理解政治哲学家

理解政治哲学家

Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\nUnderstandingthePoliticalPhilosophersUnderstandingthePoliticalPhilosophersisanabsorbingandaccessibleintroductiontothemajorphilosophersandcoretextsofwesternpoliticalphilosophy.Organisedhistorically–beginningwithSocratesandPlato,andconcludingwithpost-Rawlsiantheory–AlanHaworthpresentsthekeyideasanddevelopmentswithclarityanddepth.Eachchapterprovidesaconcentratedstudyofagiventhinkerorgroupofthinkersandtogethertheyconstituteabroadaccountofthemainargumentsinpoliticalphilosophy.TherearechaptersonSocrates,Plato,Aristotle,Hobbes,Locke,Rousseau,theUtilitarians,Marx,andRawls’searlywork.Thisrevisedsecondeditionhasbeenbroughtfullyup-to-date,andincludesexpandedcoverageoftheperiodfromthedeathofAristotletothesixteenthcentury,aswellasanewchapteronRawls’slaterphilosophyandthedirectionofpost-Rawlsianphilosophy.Includingachronologyandsuggestionsforfurtherreading,UnderstandingthePoliticalPhilosophersisanidealintroductorytextforstudentstakingcoursesinpoliticalphilosophyorpoliticaltheory.AlanHaworthisaSeniorResearchAssociateoftheOxfordUehiroCentreforPracticalEthics,andaSeniorFellowofLondonMetropolitanUniversity’sInstituteofHumanRightsandSocialJustice.HeistheauthorofAnti-Libertarianism:MarketsPhilosophyandMyth(1994)andFreeSpeech(1998).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\nUnderstandingthePoliticalPhilosophersFromAncienttoModernTimesSecondeditionAlanHaworthDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\nFirsteditionpublished2004byRoutledgeThiseditionpublished2012byRoutledge2ParkSquare,MiltonPark,Abingdon,Oxon,OX144RNSimultaneouslypublishedintheUSAandCanadabyRoutledge270MadisonAve,NewYork,NY10016RoutledgeisanimprintoftheTaylor&FrancisGroup,aninformabusiness©2012AlanHaworthAllrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereprintedorreproducedorutilisedinanyformorbyanyelectronic,mechanical,orothermeans,nowknownorhereafterinvented,includingphotocopyingandrecording,orinanyinformationstorageorretrievalsystem,withoutpermissioninwritingfromthepublishers.BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataAcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibraryLibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationDataHaworth,Alan,1944-Understandingthepoliticalphilosophers:fromancienttomoderntimes/byAlanHaworth.–2nded.p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.1.Politicalscience–Philosophy.I.Title.JA71.H34752012320.01–dc232011042229ISBN:978-0-415-68536-8(hbk)ISBN:978-0-415-68537-5(pbk)ISBN:978-0-203-12178-8(ebk)TypesetinGaramondbyTaylor&FrancisBooksDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\nTothememoryofmyfather,James‘Jack’Haworth,bornMay1914;diedFebruary2000Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\nContentsPrefacetothesecondeditionixIntroduction1PARTIAthens51Socrates72Plato:TheRepublic143Aristotle374Whathappenednext?61PARTIIReasonandrevolutions815HobbesgoestoParis836Hobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathan897Lockeandthemodernorder1148Locke:theargumentforproperty131Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December20129Rousseau151PARTIIIModerntimes,modernthemes17510Aftertheflood17711JohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism197\nviiiContents12Marx22513Rawls:throughreasontojustice25314InTheory’swake27915Rawls:constructinga‘political’liberalism28716Concludingreflections311Timeline318References321Index330Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\nPrefacetothesecondeditionItissaidthatThomasCarlylewasoncereproachedinthefollowingdismissivetermsbyabusinessmanwithwhomhewasdining:‘Ideas,MrCarlyle,ideas–nothingbutideas’.Carlyle’srejoinderisreportedtohavebeenthis:TherewasonceamancalledRousseauwhowroteabookcontainingnothingbutideas.Thesecondeditionwasboundintheskinsofthosewholaughedatthefirst.Asthisbookis,itself,asecondedition,IamsureyouwillappreciatewhyIfinditimpossibletoresistrepeatingthetale–althoughperhapsIshouldapologisetothosereaderstowhomitwillalreadybefamiliar.TheattitudeexpressedbyCarlyle’sfellowdinerwillbefamiliartoanyonewhosebusinessisphilosophy.Thispersonobviouslyfeltthatthereisnogoodreasonfortakingideasseriously,thattheyhavenoeffectandthat,ifyouareinterestedinthematall,itis,perhaps,notthesortofthingyoushouldembarrasseveryonewithwheninpolitecompany.Facedwithsuchanatti-tude,Carlyle’srejoinderisrightontargetfor,contrarytotheprejudiceofhiscomplacentdining-companion,itisbyideasthatwelive.Theideastowhichthefollowingpagesaredevoted,then,arethosewhichlieatthecoreofWesternpoliticalthought.Ihavetriedtodisplaysomethingoftheirstructureandtogivesomeaccountoftheeventsbywhichthosewhodevelopedthemweremotivated.Inshort,Ihavetriedtodomorethanmerelydescribe.Ihavewrittenthebookintheconvictionthattheseareideaswhich–farfrombeingtheexclusiveprovinceofanintellectualminorityorDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012someothersuitablyrarefiedelite–formasubstantialpartofourcommoninheritance.Itismyviewthatyoucannotqualifyasatallpoliticallyliterateunlessyouhavesomeknowledgeofthem.Ihavemadethefollowingchangestothefirstedition.First,Ihaveconsiderablyexpandedchapterfour,thechapterinwhichIdiscusstheperiodwhichrunsfromthedeathofAristotlein322BCtothesixteenthcentury.Ithinkyouwillagreethattheperiodinquestionisquitelong,whichis–initself–quiteagoodreasonforextendingthechapter.However,itisalsoaperiodtowhichcontemporarypoliticalphilosopherstendtopayscant\nxPrefaceattention,and,intheexpandedchapter,Ihavetriedtoexplainwhythisshouldbe.Second,inordertobringthebookuptodate,IhaveincludedaseparatechapteronRawls’s‘later’philosophy.Inthesevenyearswhichhavepassedsincethefirsteditionwaspublished,ithasbecomeincreasinglyapparent–tome,atleast–thattherearegreatdifferencesbetweenRawls’searlierandhislaterwork,andthatasinglechapterisnolongersufficienttodealwiththeworkofthisinfluentialphilosopher.Intheconcludingchapter,Ispeculatealittleuponthedirectionthatapost-Rawlsianphilosophyislikelytotake.Asforthanks,theygo,asbefore,tothosewhomadesuchhelpfulcom-mentsonthefirstdraftofthefirstedition,namelyRodneyPickering,DavidLloyd-Thomas,JonathanWolffandRoutledge’sanonymousreviewers.IamdeeplygratefultoSheilaGarrardforthediligentmannerinwhichshecarriedoutthelaborioustaskofcopy-editingthebook;toMatWillisforhisstylishcoverdesign,andtoReannaYoungandAdamJohnsonofRoutledgefortheirencouragementandsupportthroughoutthetimeofitsproduction.Also,thanksasevertomywifeRowanforthefunandtrips.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\nIntroductionWhystudypoliticalphilosophy?Itisevidentthatthehumanisapoliticalanimalinawaythatthebeeandtheothergregariousanimalsarenot.Fornaturedoesnothingwithoutapurpose,aswesay,and,outofalltheanimals,onlyhumanshavebeenendowedbynaturewithlanguage.Ofcourse,otheranimalscanmakevocalsounds,andsoexpresspainandpleasure.Theyare,bytheirnature,abletofeelpleasureandpainandtocommunicatesuchfeelingstoeachother.Butthereismoretolanguagethanmerevoice.Withlanguageweareabletodistinguishtheusefulfromtheharmfuland,likewise,thejustfromtheunjust.Fortherealdifferencebetweenhumansandotheranimalsisthathumansalonehaveasenseofgoodandevil,ofjusticeandinjustice–anditistheassociationoflivingbeingswhoshareasenseofthesethingswhichgoestomakeahouseholdandacity.AristotleThisbookhastworelatedaims.Oneistointroduceyoutotheideasandtheargumentsofthemajorpoliticalphilosophers.Theotheristointroduceyoutotheirsubject,politicalphilosophyitself.Idonotkeeptheseaimsseparate,bydevotingsomesectionstothefirst,otherstothesecond.Onthecontrary,Itakeitthat,inachievingtheformer,Iwilltherebyachievethelatter.Thisispossiblebecausephilosophyhasaspecialrelationshipwithitspast–soletmestartwiththat.Considerthedifferencebetweenphilosophyand–forexample–ascience.Normally,youwouldnottrytointroducesomeonetochemistryorphysicsbyrecountingtheideasofpastscientists.Youwouldtreattheseassupersededandconcentrateoncurrenttheoryandrecentexperimentalresearch.Or,asanotherexample,takehistory.TherewouldbesomethingratherstrangeabouttryingtoDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012introducehistorybyconcentratingalmostexclusivelyontheworkofpasthistor-ians,foranintroductiontohistoryitselfisonething,whereasanintroductiontotheworkofhistoriansisanother–asubjectfor‘historiography’,whichisjustonespecialisedbranchofhistory.But,eveninthelattercase,historymustbaseitsaccountofthepastonprimarysourcesandothermoreorlessreliableevidence.1Ifmytwoaimsaresimultaneouslyachievable,asIamclaimingtheyare,thenphilosophymustbedifferentfromtheseothersubjects.So,howisitdifferent?Theansweristhatphilosophy’srelationshipwithitspastresultsfromthewayanideacanassumealifeofitsown.Thatidea\n2Introductionmayhavebeenfirstnurturedinprivacybythisorthatthinker,but,onceithasbecomepublic,itgainsindependence.Thishappensmoststrikinglywheretheideaischallengedbyothers,whoraiseobjectionsagainstit;whereitisthendefendedbyyetothers,perhapsinamodifiedform;wherefurtherobjectionsarethenraised,andsoon.Theprocesscangoonovergenerations–millenniaeven–andtheresultisthat,althoughPlato,Locke,Marxandtheothersarephysicallylonggone,theirghostsremainwithus,demandingourattention.So,ifyouwanttoknowwhatit’sliketobeapoliticalphilosopher,trytoimagineyourselfseatedatatablewiththeothers–theghostsandtheliving–andengagedinalivelyandlong-runningdiscussionwiththem,onewhichhadbeengoingonwellbeforeyouenteredtheroom,andwhichislikelytocontinuelongafteryouhaveleftit.Thinkofitlikethatandyoushouldseewhyitissohardtoremainabystanderhere;why‘introducingyoutothegreatpoliticalphilosophers’hastoinvolvemuchmorethanjust‘tellingyouwhattheysaid’.Itmeansfindingyouaplaceatthetablefromwhichyoucanfollowthediscussion,figureoutforyourselfwhereyoustandinrelationtotheargumentswhicharegoingonand–shouldyoufeelsoinclined–contribute.Whoarethe‘major’politicalphilosophersonwhomIhavechosentoconcentrate,then?Andwhatdidtheywrite?Well,IhavealreadymentionedPlato.AfterabriefaccountofSocratesandhistimes(inthenextchapter)IturntoPlato’sdescriptionofthetypeofstatewhich–ashethought–wouldembodythevirtueofjusticetoaperfectdegree.Youcanfindhisargumentintheworkwhichisknown,thesedays,asTheRepublic,andwhichhewrotealmost2,400yearsago,inAthens.Afterthat,Iturntoacontrasting,equallyinfluential,Greekwork,Aristotle’sPolitics.PartIIisdevotedtotheworkofthegreatseventeenth-andeighteenth-century‘socialcontract’theorists.TherearechaptersonThomasHobbes,whoseLeviathanwaspublishedin1651;JohnLocke,authoroftheSecondTreatiseofGovernment(1689);andJean-JacquesRousseau,authorofTheSocialContract(1762).Thesearethreeofthemostinfluentialbooksevertohavebeenwritten.InPartIII,whichmovesfromtheearlynineteenthcenturytothepresent,Idiscusstheclassicalutilitarians,especiallyJeremyBenthamandJohnStuartMill.Theyclaimedtofoundtheirpoliticalstandpointontheprincipleof‘greatesthappiness’,accordingtowhich‘thegreatestgoodisthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber’.IalsodiscusstheworkofKarlMarxand,afterthat,presentaDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012chapterontheAmericanphilosopherJohnRawls,whosemasterpieceATheoryofJusticewaspublishedin1971.Therearemanypoliticalphilosopherswritingnow–mostlikelythemajorityofthosewritinginEnglish–whobelievethathisbookisthemostpowerfulandinfluentialworkonthesubjecttohavebeenproducedinrecentyears.In1993Rawlspublishedasecondbook,PoliticalLiberalism,reactionstowhichhavebeenmoremixed.However,Rawls’sreputationissuchthatIhavethoughtitsensibletodevoteaseparatechaptertoit.InthefinalchapterImakeafewobservationsonthepresentstateofpoliticalphilosophyanduponitsfutureprospects.\nIntroduction3Somereaders–thosetowhomthesubjectofpoliticalphilosophyisalreadyfamiliar–willfindfewsurprisesinthislist(whichisjustasitshouldbe,giventhatthisismeantasanintroduction).Buttherewillbemanyothers,Iamsure,whowon’trecognisequiteafewofthenamesIhavelisted.Inmyexperience,mostpeople–evenintelligentandknowledgeablepeople–arefamiliarwithonlyafew.Takeagroupofsuchpeople,askthemwhoShakespearewas,orwhoNewtonwas,andtheywillbesuretotellyou.Youwouldexpectthepoliticalphilosopherstobejustaswellknown,butaskthesamegroupwhoLockewas,orJ.S.Mill,andyouarequitelikelytodrawablank,orsoIhavelearnt.Thisismorethanapity.Itisacauseforgreatregret.Thereareatleasttworeasonswhy.ThefirstisthateverysinglephilosopherlistedhasplayedanenormouslysignificantroleinthedevelopmentofWesternpoliticalthought;quiteassignificantaroleasthatplayedbyShakespeareandDickensinthedevelopmentofEnglishliterature,orbyNewton,DarwinorEinsteininthatofscience.JustasthereisatraditionofEnglishliterature,andatraditionofscientificenquiry,sothereisagreattraditionofpoliticalthought;anditseemstomethat,ifitisrighttoexpecteveryeducatedEnglish-speakingpersontohavesomeknowledgeofthefirst,andeveryeducatedperson(English-speakingornot)ofthesecond,thenitmustberighttoexpectthesameinthecaseofthethird.Butthesecondreasonisthemorecompellingofthetwo.Itisthatourownwaysofthinkingaboutthesocialandthepoliticalarethedirectdescendantsofconceptionsdevelopedbypastpoliticalphilosophers.Imeanthatwethinkthewaywedoonlybecausetheythoughtthewaytheydid.Itisbecauseunderstandingwherewearenowmustinvolveknowinghowwegothereinthefirstplacethatweshouldstudytheirideas–andinthecaseofpoliticsitisespeciallydifficulttododgetherequirementtounderstandwhereweare.Thisisthemorecompellingofthetworeasonsbecause,greattraditionsnotwithstanding,youdon’thavetotakeanynoticeofthem.Certainly,nobodyisforcedtobecomeawriter,aliterarycritic,orascientist–oreventotakeaninterestintheartsorthesciences.Bycontrast,everyoneexceptRobinsonCrusoeisconstrainedbycircumstancetoliveinpoliticalrelationshipswithhisorherfellows.Itisonthebasisofthisconsideration–theirinfluence–thatIhaveselectedphilosophersandtheirworkfordiscussion.Formypurposes,theyDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012qualifyas‘great’philosopherssimplythroughhavingdonesomuchtoaffectourownwaysofseeingtheworld.Theremaywellhavebeenothers–somemoreimaginativeormorelogicallyrigorousthanthoseIhavechosen–but,asthesehaveremainedobscure,Ihavediscountedthem.(And,ofcourse,itisthisprincipleofselectionwhichexplainswhyreadersalreadyfamiliarwiththesubjectwillfindnosurprisesinmylistofnames.)Idorealisethatanylistof‘great’philosophersisboundtobecontentious.Onreadingthisbook,manytrained,‘academic’philosopherswillfindthemselveswantingtoinsistthatIshouldhavespentmoretimeonsuch-and-suchanargument,orto\n4IntroductionobjectthatIhavecompletelyignoredso-and-so.Itisintheverynatureofthesubjectthatthisshouldbethecase(and,ofcourse,Ican’tincludeeveryone).However,IamconfidentthatthemajorityofphilosopherswillagreethattheselectionIhavemadeaccuratelyrepresentsthetraditionwehaveinheritedand,Iamsure,eventhosewhoareunhappywiththelatterwillrecognisethatitrepresentsaconsensus.Tothesereasons,Iwouldaddathird,namelythatifyouknowlittleornothingofthegreattraditionofpoliticalthought,youaremissingout.Thesubjectissoabsorbingandsofrequentlyinspiring.But,ratherthanlabourthepointwithanexplanation,Iwillleaveyoutoreadonandtojudgeforyourself.Withthatsaid,letusnowmoveon–orshouldIsay‘moveback’–totheAthensofthefourthcenturyBC.Itiswherethestoryopens.Note1Theonlydifferencebetweenhistoriographyandotherbranchesofthesubjectis,ofcourse,thatintheformerthetextsthemselvesareaprimarysource.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\nPartIATHENSDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n1SocratesOurstoryopensinAthensbecauseitwasinthatcitythattheearliestmajorworkofpoliticalphilosophy–TheRepublic,asitisnowcalled–firstencounteredthelightofday.Thiswasinapproximately375BC.(Thepreciseyearisn’tknown.)Itsauthor,Plato,wouldhavewrittenitwithastylus,apointedimplementwithwhichheinscribedhissentencesonrollsofpapyrus.Thefirstcopiesmusthavebeenmadeusingthesamelaborioustechnique.SincethentherehavebeentimeswhenanycopyofanancientGreekworkmusthaveledaprecariouslife:thefalloftheRomanEmpire;theDarkAges;theearlymedievalperiod,duringwhichtheonlyguardiansofliteratureweremonksandwhenhandwrittenmanuscriptshadtobetransportedfrommon-asterytomonasteryonthebacksofmules;theburningofthegreatlibraryatAlexandriainAD640,whenmanyoriginalGreektextswhichhadsurviveduptothattimewerefinallylost.YoucouldsaythatthemostremarkablethingaboutTheRepublicisthesimplefactofitssurvival.Againstmanyodds,andafteralmost2,400years,youcannowdownloadacopyfromtheinter-net,orgoalongtoanyreasonablygoodbookshopandfindatranslation,inpaperback,producedwiththehelpofthemostup-to-datetechnology.TheRepublicis,thus,theearliestavailabletextrelevanttomysubject.Therefore,thereareatleasttwogoodreasonsforbeginningmynarrativeproperwithanaccountofitsmainarguments(asIshallinthenextchapter).Ihavealreadygivenone,namelythatPlato’sworkistheearliestknown.Theotheristhatitisstillavailable.ThismeansthatTheRepublic’sargumentconfrontsusjustasdirectlyasitconfrontedPlato’scontemporaries.Itdemandsourattention,justasitdemandedtheirs.Wecannotignoreit.WehavetocometotermswithitsargumentsforourselvesandfigureoutDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012wherewestandinrelationtothem.TheavailabilityofatextalsoaccountsforwhyIhavechosentostartwithPlatoratherthanwithhismentor,Socrates.Bymostaccounts,Socrateswasunusualandcharismatic.HeinspiredtheyoungerPlatotosuchanextentthathisinfluenceremainedwithPlatofortherestofhislife.Moreover,Socratesiscertainlyagoodcandidateforthetitle‘firstgreatphilosopher’,andanevenbetteronefor‘firstpoliticalphilosopher’.Fromourpointofview,however,theproblemwithSocratesisthatheneverwroteanything.ThismeansthathespokemoredirectlytohisfellowAtheniansthanheever\n8Athenscouldtous.Evenso,IshouldgiveabriefaccounthereofSocrates’approachtophilosophy,andhislife,becauseitiswiththestoryofSocratesthatthestoryofPlatoreallybegins.Withoutsomeknowledgeoftheformerstory,itwouldbeimpossibletofullyappreciateTheRepublic’spoint.SocratesthephilosopherThefactthatSocratesneverputhisthoughtsdowninwritingdistinguisheshimfromeverylaterphilosopher.Whereastheothersarerememberedmainlythroughtheirbooks,Socratespractisedphilosophybymeansofapurely‘wordofmouth’technique.TotheAthenianshewasafamiliarfigure.Theywouldencounterhiminthemarketplaceashedebatedphilosophicalques-tionswithanyonepreparedtoengageinadiscussionwithhim.ThiscanmakeSocratesappeartrulyremarkabletopresent-dayphilosophers.However,itdoesn’treallymakehimasremarkableasallthat,forSocrateswasacontemporaryofthesophists,wanderingscholarswhowould,inthetypicalcase,movefromplacetoplace,providingtuitioninreturnforafee.Thereweremanysophistsand,likeSocrates,alltendedtoworkthroughspeechratherthanwriting.So,itwasn’tthesimplefactthatSocratespractisedhisteachingorally,inpublic,whichmadehimsoexceptional.Ifwearetounderstandwhatitwas,wemustconsiderhowSocratesandthesophistsdiffered.Therewereanumberofdifferences.Onewasthat,unlikemostsophists,Socratesmadenochargeforhisservices.1Anotherwasthat,whereasmostsophiststravelledfromplacetoplaceinthecourseoftheirwork,SocratesleftAthensonlyonceinhislife.2Moresignificantlyfromourpointofview,Socratesandthesophistsdifferedinthereasonstheyhadforworkingastheydid.Ontheonehand,itwasSocrates’opinionthatphilosophycouldonlybeproperlytaughtandpractisedorally.‘Dialectic’wastheroutetotruth.Asthissuggests,itwouldbewrongtothinkthatSocratesjustneverfoundthetimetowrite,or–perhaps–thathenevermanagedtomaketheeffort.Onthecontrary,heconsideredwritinganinappropriatetechnique.(Ithinkmostpresent-dayphilosopherswouldagreewithhimthatdiscussioniscen-traltophilosophy,althoughtheywouldbelessdismissiveofthewrittentext.)ItisconsistentwiththisinterestintruththatSocratesshouldhaveinsisted,ashedid,ontheprimacyofreasonandlogic,onrationality.HisapproachwouldbetochallengethepersonwithwhomhewasarguingtoDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012formulateadefinitionofthething–usuallyavirtue–theywerediscussing.Socrateswouldthencallthedefinitionintoquestion,forcinghisopponenttodefendit.(Thishascometobeknownas‘theSocraticmethod’.)BycontrastwithSocrates,thesophiststendedtoattachmoreimportancetotheartsofrhetoricandpersuasionthantheyeverdidtoseekingtruththroughtheuseofreason.Theopinionofonesophist–acontemporaryofPlato’scalledIsocrates–isonrecord.Accordingtohim,‘likelyconjectureaboutusefulthingsisfarpreferabletoexactknowledgeoftheuseless’(Isocrates1954–56:63).Socratesstronglydisapproved.\nSocrates9Infact,itiseasytoappreciatewhythesophiststookthisattitudeinfavourofrhetoric.Itiswhattheywerehiredtoteach.Therewasademandfortheirservices,partlybecauseanyonewholackedtheskillofspeakingpersuasivelyinpubliccouldneversucceedingettinghis3wayatmeetingsoftheAssembly,Athens’supremelegislativeinstitution.TheAssemblypassedlaws,anddecisionsofpolicyweremadethere.Itmeteverytendaysorso,andanycitizencouldattendandspeak.Whenyouthinkthatcitizenscomposedroughlyaquarterofthepopulation,youcanimaginehowlargethemorewell-attendedmeetingsmusthavebeen.(Therewereabout30,000citizensinalland,outofthatnumber,about6,000regularlyattendedmeetingsoftheAssembly.)4Moreover,ifacitizentookoutacaseagainstyou,thelegalsystemrequiredthatyoushouldbetriedbeforeacourtoffellowcitizens,usuallynumberedinhundreds.Youwouldhavetodefendyourself.NowonderitwassoimportanttotheAtheniancitizenthatheshouldmastertheskillofpersuadingothersbyrhetoric,andthatsophistswereabletocommandhighfeesforteachingit.Somesophistsmayalsohavebeenexpertsinthisorthatfieldoflearningbut,iftheytaughtthattoo,itcamesecondarily,asabonus.Tosumup,then,onedifferencebetweenthetypicalsophistandSocrateswasthis.Whereasthesophisttaughtrhetoricandsometimesclaimedspecialistknowledge,Socratessoughttruththroughtheuseofreason.Morethanthat,farfromclaimingtoknowanything,Socratesprofessedignorance.Athistrial,inhisaddresstothejury,Socratesrelatedastoryaboutit.Heclaimedthatanoldfriendofhis,Chaerophon,oncevisitedtheoracleatDelphiandaskedthegodwhethertherewasanyonewiserthanSocrateshimself.Apparently,thegodrepliedthattherewasnot.Accordingtothestory,whenheheardofthisSocrateswassopuzzledthathesetaboutinterviewingthosewithareputationforwisdom.Itturnedoutthatnoone’spretensionstoknowledgecouldsurviveSocraticinterrogation.Therefore–andhereisthemoral–onlySocratesknewthatheknewnothing,anditwasthisknowledgewhichmadehimwiserthaneveryoneelse(Plato1954a:49ff.).ForafurtherdistinctivefeatureofSocrates’approachweneedtoconsiderhowhediffered,notfromthesophists,butfromotherphilosophers.Ofcourse,philosophershadlivedandworkedinGreecelongbeforeSocratesappearedonthescene.ExamplesofotherGreekphilosophersareThales,whothoughtthateverythingwasmadefromwater;Empedocles,whoexplainednaturalchangewithatheoryofthefourelements,earth,air,fireandwater;Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Pythagoras,whobelievedthathistoryrepeatsitselfinanendlesscycle;Heraclitus,whobelievedthateverythingisaneternal,ever-changingmodificationoffire;andDemocritus,whothoughtthatmatterwascomposedofatoms.But,astheseexamplesmakeclear,thosephilosophersweremainlyinterestedinthefundamentalnatureoftheuniverse.Theyweretryingtoanswerquestionswhich,nowadays,wouldmoreoftenthannotberaisedbyscientists–cosmologistsorphysicists.Bycontrast,Socrateswasprimarilyinterestedinmoralquestions.Liketheothers,hesoughtfundamentals,butinthedefiningcharacteristicsofvirtue–love,forexample,orjustice.\n10AthensSocratesandAthensInadditiontothedistinctivefeaturesofSocrates’approachtophilosophy,weshouldconsidertheremarkableeventsofhislife.Itiswellknownthatin399BChewasbroughtbeforetheAtheniancourthavingbeenchargedwithheresyandcorruptingthemindsoftheyoung.Thereisgeneralagreementthatthesewerepretextsratherthancredible,seriouscharges.Socrateswasfoundguilty,sentencedtodeathandexecuted(bypoison).Platothoughtthisawickedandshamefulact,areactionwhichwasonlytobeexpectedfromoneofSocrates’disciplesand,eversince,therehasbeenatendencytoportraySocratesasahap-lessmartyrforreasonandtruth(notleastbecauseagreatdealofwhatweknowaboutSocratesisbasedonPlato’stestimony).Forexample,thenineteenth-centuryphilosopherJohnStuartMillrankshisexecutionwithChrist’scrucifixion.InthesecondchapterofhisOnLiberty–acelebrateddefenceoffreespeech–MilldescribesSocratesasthe‘acknowledgedmasterofalltheeminentthinkerswhohavesincelived’and‘themanwhoprobablyofallthenbornhaddeservedleastofmankindtobeputtodeathasacriminal’(Mill1991a:29).ButitcouldbethatMillwaspaintingarosypicturehereand,assooften,thereisanothersidetothestory.Weshouldconsiderthis,beginningwitheventswhichtookplacewhenPlatowasquiteyoung,andSocratesthementorandinspirationtoacircleofyoungmenwhichincludedPlato’selderbrothers,GlauconandAdeimantus.(Itishere,then,thatPlatofirstappearsonthescene.)Atthispoint,perhapsIshouldre-emphasisethatIamnotouttowritethehistoryofAthens.Mysubjectisphilosophy,nothistory,andphilosophy’scentralsubjectmatterisideasandarguments–therelationsbetweenthem,thepresuppositionsonwhichtheyarebased,andsoon–notthesequenceofpastevents.However,sometimesitisonlypossibletofullyappreciateaphilosophicalargument,oratext,ifyouknowsomethingofthehistoricalcontextinwhichitwasfirstformulatedorwritten,andthatiswhyIamgivingabriefoutlineofcertainhistoricaleventshere.Infact,quiteanumberofthetextsIshallbediscussingareassociatedinonewayoranotherwithapoliticalupheaval–awarorarevolution.InthecaseofTheRepublictheupheavalinquestionwasaterriblewar,thePeloponnesianWar,betweenaleagueofcity-statesledbyAthensand,opposingthem,thearmiesofSparta.Thislastedfor27yearsandcametoanendin404BC,whenSocrateswas66andPlato24yearsold.Forourpurposes,themostrelevantfactsareasfollows.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Firstofall,AthenswasademocracywhereasSpartawasnot.ToseejusthowdemocraticAthenswasyouneedonlyrecallmyearlieraccountofhowtheAssemblyfunctioned.