牛津《新西方哲学史》第4卷：现代哲学(英文)

牛津《新西方哲学史》第4卷：现代哲学(英文)

\nPhilosophyintheModernWorld\nThispageintentionallyleftblank\nANEWHISTORYOFWESTERNPHILOSOPHYvolumeivPhilosophyintheModernWorldanthonykennyCLARENDONPRESS:OXFORD\n3GreatClarendonStreet,Oxfordox26dpOxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford.ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship,andeducationbypublishingworldwideinOxfordNewYorkAucklandCapeTownDaresSalaamHongKongKarachiKualaLumpurMadridMelbourneMexicoCityNairobiNewDelhiShanghaiTaipeiTorontoWithoYcesinArgentinaAustriaBrazilChileCzechRepublicFranceGreeceGuatemalaHungaryItalyJapanPolandPortugalSingaporeSouthKoreaSwitzerlandThailandTurkeyUkraineVietnamOxfordisaregisteredtrademarkofOxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountriesPublishedintheUnitedStatesbyOxfordUniversityPressInc.,NewYorkßSirAnthonyKenny2007ThemoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenassertedDatabaserightOxfordUniversityPress(maker)Firstpublished2007Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthepriorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermittedbylaw,orundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographicsrightsorganization.EnquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeoftheaboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,attheaddressaboveYoumustnotcirculatethisbookinanyotherbindingorcoverandyoumustimposethesameconditiononanyacquirerBritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataDataavailableLibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationDataDataavailableTypesetbySPIPublisherServices,Pondicherry,IndiaPrintedinGreatBritainonacid-freepaperbyBiddlesLtd,King’sLynn,NorfolkISBN978–0–19–875279–013579108642\nTothememoryofGeorgHenrikvonWright\nThispageintentionallyleftblank\nSUMMARYOFCONTENTSContentsixIntroductionxiii1.BenthamtoNietzsche12.PeircetoStrawson343.FreudtoDerrida724.Logic975.Language1216.Epistemology1447.Metaphysics1698.PhilosophyofMind1929.Ethics22010.Aesthetics25011.PoliticalPhilosophy26912.God291Chronology319AbbreviationsandConventions321Bibliography327ListofIllustrations335Index339\nThispageintentionallyleftblank\nCONTENTSIntroductionxiii1.BenthamtoNietzsche1Bentham’sUtilitarianism1TheDevelopmentofJohnStuartMill5Schopenhauer’sPhilosophyoftheWill13EthicsandReligioninKierkegaard16DialecticalMaterialism18DarwinandNaturalSelection24JohnHenryNewman28Nietzsche302.PeircetoStrawson34C.S.PeirceandPragmatism34TheLogicismofFrege37PsychologyandPragmatisminWilliamJames43BritishIdealismanditsCritics47RussellonMathematics,Logic,andLanguage50Wittgenstein’sTractatus54LogicalPositivism58Wittgenstein’sLaterPhilosophy60AnalyticPhilosophyafterWittgenstein633.FreudtoDerrida72FreudandPsychoanalysis72Husserl’sPhenomenology78TheExistentialismofHeidegger83TheExistentialismofSartre87JacquesDerrida904.Logic97Mill’sEmpiricistLogic97Frege’sRefoundationofLogic100\nCONTENTSInductionandAbductioninPeirce107TheSagaofPrincipiaMathematica110ModernModalLogic1165.Language121FregeonSenseandReference121ThePragmatistsonLanguageandTruth126Russell’sTheoryofDescriptions129ThePictureTheoryoftheProposition132Language-GamesandPrivateLanguages1376.Epistemology144TwoEloquentEmpiricists144PeirceontheMethodsofScience150FregeonLogic,Psychology,andEpistemology155KnowledgebyAcquaintanceandKnowledgebyDescription160Husserl’sEpoche162WittgensteinonCertainty1657.Metaphysics169VarietiesofIdealism169MetaphysicsandTeleology174Realismvs.Nominalism178First,Second,andThirdinPeirce181TheMetaphysicsofLogicalAtomism185BadandGoodMetaphysics1878.PhilosophyofMind192BenthamonIntentionandMotive192Reason,Understanding,andWill195Experimentalvs.PhilosophicalPsychology198TheFreudianUnconscious202PhilosophicalPsychologyintheTractatus207Intentionality209Wittgenstein’sLaterPhilosophyofMind212x\nCONTENTS9.Ethics220TheGreatestHappinessoftheGreatestNumber220ModificationsofUtilitarianism225SchopenhaueronRenunciation228TheMoralAscentinKierkegaard233NietzscheandtheTransvaluationofValues237AnalyticEthics24210.Aesthetics250TheBeautifulandtheSublime250TheAestheticsofSchopenhauer255KierkegaardonMusic258NietzscheonTragedy260ArtandMorality263ArtforArt’sSake26511.PoliticalPhilosophy269UtilitarianismandLiberalism269KierkegaardandSchopenhaueronWomen276MarxonCapitalandLabour280ClosedandOpenSocieties28612.God291Faithvs.Alienation291TheTheismofJohnStuartMill297CreationandEvolution299Newman’sPhilosophyofReligion305TheDeathofGodandtheSurvivalofReligion309FreudonReligiousIllusion314PhilosophicalTheologyafterWittgenstein315Chronology319AbbreviationsandConventions321Bibliography327ListofIllustrations335Index339xi\nThispageintentionallyleftblank\nINTRODUCTIONhisisthefinalvolumeofafour-volumehistoryofWesternphilosophyTfromitsbeginningstoitsmostrecentpast.Thefirstvolume,publishedin2004,toldthestoryofancientphilosophy,andthesecondvolume,publishedin2005,coveredmedievalphilosophyfromthetimeofStAugustinetotheRenaissance.Thethirdvolume,TheRiseofModernPhilosophy,treatedofthemajorphilosophersofthesixteenth,seventeenth,andeighteenthcenturies,endingwiththedeathofHegelearlyinthenineteenth.Thispresentvolumecontinuesthenarrativeuptothefinalyearsofthetwentiethcentury.Therearetwodifferentkindsofreasonforreadingahistoryofphiloso-phy.Somereadersdosobecausetheyareseekinghelpandilluminationfromolderthinkersontopicsofcurrentphilosophicalinterest.Othersaremoreinterestedinthepeopleandsocietiesofthedistantorrecentpast,andwishtolearnabouttheirintellectualclimate.Ihavestructuredthisandpreviousvolumesinawaythatwillmeettheneedsofbothclassesofreader.Thebookbeginswiththreesummarychapters,eachofwhichfollowsachronologicalsequence;itthencontainsninechapters,eachofwhichdealswithaparticularareaofphilosophy,fromlogictonaturaltheology.Thosewhoseprimaryinterestishistoricalmayfocusonthechronologicalsurveys,referringiftheywishtothethematicsectionsforamplification.Thosewhoseprimaryinterestisphilosophicalwillconcen-trateratheronthelaterchapters,referringbacktothechronologicalchapterstoplaceparticularissuesincontext.Certainthemeshaveoccupiedchaptersineachofthefourvolumesofthisseries:epistemology,metaphysics,philosophyofmind,ethics,andphilosophyofreligion.Othertopicshavevariedinimportanceoverthecenturies,andthepatternofthematicchaptershasvariedaccordingly.Thefirsttwovolumesbeganthethematicsectionwithachapteronlogicandlanguage,buttherewasnosuchchapterinvolumeIIIbecauselogicwentintohibernationattheRenaissance.Intheperiodcoveredbythepresentvolumeformallogicandthephilosophyoflanguageoccupiedsuchacentralpositionthateachtopicdeservesachaptertoitself.Intheearlier\nINTRODUCTIONvolumes,therewasachapterdevotedtophysics,consideredasabranchofwhatusedtobecalled‘naturalphilosophy’;however,sinceNewtonphysicshasbeenafullymaturescienceindependentofphilosophicalunderpinning,andsothereisnochapteronphysicsinthepresentvolume.VolumeIIIwasthefirsttocontainachapteronpoliticalphilosophy,sincebeforethetimeofMoreandMachiavellithepoliticalinstitutionsofEuropeweretoodifferentfromthoseunderwhichwelivefortheinsightsofpoliticalphilosopherstoberelevanttocurrentdiscussions.Thisvolumeisthefirstandonlyonetocontainachapteronaesthetics:thisinvolvesaslightoverlapwiththepreviousvolume,sinceitwasintheeighteenthcenturythatthesubjectbegantoemergeasaseparatediscipline.Theintroductorychaptersinthisvolume,unlikethoseinpreviousones,donotfollowasinglechronologicalsequence.ThefirstchapterindeeddoestraceasinglelinefromBenthamtoNietzsche,butbecauseofthechasmthatseparatedEnglish-speakingphilosophyfromContinentalphilosophyinthetwentiethcenturythenarrativedivergesinthesecondandthirdchapter.ThesecondchapterbeginswithPeirce,thedoyenofAmericanphilosophers,andwithFrege,whoiscommonlyregardedasthefounderoftheanalytictraditioninphilosophy.ThethirdchaptertreatsofaseriesofinfluentialContinentalthinkers,commencingwithamanwhowouldhavehatedtoberegardedasphilosopher,SigmundFreud.Ihavenotfounditeasytodecidewhereandhowtoendmyhistory.ManyofthosewhohavephilosophizedinthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcenturyarepeopleIhaveknownpersonally,andseveralofthemhavebeenclosecolleaguesandfriends.Thismakesitdifficulttomakeanobjectivejudgementontheirimportanceincomparisonwiththethinkerswhohaveoccupiedtheearliervolumesandtheearlierpagesofthisone.Nodoubtmychoiceofwhoshouldbeincludedandwhoshouldbeomittedwillseemarbitrarytoothersnolessqualifiedthanmyselftomakeajudgement.In1998IpublishedABriefHistoryofWesternPhilosophy.Idecidedatthattimenottoincludeinthebookanypersonstillliving.That,conveniently,meantthatIcouldfinishthestorywithWittgenstein,whomIconsidered,andconsider,tobethemostsignificantphilosopherofthetwentiethcentury.Butsince1998,sadly,anumberofphilosophershavediedwhomanyonewouldexpecttofindaplaceinahistoryofmodernphilosophy—Quine,forinstance,Anscombe,Davidson,Strawson,Rawls,andothers.SoIhadtochooseanotherwayofdrawingaterminusantequem.Asxiv\nINTRODUCTIONIapproachedmyseventy-fifthbirthdaythethoughtoccurredtomeofexcludingallwriterswhowereyoungerthanmyself.Butthisappearedaratheregocentriccut-offpoint.SofinallyIoptedforathirty-yearrule,andhaveexcludedworkswrittenafter1975.ImustaskthereadertobearinmindthatthisisthefinalvolumeofahistoryofphilosophythatbeganwithThales.Itisaccordinglystructuredinratheradifferentwayfromaself-standinghistoryofcontemporaryphilosophy.Ihave,forinstance,saidnothingabouttwentieth-centuryneo-scholasticsorneo-Kantians,andhavesaidverylittleaboutseveralgener-ationsofneo-Hegelians.Toleavetheseoutofabookdevotedtothephilosophyofthelasttwocenturieswouldbetoleaveasignificantgapinthehistory.Buttheimportanceoftheseschoolswastoremindthemoderneraoftheimportanceofthegreatthinkersofthepast.AhistorythathasalreadydevotedmanypagestoAquinas,Kant,andHegeldoesnotneedtorepeatsuchreminders.Asinwritingpreviousvolumes,Ihavehadinmindanaudienceatthelevelofsecond-orthird-yearundergraduatestudy.Sincemanyunder-graduatesinterestedinthehistoryofphilosophyarenotthemselvesphilosophystudents,Ihavetriednottoassumeanyfamiliaritywithphilosophicaltechniquesorterminology.Similarly,IhavenotincludedintheBibliographyworksinlanguagesotherthanEnglish,exceptfortheoriginaltextsofwritersinotherlanguages.Sincemanypeoplereadphilosophynotforcurricularpurposes,butfortheirownenlightenmentandentertainment,Ihavetriedtoavoidjargonandtoplacenodifficultiesinthewayofthereaderotherthanthosepresentedbythesubjectmatteritself.But,howeverhardonetries,itisimpossibletomakethereadingofphilosophyanundemandingtask.Ashasoftenbeensaid,philosophyhasnoshallowend.IamindebtedtoPeterMomtchiloffandhiscolleaguesatOxfordUniversityPress,andtotwoanonymousreadersforthePresswhoremovedmanyblemishesfromthebook.IamalsoparticularlygratefultoPatriciaWilliamsandDagfinnFøllesdalforassistingmeinthetreatmentoftwentieth-centuryContinentalphilosophers.xv\nThispageintentionallyleftblank\n1BenthamtoNietzscheBentham’sUtilitarianismBritainescapedtheviolentconstitutionalupheavalsthataffectedmostofEuropeduringthelastyearsoftheeighteenth,andtheearlyyearsofthenineteenth,century.Butin1789,theyearoftheFrenchRevolution,abookwaspublishedinEnglandthatwastohavearevolutionaryeffectonmoralandpoliticalthinkinglongafterthedeathofNapoleon.ThiswasJeremyBentham’sAnIntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation,whichbecamethefoundingcharteroftheschoolofthoughtknownasutilitar-ianism.Benthamwasbornin1748,thesonofaprosperousLondonattorney.Atiny,bookish,andprecociouschild,hewassenttoWestminsterSchoolattheageof7andgraduatedfromTheQueen’sCollege,Oxford,attheageof15.Hewasdestinedforalegalcareer,andwascalledtotheBarwhen21,buthefoundcontemporarylegalpracticedistasteful.Hehadalreadybeenrepelledbycurrentlegaltheorywhen,atOxford,hehadlistenedtothelecturesofthefamousjuristWilliamBlackstone.TheEnglishlegalsystem,hebelieved,wascumbrous,artificial,andincoherent:itshouldbereconstructedfromthegroundupinthelightofsoundprinciplesofjurisprudence.Thefundamentalsuchprinciple,onhisownaccount,heowedtoHume.WhenhereadtheTreatiseofHumanNature,hetellsus,scalesfellfromhiseyesandhecametobelievethatutilitywasthetestandmeasureofallvirtueandthesoleoriginofjustice.OnthebasisofanessaybythedissentingchemistJosephPriestley,Benthaminterpretedtheprincipleofutilityasmeaningthatthehappinessofthemajorityofthecitizenswasthecriterionbywhichtheaffairsofastateshouldbejudged.Moregenerally,\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEtherealstandardofmoralityandthetruegoaloflegislationwasthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber.Duringthe1770sBenthamworkedonacritiqueofBlackstone’sCom-mentariesontheLawsofEngland.Aportionofthiswaspublishedin1776asAFragmentonGovernment,whichcontainedanattackonthenotionofasocialcontract.Atthesametimehewroteadissertationonpunishment,drawingontheideasoftheItalianpenologistCesareBeccaria(1738–94).Ananalysisofthepurposesandlimitsofpunishment,alongwiththeexpositionoftheprincipleofutility,formedthesubstanceoftheIntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation,whichwascompletedin1780,nineyearsbeforeitseventualpublication.TheFragmentonGovernmentwasthefirstpublicstatementbyBenthamoftheprinciplethat‘itisthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumberthatisthemeasureofrightandwrong’.Thebookwaspublishedanonymously,butithadsomeinfluentialreaders,includingtheEarlofShelburne,aleadingWhigwhowaslaterbrieflyPrimeMinister.WhenShelburnediscoveredthatBenthamwasauthorofthework,hetookhimunderhispatronage,andintroducedhimtopoliticalcirclesinEnglandandFrance.MostsignificantamongBentham’snewEnglishfriendswasCarolineFox,anieceofCharlesJamesFox,towhom,afteralongbutspasmodiccourtship,hemadeanunsuccessfulproposalofmarriagein1805.MostimportantoftheFrenchacquaintanceswasE´tienneDumont,tutortoShelburne’sson,whowaslatertopublishanumberofhisworksintranslation.ForatimeBentham’sreputationwasgreaterinFrancethaninBritain.Benthamspenttheyears1785–7abroad,travellingacrossEuropeandstayingwithhisbrotherSamuel,whowasmanagingestatesofPrincePotemkinatKrichevinWhiteRussia.Whilethereheconceivedtheideaofanovelkindofprison,thePanopticon,acircularbuildingwithacentralobservationpointfromwhichthejailercouldkeepapermanenteyeontheinmates.HereturnedfromRussiafullofenthusiasmforprisonreform,andtriedtopersuadeboththeBritishandFrenchgovernmentstoerectamodelprison.WilliamPitt’sgovernmentpassedanActofParliamentauthorizingthescheme,butitwasdefeatedbyducallandownerswhodidnotwantaprisonneartheirestates,andbythepersonalintervention(soBenthamlikedtobelieve)ofKingGeorgeIII.TheFrenchNationalAssemblydidnottakeuphisoffertosupervisetheestablishmentofaPanopticon,butdidconferonhimanhonorarycitizenshipoftheRepublic.2\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEBentham’splanforaperfectprison,thePanopticon.3\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEBentham’sinterestinlegaltheoryandpracticeextendedfarbeyonditsoriginalfocusoncriminallaw.ExasperatedbytheconfusedstateofcivillawhewrotealongtreatiseOfLawsinGeneral,which,likesomanyofhisworks,remainedunpublisheduntillongafterhisdeath.ReflectingonthePoorLawsheproposedthatanetworkofPanopticonsshouldbesetuptoserveasworkhousesforthe‘burdensomepoor’,managedbyanationaljointstockcompany,whichwouldtakeadividendoncetheinmates’labourhadprovidedfortheirsustenance.NoPanopticon,whetherpenalorcommercial,waseverconstructed.In1813,however,ParliamentvotedBenthamthegiantsumof£23,000incompensationforhisworkonthescheme.In1808BenthambecamefriendswithaScottishphilosopher,JamesMill,whowasjuststartingtowriteamonumentalHistoryofIndia.Millhadaremarkabletwo-year-oldson,JohnStuart,andBenthamassistedinthatprodigy’seducation.PartlybecauseofMill’sinfluenceBentham,whohadbeenworkingforsomeyearsontherationaleofevidenceinthecourts,nowbegantofocusonpoliticalandconstitutionalreformratherthanoncriticismsoflegalprocedureandpractice.HewroteaCatechismofParliamen-taryReform,whichwascompletedin1809,thoughitwasnotpublisheduntil1817,whenitwasfollowedup,ayearortwolater,withthedraftofaradicalreformbill.Hespentyearsonthedraftingofaconstitutionalcode,whichwasunfinishedwhenhedied.Bytheendofhislife,hehadbecomeconvincedthattheexistingBritishconstitutionwasascreenhidingaconspiracyoftherichagainstthepoor.HethereforeadvocatedtheabolitionofthemonarchyandtheHouseofLords,theintroductionofannualparliamentselectedbyuniversalsuffrage,andthedisestablishmentoftheChurchofEngland.Bentham’sconstitutionalandliberalproposalsextendedwellbeyondtheaffairsofBritain.In1811heproposedtoJamesMadisonthatheshoulddrawupaconstitutionalcodefortheUnitedStates.HewasactiveontheLondonGreekCommittee,whichsponsoredtheexpeditiononwhichLordByronmethisdeathatMissolonghiin1823.ForatimehehadhopesthathisconstitutionalcodewouldbeimplementedinLatinAmericabySimo´nBolı´var,thePresidentofColombia.Thegroupof‘philosophicalradicals’whoacceptedtheidealsofBen-thamin1823foundedtheWestminsterReviewinordertopromoteutilitariancauses.Theywereenthusiastsforeducationalreform.Benthamdevised4\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEacurriculumforsecondaryeducationwhichemphasizedscienceandtechnologyratherthanGreekandLatin.HeandhiscolleagueswereactiveintheestablishmentofUniversityCollegeLondon,whichopeneditsdoorsin1828.Thiswasthefirstuniversity-levelinstitutioninBritaintoadmitstudentswithoutreligioustests.There,inaccordancewithhiswill,Ben-tham’sremainswereplacedafterhisdeathin1832,andthere,clothedandtoppedwithawaxhead,theysurvivetothisday—his‘auto-icon’ashetermedit.AmoreappropriatememorialtohisendeavourswastheGreatReformBill,widelyextendingtheparliamentaryfranchise,whichpassedintolawafewweeksbeforehedied.Amongthosewhoknewhimwell,evenhisgreatestadmirersagreedthathewasaveryone-sidedperson,powerfulinintellectbutdeficientinfeeling.JohnStuartMilldescribedhimaspreciseandcoherentinthought,butlackinginsympathyforthemostnaturalandstrongestfeelingsofhumanbeings.KarlMarxsaidthathetooktheEnglishshopkeeperastheparadigmofahumanbeing.‘Innotimeandinnocountry’,Marxsaid,‘hashomespuncommonplaceeverstruttedaboutinsoself-satisfiedaway’(C488).Bentham’sknowledgeofhumannaturewasindeedverylimited.‘Itiswhollyempirical,’Millsaid,‘andtheempiricismofonewhohashadlittleexperience.’Henever,inMill’sview,reachedmaturity.‘Hewasaboytothelast’(U78).TheDevelopmentofJohnStuartMillMillhimselfwasneverallowedtobeaboy.Hedidnotgotoschoolorminglewithotherchildren,butwaseducatedathomebyhisdemandingfather.HebegantolearnGreekattheageofthreeandbytheageoftwelvehadreadmuchofPlatointheoriginal.AtthatagehebeganstudyinglogicfromthetextofAristotle,whilehelpingtoproofreadhisfather’sHistoryofIndia.Inthefollowingyearhewastakenthroughacourseinpoliticaleconomy.Hewasneverallowedaholiday‘lestthehabitofworkshouldbebroken,andatasteforidlenessacquired’.ButwhenhewasfourteenhespentayearinFranceatthehouseofBentham’sbrotherSamuel,whichgavehimanopportunitytoattendsciencelecturesatMontpellier.Apartfromthat,hehadnouniversityeducation,butbytheageofsixteenhewasalreadyfarmorewell-readthanmostMastersofArts.5\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEWhatMill,lookingback,mostvaluedinhisextraordinaryeducationwasthedegreetowhichhisfatherlefthimtothinkforhimself.‘AnythingwhichcouldbefoundoutbythinkingIneverwastold,untilIhadexhaustedmyeffortstofinditoutformyself’(A20).Hereckonedthathestartedadultlifewithanadvantageofaquarterofacenturyoverhiscontemporarieswhohadbeentopublicschoolanduniversity.Buthiseducationturnedhim,inhisownwords,into‘amerereasoningmachine’.AfterseveralyearsspentcampaigningforliberalcausesalongsidecolleaguesontheWestminsterReview,whileholdingadayjobasaclerkwiththeEastIndiaCompany,Millsufferedamentalbreakdownandfellvictimtoadeepdepressioninwhicheventhemosteffectiveworkforreformseemedquitepointless.Hewasrescuedfromhiscrisis,onhisownaccount,bythereadingofWordsworthintheautumnof1828.Thepoemsmadehimawarenotonlyofnaturalbeauty,butofaspectsofhumanlifethathadfoundnoplaceinBentham’ssystem.Theyseemedtobetheverycultureofthefeelings,whichIwasinquestof.InthemIseemedtodrawfromasourceofinwardjoy,ofsympatheticandimagina-tivepleasure,whichcouldbesharedinbyallhumanbeings;whichhadnoconnexionwithstruggleorimperfection,butwouldbemadericherbyeveryimprovementinthephysicalorsocialconditionofmankind.FromthemIseemedtolearnwhatwouldbetheperennialsourcesofhappiness,whenallthegreaterevilsoflifeshallhavebeenremoved.AndIfeltmyselfatoncebetterandhappierasIcameundertheirinfluence.(A89)Afterhiscrisisandrecovery,MilldidnotceasetovenerateBenthamandtoregardhisworkashavingsupersededthatofallpreviousmoralists;buthebecameconvincedthathissystemneededmodificationandsupplementa-tioninbothitspersonalanditssocialaspects.Onthepersonalside,Mill’sthoughtdevelopedundertheinfluenceofEnglishpoets,ofwhomColeridgesoonovertookWordsworthasthedominantpresenceinhismind.InmaturelifehewaswillingtopairColeridgeandBenthamas‘thetwogreatseminalmindsofEnglandintheirage’.Onthesocialside,thenewinfluencesonMillwereFrenchinorigin—thenascentsocialismoftheComtedeSaint-Simon(1760–1825)andtheembryonicpositivismofAugusteComte(1798–1857).WhiletheBritishutilitarianshadbeencontenttotakeprivateowner-shipandhereditarypropertyassomethinggivenandindefeasible,the6\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHESaint-Simoniansarguedthatthecapitalandlabourofasocietyshouldbemanagedasawholeforthegeneralgoodofthecommunity,witheachofthecitizensbeingobligedtocontributeaccordingtotheirability,andentitledtoberewardedinproportiontotheircontribution.Millwasunconvincedbythesocialistprogramme,butitmadehimawareoftheneedofajustificationfortheinstitutionsofprivatepropertyandthefreemarket.HeadmiredtheSaint-Simonians’idealism,andwasinspiredbyanumberoftheirprinciples—inparticulartheirinsistenceontheperfectequalityofmenandwomen.ComtehadbegunhisphilosophicalcareerasaSaint-Simonian,butwentontodevelopasystemofhisowntowhichhegavethenameof‘positivephilosophy’.ThefeatureofthissystemthatmadealastingimpressiononMillwasthetheorythathumanknowledgeandhumansocietiespassedthroughthreehistoricalstages:theological,metaphysical,andpositive.Thesestageswere,intheSaint-Simonianterm,‘organic’,orself-contained.Inthefirststage,societiesgavesupernaturalexplanationsofphenomenaandendeavouredtobringabouteffectsintheworldbymagicalorreligiouspractices.Thisphase,accordingtoComte,lastedthroughthefeudalsystemuptotheReformation.Inthemetaphysicalphase,phenomenawereexplainedbyessencesandforces,whichturnedouttobenolessoccultthanthesupernaturalfactorsheldtooperateinthetheologicalstage.ItwastheFrenchRevolutionthathadbroughtthisstagetoconclu-sion,andtheworldwasnowabouttoenteruponthepositive,ortrulyscientific,stageofscienceandsociety.WhatMilltookfromComteandtheSaint-SimonianswastheideaofProgress.Betweeneachorganicperiodandthenexttherewas,soMillunderstood,acriticalanddisruptiveperiod,andhebelievedthathewaslivinginsuchaperiod.Henowbegantolookforwardtoafuturewhichshallunitethebestqualitiesofthecriticalwiththebestqualitiesoftheorganicperiods;uncheckedlibertyofthought,unboundedfreedomofindividualactioninallmodesnothurtfultoothers;butalso,convictionsastowhatisrightandwrong,usefulandpernicious,deeplyengravenonthefeelingsbyearlyeducationandgeneralunanimityofsentiment.(A100)Oncethatstatewasachieved,furtherprogresswouldbeunnecessary:moralconvictionswouldbesofirmlygroundedinreasonandnecessitythattheywouldnot,likeallpastandpresentcreeds,needtobeperiodicallythrownoff.7\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEThoughaprolificjournalistfromanearlyage,Milldidnotpublishanybooksuntilhislatethirties.Buthisfirstpublishedbook,in1843,wasaworkofsubstancewhichachievedimmediateandlastingfame.ThiswasASystemofLogicinsixbooks,onwhichhehadbeenworkingforseveralyears,andwhichwentthrougheighteditionsinhislifetime.Thebookcoversawidevarietyoftopics,unifiedbyMill’sdesiretopresentanineteenth-centuryupdateoftheBritishempiricisttradition.HepresentedasecularversionofBerkeley’stheologicalphenomenalism:matterisnomorethanapermanentpossibilityofsensation,andtheexternalworldis‘theworldofpossiblesensationssucceedingoneanotheraccordingtolaws’.HeagreedwithHumethatwehavenoconceptionofminditself,asdistinguishedfromitsconsciousmanifestationsinourselves,andheregardeditasaparticularlydifficultproblemforaphilosophertoestablishtheexistenceofmindsotherthanhisown.Butunlikepreviousempiricists,Millhadaseriousinterestinformallogicandthemethodologyofthesciences.TheSystemofLogicbeginswithananalysisoflanguage,andanaccountofdifferenttypesofname(includingpropernames,pronouns,descriptions,generalterms,andabstractexpressions).Allnames,accordingtoMill,denotethings:propernamesdenotethethingstheyarenamesof,andgeneraltermsdenotethethingstheyaretrueof.Butbesidesdenotation,thereisconnotation:thatistosay,awordlike‘man’willdenoteSocrates(amongothers)butwillalsoconnoteattributessuchasrationalityandanimality.Millgaveadetailedtheoryofinferences,whichhedividedintorealandverbal.Syllogisticinferenceisverbalratherthanreal,becauseasyllogismgivesusnonewknowledge.Realinferenceisnotdeductive,butinductive,aswhenwereason‘Peterismortal,Jamesismortal,Johnismortal,thereforeallmenaremortal’.Suchinductiondoesnot,assomelogicianshadthought,leadusfromparticularcasestoagenerallaw.Thegenerallawsaremerelyformulaeformakinginferencesfromknownparticularstounknownparticulars.Millsetsoutfiverules,orcanons,ofexperimenttoguideinductivescientificresearch.Theuseofsuchcanons,Millmaintains,enablesempiricalinquirytoproceedwithoutanyappealtoaprioritruths.11Mill’slogicisdiscussedindetailinCh.4.8\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHETheSystemofLogicrangesfarbeyondthediscussionoflanguageandinference.Itssixthbook,forinstance,isentitled‘OntheLogicoftheMoralSciences’.Theprincipalsuchsciencesarepsychology,sociology,andwhatMillcalled‘ethology’,orthestudyoftheformationofcharacter.Socialscienceincludesthescienceofpoliticsandthestudyofeconomics;butMill’sfullesttreatmentofthesetopicsappearedinadifferentbook,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomyof1848.InpresentinghismodernizedempiricismMilltookoneunprecedented,andimportant,step.Thetruthsofmathematicshavealwayspresentedadifficultyforthoroughgoingempiricists,sincetheyseemtobeamongthemostcertainobjectsofourknowledge,andyettheyseemtoprecederatherthanresultfromexperience.Millmaintainedthatarithmeticandgeo-metry,nolessthanphysics,consistofempiricalhypotheses—hypothesesthathavebeenveryhandsomelyconfirmedinexperience,buthypothesesthatarenonethelesscorrigibleinthelightoflaterexperience.Thisthesis—implausibleasithasappearedtomostsubsequentphilosophers—wasessentialtoMill’soverridingaiminASystemofLogic,whichwastorefuteanotionthatheregardedas‘thegreatintellectualsupportoffalsedoctrinesandbadinstitutions’,namelythenotionthattruthsexternaltothemindmaybeknownbyintuitionindependentofexperience.Millindeedsawthisissueasthemostimportantinallphilosophy.‘Thedifferencebetweenthesetwoschoolsofphilosophy,thatofIntuition,andthatofExperienceandAssociation,isnotamerematterofabstractspecula-tion;itisfullofpracticalconsequences,andliesatthefoundationofallthegreatestdifferencesofpracticalopinioninanageofprogress’(A162).ThemostaggressivecampaignwagedbyMillinthisintellectualbattlewascarriedoutinoneofhislastworks,AnExaminationofSirWilliamHamilton’sPhilosophy(1865).SirWilliamHamiltonwasaScottishphilosopherandreformerwhowasProfessorofLogicandMetaphysicsinEdinburghfrom1838to1856.Inhislecturesheattemptedtopresentanewandimprovedversionofthecommon-sensephilosophyofReid,justasMillhadtriedtobringoutanewandimprovedversionoftheempiricismofHume.Millsawintheselectures,whentheywerepublished,anidealtargetatwhichtofirehisexplosivecriticismsofallformsofintuitionism.Mill’sExaminationachievedmorefamethanthetextitwasexamining;butnowadaysittooisnotoftenstudied.TheworksofMillthathaveretainedalargereadershipwere,onhisownaccount,notentirelyhisown9\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEwork.In1851hemarriedHarriet,thewidowofaLondonmerchant,JohnTaylor,abluestockingwithwhomhehadenjoyedanintimatebutchastefriendshipforsometwentyyears.ThemarriagelastedonlysevenyearsbeforeHarrietdiedatAvignon.AccordingtoMillsheshouldbecountedasco-authorofhispamphletsOnLiberty(publishedin1859)andTheSubjectionofWomen(writtenin1861andpublishedin1869).HarrietTaylor,inspirer,collaborator,andeventuallywifeofJ.S.Mill10\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEOnLibertyseekstodrawlimitstogovernmentinterferencewithindivi-dualfreedom.Itskeyprincipleissetoutthus:Thesoleendforwhichmankindarewarranted,individuallyorcollectively,ininterferingwiththelibertyofactionofanyoftheirnumber,isself-protection.Theonlypurposesforwhichpowercanberightfullyexercisedoveranymemberofacivilisedcommunity,againsthiswill,istopreventharmtoothers.Hisowngood,eitherphysicalormoral,isnotasufficientwarrant.Overhimself,Millsays,overhisownbodyandmind,theindividualissovereign.Theessayappliesthisprincipleinvariousareas,mostconspicu-ouslyinsupportoffreedomofopinionandfreedomofexpression.ThepublicationofTheSubjectionofWomenwastheculminationofalongcampaignbyMilltosecurefemalerightsandimprovewomen’slot.WhenJamesMill,inhisEssayonGovernment,hadaffirmedthatwomendidnotneedavote,becausetheirinterestscoincidedwiththatoftheirmenfolk,youngJohnStuart,supportedbyBentham,haddissented.InhisThoughtsonParliamentaryReformof1859heproposedthateveryeducatedhouseholder,maleorfemale,shouldbeentitledtovote‘forwhyshouldthevote-collectormakeadistinctionwherethetax-gatherermakesnone?’(CWxix.328).In1866hepresentedapetitionforfemalesuffrage,andduringthedebatesontheSecondReformBillproposedanamendment—whichattractedseventy-threevotes—tostrikeoutthewordsthatrestrictedthefranchisetomales.ButTheSubjectionofWomenaddressedissuesmuchwiderthanthatofthesuffrage,andattackedthewholeinstitutionofmarriageasinterpretedbyVictorianlawandmorality.Sostructured,hemaintained,wedlockwassimplyaformofdomesticservitude.From1865to1868MillwasMemberofParliamentforWestminster.Inadditiontofeministissues,heinterestedhimselfinIrishaffairsandinelectoralreform.HewascriticaloftheBritishgovernment’spolicyofcoercioninIreland,andpublishedapamphletadvocatingaradicalreformofthelandholdingsystem.Headvocatedproportionalrepresentationinparliamentaryelections,asasafeguardagainsttheexerciseoftyrannybyamajorityagainstaminority.Histhoughtsonsuchmattershadappearedinprintin1861inConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment.DuringthelastyearsofhislifeMilldweltatAvignonwithhisstepdaughterHelenTaylor.Hediedtherein1873andwasburiedbesidehiswife.His11\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEAutobiographyandThreeEssaysonReligionwerepublishedposthumouslybyhisstepdaughter.ThoughMill’sliberalismneverceasedtohaveadmirers,hisreputationasasystematicphilosopherfadedrapidlyafterhisdeath.Hislogicalworkwaslookedonwithdisfavourbythefoundersofmodernsymboliclogic.HisempiricismwasswampedbythewaveofidealismthatengulfedBritaininthelastdecadesofthenineteenthcentury.Itwasonlywhenempiricismreturnedtofavourinthe1930sthathiswritingsbeganoncemoretobewidelyread.Buttheutilitariantraditionwaskeptalivewithoutinterrup-tionbyHenrySidgwick(1838–1900),whopublishedhisprincipalwork,MethodsofEthics,intheyearafterMill’sdeath.SidgwickwasaFellowofTrinityCollege,Cambridge,whoin1869resignedhisfellowshiponconscientiousgrounds.HebecameProfessorofPhilosophyintheuniversityin1883.HewasatfirstanuncriticaladmirerofMillandwelcomedhissystemasgivinghimrelieffromthearbitrarymoralrulesofhisupbringing.ButhecametoholdthattherewasaninconsistencybetweentwogreatprinciplesofMill’ssystem:psychologicalhedonism(everyoneseekstheirownhappiness)andethicalhedonism(everyoneshouldseekthegeneralhappiness).OneofthemaintaskshesethimselfinMethodsofEthicswastoresolvethisproblem,whichhecalled‘thedualismofpracticalreason’.InthecourseofhisthinkingSidgwickabandonedtheprincipleofpsychologicalhedonismandreplaceditwithanethicalprincipleofrationalegoism,thateachpersonhasanobligationtoseekhisowngood.Thisprinciple,hebelieved,wasintuitivelyobvious.Ethicalhedonism,too,hedecided,couldonlybebasedonfundamentalmoralintuitions.Thus,hissystemcombinedutilitarianismwithintuitionism,whichheregardedasthecommon-senseapproachtomorality.However,thetypicalintuitionsofcommonsensewere,hebelieved,toonarrowandspecific;theonesthatwerethefoundationofutilitarianmoralityweremoreabstract.Onesuchwasthatfuturegoodisasimportantaspresentgood,andanotheristhatfromthepointofviewoftheuniverseanysingleperson’sgoodisofnomoreimportancethananyotherperson’s.Theremainingdifficultyistoreconciletheintuitionsofutilitarianismwiththoseofrationalegoism.Sidgwickcametotheconclusionthatnocompletesolutionoftheconflictbetweenmyhappinessandthegeneralhappinesswaspossibleonthebasisofmundaneexperience(ME,p.xix).Formostpeople,heaccepted,theconnectionbetweentheindividual’sinterest12\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEandhisdutyismadethroughbeliefinGodandpersonalimmortality.AshehimselfwasunwillingtoinvokeGodinthiscontext,heconcludedsadlythat‘theprolongedeffortofthehumanintellecttoframeaperfectidealofrationalconductisseentohavebeenforedoomedtoinevitablefailure’(ME,end).Heconsoledhimselfbyseeking,throughtheworkoftheSocietyforPsychicalResearch,foundedin1882,empiricalevidenceforthesurvivaloftheindividualafterdeath.Schopenhauer’sPhilosophyoftheWillInsettingouthisprincipleofutility,Benthamhadcontrasteditwiththeprincipleofasceticism,whichapprovesofactionsinsofarastheytendtodiminishhappiness.Bentham’stargetwasChristianmorality,butnoChristianeverheldtheprincipleofasceticisminallitsfullness.OfallphilosopherstheonewhocameclosesttoprofessingsuchaprinciplewastheatheistArthurSchopenhauer,whowasjustoneyearoldwhenBenthampublishedhisIntroduction.SchopenhauerwasthesonofaDanzigmerchant,andwasbroughtuptofollowabusinesscareeruntilhisfather’sdeathin1803.Hethenresumedalifeofstudy,beginningin1810acourseofphilosophyattheUniversityofGo¨ttingen,afterafalsestartasamedicalstudent.Hisfavouritephilo-sopherswerePlatoandKant,buthedidnotadmireKant’sdiscipleFichte,whoselecturesheheardatBerlinin1811.InparticularhewasdisgustedbyFichte’snationalism,andratherthanjointhePrussianstruggleagainstNapoleonhewithdrewtowriteaworkOntheFourfoldRootofthePrincipleofSufficientReason,whichhepresentedasadoctoraldissertationtotheUniversityofJenain1813.Duringtheyears1814–18hewrotehismajorwork,TheWorldasWillandIdea.Theworkisdividedintofourbooks,thefirstandthirddevotedtotheworldasIdea,andthesecondandfourthtotheworldasWill.By‘idea’(Vorstellung,sometimestranslated‘representation’)Schopenhauerdoesnotmeanaconcept,butaconcreteexperience—thekindofthingthatLockeandBerkeleycalledbythename‘idea’.AccordingtoSchopenhauer,theworldexistsonlyasidea,onlyinrelationtoconsciousness:‘Theworldismyidea.’Foreachofusourownbodyisthestartingpointofour13\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEperceptionoftheworld,andotherobjectsareknownthroughtheireffectsoneachother.Schopenhauer’saccountoftheworldasideaisnotverydifferentfromthesystemofKant.Butthesecondbook,inwhichtheworldispresentedaswill,ishighlyoriginal.Science,Schopenhauersays,explainsthemotionofbodiesintermsoflawssuchasinertiaandgravitation.Butscienceoffersnoexplanationoftheinnernatureoftheseforces.Indeednosuchexplanationcouldeverbeofferedifahumanbeingwasnomorethanaknowingsubject.However,Iammyselfrootedintheworld,andmybodyisnotjustoneobjectamongothers,buthasanactivepowerofwhichIamconscious.This,andthisalone,allowsustopenetratethenatureofthings.‘Theanswertotheriddleisgiventothesubjectofknowledge,whoappearsasanindividual,andtheansweriswill.Thisandthisalonegiveshimthekeytohisownexistence,revealstohimthesignificance,showshimtheinnermechanismofhisbeing,ofhisaction,ofhismovements’(WWI100).Eachofusknowshimselfbothasanobjectandasawill,andthisthrowslightoneveryphenomenoninnature.Theinnernatureofallobjectsmustbethesameasthatwhichinourselveswecallwill.Buttherearemanydifferentgradesofwill,reachingdowntogravitationandmagnetism,andonlythehighergradesareaccompaniedbyknowledgeandself-determination.Nonetheless,thewillistherealthing-in-itselfforwhichKantsoughtinvain.Sinceheagreesthatinanimateobjectsdonotactonreasonsoractformotives,whydoesSchopenhauercalltheirnaturaltendencies‘will’ratherthan‘appetite’likeAristotle,or‘force’likeNewton?Ifweexplainforceintermsofwill,Schopenhauerreplies,weexplainthelessknownbythebetterknown.Theonlyimmediateknowledgewehaveoftheworld’sinnernatureisgivenusbyourconsciousnessofourownwill.Butwhatisthenatureofwillitself?Allwilling,Schopenhauertellsus,arisesfromwant,andsofromdeficiency,andthereforefromsuffering.Ifawishisgranted,itisonlysucceededbyanother;wealwayshavemanymoredesiresthanwecansatisfy.Ifourconsciousnessisfilledbyourwill,wecanneverhavehappinessorpeace;ourbesthopeisthatpainandboredomwillalternatewitheachother.InthethirdandfourthbookofhismasterpieceSchopenhauerofferstwodifferentwaysofliberationfromtheslaverytothewill.Thefirstwayofescapeisthroughart,throughthepure,disinterestedcontemplationofbeauty.Thesecondwayofescapeisthroughrenunciation.Onlybyrenoun-14\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEcingthewilltolivecanwebetotallyfreedfromthetyrannyofthewill.Thewilltoliveistoberenouncednotbysuicide,butbyasceticism.Tomakerealmoralprogresswemustleavebehindnotjustwickedness(delightinginthesufferingofothers)andbadness(usingothersasmeanstoourends)butalsomerejustice(treatingothersonequaltermswithourselves)andevengoodness(willingnesstosacrificeoneselfforothers).Wemustgobeyondvirtuetoasceticism.ImustcometohavesuchahorrorofthismiserableworldthatIwillnolongerthinkitenoughtoloveothersasmyselfortogiveupmyownpleasureswhentheystandinthewayofothers’good.ToreachtheidealImustadoptchastity,poverty,andabstinence,andwelcomedeathwhenitcomesasadeliverancefromevil.Asmodelsofself-abnegation,SchopenhauerheldoutChristian,Hindu,andBuddhistsaints.However,hiscaseforasceticismdidnotrestonanyreligiouspremisses,andheacceptedthatthelifeofmostsaintswasfullofsuperstition.Religiousbeliefs,hethought,weremythicalclothingsoftruthsunattainablebytheuneducated.ButhissystemwasexpresslyinfluencedbytheMayadoctrineofIndianphilosophy,thedoctrinethatindividualsubjectsandobjectsareallmereappearance,theveilofMaya.TheWorldasWillandIdeahadlittleimmediateinfluence.In1820Schopen-hauerwenttoBerlin,wherethedominantphilosopherintheuniversitywasHegel,forwhomhehadlittlerespect,sneeringat‘thenarcoticeffectoflong-spunperiodswithoutasingleideainthem’.HedeliberatelyadvertisedhislecturesatthesametimeasHegel’s,buthewasunabletowoothestudentsaway.TheboycottofhislecturesaddedfueltohisdislikeoftheHegeliansystem,whichheregardedasmostlynonsense,or,asheputit,‘atrociousandextremelywearisomehumbug’(WWI26).Schopenhauerdidnotwinanypublicrecognitionofhisgeniusuntil1839,whenhewonaNorwegianprizeforanessayOntheFreedomoftheWill.Thishepublishedin1841,alongwithanotheressayonthefoundationofethics,underthetitleTheTwoFundamentalProblemsofEthics.In1844hepublishedanexpandededitionofTheWorldasWillandIdeaandin1851acollectionofessaysentitledParergaandParalipomena.Theseenabledawidepublictoappreciatethewitandclarityofhisliterarystyle,aswellastosavour,withpleasureordistaste,hisirreverentandpoliticallyincorrectopinions.15\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHETheunsuccessfulContinentalrevolutionsof1848tookplacejustafterSchopenhauer’ssixtiethbirthday.Inhissixtieshebecamepopularwithmembersofagenerationthathadbecomedisillusionedwithpoliticalattemptstomaketheworldabetterplace.HewascourtedbytheGermanacademicestablishmentthathehadflagellatedinhiswritings.Hewasabletoenjoythecomfortsoftheworldthathehaddenouncedasadegradingillusion.Ifpeoplecomplainedthathisownlifewasverydifferentfromtheasceticidealthatheproclaimed,hewouldreply,‘itisastrangedemanduponamoralistthatheshouldteachnoothervirtuethanthatwhichhehimselfpossesses’.Hediedin1860.EthicsandReligioninKierkegaardWhileSchopenhauer,inFrankfurt,wasexpandingTheWorldasWillandIdea,aDanishphilosopherinCopenhagenwasbringingoutaseriesoftreatisesthatpresentedasimilarcalltoasceticismonaquitedifferentmetaphysicalbasis.ThiswasSørenAabyeKierkegaard,bornin1813intoatragicfamily.Hismotherandfiveofhissixsiblingsdiedbeforehereachedadulthood,andhisfatherbelievedhimselfcursedforablasphemyutteredlongagowhileashepherdboy.SenttoCopenhagenUniversityin1830tostudytheology,Kierkegaardacquired,likeSchopenhauer,afamiliaritywith,andahatredfor,thephilosophyofHegel.Hedislikedtheology,butin1838heunderwentareligiousconversion,accompaniedbyamysticalexperience‘ofindescribablejoy’.In1840hebecameengagedtoRegineOlsen,buthebrokeofftheengagementayearlater,decidingthathisownandhisfamily’shistoryrenderedhimunsuitableformarriage.Henceforthhesawhimselfasamanwithavocationasaphilosopher.In1841,aftercompletingadissertationonSocraticirony,KierkegaardwenttoBerlinandattendedthelecturesofSchelling.HisdistasteforGermanidealismincreased;butunlikeSchopenhauer,hethoughtthatitsmistakewastoundervaluetheconcreteindividual.LikeSchopenhauer,though,hesketchedoutforhisreadersaspiritualcareerthatendswithrenunciation.Inhisversion,however,eachupwardphaseinthecareer,farfrombeingadiminutionofindividuality,isastageintheaffirmationofone’sownuniquepersonality.16\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEKierkegaard’ssystemwasexpounded,between1843and1846,inaseriesofworkspublishedunderdifferentpseudonyms.Either/Or,of1843,presentstwodifferentlife-views,oneaestheticandoneethical.Fromastartingpointinwhichtheindividualisanunquestioningmemberofacrowd,theaestheticlifeisthefirststagetowardsself-realization.Theaestheticpersonpursuespleasure,butdoessowithtasteandelegance.Theessentialfeatureofhischaracteristhatheavoidstakingonanycommitment,whetherpersonal,social,orofficial,thatwouldlimithisoptionsforseizingwhat-everisimmediatelyattractive.Astimegoeson,suchapersonmayrealizethathisdemandforinstantfreedomisactuallyalimitationonhispowers.Ifso,hemovesontotheethicalstage,inwhichhetakeshisplacewithinsocialinstitutionsandacceptstheobligationsthatflowfromthem.Buthoweverhardhetriestofulfilthemorallaw,hefindsthathispowersareunequaltoit.BeforeGodheisalwaysinthewrong.Bothaestheticandethicalwaysoflifehavetobetranscendedinanascenttothereligioussphere.Thismessageisconveyedindifferentwaysinfurtherpseudonymousworks:FearandTremblingin1843,TheConceptofAnxietyin1844,andStagesonLife’sWayin1845.TheseriesreacheditsclimaxwiththepublicationofthelengthyConcludingScientificPostscriptin1846,whosemess-ageisthatfaithisnottheoutcomeofanyobjectivereasoningastheHegelianshadclaimed.Thetransitionfromtheethicaltothereligioussphereisvividlypor-trayedinFearandTrembling,whichtakesasitstextthebiblicalstoryofGod’scommandtoAbrahamtokillhissonIsaacinsacrifice.Anethicalhero,suchasSocrates,laysdownhislifeforthesakeofauniversalmorallaw;butAbrahambreaksamorallawinobediencetoanindividualcommandofGod.ThisiswhatKierkegaardcalls‘theteleologicalsuspensionoftheethical’—Abraham’sacttransgressestheethicalordertopursueahigherend(telos)outsideit.Butifanindividualfeelsacalltoviolatethemorallaw,noonecantellhimwhetherthisisameretemptationoragenuinecommandofGod.Hecannotevenknoworproveittohimself:hehastomakeadecisioninblindfaith.Afterasecondmysticalexperiencein1848Kierkegaardadoptedamoretransparentmethodofwriting,andpublished,underhisownname,anumberofChristiandiscoursesandworkssuchasPurityofHeartistoWillOneThing(1847)andWorksofLove(1847).ButherevertedtoapseudonymforSicknessuntoDeath,whichpresentsfaithasbeingtheonlyalternativeto17\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEdespair,andasthenecessaryconditionforafullrealizationofone’sauthenticexistenceorselfhood.MuchofthelatterpartofKierkegaard’slifewastakenupinconflictwiththeestablishedDanishChurch,whichheregardedasChristianonlyinname.HewashighlycriticalofthePrimate,BishopJ.P.Mynster,andafterhisdeathin1854publishedabitterattackonhim.Hefoundedandfundedananticlericalbroadsheet,TheMoment,whichranfornineissues,afterwhichhecollapsedinthestreetanddied,afterafewweeks’illness,inNovember1855.Againsthiswishes,andagainsttheprotestsofhisnephew,hewasgivenachurchfuneral.DialecticalMaterialismSchopenhauerandKierkegaardbothderivedtheirphilosophicalimpetusfromareactionagainstthesystemofHegel.ButthemostviolentandmostinfluentialrejectionofHegelianismwasthatofKarlMarx,whodescribedhisownphilosophicalmissionas‘turningHegelupsidedown’.Thedia-lecticalidealismofHegelwasinhisvisiontobereplacedbyadialecticalmaterialism.Marx’sfatherwasaliberalJewwhohadturnedProtestantshortlybeforehisson’sbirthin1816.TheyoungKarlwenttoschoolinTrierandattendedBonnUniversityforoneyear,studyinglawandlivingriotously.HethenwenttoBerlinUniversityforfiveyears,wherehesoberedup,tooktowritingpoetry,andswitchedfromlawtophilosophy.WhenMarxarrivedinBerlin,Hegelwasalreadydead,buthestudiedHegelianphilosophywithaleft-winggroupknownastheYoungHegelians,whichincludedLudwigFeuerbachandwasledbyBrunoBauer.FromHegelandBauer,Marxlearnttoviewhistoryasadialecticalprocess.Eachstageofhistorywasdeterminedbyitspredecessoraccordingtofundamentallogicalormeta-physicalprinciplesinaprocessthathadarigoursimilartothatofageometricalproof.TheYoungHegeliansattachedgreatimportancetoHegel’sconceptofalienation,thatistosay,thestateinwhichpeopleviewasexteriortothemselvessomethingthatistrulyanintrinsicelementoftheirownbeing.TheformofalienationHegelhimselfemphasizedwasthatinwhichindividuals,allofwhomweremanifestationsofasingleSpirit,saweach18\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEAposthumousdrawingofKierkegaard,byVilhelmMarstrandotherashostilerivalsratherthanelementsofanunderlyingunity.Bauer,andstillmoreFeuerbach,regardedreligionasthesupremeformofalienation,inwhichhumans,whowerethehighestformofbeings,projectedtheirownlifeandconsciousnessintoanunrealheaven.‘Religionistheseparationofmanfromhimself,’Feuerbachwrote;‘hesetsGodoveragainsthimselfasanopposedbeing’(Wvi.41).19\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEForbothHegelandFeuerbachreligionwasaformoffalseconsciousness.ForHegelthiswastoberemediedbythetranslationofreligiousmythsintoidealistmetaphysics.ForFeuerbach,however,Hegelianismwasitselfaformofalienation.Religionshouldbeeliminated,nottranslated,andreplacedbyanaturalistic,andpositive,understandingoftheeverydaylifeofhumanbeingsinsociety.Marxagreedthatreligionwasaformoffalseconscious-ness,buthethoughtthatbothHegelandFeuerbachhadprovidedonlyinadequateremediesforalienation.Hegel’smetaphysicsrepresentedmanasamerespectatorofaprocessthatheshouldinfactcontrol.Feuerbach,ontheotherhand,hadnotrealizedthatGodwasnottheonlyalienessencemenworshipped.Muchmoreimportantwasmoney,whichrepre-sentedthealienationofmen’slabour.InsofarasprivatepropertywasthebasisoftheState,MarxwroteinacritiqueofHegel’spoliticalphilosophy,theStatetoowasanalienationofman’struenature.Alienationwasnottoberemovedbyphilosophicalreflection:whatwasneededwasnothinglessthansocialupheaval.‘Thephilosophershaveonlyinterpretedtheworldinvariousways;thepointistochangeit’(TF11).HavingobtainedadoctoratefromJenaUniversityforathesisonDemocritusandEpicurus,in1842MarxbrokewiththeYoungHegelians,wenttoliveinCologne,andbeganacareerasapoliticaljournalist.Heeditedaradicalnewspaper,theRheinischeZeitung.In1843hemarriedawomanhehadknownsincechildhood,JennyvonWestphalen,thedaugh-terofabaronintheserviceofthePrussiangovernment.Thoughirritableanddictatorial,Marx—unusuallyamonggreatphilosophers—enjoyed,untilJenny’sdeathin1881,ahappymarriedlife.Shortlyafterthewedding,theRheinischeZeitungwascloseddownbythePrussiangovernment,underpressurefromtheTsarofRussia.TheMarxesmovedtoParis,whereKarlfoundfurtherworkasajournalist,readhiswaythroughtheEnglishclassicsofpoliticaleconomy,andmadeanumberofradicalfriends.ThemostimportantofthesewasFriedrichEngels,whohadjustreturnedfromworkingforhisfather’scotton-spinningbusinessinManchester,wherehehadwrittenastudyoftheEnglishworkingclasses.MarxandEngels,afterameetingattheCafe´deRe´genceinParis,begantoworkouttogetherthetheoryof‘communism’,thatistosay,theabolitionofprivatepropertyinfavourofcommunalownership.ThemajorworkonwhichthetwomencollaboratedwasThe20\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEGermanIdeology,whichwascompletedinBrussels,whitherMarxhadmigra-tedafterbeingexpelledfromParisforsubversivejournalism.InthisbookMarxandEngelspresentedthematerialistconceptionofhistory.Lifedeterminesconsciousness,notconsciousnesslife.Thebasicrealityofhistoryistheprocessofeconomicproduction,andtounderstanditonemustunderstandthematerialconditionsofthispro-duction.Thevaryingmodesofproductiongiverisetotheformationofsocialclasses,towarfarebetweenthem,andeventuallytotheformsofpoliticallife,law,andethics.Thehand-mill,forinstance,givesyouasocietypresidedoverbyafeudallord,thesteammillproducesasocietydominatedbytheindustrialcapitalist.Adialecticalprocessisleadingtheworldthroughthesevariousstagestowardsaproletarianrevolutionandthearrivalofcommunism.TheGermanIdeologywasnotpublisheduntillongafterMarx’sdeath,butitsideasweresummarizedinThePovertyofPhilosophyof1847(aresponsetoaworkofP.J.ProudhonentitledThePhilosophyofPoverty).Abetter-knownpresentationofthematerialistconceptionofhistorywasTheCommunistManifesto,whichMarxproducedinFebruary1848onthebasisofdraftsbyEngels.ThiswasintendedasanepitomeoftheprinciplesandidealsofthenewlyfoundedCommunistLeague.ThemessageoftheManifestowassummedupthusbyEngelsintheforewordtooneofitslatereditions:Thewholehistoryofmankind(sincethedissolutionofprimitivetribalsociety,holdinglandincommonownership)hasbeenahistoryofclassstruggles,contestsbetweenexploitingandexploited,rulingandoppressedclasses;thehistoryoftheseclassstrugglesformsaseriesofevolutionsinwhich,nowadays,astagehasbeenreachedwheretheexploitedandoppressedclass—theproletariat—cannotattainitsemancipationfromtheswayoftheexploitingandrulingclass—thebourgeoisie—withoutatthesametime,andonceandforall,emancipatingsocietyatlargefromallexploitation,oppression,classdistinctionsandclassstruggles.(CM48)ThemostfamoussentencesoftheManifestowereitslast:‘Lettherulingclassestrembleatacommunisticrevolution.Theproletarianshavenothingtolosebuttheirchains.Theyhaveaworldtowin.Workingmenofallcountries,unite!’IntheyearinwhichtheManifestowaspublishedtherewerearmeduprisingsinmanycities,notablyParis,Berlin,Milan,andRome.MarxandEngelsbrieflyreturnedtoGermany,urgingtherevolutionariestoset21\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEupasystemoffreestateeducation,tonationalizetransportandbanking,andtoimposeaprogressiveincometax.Afterthecollapseoftherevolu-tion,MarxwastwicetriedinCologne,onceonachargeofinsultingthepublicprosecutorandonceonachargeofincitementtorevolt.HewasacquittedonbothcountsbutwasexpelledfromPrussianterritories.HereturnedbrieflytoParisbutwasoncemoreexpelledfromthere.FortherestofhislifehelivedinLondon,ofteninabjectpoverty,whichcausedthreeofhissixchildrentodieofstarvation.InLondon,Marxworkedtirelesslyatdevelopingthetheoryofdialecticalmaterialism,oftenspendingtenhoursadayresearchinginthelibraryoftheBritishMuseum.Duringthewinterof1857–8hewroteaseriesofnotebooksinwhichhesummeduphiseconomicthoughtofthepreviousdecade:thesewerenotmadeavailabletotheworldingeneraluntil1953,whentheyappearedundertheGermantitleGrundrisse.OnthesedraftshebasedtheContributiontoaCritiqueofPoliticalEconomyof1859.Theprefaceofthatworkcontainsasuccinctandauthoritativestatementofthematerialisttheoryofhistory.ThroughouthislifeMarxendeavouredtocombinecommunisttheorywithcommunistpractice.In1864hehelpedtofoundtheInternationalWorkingMen’sAssociation,betterknownastheFirstInternational.Itheldsixcongressesinnineyears,butitsufferedfrominternaldissension,ledbytheanarchistMikhailBakunin,andfellintoexternaldisreputebecauseofitssupportforthesavageandfutileinsurrectioninParisin1870.Itwasdissolvedin1876.Marx’swritingcareerculminatedinthemassiveCapital,whichsoughttoexplainindetailhowthecourseofhistorywasdictatedbytheforcesandrelationsofproduction.ThefirstvolumeofthiswaspublishedinHamburgin1867;thesecondandthirdvolumesremainedunpublishedwhenMarxdiedin1883andwereposthumouslypublishedbyEngels.MarxwasburiedbesidehiswifeinHighgateCemetery.ThethemeofMarx’sgreatworkisthatthecapitalistsystemisinastateofterminalcrisis.Capitalism,ofitsverynature,involvestheexploitationoftheworkingclass.Forthetruevalueofanyproductdependsupontheamountoflabourputintoit.Butthecapitalistappropriatespartofthisvalue,payingthelabourerlessthantheproduct’srealworth.Astechnol-ogydevelops,andwithitthelabourer’sproductivity,agreaterandgreaterproportionofthewealthgeneratedbylabourfindsitswayintothepockets22\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEofthecapitalist.2Thisexploitationisboundtoreachapointatwhichtheproletariatfindsitintolerable,andrisesinrevolt.Thecapitalistsystemwillbereplacedbythedictatorshipoftheproletariat,whichwillabolishprivatepropertyandintroduceasocialiststateinwhichthemeansofproductionaretotallyundercentralgovernmentcontrol.Butthesocialiststate,initsturn,willwitherawaytobereplacedbyacommunistsocietyinwhichtheinterestsoftheindividualwillcoincidewiththoseofthecommunity.Marx’spredictionsofproletarianrevolutionfollowedbyuniversalsocialismandcommunismhave,mercifully,beenfalsifiedbythecourseofhistorysincehisdeath.Butwhateverhemayhimselfhavethought,histheoriesareessentiallyphilosophicalandpoliticalratherthanscientific;andjudgedfromthatstandpointtheycanclaimbothsuccessesandfailures.Marxerredinclaimingthateventsaredeterminedtotallybyeconomicfactors.EvenincountriesthatunderwentsocialistrevolutionsofaMarxisttype,thepowerwieldedbyindividualssuchasLenin,Stalin,andMaogavethelietothetheorythatonlyimpersonalforcesgivehistoryitsshape.But,ontheotherhand,nohistorian,notevenahistorianofphilosophy,wouldnowadaysdaretodenytheinfluenceofeconomicfactorsonpoliticsandculture.Ifwelookback,acenturyandahalflater,ontheproposalsofTheCommunistManifesto,wefindamixtureofrashdraconianmeasuresenforce-ableonlybytyranny(e.g.abolitionofinheritanceandcompulsoryagriculturallabour),institutionsthatadvancedcountriesnowtakeforgranted(progressivetaxationanduniversaleducation),andexperimentsthathavebeenadoptedwithgreaterorlesssuccessindifferenttimesandplaces(nationalizationofrailwaysandbanks).Consideredasaprophet,Marxhasbeendiscredited;andsohashisclaimthatideologyismerelythesmokescreenofthestatusquo.ButthemostconvincingrefutationofthethesisthatconsciousnessisimpotenttodeterminelifeisprovidedbyMarx’sownphilosophy.Forthehistoryoftheworldsincehisdeathhasbeenenormouslyinfluenced,forgoodorill,byhisownsystemofideas,considerednotasascientifictheory,butasaninspirationtopoliticalactivismandaguidelineforpoliticalregimes.2Marx’stheoryofsurplusvaluewillbeconsideredindetailinCh.11.23\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEDarwinandNaturalSelectionTenyearsbeforehisdeathMarxsentacopyofthesecondeditionofthefirstvolumeofCapitaltoCharlesDarwin,whoseOntheOriginofSpecieshadbeenpublishedfourteenyearsearlier.Hereceivedacourteousacknow-ledgementofthisgiftof‘thegreatwork’,butDarwin,likemanyanotherreader,founditimpossibletoproceedbeyondthevolume’searlypages.IngivingMarx’sfuneralorationEngelsdescribedthematerialistconceptionofhistoryasascientificbreakthroughcomparablewiththediscoveryofevolutionbynaturalselection.Thiswasanexaggeration,butMarxandDarwindidturnouttobethetwomostinfluentialthinkersofthenineteenthcentury—andthetwomostheavilycriticized,thenandnow.CharlesDarwinwasborninShrewsburyin1809andboardedatShrews-burySchoolfrom1818to1825.HeenrolledasamedicalstudentatEdinburghin1825butdidnotcompletehisstudies;insteadhewenttoChrist’sCollegeinCambridgeandtookapassBAin1831.TheProfessorofBotanyrecommendedhimtoCaptainFitzroyofHMSBeagle,whoappointedhimship’snaturalist.Duringafive-yearcruiseinthesouthernhemisphereDarwincollectedamassofgeological,botanical,zoological,andanthropologicalmaterial.Initiallyhewasmoreinterestedingeologythaninzoology,andmadediscoveriesaboutthenatureofvolcanicislandsandtheformationofcoralreefs.Hepublishedapopularaccountofhismaritimeresearchesin1839inavolumebestknownasTheVoyageoftheBeagle.InthesameyearhemarriedEmmaWedgwoodandwaselectedtotheRoyalSociety.Duringthe1840sand1850s,studyingthefloraandfaunaofhisestateinKent,hedevelopedthetheoryofnaturalselection,producingin1844asketchofhisideasforprivatecirculation.Hehadinmindtopresentthetheoryinavastvolume,tobecompletedsometimeinthe1860s.However,whenanotherzoologist,AlfredRussellWallace,hadasimilartheoryofthe‘survivalofthefittest’presentedtoalearnedsocietyin1858,Darwindecidedtoestablishtheindependenceandpriorityofhisownideas,andthusrushedintoprintan‘abstract’ofhisideas,whichwasOntheOriginofSpecies.In1860atameetingoftheBritishAssociationfortheAdvancementofScience,ThomasHenryHuxleysuccessfullydefendedDarwinisminafamousdebatewithSamuelWilberforce,theBishopofOxford.24\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEInlateryearsDarwinpublishedanumberofsupplementarytreatisesonfertilizationandvariationsofstructureandbehaviourwithinandacrossspecies.Thebestknownofhislaterbookswaspublishedin1871,TheDescentofManandSelectioninRelationtoSex.Inthatbook,besidesdeve-lopingthetheoryofsexualselection,whichwasanimportantsupplementtothetheoryofnaturalselection,hedefendedthethesisthathumanbeingssharedacommonancestorwithorang-utans,chimpanzees,andgorillas.Hediedin1882andwasburiedinWestminsterAbbey.Darwinwasnotthefirstpersontoproposeatheoryofevolution.Intheancientworld,asDarwinhimselfacknowledged,theSicilianphilosopherEmpedocleshad‘shadowedforththeprincipleofnaturalselection’.3ButEmpedocleshadbeensavagedbyAristotle,whobelievedthatspecieshadexistedfrometernity,andhewasignoredbyChristians,whobelievedthatanimalspecieshadbeencreatedbyGodforAdamintheGardenofEden.ThegreatSwedishnaturalistLinnaeus(1707–78),whoseclassificationofplantandanimalspecieswastoprovidetheplatformonwhichDarwin’stheorywasbuilt,believedthateachspecieshadbeenseparatelycreatedandthattheresem-blancesanddifferencesbetweenthemrevealedthedesignofthecreator.Linnaeusandothertaxonomistshaddividedtheplantandanimalkingdomsintogeneraandspecies,towhichtheygaveLatinnames.Alllions,forinstancearemembersofthesamespecies,felisleo.Thelionspeciesisamemberofthegenusofcats(felis),whichincludesotherspeciessuchasthetiger(felistigris)andtheleopard(felispardus).Withinagivenspeciesthecharacteristicsofindividualsmayvarywidely,butthedefiningmarkofaspeciesisthatitsmemberscanbreedwithothermemberstoproduceoffspringofthesamespecies.Unionsbetweenmembersofdifferentspecies,ontheotherhand,arecommonlysterile.Ratherthanappealtotheinscrutablepurposesofacreator,anumberofnaturalistshadsuggestedthattheresemblancesbetweendifferentspecieswithinagenusmightbeexplainedbydescentfromadistantcommonancestor.ThiswasproposedbyDarwin’sgrandfatherErasmusDarwin(1731–1802),andalsobytheFrenchzoologistJ.B.Lamarck,whoin1815maintainedthatanygenerationofaspeciesmightacquireabeneficialcharacteristicwhichitwouldthenpassontoitsoffspring.Giraffes,stretchingtoreachthetopmostleaves,wouldlengthentheirnecksandbegetlonger-neckedoffspring.3Seevol.I,p.21.25\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEDarwin,byresurrectingtheancientideaofnaturalselection,wasabletoputforwardaquitedifferentexplanationoftheresemblancesanddiffer-encesbetweenspecies.Thefundamentalbasesofhistheorywerethree.First,organismsvarygreatlyinthedegreetowhichtheyareadaptedtotheenvironmentinwhichtheylive.Second,allspeciesarecapableofrepro-ducingataratethatwouldincreasetheirnumbersfromgenerationtogeneration:evenasinglecoupleofslow-breedingelephants,afteraperiodof500years,couldhave15milliondescendants.Third,thereasonthatspeciesdonotincreaseandmultiplyatthisrateisthatineachgenerationonlyafewoffspringsurvivetobreed.Allthemembersofeachspecieshavetofightforexistence,againsttheclimateandagainstcompetingindividualsandcompetingspecies,toobtainfoodforthemselvesandtoavoidbecom-ingfoodforothers.Itisthisthirdfactorthatoperatestheselectionthatisthemechanismofevolution.Owingtothisstruggleforlife,anyvariation,howeverslight,andfromwhatevercauseproceeding,ifitbeinanydegreeprofitabletoanindividualofanyspeciesinitsinfinitelycomplexrelationstootherorganicbeingsandtoexternalnature,willtendtothepreservationofthatindividualandwillgenerallybeinheritedbyitsoffspring.Theoffspring,also,willthushaveabetterchanceofsurviving,for,ofthemanyindividualsofanyspecieswhichareperiodicallyborn,butasmallnumbercansurvive.(OS52)Darwindistinguishedthreedifferentkindsofselection.Artificialselectionhadlongbeenpractisedbyhumanhusbandmenwhoselectedforbreedingthespecimens,whetherofpotatoesorracehorses,thatwerebestadaptedtotheirpurposes.Naturalselection,unlikeartificialselection,wasnotpur-posive.Advantageousvariationswerepreservedandextendedsimplybynaturalpressuresonthesurvivalandreproductionoftheindividualsofaspecies.WithinnaturalselectionDarwinmadeafurtherdistinction:bet-weennaturalselectioninthenarrowsense,whichdeterminedwhetheranindividualsurvivedlongenoughtobreed,andsexualselection,whichdeterminedwithwhomsuchasurvivingindividualwouldmate.UnlikeLamarck,Darwindidnotbelievethatthevariationsinadaptationwereacquiredbyparentsintheirlifetime:thevariationsthattheypassedonwereonestheyhadthemselvesinherited.Thoughitwaspossibletoestablishsomelawsofvariability,theoriginofaparticularadvantageousvariationcouldwellbeamatterofchance.26\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHENaturalselectioncaneasilybeillustrated,andobserved,inthecaseofcharacteristicswithinasinglespecies.Supposethatthereisapopulationofmoths,somehappeningtobedarkandothershappeningtobepale,wholiveonbirchtreesandarepreyeduponbybirds.Whilethetreesretaintheirnaturalsilvercolour,thebetter-camouflagedpalemothswillhaveabetterchanceofsurvival,andwillthereforecometoformthegreaterpartofthepopulation.If,however,thetreesbecomeblackenedwithsoot,theoddsofsurvivalwilltiltinfavourofthedarkmoths.Astheysurviveinmorethanaveragenumbers,itwillappearfromtheoutsidethatthespeciesischangingitscolour,frombeingcharacteristicallypaletobeingcharacteristicallydark.Darwinbelievedthatoveralongperiodoftimenaturalselectioncouldgofurtherandcreatewholenewspeciesofplantsandanimals.Thiswould,indeed,beaprocesssoslowastobeinthenormalsenseunobservable;butrecentdiscoveriesingeologymadeplausibletheideathattheearthhadexistedforasufficientlengthoftimeforspeciestocomeintoandgooutofexistenceinthismanner.Evolutioncouldthusexplainnotonlythelike-nessesanddifferencesbetweenexistingspecies,butalsothedifferencebetweenthespeciesnowextantanddefunctspeciesfromearlieragesthatwerebeingdiscoveredinfossilformthroughouttheworld.Eventhemostcomplexorgansandinstincts,Darwinclaimed,couldbeexplainedbytheaccumulationofinnumerableslightvariations,eachgoodfortheindividual.Tosupposethattheeye,withallitsinimitablecontrivancesforadjustingthefocustodifferentdistances,foradmittingdifferentamountsoflight,andforthecorrectionofsphericalandchromaticaberration,couldhavebeenformedbynaturalselection,seems,Ifreelyconfess,absurdinthehighestpossibledegree.Yetreasontellsme,thatifnumerousgradationsfromaperfectandcomplexeyetooneveryimperfectandsimple,eachgradebeingusefultoitspossessor,canbeshowntoexist;iffurther,theeyedoesvaryeversoslightly,andthevariationsbeinherited,whichiscertainlythecase;andifanyvariationofmodificationintheorganbeeverusefultoananimalunderchangingconditionsoflife,thenthedifficultyofbelievingthataperfectandcomplexeyecouldbeformedbynaturalselection,thoughinsuperablebyourimagination,canhardlybeconsideredreal.(OS152)ThecaseforDarwin’stheorywasgreatlystrengthenedafterhisdeath,firstwhenthelawsofpopulationgeneticsestablishedbyGregorMendelbecamegenerallyknown,andthenwhentheidentificationofDNAenabledmoleculargeneticiststoelucidatethemechanismsofheredity.ThestoryofDarwinismbelongstothehistoryofscience,notthehistoryof27\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEphilosophy;butnohistoryofphilosophycanomittomentionDarwin,becauseoftheimplicationsofhisbiologicalworkonphilosophyofreligionandongeneralmetaphysics.4JohnHenryNewmanThoughDarwin’sideasmetwithoppositioninsomeecclesiasticalcircles,theywereacceptedwithequanimitybythegreatestreligiouswriteroftheVictorianage,JohnHenryNewman.ShortlyaftertheappearanceofOntheOriginofSpeciesNewmanobservedthatifoneweretobelieveintheseparatecreationofeachspeciesonewouldalsohavetobelieveinthecreationoffossil-bearingrocks.‘Thereisasmuchwantofsimplicityinthecreationofdistinctspecies’,hewrote,‘asinthoseofthecreationoftreesinfullgrowthorofrockswithfossilsinthem.Imeanthatitisasstrangethatmonkeysshouldbesolikemen,withnohistoricalconnexionbetweenthem,asthatthereshouldbe...nohistoryorcourseoffactsbywhichfossilbonesgotintotherocks.’5Hewasquiteprepared‘togothewholehogwithDarwin’andhetooknopartinanycontroversybetweenscienceandreligion.Hisclaimtoaplaceinthehistoryofphilosophylieselsewhere.NewmanwasborninLondonin1801,andwasanundergraduateatTrinityCollege,Oxford,from1817to1820,andaFellowofOrielbetween1822and1845.In1828hebecameVicarofStMary’s,theuniversitychurch,andacquiredalastingfameasapreacher.Afteranevangelicalupbringinghebecameconvinced,overtheyears,ofthetruthoftheCatholicinterpre-tationofChristianity.Hewasoneofthefoundersofthe‘OxfordMovement’,whichsoughttohavethisinterpretationacceptedasauthoritativewithintheChurchofEngland.In1845,however,heconvertedtoRomanCatholicismandresignedhisOrielfellowship.AsaRomanCatholicpriesthefoundedanoratory,orcommunityofparochialpriests,inBirmingham,wherehewasbasedformostoftherestofhislife.In1850hewasappointedthefirstRectorofanewCatholicuniversityinDublin,apostwhichhehelduntil1858.ThelecturesandaddresseswhichhegaveinthatcapacitybecameTheIdeaofaUniversity,whichwhenpublishedbecameaclassicofthetheoryofeducation.4TheseimplicationsarediscussedinChs.7and12.5QuotedbyDavidBrown,Newman:AManforourTime(London:SPCK,1990),5.28\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHENewmanwrotenumeroustheologicalworksbothbeforeandafterhisconversion,buthisclaimtobeagreatwriterwasestablishedforthegeneralpublicbyhisApologiaproVitaSua,anautobiographywritteninresponsetochargesagainsthisintegritybroughtbythenovelistCharlesKingsley.Inadditiontohistoricalanddevotionalworkshewroteonephilosophicalclassic,AnEssayinAidofaGrammarofAssentof1870,whichdevelopedepistemologicalideashehadfirstpresentedinhisUniversitySermonsinStMary’s.NewmandidnotsharetheenthusiasmofCardinalManning,headoftheCatholicChurchinEngland,fortheVaticanCouncil’sdefin-itionofPapalInfallibilityin1870.Nonetheless,hewasin1879madeacardinalbyPopeLeoXIII.Helivedaretiredlifeuntilhisdeathin1890.Oneofhisbest-knownworkstodayisTheDreamofGerontius,apoeticaldramaandmeditationondeath,whichwassettomusicbyEdwardElgarin1900.Newman’sinterestinphilosophyderivedfromhisdesiretoprovetotheworldthatnotjustbeliefinGod,buttheacceptanceofaspecificreligiouscreed,wasacompletelyrationalactivity.Hefacedsquarelythequestion:howcanreligiousbeliefbejustified,giventhattheevidenceforitsconclu-sionsseemsinadequateforthetotalcommitmentoffaith?Hedidnot,likeKierkegaard,demandtheadoptionoffaithintheabsenceofreasons,ablindleapoveraprecipice.Hesoughttoshowthatadhesiontoacreedwasitselfreasonable,evenifnoproofcouldbeofferedofitsarticles.InthecourseofdealingwiththisquestioninTheGrammarofAssent,Newmanhadmuchtosayofgeneralphilosophicalinterestaboutthenatureofbelief,insecularaswellasreligiouscontexts.ThegeneralphilosophicalquestionposedbyNewmanisthis:isitalwayswrongtogiveassenttoapropositionintheabsenceofadequateevidenceorargument?Lockehadassertedthatnopropositionshouldbeentertainedwithgreaterassurancethanjustifiedbytheproofsitwasbuilton.Inresponse,Newmanpointedtothefactthatmanyofourmostsolidbeliefsgowellbeyondtheflimsyevidencewecouldofferforthem.WeallbelievethatGreatBritainisanisland;buthowmanyofushavecircumnavigatedit,ormetpeoplewhohave?Ifwerefusedevertogiveassentsgoingbeyondtheforceofevidence,theworldcouldnotgoon,andscienceitselfcouldmakenoprogress.Religiousbelief,then,cannotbecondemnedasirrationalsimplyonaccountofbeingbasedongroundsthatarenomorethanconjectural.Infact,Newmanmaintained,strongevidenceforthetruthoftheChristian29\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEreligionistobefoundinthehistoryofJudaism.Heagreed,however,thatthisevidencecarriedweightonlyforthosewhowerealreadypreparedtoreceiveit,peoplewhobelievedintheexistenceofGodandthepossibilityofrevelation.IfitisaskedwhyoneshouldbelieveinGodinthefirstplace,Newmanrespondsbyappealingtotheinwardexperienceofdivinepower,whichistobefoundinthevoiceofconscience.FewwhowerenotalreadybelievershavefoundconvincingeitherNewman’sargumentfromconscienceorhisappealtothetestimonyofhistory.Butthegeneralepistemologicalaccountwithinwhichheembedshisapologeticshasbeenadmiredbyphilosopherswhowerefarfromsharinghisreligiousfaith.ItisarguablythebesttreatmentofthetopicsofbeliefandcertaintybetweenHumeandWittgenstein.6NietzscheJustatthetimewhenNewmanwaspresentinghisjustificationoftherationalityofreligiousbelief,therewasappointedtoaprofessorshipinBaselayoungmanwhowastomakethetwentiethcenturyechotohisproclamationofthedeathofGod.FriedrichNietzschewasbornintoadevoutLutheranfamilyinSaxonyin1844.HestudiedattheuniversitiesofBonnandLeipzig;histrainingwasnotinphilosophybutinclassicalphilology,inwhichhedisplayedsuchfacilitythathebecameafullprofessorattheageoftwenty-four,beforehehadevencompletedhisdoctorate.HetaughtatBaselfrom1869to1879,withabriefintervalofserviceintheambulancecorpsduringtheFranco-PrussianWarof1870.Nietzschewasprofoundlyinfluencedbytwoeventsshortlybeforehetookuphischair.OnewasreadingofSchopenhauer’sTheWorldasWillandIdea;theotherwasmeetingRichardWagner,whoseTristanundIsoldehadfascinatedhimsincehehadhearditattheageofsixteen.Hisfirstpublishedwork,TheBirthofTragedyof1872,showedtheinfluenceofbothmen.InithedrewacontrastbetweentwoaspectsoftheGreekpsyche:thewildirrationalpassionspersonifiedinDionysus,whichfoundexpressioninmusicandtragedy,andthedisciplinedandharmoniousbeautyrepresentedbyApollo,whichfoundexpressioninepicandtheplasticarts.The6SeeCh.6below.30\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEtriumphofGreekculturewastoachieveasynthesisbetweenthetwo—asynthesisthatwasdisruptedbytherationalisticincursionofSocrates.ThedecadencewhichthenovertookGreecehadinfectedcontemporaryGermany,whichcouldachievesalvationonlythroughfollowingtheleadofWagner,towhomthebookwasdedicated.Between1873and1876Nietzschepublishedfouressays,UntimelyMedita-tions(or,inanotherEnglishversion,SongsoutofSeason).Twowerenegative,oneacriticismofDavidStrauss,authorofafamouslifeofJesus,theotheranattackonthepretensionsofscientifichistory.Twowerepositive:oneinpraiseofSchopenhauerandtheotherineulogyofWagner.Butby1878NietzschehadbrokenwithWagner(hewasdisgustedwithParsifal)andhadlosthisenthusiasmforSchopenhauer(whosepessimismhenowfoundstifling).InHuman,AlltooHuman,heshowedhimselfuncharacteristicallysympathetictoutilitarianmoralityandforonceappearedtovaluescienceassuperiortoart.Buthisenduringunderlyingconvictionthatartwasthesupremetaskoflifedisplayeditselfintheformofthework,whichispoeticandaphoristicratherthanargumentativeordeductive.In1879,afflictedbypsychosomaticillness,Nietzschetookearlyretire-mentfromhischairatBaselandbroughthisacademiccareertoanend.ForthenexttenyearshedweltinvariousplacesinItalyandSwitzerlandinpursuitofbetterhealth,spendingmanyasummerinSilsMariaintheEngadine.HepublishedaseriesofworksinwhichhehopedtoreplacethepessimismofSchopenhauerwithanoptimisticaffirmationoflife.InworkssuchasDaybreakin1881andTheGayScience(orJoyfulWisdom)in1882hedenounced,aselementshostiletolife,Christianself-denial,altruisticethics,democraticpolitics,andscientificpositivism.Hesawitashistask‘toerectanewimageandideaofthefreespirit’.Asapracticalexpressionofthefreedomofhisspirit,Nietzschein1882joinedtheGermanmaterialistPaulRe´eandtheRussianfeministLouisevonSalome´inacohabiting‘trinity’.Thislovetriangle,however,didnotlastlongandfrom1883to1885Nietzschedevotedhimselftotheproduc-tionofhismostfamouswork,theoracularThusSpakeZarathustra.TheunhappyendingofhisrelationshipwithLoumaybepartcauseofthebook’smostfamousaphorism,‘Youaregoingamongwomen?Donotforgetthewhip!’ButtheworkcontainedthreemoreimportantideasthatweregoingtobeofsignificanceinthefinalperiodofNietzsche’slife.Oneistheideathatmenastheynowarewillbesupersededbyaraceofsupermen:31\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHEThetrinityofSalome´,Re´e,andNietzsche,photographedin188232\nBENTHAMTONIETZSCHE‘higherones,strongerones,moretriumphantones,merrierones,builtsquarelyinbodyandsoul’.Thesecondistheideaofthetransvaluationofvalues:acompleteoverturningoftraditionalandespeciallyChristianmoralpriorities.Thethirdistheideaofeternalrecurrence:ininfinitetimethereareperiodiccyclesinwhichallthathaseverhappenedhappensonceagain.TheseideasweregivenanexpositionthatwaslesspropheticalandmorediscursiveinthephilosophicallymostimportantofNietzsche’sworks,BeyondGoodandEvilof1886andTheGenealogyofMoralsin1887.Thesetextssetoutacontrastbetweenanaristocraticmaster-moralitywhichplacesahighvalueonnobility,bravery,andtruthfulness,andaslave-moralityorherd-moralitywhichvaluessubmissivetraitssuchashumility,sympathy,andbenevolence.Nietzschesawtheseworksasprolegomenatoasystem-aticexpositionofhisphilosophy,onwhichheworkedenergeticallybutwasneverabletocomplete.Severalversionsextractedfromhisnoteswereposthumouslypublished,butonlythefirstpartoftheworkappearedinhislifetime,underthetitleTheAntichrist(publishedin1895).Theyear1888wasoneoffeverishproduction.InadditiontoTheAntichristNietzschepublishedaferociousattackonWagner(TheCaseofWagner)andwroteTheTwilightoftheIdols(publishedin1889).Healsowroteasemi-autobiographicalwork,EcceHomo,inwhichcanbedetectedsignsofthementalinstability(probablyofsyphiliticorigin)thatledtohimbeinginstitutionalizedinJenain1889.Heendedhisdaysinsane,beingnursedfirstbyhismotherandlateratWeimarbyhissisterElizabeth,whobuiltupanarchiveofhispapers.Nietzschediedin1900;hissistertookcontrolofhisNachlassandexercisedadegreeofprotectivecontroloveritspublication.DuringthetwentiethcenturyNietzschehadagreatinfluenceincontinentalEurope,especiallyuponRussianliteratureandGermanphilo-sophy.HisoppositiontosubmissivemoralityandtodemocraticsocialismmadehimpopularamongNazis,whosawthemselvesasdevelopingaraceofsuperiorhumans.Partlyforthisreason,hewaslongneglectedbyEnglish-speakingphilosophers;butinthelatterpartofthecentury,ethicistsintheanalytictraditioncametorealizethathisonslaughtontraditionalmoralityneededtobeansweredratherthanignored.77Nietzsche’swritingsonmoralityareconsideredindetailinCh.9.33\n2PeircetoStrawsonC.S.PeirceandPragmatismThethinkerswhomwehaveconsideredsofarinthesevolumeshaveallcomefromEurope,NorthAfrica,ortheMiddleEast.TheAmericancontinent,nowadayshometomanyoftheworld’smostinfluentialphilosophers,wasalmostbarrenofphilosophyuntilthelatterpartofthenineteenthcentury.IntheeighteenthcenturyacutecontributionstodifferentareasofphilosophyweremadebytheCalvinisttheologianJonathanEdwards(1703–58)andtheEnlightenmentpolymathBenjaminFranklin(1706–90).EarlyinthenineteenthcenturytheessayistRalphWaldoEmerson(1803–82)presentedaformofidealism,called‘transcen-dentalism’,whichwasbrieflyfashionableintheUnitedStates.ButitwaswiththeworkofCharlesSandersPeirce(1839–1914)thatAmericanphilo-sophyreallycameofage.PeircewasthesonofaformidableprofessorofmathematicsatHarvard,andhetookasummacumlaudedegreeinchemistrytherein1863.ForthirtyyearsheservedontheUScoastalsurvey,andhealsoundertookresearchatHarvardObservatory.Theonlybookhepublished,PhotometricResearches,wasaworkofastronomy.Around1872hejoinedWilliamJames,ChaunceyWright,OliverWendellHolmes,andothersinadiscussiongroupknownastheMetaphysicalClub.HegaveseverallecturecoursesatHarvardonthehistoryandlogicofscience,andfrom1879until1884hewasalectureronlogicatthenew,research-orientedJohnsHopkinsUniversityinBaltimore.Buthewasadifficultcolleague,impatientofacademicconventions,andhismarriagetoMelusinaFay,apioneeringfeminist,brokedownin1883.Hefailedtoobtaintenure,andheneveragainheldanacademicpostor\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONafull-timejob.DuringthelatterpartofhislifehelivedinpovertyinPennsylvaniawithhisdevotedsecondwife,Juliette.Peircewasahighlyoriginalthinker.Likemanyanothernineteenth-centuryphilosopher,hetookashisstartingpointthephilosophyofKant,whoseCritiqueofPureReasonheclaimedtoknowalmostbyheart.ButheregardedKant’scomprehensionofformallogicasamateurish.WhenhesethimselftorepairthisdeficiencyhefounditnecessarytorecastsubstantialpartsoftheKantiansystem,suchasthetheoryofcategories.Unusuallyamonghiscontemporaries,heknewandadmiredthewritingsofthemedievalscholastics,inparticulartheworksofDunsScotus.Thefeaturehemostpraisedinscholasticphilosophers(asinGothicarchitects)wasthecompleteabsenceintheirworkofself-conceit.Hehimselfhadahighopinionofhisownmerits,regardingAristotleandLeibnizashisonlypeersinlogic.Hisworkrangedwidely,notonlyoverlogicinthenarrowsense,butalsoencompassingtheoryoflanguage,epistemology,andphilosophyofmind.HewastheoriginatorofoneofthemostinfluentialofAmericanschoolsofphilosophy,namelypragmatism.Duringhislifetime,Peirce’sphilosophywaspresentedtothepubliconlyinaseriesofjournalarticles.In1868hepublishedintheJournalofSpeculativePhilosophytwoarticleswiththetitle‘QuestionsConcerningCertainFacultiesClaimedforMan’:thesesetoutanearlyversionofhisepistemology.Theresultsaremainlynegative:wehavenopowerofintrospection,andwehavenopowerofthinkingwithoutsigns.Aboveallwehavenopowerofintuition:everycognitionisdeterminedlogicallybysomepriorcognition.Moreinfluentialwasaseriesof‘illustrationsofthelogicofscience’whichappearedinthePopularScienceMonthlyin1877–8.Intheseheenun-ciatedhisprincipleoffallibilism,thatanythingthatclaimstobehumanknowledgemay,intheend,turnouttobemistaken.This,heinsisted,doesnotmeanthatthereisnosuchthingasobjectivetruth.Absolutetruthisthegoalofscientificinquiry,butthemostwecanachieveisever-improvingapproximationstoit.Oneofthe1878articlescontainsthefirstformulationofwhatwaslatercalled‘theprincipleofpragmatism’.Thiswastotheeffectthatinordertoattainclearnessinourthoughtsofanobject,weneedonlyconsiderwhatconceivableeffectsofapracticalkindtheobjectmayinvolve(EWP300).In1884PeirceeditedacollectionofJohnsHopkinsStudiesinLogic.Hewroteanessayonthelogicofrelations,andhissystemofquantificationallogic35\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONC.S.PeircewithhissecondwifeJuliette36\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONwaspresentedbyoneofhisstudents.Thesystemincludedanovelnotationforrepresentingthesyntaxofrelations:e.g.thecompoundsign‘Lij’couldrepresentthatIsaaclovesJessica,andthesign‘Gijk’couldrepresentthatIsaacgaveJessicatoKore.Italsocontainedtwosignsforquantifiers,‘Ó’correspondingto‘some’,and‘—’correspondingto‘all’.ThesyntaxofPeirce’s‘GeneralAlgebraofLogic’,ashecalledit,wasequivalenttothatofthesystemoflogicthatGottlobFrege,unknowntohim,haddevelopedinGermanyafewyearspreviously.InTheMonistin1891–2,‘AGuessattheRiddle’,Peircepresentedhismetaphysicsandphilosophyofmindagainstthebackgroundofanoverallevolutionarycosmology.Thedefinitivestatementofhispragmatism(whichhenowpreferredtocall‘pragmaticism’,sincehewishedtodisownsomeofthethesesofhispragmatistdisciples)wasissuedinacourseoflecturesatHarvardin1903andafurtherseriesofpapersinTheMonistin1905.InthelastyearsofhislifePeirceworkedhardtodevelopageneraltheoryofsigns—a‘semiotic’ashecalledit—asaframeworkforthephilosophyofthoughtandlanguage.Manyoftheseideas,whichsomeregardashismostimportantcontributiontophilosophy,wereworkedoutbetween1903and1912incorrespondencewithanEnglishwoman,VictoriaWelby.Peircenevercompletedthefullsynthesisofphilosophyonwhichheworkedformanyyears,andathisdeathleftamassofunpublisheddrafts,manyofwhichwereposthumouslypublishedonceinterestinhisworkblossomedinthetwentiethcentury.Hisinfluenceonotherphilosophershasnotbeeninproportiontohisgenius.Peirce’sworkinlogicwasneverpresentedinafullyrigorousform,anditwasFregewho,throughRussell,gavetotheworldthelogicalsystemthatthetwoofthemhadindepend-entlyconceived.Peirce’ssubtleversionofpragmatismneverseizedtheimaginationoftheworldinthesamewayasthemorepopularversionofhisadmirerWilliamJames.ItistotheworkofFregeandJames,therefore,thatwenowturn.TheLogicismofFregeGottlobFrege(1848–1925)wasknowntofewpeopleinhislifetime,butafterhisdeathcametooccupyauniquepositioninthehistoryofphilosophy.Hewastheinventorofmodernmathematicallogic,andanoutstanding37\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONphilosopherofmathematics.HeisreveredbymanyasthefounderoftheschoolofphilosophywhichhaslongbeenthedominantoneinAnglo-phoneuniversities:analyticphilosophy,whichfocusesitsconcernontheanalysisofmeaninginlanguage.Itwashisinfluence—mediatedinBritainbyBertrandRussellandontheEuropeanmainlandbyEdmundHusserl—thatgavephilosophythelinguisticturnthatcharacterizedthetwentiethcentury.FregewasbornintoaLutheranfamilyofschoolteacherswholivedinWismar,ontheBalticcoastofGermany.Hisfatherdiedwhenhewasinhisteens,andhewassupportedthroughschoolanduniversitybyhismother,nowheadmistressofthegirls’schoolthathadbeenfoundedbyherhusband.HeenteredJenaUniversityin1869,butafterfoursemestershemovedtoGo¨ttingen,wherehetookhisPh.D.,withageometricaldissertation,in1873.HereturnedtoJenaasaprivatdozent,orunsalariedlecturer,in1874,andtaughtthereinthemathematicsfacultyforforty-fouryears,becomingaprofessorin1879.Apartfromhisintellectualactivityhislifewasuneventfulandsecluded.Fewofhiscolleaguestroubledtoreadhisbooksandarticles,andforhismostimportantworkhehaddifficultyinfindingapublisher.Frege’sproductivecareerbeganin1879withthepublicationofapamphletentitledBegriffsschrift(‘ConceptScript’).Theconceptscriptthatgavethebookitstitlewasanewsymbolismdesignedtobringoutclearlylogicalrelation-shipsthatordinarylanguageobscures.Fregeusedittodevelopanewsystemthathasapermanentplaceattheheartofmodernlogic:thepropositionalcalculus.Thisisthebranchoflogicthatdealswiththoseinferencesthatdependontheforceofnegation,conjunction,disjunction,etc.whenappliedtosentencesaswholes.Itsfundamentalprincipleistotreatthetruth-value(i.e.thetruthorfalsehoodasthecasemaybe)ofsentencescontainingconnectivessuchas‘and’,‘if’,and‘or’asbeingdeterminedsolelybythetruth-valuesofthecomponentsentenceslinkedbytheconnectives.Com-positesentencessuchas‘Snowiswhiteandgrassisgreen’aretreatedasbeing,inthelogicians’technicalterm,truth-functionsoftheirconstituentsimplepropositionssuchas‘Snowiswhite’and‘Grassisgreen’.PropositionallogichadbeenstudiedintheancientworldbytheStoicsandintheMiddleAgesbyOckhamandothers;1butitwasFregewhogaveititsfirstsystematicformulation.Begriffsschriftpresentsthepropo-1Seevol.I,p.141;vol.II,pp.148–50.38\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONsitionalcalculusinanaxiomaticmannerinwhichallthelawsofpropositionallogicarederived,byaspecifiedmethodofinference,fromanumberofprimitivepropositions.TheactualsymbolismthatFregeinventedforthispurposeisdifficulttoprint,andhaslongbeensupersededinthepresentationofthecalculus;buttheoperationsthatitexpressedcontinuetobefundamentalinmathematicallogic.Itwasnot,however,thepropositionalcalculus,butthepredicatecalculus,thatwasFrege’sgreatestcontributiontologic.Thisisthebranchoflogicthatdealswiththeinternalstructureofpropositionsratherthanwithpropositionsconsideredasatomicunits.Fregeinventedanovelnotationforquantification,thatistosay,amethodofsymbolizingandrigorouslydisplayingthoseinferencesthatdependfortheirvalidityonexpressionssuchas‘all’or‘some’,‘no’or‘none’.WiththisnotationhepresentedapredicatecalculusthatgreatlyimprovedupontheAristoteliansyllogisticthathadhithertobeenlookeduponasthebe-allandend-alloflogic.Frege’scalculusallowedformallogic,forthefirsttime,tocopewithsentencescontainingmultiplequantification,suchas‘Nobodyknowseverything’and‘Everyboylovessomegirl’.2ThoughBegriffsschriftisaclassicaltextinthehistoryoflogic,Frege’spurposeinwritingitwasconcernedmorewithmathematicsthanwithlogic.Hewantedtoputforwardaformalsystemofarithmeticaswellasaformalsystemoflogic,andmostimportantly,hewantedtoshowthatthetwosystemswereintimatelylinked.Allthetruthsofarithmetic,heclaimed,couldbeshowntofollowfromtruthsoflogicwithouttheneedofanyextrasupport.Howthisthesis(whichcametobeknownas‘logicism’)wastobedemonstratedwassketchedinBegriffsschrift,andsetoutmorefullyintwolaterworks,GrundlagenderArithmetik(‘FoundationsofArithmetic’)of1884andDieGrundgesetzederArithmetik(‘TheFundamentalLawsofArithmetic’)of1893and1903.ThemostimportantstepinFrege’slogicistprogrammewastodefinearithmeticalnotions,suchasthatofnumber,intermsofpurelylogicalnotions,suchasthatofclass.Fregeachievesthisbytreatingthecardinalnumbersasclassesofequivalentclasses,thatistosay,ofclasseswiththesamenumberofmembers.Thusthenumbertwoistheclassofpairs,andthenumberthreetheclassoftrios.Suchadefinitionatfirstsightappears2SeeCh.4below.39\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONcircular,butinfactitisnotsincethenotionofequivalencebetweenclassescanbedefinedwithoutmakinguseofthenotionofnumber.Twoclassesareequivalenttoeachotheriftheycanbemappedontoeachotherwithoutresidue.Thus,totakeanexampleofFrege’s,awaitermayknowthatthereareasmanyknivesasthereareplatesonatablewithoutknowinghowmanyofeachthereare.Allheneedstodoistoobservethatthereisaknifetotherightofeveryplateandaplatetotheleftofeveryknife.Thus,wecoulddefinefourastheclassofallclassesequivalenttotheclassofgospel-makers.Butsuchadefinitionwouldbeuselessforthelogicist’spurposesincethefactthattherewerefourgospel-makersisnopartoflogic.Fregehastofind,foreachnumber,notonlyaclassoftherightsize,butonewhosesizeisguaranteedbylogic.Hedoesthisbybeginningwithzeroasthefirstofthenumberseries.Thiscanbedefinedinpurelylogicaltermsastheclassofallclassesequivalenttotheclassofobjectsthatarenotidenticalwiththemselves:aclassthatobviouslyhasnomembers(‘thenullclass’).Wecanthengoontodefinethenumberoneastheclassofallclassesequivalenttotheclasswhoseonlymemberiszero.InordertopassfromthesedefinitionstodefinitionsoftheothernaturalnumbersFregeneedstodefinethenotionof‘succeeding’inthesenseinwhichthreesucceedstwo,andfoursucceedsthree,inthenumberseries.Hedefines‘nimmediatelysucceedsm’as‘ThereexistsaconceptF,andanobjectfallingunderitx,suchthatthenumberofFsisnandthenumberofFsnotidenticalwithxism’.Withtheaidofthisdefinitiontheothernumberscanbedefinedwithoutusinganynotionsotherthanlogicalonessuchasidentity,class,andclass-equivalence.Begriffsschriftisaveryaustereandformalwork.TheFoundationsofArithmeticsetsoutthelogicistprogrammemuchmorefully,butalsomuchmoreinformally.Symbolsappearrarely,andFregetakesgreatpainstorelatehisworktothatofotherphilosophers.AccordingtoKant,ourknowledgeofbotharithmeticandgeometrydependedonintuition:intheCritiqueofPureReasonhehadmaintainedthatmathematicaltruthsweresyntheticapriori,thatistosaythatwhiletheyweregenuinelyinformative,theywereknowninadvanceofallexperience.3JohnStuartMill,aswehaveseen,maintainedthatmathematicalpropositionswereempiricalgeneralizations,widelyapplicableandwidelyconfirmed,butaposteriorinonetheless.3Seevol.III,p.103.40\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONFregeagreedwithKantagainstMillthatmathematicswasknownapriori,andlikeKanthethoughtthatgeometryrestedonintuition.Buthisthesisthatarithmeticwasabranchoflogicmeantthatitwasnotsynthetic,asKanthadclaimed,butanalytic.Itwasbased,ifFregewasright,solelyupongenerallawsthatwereoperativeineverysphereofknowledgeandneedednosupportfromempiricalfacts.Arithmetichadnoseparatesubjectmatterofitsownanymorethanlogichad.IntheFoundationstherearetwothesesthatFregeregardedasimportant.Oneisthateachindividualnumberisaself-subsistentobject.Theotheristhatthecontentofastatementassigninganumberisanassertionaboutaconcept.Atfirstsightthesepropositionsseemtoconflictwitheachother;butonceweunderstandwhatFregemeansby‘concept’and‘object’weseethattheydonot.Insayingthatanumberisanobject,Fregeisnotsuggestingthatitissomethingtangiblelikeabushorabox.Rather,heisdenyingtwothings.First,heisdenyingthatanumberisapropertyofanything:inthreeblindmice,threenessisnotapropertyofanymouseinthewaythatblindnessis.Second,heisdenyingthatnumberisanythingsubjective,animageorideaoranypropertyofanymentalitem.Concepts,forFrege,aremind-independent,andsothereisnocontra-dictionbetweentheclaimthatnumbersareobjectiveandtheclaimthatnumberstatementsarestatementsaboutconcepts.Bythissecondclaim,Fregemeansthatastatementsuchas‘Theearthhasonemoon’assignsthenumberonetotheconceptmoonoftheearth.Similarly,‘Venushasnomoons’assignsthenumberzerototheconceptmoonofVenus.Inthislattercase,itisquiteclearthattheredoesnotexistanymoontohaveanumberasitsproperty.Butallstatementsofnumberaretobetreatedinthesameway.Butifnumberstatementsofthiskindarestatementsaboutconcepts,whatkindofobjectisanumberitself?Frege’sansweristhatanumberistheextensionofaconcept.ThenumberthatbelongstotheconceptF,hesays,istheextensionoftheconcept‘likenumberedtotheconceptF’.ThisistantamounttosayingthatitistheclassofallclassesthathavethesamenumberofmembersastheclassofFs,aswasexplainedabove.SoFrege’stheorythatnumbersareobjectsdependsonthepossibilityoftakingclassesasobjects.IntheyearsafterthepublicationofFoundations,Fregepublishedanumberofseminalpapersonthephilosophyoflanguage.Threeappearedin1891–2:41\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSON‘FunctionandConcept’,‘SenseandReference’,‘ConceptandObject’.Eachofthesepresentedoriginalphilosophicalideasofgreatimportancewithastonishingbrevityandclarity.Theywereseen,nodoubt,byFregehimselfasancillarytohisconcernswiththenatureofmathematics,butatthepresenttimetheyareregardedasfoundingclassicsofmodernsemantictheory.4Between1884and1893Fregeworkedonthetreatisethatshouldhavebeentheclimaxofhisintellectualcareer,theGrundgesetzederArithmetik,whichwastosetoutinacompleteandformalmannerthelogicistconstructionofarithmeticfromlogic.Thetaskwastoenunciateasetofaxiomsthatwouldberecognizablytruthsoflogic,topropoundasetofundoubtedlysoundrulesofinference,andthenfromthoseaxiomsbythoserulestoderive,onebyone,thestandardtruthsofarithmetic.Thederivationwastooccupythreevolumes,ofwhichonlytwowerecompleted,thefirstdealingwiththenaturalnumbers,andthesecondwithnegative,fractional,irrational,andcomplexnumbers.Frege’sambitiousprojectabortedbeforeitwascompleted.Betweenthepublicationofthefirstvolumein1893andthesecondin1903FregereceivedaletterfromanEnglishphilosopher,BertrandRussell,pointingoutthatthefifthoftheinitialsetofaxiomsrenderedthewholesysteminconsistent.Thisaxiomstated,ineffect,thatifeveryFisaG,andeveryGisanF,thentheclassofFsisidenticalwiththeclassofGs;andviceversa.Itwastheaxiomwhich,inFrege’swords,allowedthetransitionfromaconcepttoitsextension,thetransitionfromconceptstoclassesthatwasessentialifitwastobeestablishedthatnumberswerelogicalobjects.Theproblem,asRussellpointedout,wasthatthesystem,withthisaxiom,permitswithoutrestrictiontheformationofclassesofclasses,andclassesofclassesofclasses,andsoon.Classesmustthemselvesbeclassifi-able.Nowcanaclassbeamemberofitself?Mostclassesarenot(theclassofmenisnotaman)butsomeapparentlyare(e.g.theclassofclassesissurelyaclass).Itseems,therefore,thatwehavetwokindsofclasses:thosethataremembersofthemselvesandthosethatarenot.Buttheformationoftheclassofallclassesthatarenotmembersofthemselvesleadstoparadox:ifitisamemberofitself,thenitisnotamemberofitself,andifitisnota4Frege’scontributiontothephilosophyoflanguageisdetailedinCh.5.42\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONmemberofitself,thenitisamemberofitself.Asystemthatleadstosuchaparadoxcannotbelogicallysound.ThesecondvolumeofGrundgesetzewasalreadyinpresswhenRussell’sletterarrived.Utterlydowncast,Fregedescribedtheparadoxinanappen-dix,andattemptedtopatchthesystembyweakeningtheguiltyaxiom.Butthisrevisedsysteminitsturnprovedinconsistent.AfterretiringfromJenain1918Fregeseemstohavegivenuphisbeliefthatarithmeticcanbederivedfromlogic,andreturnedtotheKantianviewthatitis,likegeometry,syntheticapriori.Wenowknowthatthelogicistprogrammecanneverbecarriedout.Thepathfromtheaxiomsoflogictothetheoremsofarithmeticisbarredattwopoints.First,asRussellshowed,thenaivesettheorythatwaspartofFrege’slogicalbasiswasinconsistentinitself.Second,thenotionof‘axiomsofarithmetic’wasitselfcalledinquestionwhenitwaslatershown(bytheAustrianmathematicianKurtGo¨delin1931)thatitwasimpossibletogivearithmeticacompleteandconsistentaxiomatization.Nonetheless,Frege’sphilosophicallegacywasenormous.Heoftencom-paredthemathematiciantoageographerwhomapsnewcontinents.HisowncareerasathinkerresembledthatofChristopherColumbusasanexplorer.JustasColumbusfailedtofindapassagetoIndiabutmadeEuropeacquaintedwithawholenewcontinent,soFregefailedtoderivearithmeticfromlogic,butmadeinnovationsinlogicandadvancesinphilosophythatpermanentlychangedthewholemapofbothsubjects.LikeColumbus,Fregesuccumbedtodiscouragementanddepression;hewasnevertoknowthathewasthefounderofaninfluentialphilosophicalmovement.Buthedidnotgiveupallhopethathisworkhadvalue:leavinghispaperstohissonjustbeforehisdeathin1925hewrote,‘DonotdespisethepiecesIhavewritten.Evenifallisnotgold,thereisgoldinthem.’PsychologyandPragmatisminWilliamJamesWilliamJames(1842–1910)wassixyearsolderthanFrege,buthebeganhisphilosophicalcareerquitelateinlife.HewasborninNewYork,thesonofaSwedenborgiantheologianandtheelderbrotherofthecelebratednovelistHenryJames.HewaseducatedpartlyinAmericaandpartlyinEurope,whereheattendedschoolsinFranceandGermany.Forawhile43\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONhehesitatedbetweenpaintingandmedicineasacareer,butin1864heenrolledintheHarvardMedicalSchool.Aftertakinghisdegreehesufferedaperiodofillhealthanddepression,butafterarecovery(whichheattributedtoreadingtheworksoftheFrenchphilosopherCharlesRenou-vier)hewasappointedtotheHarvardfacultyin1873asaninstructorinanatomyandphysiology.Hisinterestsshiftedtowardsempiricalpsych-ology,andin1876heestablishedthefirstpsychologicallaboratoryinAmerica.AmonghispupilswasthenovelistGertrudeStein.Histwo-volumePrinciplesofPsychology,of1890,wasaracysurveyoftheresultsoftheinfantdiscipline.Thetaskofpsychology,asJamessawit,wastolinkconditionsofthebrainwiththevaryingphenomenaofthestreamofconsciousness.Thebookbecameastandardtextbook,butbythetimeitwaspublishedJameshadleftpsychologyandbecomeaprofessorofphilosophy—asubjectthathadfascinatedhimsincehisdiscussionswithPeirceandothersintheMetaphysicalClubof1872.Likehisfather,Jameswasdeeplyconcernedwithreligiousissues,andwasanxioustoreconcileascientificworld-viewwithabeliefinGod,freedom,andimmortality.Hisprofes-sionalcareerasaphilosophicalwriterwasinauguratedin1897withtheappearanceofTheWilltoBelieve,inwhichhediscussedsituationswherewehavetodecideonissuesintheabsenceofcompellingtheoreticalevidence.Insuchcases,heargued,thedutytobelievetruthshouldbegivenequalweightwiththedutytoavoiderror.Hesoonbuiltupaninternationalreputation,andin1901–2hegavetheGiffordlecturesinEdinburgh,whichwerelaterpublishedasVarietiesofReligiousExperience.Inthatworkhesethimselftoexamine‘thefeelings,actsandexperiencesofindividualmenintheirsolitude,sofarastheyapprehendthemselvestostandinrelationtowhatevertheymayconsiderthedivine.’Hesubjectedthephenomenaofmysticismandotherformsofreligioussentimenttoempiricalinvestigationinthehopeofestablishingtheirauthenticityandvalidity.ItwasthepublicationofPragmatismin1907thatestablishedJames’spositionasthedoyenofAmericanphilosophy.BoththetitleandthemainthemeoftheworkwerecreditedbyJamestoPeirce,andinhisformulationofhispragmaticprinciple,hisdebtisobvious.Toattainperfectclearnessinourthoughtsofanobject,weneedonlyconsiderwhatconceivableeffectsofapracticalkindtheobjectmayinvolve—whatsensations44\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONwearetoexpectfromit,andwhatreactionswemustprepare.Ourconceptionoftheseeffects,whetherimmediateorremote,isthenforusthewholeofourconceptionoftheobject,sofarasthatconceptionhaspositivesignificanceatall.(P47)However,whereasPeirce’spragmatismwasatheoryofmeaning,James’swasaatheoryoftruth,andwhereasPeirce’spragmatismwasinterpersonalandobjective,James’swasindividualistandsubjective.Forthisreason,PeircedisownedJames’stheoryandrenamedhisown‘pragmaticism’.AccordingtoJames’spragmatism,anideaistruesolongastobelieveitisprofitabletoourlives:‘Thetrueisthenameofwhateverprovesitselftobegoodinthewayofbelief’(P42).Heandhisfollowerssometimessummedthisupintheslogan,‘Whatistrueiswhatworks’.Criticsobjectedthatbeliefinafalsehoodmightmakepeoplehappierthanbeliefinatruth,whichmeantthattruthcouldnotbeidentifiedwithlong-termsatisfac-toriness.BothbelieversandunbelieverswereshockedbyJames’sstatement,‘ifthehypothesisofGodworkssatisfactorilyinthewidestsenseoftheword,itistrue’(P143).Jamesinsistedthathistheorydidnotinvolveanydenialofobjectivereality.Realityandtrutharedifferentfromeachother.Thingshavereality;itisideasandbeliefsthataretrue.‘Realitiesarenottrue,theyare;andbeliefsaretrueofthem’(T196).Itisnotbydiscoveringwhethertheconsequencesofabeliefaregoodthatwelearnwhetheritistrueornot;butitistheconsequencesthatassign‘theonlyintelligiblepracticalmeaningtothatdifferenceinourbeliefswhichourhabitofcallingthemtrueorfalsecomports’(T273).Itisoftensaidthatwhatmakesabelieftrueisitscorrespondencewithreality.Jamesiswillingtoacceptthis,butaskswhatintheconcretethenotionofcorrespondenceamountsto.Whenwespeakofanidea‘pointingto’reality,or‘fittingit’,or‘corresponding’,or‘agreeing’withit,whatwearereallytalkingaboutistheprocessesofvalidationorverificationthatleadusfromtheideatothereality.Suchmediatingevents,Jamessays,maketheideatrue.Inaseriesofessays(collectedinTheMeaningofTruth,1909)Jamesdefended,qualified,andrefinedhispragmatism.Butitremainedunclearwhetherinhissystemtheactualexistenceofarealityisanecessaryconditionofabeliefinitbeingsatisfactory(inwhichcaseheiscommi-ttedtocorrespondenceasanelementoftruth)orwhetherabeliefinan45\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONobjectmaybesatisfactorywithoutthatobjectactuallyexisting(inwhichcaseheisopentothechargeofpreferringwishfulthinkingtogenuineinquiry).InthesameyearashepublishedTheMeaningofTruthJamespublishedAPluralisticUniverse,inwhichheappliedpragmatisminsupportofareligiousworld-view.Hespokeofourawarenessofa‘widerselffromwhichsavingexperiencesflowin’andofa‘motherseaofconsciousness’.Hebelieved,however,thattheamountofsufferingintheworldpreventsusfrombelievinginaninfinite,absolutedivinity:thesuperhumancon-sciousnessislimitedeitherinpower,orinknowledge,orinboth.EvenGodcannotdetermineorpredictthefuture;whethertheworldwillbecomebetterorworsedependsonthechoicesofhumanbeingsincooperationwithhim.InhisoldageJames,agenialandaffablepersonalityandagreatcommunicator,wasreveredbymanyinsideandoutsidetheUnitedStates.Peirce,ontheotherhand,wasisolatedanddestitute,andin1907wasdiscoveredbyoneofJames’sstudentsnearlydeadfromstarvationinaCambridgelodginghouse.JamesorganizedafundwhichsuppliedPeirce’sbasicneedsuntilhisdeathfromcancerin1914.Jameshimselfdiedofheartdiseasein1910;onhisdeathbedinCambridgeheaskedhisbrotherHenrytoremaincloseforsixweekstoreceiveanymessageshecouldsendtohimfrombeyondthegrave.Nomessagesarerecorded.Jamesdiedbeforecompletinghismetaphysicalsystem,buthispragma-tistprogrammewascontinuedbyothersafterhisdeath.JohnDewey(1859–1952),inalongacademiccareeratAnnArbor,Chicago,andColum-biainNewYork,applieditmostparticularlyintheareaofAmericaneducation,buthealsowroteinfluentialbooksonmanysocialandpoliticaltopics.Hisconstantaimwastoexplorehowfarmethodsofinquirythathadbeensosuccessfulinphysicalscienceandintechnologycouldbeextendedintootherareasofhumanendeavour.InEnglandF.C.S.Schiller(1864–1937)developedaversionofpragma-tismthathecalled‘humanism’.SchillerwasagraduateofBalliolCollege,Oxford,andtaughtforawhileatCornellUniversityinupstateNewYork,wherehemetJames,beforereturningtoafellowshipatCorpusChristiCollege.HewasalonelyfigureatOxfordbecauseinthelastyearsofthenineteenthcentury,philosophydepartmentsinthemajoruniversitiesof46\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONtheUnitedKingdomweredominatedbyaBritishversionofHegelianidealism.BritishIdealismanditsCriticsAfterthedeathofJohnStuartMillareactionhadsetinagainstthetraditionofBritishempiricismofwhichhehadbeensuchadistinguishedexponent.In1874,ayearafterMill’sdeath,aBallioltutor,T.H.Green(1836–82),broughtoutaneditionofDavidHume’sTreatiseofHumanNaturewithasubstantialintroductionsubjectingthepresuppositionsofempiri-cismtodevastatingcriticism.InthesameyearthereappearedthefirstofalongseriesofEnglishtranslationsoftheworksofHegel,whichhadfirstbeenintroducedtoOxfordinthe1840sbyBenjaminJowett(1817–93),theMasterofGreen’scollege.TwoyearslaterF.H.BradleyofMertonpublishedEthicalStudies,afoundingclassicofBritishHegelianism.In1893BradleycompletedAppearanceandReality,thefullestandmostmagisterialstatementofBritishidealism.ShortlyafterwardsatCambridgethemethodsandsomeofthedoctrinesofHegel’sLogicwereexpoundedinaseriesoftreatisesbytheTrinityCollegephilosopherJ.M.E.McTaggart.Green’sidealism,likeJames’spragmatism,waspartlymotivatedbyreligiousconcerns.‘Thereisonespiritualandself-consciousbeingofwhichallthatisrealistheactivityandexpression,’hewroteinProlegomenatoEthics,publishedtheyearafterhisdeathin1882;‘weareallrelatedtothisspiritualbeing,notmerelyaspartsoftheworldwhichisitsexpression,butaspartakersinsomeinchoatemeasureoftheself-consciousnessthroughwhichitatonceconstitutesitselfanddistinguishesitselffromtheworld.’Thisparticipation,hemaintained,wasthesourceofmoralityandreligion.BradleyandMcTaggart,however,evacuatedidealismofanyremotelyChristiancontent,andthelatterwentsofarastodenythattherewasanyAbsoluteotherthanacommunityoffiniteselves.ItwascommongroundamongtheBritishidealists,however,thatrealitywasessentiallyspiritualinnature:theyrejectedthedualistideathatmindandmatterweretwoequalandindependentrealmsofbeing.ButBradley’s‘monism’hadanotherfundamentalaspect:theclaimthatrealityistobeconsideredasatotality.Truthbelongsnottoindividual,atomisticproposi-47\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONtions,butonlytojudgementsaboutbeingasawhole.InAppearanceandRealityBradleysoughttoshowthatifwetrytoconceivetheuniverseasacomplexofindependentsubstancesdistinctfromtheirrelationstoeachotherwefallintocontradiction.Everyitemintheuniverseisrelated—internallyrelated,byitsveryessence—toeveryotheritem.Theobjectsofeverydayexperience,thespaceandtimethattheyinhabit,andindeedtheverysubjectofexperience,theindividualself—allthesearemereappearances,helpfulforpracticalpurposes,butquitemisleadingastothetruenatureofreality.ThedominanceofidealismwasdecisivelycalledintoquestionattheturnofthecenturybytwoyoungCambridgephilosophers,G.E.Moore(1873–1958)andBertrandRussell(1872–1970).BothwerepupilsofMcTaggartandtooktheirfirststepsinphilosophyasHegelians.ButRussellfoundHegelhimselfmuchlessimpressivethanMcTaggart,andwasdisgustedbyhiswoollyattitudetomathematics.Moore,in‘TheNatureofJudgement’(1899),rejectedthefundamentalthesisthatrealityisacreationofthemind,andreplaceditwithaPlatonicrealism:conceptsareobjective,independentrealities,andtheworldconsistsofsuchconceptscombinedwitheachotherintotruepropositions.Afterthisattackonmetaphysicalidealism,Moorefouryearslaterattackedempiricistidealism.In‘TheRefutationofIdealism’herejectedtheclaimthatesseispercipi;toexistissomethingquitedifferentfrombeingperceived,andtheobjectsofourknowledgeareindependentofourknowledgeofthem.More-over,materialobjectsaresomethingwedirectlyperceive.Moore’srevoltagainstidealismhadagreatimpactonRussell.‘Itwasanimmenseexcitement’,helaterrecalled,‘afterhavingsupposedthesensibleworldunreal,tobeabletobelieveagainthattherereallyweresuchthingsastablesandchairs’(A135).Hereceivedagreatsenseofliberationfromthethoughtthat,paceLockeandhissuccessors,grassreallywasgreen.LikeMoore,hecombinedhisrenunciationofidealismwiththeaffirmationofaPlatonicfaithinuniversals:everyword,particularorgeneral,stoodforanobjectiveentity.Inparticular,inreactionagainstBradley,heattachedgreatimportancetotheindependentrealityofrelations.InabrilliantstudyofthephilosophyofLeibnizin1899hewentsofarastomaintainthattheelaborateandincrediblestructureofthemetaphysicsofmonadsarisesfromthesingleerrorofthinkingthatallsentencesmustbeofsubject–predicateform,insteadofrealizingthatrelationalsentencesareirreducibletothatpattern.48\nThehallofTrinityCollegeCambridge,hometoG.E.Moore,BertrandRussell,andLudwigWittgenstein\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONRussellonMathematics,Logic,andLanguageRelationswereamatterofparticularinteresttoRussellatthistimebecausethefocusofhisthoughtwasonthenatureofmathematics,inwhichrelationalstatementssuchas‘nisthesuccessorofm’playanimportantrole.IndependentlyofFrege,andinitiallywithoutanyknowledgeofhiswork,Russellhadundertakenalogicistprojectofderivingmathematicsfrompurelogic.HisendeavourwasindeedmoreambitiousthanFrege’ssincehehopedtoshowthatnotjustarithmetic,butgeometryandanalysisalso,werederivedfromgenerallogicalaxioms.Between1900and1903,influencedinpartbytheItalianmathematicianGiuseppePeano,heworkedouthisideasforincorporationintoasubstantialvolume,ThePrinciplesofMathematics.Itwasinthecourseofthisworkthatheencounteredtheparadoxthatbearshisname,theparadoxgeneratedbytheclassofallclassesthatarenotmembersofthemselves.Aswehaveseen,hecommu-nicatedthisdiscoverytoFrege,towhomhehadbeendirectedbyPeano.RussellintroducedFrege’sworktoanEnglishreadershipinanappendixtoThePrinciples.Inthelightoftheparadox,thetwogreatlogicistssawthattheirproject,ifitwastosucceed,wouldneedconsiderablemodification.Russell’sattempttoavoidtheparadoxtooktheformofaTheoryofTypes.Accordingtothistheory,itwaswrongtotreatclassesasrandomlyclassifiableobjects.Individualsandclassesbelongedtodifferentlogicaltypes,andwhatcouldbeassertedofelementsofonetypecouldnotbesignificantlyassertedofanother.‘Theclassofdogsisnotadog’wasnottrueorfalsebutmeaningless.Similarly,whatcansignificantlybesaidofclassescannotbesaidofclassesofclasses,andsoonthroughthehierarchyoflogicaltypes.Toavoidtheparadox,wemustobservethedifferenceoftypesbetweendifferentlevelsofthehierarchy.Butnowanotherdifficultyarises.RecallthatFregehad,ineffect,definedthenumbertwoastheclassofallpairs,anddefinedallthenaturalnumbersinasimilarmanner.Butapairisjustatwo-memberedclass,sothenumbertwo,onthisaccount,isaclassofclasses.Ifweputlimitationsontheformationofclassesofclasses,howcanwedefinetheseriesofnaturalnumbers?Russellretainedthedefinitionofzeroastheclasswhoseonlymemberisthenullclass,buthenowtreatedthenumberoneastheclassofallclassesequivalenttotheclasswhosemembersare(a)themembersofthenullclass,plus(b)anyobjectnotamemberofthatclass.50\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONThenumbertwowastreatedinturnastheclassofclassesequivalenttotheclasswhosemembersare(a)themembersoftheclassusedtodefineone,plus(b)anyobjectnotamemberofthatdefiningclass.Inthiswaythenumberscanbedefinedoneaftertheother,andeachnumberisaclassofclassesofindividuals.However,thenaturalnumberseriescanbecontinuedthusadinfinitumonlyifthenumberofobjectsintheuniverseisitselfinfinite.Forifthereareonlynindividualsthentherewillbenoclasseswithnþ1members,andsonocardinalnumbernþ1.Russellacceptedthisandthereforeaddedtohisaxiomsanaxiomofinfinity,i.e.thehypothesisthatthenumberofobjectsintheuniverseisnotfinite.Whetherornotthishypothesisistrue,itissurelynotatruthofpurelogic,andsotheneedtopostulateitappearstonullifythelogicistprojectofderivingarithmeticfromlogicalone.Russell’slaterphilosophyofmathematicswaspresentedtotheworldintworemarkableworks.Thefirst,moretechnical,presentationwaswrittenincollaborationwithhisformertutorA.N.Whiteheadandappearedinthreevolumesbetween1910and1913underthetitlePrincipiaMathematica.Thesecond,morepopularwork,IntroductiontoMathematicalPhilosophy,waswrittenwhilehewasservingaprisonsentenceforhisactivitiesasananti-warprotesterin1917.Bythistime,RussellhadachieveddistinctionoutsidethephilosophyofmathematicsinareasthatwerelatertobecomemajorpreoccupationsofBritishphilosophers.Hisearlywork,alongwiththatofMoore,isoftensaidtohaveinauguratedanewerainBritishphilosophy,theeraof‘analyticphilosophy’.Eventhoughtheimpetustotheanalyticstyleofthinkingcanbetracedback,asRussellhimselfwashappytoadmit,totheworkofFrege,itwasMoorewhofirstgavecurrency,inthetwentiethcentury,totheterm‘analysis’itselfasthemarkofaparticularwayofphilosophizing.‘Analysis’was,firstandforemost,ananti-idealistslogan:insteadofacceptingthenecessityofunderstandingawholebeforeonecouldunderstanditsparts,MooreandRussellinsistedthattherightroadtounderstandingwastoanalysewholesbytakingthemtopieces.Butwhatwasitthatwastobetakentopieces—thingsorsigns?Initially,bothMooreandRussellsawthemselvesasanalysingconcepts,notlanguage—conceptsthatwereobjectiverealitiesindependentofthemind.‘Wherethemindcandistinguishelements’,Russellwrotein1903,‘theremustbedifferent51\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONelementstodistinguish’(PM466).Analysiswouldrevealthecomplexityofconcepts,andexhibittheirconstituentelements.Theseconstituentsmightbethesubjectsoffurtheranalysis,ortheymightbesimpleandunanalys-able.InPrincipiaEthica(1903)Moorefamouslyclaimedthatgoodwassuchasimple,unanalysableproperty.Russell,atthetimeofThePrinciplesofMathematics,believedthatinordertosavetheobjectivityofconceptsandjudgementsitwasnecessarytoaccepttheexistenceofpropositionsthatsubsistedindependentlyoftheirexpressioninsentences.Notonlyconcepts,relations,andnumbershadbeing,hebelieved,butalsochimerasandtheHomericgods.Iftheyhadnobeing,itwouldbeimpossibletomakepropositionsaboutthem.‘Thusbeingisageneralattri-buteofeverything,andtomentionanythingistoshowthatitis’(PM449).ItwasRussell’sseminalpaperof1905,‘OnDenoting’,thatgaveanalysisalinguisticturn.Inthatpaperheshowedhowtomakesenseofsentencescontainingexpressionslike‘theroundsquare’and‘thepresentKingofFrance’withoutmaintainingthattheseexpressionsdenotedsomeentity,howevershadowy,intheworld.Thepaperwasforlongregardedasaparadigmofanalysis;butofcourseitcontainsnoanalysisofroundsquaresornon-existentkings.Instead,itshowshowtorewritesuchsentences,preservingtheirmeaning,butremovingtheapparentattributionofbeingtothenon-existent.AndRussell’smethodisexplicitlylinguistic:itrestsonmakingadistinctionbetweenthosesymbols(suchaspropernames)thatdenotesomethingandtheworld,andothersymbolswhichhecalled‘incompletesymbols’,ofwhichdefinitedescriptionssuchas‘thepresentKingofFrance’areoneinstance.Thesesymbolshavenomeaningontheirown—theydonotdenoteanything—butthesentencesinwhichtheyoccurdohaveameaning,thatistosaytheyexpressapropositionthatiseithertrueorfalse.5Logicalanalysis,then,aspractisedin‘OnDenoting’isatechniqueofsubstitutingalogicallyclearformofwordsforanotherformofwordswhichisinsomewaymisleading.ButinRussell’smindlogicalanalysiswasnotonlyalinguisticdevicefortheclassificationofsentences.Hecametobelievethatoncelogichadbeencastintoaperspicuousformitwouldrevealthestructureoftheworld.5Russell’stheoryofdefinitedescriptionsispresentedindetailinCh.5.52\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONLogiccontainsindividualvariablesandpropositionalfunctions:corre-spondingtothis,Russellbelieved,theworldcontainsparticularsanduniver-sals.Inlogiccomplexpropositionsarebuiltupastruth-functionsofsimplepropositions.Similarly,Russellcametobelieve,therewereintheworldindependentatomicfactscorrespondingtothesimplepropositions.Atomicfactsconsistedeitherinthepossessionbyaparticularofacharacteristic,orelseinarelationbetweentwoormoreparticulars.ThistheoryofRussell’sacquiredthename‘logicalatomism’.ThedevelopmentofthetheorycanbefollowedinthebooksthatRussellwroteintheyearsleadinguptotheFirstWorldWar:TheProblemsofPhilosophy(1912),alastinglypopularintroductiontothesubject,andthemoreprofessionalOurKnowledgeoftheExternalWorldof1914.ThemostvividpresentationwasinaseriesoflecturesinLondonin1918,‘ThePhilosophyofLogicalAtomism’,publishedmuchlaterinLogicandKnowledge(1956).Russellcametobelievethateverypropositionthatwecanunderstandmustbecomposedwhollyofitemswithwhichweareacquainted.‘Acquaintance’washiswordforimmediatepresentation:wewereacquainted,forinstance,withourownsense-data,whichwerehisequivalentsofHume’simpressionsorDescartes’sthoughts.Butdirectacquaintancewasalsopossiblewiththeuniversalsthatlaybehindthepredicatesofareformedlogicallanguage;somuchofRussell’searlyPlatonismremained.Acquaintance,however,wasnotpossiblewithobjectsdistantinspaceandtime:wecouldnotbeacquaintedwithQueenVictoriaorevenwithourownpastsense-data.Thethingsthatwerenotknownbyacquaintancewereknownbydescription;hencetheimportanceofthetheoryofdescriptionsinthedevelopmentoflogicalatomism.Russellnowappliedthetheoryofdescriptionsnotonlytoroundsquaresandfictionalobjectsbuttomanythingsthatcommonsensewouldregardasperfectlyreal,suchasJuliusCaesar,tables,andcabbages.These,henowmaintained,werelogicalconstructionsoutofsense-data.Inasentencesuchas‘CaesarcrossedtheRubicon’,utteredinEnglandnow,wehaveapropositioninwhichtherearenoindividualconstituentswithwhichweareacquainted.Inordertoexplainhowwecanunderstandthesentence,Russellanalysedthenames‘Caesar’and‘Rubicon’asdefinitedescriptionswhich,speltoutinfull,wouldnotincludeanytermsreferringtotheobjectsapparentlynamedinthesentence.53\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONOrdinarypropernames,therefore,weredisguiseddescriptions.Afullyanalysedsentencewouldcontainonlylogicallypropernames(wordsreferringtoparticularswithwhichweareacquainted)anduniversalterms(wordsindicatingcharactersandrelations).Russell’saccountofwhatcountedaslogicallypropernamesvariedfromtimetotime.Inthemostaustereversionsofthetheoryonlypuredemonstrativesappearedtocountasnames,sothatanatomicpropositionwouldbesomethinglike‘(this)red’or‘(this)beside(that)’.‘ThePhilosophyofLogicalAtomism’wasfarfrombeingRussell’slastwordonphilosophy.In1921hewroteTheAnalysisofMind,whichdefendedaversionofWilliamJames’sneutralmonism,thetheorythatbothmindandmatterconsistofaneutralmaterialwhichis,forallpracticalpurposes,nothingotherthanthedataofinternalandexternalsenses.Duringthe1930sand1940sRussellwrotemanypopularbooksonsocialandpoliticaltopics,andhebecamefamousfortheunorthodoxnatureofhismoralideasandnotoriousforthebreakdownofsuccessivemarriages.In1940,havingbeenappointedtoashort-termprofessorshipattheCityCollegeofNewYork,hewasdeclaredunfittoteachbytheStateSupremeCourt.In1945hepublishedabrilliantlywritten,ifofteninaccurate,HistoryofWesternPhilosophy,whichledtohisbeingawardedtheNobelPrizeforliterature.Russell’slastphilosophicalbookwasHumanKnowledge:ItsScopeandLimits,publishedin1948,inwhichheattemptedtoprovideanempiricistjustifi-cationofscientificmethod.Tohisdisappointment,thebookreceivedlittleattention.Indeed,thoughhebecameverywidelyknowninlaterlife,especiallyafterheinheritedanearldom,asacampaigneronsocialandpoliticaltopics,particularlyontheissueofnucleardisarmament,hisreputationamongprofessionalphilosophersneverrecoveredthelevelofrespectaccordedtohisworkspriorto1920.Logicalatomismitself,ashewasthefirsttoadmit,wasinlargepartduetotheideasofoneofhisformerpupils,LudwigWittgenstein,towhosehistorywenowturn.Wittgenstein’sTractatusWittgensteinwasborninViennain1889intoanAustrianfamilyofJewishdescent.Thefamilywaslargeandwealthy,thefatheraprominentsteelmillionairewhohadninechildrenbyhisCatholicwife,andhadallofthem54\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONbaptizedasCatholics.Thefamilywasalsohighlyartistic;JohannesBrahmswasafrequentguest,andLudwig’sbrotherPaulwasaconcertpianistwhoachievedinternationalfameinspiteoflosinganarminthe1914–18war.Ludwigwaseducatedathomeuntilhewasfourteen,afterwhichheattendedforthreeyearstheRealschuleatLinz.AmonghisschoolboycontemporarieswasAdolfHitler.AtschoolWittgenstein,partlyundertheinfluenceofSchopenhauer,ceasedtobeareligiousbeliever.HestudiedengineeringinBerlin,andlaterattheUniversityofManchester,wherehedesignedajet-reactionengineforaircraft.HereadRussell’sPrinciplesofMathematicsandthroughitbecameacquaintedwiththeworkofFrege,whomhevisitedatJenain1911.OnFrege’sadvicehewenttoCambridge,andspentfivetermsatTrinityCollege,studyingunderRussell,whoquicklyrecognizedandgenerouslyfosteredhisgenius.WittgensteinleftCambridgein1913andwenttoliveasasolitaryinahuthehadbuilthimselfinNorway.Thenotesandlettershewroteatthisperiodexhibitthegerminationoftheviewofphilosophyhewastoretainthroughouthislife.Philosophy,hewrote,wasnotadeductivediscipline;itcouldnotbeplacedonthesamefootingasthenaturalsciences.‘Philo-sophygivesnopicturesofrealityandcanneitherconfirmnorconfutescientificinvestigations’(NB93).Whenwarbrokeoutin1914WittgensteinenlistedasavolunteerintheAustrianartillery,andservedwithconspicuouscourageontheeasternandItalianfronts.HewascapturedbyItaliansoldiersinthesouthernTyrolinNovember1918andsenttoaprisoncampnearMonteCassino.Duringhismilitaryservicehehadwrittenphilosophicalthoughtsintohisdiary,andduringhisimprisonmentheturnedthemintotheonlyphilosophicalbookthathepublishedinhislifetime,TractatusLogico-Philosophicus.HesentthisbookfromtheprisoncamptoRussell,withwhomhewaslaterabletodiscussitinHolland.ItwaspublishedinGermanin1921andshortlyafterwardsinEnglandwithanEnglishtranslationbyC.K.OgdenandanintroductionbyRussell.TheTractatusisshort,beautiful,andcryptic.Itconsistsofaseriesofnumberedparagraphs,oftenverybrief.Thefirstis‘Theworldisallthatisthecase’andthelastis‘Whereofonecannotspeak,thereofonemustbesilent.’Thekeythemeofthebookisthepicturetheoryofmeaning.Language,wearetold,consistsofpropositionsthatpicturetheworld.55\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONPropositionsaretheperceptibleexpressionsofthoughts,andthoughtsarelogicalpicturesoffacts,andtheworldisthetotalityoffacts.AnEnglishsentence,suchas‘TheLondontrainleavesat11.15’or‘Bloodisthickerthanwater’,doesnotlooklikeapicture.ButWittgensteinbelievedthatpropositionsandthoughtswerepicturesinaliteralsense;iftheydidnotlooklikepictures,thatwasbecauselanguagethrowsaheavydisguisearoundthought.Buteveninordinarylanguage,heinsisted,thereisaperceptiblypictorialelement.Takethesentence‘Myforkistotheleftofmyknife’.Thissayssomethingquitedifferentfromanothersentencecontainingexactlythesamewords,namely‘Myknifeistotheleftofmyfork’.Whatmakesthefirstsentencehavethemeaningitdoesisthefactthatwithinitthewords‘myfork’occurtotheleftofthewords‘myknife’,astheydonotinthesecondsentence.Sohereaspatialrelationshipbetweenwordspicturesaspatialrelationshipbetweenthings(TLP4.102).Fewcasesareassimpleasthis.Ifthesentencewerespokeninsteadofwritten,itwouldbeatemporalrelationbetweensoundsratherthanaspatialrelationshiponthepagethatwouldrepresenttherelationshipbetweentheitemsonthetable.Butthisinturnisbecausethespokensequenceandthespatialarrayhaveacertainabstractstructureincom-mon.AccordingtotheTractatusanypicturemusthavesomethingincommonwithwhatitdepicts.ThissharedminimumWittgensteincallsitslogicalform.Mostpropositions,unliketheuntypicalexampleabove,donothavespatialformincommonwiththesituationtheydepict;butanypropositionmusthavelogicalformincommonwithwhatitdepicts.Torevealthepictorialstructureofthoughtbehindthedisguiseofordinarylanguage,Wittgensteinbelieved,wehavetoproceedbylogicalanalysisalongthelinessuggestedbyRussell.Inthisanalysis,hemain-tained,wewillintheendcometosymbolsthatdenoteentirelynon-complexobjects.Afullyanalysedpropositionwillconsistofacombinationofatomicpropositions,eachofwhichwillcontainnamesofsimpleobjects,namesrelatedtoeachotherinwaysthatwillpicture,trulyorfalsely,therelationsbetweentheobjectstheyrepresent.Suchananalysismaybebeyondhumanpowers,butthethoughtthepropositionexpressesalready,inthemind,hasthecomplexityofthefullyanalysedproposition.WeexpressthisthoughtinplainGermanorEnglishbytheunconsciousoperationofextremelycomplicatedrules.Theconnectionbetweenlan-guageandtheworldismadebythecorrelationbetweentheultimate56\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONelementsofthesethoughtsdeepinthemind,andtheatomicobjectsthatconstitutetheessenceoftheworld.Howthesecorrelationsaremadewearenottold:itisamysteriousprocesswhich,itseems,eachofusmustmanageforhimself,creatingasitwereaprivatelanguage.Havingexpoundedthepicturetheoryofthepropositionandtheworld-structurethatgoeswithit,Wittgensteinshowshowpropositionsofvariouskindsaretobeanalysedintocombinationsofatomicpictures.Scienceconsistsofpropositionswhosetruth-valueisdeterminedbythetruth-valuesoftheatomicpropositionsfromwhichtheyarebuiltup.Logicconsistsoftautologies,thatistosay,complexpropositionsthataretruenomatterwhatthetruth-valueoftheirconstituentpropositions.Notallpropositionsarecapableofanalysisintoatomicpropositions:therearesomethatrevealthemselvesaspseudo-propositions.Amongthesearepropositionsofethicsandtheology.Sotoo,itturnsout,aretheproposi-tionsofphilosophy,includingthoseoftheTractatusitself.TheTractatus,likeothermetaphysicaltreatises,triestodescribethelogicalformoftheworld;butthisissomethingthatcannotbedone.Apicturemustbeindependentofwhatitpictures;itmustbecapableofbeingafalsepicturenolessthanatrueone.Butsinceanypropositionmustcontainthelogicalformoftheworld,itcannotpictureit.Whatthemetaphysicianattemptstosaycannotbesaid,butonlyshown.TheparagraphsoftheTractatusarelikealadderthatmustbeclimbedandthenkickedawayifwearetoseetheworldaright.Philosophyisnotatheory,butanactivity,theactivityofclarifyingnon-philosophicalproposi-tions.Onceclarified,thepropositionswillmirrorthelogicalformoftheworldandthusshowwhatthephilosopherwishesto,butcannot,say.Neithersciencenorphilosophycanshowusthemeaningoflife.Butthisdoesnotmeanthataproblemisleftunsolved.Doubtcanexistonlywhereaquestionexists,aquestiononlywhenananswerexists,andanansweronlywheresomethingcanbesaid.Wefeelthatevenwhenallpossiblescientificquestionshavebeenanswered,theproblemsofliferemaincompletelyuntouched.Ofcoursetherearethennoquestionsleft,andthisitselfistheanswer.Thesolutionoftheproblemoflifeisseeninthevanishingofthisproblem.(TLP6.5–6.521)Evenifonecouldbelieveinimmortality,itwouldnotconfermeaningonlife;nothingissolvedbysurvivingforever.Aneternallifewouldbeas57\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONmuchariddleasthisone.‘Goddoesnotrevealhimselfintheworld,’Wittgensteinwrote;‘itisnothowthingsareintheworldthatismystical,butthatitexists’(TLP6.432,6.44).Philosophycandoverylittleforus.Whatitcando,however,hadbeendoneonceforallbytheTractatus—orsoWittgensteinbelieved.Withperfectconsistency,havingpublishedthebookhegaveupphilosophyandtookupanumberofmorehumdrumjobs.OnthedeathofKarlWittgensteinin1912Ludwiglikehissiblingshadinheritedalargefortune,butonreturningfromthewarherenouncedhisshare,andsupportedhimselfinsteadasagardenerinamonasteryoraschoolmasterinruralschools.In1926achargeofsadisticpunishmentwasbroughtagainsthimonbehalfofoneofhispupils,andthoughhewasacquittedthisbroughthisschoolteachingcareertoanend.LogicalPositivismWittgensteinreturnedtoVienna,andhadahandindesigningthearchi-tectureofanewhouseforhissister.HewasintroducedbyhertoMoritzSchlick,since1922ProfessorofthePhilosophyofScienceatViennaUni-versity,withwhomheresumedhisphilosophicalinquiries.ThetwometonMondayeveningsin1927and1928,andwerejoinedbyothers,includingRudolfCarnapandFriedrichWaismann.In1929WittgensteinwenttoCambridgetoworkonaphilosophicalmanuscript(publishedposthu-mouslyasPhilosophischeBemerkungen).Duringhisabsencethediscussiongroupdevelopedintoaself-consciousphilosophicalmovementandissuedamanifesto,theWissenschaftlicheWeltauffassungderWienerKreis,whichlaunchedacampaignagainstmetaphysicsasanoutdatedsystemthatmustgivewaytoascientificworld-view.Theanti-metaphysicalprogrammeexploitedsomeoftheideasofWittgenstein’sTractatus,andproclaimedthatnecessarytruthswerenecessaryonlybecausetheyweretautologies.Thisenabledthemtoacceptthatmathematicaltruthswerenecessarywhiledenyingthattheytoldusanythingabouttheworld.Knowledgeabouttheworldcouldbegainedonlybyexperience,andpropositionshadmeaningonlyiftheycouldbeeitherverifiedorfalsifiedbyexperience.Thethesisthatthemeaningofapropositionwasitsmodeofitsverification,theverificationprinciple,was58\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONthegreatweaponintheattackonmetaphysics.IftwometaphysiciansdisputedoverthenatureoftheAbsolute,orthepurposeoftheuniverse,theycouldbesilencedbythequestion,‘Whatpossibleexperiencewouldsettletheissuebetweenyou?’Disputesquicklybrokeoutaboutthestatusandformulationoftheverificationprinciple.Wasititselfatautology?Wasitverifiablebyexperience?Neitheranswerseemedsatisfactory.Moreover,generallawsofscience,nolessthanmetaphysicaldogmas,seemedincapableofconclusiveverification.Still,theywerecapableoffalsification,andthatwouldbesufficienttogivethemsignificance.Shallwethenreplacetheverificationprinciplewithafalsificationprinciple?Butifwedo,itishardtoseehowassertionsofexistencearesignificant,sinceonlyanexhaustivetouroftheuniversecouldconclusivelyfalsifythem.Itseemedprudenttoreformulatethecriterionofsignificanceinaweakerformthatlaiddownthatapropositionwasmeaningfulonlyifthereweresomeobservationsthatwouldberelevanttoitstruthorfalsity.Witt-gensteingaveonlyqualifiedassenttotheverificationprinciple,butatthistimehefrequentlydefendeditsapriorianaloguethatthesenseofamathe-maticalpropositionisthemethodofitsproof.Thetruetaskofphilosophy,thepositiviststhought,wasnotsomuchtolaydownuniversalphilosophicalpropositionsastoclarifynon-philosophicalstatements,andinthistheywereatonewithWittgenstein.Theirchosenmethodofsuchclarificationwastoshowhowempiricalstatementswerebuiltuptruth-functionallyfromelementary,or‘protocol’,statementsthatweredirectrecordsofexperience.Thewordsoccurringinprotocolstatementsderivedtheirmeaningfromostensivedefinition—thatistosay,fromagesturethatwouldpointtothefeatureofexperienceforwhichthewordstood.Thisprogrammecameupagainstamassiveobstacle.Theexperiencesrecordedbyprotocolsappeartobeprivatetoeachindividual.Ifmeaningdependsonverification,andeachofuscarriesoutverificationbyaprocesstowhichnooneelsehasaccess,howcananyoneeverunderstandanyoneelse’smeaning?Schlicktriedtoanswerthisbyadistinctionbetweenformandcontent.ThecontentofmyexperienceiswhatIenjoyorlivethroughwhen,forexample,Iseesomethingredorseesomethinggreen.Thisisprivateandincommunicable.Buttheform,orstructure,ofexperiencemaybecommontomany.WhenIseeatreeorasunsetIcannotknowwhetherotherpeoplehavethesameexperiences—perhaps,whenthey59\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONlookatatreetheyseewhatIseewhenIlookatasunset.Butaslongasweallagreetocallatreegreenandasunsetred,weareabletocommunicatewitheachotherandconstructthelanguageofscience.Wittgensteinwasdissatisfiedwiththissolution,andstrovetogiveanaccountofmeaningthatwouldnotpresentathreatofsolipsism.HedistancedhimselffromtheViennaCircleandreturnedpermanentlytoCambridge.HavingsubmittedtheTractatusasaPh.D.dissertationhebecameaFellowofTrinityCollege.TheCirclecontinueditsanti-metaphysicalprogramme,notablyinajournal,Erkenntnis,editedbySchlickinconjunc-tionwithHansReichenbachofBerlin.ItsideasweregivenwidecurrencyinBritainbythepublicationin1936ofA.J.Ayer’sLanguage,TruthandLogic.Laterinthesameyear,however,Schlickwasshotdeadbyadisgruntledstudent;andby1939theCircleceasedtoexist,withsomeofitsmostprominentmembersforcedintoexile.TheCircle’smostdistinguishedlegacytoposteritywasitspublication,in1935,ofTheLogicofScientificDiscoverybyKarlPopper,whowasneverafullypaid-upmemberofthegroup.Wittgenstein’sLaterPhilosophyInthe1930sWittgensteinbecamethemostinfluentialteacherofphiloso-phyinBritain.Duringthisperiodheturnedepistemologyandphilosophyofmindupsidedown.Previousphilosophers,fromDescartestoSchlick,hadstriventoshowhowknowledgeoftheexternalpublicworld—whetherscientificorcommonsensical—couldbebuiltupfromtheulti-mate,immediate,privatedataofintuitionorexperience.Wittgenstein,intheseyears,showedthatprivateexperience,farfrombeingthebedrockonwhichknowledgeandbeliefisfounded,wassomethingthatitselfpresup-posedasharedpublicworld.Eventhewordsthatweusetoframeourmostsecretandinwardthoughtsderivetheonlysensetheyhavefromtheiruseinourcommonexternaldiscourse.Theproblemofphilosophyisnottoconstructthepublicfromtheprivate,buttodojusticetotheprivateinthecontextofthesocial.AfterhisreturntophilosophyWittgensteinabandonedmanyofthethesesoftheTractatus.Heceasedtobelieveinlogicalatoms,andceasedtolookforalogicallyarticulatelanguagecloakedincommonspeech.Adefiningdoctrineoflogicalatomismhadbeenthateveryelementarypropositionis60\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONA.J.Ayer,whopopularisedLogicalPositivisminBritaininthe1930sindependentofeveryotherelementaryproposition.Thiswasclearlynottrueofthepositivists’protocolstatements:thetruth-valueof‘Thisisaredpatch’isnotindependentofthetruth-valueof‘Thisisabluepatch’.ReflectiononthisledWittgensteintoquestionthedistinctionbetweenelementaryandnon-elementarypropositionsandtogiveuptheideathattheultimateelementsoflanguagewerenamesdesignatingsimpleobjects.IntheTractatus,Wittgensteincametobelieve,hehadgrosslyoversimplifiedtherelationbetweenlanguageandtheworld.Theconnectionbetweenthetwowastoconsistintwofeaturesonly:thelinkingofnamestoobjects,andthematchormismatchofpropositionstofacts.This,henowthought,wasagreatmistake.Wordslooklikeeachother,inthesamewayasaclutchlooksverylikeafoot-brake;butwordsdifferfromeachotherinfunctionasmuchasthemechanismsoperatedbythetwopedals.Wittgen-steinnowemphasizedthatlanguagewasinterwovenwiththeworldinmanydifferentways:andtorefertothesetie-upshecoinedtheexpression‘language-game’.61\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONAsexamplesoflanguage-gamesWittgensteinlistsobeyingandgivingorders,describingtheappearanceofobjects,expressingsensations,givingmeas-urements,constructinganobjectfromadescription,reportinganevent,speculatingaboutthefuture,makingupstories,actingplays,guessingriddles,tellingjokes,asking,cursing,greeting,andpraying.Eachoftheselanguage-games,andmanyothers,needtobeexaminedifwearetounderstandlanguage.Wecansaythatthemeaningofawordisitsuseinalanguage-game—butthisisnotageneraltheoryofmeaning,itissimplyareminderthatifwewishtogiveanaccountofthemeaningofawordwemustlookforthepartitplaysinourlife.Theuseoftheword‘game’isnotmeanttosuggestthatlanguageissomethingtrivial;thewordwaschosenbecausegamesexhibitthesamekindofvarietyaslinguisticactivitiesdo.Thereisnocommonfeaturethatmarksallgamesasgames,andlikewisethereisnoonefeaturethatisessentialtolanguage—thereareonlyfamilylikenessesbetweenthecountlesslanguage-games.Wittgensteinneverabandonedhisearlyviewthatphilosophyisanactivity,notatheory.Philosophydoesnotdiscoveranynewtruths,andphilosophicalproblemsaresolvednotbytheacquisitionofnewinforma-tion,butbytherearrangementofwhatwealreadyknow.Thefunctionofphilosophy,Wittgensteinoncesaid,istountietheknotsinourthinking.Thismeansthatthephilosopher’smovementswillbecomplicated,buthisresultwillbeassimpleasaplainpieceofstring.Weneedphilosophyifwearetoavoidbeingentrappedbyourlanguage.Embodiedinthesurfacegrammarofourlanguagethereisaphilosophythatbewitchesus,bydisguisingfromusthevarietyofwaysinwhichlanguagefunctionsasasocial,interpersonalactivity.Philosophicalmisun-derstandingwillnotharmusifwerestrictourselvestoeverydaytasks,usingwordswithinthelanguage-gamesthataretheirprimitivehomes.Butifwestartuponabstractstudies—ofmathematics,say,orofpsychology,oroftheology—thenourthinkingwillbehamperedanddistortedunlesswecanfreeourselvesofphilosophicalconfusion.Intellectualinquirywillbecorruptedbymythicalnotionsaboutthenatureofnumbers,orofthemind,orofthesoul.Likethepositivists,Wittgensteinwashostiletometaphysics.Butheattackedmetaphysicsnotwithabluntinstrumentliketheverificationprinciple,butbythecarefuldrawingofdistinctionsthatenablehimtodisentanglethemixtureoftruismandnonsensewithinmetaphysical62\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONsystems.‘Whenphilosophersuseaword—‘‘knowledge’’,‘‘being’’,‘‘object’’,‘‘I’’,‘‘proposition’’,‘‘name’’—andtrytograsptheessenceofthething,onemustalwaysaskoneself:isthewordeveractuallyusedinthiswayinthelanguagewhichisitsoriginalhome?Whatwedoistobringwordsbackfromtheirmetaphysicaltotheireverydayuse’(PII,116).6WhileteachingatCambridgebetweenthewars,Wittgensteinpublishednothing.Hewrotecopiously,fillingnotebooks,draftingandredraftingmanuscripts,andcirculatingsubstantialhandoutsamonghispupils,whoalsotookandpreserveddetailednotesofhislectures.Butnoneofthismaterialwaspublisheduntilafterhisdeath.Hisideascirculated,ofteningarbledform,largelybywordofmouth.WhenAustriabecamepartofNaziGermanybytheAnschlussof1938,WittgensteinbecameaBritishcitizen.Duringthewarheworkedasaparamedic,andin1947heresignedhisCambridgechair,beingsucceededbyhisFinnishpupilGeorgHenrikvonWright.Hecontinuedtowritephilosophyandtocommunicatephilosophicalthoughtstoclosefriendsanddisciples.AfteraperiodofsolitarylifeinIreland,hestayedinthehousesofvariousfriendsinOxfordandCambridgeuntilhisdeathin1951attheageofsixty-two.AnalyticPhilosophyafterWittgensteinIn1949GilbertRyle,ProfessorofMetaphysicsatOxford,publishedabookcalledTheConceptofMind.TheideaspresentedinthatbookboreastrongresemblancetoWittgenstein’s.Rylewasstronglyanti-Cartesian,andindeedthefirstchapterofthebookwasentitled‘Descartes’Myth’.Ryleemphasizedadistinctionbetween‘knowinghow’and‘knowingthat’,whichmayhaveowedsomethingtoHeidegger.HisdiscussionofthewillandtheemotionsannihilatedthenotionofinternalimpressionswhichmanyphilosophershadinheritedfromtheBritishempiricists.Inachapteron‘DispositionsandOccurrences’hebroughttotheattentionofmodernphilosopherstheimportanceoftheAristoteliandistinctionsbe-tweendifferentformsofactualityandpotentiality.Hisdiscussionofsensation,imagination,andintellectleanedtooheavilyinthedirection6Wittgenstein’sattitudetometaphysicsistreatedatlengthinCh.7.63\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONofbehaviourismtowingeneralacceptance.Nonetheless,thebookremainedaclassicofanalyticphilosophyofmind.However,whenWittgenstein’sPhilosophicalInvestigationsappearedposthu-mouslyin1953itwaspossibletoseeideasthatRylehaddisplayedvividlybutcrudelynowpresentedwithfargreatersubtletyandprofundity.Itwas,andremains,amatterofcontroversyhowfarRyle,inthedevelopmentofhisideas,haddrawnonconversationswithWittgensteinandhearsayaccountsofhisCambridgelectures,andhowfarhehadreachedsimilarconclusionsbyindependentreflection.Wittgensteinleftthecopyrightofhisliteraryremainstothreeofhisformerpupils:GeorgHenrikvonWright,ElizabethAnscombe,andRushRhees.ThethreephilosopherscorrespondedtodifferentfacetsofWittgen-stein’sownpersonalityandwork.VonWright,whoheldWittgenstein’sCambridgechairfrom1948to1951andthenreturnedtoacareerinhisnativeFinland,resembledWittgensteinthelogicianoftheTractatus;thebooksthatfirstmadehisreputationwereoninduction,probability,andmodallogic.Anscombe,anOxfordtutorwhoinherturnheldtheCambridgechairtowardstheendofthecentury,carriedforwardtheworkofthelaterWittgensteinonphilosophyofmind,andwithherbookIntentioninauguratedextensivediscussionofpracticalreasoningandthetheoryofaction.OfthethreeRheeswasthemostsympathetictothemysticalandfideisticsideofWittgenstein’stemperament,andinspiredinWalesacharacteristicschoolofphilosophyofreligion.DuringthelaterdecadesofthetwentiethcenturytheliteraryexecutorspresidedoverthepublicationofWittgenstein’sextensiveNachlass.Manyvolumesappeared,ofwhichthemostsignificantwerePhilosophicalGrammar(1974)andPhilosophicalRemarks(1975)fromthepre-warmanuscripts,andRemarksontheFoundationsofMathematics(1978),RemarksonthePhilosophyofPsychology(1980),plusOnCertainty(1969)fromlaternotebooksupuntilthetimeofWittgenstein’sdeath.TheentireNachlasswaspublishedbyOxfordUniversityPressin1998,intranscriptionandfacsimile,inanelectronicformpreparedbytheUniversityofBergen.AfterWittgenstein’sdeathmanypeopleregardedW.V.O.Quine(1908–2000)asthedoyenofAnglophonephilosophy.Havingearlyestablishedareputationasaformallogician,QuinespenttimewiththeViennaCircle,andinPragueandWarsaw.AfterhisreturntotheUnitedStatesin1936hejoinedthefacultyatHarvard,whereheremainedfortherestofhis64\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONprofessionallifewiththeexceptionofyearsofwarserviceinthenavy.HismostimportantbookswereFromaLogicalPointofView(1953),whichcon-tainedtwofamousessays,‘OnWhatthereIs’and‘TwoDogmasofEmpiri-cism’,andWordandObject(1960),whichwasamagisterialexpositionofhissystem,latersupplementedbyanumberoflessinfluentialstudies.Quine’saiminphilosophywastoprovideaframeworkforanaturalisticexplanationoftheworldinthetermsofscienceandespeciallyphysicalscience.Heofferedtodosobyananalysisoflanguagethatisbothempiricistandbehaviourist.Allthetheoriesbywhichweexplaintheworld(whetherinformalorscientific)arebasedontheinputtooursense-receptors.Allthetermsandsentencesoccurringinthetheoriesaretobedefinedintermsofthebehaviourofthespeakersandhearerswhousethem.Thebasicformofthemeaningofanutteranceisstimulusmeaning:theclassofallstimulationsthatwouldpromptalanguage-usertoassenttotheutterance.Inspiteofhispursuitofaradicallyempiricistprogramme,Quinemadehisfirstmajorimpactonphilosophywith‘TwoDogmasofEmpiricism’(writtenin1951).Hestatedinthefollowingtermsthetwotargetsofhisattack:Oneisabeliefinsomefundamentalcleavagebetweentruthswhichareanalytic,orgroundedinmeaningsindependentlyofmattersoffact,andtruthswhicharesynthetic,orgroundedinfact.Theotherdogmaisreductionism:thebeliefthateachmeaningfulstatementisequivalenttosomelogicalconstructupontermswhichrefertoimmediateexperience.(FLPV20)Quinedidnotdenythattherearelogicallytruestatements,statementsthatremaintrueunderanyinterpretationoftheirnon-logicalterms—e.g.‘Nounmarriedmanismarried’.Butwecannotmovefromsuchalogicallytruestatementtotheallegedlyanalyticstatement‘Nobachelorismarried’becausethatdependsontaking‘unmarriedman’and‘bachelor’assynonymous.Butwhatissynonymy?Shallwesaythattwoexpressionsaresynonymousifonecanbesubstitutedfortheotherinasentencewithoutaffectingitstruth-value?But‘creaturewithaheart’and‘creaturewithakidney’areinterchangeableinthatmanner,butnoonesupposesthat‘Allcreatureswhohaveheartshavekidneys’isanalytic.Norcanweappealtoanynotionofnecessityinordertodefineanalyticity;theexplanationmustgotheotherwayround.65\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONShallwetry,instead,todefinewhatitisforasentencetobesynthetic,sayingforinstancethatasentenceissyntheticifandonlyifitcanbeverifiedorfalsifiedbyexperience?Quinearguesthatthismoverestsonafalseconceptionofverification:itisnotsinglesentences,butwholesystems,thatareverifiedorfalsified.‘Ourstatementsabouttheexternalworldfacethetribunalofsenseexperiencenotindividually,butonlyasacorporatebody’(FLPV140).Thetotalityofourso-calledknowledgeorbeliefs,fromthemostcasualmattersofgeographyandhistorytotheprofoundestlawsofatomicphysicsorevenofpuremathematicsandlogic,isaman-madefabricwhichimpingesonexperienceonlyattheedges.Or,tochangethefigure,totalscienceislikeafieldofforcewhoseboundaryconditionsareexperience.Aconflictwithexperienceattheperipheryoccasionsreadjustmentsintheinteriorofthefield.Truthvalueshavetoberedistributedoversomeofourstatements.Reevaluationofsomestatementsentailsreevaluationofothers,becauseoftheirlogicalinterconnections—thelogicallawsbeinginturnsimplycertainfurtherstatementsofthesystem,certainfurtherelementsinthefield.(FLPV140)Itfollowsfromthisthatitisfollytosingleoutaclassofanalyticstatements,whichremaintruewhateverhappens.Anystatementcanbeheldtruecomewhatmay,ifwemakedrasticadjustmentselsewhereinthesystem.Ontheotherhandnostatement—notevenalawoflogic—istotallyimmunetorevision.Scienceasawholedoesdependbothonlanguageandonexperience—butthisdualitycannotbetracedinindivi-dualsentences.Ifnosensecanbegiventothenotionsofsynonymyandanalyticity,thenthewholenotionofmeaningissuspect,becausetherecanbenocriteriaofidentityformeaning.Certainly,Quineinsisted,therearenosuchthingsasmeaningsthathavetobeinterpretedbyappealtointentionalconceptssuchasbelieforunderstanding.Meaningmustbeexplainedpurelyinextensionalistterms,bymappingsensorystimuliontoverbalbehaviour.Quineimaginesafieldlinguistendeavouringtotranslatefromawhollyalienlanguage,usingashisonlydata‘theforcesthatheseesimpingingonthenative’ssurfacesandtheobservablebehaviour,vocalandotherwise,ofthenative’(WO28).TheupshotofQuine’sthoughtexperimentistoidentifythreelevelsofindeterminacy.First,thereisindeterminacyofindividualreference.Thelinguistmayobservethatthenativesusethesound‘Gavagai’onlyinthe66\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONpresenceofrabbits.But—evenassumingthatthisisanobservationstate-ment—itmayequallywellrefertorabbit,rabbitstage,orrabbitpart.Second,thereisindeterminacyattheleveloftheentirelanguage:thedatamaysupportequallywelltwodifferent,incompatibletranslationmanuals.Thisindeterminacyisaparticularexampleofamoregeneralphenom-enon,namelythattheories,andnotonlytheoriesoftranslation,areunderdeterminedbysensoryinputs.Morethanonetotalscientificsystem,therefore,maybecompatiblewithallthedataeveravailable.Wemustindeedgiveuptheideathatthereisanyfixedfurnitureoftheworld.Whatexistsdependsuponwhattheoryweadopt.Inhisearlyessay‘OnWhatThereIs’,Quinefamouslysaid,‘Tobeistobethevalueofaboundvariable.’WhenhesaidthishewasfollowinginthefootstepsofFregeandRussell,whoinsistedthatinascientifictheorynonamesshouldbeallowedthatlackedadefinitereference.WhenalldubiousnameshavebeeneliminatedwiththeaidofRussell’stheoryofdescriptionweareleftwithsentencesoftheform‘Thereisanxsuchthatxis...’followedbyasetofpredicatessettingoutthepropertiesbywhichtheputativeindividualistobeidentified.Whatexists,accordingtothetheory,willbetheentitiesoverwhichthequantifiersrange.Butbecausedifferenttheoriesmaybeequallysupported,somaydifferentontologies.Whatcanbesaidtoexistisalwaysrelativetoatheory.WittgensteinandQuineareoftenregarded,especiallyincontinentalEurope,asthetwoleadingexponentsofanalyticalphilosophy.Infact,theirphilosophiesareverydifferentfromeachother.7Inparticularthetwomendisagreedaboutthenatureofphilosophy.Becauseofhisdisbeliefintheanalytic–syntheticdistinctionQuinesawnosharpboundarybetweenphilosophyandempiricalscience.Wittgenstein,throughouthislife,con-tinuedtobelievewhathewroteintheTractatus(4.111),‘Philosophyisnotoneofthenaturalsciences.Theword‘‘philosophy’’mustmeansomethingwhichstandsaboveorbelow,butnotbesidethenaturalsciences.’Scien-tism,i.e.theattempttoseephilosophyasascience,washisbeˆtenoire.IntheBlueBookhewrote,‘Philosophersconstantlyseethemethodsofsciencebeforetheireyes,andareirresistiblytemptedtoanswerquestionsinthe7ThedifferenceshavebeenluminouslydetailedbyP.M.S.Hacker,Wittgenstein’sPlaceinTwentiethCenturyAnalyticPhilosophy(Oxford:Blackwell,1996),183–227.67\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONwaysciencedoes.Thistendencyistherealsourceofmetaphysics,andleadsthephilosopherintocompletedarkness’(BB18).IntheUnitedStates,however,thescientismintroducedbyQuinehadcometostay.OneofitsmosteloquentexponentswasQuine’sHarvardpupilDonaldDavidson(1917–2003),whotaughtatmanyuniversitiesintheUnitedStates,ending,forthelasttwenty-twoyearsofhislife,atBerkeley.Davidson’schosenmethodofpublicationwastheshortpaper,butmanyofhisessayshavebeencollectedintovolumes,notablyEssaysonActionsandEvents(1980)andInquiriesintoTruthandInterpretation(1984).Inthephilosophyofmindandaction,Davidson’sscientismtooktheformofadenialthattherewasadividebetweenphilosophyandpsychology;inthephilosophyoflanguageittooktheformofanempiricalandextensionaltheoryofmeaning.Davidson’s1967paper‘TruthandMeaning’beginsasfollows:Itisconcededbymostphilosophersoflanguage,andrecentlybysomelinguists,thatasatisfactorytheoryofmeaningmustgiveanaccountofhowthemeaningsofsentencesdependuponthemeaningsofwords.Unlesssuchanaccountcouldbesuppliedforaparticularlanguage,itisargued,therewouldbenoexplainingthefactthat,onmasteringafinitevocabulary,andafinitelystatedsetofrules,wearepreparedtoproduceandtounderstandanyofapotentialinfinitudeofsentences.(ITI17)Davidson’stheoryofmeaningisbuiltuponatheoryoftruth.Atruth-theoryforalanguageLsetsoutthetruth-conditionsforallthesentencesofL.Thisistobedone,notbytheimpossiblemethodoflistingeverysentence,butbyshowinghowthecomponentpartsofsentencescontri-butetothetruth-conditionsofsentencesinwhichtheyoccur.Suchatheorywillcontainafinitelistoftermsandafinitesetofsyntacticalrulesbutitwillentailasderivedthesesthepotentiallyinfinitesetoftruth-sentencesoftheform:‘‘‘S’’istrueinLifandonlyifp’.LikeQuine,Davidsonillustrateshistheorybyconsideringacaseinwhichweencounteracommunitywithatotallyalienlanguage.Inordertointerpretit,wehavetobuildupatruth-theoryfortheirlanguagebyseeingwhatsentencestheyassenttoinwhatcircumstances;butweavoidthethreatofindeterminacyandscepticismbyassumingthatthenativeshavetrueandreasonablebeliefsanddrawconclusionsandmakedecisionsinarationalway.Thisis‘theprincipleofcharity’.68\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONTheactualbehaviourofpeopleisdeterminedbytheirreasons,thatistosaytheirdesiresandbeliefs,whichDavidsonconstruesasmentalevents.Therelationbetweenthesementaleventsandtheactionsthey‘rationalize’isacausalone:tosaythatanactionisintentionalispreciselytosayitwascausedbytheappropriatebeliefsandwants.ButforDavidsonthecausationisoblique:wecannotformpsychologicallawsconnectingagents’beliefsanddesireswiththeactstheycause.Instead,Davidsonargues,everyindividualmentaleventisalsoanindividualphysicalevent,andthiseventisrelatedbyphysicallawstotheindividualphysicaleventsthatareidenticalwiththeactions.Nopsychophysiologicallawscanbestated,however,relatingphysiologicaleventsofcertainkindswithpsychologicaleventsofcertainkinds.Davidson’spositionismaterialist,inthatthereareneveranyeventsthatarenotphysicalevents.Butheendeavourstotakethestingoutofthismaterialismbyinsistingonwhathecalls‘theanomalousnessofthemental’.Anymentaleventisidenticalwithaphysicalevent,butdifferentdescriptionsapplytotheeventquamentalandquaphysical.Asamentaleventitissubjectnottocausallawsbuttointerpretation,becauseitsidentityasamentaleventdependsuponitspositioninanetworkofothermentalevents.Asamentalevent,butnotasaphysicalevent,itissubjecttonormativeevaluationasrationalorirrational.Thismakestheexactnatureofmental–physicalcausation,asDavidsonadmits,deeplymysterious.InEnglandphilosopherscontinuedtobelievethattherewasagulf,andnotjustafuzzyborder,betweenscienceandphilosophy.Theymain-tained,likeRyleandWittgenstein,thatthegoalofphilosophywasnotinformationbutunderstanding.PeterStrawson(1919–2006)withhistutorPaulGrice,inapaperentitled‘InDefenceofaDogma’,rebuttedQuine’sattackontheanalytic–syntheticdistinction.Inhisownphilosophizing,Strawsonwasanythingbutdogmatic.AtatimewhenOxfordphilosophywasoverconfidentofitsownvalue,andunwillingtolearnfromphilo-sophersdistantinspaceandtime,Strawsonremindedhiscolleaguesofthevalueofotherstylesofphilosophybywritingabout,andtosomeextentmodellinghisworkon,Kant’sCritiqueofPureReason.Atatimewhen‘metaphysics’wasregardedbymanyasadirtyword,Strawsongavethesubtitle‘AnEssayinDescriptiveMetaphysics’tohismostimportantwork,Individuals(1959).69\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONDescriptivemetaphysicsaimstodescribetheactualstructureofourthoughtabouttheworld,withnopretensiontoimprovethatstructure(suchpretensionisthemarkofrevisionarymetaphysics).InIndividualsStrawsonsoughttodrawoutthefundamentalconditionsforalanguageinwhichitispossibletorefertoobjectsandreidentifythem,andtomakepredicationsaboutthem.Hesawhistaskasoneofconceptualanalysis,butoneofawideandgeneralscope.‘Thestructurethemetaphysicianseeks’,Strawsonwrote,‘doesnotreadilydisplayitselfonthesurfaceoflanguage,butliessubmerged’(I10).Strawsonsoughttoestablishthatinourconceptualschemematerialbodiesandpersonsoccupyaspecialposition:particularsofthesetwokindsarethebasicparticulars.Thetwospeechactsofreferringanddescribing,correspondingtothesubject–predicatestructureoflanguage,areonlypossibleifwecanidentifyandreidentifymaterialobjects,andthisrequiresaunifiedspatio-temporalframework.(Inaworldofpuresounds,inwhichthereisonlypitchandtemporalsequence,reidentificationishardtocomeby.)Astructureofobjectslocatedinspaceandtimeandpossessingpropertiesispriorto,andpresupposedby,anylanguagethatmightsimplyrecordthedistributionoffeaturesinvariouslocations.Persons,nolessthanmaterialbodies,areforStrawsonafundamentallogicalcategory.ApersonmustnotbeconceivedinthetermsofCartesiandualism.IfmindsareCartesianegostowhichonlyprivateexperiencescanbeascribed,thentheproblemofhowoneascribesstatesofconsciousnesstoothersbecomesinsoluble.‘Itisanecessaryconditionofone’sascribingstatesofconsciousness,experiences,tooneself,inthewaythatonedoes,thatoneshouldalsoascribethem,orbepreparedtoascribethem,tootherswhoarenotoneself’(I99).Onecanascribesuchstatestoothersonlyifonecanidentifyotherobjectsofexperience.Andonecannotidentifyothersifonecanidentifythemonlyassubjectsofexperience,possessorsofstatesofconsciousness.Hence,whatisprimitiveistheconceptnotofamind,butofaperson:WhatImeanbytheconceptofapersonistheconceptofatypeofentitysuchthatbothpredicatesascribingstatesofconsciousnessandpredicatesascribingcorporealcharacteristics,aphysicalsituationetc.,areequallyapplicabletoasingleindividualofthatsingletype...Theconceptofapersonislogicallypriortothatofanindividualconsciousness.Theconceptofapersonisnottobeanalysedasthatofananimatedbodyorofanembodiedanima.(I102–3)70\nPEIRCETOSTRAWSONNonetheless,Strawsonbelieved,itwasnotimpossibletoconceiveofone’sownindividualsurvivalafterbodilydeath.Suchsurvival,however,wouldbethesurvivalofanindividualthatwasstrictlysolitary,unabletocom-municatewithothers,andunabletobringabouteffectsintheworld.Inproportionasmemoriesfadeandimpotencepalls,thesurvivor’sconceptofhimselfasanindividualbecomesattenuated.‘Atthelimitofattenuationthereis,fromthepointofviewofhissurvivalasanindividual,nodifferencebetweenthecontinuanceofexperienceanditscessation.Disembodiedsurvival,onsuchtermsasthese,maywellseemunattractive.Nodoubtitisforthisreasonthattheorthodoxhavewiselyinsistedontheresurrectionofthebody’(I116).Strawson’sowndeath,earlyin2006,markedtheendofanerainEnglishphilosophy.71\n3FreudtoDerridaInthenineteenthcenturytherewasaconstantinterchangeofphilosophicalideasbetweenthecountriesofcontinentalEuropeandtheEnglish-speakingworld.KantandHegelweremassivelyinfluen-tialinBritishuniversities,whilethetraditionofBritishempiricismwasfoundattractivebymanyradicalthinkersontheContinent.ThecareerofWilliamJamesillustratesthecosmopolitannatureofthephilosophyofthetime.ConvertedtophilosophybythereadingofaFrenchphilosopher,hestudiedinGermanyandlecturedfrequentlyinBritain,whilebasedintheUnitedStates.Again,theyoungBertrandRussellwasnotatallaninsularphilosopher:whileworkingouthisphilosophyofmathematicshewasinregularcorrespondencewiththeGermanFregeandtheItalianPeano.Bythemiddleofthetwentiethcenturyallthishadchanged.ContinentalandAnglophonephilosopherswenttheirseparateways,hardlyspeakingthesamelanguageaseachother.InBritainandAmericatheanalytictraditioninphilosophy,whichRussellhadhelpedtofound,hadcometobedominantinacademiccircles,andhadalmostdrivenoutalternativestylesofphilosophiz-ing.IncontinentalEuropeexistentialismwasthefashionableschool,ledinFrancebyJean-PaulSartreandinGermanybyMartinHeidegger.Well-meaningattemptstobringtogetherproponentsofthedifferentstylesofphilosophizingmetwithonlylimitedsuccessinthesecondhalfofthecentury.FreudandPsychoanalysisTheContinentalthinkerwhohadthegreatestinfluenceonAnglo-Americanphilosophicalthoughtthroughoutthetwentiethcenturywas\nFREUDTODERRIDAAgatheringofAnglophoneandContinentalphilosophers,presidedoverbyGilbertRyle,inChristChurchOxfordc.1970.notaphilosopheratall,butamanwhoregardedhimselfasascientist,andindeedastheinventorofanewscience:SigmundFreud.Veryfewphilo-sophersdescribedthemselvesasFreudians,butallwhowereengagedinteachingphilosophyofmind,ethics,orphilosophyofreligionwereforcedtotakeaccountofFreud’snovelandexcitingproposalsintheseareas.FreudwasborninMoraviain1856intoanAustrianfamilyofnon-observantJews.In1860thefamilymovedtoVienna,andFreudtrainedasadoctorintheuniversitythere,joiningthestaffoftheGeneralHospitalin1882,wherehespecializedinitiallyinbrainanatomy.HealsocollaboratedwiththeneurologistJosephBreuer,treatinghystericalpatientsunderhypnosis.ThreeyearslaterhemovedtoParistostudyundertheneurolo-gistJean-MartinCharcot,andsoonafterhisreturn,in1886,wentintoprivatemedicalpractice.InthesameyearhemarriedMarthaBernays,bywhomhehadsixchildren,threegirlsandthreeboys.In1895,inconjunctionwithBreuer,Freudpublishedaworkonhysteriawhichpresentedanoriginalanalysisofmentalillness.Graduallyheceasedtousehypnosisasamethodoftreatmentandreplaceditwithanovelformoftherapywhichhecalledpsychoanalysis,consisting,asheputithimself,innothingmorethananexchangeofwordsbetweenpatientanddoctor.73\nFREUDTODERRIDAThepremissunderlyingthenewmethodwasthatthehystericalsymp-tomsweretheresultofmemoriesofapsychologicaltraumawhichhadbeenrepressedbythepatient,butwhichcouldberecoveredbymeansofaprocessoffreeassociation.Thepatient,lyingonacouch,wasencouragedtotalkaboutwhatevercametomind.Freudbecameconvinced,asaresultofmanysuchsessions,thattherelevantpsychologicaltraumasdatedbacktoinfancyandhadasexualcontent.HistheoriesofinfantilesexualityledtoabreachwithBreuer.Inisolationfrommedicalcolleagues,FreudcontinuedinpracticeinVienna.In1900hepublishedthemostimportantofhisworks,TheInterpretationofDreams,inwhichhearguedthatdreamsnolessthanneuroticsymptomswereacodedexpressionofrepressedsexualdesires.Thetheoryherepresented,hemaintained,wasapplicabletonormalaswellasneuroticpersons,andhefolloweditupayearlaterwithastudyentitledThePsychopathologyofEverydayLife.Thesewerethefirstofaseriesofhighlyreadablebooksconstantlymodifyingandrefininghispsychoanalyticthe-ories.In1902Freudwasappointedtoanextraordinarychairofneuropath-ologyatViennaUniversity,andhebegantoacquirepupilsandcolleagues.ProminentamongthesewereAlfredAdlerandCarlJung,bothofwhomeventuallybrokewithhimandfoundedtheirownschools.In1923FreudpublishedTheEgoandtheId,inwhichhepresentedanewandelaborateanatomyoftheunconsciousmind.Neverdeterredbycontroversy,hepresentedadeflationaryaccountoftheoriginofreligioninTheFutureofanIllusion(1927).Hewashimselfanatheist,butthisdidnotpreventhimfromidentifyingwithJewishcultureorfromsufferingtheassaultsofanti-Semitism.PsychoanalysiswasbannedbytheNazisandwhenAustriawasannexedbyGermanyin1938hewasforcedtomigratetoEngland.HewasgivenawarmwelcomeinLondon,wherehisworkshadbeentranslatedandpublishedbymembersoftheBloomsburygroup.Havingsufferedforsixteenyearsfromcancerofthejaw,Freuddiedon23September1939ofalethalinjectionofmorphineadministeredbyhisphysicianathisownrequest.Hispsychoanalyticworkwascontinuedbyhisyoungestdaughter,Anna.Inasetofintroductorylecturesdeliveredbetween1915and1917Freudsummeduppsychoanalytictheoryintwofundamentaltheses.Thefirstisthatthegreaterpartofourmentallife,whetheroffeeling,thought,orvolition,isunconscious.Thesecondisthatsexualimpulses,broadly74\nFREUDTODERRIDAdefined,aresupremelyimportantnotonlyaspotentialcausesofmentalillnessbutalsoasthemotorofartisticandculturalcreation.Ifthesexualelementintheworkofartandcultureremainstoagreatextentuncon-scious,thisisbecausesocializationdemandsthesacrificeofbasicinstincts.Suchinstinctsbecomesublimated,thatistosaydivertedfromtheiroriginalgoalsandchannelledtowardssociallyacceptableactivities.Butsublimationisanunstablestate,anduntamedandunsatisfiedinstinctsmaytaketheirrevengethroughmentalillnessanddisorder.Theexistenceoftheunconscious,Freudbelieved,ismanifestedinthreedifferentways:througheverydaytrivialmistakes,throughreportsofdreams,andthroughthesymptomsofneurosis.Dreamsandneuroticsymptoms,itistrue,donotontheirface,orasinterpretedbytheunaidedpatient,revealthebeliefs,desires,andsentimentsofwhichtheunconsciousisdeemedbyFreudtoconsist.Buttheexerciseoffreeassociationinanalysis,hebelieved,asinterpretedbytheanalyst,revealstheunderlyingpatternoftheunconsciousmind.Itissexualdevelopmentthatisthekeytothispattern.Infantilesexuality,Freudexplained,beginswithanoralstage,inwhichpleasureisfocusedonthemouth.Thisisfollowedbyananalstage,betweentheagesofoneandthree,anda‘phallic’stage,inwhichthechildfocusesonitsownpenisorclitoris.Atthattime,Freudmaintained,aboyissexuallyattractedtohismother,andresentshisfather’spossessionofher.Buthishostilitytohisfatherleadshimtofearthathisfatherwillretaliatebycastratinghim.Sotheboyabandonshissexualdesignsonhismother,andgraduallyidentifieswithhisfather.ThisistheOedipuscomplex,acrucialstageintheemotionaldevelopmentofeveryboy.Neuroticcharactersarepeoplewhohavebecomefixatedatanearlystageoftheirdevelopment.TherecoveryofOedipalwishes,andthehistoryoftheirrepression,wasanimportantpartofeveryanalysis.FreudwasinnodoubtthatmutatismutandistherewasafeminineequivalentoftheOedipuscomplex,butitwasneverfullyworkedoutinaconvincingmanner.Towardstheendofhislife,Freudreplacedtheearlierdichotomyofconsciousandunconsciouswithathreefoldschemeofthemind.‘Thementalapparatus’,hewroteinTheEgoandtheId,‘iscomposedofanidwhichistherepositoryoftheinstinctualimpulses,ofanegowhichisthemostsuperficialportionoftheidandonewhichhasbeenmodifiedbytheinfluenceoftheexternalworld,andofasuperegowhichdevelopsoutof75\nFREUDTODERRIDAtheid,dominatestheego,andrepresentstheinhibitionsofinstinctthatarecharacteristicofman’(SExx.266).Thewholeendeavouroftheego,Freudsays,istoeffectareconciliationbetweenthepartsofthesoul.Solongastheegoisinharmonywiththeidandthesuperego,allwillbewell.Butintheabsenceofsuchharmonymentaldisorderswilldevelop.Conflictsbetweentheegoandtheidleadtoneuroses;conflictsbetweentheidandthesuperegoleadtomelancholiaanddepression.Whentheegocomesintoconflictwiththeexternalworld,psychosesdevelop.Freudwouldnotthankusforincludinghiminahistoryofphilosophy,sinceheregardedhimselfasascientist,dedicatedtodiscoveringtherigiddeterminismsthatunderliehumanillusionsoffreedom.Infact,mostofhisdetailedtheories,whentheyhavebeenmadepreciseenoughtoadmitofexperimentaltesting,havebeenshowntolackfoundation.Medicalpro-fessionalsdisagreehowfarpsychoanalytictechniquesareeffectiveformsoftherapy,andiftheyare,whencetheyderivetheirefficacy.Whentheydoachievesuccessitappearstobenotbyuncoveringdeterministicmechan-isms,butbyexpandingtheself-awarenessandfreedomofchoiceoftheindividual.Butdespiteallthetheoreticalcriticismsthatcanbemadeofhiswork,Freudhashadanenormousinfluenceonsociety—inrelationtosexualmores,toourunderstandingofmentalillness,toourappreciationofartandliterature,andoninterpersonalrelationshipsofmanykinds.Freudwasnotthefirstthinkertoassigntothesexualimpulseaplaceoffundamentalsignificanceinthehumanpsyche.Hehadbeenprecededbymanygenerationsoftheologianswhoregardedouractualhumancondi-tionashavingbeenshapedbyasinofAdamwhichwassexualinorigin,transmission,andeffect.Ifnineteenth-centurypruderystrovetoconcealtheubiquityofsex,theveilwasalwayseasytotearaway.FreudlovedtoquoteadictumofSchopenhauerthatitwasthejokeoflifethatsex,man’schiefconcern,shouldbepursuedinsecret.Sexwas,Schopenhauersaid,thetruehereditarylordoftheworld,treatingwithscornallpreparationsmadetobindit.Freud’scontemporarieswereshockedbyhisemphasisoninfantilesexuality.ButVictoriansentimentalityaboutchildrenwasanattitudeofrecentorigin.Itwasnotshared,forinstance,byAugustine,whowroteinhisConfessions:‘Whatisinnocentisnottheinfant’smind,butthefeeblenessofhislimbs.Ihavemyselfwatchedandstudiedajealousbaby.Hecouldnot76\nFREUDTODERRIDAyetspeak,andpalewithjealousyandbitterness,glaredathisbrothersharinghismother’smilk.Whoisunawareofthisfactofexperience?’ThesexualpermissivenessofmanymodernsocietiesisduenotonlytotheavailabilityofcontraceptivesbuttoawholeclimateofthoughtwhichFreuddidmuchtocreate.Itisnotthatherecommendedsexuallicenceinhispublishedwritings,butthathegavecurrencytoaninfluentialmeta-phor:thevisionofsexualdesireasapsychicfluidthatmustfindanoutletthroughonechanneloranother.Inthelightofthatmetaphor,sexualabstinenceappearsasadangerousdamming-upofforcesthatwilleventu-allybreakthroughanyrestrainingbarrierswithadisastrouseffectonmentalhealth.Theveryconceptofmentalhealth,asdevelopedinmoderntimes,maybesaidtodatefromthetimewhenFreud,Breuer,andCharcotbegantotreathystericalpatientsasgenuineinvalidsinsteadofmalingerers.This,itisoftensaid,wasmoreofamoraldecisionthanamedicaldiscovery,butmostpeoplenowadayswouldregarditastherightmoraldecision.ItcanbeclaimedthatFreudredrewtheboundariesbetweenmoralsandmedicine.Formsofbehaviourthatprevioustohistimewouldhavebeenregardedastransgressionsworthyofpunishmenthavenowlongbeenseen,inthecourthousenolessthanintheconsultingroom,asmaladiesfitfortherapy.Thedifficultyinmakingahardandfastdistinctionbetweenclinicaljudgementandmoralevaluationisstrikinglyillustratedbychangingattitudestohomosexualbehaviour.This,havingbeenlongregardedasheinouslycriminal,wasfornearlyacenturyregardedassymptomaticofapsychopathologicaldisorder,andisnowregardedbymanyasthekeyelementofarationallychosenalternativelifestyle.Freud’sinfluenceonartandliteraturehasbeengreat,inspiteofhisunflatteringviewofartisticcreationascloselysimilartoneurosis.Novelistsmakeuseofassociativetechniquessimilartothoseoftheanalyst’scouch,andcriticsdelighttointerpretworksofliteratureinOedipalterms.Historiansenjoywritingpsychobiography,analysingtheactionsofmaturepublicfiguresonthebasisofrealorimaginedepisodesintheirchildhood.PaintersandsculptorshavetakenFreudiansymbolsoutofadreamworldandgiventhemconcreteform.Allofus,infact,directlyorindirectly,haveimbibedagreatdealofpsychoanalytictheory.Indiscussionofourrelationshipswithourfamilyandfriendswetalkunself-consciouslyofrepressionandsublimation,and77\nFREUDTODERRIDAwedescribecharactersasanalornarcissistic.PeoplewhohaveneverreadawordofFreudcanhappilyidentifytheirownandothers’Freudianslips.NophilosophersinceAristotlehasmadeagreatercontributiontotheeverydayvocabularyofpsychologyandmorality.ItishardtofaultthejudgementofW.H.Auden,whomournedFreud’sdeathintwenty-eightintricatequatrains:Ifoftenhewaswrong,and,attimes,absurd,tousheisnomoreapersonnowbutawholeclimateofopinion.Husserl’sPhenomenologyThelifeofEdmundHusserlresembles,atcrucialpoints,thatofSigmundFreud.HusserlwasthreeyearsyoungerthanFreud.LikehimhewasbornintoaJewishfamilyinMoravia,andattendedlecturesinVienna.Bothmendevotedthegreaterpartoftheirlivestoapersonalprojectthatwasintendedtobethefirstreallyscientificstudyofthehumanmind.AttheendoftheirlivesbothmenfellfoulofNazianti-Semitism,withFreuddrivenoutofAustriatodieinexile,andHusserl’sbooksburntbyGermantroopsmarchingintoPraguein1939.Husserl’sprofessionallife,however,wasquitedifferentfromFreud’s.Hisinitialstudieswereinmathematicsandastronomy,notinmedicine.Hewentontopursueanorthodoxacademiccareerinphilosophy,holdingpostsinasuccessionofuniversitydepartments.ThoughhisdoctoratewasfromVienna,hewentonforhishabilitationdegreetoHalle,andthechairstowhichhewaslatercalledwereinGermanandnotAustrianuniversities.Husserl’sinterestinphilosophywasfirstawakenedbythelecturesofFranzBrentanoinViennabetween1884and1886.Brentano(1838–1917)wasanex-priest,aneruditescholarwhohadsoughttorelateAristotelianphilosophyofmindtocontemporaryexperimentalinquiryinabookPsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint(1874),whichwastoprovewidelyinfluential.Thedataofconsciousness,thebookexplained,comeintwokinds:physicalandmentalphenomena.Physicalphenomenaaresuchthingsascoloursandsmells;mentalphenomena,suchasthoughts,arecharacterizedbyhavingacontent,orimmanentobject.Thisfeature,for78\nFREUDTODERRIDAwhichBrentanoreintroducedthescholasticterm‘intentionality’,wasthekeytotheunderstandingofmentalactsandlife.WhileinfluencedbyBrentano’sapproachtopsychology,Husserlcon-tinuedinitiallytofocushisattentiononmathematics.HishabilitationthesisatHallewasontheconceptofnumber,andhisfirstbook,publishedin1891,wasthePhilosophyofArithmetic.Thissoughttoexplainournumericalconceptsbyidentifyingthementalactsthatweretheirpsychologicalorigin.Ourconceptofplurality,forinstance,wasallegedtoderivefromaprocessof‘collectivecombination’thatgroupeditemsintoaggregates.Becauseofhisdesiretofindabasisformathematicsinempiricalpsychology,Husserlwasforcedintosomeunattractiveconclusions.Hedenied,forinstance,thatzeroandonewerenumbers,andhehadtomakeasharpdistinctionbetweenthearithmeticofsmallnumbersandthearithmeticoflargenumbers.Withourmind’seyewecanseeonlytinygroups,soonlyasmallpartofarithmeticcanrestonanintuitivebasis;oncewedealwithlargernumbers,wemoveawayfromintuitionintoamerelysymbolicrealm.ReviewersofHusserl’sbook,notablyFrege,complainedthatitcontainedaconfusionbetweenimaginationandthought.Thementaleventsthatwerethesubjectmatterofpsychology,beingprivatetotheindividual,couldnotbethefoundationofapublicsciencesuchasarithmetic.Thatmustrestonthoughtsthatwerethecommonpropertyoftherace.Husserlyieldedtothecriticismandabandonedhisearlypsychologism.InhisLogicalInvestigationsof1900–1hearguedthatlogiccannotbederivedfrompsych-ology,andthatanyattempttodosomustinvolveaviciouscirclesinceitwillhavetoappealtologicinthecourseofitsdeduction.Henceforth,likeFrege,hemaintainedasharpdistinctionbetweenlogicandpsychology.ButwhileFrege,followedbytheanalytictradition,focusedphilosophyonthelogicalsideofthedivide,Husserl,followedbytheContinentaltradition,sawthepsychologicalsideasphilosophy’srightfulhome.Atthisperiod,however,FregeandHusserlwereatoneinbasingphilosophy—whetherlogicalorpsychological—onanexplicitPlatonicrealism.Theoverallsituationatthebeginningofthetwentiethcenturyhasbeenvividly,ifnotquiteimpartially,describedbyGilbertRyle:HusserlattheturnofthecenturywasundermanyofthesameintellectualpressuresaswereMeinong,Frege,Bradley,Peirce,G.E.MooreandBertrandRussell.Allalikewereinrevoltagainsttheidea-psychologyofHumeandMill;79\nFREUDTODERRIDAallalikedemandedtheemancipationoflogicfrompsychology;allalikefoundinthenotionofmeaningtheirescape-routefromsubjectivisttheoriesofthinking;nearlyallofthemchampionedaPlatonictheoryofmeanings,i.e.ofconceptsandpropositions;allalikedemarcatedphilosophyfromnaturalsciencebyallocatingfactualenquiriestothenaturalsciencesandconceptualenquiriestophilosophy;nearlyallofthemtalkedasiftheseconceptualenquiriesofphilosophyterminatedinsomesuper-inspectionsofsomesuper-objects,asifconceptualenquirieswere,afterall,super-observationalenquiries;allofthem,however,intheactualpracticeoftheirconceptualenquiriesnecessarilydivergedfromthesuper-observationsthattheirPlatonisingepistemologyrequired.HusserltalkedofintuitingessencessomewhatasMooretalkedofinspectingconcepts,andasRusselltalkedofacquaintanceshipwithuniversals,butofcourseitwasbytheirintellectualwrest-lings,notbyanyintellectualintuitings,thattheytackledtheiractualconceptualdifficulties.