,141);itfailstosatisfythecriteriaforafullyself-determiningwillbecauseitcannotbyitselfgivesufficientdeterminacytoitsowngoverningcon-cept.TheideabehindHegel’sdoctrineofsocialfreedomisthattherem-edyforbothdefectsofmoralsubjectivityliesinanaccountofgood(orrational)socialinstitutions.Thus,forHegel,rationalsocialinstitutionsarechargedwiththedualtaskofsocializingtheirmembersintobeingswhopossessthesubjectivecapacitiesrequiredtorealizepersonalandmoralfreedom,andofprovidingasocialframeworkthatdefinestheparticularprojectsthatmaketheirlivesmeaningfulandgivedetermi-nacytotheirunderstandingofthegood.Eachofthesetaskspointstoanimportantrespectinwhichthesystematicrealizationofpersonalandmoralfreedomdependsonrationalsocialinstitutions.Thatsuchinstitutionssecuretheconditionsnecessaryforrealizingpersonalandmoralfreedomshouldnot,however,leadustothinkthatHegelvaluessocialmembershipforpurelyinstrumentalreasons(merelyasameanstoachievingpersonalandmoralfreedom).Onthecontrary,iftheprob-lemsposedbythefirsttwoformsoffreedomaretobesolvedinawaythatremainstruetotheidealofcompleteself-determination,thissolu-tionmustitselfgiverisetoanewconfigurationoftheself-determiningwill,onethatfindsexpressionintheideaofsocialfreedom.Inotherwords,themeansthroughwhichrationalsocialinstitutionssecuretheconditionsofpersonalandmoralfreedommustthemselvesembodyakindofself-determination;morethanbeingmerelymeanstothereal-izationoffreedom,therationalsocialordermustalsoitself,consideredasawhole,instantiatefreedom.9ThisclaimpointstoadistinctiveandpotentiallymisleadingfeatureofHegel’sview:socialfreedomisapropertythatcanbepredicatedofboththerationalsocialorderasawholeandtheindividualsocialmembersthatcomposeit.Untilrecently,interpretersofHegeloftenconstruedhistalkof“thefreewhole”asevidenceofthetotalitariancharacterofhissocialphilosophy,whichwasthoughttosubordinatetheinterestsofindividualstosomemysterious“freedomofthewhole.”Oneoftheprincipalaimsofthispaperistodiscreditthatmistakenunderstanding.Forinadditiontobeingapropertyoftherationallyorga-nizedsocialorderitself,socialfreedomisafreedomthatindividual9Hegelputsthispointbysaying:“InSittlichkeitfreedomis”(VPR1,248).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n212frederickneuhousersocialmembersrealize:10byparticipating(intherightways)intheinstitutionsofethicallife,individualsnotonlysecuretheconditionsoftheirpersonalandmoralfreedom,theyalsogiverealitytotheirownparticularidentitiesand,byaffirmingthelawsandsocialnormsthatgovernthem,theyseetheirsocialparticipationashavingitssourceintheirownwills.Bringingtogetherthevariousrequirementssocialfreedomissup-posedtomeetwillprovideuswithaconcisestatementofitsessen-tialfeatures:Inadditionto(i)securingthenecessaryconditionsofpersonalandmoralfreedom,therationalsocialorderwillrealizefree-domintwofurthersenses;(ii)individualsocialmemberswillbeself-determininginthesensethat,becausetheirself-conceptionsarelinkedtothesocialrolestheyoccupy,theirparticipationintheinstitutionsofethicallifewillbenotonlyvoluntarybutalsoanactivitythroughwhichtheyconstituteandexpresstheiridentities;and,(iii)thesocialorderitself–theensembleofsocialinstitutions–willconstituteaself-determiningwhole,onethatismorecompletelyself-determining(orself-sufficient)thananyindividualonitsowncanbe.Thus,theactionsofsociallyfreeindividualswillproceedfromtheirownwillsinadualsense:first,theirsocialparticipationwillbeexpressiveoftheirownself-conceptions(e.g.,asmother,teacher,andcitizenofaparticularstate).Second,byactinginaccordancewiththeirself-conceptions,theywillproducethetotalityofsocialconditionsthatmaketheirownpersonalandmoralfreedompossible,aswellashelptorealizeanentity–thesocialorderitself–thatismorecompletelyself-determinedthananyindividual.thedualstructureofsocialfreedomWhenHegelsetsouttoarticulatetheideaofsocialfreedominthePhilosophyofRight,hecharacterizesethicallifeas“theunityofobjec-tive...andsubjectivefreedom”(PR,§258A).Inanotherlocationhesayssomethingsimilar:“ethicallifeis[i]objective,realfreedomthat[ii]hasanexistenceinself-consciousnessbefittingoffreedom”(VPR1,248).Inthelatterclaimfreedomappearsintwoguises,onceas“objective,realfreedom”andonceasasubjectivephenomenon(a“self-consciousnessbefittingoffreedom”).Inconnectingethicallifetofreedominthesetwoways,Hegelisassertingtwoclaims.First,socialfreedomhasbothanobjectiveandasubjectivecomponent(PR,§§144,146);theformerexistsin“thelawsandinstitutions”oftherationalsocialorder(PR,10Thisissueisaddressedindetailinmydiscussionoftheholisticcharacterofsocialfreedom;Neuhouser,pp.38–49.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sSocialPhilosophy213§144;E,§538),whereasthelatterconsistsintheframeofmind,or“disposition,”ofsocialmembers.Second,theterms“objectivefree-dom”and“subjectivefreedom”implythateachcomponentofsocialfreedomcanbeunderstoodasakindoffreedominitsownright:Freedomboth“hasitsactualityinthesubjectivedisposition”ofindividuals(assubjectivefreedom)andis“objectiveandreal”(asobjectivefreedom)intheinstitutionsoftherationalsocialorder(VPR1,248).TheintuitionunderlyingHegel’stwo-partaccountofsocialfreedomiscapturedinthefollowingtwothoughts.First,incallingthelawsandinstitutionsofethicallife“objectivefreedom,”Hegelmeanstoclaimthatthereisasenseinwhichrationallawsandinstitutionsobjectivelyembodyfreedom–thatis,theyrealizefreedomindependentlyofthesubjectiverelationsocialmembershavetothem.Hence,freedomcanbesaidtoberealized(atleastpartially)simplyinvirtueofthefactthatrational(i.e.,freedom-promoting)lawsandinstitutionsexistandaresustainedovertime.OneideaHegelreliesonhereisthatrationallawsandinstitutionscreatethesocialconditionsofindividuals’personalandmoralfreedom.Thus,ifIliveinasocialworldthatsuppliesthecon-ditionsandresourcesIneedinordertoexistasapersonandamoralsubject–ifmysocietyeducatesmetovaluemyfreedom,enforcesasystemofindividualrights,makesitpossibleforeveryonetoownprop-erty,andsoforth–thenthereisasenseinwhichIamfree“objectively,”regardlessofwhetherIaffirm,reject,oramindifferenttotheinstitutionsthatinfactsecuremyfreedom.(Aswewillseebelow,rationallawsandinstitutionsembodyobjectivefreedominafurthersense:togethertheyconstituteasocialorderthatrealizes–orapproximates–thepropertiesofafullyself-determiningbeing.)Thesecondcomponentofsocialfreedomisexpressedinthedemandthatobjectivefreedomacquire“anexistenceinself-consciousnessbefit-tingoffreedom.”Theideahereisthatsocialmemberswhosebehaviorconformedexternallytotherequirementsofrationallawsandinstitu-tionsbutwholackedtheappropriatesubjectiverelationtothoselawsandinstitutionswouldfallshortoftheidealoffreedominanimportantrespect.Themerefactthatindividualsdowhatrationallawsandinsti-tutionsrequireofthemisnotsufficienttoensurethattheiractivityissubjectivelyfree–thatis,freeinthesenseinwhichactionscanbesaidtocomefromone’sownwillortobefreelywilled(asopposedtoinvolun-tary,coerced,ordeterminedbyanalienwill).Intheabsenceofsubjectivefreedom,socialmemberswouldbesubjecttoprinciples(embodiedinlawsandinstitutions)thatremainedexternaltotheirwills.Sincethesocialparticipationofsuchbeingswouldbegovernednotbytheirownwillsbutbysomethingexternal,theiractionswouldnotbe,subjectivelyspeaking,theirown.Ifsocialmembersaretobefullyself-determining,DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n214frederickneuhouserthen,itisnotenoughthattheymerelyconformtotheprinciplesthatmakethemfree(objectively);theymustalsohaveaconsciousrelationtothoseprinciplesthatmakestheirsocialactivitysubjectivelyfree–theymustinsomemannerknowandwillthoseprinciplesastheirown.TheSubjectiveElementofSocialFreedomThesubjectiveelementofsocialfreedomconsistsinwhatHegelcallsthe“subjectivedisposition”ofsocialmembers.Itcanbethoughtofasacertainframeofmind,orconsciousattitude,thatindividualshavewithrespecttothesocialinstitutionstowhichtheybelong.Thissubjectivedispositionis“befittingoffreedom”inthesensethatitisinvirtueofitthatindividualsexperiencetheirsocialparticipation–theirconformingtothedemandsofsocialinstitutions–astheirownfreelywilledactivity.ItmaybesurprisingtodiscoverthatHegelcharacterizesthedispositionthatissupposedtomakeindividualssubjectivelyfreeasakindoftrustintheirsocialinstitutions(PR,§268;E,§515).Evenmoresurprising,thistrustissaidtobegroundedinarelationofidentity(PR,§147A),oroneness(PR,§158),betweenindividualsandtheirinstitutionsinwhichtheformerperceivethelatternotas“other”(PR,§268)or“alien”(PR,§147)butasundifferentiatedfromthemselves(PR,§147).IntryingtounderstandwhatHegelmeansbysuchclaimsitisimportanttobearinmindthatthepointofhisdoctrineofsubjectivefreedomisnotthatindividualsoughttoadoptanattitudeoftrusttowardtheirinstitutionsregardlessofwhatthoseinstitutionsarelike.Itspoint,rather,istoarticulatethekindofattitudeindividualswouldhavetobeabletotaketotheirsocialorderiftheyweretorealizethefullpanoplyoffreedomsavailableinthemodernworld.Inotherwords,thedoctrineofsubjectivefreedomisanaccountofthedispositionsocialmembersoughttohavewhenthesocialorderisfunctioningasitshould(andcan,inthemodernworld).Hegelspellsoutthecontentofthesubjectivedispositionappro-priatetofreesocialmembershipintermsofthreeelements:sociallyfreeindividualsareconsciousoftheironenesswithsocialinstitu-tionsinsofarastheyregardthoseinstitutionsas(i)theirpurpose(orend);(ii)theiressence;and(iii)theproductoftheirownactivity(PR,§257).11Thefirstoftheseelementscanbethoughtofasaonenessofwills:sociallyfreeindividualsembracethecollectiveendsofsocialinstitutionsastheirown,andtheyregardtheiractivityonbehalfof11AlthoughPR,§257describesthesubjectivedispositioninvolvedinmembershipinthestate,thisthreefoldaccountappliesaswelltothedispositionappropriatetoethicallifeingeneral.SeethenearlyidenticalaccountsatPR,§152andE,§514.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sSocialPhilosophy215thoseendsasvaluableforitsownsakeratherthanasmerelyinstru-mentaltoachievingtheirprivategood.Thesecondelementreferstoaonenessbetweensocialmembersandtheirinstitutionsatthelevelofindividuals’self-conceptions,orpracticalidentities.12Thatis,socialmembers’understandingofwhotheyareasparticularindividualsisconstitutedbyandexpressedthroughtheirsocialmembership.Accord-ingtothethird,sociallyfreeindividualsregardthemselvesasonewiththeirsocialinstitutionsinthattheyknowthemselvestobetheproduc-ers(orreproducers)oftheirinstitutions:theyseetheirsocialworldassustainedbyandthereforedependentontheirowncollectiveactivity.13Hegeloftencharacterizestheonenessofwillthatexistsbetweensociallyfreeindividualsandtheirsocialinstitutionsasaunityofpar-ticularanduniversalwills(VPR2,124).Thisunityobtainswhenindi-vidualsneedpursueonlytheirownparticularendsinorderforthegoodofthesocialwhole(theendoftheuniversalwill)tobeachieved.Hegel’spointherehasitsoriginsinAdamSmith’sunderstandingofthehar-monythatexistsamongindividualandcollectiveinterestsinamarketeconomy,where“infurtheringmyendIfurthertheuniversal,andthisinturnfurthersmyend”(PR,§184Z).Yet,theharmonyofintereststhatsupposedlycharacterizesmarket-governedcivilsocietyfallsshortofthemoreperfectunityofparticularanduniversalwillsthatfiguresmostprominentlyinHegel’ssocialphilosophy.Eventhoughuniversalandparticularwillsconvergeincivilsociety,theyremain“external”tooneanotherinanimportantrespect:inamarketeconomythegoodofthewholeisrealizedonly“behindthebacks”ofindividualpartici-pants.Thatis,particularwillsareinharmonywiththeuniversalwillindependentlyofanyconsciousrelationindividualshavetothegoodofthewhole.Thisisnotthecaseinthefamilyandthestate.Familymem-bers,forexample,differfrommembersofcivilsocietyinthattheirwillsareuniversalnotonlyobjectivelybutsubjectivelyaswell.Thismeansthatfamilymembershaveaconsciousunderstandingofwhatisgoodfortheirfamilyasawholeandthattheyaremotivatedtorealizethatgood,evenwhendoingsoconflictswiththeirowninterestsasseparateindividuals.Iffamilymembersandcitizensconsciouslystrivetorealizethecol-lectivegoodoftheirfamiliesandstates,itmightbewonderedinwhatsensetheirwillsareparticularatall.Twopointsarerelevanthere.First,particularityforHegelisassociatedwiththeideasofqualitative12IborrowthistermfromChristineKorsgaard’sdiscussionofthetopicinTheSourcesofNormativity(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),pp.100–107.13Iwillsaynothingfurtheraboutthisaspectofsocialmembers’subjectivedisposi-tionsinceitismucheasiertograspthantheothertwo.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n216frederickneuhouserdeterminacyanddifferencefromothers.Tobeaparticularbeingistohaveatleastonespecificquality(or“determination”)thatisnotcom-montoallbeingsofthesamespecies.Tocallahumanwillparticular,then,istosaythatithasanendorinterestthatisnotsharedbyallhumanwillsandthatthereforemarksitasdifferentfromatleastsomeotherhumanwills.Thisisalsotosaythattheendsofaparticularwillderivenotfromsomeuniversalfeatureofhumanbeingsbutfromthespecificpositionanindividualoccupiesintheworld.TheparticularendsIembraceasafamilymember–tocarefortheparticularmem-bersofmyfamilyinwaysappropriatetomyparticularplacewithinit–distinguishmywillnotonlyfromthewillsofthemembersofotherfamilies(myendistocareforthisfamily)butalsofromthewillsoftheothermembersofmyownfamily(Icareforthisfamilyinaccordwithmyplacewithinit).Giventhisconceptionofparticularity,itisnolongerpuzzlinghowawillcanbebothparticular(havingdeterminateendsthatdistinguishitfromothers)anduniversal(consciouslydirectedatthecollectivegood).Thesecondpointrelevanttounderstandingtheparticularityofsocialmembers’willsisthatparticularwillsareattachedtotheirendsnotthroughabstractreason(reasonthatcommandsindependentlyofdesire)butthroughinclination(broadlyconstrued).14Thismeansthatindivid-ualshaveamotivationforactingontheirparticularendsindependentlyofanyreflectionundertakenfromthestandpointofapurelyrationalagentwhoabstractsfromhisparticularcircumstances,includinghisparticularrelationstoothers.Hegel’sideaisthataparticularwillisalwaysmotivated,inpart,byitsconceptionofitsowngoodandthatitsactionsonbehalfofthewholealsoprovideitwith(oratleastpromise)akindofparticularsatisfaction.Tosaythatthewillsoffamilymembersarebothparticularanduniversal,then,istosaythatfamilymembersareinclinedtoactinwaysthatfurthertheirfamily’sgoodastheyunder-standitandthattheyexperiencetheiractionforthesakeofthewholeasintrinsictotheirowngood.Incaringformychildrenandspouse,forexample,IdogoodtothoseIlove,Isecureinturntheirloveforme,and,aswewillseebelow,I“satisfy”myselfbycarryingoutasocialrolethatIidentifywithandthroughwhichIwinrecognition(asagood14Hegeluses“inclination”(Neigung)torefertonatural,sensibleinclinations,buthealsospeaksofspiritualorrationalinclinations(E,§474A),whicharenotnaturallygivenbutaretheresultsofsocialization.Thelatterinclinationsarespiritualinthattheyareexpressionsofanindividual’sself-conceptionandthereforepossibleonlyforspiritual,orself-conscious,beings.Thedesiretocareforone’schildrenandthedesiretovoteinanelectionarebothexamplesofspiritualinclinations.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sSocialPhilosophy217parentandspouse),bothfrommyfellowfamilymembersandfromthemembersofsocietyatlarge.Ofcourse,tosaythatsociallyfreeindividualsareinclinedtoworkforthecollectivegooddoesnotmeanthattheyneverexperienceconflictingdesiresinsituationswheretherequirementsoftheirrolescollidewithsomeoftheirpurelyself-interesteddesires.Whenmychild’sneedforattentionconflictswithmydesiretoreadmynewspaperinpeace,ImayhavetoexertsomeefforttodenythatdesireinordertodowhatIknowisbestoverall(includingbestformyself,sincebeingagoodparentisimportanttome).ThepointisthatinsuchacaseanyhesitationIexperienceisnotastrugglebetweeninclination,ontheonehand,andabstractreason,ontheother,butbetweentwo“inclinations”–twokindsofparticularsatisfaction–oneofwhichIregardaslesscentraltowhoIamthantheother.Inadditiontoworkingwillinglytoachievethecollectivegoodoftheinstitutionstowhichtheybelong,sociallyfreeindividualsviewthoseendsastheir“highest,”“absolute”ends(PR,§258;E,§514).Thismeansthattheirparticipationisnotonlyintrinsicallyvaluabletothembutalsotheirmosthighlyvaluedactivity.Understandingthisleadsustothesecondelementofthesubjectivedispositionassociatedwithsocialfreedom:theonenessbetweensocialmembersandtheirinstitutionswithrespecttotheir“essence,”orpracticalidentities.Itisthisfea-tureofHegel’sviewthatexplainshowforsakingpurelyself-interested(egoistic)endsinfavorofthegoodofthewholecanberegardednotasself-sacrificebutasitsopposite,namely,anactivitythroughwhichsocialmembersachieveselfhoodbyestablishingidentitiesasparticularindividuals.AlthoughHegelacknowledgesmanyimportantdifferencesamongthefamily,civilsociety,andthestate,hetakestheseinstitu-tionstoshareonebasicfeature:eachfunctionsbyfosteringamongitsmembersadistinctivekindofparticularidentity–asfamilymember,asmemberofaprofession,andascitizenofastate–thatmakesitpos-sibleforparticularwillstoserveuniversalendswithoutasacrificeoffreedom.Hegel’sideahereisthatindividualscanworkfreelyforthecollectivegoodofagrouptowhichtheybelong,insofarasdoingsoisalsoawayofgivingexpressiontoaparticularidentitytheytaketobecentraltowhotheyare.Thismeansthatparticipationinthefamily,civilsociety,andthestatecanbebothuniversallybeneficialandpartic-ularlysatisfying,sincetoactonthebasisofone’sidentityasafamilymember,asthememberofaprofession,orasacitizenisatthesametimetoworkforthegoodofthewhole.Whatfreesocialmembersregardastheirown“essence,”then,isnotinthefirstinstancesocialinstitutionsbuttheparticularrolesDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n218frederickneuhousertheyoccupywithinthem:membersofethicallifedefinethemselvesasmothersorfathers,asfarmersorteachers,ascitizensofaspecificcountry.Anindividual’spositionswithintheinstitutionsofethicallifemakeuphis“essence”inthesensethathisparticularrolesasparent(ofthesechildren),teacher(ofthissubject),andcitizen(ofthisnation)providehimnotonlywithhis“senseofself”(PR,§261A)and“dignity”(PR,§152)butalsowiththeprojectsandendsthatgivemeaningtohislife.ItisimportantnottoinferfromthisthatHegeldeniestheneedforfreeindividualstothinkofthemselvesasabstract,universalbeingsaswell.Bothpersonsandmoralsubjectsareuniversalinpreciselythissense.Thepoint,rather,isthatatthecoreofsocialfreedomarethewaysinwhichindividuals,throughsocialparticipation,winidentitiesasparticularbeingsbyachievingakindofstanding“intheirowneyesandintheeyesofothers”(PR,§207).15Insummary,then,Hegelregardsthesubjectivedispositionsjustdescribedasessentialtosocialfreedomfortworeasons:first,itisbyvirtueofthesedispositionsthatsocialmembersareabletoembracethecollectiveendsofthegroupstowhichtheybelongastheirown(andhencetoobeywillinglythedemandsoftheirinstitutions);second,thesedispositionsmakesocialactivitythesourceofadeep,“substantial”satisfactionforindividuals,insofarasitisthroughsuchactivitythattheyexpressandrealizetheirownparticularidentities.WearenowinabetterpositiontounderstandwhatHegelmeanswhenhecharacterizesthesubjectivedispositionappropriatetosocialfreedomastrustinone’ssocialorder.AsHegeldefinesit,thistrustconsistsin“theawarenessthatmysubstantialandparticularinterestiscontainedandpreservedintheinterestandendofan‘other’[i.e.,theinstitutionsinquestion]”(PR,§268).Trust,then,issimplytheenduringconfidenceofsocialmembersthatthattheirownfundamentalinterestsareinseparablyintertwinedandinessentialharmonywiththeendsoftheirsocialinstitutions–that,inotherwords,theirinstitutionscon-stitutea“home.”Itisimportanttonotethat,understoodinthisway,trustneednotbeblindorunconditionaland,hence,exclusiveofrationalreflection.Indeed,ifthiswerethekindoftrustHegelwereadvocating,hewouldundermineoneofhisownfundamentalaims,namely,tomakesocialfreedomcompatiblewithmoralfreedom.For,aswehaveseen,thelatterincludestheabilitytosubmittheprinciplesoneendorsestorationalscrutinyandtorejectorrevisethemasreflectiondemands.Thus,atheoryofmodernethicallifeinsiststhatthetrustofsocial15Thisistrueevenincivilsociety,whereprofessionalidentitiesimbuelaborwithmorethaninstrumentalsignificanceandalsoserveasthebasisforbondsofsoli-darityamongmembersofthesameprofession.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sSocialPhilosophy219membersbeabletosurvivegood-faithreflectiononthemeritsoftheirinstitutions.Moreover,ifmoralfreedomistoberealizableforall,therationalityofthesocialworldcannotbevisibleonlytothefewbutmustallowofbeingmadetransparenttotheaveragesocialmember.Inotherwords,inordertorealizethefullrangeoffreedomsavailabletothemasmodernsubjects,socialmembersmustnotonlyhavethesubjectivedispositionjustdescribed,theymustalsobeabletoreflectonandunderstandwhatmakesitrationalforthemtohavesuchanatti-tudetotheirsocialworld.ForHegel,thisisjusttosaythattheirtrustmustbecompatiblewithunderstandinghow,apartfromtheirsubjectiveattachmenttoit,theirsocialworldmakesthem,objectivelyspeaking,free.theobjectiveelementofsocialfreedomAsindicatedabove,Hegel’sconceptionofsocialfreedomisnotexhaustedbyhisaccountofthesubjectivedispositionofsocialmem-bers.Inordertoascribesocialfreedomtoindividualsitisnotenoughtoestablishmerelythattheytaketheirsocialworldtobea“home;”theirworldmustalsobeahome,whichmeansitmustinfactcontributetotherealizationofpracticalfreedom(inallitsguises).Inotherwords,ifsocialfreedomistobeachieved,theinstitutionsthatsocialmemberssubjectivelyendorsemustalsobeworthyoftheirendorsement.ThedoctrineofobjectivefreedomisHegel’sanswertothequestion:Whataboutthefamily,civilsociety,andthemodernstatemakesitratio-nal(orgood)thatindividualssubjectivelyembracethoseinstitutionsandlivewithinthem?AclearunderstandingofHegel’sanswertothisquestionhasfrequentlyeludedevensympatheticreaders.ThisispartlybecauseinthefewinstancesinwhichHegelspeaksofobjectivefreedomhefailstoclarifywhatitmeansandhowitfunctionsinhistheory.Afurtherreasonforconfusionisthatobjectivefreedomisrealizedintwoquitedisparate(thoughcompatible)featuresofarationalsocialorder.Ontheonehand,Hegelconsiderssocialinstitutionstorealizeobjec-tivefreedomwhentheyconstituteaself-sufficient,self-reproducingsystemthat,takenasawhole,is“self-determining.”16Ontheotherhand,objectivefreedomisrealizedwheninstitutionssecurethesocial16Thisviewisapparentinthefollowingclaim:“TherationalityofethicalliferesidesinthefactthatitisthesystemofthedeterminationsoftheIdea.Inthiswayethicallifeisfreedom,orthewillthathasbeinginandforitselfassomethingobjective”(PR,§145+Z).SeealsoPR,§§144,258A+Z,261Z,270Z;E,§539.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n220frederickneuhouserconditionsnecessaryfortheirmemberstoachievepersonalandmoralfreedom.17ThatHegelreliesonbothoftheseconceptionsofobjectivefreedomisconsistentwithmyearlierclaimthathissocialphilosophyisdrivenbytheconceptual(or“logical”)projectofarticulatingacoherentandfullyadequateconceptionofpracticalfreedom.Ifwekeepthisprojectinmind,itbecomesclearhowthetwoversionsofobjectivefreedomdistinguishedhereareessentialtoHegel’sview.First,ifpracticalfree-domistoberealized,thesocialordermustsecurethesocialconditionsthatmakeitpossibleforitsmemberstoachievethetworelativelyindividualisticformsoffreedomwithwhichthePhilosophyofRightbegins:personalfreedomandmoralfreedom.But,second,ifthecondi-tionsoftheseformsoffreedomaretobesecuredinamannerconsistentwiththeidealofaself-determinedwill–ifpracticalfreedomistobecompletelyrealized–thesocialorderthatsecuresthemmustitselfbeaself-determiningentity,thatis:aliving,self-reproducingsystemthathasthestructureofwhatHegelcalls“theConcept.”Thelatter,distinctivelyHegelianclaimisbestmadesenseofintermsoftheidealofteleologicalorganization.Thus,onethingHegelmeanswhenhesaysthattherationalsocialworldisobjectivefreedomisthat,asawhole,itexhibitsthekindofintelligibilitysoughtbyabiologistexamininganunfamiliarformoflifeorbyacriticseekingtointerpretaworkofart.Eachoftheseinvestigatorsattemptstounderstandhisobjectbyfiguringouthowitsvariouspartsworktogethertoformacoherent,harmoniouswhole.Whateachseekstofindinhisobjectisapurposiveorderthatmakestheobjectintelligibleasawhole.Find-ingthisorderinvolvesdiscoveringatleasttwothings:first,theend,ortelos,oftheentityasawhole;and,second,howitsindividualpartsaredeterminedbythatend–thatis,howitsspecificfeaturescanbeexplainedintermsofwhatitrequiresinordertorealizeitsessen-tialfunction.Suchabeingrepresentsaself-determiningwhole,notonlybecauseitsspecificfeaturesaredeterminedby(derivefrom)noth-ingotherthanitself(itsessentialnature,ortelos)butalsobecause,inthecaseoftherationalsocialorder,thatgoverningtelosisitselffree-dom.Moreprecisely,thesocialorderthatmeetsHegel’scriterionforaself-determiningwholewillexhibitfourcharacteristics:itwillbea(i)teleologicallyorganized,(ii)self-reproducingwholethatintegrates(iii)specialized,semiautonomousfunctions(family,civilsociety,andstate)17ThispositionisimplicitinHegel’sstatementthatpersonhoodandmoralsubjec-tivity“cannotexistontheirown”but“musthaveethicallifeastheirbearerandfoundation”(PR,§141Z).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sSocialPhilosophy221into(iv)aformoforganizationthatisdeterminedbytheConcept(or“derivesfromthesingleconceptoftherationalwill”)(E,§539).Itfollowsfromthisidealthateachsphereofarationalsocialorderwillcarryoutadistinctfunctionnecessaryforsociety’smaterialreproduc-tion:thefamilyfurnishessocietywithhumanindividuals;civilsocietysuppliesthegoodsrequiredtosustainlife;andthestatesupportsandcoordinatesthese“lower”spheres.Ofcourse,sincesociallifehasanethicalsignificance,itstelosincludesnotmerelymaterialreproduc-tionbutfreedomaswell.Thismeansthatitbelongstotheessenceoftherationalsocialordertoreproduceitselfinawaythataccommodatesthegreatestpossiblefreedomofitsmembers.ForHegel,then,oneofthecharacteristicsofmodernethicallifethatmakesitrationalisthatitsparticularinstitutions,workinginconcert,areespeciallywell-suitedtoachievingthetwoprimaryendsofthesocialorderasawhole,namely,itsmaterialreproductionandtheformationofconsciousagentsofsocialreproductionwhoarefreeasbothpersonsandmoralsubjects.Hegel’sconceptionofrationalorganizationincludesafurther,moreobscureelementthatisboundupwithhismetaphysicaldoctrineoftheConcept[derBegriff],18asdevelopedinhisLogic.“TheConcept”isHegel’stermforthebasicstructurethatreasoningeneralmustattributetoitsobjectsiftheyaretosatisfyitsdemandthattheworldbeintelli-gibletoit.Therelevanceofthismetaphysicalthesisliesinitsclaimtogiveacertaincontenttotheideaofarationallyorganizedwhole.Moreprecisely,Hegelappealstohisaccountofthethreeessentialconstituentsofanyrationallyorderedwhole–the“moments”ofimmediateunity,difference,andmediatedunity19–inordertodeterminethenumberandnatureofthepartsoftherationalsocialorder.Thus,inthecontextofsocialphilosophy,Hegel’sdoctrineoftheConcepttranslatesintotherequirementthatthesocialworldbemadeupofthreedistinctsocialspheres,eachcorrespondingtooneofthethreemomentsoftheCon-cept:therationalsocialorderisonewhosebasicinstitutionsallowthemomentsofimmediateunity,difference,andmediatedunitytoattainfullandcompatibleexpression.2018SeeespeciallyPR,§144,wherethe“differences”thatcharacterizeSittlichkeitaresaidtobe“determinedbytheConcept.”Similarstatementscanbefoundthrough-outthePhilosophyofRight,forexample,atPR,§§145Z,260Z,262,263+Z,and270Z.19Theseelementscanalsobespecifiedasuniversality,particularity,andindividual-ity,butwhenHegelreferstothestructureoftheConceptinthecontextofethicallife(e.g.,PR,§§157–158,181)henormallyemploysthetermsIusehere.20ThisformulationisinspiredbyCharlesTaylor’sdiscussionofthetopicinHegel(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1975),p.374.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n222frederickneuhouserInthiscontextimmediateunity,difference,andmediatedunitydes-ignatethetypeofunitythatcharacterizestheinstitutioninquestion,aswellasthekindsofrelationsamongitsmembersthatsuchunityinvolves.Thefamilycountsasaninstanceofimmediateunitybecauseloveistheprincipalbondthatunitesitsmembersandmakesitpos-sibleforthemtohaveacollectivewill,eachregardingthegoodofthefamilyashisowngood.Civilsocietyrepresentsthemomentofdifferencebecauseitsmembersparticipateinitasindependentindi-vidualswhoworkandtradeinordertosatisfytheirownparticularneeds.21Thestate,incontrast,embodiesmediatedunity.FollowingRousseau,Hegelconceivesofthepoliticalsphereasthepublicrealmwherelegislationisframedandexecutedinaccordancewithasharedconceptionofthesociety’scollectivegood.22Thestateincorporatesthe“difference”ofcivilsocietybecausecitizensenterthepoliticalspherewithdiverseidentitiesasindividualswhosefamilytiesandpositionswithincivilsocietyprovidethemwithdivergentparticularinterests.Becausethemomentofdifferenceisnottobesuppressedbythestatebutincorporatedintoit,thestate’smaintaskistofindawayofinte-gratingtheparticularwillsofcitizensintoageneralwillthatframeslawsthatfurtherthegoodofthewhole.Inexplaininghowcitizensareabletoassenttolawsthatsometimessubordinatetheirprivateinter-eststothegoodofthewhole,Hegelappealstoafamiliaridea:indi-vidualscanembracetheendsofthestateastheirownonlyifbeingjoinedtogetherasasinglenation,orpeople[Volk],providesthemwithasharedproject,thepursuitofwhichisforthemanendinitselfandasubstantialsourceofthevaluetheyfindintheirownlives.Theunitythatcharacterizesthestate,Hegelinsists,isnotgroundedinimmedi-atefeelingoranyother“bondofnature”(suchasblood)(VPR1,250,268).Thestate,rather,isamediatedunitybecausethetiethatbindsitscitizensarisesthroughacollectiveactofreason–thatis,throughthemakingoflawsthatareuniversallybinding,explicitlyknown,andcon-sciouslyendorsedthroughaprocessofpublicreflectiononthecommongood(PR,§270).21ThisisasimplificationofHegel’sview,sincecivilsocietyalsoincludescertaingroups,thecorporations,inwhichmemberspartiallyshedtheperspectiveofinde-pendentindividualsandacquirebondsofsolidaritywiththefellowmembersoftheirtradeorestate.Yeteventhesebondsdevelopoutofegoisticallymotivatedproductiveactivityandarethereforegroundedinmembers’statusasindependentindividualswhopursueprivateends.22FormoreonHegel’sconceptionofthestate,seeEricWeil,HegelandtheState,trans.MarkA.Cohen(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsPress,1998)andHarryBrod,Hegel’sPhilosophyofPolitics(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1992).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sSocialPhilosophy223ImplicitinHegel’sviewofethicallife’sConceptualstructureistheclaimthatpartofwhatmakesthemodernsocialworldrationalisthatitallowsitsmemberstodevelopandexpressdifferent,complemen-taryidentities.Theideahereisthateachtypeofidentityhasadis-tinctvalueforindividualsandthatpossessingthemallisessentialtorealizingthefullrangeofpossiblemodesofselfhood.Tomissoutonanyoftheseformsofsocialmembership,then,istobedeprivedofoneofthebasicwaysofbeingaselfandhencetosufferanimpover-ishmentofone’slife(inthisonerespect).Thereasonforthisisthatmembershipineachspherebringswithitdifferentkindsofpracticalprojects,eachpossessingitsowndistinctivesatisfactionsandrewards:whilefamilymembersengageinsharedprojectsdefinedbythegoodofotherstowhomtheyareattachedthroughlove,civilsocietyisthesphereinwhichindividuals“pursuetheirownwelfareintheirownway,choosetheirownwayoflife,andenterintovoluntaryrelationswithotherswhoarelikewisefreechoosersoftheirownendsandactiv-ities.”23Membershipinthestateisimportantbecauseitprovidescit-izenswithprojectsandattachmentsthatroundoutandenrichtheirotherwisemerelyparticularlives.Incontrasttotheothertwospheres,thestateaffordsitsmemberstheopportunitytoacquireauniversalidentity(onesharedwithallothercitizens),theachievementofwhichmostcloselyapproximatestheidealofself-sufficientsubjectivity:inthestate,citizens–constitutedasasinglebody–determinethemselvesinaccordancewithuniversalprincipleslegislatedbytheirownpublicreason.Socialinstitutionsembodyobjectivefreedominthesecondsensedis-tinguishedabovewhentheysecurethesocialconditionsnecessaryforindividualstoachievepersonalandmoralfreedom.Themostimpor-tantofHegel’sclaimshereisthattherationalsocialorderhasasitstasktheBildung–theformationoreducation–ofitsmembersintoagentswhopossessthesubjectivecapacitiesrequiredforpersonhoodandmoralsubjectivity.Thus,theaimofBildungisfreedom,butsinceunformedsubjectslackeventheaspirationtobefree,Bildungmusttakeplaceunconsciouslyandinvoluntarily,behindthebacks,sotospeak,oftheverysubjectswhoundergoit.Bildungisnecessarilyinvoluntaryforafurtherreason:thesubjectivecapacitiesfreedomdependsonaretypicallyacquiredonlythroughtheseverityofadisciplinaryregimen,2423AllenW.Wood,Hegel’sEthicalThought(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990),p.239.24Itmaybehelpfultorecallthenecessaryrolesplayedbyservitude,fear,andlaborintheformationofGeistasrelatedinThePhenomenologyofSpirit,152–155.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n224frederickneuhousersuchasistobefoundinlabor(theformofdisciplinedistinctivetocivilsociety)orinsubjectiontothewillofahigherauthority(thebasisofdisciplineinthefamily).Theseclaimsmakeclearwhytheformativefunctionsofsocialinsti-tutionscountaspartofthedoctrineofobjectivefreedom:Bildungrep-resentsonewayinwhichindividualsaremadetobefree(here,theycometobeequippedwiththesubjectiveconditionsoftheirfreedom)independentlyoftheirknowledgeorconsent.Thefactthatindividu-alssubmittotheprocessofformationonlyoutofnecessitymakesthefamilyandcivilsocietyespeciallywell-suitedtocarryingoutBildung’stasks.Forindividualsbelongtothefamilyandcivilsocietynotoutofchoicebutbecausetheirneediness–boththeirhelplessnessaschildrenandtheirenduringneedforthemeansofsurvival–leavesthemnootheroption.Humanneedinessguaranteesthatindividualswilltakepartinthefamilyandcivilsociety,and,whenrationallyordered,theseinsti-tutionsbothalleviatethatneedinessandputittoworkinserviceoffreedom.TherearemanyrespectsinwhichthefamilyandcivilsocietyarethoughtbyHegeltobeinstrumentsofBildung;inthepresentcontexttwoexampleswillsufficetoindicatethegeneralthrustofhisview.OfthevariouswaysthefamilycontributestotheBildungofitsmem-berstheeasiesttoarticulateisthecultivationofmoralsubjectivityintherearingofchildren.Herethemostimportantaspectoffamilylifeisparentaldiscipline.Thesignificanceofparentaldisciplineresideslessintheteachingofspecificmoralpreceptsthaninprovidingchildrenwithaparticularcapacityofwillthatisessentialtotheself-determinationdistinctiveofmoralsubjects.Therationalendofdiscipline,asHegelconceivesit,istoraisechildrenoutoftheir“naturalimmediacy”(PR,§175),wherethewillissimplydeterminedbythe“drives,desires,andinclinations”naturegivestoit(PR,§11),toaconditioninwhichthewillisnolongerdeterminedbyitsnaturalcontent.Thesubjectivecapacitythatdisciplineinstillsinchildrenistheabilitytosaynototheirimme-diatedesiresandtofollowinsteadanexternal,“objective”will(thedictatesoftheparent)thattakesprecedenceoverimmediatedesiresand(inthecaseofgoodchildrearing)exhibitsaconstancythatislackinginawilldeterminedbycapriceormomentaryurges.Althoughdeterminingone’swillinaccordancewiththewillofaparentclearlyfallsshortoftheidealofmoralself-determination(determiningone’swillinaccordancewithone’sownreasonedunderstandingofthegood),aperiodofsubjec-tiontoparentalauthorityisanessentialpartoftheformativeprocessthatmustbeundergonebyoriginallyimmediatebeingslikeourselvesinordertoachievethatend.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sSocialPhilosophy225Theeducativeeffectsofcivilsocietyhavetheirsourceinthefactthatitsmembers’productiveactivitytakesplacewithinasystemofcooperationmarkedbyadivisionoflabor(PR,§187).Sincenooneinsuchasystemcansatisfyhisneedsthroughhislaboralone,membersofcivilsocietymustlearntotailortheiractivitysoastotakeintoaccounttheneeds,desires,andperceptionsofotherindividuals.Inotherwords,laborincivilsocietyisinformedbyarecognitionofthesubjectivityofothers,includingarecognitionofthenecessityoflettingothers’endsenterintothedeterminationofone’sownactions.Forthisreasoncivilsocietycanbeseenashelpingtoformitsmembersintomoralsubjects.Althoughlaborincivilsocietyisnotitselfmoralaction(sinceitismoti-vatedbyegoisticends),itcultivatesinindividualsasubjectivecapacitywithoutwhichmoralactionwouldbeimpossible,namely,theabilitytodiscern,anddetermineone’sactivityinaccordancewith,theendsofone’sfellowbeings.Beyondthis,participantsinthemodernecon-omyarerequiredtotakeothers’willsintoaccountinaquitespecificmanner–thatis,laborincivilsocietyisessentiallytheproductionofexchangeablegoods.25Thepointhereisnotsimplythatthefruitsofone’slaborcanbeexchangedafterthefactforothers’productsbutratherthatfromtheverybeginningproductionisdeterminedbytheintentiontodoso.Thismeansthatproductiveactivityincivilsocietyiscarriedoutnotwiththeaimofmeetingtheneedsorwishesofdeterminateindividualsbutinaccordancewiththedemandsofanimpersonalmar-ket.Becausetheirinteractionsaremediatedbya“universal”mediumofexchange(money),membersofcivilsocietydonotrelatetooneanotherasconcrete,particularindividualsbutonlyasabstractbuyersandsell-erswhoareessentiallyidenticaltooneanother,insofarasallhavethesamerightsandobligationsofexchange.Butthisfeatureofcivilsociety,inHegel’sview,fostersakindofself-consciousnessamongmembersofcivilsocietythatisessentialtotherealizationofpersonalfreedom.Thatis,participatingincivilsocietyencouragesindividualstothinkofthemselvesandothersasbeingswho,despitetheirmanyconcretediffer-ences,arefundamentallyalike.Moreprecisely,theycometoconceiveofthemselvesandothersaspersons,who,assuch,areidenticaltoallotherpersonsandwhocountaspersons(asbearersofthesamerights)notbecauseofanyparticularqualitiestheypossessbutsolelyinvirtueoftheirstatusasahumanbeing:“thatIamtakentobeauniversalper-son,identicaltoall,isapartofBildung....Thehumanbeingcounts25IntheEncyclopediatreatmentofSittlichkeitHegelmakesthispointmoreexplic-itlythaninotherplaces;productiveactivityincivilsocietyischaracterizedthereas“thebringingforthofexchangeablegoodsthroughone’sownlabor”(E,§524).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n226frederickneuhouserassuchbecauseheisahumanbeing,notbecauseheisaJew,Catholic,Protestant,German,Italian,andsoforth”(PR,§209A).socialfreedomandmoralreflectionCriticsofHegelhavefrequentlyobjectedthattherationalsocialorderashedepictsitaccordsnoplacefortheexpressionofthecentralfea-tureofmoralsubjectivitythatHegelcallsconscience:“theabsoluteauthorityofsubjectiveself-consciousness,namely,toknowwhatrightanddutyarebothwithinoneselfandasproceedingfromoneself,andtorecognizenothingotherthanwhatitthusknowsasthegood”(PR,§137A).26Onechargeinterpretershavemadeisthatthesubjectivedis-positionrequiredbysocialfreedomisincompatiblewithadoptingauniversal,nonparochialperspectivefromwhichonecouldaskwhetherthenormsandpracticesofone’ssocialorderarerationallyjustified.Theideabehindthischargeisthatwhereassocialfreedomrequiresthatonesubjectivelyidentifywithone’ssocialinstitutions,rationalreflec-tionpresupposesjusttheopposite,namely,thatone’sattachmentstosocialinstitutionsbesufficientlyloosetoallowonetoevaluateone’ssocialorderfromadetached,universalperspective.Thischarge,how-ever,restsonamistakenunderstandingofthesenseinwhichmember-shipintherationalsocialorder,forHegel,isconstitutiveofindividuals’identity.Hegeldoesnotclaim,ascontemporarycommunitarianssome-timesappearto,thatsocialrolesexhaustpracticalidentitiesinthesensethatindividualsarenothingmorethanbearersofthevarioussocialrolestheyoccupy.Aswehaveseen,Hegel’sclaimthatindividualsfindtheiridentitiesintheirsocialrolesmeansonlythatsocialrolesfurnishthemwiththeendsandprojectsthatconstitutetheirlife-definingactivity,andthatasubstantialpartoftheir“senseofself”–their“worthanddignity”(PR,§152)–derivesfromtherecognitiontheyreceiveasaresultofsuccessfullyfulfillingtheirsocialroles.Whenidentityisunderstoodinthismorelimitedsense,thereisnothinginHegel’saccountofthesubjectivedispositionoffreesocialmembersthatprecludesdistancingoneselfreflectivelyfromone’ssocialrolesinordertoask,asamoralsubject,whetherthesocialorderoneinhabitsisrationallyjustifiable.Onthecontrary,thecapacityforsuchreflectionisanecessarypartofthefreedomHegel’ssocialphilosophyisconcernedwith,forwithoutitindividualswouldnotbesociallyfreeinamannerappropriatetotheir26OnesuchcriticisErnstTugendhat,Self-ConsciousnessandSelf-Determination(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1986),pp.315–316.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sSocialPhilosophy227statusasmoralsubjects(whoareboundonlybyprinciplesthattheirownreasonsanctions).YetevenifwegrantthatHegel’ssocialphilosophyallowsroomforindividualstotakeupareflective,evaluativestancewithrespecttotheirsocialorder,afurtherconcernremains:areindividualsinapositionnotonlytoreflectonbutalsotocriticizethesocialordertheyinhabit?ThechargethatHegelfailstomakesufficientroomforcriticismoftheexistingsocialordercomesclosertohittingitsmarkthantheobjectionthatsocialfreedomisincompatiblewithrationalreflection.Thereare,forexample,nopassagesinthePhilosophyofRightthatacknowledgetheimportanceofcitizens’freedomtoengageinpublicdiscoursecrit-icalofsocialinstitutions.Oneplacewewouldexpecttofindsuchanacknowledgmentisthediscussionofthepress’sroleinpoliticalsoci-ety(PR,§319+A).ButhereHegelignoresthefunctionafreepresscouldserveasaforumforrational,criticaldebate.Insteadheappearstodefendfreedomofthepress(inaverylimitedform)onlybecauseitsatisfiestheneedofindividuals“toexpresseventheirsubjectiveopinionsconcern-ingtheuniversal”(PR,§308A)andbecausethefalsity,distortion,andderisionthatarelikelytoresultfromsuchfreedomcandolittledamageinawell-constitutedstate.DespitethesedeficienciesinHegel’sview,itwouldbewrongtocon-cludethatsocialcriticismcanhavenoplaceinhistheory.Inordertoseethis,itissufficienttonoteanobviousbutfrequentlyoverlookedfea-tureofhisview,namely,thatthesocialorderthePhilosophyofRightlaudsas“actual”[wirklich]hasneverexistedinpreciselytheforminwhichHegelpresentsit.DespiteHegel’sreputationasanapologistforthePrussianstate,theinstitutionsheendorsesareobviouslynotiden-ticaltothoseofnineteenth-centuryPrussia.Itispreciselyhere–inthedisparitybetweenexistinginstitutionsandthosethatare“actual”inHegel’stechnicalsense–thatthepossibilityforsocialcriticismistobefound.ForthePhilosophyofRight’sidealizedaccountofmod-ernsocialinstitutionsprovidesuswiththeresourcesforseeingwhereexistinginstitutionsdonotfullymeasureuptowhattheyshouldbeandforthinkingabouthowtheycanbemadetoconformtotheirown(immanent)rationalprinciples.ThatthecriticalpotentialofHegel’ssocialphilosophyissooftenoverlookedisnodoubtdueinparttoanaturalmisunderstandingofhisclaimthattheprimaryaimofphilosophyistoreconcilehumanbeingswiththeactualworld.(Inthecaseofsocialphilosophy,reconcili-ation–affirmingtheworldashospitabletothefundamentalaspirationsofhumansubjects–istheresultofcomprehendinghowtheactualDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n228frederickneuhousersocialordersystematicallyrealizespracticalfreedom.)Butitisimpor-tanttorecognizethatreconciliationisnotincompatiblewithsocialcriticismdirectedatthereform,asopposedtotheradicaloverhaul,ofexistinginstitutions.CriticismandreformareconsistentwiththespiritofHegel’ssocialphilosophy,insofarastheyaimattransforminginstitutionstomakethemconformmorefaithfullytotherationalprin-ciplesalreadyimplicitintheirexistentpractices.Thisisjusttosay,inHegelianjargon,thattheproperobjectofourreconciliationisactuality[Wirklichkeit],notexistingreality[Realitat¨].Actuality,asHegelcon-ceivesit,isnottobeidentifiedwithwhateverexists;itis,instead,theunityofexistingreality[Existenz]anditsrationalessence(EL,§142).27Appliedtothesocialworld,“actuality”referstoexistingsocialrealityasreconstructedwithinphilosophicalthought–thoughtthataimstoclarifyandbringintoharmonythebasicprinciplesunderlyingthevar-iousexistingsocialordersthattypifyWesternEuropeanmodernity.Assuch,actualityrepresentsapurifiedversionofexistingrealitythatismorefullyrationalthananyparticularexistentsocialorderbutthatisnotforthatreasonindependentof,oroutoftouchwith,theexistingworld.Thus,thenormativestandardsHegeliansocialcriticismbringstobearonexistingrealityareactual,andnot“merelyideal,”inthesensethattheyarenotexternallyimposedupon,butalreadybelongto,theexistingobjectofcriticism.Wearenowinapositiontounderstandhowacriticalperspectiveonsocialrealityiscompatiblewiththesubjectivedispositionthatsocialfreedomrequiresofindividuals.Thesetwoattitudescanappeartobeindirectconflict,sincefindingone’sidentityinone’ssocialmembershiprequiresanaffirmationoftheexistingsocialorderthatseemsincompat-iblewithcriticizingit.Infact,however,nosuchconflictexistssince,strictlyspeaking,theproperobjectofouraffirmationassociallyfreeindividualsisnotinstitutionsastheypresentlyexistbutsomethinglike“ourinstitutionsastheyaspiretobe,almostare,andinprinciplecouldbe,ifonlyweworkedhardenoughtobringthembetterinlinewiththeirownideals.”Thereisnothingcontradictoryinthinking,forexample,thatasingleindividualcantakehisU.S.citizenshiptocon-stituteasubstantialpartofwhoheis(inthesenserequiredbysocialfreedom)andatthesametimebelievethatintheirpresentform,U.S.politicalinstitutionsdonotmeasureuptotheirownimmanentideals.Whatisrequiredforthissynthesistobepossibleisthatexistinginstitu-tionscomecloseenoughtorealizingtheirownidealstoberecognizable27ForahelpfuldiscussionofHegel’sconceptofWirklichkeit,seeHardimon,pp.53–63.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sSocialPhilosophy229asgenuine,albeitimperfect,embodimentsoftherationalsocialorder,orasontheirwaytobecomingsuch.ThesortofcritiquethatHegeldoesregardasatoddswiththefullestrealizationoffreedomiswhatcouldbecalledradicalsocialcriticism.Radicalcritiquecantaketwoforms:thefirstrejectsthebasicvaluesthatexistinginstitutionsembody(orseektoembody),whereasthesec-ondacceptsthosevaluesbutinsiststhattheexistingsocialorderisincapableofrealizingthemandmustthereforebereplacedbynewinsti-tutions.Itiseasytoseehowadoptingaradicallycriticalstancetowardexistinginstitutionsisinconflictwithsocialfreedom,sincedoingsoisincompatiblewithfindingone’sidentitywithinone’ssocialroles.Thisalone,however,doesnotestablishthatHegelregardsradicalcriti-cismasalwaysundesirable,foritispossibletoimaginecasesinwhichonecansubjectivelyidentifywithone’ssocialorderonlyby,ineffect,relinquishingone’sstatusasamoralsubject.Forifexistinginstitu-tionsarefundamentallybad–iftheystandinthewayof,ratherthanpromote,therealizationoffreedominitsvariousforms–thensocialmemberswhoaffirmthoseinstitutionsfailtowillinaccordancewith(true)principlesofthegood.Inotherwords,Hegeldoesnotbelievethatradicalsocialcriticismisunwarrantedinallhistoricalcircumstances.Onthecontrary,radicalsocialcritiqueisunwarrantedonlyinthemod-ern(Western)world,andthisisbecause,forHegel,modernity’sthreesocialinstitutionsare,inbasicoutline,rational.Inhistoricalcircum-stancesinwhichthelatterconditiondoesnotobtain,refusingtoaffirmtheexistingsocialordermustberegardedasalegitimateexpressionofmoralsubjectivity.2828EveninthesecircumstancesHegel’spreferredresponseiswithdrawalfromthesocialworldratherthancritiqueorsocialactivism(PR,§138Z).Thisisnodoubtduetohisbeliefthatfundamentalhistoricalprogressisneverthedirectresultofhumanplanningbuttakesplacebehindthebacksofhumanparticipants,viatheruseofreason.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.009CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\npeterc.hodgson9Hegel’sPhilosophyofReligionhegel’slecturesonthephilosophyofreligionHegellecturedonthephilosophyofreligionforthefirsttimeinthesummersemesterof1821attheUniversityofBerlin,lecturesthathewastorepeatonthreeoccasions,in1824,1827,and1831.Hisdelayinaddressingthetopicofreligionwasnotasignoflackofinterest.Onthecontrary,therewasnotopicinwhichhehadadeeperandmoreabidingconcern,asevidencedfromhisdaysasatheologicalstudentinTubingenthroughtheyearsinFrankfurt,Jena,andNuremberg.¨1UponhisdeparturefromJena,hewrotetoafriend:“Iwaseagertolectureontheologyatauniversityandmightwellhavedonesoaftersomeyearsofcontinuingtolectureonphilosophy.”2However,theopportunitytodosodidnotpresentitselfuntilafterhisarrivalinBerlin.Hewasstim-ulatedtoofferhisownviewsbytheimpendingpublicationofFriedrichSchleiermacher’sGlaubenslehre,aworkwithwhichHegelhadreasontobelievehewouldfindsharpdisagreements.3Asaphilosopher,hedidnotlectureontheologypersebutonphilosophyofreligion,adis-ciplinethathetooktobeengagednotsimplywiththephenomenonofreligionbutwiththenatureandrealityoftheobjectofreligion,namely,God.Sincethistranscendentreferenthadbeenrenderedprob-lematicbyEnlightenmentphilosophy,history,andscience,Hegelsetouttodevelopanewphilosophicaltheologythatwouldreestablishtheconceptualfoundationsofreligionbyofferingapostmetaphysicaland1Forexcerptsfromwritingsonreligionpriortothephilosophyofreligion,seeG.W.F.Hegel:TheologianoftheSpirit,ed.byPeterC.Hodgson(MinneapolisandEdinburgh:FortressPressandT&TClark,1997),chapters1–5.2HegeltoI.Niethammer,November1807,BriefevonundanHegel,ed.byJ.HoffmeisterandJ.Nicolin,4vols.,3rded.(Hamburg:FelixMeinerVerlag,1969–1981),vol.1,p.196.3SeeRichardCrouter,“HegelandSchleiermacheratBerlin:AMany-SidedDebate,”JournaloftheAmericanAcademyofReligion,48(March1980),pp.19–43.230DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhilosophyofReligion231postcriticalwayofthinkingaboutGod.4Attheverybeginningofhislectureshesaid:Godisthebeginningofallthingsandtheendofallthings;[everything]startsfromGodandreturnstoGod.Godistheoneandonlyobjectofphilosophy.[Itsconcernis]tooccupyitselfwithGod,toapprehendeverythinginGod,toleadeverythingbacktoGod,aswellastoderiveeverythingparticularfromGodandtojustifyeverythingonlyinsofarasitstemsfromGod,issustainedthroughitsrelationshipwithGod,livesbyGod’sradianceandhas[withinitself]themindofGod.Thusphilosophyistheology,and[one’s]occupationwithphilosophy–orratherinphilosophy–isofitselftheserviceofGod.(1:84)5ThispassageisfromHegel’slecturemanuscriptof1821,whichsur-vivesinaBerlinlibrary.Withtheexceptionofvariousmiscellaneouspapers,itistheonlywritingonphilosophyofreligioninHegel’sownhand.Thebulkoftheresourcesisintheformofauditors’notebooksortranscriptions[Nachschriften]ofthefourseriesoflectures.ThesematerialswereamalgamatedintoaneditoriallyconstructedtextbytheoriginaleditorsofHegel’sWerkeinthe1830sand1840s.SinceHegelchangedthestructureanddetailsofhisanalysisconsiderablyfromoneyeartothenext,theeditorialamalgamintroducedmarkedtensionsandinconsistencies.ThecriticaleditionpublishedbyWalterJaeschkeinthe1980sreconstructsthe1821,1824,and1827lecturesasseparatetextsbasedonthebestavailableresources.6Theonefeatureofthelec-turesthatremainsconstantthroughtheyearsfrom1821to1831istheirdivision,followinganIntroduction,intothreemainparts:theConceptofReligion,DeterminateReligion,andtheConsummateorRevelatoryReligion.Thesectionsofthischapterfollowthisdivision.Itisnot4SeeWalterJaeschke,ReasoninReligion:TheFoundationsofHegel’sPhilosophyofReligion,trans.byJ.MichaelStewartandPeterC.Hodgson(BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1990),pp.1–9.5In-textreferencesaretothetranslationcitedinFootnote6.6VorlesungenuberdiePhilosophiederReligion,¨ed.byWalterJaeschke,3vols.(vols.3–5inHegel’sVorlesungen:AusgewahlteNachschriftenundManuskripte¨[Hamburg:FelixMeinerVerlag,1983–1985]).TheEnglishtranslationisLecturesonthePhilosophyofReligion,3vols.,ed.byPeterC.Hodgson,trans.byR.F.Brown,P.C.Hodgson,andJ.M.StewartwiththeassistanceofH.S.Harris(BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1984–1987;reprintOxfordUniversityPress,2007).Aone-volumeeditionofthelecturesof1827isalsoavailable.The1831lecturescannotbereconstructedsinceonlyexcerptspresentlyexist.Fordetailsonthetextsandtheirediting,seetheeditorialintroductiontovolume1oftheGermanandEnglisheditions.Theanalysiscontainedinthischapterisbasedonmymonograph,HegelandChristianTheology:AReadingoftheLecturesonthePhilosophyofReligion(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005).UsedbypermissionofOxfordUniversityPress.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n232peterc.hodgsonpossibleinabriefpresentationtoattendtothedistinctivenuancesoftheindividuallectures.Hegel’slogicfunctionsasahermeneuticalkeyforreadingandinter-pretingexperience.TheWerkeeditionpresentedhislecturesonthevarioustopicsofphilosophyaspartofacompleted,consistent,unitarysystem,butwenowknowthatHegellecturedwithaninnovativespirit,unwillingeversimplytorepeatwhathehadsaidbefore.Onnosubjectwasthistruerthanthatofreligion.Farfromimposinganabstract,apriorischemaonthehistoryofreligions,Hegelapproachesthistopicasanexperimentalfieldinwhichavarietyofinterpretativearrange-mentsmustbetriedout.Hisevidentwillingnesstoincorporatenewdataandtestnewschemassuggeststhatforhimspeculativephilosophyasawholeinvolvesaconceptualplaywiththelogicaldeepstructureinordertoarriveatnewinsights,tograspconnections,differences,types,trends,directions,tounderstandmorefullytheinexhaustiblewealthofwhatpresentsitselfinexperience.Heisnotofferingempiricaldescrip-tionsbutimaginativeconstructions.Forthispurposethemediumoforallectureswasideallysuited,anditisnotablethatHegelwasreluctanttoconstrainthefluidityofspeechthroughpublication.7theobject,context,andmethodofphilosophyofreligionIntheIntroductiontohislectures(1:83–184),Hegelestablishesthattheobjectofthephilosophyofreligionisbothreligionanditsreferent,God.Thushesaysthatphilosophyofreligionhasthesamepurposeasthenat-uraltheologyoftheschoolphilosophyoftheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturies:knowledgeofGodbyreasonalone,asdistinctfromwhatisknownofGodonthebasisofpositiverevelation(1:83),althoughhealsoargueslaterthatnocontradictionexistsbetweenreasonandrevelation,forwhatisrevealedisrational,andreasonitselfisrevelatory(3:63).Theobjectofthephilosophyofreligionisthesameastheobjectofreligion,namely,“thesupremeorabsoluteobject”thatexistsstrictlyforitsownsakeandisradicallyfreeandunconditioned;likewiseoccupationwithitmustbefreeandunconditioned.ContraSchleiermacher’semphasisonthefeelingofabsolutedependence,religiousconsciousnessisthe“absolutelyfreeconsciousness,”whichenjoysitsobjectinthestateofblessednessandmanifeststhegloryofGodinsuchawaythateverythingtransientandfinitewaftsawayintoeternalharmony(1:113–114).7SeetheintroductionbyDuncanForbestoLecturesonthePhilosophyofWorldHistory:Introduction:ReasoninHistory,trans.byH.B.Nisbet(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1975),xiii–xiv.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhilosophyofReligion233TheobjectofthephilosophyofreligionisnotjustGodbutreligion,orGodandreligiontogether.IftheobjectweresimplyGod,thentheconceptofGodwouldberestricted“tothesterileresultofanabstractessence[Wesen]oftheunderstanding”(1:116)–theEnlight-enmentunderstandingofGodasa“supremebeing.”HereGodisnotyetgraspedasalivingbeing,asspirit[Geist].TothinkofGodasGeistratherthanasWesenistothinkofGodasGodispresentinreligiousbelief,thatis,inthecommunityoffaith.“Godcanonlybegenuinelyunderstoodinthemodeofhisbeingasspirit,bymeansofwhichGodmakeshimselfintothecounterpartofacommunityandbringsabouttheactivityofacommunityinrelationtohim;thusitwillbeevidentthatthedoctrineofGodistobegraspedandtaughtonlyasthedoctrineofreligion”(1:116–117).“God”and“religion”arerelationalconcepts:GodisGodonlyinrelationtotheknowledgeofandfaithinGodonthepartofhumancommunities,andreligionistherelationshipbetweenGodandconsciousness.The“modern”doctrinethathumanscanknownothingofGodunder-cutsthephilosophyofreligionprojectasthusconceived.Itisthedis-tinctionofourage,saysHegel,“toknowaninfinitemassofobjects,butonlyofGodtoknownothing”(1:86–87).OursisanessentiallysecularagetowhichthereligiousinjunctiontoknowGodisaccountedmerefolly.Surelyitisironictoarriveattheconclusionthroughcognitionitselfthatcognitiongraspseverythingbutthetruth.Thisisthepress-ingissueofmodernitytowhichChristiantheologyshouldfashionaconvincingresponse.ButChristiantheologyitselfhasmostlyaccededtosuchaview;andHegel’slecturesareintendedtofillthevoidleftbytheologicalagnosticism(1:89).Oneofthecharacteristicsofmodernsecularismistheoppositionbetweenreligiousconsciousnessandtherestofconsciousness,agulfthatisreinforcedbynaturalscience,whichconstructsafinitesystemoftheuniverseinwhichGodisnotneededandhasnoplace(1:92–93,102–103).Thecompartmentalizationofreligionandthenotionofdoubletruth(ahumantruthofreasonandadivinetruthoffaith)aresymptomaticof“thediscordofourtimes”(1:107).Hegelinsiststhattherecannotbetwokindsofreasonandtwokindsoftruth:Humanreason...isreasongenerally,isthedivinewithinhumanity.Spirit,insofarasitiscalleddivinespirit,isnotaspiritbeyondthestarsorbeyondtheworld;forGodispresent,isomnipresent,andstrictlyasspiritisGodpresentinspirit.GodisalivingGodwhoiseffective,active,andpresentinspirit.Religionisabegettingofthedivinespirit,notaninventionofhumanbeingsbutaneffectofthedivineatwork,ofthedivineproductiveprocesswithinhumanity.(1:130)DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n234peterc.hodgsonToaffirmthisdeeptruthisthepropervocationoftheology.MuchoftheIntroductiontoHegel’slecturesisgivenovertoacritiqueofthethe-ologiesofhistimeforfailingtodoso:metaphysicaltheology,rationaltheology,historicaltheology,agnostictheology,ethicotheology,theolo-giesoffeeling,andatheisticandpantheistictheologies.Hegel’scritiqueofthelatterisofspecialinterestinviewoftheironythathehimselfwasaccusedofatheismandpantheisminhisowntime,andcontin-uestobesoaccused.PantheismisnottheabsurdviewthatallthingssimplyareGod,butratherthatGodistheessencewithinaccidents,theuniversalwithintheparticular,theonewithinthemany,andthesubstancewithinaccidents.Inthephilosophicalsensetheworldhasnoindependentactuality,althoughofcourseempiricallyitexists.ThisisSpinoza’sposition,accordingtoHegel,anditisproperlydescribedas“acosmism,”not“atheism”or“pantheism”(1:374–377).ItisnotGodwhoisabsorbedintotheworld,buttheworldintoGod.However,spec-ulativephilosophy,withitsmediationoflogicalidea,nature,andfinitespirit,consummatedinGodasabsolutespiritinwhomdistinctionsarepreservedratherthanannihilated,avoidsbothatheismandacosmism,anditcertainlyisnotcrudepantheism.Itismoreaccuratelydescribedas“panentheism”–allthingshavetheirbeingoractualityinGod–oras“holism.”WhetherHegelallowssufficientindependencetotheworldoveragainstGodisoneofthelastingissuesofdebateoverhisthought.8Themethodofphilosophyofreligionis“speculative,”bycontrastwiththeempiricalandcriticalmethodsepitomizedbyHumeandKant.Kant’sphilosophystartswithsenseexperiencereceivedintheformofintuition.Byapplicationofaprioricategories(time,space,causality,substance),themindconstructstheseintuitionsintoapictureofreal-ity.Wecannever,Kantinsists,getbeyondtheseconstructionstoknowrealityortheworldasitisinandforitself.Theconstructedobjectsim-plyreflectsmindbacktoitself.ForHegelthereisa“gettingbeyond”intheformofaturn,areversal,suchthatwhatisconstructedalsoshowsormanifestsitself,givesitselfonitsownterms,whichpartlycorrespondtobutalsoenrichandcorrectconsciousness.Somethingnewisknownbeyondself-knowledge;thereisaspiralingahead,andconsciousnessprovestobeparticipatoryandreceptiveaswellascriticalandconstruc-tive.Realityis,tobesure,amirrorofconsciousness;butconsciousnessisalsoamirrorofreality.“Speculation”(fromtheLatinspeculum,“mir-ror”)involvesarelationshipofdoublemirroringinwhichareversalintheflowofmeaningoccurs–fromobjecttosubjectaswellasfromsubjecttoobject.Theconditionofpossibilityforthisreversalisthat8WilliamDesmondoffersascathingcritiqueinthisregard;seeHegel’sGod:ACounterfeitDouble?(Aldershot:AshgatePublishing,2003).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhilosophyofReligion235subjectandobject,selfandworld,participatein,aremomentsof,ofanencompassingwhole,whichHegelcallsvariously“truth,”“actuality,”“theuniversal,”“theabsolute,”“spirit”–or“God.”Inadditiontoafirstandasecond,thereisathird,whichoverreachesthefirstandthesec-ondandistherelationshipbetweenthem.Thisrelationship,orwhole,isnotseparablefromitscomponentelementsbutbecomesactualandmanifestsitself,onlyintheirdoublemirroring.Hegelcontendsthatanidentityexistsbetweenthemethodofasci-encesuchasphilosophyofreligionanditscontent,whichisnothingotherthanthe“theself-explicatingconcept.”Thismeansthattruthandmethodareultimatelyone,andthatscientificprocedurefollowsfromthemovementofthesubjectmatteritself.Thus,thefirstmomentinthephilosophicaltreatmentofreligionistheconceptofreligioninitsabstractnessandideality;thesecondmomentcomprisesthedeter-minateformsoftheconcept,thewayitactuallyappearsinconcretereligions;andthethirdmomentistheconsummationofthedetermina-tionsoftheconceptasitreturnstoitselfenrichedbyitsinstantiations.Thisconsummation,claimsHegel,occursintheChristianreligion,whilethedeterminatereligions“constitutethestagesoftransitionfortheconceptofreligiononthewaytoitsconsummation”(1:109–112,174–176).Thisthreefolddivisionistheoneconstantfeatureofallthelecturesonthephilosophyofreligion.Itposesanimmediateproblemforacontemporaryreader.Thereturnoftheconcepttoitselfseemstoinvolveatranscendenceofthehistoricaldeterminacythroughwhichtheconcepthasemerged.Ifso,thenitisdifficulttounderstandhowanyhistoricallydeterminatereligionsuchasChristianitycouldsimplybetheabsolute,true,andconsummatereligion–whichnonethelessisunderstoodtobeanexistingreligion,somethingthatmustcometopassinhistory(1:141).Hegel’sspeculativelyimaginedconsummatereligionwouldseemmoreplausibleandmoreadequatetotheconceptifitweretodrawupontheresourcesofadiversityofreligioustraditions.Theconceptisformedinthematrixofhistoryasawhole,and(asHegelhimselfknew)thehistoryofreligionscannotbeorderedintoalineartrajectoryculminatinginChristianity.theconceptofreligionEmpiricalandSpeculativeDefinitionsoftheConceptofReligionThefirsttwolectureseries(1821,1824)movetowardadefinitionoftheconceptofreligionbydistinguishingbetweenempiricalandspec-ulativeapproaches(1:185–232,257–328).TheempiricalapproachisinDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n236peterc.hodgsonvoguetoday,saysHegel,becauseitstartswithimmediateexperienceorfeelinganddefinesreligionasamodificationoffeeling(1:261–288).Itquicklyarrivesatanimpasse,however,foritisprincipallyawareoftheantithesisbetweentheselfasafinite,feeling,particularsubjectandGodastheinfinite,independent,universalobject.How,then,isarela-tionshipbetweenfiniteandinfinitepossible?Fromthepointofviewofempiricalobservation,onlytwooptionsseemplausible:eitherGodremainswhatistotallyotherandbeyond,thenegationoffinitude,ofwhichonecanhavenocognitiveknowledge;orfinitudeitselfiswhatisexhaustivelyrealandgood,existingsolelyforitself.FinitudeisrelatedeithernegativelytoGodoraffirmativelytoitself;itcannotberelatedaffirmativelytoGod.Finitudeattemptstobridgethisgulfintheformof“reflective”knowledge,whichappearsphilosophicallyas“understand-ing”andreligiouslyas“representation,”butfromthispointofviewtheinfiniteremainseitheranincomprehensiblebeyondoramereprojec-tionofthefinite.ThenegativerelationshiptoGodisexpressedinthefeelingofutterdependence,asdescribedbySchleiermacher.Theaffir-mativerelationshiptotheselfisthebasisofmodernatheism,fromKantandFichteonward.Onlyfromthepointofviewofreasonorthoughtisitpossibletoconceivetheinfiniteasthatwhich“overreaches”thefinite,bothencompassingandtranscendingitasan“affirmativeinfini-tude”(1:288–310).Heretheperspectiveshiftsfromfiniteconsciousnesstotheinfiniteself-mediationofspirit.Thereisnowayofpassingoverfromthefinitetotheinfiniteunlesstheinfiniteitselfconstitutesthepassage;butthisisalreadythespeculativeinsight.“Thespeculative”forHegel,aswehavesaid,involvesarelationshipofdoublemirroringbetweenconsciousnessandobjectandareversalintheflowofmeaning–fromobjecttosubjectaswellasfromsubjecttoobject.Religion,speculativelydefined,isnotmerelyourconsciousnessoftheabsolutebuttheself-consciousnessofabsolutespirit,mediatedinandthroughfiniteconsciousness(1:314–318).Religionisbothahumanandadivineprocess;whattranspiresinitisnothumanprojectionbut“theself-knowingofdivinespiritthroughthemediationoffinitespirit”(1:318n.7).Hegelexpressesthisideawithpowerfulmetaphors.“Tophilosophicalcognition,theprogression[ofconsciousness]isastreamflowinginoppositedirections,leadingforwardtotheother,butatthesametimeworkingbackward,sothatwhatappearstobethelast,foundedonwhatprecedes,appearsrathertobethefirst–thefounda-tion”(1:227n.115).Theimageofastreamflowinginoppositedirectionssuggestsa“speculativereversal”:theriseoffiniteconsciousnesstotheabsoluteisatthesametimethereturnofabsolutespirittoitself.Whatappearstobetheresultofthephenomenologyofconsciousnessprovesrathertobeitspresupposition.Tothesethoughtsarticulatedin1821,DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhilosophyofReligion237Hegeladdsin1824:“Absolutetruthcannotbearesult;itiswhatispurelyandsimplyfirst,unique.Itiswhattakesupsimplyeverythingintoitself–theabsoluteplenitudeinwhicheverythingisbutamoment....Itisinthisresultitselfthattheone-sidednessisabolished:theresultcastsoffitspositionasresultanddevelopsacounterthrust,sotospeak,againstthismovement”(1:322).Thecounterthrustisanotherimageofreversalandmirroring.ItmeansthatGodisbothalphaandomega.Twomomentsormovementstogether–Godcreatingtheworld,andtheworldbetakingitselfbacktoGod–makeuptheactivityofGod.Thisprocessfirstshowsitselfoutsideofreligion,thenwithinreligion.Out-sidereligion,thereisaninnocencewithrespecttoGod;withinreligion,itisGodwhoisstrictlythefirstandthelast(1:323–324).TheConceptofGodThereversalandmirroringsignifythattheconceptofreligionisreallytheconceptofGod–ofGodasabstractbeingorsubstance,asthecreatorwho“unlocks”godselfandreleaseswhatisnotGodintoexistence,andastheconsummatorwhobringsallthingsbackintorelationshipwithGod.The1827lecturesstartatthispoint–withthespeculativeinsightintothenatureofGodandreligionatwhichthe1824lecturesarriveonlyattheend(throughalaboriousbutilluminatingprocess).TheconceptofGodfocusesonthreethemesthatcorrespondtothetriunelifeofGod(althoughtheapproachatthispointisphilosophicalratherthantheological):theabstractbeingofGod,9theknowledgeofGodinthereligiousrelationship,andtheconsummationofthisrelationshipintheworshipofGod(1:365–449).TheabstractbeingofGodcorrespondstowhatisordinarilymeantbytheword“God,”namely,thatbeingwhichisabsolutetruthanduni-versality,fromwhicheverythingproceedsandintowhicheverythingreturns.ThisOne,saysHegel,istheresultofthewholeofphiloso-phythatprecedesthephilosophyofreligion,andthelatterdisciplinemustacceptitasapremise(1:367–368).WhilethisdefinitionofGodisabstractandformal,theuniversal“showsitselftobesomethingabsolutelyconcrete,rich,andfullofcontent”(1:368–369).The9Thissectionappearsassuchonlyinthe1827lectures,althoughanaloguestoitarefoundintheotherlectureswhereitisusedasavehicletopresentproofsoftheexistenceofGod.Theseproofsconstituteaspecificreligion’s“abstractconcept”or“metaphysicalconcept”ofGod,andtheproofsarediscussedastheyappearinthedeterminatereligions(part2)andtheconsummatereligion(part3).The1827lecturesgatheralltheproofstogetherintoalengthysubsectionattheendofthesectionon“TheKnowledgeofGod”inpart1.