(Ofcourse,thereweresomerespectsinwhichitwaslessdemocraticthanamodern‘representativedemocracy’.Forexample,thefranchisedidnotextendtoslavesorwomen.NordiditextendtoresidentsofAthenswholackedanAthenianpedigree,whichiswhyevenAristotlewasdeniedthevote.Butyoucouldcertainlyarguethat,ontheotherhand,thedegreetowhichcitizensparticipatedindecisionmakingmadeitfarmore\nSocrates11democratic.)Moreover,onthewholetheAthenianswereproudoftheirconstitution.InhisHistoryofthePeloponnesianWar–publishedin410BCorthereabouts–ThucydidesrecordsafuneralspeechgivenbythegreatAthenianstatesmanPericlesattheendofthewar’sfirstyear.Periclessaysthis:Hereeachindividualisinterestednotonlyinhisownaffairsbutinaffairsofthestateaswell:eventhosewhoaremostlyoccupiedwiththeirownbusinessareextremelywell-informedongeneralpolitics.Andheadds,thisisapeculiarityofours:wedonotsaythatamanwhotakesnointerestinpoliticsisamanwhomindshisownbusiness;wesaythathehasnobusinesshereatall.(Thucydides1954:145)ThiswastheAthenianideal,asysteminwhicheverycitizenhasarighttoparticipateandtakeaninterestinpublicaffairsand,moreover,wherethereisanexpectationthateachcitizenwilldojustthat.Spartawascompletelydifferent.Itwasarepressivetyrannyrunbyanelitemilitarycaste.Second,duringtheclosingyearsofthewar,Athenssufferedaperiodofpoliticalinstability.Thedemocracywastwiceoverthrown,thefirsttime,in411BC,bydisaffectedpro-Spartanconspirators.Thenitwasrestoredafterafour-monthperiodknownastheReignoftheFourHundred.Itwasover-thrownagainin404BC,whenAthenswasfinallydefeatedbytheSpartans.Therefollowedaneight-monthperiodknownastheReignoftheThirtyTyrants.Thesewerenotmerechangesinthesystem.Eachtyranny–thatoftheFourHundredandthatoftheThirty–wasareignofterror.Thucydidesrecordsthat,duringthetimeoftheFourHundred,althoughtheAssemblyandtheCouncilwhosemembersitchosebylotcontinuedtomeet,theytooknodecisionsthatwerenotapprovedbythepartyoftherevolution;infactallthespeakerscamefromthisparty,andwhattheyweregoingtosayhadbeenconsideredbythepartybeforehand.Peoplewereafraidwhentheysawtheirnumbers,andnoonenowdaredtospeakinoppositiontothem.Ifanyonedidventuretodoso,someappropriatemethodwassoonfoundforhavinghimDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012killed,andnoonetriedtoinvestigatesuchcrimesortakeactionagainstthosesuspectedofthem.Instead,thepeoplekeptquiet,andwereinsuchastateofterrorthattheythoughtthemselvesluckyenoughtobeleftunmolestedeveniftheyhadsaidnothingatall.(1954:575)Itisapicturewhichhasremaineddepressinglyfamiliar.Afurtherattempttooverthrowthedemocracylookedlikelyin401BC–justtwoyearsbeforeSocrates’trial–butthisnevermaterialised.Itiseasytoappreciatethat,for\n12AthensmostAthenians,the12-yearperiodpriortothetrialmusthavebeeninsecureandjittery.Inconnectionwiththeseevents,weshouldbearinmind–third–thatthedemocracywasnotequallypopularwithallelementsofthepopulation.Itwaspopularwiththeordinarypeople,thepoor.Itwasalsopopularwithmiddle-classtradersandmerchants,someofthemquitewealthy.(InacosmopolitanseaportlikeAthens,whichdependedforitswealthontradewiththeoutsideworld,thisclasswouldhavebeenparticularlystrong.)However,itwasfarlesspopularamongstthehereditaryaristocracy,manyofwhomwouldhaveregardeditasathreattotheirownpowerandinfluence.Thecrucialpointstonotehereare,first,thatPlato’sfamilyandassociatesweremembersofthisclass;second,that–asateacher–Socrateswascloselyassociatedwiththesameclass;and,third,thatinboth411BCand404BCgroupsofyoungaristocraticmales,muchliketheonesSocratesusedtoteach,wereinstrumentalinbringingaboutthedemocracy’sfall.Inthenervyatmosphereofpost-warAthens,itcouldbethattheactivitiesofthephilo-sopherinthemarketplace–onceapparentlyharmlessandeccentric–cametotakeonamoresinister,conspiratorial,aspect.Perhapsitwasthisthatinspiredthechargeof‘corruptingtheyouthofthecity’.So,wasSocratesreallyamartyr,someonewhosufferedforthestandhetookonbehalfoffreedomofthought?Or,werethesuspicionsthathewasdeeplyinvolvedwithsubversive,anti-democratic,elementsjustified?IfIweretopursuethesequestionsanyfurther,Ireallywouldbestrayingfromthepoint.So,letusnowmoveontoconsiderTheRepublic’sargument.SuggestionsforfurtherreadingSocratesSeeGregoryVlastos,Socrates,IronistandMoralPhilosopher(1991)foracommentarybyaleadingexpert.I.F.Stone’sTheTrialofSocrates(1988)isareadableaccountoftheeventsleadinguptoSocrates’trialandexecution.SoisBettanyHughes,TheHemlockCup:Socrates,AthensandtheSearchfortheGoodLife(2010).Infact,ifyouwanttogetasenseofwhattheAthensofSocrates’timewasreallylike,youcouldhardlydobetterthanreadHughes’sbook.JohnThorley’sAthenianDemocracy(2004)isaDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012readable‘in-depth’accountofthewaytheAtheniansystemworked.Notes1ThesourceofSocrates’incomeisn’tknown.Hemusthavederivedsupportfromsomewhere.AsRodneyPickeringtellsme,itismostprobablethat,likemanyGreekcitizens,heownedasmallholdingwhichhecouldleavetobelookedafterbyacoupleofslaveswhileheremainedinthecity.\nSocrates132OntheoneoccasionthatSocratesdidleaveAthens,itwastoperformmilitaryservice.HefoughtagainstthePersians,asaninfantryman,attheBattleofSalamisin480BC.3Isay‘his’advisedly.Toqualifyasacitizenyouhadtobemale.4MysourceforthisfigureisJohnThorley’sAthenianDemocracy(Thorley2004).MeetingsoftheAssemblywereusuallyheldonthePnyx,whichThorleydescribesas,‘agentlyslopinghillabout500metrestothewestoftheAcropolis,whichcouldaccommodatearound6,000people’,andheaddsthat,‘therewereusuallyenoughatmeetingstofillthePnyx,moreorless’(2004:33).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n2Plato:TheRepublicOneofSocrates’majorlegaciestoPlatoisevidentthroughoutTheRepublic.Itisacertainviewofphilosophy’spurpose.Aswehaveseen,thepurposeofSocrates’interrogationswastoarriveatall-embracingdefinitions.(‘Socraticignorance’wastheusualresult,becausetheseturnedouttoberatherelusive.)Quitesimilarly,Platothoughtthatthejobofthephilosopherwastosearchouttheunitywhich,ashesupposed,underliesapparentdiversity.ThisisagoodpointatwhichtomentionanotherofSocrates’legaciestoo,namelytheideathatphilosophyshouldproceedbyargument,dialectically.NearlyallPlato’sbooksarewrittenasdialogues,withSocratesastheleadingparticipant.TheothercharacterstendtobefigureswhowouldhavebeenknowntoPlato’sAthenianreaders.Forexample,inTheRepublic,themaincharacters–Socratesapart–arePlato’solderbrothers,GlauconandAdeimantus;Polemarchus,arichAtheniancitizen;Polemarchus’father;histwobrothers,oneofthemawell-knownorator;andThrasymachus,asophistandorator.(Mostofthemhavelittletosay,soIhaven’tlistedthemallbyname.)Thereissomedisagreementamongstscholarsovertheextenttowhichthe‘Socrates’ofthedialoguesresemblestherealSocrates.Theconsensusappearstobethat,intheearlierdialogues,hedoes.However,asTheRepublicwaswrittenduringPlato’smiddleperiod,wecansafelytakeitthatthe‘Socrates’ofthatworkismoreamouthpieceforPlato’sownideas.Plato’sperfectstateSo,whatdoesTheRepublicsay?Well,asthebook’spurposeistodefineDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012andjustifyacertainconceptionoftheperfector‘ideal’state,itwouldbeagoodideatostartbysummarisingPlato’sdescriptionofthatstate.Ishan’tspendtoolongonthedetails.SofarasIamconcerned,itistheprinciplesthatunderliehisdescriptionwhichcount,andIshalleventuallywanttofocusonthose.Inanycase,ifyouwantthedetails,youcanalwaysreadTheRepublicitself.Brieflythen,Plato’sstate’smostfundamentalfeatureisitssystemofadministration.Thereisapyramidalclassstructure,witharulinggroupof‘philosopherrulers’or‘guardians’atthepyramid’speak.Itistheirjob,and\nPlato:TheRepublic15theirsalone,torule.Thatisbecausetheyarephilosopherswhichmeansthatthey–andtheyalone–knowwhatisgoodandwillthereforedowhatisbest.Everyoneissupposedto‘mindtheirownbusiness’andconcentrateonwhattheyarebestat,leavingthephilosopherrulerstogetonwiththejobofruling.(Inmanytranslationstherulersarecalled‘philosopherkings’butthereisnoespeciallygoodreasonfordescribingthemas‘kings’.Foronething,Platoexplicitlystatesthatwomenarecapableofbecomingphilosopherrulers.1Foranother,Plato’srulersdonotinherittheirpositions,askingsnormallydo.Plato’sstateisameritocracy.)Immediatelysubsidiarytotheguardianclassisaclassof‘auxiliaries’.Theirjobistoensurethattherulers’directivesarecarriedout.Youcouldthinkofthemas‘middlemanagement’.Alternatively,sincePlatoclearlythinksofthemasexhibitingmilitaryvirtues,youcouldthinkofthemasjuniorofficers,withthephilo-sopherrulersasthegenerals.Finally,atthebaseofthepyramid,thelargestclassiscomposedofeveryonewhoisnotaguardian.Itistheclassofordinarypeople.Withcertainfurtherassumptions,therestofPlato’sdescriptionfollows.Forexample,Platohastomakesurethattheguardiansarecapableofdoingtheirjob.Giventhis,togetherwiththeassumptionthattalentistosomeextentinnateratherthanacquired–thatis,thatwearebornwithit–itmakessensethatsomeguardiansshouldbechargedwiththeresponsibilityofselectinginfantsfortrainingasfutureguardians.Ifyouassume,further,thatthetalentyouarebornwithisinheritedfromyourparents,thenitmakessensetothinkthatpeoplewithanimprovedtalentforguardianshipcanbeproducedbymeansofselectivebreeding,justasdogswithakeenersenseofsmellorhearingcan.Platoimaginesthat,inhisidealstate,therewillbestatutoryfestivalsatwhichyoungmaleandfemaleguardiansselectsexualpartnersbydrawinglots.Hesupposesthat,althoughtheselectionprocesswillappearrandomtotheparticipants,infactitwillhavebeenorchestratedbehindthescenesbyolderguardianswhoaremakingsurethattherightcouplesbreedinordertoproducethebeststock(Republic:459e.ff.).2Thatmightstrikeyouasfanciful,sinister,orjustfun,but–howeveritstrikesyou–IthinkyouwillappreciatethepointthatitisalogicalconsequenceofPlato’sideathatthestateshouldberunbyaclasswithspecialistexpertise.3Again,onceselectedatinfancy,theyoungguardianshavetobetrainedforDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012theirfuturerole.Forthatreason,thereisalengthysectionofTheRepublicinwhichtheireducationisdescribed.Withinit,thereis,forexample,alongsectiondevotedtoadiscussionofwhytheyshouldnotbepermittedtoreadcertainliterature.‘[We]cannothaveanypoetsayingthatthegodsdisguisethemselvesasstrangersfromabroad,andwanderroundourtownsineverykindofshape’saysPlato(throughhismouthpiece,‘Socrates’).‘Wemuststopallstoriesofthiskind,andstopmothersbeingmisledbythemandscaringtheirchildrenwithharmfulmyths’(Republic:381d).Later,helistsastringofpassageshewouldexcisefromtheworkofHomer(Republic:383a.ff.)\n16Athensandthereisagreatdealmoreinthesamevein.Thisisreasonableenoughifyouassumethattheliteraturetowhichachildisexposedcaninfluencethewayhisorhercharacterdevelops.Itisthesamelogicwhichcanleadamodernparenttodenyayoungchildaccesstocertainviolentmoviesandvideogames.Asforotherarts,suchasmusic,Platowrites,forexample,thatthe‘IonianandcertainLydianmodes,commonlydescribedas“languid”’shouldbeprohibitedforthewaytheyfoster‘drunkenness,softness[and]idleness’.Theyoungguardiansareonlypermittedtolistentomusicinthe‘DorianandPhrygianmodes’asthesetendtofostermilitaryandcivicvirtue(Republic:399a).Oragain,ifyouassume–quitereasonably–thatthewaypeoplelivecanaffecttheirattitudetothewidercommunity,thenyouwilltakecareoverthewayyoudesigntheirlivingconditions.ThatiswhatPlatodoes.Inhisstate,theguardianslivecommunally,inspecialcompounds.Theylivefrugally.Thelittlepropertytheyhaveisheldincommonand‘theyeattogetherinmessesandlivetogetherlikesoldiersincamp’(Republic:416e).Theyarecertainlynotpermittedtoownland,housesormoney,andnoraretheyallowedmarriageandfamilylife.Thepurposeofallthisistoensurethattheinterestofanyindividualguardianiscloselyidentifiedwiththatofthecommunityasawhole.Nothingelsemustgetinthewayasguardiansshouldbe‘partnersintheirdealingswiththeirfellowcitizens’(Republic:417b).AllthisillustratestheextenttowhichtheadministrationofPlato’sstateliesinthehandsofaspeciallytrainedrulingclass.Onegoodwaytosum-marisethevisionwhichliesatthecoreofhisviewiswiththe‘foundationmyth’heproposesforit.Thisisthefamous‘mythofthemetals’.‘Weshalltellourcitizensthefollowingtale’,saysSocrates(knowingverywellthatitisn’ttrue;sofarastherulersareconcerned,thepointisthatpeoplewillbeeasiertocontroliftheybelieveit).Youare,allofyouinthiscommunity,brothers.Butwhengodfashionedyou,headdedgoldinthecompositionofthoseofyouwhoarequalifiedtoberulers(whichiswhytheirprestigeisgreatest);heputsilverintheAuxiliaries,andironandbronzeinthefarmersandotherworkers.Nowsinceyouareallofthesamestock,thoughyourchildrenwillcommonlyresembletheirparents,occasionallyasilverchildwillbebornofgoldenparents,oragoldenchildofsilverparentsandsoon.Therefore,thefirstandmostimportantofgod’scom-mandmentstotheRulersisthatintheexerciseoftheirfunctionasGuardiansDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012theirprincipalcaremustbetowatchthemixtureofmetalsinthecharactersoftheirchildren.Ifoneoftheirownchildrenhastracesofbronzeorironinitsmake,theymusthardentheirhearts,assignititspropervalue,anddegradeittotheranksoftheindustrialandagriculturalclasstowhichitproperlybelongs:similarly,ifachildofthisclassisbornwithgoldorsilverinitsnature,theywillpromoteitappropriatelytobeaGuardianoranAuxiliary.AndthistheymustdobecausethereisaprophecythatthestatewillberuinedwhenithasGuardiansofsilverorbronze.(Republic:415a–c)\nPlato:TheRepublic17Plato’sintentionsThequestionofjusticeWhatarewetomakeofthis?BecauseTheRepublichasasortof‘doubleaspect’,thereisnosimpleanswer.AsIcommentedearlier,theveryfactofitssurvivalmeansthatitsargumentconfrontsusjustasitconfrontedPlato’scontemporaries.Likethem,wehavetocometotermswithit.However,thatdoesnotmeanthatanyonereadingitinpaperback,onkindleoripadnowadayswillautomaticallyfinditsmeaningclear.Ifphilosophyisaconversationacrossthegenerationsthen–sometimes–tryingtounderstandtheotherscanbeliketryingtofollowthewordsofastrangerfromafaranddistantlandverydifferentfromyourown.Youhavetomakeaneffort.ThisisespeciallysointhecaseofPlato,whoseideas,outofallthoseIdiscussinthisbook,havetakenthelongestjourneytoreachus.Foronething,thereisthequestionofreadingaphilosopher’sintentionscorrectly.TakethewayPlato’sstate(supposedly)embodiesthe‘virtue’of‘justice’toaperfectdegreeandis,thus,‘ideal’inthesensethatweareintendedtotreatitasameasuringrod.Theideaisthatactualstatesarethemorejust,themoretheyresemblehisidealandthelessjustthelesstheyresembleit.Atfirstsight,Plato’sintentionappearsmoreorlessequivalenttotheintentionexpressedbyJohnRawlswhenheintroduceshisATheoryofJustice(Rawls1972)asfollows:Justiceisthefirstvirtueofsocialinstitutions,astruthisofsystemsofthought.Atheoryhoweverelegantoreconomicalmustberejectedorrevisedifitisuntrue;likewiselawsandinstitutionsnomatterhowefficientandwell-arrangedmustbereformedorabolishediftheyareunjust.(Rawls1972:3)Rawlsgoesontoarguethatthereare‘principlesofjustice’whichwouldbechosenbyfair-mindedpeoplewhostandtogainfromcooperatingwitheachother,atleastwhenthosepeopleareplacedinconditionssoarrangedthattheirjudgementcannotbebiased.Hethinksthatasocial,legalorpoliticalarrangementisthemorejustthemoreitsatisfiesthoseprinciples,andthelessjustthelessitdoesso.So,likePlato’sidealstate,Rawls’sfamousDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012‘twoprinciplesofjustice’aremeanttoserveasatemplate.Butwemustbecarefulhere.Itistrueenoughthatmodernpeople–ourcontemporaries–dohaveatendencytothinkofjusticeintermsofthesatisfactionofcertainprinciples.Thatisbecause,likeRawls,theytendtoassociatejusticewithfairness.Indeed,Rawlssometimesdescribesthesubjectofhisworkas‘justiceasfairness’,anditisagreatstrengthofhisphilosophicalpositionthathetriestoworkthisideaoutinalogical,systematic,way.Clearly,ifajustarrangementisoneinwhicheveryoneaffectedbyitcanbetreatedfairlythen‘thephilosophicalproblemofjustice’willhavebeensolved\n18Athensoncecorrectprincipleshavebeenarrivedat;thatis,principleswhich,iffollowed,wouldresultineveryone’sbeingtreatedfairly,oratleastintheirbeingtreatedasfairlyasishumanlypossible.Noticealsothat,whentheproblemisconceivedthisway,thequestionofhowgoodswhicharescarceoughttobedistributedusuallycomeswelltothefore.Thisisinevitablegiventhat,inmoderntimes,thejustice–and,indeed,thecompetence–ofagovernmentorregime’sbehaviourtendstobejudgedbythewayitdistributesscarceresourceswhichareingreatdemand.Philosopherswhobroadlysharethiswayofthinkingaboutjusticecanstilldisagreeoverpreciselywhatthecorrect‘princi-plesofjustice’are.Forexample,Rawlsiansholdthat,underjustarrangements,theworstoffpeoplearebetteroffthantheywouldbeunderanyalternativeset-up.(ThisisrequiredbyRawl’s‘secondprincipleofjustice’.)Theydisagreewithutilitarianswhoholdthatjusticerequiressatisfactionofthe‘principleofutility’accordingtowhich‘thegreatestgoodisthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber’.UtilitarianismandRawl’stheoryarediscussedinlaterchapters.Forthepresent,thequestionatissueisthis:ArethesemorerecenttreatmentsofjusticereallyaddressingthesamequestionwithwhichPlatowasconcerned?Here,thefactthatPlatoneverreferstoanythingresemblingRawls’ssecondprinciple,ortheprincipleofutility,shouldbeenoughtoputusonourguard.Soshouldthefactthatheshowsnointerestinthequestionoffairdistribution.Onthecontrary,andaswehaveseen,Platothinksof‘justice’inthestateasamatterofitshavingacertainstructure,andoftherebeingabalanceorharmonybetweenthestructure’sparts,thesebeingthethreeclasses,theguardians,theauxiliariesandtherest.Atonepoint,Platoevendrawsaparallelbetweenjusticeinthestateandjustice‘intheindividual’.Accordingtohim,thesoul,liketheidealstate,alsohasthreeparts.Inthecaseofthesoul,theseare‘reason’,‘spirit’and‘appetite’,andapersoncanonlybehappywhentheseareinharmony(Republic:441c.ff.).Thiscomparisonismorethanapoeticflightoffancy.ItissointegraltoPlato’spoliticalvision,that,inTheRepublic,heintroduceshisdescriptionofthejuststateonthepretextthatitwillhelpustounderstandwhatjusticeintheindividualis.‘Justicecanbeacharacteristicofanindividualorofacommunity’,hewrites,butaddsthat,because‘acommunityislargerthananindividual’,wemayfindit‘onalargerscaleinthelargerentity,andsoeasiertorecognise’(Republic:368e).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ThewayJohnRawlsconceivesthequestionofjustice,suchtalkof‘justiceintheindividual’wouldmakenosense.So,itisfairtoaskwhetherPlatoandRawlshavecomeupwithdifferentanswerstothesamequestion,orwhethertheygivedifferentanswersbecausetheyweretryingtoanswerdifferentques-tionsinthefirstplace.Andheretheproblemofreadingintentionscorrectlyiscompoundedbyafurtherproblem,thatoftranslation.InPlato’scase,thisarisesbecausetheword‘virtue’isthemostaccuratetranslationanyonecanthinkoffortheGreekwordarete-andbecause,evenso,‘virtue’andarete-donotmeanquitethesamething.So,althoughyoucouldeasilygainthe\nPlato:TheRepublic19impressionthatPlato,likeRawls,believesthat‘justiceisthefirstvirtueofpoliticalinstitutions’,thatisnotwhathebelieves–ornotprecisely.WhatPlatobelievesisthatdikaiosyne-(theGreekwordtranslatedas‘justice’)isthestate’sarete-.Thedifferencebetween‘virtue’andarete-isthatthelatterisconnectedmuchmorecloselytonotionsoffunctionandstatus.Infact,arete-issometimestranslated,notas‘virtue’butas‘excellence’.Youdemonstratearete-byshowingthatyouareespeciallygoodatsomething–fightinginbattle,forexample,orspeakingintheAssembly.Intheearly,‘heroic’periodofGreekhistory–theperiodoftheTrojanWar,ofHomer’sIliadandOdyssey–arete-seemstohavebeenaquestionofexcellenceinbeingthesortofpersonyouwere,and‘thesortofpersonyouwere’would,inturn,havebeenamatterofyoursocialrank.Muchasanaxedemonstratesitspeculiarexcellencebycuttingswiftlyandcleanly,sonoblesandwarriorswouldhavedemonstratedarete-bydoingwhatisexpectedofnoblesandwarriors–showingauthority,actingcour-ageouslyinwar,andsoon.Somescholarshavearguedthattherewasnothingwewouldrecogniseas‘morality’duringthatperiod;thattherewereonlyindividualsdemonstrating,orfailingtodemonstrate,thequalitiesappropriatetotheircaste.4BythetimePlatowaswriting,themeaningofarete-wasfarlessstrictlytiedtosocialclass,butitstillmeant‘excellence’atthisorthatparticularactivity.Thisexplainswhyarete-cansometimesbetranslatedas‘skill’.Theinexactmatchbetweenthemeaningsof‘virtue’andarete-showsjusthowcarefulyousometimeshavetobeifyouwanttoknowwhatawriterisreallytryingtosay.ItalsohelpsustounderstandwhyPlatodefined‘justiceinthestate’ashedid,soletusnowconsiderthatdefinition.Plato’sdefinitionof‘justiceinthestate’Withoutadefinitionof‘justice’–or,atleast,withoutsomeaccountoftheword’smeaning–wewouldhavenoreasonatallforbelievingPlato’sclaimthatthestatehedescribesinTheRepublicisperfectlyjust.Platosuppliesadefinitionabouthalfwaythroughthebook.‘Justice’,hesays,‘consistsinmindingyourownbusinessandnotinterferingwithotherpeople’(Republic:433a–b).Alittlelaterheaddsthat‘wheneachofourthreeclasses…doesitsownjobandmindsitsownbusinessthat…isjustice,andmakesourstatejust’(Republic:434c).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Here,itisimportanttoemphasisethatthephrase‘mindingyourownbusiness’,althoughitistheoneconventionallyusedintranslationsofPlato,isaslightlyunfortunatechoiceforwhatPlatohadinmind.InEnglish,to‘mindyourownbusiness’istokeepyournoseoutofotherpeople’saffairs.Itistonotinterferewhereyouhavenoright.ButallPlatomeansisthat,inajuststate,everyoneconcentratesondoingwhatheorsheisbestat.Thisisadefinitionof‘justice’whichwouldhavecomefairlynaturallytosomeonewhowasthinking,notintermsof‘virtue’,butintermsofarete-,asthelatteristiedfarmorecloselytonotionsoffunctionandpurpose.Platoisaskingwhatthe\n20Athensparticularpurpose,pointor‘excellence’ofthestateisand,sofarasheisconcerned,thisisprettymuchequivalenttoaskingforthepurposeorpointoflivinginacommunityorasociety.Incidentally,thisisagoodpointatwhichtonoteyetanotherexampleofhowyouhavetogoquitecarefullyifyouwanttounderstandwhatPlatoisreallytryingtosay.InPlato’stimeaGreekwouldhavelivedina‘city-state’,orpolis,consistingofacityanditsoutlyingarea.The‘city’inquestionwouldbeacentreatwhichpeoplecouldmeetandtradeand,ifthepoliswasademocracy,attendmeetingsoftheAssembly.Typically,itwouldconsistofatractoflandwithanacropolis(citadel).Clearly,theGreekcityborelittleresemblancetothegreatcitiesofourowntime.Platoisaskinghowthepolisshouldbeorganised,afactwhichbecomesevenclearerifyouconsiderthatTheRepublicwasnoteventheoriginaltitleofhiswork.ItwasoriginallyentitledPoliteia,whichtranslatesas‘constitution’.Nowadays,wetendtothinkofthestateasaparticularsetofinstitutions–thelegislativeassemblyorparliament,thecourts,thepoliceandthearmedservices,andsoon–butthatisnotquitewhatPlatohadinmind.Iwouldsaythat‘state’,‘community’and‘society’allcoversomethingofwhathehadinmind,butthatnoneofthemcapturesitaccurately.ItisPlato’sview,then,thateverymemberofacommunitybenefitswheneachspecialisesinthetaskheorsheisbestatdoing.Thatiswhatgivescommunallivingitspoint.Inlinewiththis,hisdefinitionof‘justice’ispreceded,muchearlierinthediscussion,byaspeculativeaccountofhowsocietycouldhaveoriginated.‘Societyoriginates’,saysthe‘Socrates’char-acter,‘becausetheindividualisnotself-sufficient,buthasmanyneedswhichhecan’tsupplyhimself’(Republic:369b).Hethengoesontoarguethat,atanabsoluteminimum,astateorcommunitywouldhavetoconsistoffourorfivemen.‘Itwillneedafarmer,abuilder,aweaver,andalso,Ithink,ashoemakerandoneortwoothers’(369d).Thisisthenumberrequiredtosatisfyourbasicneedsforfood,shelterandclothing,anditobviouslymakessensethateachofthesemenshouldconcentrateonasingleactivityandsharehisproductwiththeothers.Itwouldbesillytoexpectthefarmer,say,to‘devoteaquarterofhistimetoproducingaquartertheamountoffood,andtheotherthreequarters,onetobuildinghimselfahouse,onetomakingclothes,andanothertomakingshoes’.Notonlythat,but‘Wehavedifferentnaturalaptitudeswhichfitusfordifferentjobs’(Republic:370b).OfDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012course,thereisagreatdifferencebetweenthissimple,ratheridyllic,com-munityandsomethingassophisticatedasAtheniansociety,soPlatopresentsascenarioinwhichmorespecialistsareneededastastesdevelopandbecomemorecomplex.Evenhissimplesocietywillsooncometoneedsmithsandothercraftsmentomakeandrepairtools,shepherdsandcowherdstoguardlivestock,merchantsandothertypesoftrader.Asforafullycivilisedsociety,whichPlatoportraysas‘unhealthy’becauseitismarkedbyatasteformorethanbarenecessities,itwillneedagreatdealmore.‘Itwillwantcouchesandtablesandotherfurniture,andavarietyofdelicacies,scents,perfumes,\nPlato:TheRepublic21prostitutes,andconfectionery.’5‘Weshallhavetoenlargeourstateagain’,hewrites,Ourhealthystateisnolongerbigenough;itssizemustbeenlargedtomakeroomforamultitudeofoccupationsnoneofwhichisconcernedwithnecessaries.Therewillbehuntersandfishermen,andtherewillbeartists,sculptors,painters,andmusicians;therewillbepoetswiththeirfollowingofreciters,actors,chorus-trainers,andproducers;therewillbemanufacturersofdomesticequipmentofallsorts,especiallythoseconcernedwithwomen’sdressandmake-up.Andweshallneedalotmoreservants–tutors,wet-nurses,nannies,cosmeticians,barbers,butchersandcooks.Andweshallneedswineherdstoo;therewerenoneinourformerstate,aswehadnoneedofthem,butnowweneedpigsandcattleinquantitiestoo,ifwearetoeatmeat.(Republic:373b–c)Platoaddsthat,withthisluxuriouslifestyle,moredoctorswillbeneeded–andsoonandsoforth.Finally,andofcourse,aguardianclasswhosespecialskillisrulingwillbeneededtoadministrateandtakedecisions.Inthisway,thetripartiteclassstructureofPlato’sidealstatefollowssmoothlyandquitelogicallyfromhisdefinitionof‘justice’.ThereisquitealotwrongwithPlato’sdefinition,butthereissomethingrightaboutittoo,soletustakethatfirst.Platoisrighttosuppose,then,thateveryonebenefitswherethereisdivisionoflabourandpeoplespecialiseindoingthingstheyaregoodat.Youcouldsaythatthisgivesthecommunityacertainfunctionandcommunallifeacertainpoint,soheisrightonthatscoretoo.However–turningnowtowherehisdefinitiongoeswrong–itdoesnotfollowthatthebenefitsofspecialisationgivecommunallifeitsonlypoint,somuchsothateverythingmustbeorganisedtosatisfythatparticularend.Nordoesitfollowthatsocietycannotcometoservenewanddifferentrequirementsasitdevelops.Morethanthat,theoriginalreasonforsomething’sexistencecanbecomequiteirrelevanttothewayitisnow.Forallweknow,socialorganisationevolvedbecausetriballifemadeiteasierforwomentoconcentrateonchildrearingwhilemenhunted,orperhapsitmeantthatpeoplecouldhavesexmoreoften,withtheresultthatindividualswitha‘socialgene’succeededwhereothersfailed.Perhapssobut,sofarasIcansee,thefactwouldbeofabsolutelynorelevancetothewaymodernsocietieslikethoseofDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012EuropeandNorthAmericaoughttoberun.Itisamistaketosupposethattheremustalwaysbeconclusionstobedrawnfromanaccountofhowathingoriginated.(Thisissometimescalled‘thegeneticfallacy’.)So,Plato’sstoryofhowthefirststatemighthavedevelopedisreallybesidethepoint.Actually,youdon’thavetopushPlato’sdefinitionveryhardbeforeitfallstopiecesinfrontofyoureyes.It’samess.InadditiontothedifficultyIhavejustmentioned,thereareplentyofotherthingswrongwithit.Herearejustthreeexamples.First:althoughitisundoubtedlytruethatwehavedifferentnaturalaptitudes,theseareonlypreconditionsforthetalentsandskillswe\n22Athenseventuallyhaveoncewearemature.Talentsandskillsarethingsyouworkonanddevelop.Justforexample,itcouldbethatsomepeoplearecon-genitallyincapableofbecomingpianists.Itcouldbethatothersarebornwitha‘naturaltalent’but,outofthelatter,onlythosewholearnthepianoandpractisehardatitwillbecomegoodpianists.Therefore,Platoiswrongtoassumethateachofusissuited,frombirth,tofillaspecificsocialslot.(Giventheeffortheputsintodescribingtheeducationofthephilosopherrulers,youwouldthinkhewouldhavenoticedthis.)Second:Plato’sideathatweshouldspecialiseinwhatwearebestatassumesthateveryoneisabsolutelyhopelessatdoinganythingotherthanthethingheorsheisbestat.Withoutthisassumption,therewouldbenoreasonforstoppingpeopledoingthingstheyaregoodat,evenifthosethingsarenotwhattheyarebestat.Forexample,someonecouldbeabrilliantsoftwareengineerandaverygood,butnot100-per-cent-brilliant,cook.Ifthispersonwasauselesscook,thenhewouldbewelladvisedtoconcentrateonthesoftware.ButIamsupposingthatheisnotuseless.Heisverygood,whichmeansthatifhewantstoopenarestaurantandgiveupsoftwareengineering,thereneedbenoreasonwhyheshouldn’t.Onethingisforsure:therewouldbenosocialcollapseofthesortthatwouldensueiffarmerswereforcedtospendthree-quartersoftheirtimebuilding,weavingandmakingshoes.Third:Plato’sdefinitionassumesthat,foreachperson,thereisaneconomicslotconvenientlywaitingtobefilled;forexample,that,forasocietyofexactly100people,therewillbeexactly100jobstobedone.(Eitherthat,orthereissomeunmentionedmethodfordisposingofthoseunfortunateswhofindthemselvesclassedas‘sparecapacity’.)Thisiscompletelyimplausible.Icouldcontinue,butbypickingawayattheshortcomingsofPlato’sdefinitioninthisdetailedway,weruntheriskofoverlookingsomethingelse.Ihavenotyetmentionedthatdefinition’smoststrikingfeature.Thisisnotadetail.Itisthedefinition’sremarkablyun-Atheniancharacter.InthepreviouschapterIquotedfromPericles’funeraloration,thespeechwithwhichthatgreatstatesmancelebratedtheAthenianidealattheendofthefirstyearofthePeloponnesianWar.Thereisadirectcontrastbetweenhisproudboastthat‘wedonotsaythatamanwhotakesnointerestinpoliticsisamanwhomindshisownbusiness;wesaythathehasnobusinesshereatall’andPlato’sclaimthat‘Justiceconsistsinmindingyourownbusinessandnotinterferingwithotherpeople’.TheveryfeaturePericlescelebratesashisDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012city’scrowningglory,Platodenigratesasitsdeepestvice.ThisisacontrastwhichtakesustotheheartofPlato’sposition,soletusnowexploreit.DemocracyandthetotalitarianmenaceSofar,IhaverepeatedlyemphasisedthattherearedifferencesbetweenPlato’sworldandourown,andthatyouhavetotaketheseintoaccountifyouwanttounderstandwhathewasreallytryingtosay.Thereisanothersidetothecoin,though,fortherearealsosimilaritieswhichlendhisargumentsa\nPlato:TheRepublic23certainurgency,eveninpresent-daycircumstances.Forexample,inhistimeasinours–inAthensatleast–democracywaswidelyheldtobesuperiortoothersystemsofgovernment.IfyouforgetthatAthenshadastrongdemo-cratictraditionthenyouarelikelytomissthepointofTheRepublic.But,morethanthat,justastheAthenianswouldhaverecognisedinPlato’sargumentasustainedcritiqueoftheirdemocraticideals,sowecantreatitasembodyingacritiqueofourown.Ifyouvaluedemocracy,then,onewaytoapproachTheRepublicisbytryingtoansweritsanti-democraticcase.Thereisarelativelyshort,butsustainedanddirect,attackondemocracyitselfinTheRepublic,PartIX(Republic:555b.ff.).There,Platoarguesthatthetypical‘democraticcharacter’issuperficial,fecklessandeasilyled(thisbeingaresultoftoomuchlibertyandtheprevailingideathatallareequal).PeoplewiththistypeofcharacteraresaidbyPlatotobeeasypreyforthemanipulativeandpower-hungry,withtheinevitableresultthatdemocracydegeneratesintotyranny.Forthemostpart,thistrainofreasoningmerelyrevealsPlato’shostilitytotheAtheniansystem,aswellashisaristocrat’scontemptforthecommonpeople.Forexample,heclaimsthat,inademocracy,practicallyallleadersaredrawnfromaclassof‘thriftlessidlers’whomhecomparestodronesinabeehive:‘theirenergeticleaderstodroneswithstings,themoreinertmassoffollowerstodroneswithoutstings’(Republic:364b).Remarkslikethatcontainmoreprejudicethanargument,andwecansafelyignorethem.However,thereisonethreadrunningthroughthesepassageswhichwedohavetotakeseriously,namelyPlato’sinsistencethatdemocracycannotbereliedupontoproducethebestleadersordecisions,orevenverygoodones.Democracy–beitAtheniandemocracyormodern‘liberaldemocracy’–is(attheveryleast)asystemormethodforchoosingleadersormakingdecisions.Theleadersanddecisionsityieldsare–asPlatosays–themostpopular,‘mostpopular’beingdefinedwithreferencetoagivenvotingprocedure(somewouldsayratherarbitrarily,butthatisapointwecansettoonesideforthemoment).Thisbeingso,thereisnoguaranteewhatsoeverthatitwillproduceleaderswhoare‘thebest’inthesenseofbeingwise,orgood,orefficient,northattheoperationofdemocraticprocedureswillresultinwiseorsensiblepolicies.Sometimesthe‘democraticdecision’willturnoutinretrospecttohavebeenquitefoolish.So,ifyouwanttodefenddemocracyagainstPlato,youcan’tdoitwithanargumentthat,despiteappearances,democracyreallydoesproduce‘thebest’leadersanddecisions.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Itdoesn’t;thereisnopointintryingtothinkofsuchanargument,andyouhavetocomeupwithadifferentwayofdefendingdemocracy.BeforeconsideringhowthismightbedoneweshouldnotesomethingelsewhichwouldhavebeenalltoofamiliartoAthenians,justasitistous,andthatishisstate’scentralised,authoritarian,structure.ToAthenianreadersofTheRepublic,Plato’sstatewouldhavebeenimmediatelyrecognisableasanidealisedportraitoftheircity’sgreatenemy,Sparta.AsInotedinthepreviouschapter,thiswasadictatorshiprunbyamilitarycaste.AsinPlato’sstate,therulingclass–theSpartiates–livedcollectivelyinfairlyharsh,simpleand\n24Athensdisciplinedconditions,menandwomenalike.Likewise,inbothSpartaandPlato’sstate,thepurposeofthis‘Spartan’lifestylewastoensuretheclosestpossibleidentificationoftheindividual’sinterestswiththoseofthecommunity.AsinPlato’sstate,orderswerepasseddownfromthetoptothosewhoformedthebaseofthepyramid.Platoidealisesthisinatleasttwoways.First,althoughhedoesn’tdescribethewaythelowerclassesliveinhisstate,wecanassumethat,thankstoitsjustconstitution(orratheritsarete-),theirconditionswillbethebestpossible.Bycontrast,theSpartanhelotslivedtheharshandbrutalisedlifeofserfs.Second,whereasPlato’sstateisbenignlyruledbyphilosophers,theSpartanrulinggroupwerenothingmorethanamilitarycaste.6Twentieth-centurycommentatorshavedrawnotherparallels.Forexample,KarlPopperhasdescribedPlatoasadefenderof‘totalitarianism’.Whatevertheprecisemeaningof‘totalitarianism’maybe–thereissomedisputeamongstscholarsoverwhethertheworddenotesanewphenomenonorwhetheritisjustanewwordforsomethingmuchmoreancient–thisis,inoneway,fairenough,forallareagreedthatStalin’sSovietUnionandHitler’sGermanywereexamplesoftotalitariansystemsatwork.Underthoseregimes,asmallgroup(thepartyelite,thistimewitha‘leader’atitshelm)strovetoexerttotalcontroloverapassiveandcompliantpopulation.AsinPlato’sstate,everyone,butespeciallymembersofthedominantparty,wasexpec-tedtoputtheinterestofthenation,theraceorthecommunityfirst.Andthereareothersimilarities.Forexamplerecenttotalitarianregimeshavestriventomono-polisethemedia,andsotoexertcontrol,notonlythroughcensorship–whichcertainlyexistsinPlato’sstate–butthroughthedisseminationofpropaganda.Somecommentatorshavedrawnparallelsbetweenthisandthepropagationof‘thenoblelie’(themythofthemetals)byPlato’sphilosopherrulers.ThissuggestsanotherwaytoanswerPlato.Ratherthanattemptingtheimpossible,bytryingtoshowthatdemocracyalwaysproduces‘thebest’results,wecantrytounderminehiscaseforthecentralisedstate.And,whateveryoumaythinkofhisidealstate,thatcaseissopowerfulthatitisworthtryingtoanswerit.ThatisonereasonwhyPlatoremainsaninterestingchallenge.Afterall,betweenhistimeandthepresenttheremusthavebeenplentyofdisgruntledreactionarieswhohaveproducedthisorthatmoreorlesseccentricargumentforsomeformofstatewithacentralauthority.Ourowntimeshavewitnessedquiteafewdictators,eachspinningalineonDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012‘preservingthenationalidentity’,‘eliminatingundesirableelements’,‘runningthingsefficiently’,‘makingthecountrysafebeforedemocracyisrestored’,andsoon.ButPlatodoessomethingalotmoreinterestingthanthat.Thepositionhetakesisaforcefulillustrationofthewayunderstandingapoliticalphilosophycansometimesrequireunderstandingmuchmorethanitsapproachto‘thepolitical’,narrowlyconceived.TofullyappreciatetheargumentofTheRepublic,wemustconsiderhowPlatoanswersquestionswhich,atfirstsight,appeartohavenothingtodowithpolitics.Theyarequestionsaboutthenatureoftheuniverse;aboutmeaningandknowledge;appearanceandreality.\nPlato:TheRepublic25ThetheoryofformsAppearanceandrealityAttheheartofPlato’sworldviewtherelieshis‘theoryofforms’.Accordingtothattheory,theworldrevealedbyoursenses–theworldofobjects,shapes,colours,soundsandsmells–isamereappearance.Itisthedistortedreflectionofadeeper,‘true’,reality.Thelatteristheworldofforms(‘patterns’or‘paradigms’).ItisfromthesethatthereflectionsareheldbyPlatotoderivethesecondaryrealitytheyhave.Platoalsothinksthatmostofusarefatedtospendourliveslabouringunderthedeludedbeliefthattheworldofmereappearanceis,infact,therealworld.Forthenextfewpages,Ishalltrytoexplainthetheoryinacertainamountofdetail.Sohow,accordingtothetheory,istheappearancesupposedtoreflectthereality,andbywhatprocessisthedeceptionsupposedtocomeabout?Afterallareflection,thethingitreflectsandthepersondeceivedintomistakingonefortheothercanberelatedinanumberofways.Thewaythereflectioninanordinaryplanemirrorisrelated,ontheonehand,totheobjectitreflectsand,ontheother,tothepersonseeingthereflectionisjustone.(Itissafetosaythat,wherethisrelationshipholds,wearenotusuallydeceivedintoconfusingthereflectionwiththethingitself.However,Iamsurethatallofushavebeenonoccasions,forexamplewhereamirrorisusedtogreateffectbyaprofessionalmagician.)Thisvariantcontrastswiththewaytheimageonacinemascreenisrelatedtothatonthetranslucentfilmintheprojector.Itseemsrighttocalltheformera‘reflection’ofthelatter,andyoucouldsaythatthelatteris,initsturn,itselfareflectionoftherealeventswhichwereori-ginallyfilmed.Again,Idoubtthatmanyofusareoftendeceivedintoconfusingtheimageonthescreenwithrealityitself–certainlynotthesedays–butitiseasytoseehowsomeoneunfamiliarwiththecinemacouldbe.Hereisyetanotherpossibility.Supposeyouarestandingonapieceofdryland,butthatallaroundyouarepoolsofwater.Somearequitebrackish;otherslessso,andtheirsurfacesarerippledbythebreeze.Nowtrytoimaginehowyouwouldappeartoacreaturelivingnearthebottomofoneofthepools.Evenifitwerelookingdirectlyupatyou,itsperceptionofyouwouldbedistortedbytheripplesmovingacrosstheinterveningsurface.Also,becauselightenteringwaterisrefracted,youwouldappeartobeinthewrongplace.Moreover,itisquitelikelythatyourimagewouldbefurtherDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012reflectedanddistortedbyobjectswithinthepool,aswellasbymovementsofthewateritself–currents,eddiesandsuchlikedisturbances.Thiscreaturewillbesurroundedbyfracturedanddistortedimages–asifitwerelivingwithinawarpedkaleidoscope–anditcouldhardlyavoidconfusingtheseimageswiththe‘real’world(thatofthesurface).Platosometimesportraystherelationbetweentheworldofformsandtheworldofappearancesinamannerwhichresemblesthis.Consider,forexample,thebeliefsheexpresses(throughthemediumofthe‘Socrates’character)\n26Athenstowardstheendofhisdialogue,Phaedo.ThedialogueisrepresentedastakingplaceinthedeathcellduringthenightonwhichSocrateswillswallowpoisonanddie,sofulfillingthesentenceoftheAtheniancourt.Afewdis-ciplesarepresent,andSocratescomfortsthembyoutlininghisbeliefinthesurvivalofthesoulafterdeath.Afterbrieflystatinghisbeliefthattheearthissphericalandsetatthecentreoftheuniverse,hecontinuesasfollows.Ibelievethatit[theearth]isvastinsize,andthatwewhodwellbetweentheriverPhasisandthePillarsofHerculesinhabitonlyaminuteportionofit;weliveroundthesealikeantsorfrogsroundapond;andtherearemanyotherpeoplesinhabitingsimilarregions.Therearemanyhollowplacesallroundtheearth,placesofeveryshapeandsize,intowhichthewaterandmistandairhavecollected.Buttheearthitselfisaspureasthestarryheaveninwhichitlies,andwhichiscalledEtherbymostofourauthorities.Thewater,mist,andairarethedregsofthisEther,andtheyarecontinuallydrainingintothehollowplacesintheearth.Wedonotrealisethatwearelivinginitshollows,butassumethatwearelivingontheearth’ssurface.Imaginesomeonelivinginthedepthsofthesea.Hemightthinkthathewaslivingonthesurface,andseeingthesunandtheotherheavenlybodiesthroughthewater,hemightthinkthattheseawasthesky.Hemightbesosluggishandfeeblethathehadneverreachedthetopofthesea,neveremergedandraisedhisheadfromtheseaintothisworldofours,andseenforhimself–orevenheardfromsomeonewhohadseen–howmuchpurerandmorebeautifulitreallyisthantheoneinwhichhispeoplelives.Nowweareinjustthesameposition.(Plato1954b:172)Socratescontinuesinthisveinforsometime.Hethengoesontoasserthisbeliefthathisdepartedsoulwillmigrate,firstthroughtheupperairandthenintotheEther,onwardsandupwardstoyetpurerandmorebeautifulregions.ItisSocrates’beliefthat,oncehehasreachedthese,hewillgainaclearerviewofhowthingsreallyare.Itwouldbeinterestingtopursuethisargu-menttoitsfinaldestination.Ishan’t,though,becausethepointIamtryingtomakeherehasnothingtodowiththesoul’sallegedimmortality.Itrelates,rather,tothecosmologyembodiedinthispassage.ImeanthewayPlatorepresentstheearth’sstructureanditsrelationtotherestoftheuni-Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012verse.Mypointisthat,withtheassumptionofthecosmologicalpicturegivenhere,youcanseehowsomeonereallycould–quitegenuinelyandsincerely–believethattheworldweperceiveisapalereflectionofadiffer-ent,‘higher’reality.Thatisbecauseitisequallypossibletoappreciatehowacreatureinapondwhoactuallythoughtaboutthesethingscouldformasimilarbelief.Thebeliefmaynotbetrue,but–withtheassumption–itmakessense,somuchsothatyoucould,ifyouwanted,representtherelationwhichissupposedtoholdbetweenappearanceandrealityherewiththehelpofadiagram.\nPlato:TheRepublic27Withoutthebackgroundassumption,athesissuchasthetheoryofformscanbemystifying.Believeme.IspeakfromexperienceherebecauseIknowthatwhenIfirstencounteredPlatoIhadrealtroublefiguringoutwhattheformsweresupposedtobe.(Iwasinmyfirstyearasaphilosophystudent.)WhenItriedtopicturetheforms,Itendedtoimaginenebulous,cloud-likeentities,wobblinglikejelliesastheyhoveredinthesky.Asfortheircon-nectionwithearthlythings,thebestIcoulddowasimagineinvisiblewiresorstringsrunningbetweentablesandchairsandtheformsthemselves.(Infact,Irecollectthat,whenlecturingonthesubject,theprofessordrewadiagramontheboardwhichillustratedtheconnectioninprettymuchthatway.)Thewholethingstruckmeasfaintlyridiculous–eventhough,atthetime,IwascompletelyunabletodiscoveranyfaultinPlato’sargumentitself.Ofcourse,InowrealisethatIonlygainedsuchanimpressionbecauseIwasapproachinghisthesiswiththewrongbackgroundassumptions.Anymodernperson,readingPlatoforthefirsttime,wouldfinditequallydifficulttoworkoutwheretheformsaresupposedtobelocated,forexample,howtheyconnectwithotherthings.However,withdifferentbackgroundassumptions,itmakesalotmoresense.7Theforms,meaningandknowledgePlato’stheoryofformssupplieshimwithanswerstoanumberofdifficultphilosophicalproblems.ToillustratethetheoryIshallconcentrateonjusttwo:first,aproblemabouthowwordsacquiremeaning;second,aproblemaboutknowledge.Plato’ssolutionstothesearecloselyrelated,andeachisdirectlyrelevanttohispoliticaltheory.Ishalleventuallysayhow,butletmefirstoutlinetheproblemsandthewayPlatohandlesthem.Firstofall,then,thereisthequestionofwhatdistinguishesameresoundormarkonpaper(papyrus,stoneorthecomputerscreen)fromaword.Whenweexpressourselvesinlanguage,wenormallydosoinspeechorwriting–so,ofcourse,thereisasenseinwhichwordsaresoundsormarks–buttheyarenotjustthat.Howcome?Youcananswerthequestionbypointingoutthat,unlikemeresoundsandmarks,wordscarrymeaning.Thatistrueenough,butitonlyraisesafurtherquestion,namely,byvirtueofwhatdowordscarrymeaning?Plato’sansweristhatawordhasmeaningwhenitisaname;thatis,whenthereisacertainone-to-onerelationshipDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012betweenthewordandthethingit‘standsfor’.Thisisclearlytrueinthecaseofsomewords.Forexample,thewords‘Socrates’and‘Plato’meanwhattheydobecausetheystandforSocratesandPlatothemselves.Platobelievesthatwhatgoesforwordssuchasthesegoesformeaningfulwordsgenerally.Insomerespectsthisisanappealingandquitepersuasiveanswer.(Atanyrate,ithascertainlypersuadedalotofintelligentpeople,forPlatoisonlygivinghisownversionofananswerwhich,afterhistime,hadalonganddistinguishedhistory.)Toappreciateitspower,allyouneedtodoisthinkaboutwhathappenswhenaninfantfirstlearnstospeak.Thefirstthinga\n28Athenschildlearnsistoassociatewordswiththethingstheystandfor–‘Mummy’withitsmother,‘dog’withthedog,andsoon.Ifthisisn’tnaming,thenitissomethingverylikeit,anditwouldbeeasytoassumethat,asthechildlearnsincreasinglymorelanguage,itisjustcontinuingtodothesamething.Nevertheless,theideathatallwordsarenamesgivesrisetosomefairlyintractabledifficulties.Forexample,howisittoaccountforgeneraltermssuchas‘dog’wherethisisused,notastheinfantusesit,torefertoaspecificdog,buttodogsingeneral(asin‘man’sbestfriendisthedog’)?WhereasthereisonlyoneSocrates(forwhom‘Socrates’isthename),therearemanydogs;and,notonlythat,dogscandiffergreatly.Therearebigdogs,littledogs,shaggydogs,short-haireddogs,lapdogs,huntingdogs,guarddogs,browndogs,whitedogs,redsetters,Scotsterriers,mongrels,andsoon.Ifthegeneralterm‘dog’isaname,thenwhatdoesitname?Notealsothatthesamedifficultyisraisedinthecaseofabstracttermssuchas‘justice’and‘beauty’,for,justastherearemanydogs,sotherearemanyjustactsandmanybeautifulthings.If‘justice’and‘beauty’arenamesthen,again,thequestionofwhattheynameisforceduponus.Ifthesewordsnameobjects,thenthoseobjectscan’tbeordinary,visiblethings,likeSocratesdiscussingphilosophyinthemarketplace.Facedwithsuchchallenges,anyphilosopherattractedbythethesisthatallwordsarenamesisnowforcedtochoosebetweentwoalternatives.Oneistoabandonthethesisandgoinsearchofacompletelydifferenttheoryofmeaning.Theotheristostickwithit,butarguethattheobjectsnamedbygeneralandabstracttermsarenoordinaryobjects.Platotakesthissecondalternativeand,intermsofhistheory,theobjectsinquestionaretheforms.So,forexample,hewouldsayof‘dog’thatthewordhasmeaningbecauseitnamesthatwhichalldogshaveincommon;‘thatwhichalldogshaveincommon’beingthatalldogs‘sharein’or‘partakein’orimperfectlyreflecttheidealformofdog(ormaybethatshouldbe‘dogginess’).Likewise,heholdsthatthethingswe(correctly)describeasbeautifulreflector‘partakeof’theformofbeauty–or,ashealsoputsit,‘beautyitself’.Withallthatsaid,wecannowdealmorebrieflywithPlato’ssolutiontothesecondphilosophicalproblemIsaidIwouldmention.Thisistheproblemofdefiningknowledge.AccordingtoPlato,tohaveknowledgeistobedirectlyawareofanobject.Now,thereisacertain‘commonsense’tothisanswer,justastherewasinthecaseofhissolutiontothequestionofmeaning.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Thatisbecausethereareeverydaycasesinwhichknowingsomethingreallyisnothingmorethanbeingdirectlyawareofanobject.Forexample,inbroaddaylightyouknowthattheobjectsinfrontofyouarethere,justbecauseyoucanseethemthere.8Toputthesamepointslightlydifferentlyyouhaveknowledgebecausetheobjects–thetablesandchairs,say–aredirectlypresenttooneofyourfaculties.Inthiscaseitissight.However,theideathattoknowistobeawareofanobjectalsoraisesdiffi-cultiesand–justashedidinthecaseofmeaning–Platoattemptstosolvethesebyassumingtheexistenceofaspecialtypeofobject.And,inthecase\nPlato:TheRepublic29ofknowledgeheassumessomethingelsetoo,namelyaspecialfacultywithwhicheachtypeofobjectisperceived.Asanexample,takehisaccountofknowledgeingeometry.Likeotherbranchesofmathematics,thisposesaproblemforPlato’saccountbecausestudentsofgeometrydonottakeobjectsastheirsubjectmatter.Or,atleast,iftheydotheobjectsarenoordinaryobjects,notinthewaytablesandchairsareordinaryobjects.If,atfirst,youfindthatpointdifficulttograsp,thatisprobablybecauseyouarepicturingyouroldschoolteacherdrawingatriangleontheboardandshowingthatthesumofthetriangle’sinternalanglesis180°or,ifnotthat,drawingacircleandprovingthatthecircumferenceisequaltoπr2.However,thedrawingsontheboardarereallyonlyvisualaids.Thatisthepoint.Ifyouweretomeasurethe‘triangle’roughlydrawnbytheteacherontheboardyouwouldalmostcertainlyfindthatthesumofitsinternalangleswasnothinglike180°,butgeometryisnotreallyconcernedwiththepropertiesofthat.Itisonlyconcernedwiththepropertiesofperfectfigures–the‘ideal’triangleforexample–andthedrawingsontheboardareamereapproximationtothese.AsPlatoputsit,studentsofgeometry‘makeuseofandargueaboutvisiblefigures,thoughtheyarenotreallythinkingaboutthem,butabouttheoriginalswhichtheyresemble’.And,asheadds,itisnotaboutthesquarewhichtheyhavedrawnthattheyarearguing,butaboutthesquareitselfordiagonalitself,orwhateverthefiguremaybe.Theactualfigurestheydrawormodel,whichthemselvescasttheirshadowsandreflectionsinwater–thesetheytreatasimagesonly,therealobjectsoftheirinvestigationbeinginvisibleexcepttotheeyeofreason.(Republic:510d)NoticethewayPlatointroducesaspecialobjectofknowledgeinthispassage,notthedrawingbut‘thesquareitself’orthe‘diagonalitself’.(‘Thetriangleitself’wouldfallintothesamecategory.)Noticetoohisintroductionofaspecialfaculty.Theseintellectualobjectsarenotpresenttovision,asordinaryobjectscanbe,buttothefacultyofreason.Plato’sphrase‘theeyeofreason’issignificanthere.Heclearlybelievesthatboththe‘eyeofvision’and‘theeyeofreason’scanobjects,butthatthereisadifferenttypeofobjectforeachtypeofeye.Indeed,thereisawell-knownsectionofTheRepublicinwhichPlatoinvitesustothinkofhistheoryofknowledgeasrepresenteddiagrammatically(Republic:509d.ff.).9Picturealine.Ononeside,thereisalistof(supposed)Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012faculties.Itmovesindescendingorderofimportancefrom‘intelligence’to‘mathematicalreasoning’to‘belief’to‘illusion’.Ontheother,thereisacorrespondinglistoftheobjectsappropriatetoeachfaculty.Theformscomerightatthetop.Liketheobjectsofmathematicstheseareintelligible,objectsforthe‘eyeofreason’toperuse.‘Shadowsandimages’,theobjectsofillusion,areplacedrightatthebottom.Interestingly,ourawarenessofphysicalthingsisrelegatedbyPlatotothestatusof‘belief’,butIsupposethatiswhatitwouldbefordeludedinhabitantsofamurkypond.\n30AthensTheescapefromthecaveWhentakeninconjunction,Plato’saccountofmeaningandhisaccountofknowledgehelpexplainquiteafewofTheRepublic’sfeatures.Forexample,takethestructureofBookOne.Inthissectionofthebookanumberofcharactersadvancedefinitionsof‘justice’,eachinhisturn.Aseachdefinitionisproduced,Socratesrefutesitwiththehelpofcounter-examples.Forexample,onecharacter,Polemarchus,claimsthattoactjustlyis‘togiveeverymanhisdue’(Republic:331e).Socratespointsoutthatthiscannotberight,as‘givingamanhisdue’couldmeanrepayingmoneytosomeonewhohasgonemad,andwhowillonlydoharmwithitasaresult.ThiscontradictsPolemarchus’realguidingthought,whichisthat‘onefriendowesittoanotherasaduetodohimgood,notharm’.Again,if‘givingamanhisdue’meanshelpingone’sfriendsandharmingone’senemiesthen,asSocratespointsout,adoctor,acook,anavigator,afarmerorashoemakercanbeinabetterpositiontogivesomeonehisduethanajustmancan(Republic:332c.ff.).Itdependsonthecircumstances.Anothercharacter,thebad-temperedThra-symachus,arguesboththat‘justiceorrightissimplywhatisintheinterestofthestrongerparty’(Republic:338c)andthatitis‘obediencetotherulingpower’(Republic:339b.ff.).Socratesrefuteshimbypointingoutthat–becausearulingpowercanbemistakenaboutwhatisinitsinterest–theseclaimscontradicteachother.Ishan’tgothroughtheseargumentsinanydetail.WhatIwouldlikeyoutonotice,however,isthegeneralstructureofPlato’sargumenthere.Platoisassumingthatallthingscalledbythesamenamehavesomethingincommon,its‘essence’;thatthereis,asheexplicitlystates,‘asingleformforeachsetofparticularthingstowhichweapplythesamename’(596a).Withoutthisassumption,therewouldbenopointintryingtocapturethatcommonelementwithasingledefinition.Plato’sprocedurewouldbepointless.(JusttomakeitclearthatPlato’saccountisnottheonlypossibility,itmaybeworthmentioninganalternativeatthispoint.Suppose,then,that,contrarytoPlato,Wittgensteinwasrighttosaythatthereare‘familyresemblances’betweenthethingstowhichthesamewordapplies;thatthereis‘acomplicatednetworkofsimilaritiesoverlappingandcriss-crossing’,but–aswithmembersofthesamefamily–nosinglefeaturecommontoallofthem.IfthisisrightthenSocrates’counter-exampleswouldnotrefutehisopponents’definitions.TheycouldsimplyretortthattheirdefinitionsonlyDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012applytosomecasesofjustice,andthatheisthinkingofothers.)Plato’stheoriesofmeaningandknowledgealsohelpustounderstandsomeotherwisedifficultpassages.Forexample,takePlato’sargumentthat‘sincebeautyanduglinessareopposites,theyaretwo’.Sothat‘[And],astheyaretwo,eachofthemissingle’.And,Thesameistrueofjusticeandinjustice,goodandevil,andallqualities;eachofthemisinitselfsingle,buttheyappeareverywhereasamultiplicitybecause\nPlato:TheRepublic31theyappeareverywhereincombinationwithactionsandmaterialbodiesandwitheachother.Platousesthisprinciple‘todistinguishyoursight-loversandart-loversandpracticalmenfromthephilosophersinthetruesense’,asfollows.Thosewholovelookingandlisteningaredelightedbybeautifulsoundsandcoloursandshapes,andtheworksofartwhichmakeuseofthem,buttheirmindsareincapableofseeinganddelightingintheessentialnatureofbeautyitself.