(CPi.180)RyledoeswelltoemphasizethecommonstartingpointoftheanalyticandContinentaltraditions;butinthecaseofHusserl,theintellectualwrest-lingswere,infact,morecomplicatedthanthisbriskpassagesuggests.HusserltookoverfromBrentanothenotionofintentionality,thatistosay,theideathatwhatischaracteristicofmental,asopposedtophysical,phenomenaisthattheyaredirectedtoobjects.IthinkofTroy,perhaps,orIworryaboutmyinvestments—intentionalityisthefeatureindicatedinthelittlewords‘of’and‘about’.Whatistherelationbetweenwhatisgoingoninmymindandalongdefunctcityorstockmarketsacrosstheworld?Husserl,andmanyafterhim,spentyearswonderingabouttheanswertothatquestion.1Twothingsareessentialtoathought:thatitshouldhaveacontentandthatitshouldhaveapossessor.SupposethatIthinkofadragon.Twothingsmakethisthethoughtitis:first,thatitisthethoughtofadragonandnotofaneagleorahorse;second,thatitismythoughtandnotyourthoughtorNapoleon’sthought.Husserlwouldmarkthesefeaturesbysayingthatitwasanactofminewithaparticularmatter(itsintentionalobject).Otherpeople,too,maythinkofdragons;inthatcase,forHusserl,wehaveseveralindividualactsbelongingtothesamespecies.Theconcept1Intentionalityisnothingtodowith‘intention’inthemodernsense.Brentanotookthewordfrommedievalcontexts,inwhichitwasderivedfromtheverb‘intendere’,meaningtopullabowstringinthecourseofaimingatatarget.Anintentionalobjectis,asitwere,thetargetofathought.80\nFREUDTODERRIDAdragon,infact,isnothingotherthanthespeciestowhichallsuchactsbelong.Conceptsarethus,intheLogicalInvestigations,definedonthebasisofpsychologicalitems.How,then,islogicrelatedtoconceptsthusunder-stood?Inthesameway,Husserlnowbelieved,asthetheoremsofgeometryarerelatedtoempiricalthree-dimensionalbodies.Thushewasabletodisownhisearlierpsychologism,andmakeacleardistinctionbetweenpsychologyandlogic.Henowproceededtogofurther,anddrawalinebetweenpsychologyandepistemology.Hedidsobyareinventionofpsychologyasanewdisciplineof‘phenomenology’.Phenomenologywasdevelopedduringthefirstdecadeofthetwentiethcentury.In1900HusserlwasappointedtoanassociateprofessorshipattheUniversityofGo¨ttingen.TherehehadasacolleaguetherenownedmathematicianDavidHilbert,buthismostenthusiasticcollaboratorsinhisnewventurewereagroupofphilosophersatMunich,whocoinedthephrase‘phenomenologicalmovement’.By1913themovementwasself-confidentenoughtopublishayearbookforphenomenologicalresearch.Inthefirstissueofthisappearedabook-lengthtextofHusserl’s,whichwasplannedasthefirstvolumeofaworktobeentitledIdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenology.Theaimofphenomenologywasthestudyoftheimmediatedataofconsciousness,withoutreferencetoanythingthatconsciousnessmighttellus,orpurporttotellus,abouttheextra-mentalworld.WhenIthinkofaphoenix,theintentionalityofmythoughtisexactlythesamewhetherornotthereareanyphoenixesinreality.Already,in1901,Husserlhadwritten,‘Itmakesnoessentialdifferencetoanobjectpresentedandgiventoconsciousnesswhetheritexists,orisfictitious,orisperhapscompletelyabsurd.IthinkofJupiterasIthinkofBismarck,ofthetowerofBabelasIthinkofCologneCathedral,ofaregularthousand-sidedpolygonasofaregularthousand-facedsolid’(LIii.99).Sotoo,Husserlbelieved,whenIseeatable.TheintentionalityofmyexperienceisjustthesamewhetherthereisarealtablethereorifIamhallucinating.Thephenomenologistshouldmakeaclosestudyofthepsychologicalphenom-ena,andplaceinbracketstheworldofextra-mentalobjects.Hisattitudetotheexistenceofthatworldshouldbeoneofsuspenseofjudgement,forwhichHusserlusedtheGreekwordepoche.Thiswascalled‘thephenom-enologicalreduction’.Itwas,asitwere,philosophydrawinginitshorns.81\nFREUDTODERRIDAPhenomenologyisnotthesameasphenomenalism.Aphenomenalistbelievesthatnothingexistsexceptphenomena,andthatstatementsaboutsuchthingsasmaterialobjectshavetobetranslatedintostatementsaboutappearances.BerkeleyandMillheldversionsofphenomenalism.2Husserl,ontheotherhand,didnotassertinIdeasthattherearenorealitiesotherthanphenomena;hedeliberatelyleftopenthepossibilitythatthereisaworldofnon-phenomenalobjects.Only,suchobjectsarenoconcern,oratleastnoinitialconcern,ofthephilosopher.Thereasonforthisisthat,accordingtoHusserl,wehaveinfallibleimmediateknowledgeoftheobjectsofourownconsciousnesswhilewehaveonlyinferentialandconjecturalinformationabouttheexternalworld.Husserlmadeadistinctionbetweenimmanentperception,whichwasself-evident,andtranscendentperception,whichwasfallible.Imma-nentperceptionismyimmediateacquaintancewithmyowncurrentmentalactsandstates.Transcendentperceptionismyperceptionofmyownpastactsandstates,ofphysicalthingsandevents,andofthecontentsofotherpeople’sminds.Immanentperceptionprovidesthesubjectmatterofphenomenology.Immanentperceptionismorefundamentalthantranscendentperceptionnotonlybecauseimmanentperceptionisself-evidentwhiletranscendentperceptionisfallible,butbecausetheinferencesandconjecturesthatconstitutetranscendentperceptionarebased,andhavetobebased,onthedeliverancesofimmanentperception.Onlyconsciousnesshas‘absolutebeing’;allotherformsofbeingdependuponconsciousnessfortheirexistence(Ideas,i.49).Thusphenomenologyisthemostbasicofalldisciplines,becausetheitemsthatareitssubjectmatterprovidethedataforallotherbranchesofphilosophyandscience.HusserlprojectedIdeasasathree-volumework,butthelasttwovolumeswerepublishedonlyafterhisdeath.In1916hemovedtoFreiburgandremainedasaprofessorintheuniversitythereuntilheretiredin1928,havingrejectedin1923acalltotheUniversityofBerlin.AtFreiburghislecturesattractedawideinternationalaudience,andhehadamonghispupilssomewhoweretobecomehighlyinfluentialphilosophers,suchasMartinHeideggerandEdithStein.Inthoseyearshedevelopedinseveral2Seevol.II,p.203,andp.8above.82\nFREUDTODERRIDAdirectionsthesystempresentedinIdeasI.OnetheonehandheextendedthephenomenologicalmethodinordertoundercutsomeassumptionsthatDescarteshadleftunquestioned,sothathisepochebecamemoreradicalthanCartesiandoubt.Ontheotherhand,heendeavouredtocombinehismethodologicalsolipsismwithasolutiontotheproblemofintersubject-ivitythatwouldestablishtheexistenceofotherminds.Hisfinalpositionwasatranscendentalidealismwhichhemaintainedwastheinseparableconclusionofphenomenology(CM42).Someoftheresultsofhislaterreflectionswerepublishedintwoworksthatappearedintheyearafterhisretirement:CartesianMeditationsandFormalandTranscendentalLogic.TheExistentialismofHeideggerTwoyearsearlieroneofHusserl’spupilshadpublishedabookthatwastohaveamuchgreaterimpactonphilosophythaneitherofthese.TheSeinundZeitofMartinHeidegger(1889–1976)claimedthatphenomenology,uptothispoint,hadbeentoohalf-hearted.Itpurportedtoexaminethedataofconsciousness,butitemployednotionslike‘subject’,‘object’,‘act’,and‘content’whichwerenotitemsthatithaddiscoveredinconsciousness,butitemsinheritedfromearlierphilosophy.Mostimportantly,HusserlhadacceptedtheframeworkofDescartesinwhichtherewerethetwocorrela-tiverealmsofconsciousnessandreality.Onlyoneofthese,consciousness,wasthesubjectmatterHusserlhadadoptedforphenomenology.Butthefirsttaskofphenomenology,Heideggermaintained,wastostudytheconceptofBeing(Sein)whichwaspriortothecleavagebetweenconscious-nessandreality.Theexperiencethatleadsustocontrastthesetwoaspolaroppositesistheprimaryphenomenontobeexamined.WemustthereforegobackbehindDescartesinordertogetclearaboutthenatureofphilosophy,andtakeasourstartingpointnotconsciousnessbutBeing.Butitwillnotsuffice,Heideggerwarnsus,simplytoreturntothecategoriesofPlatoandAristotle,whichalreadyhaveanelementofartificialsophistication.ThePresocraticsprovidethebestexamplesforathoroughgoingphenomenalisttoimitate,becausetheypre-datethefor-mationofaprofessionalphilosophicalvocabularywithallthepresupposi-tionssuchavocabularyentails.Heideggerwouldsethimselfthetaskof83\nFREUDTODERRIDAMartinHeidegger,doyenofcontinentalexistentialisminventingapristinevocabularythatwouldenableus,asitwere,tophilosophizeinthenude.ThemostimportantofHeidegger’scoinagesisDasein.Daseinisthekindofbeingthatiscapableofaskingphilosophicalquestions,andasHeideggerexpoundsDaseinitsoundsinitiallysuspiciouslyliketheCartesianego.ButwhereasDescartes’segowasessentiallyathinkingthing,arescogitans,thinkingisonlyone,andnotthemostfundamental,ofthewaysinwhichDaseinhasitsbeing.TheprimitiveelementofDaseinis‘being-in-theworld’,andthinkingisonlyonewayofengagingwiththeworld:actinguponitandreactingtoitareatleastasimportantelements.Daseinispriortothedistinctionbetweenthinkingandwillingortheoryandpractice.Daseiniscaringabout(besorgen).Daseinisnotarescogitans,butarescurans:notathinkingthing,butacaringthing.OnlyifIhavesomecareabout,orinterestin,theworldwillIgoontoaskquestionsaboutitandgiveanswerstothosequestionsintheformofknowledge-claims.84\nFREUDTODERRIDAConceptsandjudgementscanbethoughtofasinstrumentsforcopingwiththeworld.Buttherearemoreprimitivesuchinstruments,thingsthataretoolsinaliteralsense.Acarpenterrelatestotheworldbyusingahammer.Hedoesnotneedtobethinkingaboutthehammertobeusingitwell;consciousnessofthehammermayindeedgetinthewayoftheconcentrationonhisprojectthatishistrueengagementwithreality.EntitiesthatwecopewithinthistransparentmodearecalledbyHeidegger‘ready-to-hand’.Thedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotready-to-handunderliesourconstructionofthespatialityoftheworld.HeideggeremphasizesthetemporalnatureofDasein:weshouldthinkofitnotasasubstancebutastheunfoldingofalife.Ourlifeisnotaself-contained,self-developingentity:fromtheoutsetwefindourselvesthrownintoaphysical,cultural,andhistoricalcontext.This‘thrownness’(geworfenheit)iscalledbyHeideggerthe‘facticity’ofDasein.NorismylifeexhaustedbywhatIamnowandhavehithertobeen:IcanbewhatIhavenotyetbeen,andmypotentialitiesareasessentialtomybeingasmyachievementsare.Indeed,accordingtoHeidegger,indefiningwhatIamthefuturehaspriorityoverthepastandthepresent.Dasein,saysHeidegger,is‘anabilitytobe’andwhatIamaimingatinmylifedeterminesthesignificanceofmypresentsituationandcapacities.Butwhatevermyachievementsandpotentialitiesare,theyallterminateindeath—butthoughdeathterminatesthem,itdoesnotcompletethem.AnyviewofmylifeasawholemusttakeaccountofthedifferencebetweenwhatIwillbeandwhatImighthavebeen:hencecomesguiltandanxiety.IfHeideggerisright,thereissomethingabsurdintheattemptsofphilosophers,fromDescartestoRussell,toprovetheexistenceofanexternalworld.Wearenotobserverstrying,throughthemediumofexperience,togainknowledgeofarealityfromwhichwearedetached.Fromtheoutsetweareourselveselementsoftheworld,‘alwaysalreadybeing-in-the-world’.Wearebeingsamongotherbeings,actinguponandreactingtothem.Andouractionsandreactionsneednotatallbeguidedbyconsciousness.Itis,infact,onlywhenourspontaneousactionsmisfireinsomewaythatwebecomeconsciousofwhatwearedoing.Thisiswhenthe‘ready-to-hand’becomes‘unready-to-hand’.TheactivityofDasein,forHeidegger,hasthreefundamentalaspects.First,thereiswhathecalls‘attunement’:thesituationsintowhichwearethrownmanifestthemselvesasattractive,oralarming,orboring,andso85\nFREUDTODERRIDAon,andwerespondtothemwithmoodsofvariouskinds.Second,Daseinisdiscursive:thatistosay,itoperateswithinaworldofdiscourses,amongentitiesthatarearticulatedandinterpretedforusbythelanguageandculturethatwesharewithothers.Third,Daseinis‘understanding’inaspecialsense—thatistosay,itsactivitiesaredirected(notnecessarilyconsciously)towardssomegoal,some‘for-the-sake-of’whichwillmakesenseofawholelifewithinitsculturalcontext.ThesethreeaspectsofDaseincorrespondtothepast,present,andfutureoftime:thetimethatgivesSeinundZeitthesecondpartofitstitle.ThoughDaseinoperateswithinabiological,social,andculturalcontext,thereisnosuchthingasahumannaturethatgivesrisetotheactivitiesofthehumanindividual.TheessenceofDasein,saysHeidegger,isitsexistence.Insayingthis,hebecamethefatherof‘existentialism’,theschoolofphilosophythatemphasizesthatindividualsarenotmeremembersofaspeciesandarenotdeterminedbyuniversallaws.WhatIessentiallyamiswhatIfreelytakemyselftobe.Theungroundednessofsuchachoiceisalarming,andImaywelltakerefugeinunthinkingconformity.Butthatisaninauthenticdecision,abetrayalofmyDasein.TobeauthenticImustmakemyownlifeinfullawarenessthatthereisnoground,eitherinhumannatureorindivinecommand,forthechoicesImake,andthatnochoiceisgoingtobringanytranscendentmeaningfulnesstomylife.BeingandTimeisadifficultbooktoread,andanyinterpreterwhowishestomakeitsideasseemreadilyintelligiblehastowriteinastyleverydifferentfromHeidegger’sown.ItisamatterofdisputewhetherHeideg-ger’sidiosyncraticvocabularyandconvolutedsyntaxwereessentialtohisprojectorwereanunnecessarypieceofself-indulgence.Butthereisnodoubtthathisworkwasnotjustoriginalbutimportant.OneofHeideg-ger’smostpungentopponents,GilbertRyle,admittedattheendofacriticalreviewofthebookthathehadnothingbutadmirationforhis‘phenomenologicalanalysisoftherootworkingsofthehumansoul’.Asaworkofphenomenology,SeinundZeitenjoyedagreatere´clatthananyoftheworksofphenomenology’sfounder,Husserl.Therelationshipbetweenthediscipleandhismasterhadanunhappyending.In1929HeideggersucceededHusserlasProfessorofPhilosophyatFreiburgandin1933hebecameRectoroftheuniversity.InanotoriousinauguraladdressinMayofthatyearhewelcomedNazismasthevehiclethroughwhichtheGermanpeoplewouldatlastcarryoutitshistoricspiritual86\nFREUDTODERRIDAmission.OneofhisfirstactsasRectorwastoexcludefromtheUniversityLibraryallJewishfacultymembers,includingEmeritusProfessorHusserl,whostillhadfiveyearstolive.AfterthewarHeideggerhadtodopenanceforhissupportofHitlerandwashimselfpreventedfromteachingintheuniversityfrom1945to1950.However,histhoughtremainedinfluentialuptoandbeyondhisdeathin1976.TheExistentialismofSartreIncontrasttotheright-wingexistentialismofHeidegger,inFranceJean-PaulSartre,oncebrieflyastudentunderhim,developedaformofexistentialismthatmovedsteadilytowardsthepoliticalleft.BorninParisin1905,SartrestudiedattheE´coleNormaleSupe´rieurefrom1924to1928andforsomeyearssupportedhimselfbyteachingphilosophyinhighschools.Itwas,however,inBerlinandFreiburgfrom1933to1935thathebegantodevelophisownphilosophy,whichfounditsfirstexpressionintwophilosophicalmonographspublishedin1936,TheTranscendenceoftheEgoandImagination:APsychologicalCritique.Thesewerefollowedbyanovel,Nausea,in1938andSketchforaTheoryoftheEmotionsin1939.Sartre’spre-waressaysaredetailedstudiesinthephilosophyofmindinthephenomenologicalmould.Sartre,likeHeidegger,complainedthatHusserlhadnottakenthephenomenologicalreductionfarenough.Hus-serlhadacceptedtheCartesianego,thethinkingsubject,asadatumofconsciousness,butinfactitisnosuchthing:whenIamabsorbedinwhatIamseeingorhearingIhavenothoughtofmyself.Itisonlybyreflectionthatwemaketheselfintoanobject,soifwearetobethoroughphenomenologistswemuststartfrompre-reflexiveconsciousness.Theself,thethinkingsubject,liesoutsideconsciousnessandthereforebelongs,nolessthanotherminds,tothetranscendentworld.InImaginationSartreattacksthenotion,widespreadamongphilosophersbutparticularlyexplicitinHume,thatinimaginationwearesurveyingthecontentsofaninteriormentalworld.Itisamistake,Sartreshowed,tothinkthatperceptionandimaginationbothconsistedinthementalpresenceofpicturesorsimulacra,theonlydifferencebetweenthembeingthatinperceptiontheimagesaremoreintenseorvividthantheyareinimagination.Infact,Sartremaintained,imaginingrelatesustoextra-mentalobjects,notto87\nFREUDTODERRIDAinternalimages.Itdoessonolessthanperception,butinadifferentmode.Thisismosteasilymadeoutinthecasewhereweimagineareal,butabsent,person;inthecaseswherewhatweimaginedoesnotinfactexist,whatwearedoingiscreatinganobjectintheworld.Emotions,too,accordingtoSartre,aremisconceivedifwethinkofthemaspassiveinternalsensations.Emotionisacertainmannerofapprehendingtheworld:tofeelhatredtowardssomeone,forinstance,istoperceivehimashateful.Butobviouslyemotionisnotanimpartial,unbiasedawarenessofourenvironment;onthecontrary,Sartregoessofarastodescribeitas‘amagicaltransformation’ofthesituationsinwhichwefindourselves.Whenwearedepressed,forinstance,weasitwerecastaspellovertheworldsuchastomakealleffortstocopewithitappearpointless.Whenwarbrokeoutin1939Sartrewasconscripted,andin1940hefoughtinthearmyuntilcapturedbytheGermans.Releasedafterthearmistice,hereturnedtoParisasaphilosophyteacher,butalsotookpartintheresistancetoNazioccupation.In1943hepublishedhismagnumopus,BeingandNothingness.Whilehispre-waressayshadbeenHusserlianininspiration,thisworkowesagreatdebttoHeidegger,whichisacknowledgedbytheformofitstitle.PartsofBeingandNothingnessareasdifficultasanythinginSeinundZeit.But,asbefitsanovelistandplaywright,Sartrehadagift,whichHeideggerlacked,forillustratingphilosophicalpointswithdetailedandconvincingnarratives.AfterthewarSartrereturnedtopresentthemainthemesofhisworkinabrieferandmorepopularmannerinExistentialismandHumanism(1946).Being(l’eˆtre),forSartre,iswhatprecedesandunderliesallthedifferentkindsandaspectsofthingsthatweencounterinconsciousness.Wesortthingsintokindsandclassesinaccordancewithourinterestsandasinstrumentsforourpurposes.Ifwestripoffallthedistinctionsthatconsciousnesshasmade,weareleftwithpurebeing,beinginitself,l’en-soi.Thisisopaque,massive,simple,andaboveallcontingent.Itis‘withoutreason,withoutcause,withoutnecessity’(BN619).Tosaythatitiswithoutcauseisnottosaythatitisitsowncause,causasui;itisjustsimplythere—‘gratuitous’Sartrecallsit,andsometimes‘detrop’.Theen-soiisoneofthetwokeyconceptsofBeingandNothingness.Theotherislepour-soi,thefor-itself,thatistosayhumanconsciousness.Howisthisrelatedtothenothingnessofthetitle?Sartre’sansweristhatmanisthebeingthroughwhomnothingnesscomesintotheworld.Negationistheelementthatmakesthedifferencebetweenlepour-soiandl’en-soi.88\nFREUDTODERRIDASartreishereexpandingathemeofHeidegger’s.WhileEnglishphilo-sopherstookHeidegger’sdictum‘nothingnoths’(DasNichtsnichtet)asthequintessenceofabsurdity,Sartreacceptstheobjectificationofnothing,andattemptstogiveitanimportantsignificance.Whenconsciousnessarticu-latestheworld,itdoessobymeansofnegation.IfIhaveaconceptofred,Idividetheworldintotheredandthenot-red.IfIdistinguishbetweenchairsandtables,thenImustconsiderchairsasnot-tablesandtablesasnot-chairs.IfIwanttomakeadistinctionbetweenconsciousnessandbeing,Imustsaythatconsciousnessisnot-being:‘thebeingbywhichnothingnesscomesintotheworldmustbeitsownnothingness’(BN23).Tothehistorian,itlooksasifSartreisreintroducingintophilosophyaconundrumdevisedbyParmenidesandsolvedlongagobyPlato.3A.J.Ayer,in1945,comparedSartre’streatmentoflene´antwiththeresponseoftheKinginAliceinWonderlandwhenAlicesaysthatsheseesnobodyontheroad:‘IonlywishIhadsucheyes...TobeabletoseeNobody!Andatthatdistancetoo!’Fortunately,BeingandNothingness,despiteitstitle,containsmuchthatisofimportancequiteindependentlyofSartre’saccountof‘nihilification’.ThemostinterestingideaisagaintakenfromHeidegger.Whereasformostobjectsessenceprecedesexistence,‘thereisatleastonebeingwhoseexistencecomesbeforehisessence,abeingwhichexistsbeforeitcanbedefinedbyanyconceptionofit.Thatbeingisman’(EH66).Humanfreedomprecedestheessenceofmanandmakesitpossible.Whereasanoaktreehastofollowaparticularlifepatternbecausethatisthekindofthingitis,humanbeingsdonotbelongtoakindinthisway:itisforeachpersontodecidewhatkindofthingtobe.Humanfreedomcreatesafissureintheworldofobjects.Thelifeofahumanindividual,accordingtoSartre,isnotdeterminedinadvance,neitherbyacreator,norbynecessitatingcauses,norbyabsolutemorallaws.TheonenecessityIcannotescapeisthenecessitytochoose.Humanfreedomisabsolutebutitisalsoalarming,andwetrytohideitfromourselves,andadoptsomepredeterminedroleofferedbymorality,society,orreligion.Butoureffortsatconcealmentareboundtofail,andweendupdouble-minded,tacitlyawareofourfreedomwhilestrivingtoreduceourselvestomereobjects.ThisistheconditionthatSartrecalls‘badfaith’.3Seevol.I,pp.200and214.89\nFREUDTODERRIDAThealternativeattitudeistoacceptandaffirmone’sfreedomandaccepttheresponsibilityforone’sownactsandlife,unsustainedbyanypre-existingmoralorderandunconstrainedbyanycontingentcircumstances.Tobesure,therewillbephysicallimitstomypossibleactions,butbytheadjustmentofmyowndesiresandprojectsitisIwhoconfersignificanceonthesituationinwhichIfindmyself.Imustmakeatotalchoiceofmyself.‘Iemergealoneandindreadinthefaceoftheuniqueandfirstprojectwhichconstitutesmybeing:allthebarriers,alltherailings,collapse,annihilatedbytheconsciousnessofmyliberty;Ihavenot,norcanIhave,recoursetoanyvalueagainstthefactthatitisIwhomaintainvaluesinbeing’(EH66).IntheyearsafterthewarSartre,withSimonedeBeauvoir,becamethecentreoftheculturalandintellectuallifeoftheleftbankofParis.Hefoundedandeditedanavant-gardemonthly,LesTempsModernes,andwroteanumberofsuccessfulnovelsandplays,ofwhichperhapsthebestknownwasHuisclos(‘InCamera’),whichcontainstheoften-quotedline‘Hellisotherpeople’.InBeingandNothingness,inadditiontotheen-soiandthepour-soi,Sartrehadintroducedthenotionofbeing-for-others.ThisisessentiallythewayinwhichIampresentedtoothersandobservedbythem,becomingnothingmorethananobjectforthem,theobjectperhapsoftheirenvyorcontempt.Theoriginalmeaningofbeing-for-others,hehadwritten,isconflict.InhislaterworkSartredevelopedthisthemeandgaveitgreaterimportance.OnsocialandpoliticalviewshetookuppositionsclosetothoseoftheCommunistParty,thoughMarxistdeterminismwasnoteasytoreconcilewiththeabsolutelibertarianismthatwasthekeynoteofexistentialism.InanefforttoresolvethistensionhewroteaCritiqueofDialecticalReasonin1960.In1964hedeclinedtheNobelPrizeforliteratureandin1968hesupportedthestudentrebellionsthatthreatenedthedeGaullegovernment.Hediedin1980.JacquesDerridaForabriefperiodinthe1960sitlookedasiftheremightbearapproche-mentbetweenContinentalandAnglophonephilosophy.In1962athirty-two-year-oldphilosopher,ofAlgerianJewishparentage,calledJacques90\nFREUDTODERRIDADerridapublishedadoctoralthesisonHusserlandgeometry.InthesameyeartherewasposthumouslypublishedasetoflecturesbytheOxfordphilosopherJ.L.Austin(1911–60),entitledHowtoDoThingswithWords,whichcontainedatheoryofthedifferentkindsofspeechacts.In1967Derridapublishedthreehighlyoriginalworks(WritingandDifference,SpeechandPhenomena,andOfGrammatology)whichboreclearmarksofAustin’sinfluence.Thetwophilosophers,however,treatedthesametopicinverydifferentways.Austinstarted,asearlyas1946,fromadistinctionbetweentwokindsofspeech,constativeandperformative.Aconstativesentenceisusedtostatehowthingsareasamatteroffact:‘Itisraining’,‘Thetrainisapproaching’.Performativeutterances,however,werenotstatementsthatcouldbejudgedandfoundtrueorfalsebycomparisonwiththefacts;theywerespeechactsthatchangedthingsratherthanreportedonthem.Examplesare‘InamethisshiptheQueenElizabeth’,‘Ipromisetomeetyouatteno’clock’,‘Ibequeathmywatchtomybrother’.Austinwentontoclassifymanydifferentkindsofperformativeutter-ances,suchasbets,appointments,vetoes,apologies,andcurses,andtoidentifyconcealedperformativeelementsinapparentlystraightforwardstatements.Initsdevelopedstagehistheorymaderoom,inspeechacts,forthreeelements:thelocutionary,theillocutionary,andtheperlocu-tionaryforce.Supposesomeonesaystome‘Shoother!’Thelocutionaryactisdefinedbyspecifyingthesenseof‘shoot’andthereferenceof‘her’.Theillocutionaryactisoneofordering,orurging,etc.Theperlocutionaryact(whichtakesplaceonlyiftheillocutionaryactachievesitsgoal)wouldbedescribedby,forexample,‘Hemademeshoother’.Austinintroducedmanynewtechnicaltermstobringoutdistinctionsbetweendifferentkindsofspeechactsandelementswithinthem.Eachterm,asintroduced,isdefinedinlucidtermsandisilluminatedbyexamples.Theoveralleffectistobringclarity,atamicroscopiclevel,intoavastandimportantfieldofthephilosophyoflanguage.Derrida’smethodisquitedifferent.He,too,introducestechnicaltermsingreatprofusion:forinstance,‘gram’,‘reserve’,‘incision’,‘trace’,‘spacing’,‘blank’,‘supplement’,‘pharmakon’,andmanyothers.Butheismuchlesswillingtoofferdefinitionsofthem,andoftenseemstorejecttheveryrequestforadefinitionassomehowimproper.Therelevanceofhisillus-trativeexamplesisrarelyclear,sothatevenbanalfeaturesoflanguagetakeonanairofmystery.91\nFREUDTODERRIDAIntreatingofspeechacts,Austinwasnotparticularlyinterestedinthedistinctionbetweenwhatisspoken(asinanoralpromise)andwhatiswritten(asinawill);thephilosophicalpointshemakesapplyingeneraltobothkindsoflanguageuse.Derrida,ontheotherhand,attachedgreatimportanttothedistinction,attackingwhathecalls‘phonocentrism’,theallegedoveremphasisinWesterncivilizationonthespokenword.Giventheemphasisplacedbybothlawandbusinessongettingthingsinwriting,andtheenormouseffortsmodernsocietieshaveputintomakingtheircitizensliterate,Derrida’schargeofphonocentrismhastobebasedonanumberofeccentrictextsstartingwithanironicpassageinPlato’sPhaedrus.AmongperformativespeechactspromisingisaparadigmcasethatinterestedbothAustinandDerrida.Austinlisted,inaninstructiveway,thedifferentkindsofinfelicitythatmayaffectapromise,frominsinceritytoincapacity.Derridawasprincipallyimpressedbythefactthatonemaydiebeforefulfillingapromise,acircumstancewhichheexpressesbysayingthateveryperformativeishauntedbydeath.But,paceDerrida,sinceweareall,always,mortal,thepossibilityofdeathtellsusnothingaboutperforma-tivesinparticular.Cyclingtowork,nolessthanmakingapromise,issomethingthatmaybeinterruptedbydeath.Ofcourse,inapromisedeathmayactuallybementioned,aswhenbrideandgroomvowfidelity‘tilldeathdouspart’.Butinthatcase,apromiseisnotinfactbroken,orleftunfulfilled,whenoneofthespousesdies.Derrida’shostilitytophonocentrismwaspartofanattackonwhathecalled‘themetaphysicsofpresence’,thenotionthatthebasisofclaimstomeaningandtruthissomethingintimategiveninconsciousness.TheprimetargetofhisattackwasHusserl,buttheempiricistnotionofsense-dataliesopentosimilarcriticism.SpeechwasgivenprimacyoverwritinginWesterntradition,heclaims,becausespeechiscloserthanwritingtothethinkingthatisidealizedastheultimate,transcendentalobjectofsignifi-cation.Derrida‘deconstructs’theoppositionbetweenspeechandwritingandgivestheprivilegedpositiontothewrittentext,theonefurthestfromthecontrolofitsauthor,theonemostcapableofdiverseandsupersedinginterpretations.SomehaveseenDerrida’sattackonthemetaphysicsofpresenceasanenterprise,inaverydifferentkey,paralleltoWittgenstein’sdemolitionofthenotionofaprivatelanguage.Derridainhisearlyworksshowedevidenceofgreatphilosophicalacumen;butafter1967histhinkingandwritingmovedfurtherandfurther92\nFREUDTODERRIDAawayfromthatofAustinandWittgenstein.Ashiscareerdeveloped,hisstyleofoperationmovedfarawaynotonlyfromcurrentanalyticphiloso-phy,butfromphilosophyasunderstoodbythegreatphilosophersfromAristotletoHusserl.Ithasalwaysbeenseenasataskofphilosopherstodrawdistinctionsbetweenconceptsthatmaybeconfusedwitheachother,andifnecessarytoinventoradapttermstomarkthesedistinctions.Derrida,bycontrast,introducednewtermswhoseeffectwastoconfuseideasthatareperfectlydistinct.Considerthenotionof‘deferrence’(diffe´rance),inwhichDerridatookgreatpride.4Deferrenceissupposedtocombinethenotionsofdeferring(puttingoff)anddifference(beingdistinct).‘Deferrence’,hetellsus,‘istobeconceivedpriortotheseparationbetweendeferringasdelayanddifferingastheactualworkofdifference’(SP88).Itisnotclearhowthesetwocontrastingnotionscanbecombinedinthisway,andtheexplicationsandparaphrasesofferedbyDerridaarenotaltogetherhelpful:Deferrenceiswhatmakesthemovementofsignificationpossibleonlyifeachso-calledpresentelement,eachelementappearingonthesceneofpresence,isrelatedtosomethingotherthanitself,therebykeepingwithinitselfthemarkofapastelement,andalreadylettingitselfbevitiatedbythemarkofitsrelationtoafutureelement,thistracebeingrelatednolesstowhatiscalledthefuturethantowhatiscalledthepast,andconstitutingwhatiscalledthepresentbymeansofthisveryrelationtowhatitisnot,towhatitabsolutelyisnot:thatis,noteventoapastorafutureasamodifiedpresent.(Diff.13)Onecanseewhathemeans.IfIsaytothebreakfastwaiter‘baconandeggs’,themeaningofwhatIsaydependsonthefactthatatthemomentwhenIuttertheword‘and’theword‘bacon’isinthepast,butremainsrelatedtoit;moreoverthe‘and’isalsorelatedtotheword‘eggs’thathasnotyetbeenuttered,butisabouttoberelatedtoit.Verytrue.Andifthatiswhatdeferrencemeans,thenwhatDerridasaysofitisperfectlycorrect:‘itisnotthenameofanobject,notthenameofsome‘‘being’’thatcouldbepresent.Andforthatreasonitisnotaconcepteither.’Butthatcannotbeall‘deferrence’means,becauseweknowthatsomeofDerrida’sreadershave4Theword‘diffe´rance’isoftentranslatedby‘differance’,butmytranslationcorrespondsmoreexactlytotheconstructionoftheFrenchword.Imust,however,askthereadertopronounceitexactlylike‘difference’,outofdeferencetoDerrida,whoattachedimportancetotheequivalentFrenchwordssoundingalike.93\nFREUDTODERRIDAtakenittobeanameofGod—thoughDerridareassuresusthatit‘blockseveryrelationshiptotheology’(P40).Thevariousparaphraseswefindof‘deferrence’inhistextsareperhapsthemselvesaninstanceofdeferrence:IOUsthatarequitedistinctfromadefinitionandwhichputofftoanindefinitefutureanactualconfermentofsense.Derridadevisedamethodofdealingwithauthors,atechniquethatcanbenicknamedthenosegaymethod.Toassembleanosegay,onecollectsanumberoftextsthatcontainthesameword(oroftenjustthesamephoneme).Onethensnipsthemoutofcontextanddate,discardsuttererorvoice,andmodifiesthenaturalsensebyitalicization,omission,ortruncation.Onegathersthemtogetherandpresentsthemasanosegaywithsomestrikingorprovocativethesistiedaroundit.Thenosegaytechniquebecamepopularinsomedepartmentsofliterature,sinceitdemandsconsiderablylesseffortthanmoretraditionalmethodsofliterarycriticism.ThelaterDerridamaintainsthereader’sattentionbythedeftdeploy-mentofrhetoric.Aparticularlysuccessfuldevicemightbenamed‘theirrefutableparadox’.OneofthemostoftenquotedlinesinGrammatology—underlinedbytheauthorhimself—is‘Thereisnothingoutsidethetext.’Anarresting,evenshocking,remark!SurelytheBlackDeathandtheHolocaustwerenottextualeventsinthewaythataneweditionofJohnson’sLivesofthePoetsisatextualevent.ButlaterDerridakindlyexplainsthatbytexthedoesnotmeanacorpusofwriting,butsomethingthatoverrunsthelimitsoftheworld,ofthereal,ofhistory.5Well,ifwhatwearebeingtoldissimplythatthereisnothingoutsidetheuniverse,itwouldberashtocontradict.Andaninjunctiontotrytoseethingsincontextissurelysoundadvice.Liketheskilfulrhetoricianthatheis,Derridakeepshisreadersawakebybringinginsexanddeath.Wehavealreadymetdeathhauntingtheperformatives;wemeetsexinequallyirrelevantplaces.Talkingtooneself,wearetold,standsinthesamerelationtotalkingaloudasmasturbationstandstocopulation.Nodoubtitdoes.Anolessaptcomparisonwouldhavebeenwithsolitairevs.whist;butthatwouldnothavetickledthereaderinquitethesameway.Again,attheendofthebookofRevelation,5‘LivingOn’,inHaroldBloomfield(ed.),DeconstructionandCriticism(NewYork:SeaburyPress,1979).94\nFREUDTODERRIDAJacquesDerrida,photographedafterhehadachievediconicstatusinmanycirclesweread:‘AndtheSpiritandthebridesayCome!AndlethimthathearethsayCome!’(22:17).Derridahaswrittenatlengthonthistext,makinggreatplaywiththedoubleentendrethatattaches,inFrenchasinEnglish,totheword‘come’.IfonewerechurlishenoughtopointoutthattheGreekwordtranslated‘come’cannotpossiblyhavethesenseof‘achieveorgasm’,onewouldnodoubtbetoldthatonehadmissedthewholethrustoftheexercise.ItmayappearunseemlytocriticizeDerridainthemannerjustillustrated.Thereasonfordoingsoisthatsuchaparodyoffaircommentispreciselythemethodheadoptedinhisownlaterwork:hisphilosophicalweaponsarethepun,thebawdy,thesneer,andthesnigger.Normally,thehistoriantriestoidentifysomeofthemajordoctrinesofaphilosopher,presentthemasclearlyashecan,andthenperhapsaddawordofevaluation.InthelaterDerridatherearenodoctrinestopresent.Itisnotjustthatanunsympa-theticreadermayfailtoidentifyorunderstandthem;Derridahimselfrejects95\nFREUDTODERRIDAtheideathathisworkcanbeencapsulatedintheses.Indeed,sometimesheevendisclaimstheambitiontobeaphilosopher.Isitnotunfair,then,toincludeDerrida,whetherforblameorpraise,inahistorysuchasthis?Ithinknot.Whateverhehimselfmaysay,hehasbeentakenbymanypeopletobeaseriousphilosopher,andheshouldbeevaluatedassuch.Butitisunsurprisingthathisfamehasbeenlessinphilosophydepartmentsthanindepartmentsofliterature,whosemembershavehadlesspracticeindiscerninggenuinefromcounterfeitphilosophy.96\n4LogicMill’sEmpiricistLogicJohnStuartMill’sSystemofLogicfallsintotwoprincipalparts.Thefirsttwobookspresentasystemofformallogic;theremainderoftheworkdealswiththemethodologyofthenaturalandsocialsciences.Hebeginsthefirstpartwithananalysisoflanguage,andinparticularwithatheoryofnaming.MillwasthefirstBritishempiricisttotakeformallogicseriously,andfromthestartheisanxioustodissociatehimselffromthenominalismthathadbeenassociatedwithempiricismsincethetimeofHobbes.By‘nominalism’hemeansthetwo-nametheoryoftheproposition:thetheorythatapropositionistrueifandonlyifsubjectandpredicatearenamesofthesamething.TheHobbesianaccount,Millsays,fitsonlythosepropositionswherebothpredicateandsubjectarepropernames,suchas‘TullyisCicero’.Butitisasadlyinadequatetheoryofanyotherpropositions.Millusestheword‘name’verybroadly.Notonlypropernameslike‘Socrates’andpronounslike‘this’,butalsodefinitedescriptionslike‘thekingwhosucceededWilliamtheConqueror’,countasnamesforhim.Sotoodogeneraltermslike‘man’and‘wise’,andabstractnounslike‘wisdom’.Allnames,whetherparticularorgeneral,whetherabstractorconcrete,denotethings;propernamesdenotethethingstheynameandgeneraltermsdenotethethingstheyaretrueof:thusnotonly‘Socrates’butalso‘man’and‘wise’denoteSocrates.Generalterms,inadditiontohavingadenotationinthisway,alsohaveaconnotation:thereareitemstheycon-noteaswellasitemstheydenote.Whattheyconnotearetheattributesthey\nLOGICsignify,thatistosay,whatwouldbespecifiedinadictionarydefinitionofthem.Inlogic,connotationispriortodenotation:‘whenmankindfixedthewordwisetheywerenotthinkingofSocrates’(SL1.2.5.2).Since‘name’coverssuchamultitudeofterms,Millcanacceptthenominalistviewthateverypropositionisaconjunctionofnames.ButthisdoesnotcommithimtotheHobbesianviewsince,unlikeHobbes,hecanappealtoconnotationinsettingoutthetruth-conditionsofpropositions.Asentencejoiningtwoconnotativeterms,suchas‘allmenaremortal’,tellsusthatcertainattributes(those,say,ofanimalityandrationality)arealwaysaccompaniedbytheattributeofmortality.Inhissecondbook,Milldiscussesinference,ofwhichhedistinguishedtwokinds,realandverbal.Verbalinferencebringsusnonewknowledgeabouttheworld;knowledgeofthelanguagealoneissufficienttoenableustoderivetheconclusionfromthepremiss.Asanexampleofaverbalinference,Millgivestheinferencefrom‘Nogreatgeneralisarashman’to‘Norashmanisagreatgeneral’:bothpremissandconclusion,hetellsus,saythesamething.Thereisrealinferencewhenweinfertoatruth,intheconclusion,whichisnotcontainedinthepremisses.Millfounditverydifficulttoexplainhownewtruthscouldbediscov-eredbygeneralreasoning.Heacceptedthatallreasoningwassyllogistic,andheclaimedthatineverysyllogismtheconclusionisactuallycontainedandimpliedinthepremisses.Taketheargumentfromthepremisses‘Allmenaremortal,andSocratesisaman’totheconclusion‘Socratesismortal’.Ifthissyllogismistobedeductivelyvalid,thensurelytheprop-osition‘Socratesismortal’mustbepresupposedinthemoregeneralassumption‘Allmenaremortal’.Ontheotherhandifwesubstitutefor‘Socrates’thenameofsomeonenotyetdead(Mill’sexamplewas‘theDukeofWellington’)thentheconclusiondoesgiveusnewinformation,butitisnotjustifiedbytheevidencesummarizedinthefirstpremiss.Hencethesyllogismisnotagenuineinference:Allinferenceisfromparticularstoparticulars.Generalpropositionsaremerelyregistersofsuchinferencesalreadymade,andshortformulaeformakingmore.Themajorpremiseofasyllogism,consequently,isaformulaofthisdescription;andtheconclusionisnotaninferencedrawnfromtheformula,butaninferencedrawnaccordingtotheformula;thereallogicalantecedentorpremisebeingtheparticularfactsfromwhichthegeneralpropositionwascollectedbyinduction.(SL3.3.4)98\nLOGIC‘Induction’wasanamethathadlongbeengivenbylogicianstotheprocessofderivingageneraltruthfromparticularinstances.Butthereismorethanonekindofinduction.SupposeIstate‘PeterisaJew,JamesisaJew,JohnisaJew...’andthengoontoenumeratealltheApostles.Imaygoontoconclude‘AlltheApostlesareJews’,butifIdoso,Millsays,Iamnotreallymovingfromparticulartogeneral:theconclusionismerelyanabridgednotationfortheparticularfactsenunciatedinthepremiss.Mattersareverydifferentwhenwemakeageneralizationonthebasisonlyofanincompletesurveyoftheitemstowhichitapplies—aswhenweconcludefromprevioushumandeathsthatallhumansofalltimeswilldie.Mill’scriticismofdeductiveargumentinvolvesaconfusionbetweenlogicandepistemology.Aninferencemaybe,ashesays,deductivelyvalidwithoutbeinginformative:validityisanecessarybutnotasufficientconditionforanargumenttoproducetrueinformation.Butsyllogismisnottheonlyformofinference,andtherearemanyvalidnon-syllogisticarguments(e.g.argumentsoftheform‘A¼B’,‘B¼C’,therefore‘A¼C’)whicharequitecapableofconveyinginformation.Eveninthecaseofsyllogism,itispossibletogiveanaccountthatmakesitarealinferenceifweinterpret‘Allmenaremortal’notassayingthat‘mortal’isanameofeverymemberoftheclassofmenbut—inaccordancewithMill’sownaccountofnaming—assayingthatthereisaconnectionbetweentheattributesconnotedby‘man’andby‘mortal’.Millwouldnodoubtrespondbyaskinghowwecouldeverknowsuchaconnection,ifnotbyinduction;andthemostinterestingpartofhisLogicishisattempttosetouttherulesofinductivediscovery.Hesetoutfiverules,orcanons,ofexperimentalinquirytoguideresearchersintheinductivediscoveryofcausesandeffects.Wemayconsiderasillustrationsthefirsttwoofthesecanons.Thefirstiscalledthemethodofagreement.Itstatesthatifapheno-menonFappearsintheconjunctionofthecircumstancesA,B,andC,andalsointheconjunctionofthecircumstancesC,D,andE,thenwearetoconcludethatC,theonlycommonfeature,iscausallyrelatedtoF.Thesecond,themethodofdisagreement,statesthatifFoccursinthepresenceofA,B,andC,butnotinthepresenceofA,BandD,thenwearetoconcludethatC,theonlyfeaturedifferentiatingthetwocases,iscausallyrelatedtoF.99\nLOGICMillmaintainsthatwearealways,thoughnotnecessarilyconsciously,applyinghiscanonsindailylifeandinthecourtsoflaw.Thus,toillustratethesecondcanonhesays,‘Whenamanisshotthroughtheheart,itisbythismethodweknowthatitwasthegunshotwhichkilledhim:forhewasinthefullnessoflifeimmediatelybefore,allcircumstancesbeingthesame,exceptthewound.’Mill’smethodsofagreementanddisagreementareasophisticationofBacon’stablesofpresenceandabsence.1LikeBacon’s,Mill’smethodsseemtoassumetheconstancyofgenerallaws.Millsaysexplicitly,‘Thepropos-itionthatthecourseofNatureisuniform,isthefundamentalprinciple,orgeneralaxiom,ofInduction.’Butwheredoesthisgeneralaxiomcomefrom?Asathoroughgoingempiricist,Milltreatsitasbeingitselfagener-alizationfromexperience:itwouldberash,hesays,toassumethatthelawofcausationappliedondistantstars.Butifthisverygeneralprincipleisthebasisofinduction,itisdifficulttoseehowitcanitselfbeestablishedbyinduction.ButthenMillwaspreparedtoaffirmthatnotonlythefunda-mentallawsofphysics,butthoseofarithmeticandlogic,includingtheveryprincipleofnon-contradictionitself,werenothingmorethanverywell-confirmedgeneralizationsfromexperience.2Frege’sRefoundationofLogicOnthesemattersFregeoccupiedtheoppositepolefromMill.WhileforMillpropositionsofeverykindwereknownaposteriori,forFregearith-meticnolessthanlogicwasnotonlyaprioributalsoanalytic.Inordertoestablishthis,FregehadtoinvestigateandsystematizelogictoadegreethatneitherMillnoranyofhispredecessorshadachieved.Heorganizedlogicinawhollynewway,andbecameineffectthesecondfounderofthedisciplinefirstestablishedbyAristotle.Onewaytodefinelogicistosaythatitisthedisciplinethatsortsoutgoodinferencesfrombad.InthecenturiesprecedingFregethemostimportantpartoflogichadbeenthestudyofthevalidityandinvalidityofaparticularformofinference,namelythesyllogism.Elaborateruleshadbeendrawnuptodistinguishbetweenvalidinferencessuchas1Seevol.III,p.31.2SeeCh.6below.100\nLOGICAllGermansareEuropeans.SomeGermansareblonde.Therefore,SomeEuropeansareblonde.andinvalidinferencessuchasAllcowsaremammals.Somemammalsarequadrupeds.Therefore,Allcowsarequadrupeds.Thoughboththeseinferenceshavetrueconclusions,onlythefirstisvalid,thatistosay,onlythefirstisaninferenceofaformthatwillneverleadfromtruepremissestoafalseconclusion.Syllogistic,infact,coversonlyasmallproportionoftheformsofvalidreasoning.InAnthonyTrollope’sThePrimeMinistertheDuchessofOmniumisanxioustoplaceafavouriteofhersasMemberofParliamentfortheboroughofSilverbridge,whichhastraditionallybeeninthegiftoftheDukesofOmnium.Hetellsusthatshe‘hadalittlesyllogisminherheadastotheDukerulingtheborough,theDuke’swiferulingtheDuke,andthereforetheDuke’swiferulingtheborough’.TheDuchess’sreasoningisperfectlyvalid,butitisnotasyllogism,andcannotbeformulatedasone.Thisisbecauseherreasoningdependsonthefactthat‘rules’isatransitiverelation(ifArulesBandBrulesC,thenAdoesindeedruleC),whilesyllogisticisasystemdesignedtodealonlywithsubject–predicatesentences,andnotrichenoughtocopewithrelationalstatements.Afurtherweaknessofsyllogisticwasthatitcouldnotcopewithinferencesinwhichwordslike‘all’or‘some’occurrednotinthesubjectplacebutsomewhereinthegrammaticalpredicate.Theruleswouldnotdeterminethevalidityofinferencesthatcontainedpremissessuchas‘Allpoliticianstellsomelies’or‘Nobodycanspeakeverylanguage’incaseswheretheinferenceturnedontheword‘some’inthefirstsentenceortheword‘every’inthesecond.Fregedevisedasystemtoovercomethesedifficulties,whichheexpoundedfirstinhisBegriffsschrift.Thefirststepwastoreplacethegram-maticalnotionsofsubjectandpredicatewithnewlogicalnotions,whichFregecalled‘argument’and‘function’.Inthesentence‘WellingtondefeatedNapoleon’grammarianswouldsay(orusedtosay)that‘Wellington’wasthesubjectand‘defeatedNapoleon’thepredicate.Frege’sintroductionof101\nLOGICTrollope’sLadyGlencoraPalliserrulednotjustonebuttwoDukesofOmnium.Here,inMillais’illustrationtoPhineasFinn,sheestablishesherdominionovertheelderDukebypresentinghimwithagrandson.102\nLOGICthenotionsofargumentandfunctionoffersamoreflexiblemethodofanalysingthesentence.Thisishowitworks.Supposethatwetakeoursentence‘WellingtondefeatedNapoleon’andputintoit,inplaceofthename‘Napoleon’,thename‘Nelson’.Clearlythisaltersthecontentofthesentence,andindeeditturnsitfromatruesentenceintoafalsesentence.Wecanthinkofthesentenceasinthiswayconsistingofaconstantcomponent,‘Wellingtondefeated...’,andareplaceableelement,‘Napoleon’.Fregecallsthefirst,fixedcomponentafunction,andthesecondcomponenttheargumentofthefunction.Thesentence‘WellingtondefeatedNapoleon’is,asFregewouldputit,thevalueofthefunction‘Wellingtondefeated...’fortheargument‘Napoleon’andthesentence‘WellingtondefeatedNelson’isthevalueofthesamefunctionfortheargument‘Nelson’.Wecouldalsoanalysethesentenceinadifferentway.‘WellingtondefeatedNapoleon’isalsothevalueofthefunction‘...defeatedNapoleon’fortheargument‘Wellington’.Wecangofurther,andsaythatthesentenceisthevalueofthefunction‘...defeated...’forthearguments‘Wellington’and‘Napoleon’(takeninthatorder).InFrege’sterminology,‘Wellingtondefeated...’and‘...defeatedNapoleon’arefunctionsofasingleargument;‘...defeated...’isafunctionoftwoarguments.3Itwillbeseenthatincomparisonwiththesubject–predicatedistinctionthefunction–argumentdichotomyprovidesamuchmoreflexiblemethodofbringingoutlogicallyrelevantsimilaritiesbetweensentences.Subject–predicateanalysisissufficienttomarkthesimilaritybetween‘CaesarconqueredGaul’and‘CaesardefeatedPompey’,butitisblindtothesimilaritybetween‘CaesarconqueredGaul’and‘PompeyavoidedGaul’.Thisbecomesamatteroflogicalimportancewhenwedealwithsentencessuchasthoseoccurringinsyllogismsthatcontainnotpropernameslike‘Caesar’and‘Gaul’,butquantifiedexpressionssuchas‘allRomans’or‘someprovince’.Havingintroducedthesenotionsoffunctionandargument,Frege’snextstepistointroduceanewnotationtoexpressthekindofgeneralityexpressedbyawordlike‘all’nomatterwhereitoccursinasentence.If‘Socratesis3AsIhaveexplainedthemabove,followingBegriffsschrift,functionsandargumentsandtheirvaluesareallbitsoflanguage:namesandsentences,withorwithoutgaps.InhislaterwritingsFregeappliedthenotionsmoreoftennottolinguisticitems,buttotheitemsthatlanguageisusedtoexpressandtalkabout.Iwilldiscussthisinthechapteronmetaphysics(Ch.7).103\nLOGICmortal’isatruesentence,wecansaythatthefunction‘...ismortal’holdstruefortheargument‘Socrates’.Toexpressgeneralityweneedasymboltoindicatethatacertainfunctionholdstruenomatterwhatitsargumentis.AdaptingthenotationthatFregeintroduced,logicianswrite(x)(xismortal)tosignifythatnomatterwhatnameisattachedasanargumenttothefunction‘...ismortal’,thefunctionholdstrue.Thenotationcanbereadas‘Forallx,xismortal’anditisequivalenttothestatementthateverythingwhateverismortal.Thisnotationforgeneralitycanbeappliedinallthedifferentwaysinwhichsentencescanbeanalysedintofunctionandargument.Thus‘(x)(Godisgreaterthanx)’isequivalentto‘Godisgreaterthaneverything’.Itcanbecombinedwithasignfornegation(‘’)toproducenotationsequivalenttosentencescontaining‘no’and‘none’.Thus‘(x)(xisimmortal)’¼‘Forallx,itisnotthecasethatxisimmortal’¼‘Nothingisimmortal’.Torenderasentencecontainingexpressionslike‘some’Fregeexploitedtheequivalence,longacceptedbylogicians,between(forexample)‘SomeRomanswerecowards’and‘NotallRomanswerenotcowards’.Thus‘Somethingsaremortal’¼‘Itisnotthecasethatnothingismortal’¼‘(x)(xismortal)’.Forconveniencehisfollowersused,for‘some’,asign‘(Ex)’asequivalentto‘(x)’.Frege’snotation,anditsabbreviation,canbeusedtomakestatementsabouttheexistenceofthingsofdifferentkinds.‘(Ex)(xisahorse)’,forinstance,istantamountto‘Therearehorses’(provided,asFregenotes,thatthissentenceisunderstoodascoveringalsothecasewherethereisonlyonehorse).Fregebelievedthatobjectsofallkindswerenameable—numbers,forinstance,werenamedbynumerals—andtheargumentplacesinhislogicalnotationcanbefilledwiththenameofanythingwhatever.Consequently‘(x)(xismortal)’meansnotjustthateveryoneismortal,butthatevery-thingwhateverismortal.Sounderstood,itisafalseproposition,because,forinstance,thenumbertenisnotmortal.Itisrare,infact,forustowanttomakestatementsofsuchunrestrictedgenerality.Itismuchmorecommonforustowanttosaythateverythingofacertainkindhasacertainproperty,orthateverythingthathasacertaingivenpropertyalsohasacertainotherproperty.‘Allmenaremortal’or‘Whatgoesupmustcomedown’areexamplesoftypicaluniversal104\nLOGICsentencesofordinarylanguage.InordertoexpresssuchsentencesinFrege’ssystemonemustgrafthispredicatecalculus(thetheoryofquan-tifierssuchas‘some’and‘all’)ontoapropositionalcalculus(thetheoryofconnectivesbetweensentences,suchas‘if’and‘and’).InFrege’ssystemofpropositionallogicthemostimportantelementisasignforconditionality,roughlycorrespondingto‘if’inordinarylanguage.TheStoiclogicianPhilo,inancienttimes,haddefined‘Ifpthenq’bysayingthatitwasapropositionthatwasfalseinthecaseinwhichpwastrueandqfalse,andtrueinthethreeotherpossiblecases.4Fregedefinedhissignforconditionality(whichwemayrender‘!’)inasimilarmanner.Hewarnedthatitdidnotaltogethercorrespondto‘if...then’inordinarylanguage.Ifwetake‘p!q’asequivalentto‘Ifpthenq’thenpropositionssuchas‘Ifthesunisshining,37¼21’and‘Ifperpetualmotionispossible,thenpigscanfly’turnouttrue—simplybecausetheconsequentofthefirstpropositionistrue,andtheantecedentofthesecondpropositionisfalse.‘If’behavesdifferentlyinordinarylanguage;theuseofitthatisclosestto‘!’isinsentencessuchas‘Ifthosecurtainsmatchthatsofa,thenI’maDutchman’.Frege’ssigncanbelookedonasastripped-downversionoftheword‘if’,designedtocapturejustthataspectofitsmeaningthatisnecessaryfortheformulationofrigorousproofscontainingit.InFrege’sterminology,‘...!...’isafunctionthattakessentencesasitsarguments:itsvalues,too,aresentences.Whetherthesentencesthatareitsvalues(sentencesoftheform‘p!q’)aretrueorfalsewilldependonlyonwhetherthesentencesthatareitsarguments(‘p’and‘q’)aretrueorfalse.Wemaycallfunctionsofthiskind‘truth-functions’.Theconditionalisnottheonlytruth-functioninFrege’ssystem.Sotooisnegation,representedbythesign‘’,sinceanegatedsentenceistruejustincasethesentencenegatedisfalse,andviceversa.WiththeaidofthesetwosymbolsFregebuiltupacompletesystemofpropositionallogic,derivingallthetruthsofthatlogicfromalimitedsetofprimitivetruthsoraxioms,suchas‘(q!p)!(p!q)’and‘p!p’.Connectivesotherthan‘if’,suchas‘and’and‘or’,aredefinedintermsofconditionalityandnegation.Thus,‘q!p’rulesoutthecaseinwhichpisfalseandqistrue:itmeansthatpandqarenotbothfalse,4Seevol.I,p.138.105\nLOGICandthereforeisequivalentto‘porq’(inmodernsymbols,‘pVq’).‘pandq’(‘p&q’),ontheotherhand,isrenderedbyFregeas‘ðq!pÞ’.AsFregerealized,adifferentsystemwouldbepossibleinwhichconjunctionwasprimitive,andconditionalitywasdefinedintermsofconjunctionandnegation.Butinlogic,hemaintained,deductionismoreimportantthanconjunction,andthatiswhy‘if’andnot‘and’istakenasprimitive.Earlierlogicianshaddrawnupanumberofrulesofinference,rulesforpassingfromonepropositiontoanother.Oneofthebestknownwascalledmodusponens:‘From‘‘p’’and‘‘Ifpthenq’’infer‘‘q’’’.InhissystemFregeclaimstoproveallthelawsoflogicusingthisasasingleruleofinference.Theotherrulesareeitheraxiomsofhissystemortheoremsprovedfromthem.Thustheruletraditionallycalledcontraposition,whichallowstheinferencefromIfJohnissnoring,JohnisasleeptoIfJohnisnotasleep,Johnisnotsnoring,isjustifiedbythefirstoftheaxiomsquotedabove.WhenweputtogetherFrege’spropositionalcalculusandhispredicatecalculuswecansymbolizetheuniversalsentencesofordinarylanguage,makinguseofboththesignofgeneralityandthesignofconditionality.Theexpression(x)(Fx!Gx)canbereadForallx,ifFxthenGx,whichmeansthatwhateverxmaybe,if‘Fx’istruethen‘Gx’istrue.Ifwesubstitute‘isaman’for‘F’and‘ismortal’for‘G’thenweobtain‘Forallx,ifxisaman,xismortal’,whichiswhatFregeoffersasthetranslationof‘Allmenaremortal’.Thecontradictoryofthis,‘Somemenarenotmortal’,comesoutas‘(x)(xisaman!xismortal)’anditscontrary,‘Nomanismortal’,comesoutas‘(x)(xisaman!xismortal)’.Bytheuseofthesetranslations,FregeisabletoproveaspartofhissystemtheoremscorrespondingtotheentirecorpusofAristoteliansyllogistic.106\nLOGICFrege’slogicalcalculusisnotjustmoresystematicthanAristotle’s;itisalsomorecomprehensive.Hissymbolismisable,forinstance,tomarkthedifferencebetweenEveryboylovessomegirl¼(x)(xisaboy!Ey(yisagirl&xlovesy))andtheapparentlysimilar(butmuchlessplausible)passiveversionofthesentenceSomegirlislovedbyeveryboy¼(Ey(yisagirl&(x)(xisaboy!xlovesy)).Aristotelianlogiciansinearlierageshadsoughtinvaintofindasimpleandconspicuouswayofbringingoutsuchdifferencesofmeaninginambiguoussentencesofordinarylanguage.AfinalsubtletyofFrege’ssystemmustbementioned.Thesentence‘Socratesismortal’,aswehaveseen,canbeanalysedashaving‘Socrates’forargument,and‘...ismortal’asfunction.Butthefunction‘...ismortal’canitselfberegardedasanargumentofadifferentfunction,afunctionoperatingatahigherlevel.Thisiswhathappenswhenwecompletethefunction‘...ismortal’notwithadeter-minateargument,butwithaquantifier,asin‘(x)(xismortal)’.Thequantifier‘(x)(x...)’canthenberegardedasasecond-levelfunctionofthefirst-levelfunction‘...ismortal’.Theinitialfunction,Fregealwaysemphasizes,isincomplete;butitmaybecompletedintwoways,eitherbyhavinganargumentinsertedinitsargumentplace,orbyitselfbecomingtheargumentofasecond-levelfunction.Thisiswhathappenswhentheellipsisin‘...ismortal’isfilledwithaquantifiersuchas‘Everything’.InductionandAbductioninPeirceAnumberofFrege’sinnovationsinlogicoccurred,quiteindependently,toC.S.Peirce;butPeircewasneverabletoincorporatehisresultsintoarigoroussystem,muchlesstopublishtheminadefinitiveform.Peirce’simportanceinthehistoryoflogicderivesratherfromhisinvestigationsintothestructureofscientificinquiry.Deductivelogicassistsusinorganizingourknowledge;butthekindofreasoningthatextendsourknowledge(‘ampliativeinference’asPeircecallsit)isofthreekinds:induction,hypothesis,andanalogy.Alloftheseinferences,Peirceclaimed,107\nLOGICModernsymboliclogicnolongerusestheactualsymbolsystemofitsfounderFrege,whichwasdifficulttoprint.Theillustrationshowsthepattern,inhisnotation,forderivingresultssuchas‘‘Ifthisostrichisabirdandcannotfly,itfollowsthatsomebirdscannotfly’’.dependessentiallyonsampling.Anyaccount,therefore,ofnon-deductiveinferencemustberelatedtothemathematicaltheoryofprobability(EWP177).Scientistsframehypotheses,makepredictionsonthebasesofthesehypotheses,andthenmakeobservationswithaviewtoconfirmingorrefutingtheirhypotheses.ThesethreestagesofinquiryarecalledbyPeirceabduction,deduction,andinduction.Intheabductivephasetheinquirerselectsatheoryforconsideration.Inthedeductivephaseheformulatesamethodtotestit.Intheinductivephaseheevaluatestheresultsofthetest.Howdoesascientistdecidewhichhypothesesareworthinductivetesting?Indef-initelymanydifferenttheoriesmightexplainthephenomenahewishestoinvestigate.Ifheisnottowastehistime,hisenergy,andhisresearchfunding,thescientistneedssomeguidanceaboutwhichtheoriestoexplore.Thisguidanceisgivenbytherulesofthelogicofabduction.Thetheorymust,iftrue,begenuinelyexplanatory;itmustbeempiricallytestable;itshouldbesimpleandnaturalandcoherewithexistingknowledge,thoughnotnecessarilywithoursubjectiveopinionsaboutantecedentlikelihood.(P7.220–1)Rulesofabduction,however,donotbythemselvesexplainthesuccessofscientistsintheirchoiceofhypotheses.Wehavetobelievethatintheirinvestigationofnaturetheyareassistedbynatureherself.Sciencepresupposesthatwehaveacapacityfor‘guessing’right.Weshalldobettertoabandonthewholeattempttolearnthetruth...unlesswecantrusttothehumanmind’shavingsuchapowerofguessingrightthatbeforeverymany108\nLOGIChypothesesshallhavebeentried,intelligentguessingmaybeexpectedtoleadustotheonewhichwillsupportalltests.(P6.530)Thistrusthastobepresupposedattheoutset,eventhoughitmayrestonnoevidence.Butinfactthehistoryofscienceshowssuchtrusttobewellfounded:‘ithasseldombeennecessarytotrymorethantwoorthreehypothesesmadebycleargeniusbeforetherightonewasfound’(P7.220)Oncethetheoryhasbeenchosen,abductionissucceededbydeduction.Consequencesarederivedfromthehypothesis,experimentalpredictionsthatis,whichwillcomeouttrueifthehypothesisiscorrect.Indeduction,Peircemaintained,themindisunderthedominionofhabit:ageneralideawillsuggestaparticularcase.Itisbyverifyingorfalsifyingthepredictionsoftheparticularinstantiationsthatthescientistwillconfirm,orasthecasemayberefute,thehypothesisundertest.Itisinductionthatistheall-importantelementinthetesting,andinductionisessentiallyamatterofsampling.SupposeashiparrivesinLiverpoolladenwithwheatinbulk.Supposethatbysomemachinerythewholecargobestirredupwithgreatthoroughness.Supposethattwenty-seventhimblefulsbetakenequallyfromtheforward,midships,andaftparts,fromthestarboard,centerandlarboardparts,andfromthetop,halfdepthandlowerpartsofherhold,andthatthesebeingmixedandthegrainscounted,four-fifthsofthelatterarefoundtobeofqualityA.Thenweinfer,experientiallyandprovisionally,thatapproximatelyfourfifthsofallthegraininthecargoisofthesamequality.(EWP177)Bysayingthatwedrawtheinferenceprovisionally,Peircemeansthatifourexperiencebeindefinitelyextended,andeverycorrectionthatpresentsitselfbedulyapplied,thenourapproximationwillbecomeindefinitelycloseinthelongrun.Inferenceofthiskind,Peirceclaims,restsonnopostulationofmatteroffact,butonlyonthemathematicsofprobability.Inductionthusdescribedisquantitativeinduction:aninferencefromtheproportionofasampletotheproportionofapopulation.Butthereisanotherkindofinductionthatisimportantnotonlyinsciencebutineverydaylife.Thatisqualitativeinduction,whenweinferfromoneormoreobservedqualitiesofanindividualtoother,unobservedqualities.ToillustratethisPeirceintroducesustotheconceptofthemugwump.Amugwump,hetellsus,hascertaincharacteristics:109\nLOGICHehasahighself-respectandplacesgreatvalueuponsocialdistinction.Helamentsthegreatpartthatrowdyismandunrefinedgood-fellowshipplayinthedealingsofAmericanpoliticianswiththeirconstituency....Heholdsthatmonetaryconsid-erationsshouldusuallybethedecisiveonesinquestionsofpublicpolicy.Herespectstheprincipleofindividualismandoflaissez-faireasthegreatestagencyofcivilisation.Theseviews,amongothers,Iknowtobetheobtrusivemarksofa‘mugwump’.Now,supposeIcasuallymeetamaninarailwaytrainandfallingintoconversationfindthatheholdsopinionsofthissort;Iamnaturallyledtosupposethatheis‘mugwump’.Thatishypotheticinference.Thatistosay,anumberofreadilyverifiableamarksofamugwumpbeingselected,Ifindthismanhasthese,andinferthathehasalltheothercharactersthatgotomakeathinkerofthatstripe.(EWP210)ThishomespunexampleillustratesthethreestagesofscientificinquiryasdescribedbyPeirce.Myfellowpassengerdeplorestheplebeianvulgarityofhiscongressman.Iframethehypothesisthatheisamugwump.Iconcludethatheislikelytoopposegovernmentregulationofbusiness.Iaskhimhisopiniononarecentmeasureinrestraintoftrade,andmyhypothesisisconfirmedbyhisvehementdenunciation.Itremains,how-ever,nomorethanprobable,inspiteoffurtherconversation,forthetrainjourneyis,mercifully,onlyfinitelylong.TheSagaofPrincipiaMathematicaPeirce’slogicalinvestigationsleftlittlemarkonthedevelopmentoflogicintheearlytwentiethcentury.ItwasrathertheworkofFregethatwascarriedforward,inparticularbytheworkofRussellandWhitehead,hissuccessorsinthequestforthelogicistgrail.ThethreevolumesofPrincipiaMathematicacontainasystematizationoflogicthatsoonbecamemuchbetterknownthanthatpresentedinFrege’sownworks.OnereasonforthegreaterpopularityofPrincipiaisthatitreplacesFrege’singeniousbutcumbersomesymbolismwithamuchmoreconvenientnotation,whichRussellandWhiteheadtookoverfromitsinventor,theItalianmathematicianGiuseppePeano.WhereasFrege’ssystemwastwo-dimensional,andcalledforcomplicatedtypesetting,thePeanosystemislinear,andcallsonlyforafewspecialsignsinadditiontolettersofthealphabet.Thusthetildesign‘’wasusedfornegation,thesign‘V’fordisjunction,andthehorseshoesign‘’forthetruth-functional‘if’.These110\nLOGICsignsforlogicalconnectivesarestillincommonuse,thoughweuseinthistextinsteadofthehorseshoethesign‘!’,whichisnowadayspreferred.ForconjunctionRussellandWhiteheadusedasimplepoint,asin‘p.q’;nowadaystheampersand,asin‘p&q’,iscommonlyusedinstead.RussellandWhiteheadexpresseduniversalquantificationthus:‘(x)F(x)’;andexist-entialquantificationthus:‘(Ex)F(x)’.Thesesymbols,too,arenowincommonuse;the‘E’inexistentialquantificationissometimesprintedinreverse.ThesystemofPrincipiais,likeFrege’s,anaxiomaticsysteminwhichlogicaltruthsarederivedbyrulefromahandfulofaxioms.Theinitialsetofaxioms,however,differsfromFrege’sset,andwhereasFregehadtaken‘if’and‘not’asprimitiveconnectivesfromwhichtheotherscouldbedefined,RussellandWhiteheadtook‘or’and‘not’(whichtheycalled‘logicalconstants’)asbasic.Infactmanyothersetsofaxiomsarepossible,withdifferentprimitiveconstants,andtheywerestudiedbylogiciansinthenextdecades.Butitsooncametoberealizedthataxiomaticsystemswerenottheonlyway,orevennecessarilythebestway,togivelogicarigorousform.ThiswasshownbyWittgenstein,whoinventedaformaldevicewhich,likemanyofthoseofFrege,passedintothelogictextbooks,namelythetruth-table.Itispossibletodefinethepropositionalconnectivesbysettingoutinatablethetruth-conditionsofpropositionscontainingthem.Thusthetablepqp&qTTTFTFTFFFFFrepresentsthat‘p&q’istrueinthecaseinwhich‘p’and‘q’arebothtrue,andfalseinthethreeotherpossiblecases,namely(a)when‘p’isfalseand‘q’istrue,(b)when‘p’istrueand‘q’isfalse,(c)when‘p’and‘q’arebothfalse.Thetruth-valueof‘p&q’,asthetablebringsout,isdeterminedbythetruth-valuesofthecomponentpropositions‘p’and‘q’;thecompoundproposition,wemaysay,isatruth-functionofitsconstituents,andthepossiblecombinationsofthetruth-valuesoftheconstituentssetoutthetruth-conditionsforthecompoundproposition.111\nLOGICSimilartablescanbesetoutfortheotherlogicalconstants,suchas‘or’and‘if’.‘Ifpthenq’iswrittenas‘p!q’andisinterpretedasatruth-functionalconditionthatistrueinallcasesexceptwhere‘p’istrueand‘q’isfalse.Thesimplesttruth-tableistheonefor‘not’:ppTFFTThisshowsthatapropositionistruewhenitsnegationisfalse,andviceversa.Propositionsofgreatlengthandcomplexitymaybebuiltupbyrepeateduseofthelogicalconstants,buthowevercomplextheyaretheirtruth-valuecanalwaysbedeterminedfromthetruth-valuesofthesimplepropositionsthatmakethemup(Wittgenstein,TLP5.31).Considerthefollowingproposition:Ifpandq,thennot-pandq.Thisisatruth-functionof‘p’and‘q’asshowninthefollowingtable:pqp&q!p&qTTTTTFFTFTFTFFTTTFTTTFTFFTFTFFFFFFFTTFFFThistableisconstructedinthefollowingmanner.Firstthecolumnsundereachoccurrenceofthesinglepropositionalvariablesarefilledinbycopyingoutthevaluesgiveninthetwoleft-handcolumns,whichrepresentaconventionalarrangementtoensurethatallpossiblecombinationsoftruth--valuesarecovered(TLP4.31).Theninthefourthcolumnfromtherightthetruth-valueof‘not-p’isfilledinunderthe‘’signbyreversingthetruth-valueof‘p’.Thenthecolumnsunderthe‘&s’arefilledinbyderivingthetruth-valueoftheconjunctpropositionsviathetablegivenearlier.Finallythe‘!’columniscomputed,thetruth-valuesbeingderivedfromthetruth-functionaldefinitionof‘if...then’.Thiscolumnshowsthevalueofthewholecomplexformulaforeverypossiblecombinationoftruth-valuesofitsconstitu-ents.Itturnsouttobefalseif‘p&q’istrue,andtobetrueinallothercases.112\nLOGICWhenweconstructtruth-tablesforcomplexpropositionsinthisman-ner,wesometimesfindthattheytakethesametruth-valueforeverypossibletruth-valueoftheelementarypropositions.Thus,theproposition‘pornotp’istruewhether‘p’istrueorfalse,asweseethus:ppVpTTTFTFFTTFOntheotherhand,theproposition‘pandnot-p’isfalsewhatever‘p’maybe:pp&pTTFFTFFFTFApropositionthatistrueforalltruth-possibilitiesofitselementaryproposi-tionsiscalledatautology;apropositionthatisfalseforalltruth-possibilitiesiscalledacontradiction(TLP4.46).Thetautologysetoutabovecorrespondstothelawofexcludedmiddle.Thetautologythatisthenegationofthecontradic-tionsetoutabovecorrespondstothelawofnon-contradiction.Thesetwolawsweretwoofthethreetraditionallawsofthought.Inthiswaythestudyoftautologieslinkswithold-fashionedlogics,butitalsomarksanadvanceonFrege’shandlingofpropositionallogic.ItcanbeshownthatallformulaethataretautologousbyWittgenstein’stestareeitheraxiomsortheoremsofFrege’ssystem,andconverselythatanythingthatcanbeprovedfromFrege’saxiomswillbeatautology.Thetruth-tablemethodandtheaxiomaticsystemthusturnouttobetwodevicesforhandlingthesamematerial,namelythelogicaltruismsofthepropos-itionalcalculus.Butthetruth-tablemethodhasseveraladvantagesovertheaxiomaticmethod.First,itrepresentsalllogicaltruthsasonalevelwitheachother,whereasFrege’ssystemandthesystemofPrincipiaprivilegeanarbitrarilychosensetofthemasaxioms.Second,thereisnoneedtoappealtoanyself-evidenceinlogic:thetruth-tablemethodisentirelymechanical,inthesensethatitcanbecarriedoutbyamachine.Finally,givenaformulaofthepropositionalcalculuswecanalwayssettle,bytheuseofatruth-table,whetherornotitisatautology.Anaxiomaticsystemoffersnothingcomparable.Tobesure,ifwediscoveraproofweknowtheformulaisa113\nLOGICtheorem;butifwefailtodiscoveraproofthismayexhibitnothingmorethanthelimitsofourowningenuity.Ifweareasked‘Ispatautologyornot?’,Wittgenstein’smethodgivesusafoolproofmethodofansweringthequestionnotonlywitha‘yes’butwitha‘no’.Theaxiomaticmethoddoesnotofferasimilardecisionprocedure(tousethetermthatbecamestandardamonglogicians).Theclassicalpropositionalcalculus,asformulatedindifferentwaysbyFrege,Russell,andWittgenstein,wascriticizedbyaschooloflogicians,foundedbyL.E.J.Brouwer,whodeploredtheuseinmathematicsoftheprincipleofexcludedmiddle.Theselogicians,called‘intuitionists’,con-ceivedmathematicsasaconstructionofthehumanmind,andthereforetheyassignedtruthonlytosuchmathematicalpropositionsaswerecapableofdemonstration.Onthisbasisitwouldbewrongtoaffirm‘p’withoutindependentproof,simplybecauseonehadrefuted‘not-p’.Intuitionistsdevisedsystemsoflogicthatlackednotonly‘pVp’butotherfamiliartheoremssuchas‘p!p’.Logiciansinthe1920sand1930sshowedthatthereweremanydifferentwaysinwhichthepropositionalandpredicatecalculuscouldbeforma-lized.Besidesaxiomaticsystemscontainingoneorothersetofaxiomsplusanumberofrulesofinference,onecouldhaveasystemwithnorulesbutaninfinitesetofaxioms,orasystemwithnoaxiomsandalimitednumberofrules.AsystemofthelatterkindwasdevisedbyGeorgGentzenin1934:itconsistedofsevenrulesfortheintroductionofthelogicalconstantsandquantifiers,andeightrulesfortheirelimination.Formallogic,ifpresentedinthismanner,resemblesnon-formalargumentsineverydaylifemorecloselythananyaxiomaticsystemdoes.Systemsofthiskind,accordingly,werecalledsystemsof‘naturaldeduction’.Theywereappropriatenotonlyforclassicalbutalsoforintuitionistlogic.Besidesdevisingavarietyofmethodsofsystematizinglogic,logiciansinterestedthemselvesinestablishingsecond-ordertruthsaboutthepropertiesofvarioussystems.Onepropertythatitisdesirable,indeedessential,forasystemoflogictopossessisthepropertyofconsistency.Givenasetofaxiomsandrules,forinstance,weneedtoshowthatfromthoseaxioms,bythoserules,itwillneverbepossibletoderivetwopropositionsthatcontradicteachother.Anotherproperty,whichisdesirablebutnotessential,isthatofindependence:wewishtoshowthatnoaxiomofthesystemisderivablebytherulesfromtheremainingaxiomsofthesystem.ThelogicianPaulBernays114\nLOGICin1926showedthatthepropositionalsystemofPrincipiaMathematicawasconsistent,andthatfourofitsaxiomswereindependentofeachother,butthefifthwasdeducibleasathesisfromtheremainingfour.Themethodofprovingconsistencyandindependencedependsupontreatingtheaxiomsandtheoremsofadeductivesystemsimplyasabstractformulae,andtreatingtherulesofthesystemsimplyasmechanicalproceduresforobtainingoneformulafromanother.Thepropertiesofthesystemarethenexploredbyofferingasetofobjectsasamodel,orinterpretation,oftheabstractcalculus.Theelementsofthesystemaremappedontotheobjectsandtheirrelationsinsuchawayastosatisfy,orbringouttrue,theformulaeofthesystem.AformulaPwillentailaformulaQifandonlyifallinterpretationsthatsatisfyPalsosatisfyQ.Thismodel-theoreticapproachtologicgraduallyassumedanimportanceequaltothatoftheearlierapproachthathadfocusedonthenotionofproof.Athirdpropertyofdeductivesystemsthatwasexploredbylogiciansintheinter-waryearswasthatofcompleteness.Anaxiomaticpresentationofthepropositionalcalculusiscompleteifandonlyifeverytruth-tabletautologyisprovablewithinthesystem.HilbertandAckermannin1928offeredaproofthatthepropositionalcalculusofPrincipiaMathematicawasinthissensecomplete.Indeed,itwascompletealsointhestrongersensethatifweaddanynon-tautologousformulaasanaxiom,wereachacontradiction.In1930KurtGo¨delprovedthatfirst-orderpredicatecalculus,thelogicofquantification,wascompleteintheweaker,butnotthestronger,sense.Thequestionnowarose:wasarithmetic,likegenerallogic,acompletesystem?Frege,Russell,andWhiteheadhadhopedthattheyhadestablishedthatarithmeticwasabranchoflogic.Russellwrote,‘Iftherearestillthosewhodonotadmittheidentityoflogicandmathematics,wemaychallengethemtoindicateatwhatpoint,inthesuccessivedefinitionsanddeductionsofPrincipiaMathematica,theyconsiderthatlogicendsandmathematicsbegins’(IMP194–5).Ifarithmeticwasabranchoflogic,andiflogicwascomplete,thenarithmeticshouldbeacompletesystemtoo.Go¨del,inanepoch-makingpaperof1931,showedthatitwasnot,andcouldnotbeturnedintoone.ByaningeniousdeviceheconstructedaformulawithinthesystemofPrincipiathatcanbeshowntobetrueandyetisnotprovablewithinthesystem:aformulathatineffectsaysofitselfthatitisunprovable.HedidthisbyshowinghowtoturnformulaeofthelogicalsystemintostatementsofarithmeticbyassociatingthesignsofPrincipiawith115\nLOGICnaturalnumbers,insuchawaythateveryrelationshipbetweentwoformulaeofthelogicalsystemcorrespondstoarelationbetweenthenumbersthusassociated.Inparticular,ifasetofformulaeA,B,CisaproofofaformulaD,thentherewillbeaspecificnumericalrelationshipbetweentheGo¨delnumbersofthefourformulae.HethenwentontoconstructaformulathatcouldonlyhaveaproofinthesystemiftherelevantGo¨delnumbersviolatedthelawsofarithmetic.Theformulamustthereforebeunprovable;yetGo¨delcouldshow,fromoutsidethesystem,thatitwasatrueformula.Wemightthinktoremedythisproblembyaddingtheunprovableformulaasanaxiomtothesystem;butthiswillenableanother,different,unprovableformulatobeconstructed,andsoonadinfinitum.Wehavetoconcludethatarithmeticisincompleteandincompletable.Evenifasystemiscomplete,itdoesnotfollowthattherewillalwaysbeawayofdecidingwhetherornotaparticularformulaisvalid.Productionofaproofwillofcourseprovethatitis;butfailuretoproduceaproofdoesnotprovethatitisinvalid.Forpropositionalcalculus,thereissuchadecisionprocedure:thetruth-tablemethodwillshowwhethersomethingisorisnotatautology.Arithmetic,beingincompletable,afortioriisundecidable.Butbetweenpropositionallogicandarithmetic,whatoffirst-orderpredicatelogic,whichGo¨delhadshowntobecomplete:isthereadecisionprocedurethere?Thepainstakingworkoflogiciansshowedthatpartsofthesystemweredecidable,butthattherecanbenodecisionprocedurefortheentirecalculus,norcanwegiveasatisfactoryrubrictodeterminewhichpartsaredecidableandwhicharenot.ModernModalLogicMeanwhile,otherlogicianswerestudyingabranchoflogicthathadbeenneglectedsincetheMiddleAges,modallogic.Modallogicisthelogicofthenotionsofnecessityandpossibility.ItsstudyinmoderntimesdatesfromtheworkofC.I.Lewisin1918,whoapproacheditviathetheoryofimplication.Whatisitforapropositionptoimplyapropositionq?RussellandWhiteheadtreatedtheirhorseshoesign(thetruth-functional‘if’)asasignofimplication,onthegroundsthat‘Ifpandp!qthenq’wasavalidinference.Buttheyrealizedthatitwasanoddformofimplication—itentails,forinstance,thatanyfalsepropositionimplieseveryproposition—andsotheygaveitthename116\nLOGICof‘materialimplication’.Lewisinsistedthattheonlygenuineimplicationwasstrictimplication:pimpliesqonlyifitisimpossiblethatpshouldbetrueandqfalse.‘pstrictlyimpliesq’,hemaintained,wasequivalentto‘qfollowslogicallyfromp’.Hedrewupaxiomaticsystemsinwhichthesignformaterialimplicationwasreplacedbyanewsigntorepresentstrictimplication,andthesesystemswerethefirstformalsystemsofmodallogic.Strictimplicationstruckmanycriticsasbeinghardlylessparadoxicalthanmaterialimplication,sinceanimpossiblepropositionstrictlyimplieseveryproposition,sothat‘Ifcatsaredogsthenpigscanfly’comesouttrue.Lewis’smodalresearches,however,wereinterestingintheirownright.Heofferedfivedifferentaxiomsystems,whichhenumberedS1toS5,andshowedthateachoftheaxiomsetswasconsistentandindependent.Theyvaryinstrength.S1,forinstance,doesnotallowaproofof‘Ifp&qispossible,thenpispossibleandqispossible’(whichseemsveryplausible),whileS5contains‘Ifpispossible,thenpisnecessarilypossible’(whichseemsratherdubious).InsomewaysthemostinterestingsystemisS4,whichGo¨delshowedwasequivalenttothelogicofPrincipiaMathematicawiththefollowingadditionalaxioms(reading‘if’asmaterial,notstrict,implica-tion):(1)Ifnecessarilyp,thenp.(2)Ifnecessarilyp,then(ifnecessarily[ifpthenq]thennecessarilyq).(3)Ifnecessarilyp,thennecessarilynecessarilyp.Headdedalsoarule,thatif‘p’wasanythesisofthesystem,wecanaddalso‘necessarilyp’.Thesystemexploitstheinterdefinabilityofnecessity(whichherepresentedbythesymbol&)andpossibility(representedby).Aswas^wellknowninantiquityandtheMiddleAges,‘necessarily’canbedefinedas‘notpossiblynot’and‘possibly’as‘notnecessarilynot’.Therearemanystatementsthatcanbeformulatedwithinmodallogicaboutwhosetruth-valuethereisnoconsensusamonglogicians.Themostcontentiousonesarethoseinwhichmodaloperatorsareiterated.ThesystemthatGo¨delaxiomatized,S4,containsasderivablethesesthetwofollowingformulae:Ifpossiblypossiblyp,thenpossiblypIfnecessarilyp,thennecessarilynecessarilypItdoesnot,however,containthesetwo:117\nLOGICIfpossiblyp,thennecessarilypossiblypIfpossiblynecessarilyp,thennecessarilypwhichareprovableinS5andarecharacteristicfeaturesofthatsystem.TherelativemeritsofS4andS5assystemsofmodallogicremainamatterofdebatetoday,andnotonlyamonglogicians.Somephilosophersofreligion,forinstance,havearguedthatifitispossiblethatanecessarybeing(i.e.God)exists,thenanecessarybeingdoesexist.ThisinvolvesatacitappealtothesecondoftheS5theseslistedabove.Thereareanumberofparallelsbetweenmodaloperatorsandthequantifiersofpredicatelogic.Theinterdefinabilityof‘necessary’and‘pos-sible’parallelstheinterdefinabilityof‘all’and‘some’.Justas‘Forallx,Fx’entails‘Fa’,so‘Necessarilyp’entails‘p’,andjustas‘Fa’entails‘Forsomex,Fx’,so‘p’entails‘possiblyp’.Therearelawsofdistributioninmodallogicthataretheanaloguesofthoseinquantificationtheory:thusitisnecessarythatpandqifandonlyifitisbothnecessarythatpandnecessarythatq,anditispossiblethatporqifandonlyifitiseitherpossiblethatporitispossiblethatq.Becauseofthis,ifweintroducequantificationintomodallogic,andusemodaloperatorsandquantifierstogether,wehaveasystemthatresemblesdoublequantification.Inquantifiedmodallogicitisimportanttomarktheorderinwhichtheoperatorsandquantifiersareplaced.Itiseasilyseenthat‘Forallx,xispossiblyF’isnotthesameas‘Itispossiblethatforallx,xisF’:inafairlottery,everyonehasachanceofbeingthewinner,butthereisnochancethateveryoneisthewinner.Likewisewemustdistinguishbetween‘ThereissomethingthatnecessarilyÖs’and‘Necessarily,thereissomethingthatÖs’.Itistruethatofnecessitythereissomeonethanwhomnooneismoreobese.However,thatpersonisnotnecessarilysoobese:itisperfectlypossibleforhimtoslimandceasetobeachampionfatty.Sentencesinwhichthemodaloperatorprecedesthequantifier(asinthesecondofeachofthetwopairsabove)werecalledintheMiddleAgesmodalsdedicto,andsentencesinwhichthequantifiercomesearlier(asinthefirstofeachofthetwopairsabove)werecalledmodalsdere.Thesetermshavebeenrevivedbymodernmodallogicianstomakeverysimilardistinctions.Despitetheparallelsbetweenmodallogicandquantificationtheorythereisalsoanimportantdifference,onceweintroduceintothesystemthenotionofidentity.InthetechnicaltermintroducedbyQuine,modal118\nLOGIClogicsarereferentiallyopaque,whereasquantificationalcontextsarenot.Referentialopacityisdefinedasfollows.LetEbeasentenceoftheformA¼B(whereAandBarereferringexpressions).ThenifPisasentencecontainingA,andQisasentenceresemblingPinallrespectsexceptthatitcontainsBwherePcontainsA,thenPisreferentiallyopaqueifPandEdonottogetherimplyQ.Modalcontextsareeasilyseentobeopaqueinthisway.WhenQuinewrote,thenumberofplanetswasnine,butwhereas‘Necessarily,9isgreaterthan7’istrue,‘Necessarily,thenumberofplanetsisgreaterthan7’isnot.Becauseofthisopacitysomelogicians,notablyQuine,rejectedmodallogicaltogether.Buttheworkofanumberoflogiciansintheearly1960s—notablyFøllesdal,Kripke,andHintikka—mademodallogicrespectable.Thekeyideaofmodernmodallogicistoexploitthesimilaritiesbetweenquantificationandmodalitybydefiningnecessityastruthinallpossibleworlds,andpossibilityastruthinsomepossibleworld.Plaintruthisthenthoughtofastruthintheactualworld,whichisoneamongallpossibleworlds.Talkofpossibleworldsneednotinvolveanymetaphysicalimpli-cations:forthepurposesofmodalsemanticsanymodelwiththeappro-priateformalstructurewillsuffice.Toillustratehowthesemanticsissetout,considerauniverseinwhichtherearejusttwoobjects,aandb,andthreepredicates,F,G,andH,andletussupposethattherearethreepossibleworldsinthatuniverseofwhichworld2istheactualone,whichwemaycallalpha.World1FaGaHaFbGbHbWorld2FaGaHaFbGbHbWorld3FaGaHaFbGbHbIfnecessityistruthinallpossibleworlds,wehaveinthisuniverse‘NecessarilyFa’and‘NecessarilyGb’.Thethesis‘Ifnecessarilyp,thenp’isexemplifiedbythetruthofFaandGbinalpha,theactualworld.Ifpossibilityistruthinsomepossibleworldwehave,forexample,‘PossiblyFb’and‘PossiblyGa’,eventhough‘Fb’and‘Ga’arefalseinalpha.Theiterationofmodalities,whichaswesawgaverisetoproblems,isnowexplainedintermsofarelationshiptobedefinedbetweendifferentpossibleworlds.Onepossibleworldmayormaynotbeaccessiblefromanother.Whenweuseasingleoperator,asin‘possiblyp’,wecanbe119\nLOGICtakentobesaying‘Insomeworldbeta,accessiblefromalpha,pisthecase’.Ifweiterate,andsay‘possiblypossiblyp’,wemean‘Insomeworldgamma,accessiblefrombeta,whichisaccessiblefromalpha,pisthecase’.Itcannotbetakenforgrantedthateveryworldaccessiblefrombetaisalsoaccessiblefromalpha:whetherthisisthecasewilldependonhowtheaccessibilityrelationisdefined.This,inturn,willdeterminewhichsystem—which,forinstance,ofLewis’sS1–S5—istheappropriateoneforourpurposes.Ifthenotionsthatwewishtocaptureinourmodallogicarethoseoflogicalnecessityandpossibility,theneverypossibleworldwillbeaccessiblefromeveryotherpossibleworld,sincelogicisuniversalandtranscendent.Butthereareotherformsofnecessityandpossibility.Thereis,forinstance,epistemicnecessityandpossibility,where‘possiblyp’means‘ForallIknowtothecontrary,p’.Philosophershavealsoextendedthenotionofmodalityintomanydifferentcontexts,wheretherearepairsofoperatorsthatbehaveinwaysthatresembletheparadigmaticmodaloperators.Inthelogicoftime,forinstance,‘always’correspondsto‘necessary’and‘sometimes’to‘possible’,bothpairsofoperatorsbeinginterdefinablewiththeaidofnegation.Indeonticlogic,thelogicofobligation,‘obligatory’isthenecessityoperator,and‘permitted’isthepossibilityoperator.Intheseandothercasestheaccessibilityrelationshipwillneedcarefuldefinition:inalogicoftenses,forinstance,futureworlds,butnotpastworlds,willbeaccessiblefromtheactual(i.e.thepresent)world.5Theproblemofreferentialopacityarisesinallthesebroadlymodalcontexts.Itcanbedealtwithbymakingadistinctionbetweentwodifferentkindsofreference.Tobeagenuinename,atermmustbe,intheterminologyofKripke,arigiddesignator:thatistosay,itmusthavethesamereferenceineverypossibleworld.Thereareotherexpressionswhosereferenceisdeterminedbytheirsense(e.g.‘thediscovererofoxygen’)andthereforemaychangefromonepossibleworldtoanother.Oncethisdistinctionhasbeenmade,itiseasytoacceptthatastatementsuchas‘9¼thenumberoftheplanets’isnotagenuineidentitystatementlinkingtwonames.‘9’isindeedarigiddesignatorthatkeepsitsreferenceacrosspossibleworlds;but‘thenumberoftheplanets’isadescriptionthatindifferentworldsmayrefertodifferentnumbers.5ThelogicoftimeandtensewasfirststudiedsystematicallybyA.N.PriorinTimeandModality(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1957)anddeonticlogicbyG.H.vonWrightinAnEssayonDeonticLogic(Amsterdam:North-Holland,1968).120\n5LanguageInthecourseofthenineteenthcentury,philosophersturnedtheirattentionevermoreintenselyonthetopicofmeaning.Whatdowordsandsentencessignify?Howdotheysignifyanddotheyallsignifyinthesameway?Whatistherelationshipbetweenmeaningandtruth?ThesequestionswerenowaskedwithanurgencythathadnotbeenfeltsincetheMiddleAges.1FregeonSenseandReferenceAseminalworkinthetheoryofmeaningwasFrege’spaperof1892,‘SenseandReference’.Thatpaperstartsfromaquestionaboutstatementsofidentity.Isidentityarelation?Ifitisarelation,isitarelationbetweensignsorbetweenwhatsignsstandfor?Itseemsthatitcannotbearelationbetweenobjectsthatsignsstandfor,becauseifso,when‘a¼b’istruethen‘a¼a’cannotdifferfrom‘a¼b’.Ontheotherhand,itseemsthatitcannotbearelationshipbetweensigns,becausenamesarearbitrary,andifasentenceoftheform‘a¼b’expressedarelationshipbetweensymbolsitcouldnotexpressanyfactabouttheextra-linguisticworld.Yetasentencesuchas‘Themorningstarisidenticalwiththeeveningstar’expressesnotalinguistictautology,butanastronomicaldiscovery.Fregesolvedthisproblembydistinguishingbetweentwodifferentkindsofsignification.Whereotherphilosopherstalkofmeaning,Frege1Formedievaltheoriesofmeaning,seevol.II,pp.130–1,146–7.\nLANGUAGEintroducesadistinctionbetweenthereferenceofanexpression(theobjecttowhichitrefers,astheplanetVenusisthereferenceof‘themorningstar’)andthesenseofanexpression(theparticularmodeinwhichasignpresentswhatitdesignates).‘Theeveningstar’differsinsensefrom‘themorningstar’eventhoughithasbeendiscoveredthatbothexpressionsrefertoVenus.Fregesays,ingeneral,thatanidentitystatementwillbetrueandinformativeifthesignofidentityisflankedbytwonameswiththesamereferencebutdifferentsenses.Theword‘name’is,astheexampleshows,usedbyFregeinabroadsensetoincludecomplexdesignationsofobjects.Heispreparedtocallallsuchdesignations‘propernames’(CP157–8).Fregeappliesthedistinctionbetweensenseandreferencetosentencesofallkinds.Inhisaccountofmeaningthereareitemsatthreelevels:signs,theirsenses,andtheirreferences.Byusingsignsweexpressasenseanddenoteareference(CP161).Inawell-regulatedlanguage,Fregebelieved,everysignwouldhaveasenseandonlyonesense.Innaturallanguageswordslike‘bank’and‘port’areambiguous,andanamelike‘Aristotle’canbeparaphrasedinmanydifferentways;wehavetobecontentifthesamewordhasthesamesenseinthesamecontext.Ontheotherhand,thereisnorequirement,eveninanideallanguage,thateverysenseshouldhaveonlyonesign.Thesamesensemaybeexpressedbydifferentsignsindifferentlanguagesoreveninthesamelanguage.Inagoodtranslation,thesenseoftheoriginaltextispreserved.WhatislostintranslationiswhatFregecalls‘thecolour’ofthetext.Colourisimportantforpoetrybutnotforlogic;itisnotobjectiveinthewaythatsenseis.Thesenseofawordiswhatwegraspwhenweunderstandtheword.Itisquitedifferentfromamentalimage,eventhough,ifasignreferstoatangibleobject,Imaywellhaveamentalimageassociatedwithit.Imagesaresubjectiveandvaryfrompersontoperson;animageismyimageoryourimage.Thesenseofasign,ontheotherhand,issomethingthatisthecommonpropertyofallusersofthelanguage.Itisbecausesensesarepublicinthiswaythatthoughtscanbepassedonfromonegenerationtoanother.ForFrege,itisnotonlypropernames—simpleorcomplex—thathavesensesandreferences.Whatofentiresentences,whichexpressthoughts?Isthethought,thatistosaythecontentofthesentence,itssenseoritsreference?122\nLANGUAGELetusassumeforthetimebeingthatthesentencehasreference.Ifwenowreplaceonewordofthesentencebyanotherhavingthesamereference,butadifferentsense,thiscanhavenobearinguponthereferenceofthesentence.Yetwecanseethatinsuchacasethethoughtchanges;sincee.g.thethoughtinthesentence‘ThemorningstarisabodyilluminatedbytheSun’differsfromthatinthesentence‘TheeveningstarisabodyilluminatedbytheSun’.Anybodywhodidnotknowthattheeveningstaristhemorningstarmightholdtheonethoughttobetrue,theotherfalse.Thethought,accordingly,cannotbethereferenceofthesentence,butmustratherbeconsideredasthesense.(CP162)Ifthethoughtexpressedbyasentenceisnotitsreference,doesthesentencehaveareferenceatall?Fregeagreesthattherecanbesentenceslackingreference:sentencesoccurringinworksoffictionsuchastheOdyssey.Butthereasonthesesentenceslackareferenceisthattheycontainnamesthatlackareference,suchas‘Odysseus’.Othersentencesdohaveareference;andconsiderationoffictionalsentenceswillenableustodeter-minejustwhatthatreferenceis.Wemustexpectthatthereferenceofasentenceisdeterminedbythereferenceofthepartsofasentence.Letusinquire,therefore,whatismissingfromasentenceifoneofitspartslacksareference.Ifanamelacksareference,thatdoesnotaffectthethought,sincethatisdeterminedonlybythesenseofitsconstituentparts,notbytheirreference.ItisonlyifwetreattheOdysseyasscienceratherthanmyth,ifwewantseriouslytotakethesentencesitcontainsastrueorfalse,thatweneedtoascribeareferenceto‘Odysseus’.