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n238peterc.hodgsondevelopmentthroughwhichitmanifestsitselfisnotsomethingalientoitsuniversalitybutalreadyimplicitwithinit;fromtheoutsetitisaconcreteuniversal.ExpressedinmorefamiliarphilosophicalcategoriesderivingfromSpinoza,wesaythat“Godistheabsolutesubstance,theonlytrueactuality”–thesubstanceoressenceuponwhicheverythingelsedependsforitsexistence(1:369).Ifweclingtothisdeclarationinitsabstractform,thenweseemtobeguiltyofSpinozismorpantheism.10“ButthefactthatGodissubstancedoesnotexcludesubjectivity.”Indeed,substanceisanattributeofGod’sabsolutebeing-with-selfandabiding-with-selfthatwecall“spirit,absolutespirit.”Whenwespeakofsubstance,“theuniversalisnotyetgraspedasinternallyconcrete”;onlywhenitissograspedisitspirit(1:370–371).Godisnotsheer,undifferentiatedsubstance,nota“meresoil”outofwhichdistinctionssubsequentlygrow,butan“abidingunity”inwhichalldistinctionsremainenclosed:justthisisthemeaningoftheimmanentTrinityasaninexhaustiblegenerativematrix.ThusincreatingtheworldGoddoesnotstepoutofunitywithgodself.GodremainstheOne,theabundantuniversal–“notaninert,abstractuniversal,butrathertheabsolutewombortheinfinitefountainheadoutofwhicheverythingemerges,intowhicheverythingreturns,andinwhichitiseternallymaintained.”Withthesesensual,sexualimagesdrawnfromaNeoplatonic-mysticaltrajectory,HegelunpacksthedefinitionofGodasuniversalsubstance.AtthesametimeheremarksthatwehavethisGodnotprimarilyinthemodeoffeelingandsensationbutinthemodeofthought.ThemysticalandtherationalareconnectedforHegel.“Thoughtisalonethesoilforthiscontent,istheactivityoftheuniversal–theuniversalinitsactivityandefficacy.”“Animalshavefeelings,butonlyfeelings.Humanbeingsthink,andtheyalonehavereligion.”Thusreligionhasits“inmostseat”inthought,thoughdoubtlessitcanalsobefelt,believed,imagined,andpracticed(1:372–374).TheselastremarkspointtothesecondmajortopicconsideredundertheconceptofGod,namely,theknowledgeofGod.TherelationshipofGodandconsciousness(whichiswhatreligionisallabout)hastwoaspects:God’sself-manifestationorself-communicationandhumancomprehensionorknowledge(1:380–383).JustasitisGod’sverynaturetocommunicategodself,soitishumanity’sverynaturetoknowGod.10ThisremarkleadsHegelintoanotherdiscussionofanddefenseagainstpantheism(1:374–380)intermssimilartothoseusedintheIntroductiontothelectures(assummarizedabove).In1827hereturnstothetopicforathirdtimeinhisdiscussionofBuddhisminpart2(2:572–575).Heencounteredthechargeofpantheismdirectedagainsthisownphilosophyforthefirsttimeinthemid-1820s,andinthe1827lectureshewasespeciallyconcernedtorefuteit.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhilosophyofReligion239HegeldistinguishesamongfourbasicformsoftheknowledgeofGod:immediateknowledge,feeling,representation,andthought.Immedi-ateknowledgeistheimmediatecertaintythatGodis,andindeedthatGodis“thisuniversalityhavebeinginandforitself,outsidemeandindependentofme,notmerelyhavingbeingforme”(1:386).Themostbasicformofthiscertaintyisfaith,whichisnotplacedinoppositiontoknowledgebutisaformofknowledge(1:386–389).Faithmeanshold-ingsomethingtobetrueforwhichwelackdirectempiricalevidenceorintellectualintuitionofitsnecessity.Faithrestsonbothexternalauthority(thetestimonyofothers)andtheinnerwitnessoftheSpirit(notonlytheHolySpiritbutourownspirituality).Ithastwobasicmodalities:feeling(whichilluminesitssubjectiveaspect)andrepresen-tation(whichconcernstheobjectivemodeofitscontent,howitisanobjectofconsciousnessforus).Feelingarisesfromsensebutbelongstotherealmofideality,ofsub-jectivity.WhenIsaythat“IfeelGod,”ImeanthatGodiswithinmybeing:wearenottwobutone,yettheoneremaintwo,forGodisnotaproductoffeelingbutexistsindependentlyofmeasthegroundofmybeing(1:268–270).Whilefeelingisanecessaryaspectofreligiousexperi-ence,ithasseverelimitations.Itisindeterminate,neithergoodnorevil,neithertruenorfalse;andithasnocapacityformakingjudgmentswithrespecttothevalidityofitscontents.Thefeelingsoftheheartmustbepurifiedandcultivated,andthisinvolvespreciselythought.Thought“istheejectionofthecontentoutoffeeling;itisakindofliberation”(1:391–396).Hegeldeliversthecoupdegracetofeelingwhenheremarksˆthat“feelingiswhathumanbeingshaveincommonwiththeanimals;itistheanimal,sensuousform.”ThusifweagreewithSchleiermacher,“thatreligionrestsonth[e]feelingofdependence,thenanimalswouldhavetohavereligiontoo,fortheyfeelthisdependence”(1:273,279).11Representation[Vorstellung]attendstotheobjectiveaspect,thecon-tent,ofwhateveritisthatwefeeloraresubjectivelycertainof,butitdoesnotyetpenetratethiscontentrationallyorcognitively.Itreliesontheunderstanding[Verstand)],whichplacesimagesandsenseimpres-sionsundercategories[ver-stehen]andbeforethemind[vor-stellen]asobjective,unmediatedentities.Sincethisishowpeopleordinar-ilythink,“religionistheconsciousnessofabsolutetruthintheway11ThisremarkaboutSchleiermacherignoresthelatter’sdistinctionbetweenordi-narysense-basedfeelingandreligiousfeelingastheawarenessofutterorabsolutedependenceonGod,anawarenessthatistheconditionofpossibilityforallknow-inganddoing.AssuchitisclosertowhatHegelcallsimmediateknowledgeorfaith.ThemutualpolemicsbetweenHegelandSchleiermacherwereoftenmisdi-rected.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n240peterc.hodgsonthatitoccursforallhumanbeings.”Philosophyhasthesamecon-tent,anditstaskissolelythatoftransformingrepresentationsintoconcepts.Thecontentremainsthesame,althoughphilosophyisoftenreproachedforremovingthecontentasitseparatesoutfromitwhatpertainsonlytorepresentation(1:396–397).Thisoperationissupposedtobenotareductionbutatransformation,yetthequestionremainsastohowandtowhatextentrepresentationalimagescontinuetorever-berateinconcepts.Withoutimages,conceptsbecomedryandabstract.Hegel’sownthinkingisfamouslyrepletewithimages,metaphors,andanalogies.Thoughtseeksforrelationshipsanduniversalityamongthevariouscontentsthatrepresentationapprehendsonlyintheirdeterminateiso-lation(1:404–406).Itdoesthisbyraisingrepresentationalfigurestocon-ceptualideas.A“concept”(Begriff)grasps-orholds-together(be-greifen)thoseelementsthatremaindisparateinthesimpleplacingbeforethemindofvarioussensibleornonsensibleimages.Conceptualthinkingforthemostpartdoesnotinventnewtermsorconverteverythingintothegrammaroflogicbutmakesuseofmaterialsfurnishedbyrepresen-tation.Itdevelopsargumentsandhypothesesthatelucidatetheunityofrepresentationalfeatures.Itgraspsthelogicalrelationsimplicitinnarra-tiverelations.Inthisfashionitarrivesatconviction,whichiscertaintyintheformofthought.Thoughtisnotanewconceptualapparatusbutawayofthinkingdialectically.Thusitisevidentthatthoughtcontinuestobefructifiedbytheimagisticmaterialsthrownupbyrepresenta-tion;withoutrepresentationtherecouldbenothought,andadialecticbetweenrepresentationandthoughttakesplace.Thoughtinvolvesmediation,andtheproofsoftheexistenceofGodareaformofmediationbetweenconsciousnessanditsobject;theyareequivalenttothethirdtermofasyllogism,whichlinkstheothertwoandhasthecharacterofaproof.Moreover,themediationcontainedinthisknowledgeisreligionitself,forreligionisanactofmediation:itisnotsimplyareferencetoanobjectbutinwardlyamovement,apassingoveroranelevationtoGod.Thepassageisofatwofoldsort:fromfinitetoinfinitebeing(orfromfinitebeingtotheconceptofGod),andfromsubjectivetoobjectiveinfinitude(orfromtheconceptofGodtothebeingofGod).Thefirstofthesepassagescorrespondstothecosmologicalandteleologicalproofs,thesecondtotheontologicalproof.Theproofs,then,aretheconcreteformsthattheknowledgeofGodassumesinthevariousreligions(1:411–416).Twosortsofdistortionarepresentintheattemptto“prove”God’s“existence.”Thefirst(1:417–418)isthesuggestionthatGodcanbesaidto“exist,”for“existence”[Dasein]referstodeterminate,finiteDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhilosophyofReligion241being,whereasGod’sbeingisinnowaylimited.Itwouldbebettertosay,“Godandhisbeing,hisactualityorobjectivity,”andthepurposeoftheproofswouldbetoshowtheconnectionorcoherencebetweenGodandbeing,thatis,betweentheconceptofGodandthebeing(oractuality,objectivity)ofGod.Theseconddistortion(1:419–421)isthenotionthatitispossibleto“prove”ordemonstrateGod’sbeingfromfinitebeing,forthiswouldbetobemakeGodaresultoraconsequence,dependentuponthebeingofthefinite,whereasGodispreciselythenonderivative,is“utterlyactualbeinginandforitself.”Butreligionremainsan“elevation”toGodevenafterthisformofdemonstrationhasbeenstrippedaway.TheKantiancritiqueofthedemonstrativeformoftheproofscannotbeconsideredtohavedemolishedreligiousknowledgeandactivityassuch.ItisonlythatelevationtoGoddoesnotproperlyentailademonstrationoftheinfinitefromthefiniteonthebasisofaself-projectionofthefinite.Forthisreason,thecosmologicalandteleologicalproofs,whilecon-tainingusefulelements,arenotfinallyvalid.Theonlygenuineproofistheontologicalproof,whichpassesover,notfrom(finite)beingtoGod,butfromGodtobeing,thatis,fromtheconceptofGodtothebeingorrealityofGod(1:433–441,3:351–358).TheproblemwithAnselm’sargumentfrom“perfection”–aproblemclearlyexposedbyKant–isthatitpresupposestheveryunityofconcept(thought)andbeing(real-ity)thatmustbedemonstrated.Hegelprovideshisownpost-Kantiandemonstration.Thetrueconceptisnotasubjectiveideaorafantasyoftheimagination(forwhichbeingisrightlynotapredicate).Thetrueconceptcontainsobjectivitywithinitself.Itisaliveandactive;itmedi-atesitselfwithitself;itisthemovementorprocessofself-objectifyingbywhichitssubjectivityissublated–justaswhenhumanbeingsrealizetheirdrivesorpurposeswhatwasatfirstonlyidealbecomessomethingreal.Theconcept“makesitselfrealityandthusbecomesthetruth,theunityofsubjectandobject.”Themostperfectconceptisthemostperfectlyreal,andGodisthemostperfectconcept.ThislogicaltruthbecomesfullymanifestintheChristianreligion,whichisthereligionofincarnation.TheproofdoesnotinvolvesomeillicitlogicaltrickbutisprovidedbyGod’sinvolvementinworld-process.God,whoisutterlyactualbeing[dasSeiende],takesonworldly,determinate,existentialbeing[Dasein].ThereligiouselevationtoGodpresupposesthisdivinedescent,whichisGod’sself-proof.OfcoursethisproofwillnotworkforthosewhohavenoconceptofGod,noknowledgeofGod,andnoexperienceofreligiouselevationanddivinedescent.Thereisnowayofprovingapersonintobeingreli-gious.WhatisrequiredisinvolvementinthepracticeofareligiousDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n242peterc.hodgsoncommunity,itsworshipofGod.12InthecaseoftheknowledgeofGod,Iamimmersedinmyobjectandknownothingofmyself.Butthetruesituationistherelationshipbetweenmyselfandthisobject;Imustknowmyselfasfilledbyit.Whataccomplishesthisunityisaction,theactivityofthecultus.Cultusis“theincluding,withinmyownself,ofmyselfwithGod,theknowingofmyselfwithinGodandofGodwithinme”(1:443).Thisisaccomplishedthroughtheactof“enjoyment,”“par-taking,”“communion,”or“eucharist,”whichisthedefinitiveculticact.TodescribeitHegelusesthetermGenuß,whichhasatitsrootthephysicalimageofeatinganddrinking:symbolicallyweingestorassimilatethecrucifiedGod,whoisreallypresentinthesacramen-talelements.ThisactiondoesnotbringaboutthereconciliationofGodandhumanitybyasubstitutionaryatonement,forexample,orbysacrificespleasingtoGod.Ratheritpresupposesreconciliation,partici-patesinitassomethingalreadyimplicitlyandexplicitlyaccomplishedbythegraceofGod(1:443–444).HegelremarksthatthepreoccupationtodayinProtestantchurchesseemstobesolelywithsubjectivefaith,notwithparticipationinGodthroughritualpractice.Hedistinguishesfouraspectsofthecultus:devotion(anengagedthinking),sacrifice(anegationofthefinitebyofferingituptoGod),sacraments(reconcilia-tionbroughtintofeeling),andrepentance(anofferingofone’shearttoGod).Notablynomentionismadeofpreaching.Whenpurityofheartisproperly“cultivated,”itissuesinethicallife,whichis“themostgen-uinecultus,”butonlytotheextentthatconsciousnessofGodremainsboundupwithit(1:446).Thussocialandpoliticalethicsrepresentanextensionandrealizationofthereligiouscultus.determinatereligionDeterminateReligionisbyfarthelargestofthethreepartsofthephi-losophyofreligion.Anotherchapterwouldbeneededtodoitevenminimaljustice.Bythetimeofthe1824lecturesHegelhadbecomeengagedwiththetopicofthehistoryofreligions.Itclearlyfascinatedhim,anditsproperinterpretationdeeplychallengedhimtowardtheendofhiscareer.Thisisevidentfromtwofacts:thereadingheundertookinprimarysourcesandsecondaryliteratureforthispartofthelectures,andhisinabilitytoarriveatasatisfactoryarrangementofthematerials.Hegelhadanextensiveknowledgeofworldreligionsforhistime,but12ThistopicisdiscussedbyHegelnotonly(briefly)attheendoftheConceptofReligioninthe1827lectures(1:441–449)butalso(extensively)inrelationtoeachofthedeterminatereligionsandtotheconsummatereligioninallofthelectures.IntheConceptofReligionitisdescribedprincipallyintermsofChristianworship.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhilosophyofReligion243hissourcesleftagreatdealtobedesiredasfarasascientificstudyofreli-gionisconcerned(manywerebasedontravelandmissionaryreports).Hefocusedhisattentionontheoriginalorclassicalexpressionsofthereligions,forthemostpartnotattendingtotheirsubsequenthistoriesorcontemporarylivingexpressions,ifany.Heviewedthehistoryofreligionsasprimarilyathingofthepast,withtheexceptionofChris-tianity–andofIslam,whichismissingfromDeterminateReligionandisbrieflymentionedonlyinPartThreeofthelecturesasacontem-poraryrivalofChristianity.ThisisoneoftheseverestproblemswithHegel’streatment,forseveralofthereligionshediscussesarecertainlystillalive:natureorindigenousreligions,Chinesereligion(ConfucianandDaoist),Buddhism,Hinduism,Judaism,Zoroastrianism.ThedeadreligionstowhichhedevotesconsiderableattentionaretheEgyptian,Greek,andRomanreligions.Hegel’sviewseemstobethat,whilereli-gionscontinuetobepracticedthroughouttheword,Geisthasleftmostofthembehind.Christianityalonetrulylives,surroundedbyfossilizedforms,anditispossiblethatittoowillbecomeafossil.Yetheisnotsanguineaboutapostreligiousfuture.Hegel’sinabilitytoarriveatasatisfactoryarrangementofthemateri-alsisindicatedbythefactthathisorganizationofDeterminateReligiondifferedwidelyineachofthefourlectureseries.Whereasthetreat-mentofConsummateReligionfellintoplacewiththe1824lectures,andoftheConceptofReligionin1827,HegelexperimentedwithyetanotherarrangementofDeterminateReligionin1831,whichhadasmanyproblemsasthepreviousarrangements.Yetallthearrangementsanddetaileddiscussionsofspecificreligionsarepackedwithinsights.WalterJaeschkeremarksthatHegel’s“treatmentofthehistoryofreli-gionformsanexperimentalfieldinwhichvirtuallyeverythingistriedout.”13ThusJaeschkesuggeststhatwhatHegeloffersinDeterminateReligionislessahistoryofreligionthanatypologyorgeographyofreligion.14Tobesure,religionisfundamentallyhistorical,butitshis-toricalityfollowsfromthehistoricalityofhumanspirit.Sincethereisnosinglehistoryofhumanspirit,therecannotbeasingle,unifiedhistoryofreligionorganizedunderanencompassingphilosophicalconceptuality.Hegel’sclaimtobeabletodothelatterisfalsifiedbyhisactualachieve-mentinthesuccessivelectures,whichshouldhavemadeitclearthattheobjectiveofalogicalconstructionofthehistoryofreligioncannotbeattained.WhatHegelgivesisatypologyofshapesinwhichspiritappearsinreligioushistoryandbywhichitdevelops,buttheseshapesneednot,indeedcannot,belinkedintoaunitaryhistorydirectedto13Jaeschke,ReasoninReligion,277.14Ibid.,pp.272,277–284.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n244peterc.hodgsonacommongoal.Heisabletodemonstratethenecessityofadiversityandpluralityofreligions,becausespiritcomestoitselfonlythroughmovementanddistinction,butnotthenecessityofauniversalhistoryofreligion.Theshapesappearasdispersedgeographicallyindistinctiveculturaltrajectoriesratherthanaslinkedinatemporalprogression.HegelhimselfwasawareofthisinsofarasforhimChristianitydoesnotevolvefromthesequenceofthedeterminatereligions(althoughitisofcourselinkedtoJudaism).Ratherthanahistoricalprogression,whathepicturesisthatabreakoccursandsomethingnewemergesoutofcrisis–areligionthatcorrespondsfullytotheconceptofreligion,andthusareligioninwhichGodisknownasGodisingodself.Thisnewreligionseemstobereleasedfromthecourseofhistory.theconsummatereligionChristianityastheConsummateandRevelatoryReligionThecorrespondenceofChristianitytotheconceptofreligionandofGodismarkedbythefactthatitsinnerstructuralelementsarticulatemomentsinthetriunelifeofGod.ThesearewhatHegelcametocall(inthe1831lectures)thekingdomsoftheFather,theSon,andtheSpirit.Hisunderstandingofthisstructureevolvedfromthatofaphilosophi-caltriadtoatheologicaltrinity.15Thetriad,asdescribedinthe1821lectures(3:73ff),correspondstothethreebranchesofphilosophy:thelogicalidea,nature,andfinitespirit.AppliedtoChristianity’s“concreterepresentation,”ithasthepeculiarresultoflocatingChristinthethirdmomentofthetriad,whiletheSpiritbecomesanappendagetreatedunderthethemeof“community,cultus.”Amodificationisneededsothatthesecondandthirdmomentsofthetriad(nature,finitespirit)togethercomprisethesecondmomentofthetrinitariandialectic,thecreationandredemptionoftheworldthroughtheworkoftheSon;whiletheSpiritisbroughtintotheTrinityasthethirdmoment,theconsummationandreturnofallthingstoGodasabsolutespirit.Hegelmakessuchanadjustmentin1824andthereafterwhenheidentifiesthethree“elements”or“kingdoms”thatmakeuptheChris-tianideaofGod(3:185–188,271–274,362–363).Thefirst,thekingdomoftheFather,concernstheideaofGodinandforitself,theimma-nentTrinity;thesecond,thekingdomoftheSon,encompassestheprocessesofdifferentiation,estrangement,andreconciliationwhereby15Fordetails,seetheeditorialintroductiontovol.3oftheLecturesonthePhilosophyofReligion(3:11–14),includingthetablethatprovidesacomparativeanalysisofthestructureoftheConsummateReligion(3:54–55).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhilosophyofReligion245theworldiscreated,fallsintoevil,andisredeemed;andthethird,thekingdomoftheSpirit,concernstheformationofthecommunityoffaithanditseschatologicalorientationtotheperfectionofallthingsinGod.TogetherthethreekingdomsformaninclusiveTrinity(aneconomicTrinitythatincorporatesanimmanentTrinityasitsfirstmoment).TheinclusiveTrinityarticulatesthecomplexlifeofGod,whichunfoldsfromself-identitythroughdifferentiationandothernesstocompletionandwholeness.ThisistheChristianmetanarrative.WhatHegeloffersinthethirdpartoftheLecturesonthePhilosophyofReligionisaspeculativeredescriptionofthemetanarrativebymeansofwhichitsmythologicalworldview,sequentialviewofspace/time,andrepresentationallanguagearetranslatedintoaphilosophicalcon-ceptualitythatwillprotectitfromthehostiledemythologizationsofmodernity.16ThetermsbywhichHegelnamestheChristianreligioninhisspec-ulativeredescriptionofitarenoteworthy.Thetwoprincipalnames,whichappearintheheadingofhislecturemanuscript,are“consum-mate”[vollendete]and“revelatory”[offenbare](3:61–63,163–164,249–250).TheconceptofreligioniscompletedorfulfilledinChristianityasdievollendeteReligionbecauseatthecenterofthisreligionisthe“infi-niteideaoftheincarnationofGod”inwhichtheextremesoffiniteandinfinite,consciousnessandobject,areunified:thisisthe“speculativemidpoint”ofreligion(1:245;3:125).ChristianityisalsodieabsoluteReligion(3:165–169),andtheterm“absolute”formsasetwith“con-summate,”butwithdistinctivenuances.“Absolute”forHegelisnotastaticbutadynamic,relationalconcept.Absolutespiritisutterlyconnectedwitheverything:itisnothingbutrelationality.Godisabso-lutelyfreewithingodself,anditispreciselyinthisabsolutefreedomthatGod“absolves”or“releases”theothertoexistasafreeandinde-pendentbeing.“Thisother,releasedassomethingfreeandindependent,istheworldassuch”(3:292).TheworldthatGodreleasesisagenuineothernesswithwhichGodhasreciprocalrelations,butitisnotsome-thingthatresides“beyond”theabsolutebywhichthelattermightbelimitedandrenderedfinite;thedivinelifeisall-encompassing.Theverbentlassen,“torelease,”isaGermanicequivalenttotheLatinverbabsolvere,“toloosenfrom”or“letgo,”fromwhichtheword“abso-lute”derives.Hegel’sassociationof“release”withthetheabsolute”showsthatthelatter,forhim,hasjusttheoppositemeaningthanitsconventionalusage.16SeeEmilFackenheim,TheReligiousDimensioninHegel’sThought(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1967),andCyrilO’Regan,TheHeterodoxHegel(Albany:SUNYPress,1994).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n246peterc.hodgsonHegel’sotherpreferrednamefortheChristianreligionis“reve-latory”[dieoffenbareReligion].Thisissobecause“revelatoriness”[Offenbarkeit]isoneofthedefiningattributesofitsGod(3:63,170).Godisintrinsicallyrevelatory,self-manifesting;Godisnotjealous,doesnotwithholdorconcealgodself,asPlatoandAristotlecon-tendedagainstthemysterycults.WhatGodrevealsisnotsomuchtruthsorinformationaboutGodbutratherthatrevelatorinessandself-communicationareessentiallywhatGodis.ThisiswhatitmeanstosaythatGodis“spirit,”forspiritisessentiallyabeingforspirit,foranother,arelating,revealing,self-opening,self-diremptingspirit(1:382–383,3:250–251).Christianityis,however,morecommonlyspo-kenofasthe“revealed”religion[diegeoffenbarteReligion],suggest-ingthatsomethinghasbeendisclosedthroughitinahistorical,pos-itive,objectivefashion.Hegelaffirmsthisclaim17butinsiststhatinthefirstinstancewhathasbeenrevealedaboutGodissimplythatGodisintrinsicallyrevelatory,manifest(3:170–171,252–253).Whatisrevealedisrevelatoriness,openness.Revelationhasnoobjectorcon-tentotherthanitself.ThecoincidenceofoffenbarandgeoffenbartmeansthatforHegelthewholedebateinlateEnlightenmentthoughtoverreasonversusrevelationwasmisplaced.Whatisrevealedispre-ciselytheprocessinwhichreasonandtruthmakethemselvesopenandmanifest.18Trinity:GodasAbsoluteSpiritTheintrinsicrevelatorinessandself-communicationofGodareexpressedforChristianityinthedoctrineoftheTrinityorthecon-ceptofGodasabsolutespirit.Whatmakesspiritabsoluteandinfiniteisthatallofitsrelationshipsoccurwithinamatrixofcommunicationandrecognition.Absolutespiritincorporatestheexternalityoffiniterelations,butitsownrelationsareproperlyinternal,whichistosaythattheyaremomentsofaninwardlydifferentiatedwhole(3:186–168).Inaholisticsystemtheotherisnotreducedtothesame,butneitherarethesameandtheotherviewedasmutuallyexclusiveatoms.Hegel’sholismseeksamiddlegroundbetweenatomismandmonism.ChristianityarticulatestheholismofabsolutespiritintermsofthedoctrineoftheTrinity(3:77–86,192–197,275–290).Hegel’sinclusive17IntheEncyclopediaofthePhilosophicalSciencesHegelnamesChristianityDiegeoffenbarteReligion,whereasinthePhenomenologyofSpiritaswellasthephilosophyofreligionlecturesitisDieoffenbareReligion.18FurtheraspectsofChristianitysuchastruth,freedom,andreconciliationfollowfromitsconsummateandrevelatorycharacter.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhilosophyofReligion247orholisticTrinity,aswehaveseen,incorporatestheimmanentandeconomicTrinitiesdistinguishedinChristiantradition.Classicalthe-ologyaccordedprecedencetoGod’sidealself-relations,ofwhichtheworldisanepiphenomenalreflection.ModerntheologyhasprioritizedtheeconomicTrinity,God’sappearanceandworkintheworldasSonandSpirit,onthegroundsthatnothingcanbeknownofGod’sinnerlife,ofwhatGodisinandforgodself.Hegelwillhavenothingofthisdivision,foritdestroystheveryheartofwhatGodis.Theelementsaredistinguishablebutnotseparable.Whileinadiscursivetreatmenttheyareunavoidablydiscussedinlinearfashion,theyarerelatednotlinearlybutspirallyorconcentrically,witheachspiraloverlappingandencompassingthepreviousones.Thepatternisthatofatrinitywithinatrinity,ofFatherwithinSonwithinSpirit.ThedifficultywiththeclassicaldoctrineoftheTrinity,fromHegel’sperspective,isnotonlythatitdividesthetwotrinitiesbutalsothatitiscouchedinrepresentationallanguageemployingnumbersandpersons.Astonumbers,theTrinitycannotbeamatterofquantityorcount-ing.Quantitativethinkingcannotgrasphowunitymanifestsitselfindiversityanddifference.Hegelsuggeststhat“reasoncanemployalltherelationshipsoftheunderstanding,butonlyinsofarasitsdestroystheformsoftheunderstanding”(3:192).Fortherepresentationalformofunderstanding[Verstand],theTrinityisasuprarationalparadox,some-thingtobeacceptedontheauthorityoffaith;itisnotatruthofreasonitself[Vernunft].Astopersons,itcanonlybemisleadingtointroducethefigurative,familialrelationshipsexpressedby“Father”and“Son.”Intruth,“allthree[persons]arespirit”(3:194–195).TheTrinityisaplayofspiritualrelationshipsbywhichGodisGod.“Father”isnotadivinepersonbutasymboldesignatingtheimmanentTrinity,while“Son”isasymboldesignatingtheeconomicorworldlyTrinity,and“Spirit”isasymboldesignatingtheinclusiveorholisticTrinity.Inthe1831lectures,thisprovocativestatementoccurs:“TheabstractnessoftheFatherisgivenupintheSon–thisthenisdeath.ButthenegationofthisnegationistheunityofFatherandSon–love,ortheSpirit”(3:370;cf.3:324n.199).HegeldoesnotmeanthattheFatherandtheSonsimplydisappearintotheSpirit,butratherthattheSpiritisthemostconcreteandencompass-ingofthetrinitariansymbols.ThedeathofChristsignifiesthedeathofthetranscendentfather-figureandoftheindividualsavior-figure.ButtherecanbenoSpiritapartfromtheabstractnessoftheFatherandthedeathoftheSon–apart,thatis,fromthedialecticofidentityanddifferenceanduniversalityandparticularity.Godistobeunderstoodnotasthreepersonsbutasinfinitepersonal-ityorinfinitesubjectivity,whichconstitutesdistinctionswithinitselfDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n248peterc.hodgsonbutsublatesthesedistinctionsandachievesaricherunity.Personalityisnotadead,unmovingsubstancebutalivingplayofrelationshipsformedbyloveandfriendship.Onlyspeculativethinkingisabletograsphowdistinctionsarebothpositedandresolved,andwhycontradic-tionsarepresentineverythinglivingandconcrete.SpeculativetheologycomprehendstherationalityofthedivinemysterynotonlyintermsofthelogicalparadigmthatgovernsHegel’ssystembutalsobyintroduc-ingtheanalogyofethicalrelationshipsandbydescribingthenatureofpersonality.“Ethicallife,love,meanspreciselythegivingupofparticularity,ofparticularpersonality,anditsextensiontouniversal-ity–so,too,withfriendship.InfriendshipandloveIgiveupmyabstractpersonalityandtherebywinitbackasconcretepersonality.Thetruthofpersonalityisfoundpreciselyinwinningitbackthroughthisimmersion,thisbeingimmersedintheother”(3:285–286).Godistheutterlyconcrete,universalpersonality,accomplishedinandthroughthetotalityofthedivinelife,notintheabstractionofpurelyinteriorrelations.Creation,Humanity,andEvilCreationisaveryimportantdoctrineforHegelbecauseitdescribestheprocessbywhichtheinternaldifferentiationwithinthedivinelifeisoutwardlypositedasaconcrete,materialreality(3:86–90,198–201,290–294).Aswehavenoted,heusesthemetaphorof“release”of“lettingexist”[Entlassen].TheabsolutefreedomofGodissuchthatGodisabletoreleasetheothernessthatisintrinsictoGod’sownbeingintoactual,independentexistence,whichistheworldvis-a-visGod.The`otherwithinGod,theeternalSon,obtainsthedeterminacyofother-being,becomesahistoricalSon.Inthisway,thenonseriousplayoflovewithitself(theimmanentTrinity)becomesdeadlyserious,subjecttotheruptures,conflicts,andsufferingofthefiniteworld(3:291–293).Godisnottherebydiminishedbutenlarged,fortheworldpreciselyinitsothernessfromGodremainsamomentwithinthedivinelife.Goddoesnotabandontheworldbutpreservesandsavesit,andindeedisenrichedandcompletedbyit;butthisisanexistential,notalogicalcompletion.Bothtruthsmustbemaintained:thatGodiscompleteapartfromtheworld,andthatGodachievescompletionthroughtheworld.Theworlddividesintotherealmsofnatureandhumanity(finitespirit).Godispresentandactiveinbothrealms,butonlyhumanbeingsarecapableofknowingandrelatingtoGod.Humans,however,arerivenbyaninternalcontradiction:theybelongtonaturebutmustraisethemselvesfromnaturetospiritbytheuseofreason.SuchanactionDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhilosophyofReligion249involvesaseparationorcleavagebroughtaboutbytheconsciousnessofselfandother.Evilresultswhencleavage[Entzweiung]becomesalien-ation[Entfremdung]betweenseparatedelements,orwhenaretreatoccursbackintonaturalimmediacywithitsselfishnessandstruggleforsurvival(3:92–103,202–205,295–300).ThisisHegel’sdemytholo-gizedversionofthebiblicalstoryofthe“fall,”whichisalso,paradox-ically,a“rising”(3:101–107).Whatispresentedhereisatragicviewofhumannature:theconditionforthepossibilityofgoodincludesalsothepossibilityofevil.Inordertoriseoutofthenaturalstateandrealizetheirspiritualpotential,humanbeingsmustexercisetheirrationalcapacity,whichiswhatmakesthemlikeGod,butwhichalsoproducesanxiety,alienation,andeffortsatself-securing.Theknowl-edgethatmakeshumansalsowoundsthem(3:205–206,301–310).ItissometimessaidthatHegeltrivializestheproblemofevilbyconnect-ingittoocloselywithknowledgeandfailingtorecognizeitsabsurdandirrationalaspects.FromHegel’spointofviewwhatgivesevilitsextraordinarypowerispreciselyitsconnectionwithknowledge.Itisadistortionandperversionofwhatishighestinhumanity,notofwhatislowest,andthusithasapotencythatfaroutstripsnaturaldestructionaswellasacapacityforself-deceptionthatreasononitsowncan-notovercome.Whatisrequiredisaredemptionofreason–notitsdisplacement.ChristandRedemptionThisredemptioncomesaboutthroughtheincarnationofGodinasinglehumanbeingataspecifictimeandplace.Hegeldevotesconsiderableeffortstoestablishingthepossibility,necessity,andactualityofsuchanincarnation.Thepossibilityresidesintheimplicitunityofdivineandhumannature,whichisgivenwithhumanity’sawarenessthatGodisitsabsolutetruthanddestiny.Divinityandhumanityarenotonto-logicallyincompatiblenaturesbutbelongtoeachotherdespitetheirpresentestrangement.TheactualizedunityofdivineandhumannatureisHegel’sphilosophicalinterpretationof“incarnation.”Thebecoming-human[Menschwerdung]ofdivinityisnotsomethingthathappensonlyonceasanextrinsicmiracle;ratheritisa“momentintheprocessofthedivinenature”(3:109–110,211–212,310–312).Thenecessityofincar-nationisthattheunitymustappearandbeaccomplishedinhistory.Ontheonehand,GodmustshareintheanguishofhistorytobecomeaspiritualGod;andontheotherhand,humansneedsuchanappearanceasaconcretesensibleverificationoftheirredemption(3:110–112,214–215,312–313).Finally,theactualityfocusesonasinglehumanbeing.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n250peterc.hodgsonGodispresentintheconcretesubjectivityofindividuals,andeachindi-vidualisunique.Moreover,theremustbeonlyoneindividualinwhomtheideaofdivine-humanunityappearsinarevelatorilydefinitivewaybecauseseveralwouldbeanabstractionandbecauseonemuststandapartfromalltheothersintheirneedandignorance(3:112–114,145,214,313–314).ThatthisindividualisJesusofNazarethcannotbeestab-lishedphilosophicallybutisgivenbyhistory.TheclaimthatJesusistheChrist,thebearerandrevealerofredemption,isaclaimoffaith,butHegelbelievesthatitcanbeshowntobecongruentwithhistoricalfact(3:114–115,142–149).HistoryshowsthatJesuswasanextraordinaryteacherwhoselifeconformedtowhathetaughtaboutloveandfriendship,therevolution-aryreversalofvalues,andthedefiningrelationshiptoGod(3:115–122).OnthisbasisHegelmakesstrongclaims.Thelifeofthisteacheris“inconformitywith”histeachingand“strictlyadequateto”theideaofdivine-humanunity.ThecontentofhislifeissimplythekingdomofGodthatheproclaims.“Sinceitisthedivineideathatcoursesthroughthishistory,itoccursnotasthehistoryofasingleindividualalone,butratheritisimplicitlythehistoryofactualhumanityasitconstitutesitselfastheexistenceofspirit”(3:122–124,145).JesusisnotmerelyateacherbutaprophetthroughwhomGodspeaks.Thespeechandactiv-ityofJesusisthatofahumanbeing,yetitisatthesametime“essen-tiallytheworkofGod–notassomethingsuprahumanthatappearsintheshapeofanexternalrevelation,butratheras[God’s]workinginahumanbeing,sothatthedivinepresenceisessentiallyidenticalwiththishumanbeing”(3:316–321).ThefaiththatthedivinelifeflowsinthishumanlifeisbasedonthewitnessoftheHolySpirittoindividualsandtothecommunityoffaith.Hegelisclearaboutthis:onlyfaithcanseethatGodispresentinChrist;buttherearereasonsforthisenvis-agement;itdoesnotruncountertothehistoricalwitness(3:368–369).Faithisrootedinhistory,butnoproofofGodcanbegivenfromhistory.TheperspectivefromwhichfaithseesthepresenceofGodinChristisapostdeathandpostresurrectionperspective.ForHegelthedeathofChristisofgreatsignificance,foritistobeseenasthedeathofGod,thatis,asthemostextreme“divestment”[Entaußerung¨]ofdivinity(3:124–128,131).The“deepestanguish”ofthecross(ashameful,dishonor-ingdeath)isalsothehighestexpressionofGod’sloveforhumanity.Thisisnottobeconstruedasasubstitutionaryatonementorextrin-sicsacrifice,butasthehistoricalmanifestationofthereconciliationeternallyaccomplishedwithinthegodhead(3:219–220).ThedeathofChristalsorepresentsatransitionfromthesensibletothespiritualpresenceofGodinthecommunityoffaith(3:322–326).Thistransi-tionisHegel’sdemythologizedinterpretationoftheresurrection,whichDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sPhilosophyofReligion251occurswiththeriseofanewcommunalexistencepatternedonChrist(3:131–133).SpiritandCommunityHumansubjectivity,whenitistransfiguredbytheindwellingoftheSpiritofGod,becomesacommunalsubjectivity,anintersubjectivityinwhichexternaldistinctionsandsocialrankingsareabolished.InthepresenceofGodallhumanbeingsarefreeandequal.Theirrelationshipsarebasednotonattractionorpersonalfulfillmentbuton“theinfinitelovethatcomesfrominfiniteanguish.”Theanguish,thesharedsuf-fering,createsanewkindofhumanfellowshipinwhichpersonsfindthemselvesonlybylosingthemselvesforthesakeofothers.Loveinthefullestsenseiscompassion,sufferingwithandonbehalfofothers.ItisgroundedinthedivinecompassionrevealedinChrist.TheHolySpiritisthepowerandrealityofthislovemadesubjectivelypresentandactualinthelifeofthecommunity.Itis“theSpiritofGod,orGodasthepresent,actualSpirit,Goddwellinginhiscommunity”(3:133–142,331).ThisisHegel’sradicalvisionoftheChristiancommunity.Heknowsthatitcanexistinhistoryonlybymeansofinstitutionalformsthatareinadequatetothedivinecontent;yetwithoutformorshape,spiritdissipates:noGeistwithoutGestalt.Theinstitutionalformsofthechurchfollowfromthetwofoldtaskofcomingtothetruth(baptism,faith,doctrine)andappropriatingthetruth(repentance,worship,sacra-ments)(3:333).Hegeldevotesconsiderableattentiontotheseforms,culminatingintheeucharist,which,whileasensuousactofpartaking,bringsaboutamysticalorspiritualunionbyappropriatingtheeter-nalsacrificethatisGod.Theeucharistextendsintothelifeofthecommunitytheself-divestmentofGodinChrist(3:152–154,235–236,337).Thecommunityinturnhasthemissionofextendingthispatterntotheworld,ofgivingupitsinwardspiritualityforthesakeoftheredemp-tionoftheworld.Hegeldescribesathree-stepprocessbywhichthishappens:therealityofworldlyinstitutions(monasticism,themedievalchurch,ethicallife,andthestate),theidealityofabstractreflection(Enlightenment,Pietism),andthemediationofrealityandidealitybyspeculativephilosophy(whichdefendsreligionagainsttheattacksofmodernrationalismandpreservesitstruthinconceptualform).Butironicallythephilosophicalresolutionisonlypartial,forphilosophyforms“anisolatedorderofpriests”whosemissionistopreserveandinterpretthetruthbutnottostruggleforit.Thus,thePhilosophyofReligionlectures(atleastthoseof1821)endona“discordantnote,”DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n252peterc.hodgsonwhichreflectsHegel’sambivalentattitudetowardthechurchandthe-ologyontheonehand,andpost-Enlightenmentcultureontheotherhand.Hebelievesthatreligionmust“takerefuge”intheconcept,andthattheworkoftheologyismoreadequatelyperformedbyphilosophy.ButHegel’sownawarenessoftheinsecureplaceofphilosophyinthemodernworldisasoberwarningagainstadvancinghegemonicclaimsonitsbehalf.1919Hereawealthofmaterial(3:237–247,339–347)iscompressedintoaninadequatesummary.Hegel’sownpresentationiscompressedandincompletebecauseoftheapproachingendofthesemester.Thissummarydoesnottakeintoaccountthediscrepancybetweentheendingofthelecturesin1821(3:158–162)andinlateryears.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:21WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.010CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nglennalexandermagee10HegelandMysticismi.introductionThatthereissomething“mystical”aboutHegel’sphilosophyisafamil-iarclaim.IntheyearsfollowingHegel’sdeathitwasacommonplace.Inan1840essayonMeisterEckhart,theDanishphilosopherHansMartensenremarkedthatHegel(aswellasSchelling)had“demandedthatphilosophicalthoughtrejuvenateitselfintheimmediateknowl-edgeofGodanddivinethingsfoundinmysticism.”1FriedrichTheodorVischerremarkedthattheHegelianphilosophyhadcomeforth“fromtheschooloftheoldmystics,especiallyJakobBoehme.”2Inhis1835workDiechristlicheGnosis,FerdinandChristianBauerclaimedthatHegelwasamodernGnostic,andarguedforhisphilosophicalkinshipwithBoehme.WilhelmDiltheylaternotedthesameaffinitybetweenHegelandthemystics.Morerecently,authorsasdifferentasBertrandRussellandJ.N.Findlayhaveclaimeda“mysticalelement”inHegel’sthought–RussellinordertodisparageHegel,Findlayinordertoelevatehim.Inthischapter,Ishallsurveytheevidencefortheinfluenceofmys-ticismonHegel’swritings.Ishallarguethattheevidenceisabundantandtheinfluencedecisive.However,evenifitcanbeestablishedthattherewassuchaninfluence,andthatitwasofimportance,thisdoesnotmeanthattheHegelianphilosophycanitselfbeaccuratelydescribedasmystical.Therefore,thisissuemustbeaddressedaswell,andIshallapproachit,primarilyinsectionthree,throughanexaminationofwhatHegelhimselfhadtosayabouttherelationshipofhisphilosophytomysticism.Iamactuallygoingtoputoffdefiningpreciselywhatismeantbymysticismuntilsectionthree.Infact,IwillletHegelhimselfdefinethe1BetweenHegelandKierkegaard:HansL.Martensen’sPhilosophyofReligion,trans.byCurtisL.ThompsonandDavidJ.Kangas(Atlanta:ScholarsPress,1997),p.154.2SeeErnstBenz,TheMysticalSourcesofGermanRomanticPhilosophy,trans.byBlairG.ReynoldsandEuniceM.Paul(AllisonPark:PickwickPublications,1983),p.2.253DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n254glennalexandermageetermforus.Fornow,Iintendtorelyonmyreaders’intuitionsaboutthemeaningoftheterm.Philosophershaveasenseofwhatcountsas“mystical,”asensewhichamountstoanintuitiverecognitionof“familyresemblances”betweencertainthinkers,claims,andstylesofwriting.Evenintheabsenceofadefinition,Ithinkthatthissensegenerallyservesusquitewell,andsoIseenoseriousprobleminrelyingonit,atleastinitially.WhatwouldcountasevidencefortheinfluenceofmysticismonHegel?Wewouldprobablyhavetoestablishthreethings:thatHegelreadwidelyinmysticismandshowedanactiveinterestinit,thathewrote(andwroteapprovingly)aboutthemystics,andthathisphilosophywouldnothavetakentheformitdidintheabsenceofhisencounterwithmysticism.Thefirsttwopointscanbeestablishedwithrelativeease.Thethirdpointismoredifficulttoprove.ii.theinfluenceofmysticismonhegelPerhapsthemostsensiblewaytoproceedistomovechronologically,tracingtheevidencefortheinfluenceofmysticismthroughoutHegel’sentirelife.3Hegel’schildhoodinStuttgart–from1770to1788–doesnotpro-videmuchevidenceofmysticinfluence,butallowsforsometantalizingspeculations.Duringthistime,Hegel’shomeland,Wurttemberg,wasa¨hotbedofinterestnotonlyinmysticism,butalsoinsuch“Hermetic”fieldsasalchemy.MysticalandHermeticliteraturewasplentifulinWurttemberg,andworksbyParacelsusandBoehmewerewidelycircu-¨lated.TheSchwabischenMagazin¨,ahighlyinfluentialpublicationinSwabianliteraryculture,printedalchemicalandtheosophicalworks.Hegel’sreligiousupbringingisthoughttohavebeen,broadlyspeak-ing,pietist.TheleadingSwabianexponentsofpietism,J.A.Bengel(1687–1752)andF.C.Oetinger(1702–1782)wereheavilyinfluencedbythetraditionofGermanmysticism,especiallyMeisterEckhart(1260–ca.1327)andJakobBoehme(1575–1624).Thishasledsomescholarstospeculatethatfromearlyon,Hegelmayhavereceivedsomeinfluence,howeverindirect,frommysticalsources.FranzWiedmannwritesthat“Hegel’shome,likethatofeveryold,establishedfamilyinStuttgartuptothebeginningofourcentury,wasmarkedbyProtestantPietism.AndthusHegelwassteepedinitstheosophyandmysticismfrom3Mostofthematerialpresentedinthissectionisdiscussedmuchmorefullyinmybook,HegelandtheHermeticTradition(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2001;revisedpaperbackedition,2008).ReaderswhowishamoredetailedargumentfortheinfluenceofmysticismonHegelarereferredtothatwork.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandMysticism255childhood.”4WritingofbothHegelandSchelling(whowasalsoSwabian),RobertSchneiderhasemphasizedtheirintellectualdistance,startingataveryearlyage,fromthemechanisticmaterialismoftheEnlightenment.Their“conceptualworld,”hewrites,wasthatofthe“ancientcategoriesofchemical(i.e.,alchemical)-biologicalphilosophyofnature,”derivingfrom“Oetinger,Boehme,vanHelmont,Boyle,Fludd,Paracelsus,AgrippavonNettesheim,Telesio,andothers....ThisphilosophyofnaturewasstillaliveinWurttembergduringSchellingand¨Hegel’syouth.”5Thereisnoharddocumentaryevidence,though,fortheinfluenceofmysticismonHegelduringthisperiod.Tobesure,someofHegel’sear-liestjottingsdotouchonissuescharacteristicofWurttembergPietism.¨Helaboriouslycopiedoutpassagesfromreligioustexts,butthereisnothingovertlymysticalinanyofit.Ishallhavereason,however,toreturnlatertothequestionofthepossibleinfluenceonHegelofOetinger.Hegel’sstudiesintheTubingen¨Stift(1788–1793)alsogivepreciouslittleevidenceofthecontributionofmysticismtoHegel’sdevelopment.AttheStift,Hegelstudiedwithafacultyofratherconventionalthe-ologiansandreadworksbyPlato,Kant,Schiller,Jacobi,Hemsterhuis,Montesquieu,Rousseau,andHerder.TheremarksofHegel’sinstructorsindicatethathehadlittleinterestatthetimeinmetaphysics,letalonemysticism.6From1793to1801,HegelwasemployedasaprivatetutorinBerneandtheninFrankfurt.Hegel’sbiographerKarlRosenkranzhasreferredtothisasa“theosophicalphase”inHegel’sdevelopment.HisclaimhasprovedcontroversialamongHegelscholars.However,itdoesseemthatduringthisperiodHegelbegantostudytheworksofBoehme,Eckhart,Tauler,andpossiblyalso(ifRosenkranzistobebelieved)FranzvonBaader.ItwasBoehmewhomadethegreatestimpressiononhim.WhydidHegelsuddenlytakeupthewritingsofseveralofthegreat-estGermanmystics?ThathedidlendssomeplausibilitytothethesisthattherewasaninfluenceofthemysticsonHegelinhisboyhood.PerhapspriortotheBerne-Frankfurtperiodhehadneverstudiedthe4FranzWiedmann,Hegel:AnIllustratedBiography,trans.byJoachimNeugroschel(NewYork:Pegasus,1968),p.14.Asanadult,Hegelwascriticalofpietism,buthislaterendorsementoftheworkofKarlFriedrichGoschel(¨1784–1862),whotriedtofuseHegelianismandpietism,indicatesthathewasnotentirelyunsympathetictoit.5RobertSchneider,SchellingsundHegelsschwabischeGeistessahnen¨(Wurzburg:¨Tiltsch,1938),p.2.6JohannesHoffmeister,DokumentezuHegelsEntwicklung(Stuttgart:Fromann,1936),p.430.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n256glennalexandermageemysticsdirectly,butthen,afteralongperiodstudyingmoreconven-tionalauthorsandsubjects,heturnedatlasttotheiroriginaltexts.Thisisquiteplausible,butitispurespeculation.Weknowthatdur-ingthisperiodHegelalsobecameinvolvedinMasoniccircles.7WhenHegelmadethemovefromBernetoFrankfurt,partlyinordertobereunitedwithhisclosefriendHoelderlin,hesentthelatterapoemtitled“Eleusis,”whichcontainsMasonicimagery.8VariousstrainsofMasonryexistedatthetime,andsomewerepurveyorsofEnlightenmentrationalismandpoliticalliberalism,ratherthantheosophy.ItisbelievedthatHegel(whoneveractuallybecameaMason)wasinvolvedwiththeEnlightenmentwingofFreemasonry.Nevertheless,someMasons,par-ticularlythoseinGermany,combinedbothliberalpoliticsandmysti-cism,anditcouldbethatoneormoreindividualsHegelmetthroughthesecontactsencouragedhisstudyofthemystics.9Inanycase,itissubsequenttothis“theosophicalphase”thatHegelbeginstoproducethefirstwritingswhichbearhisdistinctivestamp.InJena(1801–1807)Hegel’sinterestinmysticismappearstohaveintensified.HenowfoundhimselfonceagaininthecompanyofSchelling,whowasavidlyinterestedinthewritingsofBoehme,Oetinger,andthevisionaryEmanuelSwedenborg(1688–1772).DavidWalshwritesthatJenaduringthisperiod...hadbecomethefocalpointoftheGermanRomanticmovement,andmanyofitsgreatestfigureswereassembledthere,includingTieck,Novalis,Schelling,F.Schlegel,andA.W.Schlegel.WithinthatcompanyanintensecenterofinterestwasformedbytheirrediscoveryoftheGermanmysticaltradition.ForthefirsttimetheworksofthegreatmedievalandReformationmysticswerebecomingwidelyavailablewithintheirnativeland.TheappearanceofEckhartandBoehmeinparticularwasheraldedasaliberatingreleasefromthedeadnessofEnlighten-mentrationalism.Theyread,too,themajoreighteenth-centurycommentatorsofBoehme...andtheSwabianPietisttheologianFriedrichChristophOetinger,inwhomtheyfoundamorecontemporaryapplicationofthegreatmysticalinsightsofthepast.107SeeJacquesD’Hondt,HegelSecret:Recherchessurlessourcescacheesdelapens´ee´deHegel(Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance,1968).SeealsoH.S.Harris,Hegel’sDevelopment:TowardtheSunlight(1770–1801)(London:OxfordUniver-sityPress,1972),p.156.8SeeD’Hondt,pp.227–281.Seealsomydiscussionofthepoem,drawingonD’Hondt,inHegelandtheHermeticTradition,pp.75–76.9HeinrichSchneidernotesthattheGermanlodgeswere“teemingwithmagical,theosophical,mysticalnotions”andthatmuchoftheirlorewasKabbalistic.SeeSchneider,QuestforMysteries:TheMysticalBackgroundforLiteratureinEigh-teenthCenturyGermany(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1947),pp.22,102.10DavidWalsh,“TheHistoricalDialecticofSpirit:JacobBoehme’sInfluenceonHegel”inHistoryandSystem:Hegel’sPhilosophyofHistory,ed.byRobertL.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandMysticism257Hegel’slecturesonthePhilosophyofNatureatthistimeshowaninterestinParacelsusandalchemy.Moreimportantly,hisLecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophyincludelengthy,largelypositiveaccountsofGiordanoBrunoandBoehme.Hegel’streatmentofBoehmeoccupiesalmostthirtypagesinmostmoderneditions,farexceedingtheamountoftextHegeldevotedtomany“canonical”philosophers.Indeed,itwouldbeeasyenoughtoarguefortheinfluenceofmysticismonHegelsimplybyconfiningoneselftoBoehme.H.S.Harrisis“inclinedtobelieveinBoehme’sinfluenceuponHegelfrom1801onwards.”11BoehmewasashoemakerinGoerlitz,inLusatiaonthebordersofBohemia,whohadamysticalvisionin1600.Transfixedbyagleamoflightreflectedinapewtervessel,hefeltsuddenlyable,foraquarterofanhour,tointuittheessencesor“signatures”ofallthings.Hewrotenoth-ingformanyyears,thenproducedAurora(MorgenrotheimAufgang¨)in1612,hisfirstattempttolayoutina“piecemeal”fashiontherevelationhehadreceivedallatoncetwelveyearsearlier.CentraltoBoehme’sthoughtisaconceptionofGodasdynamicandevolving.RejectingtheideaofatranscendentGodwhoexistsoutsideofcreation,completeandperfect,BoehmewritesinsteadofaGodwhodevelopsHimselfthroughcreation.Shockingly,BoehmeclaimsthatapartfromorpriortocreationGodisnotyetGod.WhatmovesGodtounfoldHimselfintheworldisthedesiretoachieveself-consciousness,andthemechanismofthisprocesswasthoughtbyBoehmetoinvolveconflictandopposition.12Inalaterwork,Boehmewrote,“Nothingcanberevealedtoitselfwithoutopposition.”13Thus,Godmust“other”Himselfintheformoftheworld.Theprocessofcreation,andofGod’scomingtoself-consciousness,eventuallyreachesconsummationwithman.Boehmeexplainstheseideas,andlaysoutthestagesofcreation,Perkins(Albany:SUNYPress,1984),pp.22–23.ErnstBenzhasalsosaidthat“InacertainsenseonecanrefertothephilosophyofGermanIdealismasaBoehme-Renaissance,whenBoehmewasdiscoveredatthesametimebySchelling,Hegel,FranzvonBaader,Tieck,Novalisandmanyothers.”SeeBenz,AdamderMythusvomUrmenschen(Munich:Barth,1955),p.23.11H.S.Harris,Hegel’sDevelopment:NightThoughts(Jena1801–1806)(London:OxfordUniversityPress,1983),p.85.12DavidWalshstatesthat,“AtthecoreofhisconstructionwasBoehme’sdiscoverythatconflictandoppositionwerenecessarytotheself-revelationofGod.Itwasanextrapolationfromwhatisrequiredfortheself-realizationofmantowhatisrequiredfortheself-realizationofGod.”Walsh,“AMythologyofReason:ThePersistanceofPseudo-ScienceintheModernWorld,”inScience,Pseudo-Science,andUtopianisminEarlyModernThought,ed.byStephenMcKnight(Columbia:UniversityofMissouriPress,1992),p.153.13JakobBoehme,VomGottlicherBeschaulichkeit¨,inSamtlicheSchriften¨,ed.byWill-ErichPeuckert(Stuttgart:Frommann,1955–1961),vol.4,chap.1,§8.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n258glennalexandermageeintermsofabafflingaccountinvolvingseven“sourcespirits”(Quell-geister).Theidentityofthesespiritsdiffersfromworktowork,butasamplingofsomeofthenameshegivestothemwillofferanindicationoftheobscurityofBoehme’sthinking:Sour(Herb),Sweet(Suss¨),Bitter(Bitter),Flash(Schrack),Heat(Hitze),Sound(Ton),Body(Corpus),andsoforth.Inhis1805LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,HegelreferstoBoehmeasthephilosophicusteutonicusandpairshimwithFrancisBaconasthetworepresentativesof“ModernPhilosophyinitsFirstStatement.”14Hegel’streatmentofBoehmeislongandrespectful,butheendsit,ashedoeshisaccountofmostotherphilosophers,bypoint-ingoutthecrucialshortcominginBoehme’sthought:“Boehme’sgreatmindisconfinedinthehardknottyoakofthesenses–inthegnarledconcretionoftheordinaryconception–andisnotabletoarriveatafreepresentationoftheidea.”15Itwouldbeerroneoustoconcludefromthis,however,thatHegelissimplydismissingBoehme.Thelengthandtoneofhistreatmentofthephilosophicusteutonicushereandelsewheresug-gestthatthiswouldbeamisreading.16AsH.S.Harrishasstated,Hegel’scriticismofBoehmeisconsistentwithhis“evidentdesire”todemon-stratethatBoehme’swritings(andthoseofParacelsus)“containedsym-bolicexpressionsofimportantspeculativetruths.”1714M.J.Petrywritesthat“ForHegel...theIdeaofNatureinvolvesacombinationofBaconianandBoehmeanattitudestonaturalphenomena.”Petry,introductiontoHegel’sPhilosophyofNature,3vols.,trans.byM.J.Petry(London:GeorgeAllenandUnwin,1970),vol.1,p.114.15Hegel,LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy(henceforthLHP),3vols.,trans.byE.S.Haldane(London:KeganPaul,Trench,Trubner,¨1892),vol.3,p.195;G.W.F.HegelsWerke(henceforthWerke),20vols.,ed.byEvaMoldenhauerundKarlMarkusMichel(FrankfurtamMain:Suhrkamp,1986),vol.20,p.98.Note:inreferringtoHegel’spublicationswhichhedividedintonumberedparagraphs,Iwillrefertothoseparagraphssothatthereadermayeasilyconsultanyedition.Whenreferringtoworks,orportionsofworks,withoutparagraphnumbers,referencewillbetopagenumbersinaspecificGermanedition,usuallyWerke.Ineithercase,IwillalsociteareadilyavailableEnglishtranslation.16HegelisunambiguousinsharplyrejectingBoehme’s“picturethinking.”Forexam-ple,inan1828reviewessayHegel–writingofLudwigTieck’sfascinationwithBoehme’smysticism–states,“Theequallyenormousdefectivenessinthismys-ticismbecomesobvious,tobesure,onlytotherequirementsofthought.”SeeMiscellaneousWritingsofG.W.F.Hegel,ed.byJonStewart(Evanston,IL:North-westernUniversityPress,2002),p.369;Werke,11:227.SomeHegelscholarsseizeonsuchstatementstotryandarguethatHegelrepudiatesBoehme.However,whatherepudiatesismerelytheformofBoehme’sthought;hemakesitquiteclearthatheadmiresitscontentorsubstance.17Harris,NightThoughts,p.399.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandMysticism259Inessence,Hegel’sattitudetowardthemysticismofBoehmeandoth-ersisanalogoustohisattitudetowardreligioningeneral:mysticism,likereligion,hasthesamecontentorthesameobjectasphilosophy,andapproximatestoatruthwhichonlyphilosophycanfullyunveil.Hencethestudyofmysticism,likereligion,mayofferthephilosopherimportantsignpostspointingthewaytophilosophy’sgoal.Hegelstatesthat“Itisthedistinctivetaskofphilosophytotransmutethecontentthatisintherepresentationofreligionintotheformofthought;thecontent[itself]cannotbedistinguished.”18Hegelreferstoreligionsas“sproutingupfortuitously,liketheflowersandcreationsofnature,asforeshadowings,images,representations,without[our]knowingwheretheycomefromorwheretheyaregoingto.”19“Religion,”hewritesinthesametext,“isabegetterofthedivinespirit,notaninventionofhumanbeingsbutaneffectofthedivineatwork,ofthedivineproduc-tiveprocesswithinhumanity.”20Hegeldistinguishesbetweenvarietiesofmysticismjustashedistinguishesbetweenreligions,intermsofhowcloselytheycometothetruth.Forexample,intheLecturesonAesthet-ics,hecontrastsChristianmysticism(inthepersonofAngelusSilesius)withthemysticismoftheEast,and,predictably,makesitclearthatheregardstheformerasonahigherplane.21Intheyears1804–1805,whileheavilyundertheinfluenceofBoehme,Hegelhadcomposedandthencritiqueda“myth”aboutLucifer.Hegelwritesinthistext,God,havingturnedtowardnatureandexpressedHimselfinthepompanddullrepetitionofitsforms,becameawareofHisexpansion...andbecameangryoverit.Wrath[Zorn]isthisformation,thiscontractionintoanemptypoint.HefindsHimselfinthisway,withHisbeingpouredoutintotheunending,restlessinfinity,wherethereisnopresentbutanemptytranscendenceoflimit,whichalwaysremainsevenasitistranscended.22Hegel’suseof“wrath”hereisinfluencedbyBoehme’sconceptoftheSour(Sauer),whichexpressestheinitialmomentofGod’sbeing,HiswilltocloseHimselfandremainunmanifest.HegelwouldlaterusethetermZorninspeakingofBoehme’sphilosophyintheLectures,18Hegel,LecturesonthePhilosophyofReligion(henceforthLPR),3vols.,ed.andtrans.byPeterC.Hodgson,etal.(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1984),vol.1,p.333;VorlesungenuberdiePhilosophiederReligion¨(henceforthVPR),3vols.,ed.byWalterJaeschke(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1983–1987)vol.1,p.235.19LPR,1:196;VPR,1:106.20LPR,1:130;VPR,1:46.21Hegel,Aesthetics,2vols.,trans.byT.M.Knox(Oxford:TheClarendonPress,1975),vol.1,p.371;Werke,13:478.22Hoffmeister,Dokumente,pp.364–365.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n260glennalexandermageewhereheidentifiedthe“firstprinciple”ofBoehme’sthoughtasGottinZorn.23InHegel’s“myth,”GodexternalizesHimselfinnature,butbecomes“angry”overitandthroughthisbecomesconsciousofHimself.God’swrathbecomesthespiritofLucifer,whichreflectsGodbacktoHim-self.Hegelcritiquedhisownmythas“theintuitionsofbarbarians”(dieAnschauungenderBarbarei)becauseofitspicture-thinking.Thetoneandlanguageofthisaccountareechoedinthe“RevealedReligion”sec-tionofthePhenomenologyofSpirit(1807).Walshstatescorrectlythatthissectionis“fromstarttofinishidenticalwiththetheosophicChris-tianityofBoehme.”24There,Hegelwritesofthe“first-bornSonofLight”(whoisLucifer),“whofellbecausehewithdrewintohimselforbecameself-centered,butthatinhisplaceanotherwasatoncecreated.”25Inthewinterof1804–1805,Hegelproducedaworkthatscholarshavecometocallthe“divinetrianglefragment.”Theactualtextnolongerexists,butHegel’sbiographerKarlRosenkranzquotesanddescribesitatlength.26RosenkranzarguesthatthetextwasheavilyinfluencedbyBoehme(andFranzvonBaader)andhesummarizesitscontentasfollows:Toexpressthelifeoftheidea,[Hegel]constructedatriangleoftriangles,whichhesufferedtomovethroughoneanotherinsuchawaythateachonewasnotonlyatonetimeextreme,andatanothertimemiddlegenerally,butalsoithadtogothroughthisprocessinternallywitheachofitssides.Andthen,inordertomaintaintheidealplasticityofunityamidthisrigidityandcrudityofintuition,tomaintainthefluidityofthedistinctionsrepresentedastriangleandsides,hewentonconsistentlytothefurtherbarbarityofexpressingthetotalityas[a]squarerestingoverthetrianglesandtheirprocess.Butheseemstohavegottiredinthefollowingoutofhislabour;atanyratehebrokeoffattheconstructionoftheanimal.27Hegel’sfirsttriangle(“GodtheFather”)describesthe“Godhead”closedwithinitself,alaBoehme’sSour-Sweet-Bitter,theprimordial`23LHP,3:192;Werke,20:95.24Walsh,“TheHistoricalDialecticofSpirit,”p.28.25Hegel,ThePhenomenologyofSpirit(henceforthPS),trans.byA.V.Miller(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1977),p.468;PhanomenologiedesGeistes¨(henceforthPG),ed.byHans-FriedrichWesselsandHeinrichClairmont(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1988),p.504.Note:paragraphsarenumberedinMiller’stranslation,butnotinHegel’soriginal.InMiller,theparagraphsarenumberedtocorrespondtoJ.N.Findlay’sparagraph-by-paragraphcommentary,printedasanappendix.26KarlRosenkranz,“HegelsursprunglichesSystem¨1798–1806,”LiterarhistorischesTaschenbuch,2(1844),pp.157–164.TranslatedinHarris,NightThoughts,pp.184–188.27Ibid.,p.160(Harris,p.185).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandMysticism261trinityofconflictwithinGod,precedinghismanifestation.Inthesec-ondtriangle(“GodtheSon”),GodrecognizesHimselfintheformofotherness.Thisotherness,ifbrokenofffromthewhole,hasthepoten-tialforevil.Therefore,itmustbebroughtintoonenesswithGod.Hegelstatesthat“theSonmustgorightthroughtheEarth,mustovercomeEvil,andinthathestepsovertoonesideasthevictor,mustawakentheother,theself-cognitionofGod,asanewcognitionthatisonewithGod,orastheSpiritofGod;wherebythemiddlebecomesabeautiful,free,divinemiddle,theUniverseofGod.”28Anewtrianglethencomesintobeing,thatoftheHolySpirit.Hegelwritesthat“theEarthastheself-consciousnessofGodisnowtheSpirit,yetitisalsotheeternalSonwhomGodintuitsasHimself.Thushastheholytriangleoftrianglescloseditself.Thefirst[triangle]istheIdeaofGodwhichiscarriedoutintheothertriangles,andreturnsintoitselfbypassingthroughthem.”29Itisclearthatinthisearlytext,aswellasinthe“Lucifermyth”ofthesameperiod,Hegelisworkingoutthebroadoutlinesofhisphilosophicalsystem,andthatbothhisideasandhislanguageareheavilyinfluencedbyBoehme.Hegel’sfirsttriangle,“GodtheFather”isanalogoustothelaterLogic,withitstripartitestructureofBeing-Essence-Concept.Thesecondtriangle,thatoftheSonorEarth,correspondstothePhilosophyofNature(Mechanics-Physics-Organics).InHegel’swords,the“IdeaofGod”becomes“theuniverseofGod.”TheIdea’stelosistobecomeembodied,anotherelementwhichstronglysuggeststheinfluenceofBoehme(andalso,asweshallsee,F.C.Oetinger).Inthethirdtriangle,GodintuitstheSon,orEarth,asHimself,andachievesself-awareness,amomentwhichapproximatestheroleplayedbySpiritinHegel’smaturesystem.HegelremainedinterestedinBoehmethroughouthislifetime.In1811,aformerstudentnamedPeterGabrielvanGhert(1782–1852)sentHegelBoehme’scollectedworksasagift.Hegelrespondedinalet-terdatedJuly29,1811:“NowIcanstudyJakobBoehmemuchmorecloselythanbefore,sinceIwasnotmyselfinpossessionofhiswrit-ings.Histheosophywillalwaysbeoneofthemostremarkableattemptsofapenetratingyetuncultivatedmantocomprehendtheinnermostessentialnatureoftheabsolutebeing.ForGermany,hehasthespecialinterestofbeingreallythefirstGermanphilosopher.”3028Ibid.,p.163(Harris,pp.187–188).29Ibid,pp.162–163(Harris,187).30SeeHegel:TheLetters,trans.byClarkButlerandChristianneSeiler(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1984),p.573[henceforth,Butler];BriefevonundanHegel,4vols.,ed.byJohannesHoffmeister(Hamburg:FelixMeinerVerlag,1952–1981);Hoffmeisternumberstheletters;thisisnumber192.ItshouldbenotedthatDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n262glennalexandermageeTheyear1816wasafatefuloneforHegel,forhereceivedinvitationstoteachatbothHeidelbergandBerlin.ItwastoHeidelberghewouldgo,forHegel’schancesinBerlinwereruinedbythepowerfultheologianWilhelmMartinLeberechtdeWette(1780–1849).DeWettecondemnedHegel’sLogicasanobscure“occultism”(Geheimwissenschaft).31Inan1815lettertoJakobFriedrichFries(1773–1843),himselfnofriendtoHegel,deWettehadwrittenthat“Mysticismreignsheremightily,andhowdeepwehavesunkisshowninthethoughtofHegel.”32Ofcourse,in1818HegeldideventuallygethispostinBerlin.Con-trarytowhatonemightexpect,duringthisperiod,thefinalactofHegel’slife,hisinterestinmysticismseemsonlytohaveintensified.Aftercom-ingtoBerlin,HegelworkedhardtoestablishafriendshipwithFranzvonBaader.TheprefacetothesecondeditionoftheEncyclopediaofthePhilosophicalSciences(1827),includesmorethanonereferencetoBoehme,whomHegelcallsa“mightyspirit.”33TheprefacealsoincludesadmiringreferencestoBaader,whowasthentheforemostinterpreterofBoehme.Inaremarkablefootnote,HegelexpressesdelightthatBaaderagreeswithsomepointsofhisphilosophy,andadds“Aboutmostofwhathecontests–andevenquiteeasilyabouteverything–itwouldnotbedifficultformetocometoanunderstandingwithhim,thatistosay,toshowthatthereis,infact,nodeparturefromhisviewsinit.”34ThisiscertainlyaremarkablydeferentialattitudetotaketowardamanmostacademicsregardedasanoccultistandSchwarmer¨.Hegel’sinterestseemsmerelytohavepuzzledBaader,whoprivatelyreferredtotheHegeliansystemasa“philosophyofdust.”Nevertheless,thetwodidestablishafriendship.BaadervisitedHegelinBerlin,andthetwostudiedMeisterEckharttogether.BaaderreportsthatonreadingacertainpassageinEckhart,Hegelcried“dahabenwiresja,waswirwollen!”(“There,indeed,wehavewhatwewant!”).35Hegelthensub-sequentlyintroducedaquotationfromEckhartintohis1824LecturesHegel’slibraryalsocametoincludeworksbyAgrippa,Bruno,andParacelsus.ThefactthatHegeldidnotpurchaseBoehme’sworksshouldnotbetakenasindicatingalackofinterestonhispart.Duringthistimebooks,especiallycollections,wereveryoftendifficulttoobtainandquiteexpensive,andHegelwasnotawealthyman.31Wiedmann,p.53.32GuntherNicolin,ed.,HegelinBerichtenseinerZeitgenossen(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1970),p.117.33Hegel,TheEncyclopediaLogic,trans.byT.F.Geraetsetal.(henceforthGeraets)(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1991),p.15;Werke,8:28–29.WhenHegel’snumberedparagraphsarereferredto,theabbreviationELwillbeused.34Geraets,15;Werke,8:29.35Nicolin,p.261.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandMysticism263onthePhilosophyofReligion:“TheeyewithwhichGodseesmeisthesameeyebywhichIseeHim,myeyeandHiseyeareoneandthesame.InrighteousnessIamweighedinGodandHeinme.IfGoddidnotexistnorwouldI;ifIdidnotexistnorwouldhe.”36BaaderwaswidelyreputedtobeamemberofthemysticalorderoftheRosicrucians,whichhadbeenrevivedinthelateeighteenthcentury.TheRosicruciansofHegel’stimehadareputationforalchemyandHermeticinterestsofallkinds,aswellasforpoliticalconservatism.InthePrefacetothe1821PhilosophyofRight,Hegellaunchesanattackonpoliticalidealismandstates“Torecognizereasonastheroseinthecrossofthepresentandtherebytoenjoythepresent,thisistherationalinsightwhichreconcilesustotheactual....”37Inthe1824LecturesonthePhilosophyofReligion,thesamemetaphoroccurs:“inordertopluckreason,theroseinthecrossofthepresent,onemusttakeupthecrossitself.”38MostcommentatorsagreethatHegelismakingareferencetotheimageryoftheRosicrucians,whosesymbolwasarosebloomingfromthecenterofacross.HegelhimselfmakesitclearthathewasreferringtotheRosicrucians,inareviewessaypublishedin1829.39InthePreface,priortothe“roseinthecross”image,HegelreferstothereasoninherentinnatureasderSteinderWeisen,or,asitisusuallytranslatedintoEnglish,“thephilosopher’sstone.”TheseareequivalentmetaphorsinthePreface:boththeroseinthecrossandthephilosopher’sstonerepresent,forHegel,reason,whichheiscallinguponhisreaderstodiscerninthepresentday.GiventhattheRosicrucianswerewidelyknownasalchemists,Hegelcouldnothavebeenignorantoftheconnectionbetweenthesetwometaphors.ButwhywouldHegelmakereferencetotheRosicruciansinthePhi-losophyofRight?SomehaveclaimedthatHegelissomehowcriticiz-ingthepowerfulRosicruciancourtierstotheKingofPrussia.AdriaanPeperzak,forexample,interpretsHegel’sremarkstobeanattemptto“givetheappearanceofagreementwiththeRosicruciansamongthepoliticians,”inthecontextofwhatactuallyamountstoacriticismoftheirideas.40ButFriedrichWilhelmII,theRosicrucianking,diedin36LPR,1:347–48;Werke,16:209.Thisisactuallyacompositequotation,builtoutoflinesfromseveralofEckhart’swritings.37Hegel,PhilosophyofRight,trans.byT.M.Knox(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1952),p.12;GrundlinienderPhilosophiedesRechts,section27.38LPR,2:248note45.39“UberdieHegelscheLehreoderabsolutesWissenundmodernerPantheismus–¨UberPhilosophies¨uberhauptundHegelsEnzyclopaediederphilosophischenWis-¨senschafteninsbesondere,”(1829)inWerke,11:466.40AdriaanTh.Peperzak,PhilosophyandPolitics:ACommentaryonthePrefacetoHegel’sPhilosophyofRight(Dordrecht:MartinusNijhoff,1987),p.109.SeeDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n264glennalexandermagee1797.TheRosicrucianshadallbeenpurgedfromthecourtbyhissuc-cessor,FriedrichWilhelmIII,thekingwhoreignedduringHegel’stime.By1821,nooneinPrussiacouldhavegainedanythingbyappearingtoagreewiththeRosicrucians–quitethereverse,infact.ItmaythereforebethatHegelreallydoesagreewiththeRosicrucians,atleastinsomeways.When,neartheendofhislife,HegelturnedtotheprojectofrevisinghisScienceofLogic,Boehmewasagainverymuchonhismind.Inthe1812DoctrineofBeing,HegelhadintroducedthetermsQualierungandInqualierung.Hehadsaidnothingaboutthesourcefortheseunusualterms,andremarkedonlythattheycamefrom“aphilosophywhichgoesdeepbutintoaturbiddepth....”41However,inthe1832versionoftheDoctrineofBeing(theonlysectionoftheworkHegelcompletedrevisionsonbeforehisdeath),thispassagehasbeenchanged.Nowthetwoterms(whicharegivenassynonyms)areexplicitlyidentifiedas“anexpressionofJakobBoehme’s.”42WhyhadHegelchosennottonameBoehmeinthe1812edition?Actually,theonlyreferencetoBoehmeinHegel’spublishedwritingsupuntiltheBerlinperiodisinthe1817Encyclopedia,whereabriefreferenceoccursinparagraph472ofthePhilosophyofSpirit.PerhapsHegelfeltitprudentnottoadvertisehisinterestinBoehmeinhispublishedwritings.BytheBerlinperiod,how-ever,hefeltsecurefromacademicpersecution,andsodecidedtoopenlyacknowledgehisinterestinprint.Hence,notonlydoesareferencetoBoehmeappearinthe1832DoctrineofBeing,butalso,asmentioned,intheprefacetothe1827Encyclopedia.This,plustheencounterwithBaader,makesitexceedinglydifficultforscholarstodismissHegel’sinterestinmysticismasamere“aberrationofyouth.”iii.“thespeculativeisthemystical”TheevidencethatHegelwasinfluencedbymysticismandtookitseri-ouslyuntiltheendofhislifeis,inshort,abundant.However,asnotedalsoKennethWestphal,“TheBasicContextandStructureofHegel’sPhilosophyofRight,”inTheCambridgeCompaniontoHegel,ed.byFrederickC.Beiser(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993),pp.238–239.Westphalhasasimilarthesis,andcommitsthesameerrors.41WissenschaftderLogik:DasSein(1812),ed.byHans-JurgenGawoll(Hamburg:¨FelixMeiner,1986),p.82.SinceA.V.Millerbaseshistranslationonthe1832edition,thispassageisnottranslatedinthemostpopularEnglisheditionofthework.42Hegel,TheScienceofLogic(henceforthSL),trans.byA.V.Miller(London:GeorgeAllenandUnwin,1969),p.114;WissenschaftderLogik:DieLehrevomSein(1832),ed.byHans-JurgenGawoll(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,¨1992),p.109.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandMysticism265earlier,thefactthatHegelwaspositivelyinfluencedbymysticismdoesnotmeanthatHegelhimselfwasamysticorthathisphilosophycouldbeplausiblydescribedasamysticalone.Inthissection,Ishallbecon-cernedpreciselywithwhetherornotonecanmakesuchclaims.ManyreaderswhohavenotevenbotheredtoexplorethemysticalinfluencesonHegelstillseesomething“mystical”inhisthought.Whatisitthattheycanbeseeing?Tobeginwith,lookingattheoverallstructureofHegel’sphilosophicalsystem,onecanseethatitcontainsmanyparallelstomysticism.Ofcourse,inordertoseethisonehastoknowwhattolookfor.Ifoneisignorantofthemysticaltradition,thentheclaimIhavejustnowmadewillseemimplausible.MysticismisusuallyportrayedasapathtoknowledgeofthedivineorAbsolutethatbeginswithaninitialstageofpurificationorinitiation.Thistradition,ofcourse,goesallthewaybacktothecultsfromwhichmysticismtakesitsname:tamusteria,themysteryritesofAncientGreece.TheinitiationatEleusiswassupposedtoaltertheconscious-nessoftheinitiate.Itwassupposedtopurgeoneoffalseormisguidedwaysoflookingattheworldandthenofferaglimpseofthetrulyreal.Theexperiencewasoftenadifficultandtraumaticone.ThisstageonthepathtowisdomisrepresentedinHegel’sphilosophybythePhe-nomenologyofSpirit,inwhich,byfollowingoutthedialectic,oneisraisedabovetheleveloftheUnderstandingtothestandpointfromwhichonemayreceiveAbsoluteKnowledge.43AnditmustbenotedthatHegelpromisesactuallytohavegotbeyondtheloveofwisdomentirely.LikethegreatmysticalandHermeticteachers,heclaimstobeimpartingafinishedandcompletewisdom.ThePhenomenologyevenreferencestheEleusinianmysteries,mostfamouslyinthe“Bacchanalianrevel”pas-sage.44JohnBurbidgenotesthatthePhenomenology,“withitslengthyandarduousprocessofinitiation,cameatatimewhenHegelwasfre-quentingthecompanyofknownMasons,someofthemgraduatesofthebannedIlluminati.”45K.J.H.Windischmann,whosereviewofthePhenomenologywasoneofthemostimportantnoticesofHegel’searlycareer,tooktheworkasanexpressionofMasonicthemes.46AndwhatdoesonereceiveoninitiationintotheHegelianmysteries?WhatisAbsoluteKnowledge?Hegelstatesthatthesubjectmatterofhis43H.S.Harriswritesthat“In[Hegel’s]viewwehavetoannihilateourownselfhoodinordertoenterthespherewherePhilosophyherselfspeaks.”NightThoughts,p.51.44PS,27;PG,35.IhavediscussedthisandHegel’sotherreferencestoEleusisinHegelandtheHermeticTradition,pp.130–132,139,148.45FromBurbidge’sintroductiontoJacquesD’Hondt,HegelinHisTime,trans.byJohnBurbidge(Lewiston,NY:BroadviewPress,1988),p.xi.46SeehislettertoHegeldatedApril27,1810;Hoffmeisterletter155.