(Republic:476b)NoneofthiscouldmakeanysenseuntilyourealisethatPlatoisassuming(i)that‘beauty’and‘ugliness’namedistinctpropertieswhichcancoexistinthesamething(wherethisissomethingvisible,orotherwisedirectlyapprehendedbyoursenses);(ii)thatweareabletorecognisethesepropertiesinsomethingbecausethatthing‘partakes’bothof‘beautyitself’andof‘uglinessitself’;and(iii)thatthereisan‘essentialnatureofbeautyitself’(a‘formofbeauty’)lyingbehindandbeyondtheworldofappearances.Atthispoint,Ithinkitisworthemphasisingthat,forallitsfar-reaching,other-worldly,ambition,Plato’stheoryofformsrestsonassumptionswhichitisverynaturaltomake.Imeanthatyoucaneasilyseehowsomeonecouldmakethem,eveniftheyarewrong.(Again,youonlyhavetothinkofhowaninfant’sfirsteffortsatlanguagecanbesoeasilyconstruedonthemodelofnaming.)Evenso,agreatdealofphilosophy,especiallyphilosophysincearoundthetimeoftheSecondWorldWar,hasbeendevotedtodismantlingtheviewoflanguageonwhichPlato’sworldview,likethatofmanyothers,rests.HeretooaquotationfromWittgensteinisappropriate.Thinkofthetoolsinatool-box;thereisahammer,pliers,asaw,ascrew-driver,arule,aglue-pot,glue,nailsandscrews.Thefunctionsofwordsareasdiverseasthefunctionsoftheseobjects.(Andinbothcasestherearesimilarities.)Ofcourse,whatconfusesusistheuniformappearanceofwordswhenwehearthemspokenormeettheminscriptorprint.Fortheirapplicationisnotpresentedtoussoclearly.(Wittgenstein1953:section11:6)Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012IfWittgensteinisright,thenPlatoiswrongtoconstruemeaningprimarilyonthemodelofnaming.Finallyonthispoint,though,theredoesseemtobeonequitestrikingdifferencebetweenPlatoandourselves.Itisthis.Modernpeoplearemuchmoreusedtomakingadistinctionbetween‘language’ontheonehandand‘theworld’ontheother.Weareusedtothinkingoftheformerasasystemofrulesandconventions,somethingwebringtotheworld.Onthisviewmeaningsare,inpart,afunctionofourlinguisticsystem.Bycontrast,Platoappearstothinkofmeaningsaspartofthenaturalworld,thattheyare\n32Athens‘outthere’,justasstonesandtreesare.(Here,itisworthnotingadifferencebetweenPlato’suseofidea,theGreekwordfromwhich‘form’istranslated,andourown.Wethinkofanideaaspartofaperson,thatitissomething‘insidethemind’forexample.Platolocatesideasintherealworld.)WhenreadingPlato,itissometimesworthbearingthisinmind.Icouldcontinuethisdiscussionofthetheoryofformsforsometime.Thereisplentymoretosay.Still,theliteratureonthesubjectisalreadyvastand,inanycase,mysubjectisPlato’spoliticalphilosophy.Itisnowtimetoconsidertherelevanceofthetheoryofformstothat.Here,thekeyistherelationshipbetweentheoryandtheprogrammeofeducationPlatorequireshisphilosopherrulerstoundergo.Thisbeginswiththestudyofmathe-matics.Aswehaveseen,itisPlato’sviewthatmathematiciansstudyobjectswhosetruenatureisavailableonlytotheintellect,nottothesenses.Afterthattheyareled,throughdialectic,toknowledgeoftheforms.Thesearealsoknownonlytotheintellect.Theculminationoftheprocessisthatthephi-losopherrulerachievesknowledgeoftheformofthegood.Thisisthehighestformofall,therebeingnopointinhavinganyknowledgewithoutknowledgeofwhatisgoodandvaluable(Republic:505b).Platocomparestheformofthegoodwiththesun.Asthesourceoflight,itisthesunwhichmakesitpossibleforustoseethevisibleworld.Italso‘causestheprocessesofgeneration,growth,andnourishment’.Likewise,orsoPlatothinks,theformofthegoodis‘thesourcenotonlyoftheintelligibilityoftheobjectsofknowledge,butalsooftheirbeingandreality’(Republic:509b).ThereisaveryfamouspassageinwhichPlatocomparesachievingknowl-edgeoftheformofthegoodwithescapefrom‘anundergroundchamberlikeacave,withalongentranceopentothedaylightandaswideasthecave’.Withinthischamber,therearepeoplewho‘havebeenprisonerstheresincetheywerechildren,theirlegsandnecksbeingsofastenedthattheycanonlylookstraightaheadofthemandcannotturntheirheads’.Behindthemandhigherupthereisafire,andotherpeoplearecarryingwoodencut-outfiguresofmen,animalsandotherthings.Shadowsofthesearecastontheoppositewall.Theprisonersmistaketheseforrealobjects.(Itislikemistakingtheimageonacinemascreenforreallife.)Ofcourse,ourownsituationissup-posedtoresemblethepredicamentoftheprisoners,andthephilosopherrulerwhofinallyachievesknowledgeofthetruthislikethepersonwhofinallyescapesfromthecaveandseesthesundirectly.Platowrites,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Supposeoneofthemwereletlooseandsuddenlycompelledtostandupandturnhisheadandlookandwalktowardsthefire;alltheseactionswouldbepainfulandhewouldbetoodazzledtoseeproperlytheobjectsofwhichheusedtoseetheshadows.And,Andif…hewereforciblydraggedupthesteepandruggedascentandnotletgountilhehadbeendraggedoutintothesunlight,theprocesswouldbea\nPlato:TheRepublic33painfulone,towhichhewouldmuchobject,andwhenheemergedintothelighthewouldbesodazzledbytheglareofitthathewouldn’tbeabletoseeasingleoneofthethingshewasnowtoldwerereal.…Because,ofcourse,hewouldneedtogrowaccustomedtothelightbeforehecouldseethingsintheupperworldoutsidethecave.First,hewouldfinditeasiesttolookatshadows,nextatthereflectionsofmenandotherobjectsinwater,andlateronattheobjectsthemselves.Afterthathewouldfinditeasiertoobservetheheavenlybodiesandtheskyitselfatnight,andtolookatthelightofthemoonandstarsratherthanatthesunanditslightbyday.(Republic:515c–516b)AccordingtoPlato,itiswhen‘onehasgraspedbypurethoughtwhatthegoodisinitself’that‘oneisatthesummitoftheintellectualrealmasthemanwholookedatthesunwasofthevisualrealm’(Republic:532a–b).ToappreciatetherelationshipbetweenthetheoryofformsandPlato’spoliticaloutlookyouneedonlyconsiderhowthiscelebratedparablecarriesustothetrulyauthoritarianheartofhisvision.Thepointisthatifallrealknowledgeisdirectawarenessofanobject,justasvisionisdirectawarenessofanobject,thenonlyaspeciallyinitiatedelitecanhaverealknowledge.Imaginetryingtoexplainwhatitisliketoseearedobjecttosomeonewhocanonlyseeinblackandwhite.Ihavenevertried,butIguessthat,ifyouwereresourceful,therearequiteafewthingsyoucouldexplain–thatredisacolour,forexample,andthatitformspartofaspectrum.However,onethingyoucouldneverdoisshowthatpersonwhatredis,thatis,tohavethesameexperienceyouhavewhenyouseesomethingred.(Todothatyouwouldhavetogethimorhertoseeincolour–theverythingIhavejustsupposedyoucannotdo.)Yourdifficultywouldexactlyparallelthatofthepersonwho,havingonceescapedfromthecave,hasnowreturnedandistryingtoexplaintotheotherswhatitisliketoseetheworldoutside.Andlikewise,thephilosopherrulerscouldneverexplaintheirknowledgetous,theuninitiated.Therewouldbenopointinouraskingquestions,sowemightjustaswellcarryonwithourlives,‘mindingourownbusiness’aswego.ConclusionDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012HowshallIsummarisethisdiscussionofTheRepublicanddrawittoaclose?Well,earlierIraisedthequestionofhowasupporterofdemocracymighttrytoanswerPlato’santi-democraticcase.TheoutlineofthetheoryofformsIhavejustgivensuggestsawayofdoingso,onewhichdrawsattentiontojusthowmuchyouhavetobelieveifyouaretoacceptPlato’sargument.Hereisananalogy.Supposethat,oneday,ahugespaceshipfromextraterrestrialregionslandsinawell-knownpublicspace.Forthesakeofthestory,supposethatitlandsinCentralPark,NewYorkCity.Thevisithasbeenanticipatedforsomedays,andacrowdhasgathered.Thereisareceptionpartywhich\n34Athensincludesalltheworld’smajorpoliticalleaders.Thedoorsoftheshipslidesilentlyopen,andthealiens’leaderappears.Hereiswhattheleadersays.GreetingsEarthpeople.Wecomefromadistantplanetwithacivilisationfarmoreadvancedthanyourown.Ourknowledgeofscienceisalsomuchmoreadvanced.ScientistsbasedinourAstronomicalInstitute’sDepartmentofPoliticalSociologyhavebeenstudyingyouforalongtimenow.Weseethatyouhaveproblems.Thatiswhywearehere,forourmissionistotraveltheuniversedoingGoodThings.Wehavetheanswer.Justdowhatwesayandyourproblemswillbesolved.Allwillbewellfromnowon.Shouldtheearth’sleadersresign,havingfirstabolishedallpoliticalinstitutions,andshouldtheythenputthemselves,andus,entirelyinthehandsofthealiens?Theanswerisclear.Theywouldbecrazytodoanysuchthing.Justthinkhowmuchyouwouldhavetobelieveifyoudecidedtoletthealienstakeover.Youwouldhavetobelieveatleastthefollowing:1.Thatthe‘spaceship’reallyisaspaceshipandthe‘aliens’reallyaliens;i.e.thatthisisn’tjustanelaboratestuntthatsomeoneispulling.2.That,evenifthealiensarewhotheysaytheyare,theyarereallyasaltruisticastheyclaimtobe.3.That,evenifthealiensareasaltruisticastheyclaimtobe,theirsciencereallyissohighlydevelopedthattheycanachievewhattheysaytheycanachieve.4.That,inthecaseofsocialandpoliticallifehereonearth,therereallyisasingleproblem–orasinglesetofproblems–towhichthereisastraight,once-and-for-allsolution.Ofcourse,itcouldbethatthealiens’claimsaretrue.Itmightevenbethattherearegoodreasonsforsuspectingthattheyare,butyouwouldstillbecrazytotrustthemsofarastoputourselvesentirelyintheirhands.MypointisthatitispossibletothinkofTheRepublicasaclassicalGreekversionofthissciencefictionfantasy,fortherewouldbenomorereasonfortrustingsomeonewhoclaimedtobeanespeciallyqualifiedphilosopherruler.SupposethispersonclaimstohavebeenthroughtheeducationalprocessPlatodescribes,withtheresultthathenowhasdirectaccesstotheformofthegood.ToDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012believethis,youwouldhavetobepersuadedthatthetheoryofformsistrue,but,evenifyoususpectedthattherecouldbesometruthinit,itseemstomethatitwouldbeabigmistaketosubmityourselftohisauthorityonceandforall.Nownotethat,forapro-democraticargument,allwehavetodoischangethislastexampleslightly.Supposethataself-styled‘philosopherruler’comesknockingonyourdooraskingyoutovoteforhim.(Youarelivinginapresent-day,liberaldemocracy.)Thispersonclaimstohavebeeneducatedinaspecialway,tohaveaccesstotheformofthegood,andsoon,butthe\nPlato:TheRepublic35differencenowisthat,ifelectedtopower,hispartywillleavetheelectoralsystemintact.Ifitmakesahashofthings,youwillbeabletovoteagainsthimnexttime.Wouldyounowvoteforhim?Well,ifyouthoughttherecouldbesomethinginhisargument–i.e.inthetheoryofforms–youmight.Inthiscase,youdon’thavetosubmittohisdominationforever,youcanjustgivehimarunforhismoney.Here,then,isonevirtueofdemocracy,namelythatitgivespeoplewithideasonhowthingsshouldbedoneachancetoprovethoseideaswithoutyourhavingtoaccepttheirargumentsfully,oryourhavingtoplaceyourselfirrevocablyundertheircontrol.(And,ofcourse,thepersonknockingonyourdoorneednotbeclaimingtobequalifiedasaphilosopherruler.Heorshecouldbeanadvocateofthelatest,fashionable,economictheory.)Noticethatthisisnottheargumentthatdemocracytendstoproducethebestsolutions,whereasothersystemsdonot.Onthecontrary,itisanargumentthatdemocracyisaprotectionagainstanyonewhothinksthattherecanbesuchathingas‘theright’or‘thebest’solution.Itisnotanargumentwhichsitseasilywiththeideathattheperfectstateislikeawell-oiledmachineofwhichweare,eachofus,aspecificmovingpart.InTheRepublicwefindonevariantofthatidea–andinthecourseofthisbookwewillencounterothers–butitcouldbethewrongwaytothinkoftherelationbetweenthestateandourselves.SuggestionsforfurtherreadingPlatoOfcourse,TheRepublicisjustoneofPlato’sworks.AgoodintroductiontoPlato’sworkasawholeisDavidJ.Melling’sUnderstandingPlato(Melling1987).RichardKraut,ed.,TheCambridgeCompaniontoPlato(Kraut1992)isaninterestingcollectionofessays.ForamoredetailedtreatmentofTheRepublicitself,seeNickolasPappas,TheRoutledgePhilosophyGuidebooktoPlatoandthe‘Republic’(1995).ThecaseagainstPlato,thatheisaprecursorof‘totalitarianism’is–famouslyandelo-quently–madebyKarlPopperinVolume1ofhisTheOpenSocietyanditsEnemies(Popper1945).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Notes1Ofcourse,itisonethingtopointoutthatPlatocouldcontemplatethepossibilityoftherebeingfemalephilosopherrulers,butquiteanothertocredithimwithhavingbeenanearlyfeminist.Hewascertainlynosuchthing.OnthispointseeespeciallySusanMollerOkin’sWomeninWesternPoliticalThought(Okin1979).2ThroughoutthischapterIquotefromDesmondLee’stranslationofTheRepublic(Plato1987).However,thepagereferencesaretoamuchearlieredition,theStephanusof1578.Itiscustomary\n36AthensfortranslationsofTheRepublic–includingLee’s–tocarrypagereferencestoStephanusinthemargin.TheadvantageofdoingthingsthiswayisthatyouwillbeabletofindthepassagesIamreferringto,whateverthetranslationyoumaybeusing.3Thepurposeofthesesessionsistobreedgoodleaders,nota‘masterrace’.ItdoesnotfollowthatPlatowasaracist,asHitlerwasaracist.4Mostrecently,thishasbeenforciblyarguedbyAlasdairMacIntyreinhisAfterVirtue(seeMacIntyre1981:chap.10,especiallypp.123ff.).5Here,Lee’stranslationspeaksratherdecorouslyof‘call-girls’.Ihavesubsituted‘prostitutes’,notjustbecause‘call-girls’carriestheratherunfortunateimplicationthatancientGreekshadtelephones,butbecauseprostitutionofmanyformswasclearlyathrivingactivityinAthens.See,forexample,BettanyHughes’sdescriptionoftheKerameikos:Hughes(2010),p.72.6InSparta,thehelotsweregovernedbyamilitarycaste,theSpartiates.YoucouldthinkofPlato’sidealstateasSpartawithanextralayerofrationalgovernorsimposedattheapexofthepyramid.Thatseemsquiteagoodsuggestiontome.IoweittoRodneyPickering.7Awordofcautionhere:IabsolutelydonotmeantosuggestthatSocrates’accountoftheprogressofthesoulafterdeath,asgivenhere,representsPlato’smostconsidered,‘official’viewofthenatureoftheforms.Youcanfindthisinadifferentdialogue,theTimaeus.8Iignorethewell-knownproblemofscepticismovertheexistenceofan‘externalworld’.Theproblemisinteresting,butitisnotespeciallyrelevanttothepointIammakinghere.9Isay‘invitesustothink’ofalineadvisedly,because–inhisoriginalmanuscript–Platodidnotactuallyproduceadiagram.However,itiscustomaryforhismoderntranslatorstodoso,whichisveryhelpful.See,forexample,theLeetranslation,Plato(1987),p.250.Asyouwillseefrommydescription,Iamthinkingofthelineasvertical.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n3AristotleIn347BCAristotleleftAthensandsetsailfordistantshoresattheGreekworld’souterrim.Fifty-twoyearshadelapsedsincetheexecutionofSocrates,butonlymonths–ifthat–sincethedeathofAristotle’sgreatteacher,Plato.(Platohaddiedearlierthatsameyearattheageof80.)AristotleandPlatohadfirstmetwhentheformerjoinedthelatter’srenownedfoundationforthepromotionoflearningandscholarship–‘TheAcademy’,asitwascalled.Onlearningofitsexistence,AristotlehadtravelledtoAthensfromStagirainThrace,justsothathecouldjoin.Hewas17atthetime.TheAcademy’sreputationhadgrowntosuchanextentthatithadcometoattracttalentedintellectualsfromthroughouttheknownworld(and,ofcourse,nottheleastofitsattractionswasthefactthatPlatocontinuedtoteachtherehimself).ButtherecanbelittledoubtthatAristotlewasPlato’smostgiftedpupil,andnodoubtatallthathewastobecomethemostfamous.By347BCAristotlemusthaveenjoyedacertainstandinginAthens.Andyet,asthedatesmakeclear,hecanhavewastednotimeinpreparingforhisdeparture.Whythehaste?ThemostlikelyexplanationisthattheAthenianswerefeelingthreatenedonceagain,notbySpartathistime,butbyMacedonia,whoseruler,PhilipII,hadambitionstodominatetheregion.Aristotlewasanotablememberofahigh-rankingfamilywhoseMacedonianconnectionswerewellknown.Hadn’thisfatherbeenPhilip’sdoctorforatime?ItismorethanlikelythatAristotlewasleavingAthensatatimewhenhecouldfeelneitherwelcomenorsecurethere.HavingcrossedtheAegeanSea,AristotlesettledfirstatAterneusonthecoastofAsiaMinor(inwhatisnowTurkey)andlateratAssos,anothertownonthesamecoast.Atthistime,AristotleandasmallcommunityofotherDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012scholarlyexilesweresupportedbythelocalruler,or‘tyrant’,Hermias.Laterstill,in345BC,AristotlemovedtothenearbyislandofLesbos.AristotlewasawayfromAthensfor12years.Itwasaperiodduringwhichhehadmanyadventures1andduringwhichhealsoproducedoneofhismostremarkableworks.TheHistoryofAnimals(Aristotle1910)isnotaworkofphilosophyatall–atleast,itisnotwhatyouorIwouldrecogniseassuch.Itisaworkofcomparativezoology.Theworkissosystematicallyconstructed,anditcon-tainssomanydetailedandaccurateobservations,thatitoncepromptedCharlesDarwinhimselftoremarkofhisowncontemporariesthattheywere\n38Athens‘mereschoolboyscomparedtooldAristotle’(Darwin1888:Vol.3,252).TheHistoryofAnimalsisespeciallyremarkableforitstreatmentofmarinelife.Aristotlemusthavespentagreatdealoftimewalkingtheshore,searchingthebeachandtherockpoolsforspecimenshecoulddissectandanalyse.Therewasanaccompanyingtext–theDissections–whichconsistedofdiagramsanddrawings.Tragically,thisisnowlost.ItwasduringthissameperiodthatAristotleproducedtheNicomacheanEthics(sonamedafterhisson,Nicomachus)2andThePolitics(Aristotle1976and1981).Itisthelatterwhichformsthischapter’smainsubject.TheforegoingbriefaccountshouldgiveyousomeideaofhowAristotleapproachedphilosophy.SoshouldacomparisonwithPlato.Forexample,considerhowwidelythetwophilosophersdifferedintheirmaininterests.Aswehaveseen,PlatofollowedSocratesinbeinglargely,thoughnotexclusively,concernedwithquestionsofvalue.3Bycontrast,Aristotlewasinterestedinmuchelsebesides,includingwhatwewouldnowcall‘science’.Isay‘whatwewouldnowcall’becauseourdistinctionbetweenscienceandphilosophywouldnothavebeendrawnbytheGreeks.Initsoriginalmeaning‘philosophy’issimplytheloveofwisdomanda‘philosopher’someonewhoseekstoknowandunderstand–andyouonlyhavetolistthetitlesofthebooksbyAristotlewhichhavesurvivedtoappreciatethathewascertainlythat.Thereareworksonlogic,psychology,botany,astronomy,physics,poetryandmanyothersubjects,allthisinadditiontotheworkonethics,politicsandzoologyIhavealreadymentioned.AsJonathanBarnes,oneoftoday’sleadingAristotlescholars,hasobserved,‘Chooseafieldofresearch,andAristotlelabouredinit;pickanareaofhumanendeavour,andAristotlediscourseduponit.Hisrangeisastonishing’(Barnes2000:3).Andsoitis.AnotherdifferencebetweenPlatoandAristotleisthis.ItwasPlato’sambitiontodirectourmindsawayfromtheworldof‘mere’appearancetowardsthedeeperrealitywhich,ashethought,liesbehindit.Bycontrast,Aristotleisagreatobserver.Aswithzoology,sointhecaseofphilosophygenerally,heapproacheshissubjectsbyrecordingandsystematisingnumerousobservations.Inthisrespect,Aristotle’smethodisfarmore‘empirical’thanPlato’s.Andyetanotherdifferenceisthat,whenitcomestopolitics,Platoisthefarmoreengagedofthetwo.Aswesawinthepreviouschapter,Plato’sRepublicismorethanadescriptionofanidealstate.ItisanidealisedversionDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ofarealconstitution,Sparta’s,drawnupbyamanwhohadsympathisedwithaparticularsideintherecentwar,andwhotookaparticularstanceincriticismofcontemporaryAthenianinstitutions.Bycontrastwiththis–andasweshallsee–Aristotletendstowriteofthedifferencesbetweenconstitutionsratherashewritesofthedifferencebetweenthesquidandthecrawfish:thatis,asthedispassionateobserverofinterestingphenomena.Perhapsweshouldnotfindthissurprisinginsomeonewhospentthegreaterpartofhislifeasanimmigrantandametic–thatis,anon-citizenresidentofthecitytowhoselifehecontributedsomuch.\nAristotle39Letusnowtakeacloserlookathisarguments,beginningwithhistreatmentofathemewhichhastendedtorecurthroughoutthehistoryofpoliticalthought.Aristotle’spoliticalscienceTakingthescientificapproachYoucouldsaythatAristotlewasthefirst‘politicalscientist’.ReadthefollowingpassagethroughandyouwillseewhatImean.ItoccursinPartFourofThePolitics,abouthalfwaythroughthebook.Weagreethateverystateiscomposedofmanyparts,notjustone.Nowifourchosensubjectwereformsofanimallife,weshouldfirsthavetoanswerthequestion‘Whatisitessentialforeveryanimaltohave?’Andamongthoseessentialsweshouldhavetoincludesomeoftheorgansofsenseperception,andsomethingfortheprocessingandreceptionofnourishment,suchasmouthandstomach,andinadditionpartsofthebodywhichenabletheanimalinquestiontomoveabout.Ifthesewereallthatwehadtoconsiderandthereweredifferencesbetweenthem(severaldifferentkindsofmouthforinstance,ofstomach,ofsense-organs,andofpartstodowithlocomotion),thenthenumberofwaysofcombiningthesewillnecessarilymakeanumberofdifferentkindsofanimals.Foritisimpossibleforoneandthesameanimaltohaveseveraldifferentkindsofmouthorear.Sowhenyouhavetakenallthepossiblecouplingsoftheseonewithanother,theywillproduceformsofanimal;andthenumberofformsofanimalwillbeequaltothenumberofessentialparts.(Politics:1290b21)4Aristotlethengoesontosaythis:Wemayapplythistotheconstitutionsmentioned,forstatesaremadeupnotofonebutofmanyparts,ashasoftenbeensaid.(Politics:1290b38)Inotherwords,goodpracticeincomparativezoologyandgoodpracticeinthecomparativestudyofpoliticalconstitutionsareequivalent.Inbothcases,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012youshouldapplythesametechniques.Thepassageembodiesafrequentlymadeassumption,namelytheassumptionthatcorrectprocedureinscienceis,equally,thecorrectproceduretofollowwhenseekingtounderstandpoliticalphenomena.IshouldaddthatyoucanhardlyblameAristotleforhavingmadetheassumption.Itisn’tjustthat,asIhavesaid,hewouldnothavedistinguished‘philosophy’from‘science’.Morethanthat,wehavetobearinmindthat,inlaterperiods,whenpoliticalphilosophershavefollowedtheexamplessetbytheleadingscientistsoftheirtime–byGalileo,forexample,byNewton,andmorerecentlybyDarwin–theywerefollowingexamplessetbyother\n40Athenspeople.Aristotlecouldhavedonenosuchthingbecausehewashimselftheleading‘scientist’ofhisgeneration.Hecanonlyhavepicturedhimselfasaninquisitiveindividualapplyingtechniquesofrationalanalysistoeverycategoryofphenomenonwhichinterestedhim.Fromourstandpointintime,theideathat‘scientificmethod’canbeappliedwithequalsuccessoutsidesciencecanappearopentoquestion,butifyoutrytoseethingsfromAristotle’spointofview,itisdifficulttoseewhatelsehecouldhavebelieved.Istheassumptionatissuecorrect?Well–sofarasIcansee–thereisnostraight‘yesorno’answertothequestion.Whenphilosophersborrowfromscientistsitalldependsonwhoisborrowingwhatfromwhomandonthepurposeforwhichtheloanisused.Weshallencounterfurtherexampleslater.Forthepresent,wemustnowconsiderwhatAristotlethoughtscientistsactuallydo(for,likemanyothers,conceptionsofwhatcountsasgoodscientificpracticecanvaryovertime).ThepartsofanimalsandtheconstitutionsofstatesThepassagequotedabovewasdrawnfromThePolitics,butitshouldgiveyouagoodideaofhowTheHistoryofAnimalsisconstructed.Inthelatter,Aristotlepainstakinglycategorisesthewayformstakenbypartsofanimalsvaryfromspeciestospecies.Thediscussionopens,quiteappropriately,withadiscussionoftheconceptof‘part’itself;thatis,withadistinctionbetweendifferenttypesofpart.Forexample,Aristotlenotesthat‘Ofthepartsofanimalssomearesimple:towit,allsuchasdivideintopartsuniformwiththemselves,asfleshintoflesh’andthat‘othersarecomposite,suchasdivideintopartsnotuniformwiththemselves,as,forinstance,thehanddoesnotdivideintohandsnorthefaceintofaces’(Animals:486a).5(Incidentally,theopeningchapteroftheHistoryalsocontainsabriefdiscussionofthedistinctionbetweengeneraandspecies.ItwasAristotlewhointroducedthismethodofcategorisation–anditisstillused.)ThefollowingpassageisquiterepresentativeoftheexhaustiveanddetailedaccountAristotlegoesontoprovide.Ofswimmingcreaturesthataredestituteoffeet,somehavewingletsorfins,asfishes:andofthesesomehavefourfins,twoaboveontheback,twobelowonthebelly,asthegiltheadandthebasse;somehavetwoonly,towit,suchasareDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012exceedinglylongandsmooth,astheeelandtheconger;somehavenoneatall,asthemuraena,butusetheseajustassnakesusedryground–andbytheway,snakesswiminwaterinjustthesameway.Oftheshark-kindsomehavenofins,suchasthosethatareflatandlong-tailed,astherayandthestingray,butthesefishesswimactuallybytheundulatorymotionoftheirflatbodies;thefishingfrog,however,hasfins,andsolikewisehaveallsuchfishesashavenottheirflatsurfacesthinnedofftoasharpedge.Ofthoseswimmingcreaturesthatappeartohavefeet,asisthecasewiththemolluscs,thesecreaturesswimbytheaidoftheirfeetandtheirfinsaswell,and\nAristotle41theyswimmostrapidlybackwardsinthedirectionofthetrunk,asisthecasewiththecuttle-fishorsepiaandthecalamary;and,bytheway,neitheroftheselattercanwalkasthepoulpeoroctopuscan.(Animals:489b)Andsoonandsoforth.Thisdiscussionoflocomotioninmarinelifeisfollowedbyanaccountofflightindifferentanimals–insects,birdsandsoon–whichisfollowedinitsturnbyanaccountofthedifferencesbetween‘blooded’and‘non-blooded’,‘oviparous’and‘viviparous’,animals.Laterstill,comparativezoologyisreplacedwithanatomy.‘Tobeginwith’,writesAristotlewhenintroducingthesesectionsofhiswork,‘wemusttakeintoconsiderationthepartsofMan’andafewlineslaterthat‘Thechiefpartsintowhichthebodyasawholeissubdivided,arethehead,theneck,thetrunk(extendingfromthenecktotheprivyparts),whichiscalledthethorax,twoarmsandtwolegs’andafewlineslaterstillthat‘Ofthepartsofwhichtheheadiscomposedthehair-coveredportioniscalledthe“skull”.Thefrontportionofitistermed“bregma”or“sinciput”,developedafterbirth–foritisthelastofallthebonesinthebodytoacquiresolidity’andsoon(Animals:491a).Laterstill,Aristotlenotesthat‘takingsizeforsizeofanimal,thelargestbrain,andthemoistest,isthatofman.Twomembranesencloseit:thestrongeroneneartheboneoftheskull;theinnerone,roundthebrainitself,isfiner’(Animals:494b).TheHistoryofAnimalsdemonstratesAristotle’sextraordinary–wonderful–geniusforobservationandclassification.AndIhavebeenquotingonlyfromthefirstbookofTheHistory.Therearenineinall.Therearemistakes,ofcourse,butthetrulyremarkablethingisjusthowmuchAristotlegotright.6NowonderDarwinwasimpressed.Still,mysubjectisnotAristotle’scomparativezoologybuthistreatmentofpolitics.AstheforegoingaccountofTheHistoryofAnimalsshows,itwasAristotle’sbeliefthatscienceproceedsbyobservationandcategorisation.Hencethewealthofdetailandtheexhaustivelists.Butthepointisthathealsobelievedthatthesamemethodappliesequallytobothzoologyandpolitics.Sureenough,openThePoliticsatrandomandyouarealmostcertaintofindpassagesverysimilartothatsectionoftheHistoryinwhichhecategorisesdifferenttypesof‘swimmingcreature’.Hereisanexample.Init,Aristotleiscategorisingpeoplebyoccupationandsocialclass.