‘Whydowewanteverypropernametohavenotonlyasense,butalsoareference?Whyisthethoughtnotenoughforus?Because,andtotheextentthat,weareconcernedwithitstruth-value’(CP163).Weare,Fregesays,drivenintoacceptingasthereferenceofasentenceitstruth-value,theTrue,orasthecasemaybe,theFalse.Everyseriouslypro-poundedindicativesentenceisanameofoneorotheroftheseobjects.Alltruesentenceshavethesamereferenceaseachother,andsodoallfalsesentences.Therelation,then,betweenasentenceanditstruth-valueisthesameasthatbetweenanameanditsreference.Thisisasurprisingconclusion:surely,toassertthatpigshavewingsistodosomethingquitedifferentfromnaminganything.Fregewouldagree;butthatisbecauseassertingasentenceissomethingquitedifferentfromputtingasentencetogetheroutofsubjectandpredicate.‘Subjectandpredicate(understoodinthelogical123\nLANGUAGEsense)areindeedelementsofthought;theystandonthesamelevelasitemsforcomprehension.Bycombiningsubjectandpredicateonereachesonlyathought,neverpassesfromsensetoreference,neverfromathoughttoitstruthvalue’(CP164).Sentencescanoccurunasserted,perhapsasaclauseinaconditional,suchas‘Ifpigshavewings,thenpigscanfly’.Thougheveryserioussentencenamesatruth-value(inthiscasetheFalse)themereuseofasentencedoesnotcommittheusertospecifyingitstruth-value.OnlyifweassertasentencedowesaythatitisanameoftheTrue.ManyphilosopherssinceFregehavemadeuseofhisdistinctionbetweensenseandreference,andhaveacceptedthatthereisanimportantdiffer-encebetweenpredicationandassertion;butalmostallhaverejectedthenotionthatcompletesentenceshaveareferenceofanykind.Indeed,inhisownlaterwritingsFregehimselfseemstohavegivenuptheideathatthereweretwograndobjects,theTrueandtheFalse;instead,hecametoacceptthattruthwasnotanobjectbutaproperty,albeitoneofanindefinable,suigeneriskind(CP353).TowardstheendofhislifeFregebecamemoreinterestedinaspectsoflanguagethatwerenotcapturedbyhissystemoflogic—the‘colouring’intheexpressionofthoughts.Scientificlanguageasitwerepresentsthoughtsinblackandwhite;butinhumanedisciplinessentencesmayclothethoughtsincolourfulgarb,withexpressionsoffeeling.Weinterjectwordsandphraseslike‘Alas!’or‘ThankGod!’andweusechargedwordslike‘cur’insteadofplainwordslike‘dog’.Suchfeaturesofsentencesarenotconcernsoflogicbecausetheydonotaffecttheirtruth-value.Astatementcontainingtheword‘cur’inplaceof‘dog’doesnotbecomefalsemerelybecausethepersonutteringitdoesnotfeelthehostilitythatthewordexpresses(PW140).Inhispaper‘TheThought’Fregeconsideredthefeaturesoflanguagerepresentedbythetensesofverbs,andbyindexicalexpressionssuchas‘today’,‘here’,and‘I’.Ifasentencecontainsapresent-tenseverb,asin‘Itissnowing’,theninordertograspthethoughtexpressedyouneedtoknowwhenthesentencewasuttered.Somethingsimilarhappenswiththeuseofthefirst-personpronoun.‘Iamhungry’saidbyPeterexpressesadifferentthoughtthanisexpressedby‘Iamhungry’saidbyPaul.Onethoughtmaybetrueandtheotherfalse.Sooneandthesamesentencemay,indiff-erentcontexts,expressadifferentthought.Theoppositemayalsohappen,accordingtoFrege.Ifon9DecemberIsay‘Itwassnowingyesterday’124\nLANGUAGEAletterfromFregetoHusserl,explaininghisdistinctionbetweensenseandreference.125\nLANGUAGEIexpressthesamethoughtasifon8DecemberIsay‘Itissnowingtoday’.Itwaslefttologiciansofalatergenerationtotrytoincorporatesuchcomplicationsintoformalsystems.ThePragmatistsonLanguageandTruthCharlesSandersPeirce,whohaddevelopedquantificationaltheoryinde-pendentlyofFrege,likewiseexpressed,inadifferentterminology,manyofFrege’sinsightsintophilosophyoflanguage.Bothphilosophersrejectedthetraditionalwayofdistinguishingbetweensubjectandpredicate,andanalysedpropositionsintoelementsoftwokinds,oneacompletesymbol(theargumentsinFrege’sBegriffsschrift)andtheotheranincomplete,orunsaturated,symbol(thefunctionsofBegriffsschrift).ThepropernamesthatFregecalled‘arguments’Peircecalled‘indices’,andFrege’sconceptexpres-sionsorfunctionswerecalledbyPeirce‘icons’.ForPeirceaparticularlyimportantclassoficonswasexpressionsforrelations.‘Inthestatementofarelationship,’hewrote,‘thedesignationsofthecorrelatesoughttobeconsideredassomanylogicalsubjectsandtherelativeitselfasthepredi-cate.’Inhistreatmentofsentencesconcerningtwo-placerelationshipssuchas‘JohnlovesMary’PeircedifferedlittlefromFrege.However,heextendedthenotionofrelationshipintwodirections,byconsideringwhathecalledthe‘valency’(i.e.thenumberofarguments)ofdifferentrelations.Hewasinterestedinparticularinthree-placerelationships(suchas‘JohngaveFidotoMary’);andinadditionto‘polyadic’relationshipswithtwoormoresubjects,heintroducedtheterm‘monadicrelationship’forordinaryone-placepredicatessuchas‘...iswise’.Hewasevenwillingtocallacompletepropositiona‘medadicrelation’—thatis,arelativepropositionwithzero(inGreekmeden)unsaturatedplaces.Peirce’slogicandtheoryoflanguagewasembeddedinageneraltheoryofsigns,whichhecalled‘semiotics’,andtowhichheattachedgreatimportance.Asignstandsforanobjectbybeingunderstoodorinterpretedbyanintelligentbeing;theinterpretationisitselfafurthersign.Peircecallstheexternalsigna‘representamen’andthesignasunderstood‘theinter-pretant’.Thesemioticfunctionofsignsisatriadicrelationbetweenrepresentamen,object,andinterpretant.126\nLANGUAGEPeirceclassifiedsignsintothreeclasses.Therearenaturalsigns:clouds,forinstance,areanaturalsignofrain,andstrippedbarkonatreemaybeasignofthepresenceofdeer.Next,thereareiconicsigns,whichsignifybyresemblingtheirobjects.Naturalisticpaintingsandsculpturesarethemostobviousexamples,butthereareotherssuchasmaps.Twofeaturesareessentialtoaniconicsign:(1)itshouldsharewithitsobjectsomefeaturethateachcouldhaveiftheotherdidnotexist;(2)themethodofinterpretingthisfeatureshouldbefixedbyconvention.Finally,therearesymbols,ofwhichwordsarethemostimportantexample,butwhichincludesuchthingsasuniformsandtrafficsignals.These,likeiconicsigns,aredeterminedbyconvention,butunlikeiconicsignstheydonotoperatebyexploitinganyresemblancetotheirobjects.SincePeirce,theoristshavedividedsemioticsintothreedisciplines:syntactics,thestudyofgrammarandwhatevermayunderliegrammaticalstructure;semantics,thestudyoftherelationshipbetweenlanguageandreality;andpragmatics,thestudyofthesocialcontextandthepurposesandconsequencesofcommunication.Peirce’sownworkoperatedattheinterfaceofallthreedisciplines;butintheworkofhisfollowers,despitetheirschooltitleof‘pragmatists’,discussionfocusedupontwokeycon-ceptsofsemantics,namelymeaningandtruth.PeirceandJamesexplainedmeaninginsimilarways:inordertodiscoverwhatanutterancemeantyouhadtoexplorewhatwouldbethepracticalconsequencesofitsbeingtrue,andiftherewasnodifferencebetweentheconsequencesoftwodifferentbeliefsthentheywereineffectthesamebelief.ButJamesmaintainedthatthetruthofabelief,andnotjustitsmeaning,dependedonitsconsequences,orratherontheconsequencesofbelievingit.Ifmybelievingthatpissomethingthatpaysinthelongrun,somethingwhoseoverallconsequenceisprofitableformylife,thenpistrueforme.Thepragmatist’sclaim,hetellsus,isthis:Truth,concretelyconsidered,isanattributeofourbeliefs,andtheseareattitudesthatfollowsatisfactions.Theideasaroundwhichthesatisfactionsclusterareprimarilyonlyhypothesesthatchallengeorsummonabelieftocomeandtakeitsstanduponthem.Thepragmatist’sideaoftruthisjustsuchachallenge.Hefindsitultra-satisfactorytoacceptit,andtakeshisownstandaccordingly.(T199)127\nLANGUAGEPragmatism,heclaimed,wasnotatallinconsistentwithrealism.Truthandrealityarenotthesameaseachother;truthissomethingknown,thought,orsaidaboutthereality.Indeed,thenotionofarealityindepen-dentofanybeliever,Jamessaid,wasatthebaseofthepragmatistdefinitionoftruth.Anystatement,tobecountedtrue,mustagreewithsomesuchreality.Pragmatismdefines‘agreeing’tomeancertainwaysof‘working’,betheyactualorpotential.Thus,formystatement‘thedeskexists’tobetrueofadeskrecognizedasrealbyyou,itmustbeabletoleadmetoshakeyourdesk,toexplainmyselfbywordsthatsuggestthatdesktoyourmind,tomakeadrawingthatislikethedeskyousee,etc.Onlyinsuchwaysasthisistheresenseinsayingitagreeswiththatreality,onlythusdoesitgainformethesatisfactionofhearingyoucorroborateme.(T218)Passageslikethissuggestthatpragmatismaddsto,ratherthansubtractsfrom,thecommon-sensenotionoftruth.For‘p’tobetrue,itappears,notonlymustitbethecasethatp,butitmustactuallyhavebeenverified,oratleastverifiable,thatpisthecase.Toanobjectorwhoprotestedthatwhenabeliefistrue,itsobjectdoesexist,Jamesretorted,‘itisboundtoexist,onsoundpragmaticprinciples’.Howistheworldmadedifferentforme,heasked,bymyconceivinganopinionofmineastrue?‘First,anobjectmustbefindablethere(orsuresignsofsuchanobjectmustbefound)whichshallagreewiththeopinion.Second,suchanopinionmustnotbecontra-dictedbyanythingelseIamawareof’(T275).Butinspiteofhisbluff,sleeves-rolled-up,mannerofspeech,Jameswasratheraslipperywriter,anditisquitedifficulttopinhimdownonthequestionwhetherapropositioncanbetruewithoutanyfacttocorrespondtoit.Hetriestoavoidthequestionbymakingthenotionoftrutharelativeone.Inhumanlife,hetellsus,theword‘truth’canonlybeused‘relativelytosomeparticulartrower’.Criticsobjectedthatthereweresometruths(say,aboutthepre-humanpast)thatnobodywouldeverknow;towhichJamesrepliedthatthese,thoughneveractualobjectsofknowledge,werealwayspossibleobjectsofknowledge,andindefiningtruthweshouldsurelygiveprioritytotherealoverthemerelyvirtual.Butthereisanother,moreserious,objectiontohisclaimthattruthisrelativetothetruth-claimer.SurelyifIholdthatpistrue,andyouholdthatnot-pistrue,itisagenuinequestionwhichofusisintheright.128\nLANGUAGERussell’sTheoryofDescriptionsOneofJames’searliestandmosttrenchantcriticswasBertrandRussell,whoattackedthepragmatistaccountoftruthinanarticleof1908entitled‘TransatlanticTruth’.‘Accordingtothepragmatists’,hewrote,‘tosay‘‘itistruethatotherpeopleexist’’means‘‘itisusefultobelievethatotherpeopleexist’’.Butifso,thenthesetwophrasesaremerelydifferentwordsforthesameproposition;thereforewhenIbelievetheoneIbelievetheother’(James,T278).But,Russellclaimed,onepropositioncouldbetrueandtheotherfalse;andingeneralitwasoftenmucheasierinpracticetofindoutwhetherpwastruethanwhetheritwasgoodtobelievethatp.‘Itisfareasier’,Russellwrote,‘tosettletheplainquestionoffact‘‘Havepopesalwaysbeeninfallible?’’thantosettlethequestionwhethertheeffectsofthinkingtheminfallibleareonthewholegood’(James,T273).IntheyearsleadinguptoPrincipiaMathematica,however,Russell’sphilo-sophicalinterestswerefocusedlessonthenatureoftruththanonthedifferentkindsofmeaningthatwordsandphrasesmighthave,andalsothepossiblewaysinwhichtheymightturnouttolackmeaning.WhenhewroteThePrinciplesofMathematicshehadaverysimpleviewofmeaningwhichledtoaverycatholicviewofbeing,reminiscentofParmenides.2Beingisthatwhichbelongstoeveryconceivableterm,toeverypossibleobjectofthought—inshorttoeverythingthatcanpossiblyoccurinanyproposition,trueorfalse,andtoallsuchpropositionsthemselves....‘Aisnot’mustalwaysbeeitherfalseormeaningless.ForifAwerenothingitcouldnotbesaidnottobe;‘Aisnot’impliesthatthereisatermAwhosebeingisdenied,andhencethatAis.Thus,unless‘Aisnot’beanemptysound,itmustbefalse—whateverAmaybe,itcertainlyis.Numbers,theHomericgods,relations,chimerasandfour-dimensionalspacesallhavebeing,foriftheywerenotentitiesofakind,wecouldmakenopropositionsaboutthem.Thusbeingisageneralattributeofeverything,andtomentionanythingistoshowthatitis.(PM449)Itwasnotlongbeforehebegantobelievethatasystemthatmadedistinctionsbetweendifferentwaysinwhichsignsmightsignifywasmorecrediblethanoneinwhichtheworldcontainedaprofusionofdifferentkindsofobjectallrelatedtosymbolsbyasinglesimplerelationofdenotation.Hesoon,forinstance,adoptedFrege’smethodofdealing2Seevol.I,pp.200–4.129\nLANGUAGEwithassertionsanddenialsofexistence.AshewastoputitinPrincipiaMathematica:Supposewesay‘Theroundsquaredoesnotexist’.Itseemsplainthatthisisatrueproposition,yetwecannotregarditasdenyingtheexistenceofacertainobjectcalled‘theroundsquare’.Forifthereweresuchanobject,itwouldexist:wecannotfirstassumethatthereisacertainobject,andthenproceedtodenythatthereissuchanobject.Wheneverthegrammaticalsubjectofapropositioncanbesupposednottoexistwithoutrenderingthepropositionmeaningless,itisplainthatthegrammaticalsubjectisnotapropername,i.e.notanamedirectlyrepresentingsomeobject.Thusinallsuchcasesthepropositionmustbecapableofbeingsoanalysedthatwhatwasthegrammaticalsubjectshallhavedisappeared.Thuswhenwesay‘Theroundsquaredoesnotexist’wemay,asafirstattemptatsuchanalysis,substitute‘itisfalsethatthereisanobjectxwhichisbothroundandsquare’.(PM,2ndedn.,66)Russellcontinuedtobelievethatanygenuinepropernamemuststandforsomething,must‘directlyrepresentsomeobject’.Buthethoughtthatnotallapparentnamesweregenuinenames.Forinstance,hethoughtthatFregewaswrongtotreat‘Aristotle’and‘thetutorofAlexander’asbeingthesamekindofsymbol,eachanamewithasenseandareference.If‘Aristotle’wasagenuinepropername,hemaintained,itdidnothaveasense,buthadmeaningsolelybyhavingareference.Ontheotherhandanexpressionlike‘thetutorofAlexander’wasnotanameatall,becauseunlikeagenuinenameithadpartsthatweresymbolsintheirownright.Russell’spositiveaccountofsuchexpressionsiscalledhistheoryofdefinitedescriptions;itwasfirstputforwardinhispaper‘OnDenoting’of1905.Considerthesentence‘TheauthorofHamletwasagenius’.Forthistobetrue,itmustbethecasethatoneandonlyoneindividualwroteHamlet(otherwisenoonehastherighttobecalled‘theauthorofHamlet’).SoRussellproposedtoanalysethesentenceintothreeelements,thus:Forsomex,(1)xwroteHamletand(2)Forally,ifywroteHamlet,yisidenticalwithxand(3)xwasagenius.ThefirstelementsaysthatatleastoneindividualwroteHamlet,andthesecondthatatmostoneindividualwroteHamlet.HavingthusestablishedthatexactlyoneindividualwroteHamlet,theanalysedsentenceusesthethirdelementtogoontosaythatthatuniqueindividualwasagenius.130\nLANGUAGEIntheunanalysedsentence‘theauthorofHamlet’lookslikeacomplexname,andwouldhavebeentreatedasoneinFrege’ssystem.AsanalysedbyRussellnosuchnominalexpressionappears,andinsteadwehaveacombinationofpredicatesandquantifiers.Theanalysisismeanttoapplynotonlywhen—asinthiscase—thereactuallyisanobjectthatanswerstothedefinitedescription,butalsowhenthedescriptionisavacuousone,suchas‘thepresentKingofFrance’.Asentencesuchas‘TheKingofFranceisbald’,whenanalysedalongRussellianlines,turnsouttobefalse.Considerthefollowingtwosentences:(1)ThesovereignoftheUnitedKingdomismale.(2)ThesovereignoftheUnitedStatesismale.Neitherofthesesentencesistrue,butthereasondiffersinthetwocases.Thefirstsentenceisplainfalse,becausethoughthereisasovereignoftheUnitedKingdomsheisfemale;thesecondfailstobetruebecausetheUnitedStateshasnosovereignruler.OnRussell’sanalysisthissentenceisnotjustuntruebutpositivelyfalse,andaccordinglyitsnegation,‘ItisnotthecasethatthesovereignoftheUnitedStatesismale’,istrue.(Ontheotherhand‘ThesovereignoftheUnitedStatesisnotmale’comesout,likethesecondsentenceabove,positivelyfalse.)Whatisthepointofthiscomplicatedanalysis?ItisnaturaltothinkthatsincethereisnosovereignoftheUnitedStates,sentence(2)isnotsomuchfalseasmisleading;thequestionofitstruth-valuedoesnotarise.Thisisnodoubttrueofouruseofsuchdefinitedescriptionsinordinarylanguage,butFregeandRussellaimedtoconstructalanguagethatwouldbeamorepreciseinstrumentthanordinarylanguageforthepurposesoflogicandmathematics.Theybothregardeditasessentialthatsuchalanguageshouldcontainonlyexpressionswithadefinitesense,bywhichtheymeantthatallsentencescontainingtheexpressionsshouldhaveatruth-value.Ifweallowintooursystemsentenceslackingatruth-value,theninferenceanddeductionbecomeimpossible.Fregeproposedtoavoidtruth-valuegapsbyvariousarbitrarystipula-tions.Russell’sanalysis,whereby‘thesovereignofX’isinnocaseareferringexpressionatall,achievesthedefinitenessthatheandFregebothsought,anddoessobyfarlessartificialmeans.Itiseasyenoughtorecognizethat‘theroundsquare’denotesnothing,becauseitisanobviouslyself-contradictoryexpression.Butpriortoinvestigationitmay131\nLANGUAGEnotbeatallsoclearwhethersomecomplicatedmathematicalformulacontainsahiddencontradiction.Andifitdoesso,weshallnotbeabletodiscoverthisbylogicalinvestigation(e.g.byderivingareductioadabsurdum)unlesssentencescontainingitareassuredofatruth-value.ThePictureTheoryofthePropositionIntheTractatusLogico-PhilosophicusWittgensteinbuiltuponRussell’stheoryofdescriptionsinordertoanalysethedescriptionsofcomplexobjects.‘Everystatementaboutcomplexes’,hewrote,‘canberesolvedintoastatementabouttheirconstituentsandintothepropositionsthatdescribethecom-plexescompletely.’Considerthefollowingsentence(notoneofWittgen-stein’sownexamples):Austria-HungaryisalliedtoRussia.ThatsentencewasuntruewhenWittgensteinwrotetheTractatusbecauseAustria-HungarywasatwarwithRussia.Itisnottruenowforaquitedifferentreason,becausethepoliticalunitcalled‘Austria-Hungary’nolongerexists.IfwefollowtheleadofRussell,wewillsaythatinbothcasesthesentenceismeaningfulbutfalse.Thetwopossibilitiesoffalsehoodareclearlyparalleltothosefor‘ThesovereignofXismale’.‘Austria-Hungary’canbelookedonasadefinitedescription,roughly,‘theunionofAustriaandHungary’.IfwefollowWittgensteinandanalysethesentenceonthelinesofRussell’stheory,weget:Forsomexandsomey,x¼Austriaandy¼HungaryandxisunitedtoyandxisalliedtoRussiaandyisalliedtoRussia.Ormoresimplywecansaythat‘Austria-HungaryisalliedtoRussia’means‘AustriaisalliedtoRussiaandHungaryisalliedtoRussia,andAustriaisunitedtoHungary’.IntheTractatusWittgensteinbuiltagreatdealofmetaphysicsonthepossibilityofanalysisofthiskind.Butinphilosophyoflanguage,hewrote,‘Russell’smeritistohaveshownthattheapparentlogicalformofapropositionneednotbeitsrealform.’132\nLANGUAGEWhenhewrotetheTractatusWittgensteinbelievedthatlanguagedisguisedthestructureofthoughtbeyondrecognition.Itwasthetaskofphilosophytouncover,byanalysis,thenakedformofthoughtbeneaththedraperyofordinarylanguage.Complexpropositionsweretobereducedtoelementarypropositions,andelementarypropositionswouldberevealedaspicturesofreality.Wittgensteinrecordedinhisdiaryon29September1914howtheideafirstdawnedonhimthatpropositionswereessentiallypictorialinnature:Thegeneralconceptofthepropositioncarrieswithitaquitegeneralconceptofthecoordinationofpropositionandsituation.Thesolutiontoallmyquestionsmustbeextremelysimple.Inapropositionaworldisasitwereputtogetherexperimentally.(Aswheninthelaw-courtinParisamotor-caraccidentisrepresentedbymeansofdolls,etc.)Thismustyieldthenatureoftruthstraightaway.(NB7)ThethesisthatapropositionisapictureisnotsoimplausiblewhenwerealizethatWittgensteincountedaspicturesnotonlypaintings,drawings,andphotographs,andnotonlythree-dimensionalmodels,butalsosuchthingsasmaps,musicalscores,andgramophonerecords.Hispicturetheoryisperhapsbestregardedasatheoryofrepresentationingeneral.Inanyrepresentationtherearetwothingstoconsider:(a)whatitisarepresentationof;(b)whetheritrepresentsitcorrectlyorincorrectly.Thedistinctionbetweenthesetwofeaturesofarepresentation,inthecaseofaproposition,isthedistinctionbetweenwhatthepropositionmeans,andwhetherwhatitmeansistrueorfalse—thedistinctionbetweensenseandtruth-value.If,inalawcourt,atoylorryandatoypramaretorepresentacollisionbetweenalorryandapram,severalthingsarenecessary.First,thetoylorrymustgoproxyforthereallorry,andthetoypramfortherealpram:theelementsofthemodelmuststandinfortheelementsofthesituationtoberepresented.ThisiscalledbyWittgensteinthepictorialrelationshipthatmakesthepictureapicture(TLP2.1514).Second,theelementsofthemodelmustberelatedtoeachotherinaparticularway.Thepositioningofthetoylorryandthetoypramrepresentsthespatialrelationshipatthetimeoftheaccident,inawayinwhichitwouldnotifthetoyshadsimplybeenstowedawaytogetherinacupboard.This,forWittgenstein,isthestructureofthepicture(TLP2.15).Everypicture,then,consistsofstructurepluspictorialrelationship.133\nLANGUAGETherelationshipbetweenthetoysincourtisafact,andthisledWittgensteintosaythatapicture,aproposition,isafactandnotamerecollectionofobjectsornames.Itisafactthatcouldhavebeenotherwise.Thepossibilityofstructure—inthecaseofthetoysincourt,theirthree-dimensionality—iscalledbyWittgensteinpictorialform.Pictorialformiswhatpictureshaveincommonwithwhattheypicture,thecommonelementthatenablesonetobeapictureoftheotheratall.Thus,apicturerepresentsapossibilityintherealworld(TLP2.161).Howdoesthepictureconnectwiththerealityitrepresents?Thisisdonebythechoiceofanobjectquaobjectwithacertainpictorialform.IfIselectasetoftoysasthree-dimensionalproxiesforthree-dimensionalobjects,Iatthesametimemaketheirthree-dimensionalpropertiesthepictorialformofthepicture.Imaketheconnectionwithrealitybymakingthecorrel-ationbetweentheelementsofthepictureandtheelementsofthesituationitistorepresent.HowdoImakethiscorrelation?WhenhewrotetheTractatusWittgensteinthoughtthiswasanempiricalmatterofnoimport-ancetophilosophy.Picturescanbemoreorlessabstract,moreorlesslikewhattheypicture:theirpictorialformcanbemoreorlessrich.TheminimumthatisnecessaryifapictureistobeabletoportrayasituationiscalledbyWittgensteinlogicalform(TLP2.18).Theelementsofthepicturemustbecapableofcombiningwitheachotherinapatterncorrespondingtotherelationshipoftheelementsofwhatispictured.Thus,forinstance,inamusicalscoretheorderingofthenotesonthepagefromlefttorightrepresentstheorderingofthesoundsintime.Thespatialarrangementsofthenotesisnotpartofthepictorialform,sincethesoundsarenotinspace;buttheorderingiscommontoboth,andthatiswhatislogicalform.Wittgensteinappliedhisgeneraltheoryofrepresentationtothoughtsandtopropositions.Alogicalpictureofafact,hesaid,isathought,andinthepropositionathoughtisexpressedinamannerperceptibletothesenses(TLP3,3.1).Though,intheTractatus,thoughtsarepriortoproposi-tionsandgivelifetopropositions,Wittgensteinhasmuchlesstotellusaboutthoughtsthanaboutpropositions,andinordertounderstandhimitisbettertofocusonpropositionsaspicturesthanonthoughtsaspictures.Ifweaskwhataretheelementsofthoughts,forinstance,wearegivennoclearanswer;butifweaskwhataretheelementsofpropositionsananswerimmediatelypresentsitself:names.134\nLANGUAGEIndeedthepicturetheoryofthepropositionsgrewoutofWittgenstein’sreflectionsonthedifferencebetweenpropositionsandnames.ForFregenamesandpropositionsalikehadbothsenseandreference,thereferenceofapropositionbeingatruth-value.But,asWittgensteincametosee,thereisanimportantcontrastbetweentherelationbetweennamesandwhattheyreferto,ontheonehand,andpropositionsandwhattheyreferto,ontheother.Tounderstandapropername,like‘Bismarck’,Imustknowtowhomorwhatitrefers;butIcanunderstandapropositionwithoutknowingwhetheritistrueorfalse.Whatweunderstand,whenweunderstandaproposition,isnotitsreferencebutitssense.Anamecanhaveonlyonerelationshiptoreality:iteithernamessomethingoritisnotasignificantsymbolatall.Butapropositionhasatwo-wayrelation:itdoesnotceasetohaveameaningwhenitceasestobetrue(TLP3.144).So,tounderstandanameistograspitsreference;tounderstandapropositionistograspitssense.Thereisafurtherdifferencebetweennamesandpropositionsconsequentonthisfirstdifference.Thereferenceofanamehastobeexplainedtoone;buttounderstandthesenseofapropositionnoexplanationisnecessary.Apropositioncancommunicateanewsensewitholdwords:wecanunderstandapropositionthatwehaveneverheardbeforeandwhosetruth-valuewedonotknow.ItisthisfacttowhichWittgensteinappealswhenheassertsthatapropositionisapicture.WhatWittgensteinmeantbycallingapropositionapicturecanbesummedupinninetheses:(1)Aproposition,unlikeaname,isessentiallycomposite.(TLP4.032)(2)Theelementsofapropositionarecorrelatedbyhumandecisionwithelementsofreality.(TLP3.315)(3)Thecombinationoftheseelementsintoapropositionpresents—withoutfurtherhumanintervention—apossiblesituationorstateofaffairs.(TLP4.026)(4)Apropositionstandsinanessentialrelationtothepossiblesituationitrepresents:itsharesitslogicalstructure.(TLP4.03)(5)Thisrelationshipcanonlybeshown,butnotsaid,becauselogicalformcanonlybemirrored,notrepresented.(TLP4.022)(6)Everypropositionisbipolar:itiseithertrueorfalse.(TLP3.144)135\nLANGUAGE(7)Apropositionistrueorfalsebyagreeingordisagreeingwithreality:itistrueifthepossiblesituationitdepictsobtainsinfact,andfalseifitdoesnot.(TLP4.023)(8)Apropositionmustbeindependentoftheactualsituation,which,ifitobtains,makesittrue;otherwiseitcouldneverbefalse.(TLP3.13)(9)Nopropositionisaprioritrue.(TLP3.05)InstatingthesethesesIhavenotusedtheword‘picture’,becausethetheoryisinterestingandimportantwhetherornotitismisleadingtoencapsulateitintheslogan‘Apropositionisapicture’.Wittgensteindidinfactbelievethatallthetheoremsremaintrueiffor‘proposition’onesubstitutestheword‘picture’.Hewasalsowellawarethatpropositionsdonotlooklikepictures.Buthebelievedthatifapropositionwerefullyarticulatedandwrittenoutinanideallanguage,thentoeachelementofthepropositionalsignwouldcorrespondasingleobjectintheworld.Thusitspictorialnaturewouldleaptotheeye(TLP3.2).Weshouldnotthink,however,thatthereisanythingwrongwiththeunanalysedsentencesweutterinordinarylife.Wittgensteininsiststhatallthepropositionsofoureverydaylanguage,justastheystand,areinperfectlogicalorder(TLP5.5563).Thatisbecausethefullanalysisofthemisalreadypresentinthethoughtofanyofuswhounderstandthem,althoughofcoursewearenomoreconsciousofhowourwordssymbolizethanweareofhowoursoundsareproduced(TLP4.002).NotallsentencesproducedbyEnglishspeakers,however,aregenuinepropositions:manyareonlypseudo-propositionswhichanalysiswouldrevealtolacksense.ThelastseventeenpagesoftheTractatusaredevotedtoabriskdemonstrationofhowthepropositionsoflogic(6.1ff.),math-ematics(6.2ff.),aprioriscience(6.3ff.),ethicsandaesthetics(6.4ff.),andfinallyphilosophy(6.5ff.)areallindifferentwayspseudo-propositions.Theonlypropositionsthatdeserveaplaceinlogicbooksaretautologies,whichsaynothingthemselvesbutsimplyexhibitthelogicalpropertiesofgenuinepropositions,whichdosaythings(TLP6.121).Mathematicsconsistsofequations,butequationsareconcernednotwithrealitybutonlywiththesubstitutabilityofsigns.Inreallifewemakeuseofmathe-maticalpropositionsonlyinpassingfromonenon-mathematicalpropos-itiontoanother(TLP6.2–3).Inscience,propositionssuchastheaxiomsofNewtonianmechanicsarenotreallypropositions;rather,theyare136\nLANGUAGEexpressionsofinsightsintotheformsinwhichgenuinescientificproposi-tionscanbecast(TLP6.32ff.).Inethicsandaesthetics,likewise,therearenogenuinepropositions.Nopropositioncanexpressthemeaningoftheworldoroflife,becauseallpropositionsarecontingent—theyhavetrue–falsepoles—andnogenuinevaluecanbeacontingentmatter(TLP6.41).Finally,thepropositionsofphilosophyitselffallundertheaxe.Philosophyisnotacorpusofproposi-tionsbutanactivity,theactivityofanalysis.Appliedtothepropositionsofeverydaylife,philosophygivesthemaclearmeaning;appliedtopseudo-propositionsitrevealsthemasnonsensical.ThepropositionsoftheTractatusitselfaremeaninglessbecausetheyareattemptstosaywhatcanonlybeshown.This,however,doesnotmakethemuseless,becausetheirveryfailureisinstructive.Mypropositionsserveaselucidationsinthefollowingway:anyonewhounder-standsmeeventuallyrecognizesthemasnonsensical,whenhehasusedthemasstepstoclimbupbeyondthem.(Hemust,sotospeak,throwawaytheladderafterhehasclimbedupit.)Hemusttranscendthesepropositions,andthenhewillseetheworldaright.(TLP6.54)Language-GamesandPrivateLanguagesWhenhereturnedtophilosophyinthe1920sand1930s,Wittgensteinretainedtheideathatphilosophywasanactivity,notatheory,andthatphilosophicalpronouncementswerenotpropositionsinthesamesenseasstatementsofeverydaylanguage.Buthecametohaveaverydifferentviewofhowordinarypropositionshadmeaning.Earlyandlate,hebelievedthatordinarylanguagewasinorderjustasitstood.AtthetimeoftheTractatus,however,hebelievedthisbecausehethoughtordinarylanguagewasunderpinnedbyaperfectlanguagearticulatedintologicalatoms.FromthePhilosophischeGrammatikonwardshebelievedthisbecausehethoughtordinarylanguagewasembeddedinthesocialactivitiesandstructuresthathecalled‘language-games’.Whatisit,heaskedintheGrammatik,thatgivessignificancetothesoundsandmarksonpaperthatmakeuplanguage?Bythemselvesthesymbols137\nThehouseinViennathatWittgensteindesignedinthe1920sforhissister.IthasthesameaustereandintimidatingbeautyastheTractatus.138\nLANGUAGEseeminertanddead;whatisitthatgivesthemlife(PG40,107;PIi.430)?Theobviousansweristhattheybecomealivebybeingmeantbyspeakersandwritersandunderstoodbyhearersandreaders.Thisobviousansweristhetrueone;butwemustgetclearwhatmeaningandunderstandingare.Theyarenot,asonemightthink,mentalprocessesthataccompanyspokensentences.Ifyouaretemptedtothinkthis,trytoperformthatprocesswithoutthespeaking.‘Makethefollowingexperiment,’saysWittgenstein;‘say‘‘It’scoldhere’’andmean‘‘it’swarmhere’’.Canyoudoit?andwhatareyoudoingasyoudoit?’(PIi.332,510).Ifyoutrytoperformanactofmeaningwithoututteringtheappropri-atesentence,youarelikelytofindyourselfrecitingthesentenceitselfunderyourbreath.Butofcourseitwouldbeabsurdtosuggestthatsimultaneouslywitheverypublicutteranceofasentencethereisalsoasottovoceone.Itwouldtakeskilltoensurethatthetwoprocesseswereexactlyinsynchrony—andhowdisastrousitwouldbeiftheygotoutofstepsothatthemeaningofawordgotwronglyattachedtoitsneighbour!Itistruethatwhenwehearasentenceinalanguageweknow,therearementalevents—feelings,images,etc.—thatdifferfromthosethatoccurwhenwehearasentenceinalanguagewedonotknow.Buttheseexperienceswillvaryfromcasetocase,andcannotberegardedasthem-selvesconstitutingtheunderstanding.Understandingcannotreallybethoughtofasaprocessatall.Wittgensteinasks:Whendoweunderstandasentence?Whenwehaveutteredthewholeofit?Orwhileweareutteringit?Istheunderstandinganarticulatedprocesslikethespeakingofthesentence;anddoesitsarticulationcorrespondtothearticulationofthesentence?Orisitnon-articulated,accompanyingthesentenceinthewayinwhichapedalpointaccompaniesamelody?(PG50)Understandinglanguage,likeknowinghowtoplaychess,isastateratherthanaprocess;butweshouldnotthinkofitasastateofsomehiddenmentalmechanism.Sometimeswearetemptedtothinkthattheconsciousoperationsofourmindaretheoutcomeofamentalprocessatalevellowerthanthatofintrospection.Perhaps,wethink,ourmentalmechanismoperatestooswiftlyforustobeabletofollowallitsmovements,likethepistonsofasteamengineorthebladesofalawnmower.Ifonlywecouldsharpenourfacultyforintrospection,orgetthemachinerytoruninslowmotion,we139\nLANGUAGEmightthenbeableactuallytoobservetheprocessesofmeaningandunderstanding.Accordingtooneversionofthemental-mechanismdoctrine,tounder-standthemeaningofawordistocallupanappropriateimageinconnec-tionwithit.Iamtold‘Bringmearedflower’andaccordingtothisstoryIhavetohavearedimageinmymind,andascertainwhatcolourflowertobringbycomparingitwiththisimage.Butthatcannotberight:otherwisehowcouldoneobeytheorder‘Imaginearedpatch’?Thetheorysetsusoffonanendlessregress(BB3;PG96).Supposewereplacetheallegedinspectionofanimagewiththeactualinspectionofaredbitofpaper.Surely,thegreatervividnessofthesamplewillmakeitevenmoreexplanatory!Butno:ifitistobeexplainedhowsomeoneknowswhat‘red’meansitisequallytobeexplainedhowheknowsthathissample—whethermentalorphysical—isred.‘Assoonasyouthink’,Wittgensteinsays,‘ofreplacingthementalimageby,say,apaintedone,andassoonastheimagetherebylosesitsoccultcharacter,itceasestoseemtoimpartanylifetothesentenceatall’(BB5).Ofcourse,itistruethatoftenaswetalkmentalimagespassthroughourminds.Butitisnottheythatconfermeaningsonthewordsweuse.Itisrathertheotherwayround:theimagesarelikethepicturesilluminatingawrittentextinabook.Oneofthemostimportantversionsofthemistakentheorythatmeaningisamentalprocessisthethesisthatnamingisamentalact.ThisideaisthetargetofoneofthemostimportantsectionsofthePhilosophicalInvestigations:theattackonthenotionofaprivatelanguage,ormoreprecisely,ofthenotionofprivateostensivedefinition.IntheepistemologyofRussellandthelogicalpositivists,ostensivedefinitionplayedacrucialrole:itwaswherelanguagelinkedupwithknowledgebyacquaintance.ButWittgensteininsiststhatacquaintancewiththeobjectforwhichawordstandsisnotthesamethingasknowledgeoftheword’smeaning.Acquaintancewiththeobjectwillnotsufficewithoutagraspoftheroleinlanguageofthewordtobedefined.SupposeIexplaintheword‘tove’bypointingtoapencilandsaying‘Thisiscalled‘‘tove’’’.Theexplanationwouldbequiteinadequate,becauseImaybetakentomean‘Thisisapencil’or‘Thisisround’or‘Thisiswood’andsoon(PG60;BB2).Tonamesomethingitisnotsufficienttoconfrontitandtoutterasound:theaskingandgivingofnamesissomethingthatcanbedoneonlyinthecontextofalanguage-game.140\nLANGUAGEThisissoevenintherelativelysimplecaseofnamingacolouroramaterialobject;mattersaremuchmorecomplicatedwhenweconsiderthenamesofmentaleventsandstates,suchassensationsandthoughts.Considerthewayinwhichtheword‘pain’functionsasthenameofasensation.Wearetemptedtothinkthatforeachperson‘pain’acquiresitsmeaningbybeingcorrelatedbyhimwithhisownprivate,incommunicablesensation.ButWittgensteinshowedthatnowordcouldacquiremeaninginthisway.Oneofhisargumentsrunsasfollows.SupposethatIwanttokeepadiaryabouttheoccurrenceofacertainsensation,andthatIassociatethesensationwiththesign‘S’.Itisessentialtothesuppositionthatnodefinitionofthesigncanbegivenintermsofourordinarylanguage,becauseotherwisethelanguagewouldnotbeaprivateone.Thesignmustbedefinedformealone,andthisbyaprivateostensivedefinition.‘Ispeak,orwritethesigndownandatthesametimeIconcen-tratemyattentiononthesensation...inthiswayIimpressonmyselftheconnectionbetweenthesignandthesensation’(PIi.258).Wittgensteinarguesthatnosuchceremonycouldestablishanappro-priateconnection.WhennextIcallsomething‘S’,howwillIknowwhatImeanby‘S’?TheproblemisnotthatImaymisrememberandcallsomething‘S’whichisnotS;thetroublegoesdeeper.EventothinkfalselythatsomethingisS,Imustknowthemeaningof‘S’,andthis,Wittgensteinargues,isimpossibleinaprivatelanguage.ButcanInotappealtomemorytosettlethemeaning?No,fortodosoImustcalluptherightmemory,thememoryofS,andinordertodothatImustalreadyknowwhat‘S’means.Thereisintheendnowayofmakingoutadifferencebetweencorrectandincorrectuseof‘S’,andthatmeansthattalkof‘correctness’isoutofplace.TheprivatedefinitionIhavegiventomyselfisnorealdefinition.TheupshotofWittgenstein’sargumentisthattherecannotbealanguagewhosewordsrefertowhatcanonlybeknowntotheindividualspeakerofthelanguage.TheEnglishword‘pain’isnotawordinaprivatelanguagebecause,whateverphilosophersmaysay,otherpeoplecanveryoftenknowwhenapersonisinpain.Itisnotbyprivateostensivedefinitionthat‘pain’becomesthenameofasensation;pain-languageisgraftedontothepre-linguisticexpressionofpainwhentheparentsteachababytoreplaceherinitialcrieswithaconventional,learnedexpressionthroughlanguage.141\nLANGUAGEWhatisthepointoftheprivatelanguageargument,andwhoisitdirectedagainst?Wittgensteinoncewrotethatphilosophicaltherapyisdirectedagainstthephilosopherineachofus.Itisquiteplausibletoproposethateachofus,whenwebegintophilosophize,implicitlybelieveinaprivatelanguage.Certainly,manyfirst-yearstudentsaretemptedbythescepticalsuggestion.‘Forallweknow,whatIcall‘‘red’’youcall‘‘green’’andviceversa.’ThissuggestionwasattherootofSchlick’sdistinctionbetweenformandcontentinprotocolsentences,andthewholeedificeoflogicalpositivismtumblesdownifaprivatelanguageisimpossible.SotoodotheepistemologiesofRussellandoftheearlierWittgensteinhimself.Butthescopeoftheprivatelanguageargumentextendsmuchfurtherbackinthehistoryofphilosophy.Descartes,inexpressinghisphilosophicaldoubt,assumesthatmylanguagehasmeaningwhiletheexistenceofmyownandotherbodiesremainsuncertain.Humethoughtitpossibleforthoughtsandexperiencestoberecognizedandclassifiedwhiletheexist-enceoftheexternalworldisheldinsuspense.MillandSchopenhauer,indifferentways,thoughtthatamancouldexpressthecontentsofhismindinlanguagewhilequestioningtheexistenceofotherminds.Allofthesesuppositionsareessentialtothestructureofthephilosophyinquestion,andallofthemrequirethepossibilityofaprivatelanguage.Bothempiricismandidealismentailthatthemindhasnodirectknowledgeofanythingbutitsowncontents.Thehistoryofbothmove-mentsshowsthattheyleadinthedirectionofsolipsism,thedoctrine‘OnlyIexist’.Wittgenstein’sattackonprivatedefinitionundercutssolipsismbyshowingthatthepossibilityoftheverylanguageinwhichitisexpresseddependsontheexistenceofthepublicandsocialworld.Thedestructionofsolipsismcarriesoverintoarefutationoftheempiricismandidealismthatinexorablyinvolveit.Wittgenstein’sdemolitionofthenotionofaprivatelanguagewasthemostsignificanteventinthephilosophyoflanguageinthetwentiethcentury.Afterhisdeath,philosophyoflanguagetookadifferentturnbecauseofdifferingconceptionsofthenatureofphilosophyitself.Wittgensteinhadmadeasharpdistinctionbetweenscience,whichisconcernedwiththeacquisitionofnewinformation,andphilosophy,whichsoughttoprovideunderstandingofwhatwealreadyknow.ButQuine’sattackonthetraditionaldistinctionbetweenanalyticandsyntheticpropositionsledmanyphilosophers,particularlyintheUnitedStates,to142\nLANGUAGEquestionwhethertherewasasharpboundarybetweenphilosophyandempiricalscience.Inparticular,therewasadrivetoamalgamatethephilosophyoflanguagewithpsychologyandlinguistics.ThiswasspearheadedfromthephilosophicalsidebyDonaldDavidsoninthequestofasystematictheoryofmeaningfornaturallanguages,andfromthesideoflinguisticsbyNoamChomskywithsuccessivetheoriespostulatinghiddenmechanismsunder-lyingtheacquisitionofeverydaygrammar.Inmyview,Wittgensteinwascorrectinseeingthetaskofphilosophyascompletelydifferentfromthatofempiricalscience,andmanydevelopmentsinthephilosophyoflanguageinthelatterpartofthetwentiethcenturyservedtoobscure,ratherthantoenrich,theinsightsthathadbeengainedinitsearlierdecades.143\n6EpistemologyTwoEloquentEmpiricistsMilldescribedhisSystemofLogicasatextbookofthedoctrinethatderivesallknowledgefromexperience.Hewas,therefore,apropon-entofempiricism,thoughhedidnotliketheterm.Indeed,inanimport-antrespect,hewasoneofthemostresoluteempiriciststherehaveeverbeen.Hewentbeyondhispredecessorsinclaimingthatnotonlyallscience,butalsoallmathematics,derivedfromexperience.Theaxiomsofgeometryandthefirstprinciplesofmathematicsare,hesays,‘notwith-standingallappearancestothecontrary,resultsofobservationsandexperiences,founded,inshort,ontheevidenceofthesenses’(SL2.3.24.4).Thedefinitionofeachnumber,Millmaintained,involvestheassertionofaphysicalfact.Eachofthenumberstwo,three,four&c.,denotesphysicalphenomena,andconnotesaphysicalpropertyofthosephenomena.Two,forinstance,denotesallpairsofthings,andtwelvealldozensofthings,connotingwhatmakesthempairsordozens;andthatwhichmakesthemsoissomethingphysical;sinceitcannotbedeniedthattwoapplesarephysicallydistinguishablefromthreeapples,twohorsesfromonehorse,andsoforth:thattheyareadifferentvisibleandtangiblephenomenon.(SL3.24.5)Hedoesnotmakeclearexactlywhatthepropertyisthatisconnotedbythenameofanumber,andheadmitsthatthesensesfindsomedifficultyindistinguishingbetween102horsesand103horses,howevereasyitmaybetotelltwohorsesfromthree.Nonetheless,thereisapropertyconnotedbynumbers,namely,thecharacteristicmannerinwhichtheagglomerationismadeup,andmaybeseparatedintoparts.Forinstance,collectionsof\nEPISTEMOLOGYobjectsexist,whichwhiletheyimpressthesensesthus;maybeseparatedintotwopartsthus...‘Thispropositionbeinggranted,wetermallsuchparcelsThrees’(SL2.6.2).CriticsofMillweretoobservethatitwasamercythatnoteverythingintheworldisnaileddown;forifitwere,weshouldnotbeabletoseparateparts,andtwoandonewouldnotbethree.Itdoesnot,onsoberreflection,seemthatthereisanyphysicalfactthatisassertedinthedefinitionofanumberlike777,864.ButMill’sthesisthatarithmeticisessentiallyanempiricalsciencedoesnotstandorfallwithhisaccountofthedefinitionofnumbers.Heclaims,forinstance,thataprinciplesuchas‘Thesumsofequalsareequals’isaninductivetruthorlawofnatureofthehighestorder.Inductivetruthsaregeneralizationsbasedonindividualexperiences.Assertionsofsuchtruthsmustalwaysbetosomeextenttentativeorhypothetical;andsoitisinthiscase.Theprinciple‘isneveraccuratelytrue,foroneactualpoundweightisnotexactlyequaltoanother,noronemeasuredmile’slengthtoanother;anicebalance,ormoreaccuratemeasuringinstruments,wouldalwaysdetectsomedifference’(SL2.6.3).HerecriticssaidthatMillwasconfusingarithmeticwithitsapplications.ButitwasimportantforMilltomaintainthatarithmeticwasanempiricalscience,becausethealternative,thatitwasanaprioridiscipline,wasthesourceofinfiniteharm.‘Thenotionthattruthsexternaltothemindmaybeknownbyintuitionorconsciousness,independentlyofobservationandexperienceis,Iampersuaded,inthesetimesthegreatintellectualsupportoffalsedoctrinesandbadinstitutions’(A134).ToavoidthismischiefMillwaswillingtopayahighprice,andentertainthepossibilitythatatsomefuturetime,insomedistantgalaxy,itmightturnoutthattwoandtwomadenotfourbutfive.Consideredasaphilosopher,JohnHenryNewmanbelongedtothesameempiricisttraditionasJohnStuartMill.HedislikedtheGermanmetaphy-sicsthatwasbeginningtoinfiltrateOxfordduringhistimethere.‘Whatavainsystemofwordswithoutideassuchmenseemtobepilingup,’heremarked.AfterhisconversiontoRomehewasequallyillateasewiththescholasticphilosophyfavouredbyhisCatholicconfre`res.Theonlydirectacquaintancewehavewiththingsoutsideourselves,heasserted,comesthroughoursenses;tothinkthatwehavefacultiesfordirectknowledgeofimmaterialthingsismeresuperstition.Evenoursensesconveyusbuta145\nEPISTEMOLOGYJohnHenryNewman,whoseGrammarofAssent,thoughwrittentoareligiousagenda,isaclassicofepistemologyinitsownright.littlewayoutofourselves:wehavetobenearthingstotouchthem;wecanneitherseenorhearnortouchthingspastorfuture.Butthoughastaunchempiricist,NewmangivesamoreexaltedroletoreasonthanitwasgrantedbytheidealistKant:Nowreasonisthatfacultyofmindbywhichthisdeficiency[ofthesenses]issupplied:bywhichknowledgeofthingsexternaltous,ofbeings,facts,andevents,isattainedbeyondtherangeofsense.Itascertainsforusnotnaturalthingsonly,orimmaterialonly,orpresentonly,orpastorfuture;buteveniflimitedinitspower,itisunlimitedinitsrange...Itreachestotheendsoftheuniverse,andtothethroneofGodbeyondthem;itbringsusknowledge,whetherrealoruncertain,stillknowledge,inwhateverdegreeofperfection,fromeveryside;146\nEPISTEMOLOGYbutatthesametime,withthischaracteristicthatitobtainsitindirectly,notdirectly.(US199)Reasondoesnotactuallyperceiveanything:itisafacultyforproceedingfromthingsthatareperceivedtothingsthatarenot.Theexerciseofreasonistoassertonethingonthegroundsofsomeotherthing.Newmanidentifiestwodifferentoperationsoftheintellectthatareexercisedwhenwereason:inference(frompremisses)andassent(toaconclusion).Itisimportanttokeepinmindthatthesetwoarequitedistinctfromeachother.Weoftenassenttoapropositionwhenwehaveforgottenthereasonsforassent;ontheotherhandassentmaybegivenwithoutargument,oronthebasisofbadarguments.Argumentsmaybebetterorworse,butassenteitherexistsornot.Itistruethatsomeargumentsaresocompellingthatassentimmediatelyfollowsinference.Buteveninthecasesofmathematicalproofthereisadistinctionbetweenthetwointellectualoperations.Amathematicianwhohasjusthituponacomplexproofwouldnotassenttoitsconclusionwithoutgoingoverhisworkandseekingcorroborationfromothers.Assent,ashasbeensaid,maybegivenwithoutadequateevidenceorargument.Thisoftenleadstoerror;butisitalwayswrong?Lockemain-tainedthatitwas:hegave,asamarkoftheloveoftruth,thenotentertaininganypropositionwithgreaterassurancethantheproofsitisbuiltonwillwarrant.‘Whoevergoesbeyondthismeasureofassent,itisplainreceivesnottruthintheloveofit,lovesnottruthfortruth-sake,butforsomeotherby-end’(EssayconcerningHumanUnderstanding,iv.xvi).Lockemaintainedthattherecanbenodemonstrabletruthinconcretematters,andthereforeassenttoaconcretepropositionmustbeconditionalandfallshortofcertitude.Absoluteassenthasnolegitimateexerciseexceptasratifyingactsofintuitionordemonstration.Newmandisagrees.Therearenosuchthingsasdegreesofassent,hemaintains,thoughthereisroomforopinionwithouttheassentthatisnecessaryforknowledge.Everyday,asitcomes,bringswithitopportunitiesforustoenlargeourcircleofassents.Wereadthenewspapers;welookthroughdebatesinParliament,pleadingsinthelawcourts,leadingarticles,lettersofcorrespondents,reviewsofbooks,criticismsinthefinearts,andweeitherformnoopinionatalluponthesubjectsdiscussed,aslyingoutofourline,oratmostwehaveonlyanopinionabout147\nEPISTEMOLOGYthem...weneversaythatwegive[aproposition]adegreeofassent.Wemightaswelltalkofdegreesoftruthasdegreesofassent.(GA115)Nonetheless,Newmanargues,assentonevidenceshortofintuitionordemonstrationmaywellbelegitimate,andfrequentlyisso.Wearesurebeyondallhazardofamistake,thatourownselfisnottheonlybeingexisting;thatthereisanexternalworld;thatitisasystemwithpartsandawhole,auniversecarriedonbylaws;andthatthefutureisaffectedbythepast.Weacceptandholdwithanunqualifiedassent,thattheearth,consideredasaphenomenon,isaglobe;thatallitsregionsseethesunbyturns;thattherearevasttractsonitoflandandwater;thattherearereallyexistingcitiesondefinitesites,whichgobythenamesofLondon,Paris,FlorenceandMadrid.WearesurethatParisorLondon,unlesssuddenlyswallowedupbyanearthquakeorburnedtotheground,istodayjustwhatitwasyesterday,whenweleftit.(GA117)Eachofusiscertainthatweshallallonedaydie.Butifweareaskedforevidenceofthis,allthatwecanofferiscircuitousargumentorreductioadabsurdum.Welaughtoscorntheideathatwehadnoparentsthoughwehavenomemoryofourbirth;thatweshallneverdepartthislife,thoughwecanhavenoexperienceofthefuture;thatweareabletolivewithoutfood,thoughwehavenevertried;thataworldofmendidnotlivebeforeourtime,orthatthatworldhasnohistory:thattherehasbeennoriseandfallofstates,nogreatmen,nowars,norevolutions,noart,noscience,noliterature,noreligion.(GA117)Onallthesetruths,Newmansumsup,wehaveanimmediateandunhesitatinghold,andwedonotthinkourselvesguiltyofnotlovingtruthfortruth’ssakebecausewecannotreachthembyaproofconsistingofaseriesofintuitivepropositions.Noneofuscanthinkoractwithoutacceptingsometruths‘notintuitive,notdemonstrated,yetsovereign’.Thoughhedeniesthattherearedegreesofassent,Newmanmakesadistinctionbetweensimpleassentandcomplexassentorcertitude.Simpleassentmaybeunconscious,itmayberash,itmaybenomorethanafancy.Complexassentinvolvesthreeelements:itmustfollowonproof,itmustbeaccompaniedbyaspecificsenseofintellectualcontent-ment,anditmustbeirreversible.Thefeelingofsatisfactionandself-gratulationcharacteristicofcertitudeattachesnottoknowledgeitself,buttotheconsciousnessofpossessingknowledge.Onedifferencebetweenknowledgeandcertitudethatiscommonlyagreedamongphilosophersisthis:IfIknowp,thenpistrue;butImay148\nEPISTEMOLOGYbecertainthatpandpbefalse.Newmanisnotquiteconsistentonthisissue.Sometimeshetalksasifthereissuchathingasfalsecertitude;atothertimeshesuggeststhataconvictioncanonlybeacertitudeifthepropositioninquestionisobjectivelytrue(GA128).Butwhetherornotcertitudeentailstruth,itisundeniablethattobecertainofsomethinginvolvesbelievinginitstruth.ItfollowsthatifIamcertainofathing,IbelieveitwillremainwhatInowholdittobe,evenifmymindshouldhavethebadfortunetoletmybeliefdrop.Ifwearecertainofabelief,weresolvetomaintainitandwespontaneouslyrejectasidleanyobjectionstoit.Ifsomeoneissureofsomething,ifhehassuchaconviction,say,thatIrelandistothewestofEngland,ifhewouldbeconsistent,hehasnoalternativebuttoadopt‘magisterialintoleranceofanycontraryassertion’.Ofcourse,despiteone’sinitialresolution,onemayintheeventgiveupone’sconviction.Newmanmaintainsthatanyonewholoseshisconvictiononanypointistherebyprovednevertohavebeencertainofit.Howdowetell,then,atanygivenmoment,whatourcertitudesare?Noline,Newmanthinks,canbedrawnbetweensuchrealcertitudesashavetruthfortheirobject,andmerelyapparentcertitudes.Whatlookslikeacertitudealwaysisexposedtothechanceofturningouttobeamistake.Thereisnointerior,immediatetestsufficienttodistinguishgenuinefromfalsecertitudes(GA145).Newmancorrectlydistinguishescertaintyfrominfallibility.Mymemoryisnotinfallible:IrememberforcertainwhatIdidyesterdaybutthatdoesnotmeanthatInevermisremember.Iamquiteclearthattwoandtwomakefour,butIoftenmakemistakesinlongadditions.Certitudeconcernsaparticularproposition,infallibilityisafacultyorgift.ItwaspossibleforNewmantobecertainthatVictoriawasqueenwithoutclaimingtopossessanygeneralinfallibility.ButhowcanIrestincertaintywhenIknowthatinthepastIhavethoughtmyselfcertainofanuntruth?Surelywhathappenedoncemayhappenagain.SupposeIamwalkingoutinthemoonlight,andseedimlytheoutlinesofsomefigureamongthetrees;—itisaman.Idrawnearer,itisstillaman;nearerstill,andallhesitationisatanend.—Iamcertainitisaman.ButheneithermovesnorspeakswhenIaddresshim;andthenIaskmyselfwhatcanbehispurposeinhidingamongthetreesatsuchanhour.Icomequiteclosetohimandputoutmyarm.ThenIfindforcertainthatwhatItookforamanisbutasingularshadow,formed149\nEPISTEMOLOGYbythefallingofthemoonlightontheintersticesofsomebranchesortheirfoliage.AmInottoindulgemysecondcertitude,becauseIwaswronginmyfirst?Doesnotanyobjection,whichliesagainstmysecondfromthefailureofmyfirst,fadeawaybeforetheevidenceonwhichmysecondisfounded?(GA151)Thesenseofcertitudeis,asitwere,thebelloftheintellect,andsometimesitstrikeswhenitshouldnot.Butwedonotdispensewithclocksbecauseonoccasionstheytellthewrongtime.Nogeneralrulescanbesetoutthatwillpreventusfromevergoingwronginaspecificpieceofconcretereasoning.AristotleinhisEthicstoldusthatnocodeoflaws,ormoraltreatise,couldmapoutinadvancethepathofindividualvirtue:weneedavirtueofpracticalwisdom(phronesis)todeterminewhattodofrommomenttomoment.Sotoowiththeoreticalreasoning,Newmansays:thelogicoflanguagewilltakeusonlysofar,andweneedaspecialintellectualvirtue,whichhecalls‘theillativesense’,totellustheappropriateconclusiontodrawintheparticularcase.Innoclassofconcretereasonings,whetherinexperimentalscience,historicalresearch,ortheology,isthereanyultimatetestoftruthanderrorinourinfer-encesbesidesthetrustworthinessoftheIllativeSensethatgivesthemitssanction;justasthereisnosufficienttestofpoeticalexcellence,heroicaction,orgentle-man-likeconduct,otherthantheparticularmentalsense,beitgenius,taste,senseofpropriety,orthemoralsense,towhichthosesubjectmattersareseverallycommitted.(GA231–2)Newman’sepistemologyhasnotbeenmuchstudiedbysubsequentphilo-sophersbecauseofthereligiouspurposethatwashisoverarchingaimindevelopingit.Butthetreatmentofbelief,knowledge,andcertaintyinTheGrammarofAssenthasmeritsthatarequiteindependentofthetheo-logicalcontext,andwhichbearcomparisonwithclassicaltextsoftheempiricisttraditionfromLocketoRussell.PeirceontheMethodsofScienceWithinthedecadeafterthepublicationofNewman’sGrammar,C.S.Peirce,inAmerica,wasendeavouringtodeviseanepistemologyappropriatetoanageofscientificinquiry.HepresenteditinaseriesofarticlesinthePopularScienceMonthlyentitled‘IllustrationsoftheLogicofScience’.Themost150\nEPISTEMOLOGYfamousoftheseriesarethetwofirstarticles,‘TheFixationofBelief’and‘HowtoMakeourIdeasClear’(CP5.358ff.,388ff.).InthefirstessayPeirceobservesthatinquiryalwaysoriginatesindoubt,andendsinbelief.Theirritationofdoubtistheonlyimmediatemotiveforthestruggletoobtainbelief.Itiscertainlybestforusthatourbeliefsshouldbesuchasmaytrulyguideouractionssoastosatisfyourdesires;andthisreflectionwillmakeusrejectanybeliefthatdoesnotseemtohavebeensoformedastoinsurethisresult.Butitwillonlydosobycreatingadoubtintheplaceofthatbelief.Withthedoubt,therefore,thestrugglebegins,andwiththecessationofdoubtitends.Hence,thesoleobjectofinquiryisthesettlementofopinion.(EWP126)Inordertosettleouropinionsandfixourbeliefs,Peircesays,fourdifferentmethodsarecommonlyused.Theyare,hetellsus,themethodoftenacity,themethodofauthority,theapriorimethod,andthescientificmethod.Wemaytakeapropositionandrepeatittoourselves,dwellingonallthatsupportsitandturningawayfromanythingthatmightdisturbit.Thus,somepeoplereadonlynewspapersthatconfirmtheirpoliticalbeliefs,andareligiouspersonmaysay‘Oh,Icouldnotbelieveso-and-so,becauseIshouldbewretchedifIdid’.Thisisthemethodoftenacity,andithastheadvantageofprovidingcomfortandpeaceofmind.Itmaybetrue,Peircesays,thatdeathisannihilation,butamanwhobelieveshewillgostraighttoheavenwhenhedies‘hasacheappleasurethatwillnotbefollowedbytheleastdisappointment’.Theproblemyoumeetifyouadoptthemethodoftenacityisthatyoumayfindyourbeliefsinconflictwiththoseofotherequallytenaciousbelievers.Theremedyforthisisprovidedbythesecondmethod,thatofauthority.‘Letaninstitutionbecreatedthatshallhaveforitsobjecttokeepcorrectdoctrinesbeforetheattentionofthepeople,toreiteratethemperpetually,andtoteachthemtotheyoung;havingatthesametimepowertopreventcontrarydoctrinesfrombeingtaught,advocated,orexpressed.’ThismethodhadbeenmostperfectlypractisedinRome,fromthedaysofNumaPompiliustoPioNono,butthroughouttheworld,fromEgypttoSiam,ithasleftmajesticrelicsinstoneofasublimitycomparabletothegreatestworksofnature.Therearetwodisadvantagestothemethodofauthority.First,itisalwaysaccompaniedbycruelty.Iftheburningandmassacreofhereticsisfrowned151\nEPISTEMOLOGY‘‘Themethodofauthority’’thatPeircecondemnedreachedahighpointwhenPiusIX’sVaticanCouncildeclaredPopestobeinfallible.Therightmethodinepistemol-ogy,accordingtoPeirce,shouldbecalled,bycontrast,‘‘fallibilism’’.152\nEPISTEMOLOGYuponinmodernstates,nonethelessakindofmoralterrorismenforcesuniformityofopinion.‘Letitbeknownthatyouseriouslyholdatabooedbeliefandyoumaybeperfectlysureofbeingtreatedwithacrueltylessbrutalbutmorerefinedthanhuntingyoulikeawolf.’Second,noinstitutioncanregulateopiniononeverysubject,andtherewillalwaysbesomeindepend-entthinkerswho,bycomparingtheirownculturewithothers,willseethatthedoctrinesinculcatedbyauthorityariseonlyfromaccidentandcustom.Suchthinkersmayadoptathirdmethod,attempting,byapriorimedi-tation,toproduceauniversallyvalidmetaphysics.Thisismoreintellec-tuallyrespectablethantheothertwomethods,butithasmanifestlyfailedtoproduceafixationofbeliefs.Fromearliesttimestolatest,thependulumhasswungbetweenidealistandmaterialistmetaphysicswithoutevercom-ingtorest.Wemustthereforeadoptthefourthmethod,themethodofscience.Thefirstpostulateofthismethodistheexistenceofarealityindependentofourminds.Therearerealthings,whosecharactersareentirelyindependentofouropinionsaboutthem;thoserealitiesaffectoursensesaccordingtoregularlaws,and,thoughoursensationsareasdifferentasourrelationstotheobjects,yet,bytakingadvantageofthelawsofperception,wecanascertainbyreasoninghowthingsreallyare,andanyman,ifhehassufficientexperienceandreasonenoughaboutit,willbeledtotheonetrueconclusion.(EWP133)Thetaskoflogicistoprovideuswithguidingprinciplestoenableustofindout,onthebasisofwhatweknow,somethingwedonotknow,andthustoapproximateevermorecloselytothisultimatereality.ThoughPeirceinsistedthatdoubtwastheoriginofinquiry,herejectedDescartes’sprinciplethattruephilosophymustbeginfromuniversal,metho-dicalscepticism.Genuinedoubtmustbedoubtofaparticularproposition,foraparticularreason.Cartesiandoubtwasnomorethanafutilepretence,andtheCartesianendeavourtoregaincertaintybyprivatemeditationwasevenmorepernicious.‘Weindividuallycannotreasonablyhopetoattaintheultimatephilosophywepursue;wecanonlyseekit,therefore,forthecommunityofphilosophers’(EWP87).Descarteswasrightthatthefirsttaskinphilosophyistoclarifyourideas;buthefailedtogiveanadequateaccountofwhathemeantbyclearanddistinctideas.Ifanideaistobedistinct,itmustsustainthetestofdialectical153\nEPISTEMOLOGYexamination.Processesofinvestigation,ifpushedfarenough,willgiveonecertainsolutiontoeveryquestiontowhichtheycanbeapplied.Scientistsmaystudyaproblem—e.g.thatofthevelocityoflight—bymanydifferentmethods.Theymayatfirstobtaindifferentresults,butaseachperfectshismethodandhisprocesses,theresultswillmovesteadilytogethertowardsadestinedcentre.Itisatthatcentrethattruthistobefound.Doesthisconflictwiththethesisthatrealityisindependentofthought?Peirce’sanswertothisiscomplexandsubtle.Ontheonehand,realityisindependent,notnecessarilyofthoughtingeneral,butonlyofwhatyouorIoranyfinitenumberofmenmaythinkaboutit...ontheotherhand,thoughtheobjectofthefinalopiniondependsonwhatthatopinionis,yetwhatthatopinionisdoesnotdependonwhatyouorIoranymanthinks.Ourperversityandthatofothersmayindefinitelypostponethesettlementofopinion;itmightevenconceivablycauseanarbitrarypropositiontobeuniversallyacceptedaslongasthehumanraceshouldlast.(EWP155)Itispossible,therefore,thatpshouldbetrueeventhougheveryhumanbeingbelievesittobefalse.Peirceofferstwowaysofmakingroomforthispossibility.Ontheonehand,hesays,anotherracemightsucceedtheextinctionofours,andthetrueopinionwouldbetheonetheyultimatelycameto.Buthealsosaysthat‘thecatholicconsentthatconstitutesthetruthisbynomeanstobelimitedtomeninthisearthlylifeortothehumanrace,butextendstothewholecommunionofmindstowhichwebelong’(EWP60).Itisimportanttobeclearaboutthecontentofthebeliefsthatweattaininthecourseofthiscommunal,unceasingpursuitoftruth.Belief,Peircesays,hasthreeproperties:first,itissomethingweareawareof;second,itappeasestheirritationofdoubt;third,itinvolvestheestablishmentinournatureofaruleofaction,thatistosay,ahabit.Differentbeliefsaredistinguishedbythedifferentmodesofactiontowhichtheygiverise.‘Ifbeliefsdonotdifferinthisrespect,iftheyappeasethesamedoubtbyproducingthesameruleofaction,thennomoredifferencesinthemannerofconsciousnessofthemcanmakethemdifferentbeliefs.’ToillustratethispointPeirceusesareligiousexample.Protestantssaythatafterthewordsofconsecrationhavebeensaidtheofferingsonthealtararebreadandwine;Catholicssaytheyarenot.Butmembersofthetwosectsdonotdifferfromeachotherintheexpectationstheyhaveofthesensibleeffectsofthesacrament.‘Wecanmeannothingbywinebutwhathascertaineffects,directorindirect,uponoursenses;andtotalkof154\nEPISTEMOLOGYsomethingashavingallthesensiblecharactersofwine,yetbeinginrealityblood,issenselessjargon’(EWP146).ItisinthiscontextthatPeircefirstputforwardhisprincipleofpragma-tism,whichhepresentsastheruleforattainingthemaximumclearnessaboutourideas.‘Considerwhateffects,thatmightconceivablyhaveprac-ticalbearings,weconceivetheobjectofourconceptiontohave.Then,ourconceptionoftheseeffectsisthewholeofourconceptionoftheobject’(EWP146).ItisimportanttonotethatPeirce’spragmatismisatheorynotoftruth,butofmeaning;andassuchitanticipatestheverificationtheoryofmeaninglaterputforwardbythelogicalpositivists.Heappliestheprincipletotheconceptsofhardness,weight,freedom,andforce,andconcludes,inthelattercase,‘ifweknowwhattheeffectsofforceare,weareacquaintedwitheveryfactthatisimpliedinsayingthataforceexists,andthereisnothingmoretoknow’(EWP151).InPeirce’swritingitisnotalwaysclearhowheseestherelationshipbetweenlogicandpsychology.Atthebeginningofhisessaystoillustratethelogicofsciencehewritesthus:Theobjectofreasoningistofindout,fromtheconsiderationofwhatwealreadyknow,somethingelsethatwedonotknow.Consequently,reasoningisgoodifitbesuchastogiveatrueconclusionfromtruepremisesandnototherwise.Thusthequestionofitsvalidityispurelyoneoffactandnotofthinking.(EWP122)Ontheotherhand,Peircesometimeswritesasiflogicaltruthswerelawsofmentalbehaviour.Thus,havingtoldusthatthethreemainclassesoflogicalinferencearededuction,induction,andhypothesis,hegoesontosay,‘Indeductionthemindisunderthedominionofahabitorassociationbyvirtueofwhichageneralideasuggestsineachcaseacorrespondingreaction’(EWP209).Perhapsthetwostatementsaretobereconciledinthisway:reasoning,whethergoodorbad,isamatterofhabit;butitisamatteroffact,notofthought,whetheraparticularpieceofreasoningisvalidornot.FregeonLogic,Psychology,andEpistemologyInthewritingsofFrege,thereisnolackofexplicitdiscriminationbetweenlogicandpsychology.Whilehewaswritinghislogicistworks,fromBegriffss-chriftonwards,Fregewasnotinterestedinepistemologyforitsownsake,but155\nEPISTEMOLOGYhewasconcernedtosetouttherelationshipbetweenepistemologyandotherrelateddisciplines.InthetraditionofDescartes,Fregebelieved,epistemologyhadbeengivenafundamentalroleinphilosophythatshouldreallybeassignedtologic.Ontheotherhand,philosophersintheempiricisttraditionhadconfusedlogicwithpsychology.InworkingouthislogicalsystemFregewasanxioustoshowthedifferenceinnatureandrolebetweenlogicandthesetwootherbranchesofstudy.Fregetookover,andadaptedforhisownpurposes,Kant’sdistinctionbetweenaprioriandaposterioriknowledge.Toensurethattalkofaprioriknowledgeinvolvesnoconfusionbetweenpsychologyandlogic,heremindsusthatitispossibletodiscoverthecontentofapropositionbeforewehitonaproofofit.Wemustdistinguish,therefore,betweenhowwefirstcometobelieveaproposition,andhowwewouldeventuallyjustifyit.Theremustbeajustification,ifwearetotalkofknowledgeatall,forknowledgeisbeliefthatisbothtrueandjustified.Itisabsurdtotalkofanapriorimistake,becauseonecanonlyknowwhatistrue.Whenapropositioniscalledaposteriorioranalyticinmysense,thisisnotajudgementabouttheconditions,psychological,physiologicalandphysical,whichhavemadeitpossibletorepresentthecontentofthepropositioninconsciousness.Norisitajudgementaboutthepossiblydefectivemethodbywhichsomeotherpersonhascometobelieveittrue.Rather,itisajudgementaboutthefundamentalgroundwhichprovidesthejustificationforbelievingittobetrue.(FA3)Ifthepropositionisamathematicalone,itsjustificationmustbemathe-matical;itcannotbeapsychologicalmatterofprocessesinthemathe-matician’smind.Tobesure,mathematicianshavesensationsandmentalimages,andthesemayplayapartinthethoughtsofsomeonewhoiscalculating.Buttheseimagesandthoughtsarenotwhatarithmeticisabout.Differentmathematiciansassociatedifferentimageswiththesamenumber:inoperatingwiththenumberonehundred,onepersonmaythinkof‘100’andanotherof‘C’.Evenifpsychologycouldgiveacausalexplanationoftheoccurrenceofthethoughtthattensquaredisonehundred,itwouldstillbetotallydifferentfromarithmetic,forarithmeticisconcernedwiththetruthofsuchpropositions,psychologywiththeiroccurrenceinthought.Apropositionmaybethoughtofwithoutbeingtrue,andapropositionmaybetruewithoutbeingthoughtof.156\nEPISTEMOLOGYPsychologyisinterestedinthecauseofourthinking,mathematicsintheproofofourthoughts.Causeandproofarequitedifferentthings.Withoutanappropriaterationofphosphorusinhisbrain,nodoubt,Pythagoraswouldhavebeenunabletoprovehisfamoustheorem;butthatdoesnotmeanthatastatementofthephosphoruscontentofhisbrainshouldoccurasalineintheproof.Ifhumanshaveevolved,nodoubttherehasbeenevolutioninhumanconsciousness;soifmathematicswasamatterofsensationsandideas,wewouldneedtowarnastronomersagainstdrawingconclusionsabouteventsinthedistantpast.Fregebringsouttheabsurdityofthispositioninanironicpassage:Youreckonthat22¼4;buttheideaofnumberhasahistory,anevolution.Itmaybedoubtedwhetherithadyetprogressedsofar.Howdoyouknowthatinthatdistantpastthatpropositionalreadyexisted?Mightnotthecreaturesthenalivehaveheldtheproposition22¼5?Perhapsitwasonlylaterthatnaturalselection,inthestruggleforexistence,evolvedtheproposition22¼4,andperhapsthatinitsturnisdestinedtodevelopinto22¼3.(FA,pp.vi–vii)Throughouthislife,Fregecontinuedtomaintainasharpdistinctionbetweenlogicandpsychology.Inhislateessay‘Thoughts’hewarnedagainsttheambiguityinherentinthestatementthatlogicdealswiththelawsofthought.If,by‘lawsofthought’,wemeanpsychologicallawsthatrelatementaleventstotheircauses,thentheyarenotlawsoflogicbecausetheywouldmakenodistinctionbetweentrueandfalsethoughts,sinceerrorandsuperstitionhavecausesnolessthansoundbelief.Logicallawsare‘lawsofthought’onlyinthesamesenseasmorallawsarelawsofbehaviour.Actualthinkingdoesnotalwaysobeythelawsoflogicanymorethanactualbehaviouralwaysobeysthemorallaw.However,inhislate‘Thoughts’Fregeventuresintoepistemologyinamannerthattendstoblurthedistinctionshehadsoresolutelydefended.Heinquiresaboutthesense,ormodeofpresentation,ofthefirst-personpronoun‘I’,whichhetreatsasapropernamethathasitsuserasitsreference.Everyone,Fregesays,‘ispresentedtohimselfinaspecialandprimaryway,inwhichheispresentedtonooneelse’.SupposethatHoratiohasthethoughtthathehasbeenwounded.Onlyhecangraspthesenseofthatthought,sinceitisonlytohimselfthatheispresentedinthisspecialway.Hecannotcommunicateathoughthealonecangrasp.Therefore,ifhenowsays‘Ihavebeenwounded’hemustuse‘I’inasensewhichcanbegraspedbyothers,157\nEPISTEMOLOGYperhapsinthesenseof‘thepersonwhoisnowspeakingtoyou’.Indoingsohemakesthecircumstancesofhisutteranceservetheexpressionofthethought.(CP360)ThisseemstocontradictFrege’shithertoconsistentclaimthatwhereasmentalimagesmightbeprivate,thoughtswerethecommonpropertyofusall.Onhisownprinciplesanincommunicablethoughtaboutaprivateegowouldnotbeathoughtatall.Butinsteadofrejectingtheideathat‘I’isapropernameanddiscardingthewholenotionoftheCartesianego,FregewentontopresentinhighlyCartesiantermsafull-blowndoctrineoftwoseparateworlds,oneinteriorandprivateandtheotherexteriorandpublic.Perceptiblethingsofthephysicalworld,hesaid,areaccessibletousall:wecanallseethesamehousesandtouchthesametrees.Butinaddition,heclaimed,thereisaninnerworldofsense-impressions,imagesandfeelings,ofdesiresandwishes—itemswhich,forpresentpurposes,wemaycall‘ideas’.Anyonewhomaintains,asFregedidinthisessay,thatourmentallifetakesplacewithinaninnerprivateworldmustatsometimefacethequestion:whatreasonisthereforbelievingthatthereisanysuchthingasanouterworld?Descartes,inhisMeditations,usedscepticalargumentstopurifythereader,temporarily,frombeliefinanythingbeyondtheprivaterealm;hethenendeavouredtorestorethereader’sfaithintheexternalworldbyappealingtothetruthfulnessofGod.FregehereacceptstheCartesiandistinctionbetweenmatter(theworldofthings)andmind(theworldofideas).LikeDescartes,heacceptedtheneedtoprovideananswertoidealistscepticism,thethesisthatnothingexistsexceptideas.Whatifeverythingwereonlyadream,aplayperformeduponthestageofmyconsciousness(CP363)?Iseemtobewalkinginagreenfieldwithacompanion;butperhapstherealmofthingsisempty,andallIhaveisideasofwhichImyselfamtheowner.Ifonlywhatismyideacanbetheobjectofmyawareness,thenforallIknowthereisnogreenfield(forafieldisnotanidea,andtherearenogreenideas)andnocompanion(forhumanbeingsarenotideas).ForallIknowtherearenotevenanyideasotherthanmyown(forIcanknowofnooneelsetoownthem).Fregeconcludes:‘Eitherthethesisthatonlywhatismyideacanbetheobjectofmyawarenessisfalse,orallmyknowledgeandperceptionisrestrictedtotherangeofmyideas,tothestageofmyself-consciousness.InthiscaseIshouldhaveonlyaninnerworldandIshouldknownothingofotherpeople’(CP364).Indeed,doesnotthistrainofscepticalreasoningleadto158\nEPISTEMOLOGYtheconclusionthatIammyselfanidea?Lyinginadeckchair,Ihavearangeofvisualimpressions,fromthetoesofmyshoestotheblurredoutlineofmynose.BywhatrightdoIpickoutoneofmyideasandsetitupasowneroftheothers?Whyhaveanownerforideasatall?Herewecometoafullstop.Ifthereisnoownerofideas,therearenoideaseither;therecannotbeanexperiencewithoutsomeonetoexperience.Apainisnecessarilyfelt,andwhatisfeltmusthavesomeonefeelingit.Ifso,thereissomethingthatisnotyetmyidea,andyetcanbeanobjectofmythought,namelymyself.Frege,likeDescartes,bringsscepticismtoanendwithacogito,ergosum.ButwhereasDescartes’segowasanon-idealsubjectofthinking,Frege’segoisanon-idealobjectofthought.Itsexistencerefutesthethesisthatonlywhatispartofthecontentofmyconsciousnesscanbetheobjectofmythought.Ifthereistobesuchathingasscience,Fregemaintained,‘athirdrealmmustberecognized’—aworldinadditiontotheworldofthingsandtheworldofideas.Theego,astheownerofideas,isthefirstcitizenofthisthirdrealm.Thethirdrealmistherealmofobjectivethought.Thedenizensofthisrealmsharewithideasthepropertyofbeingimperceptiblebythesenses,andsharewithphysicalobjectsthepropertyofbeingindependentofanowner.Pythagoras’theoremistimelesslytrueandneedsnoowner;itdoesnotbegintobetruewhenitisfirstthoughtoforproved(CP362).Otherpeople,Fregesays,cangraspthoughtsnolessthanI;wearenotownersofourthoughtsasweareownersofourideas.Wedonothavethoughts;thoughtsarewhatwegrasp.Whatisgraspedisalreadythereandallwedoistakepossessionofit.Ourgraspingathoughthasnomoreeffectonthethoughtitselfthanourobservingitaffectsthenewmoon.Thoughtsdonotchangeorcomeandgo;theyarenotcausallyactiveorpassiveinthewayinwhichobjectsareinthephysicalworld.Inthatworld,onethingactsonanotherandchangesit;itisitselfacteduponanditselfchanges.ThisisnotsointhetimelessworldthatPythagoras’theoreminhabits(PW138).FewwhohavefollowedFregedownthepathofCartesianscepticismwillfollowhimintherouteheoffersoutofthemaze.HisresponsetothechallengeisnomoreconvincingthanDescartes’sown.Bothphilosophers,havingacceptedadivisionbetweenapublicworldofphysicalthingsandaprivateworldofhumanconsciousness,seektorejoinwhattheyhaveseparatedbyappealingtoathirdworld:thedivinemindinthecaseof159\nEPISTEMOLOGYDescartes,andtheworldofthoughtsinthecaseofFrege.Ineachcasethefatalmistakewastheacceptanceoftheinitialdichotomy.Therearenottwoworlds,butasingleonetowhichtherebelongnotjustinertphysicalobjectsbutalsoconsciousrationalanimals.Fregewaswrong,andsinnedagainsthisowncardinalprincipleofseparatingthoughtsfromideas,inacceptingthatconsciousnessprovidesuswithincommunicablecontentsandunshareablecertainties.KnowledgebyAcquaintanceandKnowledgebyDescriptionSixyearsbeforeFregepublishedhisarticlesonthenatureofthought,BertrandRussellhadwrittenhisbriefProblemsofPhilosophy,abookthatwastogivemanygenerationsofphilosophystudentstheirfirstintroductiontoepistemology.RussellwasagodsonofJohnStuartMill,andforagreatpartofhislifeheendeavouredtobefaithfultotheBritishempiricisttraditionofwhichMillhadbeensuchanintrepidexponent.ButRussellcouldnotacceptMill’sviewofmathematicsasanempiricalscience,andsohisempiricismwasalwaysblendedwithanelementofthePlatonismthathesharedwithFrege.HisstartingpointinProblemsisthesystematicdoubtofDescartes.ItseemstomethatIamnowsittinginachair,atatableofacertainshape,onwhichIseesheetsofpaperwithwritingorprint.ByturningmyheadIseeoutofthewindowbuildingsandcloudsandthesun.Ibelievethatthesunisaboutninety-threemillionmilesfromtheearth;thatitisahotglobemanytimesbiggerthantheearth;that,owingtotheearth’srotation,itriseseverymorning,andwillcontinuetodosoforanindefinitetimeinthefuture.(PP7–8)Howeverevidentthisseems,Russelltellsus,itmayallbereasonablydoubted.Thetablelooksdifferentandfeelsdifferentfromdifferentanglesandtodifferentpeopleindifferentcircumstances.Therealtableisnotwhatweimmediatelyexperience,butisaninferencefromwhatisimme-diatelyknown.Whatisimmediatelyknowninsensationissomethingquitedifferentfromanyrealtable.Letusgivethenameof‘sensedata’tothethingsthatareimmediatelyknowninsensation:suchthingsascolours,sounds,smells,hardnesses,roughnesses,andsoon.Weshallgivethename‘sensation’totheexperienceofbeingimmediately160\nEPISTEMOLOGYawareofthesethings.Thus,wheneverweseeacolour,wehaveasensationofthecolour,butthecolouritselfisasense-datum,notasensation.Thecolouristhatofwhichweareimmediatelyaware,andtheawarenessitselfisthesensation.(PP12)Sense-dataaretheonlythingsofwhichwecanbereallycertain.Descartesbroughthisowndoubttoanendwiththecogito,‘Ithink,thereforeIam’.Butthis,Russellwarnsus,sayssomethingmorethanwhatiscertain:sense-databringnoassuranceofanabidingself,andwhatisreallycertainisnot‘Iamseeingabrowncolour’but‘abrowncolourisbeingseen’.Sense-dataareprivateandpersonal:isthereanyreasontobelieveinpublicneutralobjectssuchasweimaginetablestobe?Ifthereisnot,thenafortiorithereisnoreasontobelieveinpersonsotherthanmyself,sinceitisonlythroughtheirbodiesthatIhaveanyaccesstoothers’minds.Russellconcedesthatthereisnoactualproofthatthewholeoflifeisnotjustadream.Ourbeliefinanindependentexternalworldisinstinctiveratherthanreflective,butthisdoesnotmeanthatthereisanygoodreasontorejectit.Ifweagreeprovisionallythattherearephysicalobjectsaswellassense-data,shouldwesaythattheseobjectsarethecausesofthesense-data?Ifwedo,wemustimmediatelyaddthatthereisnoreasontothinkthatthesecausesarelikesense-data—e.g.thattheyarecoloured.Commonsenseleavesusquiteinthedarkabouttheirtruenature.Inordertoclarifytherelationshipbetweensense-dataandtheobjectsthatcausethem,Russellintroduceshiscelebrateddistinctionbetweenknowledgebyacquaintanceandknowledgebydescription.Weshallsaythatwehaveacquaintancewithanythingofwhichwearedirectlyaware,withouttheintermediaryofanyprocessofinferenceoranyknowledgeoftruths.ThusinthepresenceofmytableIamacquaintedwiththesense-datathatmakeuptheappearanceofmytable—itscolour,shape,hardness,smoothness,etc....Myknowledgeofthetableasaphysicalobject,onthecontrary,isnotdirectknowledge.Suchasitis,itisobtainedthroughacquaintancewiththesense-datathatmakeuptheappearanceofthetable.Wehaveseenthatitispossible,withoutabsurdity,todoubtwhetherthereisatableatall,whereasitisnotpossibletodoubtthesense-data.Myknowledgeofthetableisofthekindwhichweshallcall‘knowledgebydescription’.Thetableis‘thephysicalobjectwhichcausessuch-and-suchsense-data’.Thisdescribesthetablebymeansofthesense-data.(PP46–7)Sense-dataarenottheonlythingswithwhichwehaveacquaintance.Introspectiongivesusacquaintancewithourownthoughts,feelings,and161\nEPISTEMOLOGYdesires.Memorygivesusacquaintancewithpastdataoftheinneroroutersenses.Wemayeven,thoughthisisamatterofdoubt,haveacquaintancewithourownselves.Wedonothaveacquaintancewithphysicalobjectsorotherminds.Butwedohaveacquaintancewithrathermorerarefiedentities:namely,universalconcepts,suchaswhiteness,brotherhood,andsoon.LikePlato,Russellthoughtthatuniversalsbelongedtoasupra-sensibleworld,theworldofbeing.Theworldofbeingwasunchangeable,rigid,perfect,anddead.Itwastheworldofexistencethatcontainedthoughts,feelings,andsense-data.Bytemperamentsomepeoplepreferredoneworld,andotherspreferredtheother.But‘botharereal,andbothareimportanttothemetaphysician’(PP100).Everypropositionthatwecanunderstand,Russellmaintained,mustbecomposedwhollyofconstituentswithwhichweareacquainted.HowthencanwemakestatementsaboutBismarck,whomwehaveneverseen,orEurope,whichisfartoobigtobetakeninbyasense-datum?Russell’sansweristhatanyjudgementaboutBismarckorEuropereallycontainsanestedseriesofdefinitedescriptions,andallknowledgeaboutthemisultimatelyreducibletoknowledgeofwhatisknownbyacquaintance.Onlyinthiswaycanwehaveanyknowledgeofthingsthatwehaveneverexperienced.WhenhecametowriteOurKnowledgeoftheExternalWorld(1914)Russelldescribedtherelationshipbetweenphysicalobjectsandsense-databysayingthattheformerwerelogicalconstructionsoutofthelatter.WhereasinProblemshethoughthatobjectscausedsense-data,butweredistinctfromthem,henowcametobelievethatstatementsabouttheobjectsofeverydaylife,andscientificstatementsalso,werereduciblebyanalysisintostatementsaboutsensoryexperiences.Butthistooturnedouttobeatemporaryphaseinhisthinking,andinhislastphilosophicalwork,HumanKnowledge:ItsScopeandLimits(1948),hereturnedtoacausaltheoryofperception.Inthemeantimemuchhadhappenedtocallinquestionthewholebasisandmethodofhisepistemology.Husserl’sEpocheHusserlwasthelastgreatphilosopherintheCartesiantradition.Hesawthephenomenologicalreduction,andinparticulartheprogrammeofepoche,orsuspensionofjudgementabouttheexistenceofextra-mental162\nEPISTEMOLOGYreality,asarefinementofDescartes’smethodologicaldoubt.InseveralwayshesoughttobemoreradicalthanDescartesincuttingawayfromthefoundationsofphilosophywhateveritispossibletodoubt.Firstofall,hedeniedtheindubitabilityofthecogitoifthatissupposedtoaffirmtheexistenceofanenduringselfratherthanjustthesubjectofmypresentsensations.Second,hethoughtthatDescartestookthedataofconscious-nessattheirfacevalue,withoutdistinguishingwithinthembetweenwhatwasactuallygiveninsensation,andwhatinthemwastheresultofametaphysicalinterpretationthattacitlypresupposedtheexistenceofanexternalworld,spreadoutinspaceandtimeandsubjecttoaprincipleofcausality(LI16).ThedifferencesthatseparateHusserlfromDescartesare,however,unimportantincomparisonwiththesimilaritiesthatbindthetwotogether.Bothphilosopherssawepistemologyasthebasicdiscipline,whichispriortoallotherpartsofphilosophyandtoallempiricalsciences.Husserl,likeDescartes,neverdoubtedtwothings:thecertaintyofhisownmentalstatesandprocesses,andthelanguagethatheusestoreportthesephenomena.Thesecertainties,theybothbelieve,cansurviveanydoubtabouttheexternalworld.DescartesbelievedthatGodcouldhavecreatedmymind,justasitis,withouttherebeinganysuchthingasmatter.Husserlarguedthatourawarenessofexternalobjectsconsistsinourpartialglimpsesandcontactswiththem—our‘adumbrations’ofthem,asheputsit.Butunlesstheseadumbrationsexhibitedtheordertheydo,wecouldnotinanywayconstructobjectsoutofthem.However,itisperfectlyconceivablethatthisordermightbeshattered,leavingonlyachaoticseriesofsensations.Ifso,wewouldceasetoperceivephysicalobjects,andourworldwouldbedestroyed.Butconsciousness,Husserlargued,wouldsurvivesuchadestructionoftheworld(Ideas,49).Ifmyownconsciousnessisindubitablycertain,whiletheworldofmatterisessentiallydubious,nothingcouldseemmorejudiciousthantosuspendjudgementaboutthelatterwhileconcentratingontheaccuratedescriptionandanalysisoftheformer.ButHusserl’sepoche,orsuspensionofjudgement,isnottheneutralstartingpointthatitappearstobebetweenrealismandidealism.Fortheassumptionthatconsciousnesscanbegivenexpressioninapurelyprivateworldbegsthequestionagainstrealismfromthestart.Becausetheyseparatethecontentofconsciousnessfromany163\nEPISTEMOLOGYnon-contingentlinkwithitsexpressioninlanguageanditsobjectsintheexternalworld,bothHusserlandDescartesfindthemselvestrappedintoaformofsolipsism,fromwhichDescartestriestoescapebyappealtotheveracityofGod,andHusserl,inhislateryears,bypostulatingatranscen-dentalconsciousness.ThelineofargumentthatdroveHusserltobecomeatranscendentalidealistwentasfollows.Hisstartingpointwasthenaturalonethatconsciousnessispartoftheworld,withphysicalcauses.Butifoneistoavoidhavingtopostulate,likeKant,aDinganSichwhichisunattainablebyexperience,onemustsaythatthephysicalworldisitselfacreationofconsciousness.Butiftheconsciousnessthatcreatesitisourownordinarypsychologicalconsciousness,thenweareconfrontedbyparadox:theworldasawholeisconstitutedbyoneofitselements,humanconsciousness.Theonlywaytoavoidtheparadoxistosaythattheconsciousnessthatconstitutestheworldisnopartoftheworldbutistranscendental.1Theworldthatconsciousnesscreates,however,isshapednotonlybyourownexperiencesbutbythecultureandfundamentalassumptionsinwhichwelive:whatHusserlcalls‘thelife-world’.Thelife-worldisnotasetofjudgementsbasedonevidence,butratheranunexaminedsubstrateunderlyingallevidenceandalljudgement.However,itisnotsomethingultimateandimmutable.Ourlife-worldisaffectedbydevelopmentsinsciencejustasscienceisrootedinourlife-world.Hypothesesgettheirmeaningthroughtheirconnectionwiththelife-world,butintheirturntheygraduallychangeit.Inapaperfirstpublishedin1939,ExperienceandJudgement,Husserlwrote:everythingwhichcontemporarynaturalsciencehasfurnishedasdeterminationsofwhatexistsalsobelongstous,totheworld,asthisworldispregiventotheadultsofourtime.Andevenifwearenotpersonallyinterestedinnaturalscience,andevenifweknownothingofitsresults,still,whatexistsispregiventousinadvanceasdeterminedinsuchawaythatweatleastgraspitasbeinginprinciplescientificallydeterminable.ItisnoteasytoseehowtoreconciletheselatethoughtswiththeearlierstagesofHusserl’sthinking.Similarly,readersofWittgenstein’slatest1HereIamindebtedtoHermanPhilipse’sarticle‘TranscendentalIdealism’inCCH239–319.164\nEPISTEMOLOGYwritingsfindhimexploringnewanddisquietingideasonthenatureoftheultimatejustificationofknowledgeandbelief.2WittgensteinonCertaintyDescartes’sscepticismhashadamoreenduringeffectthanhisrationalism:philosophershavebeenmoreimpressedbythedifficultiesraisedinhisFirstandThirdMeditationsthanbytherepliestothosedifficultiesintheFourthandSixthMeditations.Husserl’stranscendentalidealismisonlythelastofalongseriesofunsuccessfulattemptstorespondtoCartesianscepticismabouttheexternalworldwhileacceptingtheCartesianpictureoftheinternalworld.Wittgenstein’sprivatelanguageargument,whichshowedthattherewasnowayofidentifyingitemsofconsciousnesswithoutreferencetothepublicworld,cutthegroundbeneaththewholenotionofCartesianconsciousness.Butitwasonlyinthelastyearsofhislife,intheepistemologicalwritingspublishedposthumouslyasOnCertainty,thatWittgensteinaddressedCartesianscepticismhead-on.InresponsetoscepticaldoubtofthekindpresentedintheFirstMedi-tation,Wittgensteinmakestwoinitialpoints.First,doubtneedsgrounds(OC323,458).Second,agenuinedoubtmustmakeadifferenceinsomeone’sbehaviour:someoneisnotreallydoubtingwhetherhehasapairofhandsifheuseshishandsaswealldo(OC428).Inreply,Descartescouldagreewiththefirstpoint;thatiswhyheinventedtheevilgenius,toprovideagroundforsuspicionofourintuitions.Thesecondpointhewouldanswerwithadistinction:thedoubtheisrecommendingisatheoretical,methodologicaldoubt,notapracticalone.Wittgenstein’snextcriticismismuchmoresubstantial.Adoubt,heclaims,presupposesthemasteryofalanguage-game.Inordertoexpressthedoubtthatponemustunderstandwhatismeantbysayingp.RadicalCartesiandoubtdestroysitselfbecauseitisboundtocallinquestionthemeaningofthewordsusedtoexpressit(OC369,456).Iftheevilgeniusis2ThesimilaritybetweenthetwoispointedoutbyDagfinnFøllesdalinhispaper‘UltimateJustificationinHusserlandWittgenstein’,inM.E.ReicherandJ.C.Marek(eds.),ExperienceandAnalysis(Vienna:O¨BT&HPT,2005),towhichIamindebtedforthequotationintheaboveparagraph.165\nEPISTEMOLOGYdeceivingmetotally,thenheisdeceivingmeaboutthemeaningoftheword‘deceive’.So‘Theevilgeniusisdeceivingmetotally’doesnotexpressthetotaldoubtthatitwasintendedto.Evenwithinthelanguage-game,theremustbesomepropositionsthatcannotbedoubted.‘Ourdoubtsdependonthefactthatsomepropositionsareexemptfromdoubt,areasitwerethehingesonwhichthoseturn’(OC341).Butiftherearepropositionsaboutwhichwecannotdoubt,arethesealsopropositionsaboutwhichwecannotbemistaken?Wittgensteindistin-guishedbetweenmistakeandotherformsoffalsebelief.Ifsomeoneweretoimaginethathehadjustbeenlivingforalongtimesomewhereotherthanwherehehadinfactbeenliving,thiswouldnotbeamistake,butamentaldisturbance;itwassomethingonewouldtrytocurehimof,nottoreasonhimoutof.Thedifferencebetweenmadnessandmistakeisthatwhereasmistakeinvolvesfalsejudgement,inmadnessnorealjudgementismadeatall,trueorfalse.Sotoowithdreaming:theargument‘Imaybedreaming’issenseless,becauseifIamdreamingthisremarkisbeingdreamtaswell,andindeeditisalsobeingdreamtthatthesewordshaveanymeaning(OC383).Wittgenstein’spurposeinOnCertaintyisnotjusttoestablishtherealityoftheexternalworldagainstCartesianscepticism.Hisconcern,asheacknow-ledged,wasmuchclosertothatofNewmaninTheGrammarofAssent:hewantedtoinquirehowitwaspossibletohaveunshakeablecertaintythatisnotbasedonevidence.Theexistenceofexternalobjectswascertain,butitwasnotsomethingthatcouldbeproved,orthatwasanobjectofknowledge.Itslocationinourworld-picture(Weltbild)wasfardeeperthanthat.InthelastmonthsofhislifeWittgensteinsoughttoclarifythestatusofasetofpropositionsthathaveaspecialpositioninthestructureofourepistemology,propositionswhich,asheputit,‘standfast’forus(OC116).Propositionssuchas‘MontBlanchasexistedforalongtime’and‘Onecannotflytothemoonbyflappingone’sarms’looklikeempiricalproposi-tions.Buttheyare‘empirical’propositionsinaspecialway:theyarenottheresultsofinquiry,butthefoundationsofresearch;theyarefossilizedempiricalpropositionsthatformchannelsfortheordinary,fluidproposi-tions.Theyarepropositionsthatmakeupourworld-picture,andaworld-pictureisnotlearntbyexperience;itistheinheritedbackgroundagainst166\nEPISTEMOLOGY‘‘Motorcarsdon’tgrowoutoftheearth’’wasoneofWittgenstein’sexamplesofpropositionsthatbuildupourworldpicture.ItwasbycallingsuchpropositionsinquestionthatsurrealistslikeJoanMiro´achievedtheireffects.whichIdistinguishbetweentrueandfalse.Childrendonotlearnthem;theyasitwereswallowthemdownwithwhattheydolearn(OC94,476).Itisquitesurethatmotorcarsdon’tgrowoutoftheearth.Wefeelthatifsomeonecouldbelievethecontraryhecouldbelieveeverythingwesayisuntrue,andcouldquestioneverythingthatweholdtobesure.Buthowdoesthisonebeliefhangtogetherwithalltherest?Wewouldliketosaythatsomeonewhocouldbelievethatdoesnotacceptourwholesystemofverification.Thesystemissomethingthatahumanbeingacquiresbymeansofobservationandinstruction.Iintentionallydonotsay‘learns’.