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n266glennalexandermageeScienceofLogicis“truthasitiswithoutveilandinitsownabsolutenature.ItcanthereforebesaidthatthiscontentistheexpositionofGodasHeisinhiseternalessencebeforethecreationofnatureandafinitespirit.”47HegeltellsusintheLecturesonthePhilosophyofReligionthatphilosophy’staskistounveilGod’snature“asitmanifestsanddevelopsitself.”48IntheLecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,Hegelstatesthat“ThephilosophersareclosertotheLordthanthosewholivebythecrumbsoftheSpirit;theyread,orwrite,thecabinetordersofGodintheoriginal;itistheirdutytowritethemdown.Thephilosophersarethemystaiwhohavebeenpresentatthedecisionintheinner-mostsanctuary.”49TheLogicpresentsaGodasyetunmanifest;merelythe“idea”ofGod.Thenotionofaprocessofdevelopmentandactu-alizationinGodisperhapsthemostsignificantpointonwhichHegelappearstohavebeeninfluencedbyBoehme.AndgiventhecentralityofthisideainHegel’ssystem,onecouldargueonthisbasisalonethatHegel’sphilosophycouldnothavetakenshapewithouttheinfluenceofmysticism.Indeed,whatexplainsHegel’schoiceofthetitleLogicistheword’sderivationfromtheGreeklogos,afavoritetopicoftheGer-manmystics,especiallyEckhart.TheascenttotheAbsoluteIdeaoftheLogiccloselyparallelstheclassicalmysticascenttotheLogosortheUniversalMind.ThePhilosophyofNatureshowshowtheAbsoluteIdeaor“Godbeforecreation”is“embodied.”Notoriously,HegelemploysNeopla-tonicemanationimagerytodescribethetransitionfromLogictoPhi-losophyofNature,sayingthattheIdea“freelyreleasesitself.”50ThissortofapproachistobefoundinEckhartaswell.InoneofEckhart’sGermansermons,hestatesthatGod“createdthewholeworldperfectlyandentirelywithintheNow,”thatis,outsidetime.TheworldexistsinGodeternally,yetflowsoutfromGodaswell.“Itisanamazingfactthatsomethingshouldflowoutandyetremainwithin.Thattheword[i.e.,theLogos]flowsoutandyetremainswithinisastonishing;thatallcreaturesflowoutandyetremainwithinisalsoastonishing.”51ThePhi-losophyofNaturefurthersthetransformationofconsciousnessbeguninthePhenomenology:wecometoseeallofcreationasareflectionof47SL,50;WissenschaftderLogik(1832),pp.33–34.48LPR,1:117;VPR,1:33–34.49Hegel,GeschichtederPhilosophie,ed.byHermannGlockner,Jubilaumsausgabe¨(Stuttgart:Fromann,1927–1940),vol.3,p.96.50SL,843;WissenschaftderLogik:DieLehrevomBegriff(1816),ed.byHans-Jurgen¨Gawoll(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1994),p.305.51MeisterEckhart:SelectedWritings,trans.byOliverDavies(London:PenguinBooks,1994),p.123;MeisterEckhart:DeutschePredigtenundTraktate,ed.byJosefQuint(Munich:CarlHanserVerlag,1963),p.356.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandMysticism267theLogos.Thisformof“enlightenment,”inwhichtheentireworldistransfiguredfortheinitiate,is,ofcourse,typicalofmysticalpaths.Hegel’sPhilosophyofSpiritrepresentsthe“return”ofnaturetoGodthroughthecomingintobeingofhumanconsciousness.HumanbeingsareabletoriseabovenatureandliterallycompletetheactualizationofGodintheworldthroughspeculativephilosophy.Thismomentof“returntothesource,”makinghumanlifenecessaryforGod’sbeing,isanideathatisnottobefoundinthemainstreamphilosophicaltradition,butitisfrequentlyfoundinHermeticism,aformofmysticismIshalldiscussinthefinalsectionofthischapter.SomeversionofthisclaimistobefoundintheIndian,Jewish,Christian,andIslamicmystics.SometimestheclaimissimplythatGod“desirestobeknown,”andhumanbeingssatisfythisdesire.ThisclaimistobefoundinSufism,forexample.EckhartandothersholdthatGodwouldnotbeGodwith-outcreation,especiallywithouthumancreatures.RecallthequotationHegelemploysfromEckhart:“TheeyewithwhichGodseesmeisthesameeyebywhichIseeHim,myeyeandHiseyeareoneandthesame....IfGoddidnotexistnorwouldI;ifIdidnotexistnorwouldhe.”52Sometimes,asinsomeformsofKabbalism,theclaimismadethatthereligiouscommunity,infollowingthedivinelaw,ischargedwithperfectingGod’screationorrealizingGodintheworld.Onecanthusseethat,initsoutlines,Hegel’sphilosophybearsastrik-ingresemblancetomysticalthought.Butsimplymakingsuchcompar-isonscannotsuffice.Acomparisonisonlyvaluableiftheitemsbeingcomparedhavebeeninterpretedcorrectly.SettingasidewhatIhavesaidaboutmysticism,thestatementsIhavemadeaboveconcerningthetenetsofHegel’sphilosophy,whileImyselfwouldstandbythem,areopentoabadinfinityofscholarlyobjections.Furthermore,evenifmyinterpretationofHegelisaccepted,ascepticwouldstilllikelychargethattheresemblancetomysticismisasuperficialone.Wemust,there-foregodeeperthanthis.LetuslookatwhatHegelexplicitlysaysaboutmysticism.Surprisingly,Hegelmakesfewdirectreferencestomysti-cismassuch.PerhapsthemostsignificantoftheseisinaZusatztotheEncyclopediaLogic.53Hegelendsthe“PreliminaryConception”orVorbegrifftotheEncy-clopediaLogic(thesectionthatprecedesthe“DoctrineofBeing”),withasectiontitled“MorePreciseConceptionandDivisionoftheLogic”(NahererBegriffundEinteilungderLogik¨).Hewritesasfollows:“With52LPR,1:347–348;Werke,16:209.53ThispassageisalsoquotedandverybrieflydiscussedinHegelandtheHermeticTradition,86.Thediscussionthatfollowsismuchmoreextensiveandrepresentsanadvanceonhowthepassageistreatedinmybook.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n268glennalexandermageeregardtoitsform,thelogicalhasthreesides:(α)thesideofabstrac-tionoroftheunderstanding,(β)thedialecticalornegativelyrationalside,[and](γ)thespeculativeorpositivelyrationalone.”54Hegelthendevotesasubsectiontoeachoftheseaspectsofthelogical.Thethird,orspeculativemoment,ofcourse,correspondstoHegel’sownconcep-tionofwhatphilosophy,properly,shouldbe.Ofthismoment,Hegelsays,“Thespeculativeorpositivelyrationalapprehendstheunityofthedeterminationsintheiropposition,theaffirmativethatiscontainedintheirdissolutionandintheirtransition.”55IntheZusatztothissubsec-tion,wefindthefollowingremarkablestatement,whichIshallquoteatlength:Itshouldalsobementionedherethatthemeaningofthespeculativeistobeunderstoodasbeingthesameaswhatusedinearliertimestobecalled“mys-tical”[Mystische],especiallywithregardtothereligiousconsciousnessanditscontent.Whenwespeakofthe“mystical”nowadays,itistakenasaruletobesynonymouswithwhatismysteriousandincomprehensible;and,dependingonthewaystheircultureandmentalityvaryinotherrespects,somepeopletreatthemysteriousandincomprehensibleaswhatisauthenticandgenuine,whilstothersregarditasbelongingtothedomainofsuperstitionanddeception.Aboutthiswemustremarkfirstthat“themystical”iscertainlysomethingmysteri-ous,butonlyfortheunderstanding,andthenonlybecauseabstractidentityistheprincipleoftheunderstanding.Butwhenitisregardedassynonymouswiththespeculative,themysticalistheconcreteunityofjustthosedeterminationsthatcountastruefortheunderstandingonlyintheirseparationandopposition.Soifthosewhorecognizethemysticalaswhatisgenuinesaythatitissome-thingutterlymysterious,andjustleaveitatthat,theyareonlydeclaringthatforthem,too,thinkinghasonlythesignificanceofanabstractpositingofidentity,andthatinordertoattainthetruthwemustrenouncethinking,or,astheyfrequentlyputit,thatwemust‘takereasoncaptive.’Aswehaveseen,however,theabstractthinkingoftheunderstandingissofarfrombeingsomethingfirmandultimatethatitprovesitself,onthecontrary,tobeaconstantsublatingofitselfandanoverturningintoitsopposite,whereastherationalassuchisrationalpreciselybecauseitcontainsbothoftheoppositesasidealmomentswithinitself.Thus,everythingrationalcanequallybecalled‘mystical,’butthisonlyamountstosayingthatittranscendstheunderstanding.Itdoesnotatallimplythatwhatissospokenofmustbeconsideredinaccessibletothinkingandincomprehensible.56HegelscholarsarewaryofrelyingupontheZusatze¨tohiswork,sincethesewerecompiledfromstudentnotes.ButthatthesewordsaccuratelyreflectHegel’sideasisconfirmedbyothertexts.IntheLecturesonthe54Geraets,125;EL,§79.55Geraets,131;EL,§82.56Geraets,133;EL,§82Zusatz.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandMysticism269PhilosophyofReligionof1824,speakingoftheEleusinianmysteries,Hegelstatesthat“Themysticalisthespeculative,whatlieswithin.”57Inthesamelectures,healsostates,“TheTrinityiscalledthemysteryofGod;itscontentismystical,i.e.,speculative.”58IntheLecturesof1827,Hegelstatesthat“Asawholethemysticaliseverythingspeculative,orwhateverisconcealedfromtheunderstanding.”59IntheLecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,HegeldevotesashortsectiontoseveralScholasticswhomheterms“mystics,”andstates,“Amongthemgen-uinephilosophyistobefound–termedalsomysticism.”60Thereismuchtodigestinthesestatements.Tobeginwiththeobvi-ous,Hegelequatesthemysticalwiththespeculative.Andgiventhat“speculative”isthenameoftheHegelianphilosophy,heappearstobesayingthathisphilosophyismystical.Aclosereadingshowsthatheissayingthis,butonlyinaqualifiedsense.Themystical,Hegeltellsus,iswhattranscendstheUnderstanding.InHegel’sphilosophy,ofcourse,“theUnderstanding”hasaspecial,technicalsense.Itmeans,essentially,akindofdyadicthinkingthatproceedsbyholdingcertainconceptualoppositionsasfixedandperma-nent.Forexample,whattwoconceptscouldbemoreopposedtoeachotherthanbeingandnothing?But,inasuperbexampleofHegel’scon-ceptualsorcery,heshowsusintheLogichowthesetwoconcepts,sincetheyeachdenotenothingdefiniteatall,areactuallyidentical.ThisisthesortofthingHegelmeanswhenhesaysthattheUnderstandingprovesitself“tobeaconstantsublatingofitselfandanoverturningintoitsopposite.”ThesortofthinkingassociatedwiththeUnder-standingissupremelyconventional,athinkingwithinthesquareofopposition.Speculation(orReason)standsonahigherplane,foritgoesbeyondtheoppositionalthinkingoftheUnderstanding.Inthepopularlanguageusedtodaytodiscussmysticism,it“goesbeyondthepairsofopposites.”61Hegeltellsusthatspeculationismysticism,justinsofarasspecu-lation,likemysticism,goesbeyondtheUnderstanding.ItisalsoclearfromHegel’streatmentofthemysticselsewherethatheregardsthecontentoftheirthought–notjustitsaims–asequivalentinimportant57LPR,2:491;VPR,2:391.58LPR,3:192;VPR,3:125.59LPR,1:445;VPR,1:333.60LHP,2:91;Werke,19:584.61HegelstatesintheLecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,“TheUnderstandingdoesnotcomprehendthespeculative,whichsimplyistheconcrete,becauseitholdstodifferencesintheirseparation;theircontradictionisindeedcontainedinthemystery,which,however,islikewisetheresolutionofthesame.”LHP,1:79–80;Werke,18:100–101.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n270glennalexandermageerespectstohisown.HiscommentsonBoehmeintheLecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophyandhisuseofEckhartintheLecturesonthePhilosophyofReligionprovideevidencethatHegelregardedhimselfaslayingbaretheinnermeaningofmysticalstatements.Totakeafur-ther,smallexample,inthePhilosophyofNature,HegeldiscussesthestatementsofBoehmeandParacelsusregardingthealchemicaltriadofsulphur,mercury,andsalt.Hestatesthatiftakenliterally,suchideasareeasytorefute,butsays“Itshouldnotbeoverlooked...thatintheiressencetheycontainandexpressthedeterminationsoftheConcept.”62H.S.HarrisnotesthatinhisearlylecturesonthePhilosophyofNature,Hegelfrequentlyinsistsonfindingan“earlierpedigree”forhisideasinBoehmeandParacelsus.63However,onemustbecarefulnottoclaimtoomuchforthisappar-entequationofthespeculativeandthemystical,forthereisanotherelementtomysticism,referredtobyHegelinthequotefromtheEncy-clopediaLogic,andthatismystery.SpeculationismysticisminsofarasittranscendstheUnderstanding,inHegel’ssenseoftheterm.Butfrequentlywhenmysticsassertthattheirknowledgegoes“beyondtheunderstanding,”theymeanthatitisineffable,orbeyondthecapac-ityoflanguagetoexpress,andofreasontocomprehend.Hegelrejectsthisconclusionentirely.Further,themysticsoftenclaimthattheirknowledgeisineffablebecauseitconsistsinanon-rational,immediateintuitionoftheAbsolute(theso-calledmysticalexperience).Obviously,Hegelrejectsthisaswell.TheZusatzfromtheEncyclopediaLogichasHegelidentifyinghimselfwiththemysticsuptoapoint–butonthekeyissueoftheineluctabilityofmystery,Hegelpartscompanywiththem.64Ifoneexaminesthemajormysticaltraditions,onewillfindthreeelementsoverandoveragain:(1)thetreatmentoftheultimaterealitybehindappearancesasacoincidentiaoppositorum(coincidenceofoppo-sites);(2)theclaimthat,insomefashion,Godandmanareone;and(3)theclaimthatultimaterealityisunknowableinanyfashionthroughhumanconcepts,becausehumanconceptsdealonlywithappearances.OnefindsthislastclaimintheIndiantraditionintheconceptofBrah-man.ItappearsintheJewishKabbalahasEin-Sof.Itistobefoundin62Petry,pp.2,117;Naturphilosophie,§316.63Harris,NightThoughts,p.278.64However,Hegelelsewhereembraces“mystery,”understoodinhisown,idiosyn-craticmanner:“Mysteriesareintheirnaturespeculative,mysteriouscertainlytotheUnderstanding,butnottoReason;theyarerational,justinthesenseofbeingspeculative.”LHP,1:79;Werke,18:100.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandMysticism271EckhartinhisconceptofGrunt.AndthesamebasicideaistobefoundinSufism.WhenHegeldiscussesmysticismintheEncyclopediaLogic,heisemphasizingthecoincidentiaoppositorumascharacteristicofmysticism;inotherwords,theideathatalldifferenceandoppositionintheworldisreallyonlyapparent,andthat“beyond”thisallisoneinGod.Eckhart’sthoughtprovidesuswithanexcellentillustrationofthisprinciple,andofjustwhatHegelisgettingatintheZusatz.ForEckhart,Godisineffable,butthroughparadoxwemayatleastapproachHim.Essentially,thisamountstoemployingthedyadiccategoriesoftheUnderstandinginordertoshowthattheyareinadequateforknowingGod,andthatwemustsomehowleavethembehind.So,forexample,EckhartsaysthatGodisbothdistinctandindistinctandso,inaway,neither.LikewiseGodisbothtranscendentandimmanent.NicholasofCusa,whowasinfluencedbyEckhart(andwas,incidentally,thefirstauthortorefertoGodasAbsolutum)takesasimilarapproach.HestatesthatGodisbothmaximumandminimum.Sincebeingmaxi-mummeansbeingeverythinginthegreatestsense,Godmustalsobeminimum.Wecannotreconciletheseparadoxesrationally.Godisanineffablemysterylyingontheothersideofthem.Hegel’sclaimintheEncyclopediaLogicisthatspeculation,likemysticism,recognizesthenecessityoftranscendingthecategoriesoftheUnderstanding,orthe“opposites.”However,Hegelpartscompanywithmostmysticsbysayingthatthisshouldnotleadustoembrace“mystery.”InHegel’sthought,thetensionbetweenoppositesisusedasasteppingstonetogobeyondtheUnderstandingtoahigherlevelofthoughtfromwhichwecanknow,indiscursive,rationalform,theactualnatureofGodortheAbsolute.Hegelemploysalogicofcontra-diction(dialectic)toarticulatethe“moments”oraspectsofthisGod,takenasanorganicwhole.InsteadofmerelypointingtoanAbsolutethattranscendstheoppositionsoftheUnderstanding,HegelusestheseoppositionstodefinetheAbsoluteitselfintermsofasystemofmomentsinwhicheachelementdependsuponeveryother,andeachiswhatitisonlyinrelationtothewhole.Intakingthisapproach,Hegelispartingcompanywithmuchoftra-ditionalmysticism,andespeciallytheassumptionoftheultimacyofthecoincidentiaoppositorum.However,heisembracingtheheterodoxmysticismofBoehmeandhisfollowers,whoalsosoughttotranscendthecoincidentiaoppositorumandofferupdiscursiveknowledgeofGod.Further,theconceptionofthedivineasanorganicwholeunfoldingordevelopingthroughconflictandcontradictionisthecenterpieceofBoehme’sthought.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n272glennalexandermageeIbelievethatHegelwasawareofthefactthatBoehme’sdoctrinewasuniqueinthehistoryofmysticism,preciselyinitsrejectionofGodasanineffableAbsolute.Tobesure,BoehmedoesspeakofGodasUngrund,aconceptclosetotheKabbalah’sEin-Sof(or“Infinite”).65However,BoehmeclaimsthatintheUngrundGodis“notcalledGod.”66Goddevelops“out”oftheUngrund,andisonlyGod,toborrowsomewordsofHegel’s,“inthewholewealthof[His]developedform.”67Inthesec-tionthatfollowsIshallargue,throughaclosereadingofseveralpassagesfromthePrefacetothePhenomenologyofSpirit,thatHegelconsciouslydrewuponBoehmeanmysticisminframinghismatureviewsonthenatureofAbsoluteKnowledge.Simultaneously,IshallbearguingthatheconsciouslyopposedtheBoehmeansystemtotraditionalmysticalconceptionsasameansofcritiquingthethoughtsofhiscontemporaries.iv.hegel’sboehmeanchallengetoschellingInthePrefacetothePhenomenology,Hegelattacksacertaintypeofphi-losophywhichspeaksoftheAbsolute.Hewrites,“Dealingwithsome-thingfromtheperspectiveoftheAbsoluteconsistsmerelyindeclaringthat,althoughonehasbeenspeakingofitjustnowassomethingdef-inite,yetintheAbsolute,theA=A,thereisnothingofthekind,forthereinallisone.”68ThispassagehasalwaysbeentakenasacriticismofSchelling,andindeeditis.Infact,itisatthispointinthePrefacethatwemayunderstandHegeltobeopeningacovertdebatewithSchelling.WhatmustbeunderstoodaboutHegel’scriticismoftheSchellingianAbsolute,however,isthathisremarksarealsoquiteclearlyacriticismofthemysticaldoctrineofcoincidentiaoppositorum.Schellingwasdrawingonthattradition,Hegelknewhewas,andHegelhadstudiedthattraditionhimself.69Furthermore,asnotedearlier,HegelwrotethePhenomenologyinatimeandplaceinwhichtherehadbeenagreatrevivalofinterestintheworksofauthorslikeEckhart,inwhomthecoincidentiaoppositorumdoctrinefiguresprominently.WemaythusalsounderstandHegeltobeengagingindialoguewithothercontem-poraryintellectualsinfluencedbythesamemysticaldoctrine,and,ofcourse,withthemysticsthemselves.65MostKabbalistshavetreatedGodasEin-Sof,or“infinite,”meaningthatGodtranscendstheworld,andallhumanconcepts.66Boehme,MysteriumMagnuminSamtlicheSchriften¨,ed.byWill-ErichPeuckert(Stuttgart:Frohmann,1955–1961),vol.7,chap.7,§14.67PS,11;PG,15.68PS,9;PG,13.69IntheLecturesonthePhilosophyofReligionof1827,HegeltreatsSchelling’sIdentityphilosophyasequivalenttopantheism(LPR,1:374–375;VPR,1:272).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandMysticism273ThepassagefromthePhenomenologycontinuesasfollows:“Topitthissingleinsight,thatintheAbsoluteeverythingisthesame,againstthefullbodyofarticulatedcognition,whichatleastseeksanddemandssuchfulfillment,topalmoffitsAbsoluteasthenightinwhich,asthesayinggoes,allcowsareblack–thisiscognitionnaivelyreducedtovacuity.”70ThispassagehasalsobeenunderstoodasanattackonSchelling–andSchellinghimselftookitthatway.71But,again,itmustbeemphasizedthatHegel’scriticismalsoappliestothemysti-calpromulgatorsofthecoincidentiaoppositorum,andtheirlatter-dayfollowers.WhatkindofconceptionoftheAbsolutedoesHegelwanttoputinplaceofSchelling’sEckhartian“Indifferencepoint”?ABoehmeanone.TwoparagraphslaterinthePreface,HegelstatesthattheAbsolute“istheprocessofitsownbecoming,thecirclethatpresupposesitsendasitsgoal,havingitsendalsoasitsbeginning;andonlybybeingworkedouttoitsend,isitactual”(Miller,p.10;PG,14).HegelacceptsSchelling’sconceptionoftheAbsoluteasbeyondthesubject–objectdistinction,butheassertsthatwithoutanunderstandingoftheAbsoluteasasystemwhoseidentityconsistsinitsunfolding,itisavacuousnotion.Afewlineslater,HegelstatesthattheAbsolutemustbeconceivedin“thewholewealthofthedevelopedform.Onlythenisitconceivedandexpressedasanactuality.”72ThenextparagraphprovidestheclimaxtotheconcealeddialoguewithSchellingandhisfollowers.Hegelwrites,“Thetrueisthewhole[DasWahreistdasGanze].”MostHegelscholarshavemissedthefactthatthisisalmostaquotationfrom(andquiteclearlyanallusionto)theSwabian“speculativepietist”F.C.Oetinger.OetingerwasafollowerofBoehmewhoexercisedagreatinfluenceonthereligiousandintellectuallifeofWurttemberginthemidtolateeighteenthcentury,andwasan¨importantinfluenceonSchelling.KlausVondungwritesthat,“HermeticismwasbroughttoSchelling’sattentionbyOetinger,whowasanexpertinallsortsofesotericknowl-edge,althoughthisconnectionhasnotbeeninvestigatedsatisfacto-rily.”VondungbelievesthatitwasOetingerwhobequeathedtobothSchellingandHegeltheidealofpansophia,oranall-encompassing,70PS,9;PG,13.71Indeed,inaletterdatedMay1,1807HegeltriedtoprepareSchellingforthiscriticism,byclaimingthatinthePrefaceheisattackingSchelling’sfollowers:“InthePrefaceyouwillnotfindthatIhavebeentoohardontheshallownessthatmakessomuchmischiefwithyourformsinparticularanddegradesthemintomereformalism.”Butler,p.80;Hoffmeister#95.72PS,11;PG,15.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n274glennalexandermageetotalknowledge.73WeknowthatSchelling’sfatherownedOetinger’sworks.Schelling’sfirstpublishedworkwasapoemwrittenontheoccasionofthedeathofP.M.Hahn,animportantfollowerofOetinger.InalettertohisfatherdatedSeptember7,1806,SchellingstatesthatFranzvonBaaderhasaskedhimifhecouldhelphimobtainOetinger’swrit-ings.SchellingpassedthisrequestontohisfriendChristianPregizer(1751–1824),whowasthefounderofapietistsectcalledthe“JoyousChristians.”PregizerreportsthatwhenhefirstmetSchellingin1803,theyspentalmosttheentiremeetingdiscussingBoehmeandOetinger.74SchellingisknowntohaveremarkedtooneofhisstudentsinJenathatOetingerwas“clearer”thanBoehme.75IthasalsobeenarguedthatSchelling’sterminology(especiallyinthe1809Freiheitschrift)showshisfamiliaritywithOetinger’swork.76ErnstBenzdemonstrates,fur-thermore,thatinhiswork,SchellingoccasionallyemployedunorthodoxtranslationsofbiblicalpassagesmadebyOetinger,withoutattributingthemtohim.77Oetinger’sfirstbookwasacommentaryonBoehme(AufmunterndeGrundezurLesungderSchriftenJacobB¨ohmens¨,1731).Indeed,histhoughtcanbeunderstoodasanattempttoexpanduponandsystem-atizeBoehme’stheosophy,whichheaccomplishedthroughastronginfu-sionofKabbalistandalchemicalelements.OetingerdescribesGodas“aneternaldesireforself-revelation”(eineewigeBegierdesichzuoffen-baren).78HisphilosophydepictsthestagesandmechanismofGod’sactualizationintheworld.OetingeridentifiesthefullyrealizedGodwithGeist(Spirit),howeverheholdsthatGeistisonlyactualwhenitisembodiedconcretelyintheworld.Hestates“EmbodimentisthegoalofGod’swork.”79Separatedfrombody,Geistismereghost.73KlausVondung,“Millenarianism,Hermeticism,andtheSearchforaUniversalScience,”inMcKnight,pp.132,126.74Benz,MysticalSources,pp.13–14.75PaolaMayer,JenaRomanticismandItsAppropriationofJacobBohme¨(Montreal:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,1999),p.185.76See,forinstance,MysticalSources,30;RobertSchneider,p.10.GershomScholemalsostatesthathediscernsOetinger’sinfluenceinthethoughtofbothSchellingandHegel.SeeScholem,Kabbalah,NewYork:NewAmericanLibrary,1974),p.200.77Benz,MysticalSources,pp.54–56.78Oetinger,BiblischesundemblematischesWorterbuch¨(1776;reprinted,Hildesheim:GeorgOlmsVerlag,1969),p.536.79Ibid.,p.407.UndertheinfluenceofOetinger,SchellingwritesinDieWeltalter(atitleheborrowed,incidentally,fromBengel):“Theultimatepurposeisthateverything,asmuchaspossible,bebroughttovisible,materialform;embodimentis,astheancients[Alten]expressedit,theendpointofthewayofGod...whowantstorevealHimselfasspatialorastemporal.”Schelling,SamtlicheWerke¨,DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandMysticism275FollowingBoehme,Oetingerconceivesthiscorporealizationascomingaboutthroughtheconflictandoppositionofforces.ChiefamongtheseareExpansion(Ausbreitung)andContraction(Starke¨),conceptsheinheritsfromtheKabbalahandwhichhebequeathstotheNaturphiloso-phieofGoethe(wheretheyappearasdiastoleandsystole).80OetingerconceivestheactualizedGeist(orGeistleiblichkeit)asanorganicwhole(or,inhisterminology,anIntensum)inwhichthewholeisimmanentineverypart.Oetingersoughtanewtypeofthoughtthatwouldallowonetoarticulatesuchawhole.Theendresult,hebelieved,wouldbetheZentrallerkenntnis(“centralknowledge”),inwhichonewouldhaveaninsightintothewhole.OetingerconceivesZen-trallerkenntnisasaknowledgethatgoesbeyondthedualityofsubjectandobject,andthushisconceptioninvitescomparisontoHegel’sAbso-luteKnowing(dasabsoluteWissen).Oetingerwritesofitasfollows:“Thetruthisawhole[DieWahrheitisteinGanzes];whenonefinallyreceivesthistotal,synopticvisionofthetruth,itmattersnotwhetheronebeginsbyconsideringthispartorthat.”81Thiswasaratherwell-knownpassageinOetinger.AndsowhenHegelannouncesinthePrefacetothePhenomenologythat“DasWahreistdasGanze,”whichconveysjustthesameidea,withthewordingonlyslightlyaltered,heknewthatatleastoneofhisreaders–Schelling–wouldgetthereference.82EvenifHegelhadnotreadOetingerhimself,itisalmostcertainthatheknewofSchelling’sinterestinOetingerandatleastoftheroughoutlinesofOetinger’sthought.ItshouldalsobementionedthatthereisstrongevidencethatHoelderlintoowasinfluencedbyOetinger.83ItseemsunlikelythatHegelcouldhavebeenentirelyignorantofOetingerwhenhistwoclosestfriends,withwhomheroomedatTubingen,were¨14vols.,ed.byKarlFriedrichA.Schelling(Stuttgart/Augsburg:J.G.Cotta’scherVerlag,1856–1861),vol.8,p.325.80SeeRolfChristianZimmerman,DasWeltbilddesjungenGoethe:StudienzurhermetischenTraditiondesdeutschen18.Jahrhunderts,2vols.(Munich:Fink,1969,1979),vol.1,p.187.81F.C.Oetinger,SamtlicheSchriften¨,vol.5,ed.byKarlChr.Eberh.Ehmann(Stuttgart:Steinkopf,1858–64),p.45.82Itmightbeargued,ofcourse,thatthereisabigdifferencebetweensayingthatthetrueorthetruthis“thewhole”and“awhole.”ButthewordsOetingerwritesimmediatelyafterthatline(quotedabove)clearlyconveythathemeansthesamethingasthewhole.Heistellingusthattruthassuch,whatistrue,isatotality.83SeePriscillaA.Hayden-Roy,“AForetasteofHeaven”:FriedrichHolderlininthe¨ContextofWurttembergPietism¨(Amsterdam:Rodopi,1994);UlrichGaier,DergesetzlicheKalkul:H¨olderlinsDichtungslehre¨(Tubingen:MaxNiemeyer,¨1962);andWalterDierauer,HolderlinundderSpeculativePietismusW¨urttembergs:¨GemeinsameAnshauungshorizonteimWerkOetingersundHolderlins¨(Zurich:¨Juris,1986).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n276glennalexandermageestronglyinfluencedbyhim.84Infact,thelikelihoodisthatHegelwasfamiliarwithOetinger’sideasandhadprobablyreadatleastsomethingbyhim.HegelnevermentionsOetinger,butthenneitherdoesSchelling,eventhoughweknowfromindependentsourcesthatOetingerwasimportanttohim.Thereasonforthissilenceisveryclear.AcademicsandclergymenwhoreferredtoOetingerorexpressedsympathyforhisideasweregenerallyridiculedandevensometimesdismissedfromtheirposts.85ItmustalsobenotedthatHegeldoesn’trefertoSchellingbynameinthePrefaceeither.Infact,thePhenomenologyreferstofewindi-vidualsbyname.Inmakinglargelyindirectreferencetootherthinkers,Hegelwasfollowinganolderliterarytradition,and,infact,emulatingSchelling.ButwhywouldHegelplaceanallusiontoOetingerinthePreface?OnemustunderstandtheallusioninthecontextofhisdebatewithSchelling.HegelisgivingSchellingthekeytogetpastthedead-endofhisdoctrineoftheAbsoluteascoincidentiaoppositorum,orIndiffer-encePoint.Thekeyisthedevelopmental,organicconceptionofGodtobefoundinadifferentmysticaltradition,theBoehmian-Oetingeriteone.Immediatelyafterwriting“Thetrueisthewhole,”Hegelstates:“Butthewholeisnothingotherthantheessenceconsummatingitselfthroughitsdevelopment.”Thedevelopmental,organicunderstandingofthenatureoftheAbsolutewas,asfarasHegelandtheotherideal-istsknew,originalwithJakobBoehmeandhisschool.TheclimaxofthePreface’scovertdialoguewithSchellinginvolvesHegel,therefore,incriticizingSchellingbyinvokingtheauthorityofOetinger’sBoehme-influencedspeculativepietism.Schellingapparentlygotthemessage.HewouldgoontopubliclyaccuseHegel(afterthephilosopher’sdeath)ofhavingliftedmuchofhisphilosophyfromBoehme.8684Benzwrites,“OetingerwasthemediatorofcabalisticideasfortheGermanidealis-ticphilosophers,especiallySchelling,whoreturnedoftentotheSwabiantheolog-icalsources,withwhichhehadbeenindoctrinatedinhisyouthduringhissojournasatheologicalstudentattheStift,theseminaryatTubingen,andwhichhecalled¨tomindinallthedecisivecrisesofhisspiritualandphilosophicaldevelopment.”Benz,MysticalSources,p.48.85SeeHayden-Roy,p.69;RobertSchneider,p.47.86Forexample,inlecturesgiveninthe1830s,Schellingremarksdisdainfully,“JakobBoehmesays:divinefreedomvomitsitselfintonature.Hegelsays:divinefreedomreleasesnature.Whatisonetothinkofthisnotionofreleasing?Thismuchisclear:thebiggestcomplimentonecanpaytothisnotionistocallit‘theosophical.’”SeeF.W.J.Schelling,OnTheHistoryofModernPhilosophy,trans.byAndrewBowie(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994),p.155.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandMysticism277ThatHegelshouldcriticizeanotherthinkerforbeing“insufficientlyBoehmean”seemsincredible,butinfactHegelgivesthesametreatmenttoSpinoza!IntheLecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,deliveredtwoyearsearlier,HegelstatesthatSpinoza’sphilosophy“isonlyfixedsub-stance,notyetSpirit;initwedonotconfrontourselves.GodisnotSpiritherebecauseHeisnotthetriune.Substanceremainsrigidandpetrified,withoutBoehme’ssources[Quellen].Theparticulardetermi-nationsintheformofthought-determinationsarenotBohme’ssourcespiritswhichworkandunfoldinoneanother.”87ThiscriticismofSpinozaisespeciallysignificantinlightofthelat-ter’sinfluenceonSchelling’s“systemofIdentity,”whichHegeliscri-tiquinginthePreface.Schelling(andalsoHoelderlin)hadcomeundertheinfluenceofSpinozathroughreadingJacobi’sUberdieLehredes¨SpinozainBriefeandenHerrnMosesMendelssohn.Inthiswork,JacobirecordsLessingashavingsaid,“Theorthodoxconceptsofthedeityarenolongerforme.Henkaipan[oneandall],Iknownoother.”Hoelderlinadoptedthephrasehenkaipanashispersonalmottoandtookit,andSpinoza’sphilosophy,tobeanexpressionofpantheism.Apparently,hisenthusiasmwassharedbySchellingandHegel.Henkaipanisactuallysupposedtoconveytheideathatallisone,anditisanexpressionoftheperennialmysticalconceptionofcoincidentiaoppositorum.Inthecon-textofadiscussionofmysticism(inwhichheidentifiesSchelling’sphi-losophyasasynthesisofPlotinus,Spinoza,Kant,andBoehme)Schopen-hauerstatesthat“The‘Eνκαιπαν[henkaipan]hasbeenforeverthelaughingstockoffoolsandtheeverlastingmeditationofthewise.”88Schelling’sIdentityphilosophycanbeunderstoodasasophisticated,post-Kantianattempttoexpressthemeaningofhenkaipan.v.conclusion:hegel’shermeticismIntheprecedingsection,Iimplicitlydrewadistinctionbetweentwotypesofmysticism.Onestrainofmysticismemphasizestheineffablemysteryofthecoincidentiaoppositorum,andstopsthere.Theotherstrain,exemplifiedbyBoehme,actuallyseekspositiveknowledgeofthenatureofthedivine,usuallythroughsomemethodofarticulatingthedifferent“aspects”ofGod.Elsewhere,IhavetermedthelatterformofmysticismHermeticism.TheHermetica(orCorpusHermeticum)areacollectionofGreekand87LHP,3:288;notpresentinWerke,seeSamtlicheWerke¨,vol.19,ed.byHermannGlockner(Stuttgart:Fromann,1928),p.377.88ArthurSchopenhauer,OntheBasisofMorality,trans.byE.F.J.Payne(Providence,RhodeIsland:BerghahnBooks.1995),p.209.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n278glennalexandermageeLatintextsprobablywritteninthefirstorsecondcenturiesA.D.ThemythicalauthorofthesetextswasHermesTrismegistus(or“Thrice-GreatestHermes”).Hermeticismisthetraditionthatgrewuparoundthesetextsoverthecourseofcenturies.ManydifferentinfluencescametogethertocreatetheHermetictradition,until,infact,ithaddriftedconsiderablybeyondtheideasexpressedintheHermetica.Theseinfluencesincludealchemyandoccultismofvariouskinds,Kabbalism,Lullism,andthemysticismofEckhartandothers.Hermeticiststypicallyrejectthemysticismthatstopsshortat“mys-tery,”and,likeBoehmeandHegel,holdthatactual,discursiveknowl-edgeofthenatureofGodispossible,asopposedsimplytoan“imme-diateexperience.”89However,HermeticistsusuallygomuchfartherthanthisindeclaringthatGodrequirescreation,especiallythehumanbeingswhocontemplateHim,inordertobetrulyactual.90Ashasbeennotedbyothers,HermeticismcanbeseenasapositiveformofGnos-ticism,positiveinsofarasitdoesnotdenigratecreationbutmakesitplayacentralroleinthebeingofGod.91TheidealoftheHermeticististograspthenatureofGod,andrealityassuch,intermsofanall-encompassingsystemofthought.Possessionofthistotalwisdomwasthoughttoperfectandempowertheindividual.Inthemodernperiod,the“Hermeticism”ofcertainthinkersrefersnotjusttotheirendorse-mentofthesepositions,butalsotypicallytotheirinterestinagrabbagofloosely-relatedsubjects,includingalchemy,extrasensoryper-ception,dowsing,Kabbalism,Masonry,Mesmerism,Rosicrucianism,Paracelcism,priscatheologia,philosophiaperennis,“correspondences,”“cosmicsympathies,”andvitalism.“Hermetic”thinkerstypicallywereinterestedinmostofthesesubjects.Certainly,suchthinkersasBoehme,Oetinger,andBaadercanbecalledHermetic,notjustonthisbasisbut89IntheLecturesonthePhilosophyofReligion,Hegeldeclaresthatanypointofviewthatstressesman’sinabilitytoknowGodis“directlyopposedtothewholenatureoftheChristianreligion,accordingtowhichweshouldknowGodcognitively,God’snatureandessence,andshouldesteemthiscognitionaboveallelse,”(LPR,1:88;VPR,1:7).90SeeErnestLeeTuveson,TheAvatarsOfThriceGreatHermes:AnApproachtoRomanticism(Lewisburg,PA:BucknellUniversityPress,1982),pp.15–16,34.91HermeticismisoftenconfusedwithGnosticism.ThisoccursinotherwiseveryvaluablescholarshiponHegel.TheearliestexampleisBaur’saforementionedDiechristlicheGnosis(1835).Formorerecentscholarship,seeGeraldHanratty,“HegelandtheGnosticTradition:I,”PhilosophicalStudies(Ireland),30(1984),pp.23–48;“HegelandtheGnosticTradition:II,”PhilosophicalStudies(Ireland),31(1986–1987),pp.301–325;andJeffMitscherling,“TheIdentityoftheHumanandtheDivineintheLogicofSpeculativePhilosophy”inHegelandtheTradition:EssaysinHonorofH.S.Harris,ed.byMichaelBaurandJohnRusson(Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,1997),pp.143–161.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandMysticism279duetotheirendorsementofthebasictenetsofHermeticismdescribedabove.Recently,anumberofscholarshavearguedfortheinfluenceofHer-meticismonsuchimportantmodernphilosophersasBacon,Descartes,Spinoza,Leibniz,Newton,andKant.92Throughthesethinkers,Her-meticismhasshapedmodernityassuch.TheHermeticimageofthemagus,withhisperfectgnosisandworld-transformingpowers,inspiredmodernity’sprojectoftheprogressivemasteryofnatureandemancipa-tionofmankindthoughscience,technology,andsocialengineering.EricVoegelinsuggeststhatweshouldcountHegelamongthesethinkers.VoegelinwritesthathewasunabletounderstandHegeluntilhelearnedthat“byhiscontemporariesHegelwasconsideredagnos-ticthinker.”Voegelinargues,however,thatitwouldbemoreprecisetocharacterizeHegel’sthoughtasHermetic,andheboldlyassertsthatHegel“belongstothecontinuoushistoryofmodernHermeticismsincethefifteenthcentury.”93Ihavewrittenanentirebookarguingforessentiallythisthesis.Specif-ically,IarguethatHegel’ssystemisHermeticincontentandform,thatHegelsharedinthecuriouscollectionofintereststhataretypicalofHermeticists,andthattheseparallelsbetweenHegelandtheHer-metictraditionarenotaccidental,becausethereisampleevidencethatHegeltookanactiveinterestinHermeticismthroughouthisintellec-tualcareer.Sothereisa“mystical”elementinHegel’sthoughtandamysticalinfluenceuponit.Butsowhat?Isthisamerehistoricalcuriosity,ordoesithavelargerimplicationsforHegelscholarshipandforthehistoryofideasingeneral?Ibelievethatithasimportantimplications.First,itshouldserveasacorrectivetothetendencyofphilosophically-trainedHegelscholarstonarrateHegel’sintellectualdevelopmentsolelyintermsofhisencounterwithmainstreamGermanphilosophy,specificallyKant,Fichte,andSchelling.OnecanpatchtogetheranamazinglifelikesimulacrumofHegelianphilosophyfrombitsandpiecesoftheseandotheracademicallyrespectablefigures.ButthatisnothowHegeldidit.92ThesescholarsincludeFrancesYates,AntoineFaivre,RichardPopkin,AllanDebus,BettyJoTeeterDobbs,PaulOttoKristeller,D.P.Walker,StephenMcK-night,AllisonCoudert,andGregoryR.Johnson.93EricVoegelin,“ResponsetoProfessorAltizer’s‘ANewHistoryandaNewbutAncientGod,’inTheCollectedWorksofEricVoegelin,vol.12,PublishedEssays,1966–1985,ed.byEllisSandoz(BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress,1990),p.297.SeealsoVoegelin,“OnHegel:AStudyinSorcery,”inSandoz.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n280glennalexandermageeSecond,anappreciationoftheroleofmysticalideasinthethoughtofHegelandothermodernthinkersopensnewvistas,newparadigmsforthehistoryofmodernphilosophyandforthephilosophyofhistory.Modernityisaproject,asocialandhistoricalmovementwithalineartrajectory:fromunreasontoreason,superstitiontoscience,dominationbynaturetodominionoverit,masteryandslaverytouniversalfree-dom,darknesstolight.Thecentralpresuppositionofthisprojectisthatitsdrivingforce,reason,isself-groundingandcanthereforeemanci-pateitselffromandtranscendunreason,i.e.,itcanprogressbeyondthehistoricalcontingenciesofitsstartingpoint.InHegel’sterms,reasondetermineshistory;historydoesnotdeterminereason.Modernhistoriansofphilosophynaturallyhaveviewedtheirsub-jectmatterthroughthesameprogressiveoptic,asreasonassertingitsautonomyandprogressivelydispellingthedarknessofsuperstition.Butiftheveryideaoftheautonomyandprogressiveunfoldingofreasonhasdeeplyirrationalroots,thenperhapshistoryisbetterunderstoodasHeideggersawit,notasanintelligibleprogressionfromsuperstitiontoreason,butmerelyasarandomandcontingentsuccessionofsupersti-tions,themoststubbornofwhicharethosethatpresentthemselvesasmostrational.9494IwishtothankFrederickBeiser,ClarkButler,TomDarby,andCyrilO’Reganfortheirconstructivecriticismsofmyresearch.IamespeciallyindebtedtoGregoryR.Johnsonforhishelpwithanearlierdraftofthischapter.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:29WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.011CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nkennethr.westphal11PhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProjecti.introductionThoughitwasinitiatedbyPythagoras,expandedinPlato’sTimeaus,comprehensivelydevelopedbyAristotle,andhealthythroughouttheMediaeval,RenaissanceandModernperiodswellintothenineteenthcentury,1inthetwentiethcenturyamonganalyticandscientificallymindedphilosophers,“philosophyofnature”apparentlyvanished.For-tunately,theincreasingcalibreofrecentresearchinhistory,methodol-ogyandphilosophyofsciencehasonceagainrevealedfascinatingissuesattheintersectionsamongthenaturalsciences,scientificmethodology,historyofscience,andphilosophyofscience,whichtoday–preciselybecausenodisciplinecanplausiblymonopolizethem–arerightlydesignatedphilosophyofnature.PlacingHegel’snotoriousPhilosophyofNaturewithinthisinterdisciplinaryareadoesnotyetillumineit.21See,forexample,ErnstCassirer,DasErkenntnisprobleminderPhilosophieundWissenschaftderneuerenZeit(Hamburg:Meiner,1999);UweMeixnerandAlbertNewen,GeschichtederNaturphilosophie(Paderborn:Mentis,2004);RichardMcKeon,OnKnowing—TheNaturalSciences(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1994);andDavidMalament,ed.,ReadingNaturalPhilosophy:EssaysintheHistoryandPhilosophyofScienceandMathematics(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2002).2ThefollowingeditionsofHegel’sworkshavebeenused:GW:GesammelteWerke.SeeHegel,1968.M:Hegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit.SeeHegel,1977a.MM:WerkeinZwanzigBanden¨.SeeHegel,1970a.PhdG:PhanomenologiedesGeistes.¨SeeHegel,1980.WL1:WissenschaftderLogik,vol.I,2nded.SeeHegel,1984.WL2:WissenschaftderLogik,vol.II,1sted.SeeHegel,1981.G.W.F.Hegel,1801.DissertatioPhilosophicadeOrbitisPlanetarum.Jena,Prager.CorrigendainFerrini,1995,pp.11–16;criticaleditioninGW,5:223–253.–,1808.“PhilosophischeEnzyklopadie¨fur¨dieOberklasse”(TextezurphilosophischenPropadeutik¨,1).MM,4:9–69.TranslatedinHegel,1986,pp.124–169.–,1810/1811.“LogikfurdieMittelklasse”(¨TextezurphilosophischenPropadeutik,¨7).MM,4:162–203.TranslatedinHegel,1986,pp.74–104.281DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n282kennethr.westphalHegelclassifieshisphilosophyofnatureasrationalphysics.3“Ratio-nalphysics”maysoundquaint,outdated,andevenpresumptuous.However,NewtonidentifiedthegenreofthePrincipiaas“rationalmechanics”(aproperpartofrationalphysics),4andrationalphysicsremainsaseriousdisciplinetoday,withprofessionaljournalsandrecent–,1968–.GesammelteWerke.Rheinisch-Westfalischen¨AkadamiederWissenschaftenandDeutscheForschungsgemeinschaft,ed.byH.BuchnerandO.Poggeler(Hamburg,Meiner).¨–,1970a.WerkeinZwanzigBanden¨,ed.byE.MoldenhauerandK.M.Michel(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp).–,1970b.Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature.3vols.(Enzyklopadie¨,vol.II.),trans.byM.J.Petry(London:GeorgeAllenandUnwin;NewYork:HumanitiesPress).–,1970c.Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature.(Enzyklopadie¨,vol.II),trans.byA.V.Miller(Oxford:TheClarendonPress).–,1977a.Hegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit,trans.byA.V.Miller(Oxford:TheClarendonPress).–,1977b.FaithandKnowledge,trans.byW.CerfandH.S.Harris(Albany:SUNYPress).–,1977c.TheDifferenceBetweenFichte’sandSchelling’sSystemofPhilosophy,trans.byH.S.HarrisandW.Cerf(Albany:SUNYPress).–,1980.PhanomenologiedesGeistes.GW¨,9.–,1981.WissenschaftderLogik,vol.II,1sted.(1816).GW,12;citedas“WL2”.–,1984.WissenschaftderLogik,vol.I,2nded.(1832).GW,21;citedas“WL1”.–,1986.ThePhilosophicalPropaedeutic,ed.byM.GeorgeandA.VincentandtransbyA.V.Miller(Oxford:Blackwell).–,1987.“PhilosophicalDissertationontheOrbitsofthePlanets(1801)”;Precededbythe12ThesesDefendedonAugust27,1801,transbyP.Adler.GraduateFacultyPhilosophyJournal,12,1,pp.269–309.–,1991.Hegel’sEncyclopediaLogic,trans.byT.Geraets,W.Suchting,andH.S.Harris(Cambridge,MA:HackettPublishingCo).–,1994.VorlesungenuberdiePhilosophiedesGeistes.Berlin¨1827/1828,trans.byJ.E.ErdmannandF.Walteranded.byF.HespeandB.Tuschling(Hamburg:Meiner).–,2000.VorlesunguberNaturphilosophieBerlin1823/24¨,trans.byK.G.J.v.Griesheim,ed.byG.Marmasse(FrankfurtamMain:Lang).–,2001.VorlesungenuberdieLogik.Berlin1831,¨transcribedbyKarlHegel,ed.byU.RameilandH.-Chr.Lucas(Hamburg:Meiner).–,2002.VorlesunguberNaturphilosophieBerlin1821/22.Nachschrift¨uberNatur-¨philosophie,ed.byG.MarmasseandT.Posch(FrankfurtamMain:Lang).–,forthcominga.ThePhenomenologyofSpirit,trans.byT.Pinkard(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress).–,forthcomingb.TheScienceofLogic,trans.G.DiGiovanni(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress).3Enz.,II,Introduction;MM,9:10–11;Hegel,1970c,p.2.4Newton,ThePrincipia:mathematicalprinciplesofnaturalphilosophy,ed.byI.BernardCohenandA.Whitman(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1999),p.381,cf.11.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject283textbookstoshowforit.5“Rationalphysics”isphysicaltheorywhichemphasizestheconceptualfoundationsandbasicprinciplesofphysicsandhowthesecanbeusedtoexplainparticularphysicalphenomena,renderingthemcomprehensible.ThisisthekeyaimofHegel’sPhiloso-phyofNature,becausesufficientanalysisoftheconceptualfoundationsofnaturalsciencesrequiresphilosophicalresourceswhichcomplementtheresourcesfoundwithinscientifictheoriesandmethods,whichalone,heargues,areinsufficienttothetask.Hegel’sPhilosophyofNatureisfascinatinginitsownrightandalsoshedsimportantlightonthecharacterofHegel’sphilosophyasawhole,becauseasHenryHarrisnotes,“theBaconianappliedscienceofthisworldisthesolidfoundationuponwhichHegel’sladderofspiritualexperiencerests”.6Indeed,Hegel’sstudyofgravitationaltheoryplayedacentralroleinthedevelopmentofhis“dialectic”fromamerelydestructivesetofscepticalequipollenceargumentsdirectedagainstcontemporaneousphysicsandastronomytoaconstructivesetofphilosophicalprinciplesbasedongravityexhibitingtheessentialinterrelatednessofphysicalbodies.7ThoughithasbeeneasytocondemnHegel’sallegederrors–thesupposeddebacleregardingBode’sLawofinterplanetarydistancesandthediscoveryoftheasteroid,Ceres;hisapparentlyscandalousattackonNewton’sPrincipia–suchcriticismsgenerallyredoundupontheirsources,onceHegel’ssourceshavebeenproperlyidentifiedandassessed.8Hegel’spostgraduateinstructioninphysicswasexcellent,5See,forexample,C.W.KilmisterandJ.E.Reeve,RationalMechanics(London:Longmans,1966).6H.S.Harris,Hegel’sLadder(Cambridge,MA:Hackett,1997),vol.2,p.355.7CinziaFerrini,“OntheRoleofNewton’sMechanicsandPhilosophyofNatureintheGenesisofHegel’sDialectic”,inHegelsDenkentwicklunginderBonnerundFrankfurterZeit,ed.byM.BondelliandH.Linnweber-Lammerskitten(Paderborn:Fink,1999),pp.197–224;cp.DeOrbitisPlanetarum,GW,5:247.29;Hegel,1987,p.295.8AndoncecorruptionsintheLatinofHegel’sDissertatioarecorrected;seeFerrini,Guidaal‘Deorbitisplanetarum’diHegeledallesueedizionietraduzioni(Bern:Haupt,1995),andthecriticaleditioninGW,5:231–253.RegardingBode’sLaw,seeWolfgangNeuser,Hegel,DissertatioPhilosophicadeOrbitisPlaentarum/PhilosophischeEroerterungueberdiePlantenbahnen(Weinheim:Actahuman-iora,1986),pp.50–60)andFerrini,“FramingHypotheses:NumbersinNatureandtheLogicofMeasureintheDevelopmentofHegel’sSystem”,inHegelandthePhilosophyofNature,ed.byStephenHoulgate(Albany,NY:SUNYPress,1998),pp.283–310.RegardingNewton,seebelow,§2;EdwardHalper’scontribution,Chap-ter12,inthisvolume;Ferrini,Guida;PaulZiche,Mathematischeundnatur-wissenschaftlicheModelleinderPhilosophieSchellingsundHegels(Stuttgart:Fromann-Holzboog,1996),pp.133–199;andMichaelJ.Petry,HegelandNewtoni-anism(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,1993).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n284kennethr.westphalandhehadsufficientbackgroundinmathematicstounderstanditthor-oughly.9MichaelJohnPetry’smassivethreevolumeeditionofHegel’sPhilosophyofNatureshowsconclusivelythatHegelwasbothbroadlyanddeeplyversedinthenaturalsciencesofhisday,aswellasanynonspecialistpossiblycouldbeandfarmorethanhisvociferouscrit-icseverwere,thatHegelmadeveryfewoutrighterrorsaboutcon-temporaneousscienceandthatthoseerrorsusuallystemfromcrediblesources.10Thoughnotaprofessionalmathematician,Hegeltaughtcal-culusandunderstoodmathematicswellenoughtohaveinformedrea-sonsforpreferringFrenchschoolsofanalysis,particularlyLaGrange’s(§267n.2).11Indeed,hewassufficientlywellinformedaboutproblemsinthefoundationsof(mathematical)analysistocriticallyassessCauchy’sground-breaking“firstreform”ofanalysis.12Moreover,Hegelwasararityamongphilosophers,becausehewasalsodirectlyengagedin9SeeChristophFriedrichvonPfleiderer,Physik.NaturlehrenachKluegel.Nach-schrifteinerTuebingerVorlesungvon1804,ed.byPaulZiche(Stuttgart:Fromann-Holzboog,1994).Fordiscussion,seeWestphal,“Force,UnderstandingandOntol-ogy”,BulletinoftheHegelSocietyofGreatBritian57/58(2008).10M.J.Petry,“Introduction”toHegel’sPhilosophyofNature(London:George,Allen&Unwin,1970),vol.1,pp.49–59.Petry’seditionalsoindicatestheorig-inaldateofpublicationofthevariouspassagesincludedinHegel’sfinaledition(1830).AsomewhatbettertranslationisprovidedbyMiller,Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1970).SeeBuchdahl,“Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature”,BritishJournalforthePhilosophyofScience,23(1972),pp.257–266.Hegel’sPhilosophyofNatureisthesecondofthreepartsofhisEncyclopediaofPhilosophicalSciences,comprising§§245–375.ThisEncyclopediawasHegel’slec-turesyllabus.Itcontainsconsecutivelynumberedsections,oftencomplementedbypublishedRemarks(Anmerkungen).PosthumouseditionsofHegel’sEncyclo-pediahaveappendedrelevantlecturenotesfromstudentstothesesectionsas“Zusatze¨”(additions).AllotherwiseunattributedsectionnumbersrefertoHegel’sEncyclopedia.Thesemaybefollowedby“Anm”forHegel’spublishedRemarks,a“Z”forlecturematerial,oran“n”forHegel’spublishedfootnotes.Asalec-turesyllabus,Hegel’sEncyclopediawasintendedfororalelaboration;hislecturenotesarecrucialresources.Recently,severalcompletesetsoflecturetranscriptshavebeenfound,edited,andpublished.ThemostimportantoftheseareHegel,2000andHegel,2002.TherecentEnglishtranslationsofHegel’sworkslistedaboveprovidethepaginationofGW;hencenopagenumbersarecitedforthesetranslations.11ThesecondeditionofLaGrange’sTheoriedesfonctionesanalytiques´(1811)isnowavailableinEnglishtranslation.SeeJ.L.LaGrange,AnalyticalMechanics.EditedandtranslatedbyA.BoissonnadeandV.N.Vagliente(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,1997).Hegelusedthefirstedition,LaGrange,Mechaniqueanalytique.(Paris:Desaint,1788).12SeeMichaelWolff,“HegelundCauchy.EineUntersuchungzurPhilosophieundGeschichtederMathematik”,inHegelunddieNaturwissenschaften,ed.byR.-P.HorstmannandM.J.Petry(Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta,1986),pp.197–263.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject285naturalscience,specificallygeologyandmineralogy.13Hegelsimplyisnotthecharlatanwhoseimagestillarisesinconnectionwithhisphilosophyofnature.UnderstandingthephilosophicalcharacterofHegel’sPhilosophyofNaturerequiresrecognizingsomebasiclegitimatephilosophicalissuesembeddedinthedevelopmentofphysicsfromGalileotoNewton(§2).TheseissuesilluminatethecharacterofHegel’sanalysisofphilosoph-icalissuesregardingnature(§3)andthecentralaimsandpurposesofHegel’sphilosophyofnature(§4).ii.gallileo,newtonandphilosophyofnature2.1Galileodirectlydisputedauthorityasacriterionoftruthinscientificmatters.Healsoknewthatsensoryevidencecouldnotserveasthiscriterion;herecognizedthatmotionisrelativeandthatillusionsandappearancescaninfectobservation.Galileoheldthatmathematicalfor-mulationoflawsofnaturecanafforddemonstrationsofgenuinereg-ularitiesinnaturalphenomena.Thisrequiresthatmathematicalfor-mulaebefittedtocarefulobservation,whilstthejointsatisfactionofthesetwodemandsmustalsoberationallyintelligible.Thecrucialmethodologicalpointisthatgivingmathematicalexpressiontonat-uralregularitiesguidesthephysicalanalysisandexplanationofthephenomena.Thefactorsinthemathematicalformulamustbeplausi-blyinterpretableasfactorsinthephysicalsituation.Galileoexplicitlydisavowedmetaphysicsasaguidetodeterminingtheplausibilityofthosefactors,atthebeginningofDay3ofhisDiscoursesConcerningtheTwoNewSciences.ThisincensedDescartesandthesameatti-tudeinNewtonworriedKant,thoughitwasdecisiveforthedevelop-mentofmodernscienceandbecameevenmorepronouncedinNewton’sPrincipia.14Newton’smathematicaltheoryoforbitalmotionforgedanimportantkindofindependenceofphysicaltheoryfrommetaphysi-calandphysicalquestionsabouttheultimatenatureofspace,timeorgravity:ForNewton’swork,itsufficedtoregardgravityasacentrally13SeeCinziaFerrini,“Reason:Certainty,TruthandObservingNature”,inTheBlackwellGuidetoHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit,ed.byK.R.Westphal(London:Blackwell,2009),chapter5.14DescartestoMersenne,11Oct.1638;Kant,MetaphysicalFoundationsofNaturalScience(hereafter“Foundations”),vol.4,pp.472–473.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n286kennethr.westphaldirectedforce,wherethatcentreisspecifiedonlybyitsmassandlocation.15TherelevanceofthispointtoHegelcanbeseenbyconsideringGerdBuchdahl’s(1980)accountofhowscientifictheoriesaredeveloped,eval-uatedandrevisedwithinamethodologicalframeworkcomprisingthreebroadkindsofconsiderations,a“probativecomponent”regardingproperstandardsandtechniquesforcollectingandassessingobservationalandexperimentaldata,a“systemiccomponent”regardingtheinternalunityofatheoryanditsintegrationwithotherscientifictheoriesandan“explicativecomponent”concerningtheintelligibilityorplausibilityofthebasicconceptsorfactorsinvolvedinascientifictheory,includingheuristicprinciplesandbasicprinciplesofexplanation.Inbrief,Hegel’sphilosophyofnatureisdedicatedtoshowingthat,whenproperlyexpli-cated,thebasicconceptsinvolvedinanadequatescientifictheoryaremutuallycontrastiveandinterdefinedinsuchawaythatnogenuinefur-therquestionsaboutexplanatorycausesremain.ThequestionssetasidebyGalileoandNewton,theveryquestionsDescartesandKantsoughttoanswer,arenot,inthefinalHegeliananalysis,genuinequestionsatall.ThispointcanbeillustratedandfurtherspecifiedbyconsideringpartofHegel’scritiqueofNewton.2.2Newtonsoughttoanswertwoquestions:Givenanorbitingbody’stra-jectory,findthelawofforce,andmoreimportantly,givenalawofforce,findthetrajectoryofanorbitingbody.16Newton’stheoryinvolvesgen-eralizingGalileo’slawoffreefalltoregardthedeviationofanorbitfromitstangentasanindicatorofcentrallydirectedforce,wheretheextentofdeviationisproportionaltothesquareofthetime.Sincethemotioninquestionisanellipticalorbit,thedirectionofdeviationfromatangentisdirectedtowardsafocalcentre,andsoisnotconstant.Sincetheorbitiselliptical,theforcewhichproducesthedeviationalsovarieswiththedistancefromthecentre(byaninversesquareproportionality).Thesefactsrequireincorporatingtimeintothegeometricalcalculations.New-tonincludedtimebygeneralizingKepler’slawofareas;thetimeelapsedwhentraversingagivenarcofitsorbitisproportionaltotheareaofthesectorsweptoutbyaradiusfromthecentrepointtotheorbit-ingbody.Becausethedirectionofmotionchangescontinuously,thegeometricalcalculationsmustberestrictedtoverysmallornascent15Franc¸oisDeGandt,ed.ForceandGeometryinNewton’sPrincipia.(Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress,1995),pp.265–272.16Ibid,p.8.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject287motions.CombiningthesefactorsrequiredsophisticatedmathematicalanalysiswhicheludedNewton’spredecessors,thoughtheyperceivedmanyoftherelevantphysicalfactors.Becauseoneofthetwocentralproblemswastoderivethelawofforcefromagivenorbit,itissignificantthoughunsurprisingthatNew-ton’sinversesquarelawofgravitationalattractioncanbederivedfromKepler’sorbits.Hegelcontends,however,thatNewton’spurelymathe-maticaldemonstrationofKepler’slawsisinadequatebecauseNewton’smathematicalanalysisalonecannotestablishtherealityofKepler’sphysicallaws(§270R;seebelow,§2.3).17YetNewton’ssecondprob-lemismoreimportantandmoreacute:toderiveabody’sorbitfromthelawofattraction.Newtondevelopedabevyofingeniousgeometri-caltechniquestosolvethisproblem,butitultimatelyisbeyondthosemeanstohandle.Inprinciple,Newton’sexpandedgeometricalmethodscanonlydetermineonepointatatime,thetrajectoryofabodywhichbeginsmotionwithanyinitialvelocityundertheinfluenceofanycen-tralforcedependingondistance.However,onlywithintegralcalculuscanthecurveofthetrajectorybecompletelydescribedandthegeomet-ricalspeciesofthecurve(ifithasone)bedetermined.TheproblemandthesolutionwerefirstdemonstratedbyJeanBernoulliusingintegralcalculus.18ThoughIhavefoundnoreferencebyHegeltoBernoulli’sworks,HegelrefersdirectlytotheweaknessesofNewton’sproofthattheplan-etsmoveinellipses;inparticular,hisremarkssuggesttheproblemoftheuniquenessoftheellipseasasolutiontotheproblemofdeterminingtheorbitonthebasisofthelawofforce.Theproblemoftheunique-nessofthesolutionwastakenupfromBernoullibysubsequentanaly-sesusingintegralcalculus,includingFrancoeur’sTraite´el´ementairde´Mecanique´(1801)towhichHegelrefersinthisconnection(§270Anm.).Hegelcites(in1827and1830)Laplace’sExpositionduSystemduMonde`(1796)tothesameeffectinhislectures(§270Z).YetHegellearnedofthisproblemmuchearlierfromCastel(1724),arareworkwidelypubli-cizedbyMontucla(1758),whichHegellikelystudiedwhenvisitingtheuniversitylibraryinGenevafromBernandwhichheimplicitlyusedbothinhisdissertation,DeOrbitisPlanetarum,19andinhisScienceof17SeeCinziaFerrini,“OnNewton’sDemonstrationofKepler’sSecondLawinHegel’sDeOrbitisPlanetarum(1801)”.Philosophianaturalis,31(1994),pp.150–170;andWestphal,“Force,UnderstandingandOntology”,BulletinoftheHegelSocietyofGreatBritain(forthcoming).18SeeDeGandt,ForceandGeometry,pp.248–249,263–264.19Hegel(1801,1987);seeFerrini,“OnNewton’sDemonstration”;Guida;and“DieBibliothekinTschugg:HegelsVorbereitungfurseinefr¨uheNaturphilosophie”,in¨DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n288kennethr.westphalLogic.20CastelshowedthatNewton’sdemonstrationofKepler’sareallawentailstheabsurdconclusionthatallcentralorbitsarecircular.21ThisisacrucialexampleofapointrepeatedlyemphasizedbyHegel’sphysicsinstructor,Pfleiderer(1994):todeterminewhatcan,andwhatcannot,beaccomplishedusinggeometryandwhatinsteadrequiresanal-ysis(calculus).2.3Newton’spoint-by-pointcalculationofanorbitillustratesHegel’scom-plaintaboutthe“unspeakablemetaphysics”unleashedbyNewton’sPrincipia(§270Anm.).Newton’spoint-by-pointcalculationsrequiredividingupacontinuousmotionanddividingupthevariousfactorswhichconstitutethatmotionandtreatingthemasiftheyweremutu-allyindependentquantities.ThepointofHegel’scritiqueisthatnosen-siblephysicalinterpretationcanbegiventothemathematicalfactorsinvolvedinNewton’scalculations:Thepresuppositions,thecourse,andtheresultswhichanalysisrequiresandprovides,remainquitebesidethe[present]point,whichconcernsthephysicalvalueandthephysicalsignificance(Bedeutung)ofthosedeterminationsandthatcourse[ofNewton’sgeometricaldemonstration].(§270Anm.)HegelobjectstoNewton’sreifyinghisanalyticalfactorsintoapparentlymutuallyindependentrealities;hecontendsthatNewton’sgeometricalmethodscannotbutencouragethismisleadingtendencybycarvingupacontinuousmutualcausalinteractionintofictitiousdiscreteimpulses.Indeed,thiscontrastilluminatesHegel’srepeatedstressonhow“mod-ern[mathematical]analysis”hasdispensedwithNewton’smethodsofproof(e.g.,§270Anm.).2.4Hegel’scriticismofNewton’sintricategeometricalmethodsilluminatesHegel’saccountofcausaldispositionsandcausallaws.Considerthreestandardviewsofscientificlawsandexplanations.ItisoftensupposedHegelinderSchweiz(1793–1796),ed.byH.SchneiderandN.Waszek(FrankfurtamMain:Lang,1997),pp.237–259.20WL;GW,21:378.29–379.4;GW,379.6–379.9;seeFerrini,“IlgiovaneHegelcriticodiNewton”,Intersezioni,17(1997),pp.413–414.21SeeMauroNastideVincentis,“Gliargomentihegelianicontroilmodellonewto-niano”,inFerrini,Guida,pp.203–240.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject289thatgenuinelyexplanatorylawsreferto“subobservable”theoreticalentities,whosepropertiesandinteractionproduceanobservedmacro-scopicphenomenon.Insharpcontrasttothis,instrumentalismregardstheoreticalentitiesasmerefictionsforcalculatingpredictionsandretro-dictionsofobservablephenomena.22Athirdviewisthatscientificlawsshouldbe“phenomenological”inthesensethattheymerelydescriberegularitiesinmanifest,observedphenomena.Kepler’slawsareofthistype.Thisviewofnaturallawsisalsofound,forexample,inthetheoriesofJosephBlack,JohnKeil,W.J.M.Rankine,andGustavKirchhoff.23Amongthestandardoptions,thisthirdviewisclosesttoHegel’s.How-ever,Hegel’slogicalcumphilosophicalexplicationseekstheinsightorcomprehensionpromisedbyexplanatorylawswhileavoidingrecoursetoapotentiallyscepticalgapbetweenobservedphenomenaandtheo-reticalposits.TheclueliesinHegel’ssupposed“Aristotelianism”,thatis,hisoppositiontocorpuscularism.2.5CorpusculartheoriesofmatterrejectedAristotelianaccountsof“natures”toaccountforchange.Accordingtocorpuscularism,matterisdiscrete,inert,andconsistssolelyofextensionandimpenetrability.Becausematterisinert,allchangesofmattermustresultfromsomenonmaterialcause,eitherdirectlyorindirectly;noforcesareinherentinmatter.Thepostulationofinertmatterfaredillassciencedeveloped.Newtonascribedthepowerofinertiatomatter.Eighteenth-centuryphysicistslosttheirCartesianandcorpuscularaversionstoascribinggravityasaphysicalforcetomatterandthedevelopmentofchem-istry,beginningwithNewtonhimself,thoughespeciallyasdevelopedbyBlack,PriestlyandLavoisier,requiredascribingotheractiveforces22Cf.Hume,AnEnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding,ed.byP.H.Nidditch,(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1975),§VII,partI,finalnote(onvisinertiaeandgravity).23SeeWestphal,Hegel’sEpistemologicalRealism:AStudyoftheAimandMethodofHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit.PhilosophicalStudiesSeriesinPhilosophy,vol.43,ed.byKeithLehrer(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,1989),pp.160,273note29.ThisthirdviewisascribedtoHegelbyBuchdahl,“ConceptualAnalysisandScientificTheoryinHegel’sPhilosophyofNature(withSpecialReferencetoHegel’sOptics)”,inHegelandtheSciences,edbyR.S.CohenandM.Wartofsky(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Reidel,1984),pp.13–36andbyBrigitteFalkenberg,“HowtoSavethePhenomena:MeaningandReferenceinHegel’sPhilosophyofNature”,inHoulgate,ed.,HegelandthePhilosophyofNature,pp.97–135,esp.p.132note3.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n290kennethr.westphaltomatter.24Thealternativetheoryofmatterwasdynamic;itattributedactiveforcesordispositionsdirectlytomatter.Firstunambiguouslyadvocatedinchemistry,thedynamictheoryofmatterlentitselfdirectlytoNewtonianphysicsbecauseitaffordedawaytounderstandgravita-tionalforceasinherentinmatterandthusremovedonepropsupportingmechanicalexplanationsofgravity.Theotherpropwastheproblemofactionatadistance,whichisonlyaproblemforcompletelymechanicalconceptionsofmatterwhichinprinciplerequirecontactforonebodytochangethemotionofanotherbody.Thisproblem,too,isalleviatedbyadynamicconceptofmatter.Isaythatthedynamicconceptofmatterwasfirstunambiguouslyadvocatedinchemistry,eventhoughNewtonianmechanicsultimatelyascribesgravitationalforcetomatter.Throughouthislife,outofdef-erencetotheCartesiantraditionheopposedandinaccordwiththecorpusculartraditiontowhichheadhered,Newtoninsistedthat“grav-ity”wasonlyamathematical,andnotaphysicalcharacteristicofmat-ter.25NewtonwasdeliberatelyevasiveinformulatinghisQuaeriesintheOpticksin1717.ItremainedforlaterEighteenthcenturyphysi-ciststorescindtheircorpuscularandCartesianqualmsabouttheactiveforcesofmatterandtotakeNewton’sfamousQuaery31atfacevalue.(Newtonhimselfregardedimpenetrabilityasafundamentalcharacter-isticofbody,whileDescartesheldthatitderivesfromtheprimarycharacteristicofextension.)26AcentralobjectiontoNewton’stheoryofgravityfromboththeCarte-sianandthecorpusculartraditionswasthatNewton’stheoryofgravityappearedtoreinstatediscreditedAristotelianformsoractivepowersofmatter.Newtonsoughttoremainneutralaboutthecausesofgravita-tionalattraction.Yet,thisofficialagnosticismaboutthenatureandsta-tusofgravityultimatelycompromisesthenatural-scientificcredentialsofNewton’sphysicalsystemoftheworldbecauseitrequiredNewtonto24FordiscussionofthechemicalrevolutioninconnectionwithKant,seeMichaelFriedmanKantandtheExactSciences(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1992),pp.264–290.25SeeAlexandreKoyre,“NewtonandDescartes”,in´NewtonianStudies(London:Chapman&Hall,1965),pp.149–163andRupertandMarieB.Hall,“Newton’sTheoryofMatter”,Isis,51(1960),pp.131–144.26SirIsaacNewton,Opticks.(NewYork,Dover,1952),pp.389,400;UnpublishedScientificPapersofIsaacNewton,ed.byR.andM.Hall(Cambridge,UK:Cam-bridgeUniversityPress,1962),p.106;andDescartes,ThePhilosophicalWritingsofDescartes,3vols.,trans.byJ.Cottingham,R.Stoothoff,andD.Murdoch,withA.Kenney(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991),vol.3,pp.361,372.OnNewton’scorpuscularism,seeMauriceMandelbaum,Philosophy,Science,andSensePerception(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1964),pp.66–88.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject291insertatranscendent,theologicalpostulateintohiserstwhilephysicaltheory,namelythatGodsettheastronomicalclockworkgoingandocca-sionallyintervenestopreventthewholesystemfromrunningdown.AsHegelrecognizedinhisDissertatio,thispostulatesimplyrescindsthekeyaimofofferinganentirelynaturalandthusgenuinelyscientificexplanationofnaturalphenomena.27Hegelfurtherrecognized,however,thatNewtonianphysicaltheoryinfactprovidesadequategroundsforascribinggravitationalattractiondirectlytomatter;matteris“essentiallyheavy”inthesensethatmate-rialbodiesinherentlytend–theygravitate–towardsoneanother(§§262,269).28Indeed,Hegelheldthatadequatescientificexplanationprovidestheonlypossiblegroundsforascribingactivecharacteristics–causaldispositions–tomaterialphenomena.Comprehendingessentialchar-acteristicsofthingsprovidesexplanatoryinsight.ThisisHegel’sviewbeginningalreadyinthePhenomenologyofSpirit,whichhedevelopedthereinnuce,expresslyleavingitsfulldevelopmentforhissystemof“science”,29whichcametoincludenotonlyhisScienceofLogic,butalsohisEncyclopaedia,includingcentrallythePhilosophyofNature.2.6In“ForceandUnderstanding”(Phenomenology,chapter3)Hegelrepeat-edlycriticizesattemptstoreifyaspectsormomentsofforceintosupposeddistinctorindependententities.Forexample,hecriticizedthereificationof“expressed”and“repressed”force(e.g.,thecontrastbetweenkineticandpotentialenergy)or“solicited”and“soliciting”force.Kantusedtheterm“solicitation”torefertotheeffectofamovingforceonabodyinagivenmoment,whichgivesthemomentofacceleration.Kantusedthistotrytoprovethelawofcontinuity(Foundations,4:551–553).Hegel’spointisthatthinkingofforcesin27GW,5:247.12–23;Hegel,1987,p.294.FordiscussionofNewton’sview,seeMartinCarrier,“IsaacNewton.PrinzipienderNaturphilosophie:Raum,Kraft,BewegungundGott”,inPhilosophendes17.Jahrhunderts.EineEinfuhrung¨,ed.byL.Kreimendahl(Darmstadt:WissenschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft,1999),pp.176–197.28SeeBuchdahl,“ConceptualAnalysis”,pp.18–25.Buchdahl,“Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature”,pp.260–261,recognizesHegel’s“Aristotelianism”,butneverreconcilesitwithHegel’sallegedpreferencefor“phenomenological”lawsofnaturebecausehedoesn’tquiteseeHegel’senrichedaccountof“phenomenological”lawswhichIhighlighthere.ThisimportantpointisalreadycentraltoHegel’sDissertatio(GW,5:247.29;Hegel,1987,p.295).29PhdG,GW,9:101.17–27/M,102.NaturalscienceisalsofundamentaltoHegel’sanalysisof“TheCertaintyandTruthofReason”and“ObservingNature”;seeFerrini,“TheCertaintyandTruthofReason”and“ReasonObservingNature”.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n292kennethr.westphaltermsof“moments”ofsolicitationencouragesamisleadingdivisionofacontinuouslyeffectiveforceintoaseriesof(quasimechanical)impulsesofjustthesortfoundinNewton’sgeometricalanalysisofgravitationalforce(above,§2.4).Hegeldescribedasetoftheoreticalcausallaws,suchasNewton’sPrincipia,BookOne,asa“quietsupersensiblerealmoflaw”becauseabstractformulationsoflawsofnaturedon’taccountforactualphenomenapreciselybecausetheyareabstractidealizations.Account-ingforactualphenomenaadditionallyrequiresprovidingtheirspecificparameters,theirinitialconditionsandthetheoreticallinksbetweentheabstractformulaeofgenerallawsofnatureandthespecificver-sionsofthoselawswhichpertaintothespecificdomaininquestion.30Likewise,subsumingparticularlawsofphenomenaundermoregen-erallawsrequirestremendousabstraction–fromparticularphenom-enaandtheircomplex,fullydeterminateconditions.31Thusexplainingparticularphenomenarequiresreintroducingtheirspecificparameters.Nevertheless,thefactthatvariousspecificphenomenacanbebroughtunderacommongenerallaw,andnotmerelyacommonmathematicalfunction,showsthatthesephenomenaareinfactinterrelated;theyarenotmutuallyindependent,self-sufficientobjectsorevents.32Theveryconceptoflaw-likerelations,andlikewisetheveryconceptofforce,requiresinterdefinedfactorsintowhichthephenomenacanbeanal-ysed.33Thus“theforceisconstitutedexactlylikethelaw”.34Hegelthusaimstoshowthatadequatescientificexplanationprovidesthesoleandsufficientgroundsfordeterminingtheessentialcharacteristicsoftheobjectsandeventsinnature.35Whyascribeforcestomaterial30PhdG,GW,9:91.31–91.37/M,91.Forfurtherdiscussion,seeWestphal,“Force,UnderstandingandOntology”.31PhdG,GW,9:92.10–92.19/M,91.32PhdG,GW,9:92.23–92.26/M,91.Pfleiderer,Physik,repeatedlydrewhisstudents’attentiontomathematicalfunctionsexhibitedinnaturalphenomenaandtheirunderlyingcausallaws,andstressedthatdistinctcausallawsmayexhibitcom-monkindsofmathematicalfunctions.AkeyerrorofSchelling’sphilosophyofnatureishispersistenttendencytomistakeanalogiesforidentities,thushedisre-gardsPfleiderer’scrucialpoint.ThiserrorisoneobjectofHegel’scondemnationofrelyingonmereanalogies,especiallyonthebasisofintuition(Enz.,Introduction;MM,9:9;Hegel,1970c,p.1;§246Anm.).Schelling’sapologistshaveyettoaddressHegel’sdevastatingrebuke.Cf.Houlgate,“Schelling’sCritiqueofHegel’sScienceofLogic”.ReviewofMetaphysics,53(1999),pp.99–128.33PhdG,93.7–94.28/M,92–3.34PhdG,95.12–13/M,95;originalemphasis.Hegel’sclaimisconsistentwithrecog-nizingvariouskindsofidealizationstypicallyinvolvedinstatingcausallaws,butthesenicetiescannotbediscussedhere.35SeeWestphal,“IntelligenzandtheInterpretationofHegel’sIdealism:SomeHermeneuticPointers”,TheOwlofMinerva39,1–2(2008–09),§6.