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Thereisontheonehandthepeople,ontheotherthenotables,aswecallthem.Ofeachofthesethereareseveralkinds.Forexample,ofthepeopleonekindisengagedinagriculture,anotherincrafts,andyetanotherincommerce,inbuyingandselling.Anotherkindtakestothesea,andtheretheyfightortradeorcarrypassengersorcatchfish.(Inmanyplacesthesectionsofthepopulationengagedinoneorotheroftheseoccupationsarelarge:fishermenarenumerousatTarentumandByzantium,tradersatAeginaandChios;atAthensmanyareengagedontriremes,atTenedosinpassengertraffic.)Tothesewemayaddthelabouringclassandthosewhosepossessionsaresosmallthattheycannot\n42Athenshaveanytimeoff,alsothosewhoarenotoffreebirthonbothsides,andanyothersimilarkindofmultitude.Thedistinguishingmarksofthenotablesarewealth,goodbirth,virtue,educationandtheotherthingslistedunderthesameheading.(Politics:1291b14)So,ratherasspeciesoffishcanbedistinguishedintermsofthenumberandpositionoftheirfins,sothe‘city-states’orpoleisofGreececanbedistinguishedintermsofthewaytheydivideintosocio-economicclasses.(City-stateswerenumerousandsmall,soAristotlehadagreatdealofmaterialonwhichtodrawforhiscomparativestudy.)Andnowforanabsolutelycrucialpoint.Justasscienceproceedsbycategorisingitsobjectsofstudyaccordingtothepartsofwhichtheyarecomposed,so–accordingtoAristotle–partsthemselvestendtobedifferentiated,onefromanother,intermsoftheirfunction.Finsorfeetareformovement,eyesforseeing,andsoon.‘Nature’,saysAristotle,‘doesnothingwithoutsomepur-pose’(Politics:1253a7).Everymodernevolutionarybiologistwouldconcur–oralmost.(Modernevolutionarybiologistswouldinsistthat‘purpose’doesnotimply‘deliberateintention’.)Likewise,whenitcomestothepartsofstatesratherthananimals,Aristotletendstodistinguishgroupsofindividualsintermsofthespecificfunctionstheyperform.Quiteoftentheyarecategorisedaccordingtothespecificskilltheyexercise.Forexample,farmersaredis-tinguishedfromskilledartisans,tradersandmerchants,labourersandthemilitary(see,forexample,Politics:1290b38).Sometimestheyarecategorisedmoregenerally.Forexample,theslaveisdistinguishedfromthefreemanbyhisfunctionasameretoolforthelatter.Ifyoupursuethislineofthoughtyouarelikelytodrawtwoimplications.Thefirstisthat,justaspeoplecanbeclassifiedaccordingtothefunctionstheyper-form,sotheycanbefurtherclassifiedaccordingtowhethertheyperformthatfunctionwellorbadly.Thesecondisthat,since‘naturedoesnothingwithoutsomepurpose’,sothat(forexample)eachsocialclasshasafunction,itismostlikelythecasethat‘man’thespecieshasitsownpeculiar(or‘proper’)function,something‘overandabove’the‘particularfunctions’ofparticularindividuals.Aristotledrawsbothimplicationsinthefollowingpassage.Ifwetakeaflautistorasculptororanyartist–oringeneralanyclassofmenwhohaveaspecificfunctionoractivity–hisgoodnessandproficiencyiscon-Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012sideredtolieintheperformanceofthatfunction;andthesamewillbetrueofman,assumingthatmanhasafunction.Butisitlikelythatwhereasjoinersandshoemakershavecertainfunctionsoractivities,manassuchhasnone,buthasbeenleftbynatureafunctionlessbeing?Justaswecanseethateyeandhandandfootandeveryoneofourmembershassomefunction,shouldwenotassumethatinlikemannerahumanbeinghasafunctionoverandabovetheseparticularfunctions?What,then,canthispossiblybe?Clearlylifeisathingsharedalsobyplants,andwearelookingforman’sproperfunction.(Ethics:1097b22)\nAristotle43ThegeneraldirectionofAristotle’sargumentshouldbeclearbynow.Foronething,ifasocialclasshasafunctionjustasabodilyorganhasafunctionand–moreover–ifeachhasa‘proper’function,doesn’tthisimplythatthebeststateistheoneinwhicheachclassperformsitsproperfunctionaswellasitcan?Foranother,ifeven‘man’,orthehumanbeing‘assuch’,hasafunction,doesn’titfollowthatthebestconstitutionforastateistheonewhichbestenablesman‘assuch’tofulfilhisproperfunction?Well,Aristotlecertainlydrawsbothconclusions.But,beforeconsideringthem,letusfirsttakeacloserlookathisideathatthestateisanaturalphenomenon.ThepoliticalanimalOneofAristotle’sbest-knownremarksoccursquiteearlyoninThePolitics,inthecourseofadiscussionofdifferentkindsof‘association’.Afterdescribinghow(hethinks)thevillagedevelopsfromthehousehold,andthestatefromthevillage,heconcludesthat,‘whilethestatecameaboutasameansofsecuringlifeitself,itcontinuesinbeingtosecurethegoodlife’.Shortlyafterthat,headds,‘Itfollowsthatthestatebelongstotheclassofobjectswhichexistbynature,and[that]manisbynatureapoliticalanimal’(Politics:1253a1).Thepointofthisremark–orapartofitspoint–istoemphasisewhathetakestobeafeatureofourbiology.(Incidentally,asisusual,Ihaveusedtheword‘man’here,althoughwhatAristotlemeansisthathumansarepoliticalanimals.Infact,theGreekwordofwhich‘man’isatranslation–anthropos–isnotgenderspecific.)7WhenAristotlesaysthatthestateexistsbynatureandthatwe,also‘bynature’,arepolitical‘animals’heisnotemployingtheexpressions‘bynature’and‘politicalanimal’asfiguresofspeech.Hemeansthemquiteliterally.ThatiswhyyoucanfindparallelremarksinTheHistoryofAnimals;forexample,whenhedefines‘socialcreatures’ascreatureswhich‘haveonecommonobjectinview’andthenstatesthat‘thispropertyisnotcommontoallcreaturesthataregre-garious.Suchsocialcreaturesareman,thebee,thewasp,theant,andthecrane’(Animals:488a).Insuchpassages,Aristotleistrying,verycarefully,tostatehowwedifferfromotherspecies.Ontheonehand,asabove,hedistinguishesanimalswhicharegenuinelysocial–bees,wasps,antsandourselves–fromthosewhicharemerely‘gregarious’;thatis,whichswarmtogetherinflocks,likebirds,orinDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012shoals,likefish.Ontheother,hetakespainstostressthattheprecisecharacterofoursociallifeisverydifferentfromthatofants,beesandtheothers.Forexample,inThePolitics,hegoesontostressthat‘obviouslymanisapoliticalanimalinasenseinwhichabeeisnot,oranyothergregariousanimal’.Thisisbecausenature‘hasendowedmanaloneamongtheanimalswiththepowerofspeech’which‘servestoindicatewhatisusefulandwhatisharmful,andsoalsowhatisjustandwhatisunjust’,therealdifferencebetweenmanandotheranimalsbeingthat‘humansalonehaveaperceptionofgoodandevil,justandunjust,etc.’(Politics:1253a7).\n44AthensThisviewmeritsatleastthreecomments,thefirstbeingthatifAristotlemeans,quitesimply,thathumansarebynaturesocialcreaturesthenheissurelyright.Allthescientificevidencewenowhavesupportsit.Wehumansdidnothavetolearntobesocial–thatis,toliveasmembersofcommunities.Wehavebeensocialcreaturesfromthestart,asweretheearlierprimatesfromwhomwearedirectlydescended.Studiesofournearestlivingrelatives,thechimpanzees,onlyconfirmthis.8OnewaytohighlightthedistinctivenessofAristotle’spositionistocontrastitwiththattakenbytheeighteenth-centuryphilosopher,Jean-JacquesRousseau.InhisDiscourseontheOriginsofInequality,Rousseauimaginesourprehistoricancestorstohavebeen‘solitary,idle’andliving,likeanimals,‘alwaysclosetodanger’(Rousseau1984:86).AccordingtoRousseau,itwasonlylaterthathumanshad‘sociability’thrustuponthem.Inthemid-eighteenthcentury,whenhewaswriting,Rousseau’sportraitofthe‘noblesavage’becamefashionableandpopularforatime.ItwashowEuropeanslikedtoimaginethelifeofpeopleindigenoustoNorthAmerica,whichwas,ofcourse,stillquiteunknownandunexplored.ButRousseauwaswrongaboutNativeAmericans,andhewaswrongaboutourearlyancestorstoo.Relatedtothis,andsecond,Aristotle’sviewthat‘thestatebelongstotheclassofobjectswhichexistbynature’(Politics:1253a1)contrastsnotjustwithviewsofhumannaturelikeRousseau’s,butwiththeviewthatthestateisanartificialconstructwithaparticularpurpose.WehavealreadyencounteredoneversionofthelatterinPlato’swork.Asyouwillrecallfromthepreviouschapter,itishisviewthata‘just’stateisoneinwhicheveryonespecialisesbyconcentratingondoingwhatheorsheisbestat.Thefarmerconcentratesongrowingfood,thebuilderonconstructinghouses,theshoe-makeronmakingshoes,andsoon.Thatway,everyonebenefitsfromevery-oneelse’sskills.Todepictthestate,or‘community’,asPlatodoesis,thus,toportrayitasausefuldeviceforhelpingustosatisfyourneedsandwantsmoreeffectively.IfyouweretoremoveindividualsfromPlato’s‘just’statethen,forallhesaystothecontrary,theywouldremainmoreorlessunchanged.Itisjustthattheywouldfindlifemuchmoreinconvenientbecausethefarmerwouldhavetomakehisownshoes,forexample,thebuildergrowhisownfood,andtheshoemakerconstructhisownhouse.ContrastthiswithAristotle’sviewthat‘Anyonewhobyhisnatureandnotsimplybyillluckhasnostateiseithertoobadortoogood,eithersubhumanDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012orsuperhuman’(Politics:1253a1).ForAristotlethereismorethanmereinconvenienceatstake.Onhisview,thestatelessindividualisscarcelyrecognisableasgenuinelyhuman.Third,tofullyunderstandAristotle’sviewthatwearepoliticalanimalsitisimportanttorealisethat‘thestate’ofhistimewasnothinglikethestateofourown.Thestatewithwhichwearemostfamiliaristhe‘nation-state’withalargepopulation,thelatterbeingtensofmillionsinthecasesof,say,BritainorFranceandhundredsofmillionsinthecaseofa‘superstate’suchastheUSA.Bycontrast,theGreekpolis(or‘city-state’)wasminute.Onlythree\nAristotle45poleiseverhadpopulationsofmorethan20,000citizens.ThesewereAthensitself,Syracuse,andAcragasinSicily.So,eveninthesecases,ifyouassumethatroughly10percentofthepopulationwerecitizens,thatmakesapopulationof100,000.Mostpoleisweremuchsmaller,andyoucanseejusthowsmalltheymusthavebeenifyouconsidersomeofthestricturesAristotleputsonsize.Forexample,hesuggeststhatastateisbecomingtoolargeonceatowncrierwith‘thevoiceofastentor’isneededtocaptureeveryone’sattention,andhethinksthat,ifthestateistofulfilitsproperfunction,‘itisnecessarythatthecitizensshouldknoweachotherandknowwhatkindofpeopletheyare’(Politics:1326b11).SomeGreekpoleisareknowntousonlybecausetheyarereferredtobyAristotlehimself,andsomeofthesemusthavebeentiny.(ReadingThePoliticsisliketimetravel.Youglimpseaworldwhichhaslongsincedisappeared.)NotonlydidtheGreekpolisdifferinsizefromthemodernnation-state,itwasdifferentlylaidoutanddifferentlyadministered.Typically,thepoliswouldconsistofacity–Sparta,Athens,Syracuse–anditsoutlyingarea.Thecitywouldbeaculturalandadministrativecentre.Therewouldbeamarket.Wherethepoliswasademocracy,itwouldbetheplacewheretheAssemblymet.Asfortheoutlyingarea,poleiscouldvarygreatly.Atoneextreme,Spartapossessed3,200squaremilesofterritory–enormousbyGreekstandards.Attheother,thesmallislandofCeoswasdividedintofourpoleis.Inhisbook,TheGreeks,H.D.F.Kittopointsoutthat‘Ithadthereforefourarmies,fourgovernments,possiblyfourdifferentcalendars,and,itmaybe,fourdifferentcurrenciesandsystemsofmeasures–thoughthisislesslikely’(Kitto1951:66).(TheareaofCeosis61squaremiles,thatis160squarekilometres.)Ofcourse,therewouldhavebeennothingresemblingthemodernnation-statewecall‘Greece’.WhatmadeyouaGreekwouldbethefactthatyousharedalanguage,acultureandahistorywithotherGreeks.Ittranspires,then,thatwhenAristotledescribesusaspoliticalanimals,hedoesn’tjustmeanthatwearesocialcreaturesbynature.Hemeansthatournaturalhome,thesettinginwhichwearemostlikelytoflourish,isaparticulartypeofassociation,thepolis.Tounderstandwhyheshouldsaythat,wehavetoconsiderhisethics,and–mostespecially–hisaccountofvirtue.Thecity,virtueandhappinessAnisolatedpieceinagameofdraughtsDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ThereisasentenceinThePoliticsinwhichAristotlecomparesthesituationofapersonwithnocity,orstate,tothatof‘anisolatedpieceinagameofdraughts’.Itoccursshortlyafterhisremarkthatthestateexistsbynatureandthatmanisbynatureapoliticalanimal.Havingsaidthat,Aristotlecontinuesasfollows:Anyonewhobyhisnatureandnotsimplybyillluckhasnostateiseithertoobadortoogood,eithersubhumanorsuperhuman–heislikethewar-madman\n46AthenscondemnedinHomer’swordsas‘havingnofamily,nolaw,nohome’;forhewhoissuchbynatureismadonwar:heisanon-co-operatorlikeanisolatedpieceinagameofdraughts.(Politics:1253a1)Whatarewetomakeofthisanalogy?ToappreciateAristotle’spoint,Isuggestthatyouimagineachequeredboardonwhichthereisonlyonepiece,thatis,apiecewhichisnotonly‘isolated’,asinAristotle’sexample,butsolitary.Inthatsituation,theconditionsrequiredifthepieceisgenuinelytocountasa‘pieceinagame’wouldbeabsent.Tocountassuch,therewouldhavetobeotherpiecespresent,anditwouldhavetostandincertainrelationshipstotheotherpieces.Morethanthat,theruleswhichdefinethegame,andthepiece’sroleinit,couldnotapply.Infact,youcouldsaythatthesolitarypiecehaslostitsveryidentity,forwhatmakesabitofwoodorplasticapieceinagameislessaquestionofitshavingacertaincolourorshape–ofitsbeingroundlikeadraughtspieceorhorse-shapedliketheknightinchess–thanitisaquestionofitshavingarule-definedrole.Ofcourse,thatiswhyitcanmakeperfectsensetosay‘Letthesaltcellarbetheking,thepepperpotthequeen,andthesetapwasherspawns’.Ifitisapiece’sproperand,inthatsense,‘natural’placetobedeployedinagame–thatis,tobemovedaroundaboardinwayswhichareconditionedbyitsrule-governedrelationshiptotheotherpiecesontheboard–thenitfollowsthatthesituationofthesolitarypieceisbothwrongand,inthesamesense,‘unnatural’.InAristotle’sanalogy,thepieceisnotentirelysolitary,butithasbecomeisolated.Ithasbeencutofffromitsfellowsanditcanplaynofurtherpartinthegame.But,eitherway,thereisthesamemoraltodraw,namelythat,since‘manisbynatureapoliticalanimal’–thatis,sinceapersoncanonlyfunctionintherightandnaturalwayinthecontextofastate–thentofindyourselfwithoutacity‘byillluck’istohavesufferedagreatmisfortune,atragedyeven.Bythesametoken,anyonewhoiswithoutacity‘bynature’–whoexperiencesnoneedforacity–reallywouldbe,asAristotlesays,‘subhumanorsuperhuman’,abeastoragod.Theanalogyispowerful.Evenso,itisonlyananalogy.TograspAristotle’spoint,weneedtoputanalogyasideandaskexactlywhatitiswearesupposedtolosethroughbecomingstateless.Toputitroughly,AristotlebelievesthatDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012itisonlywithinthecontextofastatethatthecitizencanfindopportunitiesfortheexerciseofvirtue.Onthisview,whatyouloseis,therefore,theopportunitytolivewell.Withoutthestate,youcannotdevelopandflourishinthemannerappropriatetoahuman.(Likewise,theisolatedpiececannotmoveintheappropriateways.)Happinessalsohasaroletoplayhere.ThatisbecauseAristotlethinksthathappinessconsistsintheexerciseofvirtue–ifyoulike,thathappinessistheexerciseofvirtue.Ifheisright,itfollowsthatitisonlywithinthecontextofastate–moreaccuratelyapolis–thatanyonehasachanceoffindinghappiness.Atonepoint,hesummariseshisposition\nAristotle47asfollows:‘Thestateisanassociationofpersonswhoseaimisthebestlifepossible’(Politics:1328a33).VirtueAtthisstage,IamsurethatmanyreaderswillbewantingtoraiseobjectionstoAristotle.(Haven’texplorers,lostinthefrozenAntarcticwastes,demon-stratedpatience,courage,fortitudeandself-sacrifice?Well,ofcoursetheyhave,sowhysupposethatvirtuecanonlybeexercisedinthecontextofastate?Asfortheallegedrelationbetweenvirtueandhappiness,don’tweallknowfromexperiencethatbadbehaviourcansometimesbefun?)But,beforedealingwithdifficulties,letmefirsttrytoputthecaseforAristotleasforcefullyasIcan.Tostartwith,hereisalistoffairlyobviouspoints,eachofwhichrelatestotheconceptofvirtueinonewayoranother:(i)Virtue,orvirtuousness,canbeapropertyofanindividualaction.Anactioncanbecourageous,forexample,oritcanmanifestpatience,modesty,generosity,tact,andsoonformanyothervirtues.(ii)People,too,canbevirtuous–andnotjustsingleactions.Thereisarelationshipbetweenthesefirsttwopoints,namelythat(iii)thepeoplewecallvirtuousarethosewhotend–asaruleandonthewhole–todovirtuousthings;thatis,thepeoplewedescribeascourageousarethosewhotendtoactcourageously,theoneswedescribeasgenerousarethosewhotendtoactgenerously,etc.Ofcourse,evenpeoplewhoarenotveryvirtuous–eventhosewhoarenotatallvirtuous–candovirtuousthingsonoccasion,but(iv)it’safairassumptionthatvirtuouspeoplefinditmucheasiertodovirtuousthingsthannon-virtuouspeopledo.Whenthelatterdovirtuousthingstheyfinditdifficult;theyhavetostruggle.Now,ifallthatisasobviousasIthink,thefactisallwellandgoodbecauseitshowshowharditistoquarrelwiththewayAristotledescribesvirtueintheNicomacheanEthics.AccordingtoAristotle,avirtueisadispositiontoactincertainwaysandnotothers.Youcanalsoseewhyhethinksofavirtueassomethingthatyouhavetodevelopbypractisingit;thatis,asaskill,likeharpplaying,buildingoranyothercraft.Thesearethingsyoucandowellorbadly,andthepersonwhohasdevelopedagivenskillistheonewhocanpractiseitwithease.OnAristotle’sview,thepersonwholiveswellis,thus,thepersonwhohasdevelopedtheskill(orskills)ofactingvirtuously.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Onewell-knownfeatureoftheNicomacheanEthicsis,thus,the‘TableofVirtuesandVices’,inwhichAristotleliststheappropriatevirtueforeach‘sphereofactionorfeeling’,togetherwiththatvirtue’scorrespondingvices.Forexample,wearetoldthatcourageisthevirtueappropriatetothesphereof‘fearandconfidence’,thatanexcessofthedispositionwecallcourageousis‘rashness’(orfoolhardiness)andthatadeficiencyofthesamedispositioniscowardice.Thevirtueisthuspresentedasthe‘mean’ormid-pointbetweentwovices,sothisisanillustrationofAristotle’sfamous‘doctrineofthemean’.Similarly,whenitcomestomoney,‘liberality’isportrayedasthe\n48Athensmeanbetween‘prodigality’(anexcessofthesametypeofbehaviour)andilliberalityormeanness(thecorrespondingdeficiency);thevirtueofmodestyisportrayedasthemeanbetweenshameandshamelessness,andsoon.Asthe‘TableofVirtuesandVices’illustrates,sofarasAristotleisconcerned,actingvirtuouslyisratherlikenegotiatinganobstaclecourse.Itislikesteeringawobblybicyclebetweenstrategicallyplacedtrafficcones;andthatisjustwhatyouwouldexpectreally,giventhattheEnglishword‘virtue’isacrudenear-equivalentfortheGreekarete-.(Aswesawinthelastchapter,arete-issomewhatcloserinmeaningto‘skill’and‘function’.)Aristotleandcontemporary‘virtueethics’Asithappens,therearequiteafewphilosopherswritingatpresentwhobelievethatmodernmoralphilosophyhasgotitallwrongandthattheonlypossibleremedyisarevivalofAristotle’sapproach.So,inordertohighlightthestrengthsofAristotle’saccount,letmenowgiveabriefoutlineofsomeoftheirmainarguments.Accordingto‘neo-Aristotelian’proponentsof‘virtueethics’,then,modernmoralphilosophy’sbasicmistakeistoportraymoralityasamatterofrulefollowing.(Infact,themistakeinquestion–ifitisone–issupposedtohavebeenmadebyprettywelleverymoralphilosophersinceImmanuelKant,whoseGroundworkoftheMetaphysicofMoralswasfirstpublishedin1785.Fortunately,itwouldbeirrelevanttodwellonthatclaimhere(cf.Kant1948).)Toillustratetheirargument,letustakesimpleutilitarianismasacaseinpoint.Simpleutilitarianismstatesthat‘thegreatestgoodisthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber’.Ifthisisrightthen,clearly,doingtherightthingisaquestionoffollowingarule,namely,‘Whenfacedwithachoicebetweentwoormorecoursesofaction,alwayschoosethealternativewhich–inyouropinion–ismostlikelytocontributetothegreatesthappiness.’(Actually,itwouldbeaverycrudeutilitarianismwhichleftitatthat,butitwilldoforourpurposes.)Againstthis‘rule-following’account,theobjectionfromvirtueethicspointsoutthatitmisrepresentsthewaypeoplereallythinkaboutmorality.Toseehow,imaginethatsomepersonisonthepointofchoosingacareer.CallthispersonP.Phasthemakingsofacompetentadministrator,andhastheopportunitytotakealow-paidjobintheheadofficeofacharity.ButsupposethatPisalsoatalentedartist.IfheweretoDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012takethejob,Pwouldfailtodevelopfurtherasapainter,althoughhewouldalsobecertaintoincreasethesumofhumanhappiness.Ontheotherhand,evenifPweretosucceedasanartist–havingdeclinedtheopportunity–onlyaspecialisedminoritywouldappreciateP’swork,becauseitissoavantgarde.WhatshouldPdo?Accordingtosimpleutilitarianismtheanswerisobvious.ItfollowsdirectlyfromthegreatesthappinessrulethatPshouldtakethejob.Accordingtotheobjectionthismisrepresentsmoralthinking,becauseitcouldbethatPhasacalling,andthattakingthejobisabsolutelythewrongthingforPtodo.Inthiscase,virtueentersthepicturebecauseyou\nAristotle49couldsaythatP’sintegrityrequiresthatPconcentrateonpainting.9Moreover,whatgoesforPmightnotgoforsomeoneelsewhois,inmanyrespectsquitesimilarlyplaced.Simpleutilitarianismentailsthatitmust,butthisiswrong–orsotheobjectionruns.Forexample,supposethatyourefusetoenteraburningbuilding,atgreatrisktoyourownlife,inordertosavethoseinside.Ifyousucceededinsavingthem,youwouldincreasethesumofhumanhappiness.Youwouldalsobepraisedasahero.However,iftheriskisgreat,noonewouldblameyouforrefusing.Simpleutilitarianismentailsthateveryoneinyoursituationwouldbeequallyblameless.Butthisiswrongbecauseifyouareatrainedfirefighter–evenanoff-dutyfirefighter–youwould(morally)havetoenterthebuilding.Wehavedifferentmoralexpectationsoftrainedfirefighters.Weexpectthemtoexercisethevirtuesappropriatetofirefighters.Soitcanbeobjectedthatsimpleutilitarianismmisrepresentsrealmoralthinkingheretoo.Infact,itisarguablethatutilitarianismgetsthingscompletelyback-to-frontbecause–inreality–wemoreoftenblamepeopleforfollowing,ratherthanignoring,rulessuchasthegreatesthappinessrule.Asoneneo-Aristotelianwriter,SusanWolf,hasputit,‘Idon’tknowwhetherthereareanymoralsaints.Butifthereare,IamgladthatneitherInorthoseaboutwhomIcaremostareamongthem’(Wolf1982:419).Inotherwordsa‘moralsaint’–someonewhoalwaystriedtodothemorallyrightthing(asdefinedbyutilitarianismorsomeotherrule-followingethic)–wouldjustbeasanctimoniousprig.Aristotelianmoralphilosophy,whichportraysmoralbehaviourastheexerciseofvirtues,avoidssuchobjections–orsotheargumentgoes.Now,IamsurethatreaderswillhaverealisedthatthereisplentytobesaidagainsttheargumentsIhavejustoutlined,andquitealotmoretobesaidinfavourofthem.Still,IthinkIhavemadethepointthatAristotelianethicsisworthtakingseriously–thatitismorethanananachronism–andthatisallIsetouttodohere.Thatsaid,itiswithhisaccountofhappinessthatAristotle’smoralphilosophyreallycomesintoitsown.HappinessInfact,theGreekwordiseudaimonia.Thisisnormallyrenderedas‘happiness’inEnglish,althoughthetranslationisnotquiteexact.Still,havingissuedthatwarningI’llstickto‘happiness’anyway,ifonlybecauseitislessawkward.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Aswithhisaccountofvirtue,soagoodwaytohighlightthemeritsofAristotle’saccountofhappiness(asIshallcontinuetocallit)istocontrastitwiththeaccountgivenbysimpleutilitarianism.Aswehaveseen,thelatterisfoundedontheprincipleofutility–theprincipleaccordingtowhich‘thegreatestgoodisthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber’–andthisisadistributiveprinciple.Bythis,Imeanthatittreatshappinessassomethingwhichcanbedividedbetweenpeople,ratherascakeormoneycanbedivided.Youcouldsaythatittreatshappinessasifitwereakindofstuff.Examplesofparallelprinciplesare‘Sodividethecakethatthegreatestnumberofpeople\n50Athensgetthegreatestpossibleamountofcake’,or‘Sodividethemoneythatthegreatestnumberofpeoplegetthegreatestpossibleamountofmoney’.Unlikethese,theprincipleofutilityinstructsussotodividehappinessthatthegreatestnumberofpeoplegetthegreatestpossibleamountofhappiness.Infact,youcouldhaveaparallelprincipleforprettywellanythingdivisible–notjustcakeormoneybut(moreplausibly)freedomorrights.Itfollowsthatutilitarianismmustfacethefollowingquestion:Whymakehappinessthevalueonwhichyourethicalsystemisfounded,andnotsomeothervalue?Oneveryplausibleanswertothisisthatpeoplereallydotreathappinessasmorefundamentalthanothervalues.Somepeoplewantcakeandsomedon’t.Somedesiregreatwealth,andotherslackexpensivetastes–andsoonformanyotherthings–buteveryonedesireshappiness.Moreover,thereasonwhypeoplewantcake,moneyorotherthingsistheirbeliefthatcake/money/thoseotherthingswillmakethemhappy.Itseemsthateveryonedesireshappinessforitself,andnotbecauseitisproductiveofsomethingfurther.(Youcanwantcakebecauseitmakesyouhappy,butcanyouwanthappinessbecauseitbringsyoucake?)Infact,thelastpointismadebyAristotlehimself.Of‘happiness’,hesays,‘wealwayschooseitforitselfandneverforanyotherreason’(Ethics:1097a15–b2).10Utilitarianswouldagree.So,whatisitabouthappinesswhichmakesitsodesirabletoeveryone?Itisherethattheutilitariansdiffer,forthelatterphilosopherstendtoportrayhappinessasastateofmind,asifitwereakindofsensationorasortofeuphoria.Sofarastheyareconcerned,itisthestateofmindeveryonedesirestobein.Forsimpleutilitarianism,then,‘maximisinghappiness’meansmaximisingthenumberofpeoplewhoareexperiencingthatstateofmind,theamountoftimeduringwhichtheyexperienceitand–assumingthatitcanbeexperiencedmoreorlessintensely–maximisingthedegreeofinten-sitywithwhichtheyexperienceit.(PerhapsIshouldstressonceagainthatIamdealingwithaverysimpleformofutilitarianismhere.However,JeremyBentham,the‘classical’nineteenth-centuryutilitarian,comesquiteclosetoit(seeBentham2000b,especiallychap.4).)Inthehandsoftherightutilitarianphilosopher,thistypeofviewcanbeputquitepersuasively.However,thereisabigproblemwhichcomeswithit,andtoseewhatitisnote–first–thatastateofmindcanbedrug-induced.Forexample,youcaninducetorpororeuphoriainsomeonebygivingthemtheDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012rightsortofpill.Itfollowsthat,ifhappinesswereliterallyastateofmind–injustthesamewaythattorporandeuphoriaarestatesofmind–itoughttobepossible,similarly,todevisea‘happypill’madefromthedrugwhichinducesthestateofmindcalled‘happiness’.Nowtrythefollowingthoughtexperiment.Supposethatsomeoneweretopresentyouwithabottleofhappypillsandthatthispersonweretosay‘Swallowthesepillsandyouwillbeextremely,incrediblyhappy,happierthanyouhaveeverbeen,orthanyoucouldeverbeagain,oncetheeffectofthepillshaswornoff.Then,oncetheeffectstartstowearoff,youwilldropdeadinstantaneouslyandpainlessly,withoutevenrealisingit.’\nAristotle51Wouldyoutakethepills?