(OC279)Whenwefirstbegintobelieveanything,webelievenotasinglepropositionbutawholesystem:lightdawnsgraduallyoverthewhole.Thoughthesepropositionsgivethefoundationsofourlanguage-games,theydonotprovidegrounds,orpremissesforlanguage-games.‘Giving167\nEPISTEMOLOGYgrounds’,Wittgensteinsaid,‘justifyingtheevidence,comestoanend;buttheendisnotcertainpropositionsstrikingusimmediatelyastrue,i.e.itisnotakindofseeinginourpart;itisouracting,whichliesatthebottomofthelanguagegame.’(OC204).Epistemologyinthetwentiethcenturywentthroughparallelstagesofdevelopmentindifferentclimatesofthought.Ineachcasefromaninitialconcentrationontheindividualconsciousnessepistemologistsmovedtowardsanappreciationoftheroleofsocialcommunitiesinthebuild-upofthewebofbelief.Likewise,theymovedfromaconcentrationonthepurelycognitiveaspectofexperiencetoanemphasisonitsaffectiveandpracticalelement.Thisdevelopmenttookplacebothwithindifferentschoolsofphilosophy(Continentalandanalytic)andalsowithinthethoughtofindividualphilosopherssuchasHusserlandWittgenstein.Ineachcasethedevelopmentbroughtenrichmenttoafieldofphilosophythathadinitiallybeencrampedbyexcessiveindividualism.168\n7MetaphysicsVarietiesofIdealismInthefirstpartofthenineteenthcenturythemostsignificantphilosopherswereallidealistsofonekindoranother.TheperiodwastheheydayoftranscendentalidealisminGermany,withFichte,Schelling,andHegelworkingtowardsatheoryoftheuniverseasthedevelopinghistoryofanabsoluteconsciousness.Buteventhosewhoweremostcriticalofabsoluteidealismowedallegiancetoadifferentformofidealism,theempiricistidealismofBerkeleyaccordingtowhichtobeistobeperceived.JohnStuartMillinEnglandandArthurSchopenhauerinGermanybothtakeastheirstartingpointBerkeley’sthesisthattheworldofexperienceconsistsofnothingbutideas,andbothtrytodetachBerkeley’stheoryofmatterfromitstheologicalunderpinning.1AccordingtoMill,ourbeliefthatphysicalobjectspersistinexistencewhentheyarenotperceivedamountstonomorethanourcontinuingexpectationoffurtherperceptionsinthefuture.Hedefinesmatteras‘apermanentpossibilityofsensation’;hetellsusthattheexternalworldistheworldofpossiblesensationssucceedingoneanotherinalawfulmanner.RightatthestartofhisWorldasWillandIdeaSchopenhauertellsus,‘Theworldismyidea.’Everythingintheworldexistsonlyasanobjectforasubject,existsonlyinrelationtoconsciousness.Toachievephilosophicalwisdomamanmustacceptthat‘hehasnoknowledgeofasunandofanearth,butonlyofaneyethatseesthesunandahandthatfeelstheearth’(WWI3).Thesubject,Schopenhauersays,isthatwhichknowsallthingsandisknownbynone;itisthereforethebeareroftheworld.1Seevol.III,pp.76,315.\nMETAPHYSICSSchopenhaueracceptsfromKantthatspace,time,andcausalityarenecessaryanduniversalformsofeveryobject,intuitedinourconscious-nesspriortoanyexperience.Spaceandtimeareaprioriformsofsensibility,andcausalityisanaprioriformofunderstanding.Understanding(Verstand)isnotpeculiartohumans,becauseotheranimalsareawareofrelationsbetweencauseandeffect.Understandingiswhatturnsrawsensationintoperception,justastherisingsunbringscolourintothelandscape.Thefacultythatispeculiartohumansisreason(Vernunft),thatistosaytheabilitytoformabstractconceptsandlinkthemtoeachother.Reasonconfersonhumansthepossibilityofspeech,deliberation,andscience;butitdoesnotincreaseknowledge,itonlytransformsit.Allourknowledgecomesfromourperceptions,whicharewhatconstitutetheworld.Thethesisthattheworldexistsonlyforasubjectleadstoparadox.Schopenhaueracceptedanevolutionaryaccountofhistory:animalsexistedbeforemen,fishesbeforelandanimals,andplantsbeforefishes.Alongseriesofchangestookplacebeforethefirsteyeeveropened.Yet,accordingtothethesisthattheworldisidea,theexistenceofthiswholeworldisforeverdependentonthatfirsteye,evenifitwasonlythatofaninsect.Thuswesee,ontheonehand,theexistenceofthewholeworldnecessarilydependentonthefirstknowing[conscious]being,howeverimperfectitbe;ontheotherhand,thisfirstknowinganimaljustasnecessarilydependentonalongchainofcausesandeffectswhichhasprecededit,andinwhichititselfappearsasasmalllink.(WWI30)Thisantinomycanberesolvedonlyifwemovefromconsiderationoftheworldasideatotheworldaswill.ThesecondbookofTheWorldasWillandIdeabeginswithaconsiderationofthenaturalsciences.Someofthese,suchasbotanyandzoology,dealwiththepermanentformsofindividuals;others,suchasmechanicsandphysics,promiseexplanationsofchange.Theseofferlawsofnature,suchasthoseofinertiaandgravitation,whichdeterminethepositionofpheno-menaintimeandspace.Buttheselawsoffernoinformationabouttheinnernatureoftheforcesofnature—matter,weight,inertia,andsoon—thatareinvokedinordertoaccountfortheirconstancy.‘Theforceonaccountofwhichastonefallstothegroundoronebodyrepelsanotheris,initsinnernature,notlessstrangeandmysteriousthanthatwhichproducesthemovementsandthegrowthofananimal’(WWI97).170\nMETAPHYSICSScientificinquiry,solongasitrestrictsitsconcerntoideas,leavesusunsatisfied.‘Wewishtoknowthesignificanceoftheseideas;weaskwhetherthisworldismerelyidea;inwhichcaseitwouldpassbyuslikeanemptydreamorabaselessvision,notworthournotice;orwhetheritisalsosomethingelse,somethingmorethanidea,andifsowhat’(WWI99).Wewouldneverbeabletogetanyfurtherifweweremereknowingsubjects—wingedcherubswithoutabody.Buteachofusisrootedintheworldbecauseofourembodiment.Myknowledgeoftheworldisgivenmethroughmybody,butmybodyisnotjustamediumofinformation,oneobjectamongothers;itisanactiveagentofwhosepowerIamdirectlyconscious.Itismywillthatgivesmethekeytomyownexistenceandshowsmetheinnermechanismofmyactions.Themovementsofmybodyarenoteffectsofwhichmywillisthecause:theactandthewillareidentical.‘Everytrueactofaman’swillisalsoatonceandwithoutexceptionamovementofhisbody.’Conversely,impres-sionsuponthebodyarealsoimpactsonthewill—pleasant,ifinaccord-ancewiththewill,painfulifcontrarytothewill.Eachofusknowshimselfbothasanobjectandasawill;andthisisthekeytotheunderstandingoftheessenceofeveryphenomenoninnature.[Weshall]judgeofallobjectswhicharenotourownbodies,andareconsequentlynotgiventoourconsciousnessinadoublewaybutonlyasideas,accordingtotheanalogyofourownbodies,andshallthereforeassumethatasinoneaspecttheyareidea,justlikeourbodies,andinthisrespectareanalogoustothem,soinanotheraspect,whatremainsofobjectswhenwesetasidetheirexistenceasideaofthesubjectmustinitsinnernaturebethesameasthatinuswhichwecallwill.Forwhatotherkindofexistenceorrealityshouldweattributetotherestofthematerialworld?Whenceshouldwetaketheelementsoutofwhichweconstructsuchaworld?Besideswillandideanothingisknowntousorthinkable.(WWI105)Theforcebywhichthecrystalisformed,theforcebywhichthemagnetturnstothepole,theforcewhichgerminatesandvegetatesintheplant—alltheseforces,sodifferentintheirphenomenalexistence,areidenticalintheirinnernaturewiththatwhichinusisthewill.Phenomenalexistenceismereidea,butthewillisathinginitself.Theword‘will’islikeamagicspellthatdisclosestoustheinmostbeingofeverythinginnature.Thisdoesnotmean—Schopenhauerquicklyinsists—thatafallingstonehasconsciousnessordesires.Deliberationaboutmotivesisonlytheformthatwilltakesinhumanbeings;itisnotpartoftheessenceofwill,171\nMETAPHYSICSwhichcomesinmanydifferentgrades,onlythehigherofwhichareaccompaniedbyknowledgeandself-determination.Why,wemaywonder,shouldwesaythatnaturalforcesarelowergradesofwill,ratherthansayingthatthehumanwillisthehighestgradeofforce?Schopenhauer’sreplytothisisthatourconceptofforceisanabstractionfromthephenomenalworldofcauseandeffect,whereaswillissomethingofwhichwehaveimmediateconsciousness.Toexplainwillintermsofforcewouldbetoexplainthebetterknownbythelessknown,andtorenouncetheonlyimmediateknowledgewehaveoftheworld’sinnernature.Willisgroundless:itisoutsidetherealmofcauseandeffect.Itiswrong,therefore,toaskforthecauseoforiginalforcessuchasgravityorelectri-city.Tobesure,theexpressionsoftheseforcestakeplaceinaccordancewiththelawsofcauseandeffect;butitisnotgravitythatcausesastonetofall,butrathertheproximityoftheearth.Theforceofgravityitselfisnopartofthecausalchain,becauseitliesoutsidetime.Sodoallotherforces.Throughthousandsofyearschemicalforcesslumberinmattertillthecontactwiththereagentssetsthemfree;thentheyappear;buttimeexistsonlyforthephenomena,notfortheforcesthemselves.Forthousandsofyearsgalvanismslumberedincopperandzinc,andtheylayquietlybesidesilver,whichwillinevitablybeconsumedinflameassoonasallthreearebroughttogetherundertherequiredconditions.(WWI136)ThisaccountoftheoperationofcausalityintheworldhassomefeaturesincommonwiththeoccasionalismofMalebranche,andSchopenhauerdrawsattentiontotheresemblance.2‘Malebrancheisright:everynaturalcauseisonlyanoccasionalcause.’ButwhereasforMalebrancheGodwasthetruecauseofeverynaturaleffect,forSchopenhauerthetruecauseistheuniversalwill.Anaturalcause,hetellsus,onlygivesopportunityoroccasionforthemanifestationoftheoneindivisiblewillwhichisthe‘in-itself’ofallthings,andwhosegraduatedobjectificationisthewholevisibleworld.Onlytheappearance,thebecomingvisibleinthisplace,atthistime,isbroughtaboutbythecauseandissofardependentonit,butnotthewholeofthephenomenon,noritsinnernature.(WWI138)2Seevol.III,p.59.172\nMETAPHYSICSTheuniversalwillisobjectifiedatmanydifferentlevels.Theprincipaldifferencebetweenthehigherandlowergradesofwillliesintheroleofindividuality.Inthehighergradesindividualityisprominent:notwohumansarealike,andtherearemarkeddifferencesbetweenindividualanimalsofhigherspecies.Butthefurtherdownwego,themorecompletelyindividualcharacterislostinthecommoncharacterofthespecies.Plantshavehardlyanyindividualqualities,andintheinorganicworldallindividu-alitydisappears.Aforcelikeelectricitymustshowitselfinpreciselythesamewayinallitsmillionphenomena.Thisisthereasonwhyitiseasiertopredictthephenomenathefurtherdownwegointhehierarchyofwill.Throughouttheworldofnaturewillisexpressedinconflict.Thereisconflictbetweendifferentgradesofwill,aswhenamagnetliftsapieceofiron,whichisthevictoryofahigherformofwill(electricity)overalower(gravitation).Whenapersonraisesanarm,thatisatriumphofhumanwillovergravity,andineveryhealthyanimalweseetheconsciousorganismwinningavictoryoverthephysicalandchemicallawsthatoperateontheconstituentsofthebody.Itisthisperpetualconflictthatmakesphysicallifeburdensomeandbringsthenecessityofsleepandeventuallyofdeath.‘Atlastthesesubduedforcesofnature,assistedbycircumstances,winbackfromtheorganism,weariedevenbytheconstantvictory,thematterittookfromthem,andattaintoanunimpededexpressionoftheirbeing’(WWI146).Atthebottomendofthescale,similarly,weseetheuniversalessentialconflictthatmanifestswill.Theearth’srevolutionaroundthesuniskeptgoingbytheconstanttensionbetweencentrifugalandcentripetalforce.Matteritselfiskeptinbeingbyattractiveandrepulsiveforces,gravitationandimpenetrability.Thisconstantpressureandresistanceistheobjectivityofwillinitsverylowestgrade,andeventhere,asamereblindurge,itexpressesitscharacteraswill.Thewill,inSchopenhauer’ssystem,occupiesthesamepositionasthething-in-itselfinKant’s.Consideredapartfromitsphenomenalactivities,itisoutsidetimeandspace.Sincetimeandspacearethenecessaryconditionsformultiplicity,thewillmustbesingle;itremainsindivisible,inspiteofthepluralityofthingsinspaceandtime.Thewillisobjectifiedinahigherwayinahumanthaninastone;butthisdoesnotmeanthatthereisalargerpartofwillinthehumanandasmallerpartinthestone,becausetherelationofpartandwholebelongsonlytospace.Sotoodoesplurality:‘thewillrevealsitselfjustascompletelyinoneoakasinmillions’(WWI128).173\nMETAPHYSICSThedifferentgradesofobjectificationofthewillareidentifiedbySchopenhauerwiththeIdeasofPlato.Thesetoo,likethewillitself,areoutsidespaceandtime.Thosedifferentgradesofthewill’sobjectification,expressedininnumerableindividuals,existastheunattainedpatternsofthese,orastheeternalformsofthings.Notthemselvesenteringintotimeandspace,themediumofindividuals,theyremainfixed,subjecttonochange,alwaysbeing,neverhavingbecome.Theparticularthings,however,ariseandpassaway;theyarealwaysbecomingandneverare.(WWI129)ThecombinationofPlatonicidealismwithIndianmysticismgivesScho-penhauer’ssystemauniquelymetaphysicalquality.Howevermuchtheyadmiredhisstyle,oradmittedhisinfluence,fewphilosophersfeltabletofollowhimalltheway.TherehasneverbeenaschoolofSchopenhaueriansastherehavebeenschoolsofKantiansandHegelians.TheonepersonwhowaswillingtodeclarehimselfadiscipleofSchopenhauerwastheWagnerofTristanundIsolde.MetaphysicsandTeleologyItisafarcryfromSchopenhauer’smysticalidealismtoDarwin’sevolu-tionarynaturalism,andindeeditmayseemoddtomentionabiologistatallinachapteronmetaphysics.ButDarwin’stheorieshadimplications,whichwentbeyondhisimmediateinterests,forthegeneraltheoryofcausation.Aristotle,whowasthefirsttosystematizemetaphysics,didsointermsoffourkindsofcauses:material,formal,efficient,andfinal.Thefinalcausewasthegoalorendofastructureoractivity.Explanationsintermsoffinalcauseswerecalled‘teleological’aftertheGreekwordforend,telos.ForAristotleteleologicalexplanationswereoperativeateverylevel,fromtheburrowingofanearthwormtotherotationoftheheavens.SinceDarwin,manythinkershaveclaimed,thereisnolongeranyroomatallforteleologicalexplanationinanyscientificdiscipline.Aristotelianteleologicalexplanationsofactivitiesandstructureshavetwofeatures:theyexplainthingsintermsoftheirends,nottheirbegin-nings,andtheyinvokethenotionofgoodness.Thus,anactivitywillbeexplainedbyreferencenottoitsstartingpointbuttoitsterminus;and174\nMETAPHYSICSAlithographofF.StassenillustratesthemomentinWagner’soperainwhichIsoldehandsthefatefulpotiontoTristan.arrivalattheterminuswillbeexhibitedassomekindofgoodfortheagentwhoseactivityistobeexplained.Thus,thedownwardmotionofheavybodiesonearthwasexplainedbyAristotleasamovementtowardstheirnaturalplace,theplacewhereitwasbestforthemtobe,andthecircularmotionoftheheavenswastobeexplainedbyloveofasupremebeing.Similarly,teleologicalexplanationofthedevelopmentoforganicstructuresshowedhowtheorgan,initsperfectedstate,conferredabenefit175\nMETAPHYSICSonthecompleteorganism.Thus,ducksgrowwebbedfeetsothattheycanswim.Descartesrejectedtheuseofteleologicalexplanationinphysicsorbiology.Finalcausation,hemaintained,impliedintheagentaknowledgeoftheendtobepursued;butsuchknowledgecouldonlyexistinminds.Theexplanationofeveryphysicalmovementandactivitymustbemech-anistic;thatis,itmustbegivenintermsofinitial,notfinal,conditions,andthoseconditionsmustbestatedindescriptive,notevaluative,terms.Descartesofferednogoodargumentforhiscontention,andhisthesisruledoutstraightforwardgravitationalattractionnolessthantheAristo-teliancosmicballet.Moreover,Descarteswaswrongtothinkthatteleo-logicalexplanationmustinvolveconsciouspurpose:whateverAristotlemayhavethoughtabouttheheavenlybodies,heneverbelievedthatanearthworm,letaloneafallingpebble,wasinpossessionofamind.ItwasnotDescartes,butNewtonandDarwin,whodealttheseriousblowstoAristotelianteleology,byundermining,indifferentways,itstwoconstituentelements.Newtoniangravity,nolessthanAristotelianmotion,providesanexplanationbyreferencetoaterminus:gravityisacentripetalforce,aforce‘bywhichbodiesaredrawn,orimpelled,orinanywaytend,towardsapointastoacentre’.ButNewton’sexplanationisfundamentallydifferentfromAristotle’sinthatitinvolvesnosuggestionthatitisinanywaygoodforabodytoarriveatthecentretowhichittends.Darwinianexplanationsintermsofnaturalselection,ontheotherhand,resembleAristotle’sindemandingthattheterminusoftheprocesstobeexplained,orthecomplexityofthestructuretobeaccountedfor,shallbesomethingthatisbeneficialtotherelevantorganism.ButunlikeAristotle,Darwinexplainstheprocessesandthestructures,notintermsofapullbythefinalstateorperfectedstructure,butintermsofthepressureoftheinitialconditionsofthesystemanditsenvironment.Theredteethandredclawsinvolvedinthestruggleforexistencewere,ofcourse,inpursuitofagood,namelythesurvivaloftheindividualorganismtowhichtheybelonged;buttheywerenotinpursuitoftheultimategoodthatistobeexplainedbyselection,namely,thesurvivalofthefittestspecies.Itisthusthattheemergenceofparticularspeciesinthecourseofevolutioncouldbeexplainednotonlywithoutappealtoaconsciousdesigner,butwithoutevokingteleologyatall.176\nMETAPHYSICSItis,ofcourse,onlyatoneparticularlevelthatDarwin’ssystemofferstorenderteleologysuperfluous.Humanbeings,suchashusbandmen,actforthesakeofgoalsnotonlyinbreedingimprovedstock,butinhumanlifeandbusinessingeneral.Othersamongthehigheranimalsnotonlyactoninstinct,butpursuegoalslearntbyexperience.Moreover,Darwinianscientistshavenotgivenupthesearchforfinalcauses.Indeed,contem-porarybiologistsaremuchmoreadeptatdiscerningthefunctionofstructuresandbehavioursthantheirpredecessorsintheperiodbetweenDescartesandDarwin.WhatDarwindidwastomaketeleologicalexplan-ationrespectablebyofferingageneralrecipefortranslatingitintoanexplanationofamechanisticform.Hissuccessorsthusfeelablefreelytousesuchexplanations,withoutofferingmorethanapromissorynoteabouthowtheyaretobereducedtomechanisminanyparticularcase.Oncetheyhaveidentifiedthebenefit,G,thatanactivityorstructureconfersonanorganism,theyfeelentitledtosaywithoutfurtheradothat‘theorganismevolvedinsuchawaythatG’.TwogreatquestionsaboutteleologyareleftunansweredbytheworkofDarwin.First,arethefreeandconsciousdecisionsofhumanbeingsirreduciblyteleological,orcantheybegivenanexplanationinmechanisticterms?Therearethosewhobelievethatwhenmoreisknownaboutthehumanbrainitwillbepossibletoshowthateveryhumanthoughtandactionistheoutcomeofmechanisticphysicalprocesses.Thisbelief,how-ever,isanactoffaith;itisnottheresultofanyscientificdiscoveryorofanyphilosophicalanalysis.Second,ifweassumethatbroadlyDarwinianexplanationscanbefoundfortheexistenceoftheteleologicalorganismsweseearoundus,doesourinvestigationrestthere?Orcantheuniverseitselfberegardedasasystemthatoperates,throughmechanisticmeans,tothegoalofproducingspeciesoforganisms,inthewaythatarefrigeratorworksthroughmechanisticmeanstothegoalofauniformtemperature?Istheuniverseitselfonehugemachine,agoal-directedsystem?Biologistsaredividedwhetherevolutionitselfhasadirection.Somebelievethatithasaninbuilttendencytoproduceorganismsofevergreatercomplexityandeverhigherconsciousness.Othersclaimthatthereisnoscientificevidencethatevolutionhasanykindofprivilegedaxis.Eitherway,thequestionremainswhetheritisteleologicalexplanationormech-anisticexplanationthatistheonethatoperatesatafundamentallevelof177\nMETAPHYSICStheuniverse.IfGodcreatedtheworld,thenmechanisticexplanationisunderpinnedbyteleologicalexplanation;thefundamentalexplanationoftheexistenceandoperationofanycreatureisthepurposeofthecreator.IfthereisnoGod,buttheuniverseisduetotheoperationofnecessarylawsuponblindchance,thenitisthemechanisticlevelofexplanationthatisfundamental.SofarasIknow,noone,whetherscientistorphilosopher,hasprovidedadefinitiveanswertothisquestion.Realismvs.NominalismThroughoutthehistoryofphilosophyonemetaphysicalproblemrecursagainandagain,presentedindifferentterms.Thisisthequestionwhether,ifwearetomakesenseoftheworldwelivein,theremustexist,outsidethemind,entitiesofaquitedifferentkindfromthefleetingindividualsthatwemeetineverydayexistence.Intheancientworld,PlatoandAristotlediscussedwhetherornottherewereIdeasorFormsexistingindependentlyofmatterandmaterialobjects.ThroughouttheMiddleAges,realistandnominalistphilosophersdisputedwhetheruniversalswererealitiesormeresymbols.Inthemoderneraphilosophersofmathematicshaveconductedaparalleldebateaboutthenatureofmathematicalobjects,withformalistsidentifyingnumberswithnumerals,andrealistsassertingthatnumbershaveanindependentreality,constitutingathirdworldseparatefromtheworldofmindandtheworldofmatter.ThemostvociferousdefenderofrealisminmoderntimesisFrege.Inalectureentitled‘FormalTheoriesofArithmetic’(CP112–21)heattacks1theideathatsignsfornumbers,like‘2’and‘ð’,aremerelyemptysignsdesignatingnothing.Evencallingthem‘signs’,hesays,alreadysuggeststhattheydosignifysomething.Aresoluteformalistshouldcallthem1‘shapes’.Ifwetookseriouslythecontentionthat‘2’doesnotdesignateanything,thenitismerelyasplashofprinter’sinkorasplurgeofchalk,withvariousphysicalandchemicalproperties.Howcanitpossiblyhavethepropertythatifaddedtoitselfityields1?Shallwesaythatitisgiventhispropertybydefinition?Adefinitionservestoconnectasensewithaword;butthissignwassupposedtohavenocontent.Sure,itisuptoustogiveasignificationtoasign,andthereforeitispartlydependentonhuman178\nMETAPHYSICSchoicewhatpropertiesthecontentofasignhas.Butthesepropertiesarepropertiesofthecontent,notofthesignitself,andhence,accordingtotheformalist,theywillnotbepropertiesofthenumber.Whatwecannotdoistogivethingspropertiesmerelybydefinition.IntheGrundgesetzeFregeusesagainsttheformaliststhekindofargumentthatWyclifusedagainstthenominalistsoftheMiddleAges.3Onecannotbypuredefinitionmagicallyconjureintoathingapropertythatinfactitdoesnotpossess—savethatofnowbeingcalledbythenamewithwhichonehasnamedit.Thatanovalfigureproducedonpaperwithinkshouldbyadefinitionacquirethepropertyofyieldingonewhenaddedtoone,Icanonlyregardasascientificsuperstition.Onecouldjustaswellbyapuredefinitionmakealazypupildiligent.(BLA11)ForFrege,notonlynumbersbutfunctionstooweremind-independentrealities.Consideranexpressionsuchas‘2x2þx’.Thisexpressionsplitsintotwoparts,asignforanargumentandanexpressionforafunction.Intheexpressions(212)þ1(242)þ4(252)þ5wecanrecognizethesamefunctionoccurringoverandoveragain,butwithdifferentarguments,namely1,4,and5.Thecontentthatiscommontotheseexpressionsiswhatthefunctionis.Itcanberepresentedby‘2()2þ()’,thatis,bywhatisleftof‘2x2þx’ifweleavethexsout.Theargumentisnotpartofthefunction,ratheritcombineswiththefunctiontomakeacompletewhole.Afunctionmustbedistinguishedfromitsvalueforaparticularargument:thevalueofamathematicalfunctionisalwaysanumber,asthenumber3isthevalueofourfunctionfortheargument1,sothat‘(212)þ1’namesthenumber3.Afunctionitself,unlikethenumbersthatareitsargumentsanditsvalues,issomethingincomplete,or‘unsaturated’asFregecallsit.Thatiswhyitisbestrepresented,symbolic-ally,byasigncontaininggaps.Initself,itisnotasignbutarealitylyingbehindthesign.ItwasnotonlyinmathematicsthatFregewasaresoluterealist.Heextendedthenotionoffunctioninsuchawaythatallconceptsofanykind3Seevol.II,pp.152–3.179\nMETAPHYSICSturnouttobefunctions.Thelinkbetweenmathematicalfunctionsandpredicatessuchas‘...killed...’or‘...islighterthan...’ismadeinastrikingpassageof‘FunctionandConcept’whereweareinvitedtoconsiderthefunction‘x2¼1’.Thefirstquestionthatariseshereiswhatthevaluesofthisfunctionarefordifferentarguments.Nowifwereplacexsuccessivelyby1,0,1,2weget:(1)2¼102¼112¼122¼1Oftheseequationsthefirstandthirdaretrue,theothersfalse.Isay‘thevalueofourfunctionisatruth-value’anddistinguishbetweenthetruth-valuesofwhatistrueandwhatisfalse.(CP144)Oncethismovehasbeenmade,itispossibleforFregetodefineaconceptasafunctionwhosevalueforeveryargumentisatruth-value.Aconceptwillthenbetheextra-linguisticcounterpartofapredicateinlanguage:whatisrepresented,forinstance,bythepredicate‘...isahorse.’Concepts,likenumbers,arequiteindependentofmindormatter:wedonotcreatethem,wediscoverthem;butwedonotdiscoverthembytheoperationofoursenses.Theyareobjective,thoughtheydonothavethekindofreality(Wirklichkeit)thatbelongstothephysicalworldofcauseandeffect.Frege’srealismisoftencalledPlatonism,butthereisasignificantdifferencebetweenPlato’sIdeasandFrege’sconcepts.ForPlato,theIdealHorsewasitselfahorse:onlybybeingitselfahorsecoulditimparthorsinesstothenon-idealhorsesoftheeverydayworld.4Frege’sconcepthorse,bycontrast,issomethingveryunlikeahorse.Anyactualhorseisanobject,andbetweenobjectsandconceptsthereis,forFrege,agreatgulffixed.Notonlyistheconcepthorsenotahorse,itis,Fregetellsus,notaconcept.Thisremarkatfirsthearingbringsusupshort;butthereisnothingreallyuntowardaboutit.Prefacing‘horse’with‘theconcept’hastheeffectofturningasignforaconceptintoasignforanobject,justasputtingquotationmarksroundtheword‘swims’turnsthesignforaverbintoanounwhich,unlikeaverb,canbethesubjectofasentence.Wecan4Seevol.I,p.208.180\nMETAPHYSICSsaytruly‘‘‘swims’’isaverb’,butalso‘‘‘‘‘swims’’’’isanoun’.ThatisthecluetounderstandingFrege’sclaimthattheconcepthorseisnotaconcept.First,Second,andThirdinPeirceIntheEnglish-speakingworld,themostoriginalsystemofmetaphysicsdevisedinthenineteenthcenturywasthatofC.S.Peirce.ItistruethatPeirce’sprincipleofpragmatismresemblestheverificationprincipleofthelogicalpositivists,andthatfromtimetotimehewaswillingtodenouncemetaphysicsas‘meaninglessgibberish’;nonetheless,hehimselfconstructedasystemthatwasasabstruseandelaborateasanythingtobefoundinthewritingsofGermanidealists.LikeHegel,Piercewasfascinatedbytriads.HewroteinTheMonistin1891:Threeconceptionsareperpetuallyturningupateverypointineverytheoryoflogic,andinthemostroundedsystemstheyoccurinconnectionwithoneanother.Theyareconceptionssoverybroadandconsequentlyindefinitethattheyarehardtoseizeandmaybeeasilyoverlooked.IcallthemtheconceptionsofFirst,Second,Third.Firstistheconceptionofbeingorexistingindependentofanythingelse.Secondistheconceptionofbeingrelativeto,theconceptionofreactionwith,somethingelse.Thirdistheconceptionofmediation,wherebyafirstandsecondarebroughtintorelation.(EWP173)ThistriadicsystemwasinspiredbyPeirce’sresearchintothelogicofrelations.Heclassifiedpredicatesaccordingtothenumberofitemstowhichtheyrelate.‘...isblue’isamonadicorone-placepredicate,‘...isthesonof...’,withtwoplaces,isdyadic,and‘...gives...to...’istriadic.Asense-impressionofaqualityisanexampleofa‘firstness’,heredityisanexampleofa‘secondness’.Thethirdclassofitemscanbeexemplifiedbytherelationshipwherebyasignsignifies(‘mediates’)anobjecttoaninterpre-tingmind.Universalideasareaparadigmcaseofthirdness,andsoarelawsofnature.Ifasparkfallsintoabarrelofgunpowder(first)itcausesanexplosion(second)anddoessoaccordingtoalawthatmediatesbetweenthetwo(third).Peircewaswillingtoapplythistriadicclassificationverywidely,topsychologyandtobiologyaswellastophysicsandchemistry.Heevenemployeditonacosmicscale:inoneplacehewrote‘MindisFirst,Matter181\nMETAPHYSICSisSecond,EvolutionisThird’(EWP173).Moreover,heofferedanelaborateproofthatwhileascientificlanguagemustcontainmonadic,dyadic,andtriadicpredicates,therearenophenomenathatrequirefour-placepredi-catesfortheirexpression.Expressionscontainingsuchpredicatescanalwaysbetranslatedintoexpressionscontainingonlypredicatesofthethreebasickinds.Thirdness,however,Peirceseesasanirreducibleelementoftheuniverse,neglectedbynominalistphilosophers,whorefusedtoaccepttherealityofuniversals.Theaimofallscientificinquiryistofindthethirdnessinthevarietyofourexperience—todiscoverthepatterns,regularities,andlawsintheworldwelivein.Butweshouldnotbelookingforuniversal,exceptionlesslawsthatdetermineallthathappens.Thedoctrineofneces-sity,indeed,wasoneofPeirce’schieftargetsinhiscriticismoftheWeltan-schauungofnineteenth-centuryscience.Hestatesitthus:Thepropositioninquestionisthatthestateofthingsexistingatanytime,togetherwithcertainimmutablelaws,completelydeterminethestateofthingsateveryothertime(foralimitationtofuturetimeisindefensible).Thus,giventhestateoftheuniverseintheoriginalnebula,andgiventhelawsofmechanics,asufficientlypowerfulmindcoulddeducefromthesedatathepreciseformofeverycurlicueofeveryletterIamnowwriting.(EWP176)Thisproposition,Peircethought,wasquiteindefensible.Itcouldbeputforwardneitherasapostulateofreasoningnorastheoutcomeofobser-vation.‘Trytoverifyanylawofnatureandyouwillfindthatthemorepreciseyourobservations,themorecertaintheywillbetoshowirregulardeparturesfromthelaw’(EWP182).Peircemaintainedthattherewasanirreducibleelementofchanceintheuniverse:athesiswhichhecalled‘tychism’fromtheGreekwordforchance,ôı÷ç.InsupportoftychismheenlistedbothAristotleandDarwin.Theinclusionofchanceasapossiblecause,hesaid,wasoftheutmostessenceofAristotelianism;andtheonlywayofaccountingforthelawsofnaturewastosupposethemresultsofevolution.‘Thissupposesthemnottobeabsolute,nottobeobeyedprecisely.Itmakesanelementofindeterminacy,spontaneity,orabsolutechanceinnature’(EWP163).Thus,therewasampleroomforbeliefintheautonomyandfreedomofthehumanwill.Therewere,Peircethought,threewaysofexplainingtherelationshipbetweenphysicalandpsychicallaws.Thefirstwasneutralism,which182\nMETAPHYSICSAlecturemanuscriptofPeirce,whichil-lustratesthecurlicuesthathebelievedtobeun-predictablebydeterministiclaws.placedthemonaparasindependentofeachother.Thesecondwasmaterialism,whichregardedpsychicallawsasderivedfromphysicalones.Thethirdwasidealism,whichregardedpsychicallawsasprimordialandphysicallawsasderivative.Neutralism,hethought,wasruledoutbyOckham’srazor:neverlookfortwoexplanatoryfactorswhereonewilldo.Materialisminvolvedtherepugnantideathatamachinecouldfeel.‘Theoneintelligibletheoryoftheuniverseisthatofobjectiveidealism,thatmatteriseffetemind,inveteratehabitsbecomingphysicallaws’(EWP168).Peirceofferedtoexplainthecourseoftheuniverseintermsoffirstness,secondness,andthirdness.‘Threeelementsareactiveintheworld’,hewrote;‘first,chance;second,law;andthird,habit-taking’(CPi.409).Intheinfinitelyremotebeginning,therewasnothingbutunpersonalizedfeeling,withoutanyconnectionofregularity.Then,thegermofageneralizing183\nMETAPHYSICStendencywouldariseasasport,andwouldbedominantoverothersports.‘Thus,thetendencytohabitwouldbestarted;andfromthiswiththeotherprinciplesofevolutionalltheregularitiesoftheuniversewouldbeevolved’(EWP174).Peirce’stheoryofcosmicevolutiondiffersfromDarwinisminseveralways.Firstofall,hestatesitsprincipleinutterlygeneralterms,withnoreferencetoanimalorplantspecies:Wherevertherearelargenumbersofobjects,havingatendencytoretaincertaincharactersunaltered,thistendency,however,notbeingabsolutebutgivingroomforchancevariations,then,iftheamountofvariationisabsolutelylimitedincertaindirectionsbythedestructionofeverythingthatreachestheselimits,therewillbeagradualtendencytochangeindirectionsofdeparturesfromthem.(EWP164)Second,whileDarwin’sdoctrineofthesurvivalofthefittestsoughttoeliminatetheneedtoexplainthecourseofnatureintermsofAristotelianfinalcauses,Peirce,likeAristotle,sawthepursuitofanultimategoalasthedynamicthatrulestheuniverse.Surprisingasitmayseem,itislovethatisthedrivingforceofcosmichistory.Theoriginalslimyprotoplasmhasthepowerofgrowthandreproduction;itiscapableoffeelingandithasthepropertyoftakinghabits.‘Love,recognizinggermsoflovelinessinthehateful,graduallywarmsitintolifeandmakesitlovely.’That,forPeirce,isthesecretofevolution.Peircedistinguishedthreemodesofevolution:evolutionbyfortuitousvariation,evolutionbymechanicalnecessity,andevolutionbycreativelove.InaccordancewithhispassionforfashioningEnglishtermsfromGreekroots,hecalledthesetypesofevolutiontychastic,anancastic,andagapastic,fromtheGreekwordsrespectivelyforchance,necessity,andlove.Darwin’sevolutionarytheorywastychastic:therewas,Peircethought,littlepositiveevidenceforit,anditspopularitywasduetothenineteenthcentury’spassionforheartlesslaissez-faireeconomics.‘Itmakesthefelicityofthelambsjustthedamnationofthegoats,transposedtotheothersideoftheequation.’Theprincipleofnecessitythatunderpinnedanancasticevolutionhadalready,Peircebelieved,beendisposedofbyhisarguments.Weareleftwiththethirdformofevolution,agapasticevolu-tion.SuchaformofevolutionhadbeenproposedbyLamarck:theendeavoursofparentsproducebeneficialmodificationsthatareinheritedbytheiroffspring.‘Agenuineevolutionaryphilosophy,’Peircetellsusin184\nMETAPHYSICSconclusion,‘thatis,onethatmakestheprincipleofgrowthaprimordialelementoftheuniverse,issofarfrombeingantagonistictotheideaofapersonalcreator,thatitisreallyinseparablefromthatidea’(EWP214).WehavecomesomedistancefromtheempiricistverificationismthatseemedtobethekernelofPeirce’spragmatism.TheMetaphysicsofLogicalAtomismMetaphysicsgoeshandinhandwithlogicalsoinWittgenstein’sTractatus.Thoughmostofthebookisdevotedtothenatureoflanguage,itsearliestpagesconsistofaseriesofpronouncementsaboutthenatureoftheworld.BothhistoricallyandlogicallythethesesabouttheworldaredependentuponWittgenstein’sthesisaboutlanguage;buttheyamounttoameta-physicalsystemthatmeritsconsiderationinitsownright.AccordingtotheTractatus,toeachpairofcontradictorypropositionstherecorrespondsoneandonlyonefact:thefactthatmakesoneofthemtrueandtheotherfalse.Thetotalityofsuchfactsistheworld.Factsmaybepositiveornegative:apositivefactistheexistenceofastateofaffairs,anegativefactisthenon-existenceofastateofaffairs.Astateofaffairs,orsituation(Sachverhalt),isacombinationofobjects.Anobjectisessentiallyapossibleconstituentofastateofaffairs,anditspossibilityofoccurringincombinationwithotherobjectsinstatesofaffairsisitsnature.Sinceeveryobjectcontainswithinitsnatureallthepossibilitiesofitscombinationwithotherobjects,itfollowsthatifanyobjectisgivenallobjectsaregiven(TLP1.1–2.011).Objectsaresimpleandlackparts,buttheycancombineintocomplexes.Theyareungenerableandindestructible,becauseanypossibleworldmustcontainthesameobjectsasthisone;changeisonlyanalterationintheconfigurationofobjects.Objectsmaydifferfromeachotherbynature,orinexternalproperties,ortheymaybemerelynumericallydistinct,indiscerniblebutnotidentical(TLP2.022–2.02331).Theobjectsmakeuptheunalterableandsubsistentform,substance,andcontentoftheworld.Objectscombineintostatesofaffairs:thewayinwhichtheyarecon-nectedgivesthestateofaffairsitsstructure.Thepossibilityofastructureistheformofthestateofaffairs.Statesofaffairsareindependentofone185\nMETAPHYSICSanother:fromtheexistenceornon-existenceofoneofthemitisimpossibletoinfertheexistenceornon-existenceofanother.Sincefactsaretheexistenceandnon-existenceofstatesofaffairs,itfollowsthatfactstooareindependentofeachother.Thetotalityoffactsistheworld.ThesedensepagesoftheTractatusaredifficulttounderstand.Noexamplesaregivenofobjectsthatarethebedrockoftheuniverse.Commentatorshaveofferedwidelyvaryinginterpretations:forsome,objectsaresense-data;forothers,theyareuniversals.Possibly,bothoftheseitemswouldhavebeenrecognizedbyWittgensteinasobjects:afterall,theyarethesameastheitemsthat,accordingtoRussell,wereknowntousbyacquaintance.ButthelackofexamplesintheTractatusisnotaccidental.Wittgensteinbelievedintheexistenceofsimpleobjectsandatomicstatesofaffairsnotbecausehethoughthecouldgiveinstancesofthem,butbecausehethoughtthattheymustexistasthecorrelatesintheworldforthenamesandelementarypropositionsofafullyanalysedlanguage.Hisreasoningtothatconclusionisbasedonthreepremisses.First,whetherasentencehasmeaningornotisamatteroflogic.Second,whatparticularthingsexistisamatterofexperience.Third,logicispriortoallexperience.Therefore,whetherasentencehasmeaningornotcanneverdependonwhetherparticularthingsexists.Thisconclusionlaysdownaconditionthatanysystemoflogicmustmeet.Tomeetit,Wittgensteinthought,onemustlaydownthatnamescouldsignifyonlysimpleobjects.If‘N’isthenameofacomplex,then‘N’wouldhavenomeaningifthecomplexwerebrokenup,andsentencescontainingitwouldbesenseless.Sowhenanysuchsentenceisfullyanalysed,thename‘N’mustdisappearanditsplacebetakenbynamesthatnamesimples(TLP3.23,3.24;PIi.39).Simpleobjects,intheworldoftheTractatus,areconcatenatedintoatomicstatesofaffairs,whichcorrespondtoelementarypropositionsthatareconcatenationsofnames.Theworldcanbecompletelydescribedbylistingallelementarypropositions,andlistingwhichofthemaretrueandwhicharefalse(TLP4.26).Forthetrueelementarypropositionswillrecordallthepositivefacts,andthefalseelementarypropositionswillcorrespondtoallthenegativefacts,andthetotalityoffactsistheworld(TLP2.06).186\nMETAPHYSICSBadandGoodMetaphysicsTheTractatusisoneofthemostmetaphysicalworkseverwritten:itslikenesstoSpinoza’sEthicsisnocoincidence.Yetitwastakenasabiblebyoneofthemostanti-metaphysicalgroupsofphilosophers,theViennaCircle.Thelogicalpositivistsseizedontheideathatnecessarytruthswerenecessaryonlybecausetheyweretautologies:thisenabledthem,theybelieved,toreconcilethenecessityofmathematicswithathoroughgoingempiricism.Theythenemployedtheverificationprincipleasaweaponthatenabledthemtodismissallmetaphysicalstatementsasmeaningless.Wittgenstein,throughouthislife,sharedthepositivists’viewthattheremoval,thedissolution,ofmetaphysicswasoneofthetasksofthephilosopher.Hedescribedthetaskofthephilosopheras‘bringingwordsbackfromtheirmetaphysicaltotheireverydayuse’.Hecondemnedthemetaphysicsthatwasasearchforthehiddenessenceoflanguageoroftheworld.Yethewashimselfametaphysicianinhisownright—andnotjustatthetimeoftheTractatus,whosepropositionshecondemnedasnonsens-ical,butthroughouthislaterphilosophy.Herecognizedthattherecouldbealegitimateattempttounderstandessences,inwhichhewashimselfengaged.Inourinvestigations,hesaid,‘wetrytounderstandtheessenceoflanguage,itsfunctionandconstruction’.Whatwaswrong,onhisview,wastoconsidertheessencenotassomethingthatliesopentoviewandmustmerelybegivenaperspicuousdescription,butassomethinginteriorandhidden:akindofmetaphysicalectoplasmorhardwarethatexplainsthefunctioningofmindandlanguage.TherewereinparticularthreekindsofmetaphysicsagainstwhichWittgensteinsethisface:spiritualisticmeta-physics,scientisticmetaphysics,andfoundationalistmetaphysics.Whenweconsiderhumanthought,themetaphysicalimpulsemayleadustopostulatespiritualsubstances,orspiritualprocesses.Wearemisledbygrammar.Whengrammarmakesusexpectaphysicalsubstance,butthereisnotone,weinventametaphysicalsubstance;whereitmakesusexpectanempiricalprocess,butwecannotfindone,wepostulateanincorporealprocess.ThisistheoriginofCartesiandualism;theCartesianmindisametaphysicalsubstanceanditsoperationuponthebodyisametaphysicalprocess.Cartesianismismetaphysicalinthesenseofisolatingstatementsaboutmentallifefromanypossibilityofconclusiveverificationorfalsifi-cationinthepublicworld.187\nMETAPHYSICSBesidesdualistmetaphysics,thereismaterialistmetaphysics.‘Thechar-acteristicofametaphysicalquestion’,hewrote,‘isthatweexpressanunclarityaboutthegrammarofwordsintheformofascientificquestion’(BB35).Metaphysicsisphilosophymasqueradingasnaturalscience,andthisistheformofmetaphysicsparticularlybelovedofmaterialists.Itisametaphysicalerrortothink,forinstance,thatexplorationofthebrainwillhelpustounderstandwhatisgoingoninourmindswhenwethinkandunderstand.Thegreatmetaphysiciansofthepasthaveoftenthoughtoftheirsubjectashavingprimacyoverallotherpartsofphilosophy:Aristotlecalledmetaphysics‘firstphilosophy’andDescartesthoughtmetaphysicswastherootofthetreeofknowledge.Wittgensteindeniedthatanypartofphilosophyshouldbeprivilegedinthisway.Onecouldstartphilosophizingatanypoint,andleaveoffthetreatmentofonephilosophicalproblemtotakeupthetreatmentofanother.Philosophyhadnofoundations,anddidnotprovidefoundationsforotherdisciplines.Philosophywasnotahouse,noratree,butaweb.TherealdiscoveryistheonethatmakesmecapableofstoppingdoingphilosophywhenIwantto.Theonethatgivesphilosophypeace,sothatitisnolongertormentedbyquestionswhichbringitselfinquestion.Instead,wenowdemonstrateamethod,byexamples;andtheseriesofexamplescanbebrokenoff.Problemsaresolved(difficultieseliminated),notasingleproblem.(PII.133)ButwhileWittgenstein,throughouthislife,washostiletoscientisticandfoundationalmetaphysics,inhislaterworkhedidinfactmakesubstantialcontributionstoareasofphilosophythatwouldtraditionallyhavebeenregardedasmetaphysical.MuchofAristotle’sMetaphysicsisdevotedtophilosophicalactivitiesthatresemblequitecloselyWittgenstein’sownmethod.Thedistinctionbetweenactualityandpotentiality,andtheclassificationofdifferentkindsofpotentiality,isuniversallyrecognized(bybothfriendandfoe)asbeingoneofAristotle’smostcharacteristiccontributionstophilosophyandinparticulartothephilosophyofmind.HisdistinctionswerelatersystematizedbyscholasticphilosophersintheMiddleAges.Wittgensteinundertookaprolongedinvestigationofthenatureofpotentialityinthe188\nMETAPHYSICSBrownBook,wheresections58–67aredevotedtovariouslanguage-gameswiththeword‘can’.Thedistinctionsthathedrawsbetweenprocessesandstates,andbetweendifferentkindsofstates,correspondtotheAristoteliandistinctionsbetweenkinesis,hexis,andenergeia.Thecriteriabywhichthetwophilosophersmakethedistinctionsoftencoincide.TheexamplethatWitt-gensteindiscussesatlength,toillustratetherelationbetweenapoweranditsexercise,namelylearningtoread(PIi.156ff.),isclosetothestandardAristotelianexampleofamentalhexis,namely,knowledgeofgrammar.Wemaycallthesystematicstudyofactualityandpotentialitydynamicmetaphysics,andifwedosowemustsaythatWittgensteinwasoneofthemostconsummatepractitionersofthatparticularformofmetaphysics.ItwasnotanAristoteliantype,however,butaLeibnizianone,thatturnedouttobethemostflourishingversionofmetaphysicsinthelatterhalfofthetwentiethcentury.Thedevelopmentofmodalsemanticsintermsofpossibleworlds5neednot,initself,havehadmetaphysicalimpli-cations,butanumberofphilosophersinterpreteditinametaphysicalsenseandwerepreparedtocountenancetheideathattherewereidentifiableindividualsthathadonlypossibleandnotactualexistence.Inmyview,thiswasamistakendevelopment.Thereisadifficultyinprovidingacriterionofidentityformerelypossibleobjects.Ifsomethingistobeasubjectofwhichwecanmakepredications,itisessentialthatitshallbepossibletotellinwhatcircumstancestwopredicationsaremadeofthatsamesubject.Otherwiseweshallneverbeabletoapplytheprinciplethatcontradictorypredicationsshouldnotbemadeofthesamesubject.Wehavevariouscomplicatedcriteriabywhichwedecidewhethertwostate-mentsarebeingmadeaboutthesameactualman;bywhatcriteriacanwedecidewhethertwostatementsarebeingmadeaboutthesamepossibleman?ThesedifficultieswereentertaininglybroughtoutbyQuineinhisfamouspaper‘OnWhatThereIs’of1961:Take,forinstance,thepossiblefatmaninthatdoorway;andagain,thepossiblebaldmaninthatdoorway.Aretheythesamepossibleman,ortwopossiblemen?Howdowedecide?Howmanypossiblemenarethereinthatdoorway?Aretheremorepossiblethinonesthanfatones?Howmanyofthemarealike?Arenotwopossiblethingsalike?Isthisthesameassayingthatitisimpossiblefortwothingsto5Seep.119above.189\nMETAPHYSICSbealike?Or,finally,istheconceptofidentitysimplyinapplicabletounactualisedpossibles?Butwhatsensecanbefoundintalkingofentitieswhichcannotmeaningfullybesaidtobeidenticalwiththemselvesanddistinctfromoneanother?(FLPV666)ThequestionsaskedbyQuineseemtomeunanswerable,andthustoexposetheincoherenceofthenotionofunactualizedpossibleindividuals.ButinthelastdecadesofthecenturyphilosophersofgreattalentexercisedthemselvestoanswerQuine’squestionsandthustosolvewhatwascalled‘theproblemoftransworldidentity’.InthelightofthehistoryrecordedinthesevolumesitW.V.O.Quine,thegreatenemyofthemetaphysicsofpossibleworlds.Howmanypossiblemen,hewouldhaveasked,aresharingtheroomwithhimhere?190\nMETAPHYSICSseemstomemoreprudenttoadheretothegrandAristotelianprinciplethatthereisnoindividuationwithoutactualization—thecounterpartofthecardinalanti-Platonicprinciplethatthereisnoactualizationwithoutindividuation.IntheEnglish-speakingworldmetaphysicswasflourishingatthebegin-ningofthetwentiethcentury,withPeirceinAmericaextollingtheprincipleofcosmiclove,andtheneo-HegeliansinBritaintracingthelineamentsoftheAbsolute.Asthecenturyprogressedphilosophersbecamemoreandmorehostiletometaphysics;thishostilityclimaxedwiththepositivismofthe1930s,butcontinuedinfluentialwellintothesecondhalfofthecentury.Withtheapproachofthetwenty-firstcentury,metaphysicsoncemorebecamerespectable,butwithadifference.TheplaceonceoccupiedbythemonisticmetaphysicsoftheBritishidealistsisnowtakenbythepluralistic,indeedexuberant,metaphysicsoftheex-plorersofpossibleworlds.Itwillbeinterestingtoseewhetherthetwenty-firstcenturyexhibitsasimilarcycleofmetaphysicalthought.191\n8PhilosophyofMindBenthamonIntentionandMotiveentham’sPrinciplesofMoralsandLegislationcontainedadetailedanalysisofBhumanaction.Itdevotedsubstantialchapterstosuchtopicsasinten-tionandmotive.NotsincetheMiddleAgeshadagreatphilosopherdevotedsuchminuteattentiontothedifferentcognitiveandaffectiveelementswhosepresenceorabsencemaycontributetothemoralcharac-terofindividualactions.Bentham’sapproachtothetopicresemblesthatofAquinas,butheismuchmoregenerousinprovidingconcreteexamplestoillustratehispoints.Moreimportantly,thereisasignificantdifferencebetweenthetwophilosophersbothinterminologyandinmoralevalu-ation.1ForAquinas,anactionwasintentionalifitwaschosenasameanstoanend;ifanactionwasonlyanunavoidableaccompanimentorconsequenceofsuchachoiceitwasnotintentional,butonlyvoluntary.Benthamdislikedtheword‘voluntary’;itwasmisleading,hesaid,becauseitsome-timesmeantuncoercedandsometimesmeantspontaneous.Hepreferredtousetheword‘intentional’.However,hemadethesamedistinctionasAquinas,butmarkeditasadistinctionbetweentwokindsofintention.Aconse-quence,hesaid,maybeeitherdirectlyintentional(‘whentheprospectofproducingitconstitutedoneofthelinksinthechainofcausesbywhichthepersonwasdeterminedtoact’)orobliquelyintentional(‘whentheconse-quencewasforeseenaslikely,buttheprospectofproducingitformednolinkinthedeterminingchain’).ForBentham,anincidentthatisdirectly1Seevol.II,p.263.\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDintentionalmaybeeitherultimatelyormediatelyintentional,accordingtowhethertheprospectofproducingitwouldorwouldnothaveoperatedasamotiveifnotviewedasproductiveofafurtherevent.Thisdistinctionbetweenultimateandmediateintentioncorrespondstothescholasticdistinctionbetweenendsandmeans.BenthamillustratedhispanoplyofdistinctionsbyreferringtothestoryofthedeathofKingWilliamIIofEngland,whodiedwhilestaghuntingfromawoundinflictedbyoneSirWalterTyrell.HerangthechangesonthepossibledegreesofconsciousnessandintentionalityinthemindofTyrell,andassignedtheappropriateclassificationtoeachimaginedcase:unintentional,obliquelyintentional,directlyintentional,mediatelyinten-tional,ultimatelyintentional.TheeffectofBentham’sterminologywastodefineintentionitselfinpurelycognitiveterms:tofindoutwhatapersonintendedyouneedtoascertainwhatsheknew,notwhatshewanted.Whatshewantedisrelevantonlytothesubclassofintentionalityinvolved.Anactisuninten-tionalonlyifitsupshotwasquiteunforeseen;itisthusthat‘youmayintendtotouchamanwithoutintendingtohurthim;andyet,astheconsequencesturnout,youmaychancetohurthim’.ThecognitiveslantthatBenthamgivestointentionisofgreatimportance,sinceforhimintentionisakeycriterionforthemoralandlegalevaluationofactions.Weshouldnotthink,however,Benthamtellsus,thatintentionsaregoodandbadinthemselves.‘If[anintention]bedeemedgoodorbadinanysense,itmustbeeitherbecauseitisdeemedtobeproductiveofgoodorofbadconsequencesorbecauseitisdeemedtooriginatefromagoodorfromabadmotive’(P8.13).Nowconsequencesdependoncircumstances,andcircumstancesaresimplyeitherknownorunknowntotheagent.Sowhateveristobesaidofthegoodnessorbadnessofaperson’sintentionasresultingfromtheconsequencesofhisactdependsonhisknowledge(‘consciousness’)ofthecircumstances.IntheninthchapterofthePrinciplesBenthamclassifiesthedifferentpossibledegreesofsuchconsciousness.Ifamanisawareofacircumstancewhenheacts,thenhisactissaidtohavebeenanadvisedact,withrespecttothatcircumstance;otherwiseanunadvisedact.Besidesbeingunawareofcircumstancesthatactuallyobtain,anagentmaysupposethatcircum-stancesdoobtainwhichinfactdonotobtain;thisismissupposalandmakesanactmisadvised.Ifanactisintentional,andisadvisedwithrespecttoall193\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDcircumstancesrelevanttoaparticularconsequence,andthereisnomissupposalofpreventivecircumstances,thentheconsequenceisinten-tional.‘Advisedness,withrespecttothecircumstances,ifclearfromthemissupposalofanypreventivecircumstance,extendstheintentionalityfromtheacttotheconsequences’(P9.10).Benthammakesadistinctionbetweenintentionsandmotives:aman’sintentionsmaybegoodandhismotivesbad.Supposethat‘outofmaliceamanprosecutesyouforacrimeofwhichhebelievesyoutobeguilty,butofwhichinfactyouarenotguilty’.Herethemotiveisevil,andtheactualconsequencesaremischievous;nonetheless,theintentionisgood,becausetheconsequencesoftheman’sactionwouldhavebeengoodiftheyhadturnedoutasheforesaw.IndiscussingmotivesBenthamstressestheevaluativeovertonesofwordssuchas‘lust’,‘avarice’,and‘cruelty’.Initself,hesays,nomotiveiseithergoodorbad;thesewordsdenotebadmotivesonlyinthesensethattheyareneverproperlyappliedexceptwherethemotivestheysignifyhappentobebad.‘Lust’,forinstance,‘isthenamegiventosexualdesirewhentheeffectsofitareregardedasbad.’Itisonlyinindividualcasesthatmotivescanbegoodorbad.‘Amotiveisgood,whentheintentionitgivesbirthtoisagoodone;bad,whentheintentionisabadone;andanemotionisgoodorbadaccordingtothematerialconsequencesthataretheobjectsofit’(P10.33).By‘motive’Benthammeanswhat,describedinneutralterms,hewouldcallanultimatelyanddirectlyintentionalconsequence.Fromhisexplan-ationitisclearthatitdoesnotsupplyaseparatetitleofmoralqualificationofanact;theonlymentalstateprimarilyrelevanttothemoralityofavoluntaryactisthecognitivestatewithregardtotheconsequences.Bentham’saccountofmotiveisinaccordwiththegeneralutilitarianpositionthatmoralgoodnessandbadnessinactionsistobejudgedintermsoftheirconsequenceswithrespecttopleasureandpain.Hiscogni-tiveconceptionofintentionbroughthisfollowersintoconflictwiththedoctrineofdoubleeffectaccordingtowhichtheremaybeamoraldifferencebetweendoingsomethingonpurposeandmerelyforeseeingitasanunwantedconsequenceofone’schoices.ThesemoralissueswillbediscussedindetailinChapter9.InhisGroundworkKantexaltedtheimportanceofmotivemorethananyothermoralphilosopherhadeverdone.Bentham’spositionstandsatthe194\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDoppositeextremeofethicaltheory.AsJ.S.Millwastoputit,theutilitarians‘havegonebeyondalmostallothersinaffirmingthatthemotivehasnothingtodowiththemoralityoftheaction’.Notonlymotive,butalsointentionascommonlyunderstood,isirrelevanttoutilitarianmoraljudgementofbehaviour.Itisanagreeableparadoxthatthefounderofutilitarianismshouldhaveofferedafulleranalysisoftheconceptsofintentionandmotivethananypreviouswriterhadachieved.Reason,Understanding,andWillIncontinentalEuropetheanalysisofmentalconceptstookadifferentcourse.TheabsoluteidealismofaphilosophersuchasHegelmakesitdifficulttodistinguishinhisworkbetweenphilosophyofmindandmeta-physics.Schopenhauer,however,startingfromKant’sdistinctionbetweenunderstanding(Verstand)andreason(Vernunft),offersadetailedstudyofthedifferencesthatmarkoffhumanfromanimalcognitivefaculties.Understanding,aswellassensation,issomethingthatanimalssharewithhumans,becauseunderstandingisthecapacitytograspcausalrela-tions,whichissomethingthatanimalscanclearlydo.Indeed,thesagacityofanimalslikefoxesandelephantssometimessurpasseshumanunder-standing.Buthumanbeingsalonepossessreason,thatistosay,abstractknowledgeembodiedinconcepts.Reasonisthecapacityforreflection,whichplaceshumansfaraboveanimals,bothinpowerandinsuffering.Animalsliveinthepresentalone;manlivesatthesametimeinthefutureandthepast(WWI36).Reasonconfersthreegreatgiftsonhumans:language,freedom,andscience.Thefirstandmostessentialislanguage.Onlybytheaidoflanguagedoesreasonbringaboutitsmostimportantachieve-ments,namelytheharmoniousandconsistentactionofseveralindividuals,theplannedcooperationofmanythousands,civilization,theState;andthen,science,thestoringupofpreviousexperience,thesummarizingintooneconceptofwhatiscommon,thecommunicationoftruth,thespreadingoferror,thoughtsandpoems,dogmasandsuperstitions.(WWI37)Theimportanceofabstractknowledgeisthatitcanberetainedandshared.Understandingcangraspthemodeofoperationofalever,orthesupport195\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDofanarch;butmorethanunderstandingisneededfortheconstructionofmachinesandbuildings.Forpracticalpurposes,mereunderstandingmaysometimesbepreferable:‘itisofnousetometoknowintheabstracttheexactangle,indegreesandminutes,atwhichImustapplyarazor,ifIdonotknowitintuitively,thatis,ifIhavenotgotthefeelofit’.Butwhenlong-termplanningisnecessary,orwhenthehelpofothersisrequired,abstractknowledgeisessential.Animalsandhumans,accordingtoSchopenhauer,bothhavewills,butonlyhumanscandeliberate.Itisonlyintheabstractthatdifferentmotivescanbesimultaneouslypresentedinconsciousnessasobjectsofchoice.Ethicalconductmustbebasedonprinciples;butprinciplesareabstract.However,reason,thoughnecessaryforvirtue,isnotsufficientforvirtue.‘Reasonisfoundwithgreatwickednessnolessthanwithgreatkindness,andbyitsassistancegivesgreateffectivenesstotheoneastotheother’(WWI86).Thewill,forSchopenhauer,ispresentandactivethroughouttheuniverse,butwegraspitsnatureonlythroughthehumanwillingofwhichweareourselvesdirectlyaware.Allwilling,Schopenhauertellsus,arisesfromawant,adeficiency,andthereforefromsuffering.Awishmaybegranted,butforonewishthatissatisfiedtherearetenthataredenied.Desirelastslong;fulfilmentisonlymomentary.‘Noattainedobjectofdesirecangivelastingsatisfaction,butmerelyafleetinggratification;itislikethealmsthrowntothebeggar,thatkeepshimalivetodaythathismiserymaybeprolongedtillthemorrow’(WWI196).Asageneralrule,knowledgeisattheserviceofthewill,engagedinthesatisfactionofitsdesires.Thisisalwaysthecaseinanimals,andissymbol-izedbythewayinwhichtheheadofaloweranimalisdirectedtowardstheground.Inhumans,too,forthemostpartknowledgeistheslaveofwill;buthumanscanriseabovetheconsiderationofobjectsasmereinstru-mentsforthesatisfactionofdesire.Thehumanstandserect,andliketheApolloBelvederehecanlookintothefardistance,adoptinganattitudeofcontemplation,oblivioustothebody’sneeds.Inthisstatethehumanmindencountersanewclassofobjects:notjusttheLockeanideasofperception,norjusttheabstractideasofreason,buttheuniversalIdeasthatPlatodescribed.ThewaytograsptheIdeasisthis:letyourwholeconsciousnessbefilledwiththequietcontemplationofalandscapeorabuilding,andforgetyourownindividuality,yourownneeds196\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDanddesires.Whatyouwillthenknowwillnolongerbeanindividual,butaneternalform,aparticulardegreeofobjectificationoftheuniversalwill.Andyouwillloseyourselfandbecomeapure,will-less,painless,timelesssubjectofknowledge,seeingthingssubspecieaeternitatis.‘Insuchcontem-plationtheparticularthingbecomesatoncetheIdeaofitsspecies,andtheperceivingindividualbecomespuresubjectofknowledge.Theindividual,assuch,knowsonlyparticularthings;thepuresubjectofknowledgeknowsonlyIdeas’(WWIi179).Incontemplationfreefromtheservitudeofthewill,weloseourconcernwithhappinessandunhappiness.Indeed,weceasetobeindividual:webecome‘thatoneeyeoftheworldwhichlooksoutfromallknowingcreatures,butwhichcanbecomeperfectlyfreefromtheserviceofwillinmanalone’.EveryhumanbeinghasitwithinhispowertoknowtheIdeasinthings,butaspeciallyfavouredindividualmaypossessthisknowledgemoreintenselyandmorecontinuouslythanordinarymortals.Suchapersoniswhatwemeanbyagenius.Schopenhauerspellsoutforusthecharacteristicsofthegenius:thegeniusisimaginativeandrestless,hedislikesmathematics,andhelivesontheborderlineofmadness.Hisgiftfindsexpressionaboveallinworksofart,anditisthroughworksofartthatthoseofuswhoarenotgeniusescanbeintroducedtotheliberatingeffectofcontemplation.Schopenhauerspellsthisoutinadetailedconsiderationofthevariousarts.Thedeliver-ancefromthetyrannyofthewillthatisofferedbyartis,however,alimitedandtemporaryone.Theonlywaytoacompleteliberationisbyrenouncingaltogetherthewilltolive.2What,inSchopenhauer’ssystem,istherelationshipbetweensoulandbody?Firstofall,thereisacompleterejectionofthedualisticideathattherearecausalrelationsbetweentheinnerandtheouter.Thewillandthemovementsofthebodyarenottwodifferenteventslinkedbycausality:theactionsofthebodyaretheactsofthewillmadeperceptible.Thewholebody,withallitsparts,Schopenhauersays,isnothingbuttheobjectificationofthewillanditsdesires:Teeth,throatandbowelsareobjectifiedhunger;theorgansofgenerationareobjectifiedsexualdesire;thegraspinghand,thehurryingfeet,correspondtothemoreindirectdesiresofthewillwhichtheyexpress.Asthehumanformin2Schopenhauer’saesthetictheoryisconsideredinCh.10andhisethicaltheoryinCh.9below.197\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDgeneralcorrespondstothehumanwillingeneral,sotheindividualbodilystructurecorrespondstotheindividuallymodifiedwill,thecharacteroftheindividual,andthereforeitisthroughoutandinallitspartscharacteristicandfullofexpression.(WWI108)SchopenhauerhereanticipatesafamousremarkofWittgenstein’s,‘Thehumanbodyisthebestpictureofthehumansoul’(PIii.178).Thebodyisintimatelyinvolvedinknowledgeaswellasindesire;myownbodyisthestartingpointofmyperceptionoftheworld,andmyknowledgeofotherperceptibleobjectsdependsontheireffectsonmybody.ButevenwhenweriseaboveknowledgeofideastoknowledgeofIdeas,thebodystillhasarole,asSchopenhauerrathersurprisinglytellsus.‘Manisatonceimpetuousandblindstrivingofwill(whosepoleorfocusliesinthegenitals)andeternal,free,serenesubjectofpureknowledge(whosepoleisthebrain)’(WWI203).Isthereanypartofahumanbeingthatsurvivesthedeathofthebody,ordoestotalextinctionawaitus?OntheonehandSchopenhauersays,‘Beforeusthereisindeedonlynothingness’;ontheotherhand,hecansay,‘if,perimpossibile,asinglebeing,eventhemostinsignificant,wereentirelyannihilated,thewholeworldwouldinevitablybedestroyedwithit’(WWI129).Thelatterclaimisderivedfromthemetaphysicalprinciplethatthewillwhichistheinnerrealityofeveryindividualisitselfsingleandindivisible.Interpretershavesoughttoreconcilethetwopronouncementsbysuggestingthatatdeaththehumanpersonisabsorbedintothesinglewill:itcontinues,therefore,toexist,butitlosesallindividuality.Experimentalvs.PhilosophicalPsychologyAsthenineteenthcenturyprogressed,psychologistsendeavouredtolaunchanewscienceofthemind,whichwouldstudymentalphenomenabyempiricalandexperimentalmethods.InEuropethefirstpsychologicallaboratorywassetupin1879attheUniversityofLeipzigbyWilhelmWundt,aprofessorofphysiology,specializinginthenervoussystem,whofiveyearsearlierhadpublishedaninfluentialtextentitled‘PrinciplesofPhysiologicalPsychology’.WilliamJames,whohadgonetoGermanytostudyinthisfield,anticipatedWundtbysettingupapsychologylaboratoryinHarvard,andin1878thefirsteverdoctorateinpsychologywasawarded.198\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDPhrenologywasanearlyattempttomakepsychologyscientific.Thisillustrationfroman1825textbookattemptstorelatebumpsintheskulltotraitsofcharacter.199\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDJamessummedupthefindingsofthenewscienceinhisvolumesPrinciplesofPsychology(1890),aworkdescribedbyBertrandRussellaspossessing‘thehighestpossibleexcellence’.Thetaskofthenewpsychologywastorelatementaleventsandstatestoprocessesinthebrainandnervoussystem.James’stextbookintroducedthestudenttotherelevantphysiologyandreportedtheworkofEuropeanpsychologistsonthereactiontimesofexperimentalsubjects.Itrangedwidely,fromtheinstinctivebehaviourofanimalstothephenomenaofhypnotism.Formostofthetime,Jameswassurveyingtheworkofothers;butfromtimetotimehemadehisownoriginalcontributiontothesubject.James’smostfamousinnovationinphilosophicalpsychologywashistheoryoftheemotions.Whilehiscontemporariesstrovetofindtheexactrelationbetweenemotionalfeelingsandtheirconcomitantbodilypro-cesses,Jamesproposedthattheemotionswerenothingmorethantheperceptionoftheseprocesses.InThePrinciplesofPsychologyhewrote:Ournaturalwayofthinkingaboutcoarseremotionsisthatthementalperceptionofsomefactexcitesthementalaffectioncalledtheemotion,andthatthislatterstateofmindgivesrisetothebodilyexpression.Mytheory,onthecontrary,isthatthebodilychangesfollowdirectlytheperceptionoftheexcitingfact,andthatourfeelingofthesamechangesastheyoccurIStheemotion.Commonsensesays,weloseourfortune,aresorryandweep;wemeetabear,arefrightenedandrun;weareinsultedbyarival,areangryandstrike.Thehypothesisheretobedefendedsaysthatthisorderofsequenceisincorrect,thattheonementalstateisnotimmediatelyinducedbytheother,thatthebodilymanifestationsmustfirstbeinterposedbetween,andthatthemorerationalstatementisthatwefeelsorrybecausewecry,angrybecausewestrike,afraidbecausewetremble.(ii.250)Inordertoaccountforthegreatvarietyofemotionalstates,Jamesinsistedthattherewashardlyanylimittothepermutationsandcombinationsofpossibleminutebodilychanges,andeachoneofthese,heclaimed,wasfelt,acutelyorobscurely,themomentitoccurred.Buthewasnotabletogiveanyindependentcriterionfortheoccurrenceofsuchfeelings.James’stheoryoftheemotionshadbeenanticipatedbyDescartes.TheinfluenceofDescartesis,infact,all-pervasiveinhisaccountofthehumanmind.Nineteenth-centurypsychologistswereanxioustoemancipatethemselvesfromthethrallofphilosophy;butwhiletheirinvestigationsofphysiologicalphenomenaproducedgenuinescientificdiscoveries,their200\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDnotionoftheconsciousmindwastakenover,lock,stock,andbarrel,fromtheCartesiantraditioninphilosophy.ThisisabundantlyclearinJames’sPrinciples,butisperhapsmostcandidlyexpressedinhisearlypaperof1884,‘TheFunctionofCognition’(T1–42).Allstatesofconsciousness,Jamestheresays,canbecalled‘feelings’;andby‘feeling’hemeansthesameasLockemeantby‘idea’andDescartesmeantby‘thought’.Somefeelingsarecognitiveandsomearenot.Inordertodeterminewhatmakesthedifferencebetweencognitiveandnon-cognitivestates,Jamesinvitesustoconsiderafeelingofthemostbasicpossiblekind:Letussupposeitattachedtonomatter,norlocalizedatanypointinspace,butleftswinginginvacuo,asitwere,bythedirectcreativefiatofagod.Andletusalso,toescapeentanglementwithdifficultiesaboutthephysicalorpsychicalnatureofits‘object’,notcallitafeelingoffragranceorofanyotherdeterminatesort,butlimitourselvestoassumingthatitisafeelingofq.(T3)Wearefurtherinvitedtoconsiderthisasafeelingthatconstitutestheentireuniverse,andlastsonlyaninfinitesimalpartofasecond.Jamesinquireswhatadditiontothisprimalfeelingwouldbeneededtomakeitintoacognitivestate.Hereplies(a)thattheremustbeintheworldanotherentityresemblingthefeelinginitsqualityq,and(b)thefeelingmusteitherdirectlyorindirectlyoperateuponthisotherentity.James’saccountofknowledgedoesnotappearveryplausible,butitisnothisconclusionbuthisstartingpointthatitisimportanttonotice.Heenvisagesconsciousnessasconsistingfundamentallyofaseriesofsolitaryatomsdevoidofanycontextorrelationtoanybehaviourortoanybody.LaterinhislifeJamestookalessatomisticviewofthenatureoffeeling,believingthatasamatterofempiricalfactconsciousnessflowedinacontinuousstreamwithoutsharpbreaksbetweenoneitemandthenext.Butheretainedtheideaofconsciousnessasanessentiallyprivateinternalphenomenon,connectedonlycontingentlywithanyexternalmanifest-ationinspeechandbehaviour,andcapableinprincipleofexistinginisolationfromanybody.This,ofcourse,waspreciselyhowDescarteshadconceivedofconsciousness.Physiologicalpsychologistssawthemselvesasliberatingthemselvesfromphilosophybysubstitutingexperimentforintrospectionasthemethodofstudyingthemind.Butinthistheyweremistakenintwoways.First,athinkerlikeJamesretainsthepictureofconsciousnessasanobjectof201\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDintrospection:somethingwecanseewhenwelookwithin;somethingtowhichwehaveourselvesdirectaccess,butwhichotherscanlearnofonlyindirectly,byacceptingourverbaltestimonyormakingcausalinferencesfromourphysicalbehaviour.Second,whateverLockeandHumemayhavethought,thephilosophyofminddoesnotoperatebyscrupulousobserva-tionofinternalphenomenabutbytheexaminationoftheconceptsthatwemakeuseofinexpressingourexperience.ThehollownessofDescartes’snotionofconsciousnesswasexposed,laterinthetwentiethcentury,bytheworkofWittgenstein(whoadmiredJamesasaparticularlyhonestandcandidexponentoftheCartesiantradition).ButinJames’sownlifetime,whatappearedtobethemostseriouschallengetotheworkoftheexperimentalpsychologistscamefromadifferentquarter:fromthepictureofthemindpresentedbyFreudianpsychoanalysis.TheFreudianUnconsciousInhisIntroductoryLecturesonPsychoanalysisFreudstatesasoneofthetwomainfoundationsofhistheorythatthegreaterpartofourmentallife,whetheroffeeling,thought,orvolition,isunconscious.Beforedecidingwhetherweshouldacceptthisprincipleweneedtolookcloselyatwhatismeantby‘unconscious’.Thereareseveralpossiblesensesoftheword,anddependingonwhichsensewetake,Freud’sthesismayturnoutatruismorapieceofhardyspeculation.Itisobviousthatatanygivenmomentonlyatinyfractionofwhatweknowandbelieveispresenttoconsciousnessinthesenseofbeinganobjectofourimmediateattention.FormorethansixtyyearsIhaveknownthenurseryrhyme‘ThreeBlindMice’andhavebelievedthatthebattleofWaterlootookplacein1815;buttheoccasionsonwhichIhaverecitedtherhymeoradvertedtothedatehavebeenfewandfarbetween.ThedistinctionbetweenknowledgeanditsexercisewasalreadymadebyAristotleasadistinctionbetweenfirstandsecondactuality.KnowingGreek,hesaid,wasanactualityincomparisonwiththesimpleabilitytolearnlanguageswithwhichallhumansareendowed.ButknowledgeofGreekwasonlyafirstactuality,anabilitythatisexercisedonlywhenIamspeaking,hearing,reading,orthinkinginGreek.Thatwasthesecondactuality.Aparalleldistinctioncanbemadewithregardtoone’swishes,202\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDplans,andintentions.Younodoubtwishtohaveanadequateprovisionforyourpension.Butthethoughtofyourpensiondoesnotoccupyyourmindallthetime:onlywhenyouareworryingaboutit,orengagedintakingstepstomakesuchprovision,areyouconsciousofthiswishofyours.IfthisisthewayinwhichwemakethedistinctionbetweentheconsciousandtheunconsciousthenFreud’sstatementthatmostofourmentallifeisunconsciousisnothingmorethanaphilosophicalcommon-place.Butofcourse,Freudmeantmorethanthat.Knowledge,thoughts,andfeelingsofthekindIhavedescribedcan,inappropriatecircumstances,easilybebroughttomind.IfsomeoneasksmethedateofthebattleofWaterlooIcangiveit;ifafinancialadviserasksyouaboutyourpensionprovisionyouhavenodifficultyinadmittingthatitisamatterofconcern.TheunconsciousthatFreudpostulated,incontrast,isnotatallsoeasytobringtoconsciousness.ThereareinfactthreelevelsoftheFreudianunconscious.Todisen-tanglethesewemustrecallthataccordingtoFreudtherearethreesetsofphenomenathatrevealtheexistenceoftheunconscious,namely,trivialeverydaymistakes,reportsofdreams,andneuroticsymptoms.Weallfrequentlymakeslipsofthetongue,failtorecallnames,andmislayusefulobjects.Freudbelievedthatsuch‘parapraxes’,ashecalledthem,arenotasaccidentalastheyseemandmayhavehiddenmotives.HequotesthecaseofaVienneseprofessorwhoinhisinaugurallecture,insteadofsaying,accordingtohisscript,‘Ihavenointentionofunderratingtheachievementsofmyillustriouspredecessor’said‘Ihaveeveryintentionofunderratingtheachievementsofmyillustriouspredecessor.’Freudregardstheprofessor’sslipofthetongueasabetterguidetohisintentionsthatthewordshehadwritteninhisnotes.Butofcoursetheprofessorwasperfectlywellawareofhistrueattitudetohispredecessor’swork:hisintentionwasonly‘uncon-scious’inthesensethathedidnotmeantoexpressitsopublicly.Somethingsimilarcanhappeninwritingaswellasinspeech.Freudtellsofahusbandwho,writingtohisestrangedwifesomeyearsafterthesinkingoftheLusitania,urgedhertojoinhimacrosstheAtlanticwiththewords‘SailontheLusitania’whenhemeanttowrite‘SailontheMauretania’.Dramatists,Freudmain-tained,havelongbeenawareofthesignificanceofsuchparapraxes.InTheMerchantofVenice,whenPortiaisstrugglingbetweenherpublicobligationtobeneutralbetweenhersuitorsandherprivateloveforBassanio,Shakespearemakeshersaytohim:203\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDOnehalfofmeisyours,theotherhalfyours—Mineown,Iwouldsay.Thatsuch‘Freudianslips’canberevelatoryofstatesofmindthattheuttererwouldprefertoconcealisnowverywidelyaccepted.Butnotethatthementalstateinquestionissomethingthatcanbeverifiedinaperfectlystraightforwardway,byseekingatruthfulconfessionfromthepersonguiltyoftheslip.Suchstatesare,forFreud,thesuperficialleveloftheunconscious;hesometimescalledthislevel‘thepreconscious’(NIL96).Mattersareratherdifferentwhenwecometothesecondmethodoftappingintotheunconscious:theanalysisofdreamreports.Theinter-pretationofdreams,Freudmaintained,‘istheroyalroadtoaknowledgeoftheunconsciousactivitiesofthemind’.Buttheinterpretationisnotsomethingthatthedreamercancasuallyundertakeforherself;itcallsforlongandperhapspainfulsessionswiththepsychoanalyst.Dreams,Freudclaimed,arealmostalwaysthefulfilment,infantasy,ofarepressedwish.True,fewdreamsareobviousrepresentationsofasatisfac-tion,andsomedreamssuchasnightmaresseemtobejusttheopposite.Butthis,accordingtoFreud,isbecausewedreamincode.Thetrue,latentcontentofthedreamisgivenasymbolicformbythedreamer;thisisthe‘dream-work’,whichproducestheinnocuousmanifestcontentreportedbythedreamer.Oncestrippedofitssymbolicformthelatentcontentofthedreamcancommonlyberevealedassexual,andindeedOedipal.However,Freudwarnsus,‘thestraightforwarddreamofsexualrelationswithone’smotherwhichJocastaalludestointheOedipusRexisararityincomparisonwiththemultiplicityofdreamswhichpsychoanalysismustinterpretinthesamesense’(SExix.131ff.).Howisadreamtobedecodedandthedream-workundone?Everydreamcaneasilybegivenasexualsignificanceifonetakeseverypointedobjectlikeanumbrellatorepresentapenis,andeverycapaciousobjectlikeahandbagtorepresentthefemalegenitals.ButFreud’smethodwasnothinglikeascrudeasthat.Hedidnotbelievethatitwaspossibletocreateauniversaldictionarylinkingsymbolstowhattheysignified.Thesignificanceofadreamitemforaparticulardreamercouldonlybediscoveredbyfindingoutwhatthedreamerherselfassociatedwiththatitem.Onlyaftersuchanexplorationcouldonediscoverthenatureoftheunconsciouswishwhosefulfilmentwasfantasizedinthedream.204\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDThethird(thoughchronologicallythefirst)methodbywhichFreudpurportedtoexploretheunconsciouswasbytheexaminationofneuroticsymptoms.Atypicalcaseisthefollowing.Oneofhispatients,anAustrianundergraduate,wasstayingataholidayresortduringthevacation.Hewassuddenlyobsessedwiththethoughtthathewastoofat:hesaidtohimself‘Ichbinzudick’.Consequently,hegaveupallheavyfoods,andusedtoleapupfromthetablebeforethepuddingarrivedinordertorunupmountainsintheAugustheat.‘Ourpatientcouldthinkofnoexplanationofthissenselessobsessionalbehaviouruntilitsuddenlyoccurredtohimthatatthistimehisfiance´ehadalsobeenstoppingatthesameresortincompanywithanattractiveEnglishcousincalledDick.’Hispurposeinslimming,Freudsuggests,hadbeentogetridofthisDick(SEx.183).ThereisacertaincircularityinFreud’sprocedurefordiscoveringthedeeperlevelsoftheunconscious.Theexistenceofthesedeeperlevelsisheldtobeprovedbytheevidenceofdreamsandneuroses.Butdreamsandneuroticsymptomsdonot,eitherontheirfaceorasinterpretedbytheunaidedpatient,revealthebeliefs,desires,andsentimentsofwhichtheunconsciousissupposedtoconsist.Foracuretobeeffective,thepatienthastoacknowledgetheallegedlatentdesire.Buttheanalyst’sdecodingisoftenrejectedbythepatient,andthecriterionofsuccessindeciphermentisthatthedecodedmessageshouldaccordwiththeanalyst’snotionofwhattheunconsciousislike.Butthatnotionwassupposedtoderivefrom,andnottoprecede,theexplorationofdreamsandsymptoms.TowardstheendofhislifeFreudreplacedthedichotomyofconsciousandunconsciouswithathreefoldscheme.‘Superego,egoandid’,hesaidinNewIntroductoryLectures(1933),‘arethethreerealms,regions,orprovincesintowhichwedividethementalapparatusoftheindividual’(NIL97).Theidistheunconsciouslocusofhungerandloveandinstinctualdrives.Itisruledbythepleasureprinciple,anditisbothmoreextensiveandmoreobscurethantheotherpartsofthesoul.‘Thelogicallawsofthought’,Freudtellsus,‘donotapplyintheid,andthisistrueaboveallofthelawofcontradiction.Contraryimpulsesexistside,byside,withoutcancellingeachotheroutordiminishingeachother’(SExxii.73).Theego,bycontrast,representsreasonandcommonsense,anditisdevotedtotherealityprinciple.Itisthepartofthesoulmostintouchwiththeexternalworldperceivedbythesenses.Theegoistheriderandtheid205\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDthehorse.‘Thehorsesuppliesthelocomotiveenergy,whiletheriderhastheprivilegeofdecidingonthegoalandofguidingthepowerfulanimal’smovement’(SExx.201).Buttheego’scontrolisnotabsolute:theegoismorelikeaconstitutionalmonarchwhohastothinklongandhardbeforevetoinganyproposalofparliament.Psychoanalysis,however,canstrengthentheego’sholdontheid,andassistitinitstaskofcontrollinginstinctualdesires,choosingharmlessmomentsfortheirsatisfactionordivertingtheirexpression.Varyinghismetaphor,Freudspeaksinhydraulictermsoftheoperationoftheidasaflowofenergythatcanfindanormaldischarge,bechannelledintoalternativeoutlets,orbedammedupwithcatastrophicresults.Thesuperego,finally,isanagencythatobserves,judges,andpunishesthebehaviouroftheego.Oneformofitsmanifestationsistheutterancesofconscience,forbiddingactionsinadvanceandreproachingtheegoforthemaftertheevent(NIL82).Thesuperegoisnotpresentfrombirth;inearlychildhooditsplaceistakenbyparentalauthority.Asthechilddevelops,thesuperegotakesoveronehalfofthefunctionofparents—nottheirlovingandcaringactivities,butonlytheirharshnessandseverity,theirpreventiveandpunitivefunctions.Thesuperegoisalso‘thevehicleoftheegoidealbywhichtheegomeasuresitself,whichitemulatesandwhosedemandforevergreaterperfectionitisalwaysstrivingtofulfil’(SExxii.65).Freudclaimedthatthemodificationofhisearliertheoryhadbeenforcedonhimbytheobservationofthepatientsonhiscouch.Yetthemind,inthislaterform,closelyresemblesthetripartitesoulofPlato’sRepublic.3TheidcorrespondstowhatPlatocallsappetite(epithumetikon),thesourceofthedesiresforfoodandsex.TheegohasmuchincommonwithPlato’sreasoningpower(logistikon):itisthepartofthesoulmostintouchwithrealityandhasthetaskofcontrollinginstinctualdesire.Finally,thesuperegoresemblesPlato’stemper(thumoeides);botharenon-rationalpunitiveforcesintheserviceofmorality,thesourceofshameandself-directedanger.Theego,asdepictedbyFreud,hastotrytosatisfythreetyrannicalmasters:theexternalworld,thesuperego,andtheid.Goadedonbytheid,hemmedinbythesuper-ego,andrebuffedbyreality,theegostrugglestocopewithitseconomictaskofreducingtheforcesandinfluenceswhich3Seevol.I,pp.237–9,andA.Kenny,TheAnatomyoftheSoul(Oxford:Blackwell,1974),10–14.206\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDworkinitanduponittosomekindofharmony;andwemaywellunderstandhowitisthatwesooftencannotrepressthecry‘Lifeisnoteasy’.(NIL104)LikePlato,Freudregardsmentalhealthasharmonybetweenthepartsofthesoul,andmentalillnessasunresolveddiscordbetweenthem.‘Solongastheegoanditsrelationstotheidfulfiltheseidealconditions(ofharmoniouscontrol)therewillbenoneuroticdisturbance’(SExx.201).Theego’swholeendeavouris‘areconciliationbetweenitsvariousdepen-dentrelationships’(xix.149).Intheabsenceofsuchreconciliationmentaldisordersdevelop,andFreuddetailsthesymptomsofdifferentkindsofinternalconflict.PhilosophicalPsychologyintheTractatusWhileFreud,intheAustriancapital,wasgivinghisIntroductoryLecturesonPsychoanalysis,Wittgenstein,intheAustrianarmy,wasconstructing,inhisnotebooks,adifferentmodelofthemind.Wittgensteinacceptedthatpsychologywasagenuineempiricalscience,andhesawphilosophyofmindasstandinginthesamerelationtopsychologyasphilosophyingeneralstoodtothenaturalsciences:itstaskwastoclarifyitspropositionsanddrawlimitstoitscompetence(TLP4.112,4.113).Itwoulddothisbyanalysingsentencesreportingbeliefs,judgements,perception,andthelike;andaboveallbycastingthelightoflogiconthenatureofthought.ThefirstthingtheTractatustellsusaboutathoughtisthatitisalogicalpictureoffacts.Alogicalpictureisapicturewhosepictorialform—thatwhichithasincommonwithwhatitdepicts—islogicalform.Ordinarypicturesmayhavemorethanlogicalformincommonwithwhattheydepict,asapaintinghasspatialformincommonwithalandscape;butathoughtisapictureinthemindthathasincommonwithwhatitdepictsnothingotherthanlogicalform.SometimesWittgensteinidentifiesthoughtswithpropositions(TLP4).Butifweexaminehisuseof‘proposition’closely,itisclearthattherearetwodifferentelementsinvolved.Thereisthepropositionalsignorsen-tence,whichistheholdingofarelationbetweenwrittenorspokenwords.Thereisalsowhatisexpressedbythispropositionalsign,namelythethought,whichisitselftheholdingofarelationbetweenpsychicelements,207\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDaboutwhoseprecisenatureWittgensteinrefusedtocommithimself,sincethatwasamatterforempiricalpsychology(TLP3.1,3.11–12).Apropos-itionalsigncanonlybeapropositionifprojectedbyathoughtontotheworld,andconverselyarelationshipbetweenmentalelementscanonlybeathoughtifitisaprojectionontotheworldofapropositionalsign(TLP3.5).‘Inaproposition’,Wittgensteinsaysat3.2,‘athoughtcanbeexpressedinsuchawaythatelementsofthepropositionalsigncorrespondtotheobjectsofthethought.’The‘objectsofthethought’arethepsychicelementswhoserelationtoeachotherconstitutesthethought.Apropos-itionisfullyanalysedwhentheelementsofthepropositionalsigncorres-pondtotheelementsofthethought.Anunanalysedpropositionofordinarylanguagedoesnotbearthisrelationtothethought;onthecontrary,itdisguisesthethought.Wecanunderstandordinarylanguageandgraspthethoughtbeneathitsfoldsonlybecauseofenormouslycomplicatedtacitconventions.WittgensteinintheTractatusresemblesFreudinattachinggreatweighttounconsciousoperationsofthemind;thestructureofthethoughtsthatliebehindourutterancesaresomethingofwhichwehavenotthefaintestawareness.Amongourthoughtsthereappeartobesomethatarethoughtsaboutthoughts:propositionsreportingbeliefsandjudgements,forexample.Theseareapparentcounter-examplestothegeneralthesisoftheTractatusthatonepropositioncouldoccurwithinanotheronlytruth-functionally,becauseasentencelike‘Abelievesthatp’isnotatruth-functionofp.Wittgensteindealswiththeproblemindrasticfashion:suchsentencesarenotgenuinepropositionsatall.‘Itisclear,’wearetoldat5.542,‘that‘‘Abelievesthatp’’,‘‘Ahasthethoughtthatp’’,and‘‘Asaysp’’areoftheform‘‘‘p’saysp’’,andthisdoesnotinvolveacorrelationofafactwithanobject,butratherthecorrelationoffactsbymeansofthecorrelationoftheirobjects.’‘‘‘p’’saysp’isapseudo-proposition:itisanattempttosaywhatcanonlybeshown;apropositioncanonlyshowitssenseandcannotstateit.Wemaythinkthat,accordingtotheTractatus,thefactthat,say,in‘LondonisbiggerthanParis’‘London’istotheleftof‘isbiggerthan’and‘Paris’istotherightof‘isbiggerthan’thatsaysthatLondonisbiggerthanParis.ButitisonlythisfactplustheconventionsoftheEnglishlanguagethatsaysanysuchthing.Whatdoesthesayinginthesentenceiswhatthepropositionalsignhasincommonwithallother208\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDpropositionalsignswhichcouldachievethesamepurpose;andwhatthisiscouldonlybedescribedby—perimpossibile—specifyingandmakingexplicitthetacitconventionsofEnglish.SupposeIthinkacertainthought;mythinkingthatthoughtwillconsistincertainpsychicelements—mentalimages,orinternalimpressions,perhaps—standinginarelationtoeachother.Thattheseelementsstandinsuchandsucharelationwillbeapsychologicalfactwithinthepurviewofscience.Butthefactthattheseelementshavethemeaningtheyhavewillnotbeafactofscience.Meaningisconferredonsignsbyus,byourconventions.Butwherearetheactsofwillthatconferthemeaningbysettinguptheconventions?Theycannotbeintheempiricalsoulstudiedbysuperficialpsychology:anyrelationbetweenthatwillandanypairofobjectswouldbeascientificfactandthereforeincapableoftheineffableactivityofconferringmeaning.WhenIconfermeaningonthesymbolsIuse,theIthatdoessomustbeametaphysicalI,nottheselfthatisstudiedbyintrospectivepsychology.Thought,unlikelanguage,willhavetheappropriatecomplexitytodepictthefactsoftheworld.Butitscomplexitygivesitonlythepossibilityofdepicting.Thatathoughtactuallydoesdepict,trulyorfalsely,dependsonthemeaningofitselements,andthatisgivenbytheextra-psychologicalwillthatgivesthoseelementsanapplicationandause(TLP5.631ff.).IntentionalityThephilosophyofmindpresentedintheTractatusisjejuneandincredible.ThisissomethingthatWittgensteinwashimselflatertorealize;butmanywhoreadtheworkwhenitfirstappearedmusthaveobservedthatitignoredwhatmanycontemporariesregardedasthecentralaspectofmentalactsandprocesses,namelyintentionality.Theconceptofinten-tionality,medievalinorigin,hadbeenreintroducedtophilosophybyBrentanointhenineteenthcentury,andgivenprominenceinHusserl’sLogicalInvestigations(1901–2)andIdeas(1913).InhisbookPsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint(1874)Brentanohadsoughttofindapropertythatwouldmarkoffpsychicalfromphysicalphenom-ena.Heconsideredandrejectedthesuggestionthatthepeculiarityof209\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDpsychicalphenomenawasthattheylackedextension.Hethenproposedadifferentcriterionofdistinction:Everypsychicalphenomenonischaracterizedbywhatthemedievalscholasticscalledtheintentional(ormental)existenceofanobject,andwhatwe,notquiteunambiguously,wouldcall‘relationtoacontent’‘object-directedness’or‘imma-nentobjectivity’.(‘Object’heredoesnotmeanreality.)Eachsuchphenomenoncontainsinitselfsomethingasanobject,thoughnoteachinthesamemanner.Inimaginationsomethingisimagined,injudgementsomethingisacceptedorrejected,inlovesomethingisloved,inhatredsomethingishated,indesiresomethingisdesiredandsoforth.Thisintentionalexistenceisapropertyonlyofpsychicalphenomena;nophysicalphenomenondisplaysanythingsimilar.Andsowecandefinepsychicalphenomenabysayingthattheyarethosephenomenathatcontainanobjectintentionally.(PESii.1.5)Thisfamouspassageisnotaltogetherclear.Itistruethatwherethereislovesomethingisloved,andwherethereishatredsomethingishated—butisitnotequallytruethatifheatingtakesplacesomethingisheated?Yet‘heat’isnotapsychologicalverb.HowcanBrentanosaythatobject-directednessispeculiartopsychologicalphenomena,whenitseemstobeafeaturecommontoallgrammaticallytransitiveverbs,verbsthat‘takeanaccusative’?TheanswerbecomesclearifwelooktoBrentano’sscholasticsources,whomadeadistinctionbetweentwokindsofaction,immanentandtransient.Transientactionsareactionsthatchangetheirobjects(heatingisatransientaction,whichmakesitsobjecthot).Immanentactionsdonotchangetheirobjects,buttheiragents.Tofindoutwhetherthedoctorhascuredhispatient,weexaminethepatient;tofindoutwhetherhehasfalleninlovewithhispatient,wemustobservethedoctor.Brentano’sdistinctionbetweenpsychicalandphysicalphenomenacorrespondstothedistinctionbetweenimmanentandtransientactions.4HusserltookoverfromBrentanothescholasticconceptofintentionalityandmadeitacentrepieceofhissystem,from1901onwards.InthefifthoftheLogicalInvestigationshetellsusthatconsciousnessconsistsofintentionalexperiencesoracts,andhemakesaseriesofdistinctionsbetweendifferentelementstobefoundinconsciousness.Theintentionalityofanactiswhatitisabout;itisalsocalledtheact-matter,thesense,andinlaterworks,thenoema.4Seee.g.Aquinas,SummaTheologiae,1a18.3ad1.210\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDAmentalitemisgivenitsintentionalitybyanactofmeaning(Meinen).Therearetwokindsofmeaning:onekindisthatwhichgivessignificancetoaword,andtheotherkindisthatwhichgivessensetoaproposition.