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject293phenomena?Becausesofaraslogical,epistemic,ormetaphysicalneces-sitymaybeconcerned,naturalphenomenacouldinstantiateanymath-ematicalfunction,ornonewhatsoever.HegelrealizedthatKant’sFoun-dationsfailsutterlytoaccountforthis.36Thefactthatanaturalphe-nomenonexhibitsamathematicalfunctionindicates,asnothingelsecan,thatsomethinginthatphenomenonisstructuredinaccordwiththerelevantmathematicalfunctionexhibitedinitsbehaviour.That“something”isthecausalstructureofthephenomenon,itscausaldis-position(s).Hegel’sclaimmustbetakenliterally:theforceisconstitutedexactlylikethelaw.37Hegel’saccountofcausationhasgreatsignificanceforhisontology,ingeneral,andespeciallyforhisPhilosophyofNature.2.7DespitehispenetratingcritiqueofNewton’sflawedgeometricalmeth-ods,itiscrucialtorecognizethatHegel’scentralaccountofconcepts,ofBegriffeasinternallycomplex,systematicallyintegratedandinstan-tiatedconceptualstructures,owesitsfoundation,bothforitsmeaningandforitsjustification,totheNewtoniantheoryofuniversalgravita-tion.38Hegelhimselfinsiststhat:Gravitationisthetrueanddeterminateconceptofmaterialcorporeality,whichisrealizedasidea(zurIdeerealisiertist).(§269)Universalgravitationassuchmustberecognizedasaprofoundthought;ithasalreadyacquiredattentionandconfidence,aboveallthroughitsassociatedquan-titativedeterminationandhasbeenvindicatedbyexperiencefromthesolarsystemrightdowntothephenomenonofthecapillarytube....(§269Anm.)Hegel’sprofoundadmirationfortheenormousscopeandintegrativepowerofthetheoryofuniversalgravitation,expressedbrieflyhere,issomethinghelearnedfromhisphysicsinstructorPfleiderer,who36Westphal,“OnHegel’sEarlyCritiqueofKant’sMetaphysicalFoundationsofNatu-ralScience”,inHoulgate,HegelandthePhilosophyofNature,pp.137–166.RadicalempiricistssuchasBasvanFraassenholdthatinsistingonhavingan“account”isalreadytobegthequestioninfavorofanillicitrealismaboutexplanationsandexplananda.Radicalempiricismofthissort,however,isanunwarrantedholdoverofmisguided,earlyeighteenth-centuryphilosophicalpreconceptionsaboutsci-ence.SeeWestphal,‘Hegel,Realism,andPragmatism”,inACompaniontoPrag-matism,ed.byJ.MargolisandJ.Shook(Oxford:Blackwell,2006),pp.177–183andAndreasHuttemann,¨IdealisierungenunddasZielderPhysik.EineUntersuchungzumRealismus,EmpirismusundKonstruktivismusinderWissenschaftstheorie(Berlin:deGruyter,1997).37OnHegel’sanalysisofcausalityin“ForceandUnderstanding”,seeWestphal,“Force,UnderstandingandOntology”.38SeeFerrini,“OntheroleofNewton’sMechanics”.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n294kennethr.westphalusedthislessontoexplainanextremelyimportantkindofscientificexplanation.Pfleiderer’saccountservesasthebestcommentaryonHegel’sownbriefremark:Physicsisconcernedwiththemostexactknowledgeofnaturalphenomenapossible.Fromwhatweobserveinnaturewemakecertainrulesaccordingtowhichbodiesinterrelateundercertainconditions....Intheprevious[example;omitted]naturallawswereexpressedmerelyasgeneraloccurrent(eintretender)consequences;butonealsospeaksofpropertiesandcapacitiesofbodiesbecauseitliesinthenatureofourwayofrepresentingthings(unseresVorstellens)toregardwhateverweconsistentlyremarkinsomethingasitspropertyorpower.Inthiswayweofcoursegainbrevityandrichnessofexpression,butonemustnottherebymisleadoneselfintobelievingthatthecauseofthephenomenonhasthusbeenfound.Ifwesay,forexample,thebodyfallsbecauseitisheavy,nocauseisthusadduced;rather,heavinessisameredesignationoftheverysamephenomenon.Howeverifsuchalawisnowfound,e.g.,thatanunsupportedbodymovestowardtheearthuntilitagainfindssupport,inthatwaywestilldon’tknowthephenomenonsufficiently;whatmattersinsteadareothercir-cumstances,inthiscasethedirectionandspeedofthemotionandtherelationsamongvariousdifferentbodiesinthisregard.Toinformourselvesabouttheserequiresexperiments.Forexample,oneplacesbodiesinaspacefromwhichasmuchairaspossibleisexpelledandfindsthatnowallbodiesfallwithalmostequalspeed.Therulesconstructedfromcompilingandcomparingindividualphenomenaarethenappliedagaintoexplainotherparticularcomplexphenom-ena,indeedoneswhichoftenatfirstseemtocontradictthem,e.g.,theswingingofthependulum,therisingoflightbodies,waterspouts,suctionpumps,etc.Theselatterphenomenaoneusedtobelievewereexplainedbytheso-calledhorrorvacui;howeverthiswasbasicallynomorethananill-suitedexpressionforthephenomenonitself.Afterwardsonefoundthatthemattercouldbefullyexplainedbythepressureofaironthewater,andthatinthiswayitcouldbetracedbacktothelawofgravity,ofwhichitfirstseemedtomakeanexception.Ifonethenwantstogofurtherandadduceactualcausesofphenomena,thenonemustadmittedlybesatisfiedwithprobabilitiesandhypotheses.(Pfleiderer,1994,59–60;tr.KRW)Pfleiderer’sdismissiveclosingremarkabout“probabilitiesandhypothe-ses”prettyclearlyalludestoNewton’shypothesinonfingo.39Pflei-derer’spointisthatmathematicaldescriptionofnaturalregularitiesenablesustofindcommonregularitiesunderlyingdiverseandappar-entlyopposedorconflictingphenomenaandthatthisiscentrallya39AboutwhatNewtoncountedandrejectedasmerehypotheses,seethebrilliantanalysisbyWilliamHarper,“HowardSteinonIsaacNewton:BeyondHypotheses?”inReadingNaturalPhilosophy,ed.byD.B.Malament,ed.(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2002),pp.71–112andespeciallyhisIsaacNewton’sScientificMethod:TurningDataintoEvidenceforUniversalGravity(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,forthcoming).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject295matterofexactmathematicaldescriptioncombinedwithcomprehen-siveclassificationofnaturalphenomenaundercommonmathemati-calfunctions.Pfleidererthusespousedthestandard“phenomenologi-cal”accountofscientificlawsandexplanations,whichHegelsignif-icantlyrefashionedwhenherealizedthatthiskindofempiricalevi-dencecoupledwithexactmathematicaldescriptionprovidesthesoleandsufficientbasisforascribingcausaldispositionstonaturalphe-nomena(above,§2.5).YetHegelretainedPfleiderer’slessonsabouttheinadequacyofthecovering-lawmodelofscientificexplanationandtheenormousimportanceofseekingscientificexplanationinsystematicintegration,aviewthathasonlyrecentlybeconsideredbyanalyticphilosophersofscience.40WiththesebasicpointsaboutHegel’sviewofNewtonianphysicsinhand,wecannowconsiderthebasicphilo-sophicalcharacterofHegel’sPhilosophyofNature,beforeconsideringitscentralsystematicaims(below,§4).41iii.hegel’sphilosophyofnature:ontology,metaphysicsorsemantics?InterpretationsofHegel’sPhilosophyofNaturetendtodivideintotwokinds:Accordingtosome,Hegel’sdevelopmentorderivationofthevar-iousconceptstreatedinhisPhilosophyofNatureispurelyconceptualandapriori,andmerelydrawsillustrative,corrigibleexamplesfromtheempiricaldomainsofthenaturalsciences.OtherscontendthattheverybasisofHegel’sPhilosophyofNatureistheentiretyofnaturalscience,sothattheconceptualnetworkdevelopedinHegel’sPhilosophyofNatureisascorrigibleasnaturalscienceitself,whichhaschangedrad-icallysince1830.42TheholisticcharacterofHegel’sphilosophytogether40Forexample,Friedman,“ExplanationandScientificUnderstanding”,JournalofPhilosophy,71(1974),pp.5–19andMargaretMorrison,UnifyingScientificTheo-ries:PhysicalConceptsandMathematicalStructures(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000).41FurtherdetailsofHegel’scriticalreconsiderationofNewton’sPrincipiaaredis-cussedbyHalperinChapter12inthisvolume.FordetaileddiscussionofHegel’srationalphysics,andhisacuteaccountoftheroleofmathematicsinit,seeK.N.Ihmig,HegelsDeutungderGravitation(FrankfurtamMain:Athenaum,¨1989);AntonioMoretto,FilosofiadellaMathematicaedellaMeccanicanelSistemaHegeliano.Revisededition(Padova:IlPoligrafo,2004);andD.Wandschneider,Raum,Zeit,Relativitat¨.GrundbestimmungderPhysikinderPerspektivderHegelschenNaturphilosophie(FrankfurtamMain:Klosterman,1982).42Houlgate,HegelandthePhilosophyofNature,pp.xiii–xiv.ForareviewofrecentworkonHegel’sphilosophyofnature,seePetry,“HegelianismandtheNaturalSciences:SomeCurrentDevelopmentsandInterpretations”,Hegel-Studien,36(2001),pp.199–237.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n296kennethr.westphalwithhisepistemologyrenderssuspectthedichotomyformedbythesetwoapproaches,whichpresumes,ineffect,thesupposedlyexclusiveandexhaustiveAristoteliandistinctionbetween“rational”and“historical”knowledge.Bothkindsofknowledgeadheretoafoundationalistmodelofjustification.“Historical”knowledge(historia)isbasedsquarelyandsolelyonperceptionorempiricalevidence;itisinevitablypartialandunsystematic,oratleastcannotbeknowntobeotherwise.“Ratio-nal”knowledge[scientia]istheonlyrigorousformofknowledge,foritjustifiesconclusionssolelybydeducingthemfromoriginal“first”prin-ciples.ThisdistinctionheldswaythroughouttheModernperiod,wascentraltoKant’sepistemologyandisstilldetectabletodayinthededuc-tivistassumptionsoftenmadeaboutempiricaljustification.43Hegelwasdeeplysuspiciousofthisclassicaldichotomy.Thisisindicatedbyhisrejection,by1802,ofdistinctionsinkindbetweenboththeapri-oriandtheaposterioriandbetweentheanalyticandthesynthetic.44Hegel’scritiqueofKant’sCriticalphilosophyandhissolutiontothePyrrhonianDilemmaoftheCriterionrejectthetraditionaldichotomybetweenscientiaandhistoria,alongwiththefoundationalistmodelofjustificationtheyembody.45MorecarefulrecentresearchsuggestsmoresophisticatedlinesofinterpretationofHegel’sPhilosophyofNaturewhichavoidtheultimatelyuntenabledichotomybetween“rational”and“historical”knowledge.4643Descartes,PhilosophicalWritings,1:13,usesthisdistinctioninpassinginthethirdofhisRulesforDirectingtheMind.ThisdistinctiongivesthepointtoLocke’sclaim(Essay1.1.2)tousethe“historical,plainmethod”andtoHume’s(Enquiry,§8,para.64.2)contrastbetween“inferenceandreasoning”versus“memoryandsenses”assourcesofknowledge.KantusesitinthesamesenseasDescartesinaparallelcontextintheCritiqueofPureReason(A835–837/B863–865).44SeeGlaubenundWissen(GW,4:335.2–6).45SeeWestphal,‘Urteilskraft,gegenseitigeAnerkennungindrationaleRechtfertig-ing’,inH-DKlein,ed.,Ethikalsprimaphilosoptic?(forthcoming).46Mythinkingaboutthesemattersowesmuch,thoughprobablynotyetenough,toB.FalkenburgDieFormderMaterie.ZurMetaphysikderNaturbeiKantundHegel.(FrankfurtamMain:Athenaum-Hain,¨1987);“HowtoSavethePhenom-ena:MeaningandReferenceinHegel’sPhilosophyofNature”,inHoulgate,ed.,HegelandthePhilosophyofNature(1998),pp.97–135;FerriniGuidaand“OnTheRoleofNewton’sMechanics”;andHoulgate,AnIntroductiontoHegel:Freedom,TruthandHistory(London:Blackwell,2005),pp.106–180,thoughIpresentadis-tinctiveinterpretationanchoredinHegel’sepistemologyandsemantics.Houlgate’scomprehensiveintroductionishighlyrecommended,especiallyforitsdetailedsynopsisofHegel’sPhilosophyofNature.AlsoseeAlfredoFerrarinHegelandAristotle.(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),pp.201–233.AgoodbackgroundsynopsisofHegel’sorganicismisprovidedbyBeiser,Hegel(Lon-don:Routledge,2005),pp.80–109.However,paceBeiser(p.107),amongmanyothers,Hegel’sseriousandindependentengagementwithnaturalsciencebeganDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject297Hegelinsiststhat,whilethetwodisciplinesaredistinct(§§7–9),nat-uralscienceisfundamentaltophilosophy:Notonlymustphilosophyaccordwiththeexperiencenaturegivesriseto;initsformationandinitsdevelopment,philosophicsciencepresupposesandisconditionedbyempiricalphysics.(§246R;cf.Hegel,2000,p.72)Thisremark,madeveryearlyinHegel’sIntroductiontothePhilosophyofNature,concernsnotonlythesecondpartofhisEncyclopaedia.Nordoesitconcernonlythedevelopmentofspiritoutofnatureinpartthree.ItalsoandfundamentallyconcernsHegel’sLogic.JustquotedwasthesecondsentenceofHegel’sRemark;thefirstsentencereferstoHegel’sdiscussionoftherelationbetweenphilosophyandtheempiricalsci-encesintheIntroductiontotheEncyclopaediaasawhole.ThereHegelstatesdirectlythatphilosophyisstimulatedbyandgrowsoutofexpe-rience,includingnatural-scientificexperience,andthatthenaturalsci-encesdevelopconceptualdeterminationsintheformofgeneralizations,laws,andclassificationswhichmustbereconsideredphilosophically(§12).ThusHegelinsiststhathisLogiccannotbeproperlyunderstoodapartfromhisPhilosophyofNature,norcanhisphilosophyofnaturebeunderstoodapartfromHegel’sknowledgeandunderstandingofthemethodsandcontentofnaturalscience.Hegel’sLogicexaminestheontologicalandcognitiverolesofontologicalcategories(e.g.,being,exis-tence,quantity,essence,appearance,relation,thing,cause)andprinci-plesoflogic(e.g.,identity,excludedmiddle,noncontradiction).HisLogicalsoanalysessyllogism,judgmentandprinciplesofscientificexplana-tion(force,matter,measure,cognition;mechanical,chemical,organic,andteleologicalfunctions),byusingwhichaloneweareabletoknowtheworld.EventhisbrieflistsufficestocastgravedoubtonthesuggestionthatHegel’sLogiccanbeapurelyaprioriinvestigation,foritinvolvestoomanyquitespecificconceptsandprinciples,atleastsomeofwhichobviouslyderivefromhistoricalscience(e.g.,“chemism”).Muchlessso,then,canHegel’sattemptinhisEncyclopaediaofPhilosophicalSci-ences,toshowthatandhowtheseconceptsandprinciplesarespecifiedandexhibitedinnatureandinhumanlife,bepurelyapriori.47longbeforehisarrivalinJena;itbeganatleastbyhistimeinBern.SeeFerrini,“OnNewton’sDemonstration”,and“DieBibliothekinTschugg:HegelsVorbereitungfurseinefr¨uheNaturphilosophie”,in¨HegelinderSchweiz(1793–1796),ed.byH.SchneiderandN.Waszek(FrankfurtamMain:Lang),pp.237–259.47RegardingHegel’streatmentofchemistry,seeD.vonEngelhardt,HegelunddieChemie.StudiezurPhilosophieundWissenschaftderNaturum1800.(Wiesbaden:GuidoPressler,1976);D.vonEngelhardt,“TheChemicalSystemofSubstances,ForcesandProcessesinHegel’sPhilosophyofNatureandintheSciencesoftheTime”,inHegelandtheSciences,ed.byR.S.CohenandM.Wartofsky(Dordrecht,DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n298kennethr.westphalYetthefactthatHegelexpresslyavowstheempiricalandscientificsourcesofmanyofthekeyconceptsandprinciplesanalysedinhisLogicandespeciallyinhisPhilosophyofNaturedoesnotmakehisphilosoph-icalprojectmerelyempiricalormerelyexplicative.Intheremarkjustquoted,Hegeldistinguishessharplybetweenthebasisanddevelopmentofhisphilosophyoutofreconsiderationofthenaturalsciencesandhisphilosophicalscienceproper,forwhichthenaturalsciencesarenotfoundational.Instead,thefoundationorbasisofHegel’sPhilosophyofNatureissomethinghecalls“thenecessityoftheconcept”(§246Anm.),whichphilosophyelucidatesinpartwithsomeofitsownconceptualresources(§9).Inwhatcanthisconceptualnecessityconsist,ifitcannotbepureaprioriandifmanyoftheconceptsandprinciplesitinvolvesderivefromnaturalscience?Callingtherelevantnecessity“metaphysical”doesn’thelp,thoughitrecallsHegel’sobservationthatmetaphysicsisnothingotherthan“thefullrange(Umfang)ofuniversaldeterminationsofthought(Denkbestimmungen);asitwere,thediamondnetinwhichwebringeverythingandthusfirstmakeitintelligible”(§246Z).Hegel’scon-cernisthatbasicconceptsandprinciplesusedinnaturalscienceareeitherassumedtobefamiliar–asNewtonassumedourfamiliaritywithspaceandtime–ortheyareintroducedindependentlyofoneanotherinwaysthatobscuretheirconceptualsignificance,whichisafunctionofhoweachconceptisbothdistinguishedfromandalsointegratedwithotherconceptsinitsdomainandtheirproperontologicalinterpreta-tion(§246Z).Hegeladvocatedmoderateholismaboutconceptualcon-tentormeaning:conceptscanonlybeproperlydefinedandunderstoodbyintegratingthemwiththeirpropercounterpartswithinanyspecificdomain,andlikewiseintegratingspecificdomainsunderhigher-orderconceptsorprinciples,whilealsointegratingspecificconceptswiththeirinstances.Hegel’smoderatesemanticholismrestsonwhatmaybecalledhis“codeterminationthesis”.3.1Hegel’scodeterminationthesisisanimportantsemanticandcognitiveinsight,whichHegelgainedbyreconsideringKant’stheoryofcognitivejudgmentandwhatitrevealsabouttheinterdependenceofcategorical,hypothetical,anddisjunctivejudgments.HegelregardedKant’saccountoftheTableofJudgmentsasinadequate,thoughextremelyinstructiveTheNetherlands:Riedel,1984),pp.41–54;andJohnBurbidge,RealProcess:HowLogicandChemistryCombineinHegel’sPhilosophyofNature(Toronto:Univer-sityofTorontoPress,1996).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject299(§171Z).Kantnotedthataproperdisjunctivejudgmentdividesupthewholeofaspecificrange(“sphere”)ofpredicatesrelevanttoaparticu-larpossiblecognition.48Denyingonepredicateoftherelevantkindofsubjectentailsthatanotherpredicatewithinthatrangemustbetrueofthatsubject.Conversely,affirmingapredicateofarelevantsubjectistantamounttodenyingofthatsubjecttheotherpredicateswithinthatrange.Hegelrecognizedthatsingularcategoricaljudgmentsandhypotheticaljudgmentsbothpresupposedisjunctivejudgments.Hypo-theticaljudgmentsrequiredisjunctivejudgmentsbecauseestablishinganyjudgmentoftheform,“IfAthenB”,requiresjudgingthatnorel-evantalternativetoBeitherfollowsorresultsfromA.SuchconjoinedhypotheticalanddisjunctivejudgmentsarecentraltoKant’sAnalogiesofExperience,becausecausaljudgmentsarediscriminatory:Identifyinganyonecausalrelationrequiresdistinguishingitfromitscausallypossi-blealternatives.49Hencethecategoricaljudgmentsrequiredtoidentifyobjectsoreventsinsyntheticjudgmentsaprioriaboutthem–judgmentsrequiredforustobeself-conscious–alsorequiredisjunctivejudgmentswherebywediscriminateanyoneobjectfromotherobjectsandotherkindsofobjects.Becausesuchdisjunctivejudgmentsrequireagraspofthewholeoftherelevantrangeofalternativeswithinaclassor“sphere”,singularcognitivejudgmentsaboutobjectsarepossibleonlyonthebasisof(locally)holisticjudgmentsabouttherelevantclassofobjectsandpredicates,thatis,abouttherelevantalternatives.Thisrequires(withinany“sphere”)acompletesetofmutuallyexclusivecategories,atleastsomeofwhichareinfactinstantiated.Suchasetofcategoriesdifferssignificantlyfromacompletesetoflogicallypossiblecategories,suchasthetraditional“sumofallpossibility”,ortakenasinstantiated,thetraditionalensrealisimum–thetopicsofKant’sIdealofPureReason(KdrV,A571/B599f.).(Isitlogicallypossiblethatwecouldperceivemorecoloursthanarefoundinthestandardspectrumofvisiblelight?Whowould“we”beifwecould?Whatgenuinesensecouldananswertoeitherquestionhave?)Hegel’spointisthreefold:Hypotheticalandcat-egoricaljudgmentsarecodetermined,theycanbecodeterminedonlywithinacompletesetor“sphere”ofcontrastingpredicates(requiring48A73–74/B98–99.ForbrilliantdiscussionofKant’sTableofJudgments,seeMichaelWolff,DieVollstandigkeitderkantischenUrteilstafel¨.(FrankfurtamMain:Klostermann,1995);“ErwiderungaufdieEinwandevonAnsgarBeckermannund¨UlrichNortmann”,ZeitschriftfurphilosophischeForschung¨,52(1998),pp.435–459;and“NachtragzumeinerKontroversmitUlrichNortmann”,Zeischriftfur¨philosophischeForschung,54(2000),pp.86–94.49OnthejointroleofsuchjudgmentsinKant’sAnalogies,seeWestphalKant’sTranscendentalProofofRealism(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),pp.146–157.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n300kennethr.westphaldisjunctivejudgments)andtheycanbecodeterminedonlyinconnec-tionwithextantthingsandevents.ThisisHegel’s“CodeterminationThesis”.503.2If“semantics”isphilosophicaltheoryofconceptualcontentandcog-nitiveorlinguisticreference,then“metaphysics”,asthestudyofour“diamond[conceptual]net”withwhichHegelidentifieshisLogic,isfundamentallysemantic.Hegel’sphilosophicalanalysesofissuesinphilosophyofnatureexhibitgreatsensitivitytotheontologicalimpli-cationsofconceptualcontentandtotheimportanceoftheontologicalinterpretationofmetaphysicalandscientificprinciples(above,§2).Thismaysoundanachronistic,butisnot:Kant’ssemanticsarefarricherandmoresophisticatedthanhasgenerallybeenrecognized51andHegeladoptedthecorepointsofKant’ssemantics.ThusIagreewithPirminStekeler-WeithoferthatHegel’sLogicisfundamentallyacriticaltheoryofmeaning.52Ifthisissurprising,thisisonlyduetothepre-Kantian,Cartesiancharacterofsomuchrecentphilosophy(andtheneglectofsemanticsandepistemologybymostofHegel’sexpositors).53Kantwas50ThiswayofmakingHegel’spointdecouplesitfromintellectualintuitionandthussuggestshowHegelcouldretainthisviewinhismaturephilosophywithoutrelyingonanykindofintuitionism.OnHegel’scodeterminationthesisandhisrejectionofintuitionism,seeWestphal,“Kant,Hegel,andtheFateof‘the’IntuitiveIntellect”,inTheReceptionofKant’sCriticalPhilosophy:Fichte,Schelling,andHegel,ed.byS.Sedgwick(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),pp.283–305and“IntelligenzandtheInterpretationofHegel’sIdealism”.51SeeRobertHanna,KantandtheFoundationsofAnalyticPhilosophy(Oxford:ClarendonPress,2001)andWestphal,Kant’sTranscendentalProofofRealism.52PirimStekeler-Weithofer’ssemanticinterpretationofHegel’sLogicdovetailsper-fectlywithHegel’stranscendental-pragmaticepistemology.SeehisHegelsAna-lytischePhilosophie.DieWissenschaftderLogikalskritischeTheoriederBedeu-tung(Paderborn:Schoningh,¨1992).Onthis,seeWestphal,Hegel’sEpistemology:APhilosophicalIntroductiontothePhenomenologyofSpirit,(Cambridge,MA,Hackett,2003);“Hegel’sManifoldResponsetoScepticisminthePhenomenol-ogyofSpirit”,ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,103(2003),pp.149–178;“CanPragmaticRealistsArgueTranscendentally?”inPragmaticNaturalismandRealism,ed.byJ.Shook(Buffalo,NY:Prometheus),pp.151–175;and“HegelandRealism”,inACompaniontoPragmatism,ed.byJ.MargolisandJ.Shook(Oxford:Blackwell2006),pp.177–183.ThisisastrongconsiderationinfavorofStekeler-Weithofer’sinterpretation.TheexcellentconspectusofHegel’sLogicbyBurbidgecorroboratesthesepoints.SeeBurbidge,“Hegel’sLogic”,inHandbookoftheHis-toryofLogiced.byD.M.GabbayandJ.Woods(Amsterdam,Elsevier),vol.3,pp.131–175.53ThemisfortunehereliesinfailingtoappreciatethatsemanticandepistemologicalconsiderationscanbeputtosoundhermeneuticaluseinunderstandingHegel’sDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:38WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject301thefirstgreatanti-Cartesianinphilosophy,andHegellearnedKant’slessonswell.54TheDenkbestimmungenanalysedinHegel’sLogicandPhilosophyofNatureare,Hegelargues,fundamentalstructuresoftheextantworlditself(DenkbestimmungendesSeins).55OneofthemostimportantDenkbestimmungen,Hegelargues,is“force”,especiallyasintroducedandjustifiedbyNewton.Hegelalreadyunderstoodthecen-tralroleofnaturalscientificinvestigation,ontheonehand,andconcep-tualandsemanticanalysisontheother,fordeterminingwhetherandtowhatextentallegedDenkbestimmungenareindeedgenuinestructuresofnature.Hegel’scognitivesemanticsisequallyfundamentalbothtohisLogicandtohisPhilosophyofNature.OnlybypursuingbothoftheseinvestigationstogethercanweidentifyDenkbestimmungenthatareindeedbasicstructuresofwhatis[desSeins]andinparticularofnature.56iv.centralsystematicaimsofhegel’sphilosophyofnatureHegel’sleadquestioninthePhilosophyofNatureissimpletostate,thoughpuzzlingtounderstand:“Whatisnature?”57Isthisaphilosoph-icalquestion?Why?TheModerncorpuscularanswer,thatnatureisnothingbutbodiesinmotion,onlygeneratesmorequestions:Whatbod-iesandwhatkindsofbodies?Whatmotionsandwhatkindsofmotions?What,exactly,isruledout–andruledin–bytheclause,“nothingbut”?Yettheseventeenth-centurymaterialistviewofnaturehasprovenamazinglydurableamongphilosophers,evenmanywhoprofessamarkedinterestinphilosophyofscience,orwhoproclaimthatphiloso-phyisnothingbutanextensionoforappendagetonaturalscience.58Thephilosophy,especiallyinviewofhisexplicitepistemologicalandalsosemanticconcerns.54SeeWestphal,“ConsciousnessanditsTranscendentalConditions:Kant’sAnti-CartesianRevolt,”inAHistoryofConsciousness,ed.byS.Heinamaa,V.¨Lahteenm¨akiandP.Remes(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Springer,¨2007),pp.223–243.55Enz.,§24Z;Hegel,(1808),§164;Hegel,(1986),p.158.56WL,I,GW,21:11–12,Hegel,2001,pp.153.584–593,155.644–659;seeWestphal,Hegel,HumeunddieIdentitatwahrnembarerDinge¨(FrankfurtamMain:Kloster-mann,1998),chapter10,and“IntelligenzandtheInterpretationofHegel’sIdeal-ism,”esp.§§4,6.57Enz.,II,Introduction;MM,9:12;Hegel,1970c,p.3.58Westphal,“ScienceandthePhilosophers”,inScience:AChallengetoPhilosophy?,ed.byH.Koskinen,S.Pihlstrom,andR.Vilkko,ScandinavianUniversityStudies¨intheHumanitiesandSocialSciences(FrankfurtamMain:Lang,2006),vol.27,pp.125–152.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:39WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n302kennethr.westphalcorpuscularanswerechosthroughoutthenarrowlyreductionistconcep-tionsof“naturalism”thatisprevalentincontemporaryphilosophy.59Themind–bodyproblemisunknowntotheGreeksandMediaevals.60Inaworldcomprisingvariouskindsofenmatteredforms,wherethebehaviourofeachparticularisafunctionofitsAristotelianessenceorsoul,andwhereeachcastsoffitsperceptual“species”(literally“shapes”)bywhichwecangraspitsessence,thenow-obviousmind-bodyproblemwasprofoundlyunfamiliar.Onekeysourceofitsdevel-opmentwasthenewlyquantifiedscienceofnature:physics.Centraltoscientificinvestigationofnaturalphenomena,whetherterrestrialorcelestial,arethesize,shape,location,motion,number,andmaterialconstitutionofobjects.These“primary”qualitieswereregardedastheonlyfundamentalor“real”qualitiesofbodies.Alltheothersqualitiesthatmakelifesocolourful,tasty,anddelightfularethus“secondary”qualities,derivativefromtheeffectsoftheprimaryqualitiesofbodiesonoursensoryreceptors.Withthemechanizationofnatureinevitablycamethemechanizationofthehumanbody.Descartes’innovationwasnotthemind,itwasthebodyasmachina:ittooisexhaustivelydescrib-ableinpurelyquantitativeterms,henceittooisopentopurelysci-entific,mechanicalexplanation.Thusevenoursensoryorganscannotthemselvesbequalifiedbythe“secondary”qualities–colours,odours,tastes,orauditorytones–weexperiencesoabundantly.ThisisthekeyshiftawayfromAristotelianandMediaevalnotionsofthehumanbody.Sincewedoexperiencesuchqualities,theymust“besomewhere”orin-herein“something”;sinceweexperiencethem,theymustinhereinourminds.Thislineofreasoninggavestrongimpetusforregardingsensedqualitiesas“modes”ofthemind,causedbyphysicalobjectsinoursur-roundingsandtransmittedtousmechanicallyviaourbodiesandsensoryphysiology.Fromhereitwasbutashortstep,orratherashortleaptorepresentationalisttheoriesofperception,accordingtowhichallweare“directly”awareofareourmentalrepresentationsor“ideas”,whicharecausedbyobjectsinoursurroundings,andwhich(infavourablecir-cumstances)enableustoperceiveobjectsinoursurroundings.Yetif“mind”consistssolelyinnonextended,active,thinkingsubstance,andif“body”consistssolelyinnonthinking,inert,extendedsubstance,how59SeetheexcellentdiscussioninJosephRouse,HowScientificPracticesMatter(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2002).60SeeWallaceMatson,“WhyIsn’ttheMind-BodyProblemAncient?”inMind,Mat-ter,andMethod,ed.byP.FeyerabendandG.Maxwell(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1966),pp.92–102andPeterKing,“WhyIsn’ttheMind-BodyProblemMediaeval?”inFormingtheMind:ConceptionsofBodyandSoulinLateMedievalandEarlyModernPhilosophy,ed.byA.H.LagerlundandO.Pluta,(Berlin:Springer,2007),pp.187–205.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:39WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject303canmindandbodyinteract?Ifallwearedirectlyawareofisourmentalrepresentations,howcanweknowanythingaboutoursurroundings?Canwedeterminewhetherweknowanythingaboutoursurroundings?IfCopernicus,asitwere,dislodgedtheearthfromthecentreofouruni-verse,Galileo’sdistinctionbetween“primary”and“secondary”quali-tiesultimatelydislodgedusfromournaturalsurroundings,fromwhathadbeenthoughtandprofoundlybelievedtobeournaturalhomeandhabitat.TheCartesianpredicamentofmodernepistemologyisborneofprofoundalienationfromnature,notonlyfromourphysicalandbiolog-icalenvironment,butalsofromourownphysiologicalembodiment.Philosophybecame“Modern”withaprofoundlychangedworldview,aviewoftheworldtowhichquantitativenaturalsciencewasfunda-mental.YetifthismodernworldviewdispenseswithAristotelianformsandperceptualspecies,oneofKant’scentralquestionslooms:Howisnatural-scientific,orevencommonsenseknowledgeoftheworldpossi-ble?61Sinceitisactual,itmustbepossible–buthow?Hegel’stranscen-dentalproofsofmentalcontentexternalismshowthatwehavesomeempiricalknowledge,ifwe’reself-consciousenougheventowonderaboutwhetherwedo.62Yetknowingthatwehaveatleastsomeempiri-calknowledgeofnaturearoundusdoesn’tatalltellushowextensiveisourknowledgeofnature,orhowextensiveitcanbe.Partoftheanswertothebroadquestionofhowempiricalknowledgeispossiblebelongstoepistemologyandcognitivepsychology,whichHegeltreatedaccord-ingly.63Butgeneralepistemologydoesnotanswerquestionsaboutthecharacterandpossibilityofspecificallynatural-scientificknowledge.Answeringthesequestionsrequires,interalia,examiningspecificsci-entificconcepts,principlesofreasoning,methodsandtheiractualuseinobservationalandexperimentalscience.HegelexamineskeyconceptsandprinciplesofreasoningcentraltonaturalscienceinhisLogic,includ-ingcausaldispositionsandlaws,andthecoreprinciplesofmechanical,chemicalandbiologicalexplanation.Here-examinestheseconceptsand61KdrV,B20,Prolegomenon,§§15,23,24.62SeeWestphal,“Kant,Hegel,andtheTranscendentalMaterialConditionsofPos-sibleExperience”,BulletinoftheHegelSocietyofGreatBritain,33(1998),pp.23–41;“OnHegel’sEarlyCritiqueofKant’sMetaphysicalFoundationsofNaturalScience”,inHoulgate,Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature,pp.137–166;and“MusttheTranscendentalConditionsforthePossibilityofExperiencebeIdeal?”inEreditaKantiane(1804–2004)`:questioniemergentieproblemiirrisolti,ed.byC.Ferrini(Naples:Bibliopolis,2004),pp.107–126.63OnHegel’scognitivepsychology,seeHegel,1994;WilliamdeVries,Hegel’sTheoryofMentalActivity(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1988);andWestphal,“HegelandRealism”,inACompaniontoPragmatism,ed.byJ.MargolisandJ.Shook(Oxford:Blackwell,2006),pp.177–183.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:39WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n304kennethr.westphalprinciplesinconnectionwiththeoriesandexamplesdrawnfromnaturalsciencethroughouthisPhilosophyofNature.64OnereasonforHegelsodoingistoshowthattheconceptsandprin-ciplesanalysedinhisLogicareinfactinstantiatedinnatureandarereflected(ifoftenonlyobliquely)innaturalscientificknowledge(§246Anm.).Asecondreasonforhissodoingistoshowthattheconcepts,principlesandformsofclassificationandexplanationusedinnaturalscienceinfactcapturegenuinefeaturesofnatureandsoarenotmerelyconventionalexpressionsconvenientfornoncognitivereasonsorpur-poses(§§229Anm.,246Z,367Z).65Athirdaiminhissodoingistoshowthegreatextenttowhichtheworld,nature,isknowable.Hegelunder-takesthisexaminationinordertojustifyhisrationalistaspirationtoshowthatallthefundamentalfeaturesoftheworldareknowableandareknowablebyus–evenifphilosophyonlymakesalimitedcontribu-tiontothisknowledge(§270Z).Howmustwereconceiveourmindsandcognitioninordertounder-standthenewphenomenonofnaturalscienceandthenewknowledgeofnatureitprovides?OnestrategyforavoidingDescartes’dualismwastoconsiderwhethermattermightnothavethepower,ifproperlyconfig-ured,tothink.Perhapsmaterialismdoesnotrequireeliminatingmen-talphenomena,evenifitbanishes“themind”asadistinctkindofsubstance.66Kantdeployedanotherstrategy:Ratherthanaskingwhatthemindismadeof,askwhatitdoes.Whatareourkeycognitivefunctions,andhowcanordotheyprovideusgenuineempiricalknowl-edge?Kant’sanswerstothesequestionsareultimatelyfunctionalist.67However,Kantrefusedtodevelophisfunctionalistinsightsexplicitlyandinsistedonadualistaccountofbiologicalphenomena.68Kantinsis-tentlyarguedthatprinciplesinvolvingpurposesofanykindcanhaveonlyaheuristic,regulativeroleinnaturalscience(CritiqueofJudgment§§74,75).SchellingdispensedwithKant’sCriticalrestrictionsonthe64ThecentralityofscientificexperimentstoHegel’sphilosophyofnatureisestab-lishedbyEmmanuelRenault,Hegel:lanaturalisationdeladialectique(Paris:Vrin,2001),pp.159–290.65SeeWestphal,“IntelligenzandtheInterpretationofHegel’sIdealism”.66SeeJohnYolton,ThinkingMatter:MaterialisminEighteenth-CenturyBritain(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1983).67SeeR.Meerbote,“Kant’sFunctionalism”,inHistoricalFoundationsofCogni-tiveScience,ed.byJ.-C.Smith(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,1990),pp.161–187;PatriciaKitcher,“Kant’sDedicatedCognitivistSystem”,inHistoricalFoundationsofCognitiveScience,ed.byJ.-C.Smith(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,1990),pp.189–206;andAndrewBrook,KantandtheMind(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994).68Kant,Foundations,4:544.7–19,CritiqueofJudgment§§61,66,64,73,80,81.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:39WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject305useofteleologicalprinciplesandboldlyascribedintrinsicpurposestobiologicalorganisms.Hissodoinggavecrucialimpetustothedevelop-mentofbiologicalscienceintheeighteenthcentury,69thoughSchellingcanhardlybecreditedwithanycarefulanalysisoffunctionalistandtele-ologicalprinciplesofexplanation,orthebasisfortheirlegitimate(justi-fiable)ascriptiontovariousorganisms.Hegeldidso,andcarefullyartic-ulatedsomekeywaysinwhichteleologicalorganizationinvolvingcon-sciouspurposesrequiresandcanonlybuilduponthemorebasicleveloffunctionalorganizationinvolvedin,forexample,biologicalorganisms.70Hegel’sanalysisofthedistinctionsbetween(merely)functionalandteleologicalprinciplesoforganizationisonestageofabroadandambi-tiousprogram:Hegelsoughttoavoidbothsubstancedualismandelim-inativereductionismbydevelopingasophisticatedandsubtleemer-gentism.71Longderidedbyreductionistphilosophers,emergentismhasrecentlyregainedphilosophicalcredibilityamonganalyticalphiloso-phersbothinphilosophyofbiologyandinphilosophyofmind.7269SeeRobertJ.Richards,TheRomanticConceptionofLife.ScienceandPhilosophyintheAgeofGoethe(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2002).70SeeWilliamDeVries,Hegel’sTheoryofMentalActivity.71TosaythatHegelisanemergentististorejectstronglyholisticinterpretationsofHegel’sviews,accordingtowhich“thewhole”hasontologicalpriorityoveritspartsanddeterminestheircharacteristics,oratleast,moresothanviceversa.Hegel’sholismismoderatebecauseheinsists,interalia,thatany“substance”andits“accidents”arethoroughlymutuallyinterdependentfortheirexistenceandcharacteristics(Westphal,Hegel’sEpistemologicalRealism,pp.141–145;Hegel,2003a,§§32,34).Hegelinvertsphilosophicaltraditionbyinsistingthatthereisnothingmoretoany“substance”thanthetotalityofits“accidents”(Hegel,1810/11,§§62,63,68,/Hegel,1968,pp.87–88;WL,I,GW,11:394.33–35;GW,395.3–5;GW,395.39–396.26;Enz.,§151),aviewHegeldevelopedby1805andwhichhedeploysbothinsocialontologyandontologyofnature.AsH.S.Harrisnotes,Hegel’smoderateholismputspaidto“totalitarianinterpretationsofHegel’sphilosophy.”SeehisHegel’sDevelopment:NightThoughts(Jena1801–1806).(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1983),pp.364–365.367–368,370.OnHegel’sapproachtobiology,seeEngelhardt,“DiebiologischenWissenschafteninHegelsNaturphilos-phie”,inHegelsPhilosophiederNatur,ed.byM.J.PetryandR.P.Horstmann,(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,1986),pp.121–137;D.Dahlstrom,“Hegel’sAppropriationofKant’sAccountofTeleologyinNature”,inHoulgate,HegelandthePhilosophyofNature,pp.167–188;andErrol.Harris,“HowFinalIsHegel’sRejectionofEvolution?”inHoulgate,pp.189–208.72SeeHerbertSimon,“TheArchitectureofComplexity”,ProceedingsoftheAmer-icanPhilosophicalSociety,106(1962,pp.467–482;reprintedinidem.,TheSci-encesoftheArtificial(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,3rded.,1996),pp.183–216;Beckermann,Ansgar,HansFlohr,andJaegwonKim,eds.,EmergenceorReduc-tion?EssaysontheProspectsofNonreductivePhysicalism(Berlin:deGruyter1992);WilliamWimsatt,“TheOntologyofComplexSystems”,CanadianJournalofPhilosophy,20,supplementpp.207–274;andWilliamWimsatt,“EmergenceasDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:39WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n306kennethr.westphal“Emergence”referstopropertiesorbehaviourofacomplexsystemthatarenotsimpleaggregativefunctionsofthepropertiesorbehaviouroftheindividualpartsofthatsystem.Emergencethushighlightstheimportanceoftheorganizationofthepartswithinacomplexsystemtoenableortoproducepropertiesorbehaviourswhichmaybe“real-ized”(orinstantiated)invariousdifferentkindsofcomponentparts,orare“autonomous”fromthedynamicpropertiesoftheindividualcomponentpartsorwhichdisplayregularitiesthatare“anomalous”withrespecttoregularitiesexhibitedbythesystem’sindividualcompo-nentparts.Emergentismthusopposeseliminativereductionism,thoughnot(necessarily)materialism.73Therearevariouskindsandaspectsofemergentbehaviourofcomplexsystemsandtherearecomplexissuesaboutwhichofthesekindsareexhibitedinanyparticularcase.Theseimportantquestionscannotbeconsideredhere;hereitsufficestonotethatthecoreprinciplesofemergentismarephilosophicallylegitimateandthattheyhaveregainedphilosophicallegitimacyinlargepartbecausetheyaresoimportanttounderstandingsomanykindsofnaturalphenomena.OneofHegel’saimsinhisPhilosophyofNatureistosystematicallyorderourmostbasicontologicalandnatural-scientificconceptsandprinciples(§§246Z,247Z,249&Z),beginningwiththemostabstract,undifferentiatedanduniversal(spaceandtime,§§254–257),andwork-ingthroughafinelygrainedseriesofsteps(§249)towardsthemostcomplex,theorganiclifeofanimalspecies(§§367–376).ThethirdpartofHegel’sEncyclopaediathencontinuesthisseriesoflevels,nolongermerelyinnature,butinthehumanormoralsciences(“spirit”,Geist,§§377–387),fromanthropology(§388)throughcognition,actionandfree-domattheindividuallevel(§§445–482)andthenthroughsocial,moral,political,andlegalphilosophy(§§483–552)–treatedwithmuchgreaterdetailandsophisticationinHegel’sPhilosophyofRight–uptoabriefsketchof‘“absolutespirit”initsthreeforms,art,manifestreligionandphilosophy(§§553–577),topicstreatedinextensoinHegel’sBerlinlectures.WhydoesHegelundertakethisambitiousproject?Hegel’squestioncanbeputinaKantianformula:Allofthesenaturalandsocialphe-nomenaareactual.Howaretheypossibleandhowisourknowledgeofthempossible?Hegel’sphilosophicalcontributiontoansweringthisNon-AggregativityandtheBiasesofReductionisms”,FoundationsofScience,5,3(2000),pp.269–297.73Harris,NightThoughts,pp.238–298contendsthat,by1803/1804,Hegel’sphiloso-phyofnaturebecamematerialistandisproperlycharacterizedasakindofneutralmonism.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:39WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject307broadquestionistoidentify,clarifyandintegrate,asaccuratelyandthoroughlyaspossible,thespecificconceptsandprinciplesrequiredateachlevelandateachrelevantsublevel,inordertounderstandeachkindofphenomenonanditsproperspecies.Thisinvolvesidentifyingboththepreconditionsofeachkindofphenomenonandidentifyingwhatisuniqueandnewtoitvisavisprecedinglevels.Foreachbasis`level,Hegelseekstodeterminewhyitaloneaffordsthenecessarybasisforitsemergentsuccessorlevel.Foreachemergentlevel,Hegelseekstodeterminewhatisuniqueinit,andthroughasimilaranalysisofaseriesofsublevelswithinthatnewlevel,howitprovidesthenecessarybasisforenablinginturntheemergenceofitssuccessor(§252Z).Hegelinsiststhatthisconceptualsequenceofstagesandsubstagesdoesnotconcernthenaturaldevelopment(historicalgenesis)ofevermoresophisticatedorganizationalcomplexity(§249).Whatkindof“necessityoftheconcept”(§246&Anm.,cf.§249)guidesthisdevelopment?Hegel’sphrasemayappeartomeaneitheroftwothings,bothmisleading.Itmayseemthattherelevantnecessityliesinapreordainedrationalisttelosofacompletelyself-developingandself-explicatingsystem.Hegeldoeshavesomesuchtelosinview,butthenotionthatitisinanywaypreordainedreliesontransferringconsciouspurposesfromtheirproperdomain(humanbehaviour)toatranscendent,theisticdomainwhichatbestcanbenothingbutidlespeculation.IfthereisafirstruleofHegel’smetaphysics,itis:Positnotranscendententities.TheothernotionstemsfrompurelyaprioriinterpretationsofHegel’sLogicandEncyclopaedia,whichrequirethatHegel’slogicusessomespecialsuccessornotiontoformal-logicaldeduction.74Itmustbeasuccessornotion,becauseformal-logicaldeductiondoesnotpermitinferringthemorespecificfromthemoregeneral.DespitelongfavouramongHegel’sexpositors,IconfessthatIdonotyetunderstandwhatanysuchsuccessornotioncouldbe,despitemanyattemptsintheliterature.Fortunately,thereisanotheralternative.7574Anexcellent,highlyinformativepresentationofthiskindofinterpretationisHoul-gateAnIntroductiontoHegel:Freedom,TruthandHistory(London:Blackwell,2005),pp.106–180.IamindebtedtoStephenformanyyearsofdiscussionoftheseandrelatedissues,despiteourdivergenceonthiscentralpoint.75Anotherproblemwiththe“topdown”approach,beginningwithHegel’sLogicandexaminingitsinstantiationinnature(inEnz.,II),isthatthisapproachcannotavoidthechargeHegelhurledatSchellingof“schematizingformalism”.Hegelcanavoidthesinofschematizingformalismonlybyshowing,onthebasisofaninternalexaminationofnaturalphenomenafortheirownsake,thatthosephenomenaexhibitthekindsofconceptualstructuresandprinciplesarticulatedinHegel’sLogic.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:39WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n308kennethr.westphalKantunderstoodthe“deduction”ofaconceptorprincipleinalegalsense,ofshowingthatweareentitledtouseitingenuine,justifiablejudgments,whethercognitiveorpractical(CritiqueofPureReason,B117).ThoughHegel’sstrategyforjustifyingconceptsandprinciplesinhisPhilosophyofNatureisnottranscendental,itdoessharethisgeneralKantiansenseof“deduction”(§88).Hegelseekstodeterminetheextenttowhichandthewaysinwhichwearejustifiedinusingvariouscon-ceptsandprinciplesingenuinecognitionofnaturalphenomena.Thisisbuiltintohisemergentistagendaofshowingwhynothinglessthanacertainsetofconceptsandprinciplessufficestocomprehendnaturalphenomenaofacertainlevelofsystematiccomplexityandhowtheseconceptsandprinciplesprovidethenecessarybasisforunderstandingthesuccessorlevel.Theupperendpointortelosofthisseriesoflevelsisprovided,notbyantecedentdivinepreordination,butbythefactsofhumancognitionandaction,ontheonehand,andtheir–thatis,our–remarkableproductionsinthenaturalandsocialsciencesandmoregenerallyinsociety,history,art,religionandphilosophyontheother.CarefullydemarcatinginthePhilosophyofNaturethenaturalpreconditionsofthesehumanphenomenashowsinbroadoutlinehownaturemakesourhumanformofmindednesspossible,bothbypro-vidingforhumanlymindedindividualsandbyprovidingforhumanlycomprehensibleobjectsofknowledge(takenasawhole,nature)andahumanlymanipulablecontextofaction(nature).ThisisHegel’semer-gentiststrategyforavoidingboth(Cartesian)substancedualismandeliminativematerialism.ObviouslythereisarichhistoricalandmetaphysicalbackgroundtoHegel’semergentistand(moderately)holisticworldview.Itisimpor-tantbothtorecognizeandyetnottooverestimatethesignificanceofthatbackground.Hegelcertainlydoesseektoidentifyanddefendarichlysystematicorderlinessinnature,andindeedinallphenomena.InthiscontextitisimportanttorecallHegel’sstandardapproachtothegrandaspirationsoftheology.Hegelconsistentlyarguesthatthetheisticandmetaphysicalascriptionofsuchaspirationstoatranscen-dentcreatorwhotendstothem(God)isineverycaseahumanpro-jectionofhumanneedsontothefabricoftheuniverse.YetunlikeFeuerbach,Marx,orFreud,Hegelinterpretssuchprojectionsasreflect-ing,iffiguratively,genuineandlegitimatehumanaspirations.76Hegel76Westphal,Hegel’sEpistemologicalRealism,163–164;Harris,Hegel’sLadder,vol.1,pp.64,112,192–193,409–410,417–418;vol2,pp.125–130,252–253,344–346,367,448,533–534,537–540,678,681–682,691,738,746;FrancoChiereghin,“FreedomandThought:Stoicism,Skepticism,andUnhappyConsciousness”,inTheBlackwellGuidetoHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit,edby.K.R.WestphalDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:39WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nPhilosophizingaboutNature:Hegel’sPhilosophicalProject309seekstoshowthewaysinwhichandtheextenttowhichtheactualworld(natural,social,andhistorical)infactsatisfiestheseaspirations,toamuchgreaterextentthanistypicallyappreciated.77ThisispartofHegel’songoingefforttoovercomeourmodernalienationfromtheworld,includingourepistemologicalalienationwroughtbyDescartes’mechanicalandeliminativistaccountofthebody(cf.§246Z).Inthepresentcase,Hegelthinksthatthepre-Modern“greatchainofbeing”expressed,howevermetaphoricallyandinadequately,alegitimateaspi-rationandanticipated,howeverobliquely,acorrectidea:Naturedoesformasystematicallyorderedhierarchy(§246Z)withinwhichhumanbeingshaveaparticularandquitespecialplace:Throughourknowledgeoftheworld-whole,theworld-wholegainsknowledgeofitself.Weare,asitwere,thehomunculiinGeist.Inperformingthisrolewithintheworld-whole,wedeterminethroughaproperlyconceivedandexecutedphilosophyofnature–despitemodernformsofalienation,includingthecognitivealienationwroughtbyGallileo’sdistinctionbetweenprimaryandsecondaryqualitiesandbyDescartes’dualism–thatnatureisourproperenvironment,bothascognitiveandasactiveagents.78v.conclusionWhenconsideringtheaims,characterandmeritsofHegel’sPhilosophyofNature,itisimportanttoconsidercarefullyanobservationbyHenryHarris:ThebalanceofsocialinfluencehasshiftedsodrasticallybetweenHegel’stimeandours...fromthereligioustothescientificestablishment,thatHegel’sowncontributiontothisshifthasitselfbecomeanobstacletotherightunderstandingofwhathesaid.Hewantedtoswingreligiousconsciousnessintofullsupportof(Oxford:Blackwell,2009),chapter4;andGeorgediGiovanni,“Religion,History,andSpiritinHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit”,inTheBlackwellGuidetoHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit,chapter11.77SeeWestphal,“Hegel’sCritiqueofKant’sMoralWorldView”,PhilosophicalTop-ics,19(1991),pp.133–176.78SeeWestphal,“ScienceandthePhilosophers”,inScience:AChallengetoPhi-losophy?,ed.byH.Koskinen,S.Pihlstrom,andR.Vilkko,ScandinavianUni-¨versityStudiesintheHumanitiesandSocialSciences,vol.27(FrankfurtamMain:Lang,2006),pp.125–152(cf.forthcoming“IntelligenzandtheInterpre-tationofHegel’sIdealism”).HereIcontendthatHegel’sepistemologyprovidesanapproachtounderstandingnaturalscientificknowledgethatisfarsuperiortothoseofhispredecessors,includingKant,andtoHume’stwentieth-centuryempiricistheirs.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:39WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n310kennethr.westphalascientificinterpretationofhumanlife....Hisownchoiceoflanguagewascon-ditionedbytheChristianteaching,butalsobytheknowledgethattheChristiandoctrineofspiritwasderivedfromStoicsources.(Harris,1983,p.302)TheStoicswere,asHegelknew,thoroughgoingmaterialistsandnat-uralists.ThecommondisregardofHegel’sphilosophyofnature,espe-ciallyamongAnglophoneHegelscholars,leavestwocentralmembersofHegel’sphilosophicalsystem,LogicandPhilosophyofSpirit,precari-ouslyimbalancedbecausetheylacktheirthirdsupportingmember,Phi-losophyofNature.Thisneglectinevitablygeneratesseriousmisunder-standingsofHegel’sphilosophy,bothinpartandinwhole.Fortunately,recent,mainlyEuropean,researchhasbegunrectifyingthisneglect.CertainlyHegel’sPhilosophyofNaturehasgrand,ifnotgrandioseaspi-rations;Hegelhimselfwouldeagerlyandthoroughlyrevisemuchofitinviewofsubsequentdevelopmentsinthenaturalsciences.Neverthe-less,Hegel’sPhilosophyofNatureisalandmarkinthephilosophicalassessmentofnatureandthenaturalsciencesthatdeservescarefulcon-siderationtoday,foritscentralaimsandissues,foritsmethods,foritsstaggeringeruditionandforitsboldattempttomakephilosophicalsenseofnatureasawholewhilstappreciatingitsprofusediversity.7979Forhelpfulcommentsonpreviousdraftsofthischapter,IgratefullythankFredBeiser,Hans-ChristophSchmidtamBusch,andespeciallyCinziaFerrini.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:39WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.012CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nedwardc.halper12Hegel’sCriticismofNewtonFewscientists,orphilosophers,havepatienceforaprioriscience.Itiswidelysupposedthatmodernscienceowesitsprogresstosubjectinghypothesestoexperimentaltests,andthatnatureissimplytoointricateandsurprisingtodeterminewithoutempiricalinvestigation.Philoso-pherswhohavetriedtostudyissuesofsubstantialscientificdoctrineortheoryareregardedasembarrassments,andrecentphilosophersofsciencehavenarrowedtheirvisiontoscientificmethod.ProbablynophilosopherismoreembarrassingthanHegelbecausehecouplesapri-orisciencewithadialecticalmethodthatpurportstoderiveconceptsfromeachotherinwaysthatbearnoconnectionwitheitherexperi-enceormaterialprocesses.1Somecontemporaryscholarsemphasizetheempiricalelementsinhistext,hoping,perhaps,tomakehisphi-losophyofnaturemorepalatable2againstthelongtideofphilosophers1RecentinterestinHegel’sPhilosophyofNaturehasbeenspurredbyMichaelJ.Petry’sthree-volumetranslation,Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature(London:GeorgeAllenandUnwin,1970),alongwiththepublishedproceedingsofthreeconfer-enceshehelpedorganize:R.-P.HorstmannandM.J.Petry,eds.,HegelsPhilosophiederNatur:BeziehungenzwischenempirisherundspekulativerNaturerkenntnis(Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta,1986);M.J.Petry,ed.,HegelunddieNaturwissenschaften(Stuttgart:Frommann-Holzboog,1987);andM.J.Petry,ed.,HegelandNewtonian-ism(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:KluwerAcademicPublishers),1993.2See,forexample:J.W.Burbidge,“RealProcess,”inRealProcess:HowLogicandChemistryCombineinHegel’sPhilosophyofNature,TorontoStudiesinPhilos-ophy(Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,1996)andJ.W.Burbidge,“ChemismandChemistry,”TheOwlofMinerva,34(Fall/Winter2002–2003),pp.3–17.Foranassessment,seeS.Houlgate,(2002–2003)“LogicandNatureinHegel’sPhilosophy:AResponsetoJohnBurbidge,”TheOwlofMinerva,34(Fall/Winter2002–2003),pp.107–125,aswellastheotherarticlesinthisissueofTheOwlofMinerva.B.Falkenburg,“HowtoSavethePhenomena:MeaningandReferenceinHegel’sPhi-losophyofNature,”inHegelandthePhilosophyofNature,ed.byS.Houlgate,SUNYSeriesinHegelianStudies(Albany:SUNYPress,1998),pp.130–131,claimsthatHegel’sphilosophyofnatureisnotaprioribecauseit“presupposesthecon-ceptsofphenomenologicalnaturalkindswhicharesuggestedbyphysics”andaimstoorganizethem“intoanadequatephenomenologicalsystemofnaturalkinds.”311DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n312edwardc.halperwhoquicklydismisshisphilosophyofnature.Inmyview,thecurrentantipathytowardaprioriscienceismisplaced:manygreatscientificachievementscamefromthinkingthroughtheimplicationsofconceptsthroughso-calledthoughtexperimentsandothermodesofnonempiri-calor,atleast,notwhollyempiricalinference.3Bethatasitmay,myconcernhereisHegel’saccountofmechanicsand,inparticular,hiscrit-icismofNewtonianmechanics.IarguethatHegelnotonlydiscoveredacontradictioninNewtonor,rather,inNewtonplausiblyinterpreted,butproposedasolutionthatcarriedthedayinitstenorifnotinitssubstance.WhetherthesolutionwasacceptedbecauseofHegelisanhistoricalquestionthatIcannotaddresshere.Whatisinterestingforusishisargument.Butbeforewecanappreciateit,weneedtograspwhatT.R.Webb,“TheProblemofEmpiricalKnowledgeinHegel’sPhilosophyofNature,”HegelStudien,15(1980),p.184,arguesthatHegel’sphilosophyofnatureisneitherapriorinoraposterioribecauseittakesuptheresultsofempiricalresearchandgivestheman“absoluteform”bygraspingthemascontingentelementsofanecessarywhole.OneimportantjustificationforemphasizingtheempiricaldimensionofHegel’sPhilosophyofNatureishisfamousdeclarationofthe“impotenceofNature”eventocomprehend,letalonededuce,the“contingentproductsofNature.”SeeG.W.F.Hegel,Werke9.EnzyklopadiederPhilosophischenWissenschaftenimGrundrisse¨(1830).ZweiterTeil.DieNaturphilosopie.MitdenmundlichenZus¨atzen¨,ed.byE.MoldenhauerandK.M.Michel‘FrankfurtamMain:Suhrkamp,1970’,vol.9,pp.34–35andG.W.F.Hegel,Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature:BeingPartTwooftheEncyclopaediaofthePhilosophicalSciences(1830),trans.byA.V.Miller(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1970),p.23.Inmyview,Hegelbeginswithaconceptofnaturethathederivesfromhislogic(seeE.Halper,“TheLogicofHegel’sPhilosophyofNature:Nature,SpaceandTime,”inHegelandthePhilosophyofNature,ed.byS.Houlgate,SUNYSeriesinHegelianStudies(Albany:SUNYPress,1998),pp.29–49),andhederivesthesub-sequentcategoriesofNaturefromitdialectically.WhetherhisderivationssucceedandwhethertheentiretyofhisPhilosophyofNaturecanbesoderivedare,ofcourse,differentquestions.ResultsfromtheempiricalsciencesmustsurelyhavesuggestedtoHegelconceptualpathstoexplore,butthatdoesnotmakehisderivationsapos-teriorianymorethanmeasurementsofthesidesofrighttriangleswouldrenderaproofofthePythagoreantheoremaposteriori.ThathiscategoriesofnaturealignaswellastheydowithempiricalsciencesupportsHegel’sapproach.S.Houlgate,AnIntroductiontoHegel:Freedom,Truth,andHistory(Malden,MA:Blackwell,2005),p.143,seemstothinksthatsome,thoughnotall,ofHegeltreatmentofnatureisapriorievenifitwasinspiredbyempiricalevidence.3Unlikemostothers,S.Sambursky,“Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature,”inTheInter-actionBetweenScienceandPhilosophy,ed.byY.Elkana(AtlanticHighlands,NJ:HumanitiesPress,1974),pp.147,148–149,151,168–169,appreciatestheinsightsHegelarrivesatthroughhisaprioridialecticalmethod.HecreditsHegelwithrec-ognizingtheidentityofspaceandtime,rejectingabsolutespaceandtime,andthedualismofinertiaandgravity,allmovesthatanticipateEinstein;butherejectsHegel’smethodwhilepraisinghisresults.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton313isatissueandtosetasidebothcertainmisconceptionsaboutHegelandcertaintruths.Atstakeisnotmerelyaspecificprobleminmechanics,butalsophilosophy’srelationtoandroleinscience.SinceHegelthinksthatphilosophyproceedsbyfindingandovercomingcontradictions,hisclaimthatNewtonianmechanicsiscontradictorydoesnotimplythatitisworthless,aswemightsuppose;buthedoesthink,rightlyIargue,thathisaprioriscience,thePhilosophyofNature,advancesempiricalscience.iThe“PhilosophyofNature”isthesecondpartofHegel’sthreepartsystem;itfollowsthe“Logic”andisfollowedbythe“PhilosophyofSpirit.”4ItwaspartoftheEncyclopedia,thesummaryhandbookhewroteforhisstudents.Unlike“Logic”andportionsof“PhilosophyofSpirit,”Hegelneverproducedafullversionof“PhilosophyofNature.”Itscoreargumentisextremelycompressed.Hegelusedthistextasthebasisforlecturesthatelaboratedandillustratedtheargument,andthetextof“PhilosophyofNature”isusuallypublishedalongwithasyn-opsisoflecturenotestakenbyhisstudents.Herethenotesarelongerand,becausewehaveonlythebriefestoftexts,maybemoresignificantthanstudentnotesonotherportionsoftheEncyclopedia.54SinceallthreearepartsofHegel’sEncyclopedia,Ienclosethesetitlesinquotes,butIalsousethem,withoutquotes,torefermoregenerallytoportionsofHegel’ssystem.WhenthereferenceistoaspecificpassageofHegel’stext,Iitalicizethesetermsbecausethetextsarenowusuallypublishedseparatelyalongwithcompilationsofnoteshisstudentstookathislectures,“additions”(Zusatzen¨).(Seemytextandthenextfootnote.)Ontheotherhand,referencestothegeneralsubjectof,forexample,philosophyofnatureareinlowercase.Thus,“PhilosophyofNature”referstoHegel’streatmentofnatureintheEncyclopedia;PhilosophyofNaturerefersmoregenerallytothisportionofhissystem;PhilosophyofNaturereferstothebookpublishedunderthistitle;andphilosophyofnaturereferstothegeneralsubjecttreatedbyHegelandothers.Analogously,IusuallyusecapitalletterstorefertospecificHegeliancategoriesandlower-caseletterstoindicatemoregeneralconceptsorpredicativeusagesofthecategories.Thus,“Nature”referstooneofHegel’scategoriesand“nature”towhateverweusuallymeanbythephysicalworld–neitherwillgenerallyappearinquotes.ItisimpossibletomakethisdistinctioninGermanbecauseallnounsarecapitalized,andHegelhimself,inanycase,seemsnottodistinguishNaturefromnatureortomaketheanalogousdistinctions.5ThecriticaleditioncontainsonlyHegel’sowntext:G.W.F.Hegel,GesammelteWerke,ImAuftragderDeutschenForschungsgemeinschaft,vol.20,Enzyklopadie¨derphilosophischenWissenschaftenimGrundrisse(1830),ed.byW.BonsiepenandH.-C.Lucas(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1992).Hence,Ihavecitededitionsthatcontainthecompilationsofstudentnotes,“additions”(Zusatzen)¨.The“PhilosophyDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n314edwardc.halperThePhilosophyofNatureistheleastdiscussedportionofHegeland,possibly,themostdifficult.Ithasnothadagoodpress:notonlyisitsupposedtohavenoscientificvalue,butitisoftensaidtobefilledwitherrorsthatdemonstrateHegel’sscientificincompetence.SofarasIcantell,theseallegederrorsstemfromreaders’failuretoappreci-atehispeculiarusageandhisgoal.The“PhilosophyofNature”pur-portstobeadialecticalunfoldingofthecategoriesofnaturefromthemostabstract,SpaceandTime,tothemostconcrete,AnimalOrganism.Toputacomplicatedmattertoosimply,thedevelopmentoccursbyshowingtheexistenceofinnerprinciplesthatareprogressivelyricher.Whereasin“Mechanics,”thefirstofthethreesectionsof“Philoso-phyofNature,”Naturehasnoinnerprincipleofmotion,in“Physics”and“Organics,”thetwosubsequentsections,thesourcesofmotionareinternal.ItisclearthatwhenHegelspeaksof“Physics,”hehasinmindtheGreektermphusisand,inparticular,Aristotle’sunderstandingofphusisasaninternalprincipleofmotion(Physics,B.1.192b8–14).Impor-tantly,thisinternalprincipleaccountsforthemotionscharacteristicofaparticularnaturalkindaswellasforitsotheressentialattributes;thus,itisinrespectofitsnaturethatfirerises.Whereasin“Physics”Hegelconfineshimselftotheprimarysubstanceswithalimitedrangeofmotions–earth,air,fire,water,andinorganicderivativesofthemthathaveuniformparts–in“Organics”hefocusesonlivingbeings,substanceswithmultiple,complexpartsthatfunctiontogether.Thediscussionoftheformerincludesatreatmentofchemistry,asubjectthathadonlyrecentlyreceivedascientifictreatment.6Hegel’scriti-cismofNewtonismainlyinthefirstpartofthe“PhilosophyofNature:“Mechanics.”Beforeturningtothis,though,itiswelltosaysomethingaboutHegel’sphilosophicalpredecessors.PerhapsthemostimportantisofNature”portionappearsin:G.W.F.Hegel,Werke9.Enzyklopadie¨(TheothertwopartsoftheEncyclopediaappearinvolumes8and10ofthisedition.)ItisrenderedintoEnglishas:Hegel,G.W.F.Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature.Hegelnumbershisparagraphs,andhereIuseparagraphnumbersthatarenotfurtherspecifiedtoindicatehisparagraphs.Inhistext,anumberedparagraphbeginswithahighlycondensedargumentthatissometimesfollowedbyaremarkandusuallysupplementedwithlecturenotesontheparagraph.Idesignatehisremarkwithan“A”aftertheparagraphnumberandhisstudents’noteswitha“Z”aftertheparagraphnumber.6KantdoubtsthatChemistrycouldeverbemadescientific,I.Kant,PhilosophyofMaterialNature:TheCompleteTextsofProlegomenatoAnyFutureMetaphysicsThatWillbeAbletoComeForwardasScienceandMetaphysicalFoundationsofNaturalScience,trans.byJ.W.Ellington(Indianapolis:Hackett,1985),p.II.7.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton315Aristotlewhoseownscienceloomssurprisinglylargethroughmostofthe“PhilosophyofNature.”7ItisfromAristotlethatHegelmustgethisnotionthataninnerprinciplethatunifiescomplexdiversepartsthroughtheircommonfunctioningisahigherprinciplethanonethatunifiessimpleuniformparts(thetypeofprincipleatworkin“Physics”).AnditmustbeincontrastwithAristotle’sunderstandingoftheinnerprincipleofaphusisthatHegelconceivesof“Mechanics,”arealmforwhichthereisnoAristoteliananalogue,astherealmofexternalityandotherness.WhereasanAristotelianphusishas(oris)aninnersourceofmotion,thebodiesof“Mechanics”aremovedbyexternalsources,otherbodies.Whereasearth,fire,andotherAristoteliannaturesaredistinguishedbytheirqualities,bodiesdifferfromoneanotheronlyquantitatively,bysizeandposition.Thislattermeansthatthesciencethatstudiesbodiesandtheirmotions,mechanics,ismoreuniversalthanAristotelianphysics,butalsothatitis,thereby,moreabstractandundifferentiated.Hence,Hegelplaces“Mechanics”before“Physics”inhis“PhilosophyofNature”eventhough,inasmuchasitincludesmod-ernphysics,mechanicswasdevelopedmuchlater.ItisimportanttounderstandthatHegel’streatmentofmaterialbodiesinmotionistheprecursortohisdiscussionofAristoteliannatures.Hethinksthattheformercontainscontradictionsthatareresolvedinthelatter.Hegel’snotionsthatNewtonianphysicsisflawedandthatAris-totelianphysicsissuperiortoitastoundcontemporaryreaders.HisallegedscientificincompetenceissometimesascribedtohisAris-totelianism.8Inparticular,scholarshaveclaimedthatHegelmisun-derstandsinertialmotionasself-limitingbecausehemodelsitonAris-totelianmotion;thelatteralwayscomestoanendunlessitissustainedbyaperpetuallyactingcausesuchasanunmovedmover.Hegelhasalso7Forauseful,extendeddiscussionoftheAristotelianbackgroundofthePhiloso-phyofNature,seeA.Ferrarin,HegelandAristotle,ModernEuropeanPhilosophy(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),pp.210–234.Ferrarinconcludesthat“thecasefortheAristotelianismofHegel’sPhilosophyofNatureappearsstrong”(p.219).Thisiscertainlytrueofthelasttwopartsofthiswork.However,Aris-totelianisminfluencesthefirstpartoftheworkonlyindirectly,asIexplaininmytext.8W.R.,Shea,“Hegel’sCelestialMechanics”inHegelsPhilosophiederNatur,pp.34–36,accusesHegelofequatingmasswithweight,ashethinksAristotledid,intheremarkto§262andofendorsingAristotle’sdistinctionbetweencelestialandterrestrialmechanicsin§269Z.Ferrarin,HegelandAristotle,p.204,repeatsthelattercharge,asdoesHoulgate,Freedom,Truth,andHistory,p.154.Houlgatedoes,though,defendHegelagainstShea’schargethathedoesnotunderstandinertialmotion.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n316edwardc.halperbeenchargedwithretainingAristotle’sdistinctionbetweenterrestrialmotionandcelestialmotion.Inmyview,neitherchargeistrue,andHegel’smechanicsmightprovokefewerobjectionsifmorereadersunderstoodthedistinctionbetween“Mechanics”andsubsequentsec-tionsofthe“PhilosophyofNature”asthatbetweenthemotionsthatbelongtobodiesinsofarastheyaremerebodiesandthemotionsthatbelongtotheminsofarastheyarebodiesofaspecifictype,suchas,say,water,chargedparticles,orquarks.Hegelisarguingthatabstractandgeneralclaimsaboutbodiesdonotgiveusanadequateunderstandingofnature.Hedoessobyarguing,characteristically,thattheabstractandgeneralaccountbreaksdownandcollapses,asitwere,intoanaccountof“Physics.”Thus,HegeldoesnotpresupposeAristotelianphysicssomuchasargueforit.Toappreciatehistreatmentofmechanics,itisimportanttounderstandwhereheisgoing.Thequestionofthenatureoressenceofmatter,fundamentaltoAristotleyetsetasidebyNewton,alwayslurksinthebackgroundof“Mechanics”andwillbethecentralfactorinhiscriticismofNewton.AkeyrespectinwhichHegelalsofollowsAristotleisthenotionthatscientificknowledgedoesnotconsistofdiscoveringnewfactsbutindrawingconnectionsbetweenwhatisalreadyknown.Aristotleclaimsthatallscientificinquiryaimstofindthemiddletermofasyllogism(An.Po.,B.2.90a5–7);thistermis,paradigmatically,theessentialcharacterinrespectofwhichthethirdterm,anattribute,belongstothefirst,asubstance.Allthreetermswouldgenerallybeknownbeforeinquirycommences,aswouldthesyllogism’sconclusion.Whatisnewistheinsightintohowthetermsarelinked.SomescholarscontinuetoassumethatAristotleproposestodeducenewscientificresultsfromknownpremises,buthistextisreallyquiteclearthatscientificinquiryseeksthemiddletermand,thereby,thecauseofa“conclusion”thatisalreadyknown.Newscientificknowledgeisnotthesyllogism’sconclusion,butthe“aha”ofunderstandingaconnectionbetweentermsthatarealreadyapparent.Likewise,Hegel’sphilosophyofnaturedoesnotaimtoproducenewscientificresultsbuttodeducealreadyestablishedresultsbydialectical,aprioriargument.99Sambursky,“Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature,”p.150,holdsthatHegel“rejects,lock,stock,andbarrel,theNewtoniandynamics...includinggravitation,”andtherebyanticipatesEinstein’sgeneralrelativity(p.151).H.PaoluccithinksHegelantici-patedBohrin§271Z.Paolucci’sgeneralthesisisthatHegel’scriticismsofNewtonanticipatedthoseofmodernphysicistsandthathisreconstructionsanticipatedEinstein.Seehis“HegelandtheCelestialMechanicsofNewtonandEinstein,”inHegelandtheSciences,ed.byR.S.CohenandM.W.Wartofsky,vol.64,BostonStudiesinthePhilosophyofScience(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:D.Reidel,1984),DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton317AnotherofHegel’spredecessorswhoisalsocentraltothePhilosophyofNatureisKant.IntheMetaphysicalFoundationsofNaturalScienceKantaimstogiveanapriorideductionoftheprinciplesofNewtonianphysics.10Thebasicassumptionofhisargumentisthatanymaterialentitywould,insofarasitismovable,needtofallundereachofhisfourgroupsofcategories.Thus,abodywillhavesomequantity(possiblyzero)ofmotion,itwilloccupysomevolumeofspacewithsomequali-tativedegreeofintensity,itwillexertacausalforceonanotherorexistself-subsistently,anditwillbecapableofbeingexperiencedaspossibly,actuallyornecessarilymoving.Kantidentifiesthecapacityforeachofthesedeterminationsasadistincttypeofmatter.Accordingly,therearefourdifferenttypesofmatter.WiththisframeworkKantargues,strikingly,forNewton’slawofgravityandforhisthreelawsofmotion.Healsoarguesforthecompositionofmotionsbasedontheconserva-tionofmomentumandgiveshisownaccountofNewton’sbucket.IfKantisright,thebulkofNewtonianphysicscanbeknownapriori.11p.69.Thus,heseesHegel’sdialecticaltransformationofspaceintotimeasantici-patingRiemann–Einsteinianspace–time(p.74),hisdoctrineof“movingplace”asequivalenttothefield(p.77),andhisendorsementsofcircularmotionasanticipat-ingthecurvatureofspace(pp.75,80–81).BothSamburskyandPaolucciarerighttonotetheinterestinganticipations,butbothseeHegelasengagedinthesameenterpriseasphysicists.RelativityphysicsstemsfromthesameconcernsthatmotivateNewton,namely,todescribeandpredictthemovementsweexperience.IthinkHegel’s“PhilosophyofNature”aimsatsomethingdifferent.10TheextenttowhichKant’sphilosophyofnatureisaprioriis,ofcourse,ascon-troversialasclaimsaboutHegel’sphilosophyofnature.G.Buchdahl,“Hegel’sPhilosophyofNatureandtheStructureofScience,”inHegel,ed.byM.Inwood(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1984),p.127,contendsthatbothareconcernedtodemonstrate“intelligiblepossibilities”ratherthanaprioritruthsofnature.However,heacknowledgesthat“itisamatterofmoreandless,”andproposesthatHegel’sderivationofthelawoftheaccelerationoffallingbodies,though“notastrictlydeductiveaccount”(p.121),isa“searchforintelligibility”leadingto“conceptualexplication”(p.134).HisviewofHegel’sindebtednesstoKant(pp.118–127)is,accordingly,quitedifferentfrommine.11KantrejectsNewton’snotionofabsolutespaceand,consequently,absolutemotion.Interestingly,though,intheobservationthatconcludeshisfourthchapter,hedis-tinguishescircularmotionasactualandtruefromthemerelypossiblerectilin-earmotion,andhereferstothereciprocalmotionsoftwobodiesaccordingtoNewton’sthirdlawasnecessary.SeeKant,PhilosophyofMaterialNature,pp.II.128–131.Inthecasesofcircularandreciprocalmotions,themotionbelongstothebodiesratherthantosomethingexternal.MichaelFriedmancreativelyrecon-structsthewaysthatKantianprinciplesgroundsomeempiricalconstructionsofthePrincipia.SeeM.Friedman,“TheMetaphysicalFoundationsofNewtonianScience,”inKant’sPhilosophyofPhysicalScience:MetaphysischeAnfangsgrunde¨derNaturwissenschaft1786–1986,ed.byR.E.Butts(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:D.Reidel),1986,pp.25–60.