(Ofcourse,youalsohavetosupposethatthereisnoonewhowillbemadeunhappybyyourdeath,atleastnottoanextentwhichwouldcounterbalancetheextremehappinessyouwouldexperienceifyoutookthepills.Inshort,youhavetosupposethat‘otherthingsareequal’.)Mypointisthat,ifsimpleutilitarianism’saccountofhappinesswerecorrect,theonlyrationalthingtodowouldbetoswallowthepills.Giventhateveryonedesireshappiness,everyonewhowasofferedapillwouldtakeitand,iftherewereenoughpillstogoround,thehumanracewouldsoonbewipedout.However,Iamprettysurethatmostofuswouldnotchoosethisoption.(Certainly,whenIputthisexampletootherstheytendtosaythattheywouldn’t,althoughtheyareoftenatalosstoexplainwhy.)IfI’mright,thisdemonstratesthefalsityofsimpleutilitarianism.Happinessisnotsomethingyoucanachievejustbytakingalotofpills.Therefore,itisnotastateofmind(atleast,notinthewaythateuphoriais).Aristotle’sviewisverydifferentfromtheutilitarian’s,anditraisesadifferentquestion.Thatquestionis:Whenyouaredying,andyoulookbackoverthecourseyourlifehastaken,whatjudgementwillyouform?Thequestionarisesbecause,forAristotle,happiness(or,rather,eudaimonia)isnotamatterofbeinginanysortofstateofmind.Itisamatterof‘livingwellordoingwell’(Ethics:1095a7).Onthisview,asking‘WasIhappy?’isnotatalllikeasking,‘HowdidIfeel?’Itisasking,‘Howdidmylifego?’ForAristotle,then,‘happiness’isanevaluativeterm.Itistheconceptintermsofwhichyouassessthecourseofalife.Onceyouthinkofitthatway,someofthethingsAristotlesays–thingswhichcanseemstrangewhenyoufirstencounterhiswork–fallintoplace.Forexample,itisobviousthatyourlifecouldgobadly,notthroughanyfaultofyourown,butthroughsimplebadluckormisfortune.Therefore,itisquitenaturalthatAristotleshouldthinkthat‘amanisscarcelyhappyifheisveryuglytolookat,oflowbirth’orthatapersonis‘presumablyevenlesssoifhehaschildrenorfriendswhoarequiteworthless,orifhehadgoodoneswhoarenowdead’(Ethics:1099b20).(Contrastthiswithsimpleutilitarianism,whichimpliesthatevenugly,friendless,peoplecanbehappy,providedtheytaketherightpills.)Again,injudgingthecourseyourlifehastaken,itwillbeimportanttodecidewhetheryouhavelivedrightly.ThereisevenashortsectionoftheNicomacheanEthicsinwhichAristotleraisesthequestionofwhetheronlythedeadcanbetrulyhappy(Ethics:1100a10ff.).ThiswillstrikeyouasanabsurdquestionifyouthinklikeaDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012utilitarianandsupposethathappinessisastateofmind.(Thedeadcannotbeconscious.)ItisnotsoabsurdifyouthinklikeanAristotelian,forwhomlookingbackoverthecourseofalifemustbeakeyactivity.IthinkthatAristotlegivesafarbetteraccountoftheway‘happiness’isactuallyusedthantheutilitariansdo,andthathegivesafarbetterexplanationofwhy‘happinessissomethingwealwayschooseforitselfandneverforanyotherreason’(Ethics:1097a15–b2).Morethanthat,‘Whenyoulookback,howwillyoujudgeyourlifetohavegone?’strikesmeasa‘real’question.Imeanthatitisonemostofuswillfindourselvesasking,irrespectiveofits\n52Athensrelationtoanyphilosophicaltheory.Itis,therefore,quiteunlike,‘wouldyoutakethehappypills?’,whichisanartificial‘philosopher’sexample’.ThisisalsoareasonforpreferringAristotle’saccount.Butisheright?Well,therearecontemporaryneo-Aristotelianswhocertainlythinkthatheshouldbetakenveryseriously.Forexample,onesuch,AlasdairMacIntyre,hascomparedthe‘unityofanindividuallife’with‘theunityofanarrative’,sothatasking‘Whatisthegoodforme?’isasking,‘howImightliveoutthatunityandbringittocompletion’(MacIntyre1981:218–19).Headds,Theunityofahumanlifeistheunityofanarrativequest.Questssometimesfail,arefrustrated,abandonedordissipatedintodistractions;andhumanlivesmayinallthesewaysalsofail.Buttheonlycriteriaforsuccessorfailureinahumanlifeasawholearethecriteriaofsuccessorfailureinanarratedorto-be-narratedquest.(MacIntyre1981:218–19)ThisisnotAristotle’stheoryprecisely,butitisacontemporaryethicaltheorywhichisveryAristotelianinspirit.AnassociationwhoseaimisthebestlifepossibleSowheredoesthisleaveAristotle’sclaimthat‘Thestateisanassociationofpersonswhoseaimisthebestlifepossible’(Politics:1328a21)?InEnglish,thisisusuallyrenderedastheclaimthatitisonlywithinthecontextofa‘state’that‘virtue’canbeexercisedand‘happiness’consequentlyachieved.Butthisisapuzzlingclaimwhichbegssomefairlyevidentquestions.(Whycan’tlonelyexplorers,outintheAntarctic,demonstratevirtue?Whycan’tbadbehaviourmakeyouhappy?)Earlier,IpostponeddealingwiththeseinordertoemphasisethestrengthsofAristotle’smoralphilosophy.Letusnowreturntothem.TryingtomakesenseofAristotle’sclaimis,inanycase,agoodwaytobringthischaptertoaclose,asitwillinvolvedrawingsomethreadstogether.Polis,arete-,eudaimoniaDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Forastart,recallthat‘state’,‘virtue’and‘happiness’areinexacttranslationsofGreekwords.WhatAristotlereallysaysisthatitisonlywithinthepolisthatapersoncandemonstratearete-andsoachieveeudaimonia.Bywayofsummary,letustakeeachwordinturn.First:polisreferstothesmallGreekcity-state.Second:thewordarete-ismorefunctionalinitsconnotationthan‘virtue’.Anythingwhichperformsitsfunctionwellhasarete-,whichmeansthataninanimateobject–atoolsuchasanaxe–can,literally,demonstratearete-ifitissharp,easytohandle,andsoon.(True,itisacceptableEnglishtospeakofanaxe’s‘virtues’,butthisis\nAristotle53ametaphoricalusage.Whenwespeakofaperson’svirtues,wedonotuse‘virtue’withquitethesamefunctionalsense.)Wehavealreadyseenthenotionofarete-atworkinPlato’sideathata‘just’stateisoneinwhicheveryoneconcentratesonwhatheorsheisbestat–inotherwords,astateinwhicheveryoneperformsthefunctiontowhichtheyarebestadapted.Andthird:themeaningofeudaimoniaisalsorelatedtofunction,unlikethatof‘happiness’whichisnot.(Inlinewiththis,TheConciseRoutledgeEncyclopaediaofPhilosophydefineseudaimoniaas‘thestateofhavinganobjectivelydesirablelife,universallyagreedbyancientphilosophicaltheoryandpopularthoughttobethesupremehumangood’.TheEncyclopaediaaddsthat‘Thisobjectivecharacterdistinguishesitfromthemodernconceptofhappiness:asub-jectivelysatisfactorylife’(Taylor2000).Tohavelivedeudaimonicallyis,thus,tohavelivedwell,and–asnotedamomentago–itwouldbenaturalforthepersonwhovaluedeudaimoniatoask,‘Howhasmylifegonesofar?’Bycontrast,thatisnotthequestionwhichwillautomaticallyariseforamodernhappiness-valuer,suchasautilitarian).SubstitutetheGreektermsfortheEnglish,andAristotle’sclaimturnsouttoresembletheclaimthatasparkplugcanonlyfunctionproperlywhenitissetwithinaninternalcombustionengine,orthatamusicianwhoseskillliesinaccompanyingothers–abass-player,forexample–canonlydemonstratehisorhertalentstothefullwhenworkingasamemberofaband.InthetermsofAristotle’sownanalogy,itislikesayingthatadraughtspiececanonlyperformthefunctionforwhichithasbeendesignedwhenitisactivelydeployedinagame.Howelsecouldthesparkplug,themusician,thedraughtspiece,performtheir‘proper’functionsandsodemonstratetheirappropriatevirtues?Likewise,howelsecouldapersonperformhisorher‘proper’functionwithoutapoliswithinwhichtooperate?Substitutepolis,arete-andeudaimonia,for‘city’,‘virtue’and‘happiness’,andAristotle’sclaimbecomesalmostself-explanatory.‘Proper’functionandsocialfunctionThatshouldhelpexplainAristotle’sconceptionoftherelationshipbetweenthestate,virtueandhappiness.Butisheright?Theansweristhathewouldberight,onlyifcertainassumptionswerecorrect.Oneisthatjustasatoolhasa‘proper’function–ascrewdrivertoinsertortoremovescrews,asawtoDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012cutwood,andsoon–soeachpersonhasaproperfunction,oneforwhichheorsheisbestfitted.Anotheristhat,foreachperson,thatperson’sproperfunctionistofulfilagivensocialrole.Youcanseetheseassumptionsatworkinthefollowingpassages.TheyaredrawnfromearlychaptersofThePoliticsinwhichAristotleattemptstojustifyslavery.[Again]inanyspecialskilltheavailabilityofthepropertoolswillbeessentialfortheperformanceofthetask;andthehousehold-managermusthavehislikewise.Toolsmaybeanimateaswellasinanimate;forinstance,aship’s\n54Athenscaptainusesalifelessrudder,butalivingmanforwatch;foraservantis,fromthepointofviewofhiscraft,categorisedasoneofitstools.Soanypieceofpropertycanberegardedasatoolenablingamantolive,andhispropertyisanassemblageofsuchtools:aslaveisasortoflivingpieceofproperty,andlikeanyotherservantisachargeofothertools.(Politics:1253b23)And,thosewhoseconditionissuchthattheirfunctionistheuseoftheirbodiesandnothingbettercanbeexpectedofthem,those,Isay,areslavesbynature.Itisbetterforthem,justasinthecasesmentioned,toberuledthus[i.e.byamaster].Forthe‘slavebynature’ishethatcanandthereforedoesbelongtoanother,andhethatparticipatesinreasonsofarastorecogniseitbutnotsoastopossessit(whereasotheranimalsobeynotreasonbutemotions).Theusemadeofslaveshardlydiffersatallfromthatoftameanimals:theybothhelpwiththeirbodiestosupplyouressentialneeds.(Politics:1254b16)Inshort,theproperfunctionofthe‘naturalslave’istoserveasthefreeman’stool.Andwomenarealsocomparedwithtools,ratherasslavesare.Aristotlewritesthat‘Naturehasdistinguishedbetweenfemaleandslave:sherecognisesdifferentfunctionsandlavishlyprovidesdifferenttools’(Politics:1252a34)and,later,that‘asbetweenmaleandfemaletheformerisbynaturesuperiorandruler,thelatterinferiorandsubject’(Politics:1254b2).Asforthe‘lowerorders’generally,thereisnoescapingthefactthatAristotletakesanaristocrat’selitistviewofthesocialorder.Evenwhenhearguesforthesuperiorityofdemocracyoveroligarchy,itisonlybecausehethinksthattheformeristhebestdecisionprocedurefortherulinggroupofcitizenstoadopt.Intheend,hisargumentforthepolisturnsouttobetheargumentthatitistheonlyenvironmentinwhichaprivilegedelitecanfindtheleisureandtheoppor-tunitytolivethegoodlife–ifyoulike,thatitistheonlysoilinwhichtheflowerofthecitizenrycantrulyflourish.Thatiswhyheinsists,forexample,that‘thecitizensmustnotliveamechanicalorcommerciallife’as‘suchalifeisnotnoble,anditmilitatesagainstvirtue’(Politics:1328b33).Also,itexplainswhy,intheEthics,heshoulddefine‘thehappyman’as‘onewhoisDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012activeinaccordancewithcompletevirtue,andwhoisadequatelyfurnishedwithexternalgoods,andthatnotforsomeunspecifiedperiodbutthroughoutacompletelife’(Ethics:1101a20)(myitalics).Inotherwords,tobehappyyouneed(atleastsome)wealth.Science,virtueandsocialhierarchyItisclearthatAristotlewasnobelieverinequalityorinfreedomforall.Somereaderswillthinkthisforgivable.Whyexpectmodern‘political\nAristotle55correctness’inaphilosopherwholivedsolongago?Otherswillbelessforgiving.(Tobefair,perhapsIshouldaddthat,inancientGreece,theslavewas,typically,amemberofthehousehold–afarmlabourerforexample.Thesystemunderwhichslavesworkedinhugegangsandindreadfulconditions,inminesoronplantations–asinRomeorthepre-CivilWarUSA–wasahorroryettocome.)Still,thisismeanttobeanintroductiontophilosophy,sowhateveryourreactiontoAristotle’sconclusionsmaybe,whatIwouldreallylikeyoutoappreciateistherelationshipbetweentheseconclusionsandtheunderlyingphilosophicalpositionshetakes.Thatsaid,letmenowsummarisethebasicfeaturesofAristotle’sphiloso-phyasIhaveoutlinedituptothispoint.Sofar,IhaveconcentratedontwomajorfeaturesofAristotle’swork,hisapproachtoscienceandhisaccountofvirtue.AsIhavepointedout,itistheconceptionoffunctionbywhichtheseareunited.Thus,itisAristotle’sviewthatscienceproceedsbyanalysingitssubjectmatterintoparts,andinclassifyingthosepartsaccordingtotheirfunction.Asforvirtue,Aristotlebelievesthatvirtueconsistsinperformingyoursocialfunctionwell.ThesephilosophicalviewsconditionandreinforceAristotle’sattitudetosocialhierarchy.Toseehowthishappensinthecaseofhisapproachtoscience,takeapassagefromTheHistoryofAnimals;forexample,takethepassageinwhichAristotlewritesoffishthat‘ofthesesomehavefourfins,twoaboveontheback,twobelowonthebelly,asthegiltheadandthebasse;somehavetwoonly,towit,suchasareexceedinglylongandsmooth,astheeelandtheconger’andthat‘somehavenoneatall,asthemuraena,butusetheseajustassnakesusedryground’(Animals:489b).NowcompareitwiththefollowingpassagefromThePolitics.InitAristotlediscussesthedifferencebetweenfreemenandslaves.[For]the‘slavebynature’ishethatcanandthereforedoesbelongtoanother,andhethatparticipatesinreasonsofarastorecogniseitbutnotsoastopossessit(whereastheotheranimalsobeynotreasonbutemotions).Theusemadeofslaveshardlydiffersatallfromthatoftameanimals:theybothhelpwiththeirbodiestosupplyouressentialneeds.Itis,then,nature’spurposetomakethebodiesoffreementodifferfromthoseofslaves,thelatterstrongenoughtobeusedfornecessarytasks,theformererectanduselessforthatkindofwork,butwellsuitedforthelifeofacitizenofastate,alifewhichisinturndividedDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012betweentherequirementsofwarandpeace.(Politics:1254b16)Justassomefishhavefourfinsandsomeonlytwo,so–Aristotlenotes–slavesarelessadeptintheiruseofreasonthanarefreemenand,morethanthat,eventheirbodiesaredifferent.Whatarewetomakeofthis?Well,forastart,IthinkwecantakeitthatAristotle’sdescriptionofwhatheobservedwasaccurate.Outofslavesandfreemen,wecanbeprettysurethatslaveswouldhavebeenlessrational\n56Athensandarticulate,andthat,foreachslave,thatslave’sphysicaldevelopmentwouldhavereflectedthenatureoftheparticularmenialtaskinwhichheorshewasprimarilyengaged.(Slaveswhospenttheirlivestendingcropswouldbestooped,thosewhosetaskitwastocarrygreatweightswouldbeverystrongandsoon.)However,andtoputitmildly,modernreaderswillbeunwillingtoaccepttheexplanationAristotlegives.Thisisthatitwas‘nature’spurpose’toproducephysicallydifferenttypesofpeople,justasitwasnature’spurposetoproducedifferentspeciesofanimal.Modernreaderswillwanttoinsistthattherewere,undoubtedly,socialfactorswhichplayedamajorroleintheexplanationofthephysicaldifferences.Ifslaveswerelessgoodatreasoning,thatmusthavebeentheresultofpoorereducation.Iftheywerestronger,thatcanonlyhavebeentheresultofhavingtodomorephysicallydemandingwork.Toamodernreader,thatmustseemobvious.Butitevidentlywasn’tobvious,eventosomeoneasintellectuallygiftedasAristotle.Howcome?Asthepassageillustrates,thetroublewithproceedingdescriptively–thatisbysimplyobservingandrecording–isthatitgivesyounowayofdifferentiatingsomething’sessentialcomponentsfromitslessessentialfeatures;forexample,betweencomponentswhichperformagenuinefunctionandfeatureswhichjusthappentobepresentatthetimeyouarelooking.Nowifyouaredoingmarinebiology–atleast,ifyouaretryingtocategorisefishandothermarinespeciesbyspeciesandgenus–thismaynotmattertoomuch.Wheresomefishhavefourfinsandsomeonlytwo,youcanclassifythefishaccordingly.Itcouldbethatthedifferenceinthenumberoffinsreflectsagenuinedifferenceintheirfunction,oritcouldbepurelyaccidental,likethedifferenceincolourbetweentabbyandgingercats.ForAristotle’spurposesitwouldn’treallyhavemattered.(Ofcourse,youcanassumethat‘naturedoesnothingwithoutapurpose’–youcantakeitasaxiomatic–inwhichcaseyouwillthinkthateventhespecificcolourofacat’scoatwillbefunctionalforthecat,butyouwillhavenowayofreallyknowing.)Thereasonwhyitwouldn’thavematteredisthatspeciesevolvesoslowlythatfromanobserver’spointofview–evenfromthepointofviewofgenerationupongenerationofobservers–theymightaswellnotchangeatall.Aristotlelivedinpre-Darwiniantimes,ofcourse,butevenifthetheoryofevolutionhadoccurredtohim,11itwouldnothaveaffectedtheconclusionshedrawsinTheHistoryofAnimals,becauseallhewastryingtodotherewasclassifyanimalsintermsoftheirobservablecharacteristics.However,andbyDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012contrast,whenthesametechniqueisappliedtosocialandpoliticalinstitu-tions,allthismattersagreatdeal.Itisn’tjustthatpoliticalformschangefarmorerapidlythanzoologicalformsdo.Theabsenceofacriterionfordistin-guishingtheessentialfromtheinessential–thegenuinelyfunctionalfromthepurelyaccidental–meansthatyouriskjustifyingrelativelytemporaryfeatures,specifictosomeparticularpoliticalform,assomehow‘natural’andright.ThatishowAristotlecomestojustifyslavery.So,thisisagoodexampleofhowamethodwhichservesperfectlywellinthescientificstudyofnaturalphenomenacanletyoudownwhenyouare\nAristotle57studyingpoliticalinstitutions.Moreover,Aristotle’sperceptionofthewaythingswerewouldhavebeenreinforcedbythefactthat,foreverypolisdescribedinThePolitics,theclassstructureissimilar.Ineach,thereisa(male)groupwithinwhichdecisionsaretaken–eitherdemocratically,byvoteorlot,orbyoligarchiccommand.Thereisaclassofwomenwithinwhichtherearevariousgradations–educatedhetairaiorcourtesans,thewiveswhomanagethehousehold,femaledomesticservants,slaves,andsoon.Membersofeithersexcouldbehouseholders(thoughwithdutiesdividedaccordingtosex),servants,orslaves.Inshort,theremayhavebeengreatdifferencesbetweenpoleisinthewaytheywereorganised,intheirconstitutions,butinotherwaystheyweren’tasdifferentasallthat.Turning,now,fromAristotle’sscientificmethodtohisaccountofvirtue,Aristotlewasapparentlyblindtoadifficultywhichmustseemglaringtoanymodernreader.Thisisthedifficultyofdecidingwhatqualitiesordispositionscountasvirtues.Putitthisway:ifyouweretomakealistofvirtues,onwhatbasiswouldyoumakeyourselection?Wouldyouincludecourageandpatience?Ifso,why?Wouldyouincludecunning,say,ormeekness?(What,ifanything,wouldyoucountas‘womanlyvirtues’?It’sprettyclearthat,ifyouareasocialconservative,youranswerwillbedifferentfromtheoneyouwouldgiveifyouwerearadicalfeminist.)Thisisadifficultquestion,but–mypoint–itisfareasiertocompilelistsofvirtueswherethereisasocialhier-archysuchthatpeopleareborntocertainpositions,tofulfilcertainroles,andwhere,asaresult,certainthingsareexpectedofthem.Forexample,inaworldwheresomemenaremembersofanhereditarycasteofwarriornobles,suchmenwillbeexpectedtodemonstratecourageandphysicalstrength.Evencallousnesscouldbeavirtueinmembersofthiscaste.Again,whereitisanoblewoman’sunquestionedroletomanagethehouseholdandtheestate,patienceanddomesticcompetencewillbeconsideredvirtuesinanoblewoman.Likewise,inaworldwherepeopleareborntobeslaves,therewillbevirtuesappropriatetoaslave.(Aristotlementionsobedienceandhavingastrongbody.)Aristotle’sblindnesstothedifficultyinquestionis–Ithink–under-pinnedbytherelativestabilityofthesocialhierarchythroughouttheperiodduringwhichhelived.HisworldwasmuchmoreliketheoneIhavejustdescribed.Wedonotliveinaworldlikethat.Wedonotconsiderthesonsofsoldiersorthedaughtersofhousewivestobelittlesoldiersorhousewives,poisedtofulfiltheirgivenroles,wellorbadly.WhenwetrytocompilelistsofDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012virtueswetrytodecidewhatwewouldcountasvirtuesinapersonassuch,notwhattocountasavirtueinsomeonewhohappenstoholdagivenposition.But,bycontrastwithourown,inAristotle’sworldpeopledidnotjust‘happento’holdtheirsocialpositions.Itwasmorerigidlystructured,andtherewould,therefore,havebeenarelationshipofmutualreinforcementbetweenAristotle’saccountofvirtueandhisperceptionofthesocialorderwithinwhichhelivedandmoved.Justastheformersuppliedarationaleforthelatter,sohisperceptionofthelattercanonlyhavereinforcedtheideathatmoralityistobeaccountedforprimarilyintermsofvirtue.\n58AthensAristotle’slegacyHereisananalogy:supposethatyouarelookingthroughanalbumofoldphotographs;photographstakenin–say–theearlyyearsofthelastcentury.Certaindifferencesbetweenthepeopleinthephotoswillbeimmediatelyapparent.Somewillbewomen,ofcourse,andothersmen,butIdon’tmeanjustthat.Classdifferenceswillbeobvioustoo.Youwillrecognisethatthemenwearingclothcapsandbootsareworkers,andthattheoneswithtophatsareupper-middleorupperclass.(IfitisanEnglishalbum)youwillknowthatthosemeninbowlerhatsdisembarkingfromthetrainaremiddle-classofficeworkers.Nowsupposethatyoucanclimbintoatimemachineandtravelbacktotheyearinwhichthephotographsweretaken.Youwouldnowbecomeawareofyetmoredifferences.Peoplewouldspeakdifferently,bothfromyourselfandfromeachother.Theywouldhavedifferentaccentsandmannerisms.(Watchanymoviemadeinthe1930sor40s,andyouwillseeexactlywhatImean.)Perhapstheywouldsmellalittledifferentand,evenasacasualobserver,itislikelythatyouwouldnoticesomeofthephysicaldifferencesbetweenthem,differencesresultingfrommorefundamentaldifferencesindiet,accommodationandworkingconditions.Andnowsuppose–further–thatyoucanclimbbackintoyourtimemachineandtravelallthewaybacktotheGreeceofAristotle’stime.Itwasatimewhenclassdivisionswerefarlessfluid,andwhendifferencesbetweenmembersofdifferentclasseswouldhavebeenevenmorestriking.Ofcourse,youwillexplainthesedifferencesastheeffectsofsocialfactorswhichcanvaryashistoryprogresses.Butthenyouwillhaveaprivilegedperspective,foryouwillhavetravelledbacktherefromthetwenty-firstcentury,andyouwillknowthatthingscanchange.Thisshouldn’tleadyoutounderestimatehoweasyitmusthavebeenforsomeonelikeAristotle,rootedintheperiodashewas,totreatthemaspermanentnaturalfeatures.ButifthatisagraphicwaywithwhichtosummarisethedrawbacksofAristotle’smethod,weshouldn’tbemisledintotreatinghiscontributiontopoliticalthoughtdismissively.Onthecontrary,Aristotle’sinfluencehasbeensoprofoundthattherecanbenosimplewayofsummingitup,althoughitshouldbeclearthatanyattempttodosowouldhavetomentionatleastthefollowing.Firstofall,justasAristotlesingle-handedlyinventedthescienceofcomparativezoology,soheinventedthescienceofcomparativepolitics.(ForAristotle,bothwereaspectsofthesameenterprise.)Second,itwasDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Aristotlewhofirstintroducedthe(profoundlyinfluential)ideathatthemethodscientistsusedtostudynaturalphenomenacanalsobeappliedinthefieldofpolitics.Third,thereareelementsofAristotle’smoralphilosophy–hisaccountofvirtueanditsrelationtohappiness–whichcontinuetodemandseriousconsideration.Fourth,withhisaccountoftherelationshipbetweenthestateandtheindividual,Aristotleintroducedanimportantthemeintopoliticalphilosophy.UnlikePlato,whotendstotreatthestateasaninstrumentforthesatisfactionofindividualends,Aristotlecontendsthat\nAristotle59thereisanorganicrelationshipbetweenthestateandtheindividual.Thesubsequenthistoryofbothconceptionsislongandchequered.AsforAristotlehimself,thestoryofhislifeisladenwithironies.Thereistheironythatthephilosopherwhocelebratedthelifeofthecitizen,thelifeoffullparticipationintheaffairsofthepolis,shouldhavespenthisownlifeasanon-citizenoutsider,ametic.Morethanthat,hewastwicecompelledtoleaveAthensbyhostile,anti-Macedonianfeeling,oncein347BCandagainin325BC.(Intheinterim,AristotlehadestablishedtheLyceum,aninstitu-tiontorivalPlato’sAcademy.)OnthegreatchequerboardofGreece,itseemsthatAristotlewas,himself,somethingofanisolatedpiece.Thereisanotherironytoo.Between343/2BCand340BC,AristotlehadservedastutortothesonofPhilip,theMacedonianking.(ThereisnoevidencethatAristotlemanagedtoteachhispupilmuch.SofarasPhilipwasconcerned,itseemsthatAristotlewastheremainlyasastatussymbol.)AfterPhilip’sdeath,thesongrewuptobecomeAlexandertheGreat,theruthlessgeneralwhoseempirestretchedthroughouttheknownworld,intoPersiaandsouthwardsintoSyriaandEgypt,eastwardsacrosstheHimalayas,andintonorthernIndia.ThedestructionoftheworldAristotlecelebrated–theworldhepor-trayedasthemosthospitablenaturalenvironmentfornaturallypoliticalcreatures–hadbegunatthehandsofhisownpupil.WhenAristotlediedin322BC,itwouldnotbelongbeforethatworld,theworldoftheindependentpolis,hadvanishedfromthefaceoftheearth.SuggestionsforfurtherreadingAristotleThereareplentyofgoodintroductionstoAristotle’sphilosophyasawhole,butnotsomanywhichconcentrateuponhispoliticalphilosophy.OneexceptiontothisruleisFredMiller’s,Justice,NatureandRightsinAristotle’sPolitics(1997).Asforcontemporary,neo-Aristotelian‘virtueethics’,afoundational,powerfullyarguedtextisAlasdairMacIntyre’sAfterVirtue:AStudyinMoralTheory(1981).Onthelattersubject,agoodcollectionofarticlesbyphilosopherswritingatpresentisRogerCrispandMichaelSlote,eds,VirtueEthics(1997).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Notes1AristotlewasabsentfromAthensfor12years,duringwhichhewasmarriedtwice,firsttoHippias’niece,Pyrthias,bywhomhehadadaughter.SadlyPyrthiasdied.Afterthat,AristotlebecametheloverofHerpyllis,themotherofhisbelovedsonNicomachus.(Itisnotknownifhemarriedher.)WhenAterneuswascapturedbythePersiansin341BCtheytorturedHerpyllistodeath.Fortunatelyforus(butforAristotle,whoknows?)Aristotlehadembarkeduponhistravelsbythen.HetravelledextensivelythroughoutGreece–especiallymaritimeGreece–until\n60AthenshewasrecruitedtoPhilipofMacedon’scourtin343BC.Ihaven’twrittena‘potted’biographyforeveryphilosopherIdiscussinthisbook,buttheeventsofAristotle’slifeseemtomesoextraordinarythatIhavethoughtitworthrecordingthem,ifonlyinthisnote.2SomesaythattheNicomacheanEthicswasdedicatedtoNicomachusbyAristotlehimself;othersthatthebookwassocalledbecauseitwasNicomachuswhoputittogetherbyorganisingAristotle’snotesafterhisdeath.3IsaythisbecauseinmostofhisdialoguesPlatoisconcernedtoelucidatethenatureofavirtue–courageorjusticeforexample–or,ifnotquiteavirtue,avalue,suchasknowledge.4ExceptformyopeningquotationIhaveusedtheSinclairtranslationofAristotle’sPolitics,revisedandre-presentedbyTrevorJ.Saunders(Aristotle1981).However,whenreferringtospecificpassagesitiscustomarytousethemethoddevisedbyI.Bekkerinhiseditionof1831(AristotelisOpera,Berlin,1831).BekkerreferstotheGreektextbypage,columnandline,sothat,forexample,Politics1294b21referstoPolitics,page1294,columnb,line21.Iamusingthissystemmyself,notbecauseIexpectreaderstopossesstheoriginalGreektext–orevenbecauseIexpectthemtounderstandancientGreek–butbecauseeveryreasonabletranslationofthePoliticsusesthesamesystem.Thatshouldmakepassageseasytofind,whatevertheeditionyouhave.5ReferencestoTheHistoryofAnimalsusetheBekkersystem.Seeabove,note4.6Aristotlerecordsthattheoctopushasasecondmouth,thatthesnakehasnopenis,andthat,duringcopulation,thefemaleflyinsertsatubeintothemalefly,‘thisbeingthereverseoftheoperationobservedinothercreatures’.Headdsthat‘Thisphenomenonmaybewitnessedifanyonewillpullasunderfliesthatarecopulating’(1910:V,8).Heisalsonotoriousforhavingstatedthatthebison‘defendsitselfagainstanassailantbykickingandprojectingitsexcrementtoadistanceofeightyards;thisdeviceitcaneasilyadoptoverandoveragain,andtheexcrementissopungentthatthehairofhuntingdogsisburntoffbyit’(Aristotle1910:IX,45).Noneoftheseclaimsisright,butweshouldn’tletsuchmistakesdetractfromAristotle’sachievement.7WhichisnottodenythatAristotletooka‘patriarchal’viewofthings.Hedid.OnthisseeSusanMollerOkin(1979),chap.4.8SeeespeciallyE.O.Wilson(1975),chap.26.9Thebest-knownversionofthis‘objectionfromintegrity’isBernardWilliams’s.SeeWilliams(1973),pp.97ff.10ReferencestotheNicomacheanEthicsfollowtheBekkersystem.Seenote4above.11IputthiscautiouslybecausethereisapassageinThePhysicsinwhichAristotlediscusseswhetheritcouldbethat,innature,thingscometobe‘organizedspontaneouslyinafittingway’.However,itwouldbeanexaggerationtodescribeAristotle’sviewasatheoryofevolution.Inanycase,hegoesontoinsistthat‘itisimpossiblethatthisshouldbethetrueview’.