‘Eachmeaningis...eitheranominalmeaningorapropositionalmeaning,or,stillmoreprecisely,eitherthemeaningofacompletesentenceorapossiblepartofsuchameaning’(LIvi.1).Everymentalactwillbeanactofacertainkind,belongingtoaparticularspecies,whichwillbedeterminedbyitsmatter.Everythoughtofahorse,whoever’sthoughtitis,belongstothesamespecies;andtheconcepthorseispreciselythespeciestowhichallthesethoughtsbelong.Similarly,wheneveranyonemakesthejudgementthatbloodisthickerthanwater,themeaningofthatjudgement,thepropositionbloodisthickerthanwater,ispreciselythespeciestowhichallsuchactsofjudgementbelong.IfAagreeswiththejudgementofB,thenwhileA’sjudgementandB’sjudgementaredistinctindividualmentalevents,theyare,becausetheyhavethesamematter,instancesofthesamespecies.InhislaterwritingHusserlcalledtheindividualactthenoesisandthespecificcontentthenoema.Inadditiontohavingmatter,actshavequalities.Itisnotonlywordsandsentencesthathavemeaning,andnotonlythecorrespondingmentalactsandstates,suchasknowingandbelieving.Sotoodoperception,imagin-ation,emotion,andvolition.MyseeingRomeandmyimaginingRomeareactsthathavethesamematter,orintentionalobject,butbecauseseeingisdifferentfromimagining,theyareactsofdifferentquality(LIvi.22).Husserl’stheoryofintentionalitywasafertileone,andhisaccountofitcontainsmanyshrewdobservationsandvaluabledistinctions.Butthenatureoftheactofmeaning,whichunderpinstheuniverseofmentalphenomena,remainsdeeplymysterious.Inthe1920sand1930ssomephilosophersattemptedtopresentaphilosophyofmindthatwoulddispensealtogetherwithintentionality.BertrandRussell,inhisAnalysisofMind,presentedanaccountofdesirethatmadeitdefinableintermsoftheeventsthatbroughtittoanend.‘Amentaloccurrenceofanykind—sensation,image,belieforemotion,’hewrote,maybeacauseofaseriesofactionscontinuing,unlessinterrupted,untilsomemoreorlessdefinitestateofaffairsisrealized.Suchaseriesofactionswecalla‘behaviourcycle’....Thepropertyofcausingsuchacycleofoccurrencesiscalled‘discomfort’...thecycleendsinaconditionofquiescence,orofsuchactionastendstopreservethestatusquo.Thestateofaffairsinwhichthisconditionof211\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDquiescenceisachievediscalledthe‘purpose’ofthecycle,andtheinitialmentaloccurrenceinvolvingdiscomfortiscalleda‘desire’forthestateofaffairsthatbringsquiescence.Adesireiscalled‘conscious’whenitisaccompaniedbyatruebeliefastothestateofaffairsthatwillbringquiescence;otherwiseitiscalled‘unconscious’.(AM75)Behaviourcycles,accordingtoRussell,arecausallyinitiatedbymentaleventspossessingthecharacteristicofdiscomfort.Thenatureoftheseeventsisleftunclearinhissystem.Butotherphilosophersandpsychologists,intheiraccountsofdesireandemotion,dispensedaltogetherwithmentalevents.Forthebehaviouristschool,particularlyafterPavlovhadin1927presentedhistheoryofconditionedreflexes,therelationbetweenmentalandbodilyeventswasnolongeracausalone.Behaviourcycleswerenottheeffectofmentalevents,theyweretheactualconstituentsofsuchthingsasdesireandsatisfaction.Behaviouristsregardedreportsofmentalactsandstatesasdisguisedreportsofpiecesofbodilybehaviour,oratbestoftendenciestobehavebodilyincertainways.Intentionalitythusvanishedfrompsychology.Wittgenstein’sLaterPhilosophyofMindItwasinreactiontoRussell’saccountofdesireandexpectationthatWittgensteinbegantodevelophislaterphilosophyofmind.WhatwaswrongwithRussell’saccount,hesaid,waspreciselythatitignoredinten-tionality;andheagreedwithHusserlthatintentionalitywasall-importantifweweretounderstandlanguageandthought.Togiveacorrectaccountofitwasoneofthemajorproblemsofphilosophy.That’shim(thispicturerepresentshim)—thatcontainsthewholeproblemofrepresentation.Whatisthecriterion,howisittobeverified,thatthispictureistheportraitofthatobject,i.e.thatitismeanttorepresentit?Itisnotsimilaritythatmakesthepictureaportrait(itmightbeastrikingresemblanceofoneperson,andyetbeaportraitofsomeoneelseitresemblesless)...WhenIremembermyfriendandseehim‘inmymind’seye’whatistheconnectionbetweenthememoryimageanditssubject?Thelikenessbetweenthem?(PG102)Wittgenstein’sachievementinphilosophyofmindwastogiveanaccountthatpreservedtheintentionalitythatthebehaviouristshaddeniedwith-212\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDAphotographofWittgen-steintakenintheperiodwhenhewasworkingouthisfinalphilosophyofmind.outacceptingtheCartesianpictureofconsciousnessinwhichHusserl’saccountwasembedded.OnewaytodescribeWittgenstein’scontributiontophilosophyofmindistosaythatheexhibited,withunparalleledsensitivity,thatthehumanmindisnotaspirit,notevenanincarnatespirit.Firstandforemost,thereisnosuchthingastheCartesianego,aself,ormoi,thatisreferredtoinfirst-personutterances.Thisisnotbecausetheword‘I’referstosomethingotherthanaself;itisbecause‘I’isnotareferringexpressionatall.Theselfisapieceofphilosopher’snonsenseproducedbymisunderstandingofthereflexivepronoun.WhenDescartesarguedthathecoulddoubtwhetherhehadabody,buthecouldnotdoubtwhetherheexisted,itwasessentialtohisargumentthatitshouldbepossibleforhimtouse‘I’torefertosomethingofwhichhisbodywasnopart.Butthatwasagreatmisunderstanding.My‘self’is213\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDnotapartofmyself,notevenaverycentralpartofmyself;itis,obviouslyenough,myself.Wetalkof‘mybody’,butthepossessivepronoundoesnotmeanthatthereisan‘I’whichisthepossessorofabodythatisotherthanmyself.MybodyisnotthebodythatIhave,butthebodythatIam,justasthecityofRomeisnotacitythatRomehasbutthecitythatRomeis.Thesecondthingthatismeantbysayingthatthemindisnotaspiritisthatitisnotsomeghostlymediumorlocusofmentaleventsandprocessesthatisaccessibleonlybyintrospection.Wittgensteinfrequentlyattackedamythologyaboutthenatureofthemindthatweareallpronetoaccept.Weimagineamechanisminourminds,astrangemechanismthatworksverywellinitsownmysteriousmediumbutwhich,ifunderstoodasamechanismintheordinarysense,isquiteunintelligible.Wittgensteinthoughtthatthiswasapieceofhiddenorlatentnonsense.Thewaytoturnlatentnonsenseintopatentnonsensewastoimaginethatthemech-anismreallyexisted.Thereisatemptationtothink,forinstance,thatwhenyourecognizesomebodywhatyoudoistoconsultamentalpictureofherandcheckwhetherwhatyounowseematchesthepicture.Wittgensteinsuggeststhatifwehavethisnonsensicalideainourmindwecanmakeourselvesseethatitisnonsense,andthatitinnowayexplainsrecognition.Ifwesupposetheprocesstohappenintherealworld,withthepictureasarealandnotjustamentalpicture,ourinitialproblemjustreturns.Howdowerecognizethatthisisapictureofaparticularpersoninordertouseittorecognizeher?Theonlythingthatgavetheillusionofexplanationinthiscasewasthefuzzynatureoftheoriginalsupposition;thefactthattheprocesswassupposedtotakeplaceintheghostlymediumofthemind.Thetaskofascientifictheoryofthemind,accordingtosomephilo-sophersandpsychologists,istoestablishaprincipleofcorrelationbetweentheoccurrenceofmentalstatesandprocessesandtheoccurrenceofstatesandprocessesinthebrain.Thiscorrelationwouldonlybeapossibilityifmentalevents(e.g.thoughts,orflashesofunderstanding)werethemselvesmeasurableinthewayinwhichphysicaleventsaremeasurable.Butthoughtandunderstandingarenotprocessesinapsychicmediuminthewayinwhichelectrolysisandoxidizationareprocessesinaphysicalmedium.Thoughtandunderstandingarenotprocessesatall,asWittgen-steinshowedbyapainstakinganalysisofusesofthewords‘think’and214\nPHILOSOPHYOFMIND‘understand’.Thecriteriabywhichwedecidewhethersomeoneunder-standsasentence,forinstance,arequitedifferentfromthecriteriabywhichwedecidewhatmentalprocessesaregoingonwhileheisutteringorwritingthesentence(PG148).Thosewhothinkofthemindasaghostlymedium,andthoughtandunderstandingasprocessesoccurringthere,regardthemediumasaccess-iblebyintrospection,andonlybyintrospection.Themind,onthisview,isaninnerspacethatdeservesexplorationatleastasmuchasouterspace.Butwhereas—givenenoughtime,money,andenergy—everyonecanexplorethesameouterspace,eachofuscanonlyexploreourowninnerspace.Wedosobylookingwithinatsomethingtowhichweourselveshavedirectaccess,butwhichotherscanlearnofonlyindirectly,byacceptingourverbaltestimonyormakinginferencesfromourphysicalbehaviour.Theconnectionbetweenconsciousnessontheonehand,andspeechandbehaviourontheother,isonthisviewapurelycontingentone.TodemolishthisconceptionwasoneofWittgenstein’sgreatmerits.Iftheconnectionbetweenconsciousnessandexpressionismerelycontin-gent,thenforallweknoweverythingintheuniversemaybeconscious.Itisperfectlyconsistentwiththeideathatconsciousnessissomethingprivate,withwhichwemakecontactonlyinourowncase,thatthechaironwhichIamnowsittingmaybeconscious.Forallweknow,mayitnotbeinexcruciatingpain?Ofcourse,ifitis,wehavetoaddthehypothesisthatitisalsoexhibitingstoicalfortitude.Butwhynot?Ifconsciousnessreallyismerelycontingentlyconnectedwithitsexpres-sioninbehaviour,canwebeconfidentinourascriptionofittootherhumanbeings?Ouronlyevidencethathumansareconsciousisthateachofus,ifhelookswithinhimself,seesconsciousnessthere.Buthowcanamangeneralizehisowncasesoirresponsibly?Hecannotlookwithinothers:itistheessenceofintrospectionthatitshouldbesomethingthatweallhavetodoforourselves.Norcanhemakeacausaldeductionfromotherpeople’sbehaviour.Acorrelationbetweenotherpeople’sconsciousnessandtheirbehaviourcouldneverbeestablishedwhenthefirsttermofthecorrelationisinprincipleunobservable.‘Onlyofahumanbeing’,Wittgensteinwrote,‘andwhatresembles(behaveslike)ahumanbeingcanonesay:ithassensations;itsees;isblind;hears;isdeaf;isconsciousorunconscious’(PIi.281).Thisdoesnotmeanthatheisabehaviourist;heisnotidentifyingexperiencewith215\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDbehaviour,orevenwithdispositionstobehave.Thepointisthatwhatexperiencesonecanhavedependsonhowonecanbehave.Onlysomeonewhocanplaychesscanfeelthedesiretocastle;onlysomeonewhocantalkcanbeovercomebyanimpulsetoswear.Onlyabeingthatcaneatcanbehungry,andonlyabeingthatcandiscriminatebetweenlightanddarknesscanhavevisualexperiences.Therelationbetweenexperiencesofcertainkinds,andthecapacitytobehaveincertainways,isnotamerelycontingentconnection.Wittgensteinmadeadistinctionbetweentwokindsofevidencethatwemayhavefortheobtainingofstatesofaffairs,namelysymptomsandcriteria.Wheretheconnec-tionbetweenacertainkindofevidenceandtheconclusiondrawnfromitisamatterofempiricaldiscovery,throughtheoryandinduction,theevidencemaybecalledasymptomofthestateofaffairs;wheretherelationbetweenevidenceandconclusionisnotsomethingdiscoveredbyempiricalinvesti-gation,butissomethingthatmustbegraspedbyanyonewhopossessestheconceptofthestateofaffairsinquestion,thentheevidenceisnotameresymptom,butacriterionoftheeventinquestion.Aredskyatnightmaybeasymptomofgoodweatherthefollowingmorning,buttheabsenceofclouds,theshiningofthesun,etc.tomorrowmorningarenotjustsymp-tomsbutcriteriaforthegoodweather.Similarly,scratchingisacriterionforitching,andreciting‘ThreeBlindMice’isacriterionforknowingit—thoughofcoursenoteveryonewhoitchesscratches,andonecanknowtherhymeforyearsandyearswithouteverrecitingit.ExploitingthenotionofcriterionenabledWittgensteintosteerbetweentheScyllaofdualismandtheCharybdisofbehaviourism.Heagreedwithdualiststhatparticularmentaleventscouldoccurwithoutaccompanyingbodilybehaviour;ontheotherhandheagreedwithbehaviouriststhatthepossibilityofascribingmentalactstopeopledependsonsuchactshaving,ingeneral,abehaviouralexpression.Ifitiswrongtoidentifythemindwithbehaviour,itisevenmoremistaken,accordingtoWittgenstein,toidentifythemindwiththebrain.Suchmaterialismisinfactagrosserphilosophicalerrorthanbehaviourismbecausetheconnectionbetweenmindandbehaviourisamoreintimateonethanthatbetweenmindandbrain.Therelationbetweenmindandbehaviourisacriterialone,somethingpriortoexperience;theconnectionbetweenmindandbrainisacontingentone,discoverablebyempiricalscience.Anydiscoveryoflinksbetweenmindandbrainmusttakeasits216\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDstartingpointtheeverydayconceptsweuseindescribingthemind,conceptsthataregraftedontobehaviouralcriteria.Oddlyenough,developmentsinthephilosophyofmindsinceWittgen-steinhaveshownthatitispossibletocombinetheerrorsofmaterialismwiththoseofdualism.Oneofthemostubiquitousmisunderstandingsofthenatureofthemindisthepictureofmind’srelationtobodyasthatbetweenalittlepersonorhomunculusontheonehand,andatoolorinstrumentormachineontheother.WesmilewhenmedievalpaintersrepresentthedeathoftheVirginMarybyshowingasmall-scalemodelvirginemergingfromhermouth;butbasicallythesameideacanbefoundinthemostunlikelyplaces,includingthewritingsofcognitivescientists.Descartes,whenfirsthereportedtheoccurrenceofretinalimages,warnedusnottobemisledbytheresemblancebetweenimagesandtheirobjectsintothinkingthatwhenwesawtheobjectwehadanotherpairofeyes,insideourAmosaicfromS.MarcoinVeniceshowsGodinfusingasoulintoAdam–thesoulbeingahomunculuswithwings.217\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDbrain,toseetheimages.Buthehimselfbelievedthatseeingwastobeexplainedbysayingthatthesoulencounteredanimageinthepinealgland.Thiswasaparticularlystrikingversionofwhathasbeennicknamed‘thehomunculusfallacy’—theattempttoexplainhumanexperienceandbehaviourbypostu-latingalittlehumanwithinanordinaryhuman.Whatiswrongwiththehomunculusfallacy?Initselfthereisnothingmisguidedinspeakingofimagesinthebrain,ifonemeanspatternsinthebrain,observabletoaneurophysiologist,thatcanbemappedontofeaturesofthevisibleenvironment.Whatismisleadingistotakethesemappingsasrepresentations,toregardthemasvisibletothemind,andtosaythatseeingconsistsinthemind’sperceptionoftheseimages.Themisleadingaspectisthatsuchanaccountpretendstoexplainseeing,buttheexplanationreproducesexactlythepuzzlingfeaturesitwassupposedtoexplain.Foritisonlyifwethinkoftherelationbetweenamindandanimageinthepinealglandasbeingjustliketherelationbetweenahumanbeingandpicturesseenintheenvironmentthatwewillthinkthattalkofanencounterbetweenthemindandtheimagehasanyilluminatingpoweratall.Butwhateverneedsexplaininginthehumanturnsupgrinningandunexplainedintheshapeofthemanikin.Atthepresenttime,whenenergeticeffortsarebeingmadetoconstructanewcognitivescienceofthemind,itisthebrain,orpartsofthebrain,thatareusuallyassignedtheroleofthehomunculus.Wemaybetoldthatourbrainsaskquestions,solveproblems,decodesignals,andconstructhypotheses.ThosewhoascribehumancapabilitiestopartsofhumanbeingsareunmindfulofWittgenstein’swarning,‘Onlyofahumanbeingandwhatresembles(behaveslike)ahumanbeingcanonesay:ithassensations;itsees;isblind;hears;isdeaf;isconsciousorunconscious.’ButthesamepointhadbeenmademillenniaagobyAristotle,whowrote,‘Tosaythatthesoulgetsangryisasifoneweretosaythatthesoulweavesorbuildsahouse.Probablyitisbetternottosaythatthesoulpities,orlearns,orthinks,butthatthehumanbeingdoesthesethingswithitssoul’(deAnima408b12–15).Wittgenstein’sphilosophyofmindwasinfactclosertothatofAristotlethanitistocontemporarymaterialistpsychology.Atonepointhecoun-tenancedthepossibilitythattheremaybementalactivitiesthatlackanycorrelateinthebrain:218\nPHILOSOPHYOFMINDNosuppositionseemstomemorenaturalthanthatthereisnoprocessinthebraincorrelatedwithassociatingorwiththinking;sothatitwouldbeimpossibletoreadoffthought-processesfrombrainprocesses....Itisperfectlypossiblethatcertainpsychologicalphenomenacannotbeinvestigatedphysiologically,becausephysiologicallynothingcorrespondstothem.Isawthismanyearsago:nowIhaveseenhimagain,Irecognizehim,Irememberhisname.Andwhydoestherehavetobeacauseofthisrememberinginmynervoussystem?...Whyshouldtherenotbeapsychologicalregularitytowhichnophysiologicalregularitycorresponds?Ifthisupsetsourconceptofcausality,thenitishightimeitwasupset.(Z608–10)Thisfrontalattackontheideathattheremustbephysicalcounterpartsofmentalphenomenawasnotintendedasadefenceofanykindofdualism.Theentitythatdoestheassociating,thinking,andrememberingisnotaspiritualsubstance,butacorporealhumanbeing.ButWittgensteindidseemtobeenvisagingasapossibilityanAristoteliansoulorentelechy,whichoperateswithnomaterialvehicle—aformalandfinalcausetowhichtherecorrespondsnomechanisticefficientcause.219\n9EthicsTheGreatestHappinessoftheGreatestNumberInmostsystemsofmorality,happinessisaconceptofgreatimportance.Alongseriesofmoralphilosophers,tracingtheirancestrybacktoPlatoandAristotle,hadtreatedhappinessasthesupremegood,andsomeethicistswentsofarastoaffirmthathumanbeingsseekhappinessinalltheirchoices.1Inchallengingtheprimacyofhappiness,Kantwasunusual.InhisGroundworkheproclaimedthatduty,nothappiness,wasthesupremeethicalmotive.Atfirstsight,therefore,whenBenthamdeclaredthateveryactionshouldbeevaluatedinaccordancewiththetendencyitappearstohavetoaugmentordiminishhappiness,hewasjustreaffirmingalong-standingconsensus.ButoncloserinspectionBentham’sgreatesthappinessprincipleisverydifferentfromtraditionaleudaimonism.Inthefirstplace,Benthamidentifieshappinesswithpleasure:itispleasurethatisthesupremespringofaction.TheIntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislationfamouslybegins:Naturehasplacedmankindunderthegovernanceoftwosovereignmasters,painandpleasure.Itisforthemalonetopointoutwhatweoughttodo,aswellastodeterminewhatweshalldo.Ontheonehand,thestandardofrightandwrong,ontheotherthechainofcausesandeffects,arefastenedtotheirthrone.Theygovernusinallwedo,inallwesay,inallwethink:everyeffortwecanmaketothrowoffoursubjection,willservebuttodemonstrateandconfirmit.(P1.1)Tomaximizehappiness,therefore,forBentham,isthesamethingastomaximizepleasure.UtilitarianscouldcitePlatoasaforebear,sinceinhis1Seevol.I,p.81;vol.II,p.272.\nETHICSProtagorashehadofferedfordiscussionthethesisthatvirtueconsistsinthecorrectchoiceofpleasureandpain.2Aristotle,ontheotherhand,madeadistinctionbetweenhappinessandpleasure,andinparticularrefusedtoidentifyhappinesswiththepleasuresofthesenses.Benthambycontrastnotonlytreatedhappinessasequivalenttopleasure,butregardedpleasureitselfassimplyasensation.‘Inthismatterwewantnorefinement,nometaphysics.ItisnotnecessarytoconsultPlato,norAristotle.Painandpleasurearewhateverybodyfeelstobesuch.’Benthamwascarefultopointoutthatpleasurewasasensationthatcouldbecausednotonlybyeatinganddrinkingandsex,butalsobyamultitudeofotherthings,asvariedastheacquisitionofwealth,kindnesstoanimals,orbeliefinthefavourofaSupremeBeing.SocriticswhoregardedBentham’shedonismasacalltosensualitywerequitemistaken.However,whereasforathinkerlikeAristotlepleasurewastobeidentifiedwiththeactivityenjoyed,forBenthamtherelationbetweenanactivityanditspleasurewasoneofcauseandeffect.WhereasforAristotlethevalueofapleasurewasthesameasthevalueoftheactivityenjoyed,forBenthamthevalueofeachandeverypleasurewasthesame,nomatterhowitwascaused.‘Quantityofpleasurebeingequal’,hewrote,‘push-pinisasgoodaspoetry.’Whatwentforpleasurewentforpain,too:thequantityofpain,andnotitscause,isthemeasureofitsdisvalue.Itisthequantificationofpleasureandpain,therefore,thatisofprimeimportanceforautilitarian:indecidingonanactionorapolicyweneedtoestimatetheamountofpleasureandtheamountofpainlikelytoensue.Benthamwasawarethatsuchquantificationwasnotrivialtask,andheofferedrecipesforthemeasurementofpleasuresandpains.PleasureAcountsmorethanpleasureBifitismoreintense,orifitlastslonger,orifitismorecertain,orifitismoreimmediate.Inthe‘felicificcalculus’thesedifferentfactorsmustbetakenintoaccountandweighedagainsteachother.Injudgingpleasure-producingactionswemustalsoconsiderfecundityandpurity:apleasurableactionisfecundifitislikelytoproduceasubsequentseriesofpleasures,anditispureifitisunlikelytoproduceasubsequentseriesofpains.Allthesefactorsaretobetakenintoaccountwhenweareoperatingthecalculuswithrespecttoourownaffairs;ifweareconsideringpublicpolicy,wemustfurtherconsideranotherfactor,2Seevol.I,p.263.221\nETHICSwhichBenthamcalls‘extension’—thatis,howwidelythepainsandpleasureswillbespreadacrossthepopulation.Benthamofferedamnemonicrhymetoaidinoperatingthecalculus:Intense,long,certain,speedy,fruitful,pure—Suchmarksinpleasuresandinpainsendure.Suchpleasuresseekifprivatebethyend;Ifitbepublic,wideletthemextend.Suchpainsavoid,whicheverbethyviewIfpainsmustcome,letthemextendtofew.(P4.2)Inusingthefelicificcalculusforpurposesofdeterminingpublicpolicy,extensionisthecrucialfactor.‘Thegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber’isanimpressiveslogan;butwhenprobeditturnsouttoberiddledwithambiguity.Thefirstquestiontoberaisedis‘greatestnumberofwhat?’Shouldweadd‘voters’or‘citizens’or‘males’or‘humanbeings’or‘sentientbeings’?Itmakesahugedifferencewhichanswerwegive.Throughoutthetwocenturiesofutilitarianism’shistorymostofitsdevoteeswouldprobablygivetheanswer‘humanbeings’,andthisismostlikelytheanswerthatBenthamwouldhavegiven.Hedidnotadvocatewomen’ssuffrage,butonlybecausehethoughtthattodosowouldprovokeoutrage;inprinciplehethoughtthatonthebasisofthegreatesthappinessprinciple‘theclaimof[thefemale]sexis,ifnotstillbetter,atleastaltogetherasgoodasthatoftheother’(Bix.108–9).Inrecentyearsmanyutilitarianshaveextendedthehappinessprinciplebeyondhumankindtoothersentientbeings,claimingthatanimalshaveequalclaimswithhumanbeings.Thoughagreatloverofanimals(espe-ciallycats)Benthamhimselfdidnotgoasfarasthis,andhewouldhaverejectedtheideathatanimalshaverights,becausehedidnotbelieveinnaturalrightsofanykind.Butbymakingthesuprememoralcriterionamatterofsensationhemadeitappropriatetoconsideranimalsasbelong-ingtothesamemoralcommunityasourselvessinceanimalsaswellashumansfeelpleasureandpain.This,inthelongterm,provedtobeoneofthemostsignificantconsequencesofBentham’sbreakwiththeclassicalandChristianmoraltradition,whichplacedsuprememoralvalueinactivitiesnotofthesensebutofthereason,andregardednon-rationalanimalsasstandingoutsidethemoralcommunity.222\nETHICSAsecondquestionabouttheprincipleofutilityisthis:shouldindivid-uals,orpoliticians,infollowingthegreatesthappinessprincipleattempttocontrolthenumberofcandidatesforhappiness(howeverthesearedef-ined)?Doestheextensionofhappinesstoagreaternumbermeanthatweshouldtrytobringmorepeople(oranimals)intoexistence?Whatanswerwegivetothisislinkedtoathird,evenmoredifficult,question:whenwearemeasuringthehappinessofapopulation,doweconsideronlytotalhappiness,orshouldwealsoconsideraveragehappiness?Shouldwetakeaccountofthedistributionofhappinessaswellasofitsquantity?Ifso,thenwehavetostrikeadifficultbalancebetweenquantityofhappinessandquantityofpeople.Thisissueisaproblemratherforpoliticalphilosophythanformoralphilosophy.Butevenifwerestrictourconsiderationtomattersofindividualmorality,thereremainsaproblemraisedbytheinitialpassageoftheIntroductionquotedabove.Thehedonismthereproclaimedistwofold:thereisapsychologicalhedonism(pleasuredeterminesallouractions)andanethicalhedonism(pleasureisthestandardofrightandwrong).Butthepleasurecitedinpsychologicalhedonismisthepleasureoftheindividualperson;thepleasureinvokedinethicalhedonismisthepleasure(howeverquantified)ofthetotalmoralcommunity.IfIam,infact,predeterminedineveryactiontoaimatmaximizingmyownpleasure,whatpointisthereintellingmethatIamobligedtomaximizethecommongood?ThiswasaproblemthatwastoexercisesomeofBentham’ssuccessorsintheutilita-riantradition.Benthamcommendedutilitarianismbycontrastingitwithotherethicalsystems.ThesecondchapteroftheIntroductionisentitled‘OfPrinciplesAdversetothatofUtility’.Heliststwosuchprinciples,thefirstbeingtheprincipleofasceticism,andthesecondtheprincipleofsympathyandantipathy.Theprincipleofasceticismisthemirrorimageoftheprincipleofutility,approvingofactionstotheextentthattheytendtodiminishthequantityofhappiness.Amanwhoacceptstheprincipleofsympathyandantipathy,ontheotherhand,judgesactionsasgoodorbadtotheextentthattheyaccordornotwithhisownfeelings(P2.2).Bentham’sprincipleofasceticismsetupastrawman.Religioustradi-tionshaveindeedsetahighvalueonself-denialandmortificationoftheflesh;butevenamongreligiousteachersitisraretofindonewhomakestheinflictionofsufferingupononeselftheoverarchingprincipleof223\nETHICSeveryaction.3Noone,religiousorsecular,hadeverproposedapolicyofpursuingthegreatestmiseryofthegreatestnumber.Benthamhimselfadmits,‘Theprincipleofasceticismneverwas,norevercanbe,consistentlypursuedbyanylivingcreature’(P2.10).Theprincipleofsympathyandantipathyisacatch-allthatincludesmoralsystemsofverydifferentkinds.Sympathyandantipathy,Benthamsays,maybegivenvariousfancynames:moralsense,commonsense,understanding,ruleofright,fitnessofthings,lawofnature,rightreason,andsoon.Moralsystemsthatpresentthemselvesundersuchbanners,Benthambelieves,areallsimplyplacingagrandiosescreeninfrontofanappealtoindividualsubjectivefeeling.‘Theyconsistalloftheminsomanycontrivancesforavoidingtheobligationofappealingtoanyexternalstandard,andforprevailinguponthereadertoacceptoftheauthor’ssentimentoropinionasareasonforitself’(P2.14).WecannotappealtothewillofGodtosettlewhethersomethingisright;wehavetoknowfirstwhetheritisrightinordertodecidewhetheritisconformabletoGod’swill.‘WhatiscalledthepleasureofGodis,andmustnecessarilybe(revelationapart)neithermorenorlessthanthegoodpleasureoftheperson,whoeverhebe,whoispronouncingwhathebelieves,orpretends,tobeGod’spleasure’(P2.18).Benthamdoesnotbringoutwhatisthereallysignificantdifferencebetweenutilitarianismandothermoralsystems.Wemaydividemoralphilosophersintoabsolutistsandconsequentialists.Absolutistsbelievethattherearesomekindsofactionthatareintrinsicallywrong,andshouldneverbedone,irrespectiveofanyconsiderationoftheconsequences.Consequentialistsbelievethatthemoralityofactionsshouldbejudgedbytheirconsequences,andthatthereisnocategoryofactthatmaynot,inspecialcircumstances,bejustifiedbyitsconsequences.PriortoBenthammostphilosopherswereabsolutists,becausetheybelievedinanaturallaw,ornaturalrights.Iftherearenaturalrightsandanaturallaw,thensomekindsofaction,actionsthatviolatethoserightsorconflictwiththatlaw,arewrong,nomatterwhattheconsequences.Benthamrejectedthenotionofnaturallaw,onthegroundsthatnotwopeoplecouldagreewhatitwas.Hewasscornfulofnaturalrights,believing3OnesuchisStJohnoftheCross,butevenheseesthisasameanstoeventualsuperabun-danthappiness;seevol.III,p.251.224\nETHICSthatrealrightscouldonlybeconferredbypositivelaw;andhisgreatestscornwasdirectedtotheideathatnaturalrightscouldnotbeoverridden.‘Naturalrightsissimplenonsense:naturalandimprescriptiblerights,rhetoricalnonsense—nonsenseuponstilts’(Bii.501).Ifthereisnonaturallawandnonaturalrights,thennoclassofactionscanberuledoutinadvanceoftheconsiderationoftheconsequencesofsuchanactioninaparticularcase.ThisdifferencebetweenBenthamandpreviousmoralistsishighlysignifi-cant,ascanbeeasilyillustrated.Aristotle,Aquinas,andalmostallChristianmoralistsbelievedthatadulterywasalwayswrong.NotsoforBentham:theconsequencesforeseenbyaparticularadulterermustbetakenintoaccountbeforemakingamoraljudgement.Abelieverinnaturallaw,toldthatsomeHerodorNerohaskilled5,000citizensguiltyofnocrime,willsaywithoutfurtherado,‘Thatwasawickedact’.Athoroughgoingconsequentialist,beforemakingsuchajudgement,mustaskfurtherquestions.Whatweretheconsequencesofthemassacre?Whatdidthemonarchforesee?Whatwouldhavehappenedifhehadallowedthe5,000tolive?ModificationsofUtilitarianismJohnStuartMillwas,likeBentham,aconsequentialist.ButinotherwayshetoneddownaspectsofBentham’steachingthathadbeenfoundmostoffensive.InhistreatiseUtilitarianism,writteninhislatefifties,heacknow-ledgesthatmanypeoplehavethoughtthattheideathatlifehasnohigherendthanpleasurewasadoctrineworthyonlyofswine.Herepliesthatitisfoolishtodenythathumanshavefacultiesthatarehigherthantheonestheysharewithanimals.Thisallowsustomakedistinctionsbetweendifferentpleasuresnotonlyinquantitybutalsoinquality.‘Itisquitecompatiblewiththeprincipleofutilitytorecognisethefactthatsomekindsofpleasurearemoredesirableandmorevaluablethanothers’(U258).Howthendowegradethedifferentkindsofpleasure?‘Oftwopleasures’,Milltellsus,‘iftherebeonetowhichalloralmostallwhohaveexperienceofbothgiveadecidedpreference,irrespectiveofanyfeelingofmoralobligationtopreferit,thatisthemoredesirablepleasure.’Armedwiththisdistinctionautilitariancanputadistancebetweenhimselfandtheswine.Fewhumanswouldwishtobechangedintoaloweranimalevenif225\nETHICSpromisedacornucopiaofbestialpleasures.‘Itisbettertobeahumanbeingdissatisfiedthanapigsatisfied.’Again,nointelligent,educatedpersonwouldwish,atanyprice,tobecomeafoolishignoramus.Itis‘bettertobeSocratesdissatisfiedthanafoolsatisfied’(U260).Happiness,accordingtoMill,involvesnotjustcontentment,butalsoasenseofdignity;anyamountofthelowerpleasures,withoutthis,wouldnotamounttohappiness.Accordingly,thegreatesthappinessprincipleneedstoberestated:Theultimateend,withreferencetoandforthesakeofwhichallotherthingsaredesirable(whetherweareconsideringourowngoodorthatofotherpeople),isanexistenceexemptasfaraspossiblefrompain,andasrichaspossibleinenjoyments,bothinpointofquantityandquality;thetestofquality,andtheruleformeasuringitagainstquantity,beingthepreferencefeltbythosewhointheiropportunitiesofexperience,towhichmustbeaddedtheirhabitsofself-consciousnessandself-observation,arebestfurnishedwiththemeansofcomparison.(U262)Suppose,then,thatacriticgrantstoMillthatutilitarianismneednotbeswinish.Still,hemayinsist,itdoesnotappealtothebestinhumannature.Virtueismoreimportantthanhappiness,andactsofrenunciationandself-sacrificearethemostsplendidofhumandeeds.Millagreesthatitisnobletobecapableofresigningone’sownhappinessforthesakeofothers—butwouldtheheroormartyr’ssacrificebemadeifhedidnotbelievethatitwouldincreasetheamountofhappinessintheworld?Apersonwhodenieshimselftheenjoymentoflifeforanyotherpurpose‘isnomoredeservingofadmirationthantheasceticmountedonhispillar’.Objectionstoutilitarianismcomeintwodifferentforms.Asamoralcode,itmaybethoughttobetoostrict,oritmaybethoughttobetoolax.Thosewhocomplainthatitistoostrictsaythattoinsistthatineverysingleactiononeshouldtakeaccountnotjustofone’sownbutofuniversalhappinessistodemandadegreeofaltruismbeyondtherangeofallbutsaints.Indeed,eventoworkoutwhatisthemostfelicificofthechoicesavailableatanygivenmomentcallsforsuperhumanpowersofcalculation.Thosewhoregardutilitarianismastoolaxsaythatitsabolitionofabsoluteprohibitionsonkindsofactionopensadoorformoralagentstopersuadethemselveswhenevertheyfeellikeitthattheyareinthespecialcircumstancesthatwouldjustifyanotherwiseoutrageousact.TheycouldquotewordsthatMillhimselfwrotetoHarrietTaylorsoonaftertheymet:226\nETHICSWherethereexistsagenuineandstrongdesiretodothatwhichismostforthehappinessofall,generalrulesaremerelyaidstoprudence,inthechoiceofmeans;notperemptoryobligations.Letbutthedesiresberight,andthe‘imaginationloftyandrefined’;&providedtherebedisdainofallfalseseeming,‘tothepureallthingsarepure’.4InUtilitarianismMilloffersadefenceonbothfronts.Againsttheallegationofexcessiverigour,heurgesustodistinguishbetweenamoralstandardandamotiveofaction:utilitarianism,whileofferinguniversalhappinessastheultimatemoralstandard,doesnotrequireittobetheaimofeveryaction.Moreover,thereisnoneedtorunthroughafelicificcalculusineverycase:itisabsurdtotalk‘asif,atthemomentwhensomemanfeelstemptedtomeddlewiththepropertyorlifeofanother,hehadtobeginconsideringforthefirsttimewhethermurderandtheftareinjurioustohumanhappiness’(U275).Tothosewhoallegelaxity,herespondswithatuquoque:allmoralsystemshavetomakeroomforconflictingobligations,andutilityisnottheonlycreed‘whichisabletofurnishuswithexcusesforevildoing,andmeansofcheatingourownconscience’(U277).ThedifficultyaboututilitarianismthatMillhimselftakesmostseriouslyistheallegationthatitisarecipeforpreferringexpediencetojustice.Millrespondsthatthedictatesofjusticedoindeedformpartofthefieldofgeneralexpediency,butthatnonethelessthereisadifferencebetweenwhatisexpedient,whatismoral,andwhatisjust.Ifsomethingisexpedient(inthesenseofconducingtothegeneralhappiness)then,onutilitariangrounds,itshouldbedone,butthereneednotbeanyquestionofdutyinvolved.Ifsomethingisnotjustexpedientbutalsomoral,thenadutyarises;anditispartofthenotionofadutythatapersonmayberightlycompelledtofulfilit.Notallduties,however,createcorrelativerightsinotherpersons,anditisthisextraelementthatmakesthedifferencebetweenmoralityingeneralandjusticeinparticular:‘Justiceimpliessomethingwhichisnotonlyrighttodo,andwrongnottodo,butwhichsomeindividualpersoncanclaimfromusashismoralright’(U301).Itisimportant,forMill,tomarktheconnectionbetweenjusticeandmoralrights:becauseheemphasizesthattherecanbelegalrightsthatareunjust,andjustclaimsthatconflictwithlaw.4F.A.Hayek,JohnStuartMillandHarrietTaylor(London:Routledge,1957),59.227\nETHICSMillexplainshowvariousnotionsconnectedwithjustice—desert,impartiality,equality—aretobereconciledwiththeutilitarianprincipleofexpediency.Withregardtoquality,hecitesamaximofBentham’s,‘everybodytocountforone,nobodyformorethanone’—eachperson’shappinessiscountedforexactlyasmuchasanother’s.Buthedoesnotreallyaddresstheprobleminherentinthegreatesthappinessprinciple,thatitleavesroomforthemiseryofanindividualtobediscountedinordertoincreasetheoveralltotalofhappinessinthecommunity.Indeed,inUtilitarianismMillhaslittletosayaboutdistributivejusticeotherthantonotethatthoseformsonoffervaryfromsystemtosystem:SomeCommunistsconsideritunjustthattheproduceofthelabourofthecommunityshouldbesharedonanyotherprinciplethanthatofexactequality;othersthinkitjustthatthoseshouldreceivemostwhosewantsaregreatest;whileothersholdthatthosewhoworkharder,orwhoproducemore,orwhoseservicesaremorevaluabletothecommunity,mayjustlyclaimalargerquotainthedivisionoftheproduce.Andthesenseofnaturaljusticemaybeplausiblyappealedtoinbehalfofeveryoneoftheseopinions.(U301)SchopenhaueronRenunciationTheethicalteachingofSchopenhaueriscloselylinkedtohismetaphysics,andinparticulartothethesesthattheworldofexperienceisillusoryandthatthetruereality,thething-in-itself,istheuniversalwill.Weseeindividualsrisingoutofnothing,receivingtheirlivesasagift,andthensufferingthelossofthisgiftindeath,returningagaintonothing.Butifweconsiderlifephilosophicallywefindthatthewill,thething-in-itselfinallphenomena,isnotatallaffectedbybirthanddeath.Itisnottheindividual,butonlythespecies,thatNaturecaresfor,andforthepreservationofwhichshesoearnestlystrives,providingforitwiththeutmostprodigality....Theindividual,onthecontrary,neitherhasnorcanhaveanyvalueforNature,forherkingdomisinfinitetimeandinfinitespace,andwithintheseinfinitemultiplicityofpossibleindividuals.Thereforesheisalwaysreadytolettheindividualfall,andhenceitisnotonlyexposedtodestructioninathousandwaysbythemostinsignificantaccident,butoriginallydestinedforit,andconductedtowardsitbyNatureherselffromthemomentithasserveditsendofmaintainingthespecies.(WWI276)228\nETHICSWeshouldbenomoretroubledbythethoughtthatatdeathourindividualitywillbereplacedbyotherindividualsthanwearetroubledbythefactthatinlifeeverytimewetakeinnewfoodweexcretewaste.Deathisjustasleepinwhichindividualityisforgotten.Itisonlyasphenomenonthatoneindividualisdistinctfromanother.‘Asthing-in-itselfheisthewillwhichappearsineverything,anddeathdestroystheillusionwhichseparateshisconsciousnessfromthatoftherest:thisisafterlifeorimmortality’(WWI282).Moralityisamatterofthetrainingofcharacter;butwhatthisconsistsincanonlybeunderstood,accordingtoSchopenhauer,ifweacceptKant’sAportraitphotographofSchopenhauertakenabout1850229\nETHICSreconciliationoffreedomwithnecessity.Thewill,whichisthething-in-itself,isfreefrometernitytoeternity;buteverythinginnature,includinghumannature,isdeterminedbynecessity.Justasinanimatenatureactsinaccordancewithlawsandforces,soeachhumanbeinghasacharacter,fromwhichdifferentmotivescallforthhisactionsnecessarily.Ifwehadacompleteknowledgeofaperson’scharacterandthemotivesthatarepresentedtohim,wewouldbeabletocalculatehisfutureconductjustaswecanpredictaneclipseofthesunormoon.Webelievewearefreetochoosebetweenalternatives,becausepriortothechoicewehavenoknowledgeofhowthewillisgoingtodecide;butthebeliefinlibertyofindifferenceisanillusion.Ifallourethicalconductisdeterminedbyone’scharacter,itmightseemthatitisawasteoftroubletotrytoimproveoneself,anditisbettersimplytogratifyeveryinclinationthatpresentsitself.Inrejectingthis,Schopen-hauermakesadistinctionbetweenseveralkindsofcharacter.Thereiswhathecallstheintelligiblecharacter,whichistheunderlyingreality,outsidetime,thatdeterminesourresponsetothesituationspresentedtousintheworld.Thereisalsotheempiricalcharacter;thatistosay,whatweandotherslearn,throughthecourseofexperience,ofthenatureofourownintelligiblecharacter.Finally,thereistheacquiredcharacter,whichisachievedbythosewhohavelearntthenatureandlimitationsoftheirownindividualcharacter.Thesearepersonsofcharacterinthebestsense:peoplewhorecognizetheirownstrengthsandweaknesses,andtailortheirprojectsandambitionsaccordingly.Ourwillscanneverchange,butmanydegreesarepossibleofawarenessofwill.Humans,unlikeotheranimals,possessabstractandrationalknow-ledge.Thisdoesnotexemptthemfromthecontrolofconflictingmotives,butitmakesthemawareoftheconflict,andthisiswhatconstituteschoice.Repentance,forinstance,neverproceedsfromachangeofwill,whichisimpossible,butfromachangeofknowledge,fromgreaterself-awareness.‘Knowledgeofourownmindanditscapacitiesofeverykind,andtheirunalterablelimits,isthesurestwaytotheattainmentofthegreatestpossiblecontentmentwithourselves’(WWI306).Eventothebestofhumans,Schopenhauerholdsoutnogreathopeofcontentment.Weareallcreaturesofwill,andwillofitsnatureisinsatiable.Thebasisofallwillingisneedandpain,andwesufferuntilourneedsaresatisfied.Butifthewill,oncesatisfied,lacksobjectsofdesire,thenlife230\nETHICSbecomesaburdenofboredom.‘Thuslifeswingslikeapendulumback-wardsandforwardsbetweenpainandennui’(WWI312).Walkingisonlyconstantlypreventedfalling;thelifeofourbodyisonlyever-postponeddeath;thelifeofourmindisconstantlydeferredboredom.Wantoffoodisthescourgeoftheworkingclass,wantofentertainmentthatoftheworldoffashion.Allhappinessisreallyandessentiallynegative,neverpositive.Theonlysurewaytoescapethetyrannyofthewillisbycompleterenunciation.Whatthewillwillsisalwayslife;soifwearetorenouncethewillwemustrenouncethewilltolive.Thissoundslikearecommendationtosuicide;butinfactSchopenhauercondemnedsuicideasafalsewayofescapefromthemiseriesoftheworld.Suicidecouldonlybeinspiredbyanoverestimateoftheindividuallife;itwasmotivatedbyconcealedwilltolive.Renunciationisrenunciationoftheself,andmoralprogressconsistsinthereductionofegoism,thatistosay,thetendencyoftheindividualtomakeitselfthecentreoftheworldandtosacrificeeverythingelsetoitsownexistenceandwell-being.Allbadpersonsareegoists:theyasserttheirownwilltolive,anddenythepresenceofthatwillinothers,damaging,andperhapsdestroying,theexistenceofothersiftheygetintheirway.Therearepeoplewhoarenotonlybad,butreallywicked;theygobeyondegoism,takingdelightinthesufferingsofothersnotjustasameanstotheirownends,butasanendinitself.SchopenhauernamesNeroandRobespierreasexamplesofthislevelofcruelty.Acommonorgardenbadperson,however,whileregardinghisownpersonasseparatedbyagreatgulffromothers,nonethelessretainsadimawarenessthathisownwillisjustthephenomenalappearanceofthesinglewilltolivethatisactiveinall.Hedimlyseesthatheishimselfthiswholewill,andconsequentlyheisnotonlytheinflicterbuttheendurerofpain,apainfromwhichheisseparatedonlybytheillusivedreamofspaceandtime.Thisawarenessfindsitsexpressioninremorse.Remorseinthebadmanisthecounterpartofresignation,whichisthemarkofthegoodman.Betweenthebadmanandthegoodman,thereisanintermediatecharacter:thejustman.Unlikethebadman,thejustmandoesnotseeindividualityasbeinganabsolutewallofpartitionbetweenhimselfandothers.Otherpersons,forhim,arenotmeremasks,whosenatureisquitedifferentfromhisown.Heiswillingtorecognizethewilltoliveinothers231\nETHICSonthesamelevelashisown,uptothepointofabstainingfrominjurytohisfellowhumans.Inthereallygoodman,thebarrierofindividualityispenetratedtoafargreaterdegree,andtheprincipleofindividuationisnolongeranabsolutewallofpartition.Thegoodmanseesthatthedistinctionbetweenhimselfandothers,whichtothebadmanissogreatagulf,onlybelongstoafleetingandillusivephenomenon.‘Heisjustaslittlelikelytoallowotherstostarve,whilehehimselfhasenoughandtospare,asanyonewouldbetosufferhungeronedayinordertohavemorethenextdaythanhecouldenjoy’(WWI373).Butwelldoingandbenevolenceisnotthehighestethicalstate,andthegoodmanwillsoonbetakenbeyondit.Ifhetakesasmuchinterestinthesufferingsofotherindividualsashisown,andthereforeisnotonlybenevolentinthehighestdegree,butevenreadytosacrificehisownindividualitywheneversuchasacrificewillsaveanumberofotherpersons,thenitclearlyfollowsthatsuchaman,whorecognizesinallbeingshisowninmostandtrueself,mustalsoregardtheinfinitesufferingofallsufferingbeingsashisown,andtakeonhimselfthepainofthewholeworld.(WWI379)Thiswillleadhimbeyondvirtuetoasceticism.Itwillnolongerbeenoughtoloveothersashimself:hewillexperienceahorrorofthewholenatureofwhichhisownphenomenalexistenceisanexpression.Hewillabandonthewilltolive,whichisthekernelofthismiserableworld.Hewilldoallhecantodisownthenatureoftheworldasexpressedinhisownbody:hewillpractisecompletechastity,adoptvoluntarypoverty,andtakeupfastingandself-chastisement.Schopenhauer’sidealmandoesindeedadopttheasceticprincipledenouncedbyBentham:‘hecompelshimselftorefrainfromdoingallthathewouldliketodo,andtodoallthathewouldlikenottodo,evenifthishasnofurtherendthanthatofservingtomortifyhiswill’(WWI382).Suchasceticism,hesays,isnovainideal;itcanbelearnedthroughsufferingandithasbeenpractisedbymanyChristian,andstillmorebyHinduandBuddhist,saints.Itistruethatthelifeofmanysaintshasbeenfullofthemostabsurdsuperstition.Religioussystems,Schopenhauerbelieved,arethemythicalclothingoftruthswhichintheirnakedformareinaccessibletotheuneducatedmultitude.But,hesays,‘itisjustaslittleneedfulthatasaintshouldbeaphilosopherasthataphilosophershouldbeasaint’(WWI383)232\nETHICSThepowerofSchopenhauer’sprose,andtheenchantmentofhismetaphors,givetheimpressofgrandeurtohisethicalsystem.Butitrestsonafalsemetaphysic,anditleadstoaself-stultifyingconclusion.Thereisnoreasontobelievethattheworldisnothingbutanillusoryidea,ortoacceptthatinsatiablewillistheultimatereality.Fromthealternationbetweendesireandsatisfaction,Schopenhauerdecidedthatlifewasahistoryofsufferingandboredom;fromthesamepremisshemightwithequaljustificationhaveconcludedthatitwasahistoryofexcitementandcontentment.Inordertodistinguishtheworldofwillfromtheworldofidea,andtoreachathing-in-itself,hehastopersuadeeachofusthatourownindividualityisthefundamentalreality;inordertopersuadeustoascendthepaththroughvirtuetoasceticism,hemustgetustoacceptthatourindividualityisnothingbutillusion.Schopenhauerprovidesnoconvincingreason,otherthanaprejudiceinfavourofpessimism,whyweshouldadopttheasceticprogrammewithwhichheconcludes.Tobesure,themorephilanthropicapersonis,themoreshewillidentifywiththelivesofothers;butwhyshouldsheidentifyonlywiththeirsufferingsandnotalsowiththeirjoys?StFrancisofAssisimortifiedhisfleshasseverelyasanyIndianmystic,andyethisprayerwasthathewouldreplacedespair,darkness,andsadnesswithhope,light,andrejoicing.ThecompleterenunciationofthewilltowhichwearecalledbySchopenhauerappearstobeacontradictioninterms;foriftherenunci-ationisvoluntary,itisitselfanactofthewill,andifitisnecessaryitisnotarealrenunciation.SchopenhauertriestoescapebyappealingtotheKantiandistinctionbetweenaphenomenonthatisnecessaryandathing-in-itselfthatisfree.Butthewillthatisfreeisoutsidetime,whilethehistoryofanyself-denyingsaintbelongsintheworldofphenomena.Oneandthesameactofself-denialcannotbebothinsideandoutsidetime.TheMoralAscentinKierkegaardKierkegaard’smoralsystemresemblesSchopenhauer’sinseveralways.Bothphilosopherstakeadeeplypessimisticviewoftheethicalconditionoftheaveragehumanbeing,andbothphilosophersholdoutaspiritual233\nETHICScareerthatleadstorenunciation.ButwhereasSchopenhauer’ssystemwasbuiltonanatheisticmetaphysic,Kierkegaard’sevolvesagainstaback-groundofProtestantChristianity.Forhimtherenunciationthatisthehighpointoftheethicallifeisonlyapreliminarytoanultimateleapoffaith.WhereasSchopenhauer’sprogrammeisdesignedtoleadtotheerasureofindividuality,Kierkegaard’saimstoputtheindividualinfullpossessionofhisownpersonalityasauniquecreatureofGod.ThefinalstageoftheKierkegaardianspiritualjourneywillbeconsideredinChapter12;ourpresentconcerniswiththepreviousstage—theethical,whichcomesbetweentheaestheticandthereligious.Kierkegaard’saes-theticpersonisgovernedbyhisfeelings,andblindtospiritualvalues;butwemustnotthinkofhimasasensualboor,aphilistineglutton,orasexualdeviant.AsheisportrayedasoneofthetwoprotagonistsinEither/Orheisacultured,law-abidingperson,popularinsocietyandnotwithoutconsid-erationforothers.Whatdistinguisheshimfromaseriousmoralagentisthatheavoidsenteringintoanyengagementsthatwouldlimithiscapacityforthepursuitofwhateverisimmediatelyattractive.Topreservehisfreedomofchoiceherefusestotakeanypublicorprivateoffice;heavoidsanydeepfriendship,andmarriageaboveall.Theaestheticperson,Kierkegaardargues,isdeludedwhenhethinksofhisexistenceasoneoffreedom;infactitisextremelylimited.Incaseoneweretothinkofahouse,consistingofcellar,groundfloor,andpremier´etage,sotenanted,orrathersoarranged,thatitwasplannedforadistinctionofrankbetweenthedwellersontheseveralfloors;andincaseoneweretomakeacomparisonbetweensuchahouseandwhatitistobeaman—thenunfortunatelythisisthesorryandludicrousconditionofthemajorityofmen,thatintheirownhousetheyprefertoliveinthecellar.Thesoulish–bodilysynthesisineverymanisplannedwithaviewtobeingspirit,suchisthebuilding;butthemanpreferstodwellinthecellar,thatis,inthedeterminantsofsensuousness.Andnotonlydoesheprefertodwellinthecellar;no,helovesthattosuchadegreethathebecomesfuriousifanyonewouldproposetohimtooccupythepianonobilewhichstandsemptyathisdisposition—forinfactheisdwellinginhisownhouse.(SD176)Suchaperson,Kierkegaardsays,isinastateofdespair.‘Despair’,asusedinSicknessuntoDeathandotherworks,doesnotmeanastateofgloomordespondency;theaestheticperson,infact,maywellbelievethatheishappy.Adespairingperson,inKierkegaard’sterms,isapersonwhohasnohopeofanythinghigherthanhispresentlife.Todespairistolack234\nETHICSawarenessofthepossibilityofachievingahigher,spiritualself.Despair,sounderstood,isnotarare,butawell-nighuniversalphenomenon.Mostmen,inKierkegaard’sexpressivephrase,‘pawnthemselvestotheworld’.‘Theyusetheirtalents,accumulatemoney,carryonworldlyaffairs,calculateshrewdlyetc.,etc.,areperhapsmentionedinhistory,butthem-selvestheyarenot;spirituallyunderstoodtheyhavenoself,noselfforwhosesaketheycouldventureeverything’(SD168).Thefirststeptowardsacureistherealizationthatoneisindespair.Already,inthehiddenrecessesoftheaestheticperson’shappiness,theredwellsananxiousdread.Gradually,hemaycometorealizethathisdissipationisadispersalofhimself.Hewillbefacedwiththechoiceofabandoninghimselftodespair,orofmovingupwardbycommittinghimselftoanethicalexistence.Thenatureofsuchanexistence,andthenecessityforundertakingit,isspeltoutmostfullyinthecorrespondenceofJudgeVilhelm,thefictionalauthorofthesecondpartofEither/Or.Vilhelmishimselfafullypaid-upmemberofethicalsociety:heishappilymarried,thefatheroffourchildren,andacivilcourtjudge.Unhappilyforthereader,healsohasaponderousandrepetitiousmannerofwritingstyle,quitedifferentfromthewittyandnovelettishstylewithwhichKierkegaardendowedtheaestheticauthorofEither/Or’sfirstpart,whoisnowtherecipientoftheedifyingletters.Vilhelmgoestogreatlengthstoexpressthecontrastbetweentheaestheticandtheethicalcharacter,andsumsitupinthefollowingterms:Wesaidthateveryaestheticlife-viewwasdespair;thiswasbecauseitwasbuiltuponwhatmayormaynotbe.Thatisnotthecasewiththeethicallife-view,forthisbuildslifeuponwhathasbeingasitsessentialproperty.Theaesthetic,wesaid,isthatinwhichapersonisimmediatelywhatheis;theethicalisthatwherebyapersonbecomeswhathebecomes.(E/O525)Kierkegaardattachesgreatimportancetotheconceptoftheself.Peopleoftenwishtohavethetalentsorvirtuesofothers;buttheyneverseriouslywishtobeanotherperson,tohaveaselfotherthantheirown(E/O517).Intheaestheticstage,theselfisundevelopedandundifferentiated;amorassofunrealizedandconflictingpossibilities:lifeisahystericalseriesofexperi-mentswithnooutcome.Theaestheteisinastateofpermanentpregnancy:alwaysintravailandnevergivingbirthtoaself.Toentertheethicalstageis235\nETHICStoundertaketheformationofone’strueself,where‘self’meanssome-thinglikeafreelychosencharacter.Insteadofmerelydevelopingone’stalentsonefollowsavocation.Theethicallifeisalifeofduty;ofduty,however,notexternallyimposedbutinternallyrealized.Theproperdevelopmentoftheindividualinvolvestheinternalizationofuniversallaw.Onlywhentheindividualhimselfistheuniversal,onlythencantheethicalberealised.Thisisthesecretofconscience;itisthesecrettheindividuallifeshareswithitself,thatisatoneandthesametimeanindividuallifeandalsotheuniversal....Thepersonwhoregardslifeethicallyseestheuniversal,andthepersonwholivesethicallyexpresseshislifeintheuniversal;hemakeshimselfintotheuniversalman,notbydivestinghimselfofhisconcretion,forthenhewouldbenothingatall,butbyclothinghimselfinitandpermeatingitwiththeuniversal.(E/O547)Ingrammarsofforeignlanguages,someparticularwordischosenasaparadigmtoillustratethewaythatnounsdeclineandverbsconjugate.Thewordschosenhavenoparticularpriorityoveranyothernounandverb,buttheyteachussomethingabouteverynounandverb.Inasimilarsense,Vilhelmsays,‘Everyonecan,ifhewants,becomeapara-digmman,notbywipingouthiscontingencybutbyremaininginitandennoblingit.Butheennoblesitbychoosingit’(E/O552).Thepatternthathelaysouttobefollowedleadsthroughtheacquisitionofpersonalvirtues,throughthecivicvirtues,andendsfinallywiththereligiousvirtues.ThemanwhomKierkegaardmostoftenchoosesasaparadigmoftheethicalpersonisSocrates.Hislifeillustratesthefactthattheethicalstagemaymakestrictdemandsontheindividual,andcallforheroicself-sacrifice.JudgeVilhelmdoesnotofferusKierkegaard’slastwordonmorality,becauseinhissystemtheethicalisnotthehighestcategory.Kierkegaardhimselfneithertookajobnorgotmarried,whicharethetwomarksoftheethicallife.Becauseofhisownandhisfamily’shistoryhefeltincapableofthetotalsharingofallsecretswhichhethoughtwasessentialtoagoodmarriage.Facedwiththedemandsmadebytheethicallife,Kierkegaardtellsus,theindividualbecomesvividlyconsciousofhumanweakness;hemaytrytoovercomeitbystrengthofwill,butfindhimselfunabletodoso.Hebecomesawarethathisownpowersareinsufficienttomeetthedemandsofthemorallaw.Thisbringshimtoasenseofguiltanda236\nETHICSconsciousnessofsinfulness.Ifheistoescapefromthis,hemustrisefromtheethicalspheretothisreligioussphere:hemustmake‘theleapoffaith’.5NietzscheandtheTransvaluationofValuesNietzscheagreedwithKierkegaardthatacalltotheChristianlifewassomethingthatcouldnotbejustifiedbyreason.ButwhereasKierkegaardconcluded,‘Somuchtheworseformerereason’,Nietzscheconcluded,‘SomuchtheworseforthecallofChristianity’.NotthatNietzschespentmuchtimeindemonstratingthatChristianitywasirrational:hismaincomplaintagainstitwasratherthatitwasbaseanddegrading.InworkslikeTheGenealogyofMoralsheseeksnotsomuchtorefutetheclaimsofChristianmoralityastotraceitsignoblepedigree.History,Nietzschesays,exhibitstwodifferentkindsofmorality.Intheearliesttimes,strong,privilegedaristocrats,feelingthemselvestobelongtoahigherorderthantheirfellows,describedtheirownqualities—noblebirth,bravery,candour,blondness,andthelike—as‘good’.Theyregardedthecharacteristicsoftheplebeians—vulgarity,cowardice,untruthfulness,andswarthiness—as‘bad’.Thatismaster-morality.Thepoorandweak,resentingthepowerandrichesofthearistocrats,turnedthissystemonitshead.Theysetuptheirowncontrastingsystemofvalues,amoralityfortheherdthatputsapremiumontraitssuchashumility,sympathy,andbenevolence,whichbenefittheunderdog.Theysawthearistocratictypeofpersonnotjustasbad(schlecht)butaspositivelyevil(bo¨se).TheerectionofthisnewsystemNietzschecalled‘atransvaluationofvalues’,andheblameditontheJews.ItwastheJewswho,reversingthearistocraticequation(good¼noble¼beautiful¼happy¼lovedbythegods),daredwithafrighteningconsistencytosuggestthecontraryequation,andtoholdontoitwiththeteethofthemostprofoundhatred(thehatredofthepowerless).Itistheywhohavedeclared‘thewretchedalonearethegood;thepoor,theweak,thelowlyarealonegood;thesuffering,theneedy,thesick,thehideous,aretheonlyoneswhoarepious,theonlyoneswhoareblessed,forthemaloneissalvation.You,ontheotherhand,younoblemen,youmenofpower,youaretoalleternitytheevil,thecruel,thecovetous,the5Kierkegaard’steachingonfaithandreligionisdiscussedinCh.12below.237\nETHICSinsatiate,andthegodlessones.Youwillbeforeverunblessed,accursed,anddamned.’(GM19)Therevoltoftheslaves,begunbytheJews,achieveditstriumphwiththeriseofChristianity.InRomeitself,oncethefatherlandofaristocraticvirtue,mennowbowdowntofourJews:Jesus,Mary,Peter,andPaul(GM36).Christianityputsitselfforwardasareligionoflove,butinfact,accordingtoNietzsche,itisrootedinweakness,fear,andmalice.Itsdominantmotiveiswhathecallsressentiment,thedesireoftheweakforrevengeonthestrong,whichdisguisesitselfasawishtopunishthesinner.Christiansposeastheexecutorsofdivinecommands,butthisisonlytocloaktheirownbadconscience.Christiansexaltcompassionasavirtue,butwhentheyassisttheafflicteditiscommonlybecausetheyenjoyexercisingpoweroverthem.Evenwhenphilanthropyisnothypocriticalitdoesmoreharmthangood,byhumiliatingthesufferer.Pityisapoisonthatinfectsacompassionatepersonwiththesufferingsofothers(Z112).ThesuccessofChristianityhasledtothedegenerationofthehumanrace.Systematictendernessfortheweaklowersthegeneralhealthandstrengthofmankind.Modernman,asaresult,isameredwarf,whohaslostthewilltobetrulyhuman.Vulgarityandmediocritybecomethenorm;onlyrarelytherestillflashesoutanembodimentofthenobleideal.Theherd-maninEuropenowadaysputsonairsasifheweretheonlyacceptabletypeofhumanbeing.Heglorifiesthequalitiesthatmakehimtame,docile,andusefultotheherdasiftheywerethetruehumanvirtues:publicspirit,benevo-lence,considerateness,industriousness,moderation,modesty,tolerance,compas-sion.Buttherearecaseswherealeaderorbell-wetherisfelttobeindispensable;insuchcasespeoplekeeptryingtosetupanaggregationofcleverherd-meninplaceofrealcommanders:thatistheorigin,forinstance,ofallparliamentaryconsti-tutions.Butwhatablessing,inspiteofeverything,whatareleasefromanincreasinglyunbearableburdenistheappearanceofanabsolutecommanderfortheseherd-Europeans!ThiswasdemonstratedmostrecentlybytheeffectofNapoleonwhenheappearedonthescene.ThehistoryoftheimpactofNapoleoncanbesaidtobethehistoryofthehighesthappinessthisentirecenturyhasachievedinitsmostvaluablemenandmoments.(BGE86)Ifthehumanraceistobesavedfromdecadence,thefirststepmustbetoreversethevaluesofChristianity,introducingasecondtransvaluationofvalues.‘Theweakandthefailuresshallperish:thatisthefirstprincipleofourloveofmankind,’NietzschewroteonthefirstpageofhisAntichrist.238\nETHICSHumanbeingsfellintotwotypes:‘ascending’peopleand‘descending’people,thatistosay,peoplewhorepresentedtheupwardanddownwardtrackofhumanevolution.Itwasnotalwayseasytotellwhichwaswhich—onlyNietzschehimselfhadaperfectnosetodiscriminatebetweenthetwo—butoncedetected,thedescendingcreatureshadtomakewayforthewell-constituted,takingawayfromthemaslittlespace,energy,andsunshineaspossible(WP373).However,itisnotjustChristianmoralitythatmustbeoverturned.Wemustgobeyondtheoppositionbetweengoodandevilthatisthefeatureofanyslavemorality.ItisnotonlyChristians,forinstance,whoregardtruthasafundamentalvalue.Butweshouldnot,Nietzscheargues,objecttojudgementsjustbecausetheyarefalse.Thequestionisrathertowhatextentthejudgementpromoteslife,preserveslife,preservesthespecies,perhapsevenenhancesthespecies.Weareinprincipleinclinedtoclaimthatjudgementsthataremostfalse—includingsyntheticapriorijudgements—aretheonesmostindispensabletous.Humanbeingscouldnotlivewithoutacceptinglogicalfictions...Togiveupfalsejudgementswouldbetogiveuplife,todenylife.Recognizinguntruthasaconditionoflife?Whatadangerousrejectionoftraditionalvalues!Aphilosophythatdarestodothishasalreadyplaceditselfbeyondgoodandevil.(BGE7)Truthisthatkindoferrorwithoutwhichaparticularlivingbeingcouldnotsurvive.Lifeisthesupremevaluebywhichallothersaretobejudged.‘Wheneverwespeakofvalues’,Nietzschewrote,‘wespeakundertheinspirationoflifeandfromtheperspectiveoflife.Lifeitselfforcesustoestablishvalues;itislifethatdoestheevaluationbymeansofuswheneverwepositvalues’(TI24).Humanlifeisthehighestformoflifethathassofaremerged,butinthecontemporaryworldithassunktothelevelofsomeoftheformsthatprecededit.Wemustaffirmlifeandbringittoanewlevel,asynthesistranscendingthethesisandantithesisofmasterandslave,theSuperman(Ubermensch).TheproclamationoftheSupermanisthepropheticmessageofNietzsche’soracularspokesmanZarathustra.TheSupermanwillbethehighestformoflife,theultimateaffirmationofthewilltolive.Butourwilltolivemustnotbe,likeSchopenhauer’s,onethatfavourstheweak;itmustbeawilltopower.Thewilltopoweristhesecretofalllife;everylivingthingseekstodischargeitsforce,togivefullscopetoitsability.Pleasureismerelytheconsciousnessofpower’sexercise.Knowledge—to239\nETHICSSupermenasrepresentedonthejacketofaNietzscheanbook.theextentthattherecanbeknowledgewhenthereisnoabsolutetruth—ismerelyaninstrumentofpower.ThegreatestrealizationofhumanpowerwillbethecreationofSuperman.HumanityismerelyastageonthewaytoSuperman,whoiswhatgivesmeaningtotheworld.‘Humanityissomethingthatmustbesurpassed:manisabridgeandnotagoal’(Z44).Superman,however,willnotcomeintoexistencethroughtheforcesofevolution,butonlythroughtheexerciseofwill.‘Letyourwillsay‘‘Supermanistobethemeaningoftheearth.’’’Zarathustrasays:‘YoucouldsurelycreatetheSuperman!Perhapsnotyouyourselves,mybrothers!ButyoucouldtransformyourselvesintoforefathersandancestorsoftheSuperman:andletthisbeyourfinestcreation!’ThearrivalofSupermanwillbetheperfectionoftheworldandgiveitmeaning.Butbecauseoftheeternalrecurrence,itwillnotbetheendofhistory.Supermanwillhaveasecond,andathird,andaninfinitenumberofcomings.WhatwillSupermanbelike?Thisissomethingweneedtoknowifhischaracteristopresentanystandardbywhichtomakeajudgementofhumanvirtueandvice.ButZarathustrahasverylittletotellusabouthim,andinhislaterphilosophicalworksNietzschenolongeremployedtheconcept.Hedoes,however,continuetotalkof‘higherhumanbeings’,andwegettheimpressionthathisidealwouldbeacombinationofGoetheandNapoleon,eachofwhom,indifferentways,developedavarietyoftalentstotheirmaximumdegree.Thecombinationisamoreplausibleonethananotherthatheoncescribbledinanotebook,‘RomanCaesarwiththesoulofChrist’.240\nETHICSItisdifficulttomakeacriticaljudgementaboutNietzsche’sethics,sincehiswritingisoftenwilfullychaotic,anditisunsurprisingthatscholarsvarywidelyintheirinterpretationandevaluation.Itisnoteasy,forinstance,tofindoutwhereNietzschestandsonanissuesuchasthemoralityofcruelty.Whendenouncingtheroleplayedbyguiltinslavemorality,hedescribeswitheloquentoutragethetorturesinflictedbypersecutingbigots.Butheistendertotheexcessesofhisaristocratic‘blondbeasts’who‘perhapscomefromaghastlyboutofmurder,arson,rape,andtorture,withbravadoandamoralequanimity,asthoughsomewildstudent’sprankhadbeenplayed’.CertainlyNietzscheisanenthusiastwherewarisconcerned.‘Renoun-cingwar’,hewrote,‘meansrenouncingthegreatlife’(TI23).Warisaneducationinfreedom,andfreedommeansthatthemanlyinstinctsthatdelightinvictorytriumphoveranyotherinstinct,includingthedesireforhappiness.‘Theliberatedman,andevenmoretheliberatedspirit,tramplesunderfootthedespicablekindofwell-beingthatshopkeepers,Christians,cows,women,Englishmen,andotherdemocrats,dreamof’(TI65).Suicide,too,incertaincircumstancesengagesNietzsche’sadmiration.Physiciansshouldremindtheirpatientsthatsickpersonsareparasitesonsociety,andthatatimecomeswhenitisindecenttolivelonger.Dieproudlyifitisnolongerpossibletoliveproudly.Deathfreelychosen,deathattherighttime,broughtaboutcheerfullyandjoyfullyamongchildrenandwitnesses—sothatarealleave-takingisstillpossible,whentheonewhoistakinghisleaveisstillthere;atrueassessmentofone’sachievementsandambitions,asummingupofone’slife—allthisincontrasttotheghastlyandpitifulcomedythatChristianityhasmadeofthehourofdeath.(TI61)Ifyoudoawaywithyourself,Nietzscheconcludes,youaredoingwhatismostadmirable:italmostearnsyoutherighttolive.ButisNietzscheanethicistatall?Isheagenuinemoralistwithhighlyunconventionalviewsofvirtueandvice,orisheacompletelyamoralpersonwithnoconcernforrightandwrong?Ontheonehand,heisclearlyoperatinginthesamefieldassomegreatpastmoralists:hisidealhumanbeingbearsaresemblancetothegreat-souledmanofAristotle’sNicomacheanEthics.Ontheotherhand,hehimselfprofessesnotjusttobepresentingnovelviewsofgoodandevil,buttobetranscendingthosecategoriesaltogether.Hecallshimselfanimmoralist,andtellsusthatthere241\nETHICSarenomoralfacts,andhedoeshisbesttodevaluetwoofthekeyconceptsofmostmoralsystems,namelyjusticeandguilt.Theanswer,Ithink,isthatNietzscheshareswithtraditionalmoralityanultimateconcernwithhumanflourishing,andthereasonthathecondemnsmanyconventionalvirtuesispreciselybecausehebelievesthattheyhinderratherthanhelptheachievementofaworthwhilelife.Butinhispreferenceforthegreatoverthegood,andforthenoblemanoverthegentleman,heshowshimselftohaveafundamentallyaesthetic,ratherthanethical,criterionofthegoodlife.Hisidealhumanbeingnotonlydoesnotlovehisneighbour:hehasnoneighbour.AnalyticEthicsAsanethicist,G.E.MoorestandsattheoppositepolefromNietzsche.Heplacedgoodnessattheapexofthepyramidofmoralconcepts,andhewasnotatallinterestedingenealogicalquestionsoftheoriginanddevelop-mentoftheconcept.InhisPrincipiaEthica(1903)heseeshimselfasgivingananswertothequestion‘Howisgoodnesstobedefined?’simplybyinspec-tionoftheobjectorideathattheword‘good’standsfor.Thequestion,hemaintained,isfundamentalandmustbefacedbeforeweaskwhatkindsofactionsweoughttoperform.Fortheactionsweoughttoperformarethosethatwillcausemoregoodtoexistintheuniversethananypossiblekindofalternative.Sobeforeweaskwhatthingsaregood,wemustaskwhatkindofpropertygoodnessitselfis.Thequestion,hemaintained,couldnotbeansweredbygivinganydefinitionofgoodness,becausegoodnesswasasimple,indefinablenotion,likethenotionofyellow.Butunlikeyellowness,whichwasanaturalpropertyofthings,goodness,Mooremaintained,wasanon-naturalquality.Ifweconsidergoodness,andanyotherpropertyakintoit,suchaspleasant-ness,wewillseethat‘wehavetwodifferentnotionsbeforeourminds’.Evenifeverythinggoodwereinfactpleasant,itdoesnotfollowthat‘good’and‘pleasant’meanthesame.Toidentifygoodnesswithanypropertysuchaspleasantnesswastocommitafallacy:thenaturalisticfallacy,ofconfusinganon-naturalpropertywithanaturalone.ThoughMooremaintainedthatgoodnesswasnotanaturalproperty,hedidnotdenythatitcouldbeapropertyofnaturalthings.Indeed,itwasa242\nETHICSprincipaltaskofmoralphilosophytodeterminewhatthingspossessedthisnon-naturalproperty.AfterlengthyinvestigationMoorecametotheconclusionthattheonlythingsthathaveintrinsicgoodnessarefriendshipandaestheticexperience.TheargumentsinPrincipiaEthicaareextraordinarilyflimsy,andMoorehimselfwaslatertoadmitthat‘IdidnotgiveanytenableexplanationofwhatImeantbysayingthat‘‘good’’wasnotanaturalproperty.’6Yetthebookwasremarkablyinfluential,especiallythroughtwosignificantgroupsofadmirers.TheBloomsburygroup,inparticularJ.M.Keynes,LyttonStrachey,andE.M.Forster,heldupthebookasacharterforalifestylethatthrewoverboardconventionalnotionsofrespectabilityandrectitude.Inaddition,professionalphilosopherswhocouldnotswallowthenotionofgoodnessasanon-naturalpropertynonethelessusedtheexpression‘naturalisticfallacy’asamantratodisposeofmoraltheoriesofwhichtheydisapproved.Undertheinfluenceoflogicalpositivism,however,somephilosophersbegantodenythatgoodnesswasanysortofproperty,naturalornon-natural,andtoclaimthatethicalutteranceswerenotstatementsoffactatall.ThusA.J.AyermaintainedthatifIsay‘Stealingmoneyiswrong’,Iproduceasentencewhichhasnofactualmeaning—thatis,expressesnopropositionwhichcanbeeithertrueorfalse.ItisasifIhadwritten‘Stealingmoney!!’—wheretheshapeandthicknessoftheexclamationmarksshow,byasuitableconvention,thataspecialsortofmoraldisapprovalisthefeelingwhichisbeingexpressed.Itisclearthatthereisnothingsaidherewhichcanbetrueorfalse.Anothermanmaydisagreewithmeaboutthewrongnessofstealing,inthesensethathemaynothavethesamefeelingsaboutstealingasIhave,andhemayquarrelwithmeonaccountofmymoralsentiments.Buthecannot,strictlyspeaking,contradictme.(LTL107)Thisviewofethicalutteranceswascalled‘emotivism’.WhileAyerlaidstressontheexpressionofone’sownemotion,otheremotivistssawasthefunctionofmorallanguagetheencouragementoffeelingsandattitudesinotherpeople.Butnoemotivistwasabletogiveaconvincingaccountoftheparticularcharacterofthesentimentsinquestion,ortoshowinwhatwaylogicentersintomoralreasoningwhenweusewordslike‘because’and‘therefore’.6P.A.Schilpp(ed.),ThePhilosophyofG.E.Moore(Chicago:OpenCourt,1942).243\nETHICSR.M.Hare(1919–2002),anOxfordtutorwholaterbecameWhite’sProfessorofMoralPhilosophy,wasanxioustomakeroominethicsforlogic.InTheLanguageofMorals(1952)andinFreedomandReason(1963)Harepointedoutthatthereisalogicofimperativesnolessthanalogicofassertion,andhedrewonthistoexpoundatheoryofmoralreasoning.Hedistinguishedbetweenprescriptiveanddescriptivemeaning.Adescriptivestatementisonewhosemeaningisdefinedbythefactualconditionsforitstruth.Aprescriptivesentenceisonethatentails,perhapsinconjunctionwithdescriptivestatements,atleastoneimperative.Toassenttoanimperativeistoprescribeaction,totelloneselforotherstodothisordothat.Prescriptivelanguagecomesintwoforms:therearestraightforwardimperatives,andtherearevaluejudgements.Valuejudgementsmaycontainawordlike‘good’orawordlike‘ought’.Tocallsomething‘good’istocommendit;tocallsomethingagoodXistosaythatitisthekindofXthatshouldbechosenbyanyonewhowantsanX.TherewillbedifferentcriteriaforthegoodnessofXsandthegoodnessofYs,butthisdoesnotamounttoadifferenceinthemeaningoftheword‘good’,whichisexhaustedbyitscommendatoryfunction.‘Ought’statements—whichHare,followingHume,thoughtcouldneverbederivedfrom‘is’statements—entailimperatives.‘AoughttoÖ’entailsanordertoÖaddressednotonlytoAbuttoanyoneelseinarelevantlysimilarsituation,andtheaddresseesincludetheuttererofthesentencehimself.Theutterer’swillingnesstoobeytheorder,iftheoccasionarises,isthecriterionofhissincerityinutteringthesentence.Ought-sentencesarenotjustprescriptive,butunlikecommonorgardencommandstheyareuniversalizable.Haredistinguishedbetweenethicsandmorals.Ethicsisthestudyofthegeneralfeaturesofmorallanguage,ofwhichprescriptivityanduniversal-izabilityarethemostimportant;moraljudgementsareprescriptionsandprohibitionsofspecificactions.Inprinciple,ethicsisneutralbetweendifferentandconflictingmoralsystems.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatethicsispracticallyvacuous:onceanunderstandingofethicsiscombinedwiththedesiresandbeliefsofanactualmoralagent,itcanleadtoconcreteandimportantmoraljudgements.ThewayinwhichprescriptivityanduniversalizabilityenterintoactualmoralargumentisexplainedthusbyHare.Thoughnothingotherthanmyownchoicesgivesauthoritytomymoraljudgements,mychoicesin244\nETHICSadditiontothelogicalpropertiesofmorallanguagegiverisetosomethinglikeaGoldenRule.LetussupposethatAowesmoneytoB,BowesmoneytoC,andneitherisinapositiontorepaythedebtontheduedate.Bmayjudge‘Aoughttogotoprison’.Butsincethisjudgementisuniverzalisable,andBisinthesamepositionasA,thejudgemententailsforB‘Ioughttogotoprison’—ajudgementthatisunlikelytocommandhisassent.Haremaintainedthatconsiderationsofthissortwouldleadtotheadop-tionofaroughlyutilitariansystemofmoraljudgements,sincehebelieved,implausibly,thatonlyasmallminorityoffanaticswouldbecontenttobedonebyastheyhaddonetoothers.Inthelate1950sHare’sprescriptivismwassubjectedtodevastatingcriticismbyanumberofcolleagueslivinginOxford,notablyFoot,Geach,andAnscombe.PhilippaFoot(b.1920)in‘MoralBeliefs’(1958)and‘GoodnessandChoice’(1961)attackedthedistinctionbetweendescriptiveandevaluativepredicatesbyconcentratingattentiononthenamesofparticularvirtuesandvices.Sheinvitesustoconsiderwordslike‘rude’and‘courageous’.Itisnotdifficulttodescribeinpurelyfactualtermsbehaviourthatwouldmerittheseepithets;yetcallingsomeonerudeorcourageousisclearlyamatterofevaluation.Ajudgementcannotbetreatedasmoraljudgement,Footargued,simplyonthebasisofformalcharacteristicssuchasuniversalizabilityandprescriptivity.Merelybymakingtheappropriatechoicesonecannotmakeclaspingthehandsthreetimesinanhourintoagoodaction,ordeterminethatwhatmakesamanagoodmanishavingredhair.Moralbeliefsmustconcerntraitsandactionsthatarebeneficialorharmfultohumanbeings.Sinceitisnotamatterofhumandecisionwhichtraitsandactionspromoteordiminishhumanflourishing,moraljudgementslikewisecannotdependsimplyonhumanchoice.Intheancientandmedievalworldtheanalysisofvirtuesandvices,andtheinvestigationoftheirrelationshiptohappiness,wasaverysubstantialpartofmoralphilosophy.ItislargelyduetoPhilippaFootthatinrecentdecadesvirtuetheory,aftercenturiesofneglect,hascometooccupyaprominentpartinmoralphilosophy.PeterGeach(b.1919)in‘GoodandEvil’(1956)attackedthedescriptive–evaluativedistinctioninthecasealsoofthemostgeneralterms,suchas‘good’.Theimportantdistinction,heclaimed,isthatbetweenattributive245\nETHICSandpredicativeterms.Inthecaseofapredicativetermlike‘red’onecanknowwhatitisforanXtoberedwithoutknowingwhatanXis.Thecaseisnotthesamewithattributivetermslike‘large’or‘false’.‘Good’and‘bad’,Geachsays,arealwaysattributive,notpredicative.IfwesayofanindividualAthatheisgoodsimpliciter,wereallymeanthatheisagoodman,andifwecallsomebehaviourgood,wemeanthatitisagoodhumanaction.Itisthereforefollytolookforsomepropertycalledgoodness,orsomeactivitycalledcommending,whichisalwayspresentwhenwecallsomethinggood.In‘Assertion’(1965)Geachshowedthatthemeaningof‘good’couldnotbeexplainedintermsofcommendation,becauseinmanycontextsweuseitwithoutanyintentionofcommending.‘Good’canbepredicated,forinstance,inif-clauses.Someonewhosays‘Ifcontraceptionisagoodthing,thenfreedistributionofcondomsisagoodthing’neednotbecommend-ingeithercontraceptionorthefreedistributionofcondoms.Ofcourse,‘good’mayonoccasionbeusedtocommend,butthisdoesnotmeanthatitsprimarymeaningisnotdescriptive.Geach’swife,ElizabethAnscombe,wroteaninfluentialpaperin1958,‘ModernMoralPhilosophy’.ThiswasafrontalattacknotonlyonHarebutonthewholeofAnglophonemoralphilosophysincethetimeofSidgwick.Itsfirstparagraphproclaimsaresoundingthesis:Theconceptsofobligationandduty—moralobligationandmoralduty,thatistosay—andofwhatismorallyrightandwrong,andofthemoralsenseof‘ought’,oughttobejettisonedifthisispsychologicallypossible;becausetheyaresurvivals,orderivativesofsurvivals,fromanearlierconceptionofethicswhichnolongergenerallysurvives,andareonlyharmfulwithoutit.(ERP26)Aristotlehasmuchtosayaboutthevirtuesandvices,buthehasnoconceptansweringtoourterm‘moral’.ItwasChristianity,takingitsmoralnotionsfromtheTorah,thatintroducedalawconceptionofethics.Conformitytothevirtuesandavoidanceoftheviceshenceforthbecamearequirementofdivinelaw.NaturallyitisnotpossibletohavesuchaconceptionunlessyoubelieveinGodasalawgiver;likeJews,StoicsandChristians.Butifsuchaconceptionisdominantformanycenturies,andthenisgivenup,itisanaturalresultthattheconceptsof‘obligation’,ofbeingboundorrequiredasbyalaw,shouldremainthoughtheyhadlosttheirroot;andiftheword‘ought’hasbecomeinvestedincertaincontextswiththesenseof‘obligation’,ittoowillremaintobespokenwithaspecialemphasisanda246\nETHICSElizabethAnscombeandPeterGeach,themostintellectuallyformidablephilosophicalcoupleofthetwentiethcenturyspecialfeelinginthesecontexts.Itisasifthenotion‘criminal’weretoremainwhencriminallawandcriminalcourtshadbeenabolishedandforgotten.(ERP30)Itistrue,asphilosophershavesaidsinceHume,thatonecannotinferan‘ought’—amoral‘ought’—froman‘is’;butthatisbecausethis‘ought’hasbecomeawordofmeremesmericforce,oncethenotionofadivinelawgiverhasbeendropped.Themostsignificantpracticalresultofthis,Anscombemaintained,isthatphilosophershaveallbecomeconsequentialists,believingthattherightactionistheonewiththebestpossibleconsequences.Everyoneofthebest-knownEnglishacademicethicists‘hasputoutaphilosophy247\nETHICSaccordingtowhich,e.g.itisnotpossibletoholdthatitcannotberighttokilltheinnocentasameanstoanyendwhatsoeverandthatsomeonewhothinksotherwiseisinerror’.ThismeansthatalltheirphilosophiesareincompatiblewiththeHebrew–Christianethic,whichheldthattherearecertainthingsforbiddenwhateverconsequencesthreaten.AccordingtoAnscombe,thedifferencesbetweenindividualphilosopherssinceSidgwickare,incomparisonwiththisincompatibility,unimportantandprovincial.Thenotionsofduty,andofmoralrightandwrong,Anscombeproposed,shouldbediscardedinfavourofthenotionsofjusticeandinjustice,whichhadagenuinecontent.Evenofthesenotionsitremaineddifficulttogiveaclearaccount,untilwehadasatisfactoryphilosophicalpsychology.Foronecannotanalysetheconceptsofjusticeandvirtueunlessonehasasatisfac-toryaccountofsuchtermsas‘action’,‘intention’,‘pleasure’,and‘wanting’.Anscombeherselfmadeamonumentalcontributiontothisareaofphil-osophyinherbookIntention(1957),whichwastakenasamodelbymanylaterinvestigators.InthelatterpartofthetwentiethcenturyavarietyofapproachestoethicswasexploredbyEnglish-speakingphilosophers,andinBritainnosinglephilosopherstoodoutasaprimeexponentofethicaltheory,asforatimeHarehaddone.InreactiontoHare’srevivalofKantianmoralityanumberofphilosophersplacedarenewedfocusonthemesofAristotelianethics.ThusPhilippaFootlaidemphasisonthecentralroleofvirtueinmorality,inspiringaschoolof‘virtueethics’,andBernardWilliamsremindedphilosophersofthegreatpartplayedbyluckindeterminingone’smoralsituation.Foot’sstartingpointisthatthevirtuesarecharacteristicsthatanyhumanbeingneedstohavebothforhisownsakeandforthatofothers.Theydifferfromotherqualitiesnecessaryforflourishing—suchashealthandstrength,intelligenceandskill—inthattheyarenotmerecapacities,buttheyengagethewill.Theyconcernmattersthataredifficultforhumans,andwheretherearetemptationstoberesisted;butpaceKantmoralworthisnottobemeasuredbythedifficultyofmoralaction.Thereallyvirtuouspersonisonewhodoesgoodactionsalmosteffortlessly:areallycharitableperson,forinstance,isonewhofindsiteasy,ratherthanhard,tomakethesacrificesthatcharitycallsfor.Withoutthevirtuesthelifeofahumanbeingisstunted,inthewaythatthelifeofananimallackingasense-facultyisstunted.248\nETHICSWilliamsbeganbyrecallingthewayinwhichintheclassicaltraditionhappinesshadbeenregardedastheproductofself-sufficiency:whatwasnotinthedomainoftheselfwasnotinitscontrolandsowassubjecttoluckandthecontingentenemiesoftranquillity.Inmorerecentthought,theidealofmakingthewholeoflifeimmunetoluckwasabandoned,butforKanttherewasonesupremevalue,moralvalue,thatcouldberegardedasimmune:thesuccessfulmorallifewasacareeropennotmerelytothetalentsbuttoatalentthatallrationalbeingsnecessarilypossessinthesamedegree.Williamsinsistedthattheaimofmakingmoralityimmunetoluckwasboundtobedisappointed.Thereistheconstitutiveluckofthetemperamentweinheritandthecultureintowhichweareborn:thissetstheconditionswithinwhichourmoraldispositions,motives,andintentionsmustoperate.Thereisalso—andWilliamsdevelopedthisthemeintellingdetail—theincidentluckthatisinvolvedinbringinganyprojectofmoralimportancetoasuccessfulconclusion.Asthecenturyprogressedphilosophersbegantofocustheirattentionnotsomuchonthehigher-orderquestionssuchasthenatureofmorallanguage,ortherelationshipsbetweenprinciples,character,luck,andvirtue,butonspecificfirst-orderissuessuchastherightnessorwrongnessofparticularactions:lying,abortion,torture,andeuthanasia,forexample.FootandWilliamsplayedasignificantpartinthischangeofemphasis,whichwasalsoreflectedinuniversitiesinthegrowthofsuchcoursesasmedicalethicsandbusinessethics.BothFootandWilliamstaughtonbothsidesoftheAtlantic.IntheUnitedStatesthemostsignificantmoralphilosopherofthelatterpartofthetwentiethcenturywasJohnRawls.LikeFootandWilliams,Rawlswasanenemyofutilitarianism,asystemthathebelievedprovidednosafeguardagainstmanyformsofunfairdiscrimination.Hisprojectwastoderiveatheoryofjusticefromthenotionoffairness,whichhedidbyintroducinganovelversionofsocialcontracttheoryintoethics.Sincethemajorimpli-cationsofhistheoryconcernpoliticalinstitutionsratherthanindividualmorality,hisworkwillbeconsideredlater,inChapter11.249\n10AestheticsTheBeautifulandtheSublimeThepersongenerallyheldtobethefounderofaestheticsasanindependentphilosophicaldisciplineisAlexanderGottliebBaum-garten(1714–62).Certainlyitwashewhocoinedtheword‘aesthetics’,inashorttreatiseonpoetrypublishedin1735.ForBaumgarten,thepurposeofartistoproducebeauty,definedintermsoftheorderedrelationshipbetweenthepartsofawhole.Thepointofbeautyistogivepleasureandarousedesire.Thefinestbeautyistobefoundinnature,andthereforethehighestaimofartistoimitatenature.Othereighteenth-centuryphilosopherssoughttogiveamorepreciseanalysisofbeauty.Hume,inthesectionofhisTreatiseofHumanNatureentitled‘OfBeautyandDeformity’,offeredthefollowingdefinition:beautyissuchanorderandconstitutionofparts,aseitherbytheprimaryconstitutionofournature,bycustom,orbycaprice,isfittedtogiveapleasureandsatisfactiontothesoul.Thisisthedistinguishingcharacterofbeauty,andformsallthedifferencebetwixtitanddeformity,whosenaturaltendencyistoproduceuneasiness.Pleasureandpain,therefore,arenotonlynecessaryattendantsofbeautyanddeformity,butconstitutetheirveryessence.(ii.i.8)Later,Humewasdissatisfiedwiththeideathatunexaminedcustomanduneducatedcapricecoulddeterminebeauty;hesoughttomakeroom,inaestheticjudgements,forcorrectnessandincorrectness.InTheStandardofTaste(1757)hearguedthatthecriteriaofjudgementshouldbeestablishedbyascertainingwhichfeaturesofworksofartweremosthighlypleasingtoqualifiedandimpartialconnoisseurs.\nAESTHETICSEdmundBurke(1729–97)introducedintoaesthetics,alongsidetheconceptofbeauty,thatofsublimity.Thesublime,aswellasthebeautiful,canbetheaimofart:afeelingofbeautyisaformoflovewithoutdesire,andtofeelsomethingassublimeistofeelastonishmentwithoutfear.InAPhilosophicalInquiryintotheOriginofourIdeasoftheSublimeandtheBeautifulBurkesoughttoexplainbywhatqualitiesobjectsinspirethesefeelingsinus.Hetracedthefeelingforthesublimetothefearsandhorrorsimplicitintheoriginalinstinctforself-preservation.Thefeelingforbeauty,whosepara-digmisachasteappreciationoffemaleperfection,derives,hemaintained,fromtheneedforsocialcontactandultimatelyfromtheinstincttopropagatetherace.ThetreatisethatdominatedaestheticsinthenineteenthcenturywasKant’sCritiqueofJudgement(1790).Inhis‘AnalyticoftheBeautiful’and‘AnalyticoftheSublime’KantsoughttodoforaestheticswhathisearlierCritiqueshaddoneforepistemologyandethics.Humanbeingspossess,inadditiontotheoreticalunderstandingandpracticalreason,athirdfaculty,thecapacityforjudgement(Urteilskraft),thejudgementoftaste,whichisthebasisofaestheticexperience.AgreeingwithBurke,anddisagreeingwithBaumgarten,Kantseesdisin-terestednessasfundamentaltotheaestheticresponse.‘Taste’,hesays,‘isthefacultyofjudgingofanobjectoramethodofrepresentingitbyanentirelydisinterestedsatisfactionordissatisfaction.Theobjectofsuchsatisfactioniscalledbeautiful’(M45).Kantmakesadistinctionbetweentwokindsofsatisfaction:hecallssensualdelight‘gratification’andreservesthenotionof‘pleasingness’forthedisinterestedenjoymentofbeauty.Hewrites,‘Whatgratifiesapersoniscalledpleasurable;whatmerelypleaseshimiscalledbeautiful;whathevaluesiscalledgood.’Animalsenjoypleasure,butonlyhumansappreciatebeauty.Onlythetasteforbeautyiscompletelydisinterested,becausethepracticalreasonthatdeterminesgoodnesshasreferencetoourownwell-being.Topointthedifference,Kantremarksthatwhilewecandistinguishbetweenwhatisgoodinitselfandwhatisgoodonlyasameans,wedonotmakeanyparalleldistinctionbetweenwhatisbeautifulasameansandwhatisbeautifulasanend(M42).Ajudgementoftaste,Kanttellsus,doesnotbringanexperienceunderaconcept,inthewaythatanordinaryjudgementdoes;itrelatestheexperiencedirectlytothedisinterestedpleasure.Unlikeanexpressionof251\nAESTHETICSsensualpleasure,itclaimsuniversalvalidity.IfIlikethetasteofMadeira,Idon’tgoontoclaimthateveryoneelseshouldlikeittoo;butifIthinkapoem,abuilding,orasymphonybeautiful,Iimputetoothersanobligationtoagreewithme.Judgementsoftastearesingularinform(‘Thisroseisbeautiful’)butuniversalinimport;theyare,asKantputsit,expressionsof‘auniversalvoice’.Yet,becauseajudgementoftastedoesnotbringitsobjectunderaconcept,noreasoncanbegivenforitandnoargumentcanconstrainagreementtoit.Judgementsofvaluearerelatedtopurpose.IfIwanttoknowwhetheranXisagoodX,IneedtoknowwhatXsarefor—thatishowItellwhatmakesagoodknife,oragoodplumber,andsoon.Judgementsofperfectionaresimilar:IcannotknowwhatisaperfectXwithoutknowingwhatisthefunctionofanX.Judgementsofbeauty,however,cannotbequitelikethis,sincetheydonotbringtheirobjectsunderanyconceptX.However,Kantmaintainsthatbeautifulobjectsexhibit‘purposivenesswithoutpurpose’.Bythishemeansperhapsthatwhilebeautyhasnopoint,yetitinvitesustolingeroveritscontemplation.ThisobscurethesisbecomesclearerwhenKantmakesadistinctionbetweentypesofbeauty.Therearetwokindsofbeauty:freebeauty(pulchritudovaga)andderivativebeauty(pulchritudoadhaerens).Thefirstpre-supposesnoconceptofwhattheobjectoughttobe;theseconddoespresupposesuchaconcept,andtheperfectionoftheobjectinaccordancetherewith.Thefirstiscalledtheself-subsistentbeautyofthisorthatthing;thesecond,asdependentuponaconcept(conditionedbeauty),isascribedtoobjectswithaparticularpurpose.Ajudgementofbeautywithoutreferencetoanypurposethatanobjectistoserveisapurejudgementoftaste.AflowerisKant’sregularparadigmofafreenaturalbeauty.Asfortheotherkindofbeauty:‘Humanbeauty(i.e.ofaman,awoman,orachild),thebeautyofahorse,orabuilding(beitchurch,palace,arsenalorsummerhouse),presupposesaconceptofthepurposewhichdetermineswhatthethingistobe,andconsequentlyaconceptofitsperfection;itisthereforederivativebeauty’(M66).ItisclearfromthispassagethatKant’saestheticismuchmoreathomewithnaturalbeautythanwiththebeautyofartefacts.Buttheproblemheismainlyconcernedwitharisesinbothcontexts.Howcanajudgementofbeauty,ajudgementthatisnotbasedonreason,claimuniversalvalidity?WhenImakesuchajudgement,Idonotclaimthateveryonewillagreewithme,butIdo252\nAESTHETICSclaimthateveryoneoughttodoso.Thisisonlypossibleifweareallinpossessionofacommonsensibility(Gemeinsinn)—asensibilitywhich,sinceitisnormative,cannotderivefromexperiencebutmustbetranscendental.Kantbeginshis‘AnalyticoftheSublime’withadistinctionbetweentwokindsofsublimity,whichhecalls(notveryhappily)themathematicalandthedynamical.Ineachcasethesublimeobjectisvast,great,overwhelming;butinthemathematicalcasewhatisoverwhelmedisourperceptionandinthedynamicalcasewhatisoverwhelmedisourpower.Whateverismathematicallysublimeistoogreattobetakeninbyanyofoursenses;itawakensinusthefeelingofafacultyabovesensewhichreachesouttowardsinfinity.Whateverisdynamicallysublimeissomethingtowhichanyresistanceonourpartwouldbevain,butwhichyetallowsustoremainwithoutfearinastateofsecurity.Bold,overhanging,andasitwerethreateningrocks;cloudspiledupinthesky,movingwithlightningflashesandthunderpeals;volcanoesinalltheirviolenceofdestruction;hurricaneswiththeirtrackofdevastation;theboundlessoceaninastateoftumult;theloftywaterfallofamightyriver,andsuchlike—theseexhibitourfacultyofresistanceasinsignificantlysmallincomparisonwiththeirmight.Butthesightofthemisthemoreattractive,themorefearfulitis,providedonlythatweareinsecurity;andwewillinglycalltheseobjectssublime,becausetheyraisetheenergiesofthesoulabovetheiraccustomedheightanddiscoverinusafacultyofresistanceofaquitedifferentkind,whichgivesuscouragetomeasureourselvesagainsttheapparentalmightinessofnature.