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n318edwardc.halperWhereastheCritiqueofPureReasonusestheschemaofthecategoriestolayoutthetranscendentalconditionsfortheexistenceofobjectsofintuition,theMetaphysicalFoundationsofNaturalScienceusesthesameschematosetouttheaprioriconditionsforthepossibilityofmaterialobjects.12Theexistenceofmaterialbodiescannotbeprovenapriori;itmustbeascertainedempirically.Hence,Kantdistinguishestheaprioriknowledgepossiblefornaturalsciencefromthetypesofaprioriknowledgefoundinmetaphysicsandmathematics:whereasthelatterdependonlyonourfacultiesandthepureformstheygrasp,thepurepor-tionofnaturalsciencepresupposestheexistenceofmaterialbodies.13Evenifwecannotprovethattherearematerialbodiesand,thus,thatthereisanynaturetoknow,Kantarguesthatwecanknowwhatmustholdofmaterialbodiesiftheydoexistandthisincludes,besidestheNewtonianlaws,thatnaturemustbeknownthroughmathematicsandthatanymaterialobjectmusthavecertainmathematicallydescribedcharacters.Hegelisnottobeoutdone.Hisphilosophyofnatureextendsthescopeofwhatcanbeprovenapriori,andhewouldremoveallempiricalelementsfromthepuretreatmentofnature.ToKant’slistofaprioriscientifictruths,headdsanindependentproofofKepler’slaws,and,importantly,hederivesscientificcategoriesfromeachotherthroughdialecticalreasoningthathetakestobeintrinsictothefacultyhecalls“reason.”TheselatterderivationsallowHegeltoavoidKant’sconces-siontoexperience.Hegel’sissuewithKant,aswithNewton,isthatbothrelyonthefacultyof“understanding.”ThisisobviousinKant’scase,forhiscategoriesare“categoriesoftheunderstanding,”andacentralaimoftheCritiqueofPureReasonistorejectthedialecticthatthefacultyofreason,uncritiqued,mustgenerate.Asnoted,Kantderiveshisfourkindsofmatterfromhisfourgroupsofthesecategories.Hence,histreatmentofmatterisrootedinthefacultyofunderstanding.HegelseesasignofKant’srelianceonthisfacultyinthefactthathisdifferentkindsofmatterco-existwithoutbeingunified;forthefacultyofreasonissynthetic.1412Comparethefourpartsofsection3,chapter2ofTheCritiqueofPureReason,bookII,“AnalyticofPrinciples”withthefourchaptersoftheMetaphysicalFoundationofNaturalScience.13Kant,PhilosophyofMaterialNature,p.II.9.14Hegel’sdistinctionbetweenconceptsbelongingtothesetwofacultiesiselabo-ratedinhisearlyJaenerpiece,G.W.F.Hegel,“VerhaltnissdesSkepticismuszur¨Philosophie,DarstellungseinerverschiedenenModificationen,undVergleichungdesNeuestenmitdemAlten,”inJenaerKritischeSchriften,ed.byHartmutBuch-nerandOttoPoggeler,¨GesammelteWerke,imAuftragderDeutschenForschungs-gemeinschaft(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1986),pp.197–208.ThesamedistinctionDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton319ItisveryhelpfultounderstandKant’streatmentofmatter,becausethesamefoursensesofmatterappear,inthesamesequence,inHegel’saccount.Asusual,HegelisterseandassumessomeofKant’sargumentswithoutsettingthemoutorevenindicatinghissource.15WhatisnewisthatHegelderivesthemfromeachotherandseesthem,consequently,asaspectsofasingleconceptofmatter.TheproblemHegelhaswithKantisnotjusthishavingseparatematters,buthisabdicating,asitwere,theexplanatoryfunctionofphilosophyofnature;for,insofarasthesemattersaredistinct,thereisnoexplanationforwhyallfourmat-tersbelongtoasinglephysicalentitynor,indeed,isthereproperlyasingleentity.Ametaphysicsoftheunderstandingcanonlybeanalytic,whereasthefacultyofreasoncanbeexplanatorybecauseitissynthetic.iiHegelthinksthattheseparationoftypesofmatterswasalsoamistakeNewtonmade.16ItisattherootofthecriticismthatIwanttofocusonhere.HegelalsocriticizesNewton’sopticsonparallelgrounds:NewtonanalyzeswhitelightintolightsofdistinctcolorsthatareeachsimpleappearsinthePhilosophyofNature.Inthenotesonthesecondnumberedpara-graphofthePhilosophyofNature,§246Z,Hegeldistinguishesthephilosophyofnaturefromphysicsby“thekindofmetaphysicsusedbythemboth”(p.11).Hecriticizesthemetaphysicsusedbyphysicsontwogrounds:(1)itsUniversaldeter-minationis“abstractoronlyformal,”whereas,ontheotherside,(2)itsParticularcontentstandsoutsidetheUniversalandis,therefore,splinteredanddestroyed.Therecanbenodoubtthatheisdescribingametaphysicsoftheunderstandingbecauseitscontentsremaindistinctfromeachother.Incontrast,themetaphysicsusedbyPhilosophyofNaturesynthesizesthesecomponentsintoaunity.Lateronheidentifiesthemetaphysicsofempiricalscienceas“themetaphysicsoftheunderstanding,”§304Z,p.152.15Hegeldoes,however,discussKant’streatmentintheLogic,inalengthyremarkonAttractionandRepulsion,G.W.F.Hegel,Hegel’sScienceofLogic,trans.byA.Miller,MuirheadLibraryofPhilosophy(London:Allen&Unwin,1969),pp.178–184.16Newtonfamouslythoughtthatmathematicalprinciplescouldbereaddirectlyfromnaturewithoutmakinghypotheses.IntheScienceofLogic,p.273,Hegelobjectsthatmathematical(quantitative)manipulationscannotprovequalitativeclaimsaboutthephysicalworld.Paolucci,“HegelandtheCelestialMechanicsofNewtonandEinstein,”pp.67–68,thinksthatHegel’spointistodenythat“mathematicsofitself,ormathematicallyconductedexperiments,canleadtotrueknowledgeoftherealitiesofNature.Thedistinctionbetweengravitationalandinertia/massisimplicitinNewton’slaws:theminthesecondlawF=maisinertialmass;theminthelawofgravityF=GMm/r2isgravitationalmass,morecommonlycalled“weight.”Newtonarguesthatapendulumexperimentshowsthattheyareproportional.Recentmeasure-mentshaveshownthemtobeequaltoahighdegree.SeeP.M.Kluit,“InertialandDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n320edwardc.halperandindecomposable,whereasHegelclaimsthatcoloredlightsareeachcomplexandtransformableintodifferentcolors.17Heretoo,Newton’serrorliesinrelyingonthefacultyofunderstandingratherthanreason.Myconcerninthischapter,however,isconfinedtoHegel’scriticismofNewton’snotionofmatterandhismechanics.ThecriticismrequiresrecognizingNewton’sunstatedassumptions;but,thatsaid,itisbothstrikingandobvious–soobvious,indeed,thatareaderor,atanyrate,thisreaderfeelsitsrecognitionasablowtothehead.Thesimplestfor-mulationoftheproblemisthatNewton’sunderstandingofthecharacterofmatterinhisthreelawsofmotionisatoddswithhisunderstandingofmatterinhislawofgravity.Intheformer,matterispassiveinthesensethatitdoesnotcausemotionandis“onlywithdifficultyputoutofitsstateeitherofrestingormoving.”18Inthelatter,matterisactive,causingotherbodiestomovetowarditandacceleratingitselftowardotherbodies.Tobesure,Newtondoesnotmentionthenatureofmatterinhislawsandwithoutthisthereisnoexplicitcontradiction.How-ever,thereisgoodreasontothinkthatNewtondoesregardthelawsasexpressingfundamentalcharacteristicsofmatter.Letusconsidertheseclaimsinmoredetail.Newton’sfirstlaw,com-monlycalledthe“lawofinertia,”assertsthatmatterinmotionormatteratrestwouldremainsounless“compelledtochangeitsstatebyforcesimpressed,”thatis,unlessacteduponbyanoutsidebody.19Theimplicationisthatmatterdoesnotmoveitselforinterfere,positivelyornegatively,withanymotionthatithas,nomatterhowlargeorsmallthatmotionis.Likewise,settingabodyinmotiondoesnotincreaseordiminishitsmatter.Abody’smatteris“inert”inthesensethatitsquantityremainsunalteredbywhatevermotionitreceivesandinthesensethatthebodydoesnotdiminishorincreaseitsownmotion.WecanappreciatethisinertnessbycomparingitwithAristotle’sunder-standingofmatteraspotentialforaform.20Hismotionconsistsoftheactualizationofthispotential,andmotionceaseswhenthepotentialisfullyactualized.Sincematterisalwaysapotentialforaspecificform,notonlydoesthemotionceasewhentheformisrealized,but,exceptGravitationalMass:Newton,HegelandModernPhysics,”inHegelandNewtoni-anism,pp.229–230,whoarguesagainstachallengetotheequivalenceofthetwomatters.17Hegel’slengthydiscussionoftheOptiksiscontainedin§320A,Z.18Seedefinition3ofI.Newton,ThePrincipia;MathematicalPrinciplesofNaturalPhilosophy,trans.byI.B.CohenandA.M.Whitman(Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1999),p.404.19Newton,Principia,p.416.20Physics,1.9.192a27–32;3.1.201a29–b13.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton321forseveralimportantcases,thepotentialtoreceiveaformceasesoncethatformcomestobepresent.Whentheacornrealizesitspotential,itbecomesanactualoakanditlosesthepotentialtobecomeanoak.Matteris,insomesense,usedupor,atleast,radicallyalteredinthecourseofmotion.21Significantly,Newton’smatterdoesnotalterwhenitmoves,nordoesitaffectwhatevermotionitreceives.Itfollowsthatanymotionthatithaswouldhavecometoitfromanoutsidesource,andthereisnoobstacletoamatter’sreceivinganyquantityofmotionortoitscontinuingindefinitelyinmotion.Likewise,Newton’ssecondlaw,thatmatterisacceleratedinaccor-dancewiththeforceitreceives,dependsonthematter’snotitselfinter-feringwithaforcethatisimposedonit,againamarkofitspassivityandinertness.Theforcemovesthematterwithoutalteringitasmatter.Andthethirdlaw,thatactionequalsreaction,assertsthatwhenAactsonB,BactsonAwiththesameforceintheoppositedirection.Thisispossibleif,again,thematterthatisacteduponbyaforcefromAdoesnotalterinsofarasitismatter.Indeed,itisbecauseBisasmuchmatterasA,thatanimpactofAonBisalsoanimpactofBonA.Theidealmodelforthethreelawsconsistsofrigidlyhardballsthatremainunchangedbyimpactorbymotion.Measureddeviationsfromthelawsareexplainedeitherbyaball’sinteractionwithotherbodies,by21Aristotledefinesmotionastheactualityofapotentialquapotential(Physics,3.1.201a10–11),andheexplainsthattheactualityofthebuildableliesinthebuild-ing,“forwhenthehousewouldbe,thebuildablenolongeris”(201b11–12).L.A.Kosman,“Aristotle’sDefinitionofMotion,”Phronesis,14,(1969),p.57,speaksofthe“auto-subversive”and“tragic”dimensionofmotion:“Itswholepurposeandprojectisoneofself-destruction.”Kosmandistinguishestheactualitythatisthemotionfromtheactualitythatresultsfromthemotion;forexample,housebuildingfromthehousebuilt.Tobesure,Aristotlearguesthatmatterpersiststhroughchange(1.7.190a13–21).Soitmightbetemptingtoinsistthathismatteris,tothisextent,asinertasNewton’s.Infact,Aristotlealternatesbetween(a)speakingofmatterasthesubstratethatpersiststhroughtheacquisitionofaform(orofitsprivation)andas(b)acompositethatcontainsboththissubstrateandaprivation(oraform)incontrastwiththeform(orprivation)itbecomes.Inthelattersense,Aristotleaffirmsthatmatterdoescometobeandceasetobe(1.9.192a25–34).Anexam-pleofthislattermatteristheboardsandbricksthatarepotentiallythehousebecausetheycontaintheprivationoftheformofthehouse.Oncetheyreceivethehouseform,theynolongerhavethepotentialtolosethisform.Hence,thismatterisalteredwhenitlosesitspotentialtobecomeahouse,thoughtheynowhave.Furthermore,inordertoclaimthat(a)amaterialsubstratepersistseventhroughsubstantialchange,Aristotleproposesthatthematteristheseed(1.7.190b1–5).Buttheseedortheacorndoesnotpersistassuch;itisradicallyalteredastheorganismdevelops.Thus,again,Aristotle’smatterchangesasitspotentialisrealized.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n322edwardc.halperfriction,orbyalterationstotheinternalstructureoftheball’smatter–ontheassumptionthatthisstructureisitselfcomposedofrealbodies,whichdoconformtothelaw,couldwebutmeasurethem.Thatistosay,inmuchofourexperience,thecharacterofamatterdoesappeartoaffectthemotionithasorreceives;buttheeffectsareslight,andtheyareplausiblyexplainedanddiscounted.SuchcasesmakeclearthattheNewtoniannotionthatmatterisinertanddoesnotaffectmotionisanidealization.Itisaconsequenceofthisidealizationthateachmaterialbodythatmovesrequiressomeexternalsourceofmotion,and,consequently,theentireuniverserequiresanexternalagencyasthesourceofitsinitialmotion:hence,NewtonpositsGod.22Theconstantassumptionisthatmatteraltersonlywhenanoutsideforceis“impresseduponit.”Contrastthisnotionofmatterasinertwiththenotionofmatterthatisimplicitinthelawofgravity.Accordingtothislaw,everybitofmatterexertsaforceofattractiontowardeveryotherbitofmatter.Ourtendencynottofloatofftheearthandthelimiteddistancewecanjumpfromitremindusofourgravitationalattractiontotheearth,butearth’sgravityisnoticeableonlybecauseitissolarge.Conceptually,thereisnodifferencebetweenearth’sgravityandthegravitationalforceexertedbyanyotherbody.Experimentally,gravityismeasuredbycalculatinghowmuchacloseheavyobjectslowsdownanoscillatingball.Discussingthefirstlaw,Newtonalludestothegravityoftheearthasaforcethatcouldbeimpresseduponabodyandcauseittoalteritsmotion,23andduetoitssize,earth’sgravityisapttoseemlikeanoutsideforce.Butthisisnotexactlyright.Bothbodiesaremovingtowardeachotherbecauseoftheirmatter,anditisnomoretruethattheoneattractstheotherthanthateachmovesitselfbyitsownnaturetowardtheothermattereventheearth’smotionisimperceptible.Thepointisthatallmatterbyitsnaturefallsor,rather,propelsitselftowardothermatter.Gravityischaracteristicofallmatter,andassuchmatterdoesmoveitself.2422Newton.Principia,pp.940–943.23Ibid,p.416.24Ithasbeenproposedthatinformulatinghisnotionofgravitationalattraction,New-tondrewonhisstudyofalchemyandwasmotivatedbytheology.AccordingtoM.J.Osler,“MechanicalPhilosophy,”inScienceandReligion:AHistoricalIntro-duction,ed.byGaryB.Ferngren(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2003),pp.150–151,Newtonthoughtthat“gravitationresultsfromGod’sdirectactiononmatter.”(IowethisreferencetoJosephBracken.)ThisaccountabsolvesNewtonofthecontradictionHegelascribestohimevenwhileitimplicitlyacknowledgesthatgravitywouldconflictwithinertiaweregravity(asitisgenerallytaken)char-acteristicofmatter.Itimplies,moreover,thatthosewhorejectNewton’stheologyareleftwiththecontradiction.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton323What,then,arewetosay:ismatterinert,ordoesitmoveitself?Ismatterindependentofmotion,neitheralteringmotionnorbeingalteredbyit,ordoesmatterrathercauseabodytomoveitselftowardotherbodiesandthemtomovetowardit?Inshort,thenatureimplicitlyascribedtomatterbythethreelawsisatoddswiththenatureofmatterpresupposedbythelawofgravity.Scientistsareunlikelytobeconcernedbecausethecontradiction,ifthereisonehere,turnsonthenatureofmatteranddoesnotundermineor,indeed,evenaffectpredictionsaboutthemotionsofbodies.Letmeconsiderpredictionsfirstandturntothenatureofmatterlater.IntermsofthewaythatNewtonianphysicsisused,thelawofgravitydoesnotcomeintoconflictwiththeotherNewtonianlaws.Indeed,sofarfromcausingdifficulties,thetwoworknicelytogether.Weusethelawofgravitytodetermineonevectorcomponentofabody’smotionandthenaddvectorsforthemotionsthatthebodyhasinotherdirections.Theresultantisthebody’soverallpath.Thatistosay,wecalculateabody’smotionbytreatinggravityandinertiaasdistinctandindependentcomponents.Thereis,tobesure,along-standingquestioninNewtonianphysicswhetherthemassintheformulaofgravitationalattractionisequaltothemassinthesecondlaw,thatis,whether,gravitationalmassisequaltoinertialmass.Butthisistakentobeanempiricalquestionthatneedstoberesolvedwithprecisemeasurements,andthesehavesupportedahighdegreeofidentity.25Inshort,notonlydonoempiricalanomaliesresultfromNewton’sdistinguishingtwotypesofmatter,buthistreatingthemindependentlywasoneofhisoutstandingsuccesses.HowoddthatHegelwouldchoosemattertolaunchhiscritique!Hegel’sdiscussionsofNewton’slawshaveconvincedmanyreadersthathedoesnotunderstandthemandledthemtoconcludethathiscriticismstemsfromignorance.26Anumberofhisclaimslendcred-ibilitytothischarge.ItisjarringtoseeHegelrefertotwoopposing“forces”onabodyincircularmotion,centripetalandcentrifugalforces,andtoreadthattheoneforcedominatestheotheratdifferenttimeseventhoughtheoneshoulddestroytheother.Everyonefamiliarwithelementaryphysicsknowsthat“centrifugalforce”isafiction.Waterinapailswungoverone’sheaddoesnotfalloutbecauseittendstocontinuetravelinginthesamedirection,ateveryinstantthedirectionthatisthetangenttothecirculararcthepailmakes.Butthistendency25SeeFootnote16.26“AsfarasNewton’smechanicsareconcerned,Hegellacksthemostelementaryknowledge,probablyonaccountofhislackofmathematicalskillandthepre-ponderanceofhisstructureofnotionaldeterminations.”SeeF.H.vanLunteren,“HegelandGravitation,”inHegelsPhilosophiederNatur,p.53.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n324edwardc.halperismatter’sinertia,notaforce.Moreover,thecentripetalforcethatpullsthepailremainsconstant,asdoestheinertialtendencyofthewaterinthepail,contrarytowhatHegelseemstosay.ButHegel’sapparentmistakesstemfromoddlocutionsthat,inturn,derivefromNewton’s.27Itis,afterall,Newtonwhospeaksofthe“visinertia,”theforceofinertia,andidentifiesitwiththe“visinsita,”theforceinherentinbodies.28Newtonexplainsthat“abodyexertsthisforceonlyduringachangeofstatecausedbyanotherforceimpresseduponit,andthisexerciseofforceis,dependingontheviewpoint,bothresistanceandimpetus:resistanceinsofarasthebody,inordertomaintainitsstate,strivesagainsttheimpressedforce,andimpetusinsofarasthesamebody...endeavorstochangethestate[ofanotherbody].”29Thislastpartisawayofsayingthatthemovingbodythatimpactsanotherbodyandexertsaforceoveritmustitselfhaveitsowninner“force”thatmaintainsitinastateofmotionandresistsitsbeingaffected,inturn,bytheimpactedbody.Wenolongerspeakofforceasaninternalcharacterofabody,butitisclearwhatNewtonmeans.Whenonebodyimpactsanother,thefirstexertsaforceoverthesecond,aforcethat,weknowfromNewton’ssecondlaw,willacceleratethesecondbody.Likewise,theimpactedbodywill,atthemomentofimpact,exertaforceoverthefirstbodythatwill,inturn,accelerateordecelerateit.ThesecondlawisexpressedasF=ma,andweoftenthinkofforceasifitsomehowexistedabstractly.InNewton’suniverse,however,forcecanonlycomefromgravityorabodyinmotion;inthelattercase,itisthatbody’sbeinginmotion(relativetotheimpactedbody)thatallowsittoexerttheforce.Clearly,theamountofforceexertedheredependson27E.J.Dijksterhuis,TheMechanizationoftheWorldPicture,trans.byC.Dikshoorn(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1969),p.466,claimsthatNewtondoesnotthinkthatrectilinearmotionofapointwouldcontinuebutholdstheAristotelianviewthateverymotionrequiresamoverasitscauseandtheviewthatbodyisthatcause.ThisclaimisrepeatedbyI.BernardCohenin“AGuidetoNewton’sPrincipia”(p.98),inhislengthyintroductionto:Newton,Principia,p.98.Shea,“Hegel’sCelestialMechanics,”pp.37–39,claimsthatalthoughtheideaofmotionasproducedbysomeexternalforce“ledNewtontothePrincipia,”Newtonhimselfbegins“with‘force’asinherentforcecausingauniformmotion(F=mv).TheinherentforcerepresentedforNewtononeoftheuniversalpropertiesofmatter,notdisplacingextension,butstandingequallybesideittogetherwithhardnessandimpenetrability.”Hegelholdsthesameview,aswewillsee,but,oddly,SheaapparentlydoesnotthinkthisenoughtoabsolveHegelofthechargeofdeficientunderstandingofNewtonianphysics.28Seehisthirddefinition;Newton,Principia,pp.96–101.CohenclaimsthatwemustfollowNewtonanddistinguish“internal‘force’andexternalforces”(p.96).29Newton,Principia,pp.404–405.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton325howmuchmotiontheimpactingbodyhas.Hence,animpactingbodywillexertaforceinproportiontoitsmomentumor,moreprecisely,tothemomentumithasrelativetotheimpactedbody.Thequestionthenarisesastohoweitherbodycanexertforceontheotherwithoutitselfhavingaforcetoexert.Hence,itmakessenseforNewtontospeakoftheforcethatisinternaltoabodyandtoidentifythisforcethatresistschangewiththeforcethatenablesthebodytoimposechange.Fromallthis,itfollowsthattheforcethatinitiallybelongsinternallytotheimpactingbodyisexertedovertheimpactedbody,thatthisforceacceleratestheimpactedbody,thereby,augmentingtheimpactedbody’sowninternalforce.Tobesure,wenowtreatthissituationsimplyasaproblemofconservationofmomentumandignoreforce.Thatisfineforcomputations,butconceptuallyNewtonisright.Kantalsouses“force”todesignatetheinnerstateofabody,30andHegelfollowshim.31Shouldweconcludethatnoneofthethreeunderstoodmechanicsbecausetheirusageisoutoftunewithcurrentusage?Onceweseethatspeakingofabody’sinnerforceissimplyanotherwaytospeakaboutitsmomentum,someofHegel’sotherallegedmis-takesarerectifiedaswell.Abodythatisinanellipticalorbittravelswithvaryingvelocities,asKepler’ssecondlawasserts.Ifitsinnerforcedependsonitsvelocity,thenthatforcewillvarywithitspositioninorbit.Sincethisinnerforceexpressestheinertiaofthebody,itistheso-calledcentrifugalforce.32Itfollowsthattherelativevaluesofthecentripetaltocentrifugalforcesdovarythroughoutaplanet’sorbit,asHegelclaims.Inshort,Hegelisnotmakingtheegregious,elementarymistakesascribedtohim.WhatiscentraltohisaccountofNewtonisthatgravityandinertiaaredistinctandindependentfactorscontributingtoabody’soverallmotionandthattheymustbecombinedtocalculatetheoverallpathofaprojectile.ThereisanotherimportantrespectinwhichHegeldeviatesfromordi-naryscientificnotions,hisinterpretationofequations.Scientificlaws30“Inmechanics,theforceofamattersetinmotionisregardedaspresentinordertoimpartthismotiontoanothermatter,”Kant,PhilosophyofMaterialNature,p.II95.31“Themagnitudeofitsmotionisdeterminedbythesetwomoments:bymassandbythespecifictangentialmotionasvelocity.Ifthismagnitudeispositedassomethinginternal,itiswhatwecallforce”(§265Z,p.51).Shea,“Hegel’sCelestialMechanics,”pp.37–41,seesHegel’susageasrootedinambiguitiesinNewton,especiallyinthenotionofaninnerforce.HethinksthatHegel’sobjectionscouldhavestemmedfromtheseambiguities,butthattheyrepresented,instead,Hegel’sfailuretograspNewtonianphysics.32Newton,Principia,bookIII,prop.19,pp.822–823,usestheterm“centrifugalforce.”DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n326edwardc.halperare,ofcourse,typicallystatedinequations,andweusetheseequationstomakecalculationsandpredictions,withoutmuchreflectiononwhattheymean.Hegelreadstheselawswithmetaphysicalliteralness.Galileo’slawofgravitationalaccelerationattheearth’ssurface,forexample,assertsthatthedistancesabodyfallsisproportionaltothesquareofthetimeitfalls,traditionallyexpressedas:s=1/gt2.The2formulaindicatesthatvelocityofthefallingbodywillincreaseinpro-portiontothetimesothatitsvelocityattheendofatimeinterval,t,willbe2s/t,doubleitsaveragevelocityduringthetimeinterval,thatis,s/t.Equivalently,thechangeinvelocity,g,isconstant,andGalileo’slawissimplythelawofuniformacceleration.CloselyfollowingNewton,Hegelexplainsthatthelawexpressesan“acceleratingforceimpartingoneandthesameimpulseineachunitoftime,andaforceofinertiawhichperpetuatesthe(greater)velocityacquiredineachmomentoftime.”33Thatistosay,gravityisanouterforcethatcontinuallyaug-mentswhateverinnerinertialforcethebodyhasalreadyacquired.Thisreasoningreliesonthefacultyofunderstandingtodividetheforceonthebodyintotwoconstituents.WhileHegelacknowledgesthemath-ematicalachievement,healsoclaims,rightly,thatsofarfromprovinguniformacceleration,thelaw,rather,presupposesit.Thelawleavesopenthequestionofwhyabodyfallswithuniformacceleration.Heproposestoanswerthisquestionwithametaphysicalderivationthatusesthefacultyofreasontoderivethelawfromtheconceptofabody.Aswewillseeshortly,abodymovesitselftowardacenterofgravity.Inanymotion,thebodytraversessomespaceinsometime.ButinwhatHegelcallsthe“freemotion,”themotionthatderivesfromthenatureofthemovingbodyitself,therelationbetweenspaceandtimedependsmerelyontheirnatures.Hence,theproblemforHegelistodeterminehowthesetwodisparatenaturescanbeequatedsothatthespacetraversedisequaltothetimetraversed.Hegelthinksthatthenatureofspaceliesinitsotherness,itshavingonepartnexttooroutsideofanother(§254).This“self-otherness”isalsoaself-relation;spaceisself-relatedthroughitsownnature.Time,ontheotherhand,isnotself-related.Eachmomentoftimeexistsindependentlyofanyother;assuch,timeisaninstanceofHegel’slogicalcategoryof“being-for-self.”Hegel’sreasoningistoocomplextorepeathere,buthearguesthatthislattercategorycomestobeself-relatedandtheresultisanotherlogicalcategory,theone.34Mathematically,self-relationamountsto33§267A.Hegel,Werke9.Enzyklopadie¨,p.75.Hegel,Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature,p.57.HegelisnearlyquotingNewton,Principia,p.424.34Hegel,Hegel’sScienceofLogic,p.163.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton327beingraisedtothesecondpowerorbeingsquared.Sincespacecontainsself-relationwithinitselfasitsverynature,spaceis,initself,akindofsquare.Time,ontheotherhand,isnotself-relatedinitself;itisakindofrootthatbecomesonewhenitisself-related.Sinceabodythattraversesspacewillalsotraversetime,theamountofspacemustbesomehowequalorproportionaltotheamountoftime.Buttimemustbesquaredtobeequaltospacebecause,again,spaceisalreadyintrinsicallysquared.Hence,thespacetraversedbyabodyisproportionaltotimesquared.35Sounderstood,Galileo’sequationassertssomesortofmetaphysicalidentitybetweentwoentities:timeandspace.Whateverwemakeofitsvalue,thistypeofreasoningisboundtoraiseeyebrowsbecauseitdiscusseswhatwetypicallythinkofassim-plymathematicalquantitiesinmetaphysicalterms,andbecauseHegelthinksthathismetaphysicalderivationissuperiortomathematicalderivationsofthelaw.Itseemsunlikelythathecouldhavederivedthelawsolelyfromreasonbythinkingalongtheselines,andwecanwellaskwhatthistypeofspeculationcontributestoourgraspofthelaw.Ifgraspingthelawmeansmakingcalculations,thenthemetaphysicalderivationisunnecessaryandunhelpful.However,Hegeldoesaddressarealquestion:whydotimeandspacestandintheproportiontheyhaveintheformula?Nomerelymathematicalderivationofthelawcouldanswerthisquestion.WhateverourskepticismabouthowwellHegelsucceedsinansweringit,weshouldseethatthequestionisworthask-ing.Itisimportant,aswell,torealizethatametaphysicalderivationofthelawdoesnotundermineeitherthemathematicalderivationofitthroughthefacultyoftheunderstandingorthegraspofitsmeaningthatenablesustouseittomakepredictions.Hegelisnotdoingwhatwegenerallythinkofasscience:heisnotevaluatingtheaccuracyofalaw’spredictions.Heisdoingmetaphysics.HegelapproachesNewton’slawsinmuchthesameway.Hisconcernisneitherthesciencenorthemathematics.What,then,ishisobjection?Theissueisconceptual.Again,Hegel’sclaimisthatNewtonhastwodistinctnotionsofmatterthatareatoddswithoneanother.Accordingtoone,matteris“inert”:itdoesnotcausemotioninitselforotherbodies,nordoesitimpedeorenhancemotion.Accordingtotheother,35Buchdahl,“Hegel’sPhilosophyofNatureandtheStructureofScience,”pp.127–134,discussesHegel’sderivation,butheseesitasmoreofaconceptualexplicationthanadeduction.AbetterdiscussionofthispassageappearsinL.Fleishhacker,“HegelonMathematicsandExperimentalScience,”inHegelandNewtonianism,pp.211–213.Houlgate,Freedom,Truth,andHistory,pp.138–144,hasaveryclearandhelpfuldiscussionofGalileo’slawandHegel’sderivationofit.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n328edwardc.halpermatterdoescausemotionbecauseeverybodymovestowardthecenterofgravitybecauseofitsmatter.AsHegelputsit,“Gravitationdirectlycontradictsthelawofinertia:for,bytheformer,matterstrivestogetawayoutofitselftoanother”[andmovestowardanother](§269A).36Inertiaismatter’sstrivingtoremainasitis.Thus,thecontradictionheascribestoNewtonliesintheincompatiblenaturesthatthetwolawsimplicitlyascribetomatter.Again,scientistsareunlikelytobeconcernedwiththisconceptualcontradiction.Indeed,Hegel’sclaimsaboutthenatureortheconceptofmatterwouldseemtorepresentexactlythesortofthinkingthatNewtonaimstoovercome:HegelisobjectingtoNewton’snotexplaininghowmattercouldbebothinertandactive,whereasNewtonprideshimself,famously,onhisnot“feigninghypotheses.”37Whenhesaysthis,New-tonisreferringspecificallytohisbeingunabletodeterminethecauseofgravitationalattraction.Hislawofgravityisamathematicalformula.Thereisnoexplicitcontradictionbetweenitandmathematicalformu-laethatexpresstheinertiallaws.Thenatureofmatterfiguresintothestatementsofneithergroupoflaws.Sothereisnoneedtoidentifytheinertandactivecharactersofmatter.Whatistobegainedbyinsistingthattheymustbothstemfromthesamematerial“nature”?Indeed,isnotthislattermerelyanempty,Scholasticnotionthatdeflectsattentionawayfromthesortofscientificworkthatadvancesourunderstandingofmatteranditsmotionsandtowardametaphysicalandoccultdiscussionofcauses?SotheNewtonian.HispositionisapparentlyendorsedbyKantwhoalsorecognizesdistincttypesofmatter,aswesaw.Thefirstofhismat-tersisthatinvolvedininertialmotion,thesecondthatwhichissubjecttogravity.KantmustagreewithNewtonthatwecankeepthemultiplemattersconceptuallydistinct;forhedoesnotseekaunifyingprinciple,nordoesheascribeanynaturetothemattersotherthantheircapacitytoreceivedeterminationthroughthequalitativeorquantitativecate-gories.Atfirstglance,Hegelmayseemtohavelittletosayinresponse.WhathetakestobecontradictioninNewtonisjustthesortofcon-ceptualproblemthatNewtonwantstoshrugoff.However,IthinkthatHegelhasagoodcase.First,Ithinkheisrighttoinsistthatmattermustbeone.Thesuppositiontothecontrarystrikesmeasaholdoverfromancientphilosophy.Aristotletakesmattertobepotential,andhespeaksofdifferentkindsofmatter(Met.,H.1.1042a25–b6)thatcouldbepresenttogetherinthesamesensiblesubstance.Thisisnotanoptionfor36Hegel,Werke9,Enzyklopadie¨,83.Hegel,PhilosophyofNature.p.63.37Newton,Principia,p.943.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton329Newtonbecausehemakesmatterafullyrealizedentity.Ifmatterexistsasabody,whatevercharactersbelongtomattermuststemfromitsnature.Second,thereisgoodreasontothinkthatNewtonhimselfwasconcernedwiththenatureofmatterandthatthisinteresthascontin-uedincontemporaryscience.Whatishisdoctrineofthe“innerforce”(inthethirddefinition)ifnottherecognitionthatbodiesmustcontainsomeinternalcharacterthatallowsthemtomaintaintheirintegrityasbodiesbyresistingforcesimposeduponthemandyetalsotocarrythoseforcesinsuchawayastopassthemalongtootherbodies?Andwhatisthisinternalcharacterotherthanthenatureofmatterthatmanifestsitselfintheconstitutionofbodies.38ItisnotjustKantwhoiscon-cernedwithhowbodiescanbeconstitutedandwiththefundamentalcharactersthatbelongtothem.Newtonclaimsthatastoneswunginasling“endeavorstoleavethehandthatiswhirlingit,”39suggestingthathethinksthisbehaviorapropertyofthebody.Likewise,hisfirstlawasserts,“Everybodyperseveresinitsstateofbeingatrestorofmovinguniformlystraightforwardexceptinsofarasitiscompelledtochangeitsstatebyforcesimpressed.”40Thatbodiespersevereintheirstatesispresentedhereasafundamentalcharacterofbodies,partoftheirnature.Thisis,Ithink,theanswertothequestionwhyNewtonincludesthefirstlawwhenitseemstobealimitingcaseofthesecond:whereasthesecondreferstoachangeinmotionbeinginproportiontoanimpressedforce,thefirstlawmakestheclaimthatmatter’snatureisnottochangeitsmotionofitsownaccord.41Thislatterisapointaboutthenatureofmatter,andNewtongivesitprideofplaceasthefirstlaw.38SeeBernardCohen’sdiscussioninNewton,Principia,pp.96–98.CohennotesthatNewtonrefers,inaletter,totheinnerforceas“innate,inherent,andessential.”39Indefinitionfive;Newton,Principia,p.405.40Newton,Principia;p.416.Kant,PhilosophyofMaterialNature,p.II.106,objectsthat“inertiadoesnotsignifyapositiveeffortofsomethingtomaintainitsstate.”Onlylivingthingsmakesuchaneffort,butmatterisentirelylifelessbecauseitcannot“determineitselftomotionorrest.”Thatis,“matterhasnoabsolutelyinternaldeterminationsandgroundsofdetermination”(p.II.105).Kantisclearlyspeakingaboutthenatureofmatter,heidentifiesitslackofself-determinationwithitsinertia.(Hethinksthatthesecondlawisproperlythelawofinertia.)Inertiainthissenseisclearlyatoddswiththeideaofgravityasaforcethroughwhichmatternaturallyactsuponitself;indeed,itisevenmoreclearlyatoddswithgravitythanNewton’sinertia,thoughKantdoesnottakenoteofit.41BernardCohen’sexplanationforwhythefirstandsecondlawsaredistinctisthattheforcesinthetwolawsaredifferent.SeeNewton,Principia,p.110.Inthesecondlaw,forceisimpulsive;whereasinthefirstlaw,itisconceivedascontinuouslyacting.Iamnotconvincedthatacaseinwhichtheforceisassumedtobe0isbestdescribedascontinuousforce.However,insofarasitisthebody’sinternalforcethatmaintainsitinmotion(seepp.96–97),theinertial“force”hastobeDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n330edwardc.halperNewtonishardlyunique;whenscientistsspeakoftheirwork,theyoftenpresentthemselvesastryingtofathomtheinnerworkingsandessentialfeaturesofmatter.Philosopherstendtoreadsuchclaimsasdeclarationsofenthusiasm,andweareaccustomedtointerpretingsci-entificlawsasweaklyexistential.Mostcontemporaryreaderswould,forexample,takeaclaimlike“allmenaremortal”toassertthateveryhumanbeing,thosewhohavelivedandthoseyettobeborn,isaliveforafiniteperiodoftime.However,inothererassuchaclaimwouldtypicallybeunderstoodasanassertionabouthumanphysicalnature.Itisnotonlythatthemodalityofthesetwointerpretationsisdifferent;butthefirstismerelyextensionalanddescriptive,whereasthesecondexpressesanessentialcharacter.Inthepresentcase,Ithinkthatcontem-porarythinkerstendtoseeNewton’sfirstlawasassertingtheexistenceofafactaboutmatter.Bythesametoken,theytendtoreadthelawofgravityasassertinganotherfactaboutmatter.Sounderstood,thetwolawsareconsistentbecausethefactsareindependent.SofarasIcansee,Newtonassertstheselawsasclaimsaboutthenatureofmatter.WhatiscertainisthatbothKantandHegelreadNewton’slawsthisway.42Indeed,itisnotanexaggerationtosaythatHegelreadseveryclaimasanassertionaboutanessence,andthatthathasposedamajorobstacletocontemporaryreaders’appreciatinghisthought.If,then,Newton’sfirstlawassertsthatmatterdoesnotofitsnaturecausemotioninitselfnordoesiteitherimpedeorenhancewhatevermotionitalreadyhas,andifthelawofgravityimpliesthatanymaterialbodywill,byitsownnature,somehowmoveitselftowardthecenterofmass,thenthetwolawsassertcontradictorycharactersofmatterandarecontradictory.Thecontradictionliesinthenatureofmatterthattheselawsassertonthestrong,essentialreadingofthem.Intheseterms,moreover,Kantaimstoskirtthecontradictionbydistin-guishingtwodistinctmatters,oneofwhichispassiveandinert,andtheotheractive(alongwithtwootherdistinctmatters).Hegelrejectsthedistinctionandinsistsonasinglematter.Hearguesthatthefeaturethatenablesmattertobeimpacted,itsabilitytoresistanimpressedforce,istheveryfeaturethatisresponsibleformatter’sgravitationalattrac-tion.(Moreonthisshortly.)Thatistosay,hethinksthatthe“innerforce”thatNewtonequateswithinertiaandseesasnecessaryforthenatural,asIthinkCohensees.Inmyview,thedifferencebetweenthefirsttwolawsisthatwhereasthesecondassertspositivelythattheactionofanexternalforcewillaccelerateordeceleratethebody,thefirstclaimsthattherewillbenosuchaccelerationordecelerationintheabsenceofanexternalforce.Thus,thefirstlawisastatementaboutthenatureofthebody.42SeetheremarksonKantinFootnote40.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton331firstthreelawsisalsothegravitationalforceresponsibleforholdingthebodytogether.Apartfromthisreasoning,itiswidelysupposedthatthematterthatfiguresinthelawofgravityshouldbethesameasinertialmatterbecausesomesinglequantityofmatterconstitutesthebody.ItmightbesaidthatEinstein’sGeneralRelativitytheoryexplainstheidentitybymak-inggravityandinertiabothfunctionsofthecurvatureofspace,andthecurvatureofspace,inturn,dependentonmatter.FromHegel’spointofview,suchaunificationrepresentsasignificantadvanceoverNew-ton’streatmentofmatter,butitisstillascientifictheoryandthereforereliesonthefacultyofunderstandingand,importantly,leavesopenthequestionofwhatmatteris.Inanycase,mycontentionhereisthattheideathatmatterisoroughttobeoneandtheideathatscienceoughttoelucidateitsessentialfeaturesarewidelyacceptedinscience,atleastasideals.ThisisametaphysicalidealwithwhichevenNewton,everanxioustodiscoverthenatureofmatter,mightwellhaveconcurred.Newton’sproblemis,rather,epistemic:hehasnotdiscoveredwhatthedeepcausesofmatterare.Moreover,sinceheaimstodiscovercausesbydescribingmotions,itisnotlikelythathecoulddiscoverdeepcauses.Hethinksthatmerelycharacterizingphenomenawillcontributetosci-entificknowledgeandalsoinsulatehimfromthekindofcriticismthatHegelbrings.Therootoftheissuebetweenthemisnotjustwhethermatterhasanaturethatwecangraspthatcanaccountforbothiner-tiaandgravity,butalsowhatwecanknowaboutnatureandhowwecancometoknowit.Newtonlimitsthescopeofphysics;hesettlesfordescribingmotionswhosecauses,hefranklyadmits,hedoesnotknow.HegelinsiststhatfindingthosecausesisthecentraltaskofthePhilos-ophyofNature,buttofindthemheneedstograspmatterinawaythatisnotsupportedbyempiricalevidence.GivenNewton’sreluctancetoacknowledgethekindofevidenceHegelhastoofferor,indeed,eventoacknowledgetheproblem,Hegelneedstoshow,first,thatNewtonhimselfiscommittedtosomenotionofthenatureofmatterand,sec-ond,thathe(Hegel)canexpoundthisnatureinawaythatovercomesthecontradiction.Thatistosay,Hegel’scriticismhasnoteethinthefaceofNewton’sadmissionofhisownfailuretoknownatureunlessHegelcanshowthathecanresolvethecontradictioninNewton’slawsbyproperlyexplicatingthenatureofmatter.Inmyview,Hegeldoesthistwiceover.Hisrichestandmostfarreach-ingresolutioniscontainedinhisparagraphson“AbsoluteMechanics,”thefinalportionof“Mechanics.”IsketchthisinSectionIII.However,Hegelhasasecond,weakerbutmoreplausibleandcogentresolutionthatisimplicitintheargumentthatleadsuptothissection.Isketchthisargumentinmyfinalsection.WhereastheformerresolutionshowsDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n332edwardc.halperHegelbeing,wemightsay,mostHegelian,thelatterismorepowerfulandimportantforscience.iiiWecannowacknowledgethatHegelhasfoundacontradictioninNew-ton’sconceptionofmatter,ifnotinhislaws.TheresolutionthatHegeladvancesisdialectical.RatherthandismissingNewton’slawsbecausetheypresupposeacontradiction,heusesthecontradictiontoarriveatanunderstandingofthenatureofmatter.BecauseHegel’sresolutionhasnotbeenunderstoodandbecauseithelpstoexplainhiscritiqueofNewton,Isketchit,albeitbriefly,inthissection.Imustacknowledge,however,thatthisdiscussionwillnothelpmycasefortakingHegel’saprioriscienceseriously.Hisultimateunderstandingofthenatureofmatterissimplytooremotefromanythingthatwecanrecognizeasscientificandtoointernallyproblematictoaccept,howeverfascinatingitiswhentakeninitsownterms.BetweenHegel’sexpositionofthecontradictioninNewton’sconcep-tionofmatterandhisresolutionofit,thereisanimportantintermediatestep.Heshowsthatbothgravityandinertiaspringfromthesamecon-ceptionofmatter,aconceptheld,butnotacknowledged,byNewton.Thatistosay,beforeHegelovercomesthecontradiction,heembracesit.Indeed,thatNewton’slawspresupposecontradictorynotionsofmattersignals,forHegel,theiressentialinsightintomatterandtheirimpor-tanceintheconceptualmovementtowardahighergraspofit.Thishighergraspisexpressedin“Physics,”andinthetransitiontoitattheendof“Mechanics,”HegellaudsKepler’slawsanddeclaresthatNewton’slawsareconsequencesofthem.Kepler’slawscomeclosetoexplainingmotionthroughaninnerprinciple,as“Physics”goesontodo.TounderstandwhatHegelislookingfor,ithelpstorecalltheAris-totelianmodel.Aristotletracesnature’sattributes,includingitsessen-tialmotions,toaninnerprinciple.NowthereisnoinnerprincipleofmatterthataccountsforNewton’sthreelawsorforgravity,butHegelclaimsthatthereisaprinciplethatdoesaccountforallofNewton’smechanics.Itisanouterprinciple;indeed,HegelsometimescallsitOtherness.ThatOthernessistheprincipleofmatterispresupposedbyNew-tonianmechanics.Consider,first,Newton’ssuppositionthathisthreelawsofmotionareindependentofthelawofgravity.Thelawofinertiaassertsthatabodywillcontinueinitsstateofrestormotionunlessdisturbed.Werethereasinglebodyintheuniverse,itwouldcontinueforeveratrestorinastraightlineofmotion.However,insofarasmat-terisinertandnotacauseofmotion,thisbodycouldneitheralteritsDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton333ownmotionnorcauseitselftomove.Hence,ifitdoesmove,itmusthaveacquireditsmotionthroughaforceexertedbyanotherbody.Itfollowsthatthesuppositionofasinglebodyintheuniversecontinuinginmotionforeverisimpossible:abodythatweretrulybyitselfcouldhavenomotionbecauseitwouldneedanotherbodytomoveit(unlessitscausewerenonphysical).Becausebodiesareinert,thecausesoftheirmotionmustlieoutsidethemselves.However,betweenthebodythatismovedandthebodythatmovesit,theremustbeagravitationalforceofattractionthatwoulddeceleratetheimpactedbody.Practically,thegravitationalforceislikelytobesomuchlessthantheforceofimpactthatitisinconsequentialforcalculationsofmotion.Buttheoretically,theunavoidabilityofgravitationalattractioninanyimpactmeansthattherecouldneverbetrueinertialmotion.Gravitywouldalwaysworkagainstinertiaandinnocasewouldabodyinmotionactuallyremaininmotionatthesamevelocityinastraightline.Atbest,inertialmotionisanapproximation.Wemight,perhaps,saythatthefactthatthereisnoactualinertialmotiondoesnotdetractfromthefirstlawbecauseitassertsonlythetendencyofmattertoremaininmotionandthatthisisamplyconfirmedbytheactualmotion’sbeingtheresultantofinertialandgravitationalmotion.Butagain,HegelisnotdenyingthatNewton’stechniqueswork.Theissueiswhetherinertiacanbetheoreticallyseparatedfromgravity,andtheproblemisthattheinertnessofmattermakesanotherbodynecessary.Thisotherbody,impactingthefirstbody,causesittomoverectilinearlybutalsotodecelerate.Since,moreover,thesecondbodyisitselfinert,itsownmotionmusthavecomefromstillanothermatter,whichlatteralsoexertsagravitationalforceonbothitandthefirstbody.Itispossiblethattheseimpactswillbeheadon,butthemoregeneralcaseisthatonebodyhitsanotheratsomedistancefromitscenterimpartingtoitarectilinearmotionatsomeangle.Inthiscase,thegravitationalattractiondoesnotmerelyslowthesecondbodydown;itcurvesthesecondbody’strajectory.Thedegreeofcurvaturedependsonthemassesofallthebodiesandtheirrelativepositions.Theimpactedbodywouldnotbecurvedifallthematterintheuniversewerearrangedinastraightline,butthiscaseismerelyaremoteandabstractpossibility.Ingeneral,themotiontheimpactedbodyreceivesisnotrectilinear,asNewtonwouldhaveit,butelliptical.Thedegreeofcurvaturedependsonthemassesofallthebodiesandtheircenterofgravity.Ifwesaythatrectilinearmotionhasacurvatureof0,thenwecansaythatwheneverabodyreceivesmotionitmustbecurved.Ifthisisright,motionisessentiallycurvilinear,anditdependsonthemassesoftheimpactingbodies.Insofarasamaterialbodyisinert,itsmotionisdeterminedbywhatisotherthanit.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n334edwardc.halperThatonebody’smotionisdeterminedbyanotherbodyisalsoacon-sequenceofgravity.Inorderforonebodytoimpactonanother,eachmustbeconstitutedsoastooccupyadeterminatevolumeofspace.Aswewillseeinthenextsection,theprinciplethatsoconstitutesabodyisgravity.Gravityis,first,aforcethatattractsthepartsofasinglebodytowardacenter;but,aswewillalsosee,thisforcenecessarilyextendsbeyondtheboundariesofthebodyandattractsothermatter.Anytwobodiesare,then,mutuallyattractedandmovetowardacenterpoint,andbythesamereasoningtheremustbeacenterofgravityfortheuniversetowardwhichallbodiesareattracted.ThisseeminglyordinaryNewtonianideahas,Hegelthinks,apro-foundconsequence.Iftheprinciplethatmakesabodybeabodyalsomakesitmovetowardsomepointoutsideofitself,thenforsomethingtobeamaterialbodyisforittoseeksomethingotherthanitself.Thenatureofmatteris,thus,tomoveawayfromitselfandseektobeotherthanitself.ToputthepointmorelikeHegelwould,thecharacterthatbelongsmostofalltomatter,itsnature,isjustitsnotbeingwhatitis.43Thisnatureofmatterisgravity,amovementofattractiontowardsome-thingelse,evenifmatterappearsnottomoveitself.Again,Othernessistheessenceofmatter:matter’sinnernatureisitsmotiontowardapointoutsideofitself,thecenterofgravityofallmatter.However,matter’snatureisalsoitslackofitsowncharacterandconsequentdetermina-tionbyanother.Thatistosay,gravityandinertnessbothcometothesamething,matter’sbeingessentiallysomethingother.Ofcourse,itsoundsbizarretospeakoflawsofphysicsasconse-quencesofaconcept,particularlywhentheimplicationofdoingsoisthatthatconcept,matter,iscontradictory.WhatHegelisafterisacon-ceptualderivationofmechanicsfromthenatureofmatter.Hisproblemisthatthenatureofmatterliesoutsideofmatter;matteritselfmustdependonsomethingelse.Thatmeansthattoderivemechanicsfromtheinnercharacterofmatterisultimatelytoderiveitfromsomethingotherandexternal.Derivedfromacontradictoryconcept,mechanicsmustitselfbecontradictory.Moreconcretely,theproblemhereisthatthecenterofgravityliesoutsidematter,butinasmuchasthecenterofgravitybelongsintrinsicallytomatter,itis(conceptually,atleast)withinmatter.Sucharelationexistsphysicallyinthesolarsystem:thenatureoftheorbitingbodiesliesinthepointaroundwhichtheyrevolve.The43See:Houlgate,Freedom,Truth,andHistory,p.137.FormoreonOthernessastheessenceofNature,seeE.C.Halper,“ATaleofTwoMetaphysics:AlisonStone’sEnvironmentalHegel,”BulletinoftheHegelSocietyofGreatBritain,51/52(2005),pp.7–10.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton335planetshavetheirnaturesoutsideofthemselves,buttheirmotionstowardthesunpreservetheminthepositionsthattheyoccupy,thatis,theirorbits.Hence,theirbeingotheriswhatpreservesthemasthesame.Fromtheperspectiveofthesolarsystem,matter’snatureisnotstrictlyother,forthegravitationalcenterthatdefinesmatterlieswithinthesolarsystem,inthesun.Furthermore,withinthesolarsystem,thegravitationalmotionoftheorbitingbodiesisnowunderstoodtobetheircontinuousinertialmotions.WhatisfascinatinghereisHegel’sideathatbecausethenatureofmatteristobeother,thematterarrangesitself,asitwere,intoastructurethatmanifeststhisothernessandthatinmanifestingitselfasother,matterlocatesitsprinciplewithinitselfandceasestobeother.Weseeherethebeginningsofanewtypeofmechanicsthatisbasedontheprimacyofellipticalmotion,amechanicswherethenatureofmatterisnolongersimplyothernessbutanothernessthatisalsoaninnernature.HegelhasmadethetransitiontoPhysics.Ultimately,heresolvesthecontradictionbetweeninertiaandgravitythatheimputestoNewtonbymovingtothishigherplane.Adialecticalargumentbasedonothernessastheinnernatureofmat-terhardlyseemsscientific.However,thereisaremarkablyinterestingproposalhere:itisnotrectilinearmotionthatisfundamentaltomatter,butellipticalmotion,andmatternaturallymovesitselfellipticallyasmanifestedinthesolarsystem.Ifinertialmotionisanellipticalmotionaroundacenterofgravity,thengravityandinertiaarenolongeratodds.Hegel’squestionthenbecomeswhyparticularplanetsoccupytheorbitstheydo,aquestionthatheacknowledgeshimselfunabletoanswer.Whathedoesemphasizeisthatthecharacteroftheirorbitsisconstant.Kepler’sthirdlawdeclaresthatthereisaconstantproportionbetweenthecubeofaplanet’ssemimajoraxisandtheperiodofitsrevolution,andthisHegelunderstandsasaformofidentitybetweenspaceandtimethatisakindofenrichmentoftheidentitywesawinthelawoffreefall.44Forreasonsthatareobscure,Hegelseesthisrelationasexpressingtheconceptualnatureofgravitationalattractionand,thereby,ofmatter,andhecreditsKeplerwithgraspingitsconceptualnecessityandperse-veringinfindingempiricalconfirmation.45Itis,thus,clearwhyHegelprefersKeplertoNewton:itisKeplerwhoproposesthatmattermovesellipticallybyitsverynature,asitwere,andthatthesolarsystemis44Hegel,Werke,9Enzyklopadie¨,pp.92–93;PhilosophyofNature,p.71.45Hegel,Werke,9Enzyklopadie¨,p.96;PhilosophyofNature,pp.73–74.HegelclaimsthatKeplerspenttwenty-sevenyearssearchingforaconnectionbetweenthecubeofthedistanceandthesquareoftheperiodbecauseofhisfaiththatreasonwouldmanifestitselfinnature.TheimplicationisthatKeplergraspedtheapriorineces-sityforthelawlongbeforehefoundit.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n336edwardc.halperamanifestationofthenatureofmatter.ReasoningdialecticallywithHegel,wecouldsaythatthesun,ascenterofgravity,mustbelongtothenatureofthematterthatitattracts.Buttosaythisistoidentifyaninnernatureofmatterandtherebytoundermineitsotherness.Withthis,matterhasbeentransformedintophusisandthesubjectforstudyisnolongerbodies,butasolarsystemasawholewithitsnecessaryinternalpartsandstructure.ivScientistsdonotfeelcomfortablewithadialecticaltreatmentof“thenatureofmatter,”and,anyway,identifyingitasothernessseemshope-lesslyanthropocentric.Hegel’sfullsolutiontothecontradictioninmat-ter’snatureissofar-reaching,evenforametaphysicsofnature,thatitobscuresthepositivecontributionthatmetaphysicalreflectioncanmaketoscience.Hence,thissectionwillsketchthestepsinHegel’sargument,necessarilyrepeatingsomeofwhathasbeensaid,inordertomakeclearwhatIregardastheessentialelementinhissolutionandhowapriorimetaphysicsofthesortpracticedbyHegelcanhelptoadvancescience.1.ThefirstthingtonoticeishowthecategoryofMatteremergesfromMotionandPlace(§§260–261).Thereisaconceptualexerciseherethatisunfamiliarbutnotreallydifficult.Think,first,ofapointthatliessomewherewithinuniform,infiniteSpace.Thispointshouldlocateapositioninspace,andpositionisessentialtospacewhich,initsentirelyabstractform,justisposition.However,asinglepointstandsinexactlythesamerelationtoinfinitespaceasanyotherpointdoes.Nopointcouldbecloserorfurtherfromtheboundaryofunboundedspace.Hence,nosinglepointbyitselfcouldmarkoutapositioninspace.Iftobeapointistomarkortooccupyapositioninspace,thenthepoint’snotmarkingoutapositionisakindoffailuretobewhatitis,akindofconcep-tualdestruction.Ontheotherhand,withoutthepoint,spaceisentirelyuniform,extendingineverydirectionthesameway;itis(abstract)posi-tionwithoutany(concrete)position.Assuch,Spacerequiresapointinordertodefineitselfproperlyasposition.Butonceitisposited,thepointagaindestroysitself.Moresimplyput,wecannotthinktheideaofSpacewithoutsupposingittocontainapointthatconcretelydefinesposition;butsincenosinglepointcouldconcretelydefinepositionininfinitespace,wecannotthinkofSpacewithasinglepoint.Thismentalprocessofpositingapointanddestroyingitisthepoint’scomingtobeandpassingaway,thatis,thepoint’smotion.However,thepluralityofpointsgeneratedinthiswaydoessucceedinmarkingoffposition,butpositiondefinedinrespectofpointstemporallyandspatiallyrelatedtoDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton337eachother,ratherthan,asbefore,inrespectofasinglepoint’srelationtoabstractspace.Ontheotherhand,fromtheperspectiveofthepoints,becomingandceasingareeventsthattheyexperienceandthroughwhichtheypersistasrelativepositionsinspace.Thecollectionofthepointsthatpersistinspacethroughtheprocessofchangeconstitutesmatter.ThisisHegel’sfirstunderstandingofMatter.(Weexploredhismoreproperunderstandingofmatterintheprevioussection.)2.Thepluralityofpointsthatconstitutesmatterareunitedintoabody.However,inorderforthesepointstobeunited,theymustalsobedifferentfromeachother.Conceptually,thegatheringtogetherofthesepointsalsopresupposestheirinherentdistinctness(§262).AsHegelputsit,theirattractionpresupposesarepulsion–notonlyaninternalrepulsionofpartagainstpartthatmaintainstheirvolume,butarepulsionofthecollectionofsuchpartsfromwhatbecomesexternaltothem.Hegel’stermforsuchaself-attractionachievedthroughrepulsionis“One,”thelogicalcategorythatImentionedearlier.Thus,matterisonebodywithpartsthatareunitedandextended.Heisspeakingconceptuallyhere,buthischaracterizationalsodescribesthephysicalrealityofamatterthatoccupiesavolumeofspace.Sinceitspartsareallunitedintoasinglebody,theremustbeanattraction;butthereisalsosomerepulsionthatkeepsthemallfromcollapsingintoapoint.Inaremarkonthisargument,HegelreferstoKant’sMetaphysicalFoundationsofNaturalScience(§262A).IthinkthatheispresupposingKant’sargument.Kantiseasiertounderstandbecauseheistalkingaboutphysicalentitiesratherthanconceptualrelations.Kantthinksthatanyphysicalobjectmustbespatial,andthatmeansthatitwilloccupysomevolumeofspace,butitsdegreeofintensityinthisspacecanrangebetween0and1.Thatistosay,matteriswhatfillsavolumeofspacetosomedegree.Thedegreetowhichthevolumeisfilleddependsonthedegreetowhichmatteriscompressedbyoutsideforces.Sincethebody’smatterholdstogetheranddoesnotdissipate,theremustbesomeforcethatpullsittowardthecenteroftheobject;sincethematterdoesnotcollapseintothecenter,theremustbeacounteractingrepulsiveforce.Nowwemightobjectthatthisattractiveforceisunnecessarybecausetherepulsiveforcesfromsurroundingbodieswillsufficetopreventthebodyfromexpandingindefinitely.Thiswillnotdo,Kantargues,becausethesurroundingmatter“itselfrequiresacompressiveforceinorderthatitbematter.”46Inotherwords,wecannotrelyonsurroundingbodiestodefineabody,becauseeachofthemwouldneeditsownprincipleofattractionbeforeititselfcouldexistasabody.Sincethe46Kant,PhilosophyofMaterialNature,II.chap.2,prop.5.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n338edwardc.halperattractiveforceisaprincipleofmatter,thatis,sincematterdependsonthisforce,itcannotdependon(someother)matter.Thisattractiveforcethatholdsabodytogethermightseemtobesomesortofcohesion,butKantrejectsthissuppositionbecauseeventhoughliquidsandgaseshavelesscohesion,theydonot,forthatreason,necessarilyoccupygreatervolume.Whatisneededisanattractiveforcethatpreventsabodyfromexpandingindefinitely,andthisKantidentifiesasgravity.Nowthisattractiveforcemustoperatewherevertheboundariesofthebodyexist,bethebodyexpandedorcompressed,and,again,sinceitisaprincipleofmatter,itispriortomatterandcannotdependonit.Hence,theattractiveforceexistsindependentlyoftheboundaryofmatter.Since,though,toputtheargumentrathertoosimply,matterdoesnotlimitit,thereisnothingtopreventgravityfromextendinginfinitely,thoughitwillbediminishedbybeingdiffusedthroughthevolumeofspace.47Inshort,Kantarguesthatthelawofgravityisaprioribecausegravity,togetherwithaforceofrepulsion,makesmaterialbodiespossible.WhatHegeltakesissuewithinthisaccountisKant’sidentificationoftwodistinctforces.Heinsiststhatthereisratherasinglecontradictoryprincipleatwork:therecannotbeanattractionunlessthereissome-thingdiversetoattract.Specifically,whatmakesmatterhaveaforceofattractionisitsapartnessinspace,thatis,itsoccupyingspace.Anditisjusttherepulsionbetweenthepartsintrinsictoitsoccupyingspacethatmakesthematterofabodybeattractedtoitscenter.Thus,occupyingavolumeofspaceisatonceanattractionandexpansionofpoints.Furthermore,forthesamereasonthatpartsofonematerialbodyareattractedtoitscenter,thepartsoftwoormorebodiesareattractedtothecenterbetweenthem.Hence,theattractiveforceofanyindividualmaterialbodyisdirectedtosomeunifyingcenterpointthatliesoutsideofitself.Ironically,gravity,theessentialfeatureofamatter,isakindofothernessofmatter.Wearenot,thusfar,aheadscientifically,butwehaveseenwhygravityandrepulsionbothbelongessentiallytobodiesandwhytheforceofgravityextendsthroughoutspace.Yet,sincegravityandrepulsionarenotsimplyoneinasmuchasthecenterofgravitygenerallyfallsoutsideofthematter(whichoccupiessomevolume),thereremainsacertainunintelligibilitytomatter.3.Insofarasabodyisafilledvolumeofspace,itexistsinspaceaswellastime,butthepositionitoccupiesinspaceorintimedoesnotaffectitscharacter(§263).Itfollowsthatmovingthroughspaceandtime,thatistosay,beinginmotion,alsodoesnotaffectit(§264).Itisinert.Butsinceitisinert,anymotionitacquiresmustcomefromcontactwith47Ibid,p.II.68.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton339someotherbodythatisitselfinmotion.Atthemomentofimpact,thetwobodiesconstituteasinglebodythatmovesasone.However,theimpactisonlypossiblebecausethetwobodiesresisteachother,andtheirresistanceisduetotheinternalrepulsionbetweenthepartsofeach,arepulsionthatexistsbecauseoftheirbeingdistinctbodies,eachwithitsowninnergravity.Itisthisinnergravitythatconstitutesabodyasabodyandmakesitcapableofacquiringinertialmotionfromimpact.Inimpact,then,thetwobodiesbecomeone,butalsoremaindistinctmasses(§265).Theircommonmotiondependsontheirrelativemattersandtheirrelativemotions.Thematterandthevelocityoftheimpactingbodyare,thus,interchangeableinsofaraseachoftheseproducesthesameeffectontheimpactedbody.Thetotalmotionofimpactingandimpactedbodiesremainsthesamebeforeandafterimpactbecausethematterremainsinertandunaffectedbymotion.Ormorescientifically,thetotalmomentumofthesystemdoesnotchange.4.Eachofthecollidingbodieshasitsowncenterofgravity,butinasmuchastheydifferonlythroughthequantitiesoftheirmasses,thetwotogetherconstituteasinglebodythathasitsowncenterofgravity(§266).Inrespectofthislattercenterofgravity,bothbodiesareinmotion:beforeimpact,eachbodyisfallingtowardthiscenter(§267).Inasmuchasthiscenterofgravityisthepointofattraction,thebodiesaremovingtowarditnotwiththeuniforminertialmotioninitiallysupposed,butwiththeuniformaccelerationofgravitationalattraction.Inorderthatthebodiesbeabletoimpacteachother,eachmusthaveitsowninternalgravityandrepulsion.Butifeachhasitsowngravity,thentogethertheyhaveacommoncenterofgravitythatisattractingboth.Hence,theirfalltowardthiscenterisnotofuniformvelocity,butisthefreefallofgravitationalattraction.Moreover,themotionbetweenthesebodiesisanessentialconsequenceoftheirbeingmaterialbodiesinspace(§268).Itfollowsthattherecanbenopureuniformrectilinearmotion,aswesawinSectionIII.Theimpactthatplacesonebodyinmotionmustbecausedbyanotherbodytowhichitcannotbutbeattractedgravi-tationally;or,rather,becauseimpactdoesnotoccurinabsolutespacebutinrespectoftherelativepositionofanotherbody,theappropri-ateframeofreferenceisthegravitationalcentertowardwhichbothbodiesmove.48Butmotiontowardagravitationalcenterisalwaysanaccelerationtowardthatcenter.Hence,allactualmotionisgravita-tionalacceleration.Again,rectilinearmotionisonlytheoreticallypos-sibleinauniversewithasinglebody,butsuchabodycouldnever48Ibid,pp.II.28–30.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n340edwardc.halperreceivetheforceitneedstomove.Inshort,gravityunderminesinertia(§269A).5.Forthesamereasonsthattwoballshavethesamecenterofgravity,allmaterialbodiesoughttohave,inadditiontotheirindividualcentersofgravity,acollectivecenterofgravity(§269).Then,everymaterialbodywouldbeattractedtoit,andinrespectofthedistancebetweenthemandit,allwouldbefallingtowardit.Fallingisthustheessentialmotionofbodies.Itiscontingentinsofarasabody’sseparationfromthecenteriscontingent,butnecessaryinrespectofthenatureofmatter(§267).Moreover,thisuniversalattractionmust,again,presupposesomesortofpluralitythatisattracted.Thesebodieseachhavetheirowncentersofgravityand,thus,maintaintheirindividualidentities.Abody’sfallingtowardthecollectivecenterdoesnotundermineitsidentity,butthewayitfallsdependsonitsmatterandmotion.Thisattractiontothecentermanifestsitselfasmotionaroundthecenter;inparticular,astheellipticalmotionsoftheplanetsaroundthesun.Hegelreferstothisasthe“freemotion”ofmatter.Hispointisthatmatterrealizesitselfinauniversewheremattermovesinacyclicalmotionwhereinitreturnstoitself.Newton’sfamousbucketexperimentwassupposedtoshowthatsomemotionsarereal:Heimaginesabucketwithwaterinitsuspendedbyastring,rotated,andthenreleased.Astheropeunwinds,thewaterclimbsupthesidesofthebucket;andNewtontakesthistoindicatethattherotationofthebucketisarealmotionthatresultsasaneffectfromanagent’sact.49Kantalsoarguesthatcircularrotarymotionisactualortrue.50Hegelagreesthattherotationofmatteraboutacen-terisreal,buthearguesthatitfollowsnecessarilyfromthenatureofmatter.Aswehaveseen,Hegelinsiststhatthisrealmotionexistsintheellipticalmotionsofthebodiesorbitingthesun;fortheseorbitingbodies,ellipticalmotionwouldbeatonceinertialandgravitational.Sothesolarsystemisakindofsynthesisbetweengravitationalandiner-tialmotions.Again,thereasonthatHegelpraisesKepleranddisparagesNewtonisthatKeplerrealizesthatthesolarsystemisanexpressionofthenatureofmatter.Hisclaimisthattheplanetarymotionsarenotcompositemotionsbutfundamentalandthatthesemotions,thereby,overcomethe“contradiction”inNewton’slaws.Unfortunately,Hegel’sargumentforthislaststrikingclaim(§270)isthin,andhisremarksarelong.Hegeldoesnotknowthatthestructureoftheatommirrorsthatofthesolarsystem;hedoesnotknowthatontheBohrmodeltheorbits49Newton,Principia,pp.412–413.50Kant,PhilosophyofMaterialNature,pp.II.122–123,127–130.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton341ofelectronsaroundthenucleusarenotcompositemotions.51NordoesheknowEinstein’sfamouscontentionthatmatterisaformofenergy.Hemighthavecountedallthisasevidenceforhisnotionthatrotationaroundacenterisafundamentalcharacterofmatter.Matterdoes,atthesubatomiclevel,takeonafundamentalandnecessarystructurethatisdifferentfromwhateithergravityorinertiabyitselfsuggests.Importantly,thisstructureisintelligibleandexplainsfeaturesofmatter,eventhoughitaddsnothingtothepredictionsthatweusuallyidentifywithscience.ThesedevelopmentsshowthatHegel’sapproachwas,atleast,notmisguided.Hegel’sscientificcontributionis,however,differentand,perhaps,deeper.Theparticularstructurethatheproposesisnotasimportantastheprincipleatstake.Newtonunderstandsmatterasinert.Itisabody.Apartfromitsquantity,ithasnodistinguishingcharacteristics.OnebodyisthesameasanyotherasfarasNewton’sphysicsgoes.Whatisniceaboutthisconceptionofmatteristhatlawsofbodiesarecompletelygeneral:particularcharacteristicsthatdistinguishonebodyfromanotherneednotbeconsidered.Thisviewofmatteras“neutralstuff”standsincontrastwiththepremodernnotionofmatteras“unde-terminedpotential.”Onthislatterview,thereisnomatterthatstandsbyitself;matterisalwaysthatwhichisdeterminedbysomethingelse.Andmatterisunderstoodonlyasthepotentialforthespecificformitcanreceive.Thus,woodismatterinsofarasithasthepotentialtobefashionedintoahouse,eventhoughitisalsoaformaldeterminationofelements,whichlatterare,inturn,itsmatter.Sincematterhasnoindependentidentity,ancientandmedievalsciencecouldmakeonlythebroadestandemptiestclaimsaboutmatteringeneral.Anymoredetailedunderstandingofmatterwouldneedtofocusononeparticulartypeofmatter,suchasthematterofdogs,thematterofplants,andsoforth,andexplainhowsuchmattertakesonspecificfunctionswhenitreceivesaform.ThisiswhatAristotleandhisfollowerswantedsciencetodo.Inrelationtothispremodernview,theNewtonian‘matterasstuff’viewhasthebigadvantageofallowinggeneralclaimsaboutmatter.AndsuchclaimsconstituteNewtonianphysics.However,theproblemwiththisnewapproachtomatteristhatitabstractsfromrealdifferencesbetweendifferentkindsofthings.Infact,themerebodiesittreatsdonotexist.Moreover,inabstractingallparticularcharacteristicstoarriveatamere‘body,’wetakeawayallthatcouldgivethebodyitsowncharacter.Asaresult,bodymustbeinert.Itcannotcausemotioninitselforanotherbody,andanymotionitacquiresdoesnotalterit.Motionmust,thus,51Paolucci,“HegelandtheCelestialMechanicsofNewtonandEinstein,”p.69,thinksheanticipatedBohrin§271Z.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n342edwardc.halperexistasakindofaccidentalattributeofmatter.However,thisconcep-tionofmatterasinertbodyrunsagainstthecharacterthatmatterneedstohavetoconstituteitselfasabody.Thislatterconsistsofattractiveandrepulsiveforcesthatallowittooccupyavolumeofspace,forcesthat,aswesaw,causemotion.Hegelresolvesthiscontradictionbypropos-ingasysteminwhichthecenterandthemotionsarounditareinertbecausetheyaregovernedbyattractiveandrepulsiveforces.AlthoughHegelidentifiesitwiththesolarsystem,whatisreallyimportantaboutthissolution–farmorethanwhatitisembodiedin–isthenotionthatmatterhasitsownactivity.This,Icontend,iswhatwereallylearnfromHegel’ssolution.ThenotionimplicitinNewtonianmechanicsthatmatterismerelyinertisincompatiblewiththeactivitythatmat-termusthaveeventosustainitselfasabody:mattermustbeactive.Hegelarrivesatthisconclusionthroughmetaphysicalreflectionontheconceptofnature.Intheearlytwentiethcenturyscientistsalsoreflectingonbasicscientificconceptsaswellasactualandpossibleexperimentalresultsarrivedatthesameconclusion.Theinnerdynam-icsoftheatomconstitutesoneobviousexampleofmatter’sintrinsicactivity.Electronsarenolongersupposedtomovearoundthenucleusasplanetsmovearoundthesun;theyseemrathertoexistinstatesofexcitation,asdoestheequallyactivenucleus.Einstein’sidentificationofmatterasaformofenergyexpressesthesameidea:matterisactive.Thisintrinsicactivityofmatterexplainswhytheadditionofmotion,especiallymotionclosetothespeedoflight,doesaffectthequantityofmatter,thoughweneedmorereasoningtoseewhythechangeiswhattheLorenztransformationdescribes.Thatmatter,accordingtogeneralrelativity,doesnotnaturallymoveinstraightlinesbutsomehowbendsspaceandtimewithwhichitisintrinsicallyconnected,andthatmatterexistsaselementaryparticlesorwaves,eachwithitsownmotionsandproperties,bothsuggestthatcontemporarysciencehasacceptedkeyfeaturesofHegel’sviewofmatter.Justhowmatterisactiveneedsadifferentsortofinvestigation.Thisiswherephilosophyofnatureendsandsciencebegins.WhatHegelseesisthatthereisanimportantroleforphilosophyofnatureinuncoveringproblemsandresolvingthemconceptually,aswellasinmakingintelligibleanswersto“why?”questionsthatsciencedoesnotaddress.Philosophyofnaturedoesnotreplacescience,butneitherisitwithoutimplicationforscience.HegelrecognizesasignificantprobleminNewtonianphysicsthatisnoteasytoresolve,andhissolution,initsformifnotitsdetail,continuestohaveanimpactonthewayweseeandexplorematter.Atleastonthisissue,Hegelthearmchair,apriorimetaphysicianbeatthegreatempiricistwhoeschewedmetaphysics.IDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegel’sCriticismofNewton343ratherthinkthatheopenedapathonwhichphilosophersshouldnotfeartotread.5252VersionsofthispaperwerereadataMetaphysicalSocietyofAmericameetingattheUniversityofPittsburgh,attheUniversityofWarwick,andatanannualmeet-ingoftheCanadianSocietyfortheHistoryandPhilosophyofScience.Commentsfromtheseaudienceshelpedimprovethepaper,andIespeciallythankthosewhokindlysentmewrittenremarksafterthesepresentations.IamgratefultoToddBakerforcorrectinganerrorinthephysicsandtoDavidJohnsonforcommentsonthepenultimatedraft.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:47WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.013CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\njameskreines13TheLogicofLife:Hegel’sPhilosophicalDefenseofTeleologicalExplanationofLivingBeingsHegelaccordsgreatphilosophicalimportancetoKant’sdiscussionsofteleologyandbiologyintheCritiqueofthePowerofJudgment,andyetalsodisagreeswithKant’scentralconclusionsthere.1Morespecifically,Kantarguesforagenerallyskepticalviewofteleologicalexplanation1Incitingworks,thefollowingabbreviationshavebeenused:HEGEL:MostwritingsarecontainedintheWerkeinzwanzigBande¨,ed.byE.MoldenhauerundK.Michel,Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1970–1971.Thefirstref-erencestothesewritingsarebyvolume:pageinthatedition.TheexceptionisthatIcitetheEncyclopediaby§§number,with“A”indicatingAnmerkungand“Z”indicatingtheZusatz;wherehelpfulIalsoaddaftera“/”acitationfromWerke.Iindicateindividualworksusingtheabbreviationsbelow.Citationsfromworksnotcontainedintheaboveeditionarefromtheeditionslistedbelow.AndIadd,aftera“/”,pagereferencestothetranslationslistedbelow:EL:EncyclopaediaLogic,trans.byT.F.Geraets,H.S.Harris,andW.A.Suchting(Indianapolis:HackettPublishingCo.,1991).PhG:PhenomenologyofSpirit,trans.bybyA.V.Miller(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1977).PN:Hegel’sPhilosophyofNature,trans.byW.WallaceandA.V.Miller(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1970).PP:ThePhilosophicalPropaedeutic,ed.byM.GeorgeandA.Vincentandtrans.byA.V.Miller(Oxford:Blackwell;1986).VGP:LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,3vols.,trans.byE.S.HaldaneandF.H.Simson(Lincoln:UniversityofNebraskaPress,1995).VL:VorlesungenuberdieLogik¨.Berlin1831.TranscribedbyKarlHegel,ed.byU.RameilandH.-Chr.Lucas,(Hamburg:Meiner,2001).VN:VorlesunguberNaturphilosophie1821/22¨.Nachschr.vonBorisyonUexkull,¨hrsg.vyonGilesMarasseundThomasPosch(Wien:Lang,2002).VPA:Aesthetics:LecturesonFineArt,3vols.,trans.byT.M.Knox,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1975).VPN:VorlesungenuberdiePhilosophiederNatur:Berlin1819/20¨,nachgeschr.VonJohannRudolfRingier,hHrsg.vonMartinBondeliundHooNamSeelmann.2002(Hamburg:Meiner,2002).VPR:LecturesonthePhilosophyofReligion,3vols.,trans.byRev.E.B.Speirs,andJ.BurdonSanderson.