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n4Whathappenednext?Thesedays,itwouldbeunusualtocomeacrossaworkofpoliticalphilosophywhichpaidmuchattentiontotheperiodwhichranfromGreektimestothelatesixteenthoreventheearlyseventeenthcentu-ries.Pickamodernbookonthesubjectatrandomfromthelibraryshelf,consulttheindexand,ifyoudo,youarequitelikelytofindreferencestoPlatoandAristotle,youarecertaintofindthenamesof‘modern’philoso-pherssuchasHobbes,Locke,Bentham,Mill,andsoon,but–usually–youwillsearchinvainforsuchnamesasAverroes,MosesMaimonides,JohnofParis,MarsiliusofPaduaandWilliamofOckham.Bycontrastwiththoseofthemoderns,thelattercanhardlybedescribedashouseholdnames,andifthenamesofStAugustineandStThomasAquinasaremorefamiliartoyou,thatwillprobablybethankstotheirreputationasmajortheologiansratherthantoanycontributiontheymayhavemadetopoliticalthought.1Becausethisbookismeanttobeanintroduction–andbecauseitmakesnospecialclaimtobreaknewground–Ishallfollowtheusualpracticehere.Evenso,Irecognisethatreadersareowedsomeaccountoftheperiodinquestion,especiallyreaderstowhompoliticalphilosophyisanew,unfami-liar,subject.Tosuchreaders,therelativeneglectofthatperiodbypoliticalphilosophersislikelytoappearpuzzling.Afterall,wearedealingwithalengthystretchoftimehere–gettingonfor2,000years–andoneduringwhicheventsofsomesignificancetookplace.TheseincludedtheriseoftheRomanempire,itssubsequentdecline,andtheemergenceoftwomajorreligions–ChristianityandIslam.Accordingly,thischapterhasthreemainaims.Theseare(i)todescribeDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012someofthechangeswhichtookplaceduringtheperiodinquestion,concentrating–ofcourse–onchangesrelevanttotheunderstandingoftheworkofpoliticalphilosopherswhowerewritingthen;(ii)todescribehowtheformerchangeswerereflectedintheworkofthosephilosophers;and(iii)toofferatentativeexplanationformodernphilosophy’srelativeneglectoftheperiodinquestion.ItshouldgowithoutsayingthatIcanoffernomorethanasketchhere.Itwouldtakeawholebooktodotheperiodjustice;but,ifIwerewritingthatbook,Iwouldn’tbewritingthisone.\n62AthensFromHellenistictomedievaltimesOutofthechangeswhichtookplacebetweenlateGreekandearlymoderntimes,then,whichmeritourattention?Inanswer,itwillbehelpfultosubdividetheperiodintothreedistinctparts,thefirstbeingthatduringwhichpoliticalpowerandinfluenceshiftedwestwardsfromGreecetoRomeandduringwhich,later,thepowerofRomeitselfeventuallydeclined.Thesecondisthemedievalperiodproper.Itruns–roughlyspeaking–fromtheriseofChristianityintheWestduringRomantimestotheearlyyearsofthesixteenthcentury.Thethirdistheearlymodernperiod,which–againroughlyspeaking–spansthegreaterpartofthesixteenthcenturyandrunsintotheearlierpartoftheseventeenth.InthissectionIconcentrateuponthefirsttwo.TheeclipseofGreecebyRomeduringthefirst–the‘laterclassical’periodasIshallcallitforshort–wasagradualprocesswhichtookplaceoverthecourseofcenturies.So,initsturn,wasthedeclineofRomeitself.Still,ifyoulikespecificdates,thenIguessyoucouldchoose334BCand332BCtoserveasmarkersforthebeginningoftheperiod;foritwasintheformeryearthatAlexandertheGreatlaunchedhiscampaignsintheEast,andinthelatterthathedied.Towardstheperiod’send,Iguessthatthebestknown‘marker’eventsforthedeclineoftheRomanempirearetherepeatedsackingsofRomebyGermanictribes–Visigoths,Vandals,Ostrogoths,eachintheirturn–inthefifthandearlysixthcenturies2AD.Ofcourse,Romewasn’treally‘switchedoff’bythebarbarians,asifitwereanelectriclight,buttheseeventsare,nevertheless,indicativeofitsincreasinglyshakyposition.Sofarasweareconcerned,however,themostsignificantfeatureoftheperiodisthat,althoughthepoliticalinfluenceofGreecedeclined,itremainedculturallydominant,notonlythroughouttheearlier‘Hellenistic’years,butthroughoutRomantimestoo.InhisHistoryofWesternPhilosophy,BertrandRussellsummarisesthesituationasfollows.Totheend,RomewasculturallyparasiticonGreece.TheRomansinventednoartforms,constructednooriginalsystemofphilosophy,andmadenoscientificdiscoveries.Theymadegoodroads,systematiclegalcodes,andefficientarmies;fortheresttheylookedtoGreece.(Russell1991:283–84)Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Russellisexaggerating,slightly.TherecertainlywereRomanphilosophers.OnewasMarcusTulliusCicero,whoseworkweshallconsiderlaterinthechapter.Evenso,andwhatevertheoriginalityofthecontributionhemayhavemade,itisprettyclearthatCicerowouldhavetendedtoconcurwithRussell’sassessment.‘ItwasnotinystreamthatflowedintothiscityfromGreece,’hewrote,‘butratherarichfloodofmoralandartisticteaching’(Cicero1998a:45).Whatofthesecondperiodoutofthethreeatissuehere?Liketheshiftinpowerandpoliticalinfluence,westwardsfromGreecetoRome,sothechange\nWhathappenednext?63fromclassicaltomedievalwasgradual.Asintheformercase,sointhelatterlong-termprocesseseventuallyculminatedinasituationwhichwasrecognisablyquitedifferentfromwhathadgonebefore.Thereis,thus,nospecific,isolable,momentfromwhichitcanbesaidthatthingssuddenlybegantochange.Nevertheless,itisworthmentioningacoupleof‘marker’datesheretoo,and,fortheearlierchanges,onemightwellchooseAD380.ThiswastheyearinwhichtheRomanauthoritiesissuedtheEdictofThessalonica,therebypronouncingChristianityRome’sofficialreligion.ThepublicationofMachiavelli’sPrincein1532seemsthemostobviouschoiceofmarkerfortheendoftheperiod(Machiavelli1961).Asthesedatesindicate,theperiodis,again,lengthy–over1,000yearsinfact.Consequently,itshouldcomeasnosurprisethatitfallsintoclearlydistinguishable‘earlier’and‘later’parts.Beforeturningtothedifferencesbetweenthetwo,however,whatofthefeaturescommontoboth?Forourpurposestwoareespeciallyworthnoting.Thefirstisthecharacterofthemedievalstate–if,indeed,‘state’istheappropriatetermtousehere.Eitherway,thepointisthat,whereastherehadbeenasingle,dominant,centreofpoliticalpowerandauthorityduringRomantimes–namelyRomeitself–thisceasedtobethecaseduringthemedievalperiod.Itwasthenthatthecharacteristicpoliticalentitybecametheshiftingconfederacyofnobles,unitedbytiesofloyaltyand/ormaterialself-interest.Thisisonefeaturewhichalsoservestodistinguishthemedievalperiodfromthemodern;forthemodern‘nation-state’–withitsfixedborders,andwithgovernmentsclaimingtoexercisesoleauthoritywithinthem–isofrelativelyrecentorigin.(TherelevantmarkereventhereisthesigningofthePeaceofWestphaliain1648.)Themedievalperiod’sseconddistinguishingfeatureliesinthewaylargegeographicalareaswereeachdominatedbyasinglereligion.InWesternEurope,thedominantreligionwas–ofcourse–RomanCatholicChristianity.Furthereast,itwasOrthodoxChristianity,withitscentreinConstantinople.Lateron,Islamappearedonthescene.Allthreewerereligionswhichclaimedtoholdthemonopolyonreligioustruth,tobethetrueandonlysourcesofreligiousauthorityandtoofferthesoleroutetosalvation.Inthisrespect,themedievalworldwasquitedifferentfromthatofGreekandRomantimes,whentheauthoritieshadnochoicebuttotolerateadiversityofreligions,cults,andthelike.And–ofcourse–thisisonerespectinwhichtheclassicalworldandourownresembleeachothermorethaneitherresemblesthatofDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012themedievalperiod.Forus,religiouspluralityisasimplefactoflife,justasitwasfortheGreeksandtheRomans.Insummary,then,themedievalperiodisdifferentiatedfromothersbytheexistenceofrelativelyweakstates–orrather‘states’–andrelativelypowerfulreligiousauthorities.Nowconsidertheimplicationsofthisforpoliticalphilo-sophy.Oneisthatmedievalpoliticalphilosophersfoundthemselvesconfrontedbythequestionofhowtostrikeabalancebetweentheauthorityofthechurchandthatofthestate.ItisaquestionwhichcouldnomorepreoccupythegeneralityofphilosopherswritingnowthanitcouldtheGreeks.InGreek\n64Athenstimes,therewas,ofcourse,nosuchthingas‘thechurch’.Inmodern,culturallydiverse,societies,thereisnosinglechurch–justmanychurchestogetherwithadiverserangeofindividualsandgroupswhoadheretoarangeofbeliefsystems.Therewouldbelittlepointinarguing–asdidThomasAquinasinthe1260s–thatthereshouldbeakindofdivisionoflabourbetweenchurchandstate,suchthat,throughitsteachings,thechurchdefinesmoralgoalsandsetsultimateends,whereasthestateshouldcreateandpreservetheconditionswhichrenderitpossibleforindividualstostrivetowardsthoseends.Onlythosewhoalreadysharedyourreligiousviewwouldrecogniseanyforceinyourargument.Bycontrast,duringthemedievalperiod–dominatedasitwasbyasinglechurchandasinglebeliefsystem–anargumentsuchasAquinas’scarriedthepotentialtoberecognisedasforcefulbythemajority.Asecondimplicationisthatthetheoriesdevelopedbymodernpoliticalphilosophersarerequiredbycircumstancestobe,asitwere,free-standing,muchasthoseoftheGreekswere,butinawaythatmedievalpoliticalphilosophieswerenot.Bythis,Imeanthat,inasocietydominatedbyasinglechurchandasinglesystemofreligiousbelief,itmaybeopentoaphilosophertodefendsomefavouredpoliticalarrangementbyarguingthatitcanbesubsumedwithinthatbeliefsystem–that‘Godhaswilledit’,ifyoulike–andthatwas,infact,thestrategyadoptedbymajormedievalphilosophers.Bycontrast,Greekpoliticalphilosophershadtodefendtheirpositionsthroughanappealtoconceptsandcategorieswhichdidnotfallwithinthespecialdomainofanyspecificreligion.TheobviousexamplehereisPlato,who,aswehaveseen,restshisargumentuponthepremisethatcommunitiesderivetheirpointfromthebenefitstobegainedfromthedivisionoflabour;hencethevirtueof‘mindingone’sownbusiness’.3Thesamegoesformodernphilosophers.Againwehaveanobviousexample,onetowhomwehavereferredinanearlierchapter,namelyRawls,whoarguesthatsocialand/orpoliticalarrangementscanonlybedescribedasjustiftheyconformtothe‘principlesofjustice’thatheseekstodefend.4ForPlato,asforRawls,thevirtueofjusticeis,thus,specificallypoliticalincharacter.Thereisnoextra-politicalsetofvaluesfromwhichthemeritsofthepoliticalarrangementstheyfavourcanbederived.Somuchforsimilarities;whatofthedifferencesbetweentheearlierandlatermedievalperiods?Here,onceagain,acoupleof‘marker’datescouldbeuseful.Thereisachoice,but,asone,IthinkIwouldselectAD929,forthatDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012wastheyearinwhichAbd-al-RahmanIIIproclaimedhimselfCaliphofCórdoba,acitylocatedinwhatisnowtheSpanishprovinceofAndalucía,butwhichwasthentheArabterritoryknownasAl-Andalus.TheeventisoneindicatorofthewayIslamicculturehadestablisheditspresencebythattime;anditwasn’tjustthatanewandpowerfulreligionhadarrivedonthescene,fortheArabcivilisationofthetimewasculturedandsophisticated.Infact,Córdobaitselfwasagreatcentreoflearning,andtheeminentscholarsbasedthereincludedfollowersofallthreemajorreligions.Suchcentreswere,therefore,culturalcrossroads;interchangesthroughwhichideasmovedin\nWhathappenednext?65bothdirectionsbetweenEastandWest.Importantinnovationsinmath-ematicsreachedEuropeviathisroute,includingthenumbersystemwenowuse.(Soitwasn’tallaboutjihadandcrusaders.)Moretothepointsofarasphilosophyisconcerned,itwasinsuchcentresthatcertainkeytextswere,forthefirsttime,translatedfromGreekintootherlanguages:Arabic,HebrewandLatin.OneresultwasthatkeyworksbyAristotle,mostofwhichhadbeenlosttoWesternEuropeintheearlierpartofthemedievalperiod,foundtheirwayback.Thisshowsupin–forexample–thedifferencebetweenSaintAugustine’sCityofGodwhichwaswrittenbetween413and427,notsolongafterthesackofRomeinfact,andSaintThomasAquinas’sSummaTheologica,whichwaswrittenbetween1265and1274.Whereastheargumentoftheformerisneo-Platonistincharacter,thelatterowesacleardebttoAristotle,thelatter’sPoliticshavingfirstbeentranslatedintoLatinin1260.Bythen,Aristotle’sworkhadbecomeamajorinfluenceuponintellectuallife.Youwillgetthepictureifyouconsiderthat,outofthreeofthemosteminentphilosophersworkingatthetime–Averroes,MosesMaimonidesandThomasAquinas–thefirstwasaMuslim,thesecondJewish,andthethirdChristian.TheworkofallthreewasheavilyinfluencedbyAristotle.Infact,bothAverroesandAquinaswrote‘commen-taries’onAristotle.Notonlythatbut,outofthethree,two–AverroesandMaimonides–werebasedinCórdoba.Butthenagain,ratherthanselectAbd-al-Rahman’sassumptionoftheCaliphateasa‘marker’,ImighthavechosenthedecisionbyJohnWycliffe,theEnglishphilosopherandcleric,in1382,toinitiatetheprojectofhavingtheBibletranslatedfromLatinintoEnglish.Likethelatermoment,in1517,whenMartinLutherissaidtohave5nailedhis95thesestothedoorofthechurchinWittenberg,thisisakeyeventinthestoryof‘theReforma-tion’(thelatterbeingashorthandexpressionforthetransformationofaEuropedominatedbyasinglechurchintoacontinentinwhichanumberofcompetingchurcheseachclaimedtorepresentthetruereligion).Sucheventsaresymptomaticofprofoundchangesintheintellectualclimate,and–notjustthat–theyalsoreflectequallyprofoundsocialchanges,forwecantakeitthatanaccurateaccountoftheReformationitselfwouldhavetobeacomplexnarrativeinvolvingthemutualinteractionofmanyfactors,includingatleast:(i)improvementsinnavigationleadingtothediscoveryofAmerica,togetherwiththeopeningofothernewtraderoutes,and,withthese,aDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012shiftinwealthandpowerawayfromRomeandtowardsEurope’snorthandnorth-west;(ii)thetransformationofacastesociety,boundbyfeudalties,toasocietywhosememberswereincreasinglycomingtoconfrontanotherasfreeandequalnegotiatorswithinthecontextofamarket;and(iii)theemer-genceofanew,wealthyandliteratemiddleclasswhosemembersprovidedareadymarketfortheproductsofthenewlyinventedprintingpress,introducedbyGutenberg,circa1440(theconfidentmembersofthenewbourgeoisie–noilliteratepeasantsthese–wouldnothavetakensokindlytolecturesfromtheagentsofanincreasinglyricketysouthernprelature).\n66AthensStill,wecanleavethedetailstohistorians.Forourpurposes,itissufficienttonotethattheworldsoftheearlierandlatermedievalperiodswereverydifferentfromeachother.Forexample,considerhowtherelationshipbetweenthepriesthoodandthelaypublicwouldhavedifferedineach.Thus,intheformerperiod,therewouldhavebeenlittleifany,differencebetweentheroleplayedbythepriestandthatplayedinotherprimitiveculturesbythewitchdoctororshaman.Asonescholarhasputit,‘Thelinebetweenmagicandreligionisonewhichitisimpossibletodrawinmanyprimitivesocieties;itisequallydifficulttorecogniseinmedievalEngland’(Thomas1973:57).Itwasaworldinwhichprayerswereoftenthoughttofunction,notsomuchasinvocationstothedeity,butmoreasmagicspellsorcharms,andinwhichallmanneroffablesinvolvingwitchesandotherspiritswouldhavebeenentertainedbyacredulouspeasantryasnolesstruethanthestoriesofmiraclescontainedintheBible.Inthisworld,Latin–thelanguagewhichenabledscholarstoexchangeideasrightacrossthecontinent–couldberegardedbyilliterate,non-comprehendingcongregationsasavehicleformagicalincantationswhenchantedbyapriest.6Bycontrast,Wycliffewasactingonbehalfofcongregationswhoaspiredtothinkforthemselves,andmanyofwhosememberscouldactuallyread.Thefactthatmostphilosophersoftheperiodwerealsoclerics–monks,bishops,archbishops,andthelike–makesthisparticulardifferenceespeciallyworthnoting,foritsuggeststhat,duringtheearlierperiod,philosophycanonlyhavebeenviewed,fromoutside,asararefiedactivityconductedbyanelite;whereas,inthelaterperiod,philosophers–likepriests–werebeginningtoassumeamorepublicrole,thatofintellectualswhosebusinessitistoexploreandarticulateideaswhichare,atsomelevel,commoncurrency.Suchindividualsactonbehalfofawiderpublic,andtheyare,inturn,answerabletoit.Itisarolethatmodernpoliticalphilosopherscanplay;ortowhichtheycanatleastaspire.PhilosophersCiceroHowwerethedevelopmentsdescribedintheprevioussectionreflectedinthewritingsofindividualphilosopherswholivedatvariouspointsduringthosetimes?Inanswer,itwouldberidiculoustoattemptafullaccounthere,soletDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012metakeoneortworepresentativethinkersfromeachperiodinturn.I’llbeginwithCicero,whosetwomostpoliticalessays–TheRepublic(52BC)andTheLaws(51BC)–provideaclearillustrationofthewayGreekculturemaintaineditsgripupontheRomanmind,eventhroughthecenturiesofRomanpoliticaldominance(Cicero1998aand1998b).Infact,youdon’tevenhavetoopenCicero’sbooktoappreciatetheGreekinfluence,for,ineachcase,theverytitleisdirectlyborrowedfromamajorPlatonicdialogue.Nordothesimilaritiesstopthere:Cicero’sRepublicandLawsarewrittenindialogueform,justasPlato’sare.Itisjustthat,whereastheparticipantsin\nWhathappenednext?67Plato’simagineddialoguesareprominentAthenians,thoseinCicero’saremembersofacertainRomanelite.Otherwise,theparallelsareclose.Hereisalistoffurthersimilarities.1.ThereisapointinhisownRepublicatwhichPlatopresentsuswithafourfoldclassificationof‘imperfectsocieties’.Thesearetimarchy,oli-garchy,democracyandtyranny.Platoarguesthateachhasatendencytodecay(Republic:543–79d).Quitesimilarly,Ciceroarguesthattherearethreemaintypesofconstitution–democracy,aristocracyandmonarchy–andthateachhasaninbuilttendencytodegenerate(1998a:19–34).72.InhisRepublic,Platoleansheavilyonan‘argumentfromspecialisation’,accordingtowhichjusticerequireseachcitizentoconcentrateexclusivelyonthetaskatwhichheorsheismostskilled.(Youaresupposedto‘mindyourownbusiness’.)Itissupposedtofollowthatthosewhoruleshouldbethosewhoarebestatruling,andanalogiesbetweenrulingandtheexer-ciseofvariousskills(farming,building,medicine,etc.),eachwithadefiniteobjective,aboundinPlato’stext.Arguingalongsimilarlines,Ciceroassertsthat,justas,‘Theaimofaship’scaptainisasuccessfulvoyage;adoctor’s,health;ageneral’s,victory.So,theaimofouridealstatesmanisthecitizen’shappylife–thatis,alifesecureinwealth,richinresources,abundantinrenown,andhonourableinitsmoralcharacter’(1998a:83).Relatedtothis,itisespeciallynoticeablethateachwriterrepeatedlyinvokestheskillofnavigationtoillustratehispoint;forexample,whenPlatocomparesdemocracywithashipwhosecaptainhasallowedthecrewtotakecontrol.Becausetheyareallquarrellingwitheachotherabouthowtonavigatetheship,eachthinkingheoughttobeatthehelm,theresultismayhem,orsoPlatoargues(Republic:488).Likewise,Ciceroarguesthat‘If[thestate]leavestheprocesstochance’asinademocracy,‘itwillbeoverturnedasquicklyasashipinwhichamanchosenbylotfromamongthepassengershastakenoverthehelm’(1998a:23).3.Bothwritersarguethat‘thebest’shouldrule.4.InhisRepublic,Platoarguesthatthebest–beingphilosophers–aremoreinterestedinthepursuitoftruth,thecontemplationof‘fixedandimmu-tablerealities’(Republic:500b.ff.)thantheyareambitiousforpower.Thatiswhytheyarethemostfittedtorule,butitisalsowhytheyhavetobepersuadedtotakeontheroleofruler,havingbeeninitiallyreluctanttodoDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012so.Similarly,Ciceroarguesthatthebestmayhavetobepersuadedtoaddtheskillofgovernmenttotheirrepertoireofexpertise.‘[E]venthoughsomepeoplethinkthatalifepassedquietlyinthestudyofthehighestartsishappier’,hewrites,‘therecanbenodoubtthatthestatesman’slifeismoreadmirableandmoreillustrious’(1998a:61).Infact,CiceroisperfectlyopenabouthisdebttoPlato.Youcouldhardlyaccusehimofplagiarism.Itwouldbemoreaccuratetothinkofhimasseekingtobathehimselfinthegreatmaster’sreflectedglory.Norshouldwe\n68Athensfindthedebtespeciallysurprising,for,inCicero’scase,theinfluenceofGreekculturewouldhavebeenreinforcedbyhishavingspenttimeinAthensitself,studyingphilosophyunderthetutelageofthePlatonist,AntiochusofAscalon.Thereis,thus,afairlydirectlineofintellectualdescentfromPlatotoCicerofor,atonetime,AntiochushadtaughtattheAcademy,theschoolwhichhadbeenfoundedbyPlatohimself,andwhichwascontinuingtofunction,evenagood250yearsorsoafterthelatter’sdeath.8Inanycase,itwouldbewrongtosuggestthatCicero’sargumentreplicatesPlato’sineveryrespect.Onthecontrary,whereasthefourimperfectsocietiesofPlato’sclassificationaremeanttosupplyacontrastwiththetypeofstateheregardsasideal,Cicero’sthreefoldcategorisationismeanttoyieldanargumentfora‘mixed’constitution(onewhich,asithappens,closelyresemblesthatoftherepublicanRomeinwhichhehadonceservedasconsul).Notonlythat,butonedifferencebetweenhimselfandPlatowasespeciallyimportanttoCicero,namelythealreadynotedfactthat,inhisowncase,‘rulebythebest’meantrulebymembersofaRomanelite–aneliteofwhichhewashimselfamember–andnotbyphilosophers.Itwould,therefore,bemoreaccuratetodescribehisargumentaslargelyderivedfromPlato’s,buttailoredtosuithisownRomanpurposes.(BothCicero’sdialogueswerewrittenwithasenseoffrustration,whenhewasenduringaperiodofenforcedexile.Havingonceservedasconsul,hemostwantedtoreturntoRomeandplayanactivepartinpoliticalaffairs.ThishedidafterJuliusCaesar’sassassinationin44BC.Intheensuingturmoil,Cicerofoundhimselfonthewrongside,andwashimselfassassinatedin43BC.)ButevenifCicero’sworkisoriginaltotheextentthat,havingborrowedthemesfromGreekstoicismandPlato,heneverthelessplayedadistinctivelyRomanvariationuponthem,thesimilaritiesbetweenPlato’sworkandhisownaresoclosethatthefollowingquestionisinevitablyraised:WhybotherreadingCicerowhenyoucanconcentrateuponPlato?Weshallreturntoitlaterinthechapter.ScholasticsAbout400yearsafterCicero,SaintAugustineproducedCityofGod(Augustine1963).ItwaswritteninresponsetothosewhoblamedthesackofRomeontheempire’sabandonmentoftheoriginalgodsinfavourofDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Christianity.And,astheinclusionoftheword‘city’initstitlesuggests,thereisapoliticaldimensiontoAugustine’sdiscussion,whichcentresuponthequestionofwhatourrelationshiptothestate(or‘city’)oughttobe.However,unlikePlato,AristotleorCicero,Augustinehasnoobservationstoofferontheformthestateoughttotake;onwhoshouldruleoronwhetherdemocracyispreferabletoothersystems.Quitethecontrary.Itishisthesisthatthereare,onearth,twocoexistingcities,‘theearthlycity’and‘thecityofGod’,andthateverypersonisloyaleithertooneortotheother.(Clearly,thesearenotcitiesintheliteralsense,eachwithaprecisegeographical\nWhathappenednext?69location.Augustine’s‘cities’are,rather,categoriesintowhichwefall,eachofusintooneortheother.)Augustineholdsthat,afterChrist’ssecondcoming,onlythecityofGodwillsurvive,andhisadvicetomembersofthelattercity(i.e.Christians)istoconcentrateonmakingthemselvesreadyforthisevent.Inthemeantime,Christiansshouldtoleratetheauthoritiesandobeythelaw,whoeverthoseauthoritiesmaybeandwhateverlawstheypass.So,thisisagospelofquietismratherthanpoliticalengagement.ItisoneinterpretationofChrist’sinjunctionto‘Render[therefore]untoCaesarthethingswhichareCaesar’s;anduntoGodthethingsthatareGod’s’(Matthew,xxii,21).Perhapsweshouldnotregarditasaworkofgenuinelypoliticalphilosophyatall.Still,bethatasitmay,IamintroducingCityofGodintomydiscussionhere,onlybecauseAugustine’sphilosophyclearlyexemplifiesgeneralfeaturesofmedievalthoughtthatIdescribedearlier.Forexample,itdemonstratesthewayGreekphilosophyremainedamajorinfluenceduringthemedievalperiod.InAugustine’scase,thedominantinfluenceisPlato.Admittedly,thatmaynotbesoobviousfromthebriefsummaryofAugustine’sargumentIhavejustgiven,althoughyoucouldsaythatthecontrasthedrawsbetweentheheavenlyandtheearthlycitiesparallelsthatdrawnbyPlatobetweentheidealandtheactualstate.However,thePlatonicinfluencebecomesapparentoncethatargumentisplacedwithinthecontextofhisphilosophyasawhole,forAugustinewasaneo-PlatonistinwhosethoughtGodplaysasimilarroletothatplayedbytheformofthegoodinPlato’s.Passagessuchasthefol-lowingrenderthatroleapparent(thepersontowhomthepassageisaddressedis,ofcourse,God).[But]havingthenreadthosebooksofthePlatonists,andthencebeentaughttosearchforincorporealtruth,IsawThyinvisiblethings,understoodbythosethingswhicharemade;andthoughcastback,IperceivedwhatthatwaswhichthroughthedarknessofmymindIwashinderedfromcontemplating,beingassured‘ThatThouwert,andwertinfinite,andyetnotdiffusedinspace,finiteorinfinite;andthatThoutrulyartWhoartthesameever,innopartnormotionvarying;andthatallotherthingsarefromThee,onthismostsuregroundalone,thattheyare.’(AugustineConfessions,Book7)Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Asthepassageillustrates,sofarasAugustinewasconcerned,achievingunionwithGodmeantaspiritualwithdrawalfromtheordinaryworld–theworldweperceivebymeansofoursenses–totheworldofthenon-physical,butintelligibleandeternal.ThatiswhatAugustineintendsbyhisadvicetomakeourselvesreadyforthecityofGod.Augustine’sargumentalsodemonstratesafurtherfeaturecharacteristicofmedievalpoliticalphilosophy–onewehavealreadynoted–namelythatitissubsumedwithinaworldviewwhichisnotitselfpolitical,butreligious,andthereforethatitisnot,asIhavebeenputtingit,‘free-standing’.\n70AthensThesamefeaturesareequallyevidentinthemuchlaterworkofThomasAquinas,although,inAquinas’scase,themajorGreekinfluencestemsfromAristotle,notPlato.Infact,hisCommentariesarereallylittlemorethanparaphraseofAristotle’swork.Thefollowingmuchabridgedpassageisrepresentative.Thenheshowsthatmanisbynatureapoliticalanimal.First,heinfersthisfromthenaturalnessofthecity.Secondlyheprovesthisfromman’sproperoperation….However,therecouldbeadoubtinsomeone’smindconcerningthis,duetothefactthatthethingsthatareaccordingtonaturearefoundinallmen.Butnotallmenarefoundtobecitydwellers.Andso,inordertoeliminatethisdoubt,hegoesontosaythatsomemenarenotpoliticalonaccountoffortune,forinstancebecausetheyhavebeenexpelledfromthecity….InsupportofthisheadducesasayingofHomercursingsomeonewhowasnotpoliticalbecauseofdepravity….Thenheprovesfromhisproperoperationthatmanisapoliticalanimal,moresoeventhanthebeeandanygregariousanimal,bythefollowingargument.Wesaythatnaturedoesnothinginvain.(Aquinas1963:309ff.)Andsoitcontinuesinmuchthesamevein.Youwill,nodoubt,recognisethisasareferencetothefamouspassageinwhichAristotledescribes‘man’asa‘politicalanimal’(Politics:1253a1).