(M100–1)Naturecanbebothbeautifulandsublime,butartcanonlybebeautiful.What,then,istherelationbetweenbeautyinnatureandbeautyinart?Kant’sanswerissubtle.Ontheonehand,natureisbeautifulbecauseitlookslikeart.Ontheotherhand,ifwearetoadmireabeautifulworkofart,wemustbeconsciousthatitisartificialandnotnatural.Yet,Kanttellsus,‘thepurposivenessinitsformmustseemtobeasfreefromallconstraintofarbitraryrulesasifitwereaproductofmerenature’(M149).Forthejudgementofbeautifularttasteisneeded;foritsproductionwhatisneededisgenius.Theproductionofbeautyisthepurposeofart,butartificialbeautyisnotabeautifulthing,butabeautifulrepresentationofathing.Beautifulartcanindeedpresentasbeautifulthingsthatinnatureareuglyorrepellent.Therearethreekindsofbeautifularts,eachwiththeirbeau-tifulproducts.Therearetheartsofspeech,namelyrhetoricandpoetry.253\nAESTHETICSTherearewhatKantcallstheformativearts,namelypaintingandtheplasticartsofsculptureandarchitecture.Thereisathirdclassofartwhichcreatesaplayofsensations:themostimportantoftheseismusic.‘Ofallthearts’,saysKant,‘poetry(whichowesitsoriginalmostentirelytogeniusandwillleastbeguidedbypreceptorexample)maintainsthefirstrank’(M170).ItisinterestingtocompareKant’sideasonaestheticswiththoseexpressedafewyearslaterbytheEnglishRomanticpoets.IntreatingofworksofartKantasitwerestartsfromtheconsumerandworksbacktotheproducer;hebeginsbyanalysingthenatureofthecritic’sjudgementandendsbydeducingthequalitiesthatarenecessaryforgenius(namely,imagination,understanding,spirit,andtaste).TheRomantics,ontheotherhand,startwiththeproducer:forthem,artisabovealltheexpres-sionoftheartist’sownemotions.Wordsworth,inhisPrefacetoLyricalBallads,tellsusthatwhatdistinguishesthepoetfromothermenisthathehasagreaterpromptnessofthoughtandfeelingwithoutimmediateexternalexcitement,andagreaterpowerofexpressingsuchthoughtsandfeelings:Poetryisthespontaneousoverflowofpowerfulfeelings:ittakesitsoriginfromemotionrecollectedintranquillity:theemotioniscontemplatedtill,byaspeciesofreaction,thetranquillitygraduallydisappears,andanemotion,kindredtothatwhichwasbeforethesubjectofcontemplation,isgraduallyproducedanddoesitselfactuallyexistinthemind.Ingivingexpressiontothisemotioninverse,thepoet’sfundamentalobligationistogiveimmediatepleasuretothereader.Coleridgeagreedwiththis.‘Apoem’,hewrote,‘isthatspeciesofcomposition,whichisopposedtoworksofscience,byproposingforitsimmediateobjectpleasure,nottruth.’ButindescribingthenatureofpoeticgeniusColeridgeimprovedonbothKantandWordsworth,byidentifyingaspecialnecessarygift.WhereasKantandearlierauthorshadregardedtheimaginationasafacultycommontoallhumanbeings—thecapacitytorecallandreshuffletheexperiencesofeverydaylife—Coleridgepreferredtocallthisbanal,ifimportant,capacity‘thefancy’.Theimagination,trulysocalled,wasthespecialcreativegiftoftheartist:initsprimaryformitwasnothinglessthan‘thelivingPowerandprimeAgentofallhumanPerception,andasarepresentationinthefinitemindoftheeternalact254\nAESTHETICSofcreationintheinfiniteIAM’.SoColeridgewrotein1817inthethirteenthchapterofhisBiographiaLiteraria;andfromthatdaytothiscriticsandphilosophershavedebatedtheexactnatureofthisloftyfaculty.TheAestheticsofSchopenhauerNophilosopherhasgivenaestheticsamoreimportantroleinhistotalsystemthanSchopenhauer.ThethirdbookofTheWorldasWillandIdeaislargelydevotedtothenatureofart.Aestheticpleasure,Schopenhauertellsus,followinginKant’sfootsteps,consistsinthedisinterestedcontempla-tionofnatureorofartefacts.Whenweviewaworkofart—anudesculpture,say—itmayarousedesireinus:sexualdesireperhaps,ordesiretoacquirethestatue.Ifso,wearestillundertheinfluenceofwill,andwearenotinastateofcontemplation.Itisonlywhenweviewsomethingandadmireitsbeautywithoutthoughtofourowndesiresandneedsthatwearetreatingitasaworkofartandenjoyinganaestheticexperience.Disinterestedcontemplation,whichliberatesusfromthetyrannyofthewill,maytakeoneoftwoforms,whichSchopenhauerillustratesbydescribingtwodifferentnaturallandscapes.IfthesceneIamcontemplat-ingabsorbsmyattentionwithouteffort,thenitismysenseofbeautythatisaroused.Butifthesceneisathreateningone,andIhavetostruggletoescapefromfearandachieveastateofcontemplation,thenwhatIamencounteringissomethingthatissublimeratherthanbeautiful.Schopen-hauer,likeKant,callsupvariousscenestoillustratethesenseofthesublime:foamingtorrentspouringbetweenoverhangingrocksbeneathaskyofthunderclouds;astormatseawiththewavesdashingagainstcliffsandsendingsprayintotheairamidlightningflashes.Insuchcases,hesays:Intheundismayedbeholder,thetwo-foldnatureofhisconsciousnessreachesthehighestdegreeofdistinctness.Heperceiveshimself,ontheonehand,asanindividual,asthefrailphenomenonofwill,whichtheslightesttouchoftheseforcescanutterlydestroy,helplessagainstpowerfulnature,dependent,thevictimofchance,avanishingnothinginthepresenceofstupendousmight;and,ontheotherhand,astheeternal,serene,knowingsubject,whoastheconditionofeveryobjectisthesustainerofthiswholeworld,thefearfulstrifeofnaturebeingonlyhisownidea,andhehimselffreeandapartfromalldesireandnecessityinthecontemplationoftheIdeas.Thisisthefullimpressionofthesublime.(WWI205)255\nAESTHETICSTheimpressionproducedinthiswaymaybecalled‘thedynamicalsub-lime’.Butthesameimpressionmaybeproducedbycalmmeditationontheimmensityofspaceandtimewhilecontemplatingthestarryskyatnight.Thisimpressionofsublimity(whichSchopenhauer,borrowingKant’sunhelpfulterm,calls‘themathematicalsublime’)canbeproducedalsobyvoluminousclosedspacessuchasthedomeofStPeter’sinRomeandbymonumentsofgreatagesuchasthepyramids.Ineachcasethesensearisesfromthecontrastbetweenourownsmallnessandinsignifi-canceasindividualsandavastnessthatisthecreationofourselvesaspureknowingsubjects.Thesublimeis,asitwere,theupperboundofthebeautiful.ItslowerboundiswhatSchopenhauercalls‘thecharming’.Whereaswhatissublimemakesanobjectofcontemplationoutofwhatishostiletothewill,thecharmingturnsanobjectofcontemplationintosomethingthatattractsthewill.Schopenhauergivesasinstancessculpturesof‘nakedfigures,whoseposition,drapery,andgeneraltreatmentarecalculatedtoexcitethepassionsofthebeholder’and,lessconvincingly,Dutchstilllifesof‘oysters,herrings,crabs,breadandbutter,beer,wine,andsoforth’.Suchartefactsnullifytheaestheticpurposes,andarealtogethertobecon-demned(WWI208).Therearetwoelementsineveryencounterwithbeauty:awill-lessknowingsubject,andanobjectwhichistheIdeaknown.Incontemplationofnaturalbeautyandofarchitecture,thepleasureisprincipallyinthepurityandpainlessnessoftheknowing,becausetheIdeasencounteredarelow-grademanifestationsofwill.Butwhenwecontemplatehumanbeings(throughthemediumoftragedy,forexample)thepleasureisratherintheIdeascontemplated,whicharevaried,rich,andsignificant.Onthebasisofthisdistinction,Schopenhauerproceedstogradethefinearts.Lowestinthescalecomesarchitecture,whichbringsoutlow-gradeIdeassuchasgravity,rigidity,andlight:Thebeautyofabuildingliesintheobviousadaptationofeverypart...tothestabilityofthewhole,towhichtheposition,sizeandformofeveryparthavesonecessaryarelationthatifitwerepossibletoremovesomepart,thewholewouldinevitablycollapse.Foronlybyeachpartbearingasmuchasitconvenientlycan,andeachbeingsupportedexactlywhereitoughttobeandtoexactlythenecessaryextent,doesthisplayofopposition,thisconflictbetweenrigidityandgravity,that256\nAESTHETICSconstitutesthelifeofthestoneandthemanifestationofitswill,unfolditselfinthemostcompletevisibility.(WWI215)Ofcourse,architectureservesapracticalaswellasanaestheticpurpose,butthegreatnessofanarchitectshowsitselfinthewayheachievespureaestheticendsinspiteofhavingtosubordinatethemtotheneedsofhisclient.Therepresentationalarts,inSchopenhauer’sview,areconcernedwiththeuniversalratherthantheparticular.Paintingsorsculpturesofanimals,heisconvinced,areobviouslyconcernedwiththespecies,nottheindivid-ual:‘themosttypicallion,wolf,horse,sheep,orox,isalwaysthemostbeautifulalso’.Butwithrepresentationsofhumanbeings,thematterismorecomplicated.Itisquitewrongtothinkthatartachievesbeautybyimitatingnature.Howcouldanartistrecognizetheperfectsampletoimitateifhedidnothaveanaprioripatternofbeautyinhismind?Andhasnatureeverproducedahumanbeingperfectlybeautifulineveryrespect?Whattheartistunderstandsissomethingthatnatureonlystam-mersinhalf-utteredspeech.Thesculptor‘expressesinthehardmarblethatbeautyofformwhichinathousandattemptsnaturefailedtoproduce,andpresentsittoherasiftellingher‘‘Thisiswhatyouwantedtosay’’’(WWI222).Thegeneralideaofhumanityhastoberepresentedbythesculptororpainterinthecharacterofanindividual,anditcanbepresentedinindividualsofvariouskinds.Inagenrepicture,itdoesnotmatter‘whetherministersdiscussthefateofcountriesandnationsoveramap,orboorswrangleinabeer-houseovercardsanddice’.Nordoesitmatterwhetherthecharactersrepresentedinaworkofartarehistoricalratherthanfictional:thelinkwithahistoricalpersonagegivesapaintingitsnominalsignificance,notitsrealsignificance.Forexample,MosesfoundbytheEgyptianprincessisthenominalsignificanceofapainting;itrepresentsamomentofthegreatestimportanceinhistory;therealsignificance,ontheotherhand,thatwhichisreallygiventotheonlooker,isafoundlingchildrescuedfromitsfloatingcradlebyagreatlady,anincidentwhichmayhavehappenedmorethanonce.(WWI231)Becauseofthis,thepaintingsofRenaissancepaintersthatSchopenhauermostadmiredwerenotthosethatrepresentedaparticularevent(suchasthenativityortheCrucifixion)butrathersimplegroupsofsaintsalongside257\nAESTHETICStheSaviour,engagedinnoaction.Inthefacesandeyesofsuchfiguresweseetheexpressionofthatsuppressionofwillwhichisthesummitofallart.Schopenhauer’stheoryofartcombineselementsfromPlatoandelem-entsfromAristotle.Thepurposeofart,hebelievedwastorepresentnotaparticularindividual,noranabstractconcept,butaPlatonicIdea.ButwhereasPlatocondemnedartworksasbeingattworemovesfromtheIdeas,copiesofmaterialthingsthatthemselveswereonlyimitationsofIdeas,Schopenhauerthinksthattheartistcomesclosertotheidealthanthetechnicianorthehistorian.Thisisparticularlythecasewithpoetryanddrama,thehighestofthearts.Historyisrelatedtopoetryasportraitpaintingistohistoricalpainting:theonegivesustruthintheindividual,andtheothertruthintheuniversal.LikeAristotle,Schopenhauercon-cludesthatfarmoreinnertruthistobeattributedtopoetrythantohistory.Andamonghistoricalnarratives,hedecidesrathereccentrically,thegreatestvalueistobeattributedtoautobiographies.KierkegaardonMusicInKierkegaard’sworks,theword‘aesthetic’anditscognatesoccurfreq-uently.However,forhim‘aesthetic’isanethicalratherthananaestheticcategory.Theaestheticcharacterissomeonewhodevoteshislifetothepursuitofimmediatepleasure;andthepleasureshepursuesmaybenatural(suchasfood,drink,andsex)nolessthanartistic(suchaspainting,music,anddance).Kierkegaard’smaininterestindiscussingtheaestheticattitudetolife(notablyinEither/Or)istostressitssuperficialandfunda-mentallyunsatisfactorynature,andtopresstheclaimsofaprofounderethical,andeventuallyreligious,commitment.Butinthecourseofadetailedpresentationoftheaestheticlifehehasoccasiontodiscussissuesthatareaestheticinthenarrowersenseofbeingconcernedwiththenatureofart.Forinstance,thefirstpartofEither/Orcontainsalongsectionthatissubtitled‘TheMusicalErotic’.Theessay,whichpurportstobewrittenbyanardentexponentofaesthetichedonism,islargelyameditationonMozart’soperaDonGiovanni.DonJuanisthesupremepersonificationoferoticdesire,andMozart’soperaisitsuniquelyperfectexpression.Music,wearetold,isofalltheartstheonemostcapableofexpressingsheersensuality.Theratherunexpected258\nAESTHETICSreasonwearegivenforthisisthatmusicisthemostabstractofthearts.Likelanguage,itaddressestheear;likethespokenword,itunfoldsintime,notinspace.Butwhilelanguageisthevehicleofspirit,musicisthevehicleofsensuality.Kierkegaard’sessayistgoesontomakeasurprisingclaim.Thoughreligiouspuritansaresuspiciousofmusic,asthevoiceofsensuality,andprefertolistentothewordofthespirit,thedevelopmentofmusicandthediscoveryofsensualityarebothinfactduetoChristianity.Sensuallovewas,ofcourse,anelementinthelifeoftheGreeks,whetherhumansorgods;butittookChristianitytoseparateoutsensualitybycontrastingitwithspirituality.IfIimaginethesensualeroticasaprinciple,asapower,asarealmcharacterizedbyspirit,thatistosaycharacterizedbybeingexcludedbyspirit,ifIimagineitconcentratedinasingleindividual,thenIhavetheconceptofthespiritofthesensualerotic.ThisisanideawhichtheGreeksdidnothave,whichChristianityfirstintroducedtotheworld,ifonlyinanindirectsense.Ifthisspiritofthesensualeroticinallitsimmediacydemandsexpression,thequestionis:whatmediumlendsitselftothat?Whatmustbeespeciallyborneinmindhereisthatitdemandsexpressionandrepresentationinitsimmediacy.Initsmediatestateanditsreflectioninsomethingelseitcomesunderlanguageandbecomessubjecttoethicalcategories.Initsimmediacyitcanonlybeexpressedinmusic.(E/O75)KierkegaardillustratesthevariousformsandstagesoferoticpursuitbytakingcharactersfromdifferentMozartoperas.Thefirstawakeningofsensualitytakesamelancholy,diffuseform,withnospecificobject:thisisthedreamystageexpressedbyCherubinoinTheMarriageofFigaro.Thesecondstageisexpressedinthemerry,vigorous,sparklingchirpingofPapagenoinTheMagicFlute:loveseekingoutaspecificobject.ButthesestagesarenomorethanpresentimentsofDonGiovanni,whoistheveryincarnationofthesensualerotic.Balladsandlegendsrepresenthimasanindividual.‘Whenheisinterpretedinmusic,ontheotherhand,Idonothaveaparticularindividual,Ihavethepowerofnature,thedemonic,whichaslittletiresofseducing,orisdonewithseducing,asthewindistiredofraging,theseaofsurging,orawaterfallofcascadingdownfromitsheight’(E/O90).BecauseDonGiovanniseducesnotbystratagem,butbysheerenergyofdesire,hedoesnotcomewithinanyethicalcategory;thatiswhyhisforcecanbeexpressedinmusicalone.Thesecretofthewholeoperaisthatitsheroistheforceanimatingtheothercharacters:heisthesun,theother259\nAESTHETICSApaybillforthePraguepremiereofDonGiovanni,whichKierkegaardarguedwasthemostperfectpossibleopera.charactersmereplanets,whoarehalfindarkness,withonlythatsidewhichisturnedtowardshimilluminated.OnlytheCommendatoreisindependent;butheisoutsidethesubstanceoftheoperaasitsantecedentandconsequent,andbothbeforeandafterhisdeathheisthevoiceofspirit.Becausemusicisuniquelysuitabletoexpresstheimmediacyofsensualdesire,inDonGiovanniwehaveaperfectmatchofsubjectmatterandcreativeform.Bothmatterandformareessentialtoaworkofart,Kierkegaardsays,eventhoughphilosophersoveremphasizenowoneandnowtheother.ItisbecauseofthisthatDonGiovanni,evenifitstoodalone,wasenoughtomakeMozartaclassiccomposerandabsolutelyimmortal.NietzscheonTragedyFortheyoungNietzscheitisnotMozartbutWagnerwhoseoperasaresupreme.ThisisbecauseofashareddebttoSchopenhauer.In1854WagnerwrotetoFranzLisztthatSchopenhauerhadcomeintohislifelikeagiftfromheaven.‘Hischiefidea,thefinalnegationofthedesireforlife,isterriblygloomy,butitshowstheonlysalvationpossible.’1InhisTheBirthof1A.Goldman,WagneronMusicandDrama(NewYork:Dutton,1966).260\nAESTHETICSTragedy(1872)NietzschelikewisebaseshisaesthetictheoryonSchopen-hauer’spessimisticviewoflife,takingashistexttheGreekmythofKingMidas’questforthesatyrSilenus.WhenSilenuswasfinallyinhispower,thekingaskedhimwhatwasthebestandmostdesirablethingformankind.Thedaemonstoodinsilence,stiffandmotion-less,butwhenthekinginsistedhebrokeoutintoashrilllaughandsaid‘Wretched,ephemeralrace,childrenofmiseryandchance,whydoyouforcemetosaywhatitwouldbemoreexpedientforyounottohear?Thebestofallthingsisquitebeyondyourreach:itisnottohavebeenborn,nottobeatall,tobenothing.Thenextbestthingistodieassoonasmaybe.’(BT22)Schopenhauerhadheldoutartasthemostaccessibleescapefromthetyrannyoflife.Nietzsche,too,seestheoriginofartinhumans’needtomasklife’smiseryfromthemselves.TheancientGreeks,hetellsus,inordertobeabletoliveatall‘hadtointerposetheradiantdream-birthoftheOlympiangodsbetweenthemselvesandthehorrorsofexistence’(BT22).Therearetwokindsofescapefromreality:dreamingandintoxication.InGreekmythology,accordingtoNietzsche,thesetwoformsofillusionareper-sonifiedintwodifferentgods:Apollo,thegodoflight,andDionysus,thegodofwine.‘ThedevelopmentandprogressofArtoriginatesfromthedualityoftheApollineandtheDionysiac,justasreproductiondependsonthedualityofthesexes’.(BT14).TheprototypeoftheApollineartistisHomer,thefounderofepicpoetry;heisthecreatoroftheresplendentdream-worldoftheOlympicdeities.Apolloisanethicaldeity,imposingmeasureandorderonhisfollowersintheinterestsofbeauty.ButtheApollinemagnificenceissoonengulfedinaDionysiacflood,thestreamoflifethatbreaksdownbarriersandconstraints.ThefollowersofDionysussinganddanceinrapturousecstasy,enjoyinglifetoexcess.MusicisthesupremeexpressionoftheDionysiacspirit,asepicisoftheApolline.ThegloryofGreekcultureisAtheniantragedy,andthisistheoffspringofbothApolloandDionysus,combiningmusicwithpoetry.ThechorusesinGreektragedyrepresenttheworldofDionysus,whilethedialogueplaysitselfoutinalucidApollineworldofimages.TheGreekspiritfounditssupremeexpressionintheplaysofAeschylus(especiallyPrometheusVinctus)andSophocles(especiallyOedipusRex).Butwiththeplaysofthethird261\nAESTHETICSfamoustragedian,Euripides,tragedydiesbyitsownhand,poisonedbyaninjectionofrationality.TheblameforthismustbelaidatthedoorofSocrates,whoinauguratedanewerathatvaluedscienceaboveart.Socrates,accordingtoNietzsche,wastheantithesisofallthatmadeGreecegreat.Hisinstinctswereentirelynegativeandcritical,ratherthanpositiveandcreative.InrejectingtheDionysiacelementhedestroyedthetragedians’synthesis.‘WeneedonlyconsidertheSocraticmaxims‘‘Virtueisknowledge,allsinsarisefromignorance,thevirtuousmanisthehappyman’’.Inthesethreebasicoptimisticformulaeliesthedeathoftragedy’(BT69).Tragedy,inEuripides,tookthedeath-leapintobourgeoistheatre.ThedyingSocrates,freedbyinsightandreasonfromthefearofdeath,becamethemystagogueofscience.Wasitpossible,inmodernGermany,toremedythediseaseinheritedfromSocrates,andtorestoretheunionofApolloandDionysus?Nietzschehadnoappreciationofthenovel,whichinthenineteenthcenturymightbethoughtthegenremostfertileofthebeneficentillusionthatinhisviewwasthefunctionofart.Thenovel,hethought,wasessentiallyaSocraticartform,thatsubordinatedpoetrytophilosophy.Oddly,heblameditsinven-tiononPlato.‘ThePlatonicdialoguemightbedescribedasthelifeboatinwhichtheshipwreckedolderpoetryandallitschildrenescaped,crammedtogetherinanarrowspaceandfearfullyobeyingasinglepilot,Socrates...Platogaveposteritythemodelforanewartform—thenovel’(BT69).NorhadNietzscheanyhighopinionofItalianopera,inspiteofthecombinationofpoetryandmusicitinvolved.Hecomplainedthatitwasruinedbytheseparationbetweenrecitativeandaria,whichprivilegedtheverbaloverthemusical.OnlyinGermanywastherehopeofarebirthoftragedy:FromtheDionysiacsoiloftheGermanspiritapowerhasrisenthathasnothingincommonwiththeoriginalconditionsofSocraticculture:thatculturecanneitherexplainnorexcuseit,butinsteadfindsitterrifyingandinexplicable,powerfulandhostile—GermanMusic,asweknowitpre-eminentlyinitsmightysun-cyclefromBachtoBeethoven,fromBeethoventoWagner.(BT94)TheBirthofTragedypetersoutintoasetofrapturousandincoherentprogrammenotestothethirdactofTristanundIsolde.Noonehascon-demnedtheirweaknesseswithmoreforcethanNietzschehimself,whoafterhehademergedfromthespellofWagnerprefacedlatereditionsofthebookwithan‘AttemptatSelf-Criticism’.Thereherecantshisattempt262\nAESTHETICStolinkthegeniusofGreecewithafictional‘GermanSpirit’.Buthedidnotdisownwhathecametoseeasthefundamentalthemeofthebook,namely,thatartandnotmoralityistheproperlymetaphysicalactivityofman,andthattheexistenceoftheworldfindsjustificationonlyasanaestheticphenomenon.ArtandMoralityForNietzsche,artisnotonlyautonomousbutissupremeovermorality.AttheoppositepolefromNietzschestandtwonineteenth-centuryaestheti-cianswhosawartandmoralityasinextricablyintertwined.OnewasJohnRuskin(1819–1900),andtheotherLeoTolstoy(1828–1910).Ruskinregardedartasaveryseriousmatter.InhismassiveworkModernPainters(1843)hewrote:Art,properlysocalled,isnorecreation;itcannotbelearnedatsparemoments,norpursuedwhenwehavenothingbettertodo.Itisnohandiworkfordrawing-roomtables,noreliefoftheennuiofboudoirs;itmustbeunderstoodandundertakenseriously,ornotatall.Toadvanceitmen’slivesmustbegiven,andtoreceiveittheirhearts.2Butthedemandsmadebyartcouldbejustifiedonlybytheseriousnessofitsmoralpurpose:namely,torevealfundamentalfeaturesoftheuniverse.Beautyissomethingobjective,notamereproductofcustom.Theexperi-enceofbeautyarisesfromatruthfulperceptionofnature,andleadsontoanapprehensionofthedivine.Onlyifanartistishimselfamorallygoodpersonwillhebeabletodeliverthisrevelationinanincorruptform,andsetbeforeusthegloryofGod.Butinadecayingsociety—asRuskinbelievednineteenth-centuryindustrialsocietytobe—bothmoralandartisticpurityarealmostimpossibletoachieve.Boththeimaginativefacultythatcreates,andthe‘theoretic’facultythatappreciates,areradicallycorrupt.Workisdegradedbythemoderndivisionoflabour,andtheworkmandeprivedofhisduestatusasacraftsmanseekingperfection.Ruskinappliedhismoralizingtheoryofarttotwoartsinparticular:paintingandarchitecture.Painting,forhim,isessentiallyaformoflanguage:technicalskillisnomorethanmasteryofthelanguage,and2JohnRuskin,SelectedWritings(London:Dent,1995).263\nAESTHETICStheworthofapaintingdependsonthevalueofthethoughtsthatitexpresses.Ruskinsoughttobearoutthiscontentionbyacloseexamin-ationoftheworksofJ.M.W.Turner.InTheSevenLampsofArchitectureRuskinsetoutthecriteriabywhichhejudgedGothicarchitecturesuperiortothearchitectureoftheRenaissanceandthebaroque.The‘lamps’arepredom-inantlymoralcategories:sacrifice,truth,power,obedience,andthelike.Forarchitecture,inhisdefinition,istheartthatdisposesandadornsedificessothatthesightofthemmaycontributetoman’smentalhealth,power,andpleasure.Andtheessentialelementinmentalhealthwasajustappreciationofman’splaceinadivinelyordereduniverse.ForTolstoy,artcanbegoodonlyifithasamoralpurpose.InWhatisArt?hedescribedtheprice,intermsofmoneyandhardlabour,oftheartisticventuresofhisday,especiallyofopera.Suchart,hemaintained,couldariseonlyupontheslaveryofthemassesofthepeople;andheaskedwhetherthesocialcostsinvolvedcouldbemorallyjustified.Itwasanartthatappealedonlytothesentimentsoftheupperclasses,whichextendednofurtherthanpride,sex,andennui.Tolstoyrejectedtheclaimsofearlierwritersthattheaimofartisbeautyandthatbeautyisrecognizedbytheenjoymentitgives.Therealpurposeofartwascommunicationbetweenhumanbeings.WhilerejectingtheRomanticideathatartmustgivepleasure,heagreedwithWordsworththatitsessencewasthesharingofemotion:Totakethesimplestexample:onemanlaughs,andanotherwhohearsbecomesmerry,oramanweeps,andanotherwhohearsfeelssorrow.Amanisexcitedorirritated,andanothermanseeinghimisbroughttoasimilarstateofmind....amanexpresseshisfeelingsofadmiration,devotion,fear,respectorlove,tocertainobjects,persons,orphenomena,andothersareinfectedbythesamefeelingsofadmiration,devotion,fear,respectorlove,tothesameobjects,persons,orphenomena.(WA66)Artinthebroadsenseoftheworldpermeatesourlife,whichisfullofworksofartofeverykind,fromlullabies,jokes,mimicry,theornamenta-tionofdresses,houses,andutensils,tochurchservicesandtriumphalprocessions.Butthefeelingswithwhichtheseworksofartinfectusmaybegoodorbad.Artisonlygoodiftheemotionsitinjectsaregood;andthoseemotionscanbegoodonlyiftheyarefundamentallyreligiousandcon-tributetoasenseofuniversalhumanbrotherhood.264\nAESTHETICSTheemotionstobecommunicatedbyartmustbeemotionsthatcanbesharedbymankindingeneral,andnotjustbyapamperedelite.Wherethisisnotthecasewehaveeitherbadartorpseudoart.Tolstoyiswillingtoacceptthatthisjudgementcondemnsmanyofthemostadmiredworksofmusicandliterature—includinghisownnovels.Thegreatestnovelofthenineteenthcentury,hemaintained,wasUncleTom’sCabin,whichspreadthemessageofuniversalbrotherhoodacrosstheboundariesofraceandclass.AmongtheworksofartTolstoycondemnedwasBeethoven’sNinthSymphony.Doesthistransmitthehighestreligiousfeeling?No:nomusiccan.Doesituniteallmeninonecommonfeeling?No,Tolstoyreplied:‘Iamunabletoimaginetomyselfacrowdofnormalpeoplewhocouldunderstandanythingofthislong,confused,andartificialproduction,exceptshortsnatcheswhicharelostinaseaofincomprehensibility.’Itistruethatthework’slastmovementisapoemofSchillerwhichexpressestheverythoughtthatitisfeeling,inparticulargladness,thatunitespeopletogether.‘Butthoughthispoemissungattheendofthesymphonythemusicdoesnotaccordwiththethoughtexpressedintheverses;forthemusicisexclusiveanddoesnotuniteallmen,butunitesonlyafew,dividingthemofffromtherestofmankind’(WA249).ArtforArt’sSakeTolstoy’smoralisticviewofartquicklybecameunfashionableinthetwentiethcentury.Theautonomyofart,ifnotitsNietzscheansupremacy,waswidelyaccepted:aworkofartmightbegoodart,andevengreatart,whilebeingmorallyorpoliticallydeleterious.Theartisticmeritofaworkwasevenheldtoredeemitsethicaldubiety,andmanycountriesrepealedlawsthatforbadetheproductionandpublicationofworksofartthathadatendencyto‘depraveandcorrupt’.Oneofthemostinfluentialoftwentieth-centuryaestheticianswastheItalianphilosopherBenedettoCroce(1866–1952).Inmetaphysics,Crocewasanidealist,anddevelopedaHegeliansystemalongwithGiovanniGentile(1875–1944)untilthetwopartedcompanyin1925overtheissueofFascism.GentilebecameatheoreticianofFascism,whileCroce,whowasacabinetministerinbothpre-Fascistandpost-FascistItaliangovernments,wastheleadingintellectualopponentofMussoliniinthe1930s.265\nAESTHETICSForCroce,artoccupiesapositionbetweenhistoryandscience.Likehistoryitdealswithparticularcasesratherthangenerallaws,butitsparticularcasesareimagined,notreal,andtheyillustrate,assciencedoes,universaltruths.Crocehimselfdistinguishedbetweenfourphasesofhisaesthetictheory,fromthefirstvolumeofhisFilosofiadelloSpiritoin1902toLaPoesiaof1936.Butseveralthemesarecommontoeveryoneofthephasesofhisthought.Thecoreofart,forCroce,isintuition.Intuitionisnotthesameasfeeling,whateverpositivistsmightsay:feelingsneedexpression,andexpre-ssionisacognitive,notjustanemotional,matter.Artinhumanbeings,unlikeemotioninanimals,issomethingspiritual,notmerelysensual.Ontheotherhand,rationalistaestheticiansarewrongtoseeartassomethingintellectual:itoperatesthroughimages,notthroughconcepts.ThusCrocedistanceshimselffromRomanticsontheonehandandclassicistsontheother.Theartisticintuitionisessentiallylyrical.Croceexplainswhatthismeansprincipallybycontrasts.ArtisnotconcernedwiththeTrue(aslogicis)northeUseful(aseconomicsis)norwiththeGood(asmoralityis).Ithasitsownobject,theBeautiful,thatstandsindependentlyonequaltermswiththeotherthree.(ForCroce,thenotionoftheSublimewasonlyapseudo-concept.)Anartisticexpressionislyricalonlyifitisconcernedexclusivelywiththebeautiful.ThusapoemlikeLucretius’deRerumNatura,withitsheavyscientificandmoralmessages,isnotsomethinglyrical,butmerelyapieceofliterature.Truepoetrymusthavenoutilitarian,moral,orphilosophicalagenda.ViewssimilartoCroce’sweremadefamiliartotheEnglish-speakingworldbyR.G.Collingwood(1889–1943),whotranslatedCroce’sarticleonaestheticsforthe1928editionoftheEncyclopaediaBritannica.Collingwood,aclassicistandarchaeologistofdistinction,becameWaynefleteProfessorofMetaphysicsatOxfordin1936.Heisbestknownforhiscontributionstothephilosophyofhistory,onwhichhewasspeciallyqualifiedtowrite,buthisPrinciplesofArt(1938)wasasignificantcontributiontoaesthetictheory.Muchofthebookistakenupwithexplainingwhatartisnot.Artisnotmereamusement;evenifmuchofwhatgoesbythenameofartissimplyentertainment,trueartissomethingdifferent.Artisnotamagicalpro-cedurelikeawardance.Bymagic,Collingwoodexplains,hemeansaprocedureforarousingemotiontosomepreconceivedend,suchas266\nAESTHETICSpatrioticemotionorproletarianfervour.Mostimportantly,artmustbedistinguishedfromcraftortechnicalskill.Artisnotimitationorrepre-sentation(mimesis),forthattooisacraft.Ofcourse,agreatworkofartwillalsobeaworkofcraft,butwhatmakesitaworkofartisnotwhatmakesitaworkofcraft.Ifartwereacraft,wecoulddistinguishinitbetweenendandmeans.Butifarthasanend,itcanonlybethearousingofemotion;andthisisnotsomethingthatcanbeidentifiedseparatelyfromtheartisticactivity,asashoecanbeidentifiedseparatelyfromtheactofcobbling.Artshouldnotbeseenastheactivityofarousingemotion,butastheactivityofexpressingemotion.Thetrueworkofartisinfacttheemotionintheartisthimself.Successfulartistsconcludetheirsuccessintheirownimagination;theexternalizationoftheirimagesinapublicworkofartismerelyamatterofcraft.Theinnerwork,thetrueworkofart,consistsinraisingsomethingpreconscious,aninarticulatefeeling,intoanexplicitandarticulatestate.FollowingCroce,Collingwoodacceptedonthisbasisthatimaginationandexpressionwereoneandthesamething.Itisthroughlanguagethatthepreconsciousistransformedintothearticulate;andinthissenseallartisticexpression,inwhatevermedium,isessentiallylinguistic.Ifartistheexpressionofemotion,Collingwoodargues,thenthedistinctionbetweenartistandaudiencedisappears.Ifapoetexpresses,forexample,acertainkindoffear,theonlyhearerswhocanunderstandhimarethosewhoarecapableofexperiencingthatkindoffearthemselves.Hence,whensomeonereadsandunderstandsapoem,heisnotmerelyunderstandingthepoet’sexpressionofhis,thepoet’s,emotions,heisexpressingemotionsofhisowninthepoet’swords,whichhavethusbecomehisownwords.AsColeridgeputit,weknowamanforapoetbythefactthathemakesuspoets.(PA118)Poetandreadershareandexpressthesameemotion:thedifferenceisthatthepoetcansolveforhimselftheproblemofexpressingit,whereasthereaderneedsthepoettoshowhimhowitisdone.Bycreatingforourselves(aidedorunaided)animaginaryexperienceoractivity,weexpressouremotions;andthisiswhatwecallart.CroceandCollingwooddifferedfromTolstoybecausetheyregardedartassomethingdistinctfromandindependentofmorality.Butallthreewriters267\nAESTHETICSsharedaconceptionofartasexpressionofemotion.Mosttwentieth-centuryphilosophersrejectedtheTolstoyanviewofthefunctionofartasthecommunicationofemotion.Wittgenstein,forinstance,wrote:ThereismuchthatcouldbelearnedfromTolstoy’sfalsetheorizingthattheworkofartconveysa‘feeling’.Andindeedyoumightcallit,ifnottheexpressionofaparticularfeeling,anexpressionoffeeling,orafeltexpression.Andyoumightsaytoothatpeoplewhounderstandittothatextent‘resonate’withit,respondtoit.Youmightsay:Theworkofartdoesnotseektoconveysomethingelse,justitself.As,ifIpaysomeoneavisit,Idon’twishonlytoproducesuchandsuchfeelingsinhim,butfirstandforemosttopayhimavisit—thoughofcourseIalsowanttobewelcome.Therealabsurditystartswhenitissaidthattheartistwantsothers,inreading,tofeelwhathefeltwhilewriting.IcanindeedthinkthatIunderstandapoem,forexample,thatis,understanditinthewayitsauthorwouldwantittobeunderstood.Butwhathemayhavefeltwhilewritingitisn’tanyconcernofmineatall.(CV67)Theindependenceofaworkofartfromitscreatorbecameaprominenttheme,bothintheEnglish-speakingworldandincontinentalEurope.Americancriticsdenouncedas‘theintentionalfallacy’anyattempttoreachanunderstandingofatextonthebasisofelementsinitsauthor’sbiographyorpsychologyormotivation,ratherthaninpropertiestobediscernedinthetextinisolation.InFrance,philosopherswentsofarastospeakof‘thedeathoftheauthor’.Thetext,theyhaveargued,istheprimaryobject;thenotionofanauthorisratheraneconomicandlegalconstruct.Sofarasinterpretationgoes,thereceptionofatextbygener-ationsofreadersmaybeofgreatersignificancethananyiteminthebiographyofthepersonwhoinitiallypennedit.ThethesisofthedeathoftheauthorhasnotbeenwarmlywelcomedinBritishphilosophicalcircles.Buttheideathatintheinterpretationofaworkofarttheauthorhasnoprivilegedstatuswasanticipatedbyanineteenth-centuryEnglishman.TheVictorianpoetArthurHughCloughwroteacontroversial,somethoughtblasphemous,poemabouttheRes-urrection,EasterDay.Inalaterpoemheimagineshimselfquestionedaboutitsmeaning:wasitintendedtobeironicorsarcastic?Heresponds:InterpretitIcannot.Ibutwroteit.268\n11PoliticalPhilosophyUtilitarianismandLiberalismInintroducinghisgreatesthappinessprinciple,Benthamwaslessconcernedtoprovideacriterionforindividualmoralchoicesthantoofferguidancetorulersandlegislatorsonthemanagementofcommuni-ties.Butitispreciselyinthisarea,whenwehavetoconsidernotjustthetotalquantityofhappinessinacommunitybutalsoitsdistribution,thatthegreatesthappinessprinciple,onitsown,failstoprovideacredibledecisionprocedure.Supposethat,bywhatevermeans,wehavesucceededinestablishingascaleforthemeasurementofhappiness:ascalefrom0to10onwhich0representsmaximummisery,10representsmaximumhappiness,and5astateofindifference.Imaginethatwearedevisingpoliticalandlegalinstitutionsforasociety,andthatwehaveachoicebetweenimplementingtwomodels.TheresultofadoptingmodelAwillbethat60percentofthepopulationwillscore6,and40percentwillscore4.TheresultofadoptingmodelBwillbethat80percentofthepopulationwillscore10and20percentwillscore0.Facedwithsuchachoice,anyonewithacareforeitherequalityorhumanitywillsurelywishtoimplementmodelAratherthanmodelB.YetifweoperateBentham’sfelicificcalculusintheobviousmanner,modelAscoresonly520points,whilemodelBachievesatotalof800.Theprinciplethatweshouldseekthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumberclearlyleadstodifferentresultsdependingonwhetherweopttomaximizehappinessortomaximizethenumberofhappypeople.Theprincipleneeds,attheveryleast,tobesupplementedbysomelimitsonthe\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYamountofinequalitybetweenthebestoffandtheworstoff,andlimitsonthedegreeofmiseryoftheworstoff,ifitisnottopermitoutcomesthataregrossviolationsofdistributivejustice.Despitetheproblemswithhisgrandprinciple,problemsthatheleftforhissuccessorstostrugglewith,Benthamdidmakeverysubstantialcontri-butionstopoliticalphilosophy.Heisseenathisbestwhenheis,inthewordsofJ.S.Mill,‘organisingandregulatingthemerelybusinesspartofsocialarrangements’.Onsuchtopicshecanwriteacutelyandbriskly,makeshrewddistinctions,exposecommonfallacies,andpackaweightofargumentintobriefandlucidparagraphs.Histreatmentofstate-imposedpunishmentisanexcellentexampleofthewayinwhichheputsthesetalentstouse.What,heasks,isthepurposeofthepenalsystem?Theimmediateprincipalendofpunishmentistocontrolaction.Thisactioniseitherthatoftheoffender,orofothers:thatoftheoffenderitcontrolsbyitsinfluence,eitheronhiswill,inwhichcaseitissaidtooperateinthewayofreformation;oronhisphysicalpower,inwhichcaseitissaidtooperatebydisablement;thatofothersitcaninfluencenootherwisethanbyitsinfluenceovertheirwills;inwhichcaseitissaidtooperateinthewayofexample.(P13.1)Punishment,beingtheinflictionofpain,isassuchanevil,soitshouldonlybeadmittedinsofarasitpromisestoexcludesomegreaterevil.Benthamrejectedtheretributivetheoryofpunishment,accordingtowhichjusticedemandsthathewhohasdoneharmshallsufferharm.Unlesstheinflictionofpunishmenthassomedeterrentorremedialeffecteitherontheoffenderoronothers,retributionismerelyarenderingofevilforevil,andincreasestheamountofevilintheworldwithoutrestoringanybalanceofjustice.Itistruethatthepunishmentofanoffender,evenifithasnodeterrentorreformatoryeffect,maygiveafeelingofsatisfactiontoavictim,ortothelaw-abidingpublic.This,likeanyotherpleasure,mustbeplacedintheutilitarianscales.Butnopunishment,Benthamsays,shouldbeimposedmerelyforthisvindictivepurpose,becausenopleasureeverproducedbypunishmentcanbeequivalenttothepain.Sincetheprincipalpurposeofpunishmentwasdeterrence,punishmentshouldnotbeinflictedincaseswhereitwouldhavenodeterrenteffect,eitherontheoffenderoronothers,norshoulditbeinflictedtoanygreater270\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYextentthanisnecessarytodeter.Punishment,hesays,mustnotbeinflictedwhenitisinefficacious(cannotdeter)orunprofitable(willcausemoremischiefthanitprevents)orneedless(wherethemischiefcanbepreventedbyothermeans).InthefourteenthchapterBenthamdrewupasetofrulessettingouttheproportionbetweenpunishmentsandoffences,basednotontheretribu-tiveprincipleof‘aneyeforaneye,atoothforatooth’butontheeffectthattheprospectofpunishmentwillhaveonthereasoningofapotentialoffender.Benthamimaginedaprospectivecriminalcalculatingtheprofitandlossthatislikelytoaccruefromtheoffence,andregardeditasthefunctionofthepenallawtoensurethatthelosswilloutweightheprofit.Thelawmustthereforeimposepunishmentsthataresufficienttodeter,buttheyshouldequallybenomorethanisnecessarytodeter.Punishmentshould,inBentham’sterms,befrugal.Whiledeterrenceistheprincipalendofpunishment,Benthamadmitssubsidiarypurposes,suchasthereformationordisablementoftheoff-ender.Reform,intheconditionofmostactualprisons,wasandisunlikelytobeachieved;butBenthamhassomeproposalsforparticularreformatoryregimes.Imprisonmentdoeshavetheeffectofthetemporarydisablementoftheoffender,butobviouslydisablementismostefficaciouslyachievedbythedeathpenalty.‘Atthesametime’,Benthamobserves,‘thispunishment,itisevident,isinaneminentdegreeunfrugal;whichformsoneamongthemanyobjectsthereareagainsttheuseofit,inanybutveryextraordinarycases’(P15.19).JohnStuartMill’spoliticalphilosophy,likehismoralphilosophy,owedmuchtoBentham,butinthisareatoohefeltobligedtotemperthestrictutilitarianismofhismaster.Bentham’ssystem,withitsdenialofnaturalrights,wouldinprinciplejustify,incertaincircumstances,highlyauto-craticgovernmentandsubstantialintrusiononpersonalliberty.SotoowouldtheearlyformsofsocialismwithwhichMillhadflirtedinhisyouth,whichhadgivenbirthtothepositivistsystemofAugusteComte.InhismatureyearsMillattachedsupremeimportancetosettinglimitstotheconstraintsthatsocialsystems,howeverbenevolentinprinciple,couldplaceonindividualindependence.HedescribedtheSyste`medePolitiquePositiveasadevice‘bywhichtheyokeofgeneralopinion,wieldedbyanorganisedbodyofspiritualteachersandrulers,wouldbemadesupremeovereveryaction,andasfarasisinhumanpossibility,everythought,of271\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYBentham’s‘‘auto-icon’’:hisremainspreservedinawaxworkinUniversityCollege,London.everymemberofthecommunity’.HedenouncedComteforproposing‘thecompletestsystemofspiritualandtemporaldespotismwhicheveryetemanatedfromahumanbrain’.InOnLibertyhesoughttosetoutagenerallibertarianprinciplethatwouldprotecttheindividualfromillegitimateauthoritarianintrusionwhethermotivatedbyutilitarianism,socialism,orpositivism.Tosafeguardliberty,Millmaintains,itisnotsufficienttoreplaceautocraticmonarchybyresponsibledemocracy,becausewithinademo-craticsocietythemajoritymayexercisetyrannyovertheminority.Norisitsufficienttoplacelimitsupontheauthorityofgovernment,becausesocietycanexerciseotherandmoresubtlemeansofcoercion.272\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYThereneedsprotectionalsoagainstthetyrannyoftheprevailingopinionandfeeling;againstthetendencyofsocietytoimpose,byothermeansthancivilpenalties,itsownideasandpracticesasrulesofconductonthosewhodissentfromthem;tofetterthedevelopment,andifpossible,preventtheformation,ofanyindividualitynotinharmonywithitsways.(L130)Inordertoplaceajustlimitoncoercionbyphysicalforceorpublicopinionwemustaffirm,asafundamentalprinciple,thattheonlypartoftheconductofanyoneforwhichheisaccountabletosocietyisthatwhichconcernsothers.Inthepartwhichmerelyconcernshimself,hisindepend-enceshouldbeabsolute.Themostimportantapplicationofthisprincipleconcernslibertyofthought,andthecognatelibertiesofspeakingandwriting.AccordingtoMill,noauthority,autocraticordemocratic,hastherighttosuppresstheexpressionofopinion.‘Ifallmankindminusonewereofoneopinion,andonlyonepersonwereofthecontraryopinion,mankindwouldbenomorejustifiedinsilencingthatonepersonthanhe,ifhehadthepower,wouldbejustifiedinsilencingmankind’(L130).Thisisbecausetosuppressanopinionistorobthewholehumanrace.Theopinionsilencedmay,forallweknow,turnouttobetrue,becausenoneofusisinfallible.Ifitisnotwhollytrue,itmaywellcontainaportionoftruththatwouldotherwisebeneglected.Evenanopinionthatiswhollyfalsehasavalueasofferingachallengetothecontraryopinionandthusensuringthatthetruthisnotheldasamereprejudiceorasaformalprofession.Freedomofopinion,Millconcludes,andfreedomoftheexpressionofopinion,isessentialforthementalwell-beingofmankind.Butfreedomofopinionisnotallthatisneeded.Menshouldbefreetoactupontheiropinions,andtocarrythemoutintheirlives,withouthindrance,eitherphysicalormoral,fromtheirfellows.Ofcoursethefreedomshouldnotextendtotherighttoharmothers—evenfreedomofspeechmustbecurtailedincircumstanceswheretheexpressionofopinionamountstoanincitementtomischief.Butamplescopeshouldbegiventovarietiesofcharacterandtoexperimentsinliving,providedtheseconcernonlytheindividual’sownaffairsortheaffairsofothers‘withtheirfree,voluntary,andundeceivedconsentandparticipation’.Theindividual’sruleofconductshouldbehisorherowncharacter,notthetraditionsorcustomsofotherpeople.Ifthisprincipleisdenied,‘thereis273\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYwantingoneoftheprincipalingredientsofhumanhappiness,andquitethechiefingredientofindividualandsocialprogress’(L185).Withoutindividuality,humanbeingsbecomemeremachines,conform-ingtoapatternimposedfromwithout.But‘humannatureisnotamachinetobebuiltafteramodel,andsettodoexactlytheworkprescribedforit,butatree,whichrequirestogrowanddevelopitselfonallsides’(L188).Ifeccentricityisproscribed,damageisdonenotonlytotheindividualconstrained,buttosocietyasawhole.Wemayallhavesome-thingtolearnfromunconventionalcharacters.‘Thereisalwaysneedofpersonsnotonlytodiscovernewtruths,andpointoutwhenwhatwereoncetruthsaretruenolonger,butalsotocommencenewpractices,andsettheexampleofmoreenlightenedconduct,andbettertasteandsenseinhumanlife’(L193).Energeticandunorthodoxcharactersareneededmorethaneverinanagewhenpublicopinionrulestheworld,andindividualsarelostinthecrowd.Geniusmustbeallowedtounfolditselfinpracticeaswellasinthought.WhatexactlydoesMillhaveinmindwhenhecommends‘experimentsinliving’?Sadly,heexpoundshisthesisbyaseriesofeloquentmetaphorsratherthanbyofferingexamplesofbeneficialeccentricity.Whenhecomestoofferpracticalapplicationsofhisprinciples,heconfineshimselftodenouncinglawsrestrictinghumdrumactivitiesofeverydaypeople,notstatutesconstrainingthedevelopmentofgenius.Asexamplesofbadlegislation,actualorhypothetical,heconsiderssuchthingsasprohibitionsontheeatingofporkandthedrinkingofspirituousliquors,orlawsagainsttravellingonthesabbathandrestrictionsondancingandtheatricalper-formances.NodoubtwhenMillwasencouragingnonconformityoneexampleatthebackofhismindwashisownunconventionalrelationshipwithHarrietTaylorduringthelongyearsbeforetheirmarriage.But,oddly,theoneexampleheactuallygivesofanexperimentinlivingisoneofwhichheheartilydisapproved:theMormonsanctionofpolygamy.Thisexperiment,headmitted,wasindirectconflictwithhislibertarianprinciples,being‘amererivetingofthechainsofonehalfofthecommunity,andemancipationoftheotherfromreciprocityofobligationtowardsthem’(L224).However,sincetheworldtaughtwomenthatmarriagewastheonethingneedful,hethoughtitunderstandablethatmanyawomanshouldpreferbeingoneofseveralwivestonotbeingawifeatall.Millwasnotcommendingpolygamy;merelyurging274\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYthatMormonsshouldnotbecoercedintoabandoningit.AnditmustbesaidthathehadalmostasmuchdistasteforcurrentEnglishmonogamyasfortheinstitutionsofSaltLakeCity.Atthetimeofhisownmarriagein1851hewroteoutaprotestagainstthelawsthatconferredupononepartytothecontractcompletecontroloverthepersonandpropertyoftheother.‘Havingnomeansoflegallydivestingmyselfoftheseodiouspowers...Ifeelitmydutytoputonrecordaformalprotestagainsttheexistinglawofmarriage,insofarasconferringsuchpowers,andasolemnpromiseneverinanycaseorunderanycircumstancestousethem’(CCM396).HesetouthisobjectionstotheEnglishlawofmarriageatlengthinthepamphletOntheSubjectionofWomen.Thelegalsubordinationofonesextotheotherwaswronginprincipleandachiefobstacletohumanprogress.Awifewassimplyabond-servanttoherhusband;shewasboundtogivehimlifelongobedience,andanypropertysheacquiredinstantlypassedtohim.Insomewaysshewasworseoffthanaslave.InaChristiancountryaslavehadarightanddutytorejectsexualadvancesfromhermaster;butahusbandcanenforceuponhiswife‘thelowestdegradationofahumanbeing,thatofbeingmadetheinstrumentofananimalfunctioncontrarytoherinclinations’(L504).Thesubjectionofwomentomenhadnootheroriginthanthegreatermuscularstrengthofthemale,andhadbeencontinuedintoacivilizedageonlythroughmaleself-interest.Noonecouldsaythatexperiencehadshownthattheexistingsystemofmalesuperioritywaspreferabletoanyalternative;fornootheralternativehadeverbeentried.Womenhad,bycenturiesoftrainingfromtheearliestage,beenbroughttoacquiesceinthesystem.Whenweputtogetherthreethings—first,thenaturalattractionbetweenoppositesexes;secondly,thewife’sentiredependenceonthehusband,everyprivilegeorpleasureshehasbeingeitherhisgift,ordependingentirelyonhiswill;andlastly,thattheprincipalobjectofhumanpursuit,consideration,andallobjectsofsocialambition,caningeneralbesoughtorobtainedbyheronlythroughhim—itwouldbeamiracleiftheobjectofbeingattractivetomenhadnotbecomethepolarstaroffeminineeducationandformationofcharacter.(L487)Ifwomendidwishtothrowovertheirsubjection,rebellionagainsttheirmastersisharderthananyrebellionagainstdespotshaseverbeen.Hus-bandshavegreaterfacilitiesthananymonarchhaseverhadtopreventany275\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYAPunchcartoonof1867satirisesMill’scrusadeforequalitybetweenthesexes.uprisingagainsttheirpower:theirsubjectsliveundertheireyesandintheirveryhands.Itisnowonderthatthetyrannyofmaleshasoutlastedallotherformsofunjustauthority.KierkegaardandSchopenhaueronWomenThesignificanceofOntheSubjectionofWomenintheclimateofthetimecanbebroughtoutbycomparingitwiththetreatmentofmarriageandwoman-hoodintheworksoftwoContinentalphilosophers,KierkegaardandSchopenhauer.InKierkegaard’sEither/Oraninety-pageessayisdevotedtoaffirming‘theaestheticvalidityofmarriage’—thatis,topersuadethereaderthatenteringintomatrimonyneednotdiminish,indeedmayfortify,therapturesoffirstlove.Romanticballadsandnovelsarequite276\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYwrongtoportrayloveasaquestthatsurmountsobstaclesandtrialstoachieveitsgoalinmarriage:aweddingisthebeginning,nottheend,oftrulyromanticlove.Theessaytakestheformofalettertoaromanticcorrespondentwhohasfundamentalobjectionstothewholeideaofachurchmarriage.Kierkegaardimaginestheobjectorsaying:ThegirlbeforewhomIcouldfalldownandworship,whoseloveIfeelcouldsnatchmeoutofallconfusionandgivemenewbirth,itissheIamtoleadtotheLord’saltar,shewhoistostandtherelikeasinner,ofwhomandtowhomitshallbesaidthatitwasEvewhoseducedAdam.Toherbeforewhommyproudsoulbowsdown,theonlyonetowhomithasboweddown,toheritshallbesaidthatIamtobehermasterandshesubservienttoherhusband.Themomenthascome,theChurchisalreadyreachingoutitsarmsforherandbeforegivingherbacktomeitwillfirstpressabridalkissuponherlips,notthatbridalkissIgavethewholeworldfor;itisalreadyreachingoutitsarmstoembraceher,butthisembracewillcauseallherbeautytofade,andthenitwilltossherovertomeandsay‘Befruitfulandmultiply’.Whatkindofpowerisitthatdaresintrudebetweenmeandmybride,thebrideImyselfhavechosenandwhohaschosenme?Andthispowerwouldcommandhertobetruetome;doesshethenneedtobecommanded?Andisshetobetruetomeonlybecauseathirdpartycommandsit,onewhomshethereforelovesmorethanme?Anditbidsmebetruetoher;mustIbebiddentothat,Iwhobelongtoherwithmywholesoul?Andthispowerdecidesourrelationtoeachother;itsaysIamtoaskandsheistoobey;butsupposeIdonotwanttoask,supposeIfeelmyselftooinferiorforthat?(E/O408)JudgeVilhelm,whomKierkegaardsetsupasthedefenderoftraditionalmarriage,urgeshiscorrespondenttoacceptthatinmarriagehecannotbutbemaster,thathiswifeisnomoreasinnerthananyotherwoman,andthatacceptingathirdpowermeansonlythankingGodforthelovebetweenbrideandgroom.Atmarriagethehusbandcomestounderstandthatrealloveisdailypossessionthroughoutalifetime,notthepreternat-uralpowerofabriefinfatuation;andhistakingherasagiftfromGod,ratherthanasaconquestofhisown,enablesthewife‘toputthelovedoneatjustenoughdistanceforhertobeabletodrawbreath’(E/O411).Vilhelmisemphaticthattheonlyworthymotiveforenteringonmarriageisloveforthespouse.Helists,andrejects,otherreasonswhypeoplemarryorareurgedtomarry:thatmarriageisaschoolforcharacter,thatonehasadutytopropagatethehumanrace,thatoneneedsahome.Noneofthesemotivesareadequate,fromeitheranaestheticoranethical277\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYpointofview.‘Wereawomantomarry’,hetellsus,‘soastobearasaviourtotheworld,thatmarriagewouldbejustasunaestheticasimmoralandirreligious’(E/O417).Loveistheonethingthatwillbringthesensualandthespiritualtogetherintounity.Itistruethatmarriage,unlikeromanticlove,bringswithitduties.Butdutyisnottheenemyoflove,butitsfriend.Inmarriage‘dutyhereisjustonething,trulytolove,withthesincerityoftheheart,anddutyisasproteanasloveitself,declaringeverythingholyandgoodwhenitisoflove,anddenouncingeverything,howeverpleasingandspecious,whenitisnotoflove’(E/O470).IfOntheSubjectionofWomenisaclassicoffeminism,andJudgeVilhelm’scontributiontoEither/Orwasaclassicdefenceoftraditionalmarriage,Schopenhauer’sEssayonWomenof1861wasaclassicofmalechauvinism.Thenaturalpurposeofwomen,theessaybegan,wastogivebirth,tocareforchildren,andtobesubjecttoaman,towhomsheshouldbeapatientandcheeringcompanion.Womenwerebetterthanmenatnurturingchildren,becausetheywerethemselveschildish:theylivedinthepresentandwerementallymyopic.Naturehadprovidedwomenwithsufficientbeautytoallureamanintosupportingthem,butwiselytookitawayfromthemoncetheyhadproducedachildortwo,sothattheyshouldnotbedistractedfromraisingtheirfamilies.Thefundamentaldefectofthefemalecharacter,accordingtoSchopen-hauer,waslackofasenseofjustice.Astheweakersex,theyhadtomaketheirwaybycunning.‘Asnaturehasequippedthelionwithclawsandteeth,theelephantwithtusks,thewildboarwithfangs,thebullwithhornsandthecuttlefishwithink,soithasequippedwomanwiththepowerofdissimulationashermeansofattackanddefence’(EA83).Womenfeeltheyarejustifiedindeceivingindividualmenbecausetheirprimeloyaltyisnottotheindividualbuttothespecies—tothepropaga-tionoftheracethatistheirentirevocation.Womenareinferiortomennotonlyintheirpowersofreasoning,butalsoinartistictalentandappreciation.Itisnotjustthattheychatterinthetheatreatconcerts(somethingthatclearlyannoyedSchopenhauerin-tensely);theyaltogetherlackcreativeability....themosteminentheadsoftheentiresexhaveprovedincapableofasingletrulygreat,genuineandoriginalachievementinart,orindeedofcreating278\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYanythingatalloflastingvalue:thisstrikesonemostforciblyinregardtopainting,sincetheyarejustascapableofmasteringthetechniqueasweare,andindeedpaintverybusily,yetcannotpointtoasinglegreatpainting.(EA86)Theworsttypeofwomanisthelady,thewomanwhoissetonapedestal,treatedwithgallantrybymen,andeducatedinarroganthaughtiness.AEuropeanladyisanunnaturalcreature,theobjectofderisionintheEast;andbyherveryexistenceshemakesthegreatmajorityofherownsexdeeplyunhappy.Thelawmadeagreatmistake,Schopenhauertellsus,whenitgavewomenequalrightswithmenwithoutatthesametimeendowingthemwithmasculinereasoningpowers.By‘equalrights’Schopenhauerdoesnotmeananythingsooutrageousaspropertyrightsorthesuffrage;hesimplymeanstheinstitutionofmonogamy,whichallowsmembersofeachsextohaveoneandonlyonemaritalpartner.Polygamy,infact,isamuchmoresatisfactoryarrangement:itmakessurethateverywomanistakencareof,whereasundermonogamymanywomenareleftuntendedasoldmaidsorforcedintohardlabourorprostitution.‘Thereare80,000prostitutesinLondonalone:andwhataretheyifnotsacrificesonthealtarofmono-gamy?’Polygamyisabenefittothefemalesex,consideredasawhole,anditregularizesthesatisfactionofmaledesire.‘Forwhoisreallyamonogamist?Weallliveinpolygamy,atleastforatimeandusuallyforgood.’Sinceeverymanneedsmanywomen,therecouldbenothingmorejustthanthatheshouldbefree,indeedobliged,tosupportmanywomen.WemaybegratefulthatitwasMill,andnotSchopenhauer,whomfuturegenerationsfollowed.Indeed,OntheSubjectionofWomenhasbecomeantiquatedasaresultofitsownsuccess.Thebattleofwhichitwasanearlysalvohaslongbeenwon,atleastinthecountriesforwhomMillwaswriting.ThemarriagelawsthatMilldenouncedhavelongbeenrepealed,andinallmattersoflawwomenarenowtreatedasineveryrespecttheequalsofmen.AndithastobesaidthatthecruelimprisonmentthatVictorianmarriagelawimposedonwomenisbroughthomewithgreaterimpactbythenarrativeanddialogueofnovelistslikeEliotandTrollopethanbytheponderousearnestnessofMill’speriods.TheissuesdiscussedinMill’sOnLiberty,bycontrast,remainofthehighestimportance,thoughcontemporaryliberalsoftendifferfromMillwhentheycometodrawthelinebetweenwarrantedandunwarrantedstate279\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYinterferencewithpersonalliberty.Mostliberalsacceptparcelsoflegislationwhosepurposeistopromoteanindividual’sownwell-beingratherthantoprotectothersfromharm:lawsimposingcompulsoryinsurance,orthewearingofprotectiveheadgear,forinstance.Ifamodernliberaljustifiesthisasdesignedtopreventtheindividualfrombecomingachargeonsociety,ratherthanasaimingathisownhealthandprosperity,itshouldbepointedoutthatthepossibilityofthepoorandsickplacingaburdenonothersassumestheexistenceofanetworkofsocialservicesprovidedatthetaxpayer’sexpense—somethingforwhichMillhadaverylimitedenthu-siasm.Ontheotherhand,Millcountenancedrestrictionsonlibertythatmostmodernliberalswouldreject.Hethought,forinstance,thatagovernmentcouldlegitimatelylimitthesizeoffamilies,andhereconcileditwithhislibertarianprincipleonthefollowinggrounds:‘Inacountryeitherover-peopled,orthreatenedwithbeingso,toproducechildren,beyondaverysmallnumber,withtheeffectofreducingtherewardoflabourbytheircompetition,isaseriousoffenceagainstallwholivebytheremunerationoftheirlabour’(L242).ManyliberalsshareMill’slifelongenthusiasmforpopulationcontrolbycontraception(acauseforwhichhewaswillingtogo,briefly,toprison).ButwhenChinaintroducedlegislationtolimitthesizeoffamiliestoasinglechild,mostWesternliberalsreactedwithhorror.MarxonCapitalandLabourAtthesametimeandinthesamecityasMillwaswritingclassicalworksofliberalthought,KarlMarxwasdevelopingthetheoryofthecommunismthatwastobeformorethanacenturyoneofliberalism’sgreatestenemies.Thebasisofthetheorywashistoricalmaterialism:thethesisthatineveryepochtheprevailingmodeofeconomicproductionandexchangedeterminesthepoliticalandintellectualhistoryofsociety.‘Themodeofproductionofmateriallifeconditionsthesocial,political,andintellectuallife-processingeneral.Itisnottheconsciousnessofhumanbeingsthatdeterminestheirbeing;onthecontraryitistheirsocialbeingthatdeterminestheircon-sciousness’(CPE,p.x).Thereweretwoelementsthatdeterminedthecourseofhistory:theforcesandtherelationsofproduction.BytheforcesofproductionMarxmeanttherawmaterials,thetechnology,andthelabour280\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYthatarenecessarytomakeafinishedproduct;aswheat,amill,andamillworkerareallneededtoproduceflour.Therelationsofproduction,ontheotherhand,aretheeconomicarrangementsgoverningtheseforces,suchastheownershipofthemillandthehiringoftheworker.Relationsofproductionarenotstatic;theyalterastechnologydevelops.Intheageofthehand-mill,forinstance,theworkeristheserfofafeudallord,tiedtotheland;intheageofthesteam-millheisthemobileemployeeofthecapitalist.Relationsofproductionarenotmattersoffreechoice;theyaredeterminedbytheinterplayoftheproductiveforces.If,atanytime,theybecomeinappropriatetotheproductiveforces,thenasocialrevolutiontakesplace.Marxdividedthepast,present,andfuturehistoryoftherelationsofproductionintosixphases,threepast,onepresent,andtwotocome.Thepastphaseswereprimitivecommunism,slavery,andfeudalism.Thepresent,criticalphasewasthatofcapitalism.Aftercapitalism’sinevi-tablecollapse,thefuturewouldbringfirstsocialismandultimatelycom-munismoncemore.FollowingEngels,Marxbelievedthatintheearlieststagesofhistoryhumanbeingshadbeenorganizedintoprimitivecommunisttribes,hold-inglandincommon,owningnoprivateproperty,andruledbyamatri-archy.IntheIronAge,however,societybecamepatriarchal,itbecamepossibletoaccumulateprivatewealth,andslaverywasintroduced.Slaverywasthedominanteconomicfeatureofclassicalantiquity.Societywastobedividedintoclasses:patricianandplebeian,freemenandslaves.Thustherebeganthestoryofclassantagonismwhichwashenceforthtobethefundamentalfeatureofhumanhistory.Thesplen-douroftheclassicalcultureofGreeceandRomewasmerelyanideologicalsuperstructurebuiltupontherelationsofproductionbe-tweentheclasses.Theancientworldgavewaytothefeudalsystem,withitsrelationshipsbetweenlordandserf,andbetweenguildsmenandjourneymen.Onceagain,thephilosophyandreligionoftheMiddleAgeswereanideologicalsuperstructuresustainedbytheeconomicsystemoftheage.FromtheserfsoftheMiddleAgessprangthecharteredburghersoftheearliesttowns:thesewerethefirstbourgeois,amiddleclassbetweentheservilelabourersandthearistocraticlandowners.SincethetimeoftheFrenchRevolutionthebourgeoisiehadbeengainingtheupperhandoverthearistocrats.281\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYThemodernbourgeoissocietythathassproutedfromtheruinsoffeudalsocietyhasnotdoneawaywithclassantagonisms.Ithasbutestablishednewclasses,newconditionsofoppression,newformsofstruggleinplaceoftheoldones.Ourepoch,theepochofthebourgeoisie,possesses,however,thisdistinctivefeature:ithassimplifiedtheclassantagonisms.Societyasawholeismoreandmoresplittingupintotwogreathostilecamps,intotwogreatclassesdirectlyfacingeachother;BourgeoisieandProletariat.(CM3)Marxbelievedthatthecapitalistsocietyinwhichhelivedhadreachedastateofcrisis.Theoppositionbetweenbourgeoisieandproletariatwouldbecomesteadilystrongerandleadtoarevolutionarychangewhichwouldusherinthefinalstages,firstofsocialism,inwhichallpropertywouldpasstothestate,andfinallytocommunism,afterthestatehadwitheredaway.Thecrisiswhichcapitalismhadreached,Marxmaintained,wasnotacontingentfactofhistory;itwassomethingentailedbythenatureofcapitalismitself.Hebasedthisconclusiononananalysisofthenatureofeconomicvalue.Howisthevalueofacommoditydetermined?Asafirststep,wecansaythatathing’svalueistherateatwhichitcanbeexchangedforothercommodities:aquarterofwheatmaybeworthsomuchiron,andsoon.Buttherealvalueofsomethingmustbedifferentfromthecountlessdifferentratesatwhichitcanbeexchangedwithinnumerableothercommodities.Weneedamethodofexpressingthevalueofcommoditiesthatiscommonto,butdistinctfrom,allthedifferentparticularexchangesbetweenthem.Astheexchangeablevaluesofcommoditiesareonlysocialfunctionsofthosethings,andhavenothingatalltodowiththenaturalqualities,wemustfirstask:Whatisthecommonsocialsubstanceofallcommodities?Itislabour.Toproduceacommodityacertainamountoflabourmustbebestoweduponit,orworkedupinit.AndIsaynotonlylabour,butsociallabour.Amanwhoproducesanarticleforhisownimmediateuse,toconsumeithimself,createsaproduct,butnotacommodity.Asaself-sustainingproducerhehasnothingtodowithsociety.Buttoproduceacommodityamanmustnotonlyproduceanarticlesatisfyingsomesocialwant,buthislabouritselfmustformpartandparcelofthetotalsumoflabourexpendedbysociety.Itmustbesubordinatetothedivisionoflabourwithinsociety.(VPP30)Tovalueacommodity,weshouldlookonitasapieceofcrystallizedlabour.Howislabouritselfmeasured?Bythelengthoftimethelabourlasts.Asilkenhandkerchiefisworthmorethanabrickbecauseittakeslongertomake282\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYthanabrickdoes.Marxstateshistheorythus:‘Thevalueofonecommodityistothevalueofanothercommodityasthequantityoflabourfixedintheoneistothequantityoflabourfixedintheother’(VPP31).Twoqualificationsmustbemadetothissimpleequation.Alazyorunskilfulworkerwilltakelongertoproduceacommoditythananenergeticandskilfulone:doesthismeanthathisproductisworthmore?Ofcoursenot:whenwespeakofthequantityoflabourfixedinacommoditywemeanthetimethatisnecessaryforaworkerofaverageenergyandskilltoproduceit.Moreover,wemustaddintotheequationthelabourpreviouslyworkedupintotherawmaterialofthecommodity,andintothetechnologyemployed.Forexample,thevalueofacertainamountofcottonyarnisthecrystallisationofthequantityoflabouraddedtothecottonduringthespinningprocess,thequantityoflabourpreviouslyrealisedinthecottonitself,thequantityoflabourrealisedinthecoal,oil,andotherauxiliarymatterused,thequantityoflabourfixedinthesteamengine,thespindles,thefactorybuildingandsoforth.(VPP32)Naturally,onlyaproportionofthevalueofthespindlewillbeincorpo-ratedintothevalueofaparticularquantityofyarn:theexactproportionwilldependontheaverageworkinglifeofaspindle.Thevalueofaproductatanygiventimewilldependupontheproductivityprevailingatthattime.Ifanincreaseinpopulationmeansthatlessfertilesoilsmustbecultivated,thevalueofagriculturalproductswillrisebecausegreaterlabourisneededtoproducethem.Ontheotherhand,whentheintroductionofthepower-loommadeittwiceaseasytoproduceagivenquantityofyarn,thevalueofyarnsankaccordingly.Whenvalueisexpressedinmonetaryterms,itiscalledprice.Sincelabouritselfhasaprice,ittoomusthaveavalue.Buthowisthistobedefined?Toanswerthisquestionwemustnotethatwhatthelabourersellstohisemployerisnothisactuallabour,buthislabouringpower.Ifheispaid£10forasixty-hourweek,heissellingfor£10hislabouringpowerforsixtyhours.Buthowarewetoreckonthevalueoflabouringpoweritself?Likethatofeveryothercommodity,itsvalueisdeterminedbythequantityoflabournecessarytoproduceit.Thelabouringpowerofamanexistsonlyinhislivingindividuality.Acertainmassofnecessariesmustbeconsumedbyamantogrowupandmaintainhislife.Buttheman,likethemachine,willwearout,andmustbereplacedbyanotherman.Besidethemassofnecessariesrequiredforhis283\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYownmaintenance,hewantsanotheramountofnecessariestobringupacertainquotaofchildrenthataretoreplacehimonthelabourmarketandtoperpetuatetheraceoflabourers.(VPP39)Itfollowsthatthevalueoflabouringpowerisdeterminedbythecostofkeepingthelaboureraliveandwellandcapableofreproduction.Toshowhowthecapitalistexploitsthelabourer,Marxinvitesustoconsideracasesuchasdescribedabove.Supposethatittakestwentyhourstoproducethemeansofsubsistenceofthelabourerforoneweek.Hewould,inthatcase,produceavaluesufficienttomaintainhimselfbyworkingfortwentyhours.Buthehassoldhisworkingpowerforsixtyhours.Sooverandabovethetwentyhourstoreplacehiswagesheisworkingafurtherfortyhours.Marxcallsthesehoursofsurpluslabour,andtheproductofthosehoursoflabourwillbesurplusvalue.Itisthesurplusvaluethatproducesthecapitalist’sprofit.Theprofitisthedifferencebetweenthevalueoftheproduct(sixdays’labour)andthevalueofthelabourer’swork(twodays’labour).Itis,Marxsays,justasifhewasworkingtwodaysoftheweekforhimselfandworkingunpaidfourdaysoftheweekforhisemployer.Astechnologydevelops,andproductivityincreasesaccordingly,surplusvalueincreasesandtheproportionofthelabourer’sworkthatisreturnedtohiminwagesbecomessmallerandsmaller.Thesurplusvalueintheoutputofafactoryissharedbetweenthelandlordwhotakesrent,thebankerwhotakesinterest,andtheentrepreneurwhotakesacommercialprofit.Allthatgoestothelaboureristheeversmallersumthatisnecessarytokeephimalive.Theverydevelopmentofmodernindustrymustprogressivelyturnthescaleinfavourofthecapitalistagainsttheworkingman,andconsequentlythegeneraltendencyofcapitalisticproductionisnottoraise,buttosinktheaveragestandardofwages,ortopushthevalueoflabourmoreorlesstoitsminimumlimit.(VPP61)Giventheinexorabletendenciesofthecapitalistsystem,itisfutiletocallfor‘afairday’swagesforafairday’swork’.Onlythetotalabolitionofthecashnexusbetweenemployerandemployeecanachieveafairreturnforlabour.Thesystematicexploitationendemictothewagessystemisboundtoreachapointatwhichtheproletariatfindsitintolerableandrisesinrevolt.Capitalismwillbereplacedbythedictatorshipoftheproletariat,whichwillabolishprivateproperty,andusherinasocialiststate.Undersocialismthemeansofproduc-tionwillbetotallyundercentralgovernmentcontrol.Thesocialiststateitself,however,willbeonlyatemporarystageoftheevolutionofsociety.Eventually284\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYitwillwitherawaytobereplacedbyacommunistsocietyinwhichindividualandcommoninterestwillcoincide.JustasChristianthinkersthroughouttheageshavegivenfulleraccountsofhellthanofheaven,sotooMarx’sdescrip-tionsoftheevilsofnineteenth-centurycapitalismaremorevividthanhispredictionsofthefinalbeatificstateofcommunism.Allwearetoldisthatcommunistsocietywill‘makeitpossibleformetodoonethingtodayandanothertomorrow,tohuntinthemorning,fishintheafternoon,rearcattleintheevening,andwritecriticismjustasIhaveamind,withouteverbecominghunter,fisherman,shepherdorcritic’(GI66).Marx’sanalysisofsurplusvalueisthought-provokingandcontainsprofoundphilosophicalinsights.Butconsideredasapredictivescientifictheory,whichwashowMarxwishedittobetaken,ithasafatalflaw.Weareofferednoconvincingreasonwhythecapitalist,nomatterhowgreathisprofits,shouldpaythelabourernomorethanasubsistencewage.Butthatclaimwasanessentialelementinthethesisthatrevolutionwasaninevitableconsequenceoftechnologicaldevelopmentwithinacapitalistsystem.IfMarx’shypothesishadbeencorrect,revolutionwouldhaveoccurredsoonestinthosestatesinwhichtechnology,andthereforeexploitation,wasprogressingfastest.InfactthefirstcommunistrevolutionoccurredinbackwardRussia,andinthedevelopedcountriesofwesternEuropeemployerssoonbegan,andhavesincecontinued,topaywageswellabovesubsistencelevel.Buttobefair,theimprovementintheconditionoftheworkingclasseswouldnothavetakenplacewithouttheheightenedawarenessofthewretchedstateoffactorylabourerstowhichtheworkofMarxandEngelsmadeasignificantcontribution.AmongthemanyphilosopherswhowroteinthewakeofMarxandEngelsthemostinfluentialwasV.I.Lenin,theleaderoftheRussianRevolutionof1917.Lenin’sinfluencewasexercisednotsomuchthroughhisphilosophicalwritings,thoughhewastheauthoroftwoworksonmaterialismanditsepistemology,asthroughhisleadershipoftheCom-munistParty.AgainstotherRussiancommunistswhobelievedinwaitingfortheinevitabledissolutionofcapitalism,heinsistedthatthebirth-pangsofthenewordershouldbehastenedbyviolentrevolution.Heinsistedthatthepartyshouldbeledbyanauthoritarianelite,whoseideaswouldshape,ratherthanbeshapedby,economicchange.Sovietdemocracywastobemarkednotsomuchbytheruleofthemajorityasbytheuseofforce,onbehalfofthemajority,againsttheminority.285\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYAphotopost-cardshowingKarlMarxshortlybeforehisdeath.ClosedandOpenSocietiesLeninwasdisappointedwhenothernationsfailedtofollowRussia’sexampleandriseupagainsttheircapitalistrulers,butheexplainedthefailureofMarx’spredictionsoftheireconomiccollapsebytheirimperialistexploitationofcoloniesasanoutletforexcesscapitalandasourceofcheaplabourandrawmaterials.Imperialism,hefamouslysaid,wasthe286\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYmonopolystageofcapitalism.Lenin’ssuccessor,JosefStalin,wascontenttoseehistaskasthepreservationofsocialisminonecountry,andthepowerofthecommunistelitewassustainedandpreservedbythepatrioticfervourofthenation’sstruggleagainstNaziGermanyfrom1941–5.NeitherHitler’sGermanynorMussolini’sItalyproducedanylastingworkofpoliticalphilosophy.Itisamistake,however,toclassthetwoideologiestogetherundertheheading‘Fascism’.True,bothHitlerandMussoliniwerenationalistdictatorswhobelievedinatotalitarianstate,buttheleadingideaofNazismwasracism,whilethecorporatismthatwasacentraldoctrineofItalianFascismhadnothingtodowithrace.Corporat-ismwasintendedtobeavocationalorganizationofsocietyinwhichindividualsweregroupedforpurposesofrepresentationaccordingtotheirsocialfunctions.Thecorporatestatewouldregulaterelationsbe-tweencapitalists,workers,theprofessions,andtheChurchinsuchawayastoavoidtheconflictsbetweenclassesthatledtorevolution.Thiswasadifferentkindofpoliticalcreedfromtheideathatoneracewassuperiortoallothersandshoulddominateoreliminatethem.Ofcourse,HitlerandMussoliniwerewartimeallies;butsowereStalinandChurchill.TheSecondWorldWardid,however,produceoneclassicofpoliticalphilosophy:TheOpenSocietyanditsEnemies,bytheAustrianexileKarlPopper.Ifapoliticalorganizationistoflourish,Poppermaintainedinthisbook,itsinstitutionsmustleavemaximumroomforself-correction.Justasscienceprogressesbytheconstantcorrectionofinadequatehypotheses,sosocietywillonlyprogressifpoliciesaretreatedasexperimentsthatcanbeevalu-atedanddiscontinued.Twothings,therefore,areimportant:thattheruledshouldhaveamplefreedomtodiscussandcriticizepoliciesproposedbytheirrulers;andthatitshouldbepossiblewithoutviolenceorbloodshedtochangetherulers,iftheyfailedtopromotetheircitizens’welfare.Thesearethecentralfeaturesofanopensociety,andtheyaremoreimportantelementsofdemocracythanthemereelectionofagovernmentbyamajority.AnopensocietyisattheoppositeextremefromthecentrallycontrolledpolitiesofwartimeGermany,Italy,andRussia.Popperdidnotruleout,however,allformsofgovernmentintervention.Unboundedtolerancecouldleadtointolerance,andunrestrainedcapital-ismcouldleadtounacceptablelevelsofpoverty.Incitementtointoleranceshouldthereforebeconsideredascriminal,andthestatemustprotecttheeconomicallyweakfromtheeconomicallystrong.287\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYThis,ofcourse,meansthattheprincipleofnon-intervention,ofanunrestrainedeconomicsystem,hastobegivenup;ifwewishfreedomtobesafeguarded,thenwemustdemandthatthepolicyofunlimitedeconomicfreedombereplacedbytheplannedeconomicinterventionofthestate.Wemustdemandthatunre-strainedcapitalismgivewaytoaneconomicinterventionism.(OSEii.125)Unlimitedeconomicfreedomwasinanycaseacontradictioninterms:unlimitedfreedomofthelabourmarketcouldnotbecombinedwithunlimitedfreedomofworkerstounite.InthetwovolumesofhisbookPopperattackedtwophilosopherswhomhesawasenemiesoftheopensociety:PlatoandMarx.HisdetailedcritiqueofsomePlatonicpoliticalinstitutionswasperhapsnomorethanausefulcorrectivetothefatuousadmirationfortheRepublicthathadbeenfash-ionableinBritishuniversitiessincethetimeofBenjaminJowett.ThecritiqueofMarx,however,wassomethingmuchmoreeffectiveandinfluential.Popper’sprincipaltargetwasMarx’sbeliefthathehaddiscov-eredscientificlawsthatdeterminedthefutureofthehumanrace,ten-denciesthatworkedwithironnecessitytowardsinevitableresults.PoppershowedhowthecourseofhistorysinceCapitalhadinfactfalsifiedmanyofMarx’sspecificwould-bescientificpredictions.Marx’sdeterminismwasonlyoneexampleofamoregeneralerrorthatPopperpilloriedinalaterbook,ThePovertyofHistoricism(1957):‘Imeanby‘‘historicism’’anapproachtothesocialscienceswhichassumesthathistoricalpredictionistheirprincipalaim,andwhichassumesthatthisaimisattainablebydiscoveringthe‘‘rhythms’’orthe‘‘patterns’’,the‘‘laws’’orthe‘‘trends’’thatunderlietheevolutionofhistory.’BesidesMarxism,earlyChristianbeliefinanimminentSecondComing,andEnlightenmentbeliefintheinevitabilityofhumanprogress,offerexamplesofhistoricism.Allformsofhistoricism,Poppershowed,canberefutedbyasingleargument.Whatformthefuturewilltakewilldepend,interalia,onwhatformscientificprogresswilltake.If,therefore,wearetopredictthefutureofsocietywemustpredictthefutureofscience.Butitislogicallyimpossibletopredictthenatureofascientificdiscovery;todosowouldentailactuallymakingthediscovery.Hence,historicismisimpossible,andtheonlymeaningwecanfindinhistory,pastorfuture,isthatgivenitbyfree,contingent,unpredictablehumanchoices.ThemostsustainedattempttosetoutasystematictheoreticalstructureforthetypeofliberaldemocracyaspiredtobymostWesternstateswas288\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYmadebyJohnRawls(1921–2002)inhisbookATheoryofJustice(1971).Utilitarianism,Rawlsargued,wasinsufficientasafoundationforaliberalstatebecauseitplacedwelfareoverjustice,ignoringwhathecalled‘thepriorityoftherightoverthegood’.‘Eachpersonpossessesaninviolabilityfoundedonjusticethateventhewelfareofsocietyasawholecannotoverride.Therefore,inajustsocietytherightssecuredbyjusticearenotsubjecttopoliticalbargainingorthecalculusofsocialinterests’(TJ66).Insteadofutilitarianism,Rawlsproposedasabasisfordeterminingtheinalienablefreedomsanovelkindofsocialcontract,athought-contractlikeathought-experiment.Imaginethatthereareasyetnosocialinstitutions,butweareallinitiallyequal.Inthis‘originalposition’weareignorantofthefactsthatwilldetermineourpositioninthesocietytobedesigned.Wedonotknowourrace,sex,religion,class,talents,andabilities;wedonotevenknowhowwewillconceivethegoodlife.Underthis‘veilofignorance’wearetodrawupaconstitutiononthebasisofarationaldesiretofurtherourownaimsandinterests,whatevertheymayturnouttobe.Becauseofourignoranceofthefactorsthataregoingtodistinguishusfromothers,wearedriven,inthisimaginaryposition,toanequalconcernforthefateofeveryone.Theparticipantsinthisconstitution-building,Rawlsmaintains,wouldchoosetoabidebytwoprinciplesofjustice.Thefirstprincipleisthateachpersonshouldhavetherighttothemostextensivebasiclibertycompatiblewithalikelibertyforall.Thesecondprincipleisthatsocialandeconomicinequalitiesaretobeattachedtoofficeandpositionsthatareopentoallinfaircompetition,andthattheseinequalitiesarejustifiedonlyiftheycanbearrangedsothattheyaretothebenefitoftheworstoff.Ifthetwoprinciplescomeintoconflict,theprincipleofequallibertytrumpstheprincipleofequalopportunity.Rawlsseesitasobviousthatnooneintheoriginalpositionwouldagreetoasystemthatincorporatedslavery,forfearthatwhentheveilofignorancewasliftedhewouldfindhimselfaslave.Buthealsouseshistwoprinciplestooperateuponanumberofmorecontentiousissues,suchasintergenerationaljusticeandcivildisobedience.Inapluralisticsociety,hemaintains,thereislittlechanceofachievingtotalunanimityinethics;themostwecanhopeforisasetofsharedvalues.Butbydiscussionof,reflectionon,andadjustmenttoourmoraljudgementsRawlshopesthatwemayachievewhathecalls‘anoverlappingconsensus’onethicalissues.289\nPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYThegoalthatRawlsholdsoutisastateof‘reflectiveequilibrium’.Theinitialintuitionsofdifferentcitizenswillclashwitheachother,andindeedasingleindividual’sintuitionsmaybeinconsistentamongthemselves.However,ifwereflectupontheseintuitionsandendeavourtoarticulatethemintodefensibleprincipleswemayadvancetowardscoherenceandconsensus.Aswedoourbesttodealwithintuitionsthatarerecalcitranttotheruleswehaveformulated,wemayhopetoachieveanevermoreharmonioussetofmoralprinciplesforourselvesandoursociety.290\n12GodFaithvs.AlienationHegelregardedhissystemasasophisticatedanddefinitivepresentationofphilosophicaltruthsthathadbeengivenfluctuatingandmythicalexpressionintheworld’sreligions.InthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcenturythetwomostimportantreactionstotheHegeliantreatmentofreligioncamefromoppositepointsofthephilosophicalcompass.WhileLudwigFeuerbach(1804–72)regardedHegelasexcessivelysympathetictoreligion,SørenKierkegaard(1813–55)thoughthimimpudentlydisrespect-fulofit.IncriticizingHegel,FeuerbachmadeuseoftheHegelianconceptofalienation,theconditioninwhichpeopletreatasaliensomethingthatisinfactpartofthemselves.ThefundamentalideaofhisEssenceofChristianity(1841)isthatGodisaprojectionofthehumanmind.Humansarethehighestformofbeings,buttheyprojecttheirownlifeandconsciousnessintoanunrealheaven.Mentaketheirownessence,imagineitfreedfromitslimitations,projectitintoanimaginedtranscendentsphere,andthenvenerateitasadistinctandindependentbeing.‘GodasGod,thatis,asabeingnotfinite,nothuman,notmateriallyconditioned,notphenomenal,isonlyanobjectofthought’(EC35).WhateverHegelmaysayaboutSpirit,forFeuerbachtherealessenceofmanisthatheisamaterialbeingandpartofnature.‘Man’,hesaidfamously,‘iswhatheeats.’Butmandiffersfromotheranimals;andthegreatdifferencethatmarkshimoutishispossessionofreligion.Awarenessofhisdependenceonnaturemakesmaninitiallydeifynaturalobjectsliketreesandfountains.ThemonotheisticideaofapersonalGodariseswhen\nGODhumansbecomeconsciousofthemselvesaspossessingreason,will,andlove.Inreligion,mancontemplateshisownlatentnature,butassome-thingapartfromhimself.Religionisthedisunitingofmanfromhimself;hesetsGodbeforehimastheantithesisofhimself.Godisnotwhatmanis—manisnotwhatGodis.Godistheinfinite,manthefinitebeing;Godisperfect,manimperfect;Godeternal,mantemporal;Godalmighty,manweak;Godholy,mansinful.Godandmanareextremes:Godistheabsolutelypositive,thesumofallrealities;mantheabso-lutelynegative,comprehendingallnegations.(EC33)FeuerbachagreeswithHegelthatreligionrepresentsanessential,butimperfect,stageofhumanself-consciousness.ButHegel’sownphiloso-phy,accordingtoFeuerbach,isyetanotherformofalienation:itisthelastrefugeoftheology.BytreatingnatureaspositedbytheIdeaitoffersusonlyadisguisedversionoftheChristiandoctrineofcreation.WemustsetHegelonhisfeet,andplacephilosophyonthesolidgroundofmaterialism.LikeHegel’sdoctrineofalienation,Feuerbach’scriticismofreligionandidealismhadagreatinfluenceonMarxandEngels.ButMarxregardednotreligionbutcapitalismasthegreatestformofalienation—itwasmoney,notGod,thatwasthecapitalist’sobjectofworship.Religion,saidMarx,istheopiumofthepeople.Bythishedidnotmeanthatreligionwasapipe-dream(thoughhebelievedthatitwas)butthatbeliefinahappierafterlifewasanecessarystupefacienttomakelabourundercapitalismbearable.‘Religioussufferingisatoneandthesametimetheexpressionofrealsufferingandaprotestagainstrealsuffering.Religionisthesighoftheoppressedcreature,theheartofaheartlessworldandthesoulofsoullessconditions.Itistheopiumofthepeople’(EW257).WhileHegelandSchopenhauerregardedtraditionalreligiousbeliefsaspopularallegoricalormythicalpresentationsofphilosophicaltruthsthatwereaccessibleonlytoanenlightenedelite,andwhileFeuerbachandMarxregardedthemastheillusoryprojectionsofalienatedconsciousness,Kierkegaardalwaysplacedfaithatthesummitofhumanprogress,andregardedthereligioussphereassuperiortotheregionsofscienceandpolitics.Ethics,too,hetaught,mustbestrictlysubordinatedtoworship.Forcenturies,eversincePlato’sEuthyphro,philosophershaddebatedtherelationshipbetweenreligionandmorality.Doesthemoralvalueof292\nGODanactiondependsimplyonwhetheritisprescribedorprohibitedbyGod?OrisitonlybecausesomeactionsarealreadyoftheirownnaturegoodorbadthatGodcommandsorforbidsthem?ThomasAquinashadheldthatalltheTenCommandmentsbelongedtoanaturallawfromwhichnotevenGodcouldofferdispensation.DunsScotus,ontheotherhand,maintainedthatGodcoulddispensefromthelawagainstmurderandhaddonesowhenheorderedAbrahamtosacrificeIsaac.1InFearandTremblingKierkegaardadoptedanewapproachtothisthornytopic.HetootooktheGenesisstoryofAbrahamandIsaacasthetestcaseforhisdiscussion.GoddidtemptAbrahamandsaiduntohim,Abraham:andhesaid,BeholdhereIam.Andhesaid,Takenowthyson,thineonlysonIsaac,whomthoulovest,andgettheeintothelandofMoriah;andofferhimthereforaburntofferingupononeofthemountainswhichIwilltelltheeof.AndAbrahamroseupearlyinthemorning,andsaddledhisass,andtooktwoofhisyoungmenwithhim,andIsaachisson,andclavethewoodfortheburntoffering,androseup,andwentuntotheplaceofwhichGodhadtoldhim.ThenonthethirddayAbrahamlifteduphiseyesandsawtheplaceafaroff.AndAbrahamsaiduntohisyoungmen,Abideyeherewiththeass;andIandtheladwillgoyonderandworship,andcomeagaintoyou.AndAbrahamtookthewoodoftheburntoffering,andlaidituponIsaachisson;andhetookthefireinhishand,andaknife;andtheywentbothofthemtogether.AndIsaacspokeuntoAbrahamhisfather,andsaidMyfather:andhesaidHereamI,myson.Andhesaid,Beholdthefireandthewood:butwhereisthelambforaburntoffering?AndAbrahamsaid,Myson,Godwillprovidehimselfalambforaburntoffering:sotheywentbothofthemtogether.AndtheycametotheplacewhichGodhadtoldhimof;andAbrahambuiltanaltarthere,andlaidthewoodinorder,andboundIsaachisson,andlaidhimonthealtaruponthewood.AndAbrahamstretchedforthhishand,andtooktheknifetoslayhisson.(Gen.22:1–10)1Seevol.I,pp.291–2;vol.II,pp.273–4.293\nGODGustavDore´’s1866representationofthesacrificeofAbraham.294\nGODThereisundoubtedlysomethingheroicinAbraham’swillingnesstosacri-ficeIsaac—thesonforwhomhehadwaitedeightyyears,andinwhomallhishopeofposterityrested.Butinethicalterms,isnothisconductmonstrous?Heiswillingtocommitmurder,toviolateafather’sdutytolovehisson,andinthecourseofittodeceivethoseclosesttohim.Biblicalandclassicalliterature,Kierkegaardremindsus,offersotherexamplesofparentssacrificingtheirchildren:AgamemnonofferingupIphigeniatoavertthegods’curseontheGreekexpeditiontoTroy,Jephthagivinguphisdaughterinfulfilmentofarashvow,Brutuscondemningtodeathhistreasonablesons.Thesewereallsacrificesmadeforthegreatergoodofacommunity:theywere,inethicalterms,asurrenderoftheindividualforthesakeoftheuniversal.Abraham’ssacrificewasnothingofthekind:itwasatransactionbetweenhimselfandGod.Hadhebeenatragicheroliketheothers,hewould,onreachingMountMoriah,haveplungedtheknifeintohimselfratherthanintoIsaac.Instead,Kierkegaardtellsus,hesteppedoutsidetherealmofethicsaltogether,andactedforthesakeofanaltogetherhighergoal.SuchanactionKierkegaardcalls‘theteleologicalsuspensionoftheethical’.Abraham’sacttransgressedtheethicalorderinviewofhishigherend,ortelos,outsideit.Whereasanethicalhero,suchasSocrates,laysdownhislifeforthesakeofauniversalmorallaw,Abraham’sheroismlayinhisobediencetoanindividualdivinecommand.Moreover,hisactionwasnotjustoneofrenunciation,liketherichyoungmaninthegospelabandoninghiswealth:amandoesnothaveadutytohismoneyashedoestohisson,anditwaspreciselyinviolatingthisdutythatAbrahamshowedhisobediencetoGod.Washisactthensinful?IfwethinkofeverydutyasbeingadutytoGod,thenundoubtedlyitwas.ButsuchanidentificationofGodwithdutyactuallyemptiesofcontentthenotionofdutytoGodhimself.Thewholeexistenceofthehumanraceisroundedoffcompletelylikeasphere,andtheethicalisatonceitslimitanditscontent.Godbecomesaninvisiblevanishingpoint,apowerlessthought,Hispowerbeingonlyintheethicalwhichisthecontentofexistence.IfinanywayitmightoccurtoanymantowanttoloveGodinanyothersense,heisromantic,helovesaphantomwhichifithadmerelythepowerofbeingabletospeak,wouldsaytohim‘Idonotrequireyourlove.Staywhereyoubelong’.(FT78)295\nGODIfthereistobeaGodwhoismorethanapersonificationofduty,thentheremustbeaspherehigherthantheethical.IfAbrahamisahero,astheBibleportrayshim,itcanonlybefromthestandpointoffaith.‘Forfaithisthisparadox,thattheparticularishigherthantheuniversal.’EvenifweacceptthatthedemandsoftheuniquerelationshipbetweenGodandanindividualmayoverridecommitmentsarisingfromgenerallaws,acrucialquestionremains.Ifanindividualfeelscalledtoviolateanethicallaw,howishetotellwhetherthisisagenuinedivinecommandorameretemptation?Kierkegaardinsiststhatnooneelsecantellhim;thatiswhyAbrahamkepthisplansecretfromSarah,Isaac,andhisfriends.Theknightoffaith(asKierkegaardcallsAbraham)hastheterribleresponsibilityofsolitude.Buthowcanheevenknoworprovetohimselfwhatisagenuinedivinecommand?Kierkegaardmerelyemphasizesthattheleapoffaithistakeninblindness.Hisfailuretoofferacriterionfordistinguishinggenuinefromdelusivevocationissomethingthatcriesouttousinanagewhenmoreandmorepeoplefeeltheyhaveapersonaldivinecommandtosacrificetheirownlivesinordertokillasmanyinnocentvictimsaspossible.Kierkegaard’ssilenceatthispointisnotinadvertent.InhisPhilosophicalFragmentsandhisConcludingUnscientificPostscriptheoffersanumberofargu-mentstotheeffectthatfaithisnottheoutcomeofanyobjectivereasoning.TheformofreligiousfaiththathehasinmindistheChristianbeliefthatJesussavedthehumanracebyhisdeathonthecross.Thisbeliefcontainsdefinitehistoricalelements,andKierkegaardasks,‘Isitpossibletobaseaneternalhappinessuponhistoricalknowledge?’,andhegivesthreeargu-mentsforanegativeanswer.First,itisimpossible,byobjectiveresearch,toobtaincertaintyaboutanyhistoricalevent;thereisalwayssomepossibilityofdoubt,howeversmall,andweneverachievemorethananapproximation.Butfaithleavesnoroomfordoubt;itisaresolutiontorejectthepossibilityoferror.Nomerejudgementofprobabilityissufficientforthisfaithwhichistobethebasisofeternalhappiness.Hence,faithcannotbebasedonobjectivehistory.Second,historicalresearchisneverdefinitivelyconcluded:itisalwaysbeingrefinedandrevised,difficultiesarealwaysarisingandbeingover-come.