(NewYork:HumanitiesPress,Inc.,1974.)WL:Hegel’sScienceofLogic,trans.byA.V.Miller(London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin,1969).344DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife345oflivingbeings;HegelrespondsthatKantshouldinsteaddefendsuchexplanation–andthatthedefenseofteleologyshouldhaveledKanttodifferentconclusionsthroughouthistheoreticalphilosophy.Tobesure,Kant’sviewisnotentirelyskeptical.Kantactuallyarguesthatwenecessarilyconceiveoflivingbeingsinirreduciblyteleolog-icalterms.Butwecannotknowthatlivingbeingsthemselvestrulysatisfytheimplicationsofteleologicaljudgment.Wecannotknowwhetherteleologytrulyexplainsanythinginbiologicalcases.AndthisskepticismrequiresKanttocarefullylimithispositiveclaimsaboutteleology:itissubjectivelynecessaryweconceiveoflivingbeingsinteleologicalterms,andthisconceptionislegitimatewhenemployednotasanexplanationbutasaheuristicaidforscientificinquiry.2Hegel’sresponseinhisScienceofLogicandEncyclopediaisbynomeansentirelycritical.3HegelfrequentlypraisesadistinctioncentraltoKant’sanalysisofteleology–thedistinctionbetween“external”and“innerpurposiveness”[innereZweckmaßigkeit¨].Ontheonehand,thereistheconceptofacomplexsystem,likeapocketwatchwithmanyparts,whichsatisfiestheimplicationsofteleologicaljudgmentinvirtueoftheworkofaseparateorexternalintelligentdesigner.Herethepartsofthesystemaremeanstotheexternalendsorpurposes[Zwecke]ofadesigner(e.g.,reliableindicationofthetime).Ontheotherhand,wecanconceiveofanotherwayinwhichasystemmightsatisfytheimplicationsofteleologicaljudgment–notinvirtueofexternaldesignbutinvirtueofitsowninnernature.Herethepartswouldbemeanstoasystem’sowninnerendsorpurposes.Kantarguesthatthelatterconceptof“innerpurposiveness”islogicallyconsistentandmeaningful.Andthatitisunderstandableandheuristicallyusefulforustoconceiveofreallivingbeingsinthisway.HegelfindsKant’sanalysisheretobeofgreatphilosophicalimportance–forphilosophygenerallyandnotKANT:AllreferencestoKant’swritingsaregivenbyvolumeandpagenumberoftheAkademieeditionofKant’sGesammelteSchriften(Berlin:deGruyter,1902–).KU:CritiqueofthePowerofJudgment,trans.byP.GuyerandE.Mathews(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000).Germantextfromvolume5ofGesammelteSchriftenforthepublishedversionofthebook,andfromvolume20forthe“firstintroduction.”2Forexample,Kantaimstojustify“aheuristicprincipleforresearchingtheparticularlawsofnature,evengrantedthatwewouldwanttomakenouseofitforexplainingnatureitself”(KU,5:410).Kantconsistentlydeniesthatheisjustifyingteleologicalexplanation;seealsoKU,5:360andKU,5:417.3Mymainfocusistheargumentofthe“Life”sectioninboththebookversionoftheWissenschaftderLogik(WL)andthefirstpartofHegel’sEncyclopedia(EL).Iwillalsodrawfromothertexts,mostlylimitingmyselftothosewrittenafterthe(1807)PhenomenologyofSpirit.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n346jameskreinesjustforphilosophicalissuesconcerninglife.InHegel’sterms,“withthisconceptofinnerpurposiveness,Kanthasresuscitatedtheideaingeneralandespeciallytheideaoflife.”4AndHegelwillrarelypassupthechancetodismissandevenridiculetheideaofconceivinglivingbeingsornatureintermsofexternalpurposiveness,asinanartifact;Hegelseessuchclaimsasadistractionfromtheimportantphilosophicalissues,andaninvitationtopopularsuperstitionsortotriviality,asinthesuggestionthatGod“hasprovidedcork-treesforbottlestoppers.”5ButHegeldrawsonKant’sconceptstoargueagainstKant’sownskep-ticalinsistencethattherearephilosophicalbarriersblockingourknowl-edgeofnaturalteleology:Hegelarguesthatlivingbeingsdomanifesttrue“internalpurposiveness,”thattheirstructureanddevelopmentisexplicableinteleologicalterms,andthatwecanhaveobjectiveknowl-edgeofthisnaturalteleology–andofitsbroadermetaphysicalimpli-cations.SoKantshouldnot,Hegelsays,havebeensatisfiedininves-tigatingwhethertheapplicationofteleologytonatureprovides“meremaximsofasubjectivecognition.”Speakingof“theendrelation,”Hegelsays,“onthecontrary,itistheabsolutetruththatjudgesobjectivelyanddeterminesexternalobjectivityabsolutely”(WL,6:444/739).Itisworthnotingthatsubsequentdevelopmentsinthebiologicalsci-enceshavenotresolvedthestatusofteleologyinbiology.Tobesure,ithassometimesbeenpopulartoholdthatteleologicallanguageinmod-ernbiologycanbeonlyafac¸ondeparler,perhapsbestreplacedbyasubstitutelike“teleonomy.”Butthosenotattendingtophilosophyofbiologyofthelastthirtyyearsorsomightnotrealizethatitisnowalsopopular,perhapsmoreso,todefendteleology.Thereareskepticswhoseethesedefensesasmisunderstandingnaturalselection,orascovertlyreplacingratherthandefendingteleology.Butthisistosaythatdebatecontinues.6Somereadersmaywellsidewiththeskeptics,thinkingthat4EL,§§204A;seealsoEL,§55AandWL,4:440–1/737.5PN,§§245Z,PN,9:14/6.ThecorkexampleisajokeborrowedfromGoetheandSchiller’sXenia.Hegelreturnstotheexamplefrequently:EL,§§205Zu;VPR,17:520;VGP,20:23.On“superstition”andexternalpurposivenessseeVGP,20:88/3:186.6L.Wright’s,TeleologicalExplanations:AnEtiologicalAnalysisofGoalsandFunc-tions(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1976)andR.G.Millikan’sLanguage,ThoughtandotherBiologicalCategories(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1993),haveledtomanydefensesofteleologywithinthephilosophyofbiology.See,forexam-ple,K.Neander’s,“TheTeleologicalNotionofFunction,”AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy,69(1991),p.454.Neandercomments:“todayitisgenerallyaccepted”that“thebiologicalnotionofa‘properfunction’isbothteleologicalandscientif-icallyrespectable”.AndseeJ.Lennox’sshortsummaryofthedebatefromPlatoandAristotle,throughDarwin,andfrombehaviorismtocurrentdefensesoftele-ology,“Teleology,”inKeywordsinEvolutionaryBiology,ed.byEvelynFoxKellerandElisabethLloyd(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1992).ForcriticismofthenewDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife347anydefenseofteleologymustbesomehowscientificallyobsolete.Itwouldbefairenoughtoseektodefendthatclaiminthecontemporarydebate,whereitwouldbecontroversial.ButwemustnotsimplyassumethisclaimandthenviewHegelthroughthatlens.Ifwedidthat,thenwewillseektounderstandhimasdefendingteleologyspecificallybyprovidingalternativestocontemporaryscience–perhapsanalternativetothetheoryofnaturalselection,oraproposedexplanationoftheori-ginofalllife.Tobesure,bylookingintherightplacesonecanfindclaimsinHegelwhichconflictwithscientifictheorieswenowknowtobetrue.Butwemustnotmakeassumptionsaboutwhatrole,ifany,theseclaimsplayinHegel’sargumentagainstKantindefenseofnaturalteleology.Insteadoflookingthroughthelensofcontemporarybiologyandassumptionsaboutitsphilosophicalimplications,weshouldsimplyseektounderstandKantandHegel’sphilosophicalargumentsintheirownterms.Wecanthentrytounderstandwhetherandhowthosearguments–thoughscientificallyuninformedbyourstandards–mightreallybearontheunderlyingphilosophicalissuesofcontinuingimpor-tanceandinterest.That,inanycase,iswhatIseektodohere.IthinkthatbothKantandHegelprovidecompellingargumentswhoserealphilosophicalforceiseasytomiss.SoIdonotaimheretodecidetheissuebetweenthem,buttouncoverandexplainthearguments.IbeginwithabrieflookatKant’scaseforhisskepticalconclusions,andthenconsideratgreaterlengthHegel’sresponseandtheconclusionsitaimstosupport.IclosewithabriefdiscussionoftheimportanceofthistopicwithinHegel’sbroadermetaphysics.i.kant’sanalysisTobegin,wemustdistinguishtwooftheendeavorsKantpursuesintheCritiqueofthePowerofJudgment(hereafterKU).Kantseekstoanalyzetheconceptofacomplexsystemwhichwouldsatisfytheimplicationsofteleologicaljudgmentbynatureorinvirtueof“innerpurposiveness,”ratherthaninvirtueoftheworkofanexternaldesigner.HeseekstoanalyzetheconceptofaNaturzweck[naturalendorpurpose].AnothergoalofKant’sistodeterminewhatsortsofreasonswemighthave,defensesofteleology,seeRobertCummins,“FunctionalAnalysis,”JournalofPhi-losophy,72(1975),pp.741–765and“Neo-teleology’”inFunctions:NewEssaysonthePhilosophyofPsychologyandBiology,ed.byR.Cummins,M.Perlman,andA.R.Ariew(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002),pp.157–173andElliotSober,“NaturalSelectionandDistributiveExplanation:AReplytoNeander,”BritishJournalforthePhilosophyofScience,46(1995),pp.384–397.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n348jameskreinesifany,toconceiveofactuallivingbeingsasteleologicalsystemsbynature.7Kant’sanalysisconsistsoftworequirementsgoverningtherelations,inacomplexsystem,betweenthepartsandthewhole.Thefirstcondi-tionspecifiestheconditionsunderwhichacomplexsystemwillsatisfytheimplicationsofteleologicaljudgment,orwillbeaZweck[endorpurpose].AndKantarguesthatthiswillbesoonlywherethepartsaremeanstoanoverallendrealizedinthewhole.Tobeginwith,thisrequiresthatthepartsandtheirorganizationaresuchthatallthisjointlybenefitsthewhole.Butitiscrucialthatmerebenefitisnotsufficientforteleology.Forsomethingmighthavebeneficialconsequencesforsome-thingelsemerelybycoincidence.8SoKant’sfirstrequirementrequiresthatthepresenceofjointlybeneficialpartsisnotmerelycoincidental;suchpartsmustbepresentbecauseofthewayinwhichtheyarebene-ficialinrelationtoanoverallendorpurposerealizedinthewhole.InKant’sterms,“forathingasanaturalpurpose[Naturzweck]itisreq-uisite,first,thatitsparts(asfarastheirexistenceandtheirformareconcerned)arepossibleonlythroughtheirrelationtothewhole”(KU,5:373).Whenitcomestoactuallivingbeings,thequestionraisedbythefirstrequirementisnot“dothepartsandtheirorganizationcontributeincomplexwaystothesurvivalofthewhole?”Itisempiricallyobviousthattheydo.Buttheimportantquestionconcernsexplanation,namely:Aresuchbeneficialpartspresentinalivingbeingspecificallyforthesakeofthisbenefit,orbecauseofanendorZweck?Whenitcomestoartifacts,wehaveanobviousreasontoanswerintheaffirmative.Forexample,arethepartsofawatchpresentspecifi-callybecauseofpurposes,orbecauseofthewayeachcontributestothe7P.McLaughlincarefullydistinguishesKant’stwoendeavorshere.SeehisKant’sCri-tiqueofTeleologyinBiologicalExplanation(Lewiston:EdwinMellenPress,1990),pp.46–47.SeealsoA.Wood,Kant’sEthicalThought(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999),p.219.Itakethistoruleouttheideathat“Naturzweck”isKant’s“expressionforbiologicalorganisms.”SeeC.Zumbach,TheTranscendentScience.Kant’sConceptionofBiologicalMethodology(TheHague:Nijhoff,1984),p.19;J.D.MacFarland,Kant’sConceptofTeleology(Edinburg:EdinburgUniver-sityPress,1970),p.102;andW.deVries,“TheDialecticofTeleology,”PhilosophicalTopics,19(1991),pp.51–53.WemustdistinguishtheconceptofaNaturzweckfromtheempiricalconceptssuchoflivingbeingandorganisminordertomakesenseofKant’sdenialofthepossibilityofknowledgethatlivingbeingsareNaturzwecke.8TotakeKant’sexample,arecedingseamightbenefitaforestgrowingontheshore;thisneednotmeanthatthesearecedesforthesakeoftheforest,orbecauseofanybenefitoranyendorpurposeatall.NoteKant’sownemphasisofthe“because”(darumandweil)indiscussingthisissue.InKant’sterms,such“relativepurposive-ness”“justifiesnoabsoluteteleologicaljudgments”(KU,5:369).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife349furtherendofthewholereliablyindicatingthetime?Yes;adesignerhasselectedeachpartforthatveryreason.Invirtueofthedesigner’swork,suchcasessatisfytheexplanatoryimplicationsofteleologicaljudgment–thestructureofthewhole,andhowthatstructurecameabout,canbeexplainedbyendsorpurposes.Kantwantstoarguethatthereis,atleastinprinciple,roomforanotherkindof“invirtueof”here,anotherwayinwhichtheexplana-toryimplicationscouldbesatisfied.Thereisroomforameaningfulconceptofasystemthatisteleological(isa“Zweck”orendorpurpose)notinvirtueofexternaldesignbutbynature,orinvirtueof“innerpurposiveness.”9ThisistheconceptofaNaturzweck.Tocompletehisanalysisofthisconcept,Kantneedsasecondrequirementwhichwillexcludethemerely“externalpurposiveness”ofartifacts,leavingonly“innerpurposiveness.”TheintuitionbehindKant’sstrategyisclearenough:thepartsofartifactsaremeanstoanendonlyinsofarastheoverallstructureororganizationhasbeenimposed;aNaturzweck,bycontrast,wouldhaveto“self-organizing”(KU,5:374).Kantseekstofor-mulatethisasarequirement,likethefirst,governingpart–wholerela-tions.Framedinthisway,itwouldhavetorequirethatthestructureororganizationofthewholeisdeterminednotbysomethingelsebutbythepartsthemselves.Butforaparttocontributetothedeterminationofthestructurewouldbetocontributetowarddeterminingwhatotherkindsofpartsarepresentandtheirarrangement.SoforaNaturzweck,itisrequired“second,thatitspartsbecombinedintoawholebybeingreciprocallythecauseandeffectoftheirform”(KU,5:373).ii.naturalteleologyis“problematic”WithrespecttothisconceptofaNaturzweck,Kantseekstoargueforacomplexandbalancedconclusion:Ontheonehand,theconceptislog-icallyconsistent,andconceivinglivingbeingsinthesetermsisheuris-ticallyuseful.Ontheotherhand,wecanneverknowthatanythingrealactuallysatisfiesthatconcept.Kantwillargueagainstthepossibilityofknowledgebyapplyingwhatwenowoftencallthe‘backwardscausationproblem’tohisownrequire-mentthattheexistenceandformofthepartsofateleologicalsystem9Clearly,then,Kantdoesnotuseteleologicalnotions–forexample,theterm“Zweck,”sometimestranslatedas“purpose”–sothattheyaresupposedmerelybydefinitiontorequireexternalintelligentdesign.Heisinterestedneitherinordinaryusagenorinstipulatingherebutinthephilosophicalquestionofwhetherpartscanbepresentforthesakeofawhole,orbecauseofanend,withoutthisbeingduetoexternalintelligentdesign.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n350jameskreinesmustdependontheirrelationtothewhole.10Apartofasystemcanhavebeneficialconsequencesforthewholeonlyonceitisalreadypresentalongwiththeotherparts.Sothesebeneficialconsequencescannothaveanyinfluenceovertheprocess,entirelypriorintime,bywhichthepartoriginallycametobepresent–thiswouldbeakintosomethingreachingbackintimeandcausingitsowncause.InKant’sterms,“itisentirelycontrarytothenatureofphysical-mechanicalcausesthatthewholeshouldbethecauseofthepossibilityofthecausalityoftheparts”(KU,20:236).Theonlyexceptionwouldbeifthesystemoriginatesinapriorconceptofthewhole–aconceptdictatingthewaysinwhicheachpartistocontributealongwiththeothers.SoKant’sfirstcondition–thepartsdependontheirrelationstothewhole–canonlybemetwherethereis“aconceptoranideathatmustdetermineapriorieverythingthatistobecontainedinit”(KU,5:373).InterpretersofbothKantandHegelsometimesmissthestrengthofKant’sargumenthere.SomeseeKantasworriedabouthowanendorteloscouldbeanefficientcause,andreplythatweshouldinsteadentirelydistinguishteleologyfromexplanationintermsofefficientcauses,sothatwecanthensaythatbothlegitimatelyandindependentlyexplain,perhapsinsofaraseachaddressesdistinctexplanatoryinterestsorpracticesofourown.11AsfarasIcansee,thislineofthoughtdoesnotaddresstheconsiderationsintroducedbyKant.True,differentkindsofexplanationmightexplainincontextofdifferentinterestsorpractices.10SeealsoKant’sconsiderationofthehouseexample:intheorderof“realcauses,”anendorpurpose(Zweck)cannotprecedeandtherebyinfluenceitsowncauses,soitcandosoonlyas“ideal,”orasfirstrepresented(KU,5:372).MacFarland,Kant’sConceptofTeleology,stressesthebackwardscausationproblem(1970,p.106),buttheargumentisstrongerthanherecognizesthere.SeealsoR.Zuckert,“PurposivenessTimeandUnity:AReadingoftheCritiqueofJudgment”(Chicago:Ph.D.dissertation,2000),ch.2andGuyer,“OrganismsandtheUnityofScience,”inKantandtheSciences,ed.byEricWatkins(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001),p.265.11ThefirststepsofthisresponsearesuggestedindeVries’saccountofHegel’sresponsetoKant:TheproblemwithKant’s“model”–onwhichteleologyrequirespriorrepresentationofaconcept–isthatit“reducesfinalcausationtotheformofefficientcausation.”Seehis“DialecticofTeleology,”p.56.Bycontrast,“theancientssawnoproblemaboutthestatusofteleologicaljudgmentsorexplana-tions.FinalcauseswereoneofthefourAristotelian“becauses,”soquestionsaboutteleologywerealwaysinorderintheAristoteliansystem”(p.52)–andHegelfollowsthem(p.54).IarguethatKant’sargumentisnotsoeasilydismissed,sothatHegelrequires(andseeksinAristotle)alineofargumentwhichaddressesKant’sargumentmoredirectly.ContrastalsoZumbach’sclaimthatKantcanbereadasdefendingakindofteleologicalexplanation,andthatKantdoesnotputthepointthiswaybecauseofhisnarrowconceptionsofcausalityandexplanation.SeehisTranscendentScience,pp.95–97,123.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife351Onthefaceofit,however,explanationisalsoconstrainedbywhatisreallygoingonintheworld.IfXplaysnoroleindeterminingorinflu-encingY,thennoappealtoXcanlegitimatelyexplainY,nomatterwhatyourinterestsandpracticesmightbe.Forexample,ifthemovementsofthestarswhichmakeuptheconstellationSagittariushavenorealinfluenceonmycurrentmood,thenitissimplyamistakeforanyonetoexplainthelaterbyappealtotheformer.12Butitishardtocomprehendhowanykindofdeterminingorinfluencing(whetherwethinkofthisascausalorotherwise)couldoperatebackwardsintime.SoitcertainlyseemslegitimateforKanttoworryabouthowanendoraZweckreal-izedinawholesystemcouldpossiblyplayanyrealroleindeterminingorinfluencingtheentirelypriorprocessbywhichthestructurefirstcametobepresentinthatsystem.OtherinterpretersworrythatKanthereseekstodefendteleologicalexplanationoflivingbeingsinascientificallyoutdatedmanner.13But,first,thepointdoesnotdirectlyconcernactuallivingbeings.Itisaconceptualpointabouttheveryideaofateleologicalsystem(aZweck).And,second,thepointismeantasreasontodoubtthatwecanknowlivingbeingstobeteleologicalsystems.Inthiscase,wecanhavenoknowledgeofanyoriginatingconcept–Kantdeniesusknowledgeofanythinglikeadesignerofnature.14Theargumentissimilartothecommoncontemporaryclaimthatateleologicalsystemcanonlybeanartifact–nowgenerallyofferedasareasonwhyteleologycanhavenoplaceinbiologyatall.1512WhenitcomestoHegel’sview,comparehislimitedpraiseofBacon’sskepticismaboutteleology:Baconatleasthelpstocounteractthesortof“superstition”which“makestwosensuousthingswhichhavenorelationoperateononeanother”(VGP,20:88/3:186).Sowhereanendhasnorealrelationtoaprocess,itwouldbemerelysuperstitioustoapplyteleology.Garrettmakesthisgeneralpointinconsideringearlymodernconsiderationsofteleologymoregenerally:“ateleologicalexplana-tionisonethatexplainsastateofaffairsbyindicatingalikelyorpresumptiveconsequence(causal,logical,orconventional)ofitthatisimplicatedinthestate’soriginoretiology....Noproposedteleologicalexplanation,nomatterhowappeal-ingorcompelling,canbecorrectunlessitcitesanactualexampleofteleology.”Seehis“TeleologyinSpinozaandEarlyModernRationalism,”inNewEssaysontheRationalists,ed.byJ.GennaroandC.Huenemann(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999),p.310.13SeeMacFarland,Kant’sCritiqueofTeleology,p.106.14Wecannothaveknowledgeof“an(intelligent)worldcausethatactsaccordingtopurposes”(KU,5:389;seealsoKU,5:400andKU,5:410)CompareespeciallyDescartes’responsetoGassendi’sfirstobjectiontothefourthmeditation.15Forexample,Cumminsarguesthatanynotionoffunctionwhichpurportstoexplainthepresenceofthepartsofacomplexsystemwillapplyonlytoartifacts:“itseemstomethatthequestion,‘whyisxthere?’canbeansweredbyspecifyingDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n352jameskreinesButwhatissointerestingandsodifficulttograsphereisthatKant’sfurthercasealsodifferscruciallyfromsuchcontemporaryskepticismaboutnaturalteleology.Kantdoesnotarguethatteleologicaljudgmentimpliesthatasystemisanartifact.Hecarefullyaimstopreserveaslogicallyconsistenttheconceptofasystemthatsatisfiesteleologicaljudgment,butnotinvirtueofitsbeinganartifact.Morespecifically,Kantarguesasfollows:Ateleologicalsystemrequiresanoriginatingconcept.Ifthepurposivenessistobeinner,thenthestructureofthewholeisduetotheparts.Puttingtheserequire-mentstogether,thepartswouldhavetodeterminethestructureinamannerguidedbyaconcept.Butthepartsoftherealcomplexsystemsofwhichwehaveempiricalknowledge,suchaslivingbeings,areulti-matelymatter.Andmattercannotrepresentconceptsorintendtoactinaccordancewiththem:“nointentioninthestrictsenseofthetermcanbeattributedtoanylifelessmatter.”16SoKant’stworequirementshaveincompatibleimplicationsabouttheoriginofasystemwhenappliedtoamaterialsystem:tosaythatthestructureofanexclusivelymaterialsystemisduespecificallyandentirelytoitsownparts–tosaythatithasanoriginin“amechanicalkindofgeneration”–istodenythatanyendorpurpose[Zweck]playsanyroleinbringingaboutororiginatingthatstructure.17ThisiswhyKantsaysthat“onekindofexplanationexcludestheother”(KU,5:412).So,toknowthatanapparentlyteleo-logicalmaterialsystemmanifeststrueinnerpurposivenesswouldbetoknowthatitwasneverreallyateleologicalsystematall.ButnoneofthisshowsthatarealNaturzweckislogicallyimpos-sible.Foritisnotalogicaltruththateverythingmustbesuchthatwecancomprehenditandknowit.Morespecifically,problemsaboutbackwardscausationwouldnotapplytoanythingnonspatiotemporal.Sowecannotruleoutonlogicalgroundsthepossibilitythatthereisanonspatiotemporal“supersensiblerealgroundofnature”ora“thinginx’sfunctiononlyifxisorispartofanartifact.”Seehis“FunctionalAnalysis,”p.746.16KU,5:383.ThisclaimaboutmatterhasasurprisinglystrongstatusinKant.Fortheconceptofmatterissupposedtobesomehowempiricalandyetalsoapriori.SeeespeciallyM.Friedman,“MatterandMotionintheMetaphysicalFoundationsandtheFirstCritique:TheEmpiricalConceptofMatterandtheCategories,”inWatkins,KantandtheSciences,pp.53–69.SeealsoKU,5:394,LecturesonMetaphysics,29:275,andMetaphysicalFoundationsofNaturalScience,4:544.17Morespecifically,“ifweconsideramaterialwhole,asfarasitsformisconcerned,asaproductofthepartsandoftheirforcesandtheircapacitytocombinebythemselves...werepresentamechanicalkindofgeneration.ButfromthistherearisesnoconceptofawholeasaZweck”(KU,5:408).Theproblemhereconcernsorigins;Kanthimselfrefersto“thewholedifficultysurroundingthequestionabouttheinitialgenerationofathingthatcontainspurposesinitself”(KU,5:420).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife353itself(whichisnotanappearance)assubstratum”whichcould–unlikematterinspaceandtime–somehowself-organizeitselffromwithin,inaccordancewithaconcept,withoutanythinglikeexternaldesign.Wecannotcomprehendhowsuchself-organizationmightbepossible,butwecanconceiveofahigherformofintellect–an“intellectualintu-ition”oran“intuitiveunderstanding”–whichmight.18Andthishigherintellectmightbeinapositiontosaytwoverydifferentthingsaboutreallivingbeings:(i)asmaterialsystemsinspaceandtime,theyare“inaccordancewithmechanicallaws”;andyet(ii)assomehowdeterminedorconditionedbya“supersensiblerealground”theyare“inaccordancewithteleologicallaws”(KU,5:409).Wecanhaveneithercomprehen-sionhere,noranyreasontoassertknowledgeofanyofthis.Still,theconceptofsomethingthatisateleologicalsystembynatureratherthanbydesignislogicallyconsistent.Andthepossibilitythatlivingbeingsmightbesuchsystems“canbeconceivedwithoutcontradictionbutcannotbecomprehended”(KU,5:371).InthiswayKantopensupthespaceforpositiveclaimsaboutotheruses–asidefromtheassertionofknowledgeorexplanation–fortheconceptofaNaturzweck.First,livingbeingssuggestself-organizationinvariousways:theirpartsmutuallycompensateforoneanother,theyincorporatematterinordertogrow,andtheygeneratenewlivingbeingsbyreproduction(KU,5:371-2).Forthisandotherreasons,Kantwillholdthatourexperience“exhibits”butnonethelesscannot“prove”theexistenceofrealNaturzwecke(KU,20:234).Second,Kantwillarguethatthinkingoflivingbeingsinsuchteleologicaltermsprovidesuswithanindispensableheuristicaid,andthatwewouldhavenohopeofgaininganyscientificunderstandingoflivingbeingswithoutthisaid;KantevenarguesthatwemustforsimliarreasonsjudgenatureitselfasifitwereaNaturzweck.1918Morespecifically,ourmerely“discursive”understandingisdependentonsensi-bility,andtheformsofalloursensibleintuitionarespaceandtime.Thefurtherknowledgewouldrequirean“understandingwhichisnotdiscursivebutintuitivebecauseitgoesfromthesyntheticallyuniversal(oftheintuitionofawholeassuch)totheparticular,thatis,fromthewholetotheparts”(KU,5:406)Notethat,strictlyspeaking,whatislogicallypossibleisthattheremightbeasystemwhichsatisfiestheimplicationsofteleologicaljudgmentinvirtueofitsowninnernature.Butifwetake“nature”tomeanempiricalrealityinspaceandtime,ormaterialreality,thenKanthasnotpreservedeventhelogicalpossibilityofanentirely“natural”endorpurpose.19Withregardtolivingbeings,seeKant’sfamousdenialofthepossibilityofaNewtonforabladeofgrass.NotethatKantcarefullymakesthisclaimrelativetowhatitispossiblefor“humans”to“grasp,”whileleavingopenthepossibilitythatlivingbeingsreallyoriginatein“meremechanism”(KU,5:400).Withregardtonatureasawhole,seetheargumentsofthepublishedandunpublishedintroductions.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n354jameskreinesButwhatismostimportantforourpurposesisKant’sskepticalconclusion:wecannotcomprehendhowbothrequirementscouldbejointlymet,sowecannothaveknowledgethatlivingbeingsaretrueNaturzwecke,orknowledgethatteleologytrulyexplainsthestructureanddevelopmentoflivingbeings.InKant’sterms,theconceptofaNaturzweckis“problematic”:whenemployingit“onedoesnotknowwhetheroneisjudgingaboutsomethingornothing”(KU,5:397).20iii.hegel’saimsItisworthbrieflyclarifyingHegel’saimsbycontrastingsomereadilyapparentroutesbywhichonemightseektochallengeKant’sskepti-calconclusion.Tobeginwith,HegelisundernoillusionsthatonecandefendteleologyinresponsetoKantmerelybypointingoutthatitisadistinctanddifferentformofexplanation–whetherdifferentfrommechanism,efficientcausality,andsoforth.Teleologyandmechanismcannotbeshowntobemutually“indifferent”andequallyvalidsim-plybynotingthattheydiffer:“ifmechanismandpurposivenessstandopposedtooneanother,theycannotforthatveryreasonbetakenasindifferentconcepts,eachofwhichiscorrectonitsownaccount,pos-sessingasmuchvalidityastheyother.”Nordoesan“equalvalidity”ofbothfollow“becausewehavethemboth”(WL,6:437/735).Atissue,then,isnotwhetherwehaveaninterestinexplaininglivingbeingsinteleologicalterms,butwhethersuchexplanationcanbevalid.AndHegelrecognizesthat,atleastfromthepointofviewofaphilosophicaloutlooklikeKant’s,thepossibilityofrealinnerpurposivenessis“anincomprehensiblemystery”(WL,6:473/763).Hegelwantstoshowthatnaturalteleologyisnotproblematic,andnotincomprehensible–notonaccountofanincompatibilitywithmechanism,norforanyotherreason.ButHegelrecognizestheneedforanargumentthataddressesKant’sspecificconcerns.Somecontemporaryreadersmightbeattractedtotheideathatthenotionof“function”ofuseinbiologycarriesnoimplicationsaboutoriginsatall,andsononethatcouldgenerateanymysterybyconflictingwithmechanism.Butthiskindofcontemporaryapproachaimstogetridofteleologicalnotions(andisvulnerabletoattacksbycontemporarydefensesofteleology).Tosaythatsomethinghasa“function”inasensewithnoimplicationsaboutorigins–forexample,tosaythatitispartof“teleonomic”system–doesnotimplythatitsexistenceand20IstresstheimportanceofthisconclusioninmymoredetailedreadingofKant’sargumentin“TheInexplicabilityofKant’sNaturzweck:KantonTeleology,Expla-nationandBiology,”ArchivfurGeschichtederPhilosophie,87(2005),pp.270–311.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife355formisreallyexplainedbyanend,[Zweck],ortelos.Kant,bycontrast,defendstheimportanceofaconceptthatdoesinvolveteleologyinthissense[Naturzweck],andHegelaimstogoevenfurtherbydefendingthepossibilityofknowledgethatthisconceptappliestonaturalbeings.21OnemightobviouslydirectlyrefuteKant’scasebyarguingthatmat-teritself,ratherthanbeingconstrainedorgovernedbynecessarylaws,isactuallycapableofrepresentingconceptsandactinginaccordancewiththem.ButwewillseethatthisisnotHegel’sstrategy.HegelelsewheretakesissuewithsomeofKant’sclaimsaboutmatter,buthedoesnotdefendsuchpanpsychism.22SoHegel’sbasicgoalistoshow,withoutarguingthatmattercanactintentionally,thatwecancomprehendthepossibilityofaNaturzweck.Hegelwilltrytomeetthisgoalbyshowing,first,thatwecancompre-hendhowalivingbeingmightsatisfytheimplicationsofteleologicaljudgmentwithoutthinkingofitastheproductofanagentrepresentingaconcept.And,second,thatwecanknowthispurposivenesstobetrulyinnerwithoutknowinganythingaboutthecapacitiesoftheunderlyingconstituentmatter.Andsotheinabilityofmattertorepresentconceptsandactinaccordancewillnolongerpreventourcomprehendingthepos-sibilitythatlivingbeingsmightreallybeteleologicalsystemsinvirtueoftheirownnature.iv.theanalysisoflifeHegelarguesthisintheScienceofLogicbymeansofananalysisofaconceptoflife.Itcanbedifficulttounderstandwhatthepointof21ItiscrucialthatKant’sstrategyisnotsimilartocontemporaryattemptstoreplaceteleology,forexample,with“teleonomy,”contraC.Warnke“Naturmechanis-musundNaturzweck:BemerkungenzuKantsOrganismus-Begriff,”DeutscheZeitschriftfurPhilosophie,40(1992),pp.42–52,andDusing‘Naturteleologieund¨MetaphysikbeiKantundHegel’inHegelunddieKritikderUrteilskraft,ed.byH.-F.FuldaandR.-P.Horstmann(Stuttgart:Frommann-Holzboog,1990),p.142.Incontemporaryterms,atrulyteleologicalnotionof“function”wouldhavetobean“etiological”notion–onewhichcarriesimplicationsaboutthefactorswhichdetermineorcausethepresenceofthepartsofacomplexsystem;thepointtendstobeagreedbythosewhodefendandthosewhocriticizethescientificstatusofsuchteleologicalnotions.Thosewhodefendteleologyarguethatnonteleolog-icalnotionsoffunction,withoutimplicationsaboutorigins,canbeascribedtoobroadly(onthebasisofanycapacityofinteresttous,ratherthanjustthoseforthesakeofwhichapartitselfisreallypresent)andyetalsonotbroadlyenough(theycannotapplytoapartwhichfailstofulfillitsfunction.)22ForHegel’scomplaintsaboutKantonmatterandmechanics,seeWL,5:200ff./178ff,andPN,§§262An.SeealsoBeiser’sdenialthatHegel’sdefenseofteleologyispansychist,Hegel(London:Routledge,2005),pp.101–102.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n356jameskreinestheanalysisis.Itisnotanattempttogiveanapriorilogicaldeduc-tionofthefeaturesreallivingbeingsmusthave.23NorisitadirectreplacementfororcompetitortoKant’sanalysisoftheconceptofaNaturzweck.NorisHegelseekingmerelytoreflectonourconceptualschemeinordertoanalyzeourordinaryconceptoflifeorlivingbeing.Theanalysismustbeunderstoodasatheoreticaltool,orintermsofwhatHegelseekstodowithit–intermsofhowhewilluseittoarguethatwecancomprehendthepossibilityofasystemwithtrueinnerpurposiveness.ButthebestwaytofollowHegelisinitiallytosetasidequestionsabouthowthelargerargumentfunctions,andattendfirstjusttothecontentoftheanalysis,orthecontentofHegel’sconceptoflife.Hegel’sanalysis,andthecruxofhisphilosophicalresponsetoKantonteleologyandbiology,isfoundinasectioncalled“Life”inbothver-sionsoftheLogic.TheanalysisalsoprovidesthestructureforHegel’sdiscussionsofplantandanimalbiologyinthePhilosophyofNatureandelsewhere.InallofHegel’streatments,theanalysishasthreerequire-ments.ThefirstrequirementmirrorsKant’sanalysisintermsoftherelationsbetweenpartandwhole:“allthemembersarereciprocallymomentarymeansaswellasmomentaryends.”24Hegelputsthepointmoredirectlyelsewhere:“theorgansarethemeansoflife,andtheseverymeans,theorgansthemselves,arealsotheelementinwhichliferealizesandmaintainsitself...thisisself-preservation.”25ButHegel’sconceptoflifealsodemandsthatacomplexsystemitselfrequiressomekindofassimilationfromtheoutsideenvironmentinordertogrowandpreserveitself.InHegel’sterms:“inandthroughthisprocessagainstaninorganicnature,itmaintainsitself,developsitselfandobjectifiesitself”(EL,§219).Alternatively,itmustbeengagedina“strugglewiththeouterworld”(PN,§365Z).Third,Hegel’sconceptoflifealsorequiresthatindividualsmustbemortal,andmustaimforthereproduction(e.g.,sexualreproduction)bywhichaspeciesendures.26SoanythingsatisfyingHegel’sconceptmustalsopursueself-preservationinanadditionalsense:itmustaimto23Forexample,“itisquiteimproper”totryto“deduce”the“contingentproductsofnature”(PN,§§250).24EL,§§216.SeeKant’ssimilarformulationatKU,5:375,towhichHegelrefersatEL,§§57.InHegel,seealsoWL,2:420/766–767;PN,§§352;PN,§356.25Similarly,“theoneexistsonlythroughtheotherandfortheother,andallthemembersandcomponentpartsofmenaresimplymeansfortheself-preservationoftheindividualwhichisheretheend”(VPR,17:503/330).26Onmortalityspecifically,seeEL,§221,WL,6:486/774,PN,§§375f.,VL,213,andVPN,184.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife357reproduceitself–it“producesitselfasanotherindividualofthesamespecies”(PP,4:32/142).Andsurvivalofthespeciesrequiresthatself-preservationinthislattersensedominates:“theendoftheanimalinitselfasanindividualisitsownself-preservation;butitstrueendinitselfisthespecies.”27InHegel’sterms,thethirdrequirementdemandsthe“processoftheGattung”[genus,kindorspecies]ortheGat-tungsprozess.28(Hegel’stermGattung–usuallytranslatedas“genus”–canseemtosuggesttheideathatthereisaperfecthierarchicalclassi-ficationsystemdefinedbyclearnecessaryandsufficientconditionsfordifferentcategories;Hegel’sanalysisdoesnotrequirethatclaim,andheelsewheredeniesit.29TherequirementsoftheanalysisalonefixthemeaningofGattunghere:itreferstoageneralkindwithinwhichindi-vidualsreproduce,generatingmoreindividualsofthesamekind.Iwillgenerallyuse“species”torefertothisidea.)30Hegel’sthreerequirementsareinterrelatedinseveralways.Forexam-ple,thefirstgovernsinternalstructure.Butcombiningthiswiththesec-ondandthirdrequirementswillgenerateadditionaldemandsonstruc-ture:ifthepartsaretobemutuallybeneficial,thentheywillhavetobeorganizedinamannerthatrealizesthecapacities,ormakespossibletheactivities,requiredforassimilationandreproduction.31Itmakessense,then,forHegeltosayelsewherethatliferequiresa“systemofactiv-itieswhichisactualizedintoasystemoforgansthroughwhichthoseactivitiesproceed”sothat“inthiswaythelivingthingisarticulatedpurposefully;allitsmembersserveonlyasmeanstotheoneendofself-preservation”(VPA,13:193/1:145).Finally,notethatthestructureofHegel’sanalysisoftheconceptoflifediffersgreatlyfromKant’sanalysisoftheconceptofaNaturzweck.Kant’sanalysisitselfconsistsentirelyoftworequirementsgoverning27VGP,20:87;VGP,3:185.Alsoonthewayinwhichtheendofpreservationofthespeciestrumpspreservationoftheindividual,seeEL,§§221andWL,6:484/773–774.28Forexample,WL,6:486/774;EL§221;PN§367ff;VL,213.29Biologydoesnotallow“anindependent,rationalsystemoforganization”(PN,§§370)Life“initsdifferentiatingprocessdoesnotactuallypossesanyrationalorderingandarrangementofparts,andisnotanimmanentlygroundedsystemofshapes”(PhG,178–179,224–225).SeealsoVN,199.And“naturallytherearealsoanimalswhichareintermediateforms”(PN,§368Z).30“Species”isthebesttranslation,forexample,whereHegelreferstothepropa-gationofthe“species”or“dieFortpflanzungderGattung”(PN,§§365Z/9:492).Iwillcontinuetoalsouse“kind”andGattungbecauseitisimportantthatHegelusesthesametermfornaturalkinds,asinchemicalkinds:forexample,“theuniversalessence,therealkind(Gattung)oftheparticularobject”(WL,6:430/728).31Onthesecapacities,seeEL,§218Z;PN,§344Z,§§354–358).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n358jameskreinesspecificallypart-wholerelationswithinacomplexsystem.32Herecognizesassimilationandreproduction.Buthearguesthatthegen-eralphilosophicalproblemconcerningnaturalteleologyisindependentofthesespecificwaysinwhichourexperienceofreallivingbeingshap-penstosuggesttheself-organizationofaNaturzweck.Hegel’sanalysisoflifeismorecomplex:Italsodemandsaspecificrelationshipbetweenthewholeandtheoutsideenvironmentandbetweenthewholeandotherwholesofthesamegeneralkindorspecies.Initself,simplicitywouldbeaphilosophicaladvantage–unlessHegelcanshowthattheseadditionalfeaturesarerelevantto,andinfactresolve,Kant’sgeneralphilosophicalproblemconcerningnaturalteleology.v.comprehendingtheoriginofanaturzweckThisbeingHegel,itistoomuchtohopeforanimmediatelyandeas-ilytransparentstatementofhowtheargumentofthe“Life”sectionintheLogicissupposedtowork.ButIthinkwecanseetheanswerclearlyenoughbyconsideringhowHegel’sanalysisspecificallyrelatestoKant’sargument,andthenworkingourwaytowardprogressivelybetterunder-standingsofHegel’sinitiallyopaqueterminology.Tobeginwith,itistheoriginorgenesisofaNaturzweck–wecannotcomprehendhowanyorigincouldsatisfybothofKant’srequirements.AndHegel’sanalysisoflifedoesconspicuouslyaddressthetopicoforigins:theanalysisrequiresreproduction,or“thegenerationofindividuality”(WL,6:486/774).Thefirstquestionis,then,whyshoulditbepossibleforacomplexsystemtosatisfytheimplicationsofteleologicaljudgmentinvirtueofthiskindoforigin,withoutrequiringanoriginatingrepresentationofthewhole?Tobeginwith,Hegel’sanalysisaddsadistinctionbetweensomethingparticularandsomethinggeneraloruniversal–betweenindividualsandtheirgeneralspeciesorkind.Distinctindividuals–parent(s)andoff-spring–are(thoughinmanywaysdifferent)identicalinonerespect:theyarethesameinspeciesorkind(Gattung).Sothereisasenseinwhich,inreproducing,anindividualproducesnotsomethingelsebutrather“producesitselfasanotherindividualofthesamespecies”(PP,4:32/142).Furthermore,thegeneralstructureoftheoffspringwillgenerallybeidenticalanddeterminedbytheparent(s);forexample,“throughthemaleandfemalenatures,thereemergesadeterminationoftheentirestructure”(PN,§365Z,9:459/377).Andnowwecansee32“AlldeterminationsoftheconceptofnaturalpurposethatKantintroduceshavetodowiththerelationofpartandwhole.”SeeMcLaughlin,“Kant’sCritiqueofTeleology,”p.50.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife359howthegeneralstructureofaneworganismprecedesitsdevelopment–notintheformoranintelligentdesigner’srepresentation,butinthestructuresharedbytheparent(s)andpreviousgenerationsofthesamespecies.Howdoesthishelpwithteleology?Considerthequestionintermsofpartsandwhole,followingKant’sanalysis.Takeasanexampleatiger–IwillcallhimHobbes–andhisclaws.OnKant’saccount,theproblemisthis:howcanthebeneficialconsequencesofHobbes’sclaws,oncepresentinHobbes,haveanyinfluenceovertheprocess,entirelypriorintime,bywhichtheseveryclawsfirstcametobepresentinHobbes?Thatisindeedproblematic.ButHegel’sanalysisreconceivestheproblem.Ifdifferentindividualsarethesameinstructure,thentheywillhavethesamegeneralkindsofpartsorfeatures–or“members,”intheHegeliantermswewillcometobelow.Thegeneralkindsofpartsoflivingbeings–forexample,claws,heart,lungs–havebeneficialconsequencesforwholesofthespeciesgenerally.Forexample,“theteeth,claws,andthelike...itisthroughthesethattheanimalestablishesandpreservesitselfasanindependentexistence”(PN,§368A).Kant’sproblemwillnowlookverydifferent;thequestionisnow:howcanthebeneficialconsequencesofageneralkindofpartpossiblyhaveinfluenceoverhowanewinstanceofthatsamegeneralkindofpartcametoexistwithinthisnewindividual?Thisisnolongersoproblematic.Hobbes’sclawswillbeabenefittohim.And,crucially,thisisnocoincidence:thisgeneralfeatureor“member”contributestoassimilationandsotothesurvivaloftigersgenerally;andthisgeneralbenefithasalreadyhelpedtomakepossiblethesurvivalofprevioustigers,andsoalsotheproductionofHobbesandhisclaws.Moregenerally,anewindividualanditsnewpartsarepossibleonlyinsofaraspartsofthatgeneralkindarebeneficialinrelationtowholesofthesamegeneralkind.SothenewindividualmeetsKant’sdemandthat,inateleologicalsystemthe“parts(asfarastheirexistenceandtheirformareconcerned)arepossibleonlythroughtheirrelationtothewhole”(KU,5:373).Andwecancomprehendinthiswayhowacomplexsystemmightbethroughoutallitsparts,“meansandtheinstrumentoftheend”(WL,6:476/766).Or,morespecifically,mightbesuchthat“allitsmembersserveonlyasmeanstotheoneendofself-preservation”(VPA,13:193/1:145).Somemayfeelthattrueteleologyissomehoweliminatedorreducedinanaccountofthissort.Tobesure,intelligentdesign(aswithartifacts)ismissing;butitisclearlyHegel’sgoaltoshowthatKant’sanalysisofteleologycanbemetwithoutthis,orwithoutexternalpurposiveness.Moregenerally,Hegelspecificallyseekstodowithouttherequirementforanoriginatingrepresentation(whetherthisissupposedtobeonDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n360jameskreinesthepartofaseparatedesigner,orwhethermatteritselfisimaginedtorepresentagoalandorganizeitselfinaccordance).33Andthisisnodefenseofteleologicalexplanationofthehistoricaldevelopmentofaspecies.ButtheLogicanalysisof“life”makesnospecialrequirementsabouthoworevenwhetherabiologicalspeciesoriginatesordevelopsintimeatall.Itdoesnotruleinoroutanystandonthistopic.Bynotmentioninganyofthis,ittreatsthetopicasanempiricalmatternotrelevanttotheresolutionofthegeneralphilo-sophicalproblemconcerninghowteleologymightexplainthestructureanddevelopmentofacomplexsystemsuchasanindividualorganism.34(Ofcourse,Hegelelsewhereinsiststhat“spirit”(Geist),orsometimes“self-consciousness,”doesdevelopprogressivelyovertime;butthisisadistincttopic.)Onemightcertainlyworrythattheaccountsketchedsofarcannotrendercomprehensiblegenuineself-organizationortrueinnerpurpo-siveness.ForHegel’saccountdoesnothingtoexplainhowwecouldgetfrommerematteralonetoanorganizedlivingbeing,capableofassimila-tionandreproduction.ButthisisnotitselfthepreciseproblematissuebetweenKantandHegel.Tobeginwith,Kantdoesnotholdthatwecannothaveknowledgeoftheexistenceofanythingwhichwecannotexplainintermsofmatteranditslaws;Kantallowsknowledgeoftheexistenceoflivingbeingswhichassimilateandreproduce,eventhoughhethinkswelacksuchexplanatoryinsighthere.35Kant’sproblemisfocusedmoredirectlyontheconceptofaNaturzweck.FortheinnerpurposivenessofaNaturzweck,thestructureofthewholewouldhavetobeduetotheparts.ThisiswhyKantseesquestionsaboutmatterasrelevant:toknowthatthestructureofamaterialsystemisduetoitspartswewouldhavetoknowhowitsstructurecananddoesemergeentirelyfromthelaw-governedbehavioroftheunderlyingmatter.Buttoknowthiswouldbetoknowthatthissystemdoesnothavethekindoforiginrequiredforateleologicalsystematall.OnewaytochallengeKant’sconclusionherewouldbetoofferanexplanationofhowmatteralonemightgenerateagenuinely33AndthisleadsHegeltolimitedpraiseofthemostfamouscriticsofnaturaltele-ology:withtheStoics,“allexternal,teleologicalsuperstitionistakenundertheirprotectionandjustified,”andEpicurianism(thoughwrongaboutnaturalteleol-ogy)atleast“proceedstowardstheliberationofmenfromthissuperstition”(VGP,19:267/2:248).HegelalsocomparesthewayinwhichBacon’scriticismsofnaturalteleologyatleasthelptocountermodernsuperstitions(VGP,20:87/3:185).34Compare:Kant’sanalysistreatsthephenomenaofassimilationandreproductionasrealbutirrelevanttothegeneralproblemconcerningtheconceptofaNaturzweck.ThisisobviouslynottosaythatKantdeniestherealityofthosephenomena.35See,forexample,thefamousbladeofgrassclaimisatKU,5:400.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife361teleologicalsystem.IfwethinkthatthisisHegel’sway,thenwewilltrytounderstandhimasrespondingtoKantongroundsofsomescien-tifictheoryofepigenesis,orvitalforces,orsomethingofthelike.Butthe“Life”sectionoftheLogicproposesnothingofthesort.Instead,Hegelarguesthatwhetherornotthestructureofthewholedependsontheparts,inthesenserequiredforinnerpurposiveness,neednothaveanythingatalltododirectlywiththecapacitiesspecifictothelowest-levelunderlyingconstituentstufformatter.Thekeyhereisagaintheconnectionbetweentheparticularandthegeneraloruniversal,sothatparent(s)andoffspringarethesameinspeciesandinstructure.Thegeneralideaisjustthatanewindividualisself-organizinginsofarasitsstructureisduetoitsownnature,inthesenseofitsspecies[Gattung].Toseethepoint,consideragainthegeneralkindsofpartsor“members”presentinparent(s)andoffspring.Itisthecontributionofsuchpartsinpreviousgenerationswhichmakespossiblethegenerationofanewindi-vidualwiththesamestructure.Sothestructureoftheneworganismisnotdeterminedbysomethingelseorsomethingother–thestructureofthewholeisduetotheparts,inthesenseofthegeneralkindsofpartspresentwithinit.36InHegel’sterms(towhichIwillreturnbelow)liv-ingbeingssatisfytherequirementsofinnerpurposivenessnotinvirtueoftherelationbetweenthewholeandthemutuallyexternalmaterial“parts”inspace,butinvirtueoftherelationbetweenthewholeandthegeneralkindsofpartsor“members”(WL,6:476/766).Inthisway,Hegel’sanalysissuggeststhatthespecificnatureofthelowest-levelunderlyingmaterialisirrelevanttothegeneralquestionofwhetherornotsomethingmanifeststrueinnerpurposiveness.Strictlyspeaking,itremainsforHegeltoargueinthePhilosophyofNaturethatourempiricalknowledgeofplantandanimalbiologyfitstheanalysisoflife.Butthemainpointherewillbeuncontroversial–afterall,therearelivingbeings,andtheydoassimilateandreproduce.ThephilosophicalheavyliftingcomesintheLogicargumentforaconceptualconclusion:theconceptofsomethingthatisateleologicalsystembynatureorbyvirtueofinnerpurposivenessisnotproblematic;ifweknowsomethingtosatisfyHegel’sanalysis,thenweknowittobeaNaturzweck.36OrconsiderKant’sofficialformulation–thedemandthatthe“partsbecombinedintoawholebybeingreciprocallythecauseandeffectoftheirform”(KU,5:373).Takethetigerforexample:onefeature(liketheclaws)contributestowardmakingpossiblethegenerationofanewtigerwithmanydifferentfeatures(likelungs,legs,etc.);allthoseotherfeaturesalsocontributetowardmakingpossiblethegenerationofanewtigerwithclaws.Sotheclawsasageneralfeatureoftigerscontributestocausingallthepartsofournewtiger;andtheothergeneralfeaturesoftigersalsocontributetocausingtheclawsinournewtiger.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n362jameskreinesvi.immediacy,theconcept,andaristotle’sinfluenceIturnnowtoconsidersomeofthedistinctivewaysinwhichHegelpresentshiscaseandhisconclusions.Tobeginwith,wemustattendtothewayinwhichHegelpresentsthethreepartsofthe“Life”sectionoftheLogicnotasanarticulationofthreemerelystipulatedrequirementsofaconceptoflife,butasthreestepsofaunifiedcourseofargument.Todoso,wemustfollowhisuseoftheterm“immediate”there.Initially,Hegel’sanalysisgovernsonlypart-wholerelationsor“theprocessofthelivingbeinginsideitself”(EL,§217).HereHegelisarguingthatananalysisgoverningonlypart-wholerelationswithinasystem,suchasKant’s,wouldindeedmakethegenesisororiginofinnerpurposivenessintoamystery.InHegel’sterms,therecanbeherenomediationthroughwhichwecouldeithercomprehendthispossibility;thefirststepcon-cernsonlya“first,immediateindividuality”(WL,6:437/764).Or,atthispoint,anassertionthatthereissomethingthatisateleologicalsystembynaturecouldonlybeanimmediate“presupposition”whichisimpossibletomakegood.ButthisbeginstochangeoncewemovetowardHegel’sanalysisofwhathecalls“theuniversalconceptoflife.”SoonceHegelconcludeshissecondstep,andbeginstointroducethethird,helooksbackonthefirststepandsaysthat“thelivingindividual,atfirstdisengagedfromtheuniversalconceptoflife,isapresuppositionthatisnotasyetauthenticatedbythelivingindividualitself.”Butnow,givenHegel’saccount,“itsgenesis,whichwasanactofpresupposing,nowbecomesitsproduction”(WL,6:484/772–773).Theconclusionoftheargumentisthis:onlybyfocusingonassimilationandreproductioncanwecomprehendthepossibilityoftheoriginofsomethingthatwouldbeateleologicalsystembynature.InHegel’sterms,thesignificanceofthethirdrequirementandthecompletedanalysisisthat“thelivingindividual,whichwasatfirstpresupposedasimmediate,isnowseentobemediatedandgenerated”(EL,§221).AndwecannotunderstandHegel’spresentationofhisconclusionsaboutteleologyandbiologywithoutattendingtohisuseoftheterm“theconcept”[derBegriff].Hegelarguesthattherecanbeateleologi-calsystemwithoutneedofanoriginatingrepresentationthewhole.SoHegelnaturallyseemstobechallengingKant’sclaimthattherecanbeateleologicalsystemonlywherethereisanoriginatingconceptofthewhole.ButpartofthereasonthatHegelaccordssuchbroadphilosophi-calsignificancetothetopicofteleologyandbiologyisthatheseeshisargumentdifferentlyhere.HegeltakeshimselftobeacceptingKant’sdemandforanoriginatingconcept,whileshowingthatthisdemandcanbemetbysomethingunlikea“concept”inanyordinarysenseofDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife363thatterm.ItcanbemetbywhatHegelcalls“theconcept”[derBegriff].Morespecifically,inbiologicalcases“theconcept”isthekindorspecies[Gattung].Itmakessensetousetheterm“concept”hereinsofarastheGattungissomethinggeneraloruniversal–insofarastherearemulti-pleinstancesofoneandthesamekind.But“theconcept”inthissenseisinnowaydependentonitsbeingrepresentedbyanagent.Norisitdependentonitssomehowcontainingrepresentationsofnecessaryandsufficientconditionsofitsapplication,or(asinKant’saccountofconcepts)containing“marks.”Individualsofagivenkinddistinguishthemselvesfromeverythingelseintheirstruggletosurvive:“theani-malestablishesandpreservesitselfasanindependentexistence,thatis,distinguishesitselffromothers”(PN,§368A).Andsuchindividualsbindthemselvestogetherasinstancesofoneandthesamegeneralkindbyrelationsofreproduction,sothatthe“product”ofthisprocessis“therealizedspecies(Gattung),whichhaspositeditselfidenticalwiththeconcept(derBegriff)”(WL,6:486/774).ClearlytheGattunghereisnota“concept”inanyordinarysense,oranysenseinwhichonemightsaythatitis“onlyaconcept”ofours;itisratherwhatHegelsometimescallsan“objectiveconcept.”37Thegeneralquestionatissuehereisthis:Areconceptsofthedifferentbiologicalspeciesonlyabstractionsofours,orarethespeciesthemselvesindependentlyrealandexplanatorilyimportantfeaturesoftheworld?Thisisstilldebatedintoday’sextremelycomplexdisputesaboutthenatureofabiologicalspecies,sowemustnotassumewithoutfurtherinvestigationthatHegel’sanswerisscientificallyobsolete.3837On“onlyaconcept,”see,forexample,WL,6:258/587.On“objectiveconcept,”see,forexample,WL,6:271/597.38Onthecontemporarydebate,seeespeciallyE.Sober,“Evolution,PopulationThinking,andEssentialism,”PhilosophyofScience,47(1980),pp.350–383.HetakesissuewithMayr’sclaimthat“onlytheindividualsofwhichthepopulationarecomposedhavereality”(pp.351–352).Soberalsopointsoutthatneithertem-poralchangesnordiversityofindividualsnorvagueboundariessufficetorefute“essentialism”–thoughSoberthinksthatthereissomethingelsewrongwiththatview.Butissuesconcerning“essentialism”arecomplicated,inpartbecausethereisnoagreementaboutwhatthatviewinvolves.Andtheissuesconcerningthebio-logicalspeciesarecomplex,inpartbecauseitisalsopopulartoholdthataspeciesisanindividual.ButthisdoesnotnecessarilyruleoutsomethinglikeMillikan’streatmentofbiologicalspeciesas“realkinds”asopposedto“nominalkinds.”SeeR.G.Millikan,“HistoricalKindsandtheSpecialSciences,”PhilosophicalStudies,95(1999)pp.45–65.Finally,contemporarydefensesofteleologygenerallyrequiretreatingthegeneraltraitsofageneralspeciesasrealandexplanatorilyimportantfeaturesoftheworld;forexample,Millikan’sdefinitionoffunctionrefersto“traitshavingbeencausallyefficacious.”See“WhiteQueenPsychologyandOtherEssaysforAlice,”(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1993),p.41.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n364jameskreinesFurthermore,Hegel’sdefenseofnaturalteleologydoesnotrestonthemereassumptionofasweepingmetaphysicalclaim–suchastheclaimthatthereisaperfectlyknowable“absolute”ofsomekind,orthatrealitymustsomehowbecompletelytransparenttooridenticalwiththinking,andsoforth.39Onthecontrary,furtherconsiderationofKant’sanalysisofinnerpurposivenessissoimportantbecauseitissupposedtoprovidephilosophicalsupportforHegel’smetaphysics.Tobeginwith,attentiontoself-preservationandreproductionissupposedtodemonstratesomethingabout“theconcept,”orshowusaphilo-sophicallyinterestingwayinwhichsomethinggeneraloruniversal–aspeciesorkind[Gattung]–canhaveaneffectiveimpactwithintheworldwithoutbeingrepresented.AnditiseasytoseethatHegel’sgeneralclaimabout“theconcept”isindeedessentialtohisdefenseofnaturalteleology.Thebasicideasarethese:thestructureofanewindividualispriorintime,notinarepresentationbutinthegeneralspeciesor“theconcept”;andtheneworganismisnottheproductofsomethingentirelyotherorexternalbecauseitisdeterminedbythisgeneralnature,species,or“concept”sharedwithpreviousgenerations.Hegelputsthepointdirectly:“sincetheconcept(derBegriff)isimmanentinit,thepurposivenessofthelivingbeingistobegraspedasinner”(WL,6:476/766).Similarly,aphilosophicalviewlikeKant’smustseethepossibilityofrealinnerpurposivenessasan“incomprehensiblemystery”specifically“becauseitdoesnotgrasptheconcept,andtheconceptasthesubstanceoflife.”40Hegel’spresentationisalsoinfluencedbyhisviewthathisbasicideasarepresentinAristotle.41Firstofall,onHegel’saccount,Aristotlerecognizesandresolvesthebackwardscausationproblem.ItisatleasteasytoseehowonecouldreadAristotleinthisway.Aristotlesaysthatfinal,formal,andefficientcausescanbe“oneandthesame”innaturalcases.Howcantheefficientcausewhichbeginsaprocessof39Atleastwhenitcomestothetopicofinnerpurposiveness,Hegel’scriticismofKantdoesnotfailtobe“immanent”byrequiringsomesuchassumption.ContrastK.Dusing,“DasProblemderSubjektivitatinHegelsLogik,”¨Hegel-Studien.Beiheft15(Bonn:Meiner,1976),p.119andP.Guyer,“ThoughtandBeing:Hegel’sCritiqueofKant’sTheoreticalPhilosophy”,inTheCambridgeCompaniontoHegel,ed.byFrederickBeiser(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993).40Or,morespecificallystill,becausesuchviewstreatconceptsasrepresentations–as“theformalconcept”(WL,6:472–473/763),orwhatHegelelsewherecalls“thesubjectiveorformalconcept”(EL,§§162).41Kant’sadvanceinconceptualizinginnerpurposivenessisreallysupposedtobea“resuscitation”ofAristotle’sinsights(EL,§§204A),betterdevelopedbyAristotleinsofarastheyarefreeofKant’slimitationofteleologytoamerelysubjectivestatus(VGP,19:177/160).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife365developmentbethesameastheformofthedevelopedorganismwhichistheendofthatprocess?Becausethesameformwasalreadypresentintheparents:“Thatfromwhichthechangeoriginatesisthesameinformasthese.Thusamangivesbirthtoaman.”42NoteHegel’sglossonthispointfromhislecturesonAristotle:Thatwhichisproducedisassuchintheground,thatis,itisanend(Zweck),kind(Gattung)initself,itisbythesametokenprior,beforeitbecomesactual,aspotentiality.Mangeneratesmen;whattheproductis,isalsotheproducer.(VGP,19:176)AndHegelfollowstheviewheseesinAristotle:Hegelinsiststhat,whenconsideringteleology,“wemustnotmerelythinkoftheformoftheendasitisinus,inconsciousbeings.”Wemustdistinguishthemanifestationof“theend”inlivingbeings,where“beginningandendarealike.Self-preservationisacontinualproductionbywhichnothingnew,butalwaystheold,arises”(VGP,18:384/1:333).Asthislastpassagesuggests,HegelalsoseesAristotleasconnect-ingnaturalteleologycloselywiththeendofself-preservation.Hegelusesasanexamplethedevelopmentofaseed“directedsolelytoself-preservation.”This,Hegelsays,isAristotle’s“conceptoftheendasimmanent”(PN,§245Z/9:14/6).Again,itisnothardtoseewhatHegelisthinkingofinAristotle.Aristotleidentifies(insomesenseneedinginterpretation)“soul”withthecharacteristicactivitiesforwhichsome-thingisorganized.Forexample,“iftheeyewereananimal,sightwouldbeitssoul.”43HegelpraisesAristotlefortreating“thesoul”not“asathing”butratherintermsof“activity”;butthesimilaritiesanddif-ferencesherearecomplexandinneedofseparatediscussion.44WhatisimportantforusisAristotle’sclaimthatspecificallythe“nutritivesoul”isthat“invirtueofwhichallaresaidtohavelife.”Andtheactivitiesofthenutritivesoulareassimilationandalsoself-preservationinthesenseofreproduction:“theactsinwhichitmanifestsitselfarereproductionandtheuseoffood.”45Furthermore,Aristotleappealstothenatural42Physics,2.7,198a.ContrastdeVries’accountofHegel:“theancientssawnoprob-lemaboutthestatusofteleologicaljudgmentsorexplanations.FinalcauseswereoneofthefourAristotelian‘becauses,’soquestionsaboutteleologywerealwaysinorderintheAristoteliansystem.”Seehis“TheDialecticofTeleology,”Philo-sophicalTopics,19(1991),pp.51–70.43DeAnima,2.1412b.44VGP,19:199;VGP2:181.FormoreonHegelon“thesoul”andAristotle’sinfluencehere,seeespeciallydeVries,Hegel’sTheoryofMentalActivity(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1988)andM.Wolff,DasKoerper-Seele-Problem:KommentarzuHegel,Enzyklopadie(1830),§389.(Frankfurt:Klosertmann,1992).45DeAnima,415a.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n366jameskreinesendofself-preservation,commontoalllife,inexplainingmorespecificbiologicalcapacities.Forexample,heexplainsinthesetermswhyself-movingbeingshavethecapacityofsensation:“Everybodycapableofforwardmovementwould,ifunendowedwithsensation,perishandfailtoreachitsend,whichistheaimofnature;forhowcoulditobtainnutriment?”46Hegel’sbasicapproachtonaturalteleologycombinesthislastideawiththeideathatparentandoffspringarethesameinform.ToelaborateonAristotle’slastexample:Whydoesanindividualself-movinganimalhavethepowerofsensation?Becausethepowerofsensationisrequiredbythenaturalorimmanentend(ortelos)ofself-preservation.Ifthisgeneralkindofanimaldidnothavethepowerofsensation,thenitcouldnotassimilateandsurvive.Inthatcase,previousgenerationswouldnothavereproduced.Soonlyinsofarassensationallowsself-preservationcantherecometobeanewindividualofthesamekindwiththesamepower.47vii.teleologyandmechanismHegelalsoseekstofollowAristotleinanotherrespect.HegelseesAristotleasdefendingnaturalteleologywhilealsoholdingthatmat-terisgovernedbynecessity,orthat“necessity”isalsopresentoractive“innaturalthings.”HegelpraisesAristotle’sphilosophyofnaturefordefending“twodeterminations:theconceptionofendandtheconcep-tionofnecessity”(VGP,19:173/2:156).Tobesure,Hegeldoesnotholdthatlivingbeingscanbeexplainedintwodifferentways;theycanonlybeexplainedinteleologicalterms.Thebasicreasonisthatalivingbeinghasbyitsownnatureanintrinsicendorpurpose.Andithaspartsor“members”whicharethemselvesmeanstotheintrinsicend.Neithermatternorchemicalsubstancesfittheanal-ysisoflife,andneitherhaveintrinsicendsinthissense.Sothenatureoflivingbeingsandtheir“members”isneithermechanicalnorchemi-cal.Tobealivingbeingorthe“member”ofalivingbeing,then,isnot46DeAnima,434a–b.Iamborrowingthispassage,andthiswayofmakingthecasefortheimportanceofself-preservationinAristotle,fromRichardson(unpublished,p.71).47ImakenoargumentastowhetherthiscombinationofideasreallyisalreadypresentinAristotle.RecentphilosophicaldefensesofelementsofAristotle’saccountofnaturalteleologyseethiscombinationaspresentinAristotlehim-self.See,forexample,Lennox,“Teleology,”p.327;D.J.Furley,‘WhatkindofcauseisAristotle’sfinalcause?’inRationalityinGreekThoughted.byM.FredeandG.Striker(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1996),p.73,andalsoRichardson’scommentsonthiskindofreading(unpublished,104f.).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife367tohaveacertainmaterialorchemicalcomposition;itratherinvolveshavinganintrinsicend.InHegel’sterms,thelivingbeingassuchdoesnothave,strictlyspeaking,mutuallyexternal“parts”inspace;ithas“members”presentbecausetheyaremeanstoanend:“theobjectivityofthelivingbeingistheorganism;itisthemeansandinstrumentoftheend...inrespectofitsexternalitytheorganismisamanifold,notofpartsbutofmembers.”48Andsuch“members”“arewhattheyareonlybyandinrelationtotheirunity”–onlyinsofarastheyaremeanstotheendofthewhole.49Thisisnottodenytheapplicabilityoflower-levelformsofmechan-icalandchemicalexplanationwithinthespatiotemporalboundsofalivingbeing.Solongaswehavenoteleologicalendsorpurposesinview,whatweexplainbythismeanswillnotitselfbelivingbeingassuch–norwillitbethe“member”ofalivingbeingsassuch.SoHegelsaysofthelivingbeingthat“themechanicalorchemicalrelationshipdoesnotattachtoit.”Headds,however,that“asexternalityitisindeedcapableofsuchrelationships,buttothatextentitisnotalivingbeing.”Hegelthenputsthepointintermsoftwodistinctwayswecan“take”or“grasp”anobjectunderinvestigation:“Whenthelivingthingistaken(genommen)asawholeconsistingofparts,orasanythingoperatedonbymechanicalorchemicalcauses...itistaken(genommen)asadeadthing.”Butwecanalso“grasp”(fassen)itas“livingbeing”intermsofa“purposiveness”thatisgenuinely“inner”(WL,2:419/766).Hegel’sfavoriteexampleistheprocessbywhichassimilatedexternalelementsmaketheirwayintotheblood–afterward,theseelementshavetakenontheintrinsicendofthewhole,orbecomesomethingwhichiswhateveritisonlyinrelationtothewhole.Thistransitioncannotbeunderstoodintermsofnecessitatingcauses(WL,6:228/562).ButHegeldoesnotdenythatwecanapplymechanisticandchemicalexplanationwithinthebloodstream;whathedeniesisthatthiscaneverexplainbloodassuch:“bloodwhichhasbeenanalyzedintotheseconstituentsisnolongerlivingblood”(PN,§365Z;seealsoEL,§219Z).Fortobebloodisnottohaveacertainchemicalconstitution,buttobeameanstomediateendsandtherebytotheintrinsicendofself-preservation(e.g.wemightsaythatitistobeameanstotheendofdistributingoxygenthroughoutthebody,andtherebytoself-preservation).Morebroadly,wecanexplainthebehaviorofthesubstancesandreactionsfoundalongthewayofthebroaderprocessofassimilationin“inorganic”terms,inwhichcasetheirinterconnectionororganizationwillbe“superfluous.”Butthisdoesnotconflictwiththeclaimthatallofthesethingsare48WL,6:476/766.SeealsoVL,pp.210–211.49EL,§§216Z;seealsoWL,2:419–420/766;PN§350Z.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n368jameskreinespresent,inthisparticulararrangement,allforthesakeofanend:“butstillthecourseoforganicbeinginitselfoccursforitsownsake,inordertobemovementandthusactuality”(PN,§365Z/9:485).Somemayworrythattheapplicabilityoflower-levelexplanationstoallmattershouldexcludethepossibilityofteleologicalexplanationofanything.Thistopicisimportant,butIwillnotpursueitfurtherhere.ForunlikeKant’sworriesarisingfromthebackwardscausationproblem,suchexclusionproblemsdonotspecificallyconcerntheprob-lemofteleologywithoutdesign.Ifexclusionisaproblem,thenitwillalsothreatendesign.Ifexclusionisaproblem,thenitwillthreatenallhigher-levelteleologicalexplanationofouractionsintermsofourrepresentationsofendsorgoals.50Finally,Hegel’sstanceonthecompatibilityofteleologyandmech-anismhasimportantconsequencesconcerninghowweunderstandhisclaimsabout“theconcept”[derBegriff].Forexample,Hegelclaimsthatthegoal-directeddevelopmentofaseedintoaplantrevealsclearlytherealityandexplanatoryimportof“theconcept”:Theseedis“vis-ibleevidencetoordinaryperceptionofwhattheconceptis.”Andtheseedis“theentirelivingbeingintheinnerformoftheconcept”(WL,6:486/774).Butwemustnottakethistomeanthat“theconcept”issupposedtobelikeanadditionalthingbumpingupagainsttheotherelementshere.Northat“theconcept”isakindofadditionalforce–perhapsakindofvitalforce–somehowoverpoweringgravityorotherforcesatworkhere.Norisanythingelse,like“thesoul,”supposedtoplaytheroleofsuchaspecialthingorforce.Thepointisrather,first,50Thatis,thepresenceofapriorrepresentationofanendpreventsthebackwardscausationproblemfromapplyingtoconsiderationofpurposiveaction.Butthiswillnotmakeanydifferenceifexclusionisaproblem:iflower-levelexplanationscanexplainthemovementsofourphysicalbodiesintermswhichmakenoappealtotherepresentationofanendassuch(evenifsomeofthephysicalstatesinvolvedhappentobetoken-identicalwithmentalrepresentationsofends),thenthiscanseemtothreatentoexcludeteleologicalexplanationappealingtotherepresenta-tionofanendassuch.Thepossiblevulnerabilityoffunctionalismandanomalousmonismtosuchproblemshasbeenahugetopicofrecentdiscussion(e.g.,inJ.HeilandA.MeleMentalCausation(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1993).Theconnec-tionsbetweenteleologyappliedtobiologyandteleologicalexplanationofactionintermsofmentalrepresentationshasplayedanimportantrolerecentlyaswell–forexample,inbothL.Wright,TeleologicalExplanations:AnEtiologicalAnal-ysisofGoalsandFunctions.(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1976)andR.G.MillikenLanguage,ThoughtandOtherBiologicalCategories(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1984).TheconnectionisimportantforKant’spurposes,insofarashecomparestheproblemofNaturzwecketotheproblemoffreedom:inbothcasestheideaofthesupersensibleallowsa“possibilitywhichcannotofcoursebeunderstood,althoughtheobjectionthatthereisanallegedcontradictioninitcanbeadequatelyrefuted”(KU,5:195).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife369thatwhateverisgoingonwiththelower-levelstuff,allofitispresentspecificallyonaccountofthewayinwhichitcontributestotheendofthedevelopmentofamatureorganismcapableofself-preservationandreproduction.And,second,theendoftheprocessofdevelopmentcanexplainthatveryprocessspecificallyinsofarasthereisanexplanatoryrolehereforsomethinggeneral–forthespeciesorkind[Gattung]or“theconcept”[derBegriff]inthissense:eachstageofdevelopmentoccurshereasitdoesspecificallybecauseofthegeneralspecies,andmorespecificallybecauseofthewayinwhichthisgeneralkindofstagehasconsequenceswhichbenefittheendofthedevelopmentoforganismsofthesamegeneralkindorspecies.viii.akantianrejoinderandacontemporarycomparisonHowmightKantoraKantianrebutHegel’sargument?Kantrefersatonepointto“thewholedifficultysurroundingthequestionabouttheini-tialgenerationofathingthatcontainspurposesinitself”(KU,5:420).Thiscertainlysuggestsalineofattack.Hegelarguesthatthestruc-tureanddevelopmentofalivingbeingcanbeexplainedinteleologicaltermsinvirtueofitsplaceinthelargerprocessofreproductionwithinaspecies.AKantianmightwellrespondasfollows:Thisapproachjustshiftsthephilosophicaldifficultiesawayfromtheoriginoftheindivid-uallivingbeingtorestonthequestionoftheinitialgenerationofthespecies.Ifthereisanorigininaconcept,thenwhateverfollowsisonlyexternaldesign.Ifnot,thentheresultswillnotincludeanyteleologicalsystems.51Granted,ifthedemandhereisforanexplanationofhowonemightgetfrommerematteralonetocomplexlivingbeingsandthedifferentspeciesweknowtoday,thenHegelisindeedinnopositiontoexplain.True,onecanfindrelevantcommentsinthePhilosophyofNature.Someofthemarefalse–forexample,Hegeldeniesthepossibilityofthedifferentspeciesemergingfromacommonancestor.AndHegelcontinuesfromheretoaclaimthatissimplyinconclusive:“evenifthe51CompareKant’sownargumentagainsttheproposalthatnaturemight“initiallybearcreaturesoflesspurposiveform,whichinturnbearothersthatareformedmoresuitably,”eventuallyproducingthelivingbeingsweknowfromourexperi-ence.ThepossibilityofarealNaturzweckisnotexplainedthereby;rather,wehave“merelyputofftheexplanation.”Inotherwords,ifwearetotakethecreaturesgeneratedbysuchaprocesstobegenuineendsorZwecke,thenwewouldhavetofindatthebeginningoftheprocess“anorganizationpurposivelyaimedatallthesecreatures,forotherwisethepossibilitythepurposiveformoftheproductsoftheanimalandvegetablekingdomscannotbeconceivedatall”(KU,5:419–420).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n370jameskreinesearthwasonceinastatewhereithadnolivingthingsbutonlythechemicalprocess,andsoon,yetthemomentthelightningoflifestrikesintomatter,atoncethereispresentadeterminate,completecreature”(PN,§339Z/9:349/284).Neitherthehypotheticalnorthecomparisontoalighteningstrikesuggestsanypositiveexplanationofanything.Perhapsthisisoneofthosecasesinwhich,asHegelsayselsewhere,“thereisplentythatcannotbecomprehendedyet”(PN,§268Z).ButwhyshouldanyofthishaveanythingtodowithHegel’srejoin-dertoKantin“Life”fromtheLogic?Hegeldoesnotthereundertaketoexplainhowtogetfrommattertolivingbeings.Heprovidesanexpla-nation,inresponsetoKant’sspecificproblem,ofhowacomplexsystem(e.g.,anorganism)producedbyreproductionmightsatisfytherequire-mentsofinnerpurposiveness.AsnotedinSection5),satisfactionoftheserequirements(onHegel’saccount)simplyhasnothingtodowiththelowest-levelunderlyingmatter.InHegel’sterms,livingbeingssat-isfytheanalysisofinnerpurposivenessnotinvirtueoftherelationbetweenthewholeandthemutuallyexternalmaterial“parts”inspace,butinvirtueoftherelationbetweenthewholeandthe“members”(WL,6:476/766).Ifthisargumentworks,thenitisonlyimportantthatthereareassimilatingandreproducingorganisms–andwhocoulddoubtthis?AcontemporaryKantianmightwanttoforcetheissuebyinsistingonathoughtexperiment:Imaginethatsomeheapofmatterwere,byincrediblecoincidence(perhapsliterallyinvolvingalightningstrike),torearrangeitselfintoasimpleone-celledorganism.Thiswouldnotbeateleologicalsystem,nomatterhoweffectivelyitspartsmightbenefitthewhole;exhypothesi,thepartsarepresentnotbecauseofanendorpurposebutmerelybycoincidence.Soifthisorganismreproducesandassimilates,thenitwouldsatisfyHegel’sanalysiswithoutbeingatrulyteleologicalsystem.SuchathoughtexperimentisentirelyalientoHegel’sprocedure.ButifacontemporaryKantianweretoinsistontheexperiment,thenacontemporaryHegeliancouldrespond:Anindividualofafuturegenerationisateleologicalsystem.Foritexistsonaccountofthegeneralspeciesor“concept”itshareswithpreviousgenerations.Or,itexistsonlyinsofarasitspartsare“members”–insofarasthesekindsofpartsareabenefitinrelationtothiskindofwhole.SoitwillbeateleologicalsystembyKant’sownstandard:“itsparts(asfarastheirexistenceandtheirformareconcerned)arepossibleonlythroughtheirrelationtothewhole”(KU,5:373).5252PerhapsacontemporaryKantianwouldproposeaswellthatwemightcreatebydesignareproducingcreature.Wecouldgivethesameresponse:Thefirstcreaturewillbeameansonlytoourexternalend.But–asabove–thepartsoffuturegenerationswillalsobepresentonaccountoftheintrinsicendofself-preservation.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife371RecallaswellthatHegelisnotdefendingteleologicalexplanationofthehistoricaldevelopmentofthespecies.Onmyview,Hegelactuallydeniesthepossibilityofsuchexplanationofbiologicalspecies.(Hedoesofcoursesaythat“spirit”(Geist),orsometimes“self-consciousness,”doesmakeprogressthroughhistory.)53Butmypointhereisthatchangethroughhistoricaldevelopmentisaseparatetopic.Obviously,contem-porarybiologyisvastlysuperiortoeverythingHegelsaysorknowsaboutwhenitcomestoscientificexplanationofthechangesovertimeinabiologicalspecies.ButifHegel’sargumentinthe“Life”sectionoftheLogicworksatall,thennoneofthiswillmattertotheresolutionofKant’sspecificproblemconcerningteleologicalexplanationofthestructureanddevelopmentofalivingbeing.Finally,itisinterestingtocomparethemostpopularcontemporarydefensesofteleologicalexplanationinbiology.ThesedifferimmenselyfromHegel’s,fortheydefendnaturalteleologybydrawingonthetheoryofnaturalselection;sotheyholdthatthestatusofteleologicalexplana-tionofthestructureanddevelopmentofindividualorganismsdependsonthenatureoftheprocessbywhichaspeciesitselfhistoricallydevel-ops.Andcriticsattackpreciselyhere,arguingthatthetheoryofnaturalselection,properlyunderstood,candonothingtosupportsuchteleo-logicalexplanation.54ItseemstomeworthconsideringwhetherthereNoteherethatKant’sconceptofaNaturzweckaimstoarticulatetheconditionsunderwhichsomethingwouldsatisfytheimplicationsofteleologicaljudgmentinvirtueofinnerpurposiveness.Thatneednotitselfruleoutthepossibilitythatthissamesomethingmightalsobedesigned.Finally,Kanthimselfmightactuallyhavesomethinglikethisinmind.Afterall,hearguesthatwehavereasontobelieve(thoughlackknowledge)thatthereisan“authoroftheworld”whocreatesnatureforthesakeofa“highestgood”(KU,5:450).SowhenweareconceivingofalivingbeingasaNaturzweckwithaninnerendorpurpose,itseemswerearealsotoconsideritasdesignedbytheforthesakeofanotherpurpose.Ofcourse,Kantdeniesthepossibilityofknowledgeofanyofthis.53Hegelcontrastsabiologicalspecieswiththekindofwhichallthinkingbeingsareinstances,whichhecallsGeist:“TheworldofGeistandtheworldofnaturecontinuetohavethisdistinction,thatthelattermovesonlyinarecurringcycle,whiletheformercertainlyalsomakesprogress”(EL,§§234Z).Alternatively,“thefate(Schicksal)ofthelivingbeingisingeneraltheGattung,whichmanifestsitselfthroughtheperishablenessofthelivingindividuals.”Andthismeansthatthereisnoreason(teleologicalorotherwise)whichnecessitatesabroadercourseofdevelop-ment:“whatbefallsthemisacontingency”(WL,6:421/720).Hegeltherecontraststhe“fate”of“self-consciousness.”SeealsoVPN,184–185.Furthermore,aspeciescangoextinct,withoutapurposeoranendexplainingwhy(VGP,19:175/2:158;andPN,§§339Z/280).ThisisoneexampleofHegel’sgeneralpointthat“eventhespecies(Gattungen)arecompletelysubjecttothechangesoftheexternal,universallifeofNature”(PN,§§368A).54Fordefenses,seeMillikan,Language,ThoughtandOtherBiologicalCategoriesandWhiteQueenPsychologyandNeander,“TeleologicalNotion.”Forcriticisms,DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n372jameskreinesisroomforanotherapproach,onethatwouldbeimpervioustosuchattacks.Inparticular,wemightconsiderlookingtoHegelforinspira-tion,andtryingtoarticulateadefenseofteleologicalexplanationinbiologywhichrequiresonlythestruggleforsurvivalandreproductionofstructure,thusneitherconflictingwithnaturalselection,norrequir-ingsupportfromanyparticularinterpretationofnaturalselectionatall.55ix.thebroaderphilosophicalsignificanceTheinterpretationofthegeneralthemesofHegel’sphilosophyasawholeis,ofcourse,anenormousundertakinginitsownright.ButitisworthbrieflynotingsomeofthebroaderimplicationsofHegel’sdefenseofnaturalteleology.Tobeginwith,Hegel’sdefenseofthepossibilityofourhavingknowl-edgeofnaturalteleologyisconnectedtoamuchbroadercontrastbetweenKantandHegel.Especiallywhenitcomestoexplanatoryknowledgeofnature,Kanthasamuchmorerestrictiveunderstandingofourepistemiclimits.KantdoesargueintheMetaphysicalFounda-tionsofNaturalSciencethatwecanhaveaspecialkindofaprioriinsightintotheuniversallawsgoverningmatterspecifically.Butelse-where,asintheKU,Kantportraysourpursuitofexplanatoryknowl-edgeofnaturallawsandkindsintermsoftheideathatwecanonlymakeprogresstowardagoalthatcannotinprinciplebeachievedbyafiniteintellectsuchasourown.56Bycontrast,HegelseesKantasoverlybeholdentoempiricistideasaboutinprinciplelimitationsonwhatsortsofobjectsofknowledgeareaccessibletous(EL,§50).SoHegelismoreseeSober,“NaturalSelectionandDistributiveExplanation”andCummins,and“Neo-Teleology.”55SeeBuller’scasethatcontemporaryphilosophyofbiologyhaslargelyfailedtoclearlydistinguishthiskindofapproachfromthosewhichrequireasection-history.Hedefendsanapproachoftheformerkind:“Acurrent‘token’ofatraitTinanorganismOhasthefunctionofproducinganeffectoftypeEjustincasepasttokensofTcontributedtothefitnessofO’sancestorsbyproducingE,andtherebycausallycontributedtothereproductionofTsinO’slineage”(1998,p.507).SeeD.J.Buller,“EtiologicalTheoriesofFunction:AGeographicalSurvey,”BiologyandPhilosophy13(1998),pp.505–527.esp.p.507.J.Richardsonin“Aristotle’sTeleologies,”carefullydistinguishesthiskindofview,andconsidersthepossibleevidenceforinterpretingAristotleasholdingit,buthefindsphilosophicaldisad-vantagesinsofarastheviewcannotprovide“explanationofwhyjustthesespeciesexist”(p.107);Iwouldask:whyshouldn’titbebetterforaphilosophicaldefenseofnaturalteleologytoleavethatquestiontoempiricalscience?56SeetheunpublishedandpublishedintroductionstotheKU,andthe“AppendixtotheTranscendentalDialectic”inthefirstCritique.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife373optimisticabouttheprospectsforourachievingexplanatoryknowl-edgegenerallyof“universaldeterminations”suchasnaturallawsandkinds(Gattungen),andaboutourdoingsoincases(e.g.,biology)wellbeyondthelawsofmatter.57Myownviewisthatbothapproachesherehavetheirphilosophicalcostsandbenefitsthroughouttheoreticalphilosophy;anattemptatafinalweighingofthesewouldbeahugeundertaking.Furthermore,onereasonHegeltakesteleologyandbiologyspecifi-callytobeofsuchbroadimportanceisthathewantstoarguethatbiolog-icalphenomenaaremorecompletelyintelligibleorexplicablethanmat-terandothernaturalphenomena.58Thisis,inpart,whatHegelmeansbysayingthat“thehighestleveltowhichnatureattainsislife”(PN,§248A).AndwecanatleastanticipatethegeneraloutlinesofHegel’sargumenthere.Lower-levelphenomenacanbeexplainedintermsofuniversallaws(e.g.,gravity)andgeneralnaturalkinds(e.g.,chemicalkinds).59Butheretherecanbenofurtherexplanationoftheconnec-tionbetweentheparticularandtheuniversal,orofhowtheuniversalgovernstheparticular.Thepointisnotthatthereisamorecompleteexplanationof,forexample,gravity,towhichwelackaccess;rather,mechanisticphenomenathemselvesareonlyincompletelyintelligibleorexplicable.60Inbiologicalcases,bycontrast,thereisexplanationtobehadconcerningtherelationsbetweentheparticularorconcreteandtheuniversalorgeneral.Forexample,reproductionbyindividualsexplainsthehowthegeneralkind[Gattung]isrealizedandeffectiveintheworld;57Forexample,“Theempiricalsciencesdonotstopattheperceptionofsin-gleinstancesofappearance;butthroughthinkingtheyhavepreparedthematerialforphilosophybyfindinguniversaldeterminations,kinds,andlaws”(EL,§12A).58AlsoonHegel’scaseforthesuperiorintelligibilityofteleology,seeForsterHegel’sIdeaofaPhenomenologyofSpirit(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1998),p.64f,andmyown“Hegel’sCritiqueofPureMechanismandthePhilosophi-calAppealoftheLogicProject,”inEuropeanJournalofPhilosophy,12(2004),pp.38–74.59See,forexample,Hegelonchemicalkinds:“theuniversalessence,therealkind(Gattung)oftheparticularobject”(WL,6:430/728).60Hegelarguesagainsttheideathatourdifficultieshereareatrootepistemologi-cal.Heseesthisasinevitablysuggestingaversionoftheideathateitherforcesoruniversalsareunknowableandabsolutelyfundamentalthings,residinginakindofimmaterialhigherrealminaccessibletous;andhethinksthatproblemsconcerningtheinteractionbetweenrealmswouldmakethingslessintelligibleorexplicableratherthanmoreso.See,forexample,HegelonPlatointheLec-turesontheHistoryofPhilosophy,andthe“ForceandtheUnderstanding”inthePhenomenology.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n374jameskreinesandthekindreciprocallyexplainshownewindividualshavethecapac-itiesrequiredtosurviveandreproduce.HereHegelwillarguethattheconcreteandtheuniversalaretwosidesofonesystem,whichhecalls“concreteuniversality.”ThisiswhyHegeltakesbiologytoberelevantinabookaboutlogic.Forexample,ajudgment“SisP”willbeofverydifferentsignificancedependingonwhetherwehaveanordinarycase(e.g.,“thesunishot”)orwhetherwearedealingwithacaseof“concreteuniversality”(e.g.,“Hobbesisatiger”).Inthelatterkindofcase,Subjectandpredicatecorrespondtoeachotherandhavethesamecontent,andthiscontentisitselfthepositedconcreteuniversality;itcontains,namely,thetwomoments,theobjectiveuniversalorthekind(Gattung),andtheindivid-ualizeduniversal.Here,therefore,wehavetheuniversalwhichisitselfandcontinuesitselfthroughitsoppositeandisauniversalonlyasunitywiththisopposite.61Obviously,allthisraisesmorequestionsthanitresolves.IthinkthatthemostimportantandgeneralquestionsconcernhowHegel’sclaimsaboutthegreaterintelligibilityofbiologicalphenomenaaresupposedtofitintoanoverallmetaphysicalaccountofwhattrulyorabsolutelyexists.OneeasilyaccessibleapproachtothisquestionwouldbetoreadHegel,andperhapssomeofhispost-Kantiancontemporariesaswell,asdefendingaviewthatIwillcall“organicmonism.”Thebasicideaisthat(followingSpinoza)everythingrealmustbe“in”onesingle“substance”;butthatsubstanceisanorganism.Or,moreprecisely,thatsubstancemustmanifesttheinnerpurposivenessofaNaturzweck:itsstructureanddevelopmentovertimeareexplicableintermsofanintrinsicend.ButIthinkthatthisapproachtoHegel’smetaphysicsfacesinter-pretivedifficultieswhenitcomestoHegel’sactualdefenseofnaturalteleologyagainstKant.AsMcTaggartnotesinhiscommentary,Hegel’sanalysisinthe“Life”sectionoftheLogiccannotpossiblyapplyto“theuniverse,”orthewholeofeverything,or“substance”intheabovesense(1910,p.275).Forsubstancecouldnotdependonorhaveneed61WL,6:349/662.Hegelisspeakingofconcreteuniversalityingeneralhere,notofbiologyinparticular.Butbiologicalexamplescertainlyhelptoilluminatethepoint.SeealsoHegel’sconnectionbetweentheconcreteuniversalandKant’sanalysisofinnerpurposiveness(WL,6:443/739).Onthisissue,seeM.Thompson,“TheRepresentationofLife,”inVirtuesandReasons:PhillipaFootandMoralTheory,ed.byR.Hursthouse,G.Lawrence,W.Quinn(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995),pp.247–296.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife375ofassimilationfromanoutsideenvironment–itwillhavenoout-side,andnothingwithwhichitcouldbesaidtostruggle.Andsub-stancecouldnotbesaidtobemortalandtoreproducenewindivid-ualsofthesamekind–forallindividualswouldhavetobe“in”thesamesinglesubstanceitself.Furthermore,insofarasHegel’sanalysiscannotpossiblyapplytotheuniverseasawhole,Hegel’sargumentin“Life”doesnotevenattempttodefend(againstKant)theideathatwecouldpossiblyknowtheuniversetobeaNaturzweck–noreventheideathatwecouldcomprehendhowtheuniversecouldpossiblybeaNaturzweck.Iseetwopossiblebasicreactionshere.Oneistosay(withMcTaggart)thatHegeladvocates“organicmonism,”andseesKant’sanalysisofinnerpurposivenessascrucialforthatreason,butthatHegeldoesnotdefendorganicmonismwherehespecificallyrespondstoKant’sworriesabouttheinnerpurposivenessoflivingbeings.Myownpreferenceisforthealternative:toholdthattheLogicandtheEncyclopediaofferphilosophicalargumentsinfavorofadifferentmetaphysicalaccountofreality–onethatcontrastswith“organicmonism”.62Therecanbenoquestionofexplaininganddefendinghereanypar-ticularalternativeapproachtothewholeofHegel’smetaphysics.Butthebroadissuesatstakemightatleastbeclarifiedbycontrastingabriefsketch.63OnecouldreadHegelnotasdefending“organicmonism,”butasarguingthatthewholeofrealityisstructuredintodifferent“levels”orStufen.64Mechanisticphenomenaformthelowestlevel,andbio-logicalphenomenaformamuchhigherlevel.Furthermore,thehigherlevelsaremorecompletelyintelligiblethanthelowerlevels.Thisisnottosaythateverythingisanorganismorpartofanorganism.Sowhenweexplain,forexample,therotationofplanetsintermsoftheneces-sarylawsgoverningmatter,wearenotmakingamistakeoracceptingamerelysubjectiveappearanceofsomethingthatisintruthormost62MyownsenseisthatKantisrighttoholdthatcomprehendinghowtheuniversecouldbeaNaturzweck,andhavingknowledgeofthis,wouldrequireahigherformofintellect–somethingalongthelinesofKant’sdescriptionsof“intellectualintuition”and“intuitiveunderstanding.”AndalthoughtherearesomecomplexissueshereconcerningHegel’searlyworkandhisdevelopment,intheLogicandtheEncyclopediaHegellaysatremendousamountofstressonhiscriticismsofappealsbyhiscontemporariesto“intellectualintuition”andotherformsofsupposedly“immediateknowledge”(WL,5:65/67;EL,§61–§78).SomyviewisthatthesecriticismsprovideHegelwithgoodreasontoprefersomethingelsetoorganicmonism.Butthiscasewouldrequiremuchmoredefense.63YetanotheralternativewouldbetheoneattributedtoHegelbyR.-P.HorstmannOntologieundRelationen(Koenigstein:Athenaum,1984),p.70ff.64OnHegelon“levels”orStufenspecificallyofnature,seetheopeningsectionsofthePhilosophyofNatureanddeVries,Hegel’sTheoryofMentalActivity,ch.3.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n376jameskreinesfundamentallyanorganicorteleologicalphenomenon.Rather,mech-anisticphenomenaareperfectlyrealbutonlyimperfectlyintelligible.Livingbeingsaremorecompletelyintelligible.And,ultimately,theonlythingthatisperfectlyintelligibleisus–or,moreprecisely,thegeneralkindorGattungwhoseinstancesarethinkingandself-consciousbeings.HegelcallsthiskindGeist[mindorspirit].InHegel’sterms,thereisastandardofcompleteintelligibility–“theidea.”Andalthoughevery-thingisintelligibletosomedegree,mosteverythingfallsfarshortofthestandard.Thestandardof“theidea”ismettosomedegreebylivingbeings,andcompletelyonlybyGeist.65Onthisview,insofarasreal-ityitselfisorganizedorstructured,itiscomparabletoanorganisminthisrespect.66Butitiscrucialthatrealityasawholewouldnothaveastructurebecauseitisreallyanorganism,organic,oraNaturzweck.Thepointwouldbepreciselytheopposite:realityhasadifferentiatedstructureinsofarastherearemanydifferentkindsorlevelsofphenom-enawhichdifferinrealandimportantwaysfrombiologicalphenomenaandfromoneanother.67Insummary,then,therearewaysofinterpret-ingHegel’smetaphysicalambitions,andtheimportanceofhisdefenseofnaturalteleology,withoutreadinghimasan“organicmonist”atall.MytopicherehasnotbeenHegel’sbroadermetaphysics,however,buthisresponsetoKantconcerningthestatusofteleologicalexplana-tionofthestructureanddevelopmentoflivingbeings.IhavetriedtoshowthatKantprovidesaforcefulargumentinsupportofhisskepticalconclusion–hisdenialofthepossibilityofourhavingknowledgethatteleologytrulyexplainsthestructureanddevelopmentofalivingbeing.AndIhavetriedtoshowthatHegelrecognizesthisargumentandmeets65“Life”isthefirstsubsectionundertheheading“TheIdea”intheLogic.ButHegelargues,asheputsit,thatthe“trulyabsoluteconcept”isthe“ideaofinfinitemind”(WL,6:279/605).Also,Hegelfamouslysays“substanceisessentiallysubject”(PhG,3:28/14).Onthecurrentreading,thiswillmeanthatthereissomethingcompletelyorideallyintelligible,somethingwhichmeetsSpinoza’sdefinitionofsubstance:it“isinitself,andisconceivedthroughitself”(Ethics,1D3).ButHegelargues“Godorsubstance”inthissensecannotbeeverythingorawholeofeverything;itcanonlybeGeist.Weourselvesarebothlivingbeingsandalsogeistigbeings;seeespeciallyVPN,184–185.66Onthisorganizationsee,forexample,PN,§§246.Similarly,Hegelcomparestheearthtoanorganism,whileemphasizingthatitisnotreallyalive(PN,§§339andZusatz).67K.H.IltingstressesasimilarclaimindiscussingthebroaderimportanceofHegel’saccountoflife:“Hegelbeabsichtigtnichtetwa,inallenGestaltungenderNatureunddesGeistesnurimmerwiederdieselbelogischeStrukturaufzuweisen.”See“HegelsPhilosophiedesOrganischen,”inHegelunddieNaturwissenschaften,ed.byM.J.Petry(Stuttgart:Frommann-Holzboog,1987),p.367.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheLogicofLife377itwithanargumentofhisownindefenseofteleologicalexplanationinbiology.Itwouldofcoursebeverydifficulttoattemptanysortoffinalordefinitiveweighingofthephilosophicaladvantagesanddisadvantagesofeachviewofteleologyandbiology–letalonethecostsandbenefitsofthebroaderapproachestotheoreticalphilosophywithwhicheachviewiscloselyconnected.Butwecanatleastseethat,whenitcomestothetopicofteleologyandbiology,KantandHegelprovideargumentsthatbearonunderlyingphilosophicalissuesofcontinuinginterestandimportance.6868Forhelpfulcommentsonthismaterial,andotherassistance,Iwouldliketothank:MichaelDellaRocca,MichaelForster,DeanMoyar,DavidMcNeill,RobertPippin,CandaceVogler,andRachelZuckert.Asusual,anyerrorsaremyown.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:12:56WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.014CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nallenspeight14HegelandAesthetics:ThePracticeand“Pastness”ofArtHegel’sachievementsasaphilosopherofarthavebeenbothwidelyrecognizedandendlesslydisputed.Hispositionasthe“fatherofarthistory”(Gombrich)hasbeenconfirmedOedipally,byasuccessionoffiguresinthatprofessionwhohavecriticizedHegel’sallegedtendenciesto(amongotherthings)progressivism,essentialismandhistoricaldeter-minism.1Whileheisregardedbymany(Henrich,Danto,T.J.Clark)asaphilosophicalforerunneroftheoreticaldiscourseonmodernisminart,hisown(in)famousremarksaboutthe“endofart”areoftencitedagainsthimasevidenceofaninabilitytoimaginethedevelopmentofjustsuchlatermovements.2Heisrightlyregardedashavingpushedforwardtheindependentstatusofartinitsownright,yetthisindependenceisfre-quentlyheldtobevitiatedbythedemandsofhisownphilosophicalsystem.31E.H.Gombrich,“TheFatherofArtHistory,”inTributes:InterpretersofOurCulturalTradition(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1984),pp.51–69andInSearchofCulturalHistory(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1977).ForahelpfuldiscussionoftheissuesofhistoricityinHegelianaestheticsraisedbyGombrichandothers,seeMartinDonougho,“HegelontheHistoricityofArt,”EncyclopediaofAesthetics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998):vol.2,pp.365–368.2Ofcourse,manyofthosewhoseeHegel’sclaimsaboutromanticandpostromanticartasprolepticofthelatermovementsofmodernismsuggest,asHenrichdoes,“theprospectofdisengagingHegel’stheoryofartfromhisownshort-termpredictionsfortheartofthemid-nineteenthcentury”(DieterHenrich,“ArtandPhilosophyofArtToday:ReflectionswithReferencetoHegel,”trans.byDavidHenryWilsonetal.,inNewPerspectivesinGermanLiteraryCriticism:ACollectionofEssays,ed.byRichardE.AmacherandVictorLange(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1979),pp.107–133,atranslationofHenrich’soriginalessayinPoetikundHermeneutik,vol.2(Munich:WilhelmFink,1966),pp.11–33,524–533.ed.byR.KoselleckandW.D.Stempel(Munich:1972)).SeealsoAlainBesanc¸on,TheForbiddenImage:anintellectualhistoryoficonoclasm(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1994),p.224.3Onthispoint,seeespeciallyDieterHenrich,“ArtandPhilosophyofArtToday:ReflectionswithReferencetoHegel,”pp.112–116.378DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandAesthetics:ThePracticeand“Pastness”ofArt379ThedifficultyofassessingHegel’sachievementsinaestheticshasledtoanumberofattemptstorescuesomeversionofanHegelianaestheticsbygoingbeyondwhatthepresumably“official”accountitselfoffers.Inwhatfollows,IwanttoexaminewhatresourcesmightliewithinHegel’saestheticsforaviewofthepracticeofart,somethingIhopewillshedlightnotonlyonsomeofthefamoussystematicdifficultiesinHegel’saestheticsbutalsoonquestionssuchastheendlesslyinterpreted“endofart”thesis.IwillbeginwithabrieflookatthedevelopmentalandsystematicsignificanceofaestheticsforHegel,turntohisexplicitcon-siderationoftheroleofartisticpracticewithinthetextoftheLecturesonAestheticsandthentakeupthequestionofthe“pastness”ofartanditsrelationtoHegel’sownaestheticideals.i.development,significance,andsystematicplaceofhegel’saesthetics;structuralaporiaiandthe“endofart”thesisDevelopmentandSignificanceEmergingfromaperiodinwhichpost-Kantianidealistsandromanticsallgavevigorousnewenergytothequestionofartanditsrelationtophilosophy,Hegel’saestheticsrepresentedadeterminatestanceofitsown–onewhichdevelopedcertaintendenciesinherentinbothKantianandromanticaestheticsbutwhichstoutlyrejectedothers,yetwith-outrevertingtoaclassical(precritical,preromantic)perspective.4Mostcrucially,whatbecomesarticulatedwithinthisdistinctivelyHegelianaestheticstanceisanewpositionwithrespecttoart’sautonomy,notonlyinrelationtoitsfreedomfromnaturebutalsointermsofitsrela-tiontophilosophy.54Forthebreakwiththeprecritical,pre-Romantictradition,cf.StephenBungay’sconclusion(basedonaremarkbyHegel’sstudentRotscher)thattwoattitudesto¨artcommonintheeighteenthcenturycouldbesaidtohavedisappearedwithHegelandhisgeneration:“nobodyanylongerdemandedthatarthaveamoraleffectandbeedifyingorinstructive;andnobodydemandedthatitimitatenature”(S.Bungay,BeautyandTruth:AStudyofHegel’sAesthetics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1984),p.188).5Hegellinksthesetwoissues–theautonomyofartbutitsunderlyingconnectiontophilosophy(aswellasreligion)–inthefirstpagesoftheLecturesonAesthetics:“whatwewanttoconsiderisartwhichisfreealikeinitsendanditsmeans....Now,inthisfreedomaloneisfinearttrulyart,anditonlyfulfilsitssupremetaskwhenithasplaceditselfinthesamesphereasreligionandphilosophy....”(Hegel,Aesthetics:LecturesonFineArt,trans.byT.M.Knox(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1975),vol.I,p.7;G.W.F.Hegel:Werke,VorlesungenuberdieAesthetik¨,vol.13,ed.byEvaMoldenhauerandKarlMarkusMichel(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n380allenspeightWhatisdistinctiveaboutHegel’sviewofart’sautonomycanbeseenfirstinhiscenteringofartwithintherealmofGeistorSpirit,whosecharacteristic–incontrastwithnature–isanabilitytomain-tainorbeitself(HegelrefersregularlytoautonomyinthissenseasBeisichselbstsein,literally“being-by-itself”)initsengagementwithanother.6Artismoreparticularly,however,amodewithinAbsoluteSpirit,therealminwhichSpiritisnolongerfinite(asarethemomentsofObjectiveandSubjectiveSpirit)butinfiniteinitsself-knowledge.And,finally,althoughreligionandphilosophyarehighermodesofAbso-luteSpiritwhichariserespectivelyinturnfromart,HegeliscarefultomakeclearwhyartisanarticulatedmomentofAbsoluteSpiritwhichcannotbemerelyreducedtothosehighermodes.7Hegelthusdeparts,ontheonehand,fromKantinarticulatinganotionofbeautyasdecisivelyrelatedtoworksofartratherthannaturalphenomenabutavoids,ontheotherhand,aRomanticvalorizationofartoverphilosophy.8Hegel’sviewofartisdifferentlyconstruedatdifferenttimesinhisdevelopment,butduringnoneofthosephasescanitbesaidtohavebeenamarginalissueforhim.OfparticularconcernfromHegel’searliestphasewasthe“religionofbeauty”thatcharacterizedancientGreece–anidealfirstinvokedinacomparativewayagainstcertaintrendsinChristianityandlater.WiththehistoricalinflectionhisphilosophicalprojectpickedupintheyearsprecedingthePhenomenologyofSpirit,1970),vol.XIII,pp.20–21.FurtherreferencesbyvolumeandpagenumbertothesetwovolumesaretoAestheticsandVorlesungen,respectively.)6ThenotionofBeisischselbstseinascentraltoHegel’saccountoftheautonomythatispresentintherealmofSpiritcanbeseen,forexample,inhisHistoryofPhilosophydiscussionoftheimportanceofthestate’scapacitytomakeandfollowitsownlaws(LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy:Introduction,trans.byH.B.Nisbet(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1975),p.97;DieVernunftinderGeschichte,ed.byJ.Hoffmeister(Hamburg:Meiner,1966),p.115)aswellasinhisPhilosophyofRightdiscussionoftheconcretewill,wherefreedomisdescribedastheabilityto“willsomethingdeterminate,yettobewithoneself[beisich]inthisdeterminacy”(PR,7A).7Thus,whileHegelseesanimportantcontinuitybetweenspeculativephilosophyandpoetryinthatbothproduceworkswhichhavethroughtheircontent“perfectself-identity”aswellasan“articulateddevelopment”inwhichthepartshavethe“appearanceofindependentfreedom,”henonethelessdifferentiatesbetweenthetwomodes(seeAesthetics,II:984,Vorlesungen,XV:254–255,apassagediscussedinPartIIofthischapter).8AsJean-MarieSchaefferhasargued,however,thisdoesnotmeanthatHegelsimplyrevertedtoapreromanticviewofartinitsrelationtophilosophy:forHegel,asfortheRomantics,arthasadecisivespeculativesignificance(J.-M.Schaeffer,ArtoftheModernAge:PhilosophyofArtfromKanttoHeidegger,trans.byStevenRendall(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2000),p.135).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandAesthetics:ThePracticeand“Pastness”ofArt381HegelsawthisreligionasanunrecoverablepastmomentinthelargernarrativeoftheWest’sculturalandphilosophicalself-awareness,whichhelatercomestospeakofintermsof“Spirit.”9TheLecturesonAesthetics,whichdatefromHegel’slaterHeidelberg(1816–18)andBerlin(1818–1831)periods,arenotamongthewritingswhichHegelpublishedhimself.Hegelgavefiveseriesoflecturesonthetopic–oneatHeidelbergin1818andfourattheUniversityofBerlin(in1820–1821,1823,1826,and1828–1829).Hegel’sstudentH.G.HothocompiledHegel’smanuscriptsandstudentnotes(takenbyHothoandothers)fromthelastthreeversionsofthelectureseriesintowhatarenowknownastheLectures.10SystematicPlaceofAesthetics;AporiaiInHegel’smaturesystem,asreflectedintheultimateshapeofhislec-tures,art,religion,andphilosophyarethethreemomentsinwhichAbsoluteSpiritcomprehendsitself.Withinthistriad,artisdistinc-tivebecauseitrequiresanimmediateandsensualshapeforexpression(in,forexample,asculptor’sstone);religion,bycomparison,ischar-acterizedasaformofrepresentationalconsciousness[dasvorstellendeBewusstsein]andphilosophyaformoffreethoughtitself[dasfreieDenken].11Thesethreemodessharethesamecontent,butgraspitindifferentways.ArtisthusonHegel’sview“onewayofbringingtoourmindsandexpressingtheDivine,thedeepestinterestsofmankind,andthemostcomprehensivetruthsofthespirit[dasGottliche,die¨9ThemostaestheticallychargedtextassociatedwithHegelinhisearliestperiodisnodoubttheso-calledOldestSystematicProgramofGermanIdealism(atextwritteninhishand,butwhoseauthorshiphasbeenvariouslyclaimedforSchellingandHolderlinaswell).ThedevelopmentofHegel’searlyconcernwiththeGreek¨“religionofbeauty”canbeseeninthefragmentshewroteduringhisFrankfurtperiod(1797–1800)collectedunderthetitle,“TheSpiritofChristianityanditsFate.”ForimportantcontinuitiesbetweentheaestheticsofHegel’semergingsys-tematJenaandtheultimatelecturesatHeidelbergandBerlin,seeOttoPoggeler,¨“DieEntstehungvonHegelsAsthetikinJena,”in¨HegelinJena:DieEntwick-lungdesSystemsunddieZusammenarbeitmitSchelling,ed.byD.HenrichandK.Dusing,¨Hegel-StudienBeiheft,20(Bonn:Bouvier,1980).10Editionsofthe1820–1821,1823,and1826versionsofthelectureshavebeenpub-lishedseparately:G.W.F.Hegel:PhilosophiederKunstoderAsthetik(1826)¨,ed.byA.Gethmann-SiefertandB.Collenberg-Plotnikov(Munich:WilhelmFink,2003);G.W.F.Hegel:VorlesungenuberdiePhilosophiederKunst.Berlin1823.¨NachgeschriebenvonHeinrichGustavHotho,ed.byA.Gethmann-Siefert(Ham-burg:Meiner,1998);andVorlesunguber¨Asthetik:Berlin1820/1¨,ed.byHelmutSchneider(Frankfurt:PeterLang,1995).11Aesthetics,I:101;VorlesungenXIII:139.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n382allenspeighttiefstenInteressendesMenschen,dieumfassendstenWahrheitendesGeistes].”12Thedistinctivefocusofartasthisfirstmodeofabsolutespiritcen-tersaroundanotionofbeautyintermsoftheideal,whichHegelunder-standsintermsoftherelationbetweencontent(theIdea)andform(itsconfiguration[Gestalt]asaconcretereality).ThepotentialadequateandinadequaterelationshipsbetweenformandcontentarewhatshapeHegel’sdifferentiationofthe“formsofart”–thesymbolic,classical,andromantic.Whenformandcontentareadequatetooneanother,asinHegel’saccountofclassicalsculpture,theworkofart’ssignificanceandformofexpressionareatone:itis“notameaningofthisorthatbutwhatmeans[Bedeutende]itselfandthereforeintimates[or‘interprets,’Deutende]itself.”13Moreconcretely,wemightsaythattheclassicalsculptureofananthropomorphicgodrepresentsorrevealsthehumanbodyinitsidealshape.Bycomparison,thesymbolicandromanticartformsareonesinwhichcontentandformfallapart.Inthesymbolicform,whichHegellinkstopreclassicalartinEgyptandAsiaticreligions,theas-yetunde-terminedideaisstillina“search”ofitstrueportrayal:astoneidolmayrepresentthedivinebutdoesnotembodyitinthesenseoftheclassicalform.Theromanticformisdefinedagainstthe“pinnacle”ofconnectionbetweencontentandformwhichtheclassicalhasachieved:herethedefect,Hegelsays,“isjustartitselfandtherestrictednessofthesphereofart.”14Inadditiontotheseformsofart–whatHegelcametoassociatewiththeparticularinaesthetics–Hegelalsodevelopsadifferentiationofindividualartsthemselves.Drawingonanexistingnotionofasystemoffivearts,15Hegelsketchestheirrelationintermsofanincreasingarcofabstraction:fromarchitecturetosculpturetopainting,music,andpoetry.Anumberoffamousproblemsariseinconsideringboththerelationbetweentheseriesofart-formsandtheseriesofspecificartsontheonehand,andtherelationofthevariousformsandartsamongthemselvesontheotherhand.Therelationbetweentheartformsandthespecificarts,accordingtoHotho’stext,isdeterminedbyanunderlyingtripar-titedivision:universal(idealofthebeautiful),particular(art-forms)and12Aesthetics,I:7;Vorlesungen,XIII:21.13Aesthetics,I:427;Vorlesungen,XIV:13.14Aesthetics,I:79;Vorlesungen,XIII:111.15OnHegel’ssourceshere,seePaulOskarKristeller,“TheModernSystemoftheArts,”JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas,12(1951),pp.496–527and13(1952),pp.17–46.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandAesthetics:ThePracticeand“Pastness”ofArt383individual(specificarts).YetHegelhimselfinthe1823lecturesappearsonlytohavehadatwo-partdivision,accordingtowhichtheart-formsareuniversalandthespecificartsparticular.16Addingtothisformaldif-ficultyisanapparentdiversityofwaysHegelactuallyapplieshisschemeforpoint-to-pointcomparisons.Theofficialversionwouldseemtobethattherearespecificartswhichcorrelatemostcloselywithanart-form(architectureforthesymbolic,sculpturefortheclassical,andpaintingandmusicfortheromantic),butnonethelesseachspecificartcanappearundertheguiseoftheotherformsaswell(thustherearesymbolic,clas-sical,andromanticformsofarchitectureandtheotherartsaswell).Buttherearecleardifficultiesinmakingthiswork:asBungayandSchaeffer,amongothers,havenoted,architecturehasitsparadigmaticformintheGreektemple(aclassical,notasymbolicmoment),whileonlyromanticpaintingandmusic(andnotclassicalorsymbolicformsofthesearts)seemtocomeupformuchdiscussioninthelectures.Moreover,Hegelclearlythinkssomepoint-to-pointconnectionsaremoreintimatethanothers:thusarchitecturecaninfactbedividedbymeansofitssym-bolic/classical/romanticforms,butsculptureistoocloselyweddedtotheclassicalidealtopermitsuchadevelopment.WhilevariousattemptshavebeenmadetoworkoutamorespeculativelycoherentsystematicschemerelatingboththetwoseriesandlikewiseHegel’sapparentsolu-tionofthedifficultyforpoint-to-pointcomparisons,itmaybethatwhatisatissuehereareinherentaporiai,giventheelementsHegelwishedtoincorporateinhisaestheticsandhisownapparentindecisivenessabouthowphilosophicallytoorganizethem.Schaeffer’spointthatitispartofHegel’soriginalityanddepthtohavetriedatalltolinkthesetwosets–onestemmingfromtheRomanticinfluencesinhisinheritanceandtheother,morebroadly,fromanAristotelianconceptionofthespecificartsthemselves–issuggestivehere.Asmentioned,therearefurtherproblemsabouttheinternalrelationswithineachset,aswell.Perhapsmostdiscussedistherelationamongtheart-forms,andhowtheclassicalcanberegardedasachievingthefullnessofbeautywhiletheromanticisnonethelessahigherformofart.HegelseemsparticularlyconcernedtopointthisdifferenceupinthecourseoftheAesthetics,ashedoes,forexample,atthebeginningofhisdiscussionoftheromanticarts:[C]lassicalartbecameaconceptuallyadequaterepresentationoftheIdeal,theconsummationoftherealmofbeauty.Nothingcanbeorbecomemorebeautiful.16G.W.F.Hegel:VorlesungenuberdiePhilosophiederKunst.Berlin1823.¨NachgeschriebenvonHeinrichGustavHotho,ed.byAnnemarieGethmann-Siefert(Hamburg:Meiner,1998),pp.v–xiv.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n384allenspeightYetthereissomethinghigherthanthebeautifulappearanceofspiritinitsimmediatesensuousshape,evenifthisshapebecreatedbyspiritasadequatetoitself.17TheshapewhichSpiritmovesontoisashapewhichisnotboundbytheexternalsolidityofsculpturebutonewhichisinsteadmorereconcilablewiththeinternalityofSpirit’sultimateprogress.Artturns,inotherwords,totheromanticrealmof(two-dimensional)paintingand(nondimensional)music–andultimatelytothatofpoetry,whichrestsontheinwardnessoftheimagination.Insomeways,themovetotheromanticisreminiscentofthefalling-apartofformandmatterwhichcharacterizedthesymbolicformofart,butthistransitionisdifferentinthatheretheguidingforceisnotinternaltoartbutgovernedbythelargerdemandsofSpirit:“iftheperfectcontenthasbeenperfectlyrevealedinartisticshapes,thenthemorefar-seeingspiritrejectsthisobjectivemanifestationandturnsbackintoitsinnerself.”18The“morefar-seeingspirit”isonewhich,infact,isultimatelydissatisfiedwiththerealmofartandlooksinsteadtothehigherrealms–becauselesstiedtospecificDarstellungenofartisticshaping–characteristicofreligionandphilosophy.Artinitsclassicalprime,soHegelseemstowanttosay,isthehighestrevelationofwhatisdivine–HomerandHesiod“gavetheGreekstheirgods”–but“theformofarthasceasedtobethesupremeneedofthespirit.”19Nowthe“unityofdivineandhumannature”thatissoessen-tialtoclassicalartis“raisedfromanimmediatetoaknownunity.”20Inreligiousterms,thismeansthatChristianitynow“bringsGodbeforeourimaginationasspirit,”andthusretreatstoaspiritualinwardness;inphilosophicalterms,thismeansthatthoughtandreflectionratherthanartisticpresentationbecomemostcrucialtotheculturalactivitiesofthemodernage.The“End”ofArtWiththeseclaims,ahostofquestionsaboutthestatusofartinthepostclassicalworldarises.Ifnotartbutreligionandphilosophyarenowthemodesinwhichthe“supremeneedofthespirit”aretobeaddressed,hasartinfactreachedanend?Hegel’sremarksatthispointinthetextoftheLectureswouldappeartocutintwoways.Thereishisfamousstatementofwhatwouldappeartobeart’sinevitablepastness:“No17Aesthetics,I:517;VorlesungenXIV:127–128.18Aesthetics,I:103;VorlesungenXIII:142.19Aesthetics,I:103;VorlesungenXIII:142.20Aesthetics,I:80;VorlesungenXIII:112.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandAesthetics:ThePracticeand“Pastness”ofArt385matterhowexcellentwefindthestatuesoftheGreekgods,nomatterhowweseeGodtheFather,Christ,andMarysoestimablyandperfectlyportrayed:itisnohelp;webowthekneenolonger.”Buthisremarkisprefacedwithaqualification:“Wemaywellhopethatartwillalwaysrisehigherandcometoperfection.”21Howarethesecommentstobeunderstood?Thediscussionofthe“end”ofartinHegelhasproducedalongliterature,indeed,ofover-lappingandnotalwaysconsistentinterpretations.22Atthesametime,therehavebeenattemptstodiscountfromHegel’scommentsabouttheartworldofhisowndayandtolookinsteadtoresourceswithinhisaccountoftheromanticandpostromanticinartwhichmightbehelp-fulinclaimingsomeoftheterritoryofmovementslikemodernismforanHegelianapproach.DieterHenrich,inafamousearlyessay,notedbasictendenciesinHegelianaestheticswhichhefoundhelpfulforaconsiderationofmod-ernism–therenunciationofartisticutopia,astressonanartist’sreflec-tivenessandcapacitytotakeupanycontent,andthepartial(notfullyself-transparent)characterofthemostrecentart–butsketchedacriti-calrevisionofHegel’sprojectwhichincorporatedawiderrangeforthereflectednessoftheworkofartitselfthanhethoughtHegelallowed.23Themodernistworkofart,whichtakesitselfforatheme–HenrichcitesCubism–thusrequires,onhisview,anextensionoftheHegeliannotionofreflection.21Aesthetics,I:103;VorlesungenXIII:142.22StephenBungay(BeautyandTruth:AStudyofHegel’sAesthetics,pp.71–88)andMartinDonougho(“ArtandHistory:HegelontheEnd,theBeginningandtheFutureofArt,”inHegelandTheArts,ed.byStephenHoulgate[Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2007],pp.179–215)suggestwaysinwhichthevariousinterpretationsofthethesismaybedistinguishedandrelated.SeealsoStephenHoulgate,“Hegelandthe‘End’ofArt,”TheOwlofMinerva29,1(Fall1997),pp.1–22;FredL.Rush,Jr.,“Hegel’sConceptionoftheEndofArt,”EncyclopediaofAesthetics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998),vol.2.,pp.368–371;KarstenHarries,“HegelontheFutureofArt,”ReviewofMeta-physics,27(1973–1974),pp.677–696;andWilliOelmuller,“HegelsSatzvomEnde¨derKunst,”PhilosophischeJahrbuch,73(1965),pp.75–94.Forawiderrecent(notmerelyHegelian)considerationofissuesinmodernand“postmodern”art,seeDonaldKuspit,TheEndofArt(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004).23D.Henrich,“ArtandPhilosophyofToday:ReflectionswithReferencetoHegel.”ForHenrich’smorerecentviews,seeVersuchuberKunstundLeben:Subjek-¨tivitat–Weltverstehen–Kunst¨(Munich:Hansler,2001).AthoughtfulcriticismoftheearlierHenrichessaycanbefoundinM.Donougho,“ArtandHistory:HegelontheEnd,theBeginningandtheFutureofArt,”whichquestionstheunderlyingnotionof“reflection”relevantforHenrich’sassessmentofHegel.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n386allenspeightMorerecently,RobertPippinhassuggestedthattheelementsofabstractionandreflexivityinHegel’sphilosophyofartremaindeci-sivetermsforanyaestheticsofmodernismandmodernity.The“endofart”thesisdoesnotspelltheendofartbutratherthe“endofawayofart’smattering”:“humanbeingsrequire,lessandless,sensible,rep-resentativeimageryinordertounderstandthemselves(withrespecttothehighestissue–forHegeltheirbeingfreesubjects).”24Therelevantphenomenahere,forPippin,arenotaestheticformlessnessorpreoccu-pationwith“pure”formthatisemptyofcontent,butratherartisticworkswhichhavetheirownformascontent,asProust’snovelmaybesaidtobeaboutnovelwritingorcertainexperimentsinpaintingareaboutpaintingitself.Fromtheperspectiveofthissortofconcernwithform,“modernismafterHegelwouldthenlooksomethinglikewhatHegelprophesiedafterromanticart:‘theself-transcendenceofartbutwithinitsownsphereandintheformofartitself.’”25TakingthesesuggestionsaboutanHegelianinterpretationofmod-ernisminart,IwillexploreinthefollowingsectionstwoissueswhichwouldbecentraltoanyextensionofHegel’saesthetics–hisaccountofartisticpracticeandthe“pastness”oftheidealaroundwhichtheAestheticsissupposedlysituated.Muchrecentstresshas(rightly)beenplacedontheexperienceofmodernisminthevisualarts,26andanextended“Hegelian”accountofthesephenomenamightwellpickupwheresuchaccountshaveleftoff.Iwillbefocusinginsteadinwhatfol-lowsonanotherartwhichHegelappearstohavethoughtgaveaphiloso-pherofhispremodernistgenerationperhapsitsbestwindowontotheconcernsofself-transcendent,postromanticart:thedrama.ii.hegelonartisticpracticeInseekingwhatlightHegelmightshedonlaterformsofartwherethe“self-transcendenceofart”becomesexplicitlyaconcern,itmightmakesensetobeginwithHegel’sownaccountofwhatitisthatartistsdo.UnderlyingmanypointsofdiscussionintheAestheticsisanaccountofartisticpracticewhichhassurprisingresonanceswithHegel’sunder-standingofartisticcontentandphilosophicalreflection.Iwillturninthissectiontofourissues:(1)artasanactivitywhichmakesexplicitanimplicitcontent,(2)therelationofthisactivityofmaking-explicitto24RobertPippin,“WhatWasAbstractArt?(FromthePointofViewofHegel),”Crit-icalInquiry,29(Autumn2002),p.3.25Pippin,“WhatWasAbstractArt?”p.23.26See,amongothers,T.J.Clark,FarewelltoanIdea:EpisodesfromaHistoryofModernism(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1999),especiallychapter6.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandAesthetics:ThePracticeand“Pastness”ofArt387themorereflectiveactivityofphilosophy,(3)whatthisaccountofartanditsrelationshiptoreflectionsuggestsabouttheHegelianpossibili-tiesinherentinpostromanticart,and(4)whatgeneralconclusionscanthusbedrawnfromartisticpracticeforunderstandingthe“pastness”ofartinHegel’ssense.ArtasMaking-ExplicitanImplicitContentEarlyintheAestheticsHegelclaimsthat“art’svocationistounveil[enthullen¨]thetruthintheformofsensuousartisticconfigura-tion....”27WhileHegeldoesnotsaymuchaboutwhatisinvolvedinsuchunveiling–andEnthullung¨isbyfaraless-discussedHegeliantermofartthan,forexample,Darstellung[presentation]–itisclearthatartistictransformationinHegel’ssenseinvolvesthemakingexplicitofsomethingwhichisimplicit–inart’searlyphases,aunitywhichonlytheartistcanrevealtohisviewers.And,attheseearlystages,thereisseeminglymoreforarttodrawon:“[a]rtinitsbeginningsstillleavesoversomethingmysterious,asecretforebodingandalonging,”Hegelsays.28ImplicitnessappearstobeimportanttoHegel’saccountofartisticpracticeintwoways–firstintheunrevealedthatartfindsbeforeitstransformingactivityandsecond(asinthislastquotation)inthe“some-thingmysterious”thatisleftbehindit.Eachmodeischallengedbyreflectiveness–thefirstespeciallybythepotentialreplacementoftheartisticgraspoftheabsoluteinthemorereflectiveactivityofphiloso-phy,andthesecondbythemining-outofthemysteriousfromwithinart’sactivityitself.ArtandPhilosophyGiventhesharedcontentofthesetworealmsofabsolutespirit,Hegelmustgiveanaccountoftheirrelation.Althoughhedoesnotmakeitclearuntilhisdiscussionoftheartofpoetry,thecorrelationHegeldrawsisbetweentwomodesofmaking-explicit:[T]heworkofartdifferentiatesthefundamentaltopicthathasbeenselectedasitscenterbydevelopingitsparticularfeatures,andtotheseitimpartstheappear-anceofindependentfreedom;andthisitmustdobecausetheseparticularsare27Aesthetics,I:55;Vorlesungen,XIII:83.(Onlytheword“truth”isitalicizedinKnox’stranslation.)SeealsoHegel’sremarkthatit’satAbsoluteSpiritthatweseean“unveilingofwhattheworldofappearanceisinitstruenature”(Aesthetics,I:93;Vorlesungen,XIII:130).28AestheticsI:103;VorlesungenXIII:142.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n388allenspeightnothingbutthattopicitselfintheformofitsactuallycorrespondingrealiza-tion.Thismaythereforeremindusoftheprocedureofspeculativethinkingwhichlikewisemustdeveloptheparticular,outoftheprimarilyundifferen-tiateduniversal,uptoindependence....Bymeansofthismodeoftreatment,speculativephilosophylikewiseproducesworkswhich,likepoeticalonesinthisrespect,havethroughtheircontentitselfperfectself-identityandarticulateddevelopment.29Incomparingthesetwomodesofapprehendingunity–theartisticandthespeculative–Hegelmakesclearthatachiefdifferenceisthegreaterexplicitnessofphilosophy:poetry,ontheotherhand,doesnotgetsofarassuchadeliberateexposition:theharmonizingunitymustindeedbecompletelypresentineverypoeticalworkandbeactiveineverypartofitastheanimatingsoulofthewhole,butthispresenceisneverexpresslyemphasizedbyart;onthecontrary,itremainssomethinginnnerandimplicit,justasthesoulisdirectlylivinginallthemem-bersoftheorganismbutwithoutdeprivingthemoftheirappearanceofexistingindependently.30Insayingthattheunifyingactivityoftheartistremainssomethinginnerandimplicit,Hegelclearlydoesnotmeanthattheartistisnotalsoareflectiveorthinkingindividual.“Itis...anabsurditytosup-posethatpoemsliketheHomericcametothepoetinsleep.Withoutcircumspection,discriminationandcriticismtheartistcannotmasteranysubject-matterwhichheistoconfigure,anditissillytobelievethatthegenuineartistdoesnotknowwhatheisdoing.”31Eventheartistoftheclassicalperiodrequiresreflectioninhisactiv-ity,butthepervasivecultureofmodernreflectivityraisesnewquestionsentirelyaboutwhattheartistdoes.“Itisnot,asmightbesupposed,merelythatthepracticingartisthimselfisinfectedbytheloudvoiceofreflectionallaroundhimandbytheopinionsandjudgmentsonartthathavebecomecustomaryeverywhere,sothatheismisledintointroducingmorethoughtsintohiswork;thepointisthatourwholespiritualcultureisofsuchakindthathehimselfstandswithintheworldofreflectionanditsrelations,andcouldnotbyanyactofwillanddecisionabstracthimselffromit.”3229Aesthetics,II:984,VorlesungenXV:254–255.30Aesthetics,II:984–985;VorlesungenXV:255.31Aesthetics,I:283;VorlesungenXIII:365.32AestheticsI:10–11;VorlesungenXIII:25.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandAesthetics:ThePracticeand“Pastness”ofArt389ReflectionandPostromanticArtWhatsortofartisticpracticeisthenpossibleinsuchareflectivemod-ernworld?AlthoughHegelcanbequitederisiveabouttheworkofhisartisticcontemporaries,therearenonethelesspassageswherehesug-gestswhatmodernartisticpracticemightdrawonespecially.Henrich’sattention,forexample,wasdrawntothefollowinganalogyinthedis-cussionofpostromanticart:Inourday,inthecaseofalmostallpeoples,criticism,thecultivationofreflec-tion,and,inourGermancase,freedomofthoughthavemasteredtheartiststoo,andhavemadethem,sotosay,atabularasainrespectofthematerialandtheformoftheirproductions,afterthenecessaryparticularstagesoftheromanticart-formhavebeentraversed.Bondagetoaparticularsubject-matterandamodeofportrayalsuitableforthismaterialaloneareforartiststodaysomethingpast,andartthereforehasbecomeafreeinstrumentwhichtheartistcanwieldinproportiontohissubjectiveskillinrelationtoanymaterialofwhateverkind.Theartistthusstandsabovespecificconsecratedformsandconfigurationsandmovesfreeelyonhisownaccount....Thereforetheartist’sattitudetohistopicisonthewholemuchthesameasthedramatist’swhobringsonthesceneanddelineatesdifferentcharacterswhoarestrangetohim.33Hegel’sappealtodramaatthispointintheAesthetics–attheendofthedivisionontheromanticformofartandtheseriesofart-formsasawhole–isinteresting.Lackingcontemporaryexamplesfromthevisualarts(suchasCubism)inwhichtheartistic“self-transcendence”charac-teristicofmodernismispresent,Hegelturnsinsteadtoanexamplefromtheartwhichforhimissupposedlymostfullycapableofproducingper-fectembodimentsofbeauty–andwhichisdescribedattheendofthefol-lowingdivisionoftheAesthetics(theconclusionofthediscussionofthespecificartsthemselves)astheartinwhich“thewholemanpresents,byreproducingit,theworkofartproducedbyman(derganzeMenschdasvomMenschenproduzierteKunstwerkreproduzierenddarstellt).”3433AestheticsI:605.Inthe1823lectures,Hegelappearstohaveextendedthedramaticanalogyintoafurtherremarkabouttheuniversalizationofthebreadthofdramaitself:“Theartistis,asitwere,adramatistwhohasalienshapesmaketheirappear-ance,embedshisgeniusinthem,makesthemorganicthoughtheyremainalienalso.This,then,isthemodernsituationinsum–[an]abstractfacility,withouttiestothematerial.Dramaticart,e.g.,inrecenttimesscansallagesandpeo-ples.Withthatartiscompleted.Itisnolongerintimate[inInnigkeit]withthematerial,whichremainsallthesametoit.”G.W.F.Hegel:Vorlesungenuberdie¨PhilosophiederKunst.Berlin1823.NachgescriebenvonHeinrichGustavHotho,ed.byAnnemarieGethmann-Siefert(Hamburg:Meiner,1998),p.204.(IquoteherefromMartinDonougho’stranslationofthelectureseries;Iamgratefultohimforsharingthemanuscriptwithme.)34AestheticsII:627;VorlesungenXIV:262.(Italicizationsinthetranslationaremine.)DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n390allenspeightHegelthusappearstoturntodramanotonlyasthehighestembod-imentofbeauty–representingandrepresentedbythe“wholeman”–butalsoasanartinwhichpostromanticartisticself-transcendenceasanexplorationofthehumanmightbemostvisible(thusHegel’sfamousappealheretotheHumanuswhichisthe“newholyofholies”–theartistacquiringherehissubjectmatterinhimself,towhichnothinghumancanbealien).35ThereishereinHegel’spresentationofthepossibilitiesinherentintheartofthedramatistacuriousdualitywhichgoesdirectlytotheissueofart’sfunctionandtheissueofits“pastness.”Ontheonehand,asHegellikestopresentit,thegreatGreekfiguresareinthefirstinstanceartistsofthemselves,andsoPericles,Phidias,Plato,and“Sophoclesaboveall”are“allofthemout-and-outartistsbynature,idealartistsshapingthemselves,individualsofasinglecast,worksofartstandingtherelikeimmortalanddeathlessimagesofthegods.”36Inthissense,theactorswhostepoutonstagementionedinthequotationaboveareindeedonlyreproducingtheworkofsomedramatist,andeverynotableGreekishimselfadramatist.Ontheotherhand,theappealtotheartofthedramatistinthequotationaboutpostromanticartsuggeststhesideofpotentialalienationwithintheartist’sability.Drama,inotherwords,isatonceanartthatopensupthefullestpossibiliteswithinthesupposedHegelianidealofGreekplasticityandbeautybutatthesametimeanartthat(asHegelhimselfcategorizesit)belongsfullytotheromantic.ArtisticPracticeandPastnessHegel’sdoubleappealintheprecedingpassagestoanartwhichisputundertheheadingof“romantic”artsbutwhichisforhimalsodeeplyassociatedwiththeclassicalidealsuggestssomequestionsaboutart’spastnessthatwillbetakenupinthefollowingsection.Wecandrawalready,however,someconclusionsaboutpastnessandHegelianartfromtheconsiderationofartisticpractice.Themovementinvolvedinartisticpractice–ofmakingtheimplicitexplicit–suggestsasortofone-wayretrospectivityorpastnesstotheactivity.Whathasbeen“unveiled”bythetransformationoftheartistnolongerremainsunclearorunseen;ashisdiscussionofromanticandpostromanticartsuggests,Hegelclearlyholdsthatartmayreachthepointatwhichnofurther“mystery”isavailableforartisticactivity.35Forcommentaryonthispassageasawhole,seeMartinDonougho,“Remarkson‘HumanusheisstderHeilige,’”Hegel-Studien,17(1982):pp.214–225.36Aesthetics,II:719;VorlesungenXIV:374.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandAesthetics:ThePracticeand“Pastness”ofArt391Howshouldthe“pastness”ofart,then,beviewed?Iwillturninthefinalsectiontosomesuggestionsaboutthisquestionwhichdifferfromanumberoftheusualconstrualsinvolvedinthe“endofart”thesisalreadyunderdiscussion.iii.hegelandthe“pastness”ofartHegelisfrequentlyreadassimplyhavingorendorsingaclassicalidealofperfectcorrelationbetweenartisticformandmatter,butonemightraiseaquestionabouttheplaceofthisidealinHegel’saestheticscheme.MartinDonougho,forexample,hasquestionedwhetheritisrighttoassume,assomanycommentatorsontheAestheticshave,thatHegelissomeformof(neo)classicist.37Iwanttosuggestherethattheprecedingaccountofartisticpractice–thatartalwaysinvolvesamaking-explicitwhichrequiresaretrospectiveview–givessomefurtherreasonstofollowsuchalineofquestioning.AsDonoughosuggests,itiscertainlyanoddfactthatHegel’sprophecyaboutthe“end”ofartcoincidesatoncewiththeemergenceofboldnewclaimsaboutart’ssovereigntyandthe“museumization”(forwantofabetterword)ofworksofpastart–thecollectingandstagingthatcharacterizedthenewmuseumandconcert-hallcultureofHegel’stime.OnemightsayagooddealinthisconnectionbyexaminingtherelationbetweenSchinkel’snewartmuseumontheSpreeandHegel’saesthetics,butIwillturninsteadinthiscontext–partiallywithaneyetotheHegelianappealwehaveseentothedramatist’srepresentationalabilities–toanotherexamplefromthedrama.38OnewayofplacingthepastnessoftheidealofHegel’saestheticsys-temintosomeperspectivemightbetoconsider,then,hisidealizationofGreekdramainthelightofHellmutFlashar’simportantdramatur-gicalobservationthatthefirstproductionofaGreektragedyonaGermanstagewithoutadditions,textualrevisionsorinclusionofothersortsof(musical,dance,oroperatic)performanceoccurredtenyearsafterHegel’sdeath.39TheperformancesofGreektragedywhichHegel37Donougho,“ArtandHistory:HegelontheEnd,theBeginningandtheFutureofArt,”p.185.38OnHegelandtheculturallifeofBerlin,seeOttoPoggeler,ed.,¨HegelinBerlin:PreussischeKulturpolitikundidealistischeAsthetik:Zum150.Todestagdes¨Philosophen(Berlin:StaatsbibliothekPreusisscherKulturbesitz,1981)andOttoPoggelerandAnnemarieGethmann-Siefert,eds.¨KunsterfahrungundKulturpoli-tikimBerlinHegels(Bonn:Bouvier,1983).39Thefamous1841productionofSophocles’AntigonewasfirstpresentedinPotsdamandafterwardinBerlin.HellmutFlashar,InszenierungderAntike:DasgriechischeDramaaufderBuhnederNeuzeit1585–1990¨(Munich:Beck,1991),p.60.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n392allenspeighthimselfsaw(inBerlin,Paris,andelsewhere)tendedtobeactuallyoper-aticperformancesofthetragicmaterial.40HegelhimselfdiscussesthisissueinthelecturesintermsofthestageabilityofGreekdramasassuch.Inthe1826lectures,heexpressedthefollowingparadox:“Greekdramasarenotproduced,yetwefindthisinfinitesatisfactioninthem....”41Thisparadox–thatclassicaldramaisboth“unproducible”andatthesametimeappealingtomodernaudiences–suggeststhat,onHegel’sview,thereisalwaysadialecticalperspectivefromwhichthe“classical”idealofadequateembodimentofform–therealmoftheblissfulgodsofGreece–isintensionwiththe“romantic”abilityoftheartisttoreconstrueor“stage”aworkwithadifferentsenseofthatpast.Viewedfromthisperspective,Hegel’s“ideal”conceptionofclassicalartshouldbeseennotasaprivilegedmomentoftransparencyagainstwhichromanticartsimplyfallsshort(thestanceonemightassociatewithaneoclassicalaestheticwhichbuildsfromapresumablyimmedi-atefocusonaspecificmomentwithinart’spast–Phidiansculpture,oranotherfacetoffifth-centuryAthenianart,forexample).Rather,theHegelianidealofclassicalartshouldbeviewedinthelightofanongo-ingengagementwithpastworkswhichtakesintoaccount,withaneyeoveritsshoulder,theverypracticesofstaging(foraparticularsetting)orcollecting(withaneyetoaparticularaudience)thatmediateanaudi-ence’sencounterwiththepast.Inthislight,Hegelhimselfmaybeseenasafiguremuchmoreself-consciousofhisrolewithinthecontempo-raneousconstrualsandreconstrualsoftheromanticandpostromanticinartandculture.WhatsuchashiftinHegel’saestheticstancemightsayfortherela-tionshipbetweenartandphilosophyisanotherquestionwhichcanonlybeaddressedbrieflyhere.Art,asSchaefferhassuggested,isphilos-ophy’spast.42ThatHegelthinksthisisatleastpartiallytruegainssomeconfirmationbyhisprocedurebothinthePhenomenologyofSpiritandintheAesthetics.InthePhenomenology,Hegelpresentedagalleryofnarrativesinwhichaphilosophicalnarrativeemergesfromthe40ForadiscussionofHegel’streatmentoftheimportanceofthisform,seeAnnemarieGethmann-Siefert,“Das‘moderne’Gesamtkunstwerk:DieOper,”inPhanomen¨versusSystem:ZumVerhaltnisvonphilosophischerSystematikundKunsturteil¨inHegelsBerlinerVorlesungenuber¨AsthetikoderPhilosophiederKunst¨(Bonn:Bouvier,1992).41“GriechischeDramenwerdennichtangefuhrt,dochfindenwirdieseunendliche¨Befriedigunginihnen...”QuotedinFlashar,InszenierungderAntike,p.61.42Jean-MarieSchaeffer,ArtoftheModernAge:PhilosophyofArtfromKanttoHeidegger,p.137.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nHegelandAesthetics:ThePracticeand“Pastness”ofArt393narrativeof“religionintheformofart.”43WhiletheAestheticsmaybelessconcernedwiththenarrativerelationbetweenthesetwoactivities,itisnonethelessclear,especiallyfromaconsiderationofthepassagesintheprecedingsection,thatpartofHegel’scentralphilosophicaltaskthereistoaccountfortwomodesofapprehendingaunitywhichitselftendstowardgreaterexplicitness.43ForanaccountofHegel’sapproachtotherelationshipbetweenartandphilosophyinthePhG,seemyHegel,LiteratureandtheProblemofAgency(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),especiallychapter1.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:05WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.015CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nrobertpippin15TheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics“Presentnessisgrace.”MichaelFried,ArtandObjecthood1iAcentraltopicofmodernaestheticsafterKantistheproblemofaes-theticjudgment.Thequestionconcernstheproperunderstandingoflogicalformofsuchjudgments(suchas“thisisbeautiful”)andtheirpossibleobjectivity.ButHegeldoesnotoffer,anywhereinhisdiscus-sionsoffineart,arecognizabletheoryofaestheticjudgment.2Hedoesnotevenworkoutawelldefinedaccountofaestheticexperience.3This1MichaelFried,“ArtandObjecthood”,inArtandObjecthood:EssaysandReviews(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1998),p.168.2Thefollowingeditionsandabbreviationshavebeenused:HS:G.W.F.Hegel,“HamannsSchriften”inBerlinerSchriften,ed.byJ.Hoffmeister(Berlin:FelixMeiner,XXXX)1956E:G.W.F.Hegel,EnzyklopadiederphilosophischenWissenschaften¨,vol.6ofHauptwerkeinsechsBanden¨(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1992).FK:G.W.F.Hegel,FaithandKnowledge,trans.byWalterCerfandH.S.Harris(Albany:SUNYPress,1977).GW:G.W.F.Hegel,GlaubenundWissen,vol.IVofGesammelteWerke(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1968).JA:G.W.F.Hegel,SamtlicheWerke.Jubili¨aumausgabeinzwanzigB¨anden¨,ed.byH.Glockner(Stuttgart-BadCannstatt:Frommann,1965–1968).LFA:G.W.F.Hegel,Aesthetics:LecturesonFineArts,2vols.,trans.T.M.Knox(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1975).PhG:G.W.F.Hegel,DiePhanomenologiedesGeistes¨,vol.2,HauptwerkeinsechsBanden¨(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1992).PhS:G.W.F.Hegel,Hegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit,trans.byA.V.Miller(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1977).VA:G.W.F.Hegel,Vorlesungenuberdie¨Asthetik¨,Bd.13,14,15inJA.3TherearereallyonlytwolociclassiciforHegel’stheoryofart(besidesthethe-oreticalcommitmentsimpliedbyHegel’suseofliteratureinworkssuchasthePhenomenologyofSpirit(seeR.Pippin(forthcominga)andasidefrommarginal394DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics395divergencefrommuchmodernaesthetictheoryislargelyduetothecomplexityoftheconceptofartitselfasHegelinvokesit.ForHegel’streatmentisfamouslyhistorical;theaccountofthenatureofartisnarrativeratherthananalytic.4Andhearrivesatamostparadoxicalconclusionasaresultofthisnarrative:muchofwhatweconsiderpost-classicalart(whatHegelcalls“romantic”art)5istreatedasartintheprocessof“transcendingitselfasart,”somehow“againstitselfasart,”andasmuchamanifestationofthe“limitations”andincreasinglydis-satisfied“life”ofthepracticeoftheproductionandappreciationofartasitisapartofacontinuoustradition.(Theevendeeperparadoxisthatromanticartisallofthis“asart.”)Inlessdramaticterms,Hegeldeniestheautonomyoftheaesthetic,oratleastitscompleteautonomy,andthisdenialisthebasisoftheclaimthatartmustbeconsideredasaessayslikehis“HamannsSchriften,”Hegel(HS).)Thereareparagraphsinsections§556to§564intheAbsoluteSpiritsectionoftheEncyclopedia,andthefourlecturecoursesonfineart(1821,1823,1826,and1828/1829.)In1835(andtheninasecondeditionin1842)oneofHegel’sstudents,H.G.Hotho,workingfromHegel’sownnotes(whicharenowlost)andstudenttranscriptions,compiledaneditionbasedon(apparently)thelastthreeoftheselectureseries.ThiswaspublishedintheMoldenhauer–MicheleditionandwasthebasisforKnox’sOxfordEnglishtrans-lation.Hotho’seditionhasbeenvigorouslychallengedformorethantwenty-fiveyearsbyAnnemarieGethmann-Siefert,theeditorofthecriticaleditionofthelec-tures.(SheisputtingoutessentiallythestudentnotesforallofthelectureseriesindependentlyandhaslongclaimedthatwhatpeopletreatasHegel’saestheticsisactuallyHotho’saesthetics.)SeeA.Gethmann-Siefert“H.G.Hotho,”Hegel-Studien,Beiheft,22(1983),p.237and“AsthetikoderPhilosophiederKunst:Die¨NachschriftenundZeugnissezuHegelsBerlinerVorlesungen,”Hegel-Studien,p.26.WhiletherearesomeindicationsthattheHothoversionmayhereorthereincludesomeofHotho’senthusiasmsforvariousartobjects(SeeLydiaGoehr,“TheOdetoJoy:MusicandMusicalityinTragicCulture,”InternationalYearbookofGermanIdealism,IV(2006),pp.83–86onHegel’stastesinmusicandsimilarclaimsbyGethmann-SiefertinA.Gethmann-Siefert,(1992)“Das‘moderne’Gesamtkunst-werk:DieOper,”inPhanomenvs.System:zumVerh¨altnisvonphilosophischer¨SystematikundKunsturteilinHegelsBerlinerVorlesungenuber¨Asthetikoder¨PhilosophiederKunst,ed.byA.Gethmann-Siefert(Bonn:Bouvier,1992)p.197ff.)andthathemayhaveeditedHegelasheinterpretedHegel(howcoulditbeother-wise?),IhaveneverseenevidencetotheeffectthattheHothoversionisseriouslyunreliableorissomekindoffraud,atleastwithrespecttothebasicissuestreatedhere.Thereisoneseriousissue,butitseemstomeunresolvable.SeeFootnote7.4Officially,itisbothnarrative,inthelectures,andsystematic,intheEncyclopedia.Inthelatter,though,sections§561and§562makeitclearthattheaccounttheredependsonthehistoricaldistinctionamongsymbolic,classical,andromantic.Forthesystematicmeaningofthosedivisions,seeTerryPinkard,“Symbolic,ClassicalandRomanticArt,”inHegelandtheArts,ed.byStephenHoulgate(Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2007),pp.3–28.5ItshouldbestressedthatHegelisonlyinterestedinatheoryofgreatartandisnotterriblyinterestedinthestrictlyontologicalquestionofart“justasart.”DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n396robertpippinsocialinstitutionlinkedtothedevelopmentofthenormsandvaluesofasocietyasawhole,andthatitisbestunderstoodintermsofitssimilaritieswithreligionandphilosophyandnotasautonomous.Hegel’sapproachremainsquitecontroversial.6Someonewhodeniestheautonomyofartseemsonthevergeofmakingartameanstosome-thingelseorthemanifestationofadeeperreality:asignofthecontra-dictionsofcapitalistsociety,aformalistrefusalofthecultureindustry,asiteofnegativeresistancetospreading“identitythinking”andsoforth.Suchapproachesoftenexplainawayart,ratherthanrenderitmoreintelligibleasart.ButthefactthatHegellargelyignoresthequestionofthelogicalpeculiaritiesofaestheticjudgmentsandtheirpossiblevalidityalsohighlightstwopotentialadvantagesofhisapproach.Firstitopensupthepossibilityofaddressingthequestionofthemeaningofradicalnormativechangeinartmakingandartappreciating.(Iftheconceptualcontentof“theaesthetic”canchange,andradicallyso,thenthereisnoobviouswaytoisolatelogically“the”natureofaestheticjudgmentandaestheticexperience.Allofthatchangestoo.)AndHegel’sapproachmightputusinapositiontounderstandthesignificanceofbyfarthegreatestrevolutioninarthistory–modernism.Morespecifically,whatIwanttoshowisthatHegel’saccountofarthastobeunderstoodasrelyingontwoofhismostinterestingandchallengingclaims:hisunderstandingoftherelationbetweenthoughtandsensibilityinexperience,andhisunderstandingofwhathecallsthe“inner-outer”relationshipinhistheoryofagency.Inbothcasesastrictdualityisrejected,especiallyinhisaccountofagency,wherethemodelofinnerstatescausingexternalbodilyactionisdenied.ThebearingoftheseclaimsonhisaccountofartmighthelpframetheissueofartafterHegel.iiSinceHegel’sfullposition–hisclaimthatartisthesensibleappearanceor“showing”[Schein]of“theIdea”7–isnotaswellknownasmany6Oneofthemaininterpretivecontroversies:doesHegelmeanthatartiswhollydispensable,infavorofafullyreflectivephilosophicalaccount(“oftheAbsolute”),orisitovercomeonlyastheprimarymodeofhumanself-knowledge,apositionitheldbasicallyjustonce,infifthcenturyAthens?Myownviewisthattheevidenceisdispositive:thathemeantthelatter.Foranaccountinaccordwithsuchaverdict,anaccountofthe“nontranscendent”viewoftheachievementofabsolutespirit,seeNuzzo(2006),p.303.7Thisphrase,“dassinnlicheScheinenderIdee,”raisesthemostseriousissueaboutHotho’sreliability,asnotedabove.Itdoesnotappearintheextantstudenttran-scripts,onlyinHotho’sedition.SeeA.Gethmann-Siefert,EinfuhrunginHegels¨Asthetik¨(Munich:WilhelmFink,2005)p.241ff.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics397othermajorpositionsinthephilosophyofart,IwanttostartwithsummarysketchofwhatIunderstandtobeHegel’stheoryoffineart.Thiswillhavetobequitebreathless,andwewillquicklyseethatnosuchsummaryispossiblewithoutalsoinvolvinganinterpretationofHegel’smostambitiousgeneralphilosophicalposition,soIwillhavetosaysomethingaboutthatinSectionIII.Thenwecanreturntothequestionsposedabove.Therearefourpointsthatweneedonthetable.1.OneofthethingsthatdistinguishesHegelfrommanymodernphilosophersofartishisfocusonthecentralityofaestheticcontentinhisaccountofsuccessfulandespeciallygreatart.Contrarytopost-Kantianformalisminphilosophicalaestheticsandcriticism,forHegelinadequateunderstandingofcontent(ofthe“Idea”)=badart.“Worksofartareallthemoreexcellentinexpressingtruebeauty,thedeeperistheinnertruthoftheircontentandthought.”(LFA,74,VA,105)8Thegreatenemyisindeterminacy,meregesturesatthebeyond,orworshipfulaweattheunsayable.HenceHegel’shostilitytowardthesublimeasregressive.Whatdoeshemeanbycontent?Heisgiventosayingthatthereasonartshouldbeunderstoodasbelongingtogetherwithreligionandphi-losophyisthatthecontentofallofthese“bringtoconsciousnessandexpresstheDivine”(LFA,7;VA,21).9ButwhenhefirstintroducessuchaclaimintheIntroduction,hefollowsitwithanumberofappositivesandqualificationsthatstripitofmuchtraditionalreligiousassocia-tionandsomusthavelefthisoriginalauditorssomewhatconfused.HewritesofartisticcontentastheDivine,dasGottliche¨,(andnotGod)andhisappositivesare,theDivine,thatis,“thedeepestinterestsofmankind,”and“themostcomprehensivetruthsofspirit.”(LFA,7;VA,21)Artissaidtosharewithreligionandphilosophytheattempttoexpresswhatissimplycalled“thehighest”(dasHochste¨).Thiscouldbetakentomeantheobvious:simplythatinallgreatartissuesoftheutmostgravityandimportanceareatstake:justiceversusvengeance;thecompetingclaimsofcity,religion,andfamily;thegods;humanper-fection;whatitistolivewellwithblindfateandmoralluck;anddeath–perhapseventhe“meaningofBeing.”ButweknowfromHegel’sotherworksthatforhimthehighestvalueoraspirationisfreedom,thatfree-domisaformofrationalagency,theactualizationofreason,10thatsuch8Cf.Encyclopedia§562A.9Seealso:“...theDivineistheabsolutesubjectmatterofart.”(LFA,607;VA,237)NotetoothatHegelimmediatelysaysthattheDivine“...hadtoobjectifyitself,andthereforeproceedoutofitselfintothesecularcontentofsubjectivepersonality.”(Ibid.,myemphasis.)10Poetryis,forexample,evensaidtobe“reasonindividualized”[dasindividualisierteVernunftige]¨LFA,977;VA,245.ThelinkbetweenfreedomandreasonasHegelDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n398robertpippinresponsivenesstoreasonisconstitutiveofallintelligibility,andthathetreatsallotherpriorexpressionsof“thehighest”asincompletemani-festationsofsuchfreedom.Thisisaconsiderablymoreambitiousclaimthan“importantmattersareatstake.”Hefrequentlyclaimsinthelecturesthatthe“need”forartspringsfromaneedofhumansubjectstobeableto“externalizethemselves”inthepublicworldandsotobeabletorecognizethemselvesintheworldandinobjectsandintheotherhumanswhichconfrontanysub-ject.(Thisneedforexternalization[Entaußerung¨]Luther’stranslationforthebiblicalkenosis,inanyactualexerciseoffreedomwillplayacrucialroleinallaspectsofthetheory,aswewillsee.)11NowHegeladdsthatinart(aswellasreligionandphilosophy)thisexternalizationandself-recognitionconcerns“thehighestthings.”Again,heroughlymeanssomesortofself-knowledgeaboutthenatureand“actuality”offreedom.Suchahighesttruthisregularlysaidtobe“theidea,”which,inhisremarksonSolger,hecallssimplyandsomewhatunhelpfully“infiniteabsolutenegativity,”theIdea’sactivity“innegatingitselfasinfiniteanduniversalastobecomefinitudeandparticularity.”Forthemoment,itissafetosaythatifHegelisexpressingareligiousview,thenheisamemberofaChristiansectwithonlyonemember.