‘Eachgenerationinheritsfromitspredecessorstheillusionthatthemethodisquiteimpeccable,butthelearnedscholarshavenotyetachievedsuccess.’Ifwearetotakeahistoricaldocumentasthebasisofourreligiouscommitment,thatcommitmentmustbeperpetuallypostponed.296\nGODThird,faithmustbeapassionatedevotionofoneself,butobjectiveinquiryinvolvesanattitudeofdetachment.Becausebeliefdemandspassion,Kierkegaardarguesthattheimprobabilityofwhatisbelievednotonlyisnoobstacletofaith,butisanessentialelementoffaith.Thebelievermustembracerisk,forwithoutriskthereisnofaith.‘Faithispreciselythecontradictionbetweentheinfinitepassionoftheindividual’sinwardnessandtheobjectiveuncertainty.’Thegreatertheriskoffalsehood,thegreaterthepassioninvolvedinbelieving.Wemustthrowawayallrationalsupportsoffaith‘soastopermittheabsurdtostandoutinallitsclarity,inorderthattheindividualmaybelieveifhewillsit’(P190).Iftheimprobabilityofabeliefisthemeasureofthepassionwithwhichitisbelieved,thenfaith,whichKierkegaardcalls‘infinitepersonalpassion’,musthaveasitsobjectsomethingthatisinfinitelyimprobable.SuchwasthefaithofAbraham,whorightuptothemomentofdrawingtheknifeonIsaaccontinuedtobelieveinthedivinepromiseofposterity.Andhisfaithwasrewarded,whenGod’sangelheldbackhishandandIsaac,liberatedfromthepyre,wentontobecomethefatherofmanynations.FewbelievingChristianshavebeenwillingtoacceptthatChristianityisinfinitelyimprobable,andnon-believersareofferedbyKierkegaardnomotive,nottosayreason,foracceptingbelief.Paradoxically,hisirration-alismhasbeenmostinfluentialnotamonghisfellowbelievers,butamongtwentieth-centuryatheists.ExistentialistthinkerssuchasKarlJaspersinGermanyandJean-PaulSartreinFrancefoundattractivehisclaimthattohaveanauthenticexistenceonemustabandonthemultitudeandseizecontrolofone’sowndestinybyablindleapbeyondreason.TheTheismofJohnStuartMillInEngland,religiousthoughttookaverydifferentturninthewritingsofJohnStuartMill,publishedsomefifteenyearsaftertheConcludingUnscientificPostscript.JeremyBenthamandJamesMillhadensuredthatreligiousinstructionshouldformnopartofJohnStuart’seducation.Accordingly,inhisautobiography,Millsaysheis‘oneoftheveryfewexamplesinthiscountryofonewhohas,notthrownoffreligiousbelief,butneverhadit’.Possiblybecauseofthis,hedidnotfeeltheanimusagainstreligionthatmanyotherutilitarianshavefelt.InhisposthumouslypublishedThree297\nGODEssaysonReligionhetookaremarkablydispassionatelookattheargumentsforandagainsttheexistenceofGod,andatthepositiveandnegativeeffectsofreligiousbelief.WhiledismissingtheontologicalandcausalargumentsforGod’sexistence,Milltookseriouslytheargumentfromdesign,theonlyonebaseduponexperience.‘Inthepresentstateofourknowledge’,hewrote,‘theadaptationsinNatureaffordalargebalanceofprobabilityinfavourofcreationbyintelligence.’Hedidnot,however,regardtheevidenceasrenderingevenprobabletheexistenceofanomnipotentandbenevolentcreator.Anom-nipotentbeingwouldhavenoneedoftheadaptationofmeanstoendsthatprovidesthesupportofthedesignargument;andanomnipotentbeingthatpermittedtheamountofevilwefindintheworldcouldnotbebenevolent.StilllesscantheGodoftraditionalChristianitybesoregarded.Recallinghisfather,Millwroteinhisautobiography:Think(heusedtosay)ofabeingwhowouldmakeaHell—whowouldcreatethehumanracewiththeinfallibleforeknowledge,andthereforewiththeintention,thatthegreatmajorityofthemweretobeconsignedtohorribleandeverlastingtorment.Thetime,Ibelieve,isdrawingnearwhenthisdreadfulconceptionofanobjectofworshipwillbenolongeridentifiedwithChristianity;andwhenallpersons,withanysenseofmoralgoodandevil,willlookuponitwiththesameindignationwithwhichmyfatherregardedit.(A26)Wecannotcallanybeinggood,Millmaintained,unlesshepossessestheattributesthatconstitutegoodnessinourfellowcreatures—‘andifsuchabeingcansentencemetohellfornotsocallinghim,tohellIwillgo’.Butevenifthenotionofhellisdiscardedasmythical,theamountofevilweknowtoexistinthisworldissufficient,Millbelieves,toruleoutthenotionofomnipotentgoodness.Millwasindeedanoptimistinhisjudge-mentoftheworldwelivein:‘allthegrandsources’,Millwrote,‘ofhumansufferingareinagreatdegree,manyofthemalmostentirely,conquerablebyhumancareandeffort’(U266).Nonetheless,thegreatmajorityofmankindliveinmisery,andifthisisduelargelytohumanincompetenceandlackofgoodwill,thatitselfcountsagainsttheideathatweareallundertheruleofall-powerfulgoodness.Mill’sessayTheismconcludesasfollows:These,then,arethenetresultsofnaturaltheologyonthequestionofthedivineattributes.Abeingofgreatbutlimitedpower,howorbywhatlimitedwecannot298\nGODevenconjecture;ofgreatandperhapsunlimitedintelligence,butperhapsalsomorenarrowlylimitedpowerthanthis,whodesires,andpayssomeregardto,thehappinessofhiscreatures,butwhoseemstohaveothermotivesofactionwhichhecaresmorefor,andwhocanhardlybesupposedtohavecreatedtheuniverseforthatpurposealone.Suchisthedeitywhomnaturalreligionpointsto,andanyideaofGodmorecaptivatingthanthiscomesonlyfromhumanwishes,orfromtheteachingofeitherrealorimaginaryrevelation.(3E94)Ifthatisthecase,whatcanbesaidaboutthedesirabilityorotherwiseofreligiousbelief?Itcannotbedisputed,Millsays,thatreligionhasvaluetoindividualsasasourceofpersonalsatisfactionandelevatedfeelings.Somereligionsholdouttheprospectofimmortalityasanincentivetovirtuousbehaviour.Butthisexpectationrestsontenuousgrounds;andashumanitymakesprogressitmaycometoseemamuchlessflatteringprospect.Itisnotonlypossiblebutprobablethatinahigher,andaboveall,ahappierconditionofhumanlife,notannihilationbutimmortalitymaybetheburden-someidea;andthathumannature,thoughpleasedwiththepresent,andbynomeansimpatienttoquitit,wouldfindcomfortandnotsadnessinthethoughtthatitisnotchainedthrougheternitytoaconsciousexistencewhichitcannotbeassuredthatitwillalwayswishtopreserve.(3E122)CreationandEvolutionBythetimeMill’sEssayswerepublishedin1887,religiousbelieversfeltunderthreatmorefromevolutionarybiologythanfromempiricistphilo-sophy.OntheOriginofSpeciesandTheDescentofManweregreetedwithhorrorinsomeChristiancircles.AtthemeetingoftheBritishAssociationin1860,theevolutionistT.H.Huxley,sohereported,hadbeenaskedbytheBishopofOxfordwhetherheclaimeddescentfromanapeonhisfather’sorhismother’sside.Huxley—accordingtohisownaccount—repliedthathewouldratherhaveanapeforagrandfatherthanamanwhomisusedhisgiftstoobstructsciencebyrhetoric.ThequarrelbetweenDarwinianevolutionistsandChristianfundamen-talistscontinuestoday.Darwin’stheoryobviouslyclasheswithaliteralacceptanceoftheBibleaccountofthecreationoftheworldinsevendays.Moreover,thelengthoftimethatwouldbenecessaryforevolutiontotakeplacewouldbeimmenselylongerthanthe6,000yearsthatChristian299\nGODJohnStuartMillwithhisstepdaughterHelenwhopublishedposthumouslyhiswritingsonreligion.300\nGODfundamentalistsbelievetobetheageoftheuniverse.Butanon-literalinterpretationofGenesiswasadoptedlongagobytheologiansasorthodoxasStAugustine,andmanyChristianstodayarecontenttoacceptthattheearthmayhaveexistedforbillionsofyears.ItismoredifficulttoreconcileanacceptanceofDarwinismwithbeliefinoriginalsin.Ifthestruggleforexistencehadbeengoingonforaeonsbeforehumansevolved,itisimpossibletoacceptthatitwasman’sfirstdisobedienceandthefruitoftheforbiddentreethatbroughtdeathintotheworld.Ontheotherhand,itiswrongtosuggest,asisoftendone,thatDarwindisprovedtheexistenceofGod.ForallDarwinshowed,thewholemachineryofnaturalselectionmayhavebeenpartofacreator’sdesignfortheuniverse.Afterall,beliefthatwehumansareGod’screatureshasneverbeenregardedasincompatiblewithourbeingthechildrenofourparents;itisnomoreincompatiblewithusbeing,onbothsides,descendedfromtheancestorsoftheapes.Atmost,DarwindisposedofoneargumentfortheexistenceofGod:namely,theargumentthattheadaptationoforganismstotheirenviron-mentexhibitsthehandiworkofabenevolentcreator.Buteventhatistooverstatethecase.TheonlyargumentrefutedbyDarwinwouldbeonethatsaid:whereverthereisadaptationtoenvironmentwemustseetheimmediateactivityofanintelligentbeing.Buttheoldargumentfromdesigndidnotclaimthis;andindeeditwasanessentialstepintheargumentthatloweranimalsandnaturalagentsdidnothaveminds.Theargumentwasonlythattheultimateexplanationofsuchadaptationmustbefoundinintelligence;andiftheargumentwaseversound,thenthesuccessofDarwinismmerelyinsertsanextrastepbetweenthepheno-menatobeexplainedandtheirultimateexplanation.Darwinismleavesmuchtobeexplained.Theoriginofindividualspeciesfromearlierspeciesmaybeexplainedbythemechanismsofevolutionarypressureandselection.Butthesemechanismscannotbeusedtoexplaintheoriginofspeciesassuch.Foroneofthestartingpointsofexplanationbynaturalselectionistheexistenceoftruebreedingpopulations,namelyspecies.ManyDarwiniansclaimthattheoriginandstructureoftheworldandtheemergenceofhumanlifeandhumaninstitutionsarealreadyfullyexplainedbyscience,sothatnoroomisleftforpostulatingtheexistenceofactivityofanynon-naturalagent.Darwinhimselfwasmorecautious.Thoughhebelievedthatitwasnotnecessary,inordertoaccountfor301\nGODtheperfectionofcomplexorgansandinstincts,toappealto‘meanssuperiorto,thoughanalogouswith,humanreason’,heexplicitlyleftroom,inseveralplacesofthesecondeditionofOntheOriginofSpecies,fortheactivityofacreator.Indefendinghistheoryfromgeologicalobjectionshepleadsthattheimperfectionsofthegeologicalrecord‘donotoverthrowthetheoryofdescentfromafewcreatedformswithsubsequentmodifi-cation’(OS376).‘Ishouldinferfromanalogy’,hetellsus,‘thatprobablyalltheorganicbeingswhichhaveeverlivedonthisearthhavedescendedfromsomeoneprimordialform,intowhichlifewasfirstbreathedbytheCreator’(OS391).Indeed,Darwinclaimsitasameritofhissystemthatitisinaccordwithwhatweknowofthedivinemodeofaction:TomyminditaccordsbetterwithwhatweknowofthelawsimpressedonmatterbytheCreator,thattheproductionandextinctionofthepastandpresentinhabitantsoftheworldshouldhavebeenduetosecondarycauses,likethosedeterminingthebirthanddeathoftheindividual.WhenIviewallbeingsnotasspecialcreations,butasthelinealdescendantsofsomefewbeingswhichlivedlongbeforethefirstbedoftheSiluriansystemwasdeposited,theyseemtometobecomeennobled.(OS395)Itwasspecialcreation,notcreation,thatDarwinobjectedto.Whenneo-DarwiniansclaimthatDarwin’sinsightsenableustoexplaintheentirecosmos,philosophicaldifficultiesariseatthreemainpoints:theoriginoflanguage,theoriginoflife,andtheoriginoftheuniverse.Inthecaseofthehumanspeciesthereisaparticulardifficultyinexplainingbynaturalselectiontheoriginoflanguage,giventhatlanguageisasystemofconventions.Explanationbynaturalselectionoftheoriginofafeatureinapopulationpresupposestheoccurrenceofthatfeatureinparticularindividualsofthepopulation.Naturalselectionmightfavouracertainlengthofleg,andthelong-leggedindividualsinthepopulationmightoutbreedtheothers.Butforthiskindofexplanationoffeaturestobepossible,itmustbepossibletoconceivetheoccurrenceofthefeatureinsingleindividuals.Thereisnoproblemindescribingasingleindividualashavinglegsnmetreslong.Butthereisaproblemwiththeideathattheremightbejustasinglehumanlanguage-user.Itisnoteasytoexplainhowthehumanracemayhavebeguntouselanguagebyclaimingthatthelanguage-usingindividualsamongthepopulationwereadvantagedandsooutbredthenon-language-using302\nGODDarwin’stheoryofevolutionportrayedinPunch’sAlmanacfor1882,twentytwoyearsafterthepublicationofTheOriginofSpecies.individuals.Thisisnotsimplybecauseofthedifficultyofseeinghowspontaneousmutationcouldproducealanguage-usingindividual;itisthedifficultyofseeinghowanyonecouldbedescribedasalanguage-usingindividualatallbeforetherewasacommunityoflanguage-users.Humanlanguageisarule-governed,communalactivity,totallydifferentfromthesignallingsystemstobefoundinnon-humans.Ifwereflectonthesocialandconventionalnatureoflanguage,wemustfindsomethingoddintheideathatlanguagemayhaveevolvedbecauseoftheadvantagespossessed303\nGODbylanguage-usersovernon-language-users.Itseemsalmostasabsurdastheideathatbanksmayhaveevolvedbecausethosebornwithaninnatecheque-writingabilitywerebetteroffthanthosebornwithoutit.Languagecannotbetheresultoftrialanderrorlearningbecausesuchlearningpresupposesstablegoalsthatsuccessiveattemptsrealizeorfailtorealize(asaratmayfindorfailtofindafoodpelletinmaze).Butthereisnogoaltowhichlanguageisameans:onecannothavethegoalofacquiringalanguage,becauseoneneedsalanguagetohavethatwishin.Ifitisdifficulttoseehowlanguagecouldoriginatebynaturalselection,itisequallydifficulttoseehowlifecouldoriginatethatway.Howeversuccessfulnaturalselectionmaybeinexplainingtheoriginofparticularspeciesoflife,itclearlycannotexplainhowtherecametobesuchthingsasspeciesatall.Darwinneverclaimedthatitdid;hedidnotofferanexplanationoftheoriginoflife.Neo-Darwinians,bycontrast,oftenattempttotellushowlifebegan,speculating,say,aboutelectricalchangesinsomeprimevalorganicsoup.TheseexplanationsareofaradicallydifferentkindfromthosethatDarwinputforwardtoaccountforevolution.Neo-Darwinianstrytoexplainlifeasproducedbythechanceinteractionofnon-livingmaterialsandforcessubjecttopurelyphysicallaws.Theseaccounts,whatevertheirmerits,arenotexplanationsbynaturalselection.Naturalselectionandintelligentdesignarenotincompatiblewitheachother,inthewaythatnaturalselectionisincompatiblewiththeGenesisstory.Butthough‘intelligentdesign’maybeusedinpoliticalcirclesasaeuphemismforbiblicalfundamentalism,inthesheerideaofanextra-cosmicintelligencethereisnothingthatcommitsonetoabeliefintheJudaeo-Christian,oranyother,religiousrevelation.Tobesure,discussionofthepossibilityofsuchanintelligencedoesnotbelonginthescienceclassroom;ifitdid,theintelligencewouldnotbeanextra-cosmicone,butapartofnature.Butthatisnoreasonwhyphilosophersshouldnotgiveitseriousconsideration.Themostfundamentalreasoninfavourofpostulatinganextra-cosmicagencyofanykindissurelytheneedtoexplaintheoriginoftheuniverseitself.ItiswrongtosaythatGodprovidestheanswertothequestion,‘Whyistheresomethingratherthannothing?’Thequestionitselfisill-conceived:theproposition‘Thereisnothing’cannotbegivenacoherentsense,andthereforethereisnoneedtoaskwhyitisfalse.Itisnottheexistence304\nGODoftheuniversethatcallsforexplanation,butitscomingintoexistence.Atatimewhenphilosophersandscientistswerehappytoacceptthattheuniversehadexistedforever,therewasnoquestionoflookingforacauseofitsorigin,onlyoflookingforanexplanationofitsnature.Butwhenitisproposedthattheuniversebeganatapointoftimemeasurablydistantinthepast,thenitseemsperversesimplytoshrugone’sshouldersanddeclinetoseekanyexplanation.Inthecaseofanordinaryexistent,wewouldbeuneasywithablitheannouncementthattherewassimplynoreasonforitscomingintoexistence.UnlessweacceptaKantianviewofthelimitationsofreason,itseemsirrationaltoabandonthisattitudewhentheexistingthinginquestionisall-pervasive,liketheuniverse.Newman’sPhilosophyofReligionIfoneacceptsthattheoriginoftheuniverseneedssomeexplanationoutsideitself,thatisnotofitselfsufficienttoamounttoabeliefinGodasdefinedinthegreatmonotheistictraditions.Nor,evenaccordingtosomebelievers,isitnecessary.SodevoutaphilosopherasJohnHenryNewmancouldwrite,‘ItisindeedagreatquestionwhetherAtheismisnotasphilosophicallyconsistentwiththephenomenaofthephysicalworld,takenbythemselves,asthedoctrineofacreativeandgoverningpower’(US186).ForNewman,thejustificationofreligiousfaithcamefromquitediffer-entsources,asheexplainedinTheGrammarofAssent.‘Faith’,forNewman,hasaquiteprecisesense.FaithinGodismorethanjustbeliefthatthereisaGod:Aristotlebelievedinaprimemoverunmovedbuthisbeliefwasnotfaith.FaithinGodwasnotnecessarilytotalcommitmenttoGod:Marlowe’sFaustus,onthevergeofdamnation,stillbelievesinredemption.Faithcontrastedwithreasonandlove;thespecialfeatureofabeliefthatmakesitfaithisthatitisabeliefinsomethingasrevealedbyGod,beliefinapropositiononthewordofGod.SuchwasNewman’sconceptionoffaith.ItisaCatholicconception,differentfromtheLutheranonethatweencounteredinKierkegaard.Faith,understoodasbeliefratherthancommitment,isanoperationoftheintellect,notofthewilloremotions.Butisitareasonableoperationoftheintellect,orisitrashandirrational?Newmanacceptsthatthetesti-monyonwhichfaithisbasedisinitselfweak.Itcanonlyconvince305\nGODsomeonewhohasanantecedentsympathywiththecontentofthetestimony.Faith...doesnotdemandevidencesostrongasisnecessaryfor...beliefonthegroundofReason;andwhy?forthisreason,becauseitismainlyswayedbyantecedentconsiderations...previousnotices,prepossessions,and(inagoodsenseoftheword)prejudices.Themindthatbelievesisacteduponbyitsownhopes,fears,andexistingopinions.(US179–80)Newmaniswellawarethathisstressontheneedforpreparationoftheheartmaywellmakefaithappeartobenomorethanwishfulthinking.Heemphasizes,however,thatthemismatchbetweenevidenceandcommit-ment,andtheimportanceofpreviousattitudes,istobeobservednotonlyinreligiousfaith,butinothercasesofbelief.Wehearareportinthestreets,orreaditinthepublicjournals.Weknownothingoftheevidence;wedonotknowthewitnesses,oranythingaboutthem:yetsometimeswebelieveimplicitly,sometimesnot:sometimeswebelievewithoutaskingforevidence,sometimeswedisbelievetillwereceiveit.DidarumourcirculateofadestructiveearthquakeinSyriaortheSouthofEurope,weshouldreadilycreditit;bothbecauseitmighteasilybetrue,andbecauseitwasnothingtousthoughitwere.Didthereportrelatetocountriesnearerhome,weshouldtrytotraceandauthenticateit.Wedonotcallforevidencetillantecedentproba-bilitiesfail.(US180)TwoobjectionsmaybemadetoNewman’sclaimthatfaithisreasonableeventhoughacceptanceofitdependsnotsomuchonevidenceasonantecedentprobabilities.Thefirstisthatantecedentprobabilitiesmaybeequallyavailableforwhatistrueandforwhatmerelypretendstobetrue.Theysupplynointelligibleruletodecidebetweenagenuineandacounterfeitrevelation:Ifaclaimofmiraclesistobeacknowledgedbecauseithappenstobeadvanced,whynotforthemiraclesofIndiaaswellasforthoseofPalestine?IftheabstractpossibilityofaRevelationbethemeasureofgenuinenessinagivencase,whynotinthecaseofMahometaswellasoftheApostles?(US226)Newman,whoisnevermoreeloquentthanwhendevelopingcriticismsofhisownposition,nowhereprovidesasatisfactoryanswertothisobjection.Secondly,itmaybeobjectedthatthereisadifferencebetweenreligiousfaithandthereasonable,thoughinsufficientlygrounded,beliefstowhich306\nGODwegiveassentinourdailylives.InNewman’sownwords,Christianityistobe‘embracedandmaintainedastrue,onthegroundsofitsbeingdivine,notastrueonintrinsicgrounds,norasprobablytrue,orpartiallytrue,butasabsolutelycertainknowledge,certaininasenseinwhichnothingelsecanbecertain’.Intheordinarycases,wearealwaysreadytoconsiderevidencethattellsagainstourbeliefs;butthereligiousbelieveradoptsacertitudethatrefusestoentertainanydoubtaboutthearticlesoffaith.Newmanrespondsthateveninsecularmatters,itcanberationaltorejectobjectionsasidlephantoms,howevermuchtheymaybeinsisteduponbyapertinaciousopponent,orpresentthemselvesthroughanobsessiveimagination.IcertainlyshouldbeveryintolerantofsuchanotionasthatIshallonedaybeEmperoroftheFrench;Ishouldthinkittooabsurdeventoberidiculous,andthatImustbemadbeforeIcouldentertainit.Anddidamantrytopersuademethattreachery,cruelty,oringratitudewasaspraiseworthyashonestyandtemperance,andthatamanwholivedthelifeofaknaveanddiedthedeathofabrutehadnothingtofearfromfutureretribution,Ishouldthinktherewasnocallonmetolistentohisarguments,exceptwiththehopeofconvertinghim,thoughhecalledmeabigotandacowardforrefusingtoenterintohisspeculations.Ontheotherhand,abelievercancertainlyinvestigatetheargumentsforandagainsthisreligiousposition.Todosoneednotinvolveanyweakeningoffaith.Butmaynotaman’sinvestigationleadtohisgivinguphisassenttohiscreed?Indeeditmay,but:myvagueconsciousnessofthepossibilityofareversalofmybeliefinthecourseofmyresearches,aslittleinterfereswiththehonestyandfirmnessofthatbeliefwhilethoseresearchesproceed,astherecognitionofthepossibilityofmytrain’soversettingisanevidenceofanintentiononmypartofundergoingsogreatacalamity.(GA127)ThereisnoneedtofollowindetailtheargumentsbywhichNewmandoeshisbesttoshowthattheacceptanceoftheCatholicreligionistheactionofareasonableperson.HemaintainsthattheenduringhistoryofJudaismandChristianitythroughthevicissitudesofhumanaffairsisaphenomenonthatcarriesonitsfacetheprobabilityofadivineorigin.Butitdoesso,Newmanadmits,onlytosomeonewhoalreadybelievesthatthereisaGodwhowilljudgetheworld.307\nGODButwhatreasonisthereinthefirstplacetobelieveinGodandafuturejudgement?Inresponse,Newmanmakeshiscelebratedappealtothetestimonyofconscience:If,ondoingwrong,wefeelthesametearful,brokenheartedsorrowwhichoverwhelmsusonhurtingamother;if,ondoingright,weenjoythesamesunnyserenityofmind,thesamesoothingsatisfactorydelightwhichfollowsonourreceivingpraisefromafather,wecertainlyhavewithinustheimageofsomeperson,towhomourloveandvenerationlook,inwhosesmilewefindourhappiness,forwhomweyearn,towardswhomwedirectourpleadings,inwhoseangerwearetroubledandwasteaway.Thesefeelingsinusaresuchasrequirefortheirexcitingcauseanintelligentbeing.(GA76)Itisdifficultformembersofapost-Freudiangenerationtoreadthispassagewithoutacutediscomfort.Itisnotthemereexistenceofconscience—ofmoraljudgementsofrightandwrong—thatNewmanregardsasintima-tionsoftheexistenceofGod.Suchjudgementscanbeexplained—astheyarebymanyChristianphilosophersaswellasbyutilitarians—asconclusionsarrivedatbynaturalreasonandcommonsense.ItistheemotionalcolouringofconsciencethatNewmanclaimstobeechoesoftheadmonitionsofaSupremeJudge.ThefeelingsthatheeloquentlydescribesmayindeedbeappropriateonlyifthereisaFatherinheaven.Butnofeelingscanguaranteetheirownappropriatenessintheabsenceofreason.Earlier,wenoticedparallelsbetweentheaccountsofbeliefgivenbyNewmanandFrege.Fregehimselfhadnogreatinterestinphilosophyofreligion.Thereis,however,onepassageintheFoundationsofArithmeticthatisofgreatimportancetoanyoneinterestedinthepossibilityofprovingtheexistenceofGod.Fregesetsoutananalogybetweenexistenceandnumber.‘Affirmationofexistence’,hesays(FA65),‘isinfactnothingbutdenialofthenumbernought.’Whathemeansisthatanaffirmationofexistence(forexample,‘Angelsexist’or‘Thereare[suchthingsas]angels’)isanassertionthataconcept(forexample,angel)hassomethingfallingunderit.Andtosaythataconcepthassomethingfallingunderitistosaythatthenumberbelongingtothatconceptisnotzero.Itisbecauseexistenceisapropertyofconceptsandnotofobjects,Fregesays,thattheontologicalargumentfortheexistenceofGodbreaksdown.Thatistosay,that-there-is-a-Godcannotbeacomponentoftheconcept308\nGODGod,norcanitbeacomponentofthatconceptthat-there-is-only-one-God.IfinfactthereisoneandonlyoneGod,thatisaproperty,notofGod,butoftheconceptGod.Frege’sargumentwastakenbymanylaterphilosophers—includingBertrandRussell—asgivingthedeath-blowtotheontologicalargument.Butthematterisnotsosimple.Fregehasnotshownthatitisneverpossibletomakeaninference,astheontologicalargumentdoes,fromthecomponentsofaconcepttoitsproperties.Fregehimselfinfersfromthecomponentsoftheconceptequilateralright-angledtrianglethatithasthepropertyofpossessingthenumberzero.Perhaps,onemayargue,theremayalsobecaseswhereonecaninferfromthecomponentcharacteristicsofaconcepttoexistenceortouniqueness.Moreover,if,assomelaterlogicianshavedone,oneispreparedtoallowintoone’sontologynotonlyactualbutalsopossibleobjects,thenexistenceisindeedapropertyofobjects:itispreciselywhatmakessomeofthemactualandnotpossible.TheDeathofGodandtheSurvivalofReligionTwoyearsbeforeFregepublishedhiscriticismoftheontologicalargument,NietzschehadannouncedinTheGaySciencethatGodwasdead,thatbeliefintheChristianGodhadbecomeincredible.Hedidso,however,inthetonesnotofaphilosopher,butofanevangelist;hewasnotofferingargumentsagainstathesis,butproclaimingthegreatestofgoodnews.‘Atlastthehorizonliesfreebeforeus,evengrantedthatitisnotbright;atleast,thesea,oursealiesopenbeforeus.’TheChristianGod,withhiscommandsandprohibitions,hadbeenhithertothegreatestobstacletothefullnessofhumanlife.Nowthatheisdeadwearefreetoexpressourwilltolive.Nietzschehadnopatiencewiththosethinkers—particularlyinEngland—whotriedtopreserveChristianmoralitywhiledenyingtheChristianfaith.Hewasparticularlyscornfulofthat‘moralizinglittlewoman’GeorgeEliot,clingingontorespectabilityafterbeingemancipatedfromtheology.Christianity,Nietzschesays,isasystem,acoherentandcompleteviewofthings.Ifyoubreakoffoneofitsprincipalconcepts,thebeliefinGod,thenyoushatterthewholething;youhavenothingessentialleftinyourfingers.Christianitypresupposesthatmandoesnot—cannot—knowwhat309\nGODisgoodforhim,andwhatisevil:hebelievesinGod,andGodaloneknowsthesethings.Christianmoralityisanimperative;itsoriginistranscenden-tal;itisbeyondanycriticism,anyrighttocriticize;itistrueonlyifGodistruth—itstandsandfallswiththebeliefinGod(TI45).Theideaofamorallawwithoutalawgiverisvacuous.EnglishpeoplewhobelievethattheycandetectgoodandevilbyintuitionmerelyrevealhowmuchtheyarestillunderthehiddeninfluenceoftheChristianitytheyhavethrownoff.Whileahealthymoralitywouldfulfil‘thedecreesoflife’,conventionalmoralityisanti-naturalandfightsourvitalinstincts.‘Insaying‘‘Godlooksattheheart’’itsaysnotothelowestandhighestoflife’sdesires,andproclaimsGodastheenemyoflife...Thesaint,inwhomGodiswellpleased,istheidealcastrato...Lifeendswhere‘‘thekingdomofGod’’begins’(TI23).OnepersonwhotookseriouslyNietzsche’scriticismofsaintlinesswasWilliamJames.ForNietzsche,heobserved,thesaintrepresentslittlebutsneakingnessandslavishness.Heisthesophisticatedinvalid,thedegenerateparexcellence,themanofinsufficientvitality;hisprevalencewouldputthehumantypeindanger.PoorNietzsche’santipathy,Jamessaid,wassicklyenough,buttheclashhedescribesbetweentwoidealsisrealandimportant.‘Thewholefeud’,Jameswrote,‘revolvesessentiallyupontwopivots:Shalltheseenworldortheunseenworldbeourchiefsphereofadaptation?andmustourmeansofadaptationinthisseenworldbeaggressivenessornonresistance?’(VRE361).Jamesdevotedfiveofhis1902Giffordlecturestoadefenceofthevalueofsaintliness.Butthedefencewasqualified.‘Abstractlythesaintisthehighesttype’,heconcluded,‘butinthepresentenvironmentitmayfail,sowemakeourselvessaintsatourperil’(VRE10).TheVarietiesofReligiousExperienceisnotaworkofphilosophy,ofwhosepowersinthisareaJameswassceptical,norofanthropology,sinceitisbasednotonfieldworkbutonwrittensources.ItismorelikeaKamaSutraguidetotheexperiencesofthosewhohavesoughtreleaseandsatisfactioninreligion.(NotthatJameswelcomedanyassimilationofreligiontosex.‘Fewconceptionsarelessinstructive’,hewrote,‘thanthisre-interpretationofreligionaspervertedsexuality’;VRE33.)Besidessaintliness,Jamessurveyedreligiousphenomenasuchasthesenseofsin,theexperienceofconversion,andmysticalstates.Thetreat-mentofsaintlinessandconversionleftunansweredthequestion,‘Isthe310\nGODPhilosophershavelongdiscussedproofsanddisproofsofGod’sexistence;buttheriseandfallofreligionshasbeenduelesstoargumentthantocustomandcoercion.Thisisa1974receiptforpaymentofafineleviedintheU.S.S.R‘‘forbeliefinGod’’.senseofdivinepresenceasenseofanythingobjectivelytrue?’Mysticism,Jamesconcluded,wastooprivateandtoovarioustomakeanyclaimtouniversalauthority.Inthelastlecturesofhisseriesheaskedwhetherphilosophycouldstampanywarrantofveracityuponthereligiousman’ssenseofthedivine.JameshadlittlehopeofanyhelpfromtraditionalproofsofGod’sexistence,whethertheargumenttoafirstcause,ortheargumentfromdesign,ortheargumentfrommoralitytoalawgiver.‘TheargumentsforGod’sexistence’,hewrote,‘havestoodforhundredsofyearswiththewavesofunbelievingcriticismbreakingagainstthem,nevertotallydiscre-ditingthemintheearsofthefaithful,butonthewholeslowlyandsurelywashingthemortarfrombetweentheirjoints’(VRE420).JameslistedtheattributesofGodthattheologianshadstrivenoverthecenturiestoestablish:hisself-derivedexistence(aseity),hisnecessity,hisuniqueness,hisspirituality,hismetaphysicalsimplicity,hisimmensityandomnipresence,hisomniscienceandomnipotence.Jameshasabrief,no-nonsense,pragmatist’swaywiththeseconceptionsofnaturaltheology.Todevelopathought’smeaning,hestated,withasalutetoPeirce,weneed311\nGODonlydeterminewhatconductitisfittedtoproduce,andthatconductisforusitssolesignificance.IfweapplythisprincipletoGod’smetaphysicalattributes,wehavetoconfessthemdestituteofallintelligiblesignificance.TakeGod’saseityforexample;orhisnecessariness;hisimmateriality;his‘simplicity’orsuperioritytothekindofinnervarietyandsuccessionwhichwefindinfinitebeings,hisindivisibility,andlackoftheinnerdistinctionsofbeingandactivity,substanceandaccident,potentialityandactuality,andtherest;hisrepudiationofinclusioninagenus;hisactualizedinfinity;his‘personality’,apartfromthemoralqualitieswhichitmaycomport;hisrelationstoevilbeingpermissiveandnotpositive;hisself-sufficiency,self-love,andabsolutefelicityinhimself:—candidlyspeaking,howdosuchqualitiesasthesemakeanydefiniteconnectionwithourlife?Andiftheyseverallycallfornodistinctiveadaptationsofourconduct,whatvitaldifferencecanitpossiblymaketoaman’sreligionwhethertheybetrueorfalse?(VRE428)SomuchforGod’smetaphysicalattributes.Butwhatofhismoralattri-butes,suchasholiness,justice,andmercy?Surelytheseare,fromthepointofviewofpragmatism,onadifferentfooting:theypositivelydeterminefearandhopeandexpectations,andarefoundationsforthesaintlylife.Well,perhapsthesepredicatesaremeaningful;butdogmatictheologyhasneverproducedanyconvincingargumentsthattheydoinfactbelongtoGod.Andmodernidealism,Jamesbelieved,hassaidgoodbyetodogmatictheologyforever.Itisnotreason,hemaintainedinconclusion,thatisthesourceofreligion,butfeeling.Philosophicalandtheologicalformulasaresecondary.Allthatphilosophycandoistoassistinthearticulationofreligiousexperience,comparedifferentexpressionsofit,eliminatelocalandacciden-talelementsfromtheseexpressions,mediatebetweendifferentbelievers,andhelptobringaboutconsensusofopinion.Thetheologians’enume-rationofdivineepithetsisnotworthless,butitsvalueisaestheticratherthanscientific.‘Epithetslendanatmosphereandovertonestoourdevotion.Theyarelikeahymnofpraiseandserviceofglory,andmaysoundthemoresublimeforbeingincomprehensible’(VRE437–9).Inaworldgovernedbyscienceanditslaws,isthereanyroomforprayer?Jamesdistinguishesbetweenpetitionaryprayer,andprayerinawidersense.Amongpetitionaryprayers,hemakesafurtherdistinctionbetweenprayersforbetterweather,andprayersfortherecoveryofsickpeople.Thefirstarefutile,butnotnecessarilythesecond.‘Ifanymedicalfactcanbeconsidered312\nGODtostandfirm,itisthatincertainenvironmentsprayermaycontributetorecoveryandshouldbeencouragedasatherapeuticmeasure’(VRE443).Takeninawidersense,prayermeans‘everykindofinwardcommunionorconversationwiththepowerrecognizedasdivine’.This,Jamesmain-tains,isuntouchedbyscientificcriticism.Indeed,thewholeupshotofhisinvestigationofreligiousexperienceisthat‘religion,whereveritisanactivething,involvesabeliefinidealpresencesandabeliefthatinourprayerfulcommunionwiththem,workisdone,andsomethingrealcomestopass’.Butisthisbelieftrue,orisitamereanachronisticsurvivalfromapre-scientificage?Anyscienceofreligionisaslikelytobehostileastobefavourabletotheclaimthattheessenceofreligionistrue.Butscience,Jamesthinks,neednotnecessarilyhavethelastword.Religionisconcernedwiththeindividualandhispersonaldestiny,sciencewiththeimpersonalandgeneral.‘TheGodwhomsciencerecognizesmustbeaGodofuniversallawsexclusively,aGodwhodoesawholesale,notaretailbusiness’(VRE472).Butwhichismorereal,theuniversalortheparticular?AccordingtoJames,‘solongaswedealwiththecosmicandthegeneral,wedealonlywiththesymbolsofreality,butassoonaswedealwithprivateandpersonalphenomenaassuch,wedealwithrealitiesinthecompletestsenseoftheterm’(VRE476).Itisabsurdforsciencetoclaimthattheegotisticelementsofexperienceshouldbesuppressed.‘Religion,occupyingherselfwithpersonaldestiniesandkeepingthusincontactwiththeonlyabsoluterealitieswhichweknow,mustnecessarilyplayaneternalpartinhumanhistory’(VRE480).Jamesiswilling,inconclusion,tocallthesupremerealityintheuniverse‘God’.ButhispositiveaccountofGodisextremelynebulous;itissimilartoMatthewArnold’sdefinitionsofGodas‘thestreamoftendencybywhichallthingsseektofulfilthelawoftheirbeing’or‘aneternalpower,notourselves,thatmakesforrighteousness’.James’swoollinessofexpression,however,isonlytobeexpected,sinceheregardedreligionasessentiallyamatteroffeeling,andfeelingsasessentiallyinarticulate.Butitdisappointedmanyofhisfriends,whoregardedhim,onothertopics,asamodelofcandourandprecision.‘Hiswishesmadehimturndownthelights’,saidhisoldfriendOliverWendellHolmes,Jr.,‘soastogivemiracleachance.’22Letterof1Sept.1910,quotedinLouisMenand,TheMetaphysicalClub(London:Flamingo,2001),436.313\nGODFreudonReligiousIllusionFreud,ontheotherhand,wantedtoturnupthelightsonthedarkcornersofthesoulinordertoridtheworldofenchantment.Religion,hemaintained,wasanillusion;andheused‘illusion’inaprecisesenseasabeliefdeterminedbyhumanwishes.Illusions,forFreud,arenotnecessarilyfalsebeliefs,asdelusionsare,buttheyarebeliefsundeterminedbyevidence;iftheyaretrueitisbyahappyaccident.‘Forinstance,amiddle-classgirlmayhavetheillusionthataprincewillcomeandmarryher.Thisispossible;andafewsuchcaseshaveoccurred.’Freud’sdefinitionmeansthathecanmaintainthatreligionisanillusionwhile,intheoryatleast,leavingopenthequestionofthetruth-valueofreligiousbeliefs.Itisunlikely,hethinks,thattheMessiahwillcomeandfoundagoldenage;butreligiousdoctrinescannomorebedisprovedthantheycanbeproved.Religiousideas,FreudsaysinTheFutureofanIllusion,arenottheresultofexperienceorratiocination.Theyareillusions,fulfilmentsoftheoldest,strongestandmosturgentwishesofmankind.Thesecretoftheirstrengthliesinthestrengthofthosewishes....Theterrifyingimpressionofhelplessnessinchildhoodarousedtheneedforprotection—forprotectionthroughlove—whichwasprovidedbythefather;andtherecognitionthatthishelplessnesslaststhroughoutlifemadeitnecessarytoclingtotheexistenceofafather,butthistimeamorepowerfulone.ThusthebenevolentruleofadivineProvidenceallaysourfearofthedangersoflife;theestablishmentofamoralworld-orderensuresthefulfilmentofthedemandsofjustice,whichhavesooftenremainedunfulfilledinhumancivilization;andtheprolongationofearthlyexistenceinafuturelifeprovidesthelocalandtemporalframeworkinwhichthesewish-fulfilmentsshalltakeplace.(FI47–8)ThoughFreuddisownsanypretensiontorefutereligiousclaims,heclearlythinksitwouldbebetterforallconcernedifreligionwitheredaway.Religionhasrenderedgreatservicebyhelpingtotamehumaninstincts.Butinthethousandsofyearsithasheldswayithasachievedverylittle.Thereisnoevidencethatmenwereingeneralhappierwhenreligiousdoctrineswereuniversallyaccepted,andtheywerecertainlynomorallybetterthantheyarenowadays.Thegrowthofthescientificspirithasdecisivelyweakenedtheholdofreligion.‘Criticismhaswhittledawaytheevidentialvalueofreligiousdocuments,naturalsciencehasshownuptheerrorsinthem,andcomparativeresearchhasbeenstruckbythefatal314\nGODresemblancebetweenthereligiousideaswhichwerevereandthementalproductsofprimitivepeopleandtimes.’(FI63).ThusfarFreud’scriticismofreligion,ashehimselfinsists,owesnothingtopsychoanalysis.But,eversinceTotemandTabooin1913,hehadpro-poundedapsychoanalyticnarrativeoftheoriginofreligiousmorality.Intheearliestages,hereported,humanslivedinhordes,eachhordebeingruledbyaprimalfatherwhoenslavedtheothermenandpossessedallthewomen.Onedaythemenbandedtogetherandslewtheprimalfatherandestablishedtaboosagainstmurderandincest.Theprimalcrimeleftaninheritanceofguilt,sothathumansdeifiedthemurderedfatherintheirimaginationsanddeterminedtorespecthiswillhenceforward.Religion,onthisview,istheuniversalobsessionalneurosisofhumanity.LiketheobsessionalneurosisofchildrenitaroseoutoftheOedipuscomplex,outoftherelationtothefather.Ifthisviewisright,itistobesupposedthataturning-awayfromreligionwilloccurwiththefatalinevitabilityofaprocessofgrowth,andthatwefindourselvesatthisveryjunctureinthemiddleofthatphaseofdevelopment.(FI71)Freudtellsusthatthetimehascometoreplacetheeffectsofrepressionbytheresultsoftherationaloperationoftheintellect.Butwhatheisdoingisnotatallreplacingreligionwithscience,butsubstitutingforthemythofAdam’sfallanothermythofnogreatercredibilityasahistoricalnarrative.Hislaterwritingsdiminished,ratherthanincreased,anyplausibilitythatTotemandTaboomayhavepossessed.InMosesandMonotheismhemaintainedthattheprehistoricprimalmurderhadbeentwicerepeatedinhistorictimes—oncewhentheJewishpeoplemurderedMoses(didthey,now?)andoncewhentheymurderedJesus.Thus‘thereisarealpieceofhistoricaltruthinChrist’sresurrection,forhewastheresurrectedMosesandbehindhimthereturnedprimalfatheroftheprimitivehorde,transfiguredand,astheson,putintheplaceofthefather’(SExxiii.89–90).PhilosophicalTheologyafterWittgensteinGodishardlymentionedinWittgenstein’sTractatusLogico-Philosophicus:nodoubtheisamongthethingswhereofoneshouldkeepsilent.Butthroughouthislife,Wittgenstein,thoughheearlygaveuphisCatholicfaith,tookreligionveryseriously.‘TobelieveinGod’,hewroteina315\nGODnotebookduringtheFirstWorldWar,‘meanstoseethatlifehasameaning.’ButbelievinginGodwasnotamatterofassentingtoadoctrine.TheGospelsdonotprovideahistoricalbasisforfaith.Christianityisnotbasedonahistoricaltruth:rather,itoffersusa(historical)narrativeandsays:nowbelieve.Butnot:believethisnarrativewiththebeliefappropriatetoahistoricalnarrative;rather,believethroughthickandthin,whichyoucandoonlyasaresultofalife.Hereyouhaveanarrative;don’ttakethesameattitudeasyoutaketootherhistoricalnarratives.Makequiteadifferentplaceinyourlifeforit.(CV32)WittgensteinwasmostopposedtotheideathatChristianitywasreason-able,andthatitsreasonablenesswasestablishedbyabranchofphilosophycallednaturaltheology.Philosophy,hethought,couldnotgiveanymeaningtolife;thebestitcouldprovidewouldbeaformofwisdom.Butcomparedwiththeburningpassionoffaith,wisdomisonlycoldgreyash.Butthoughonlyfaith,andnotphilosophy,cangivemeaningtolife,thatdoesnotmeanthatphilosophyhasnorightswithintheterrainoffaith.Faithmayinvolvetalkingnonsense,andphilosophymaypointoutthatitisnonsense.HavingintheTractatusurgedustoavoidnonsensebysilence,Wittgensteinafterhisreturntophilosophysaid,‘Don’tbeafraidoftalkingnonsense’(CV56).Buthewentontoadd:‘Youmustkeepaneyeonyournonsense.’Thelogicalpositivistssharedtheviewthatreligiouslanguagewasnonsense;buttheyfeltforitnoneoftheparadoxicalrespectaccordeditbyWittgenstein.A.J.Ayer,inLanguage,TruthandLogic,offeredabriskproofthatreligiouslanguagewasmeaninglessandthat‘God’wasnotagenuinename.Areligiousman,hetellsus,wouldsaythatGodwasatranscendentbeingwhocouldnotbedefinedintermsofanyempiricalmanifestations.Butinthatcase,‘God’wasametaphysicalterm:Tosaythat‘Godexists’istomakeametaphysicalutterancewhichcannotbeeithertrueorfalse.Andbythesamecriterion,nosentencewhichpurportstodescribethenatureofatranscendentgodcanpossessanyliteralsignificance.Itisimportantnottoconfusethisviewofreligiousassertionswiththeviewthatisadoptedbyatheists,oragnostics.Foritischaracteristicofanagnostictoholdthattheexistenceofagodisapossibilityinwhichthereisnogoodreasoneithertobelieveordisbelieve;anditischaracteristicofanatheisttoholdthatitisatleastprobablethatnogodexists.Andourviewthatallutterancesaboutthenatureof316\nGODGodarenonsensical,sofarfrombeingidenticalwith,orevenlendinganysupportto,eitherofthesefamiliarcontentions,isactuallyincompatiblewiththem.Foriftheassertionthatthereisagodisnonsensical,thentheatheist’sassertionthatthereisnogodisequallynonsensical,sinceitisonlyasignificantpropositionthatcanbesignificantlycontradicted.(LTL115)Forsomeyears,believingphilosopherswerealarmedbyverificationistargumentsagainstreligiousdoctrines,andstrovetodefendtheirmeaning-fulnesswithoutmakingmuchefforttodemonstratetheirtruth.Towardstheendofthetwentiethcentury,however,somenaturaltheologiansrecoveredconfidenceandweremuchlessdefensiveintheirattitudes.TypicalofthisphaseisAlvinPlantinga,firstofCalvinCollege,GrandRapids,andlaterofNotreDameUniversity.Forinstance,Plantingahasofferedasophisticatedrestatementoftheontologicalargument.Inasimplifiedversionhisrevisiongoeslikethis.Letusbeginbydefiningthepropertyofmaximalexcellence,apropertythatincludesomniscience,omnipotence,andmoralperfection.ObviouslyGod,ifheexists,hasmaximalexcellenceintheactualworld.ButmaximalexcellenceisnotsufficientforGodhead:weneedtoconsiderworldsotherthanthisone.ThosewhoworshipGoddonotthinkofhimasabeingthathappenstobeofsurpassingexcellenceinthisworldbutwhoinsomeotherworldsispowerlessoruninformedorofdubiousmoralcharacter.Wemightmakeadistinctionherebetweengreatnessandexcellence;wemightsaythattheexcellenceofabeinginagivenworldWdependsonlyuponits...propertiesinW,whileitsgreatnessinWdependsnotmerelyuponitsexcellenceinW,butalsouponitsexcellenceinotherworlds.Thelimitingdegreeofgreatness,therefore,wouldbeenjoyedinagivenworldWonlybyabeingwhohadmaximalexcellenceinWandineveryotherpossibleworldaswell.3Maximalgreatnessthereforeismaximalexcellenceineverypossibleworld,anditismaximalgreatness,notjustmaximalexcellence,thatisequivalenttodivinityorGodhead.Anythingthatpossessesmaximalgreatnessmustexistineverypossibleworld,becauseinaworldinwhichitdoesnotexistitdoesnotpossessanyproperties.Ifitispossibleformaximalgreatnesstobeinstantiated,thenitisinstantiatedineveryworld.Ifso,thenitisinstan-tiatedinourworld,theactualworld;thatistosay,GodheadisinstantiatedandGodexists.3AlvinPlantinga,TheNatureofNecessity(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1974),214.317\nGODPlantinga’sargumentobviouslydependsonthecoherenceoftheappa-ratusofpossibleworlds,andonasolutionhavingbeenfoundtotheproblemoftransworldidentity.Hebelievesthathehasfoundsuchasolution,andhepresentsitatconsiderablelengthinhisbook.ButitshouldalsoberemarkedthatinthecaseofapossibleGod,ratherthanofapossiblehuman,theproblemdoesnotseemsopressing;itseemsfoolishtoputtoPlantingathequestion,‘WhichGodareyouprovingtheexistenceof?’Itremainsthecase,however,asPlantingahimselfpointsout,thatthewholeargumentdependsonthetruthofthepremissthatitispossibleformaximalgreatnesstobeexemplified—thatistosay,inhisterms,thatitisexemplifiedinsomepossibleworld.BertrandRussell,inhisHistoryofWesternPhilosophy,maintainedthattherewereinstanceswherephilosophyhadreacheddefinitiveanswerstocentralquestions.Hegaveasoneexampletheontologicalargument.‘ThisaswehaveseenwasinventedbyAnselm,rejectedbyThomasAquinas,acceptedbyDescartes,refutedbyKant,andreinstatedbyHegel.Ithinkitmaybesaidquitedecisivelythatasaresultofanalysisoftheconcept‘‘existence’’modernlogichasprovedthisargumentinvalid’(p.752).Plantinga’sreinstatementoftheargument,usinglogicaltechniquesmoremodernthananyavailabletoRussell,servesasasalutarywarningofthedangerthatawaitsanyhistorianoflogicwhodeclaresaphilosophicalissuedefinitivelyclosed.318\nCHRONOLOGY1757Burke’sEnquiryintotheOriginofourIdeasoftheSublimeandBeautiful1789Bentham’sIntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation1790Kant’sCritiqueofJudgement1800Wordsworth’sPrefacetoLyricalBallads1841Feuerbach’sEssenceofChristianity1843Mill’sSystemofLogic1844Schopenhauer’sWorldasWillandIdea(2ndedn.)1846Kierkegaard’sConcludingUnscientificPostscript1848MarxandEngels’sCommunistManifesto1859Mill’sOnLiberty;Darwin’sOntheOriginofSpecies1867Marx’sCapital,vol.I1870Newman’sEssayinAidofaGrammarofAssent1872Nietzsche’sBirthofTragedy1874Sidgwick’sMethodsofEthics1879Frege’sBegriffsschrift1884Frege’sGrundlagenderArithmetik1887Nietzsche’sGenealogyofMorals1897Tolstoy’sWhatisArt?1900Freud’sInterpretationofDreams1900–1Husserl’sLogicalInvestigations1905Russell’sOnDenoting1910RussellandWhitehead’sPrincipiaMathematica1918Wittgenstein’sTractatusLogico-Philosophicus1927Heidegger’sSeinundZeit1929WissenschaftlicheWeltauffassungderWienerKreis1936Ayer’sLanguage,TruthandLogic1943Sartre’sL’Eˆtreetlene´ant1945Popper’sOpenSocietyanditsEnemies1953Wittgenstein’sPhilosophicalInvestigations1957Anscombe’sIntention\nCHRONOLOGY1959Strawson’sIndividuals1960Quine’sWordandObject1967Derrida’sGrammatologie1970Davidson’s‘MentalEvents’1971Rawls’sTheoryofJustice320\nABBREVIATIONSANDCONVENTIONSWorkscitedarequotedbypagenumberunlessotherwisespecified.AnscombeERPEthics,ReligionandPolitics(Oxford:Blackwell,1981)AyerLTLLanguage,TruthandLogic,2ndedn.(London:Gollancz,1949)BenthamBTheWorksofJeremyBentham,ed.JohnBowring,10vols.(NewYork:Russell&Russell,1962)PIntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation,ed.J.H.BurnsandH.L.A.Hart(London:Athlone,1982);citedbychapter,section,and/orsubsectionBrentanoPESPsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint,ed.OskarKraus,2vols.(Hamburg:Meiner,1955)CollingwoodPAPrinciplesofArt(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1938)DarwinOSOntheOriginofSpecies,OxfordWorld’sClassics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1996)DavidsonEAEssaysonActionsandEvents(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1980)ITIInquiriesintoTruthandInterpretation(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1984)\nABBREVIATIONSANDCONVENTIONSDerridaDiff.WritingandDifference,trans.AlanBass(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1978)GOfGrammatology,trans.G.C.Spivak(Baltimore,Md.:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1976)PPositions,trans.A.Bass(Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,1981)SPSpeechandPhenomena(Evanston,III.:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1973)EngelsSeeunderMarx.FeuerbachECTheEssenceofChristianity,trans.G.Eliot(NewYork:Harper,1957)WSa¨mtlicheWerke,12vols.(Stuttgart:Bolin,1959–60)FregeBLATheBasicLawsofArithmetic:ExpositionoftheSystem,trans.MontgomeryFurth(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1964)CNConceptualNotationandRelatedArticles,trans.T.W.Bynum(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1972)CPCollectedPapersonMathematics,LogicandPhilosophy,ed.B.McGuinness(Oxford:Blackwell,1984)FATheFoundationsofArithmetic,trans.J.L.Austin(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1950,1980)PWPosthumousWritings(Oxford:Blackwell,1979)FreudEITheEgoandtheId(London:HogarthPress,1962)FITheFutureofanIllusion(GardenCity,NY:Doubleday,1964)NILNewIntroductoryLecturesonPsychoanalysis(London:HogarthPress,1949)SETheStandardEditionoftheCompletePsychologicalWorksofSigmundFreud,24vols.(London:HogarthPress,1981)HusserlCCHBarrySmithandDavidWoodruffSmith(eds.),TheCambridgeCompaniontoHusserl(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995)322\nABBREVIATIONSANDCONVENTIONSCMCartesianMeditations(Dordrecht:Kluwer,1988)IdeasIdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenology,3vols.(Dordrecht:Kluwer,1980,1982,1989)LILogicalInvestigations,ed.J.N.Findlay,2vols.(London:Routledge,2001)JamesTTheMeaningofTruth(NewYork:PrometheusBooks,1997)VREVarietiesofReligiousExperience(London:Fontana,1960)KantMCritiqueofJudgement,ed.J.C.Meredith(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1978)KierkegaardE/OEither/Or,trans.A.Hannay(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1992)FTFearandTrembling,trans.A.Hannay(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1985)PPapersandJournals:ASelection,trans.A.Hannay(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1996)SDSicknessuntoDeath,trans.A.Hannay(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1989)MarxCCapital,ed.D.McLellan,OxfordWorld’sClassics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995)CMKarlMarxandFriedrichEngels,TheCommunistManifesto,ed.D.McLellan,OxfordWorld’sClassics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1992)CPECritiqueofPoliticalEconomy(Moscow:Progress,1971)EWEarlyWritings(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1975)GITheGermanIdeology,ed.C.J.Allen(London:Lawrence&Wishart,1920,2004)TFThesesonFeuerbach(NewYork:PrometheusBooks,1998)VPPValues,PriceandProfit,ed.E.M.Aveling(NewYork:InternationalPublishers,1935)323\nABBREVIATIONSANDCONVENTIONSMill3EThreeEssays(London:Longman,1887)AAutobiography,ed.J.Stillinger(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1969)CCMTheCambridgeCompaniontoMill,ed.J.Skorupski(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998)CWTheCollectedWorksofJohnStuartMill,ed.JohnM.Robson,33vols.(Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,1963–91)LOnLibertyandOtherEssays,OxfordWorld’sClassics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1991)SLASystemofLogic;manyeditions;citedbybookandsectionnumberUUtilitarianism,ed.M.Warnock(London:Collins,1962)NewmanGATheGrammarofAssent,ed.I.Ker(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1985)USUniversitySermons(London:Rivington,1844)NietzscheBGEBeyondGoodandEvil,trans.M.Faber,OxfordWorld’sClassics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998)BTTheBirthofTragedy,trans.S.Whiteside(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1993,2003)GMTheGenealogyofMorals,trans.D.Smith,OxfordWorld’sClassics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1996)TITwilightoftheIdols,trans.D.Langan,OxfordWorld’sClassics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998)WPTheWilltoPower(NewYork:Vintage,1968)ZThusSpokeZarathustra(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1961)PeirceCPCollectedPapersofCharlesSandersPeirce,8vols.(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1931–58)EWPTheEssentialWritingsofCharlesPeirce,ed.E.C.Moore(NewYork:PrometheusBooks,1998)PPragmatism(NewYork:PrometheusBooks,1997)324\nABBREVIATIONSANDCONVENTIONSPopperOSETheOpenSocietyanditsEnemies,2vols.(London,1945)QuineFLPVFromaLogicalPointofView(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1953)WOWordandObject(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1960)RawlsTJATheoryofJustice(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1971)RussellATheAutobiographyofBertrandRussell,1872–1916(London:Allen&Unwin,1967)AMTheAnalysisofMind(London:Allen&Unwin,1921)IMPIntroductiontoMathematicalPhilosophy(London:Allen&Unwin,1917)PMThePrinciplesofMathematics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1903;2ndedn.,1927)PPTheProblemsofPhilosophy(London:OxfordUniversityPress,1912)RyleCMTheConceptofMind(London:Hutchinson,1949)CPCollectedPapers,2vols.(London:Hutchinson,1949)SartreBNBeingandNothingness,trans.HazelBarnes(London:Routledge,1969)EHExistentialismandHumanism(London:Methuen,1947)SchopenhauerEAEssaysandAphorisms,trans.R.J.Hollingdale(London:Penguin,2004)WWITheWorldasWillandRepresentation,trans.E.F.Payne,2vols.(NewYork:Dover,1969);allquotationsarefromvolumeI.SidgwickMEMethodsofEthics(London:Macmillan,1901)325\nABBREVIATIONSANDCONVENTIONSStrawsonIIndividuals(London:Methuen,1959)TolstoyWAWhatisArt?(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1966)WittgensteinBBTheBlueandBrownBooks(Oxford:Blackwell,1958)CVCultureandValue(Oxford:Blackwell,1980)NBNotebooks1914–1916(Oxford:Blackwell,1961)OCOnCertainty(Oxford:Blackwell,1969)PGPhilosophicalGrammar,trans.A.Kenny(Oxford:Blackwell,1974)PIPhilosophicalInvestigations,trans.G.E.M.Anscombe(Oxford:Blackwell,1953,1997);particitedbyparagraph,partiibypageTLPTractatusLogico-Philosophicus(London:Routledge,1921,1961);citedbyparagraphZZettel(Oxford:Blackwell,1967)326\nBIBLIOGRAPHYGeneralTheRoutledgeHistoryofPhilosophycontainsfivevolumesthatoverlapwiththeperiodofthisvolume.TheyarevolumeVI,TheAgeofGermanIdealism,ed.RobertSolomonandKathleenHiggins;VII,TheNineteenthCentury,ed.C.L.Ten;VIII,ContinentalPhilosophyinthe20thCentury,ed.RichardKearney;IX,PhilosophyofScience,LogicandMathematicsinthe20thCentury,ed.S.G.Shanker;andX,PhilosophyofMeaning,KnowledgeandValueinthe20thCentury.TheRoutledgeEncyclopaediaofPhilosophyalsocontainsmanyarticlesaboutthepeopleandtopicstreatedhere.Titlesmarked‘AP’appearedintheRoutledgeseriesArgumentsofthePhilo-sophers,andtitlesmarked‘PM’appearedintheOxfordseriesPastMasters.Copleston,F.C.,AHistoryofPhilosophy,vols.vii–ix(London:BurnesOates,1963–75)Kenny,A.,ABriefHistoryofWesternPhilosophy(Oxford:Blackwell,1998)——(ed.),TheOxfordIllustratedHistoryofWesternPhilosophy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1994)Kneale,W.andM.,TheDevelopmentofLogic(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1962)MacIntyre,Alasdair,AShortHistoryofEthics(London:Macmillan,1966)——AfterVirtue:AStudyinMoralTheory(London:Duckworth,1981)BenthamTheCollectedWorksofJeremyBentham,ed.J.H.Burns,J.R.Dinwiddy,andF.Rosen(London:Athlone,1968–)IntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation,ed.J.H.BurnsandH.L.A.Hart(London:OxfordUniversityPress,1982)Dinwiddy,J.R.,Bentham(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1989)Harrison,Ross,Bentham(London:1983)(AP)Hart,H.L.A.,EssaysonJurisprudenceandPoliticalTheory(Oxford:1982)MillandSidgwickTheCollectedWorksofJohnStuartMill,ed.JohnM.Robson,33vols.(Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,1963–91)Mill,OnLiberty,OxfordWorld’sClassics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1991)Mill,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,OxfordWorld’sClassics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1994)\nBIBLIOGRAPHYTheCambridgeCompaniontoMill,ed.J.Skorupski(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998)Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics(1874);themostconvenienteditionis(London:Macmillan,1901)Alexander,Edward,MatthewArnoldandJohnStuartMill(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1965)Berlin,Isaiah,FourEssaysonLiberty(London:OxfordUniversityPress,1969)Crisp,Roger,AGuidebooktoJ.S.Mill’sUtilitarianism(London:Routledge,1997)Mackie,J.L.,TheCementoftheUniverse(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1973)Ryan,Alan,ThePhilosophyofJohnStuartMill,2ndedn.(NewYork:Macmillan,1988)Schultz,Bart,HenrySidgwick,EyeoftheUniverse(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004)Skorupski,John,JohnStuartMill(London:Routledge,1989)(AP)SchopenhauerSchopenhauer’sworksareavailableinseveralGermaneditions,ofwhichthemostrecentisWerkeinfu¨nfBanden.NachdenAusgabenletzterHand,ed.LudgerLu¨tkehaus,5vols.(Zurich:HaffmansVerlag,1988).ThemostconvenientrecentEnglisheditionofhismainworkisTheWorldasWillandRepresentation,trans.E.F.Payne,2vols.(NewYork:Dover,1969).Englishtranslationsofotherworksinclude:EssaysandAphorisms,trans.R.J.Hollingdale(London:Penguin,2004)EssayontheFreedomoftheWill,trans.K.Kolenda(Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1960)OntheFourfoldRootofthePrincipleofSufficientReason,trans.E.F.Payne(LaSalle,Ill.:OpenCourt,1974)TheCambridgeCompaniontoSchopenhauer,ed.ChristopherJanaway(Cambridge:Cam-bridgeUniversityPress,1999)Gardiner,Patrick,Schopenhauer(Bristol:ThoemmesPress,1997)Hamlyn,D.W.,Schopenhauer(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1980)(AP)Magee,Bryan,ThePhilosophyofSchopenhauer(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1997)Tanner,Michael,Schopenhauer:MetaphysicsandArt(London:Phoenix,1998)KierkegaardThereisatwenty-volumeeditionofKierkegaard’sworksinDanish,whichhasgonethroughthreeeditions.AcompleteEnglishedition,translatedbyHowardV.Hongandothers,isbeingpublishedintwenty-sixvolumesbyPrince-tonUniversityPress.InEngland,PenguinhavepublishedtranslationsofseveralofhisworksbyAlastairHannay(FearandTrembling(1985);TheSicknessuntoDeath(1989);Either/Or(1992);PapersandJournals:ASelection(1996))328\nBIBLIOGRAPHYTheCambridgeCompaniontoKierkegaard,ed.AlastairHannayandGordonD.Marino(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998)Gardiner,Patrick,Kierkegaard(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998)(PM)Hannay,Alastair,Kierkegaard(London:Routledge,1991)(AP)Pojman,Louis,TheLogicofSubjectivity:Kierkegaard’sPhilosophyofReligion(Tuscaloosa:UniversityofAlabamaPress,1984)Rudd,A.,KierkegaardandtheLimitsoftheEthical(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993)MarxThefirstcompleteeditionoftheworksofMarxandEngelsinGermanwaspublishedbytheEastGermanauthoritiesin1968(Marx-EngelsWerke).AnEnglishtranslationofthiseditionwascommencedbytheLondonpublishersLawrence&Wishart.EnglishtranslationsofthemajorworkshaveappearedintheMarxLibrary(NewYork:RandomHouse;Harmondsworth:Penguin)between1974and1984.AconvenientabridgementofCapital,editedbyDavidMcLellan,appearedinOxfordWorld’sClassicsin1995.TheCambridgeCompaniontoMarx,ed.TerrellCarver(Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-sityPress,1991)Berlin,Isaiah,KarlMarx,4thedn.(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1978)Kolakowski,Leszek,MainCurrentsinMarxism,trans.P.S.Falla,3vols.(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1978)Mclellan,David,KarlMarx:HisLifeandThought(NewYork:Harper&Row,1973)Singer,Peter,Marx(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1980)(PM)Wheen,Francis,KarlMarx(London:FourthEstate,1999)DarwinOntheOriginofSpeciesisavailableinmanyeditions,notablyOxfordWorld’sClassicsandPenguinClassics.Recentphilosophicaldiscussionsofhisworkappearinthefollowing:Ruse,M.,TakingDarwinSeriously:ANaturalisticApproachtoPhilosophy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1986)Sober,Elliott,PhilosophyofBiology(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993)NewmanNewman’smajorphilosophicalworkisAnEssayinAidofaGrammarofAssent(ed.I.Ker(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1985)).ThereisagoodPastMastersbiographybyOwenChadwick(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1983).Grave,S.A.,ConscienceinNewman’sThought(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1989)329\nBIBLIOGRAPHYNietzscheThecriticaleditionofhiscollectedworksisKritischeGesamtausgabeWerke,editedbyG.ColliandM.Montinari,30vols.in8parts(Berlin:deGruyter,1967–).AmoreconvenientGermaneditionisWerkeinDreiBa¨nden,editedbyKarlSchlechta(Munich:CarlHansers,1965).ThefollowingworkshavebeentranslatedintoEnglishbyWalterKaufmannandpublishedinNewYorkbyRandomHouse:BeyondGoodandEvil(1966),TheBirthofTragedy(1967),OntheGenealogyofMorals(1967),TheGayScience(1974).SeveralofNietzscheworks,includingThusSpakeZarathustra,areavailableinOxfordWorld’sClassicsandPenguinClassics.Danto,Arthur,NietzscheasPhilosopher:AnOriginalStudy(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1965)Hollingdale,R.J.,Nietzsche(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1973)Schacht,R.,Nietzsche(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1983)PeirceTheCollectedPapersofCharlesSandersPeircewerepublishedineightvolumesbyHarvardUniversityPressbetween1931and1958.Anew,chronologicaleditionhasbeenunderwaysince1982,publishedbyIndianaUniversityPress.Meanwhile,thereareaccessiblecollectionsofhismainpapersinthetwo-volumeTheEssentialPeirce,editedbyN.HouserandC.Kloesel(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1992–4)andintheone-volumeTheEssentialWritings,editedbyE.C.Moore(NewYork:PrometheusBooks,1998)Brent,J.,CharlesSandersPeirce:ALife(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1993)Hookway,Christopher,Peirce(London:Routledge,1985)(AP)FregeThemostwidelyavailableworksofFregeinEnglisharethefollowing:ConceptualNotationandRelatedArticles,trans.T.W.Bynum(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1972)TheFoundationsofArithmetic,trans.J.L.Austin(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1950,1980)CollectedPapersonMathematics,LogicandPhilosophy,ed.B.McGuinness(Oxford:Blackwell,1984)TheBasicLawsofArithmetic:ExpositionoftheSystem,trans.MontgomeryFurth(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1964)Dummett,Michael,Frege:PhilosophyofLanguage(London:Duckworth,1973)——TheInterpretationofFrege’sPhilosophy(London:Duckworth,1981)——Frege:PhilosophyofMathematics(London:Duckworth,1991)Kenny,A.,Frege(London:Penguin,1995;Oxford:Blackwell,2000)330\nBIBLIOGRAPHYJamesThePrinciplesofPsychologyof1890hasbeenreissuedmanytimes:aconvenientreprintistheDoverpaperback(2vols.in1;NewYork,1950).VarietiesofReligiousExperienceisalsoavailableinmanyeditions,includingonebyCollierMacmillanofLondonin1961.Ayer,A.J.,TheOriginsofPragmatism(London:Macmillan,1968)Bird,G.,WilliamJames(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1987)(AP)BritishIdealistsandCriticsAyer,A.J.,Language,TruthandLogic,2ndedn.(London:Gollancz,1949)Bradley,F.H.,AppearanceandReality(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1893)——EthicalStudies,2ndedn.(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1927)Green,T.H.,ProlegomenatoEthics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1883)McTaggart,TheNatureofExistence(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1910,1927)Moore,G.E.,PrincipiaEthica(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1903)Baldwin,Thomas,G.E.Moore(London:Routledge,1990)Geach,Peter,Truth,Love,andImmortality:AnIntroductiontoMcTaggart’sPhilosophy(London:Methuen,1979)Wollheim,Richard,F.H.Bradley(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1959)RussellAmongthemoreimportantofRussell’scopiouspublicationsareThePrinciplesofMathematics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1903;2ndedn.,1927);‘OnDenoting’,Mind,14(1905)(oftenreprinted);TheProblemsofPhilosophy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1912);OurKnowledgeoftheExternalWorld(London:Allen&Unwin,1914);IntroductiontoMathematicalPhilosophy(London:Methuen,1917);TheAnalysisofMind(London:Allen&Unwin,1921);HumanKnowledge:ItsScopeandLimits(London:Allen&Unwin,1948)Ayer,A.J.,BertrandRussell(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1988)Pears,D.F.,BertrandRussellandtheBritishTraditioninPhilosophy(London:Fontana,1967)Sainsbury,Mark,Russell(London:Routledge,1979)(AP)WittgensteinWittgenstein’sentireNachlassisavailableintranscriptionandfacsimileinelectronicform,inatextestablishedbytheUniversityofBergenandpublishedbyOxfordUniversityPress(Oxford,1998).TractatusLogico-PhilosophicuswaspublishedbyRoutledge&KeganPaulinLondonin1921;anewtranslationbyD.F.PearsandBrianMcGuinnesswaspublishedin1961.OtherwritingsofWittgensteinwereallpublished331\nBIBLIOGRAPHYposthumouslybyBlackwellatOxford,includingNotebooks1914–1916(1961);Philosoph-icalInvestigations(1953,1997);PhilosophicalRemarks(1966);PhilosophicalGrammar(1974);CultureandValue(1980);RemarksonthePhilosophyofPsychology(1980);LastWritingsonthePhilosophyofPsychology(1982,1992);OnCertainty(1969).AcomprehensiveandscholarlycommentaryonthePhilosophicalInvestigationswasproducedbyG.P.BakerandP.M.S.Hackerbetween1980and1996.In1994IpublishedwithBlackwellananthologyoftextsunderthetitleTheWittgensteinReader.Asecondeditionappearedin2006.Anscombe,G.E.M.,AnIntroductiontoWittgenstein’s‘Tractatus’(London:Hutchinson,1959)Kenny,A.,Wittgenstein(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1973;Oxford:Blackwell,2006)Kripke,Saul,WittgensteinonRulesandPrivateLanguage(Oxford:Blackwell,1982)Pears,David,TheFalsePrison(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1997,1998)Rundle,Bede,WittgensteinandContemporaryPhilosophyofLanguage(Oxford:Blackwell,1990)AnalyticPhilosophyAnexcellentoverviewisgivenbyP.M.S.HackerinWittgenstein’sPlaceinTwentiethCenturyAnalyticPhilosophy(Oxford:Blackwell,1996).Importantworksbyindividualanalyticphilosophersarelistedbelow.Anscombe,G.E.M.,Intention(Oxford:Blackwell,1957)Austin,J.L.,HowtoDoThingswithWords(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1961)Davidson,Donald,EssaysonActionsandEvents(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1980)——InquiriesintoTruthandInterpretation(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1984)Fłllesdal,Dagfinn,ReferentialOpacityandModalLogic(London:Routledge,2004)Geach,Peter,MentalActs(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1958)Quine,W.V.O.,FromaLogicalPointofView(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1953)——WordandObject(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1960)Rawls,John,ATheoryofJustice(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1971)Ryle,Gilbert,TheConceptofMind(London:Hutchinson,1949)——CollectedPapers(London:Hutchinson,1949)Strawson,P.F.,Individuals(London:Methuen,1959)FreudFreud’sworksarecollectedinGermaninGesammelteWerke,editedbyA.Freudandothers(FrankfurtamMain:S.FischerVerlag,1960–87).InEnglishthereisTheStandardEditionoftheCompletePsychologicalWorksofSigmundFreud,24vols.(London:HogarthPress,1981).AllthemostsignificantworksareeasilyaccessibleinThePenguinFreudLibrary,editedbyA.RichardsandA.Dickson.332\nBIBLIOGRAPHYTheCambridgeCompaniontoFreud,ed.J.Neu(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991)Gay,P.,Freud:ALifeforourTime(NewYork:Norton,1988)Lear,Jonathan,Freud(London:Routledge,2005)Rieff,P.,Freud:TheMindoftheMoralist(Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,1979)Wollheim,R.,SigmundFreud(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1971)——andHopkins,J.(eds.),PhilosophicalEssaysonFreud(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982)HusserlThecriticaleditionofHusserl’sworkswasinauguratedin1950withthepublica-tionofCartesianischeMeditationen.Sincethentwenty-eightvolumeshaveappeared,editedfirstbyLeovanBreda,andlaterbySamuelIjsseling.ItisnowpublishedbyKluwer(Dordrecht).ThemostusefulEnglishtranslationsareLogicalInvestigations,trans.J.N.Findlay,2ndedn.(London:Routledge,2001);IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,FirstBook,trans.F.Kersten(TheHague:Nijhoff,1982);SecondBook,trans.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer(Dor-drecht:Kluwer,1989);ThirdBook,trans.T.E.KleinandW.E.Phol(Dordrecht:Kluwer,1980);Husserl,ShorterWorks,ed.andtrans.P.McCormickandF.Elliston(NotreDame,Ind.:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1981).TheCambridgeCompaniontoHusserl,ed.BarrySmithandDavidWoodruffSmith(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995).Bell,David,Husserl(London:Routledge,1989)(AP)Dreyfus,H.L.(ed.),Husserl,IntentionalityandCognitiveScience(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1982)Mohanty,J.N.,andMcKenna,W.R.(eds.),Husserl’sPhenomenology:ATextbook(Lanham,Md.:CentreforAdvancedResearchinPhenomenology,1989)Simons,Peter,PhilosophyandLogicinCentralEuropefromBolzanotoTarski(Dordrecht:Kluwer,1992)HeideggerAGesamtausgabeofHeidegger’sworksisplannedinapproximately100volumes.SomeseventyhavenowbeenpublishedbyKlostermann(FrankfurtamMain).Englishtranslationsofthemajorworksinclude:BeingandTime,transJ.Stambaugh(Albany,NY:SUNYPress,1996);BasicWritings,ed.D.F.Krell(NewYork:Harper&Row,1977);WhatisPhilosophy?,trans.W.KlubackandJ.T.Wilde(NewHaven,Conn.:College&UniversityPress,1958)TheCambridgeCompaniontoHeidegger,ed.C.Guignon(Cambridge:CambridgeUni-versityPress,1993)333\nBIBLIOGRAPHYDreyfus,H.L.,Being-in-the-World:ACommentaryonHeidegger’s‘BeingandTime’DivisionI(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1991)Mulhall,Stephen,OnBeingintheWorld:WittgensteinandHeideggeronSeeingAspects(London:Routledge,1990)Pöggler,Otto,MartinHeidegger’sPathofThinking,trans.D.MagurshakandS.Barber(AtlanticHighlands,NJ:HumanitiesPress,1987)Steiner,George,MartinHeidegger(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1987)SartreLaNause´e(Paris,1938),trans.RobertBaldickasNausea(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1965)L’Eˆtreetlene´ant(Paris,1943),trans.HazelBarnesasBeingandNothingness(London:Routledge,1969)L’Existentialismeestunhumanisme(Paris,1946),trans.PhilipMairetasExistentialismandHumanism(London:Methuen,1948)Caws,P.,Sartre(London:Routledge,1979)(AP)Cooper,David,Existentialism,aReconstruction(Oxford:Blackwell,1990)Warnock,Mary,ThePhilosophyofSartre(London:Hutchinson,1965)DerridaDelagrammatologie(Paris,1967),trans.G.C.SpivakasOfGrammatology(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1976)L’E´critureetladiffe´rence(Paris,1967),trans.AlanBassasWritingandDifference(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1978)Positions,trans.AlanBass(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1981)Norris,Christopher,Derrida(London:Routledge,1987)(AP)Royle,Nicholas,JacquesDerrida(London:Routledge,2003)334\nILLUSTRATIONSPage3Bentham’splanforaperfectprison,thePanopticonTimeLifePictures/GettyImages10HarrietTaylorNationalPortraitGallery,London19AposthumousdrawingofKierkegaard,byVilhelmMarstrandakg-images32Salome´,Re´e,andNietzscheakg-images36C.S.PeircewithhissecondwifeJuliettePrestonTuttleCollection,InstituteforStudiesinPragmaticism,TexasTechUni-versity–bypermissionofPhilosophyDepartment,HarvardUniversity49ThehallofTrinityCollegeCambridgeWimSwaanPhotographicCollectionResearchLibrary,TheGettyResearchInstitute,LosAngeles,California(96.P.21)61A.J.AyerSuzanneBernard/CameraPress,London73GilbertRyle’sconference,ChristChurchOxfordc.197084MartinHeideggerakg-images95JacquesDerridaStevePyke/GettyImages102LadyGlencoraPalliserTheSyndicsofCambridgeUniversityLibrary,fromAnthonyTrollope‘PhineasFinn’1869,W.18.10108Frege’ssymbolism\nILLUSTRATIONS125AletterfromFregetoHusserl138Wittgenstein’shouseakg-images/ullsteinbild146JohnHenryNewmanGettyImages152PiusIX’sVaticanCouncilGettyImages167TilledfieldJoanMiro´TheTilledField(LaTerrelaboure´e)1923–1924.OilonCanvas66x92.7cm(26x1362inches)SolomonRGuggenheimMuseum,NewYork72.2020ßSuccessionMiro/ADAGP,ParisandDACS,London2006175AlithographofF.StassenillustratesthemomentinWagner’soperainwhichIsoldehandsthefatefulpotiontoTristanakg-images183AlecturemanuscriptofPeirceBypermissionoftheHoughtonLibrary,HarvardUniversity;MSCSP301190W.V.O.QuineHarvardUniversity199PhrenologicaldiagramTheSyndicsofCambridgeUniversityLibraryfromSpurzheim‘PhrenologyortheDoctrineoftheMind’1825,c.82.23213WittgensteinintheperiodwhenhewasworkingouthisfinalphilosophyofmindAnthonyKenny217AmosaicfromS.MarcoinVeniceshowingGodinfusingasoulintoAdamßPhotoSCALA,Florence(StMark’sBasilica,Venice,1998)229AportraitphotoofSchopenhauertakenabout1850akg-images240SupermenasrepresentedonthejacketofaNietzscheanbookakg-images336\nILLUSTRATIONS247ElizabethAnscombeandPeterGeachStevePyke/GettyImages260ApaybillforthePraguepremiereofDonGiovanniakg-images272JeremyBentham’s‘‘auto-icon’’UniversityCollege,London276Punchcartoonof1867satirisingMill’scrusadeforequalitybetweenthesexesGettyImages286PhotopostcardofKarlMarxakg-images294GustavDore´’s1866representationofthesacrificeofAbrahamTimeLifePictures/GettyImages300JohnStuartMillwithhisstepdaughterHelenGettyImages303Darwin’stheoryofevolutionportrayedinPunch’sAlmanacfor1882GettyImages311A1974receiptforpaymentofafineleviedintheU.S.S.R.‘‘forbeliefinGod’’EndpapersBorisAnrep‘Lucidity’(left)andBorisAnrep‘Curiosity’(right)ßTheAnrepFamilyEstateandTheNationalGallery,LondonInafewinstanceswehavebeenunabletotracethecopyrightholderpriortopublication.Ifnotified,thepublisherswillbepleasedtoamendtheacknowledgementsinanyfutureedition.337\nThispageintentionallyleftblank\nINDEXapriorivsaposteriori156Auden,W.H.78abduction107–9Augustine,St76,301Abraham17,293–5Austin,J.L.91–2Absolute47,191Austria-Hungary132absolutism224authenticity86accessibility119authority151–2acquaintance53,160–2auto-icon5,272actions,immanentvstransient210awareness193actualityvspotentiality63,188–9,202axiomaticsystems39,105–7,111–16Adler,Alfred74Ayer,A.J.60,89,243,316–7adultery225aestheticlife17,234–5Bacon,Lord100aesthetics137,250–68badfaith89agapasticevolution184badness15,231alienation18,20,291–2Bauer,Bruno18ambiguity122beauty250–6,263America34Beccaria,Cesare2ampliativeinference107behaviourcycles212analysis56behaviourism212,215–6analyticphilosophy38,51being67,83,88,129analyticvssynthetic41,65–6beliefs69,305–8animals222Bentham,Jeremy1–6,13,193–5,269–72anomalousnessofmental69Berkeley,George8,169Anscombe,Elizabeth64,246–8Bernays,Paul114Apollo30,196,261Blackstone,William1–2Aquinas,Thomas192,293Bloomsbury74,243architecture256,263body,human14,171,197–8argumentvsfunction102–3,126bourgeoisie282Aristotle25,63,174,202,218–9,241Bradley,F.H.47arithmetic39–42,144–5brain216–9Arnold,Matthew315Brentano,Franz78,209–10art14,77,250–68Breuer,Joseph73asceticism15,223BritishMuseum21aseity311Burke,Edmund251assent147–9;simplevscomplex,148Byron,Lord4atheism305,316–7atomicobjects57,185–6Cambridge49–50,60,64attunement85canonsofinquiry99–100\nINDEXcapitalism21–3,282–6,292Dasein84Carnap,Rudolf58Davidson,Donald68–9,143Cartesianego70,158,213deBeauvoir,Simone90Catholicism28dedictovsdere118cause&effect172death92,198causevsproof157deathoftheauthor268certainty148–50,307deathpenalty271character230decisionprocedures114–6Charcot,Jean-Martin73deconstruction92charity,principleof68deduction109charm56deferrence93Cherubino259definitedescriptions52,130–2Chomsky,Noam143deliberation196Christianity13,238,248,259,300–1,316denotation8,97circumstances193deonticlogic120classstruggle281–2Derrida,Jacques90–6class,logical39,50–1Descartes,R.83–4,142,153–4,160–5,classes,social21176,200–2,217Clough,ArthurHugh268design176cogitoergosum161desires69Coleridge,SamuelTaylor6,254despair234–5Collingwood,R.G.266–8determinism76,182colouring122–4deterrence270–1commending244–6Dewey,John46communism20–1,90,285Dionysus30,261CommunistManifesto21–3DNA27Comte,Auguste6–7,271DonGiovanni258–60concepts41,81,180–1doubt151,160,165–8connotation8,98dreams75,158,161,166,204conscience30,308dualism70,187consciousness159,163,201–2,215Dublin28consequences193duty227consequentialism224dynamicmetaphysics189consistency114contraception280EastIndiaCompany6correspondence45eccentricity274craftvsart267Edwards,Jonathan34criteriavssymptoms216ego75–6,205–7,213Croce,Benedetto265–6egoism12,231elementarypropositions61Darwin,Charles24–8,174–8,299–306Elgar,Edward28DescentofMan25Eliot,George309OriginofSpecies24Emerson,RalphWaldo34VoyageoftheBeagle24emotions88,200,254,264Darwin,Erasmus25emotivism24340\nINDEXEmpedocles25freedom11,272–4empiricism8–9,12,63,98–100freedom,human89–90,182,230Engels,Friedrich20–1,24Frege,Gottlob37–43,72,100–108,121–6,en-soi88155–60,178–81,308–9entelechy219Begriffsschrift38,101–7epistemicpossibility120FoundationsofArithmetic39–40epistemology35,144–68,144–50Grundgesetze39,42epithets312Freiburg82,86–7epoche81Frenchrevolution1,7equations136Freud,Sigmund72–8,202–7,314–5essencevsexistence89Freudianslips203–4essences63frugality271ethics137,220–49function102–3,107,179–80eudaimonism220evidence29,147–9Gavagai66evilgenius166Geach,Peter245–7evolution24–7,157,170,184–5Gemeinsinn253existentialism86–90genera25expedience227–8genius197,253experimentsinliving274Gentile,Giovanni265extension41Gentzen,Georg114eye27,170geometry40GeorgeIII,2facticity85geworfenheit85facts134,185–6God13,17,30,58,94,110,291–318faith17,296–7,305–8God,deathof,30,309–11fallibilism35Godel,Kurt115–6falsification59goldenrule245familylikeness62goodness15,231–2,242–3fascism265,287gravity172felicificcalculus221,227greatesthappinessprinciple,1–2,220–5,feudalism21,281269–72Feuerbach,Ludwig18–20,291–2Green,T.H.47Fichte,G.W.13Grice,Paul69firstperson124–6,157,213Føllesdal,Dagfinn119hallucination81Foot,Philippa245,248Hamilton,SirWilliam9force14,172happiness6,220–5,230–1formvscontent59Hare,R.M.244–6formalists178–9Harvard44,64fossils28hedonism12,223Fox,CharlesJames2Hegel,G.W.15–16,18,47–8,72FrancisofAssisi233Heidegger,Martin63,72,83–7Franklin,Benjamin34hell298freeassociation74–5Hintikka,Jaako119341\nINDEXhistoricism288intentionality66–7,79–81,209–12history296–7intentionsvsmotives194Hitler,Adolf55,287introspection161,202,215Hobbes,Thomas97intuition9,266holism66intuitionism12Holmes,OliverWendell34Ireland11homosexuality77Islam306homunculus217–9Hume,David1,8,87,142,250James,Henry43,46Husserl,Edmund38,78–83,86–7,162–5,James,William34,43–6,72,127–8,198–202209–212Pragmatism44Huxley,ThomasHenry24PrinciplesofPsychology44,200hypothesis107–10VarietiesofReligiousExperience44,310–11hysteria73Jews237,307JohnoftheCross224icons126Jowett,Benjamin47,288Id75–6,205–7judgement208idea(Lockeian)13,201Jung,Carl74Idea(Platonic)174,178,196–7,256justice15,231,289ideallanguage136idealism47–8,183;transcendentalvsKant,Immanuel13–14,35,40,43,72,194,empiricist169251–4identity118–9Kierkegaard,S.A.16–19,28,233–7,illativesense150258–60,293–8illocutionaryforce91ConcludingScientificPostscript17illusion314Either/or234–6,258–60,276–8imagination87–8FearandTrembling17,293–6immortality3,57,71,198KingofFrance,present52,130–2imperativelogic244knots62imperialism286knowledge144–168implication116Kripke,Saul119–20incompletesymbols52independenceofaxioms114labour282–4indeterminacy66ladder57indexicals124–6lady279indices126Lamarck,J.B.25individuality16,173,274landscapes255induction8,98–100,107–9language51,121–43,195,302–4inertia14,170language-games61–3,137–42,165–8infallibility,Papal29,129,152–3leapoffaith237inference8,98–101,106,147Leibniz,G.W.48,189infinity,axiomof51Lenin,V.I.285inheritance23LewisC.I.116–20intelligentdesign304liberalism11,269–74intentionalfallacy268libertyofindifference230342\nINDEXlibertyofthought273Mill,James4–6,11,297life-world164Mill,JohnStuart4–12,40,97–100,142,LinnaeusC.25144–5,169,225–8,270–6,297–9Locke,John29Examination8locutionaryforce91Onliberty10–11,272–3logic39–42,97–120SystemofLogic8–9,97–100,144–5logicalatomism53–6,185–6Thesubjectionofwomen10–11,275logicalconstants111ThreeEssaysonReligion12,297–9logicalform56mind192–219logicalpositivism58–60,64,155,243mistake166logicism39–42,110–16modallogic116–20love184,277–8modeltheory115lust194modusponens106money20Madison,James4monism47magnetism14,173moons41malechauvinism278–9Moore,G.E.48,242–3Malebranche,Nicholas172moralluck248–9Manchester20,55Mormons274mapping40morningstar121–2marriage11,234–5,274–8motivesvsintentions194martyrs226Mozart258–60Marx,Karl5,18–24,280–6,288mugwump109–10Capital22music258–60CommunistManifesto21Mussolini,B287GermanIdeology21Mynster,J.P.18master-morality237masturbation94names8,54,67,97–8,104,122materialimplication116Napoleon238materialism21–2,69,183,188,216,280nationalisation2mathematics39–42,50–1,79,136,naturallaw224144–5,156naturalplace175Maya15naturalrights,224–5,271McTaggart,J.M.E.47–8naturalselection24–7,302–4meaning66,68,80,121–43,211naturalisticfallacy243meaningoflife57Nazism33,78,86,287means&ends193necessity116–20mechanisticexplanation176–7neurosis76meditation153neutralism182Mendel,Gregor27Newman,JohnHenry28–30,145–50,166,mentalimages79,122,156,209305–8mentalmechanisms139–40,214Apologiaprovitasua29mentalprocesses139GrammarofAssent29,305–8metaphysics59,62–3,68–70,169–191,209Newton,Isaac176343\nINDEXNietzsche,Friedrich30–3,237–42,260–3,perception,immanentvs309–10transcendent82BeyondGoodandEvil33performatives91BirthofTragedy260–2perlocutionaryforce91GenealogyofMorals33,237persons70–1ThusSpakeZarathustra31pessimism233noownershiptheory159phenomenalism8,82noema210–11phenomenology81–2,87nominalismvsrealism97,178–81Philo105non-naturalpropertiesphilosophy55,57,62,69,137,188nothing89,304phonocentrism92nullclass40,50pictorialform134numbers39,50–1,79,144–5,179–80picturetheory56,133–6,207pinealgland218objects(intentional)80,210Plantinga,Alvin317–8objects41,185–6Plato206,262,288obligation246Platonism48,79–80,162obliqueintention192pleasure220–2occasionalism172poetry254Ockham,William38polygamy274,279Odyssey123poorlaws4Oedipuscomplex75–6,204,315Popper,Karl60,287–8Omnium,Dukeof101populationcontrol280ontologicalargument308–9,317–8Portia203–4opera258–60,263positivism6–7,21opinion147–8possibility116–20ordinarylanguage137possibleworlds119–20,189–90orgasm95Potemkin,Prince2originofspecies301pour-soi88originalposition289pragmaticism37,45ostensivedefinition59,140pragmatism35–7,45,127–9,155oughtvsis247prayer312Oxford1,28,46predicatecalculus39,102–5,115Oxfordmovement28predicativevsattributive,245–6prescriptivism244pain141,220–2Pre-Socratics83painting257,263Priestley,Joseph1panopticon2–4primalfather315Papageno259Prior,A.N.120Parmenides89,129prisons2particularsvsuniversals53privatelanguage57,92,137–42passion297privateostensivedefinition140Peano,Giuseppe72progress7,9Peirce,CharlesSanders34–7,44–6,proletariat21–3107–9,126–8,150–5,181–5proletariat282–4344\nINDEXpromising92Russell,Bertrand38,42,48–55,110–16,propositionalcalculus38,105–6,111–3129–32,160–2,211propositions52,133–6,207–8AnalysisofMind211prostitution279IntroductiontoMathematicalPhilosophy51protocols59,142‘‘OnDenoting’’52,129–32pseudo-propositions57,136PrincipiaMathematica51,110–16psychicalresearch13PrinciplesofMathematics50psychoanalysis73–7,204–5ProblemsofPhilosophy160psychobiography77Russell’sparadox42–3,50psychologism79,156Ryle,Gilbert63–4,79,86psychology155,198–202psychosis76S1–S5117–20publicvsprivate60,159Sachverhalt185punishment270–1sacrament154push-pin221saintliness310Pythagoras159Saint-Simon,Comtede6–7Sartre,Jean-Paul72,87–90,297quantification37,39,103–5Schiller,F.C.S.46Quine,W.V.O.64–6,69,118,142,189–90Schlick,Moritz58–60,142Schopenhauer,Arthur13–16,76,142,rabbits67169–73,195–8,228–33,255–8,278–9Rawls,John249,289–90TheWorldasWillandIdea13–15,30,razor196170–3,255–8ready-to-hand85sciencevsreligion28,313realismvsnominalism178–81scientificmethod35,150–5reality45,128,154scientism65–7reason146,170,195score,musical134reasons69Scotus,Duns35,293Re´e,Paul31–2self163,213,234–5;seeCartesianegoreferencevssense121–6,135self-abnegation15,233referentialopacity119semantics127reflectiveequilibrium290semiotic37,127reform,parliamentary5sensevsreference121–6,135relations,logicof35–6,48,101sense-data53,92,160–2,186religion15,20,29,46,74,232–3,291–318sentences122–123Renouvier,Charles44sexuality74–7,94–5,204–5renunciation14,16,228–33Sidgwick,Henry12ressentiment238signs,naturalvsiconic127resurrection71simples56,61,186retribution270slave-morality237Rhees,Rush64slavery281RheinischeZeitung20socialism6–7,284–5rigiddesignators120Socrates30,236,262,295roundsquare52,130solipsism164Ruskin,John263–4sounds70345\nINDEXspace170,173tools85species25tove140speechacts91toys133–4Spinoza,Baruch187tragedy260–2spiritualism187,213transvaluationofvalues237–9Stalin,Josef287transworldidentity190–1State,the20triads181statesvsprocesses139Trollope,Anthony100–101Stein,Gertrude44True,the122–4Strawson,Peter69–71truth45,68–9,127–8,154,239strictimplication116truth-functions38,105–7,111–3subjectvspredicate102truth-tables111–3sublimation75truth-values38,123,180sublime251–6tychism182succeeding40,50types,theoryof50suicide15,241Tyrell,SirWalter193superego75–6,206supermen33,239–40UncleTom’sCabin265surplusvalue284unconscious74–5,202–7surrealism167understanding86,170,195survivalofthefittest24–7uniformityofnature100swine225–6universalisability244syllogisms98–9,101,16universalsvsparticulars53,178symbols127UniversityCollege,London5symptomsvscriteria216utilitarianism1–6,12,194–5,220–8,synonymy65269–72syntactics127valency126taste250–2value282–4tautologies7,113,136veilofignorance289taxation23verificationprinciple58–60Taylor,Harriet10,226–7,274Vernunft170,195technology281,284Verstand170,195teleologicalsuspension295Vienna73,78,138teleology174–8ViennaCircle58–60,64,187tenacity151virtueethics245tense124vonWright,G.H.63–4,120texts94thing-in-itself14,164,173Wagner,Richard30–1,174–5,260,263thirdrealm159Waismann,Friedrich58thirdness182Wallace,AlfredRussell24thought,lawsof155,157war241thoughts79,134,207–8Welby,Victoria37time,logicof120WestminsterReview4–6Tolstoy,Leo264Whitehead,A.N.51,110346\nINDEXwickedness15OnCertainty165–8Wilberforce,Samuel24PhilosophicalInvestigations64will14,170–3,196–8Tractatus54–8,185–6,207–9Williams,Bernard248–9women7,11,31,222,274–80Wirklichkeit180Wordsworth,William6,254Wittgenstein,Ludwig54–8;60–4,111–3,worldpicture166–8132–43,164–8,185–6,198,207–9,Wyclif,John179212–6,268,316Nachlass64zero40,50347