(Allofwhichisnotyeteventomentiontheflabbergastingclaimin§560oftheEncyclopedia:“Theworkofartisjustasmuchtheworkoffreewill,andtheartististhemasterofGod[MeisterdesGottes].)”2.TherelationbetweentheissueofbeautyandthenormsrelevanttofineartisnotonethatHegelstateswithanyclarity.InHotho’sedition,hefirstannouncesthesubjectmatterasthe“realmofthebeautiful”butthenimmediatelysaysthat,moreparticularly[naher¨],thesubjectisart,andthenaddsthathemeansdieschoneKunst¨,thephraseregularlytranslatedas“fine”art,asifintestimonytothekalosk’agathosissuefromantiquity.Officially,Hegel’spositionisthatthebeautyofnatureisnotaproperorsignificantsubjectforreflection(natureis“spiritless”[geistlos]andbyandlargenaturalbeautysimplydoesn’tmatter),andthatfineorbeautifulartreacheditsculminationinGreekantiquity.Greekarchitecture,sculpture,andliteratureamounttotheculminationandperfectionofwhatartisquaart,thatis,beautiful.Somewhatinconsis-tently,hewillalsorefertothetaskofmakingthespiritual,innerrealmunderstandsitisnotaKantianone,anditdoesnotjustinvolvetheexerciseofanindividualfaculty.SeeR.Pippin,Hegel’sPracticalPhilosophy:RationalAgencyasEthicalLife(forthcoming,CambridgeUniversityPress).11InHegel’sunusualtheology,boththeaccountofcreationintheHebrewbibleandtheChristiandoctrineofIncarnationare“images”ofthe“logical”necessityofsuchEntaußerung¨.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:14WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics399ofromanticartbeautiful(“thespiritualbeautyoftheabsoluteinnerlifeasinherentlyinfinitespiritualsubjectivity”),althoughhealsoreferstosuchbeautyas“somethingsubordinate”[etwasUntergeordnetes]andnotesthatromanticartmustaspiretosomethingmore“substantial”thanthis,therealmofthe“willingandself-knowingspirit”[whichhedoesnotrefertoasbeautiful].(LFA,518;VA,129)Hereisasummaryclaimofhisofficialposition:Thereforetheworld-viewoftheGreeksispreciselythemilieu[Mitte]inwhichbeautybeginsitstruelifeandbuildsitsserenekingdom;themilieu[Mitte]offreevitalitywhichisnotonlytherenaturallyandimmediatelybutisgeneratedbyspiritualvisionandtransfiguredbyart;themilieu[Mitte]ofadevelopmentofreflectionandatthesametimeofthatabsenceofreflectionthatneitherisolatestheindividualnorcanbringbacktopositiveunityandreconciliationhisnegativity,grief,andmisfortune.(LFA,437;VA,II,26)Artafterthebeautiful(whichHegelcalls“romantic”art)isnotmorebeautifulbut,Hegeloftensays,simply“better,”“moreexcellent”[vortrefflicher]evenifnotbetterart.12Hegoesontoremarkthatwhatislackingordefectiveinclassicalartisjustwhatislackinginartitself(LFA,79;VA,111)andhesuggestsfrequentlythatthisdefectconsistsintheveryassumptionconstitutiveofartitself:thatthe“ideal”(thetruenatureofreality)canhaveanadequatesensibleform.Romanticartthenmustbeartinwhichthelimitationofartasavehicleofself-knowledgeisitselfexpressedandinsomewaytranscended,notpresentmerelyasafailure,anegativelimitationornostalgiclongingorasub-limemystery.Hispuzzlingformulais:“Inthiswayromanticartistheself-transcendenceofartwithinitsownsphereandintheformofartitself”(LFA,80;VA,112).Naturallysuchaclaimraisesthequestion:whatisartonceithasbecomeitsownself-transcendence?Hegelhasanumberofanswers,rangingfromphilosophytoreligiontodisplaysofvirtuositytoamemorializingartoranartofremembrancealone,butIbelievehispositionitselfatleastallowsusatleasttosuggestapossibleanswer:Europeanmodernism.Actually–intestimonytothefactthatanysummaryofanythinginHegelhastobemultiplyqualified–forallthisphilhellinism,Hegelalsopointsoutthatthelimitationsofthebeautifulasanaestheticidealwerealreadydramatically,vividlypresentinGreekdrama,intragedy.13Itis12BeautyitselfismostlydefinedintermsofHegel’ssystematicprojectanditdoessound“classical,”afamiliarcriticismofHegel.“...thebeautifulthinginitsexistencemakesitsownConceptappearasrealizedanddisplaysinitselfsubjectiveunityandlife.”(LFA,114;VA,155.)13ItisactuallySchiller,notHegel,whosimplyidealizesthebeautyofallGreekart(cf.“HymnenandieNacht”),andHegelseemstoacceptNovalis’scritiqueofDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n400robertpippinalreadytrueintragedythat“artnowtranscendsitself,inthatitforsakestheelementofareconciledembodimentofspiritinsensuousformandpassesoverfromthepoetryoftheimaginationtotheproseofthought.”(LFA,89;VA,123)Theimpossibilityofthesortofreconciliationandharmonynecessaryforthebeautifultofunctionasanideal,andtheemphasisontheprosaicnatureofbourgeoismodernitywillplaylargerolesinHegel’streatmentoflateromanticismandsoforhisviewsofartinmodernity.ThereisapassageinthePrefacetothePhenomenologythatsummarizesthispointdramatically.Death,ifthatiswhatwewanttocallthisnon-actuality,isofallthingsthemostdreadful,andtoholdfasttowhatisdeadrequiresthegreateststrength.Lackingstrength,BeautyhatestheUnderstandingforaskingofherwhatitcannotdo.ButthelifeofSpiritisnotthelifethatshrinksfromdeathandkeepsitselfuntouchedbydevastation,butratherthelifethatenduresitandmaintainsitselfinit.Itwinsitstruthonlywhen,inutterdismemberment,itfindsitself.(§32,18–19)143.ThetwokeynotionsinHegel’saccountofbeautyandfineartarethenotionsofScheinorappearing,showing,oroftensimplyavisual“shining,”andvariationsonliveliness,lifeandenliven,Lebendigkeit,beleben,Leben,andsoforth“ThebeautifulischaracterizedasthepureappearanceoftheIdeatosense.”(E,111)IntermsofhisfrequentUr-image:“...theoutermustharmonizewithaninnerwhichisharmo-niousinitself,andjustonthataccount,canrevealitselfasitselfintheouter.”(E,155)Themanifestation(orshining)oftheIdeainsen-suousmaterial,however,isnotanythinglikeacognitiveawareness,andHegel’sattempttoexplainwhyitistheclosestheevergetstoanaccountofdistinctlyaestheticexperience.15Ratherthancognitiveawareness,fineartissaidtoawakeninusanemotionalandspiritedresponsivenesstoeverythingwhichhasaplaceinhumanspirit(HegelquotesTerence’s“Nihilhumani...”principle.)Hereishissummaryclaim.suchbeauty-worship,bothamongtheGreeks(thatthey“aestheticized”sufferinganddeath,couldmakenoplacefor“thenegative”inhumanlife)andofGermanphilhellenism.14SoHegelwouldnevergoasfarasBarnettNewman’s“Theimpulseofmodernartwastodestroybeauty.”SeeNewman,“TheSublimeisNow.”TheTiger’sEye,vol.VI,p.51;quotedinAlexanderNehamas,OnlyaPromiseofHappiness:ThePlaceofBeautyinaWorldofArt(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2007),p.13.Nothingneedstobedestroyed.Thetimeforthebeautifulasanidealofhigharthassimplypassed.15Itisn’tstraightforwardlysuchatheorybecausewhatcountsasthisenlivenedresponsivenessalsochanges.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics401[Art’s]aimthereforeissupposedtoconsistinawakening[wecken]andvivifying[beleben]ourslumberingfeelings,inclinations,andpassionsofeverykind,infillingtheheart,inforcingthehumanbeing,whethereducatedornot,togothroughthewholegamutoffeelingswhichthehumanheartinitsinmostandsecretrecessescanbear,experienceandproduce,throughwhatcanmoveandstirthehumanbreastinitsdepthandmanifoldpossibilitiesandaspects,andtodelivertofeelingandcontemplationforitsenjoymentwhateverspiritpossessesoftheessentialandloftyinitsthinkingandintheIdea....(LFA,46;VA,70)SuchclaimscansoundverymuchlikeromanticboilerplateunlesswerealizethatHegelbelievesthatitisquitepossibleforthevarious“high-est”normsgoverningacceptableandauthoritativeknowledgeclaimsorpractical,ethical,andpoliticallifeactuallyto“godead”inacertainway,tofunctioninamatteroffactwayinconstrainingclaimsofauthor-ityandkindsofconduct,buttodoso,ashesays,“positively,”merelyasan“external”lifelessauthority.16Insuchacontext,thissomewhatSchillereanconcernwiththisenliveningfunctionhasitsownobjectivesocialconditionsforsuccessfulrealization.Indeedthisability,centraltoart’sfunction,tohelpsustain(byexpressing)the“life”ofthehighestnorms(whentheycanbesosuccessfullyaffirmed)issaidtobeessen-tialtotheauthorityofsuchnormsthemselves.Hereisawell-knownpassagefromtheJenaPhenomenologyofSpiritaboutthisissue:Themannerofstudyinancienttimesdifferedfromthatofthemodernageinthattheformerwastheproperandcompleteformationofthenaturalconsciousness.Puttingitselftothetestateverypointofitsexistence,andphilosophizingabouteverythingitcameacross,itmadeitselfintoauniversalitythatwasactivethroughandthrough.Inmoderntimes,however,theindividualfindstheabstractformready-made;theefforttograspandappropriateitismorethedirectdriving-forthofwhatiswithinandthetruncatedgenerationoftheuniversalthanitistheemergenceofthelatterfromtheconcretevarietyofexistence.Hencethetasknowadaysconsistsnotsomuchinpurgingtheindividualofanimmediate,sensuousmodeofapprehension,andmakinghimintoasubstancethatisanobjectofthoughtandthatthinks,butratherinjusttheopposite,infreeing16InHegel’sdevelopment,thisconcernwiththe“life”ofnorms,rules,principles,andideals,orratherthelifeanddeathofsuchnorms,hastocountashismostprominentconcern,beginningearlywithhisaccountofloveintheChristiancommunity,developingintoageneralviewof“life,”andculminatinginthematuretheoryofGeistor“spirit.”ThisLiebe–Leben–GeisttrajectorywasfirstproposedbyDilthey,DieJugendgeschichteHegels,inGesammelteSchriftenBd.4(Goettingen:Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht,1990)in1905andreappearsinsuchcommentatorsasH.S.Harris,Hegel’sDevelopment:TowardtheSunlight1770–1801(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1971)andDieterHenrich,HegelimKontext(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1971).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n402robertpippindeterminatethoughtsfromtheirfixitysoastogiveactualitytotheuniversal,andimparttoitspirituallife.(§33,19–20)17ItwouldnotbetoomuchofanexaggerationtosaythatHegel’sphilos-ophyofartisnotatheoryofrepresentationorexpression,notaclassicaltheoryofmimesisorapost-Christiantheoryofcreation(genius)18butof“enlivening,”oncewenoticetoothatsuchenliveningisacrucialelementintheconditionsforthepossibilityofanynorm’sgriponthoseboundtoit,andthatthisgripcanloosenandfail,thusrequiringsome-thingdifferentfromart.(Thatis,suchanexternalizationcanbesaidtohelp“bring”suchnormsandprinciplesandvalues“tolife,”notmerelytoexpresstheirlife.ThesensibleshowingoftheIdeaisnotanattempttoprovideanexampleoraparadigmaticinstancebut,asHegelputsit,to“realizeoractualizetheuniversalitself.”19IwilltrytomakeuseinaminuteofHegel’saccountofagencyandtherealizationofanintentiontotrytomakethisclearer.)Insum,welearnsomethingaboutthe“life”ofsuchvalueswhenweseethemexternalizedinartobjects,andwelearnthisinawayuniquetoart.4.Asidefromthesegesturesat“quickening”orenlivening,Hegeldoesnothaveaparticularlyrichordetailedtheoryofaestheticexpe-rience.Mostofthetime,hespeaksratherdrylyofa“Kunstbetrach-tung,”awayofconsideringart,andheseemstoagreewithSchlegelthatthecriticshouldnowunderstandhimselfnotasjudge,asavatarof17ThesamelanguageappearsintheLecturesonFineArt.Noteespeciallythatinthelistofmodernoppositionsheincludesthecontrastbetween“thedead,inherentlyemptyconcept,andthefullconcretenessoflife”(LFA,53–54;VA,80;cf.alsoLFA,1006;VA,282)Sinceonewouldpresumablywanttounderstandsomethinginitsproperlife,notdead,orempty,thisimpliesparadoxicallyahighermoreadequatestatusforartwhencomparedwithphilosophy.SeeR.Pippin,“TheStatusofLiterature”foradiscussionofthisissue.18Ofcourse,HegelbeingHegel,itisalsopossibletosaythatforhimartisalsoallofthesealternatives,butthattheyallcanbeshowntobeincompletemanifestationsofthefullnotionofartasenliveningappearing,thatsuchincompletemanifesta-tionsarethemselvestiedtoanincomplete(noterroneous)self-understandingoffreedom.19ThishighlightsapeculiarityinHegel’streatmentofart,mademuchofbyHenrich.The“Ende”orendofartisnottreatedasaVollendungorcompletionorfullestrealizationofpossibilities,asis,onecouldargue,Hegel’streatmentofthemodernrepresentativestate,orLutheranismorHegeliansystematicidealism.Art’sendingismuchmore,inHenrich’sterms,aZerfall,akindofdecay;asifart’spossibilitiesareexhausted,asif“thelifehadgoneoutofthem,”onemightputit.Evenwithinthearthistorylecturesthe“end”ofsymbolicandclassicalartareformsoftran-sition;butthisisnottruefortheendofromanticart.SeeHenrich,“ZerfallundZukunft:HegelsTheoremeueberdasEndederKunst,”inFixpunkte:Abhandlun-genundEssayszurTheoriederKunst(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,2003)pp.82–83,andp.96.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics403exemplarytaste,butasinterpreter.(What“enlivening”inspiresiswhatwenowcallcriticism,notappreciation.)Hegeldistanceshimselffromanybeliefinwhathecallsthe“meresubjectivity”and“affectivity”oftheartisticresponseandspeaksinsteadoftheattemptto“plungethedepthsofawork”andtogoever“deeper”intoit[dasKunstwerkzuversenkenundzuvertiefen].(VA,54)Healsosaysthatthe“contempla-tion[Betrachtung]ofbeautyisofaliberalkind[liberalerArt];itleavesobjectsaloneasbeinginherentlyfreeandinfinite.”(E,114)Thisintro-ducestheproblemoftheautonomyoftheaestheticdimension,andalsointroducestherelationbetweentheselecturesand,letussay,hisbasicposition.20iiiIhavebegunbysuggestingthatthefirstthingweshouldunderstandaboutHegel’sviewisthatthereisan“absenceofaesthetics”inHegel’streatmentofthebeautifulandfineart.Thatis,asisalreadyquiteappar-ent,heisinterestedinawidevarietyofissuesthatdonothavemuchtodowithwhatbecamethephilosophicalissuesofaestheticsintheeighteenthcenturyafterBaumgarten’suseofthattermestablishedakindofphilosophicsubdiscipline.21Idon’tmeantosuggestthatHegelfailedtoappreciatethattheprimarymodalityintheexperienceofthebeautifulandoffineartissensible.Hemakesthispointinhisownwaymanytimes.ButprimarymodalitydoesnotforHegelmeanindepen-dentmodality,andthatisthebeginningoftheHegelianstorythatwillultimatelyassociateartwithreligionandphilosophyandwhichwillprovidethebasisforhisclaimabouttheessentialhistoricityofart.HiscleareststatementoccursintheIntroduction:Ofcoursetheworkofartpresentsitselftosensuousapprehension.Itisthereforsensuousfeeling,externalorinternal,forsensuousintuitionandideas,justasnatureis...Butneverthelesstheworkofart,asasensuousobject,isnotmerelyforsensuousapprehension;itsstandingisofsuchakindthat,thoughsensuous,itisessentiallyatthesametimeforspiritualapprehension;spiritismeanttobeaffectedbyitandtofindsomesatisfactioninit.(LFA,35;VA,57)20SeethediscussioninBubner,“IsThereaHegelianTheoryofAestheticExperi-ence?”inTheInnovationsofIdealism,trans.byNickWalker(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),pp.216–230.BubnermakesuseofwhatHegelhastosayaboutsymbolicarttoworkhiswaytowardthe“traces”ofatheoryofaestheticexperienceinHegel.Muchofwhathesaysaboutsuchanexperienceisquitesuggestiveforthecategoryofmodernistart.21Forauseful,briefsummaryoftheBaumgarten–Hegelhistory,seeA.Nuzzo,“Hegel’sAestheticsasaTheoryofAbsoluteSpirit,”InternationalYearbookofGermanIdealism,IV(2006),pp.293–295.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n404robertpippinLaterHegelformulateshisownversionofKant’sdisinterestednessclaim,insistingthatanartworkdoesnotexistforthesatisfactionofanydesirebut“forthecontemplativesideofspiritalone,”andthatitis“meanttosatisfypurelyspiritualexistence.”(LFA,36–37;VA,58)Butagain,addingtothecomplexity,by“forthecontemplativeside”Hegeldoesnotmean“forcontemplation.”Thereissupposedtobesome-thingdistinctivelyaestheticabouttheScheinofsomeideal,evenifsuchanexperienceisnotautonomousorarealmofexperiencewhollyuntoitself.AtonepointHegelsimplyproposesthatartbeunderstoodasmak-ing“everyoneofitsproductionsintoathousand-eyedArgus,”thatartmakeseveryhumanaction,event,speech,andtoneofvoice“intoaneye,inwhichthefreesoulisrevealedinitsinnerinfinity.”(LFA,154;VA,203)Thissuggeststhatthetreatmentofsomeactionorspeechinanartwork,howeversensiblyapprehended,invitesinauniquewayinterroga-tionatamoresustained,reflectiveandinvolving–“lively”–level,sug-gestingthatliketheeyeandthehumansoul,theartworkbecomesboththevehicleofsight,thatbywhichwesee,andthatintowhichthesoul,thehumanmeaningorsignificanceoftheactionorspeech,canbeseen.22Tobesure,neitherKant’snorSchiller’saesthetics,thegreatestinflu-encesonHegel,weresensualistorempiricist,butKant’sclaimabouttherelevanceofpurposivenesstoaestheticexperienceandSchiller’sinterestintherelevanceofourmoralvocationarenotwhatHegelhasinmind.For,inmakingthispoint,Hegelismakinghisusualandmostrepeatedpoint,familiarsincetheDifferenzschriftandGlaubenundWissen.23ItisthepointthatIwanttosayiscentraltoHegel’scritiqueoftheputativeindependenceofaestheticexperience,althoughadmittedly,onethatisveryhardtorestateproperly.Itisthatthedistinguishabilityofconceptandintuitioninexperience–whichHegelishappytoconcede–isnotequivalenttoanddoesnotentailtheseparabilityofconceptandintu-itionasindependentcontributorstoexperience.24Contrarytosome22Cf.“Carjeneleregardepascommeonregardeunechose,jenelefixepasensonlieu,monregarderreenluicommedanslesnimbresdel’Etre,jevoisselonouavecluiplutotqujenelevois.”SeeMerleau-Ponty,“ˆL’Oeiletl’Esprit”(Paris:Gallimand,1964),p.23.Inmanyrespects,L’Oeiletl’Espritisapowerfulrestate-mentofmanyHegelianthemes.ThecritiqueofCartesianopticsismuchlikeHegel’srejectionofa“two-stage”processofperception,asiswhatMerleau-Pontycalls“unmysteredepassivit`e”inperception,passivebutnotwhollyreceptive(p.´52).Animportantdifference:Hegelstressesmorethesocialdimensionofartisticmeaning.23GW,343;BK,92.SeealsoGW,327;BK,69–70.24I.Kant,KritikderreinenVernunftA51/B75.Kant’sclaimsaboutthestrictdis-tinctionbetweenthesetwo“sources,”evenasheemphasizedinhisownwayHegel’sdialecticalpointabouttheirnecessarilyintertwined,eveninseparableroleDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics405criticismsofthisposition,thereisnoreasontothinkthatHegeliscol-lapsingoreliminatingthedistinctionbetweenthesensualorpassiveandtheconceptual(oractive)elementsinknowledge.Hispositionismuchmorecomplicatedthanthat.Thereisnoreasontothinkheiscollapsingthetwo,anymorethanthereisanyreasontothinkthatsomeoneclaim-ingthat“XcannotberepresentationallysignificantexceptasY’ed”canbeassumedtobeclaiming“TherearenoX’s;thereisonlyY’ing,”oreventhattobeclaiming“X’snotplayingallbyitselfarepresentation-allysignificantrolemeansitplaysnorolewhatsoever,hasnofunctionwithinknowledgeclaims.”25Morebroadly,Hegel’sdenialofascheme-contentdistinctionmeansthatforhimthequestionofhowdiscursivethoughtinformssensibilityinouracquiringperceptualknowledgeisofthesamelogicalformasthequestionofhowthoughtorinnerintentioninformsorismanifestinbodilyaction.26Inneithercaseistherea“two-stage”process,neithertheconceptualizationofindependentlyacquiredsensorymaterial,noraninnerintentionfunctioningasdistinctcause,initiatingasubsequentbodilymovementasonemightkickaballtostartitrolling.Itis,inthatsense,hisUr-question.Hegel’sattempttostateproperlytheimpli-cationsofthisclaim–sensibilityistheprimaryaestheticmodalitybutnotanindependentone,justasconceptandintuitionaredistinguish-ableevenifnotseparable,justasintentionisnotreducibletobodilymotions,evenwhilenotanindependentcauseofsuchmotion–isanattemptthatsurfacesonnearlyeverypageofhiswork,earlyandlate.27inknowledge,wasthebasisofhiscritiqueoftheentirepriorphilosophicaltradi-tion,elementsofwhich,hefamouslyclaimed,either“sensualizedallconceptsoftheunderstanding”or“intellectualized”appearances(A271/B327).25ForHegelasfortheTractarianWittgenstein,thoughtdoesnot“stopshort”oftheworld;awayofthinkingaboutanobject[aSinn]isnotanintermediaryentitybetweenusandthereferentsofthought;itisawayofseeingtheworld.Thereisstillplentyofsubstantivecontentandempiricalguidednessinexperienceonsuchapicture.Theclaimisonly,again,thatthought’srelationtosuchobjectscannotbesecuredorevenintuitionallypinneddown,bythedeliverancesofsensibilityalone.Thebroadestwaytorestatethepointissimplythatthedomainofthenormative–inthiscasewhatoughttobeclaimed–isautonomous.Principlesconstrainingwhatweoughttobelieve,whatcouldcountasapossibleobjectofexperienceorwhatoneoughttodoarewhollyindependentofclaimsabouthowthemindworksorwhatpeoplegenerallydoorwhatthereceivedworlddeterminesustothink.Fichteappreciatedthispointinthedeepestwayandbuilthiswholephilosophyaroundit.26Theaestheticformulationofthepoint:“...artconsistspreciselyintheconnec-tion,theaffinityandtheconcreteinterpenetration[demkonkretenIneinander]ofmeaning[Bedeutung]andform[Form].”LFA,763–764;VA,299)27Cf.McDowell’saptformulationinMindandWorld(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1994),pp.89–90:“SimilarlyintentionswithoutovertactivityareDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n406robertpippinThemasterimageinalmostallthesediscussionsisonewehavealreadyseenanditisalsonoteasilyaccessible:thattherightwaytounderstandthe“inner–outer”relationatworkinallsuchcasesisasaspeculativeinner–outer“identity.”Thisisafrequentenoughsummaryimagethatweshouldexpectittoinformhistreatmentoffineartandthatisindeedwhatwefind.(Oneofhismoreaccessibleformulations:“Theuniversalneedforart...isman’srationalneedtolifttheinnerandouterworldintohisspiritualconsciousnessasanobjectinwhichherecognizeshisownself.”(LFA,31;VA,52,myemphasis)Therelationbetweentheartistandherproduct(innertoouter)andtheartobjectandhumanreceptivity(outertoinner)issupposedtoinvolvesuchan“identity,”withthelatteroftenexpressedasspirit(bothproducerandappreciator)“findingitself”intheartobject.Thecrucialdiscussionsoftheendofsymbolicart(intheepigram)andofclassicalart(inRomansatire)arecouchedintermsofsomeunresolvedandultimatelyunbearabledis-tortedself-understandingofthisinner–outerrelation.TherathergrandandconsiderablylessaccessiblebutcanonicalformulationfromtheEncyclopedia(theformulationthat,somewhatunfortunately,guideseverythingintheFineArtlectures):“Hencewhatisonlysomethinginner,isalsotherebyexternal,andwhatisonlyexternalisalsoonlysomethinginner.”(EL,§140)AnditisclearoftenthatHegelmakesagreatdealofhisversionofthisinterdependenceinhisaccountofart.“Inthisway,”heclaimsaboutart,“thesensuousaspectofartisspiritualized[vergeistert],sincespiritappearsinartasmadesensuous.[versinnlicht]”Theartworkissaid“towantsensiblepresence”[sinnlicheGegenwart]...whichindeedshouldremainsensuous,butliberatedfromthescaffoldingofitspurelymaterialnature.Thusthesensuousaspectofaworkofart,incomparisonwiththeimmediateexistenceofthingsinnature,iselevatedtoapureappearance,andtheworkofartstandsinthemiddlebetweenimmediatesensuousnessandidealthought.Itisnotyetpurethought,but,despiteitssen-suousnessisnolongerapurelymaterialexistenteither...thesensuousintheworkofartisitselfsomethingideal.(LFA,38;VA,60)And,Artbymeansofitsrepresentations,whileremainingwithinthesensuoussphere,liberatesmanatthesametimefromthepowerofsensuousness...artlifts(man)idle;movementsoflimbswithoutconceptsaremerehappenings,notexpressionsofagency.”DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics407withgentlehandsoutofandaboveimprisonmentinnature...”(LFA,49;VA,74)28Again,aconventionalviewofwhatHegelurgesasasuccessorto“aes-thetics”isaninstitutionalorsocialtheoryofartobjects(understoodbysomeHegelcommentatorstomeanthatwhateversomecommunity,saytheartmarket,determinestobethenormforartandgoodart,istherebyartandgoodart,thatsomesuchnormcomestobeaninseparableele-mentinaestheticexperienceitself).29Thisiswhatmanyunderstandtobetheimportoftheidealistclaimaboutthemediated,noninde-pendentstatusoftheaestheticdimension.Themediationissupposedbysuchcommentatorstobe“socialynormative,”inthe“inverted-Hegelian”waythatMarxwouldcometoconsidertheprimarymediatingormeaning-makingfunctioninmodernsocieties,includingaestheticmeaning,tobe“thecommodityform.”ThereissomethingrightaboutthischaracterizationofHegel’sposition,butattheveryleastHegelalsothinksthatthetransitiontomodern,romanticart(andbeyond)canbesaidtomakesomesortofclear,compellingsense(notatalllikeachangeinfashionorapurelycontingentsequence)andatmostheundoubtedlywantstounderstandthistransitionasprogressiveinsomeway,thatsuchartreflectssometruthaboutnorm,meaningandhumanactivity“better”thanearlierart,evenifnot,asheoftensays,better“asart”.(ItisatthispointthatHegelobviouslypartscompanywiththe“anythinggoes”versionofthesocial-institutionaltheoryofart.)Atanyrate,liketheleft-HegelianorMarxistinterpretation,Hegel’sapproachcompletelyaltersthesenseofthequestionof“bywhatright”onewouldclaimthatasingleworkisbetterorbetterartorartatall.Thatquestioncannotbeansweredasaquestionaboutartalone,certainlywhenframedabout28ItshouldbenotedthatHegelthinksthatinhisaestheticsKantcamemuchclosertorealizingthenatureofthetruerelationbetweenimmediacyandmediation,ingeneral,thananywhereelse.HenotesthatKantrealizedthatthematerialelementofart–sense,feeling,emotion,inclination–isnot“subsumedunderuniversalcategoriesoftheunderstanding,anddominatedbytheconceptoffreedominitsabstractuniversality,butissoboundupwiththeuniversalthatitisinwardlyandabsolutelyadequatetoit.Thereforethoughtisincarnateinthebeautyofart,andthematerialisnotdeterminedbythoughtexternally,butexistsfreelyonitsownaccount–inthatthenatural,sensuous,theheart,etc.,haveinthemselvesproportion,purpose,andharmony;andintuitionandfeelingareelevatedtospiri-tualuniversality,justasthoughtnotonlyrenouncesitshostilitytonaturebutisenlivenedthereby.”(LFA,60:VA,88;myemphasis)HegelthengoesontomakehisusualcriticismofKantforconstruingthisashavingonlya“subjective”meaning,ratherthanabout“whatisabsolutelytrueandactual.”(Ibid.)29Forasurveyoftherecent(post-1970)historyoftheinstitutionaltheoryofart,seeD.Graves,“TheInstitutionalTheoryofArt:ASurvey,”Philosophia,XXXV(1997),pp.51–67.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n408robertpippinaparticularwork,andcanonlybeapproachedifframedintermsofageneraltheoryofacollectiveattemptatself-knowledgeandproductiveactivity.Theskeptic’sworrythatanycategorizationoforevaluationofartmightexpressidiosyncraticpersonalpreferencesalreadystartsofffartoofardownstreamforittohaveanyinterestorbite.Ifsuchaquestionarises,itarises“inside”thepracticeoftheproductionandappreciationofartasasocialself-regulatingactivity,andcanbeaddressedaccordingtothenormsofthatpractice.The“theorist”hasnospecialauthorityaboutanysuchquestion.Ofcourse,allsuchqualificationsonthesupposedautonomyoftheaestheticcannotbesoformulatedthatsuchconsiderationsobscurethedistinctnessoftheaestheticmanifestationoftheidea.Thisisadialecti-caltightropethatappearsfrequentlythroughoutHegel’s“system.”(Thefactthatmoralconsiderationsonlygetagripwithinandasdependentonadistinctandsubstantiveformofethicallife–thattheyarenotmattersofpurepracticalreason–doesnotmeanthatHegelisouttodenytheauthorityordistinctnessofmoralconsiderations,anymorethanhispositionontheinseparabilityofconceptandintuitionmeanstodenythepossibilityofempiricalknowledge.)Simplyput,theIdea’ssensiblelivingappearanceisavital,butnotfullyarticulatedmani-festation.The“ethicalharmony”ofGreekspiritissensibleand,inHegel’ssense,alive,inGreekarchitecture,butnotinthewayinwhichitbecomesanobjectofreflectioninGreekphilosophy,andeventuallyinHegel’saccountinthePhenomenology.Thepainfulinternalten-sionsandincompatibilitiesofthatethicalworldaredirectlysensibleinGreektragedy,butnotinthemoreself-conscious(andhence“freer”)waysuchtensionsaremanifestinSocrates’challengesinthePlatonicdialogues.Thesecondimplicationisathoroughlyhistoricizedaccountofsuchinstitutionalorsocialsettings,giventhatHegeltreatsconceptualnormsasnecessarilyvariableintime.30Hiscaseforthehistoricityofsuchnormsiscomplicatedbutthebasicideaisthatthedenialofascheme-contentdistinctionmeansthattraditionallyempiricistortranscenden-talstrategiesforestablishingthenormativeauthorityofnormsforthoughtoractionarenotavailable.Thoughtdoesnotexogenouslyshape30ThislatterisoftensaidtobeHegel’smajorcontributiontonotjustthephilosoph-icalbuttheacademicandscholarlystudyofart,that,largelythankstoHegel,theproblemofart’sintelligibilityormeaningshouldberaisedandpursuedwithin“arthistory”departments.GombrichfamouslycalledHegel“thefatherofarthistory”(althoughHegelshouldnotbeblamedforanythingGombrichsaidaboutarthis-toryorart).SeeE.Gombrich,“HegelunddieKunstgeschichte,”NeueRundschau,88(1977),pp.202–219.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics409thematerialofthoughtandisnotsimplyshapedbyit;practicalreasondoesnotlegislatetoourmaterialimpulses,ormerelydevisestrategiesfortheirefficientsatisfaction.Conceptualandnormativechange,aninevitableresultofsimplehumanfinitude,mustthenbeaccountedfor“internally,”broughtaboutbythefinitudeandincompletenessofsomeattempttoregulatewhatwealloweachothertosayanddo,againwithinageneralaccountofhowwegoaboutallowingorforbiddingeachother’sclaimsandactions.31ivSoHegel’sphilosophyofartisdependentfirstofallonatheoryofspirit,onsomeaccountofcollective,norm-governedhumanmindednessandanaccountofthekindoffinitudeorlackofwhichexplainsthepro-ductionofartworksandthelegislationofnormsfortheirproductionandevaluation.Wesimplyneedtoknowhowsocialnormsworkinordertoknowhowartisticnormswork.Thistheoryofsuchaneedandsuchproductionisitselfdoublydependent.ItisfirstdependentonwhatHegelkeepsreferringtoasthe“logic”oftheinner–outerrelationcentraltoproperlyunderstandingspiritanditsproducts.Thedistinctfeatureofthislogicisitscontrary-to-common-sensedenialofastrictseparationor“two-stage”view.Soinwritingabouttheproductionofart(Greekart,inthiscase),Hegelwritesabouttheirideasanddoctrines[VorstellungenundLehren],Anditwasnotasifthesewerealreadythere(vorhanden),inadvanceofpoetry,inanabstractmodeofconsciousnessasgeneralreligiouspropositionsandcat-egoriesofthought,andthenlaterwereonlyclothedinimagerybyartistsandgivenanexternaladornmentinpoetry;onthecontrarythemodeofartisticproductionwassuchthatwhatfermentedinthesepoetstheycouldworkout(herauszuarbeiten)onlyintheformofartandpoetry.(LFA,102;VA,141;myemphasis)And,withrespecttothereceptionofthework:Buttheself(dasIch)inrelationtotheobjectlikewiseceasestobetheabstractionofbothnoticing,sensuouslyperceiving,andobserving...Inthis[beautiful]31SoforHegelthequestionofthestatusofthebeautifulisnotsimplyamatterofdisputeforaesthetictheory,asin,saythedisputebetweenA.Danto,TheAbuseofBeauty(Chicago:OpenCourt,2003),p.58,whoregardsthe“discovery”thatartcouldbegreatartwithoutbeingbeautifulanachievementofmodernart,orthecontrarydefenseofthebeautifulinNehamas’srecentbook,OnlyaPromiseofHappiness.Rathertherewasatimewhenanartworkdidneedtobebeautifultobegreat,butthattimehaspassed.Thisisnottheresultofoneagehavingabadtheoryoragoodtheory.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n410robertpippinobjecttheselfbecomes[eswird]concreteinitselfsinceitmakesexplicittheunityofConceptandreality,theunificationintheirconcreteness,oftheaspectshithertoseparated,andthereforeabstract,intheselfanditsobject.(LFA,114;VA,155)32Andthiswayoftalkingaboutinnerandouter–thattheartist’sideasdonotexist“before”butthatitisonlyas“workedout”intheartproductionthattheybecomedeterminateideas,andthatthesubject“becomes”concretelythesubjectitisinaestheticappreciation–areessentialtothisdiscussion.TheclaimsgototheheartoftheissueofhowHegelisdenyingtheautonomyoftheaesthetic,evenwhileheisnottherebyrenderingartmerelyillustrativeoforsensibleinstancesof“theIdea,”acommunity’smostimportantnorms.(Therecannotbeanyconceptualcontenttosuchideals,thereisno“actuality”forsuchideals,exceptasworkedout(“herausgearbeitet”ishisterm)inartisticproductionandreception,aswellasworkedoutinother“externaliza-tions”likereligionandpoliticallife.)ItisalsoanotiongivenfreeandparadoxicalreigninHegel’saccountofagency,whereitdoesmostofitsimportantwork,andthatintroducestheseconddependency.Asin:“Ethicalself-consciousnessnowlearnsfromitsdeedthedevelopednatureofwhatitactuallydid...”)(PhG,235)or,“anindividualcannotknowwhatheisuntilhehasmadehim-selfarealitythroughaction”(PhG,401).33Inthesameway,Hegelistryingtosaythatwedonot,cannot,knowwhoweare,whatweareupto,untilwehavefoundsomewaytoexternalizesomeversionofthisknowledgeoractivity,inartamongotherenterprises,and(tospeakhighlymetaphorically)havefoundawaytocontestwitheachotherandsettleonsomeauthoritativeview.Inthisrespect(andthisisHegel’smostambitiousclaim)art-makingisnotanincidentalorcontingentormerelyillustrativeexpressionofanalreadyachievedself-knowledge,anymorethanactionistheresult32Cf.also:“Initself,thatistosay,theindividualinhisessentialnatureisthetotality,nottheinneralone,butequallytherealizationofthisinnerthroughandintheouter.”(LFA,96;VA,133.)33“Weareaccustomedtosayofhumanbeingsthateverythingdependsontheiressence[Wesen]andnotontheirdeedsandconduct.Nowinthisliesthecorrectthoughtthatwhatahumanbeingdoesshouldbeconsiderednotinitsimmediacy,butonlyasmediatedthroughhisinwardness[Inneres]andasamanifestationofthatinwardness.Butwiththatthoughtwemustnotoverlookthepointthattheessenceandalsotheinwardonlyprovethemselves[sichbewahren¨]assuchbysteppingforthintoappearance.Ontheotherhand,theappealwhichhumanbeingsmaketoinwardnessasanessencedistinctfromthecontentoftheirdeedsoftenhastheintentionofvalidatingtheirmeresubjectivityandinthiswayofescapingwhatisvalidinandforitself.”(EL,§112A)DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics411oforexpressionofadistinctinnerintention.34Artisanachievedformofself-knowledge;knowledgewewouldnot,couldnothave,exceptforthisrealization;justasantecedentformulationsofintentioncanbemerefantasiesofcommitment,realizedor“tested,”becomewhattheytrulyare,only“inthedeed.”Forbetterorworse,thisistheclaimwehavetounderstandinordertounderstandHegel’stheoryofart.35Moreover,Hegeltreatsbeinganagent(asubjecttowhomdeedscanbeimputed)inawaythatmanifeststhatseconddependencyinhisphilosophyofart.ThisisbecausebeingasubjectoranagentisnottreatedbyHegelasanontologicalorstrictlyphilosophicalcategorybutasanachievedsocialstatussuchas,letussay,beingacitizenorbeingaprofessor,aproductorresultofmutuallyrecognitiveattitudes.Thismeansjustwhatitseemsto:differenthistoricalcommunitiesestablishthisstatusindifferentways,andthereisnotruth-makerorfactofthemattertheyaregettingwrongormoreandmoreright.Likewise,artobjectsarenotmanifestationsofnaturalkinds.Noonediscoveredtheformofopera,lyingaroundhidden.Thestatus,artobjectofakind,isanassigned,historicallyachievedsociallyauthoritativestatus,andtounderstandtheartofanagewehavetounderstandtheethicalandculturalworldwithinwhichitsreceptionwouldmakesense,possessomeauthority,36andsocould“circulate.”3734Asconcededseveraltimes,itisdifficulttofindtherightformulationforwhatHegelisgettingathere,buttheinterpretiveconsequencesofgettingitwronginvolvequiteaseriousdeparturefromHegel,asindeMann’smisguidedinsistenceonapsychological“interiorthought”externalizedinsomematerial.SeePauldeMan,“SignandSymbolinHegel’sAesthetics”CriticalInquiry8(1981),pp.761–775.IagreewithRaymondGeussthatdeManalsomisconstrueswhatHegelmeansby“symbolic”andwhathemeansbysayingthat“artisforusathingofthepast.”SeeR.Geuss,“AResponsetoPauldeMan,”CriticalInquiry,10(1983),375–382anddeMan’sreply‘“ReplytoRaymondGeuss,”CriticalInquiry,10(1983),383–390.35Thisisasketchysummary,butitshouldbeobviousthatmanyquestionscouldberaisedaboutanyofthesepoints.Couldn’titbethecase,forexample,thatsomeartworkbroughttoasuitably“lively”expression/realizationsomehighestideal,invitedinterrogationandappreciationinawaytiedtothecontinuingvitalityofthatnormandsoforth,butwasstillbadart?Hegel’sansweris“No,”butitwouldtakeanindependentdiscussiontodefendsuchaclaim.36“Theformofromanticart”issaidbyHegeltorequirebothanaccountof“anewvisionoftheworld[Weltanschauung]”aswellasa“newartisticform.”(LFA,516;VA,127)37ThesetwodependenciesarelinkedforHegel,althoughthatisabooklengthtopic.TheyarelinkedbecausewhatHegelunderstandsastherelevant“outer”intheaccountofGeistanditsnormsisasocial,publicworld,andthedependenceofadeedorartproductforitssenseonthatworldisadependenceonamutable,internally“self-negating,”restlesslydissatisfiedworld.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n412robertpippinAndfinally,Hegelwantstheretobeclearparallelsbetweenalltheseinstancesoftheinner–outerdialecticsoprominentinhisdiscussions.Thatis,thewayanaction,abodilymovement,canbesaidtoembodyasubject’sintentionandsobearacertaindeterminatemeaningisnotasaresultofaprior,determinatesubjectivecause.Theintentionunfoldsintheactionovertime,responsiveasmuchtowhatisunfoldingovertimeas“true”toanoriginalformulation;itbecomestheintentionitisonlyasthedeedunfolds.(IntheclearestcaseofwhatHegelistalkingabout,onecanbesurprised,givenwhatonewaswillingtodo,bywhatone’scommitments“turnedouttobe,”despitehowtheywereformulatedexante.)Butthisexternaldimensionofwhatisonlyprovisionallyinner,theactualbodilyaction,isalsodependentonthemeaning-makingprac-ticesinacommunityatatime;thereisnoprivileged“ownership”ofthemeaningofthedeedbythesubject.Thispubliclyauthorita-tiveact-descriptionisalsonotsomethingsimplyimposedorarbitrarilystipulated“byothers.”Alargenetworkofsuchpracticesmustbeinplaceandfunctioningauthoritativelyforsuchanascriptiontobepossi-ble.(Andthisprocesscanbegintofallapart,asinHegel’saccountsoftragedy.)Inpointoffact,Hegelissuggestingmorethanparallels.Heseemstowantustoconsidertheproductionofartasaformofagency,thatweshouldunderstandthe“work”asweunderstandthebodilymovementsofanaction.38Inthissense,whiletheremighthavebeenatime(aheroicage)whentherightethicalandaestheticnormforanactionmighthavebeenthebeautiful,itmightnowbetruethattheappropriatenormissomethinglikegenuineness(moreonthisinamoment).39Likewise,hewantstosay,anartworkbearsmeaningnotastheproductorresultoftheartist’sintention.Whattheartistturnedouttohaveintendedisavailable(eventoher)onlyinthework,as“actual-ized”or“externalized.”Andsuchadeterminatemeaningisitselfalsodependentontheauthoritativesocialnormsatatime,meaning-makingpracticesofcriticism,evaluation,categorization,andsoforththat,asinthecaseofaction,canbegintobreakdown,orgenerateincompatiblecommitments,asattheendofclassicalortheendofromanticart.4038InthePhenomenologyofSpirit,Hegelfrequentlycallsaperson’sdeedher“Werk.”PhG,178–179;PhS,194.39Cf.Cavell,“AMatterofMeaningIt,”inMustWeMeanWhatweSay?(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1969)on“thepossibilityoffraudulence”as“char-acteristicofthemodern.”p.220,andaproposoftheearlierremarkshereaboutraisingthequestionofthepointofactionsasofthesamelogicalkindasraisingthequestionofthe“point”ofapainting,cf.hisremarksonp.225ff.40Hegel’spositiononthemeaningofactionsisnotan“expressivist”one,asthatwouldbeunderstoodinthecontextof,say,HerderorCharlesTaylor.(HecertainlyDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics413vSowhataboutourage?Inthesimplestterms,theclaimisthattheartofmodernity(which,forHegel,inhisowntime(butnotforallfuturetime),waslateromanticism,primarilylyricpoetry)mustulti-matelyalsobecome“anartwhichtranscendsitselfasart,”eschewsasnostalgic,notpossiblygenuine,boththebeautifulasideal,asavehi-clefortheexternalizationandrecognitionofourhighestvalues,aswellas,inwhatHegelcallsthe“endofromanticart,”therelianceoninwardness,authenticity,purityofheartandtheheightenedimportanceofsubjectivityintheromanticviewoftheworld.(Personsandbuild-ingsandnaturecanstillobviouslybebeautiful;thepointisthatsuchmanifestationsofbothnaturalandartisticbeautyhavelosttheirsignifi-cance.Suchbeautydoesn’tmatterasitoncedid.)Suchanartwillincor-porate,inawaynecessarilydifferentfrombeautifulart,theabsenceofthepossibilityofreconciliationandharmonyandtheinspirationtypicalofclassicalart(purchasedinsuchartatthepriceoftooweak,incompleteorrepressedanacknowledgementofhumansubjectivity,understoodasself-determiningnotmerelyresponsivetoordeterminedbynature)aswellastheromanticpostureforHegelprototypicalofmodernity.Hereishowhedescribesthepostclassicalorromanticartenterpriseweareintheprocessof“transcending”:...spiritispushedbackintoitselfoutofitsownreconciliationinthecorporealintoareconciliationofitselfwithitself.ThesimplysolidtotalityoftheIdealisdissolved,anditfallsapartintothedoubletotalityof(a)subjectivebeinginitselfand(b)theexternalappearance,inordertoenablespirittoreachthroughthisdisunity[Trennung]adeeperreconciliationwithitsownelementofinwardness.(LFA,518;VA,II,128)doesnotbelievethatartisthe“go-cartofspirit,”asinDanto,AbuseofBeauty,p.94.)ThisisbecauseHegelbelievesthatthiswholeprocessofexternalizationisalsoacomponentofamoreinclusivesocialpractice,thegivingofandaskingforreasonsunderthepressureofpossiblesocialconflict.Suchexternalizations,inotherwords,countasakindofproffertoothersmadewhenone’sactionsorproductsaffectwhatotherswouldotherwisebeabletodo(orvirtuallyallactions).Thisisaverylongstory,butHegelconceivesofsuchpracticalrationalityasa“socialpractice”orheconceivesofit“pragmatically”orhehasa“historicized”viewofwhatcountsastheappealtoreasons.Thepointisthatheunderstandspracticalreasonasakindofinterchangeofattemptsatjustificationamongpersonseachofwhoseactionsaffectswhatotherswouldotherwisebeabletodo,andallofthisforacommunityatatime,andso,inawaythatchanges.Heevenconsiderstheproductionofartasacollectiveattemptatmutualintelligibilityandjustificationinawaythatisacomponentofsucharationalizingpractice.Inthiscontext,followingthatlineofthoughtherewouldagainbeabooklengthdigression,atleast.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n414robertpippinHegelisnoproponentofsuchdualism,butheregardsthisposture(thelossofbeautyasanideal,wemightsay)asnecessaryintheself-educationofspirit.TouseHegel’snarrativemetaphors,havingdis-coveredthathumanbeingsdonothaveafixed,purposive“place”innature,nonaturalhome(thatnatureisdisenchanted),spiritabandonsitsattemptto“seeitself”or“finditself”innatureorincorporealexter-nalityatall,ceasestolook“there”forpurposeandnaturallaw,andbeginstheattempttoseeitselfinitsownproducts,tofindawaytoseeitsculture,work-world,politics,laws,andreligionas“itsown,”notthecontingentconcatenationofeventswhichmerelyhappentoitandarearbitrarilyproducedorareimposedbynecessity.Romanticartisthenbothpsychologicallysensuousandreflective,expressiveofhowanexpe-rience,anotherperson,aworld,seems,orfeels,“forthesubject”asthemostimportantandprivilegeddimensionofexperience,andreflectivelytryingtomakesomesensethatitshouldfeelthatway“inwardly.”viHegelunderstandstheaspirationtothebeautifulinclassicalarttobeintelligibleonlyaspartofaverybroadandambitioushumanaspirationtounderstandandproperlylocateallaspectsofhumanbeinginawaycontinuouswiththenaturalornonhumanworld.Healsoclaimsthatthispromisecouldnotbefulfilled,andthattheexperienceofsufferinganddeathinGreektragedyalreadystartedtorevealsuchadivisionoralienationfromthegivennaturalworld.41Romanticartistherecordofsuchplacelessnessandarecordoftheexperienceofboththeneedfortheexternalizationofinnerexperience,andoftheinadequacyofanyexternalcorporealformtobearsuchameaning.Butthiswithdrawnstanceinevitablyleadstotheviewofallexter-nality,corporeality,thepublicsocialworld,ashaving“thecharacterofbeingindifferentandvulgar”(E,§562)andsuchelevationofaninwardpurityofheartamountstoakindofpathologyinHegel’smanytreatmentsofromanticartandromanticism,whathecallsinthePhe-nomenologythe“lawoftheheart,”the“frenzyofself-conceit,”the“beautifulsoul”andsoon.Itisnotpossibleheretoexplorewhyhethinksoftheseimplicationsaspathologies,orwhyhethinksthattheirbeingpathologiescountsbothtowardsexplainingwhytheycannotbesustainedandwhytheyoughtnottobe,whytheyare“irrational”inhissense.ButitisatthispointthatHegelinterpretsthislimitationofromanticartasakindoffinalrevelationofthelimitationofartitself,41“WecannotsaythattheGreeksinterpreteddeathinitsessentialmeaning.”(LFA,522;VA,134)DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics415asif,verycrudelyexpressed,thealternativescomedownto:inscrutableandmysterious“outer”(e.g.,Egyptianart);innerfullyexpressedinandathomeinthenaturalouter(classicalsculpture);ortheinnerstrugglingtofindexpressionintheouterbutneverdoingso(romanticart).Giventhissenseofthealternatives,Hegelstartssuggestingthatareconcili-ationofinnerandoutercanproperlyoccuronlyinthereligiouscom-munityandfinallyinphilosophicalself-knowledge.42Theonlyformsofartheallowsas“postromantic”aregreatlydiminishedinambitionandimportance–anewformofmoderncomedy,“objectivehumor,”43withasacralizedHumanusatitscenter.ButthebroadcategoriesthatemergefromHegel’sdevelopmentalaccountseemuniquelysuitedtoaformofartafterthebeautifulandfreedfromtheromanticpolarityofinnerpurityandthe“vulgarity”ofmerelycontingentexternalbarrierstotherealizationoftheinner.44Inothercontexts,suchasmodernethicallife,orreligion,Hegelcertainlyacceptsthathighlydeveloped,reflectiveformsofmindednesscancometobeembodiedinhabitsandongoingdailypracticesthatseemtobecounterpartstothesensible,materialembodimentsrequiredbyart.Atleast,thereisnothinginhissystematicprojecttoleadonetoexpectthataloneamongalltheprojectsofhumanspirit,indeeduniquelyamong42Cf.E,§563:“Beautifulart,likethereligionpeculiartoit,hasitsfutureintruereligion.”43HegelwasquitefondofLaurenceSterne,andquitepeevedaboutromanticor“subjective”irony.Buthismodelforobjectivehumorisverystrange,Goethe’sWest-ostlichenDivan.¨Henrich’sattempttomakesomesenseoutofthischoiceisheroic.(2003a):44First,itisthustruethatonthesurfaceHegelseemstotakethe“inevitabilityofthecollapseofclassicalstandardsofbeautywithinart”as“evidencethatartmustbesupersededbyphilosophy.”SeeGuyer,“FreedomofImagination:FromBeautytoExpression,”inInternationalYearbookofGermanIdealism,IV(2006),p.324;butthatistoorapidaleap,notjustforacommentator,but,soitwouldseematleast,forHegel.Themomentsofromanticinwardnessgeneratethesamesortofunworldlinessinthephilosophyofobjectivespirit,butreconciliationandreinte-grationoccurthereinSittlichkeit,notinaleaptoreligionorphilosophy.Second,theexistenceofromanticartfortwothousandyearscertainlydemonstratesthattherecanbe“nonbeautiful”formsofart,sotheexclusivedisjunctiononthebasisofwhichtheclaimjustquoteddependscannotberight.Andfinally,sincewhatisatstakeinallartconcernssensiblemanifestationsandunderstandingsoffreedom,andsinceHegel’stheoryisanonalienationtheoryoffreedomwithasubjectiveandobjectiveside,atheoryinwhichinnermustbecomeouterjustinordertobedeterminatelyinner,IthinkwehavetosaythatHegel’sfailuretoimagineapostromanticformofart(anouterformforapostromanticunderstandingoffreedom)isjustthat,afailureofimagination,notasystematicornecessaryexclu-sion.SeeHenrich,“ZerfallundZukunft”p.100,and§8,“SynthesisstattZerfall,”pp.100–106.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n416robertpippinthemanifestationsofAbsoluteSpirit,theproductionofartshouldsuf-fersuchalossofvitalityandsignificance,ratherthanfindamodeofembodimentappropriatetoHegel’stheoryofthemodernworld.Unfortunately,toimaginewhatHegeldidnotseemabletoimag-inewouldrequireagreatdealmoredetailabouthistheoryofWesternmodernization,and–evenmoredifficult–somecomprehensiveviewofvisual,musical,andliterarymodernism.Thereislittleconsensusabouteitherissue,butIwouldhopethetrajectoryofHegel’saccountisatleastsuggestive.Itispossible,forexample,toseethemodernistnovelsofJames,Proust,Joyce,Woolf,Musiletal.aspresentingahistor-icallydistinctrepresentationofhumansubjectivity,inunprecedentedrelationsofsocialdependenceandindependencenotcapturablebyeventhegreatest“realist”novelsandsorequiringadistinctaestheticform,withshifting,unstableandhighlyprovisionalpointsofviewandcon-stantexperimentationwithauthorialauthorityandnarrativecoherence.Bothsuchan“Idee”inHegel’ssenseanditssensibleform,its“Schein,”seemtomeconsistentwithandindeedakindofimplicationofHegel’shistoricalaccount,especiallyofsocialsubjectivity.BothembodyasartwhatHegel’smodern“ideal,”afreelife,requiresandimplies.45ItisalsopossibletoimagineamodernformofKunstbetrachtungunconcernedwithmeredistinctionsintasteandcommittedinsteadtoanalwayshistoricallyinflectedinterpretation,andsoto“depth”ofinterpretationasavalue,andatheoryofaestheticappreciationorientednotfrombeautyandpleasure46butfromthequestionoftheconcretemeaningoffreedomunderconditionsdifferentfromthoseimaginedbyHegel.IamnotmuchofafanofAdornoonmodernmusic,butIcanseeandsympathizewithwhatheistryingtodo;likewiseBeckettandBenjaminonProust,Greenbergonabstraction,ClarkonManet,FriedonCourbet,orManetonMenzelcanallbecountedas“Hegelian”interpretationsofmodernistmoments.Whatexactlyitwouldbetobemovedandgrippedbysuchacompellingpostromanticartinconditionsofnearlyhyperreflexivityandself-consciousnessisanotherquestion.Anditisaverydifficultone.HegelapparentlybelievedsomethinganalogoustowhatBernardWilliamsmeantwhenheclaimedthat“reflectionkillsethicalknowl-edge”;inthiscasethatacultureofreflectionmakesthenear-immediacy45Foradefenseofthisclaim,seeR.Pippin,HenryJamesandModernMoralLife(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000)and“OnBecomingWhoOneis(andFailing):Proust’sProblematicSelves,”inThePersistenceofSubjectivity:OntheKantianAftermath(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005).46TheseareKantiantermsbutIdonotmeantoimplythatthereisnotagreatdealofHegel’stheoryalreadyinKant,aswiththeissueofBelebung.See§49intheKU.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nTheAbsenceofAestheticsinHegel’sAesthetics417of(andsoakindofhonestyin)aestheticencountershardtoimagine.Thisisnotasituationatallimprovedbytheliberationofartfromitsroleinpoliticsorreligion.Ironicallytheautonomyofartinmodernitymakesthisproblemworse,notbetter.Greekarchitectureandchurchmusiccanbesaidtobeinterwovenintothefabricofdailylifeinawaythatallowedforamoredirectlysensible,thatisgenuinelyaes-thetic,encounter.Nowartisexperiencedas“art,”acategorizationthatcreatessomanymorecomplexexpectationsandprohibitionsthatanydirectsensiblepresenceoftheworkishardtoimagine.47ItispossibletoseesuchradicalmovesasImpressionismallthewaytoPollock’sdrippaintings,Caro’sabstractsteelsculptures,Stella’sexperimentswitheccentricpolygonsandshapedcanvasesandthelikeasattemptstobreakthroughsuchreflectedmediationandre-establishartassen-suous,medium-specific,credible,and“present”underthesealteredconditions.48Infact,anartworkfalsetotheseconditions,onethatappearsasthesimpletranslationofanideaorplanintoanexternalobject,oronethataddresseswhatisclearlyassumedtobeafixedsocialconvention,onethatdeniestheprovisionalityandtenuousnessofanyclaimtoauthorityorevenmeaning,isanartobjectthatfailsintheattempttobeart,iskitschoraconsumeritemorpropagandaordidacticor–worstofall(andmostprevalent)–anexampleofatheory.Worstofallbecausesuchobjectsarefalse,playingtheroleofartratherthanbeingart(exactlywhatHegelwasworriedabout),andsothenewaestheticstandardinpostromanticartbuiltonsuchHegeliangroundsisgenuineness,thecapacitytocompelconvictionatallundertheseconditions,toinviteinterpretationandreflectionintherightway.Likewise,onemightsaythatundersuchconditionsanagentcouldbesaidtoactfalsely,violatingthenormsofagencyevenwhilerelyingonthem,pretendingtoafalseindependence,orsubjectinghimselftoaexcessivedependenceonsocialstandards.49(Failingsuchatestinartleavesuswithmere“objecthood,”47ThisiscapturedwellinThomasStruth’smuseumphotographs,whichrendertheproblemsensibleandaesthetic,evenwhileattendingtotheabsenceofanaestheticsensibilityinthephotograph’sbeholders.48Again,admittedly,allofthismeansdrawinginferencesfromHegel’slecturesthataredifferentfromtheonesheapparentlydrew.ButHegelhimselfprovidesthematerialforsuchinferences.Ihavetriedtofleshoutsuchaclaimwithrespecttooneformofmodernism,abstraction,inR.Pippin,“WhatwasAbstractArt?(FromthePointofViewofHegel),”CriticalInquiry,XXIX(2002).49Idiscussthisissueatgreaterlengthin“AuthenticityinPainting:RemarksonMichaelFried’sArtHistory,”inCriticalInquiry,XXXI(2005).DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n418robertpippinanexemplaryfailurewhenembracedassuchandasart,asinliteralism,minimalism,andsoforth.)50Itwouldtakeagreatdealofworktogetusfromtheseveryvaguespeculationstotheclaimthatallthesecomprisethepostromanticartis-ticself-understandingandevenimplied“worldview”ofWagnerorCezanneorBeckettorProustorMir´o,letaloneallofthem.Ihaveonly´wantedtosuggestwhyHegeldoesnotregardthebeautifulasacredibleaestheticidealanylonger,whyhetransformstheproblemofaestheticjudgmentandwhy,ingoodHegelianfashion,theseabsencescansuggestsomethingaboutapositivenotionofareflexiveandexperimentalartafterboththebeautifulandromanticinwardness.50ThedebtheretoMichaelFried’sArtandObjecthoodis,Iwillassume,obvioushere,inthediscussionthroughoutthischapter.SeeM.Fried,ArtandObjecthood,pp.148–172.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:15WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.016CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nBibliographylogicBencivenga,Ermanno.Hegel’sDialecticalLogic.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2000.Burbidge,John.TheLogicofHegel’sLogic:AnIntroduction.Peterborough,Ontario:BroadviewPress,2006.Butler,Clark.Hegel’sLogic:BetweenDialecticandHistory.Evanston,IL:North-westernUniversityPress,1996.Carlson,David.ACommentarytoHegel’sScienceofLogic.NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2007.Cirulli,Franco.Hegel’sCritiqueofEssence:AReadingoftheWesenslogik.NewYork:Routledge,2006.Grier,Phillip.IdentityandDifference:StudiesinHegel’sLogic,PhilosophyofSpiritandPolitics.Albany:SUNYPress,2007.Hartnack,Justus.AnIntroductiontoHegel’sLogic.Indianapolis:Hackett,1998.Hoffmeyer,John.TheAdventofFreedom:ThePresenceoftheFutureinHegel’sLogic.Rutherford,NJ:FairleighDickinsonUniverityPress,1994.Houlgate,Stephen.TheOpeningofHegel’sLogic:FromBeingtoInfinity.WestLafayette,IN:PurdueUniversityPress,2006.Rinaldi,Giacomo.AHistoryandInterpretationoftheLogicofHegel.Lewiston,NJ:E.MellenPress,1992.phenomenologyofspiritBrowning,Gary.Hegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit:ARe-Appraisal.Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,1997.Denker,Alfred,andVater,Michael,eds.Hegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit:NewCrit-icalEssays.Amherst,NY:HumanityBooks,2003.Forster,Michael.Hegel’sIdeaofaPhenomenologyofSpirit.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1998.Harris,H.S.Hegel’sLadder.2vols.Indianapolis:Hackett,1997.———.Hegel:PhenomenologyandSystem.Indianapolis:Hackett,1995.Kalkavage,Peter.TheLogicofDesire:AnIntroductiontoHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit.Philadelphia:PaulDryBooks,2007.Lauer,Quentin.AReadingofHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit.2nded.NewYork:Fordham,UniversityPress,1993.419DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.017CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n420BibliographyPinkard,Terry.Hegel’sPhenomenology:TheSocialityofReason.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994.Rockmore,Tom.Cognition:AnIntrodutiontoHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1997.Russon,John.TheSelfanditsBodyinHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit.Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,1997.———.ReadingHegel’sPhenomenology.Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,2004.Simpson,Peter.Hegel’sTranscendentalInduction.Albany:SUNYPress,1998.Stewart,Jon.TheUnityofHegel’sPhenomenologyofSpirit.Evanston,IL:North-westernUniversityPress,2000.———.ed.ThePhenomenologyofSpiritReader.Albany:SUNYPress,1998.Stern,Robert.HegelandthePhenomenologyofSpirit.London:Routledge,2002.Verene,Donald.Hegel’sAbsolute:AnIntroductiontotheReadingofthePhe-nomenologyofSpirit.Albany:SUNYPress,2007.Westphal,Kenneth.Hegel’sEpistemology:APhilosophicalIntroductiontothePhe-nomenologyofSpirit.Indianapolis:Hackett,2003.socialandpoliticalphilosophyBrod,Harry.Hegel’sPhilosophyofPolitics.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1992.Brooks,Thom.Hegel’sPoliticalPhilosophy:ASystematicReadingofthePhilosophyofRight.Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,2007.Browning,Gary.HegelandtheHistoryofPoliticalPhilosophy.NewYork:St.Martin’sPress,1999.Burns,Tony.NaturalLawandPoliticalIdeologyinthePhilosophyofHegel.BrookfieldVT:Avebury,1996.Collins,Ardis,ed.HegelandtheModernWorld.Albany:SUNYPress,1995.Cornell,Drucilla,andRosenfeld,Michel,eds.HegelandLegalTheory.London:Rout-ledge,1991.Cristi,Renato.HegelonFreedomandAuthority.Cardiff:UniversityofWalesPress,2005.Dallmayr,Fred.Hegel:ModernityandPolitics.NewburyPark,CA:SagePublications,1993.Franco,Paul.Hegel’sPhilosophyofFreedom.NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1999.Gauthier,Jeffrey.HegelandFeministSocialCriticism.Albany:SUNYPress,1997.Geiger,Ido.TheFoundingActofEthicalLife:Hegel’sCritiqueofKant’sMoralandPoliticalPhilosophy.PaloAlto,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2007.Goldstein,Joshua.Hegel’sIdeaoftheGoodLife.Dordrecht:Springer,2005.Hardimon,Michael.Hegel’sSocialPhilosophy:TheProjectofReconciliation.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994.Hoffheimer,Michael.EdwardGansandtheHegelianPhilosophyofLaw.Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,1995.Hutchings,Kimberly.HegelandFeministPhilosophy.Malden,MA:Blackwell,2003.James,David.Hegel’sPhilosophyofRight:SubjectivityandEthicalLife.London:Continuum,2007.Knowles,Dudley.HegelandthePhilosophyofRight.London:Routledge,2002.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.017CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nBibliography421Lasurdo,Domenico.HegelandtheFreedomofModerns.Durham,NC:DukeUni-versityPress,2004.Lewis,Thomas.FreedomandTraditioninHegel.NotreDame,IN:UniversityofNotreDamePress,2005.Mills,Patricia.FeministInterpretationsofG.W.F.Hegel.UniversityPark,PA:PennStatePress,1996.Neuhouser,Frederick.FoundationsofHegel’sSocialTheory.Cambridge,MA:Har-vardUniversityPress,2000.Patten,Alan,Hegel’sIdeaofFreedom.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999.Peperzak,Adriann.ModernFreedom:Hegel’sLegal,MoralandPoliticalPhilosophy.Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,2001.Pippin,Robert.HegelonEthicsandPolitics.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004.Quante,Michael.Hegel’sConceptofAction.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004.Redding,Paul.Hegel’sHermeneutics.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1996.Rose,David.Hegel’sPhilosophyofRight:AReader’sGuide.London:Continuum,2007.Salter,Michael.HegelandLaw.Burlington,VT:Ashgate,2003.Shanks,Andrew.Hegel’sPoliticalTheology.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991.Tunick,Mark.Hegel’sPoliticalPhilosophy.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1992.Weil,Eric.HegelandtheState.TranslatedbyMarkCohen.Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsPress,1998.WilliamsRobert.Recognition:FichteandHegelontheOther.Albany:SUN,1992.———.Hegel’sEthicsofRecognition.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1997.———.ed.BeyondLiberalismandCommunitarianism.Albany:SUNYPress,2001.philosophyofhistoryGallagher,Shaun.Hegel,HistoryandInterpretation.Albany:SUNYPress,1997.Hyppolite,Jean.IntroductiontoHegel’sPhilosophyofHistory.Gainsville:UniversityofFloridaPress,1996.MacCarney,Joe.HegelonHistory.London:Routledge,2000.Walker,John.History,SpiritandExperience:Hegel’sConceptionoftheHistoricalTaskofPhilosophyinHisAge.Frankfurt:Lang,1995.philosophyofnatureHoulgate,Stephen,ed.HegelandthePhilosophyofNature.Albany:SUNYPress,1998.Petry,Michael.HegelandNewtonianism.Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,1993.Stone,Allison.PetrifiedIntelligence:NatureinHegel’sPhilosophy.Albany:SUNYPress,2005.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.017CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n422BibliographyaestheticsBates,Jennifer.Hegel’sTheoryoftheImagination.Albany:SUNYPress,2004.Houlgate,Stephen,ed.HegelandtheArts.Evanston,IL:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2007.Maker,William,ed.HegelandAesthetics.Albany;SUNYPress,2000.Speight,Allen.Hegel,LiteratureandtheProblemofAgency.Cambridge,UK:Cam-bridgeUniversityPress,2001.psychologyBerthold-Bond,Daniel.Hegel’sTheoryofMadness.Albany:SUNYPress,1995.Carlson,David.Hegel’sTheoryoftheSubject.NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2005.Forbes,Kipling.HegelonWantandDesire.Wakrfield,NH:LongwoodAcademic,1991.Murray,Patrick.Hegel’sPhilosophyofMindandWill.Lewiston,NY:E.MellinPress,1991.Olson,Alan.HegelandtheSpirit.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1992.religionBurbidge,John.HegelonLogicandReligion.Albany:SUNYPress,1992.Calton,PatriciaMarieHegel’sMetaphysicsofGod.Burlington,VT:Ashgate,2001.Crites,Stephen.DialecticandGospelintheDevelopmentofHegel’sThinking.Uni-versityPark,PA:ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,1998.Desmond,William.Hegel’sGod:ACounterfeitDouble?Burlington,VT:Ashgate,2003.Hodgson,PeterC.HegelandChirstianTheology:AReadingoftheLecturesonthePhilosophyofReligion.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005.Jaeschke,Walter.ReasoninReligion:TheFoundationofHegel’sPhilosophyofReli-gion.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1998.Kolb,David,ed.NewPerspectivesonHegel’sPhilosophyofReligion.Albany:SUNYPress,1992.Magee,Glenn.HegelandtheHermeticTradition.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2001.Merklinger,Philip.Philosophy,TheologyandHegel’sBerlinPhilosophyofReligion,1821–1829.Albany:SUNYPress,1993.O’Regan,Cyril.TheHeterodoxHegel.Albany:SUNYPress,1994.Walker,John,ed.ThoughtandFaithinthePhilosophyofHegel.Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Kluwer,1991.DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:22WEST2013.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521831673.017CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nIndexAbsolute,60,265,266,272,273Diez,CarlImmanuel,20–1Aesthetics:endofart,379–81;Hegel’sDilthey,Wilhelm,174–5,177,180,200,lectureson,381,384,392;and253post-romanticart,389–90;andromanticart,379,392,395,399,407;Eckhart,Meister,262,266,272,278systematicplaceof,379–81Evil,248–9Ameriks,Karl,135,136,140,149,150Engelhardt,Dietrich,12Analyticphilosophy,1,3Aristotle,314,315,316,328,332,364,Falkenberg,Brigitte,12365–6Fichte,JohannGottlieb:onderivationofArtautonomyof,380,395–6,410;categories,116–117;ondesire,97–98;contentof,397;anddrama,389;formsonego,98,116;foundationalismof,of,382,386;pastnessof,391–393;10;idealismof,99,116;influenceonromanticconceptof,379,392,395,Hegel,26,96,97,102,104;alleged399,407nihilismof,63–64,66,70,72;onpracticalreason,98;onrecognition,Baader,Franzvon,262,263104;his1794Wissenschaftslehre,67,Beiser,Frederick,62–6369,70,102Being,95–97,128–9Freedom:conceptsof,205–212;dualityBoehme,Jakob,253,254,257–8,261,of,212–214;andmoralreflection,264,274226–9;objectivenatureof,219–226;Brandom,Robert,4roleinHegel’sphilosophy,205;Buchdahl,Gerd,286subjectivenatureof,214–219Bungay,Stephen,199,200Forster,Michael,54–55,57Burbidge,John,111Foundationalism,11,56Freedom:conceptsof,205–212;dualityCartesianism,97,99,141,290of,212–214;andmoralreflection,Categories,112–14,119.Seealsologic226–9;objectivenatureof,219–226;Christianity,235,244–5,246–8,249–51roleinHegel’sphilosophy,205;Concept,99,123,138,220–1,307,subjectivenatureof,214–219362–4,Fogelin,Robert,59Cousin,Victor,43–44,45Fries,Jakob,Friedrich,39,41,57,262Descartes,Rene,´96,285,286.SeealsoGadmaer,Hans-Georg,111,174,175,Cartesianism177–8,180,190–1,193,194Desire,97,99–104Galileo,Galilei,285,286,326,327Dewey,John,74Gans,Eduard,44–45D’Hondt,Jacques,13God,5,145,232–5,237–42,260,266–7,Dialectic,106–8,129–30322423DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:39WEST2013.http://universitypublishingonline.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139001946CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\n424IndexGravitation,293–4,326,331,333–4,345,347–353;hisidealism,136–42,339,340168;influenceonHegel,23,31,115–117;onmethod,55;onnature,Haering,Theodor,81,82317–319,330,337–8;onsystematicity,Haym,Rudolf,81,8276–77;onteleology,304,345,347–53Harris,Henry,109,258,270,309KarlsbadDecrees,39–40Hartmann,Klaus,4Kimmerle,Heinz,12Heidegger,Martin,109,126Konstellationsforschung,10Hegel,Georg,WilhelmFriedrich:familyKojeve,Alexandre,`75,109background,16–17;inBamberg,30–31;inBerlin,38–51;Berne,22–25,Logic:andcategories,112–114;and255;inFrankfurt,25–27;inJena,metaphysics,117–124;methodof,27–29;influenceofLessingupon,18;124–8;andphenomenology,122–3.influenceofKantupon,23,31,SeealsoScienceofLogic115–117,317–319,330,337–8;influenceofmysticismupon,254–64;Matter,317,319,320–1,322–3,324–5,marriageof,34–35;andmathematics,329,330,334,336,341–2284;inNuremberg,31–36;Marx,Karl,1,50,109,407illegitimatesonof,29,36,39;MacTaggart,John,374,375universityyearsof,19–22,255;andMechanics,312,313,314,315,331Wurttemberg,¨15–16,32Mechanism,67,134,366–9Henrich,Dieter,10,111,385Metaphysics,3,5,117–124,136–46,336,Herder,JohannGottfried,190,200,255342Hermeneutics,Hegelian:definitionof,Monism,65–69135–6;influenceof,174–6;andMysticism:andcoincidentialanguage,177,181–6,194–203;andoppositorum,272–3,277;andmeaning,176,186–94;relationtohermeticism,277–80;influenceonpre-Hegelian,176–181Hegel,254–64;andcontentofHegel’sHobbes,Thomas,359philosophy,264–72Holism,152,155–6,234Holderlin,Friedrich,¨19,21,24,26,48,Naturalism,52,55,5850,51Naturphilosophie:andnon-Humboldt,Wilhelmvon,186metaphysicalinterpretationofHegel,Hyppolite,Jean,111,1195;itsmetaphysics,336,342;aspartofHegel’ssysten,2,5,6,313–314;itsIdealism,Hegelian:asanti-realism,rejectionofdistinctionbetweenpure146–9;definitionof,135–6;Kantianandempiricalknowledge,296,313;itsinterpretationof,136–146;asreputation,281–5,311;andteleology,mentalism,146–9;metaphysicsof,304,372;terraincognitaofHegel’s150–161;non-metaphysicalstudies,11–12interpretationof,135–146;asNaturrecht,13–14conceptualrealism,161–173Newton,Issac,285,287,288,289,291,Idea,131–133,169–173.Seealso292,312,314,320,322,323,324,325,concept327,329,330,332,340Nietzsche,Friedrich,176Jacobi,FriedrichHeinrich,21,56,64–69,Nihilism,53,62–69,69–7370,162Notion.SeeConceptJaeschke,Walter,231,243Oetinger,FriedrichCarl,254,256,Kant,Immanuel:onAntinomies,79–80;273–6onappearances,95;oncategories,115–116;critiqueofmetaphysics,137,Pantheism,234DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:39WEST2013.http://universitypublishingonline.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139001946CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nIndex425Peperzak,Adriaan,263positivityof,24,182;philosophyof,Pfleiderer,ChristophFriedrichvon,232–7.SeealsoGod,Christianity,293–5SpiritPhenomenologyofSpirit:andRosenkranz,Karl,255,260aesthetics,400–1;compositionof,29,Rosenzweig,Franz,1341;and‘forceandunderstanding’,189,Russell,Bertrand,253291–3;asfragment,91–93;allegedincoherenceof,74–6,83–9;andSavigny,FriedrichCarl,13,57interpretation,179,186,187,188,Schiller,Friedrich,404189;roleofrecognitionin,109–110;Schelling,FriedrichWilhelmJoseph,10,publicationof,84;religionchapterof,11,19,24,26,39,50,51,69,77,272,91–2,178–9,181,265;andScienceof274,277,305Logic,122–3,125;andskepticism,58,Schleiermacher,Friedrich,40,42,176,144;systematicstructureof,74–76,230,232,23683–89;titleproblemof,82Schulze,GottlobErnst,53–58PhilosophyofNature.SeeScienceofLogic:onlife,355–8,370;onNaturphilosophiemeaning,300;itsmethod,124–128;PhilosophyofRight:majordivisionsof,relationtophilosophyofnautre,297;205;onethicallife,210–212;anditsreputation,111.Seealsologicnaturallaw,13;reputationof,41–42;Self-awareness,97–98,107,175popularityof,1–2;onabstractright,Skepticism:Agrippan,59,62,64,69;205–210.Seealsofreedom,ancient,52,58–62;modern,53–58;Naturrecht53–62;Platonic,59,61–62;andPinkard,Terry,117,124Pyrrhonian,60Pippin,Robert,4,117–8,124,130,Spinoza,Baruchde,21,53,65,66–69,136–42,386277,374Poggler,Otto,¨83Spirit,148,274,380,384,409,413,416Positivism,1,3,11Swedenborg,Emanuel,256Reid,Thomas,54Taylor,Charles,2–3Reinhold,KarlLeonhard,10Thibaut,Friedrich,13,36Reason,58,88Religion:definitionsof,235–7;lecturesVoegelin,Eric,279on,230–2;methodof,232–5;Vondung,Klaus,273DownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:39WEST2013.http://universitypublishingonline.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139001946CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013\nDownloadedfromCambridgeCompanionsOnlinebyIP130.223.241.153onMonJun1716:13:39WEST2013.http://universitypublishingonline.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139001946CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2013426