(Thiswasdiscussedinchapter3,above.)9Clearly,Aquinasisjust‘tellinguswhatAristotlesaid’.NorisAquinasunusualinthisrespect.OthermedievaltextsdemonstratethesamereverenceforAristotle.Foranotherexample,takeJohnofParis,whosetract,‘OnKinglyandPapalPower’,openswithadefinitionof‘king-ship’as‘theruleoveraperfectmultitudebyonemanforthesakeofthecommongood’.AsJohnexplains;‘“Perfect”servestodistinguishthismul-titudefromthedomesticmultitude,whichisnotperfectbecauseitisself-sufficientonlyforashortperiodoftimeandnotforallofone’slife,asisthecity,accordingtothePhilosopherinBookIofthePolitics’(JohnofParis1963:406).(‘ThePhilosopher’towhomJohnsodeferentiallyrefershereis–clearly–Aristotle,andheisdrawinguponthesamesectionsofthePoliticsasAquinas.)Foryetanother,takethewayMarsiliusofPadua(alsodrawinguponthesamesections)openshischapter‘OntheFinalCauseoftheCity’byremarkingthat‘TheCity,accordingtoAristotleinthePolitics,BookI,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012chapterI,is“theperfectcommunityhavingthefulllimitofself-sufficiency,whichcameintoexistenceforthesakeofliving,butexistsforthesakeoflivingwell”’(MarsiliusofPadua1963:448).Infact,MarsiliusdrawsheavilyuponAristotle’stextthroughouthisentirediscussionofthestate.Itwouldbeamistaketoexaggeratethesimilaritiesbetweenthesewriters.Forexample,whereasAquinas’sargumentforthedivisionoflabourbetweenchurchandstatesubsumesthepoliticalwithinthecontextofaworldviewwhichisnotitselfpolitical,andisthereforenomorefree-standingthanAugustine’s,thisfeatureisarguablylessevidentinthecasesofJohnand\nWhathappenednext?71Marsilius.Nevertheless,whentheyareviewedretrospectivelyfromthestandpointoftheearlytwenty-firstcentury,itseemstomethatthesimila-ritiesbetweenthesewritersappearfarmorestrikingthantheirdifferences;notablythesimilarityintheirreverenceforAristotleandintheirpreoccupationwithdefiningtheboundarydividinglegitimatecivilfromlegitimatestateauthority.OnhistoryandphilosophyEarlier,whendiscussingCicero’sdebttoPlato,IraisedthequestionofwhythereshouldbeanypointinstudyingCicero’sworkwhenonecanconcentrateuponPlato’s.AparallelquestionclearlyarisesinthecaseofAquinas:WhybotherreadingAquinaswhenonecandevoteone’stimetostudyingAristotle?Itisequallyclear,Ishouldthink,thattheanswerstosuchquestionswilldependuponwhyonehastakenaninterestinthesewritersinthefirstplace.Moretothepoint,sofarasthepresentchapterisconcerned,itmaydependuponwhetheroneisapproachingtheirworkfromthestandpointofahistorian,orfromthatofaphilosopher.Beforemovingontotheearlymodernperiod,Ishouldliketoconsiderthepointalittlemoreclosely.Itmayhelpillumi-natethebroaderquestionIraisedatthebeginningofthechapter,namely,whyshoulditbethatmodernpoliticalphilosophershavetendedtoneglectthelaterclassicalandmedievalperiods?Intheremainderofthissection,then,Ishalloutlinethreeargumentswhichmightreasonablybeofferedbyamodernpoliticalphilosopherinexplanationofthatneglect.Pleasebearinmind,first,thatIoffertheseargumentsinatentativespirit.Makeofthemwhatyouwill.Second,theyare,asIsay,argumentswhichmightreasonablybeoffered;thatis,theyarenotnecessarilyargumentsphilosophersactuallygive.ForallIknow,theremaybeasmanyofthoseastherearepoliticalphilosophersnowwritingandperhapssomeofthelatterreallyareignorantoftheperiodinquestion.10Third,pleasebearinmindthatIamconcerned,quitespecifically,withpoliticalphilo-sophyhere.ForallIknow,thefollowingargumentsleaveanyreasonsthatacontemporaryphilosopherwithaninterestin–say–logic,metaphysics,ortheology,mighthavefortakinganinterestintheperiodquiteunaffected.Withthatsaid,letusnowturntothefirstargument.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012FirstargumentThisstartsoutwithanappealtotheperfectlyobviousfactthathistoryandphilosophyaredifferentdisciplines;that,whereashistoriansstudythepast,philosophersmakeittheirbusinesstoanalyseandevaluatearguments.Thehistorian’sobjectivemustthereforebetoconstructanaccuratenarrativeofpasteventsand,forthehistorian,‘understandingapoliticalphilosopher’mustbeaquestionofcarefully‘placing’thatperson’sworkwithinthenarrative’scontext.Philosophersontheotherhandasksuchquestionsas:Uponwhat\n72Athenspresuppositionsisthisargumentbased?;Aretheysound?Doestheargumenthangtogetherasalogicallyconsistentwhole?;Howdoesitstandupwhenmeasuredagainstotherarguments?Itfollowsthat,forthephilosopher,understandinganotherphilosophermustbeamatterofgraspingthelatter’sargumentintellectually–of‘understandinghowitworks’.Here,therelevantimplicationisthat,bycontrastwithhistory,thedisciplineofphilosophyis,inessence,ahistoricalincharacter(althoughitcertainlydoesn’tfollowthataknowledgeofhistoryhasnobearingupontheunderstandingofphilosophy.Itfrequentlydoes,ifonlybecauseitcanbeimpossibletograspaphilosopher’sintentions,andthereforetogainanaccurategraspofhisorherargument,withoutsomeknowledgeofthehistoricalconditionswhichprevailedwhenheorshewaswriting.Wehavealreadyencounteredinstancesofthis:under-standingPlato’sRepublicand,likewise,Aristotle’sPoliticsrequiressomeknowledgeofhowtheGreekpolisdifferedfromotherformsofstate.ItalsohelpstoknowthedifferencebetweentheGreeknotionofarete-andourown‘virtue’.)Sofarsogoodand–perhaps–soobvious;butitmaybelessimmediatelyobviousthat,whenitcomestotheselectionofsubjectmatter,theconstraintsimposedbyeachdisciplineuponitspractitionersmilitateinopposingdirections.Imeanthat,whereasthehistorianmuststriveforinclusiveness,thephilosophermustpractiseparsimony.Toexplain:supposethatahypotheticalphilosopher,P,writesabookinwhichsuch-and-suchathesisisarticulated,andinwhichthelatterisdefendedwithsuch-and-suchasetofarguments.Nowsupposethatsometimelater,asecondphilosopher,Q,publishesasecondbookinwhichathesisverysimilartoP’sisadvanced,andwhichcontainsverysimilararguments.(Forthesakeoftheexample,thedurationoftheperiodbetweentheformereventandthelatteris–ofcourse–irrelevant.)Now,ifyouareahistorianofideasthen–clearly–youmaywellfeelthatthesimilaritystandsinneedofanexplanation.YoumaylookforevidencethatQ’sworkhasbeensomehow‘influenced’byP’s,or–perhaps–thatbothhavebeeninfluencedbytheworkofsomethird,previouslyunknown,philosopher.YoumayevenmakethecasethatQisguiltyofplagiarism.(Iignoresuchfactorsasamazingcoincidenceorasurprisevisitfromextraterrestrials.)Thepointisthat,whateveryoudecidethetruthtohavebeen,yournarrativewillhavetorefertotheworkofbothphilosophers,PandQ;hencetherequirementforinclusiveness.ButwhatifyouareaphilosopherseekingtoevaluatetheargumentsofDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012PandQ.(Rememberthateachhasadvancedverysimilarargumentsforamoreorlessidenticalconclusion.)ShouldyouconcentrateuponP’sargu-ments,uponQ’s,orshouldyoupaysomeattentiontoboth?Theansweristhatyoushouldselectthestrongestalternative,thatistosaythealternativewhichmostclearlymanifeststhevirtuesthatanywell-articulatedphiloso-phicalargumentoughttopossess.(Inotherwords,inphilosophy,yourmottoshouldalwaysbe,‘Pickonsomeoneyourownsize’.Ifyoudon’t,then–foronething–theremightalwaysbesomebetterversionofthepositionyouaretargeting,onewhichescapesyourcriticisms.)Ifneitheralternativeisthe\nWhathappenednext?73moreobviouslypreferablewhenmeasuredagainstthiscriterion–forexample,whenPscoresmorehighlythanQincertainrespects,butnotinothers–thenyoushouldformulateanamalgamofbothandcriticisethat.Inthelimitingcase,wherebothscoreequally–perhapsbecausethesimilaritiesbetweenthetwosetsofargumentsareverycloseindeed–thenyouareeffectivelyconfrontedbytwoversionsofthesameargumentandyoumustchooseoneortheother,becausetocriticisebothwouldbetorepeatyourselfpointlessly–hencethepressuretowardsparsimony.WhentheforegoingpointsarebroughttobearonthecasesofPlatoandCicero,itfollowsthat,ifyouareahistorian,andifyouare–say–describingthewayGreekculturemaintaineditsholdontheRomanmind,thenyouwillhavetodiscusstheworkofbothinthecourseofyournarrative.Ontheotherhand,italsofollowsthat,ifyouareaphilosopherseekingtoevaluatetheargumentthat‘thebest’shouldrule–andfindingyourself,ashere,confrontedbytwosimilarversionsofthatargument–thenyoushouldcon-centrateuponthestrongerofthetwo.Butwhichisthestronger?Inanswer,IwillonlyremarkthatPlato’sargumentisbothpersuasiveandperspicuousinwaysthatCicero’sisnot.BythisImeanthat,whereasPlato’stheoryofforms,forexample,restsupontheoriesofknowledgeandmeaningwithwhichitisbynow–after2,500years–possibletofindmuchfault,thosetheoriesarenotsilly.Itiseasytoappreciatewhytheyshouldhavebeentakenseriously,andtheystilldemandseriousintellectualeffortonthepartofanyoneseekingtoexposetheirfaults.SimilarconsiderationsapplytoPlato’scaseagainstdemocracy,whichisequally‘persuasive’inthesenseofthetermatissuehere.Likewise,Plato’sargumentisbyfarthemoreperspicuousofthetwointhewayitmovesmethodicallyfromsteptostepandlaysthosestepsopentoview.11Withthatsaid,IwillleaveyoutoreadPlatoandCiceroforyourselfandtojudgeforyourselfifIamright.Iwillonlyaddthat,ifIamright,andifitwerepossibletogeneralisethepointtocoverothercases,then,tothatextent,therewouldbeoneargument,atleast,withwhichtojustifymodernphilosophy’srelativeneglectofthelaterclassicalandmedievalperiods.SecondargumentProponentsofthesecondargumentcanrecognisethatmuchmedievalphilosophyDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ispersuasive,perspicuousandinmanyotherwayssystematic–justaspro-ponentsofthefirstargumentwouldlikeitnottobe–andappeals,instead,todifferencesbetweenthemedievalworldandthoseoftheGreeksandour-selves.Wehavealreadynotedsomeofthese;especiallythefactthat,outofthethree,onlythemedievalwascharacterisedbytheexistenceofarelativelyweakstate,arelativelystrongchurchand–ineachmajorgeographicalarea–asingledominantreligion.Aswehavealsonoted,suchfeatureswerereflec-tedinmedievaldisputesoverhowtobalancetheauthorityofthestateagainstthatofthechurch.Suchdisputesmusthaveappearedpressingto\n74Athensthosewhoengagedinthem,buttheycanappearmorethanalittlearcanewhenviewedfromamodernperspective–andinawaywhichGreekargu-mentsoverthecharacterofjustice,forexample,donot.Thesecondargumentholdsthat,consequently,medievalphilosophyislesslikelythanthephilosophyofotherperiodstoreflectmodernpreoccupations;andyoucan’tblameanyone–philosophersincluded–forchoosingtocon-centrateuponargumentsandideaswhichhaveabearinguponhisorherownconcerns.Thisseemsareasonableviewtotake.ThirdargumentThethirdargumentmakesreferencetothefactthatthereis,inpoliticalphilosophy,acanonofmajorworksandthatthisincludesPlato’sRepublic,Aristotle’sPoliticsandworksthatwerepublishedintheseventeenthcenturyorlater.Putbriefly,theargumentstatesthat,becausefew–ifany–medievalworksfigureinthecanon,thereislessreasontopaythemseriousattention.Theargumentcanappearodd.Whyonearthshouldthefactthatothershavechosentoconcentratetheirattentionuponcertaintextsbeareasonforyoutodosotoo?Soyoumightwellask,and–inanycase–isn’tthepres-suretoconformsomethingwhichoughttoberesisted?It’sagoodquestion,andtheargumentcanappearespeciallyoddifonetakesatfacevaluetheOxfordEnglishDictionary’sdefinitionof‘canon’(intherelevantsense)as‘alistofliteraryworksconsideredtobepermanentlyestablishedasbeingofthehighestquality’.Infact,itisadefinitionwhichcapturestheroleplayedby,forexample,‘thegreattradition’ofclassicnovelswithinthecontextofEnglishliteratureverywell.Inthatcontext,suchworksserveasexemplars,modelsofexcellenceforotherauthorstoemulate.(Theyare,asthedefinitionsays,‘establishedasbeingofthehighestquality’,although,infact,thelit-erarycanonisconstantlyundergoingrevision.)However,theOEDdefinitionisneverthelessinadequatebecause–foronething–itfailstocapturetherelationshipwhichpertains,inpoliticalphilosophy,betweenthetextswhichcomposethecanonandothertexts.Oncethepointisappreciated,ArgumentThreecanappearlessodd.Here,thesalientdifferenceliesinthedistinctivemannerinwhichphilo-sophyproceedsovertime–bymoveandcountermove,asinagameofchessordraughts.Inphilosophy,itisthroughaprocessofcritiquethattherela-Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012tionshipbetweenthecanonicaltextsandotherstendstobeestablishedandnot(asinliterature)throughemulation.Thismeansthat,whenaphilosopherchoosestodevelopapositionofhisorherown,ortocriticiseathesisheorshedislikes,itisagainstthemembersofthecanonthathisorherargumentsarelikelytobedirected.Later,otherphilosopherswhowanttojointhediscussionmustinevitablyrefinetheirownpositionsthroughanengagementwiththosesamecanonicaltexts.(So,itseemsthat,contrarytotheOED’sdefinition,membersofthecanonarepreciselynot‘permanentlyestablishedasbeingofthehighestquality’.)\nWhathappenednext?75Itisaprocesswithinterestingimplications.Oneisthat,onceestablished,membershipofthecanontendstobereinforced.Itwouldbeuntruetosaythatitisimmutableorsetinstone.Evenso,itseemsthattheauthorsofthetextswhichcomposeitbecome‘greatphilosophers’simplythroughbeingtreatedassuchbyotherphilosophers.Youmaythinkthefactisunfortunate,butyoumustrecogniseitasafactnevertheless.Thenthereisthequestionofhowatextqualifiesformembershipofthecanoninthefirstplace.Perhapstherearesomewhichreallydopossesstheattributeswhichanyhistoricallysignificant,theoreticallywell-formedtheoryoughttopossess.Butthen,theremaybeotherswhichacquiremembership,onlythankstothereputationoftheirauthors–betheyfamousornotorious.Still,theseareissueswhichthereisneithertimenorspacetoaddresshere.Inordertoavertapossiblemisunderstanding,letmesimplyaddthatIaminclinedtoagreewiththeintellectualhistorian,QuentinSkinner,whodeplores‘ourcontinuingtendencytoconcentrateonthereceivedcanonofclassictexts’onthegroundsthatthey‘imposeadistortingperspectivewhenwetrytowritehistoricallyaboutthedevelopmentofsocialandpoli-ticalideas’(Skinner1974:280).Likehim,Iamsuspiciousofhistorieswhichpostulate‘perennialthemes’whichremainconstantovertime,butwhicharetreateddifferentlybyeachgenerationinturn.However,Iamonlyinclinedtoagreewithhimtotheextentthatheisdiscussingapproachestohistoryhere.AsIseeit,hisscepticismcarriesnoimplicationsforphiloso-phicaltreatmentsofpastideaswhichconcentrateuponthereceivedcanonofmajortexts.12(Inanycase,IthinkIamechoingSkinner’sownviewhere,soIshan’telaborate.)Withthatsaid,Ihavesaidenough.Itistimetomoveon.EarlymoderndevelopmentsAsforthethirdandmostrecentoftheperiodsunderdiscussionhere–theearlymodernperiod–Ishalltry,onceagain,tobebrief.SufficeittosaythatprocesseswhichhadbeenatworkthroughouttheReformationperiodeven-tuallyculminatedinasituationwhichwasrecognisablyverydifferentfromwhathadgonebefore;andthatthechangeincircumstancesbroughtwithitachangeinthewayphilosophersviewedtheirownactivities.Throughoutmedievaltimes,philosophershadmadeittheirbusinesstoengageinprojectsDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ofsynthesisandreconciliation.Inthe‘West’,theyhadtriedtoreconcilethephilosophyofPlatoand(later)thatofAristotlewiththeteachingsoftheBible;inthe‘East’,withthoseoftheKoran.Somehadpreoccupiedthemselveswiththequestionofhowtoreconciletheauthorityofthe‘state’withthatofthechurch.Bytheearlymodernperiod,however,suchprojectshadceasedtoappearrealistic.WiththedivisionofChristianityintofactions,theriseofProtestantismandaEuroperivenbyviciousreligiouswars,therewasnolongerasingle‘church’todiscuss.Nor,forthatmatter,wasthereanylongerasingleindividual,thePope,towhomindividualleaders(kings)wereheld\n76Athenstooweallegiance–withthePopeowingallegianceonlytoGod.Onthecontrary,thenetworkofloyaltiesandallegiancesbywhichthefeudalsystemhadbeendefinedandheldtogetherwaswellonthewane.Foranotherexampleofjusthowsubstantiallythingshadchanged,takethedeclineinAristotle’sinfluence.Throughoutthelatermedievalperiod,theattitudetoAristotlehadborderedonreverential,justasmuchincos-mologyor‘naturalphilosophy’(science’spredecessordisciplines)aselsewhere.Partoftheexplanationforthisisthattherewas,infact,nogoodreasonforrejectinghisdescriptionoftheuniverse.(Aristotleheldthattheuniverseconsistsofaseriesofconcentricspheres,withtheearthatthecentre.Whatreasoncouldtherebeforthinkingotherwise?Don’tthestarsappeartomoveroundtheearth,andasfortheplanets,whichappeartomoveindependentlyofthestars,isn’ttheirmovementquitewellaccountedforbythefactthattheylieattheinterfaceofspheres?Again,Aristotleheldthattherearefourelements–Earth,Air,FireandWater–andthateachseeksanaturallevelatwhichitcomestorest.Well,doesn’tobservationconfirmthatearthdoesfall,thatwatertendstorestonearthandthatfiredoesrise?Yes,ofcourse.)Bythesixteenthcentury,however,newdiscoverieswerebeingmadewithoutthehelpofAristotelianphilosophy,andbyindividualswhowerenotaffiliatedtoecclesiasticalinstitutions.Eventually,therewouldbediscoveriestoshaketheAristotelianpicturecompletely;notably,Galileo’sobservationofJupiter’smoonsin1610.Consider,then,thefateofthe‘GreatChainofBeing’thesis(yetanotherdoctrinetohavefoundexpressioninAristotle’swritings.)Accordingtoit,everyentityintheuniversecanberankedinahierarchy,ofwhich,inthelatemedievalversion,Godisplacedattheapex.God’slieutenants–hisangelsandarchangels–arerankedimmediatelybelowhim.Nextcomehumanswho–beingbothspiritualandphysicalbynature–areaccordedaspecialplace.Animalsarerankedbeneathhumansand,belowthem,beingswithmerely‘vegetativesouls’.Inanimatethings–metals,stones,dirt–arerankedlowerstill.Hierarchyalsoprevailswithineachcategory.Withintheclassofanimals,lionsare,thus,rankedabovedogs,whichare,intheirturn,rankedaboveshellfish.Likewise,withintheclassofmetals,goldisrankedabovesilver,whichisrankedaboveiron.Forthestudentofpoliticalthought,thethesisisstriking,mainlyforthewayitcombinesacosmology–thatis,anaccountofthewaythephysicaluniverseisconstructed–witharationaleDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012forthepoliticalorder.Thus,andasyouwouldexpect,thechainofbeingalsorankspersonsintermsoftheirclassandtheauthoritytheyaresubsequentlyheldtowield–asinthefeudalsystemitself.Thisorderedworldviewhadbecomedevastatinglyshakenbythelateryearsofthesixteenthcentury.(‘Thisgoodlyframe,theearth,seemstomeasterilepromontory’,saysHamlet;‘Whatapieceofworkisaman!…inactionhowlikeanangel!Inapprehensionhowlikeagod!’Butheadds,‘Andyet,tomewhatisthisquintessenceofdust?’(Hamlet,II,ii).‘Unaccommodatedman’,saysKingLear,‘isnomorebut[such]apoor,bare,forkedanimal’(Lear,\nWhathappenednext?77III,iv)–whichispreciselywhat‘man’wouldnotbeifthechain-of-beinghypothesisweretrue.)Asforthephilosophyoftheperiod,Ishallconfinemyselftoremarking–first–that,forallitsnotoriety,Idon’tseeanypointinspendingmuchtimediscussingMachiavelli’sThePrince(1961).InthattextMachiavelliarguesthat,ratherthanexercisingtheChristianvirtues,thesuccessfulprincemustpractiseviolenceanddeception–athesiswhichclearlyrepresentsaseveredisruptionoftheorderedworldviewinwhicheverythinghasitsrightfulplace.Itspublicationin1532is,therefore,auseful‘marker’fortheshiftto‘modern’conditions.However,ThePrinceismoreahandbookforthenewlyarrivedpoliticalopportunistthanitisaworked-outexerciseinpoliticalphilosophy,soitisnotthesortoftextwhichmeritsmorethanapassingcommentinabooksuchasthis.Second,thiswasaperiodduringwhich,inphilosophy,acertaindistinc-tioncametothefore,namelythedistinctionbetweentwokindsoflaw,naturalandcivil.Broadlyspeaking,theideawasthatthenaturallaw–beingthemorallawandinstitutedbyGod–shouldserveasastandardagainstwhichtomeasurethedictatesofactual,earthlycivillawsandtheactionsofindividualsovereigns.Thedistinctionplaysacrucialrolein,forexample,HugoGrotius’stextof1625,OntheLawofWarandPeace(1957),atextwhichremainsaseminaltreatmentofthedistinctionbetweenjustandunjustwars.Inthecenturytocomeitwastobetakenseriouslybysomemajorphilosophers,whointerpreteditinvariouswaysanddrewsignificantimpli-cationsfromtheirinterpretations.Infact,withGrotius,wearealreadymovingintothatcentury–theseventeenth.Itwasduringthatcenturythatthemodernargumentwithinpoliticalphilosophywastoreallygetgoingand,bycontrastwithwhathadgonebefore,thenewapproachwastobeassertivelyrationalistic,radicallyindividualisticandmorallyegalitarian.SuggestionsforfurtherreadingFromHellenistictoearlymoderntimesThereisadearthofaccessiblecommentariesonthepoliticalthoughtofCicero,asthereisonthepoliticalthoughtofSaintAugustine.NotableDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012exceptionstothisruleareNealWood’sCicero’sSocialandPoliticalThought(Wood1988)andHerbertA.Deane’sThePoliticalandSocialIdeasofSaintAugustine(Deane1966).RalphLernerandMuhsinMahdi,eds,MedievalPoliticalPhilosophy(1972)isaveryuseful–andfull–collection.ItcontainsselectionsfromtheworkofIslamic,JewishandChristianscholars.Theauthoritativestudyofthe‘GreatChainofBeing’idearemainsArthurO.Lovejoy’s:TheGreatChainofBeing:AStudyoftheHistoryofanIdea(Lovejoy1936and1964).\n78AthensGeneralsuggestionsforfurtherreadingPartIThebooksinOxfordUniversityPress’sVeryShortIntroductionseriesarereadableessaysbyleadingscholars.AtpresentthereareVeryShortIntroductionstoSocrates(ChristopherTaylor2000).Plato(JuliaAnnas2003),Aristotle(JonathanBarnes2000),Aquinas(FergusKerr2009)andAugustine(HenryChadwick2001).JanetColeman’sAHistoryofPoliticalThoughtfromAncientGreecetoEarlyChristianity(2000a)andherAHistoryofPoliticalThoughtfromtheMiddleAgestotheRenaissance(2000b)arescholarlytreatmentsofphilosopherswhowereworkingduringtheperiodcoveredbyPart1.Notes1Thisis,ofcourse,abroadandsweepinggeneralisation.Iamexcludingscholarswhosespecialismisthestudyoftheperiodinquestion.ScholarlyexamplesareColeman2000a,Coleman2000BandKilcullen2004.IamalsoexcludingAlasdairMacIntyre,whoisunusualamongcontemporarypoliticalphilosophersforthehistoricalapproachhetakes.2TherelevantdateshereareAD410(Visigoths),AD455(Vandals)andAD510(Ostrogoths).Infact,Romewassackedonearlierandlateroccasionstoo,butforthepurposesofthisaccounttheseare,Ithink,themostrelevantdates.3Seeabove,chapter2,pp.19ff.4Seeabove,chapter2,pp.17ff.5Thereappearstobesomedoubtastowhetherthiseventactuallytookplace.6Indeed,unintelligibilitywouldhavebeenpartofthepoint:onthis,KeithThomascitesthetheologian,JeremyTaylor,accordingtowhom,theCatholicstaught‘thattheprayersthemselvesexopereoperato…doprevail’and‘likethewordsaofacharmertheyprevailevenwhentheyarenotunderstood’(seeThomas1973,p.47).7NotthatPlatoandCiceroaretheonlyexamples.Discussionoftherelativemeritsofthesedif-ferenttypesofconstitutionisarecurringthemeinclassicalliterature.Foranotherexample,seeHerodotus’accountofthedebatebetweenthePersianconspiratorsaftertherevoltoftheMagihadbeenputdown(Herodotus2003,pp.207ff.).8TheAcademyfinallyclosedinAD529.9Seeabove,chapter3,p.43ff.10However,itwouldberidiculoustoimputeignoranceto,say,JohnPlamenatz,whoseauthor-itativestudy,ManandSociety(1963)beginswithanaccountofMachiavelli’sPrince,ortoRawls,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012whoseLecturesontheHistoryofPoliticalPhilosophy(2007)beginsevenlater,withHobbes’sLeviathan,firstpublishedin1651.11ThismaynotbeentirelyCicero’sfault.Sizeablesectionsofhistextshavebeenlosttous–presumableforever.12IfSkinner’sthesisismeanttoimplythatweshouldtreatpastphilosophersasiftheyareencasedinsomehermeticallysealedtimebubble,somuchsothattherearenolessonsofanycon-sequencetobedrawnfromtheirwork,thenIstronglydisagreewithhim.Ifthatwerehisview,thenitwoulddisregardthefactthatpastandfutureareasymmetrical;somuchsothat,whereaswecannotforeseethefuture,wecanrememberthepastandtrytorecordit.However,Idonot\nWhathappenednext?79thinkthatitwouldbeaccuratetointerpretSkinnerinthelatterway,althoughitmaywellbethatsome,followersaswellascritics,havedoneso.Itdoesn’thelpeitherthatSkinnercoucheshisargumentintheonce-modishjargonoflinguisticphilosophy–withreferenceto‘languagegames’,‘speechacts’,andsoon.Itisastrategywhich,inmyview,misinterpretsthistypeofphilosophybystretchingittocovercontextstowhichitcannotapply.Still,that’sanotherstory.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\nPartIIREASONANDREVOLUTIONSDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n5HobbesgoestoParisJohnAubrey,theseventeenth-centurybiographer,givesthefollowingaccountofhowitwasthatThomasHobbesfirstbecameinspiredbygeometry.Hewasfortyyearsoldbeforehelookedongeometry;whichhappenedaccidentally.Beinginagentleman’slibraryEuclid’sElementslayopenand‘twastheforty-seventhpropositioninthefirstbook.Hereadthefirstproposition.‘ByG–‡’saidhe,‘thisisimpossible!’Sohereadsthedemonstrationofit,whichreferredhimbacktosuchaproof;whichreferredhimbacktoanother,whichhealsoread.Andsoforth,thatatlasthewasdemonstrativelyconvincedofthattruth.Thismadehiminlovewithgeometry.(Aubrey1982:151–52)IamsurethatmathematicallymindedreaderswillempathisewithHobbes’sreaction,asreported.Onesourceofgeometry’scapacitytoexciteisthewayitmovessoassuredlyfromtheobvioustothenot-at-allobvious.Itbeginswithself-evidenttruths,propositionswhicharesopatentlyobviousthatitcanseemhardlyworthmakingtheefforttostatethem.TakeEuclid’s‘axiom’that‘thingswhichareequaltothesamethingarealsoequaltooneanother’,orhis‘postulate’that‘allrightanglesareequaltooneanother’(1989:155,145).Suchstatementsareundoubtedlytrue,butyoucouldhardlycallthemheadlinenews.(Whocoulddoubtthat,ifAequalsC,andBequalsC,thenitmustbethecasethatAequalsB,whichiswhattheaxiomimplies.Or,totakethepostulate,youwouldhavetobestrangeindeednottoseethateveryangleof90°exactlyresembleseveryotherangleof90°inbeinganangleof90°.)ButgeometrythenproceedstobuildimpressivestructuresonsuchDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012modestfoundations.Itmoves,stepbylogicalstep,todemonstratefurthertruths,truthswhicharenewandsurprising.Forexample,takethepropositionwhosetruthisestablishedbyEuclidinhisElements,BookOne,proposition32(Euclid1989).Thisisthenowfamiliarpropositionthat,foranytriangle,thesumofitsinternalanglesmustequaltworightangles.Theremusthavebeenatimewhenthiswasnotknown,soEuclidisstatingwhatwasonceanew–andstriking–truth;atruthwhichittookgeometrytodiscover.ItisnotatallsurprisingthatHobbesshouldhavebeen‘inlovewithgeometry’,justasAubreysays(Aubrey1982).\n84ReasonandrevolutionsParis,1634–37:DescartesAubreytellssuchagoodstorythatit’sapityitisn’ttrue.Atleast,wecanbefairlysurethatitisn’t,foritisfarmorelikelythat,howeveritmayhaveoriginated,themajorstimulusforHobbes’sinterestingeometrycamesometimebetween1634and1637withatourofmainlandEurope.Aspartofthetrip,hespentsometimeinParis,wherehebecameacquaintedwithsomeofEurope’sleadingintellectualsincluding,mostsignificantlyfromourpointofview,MarinMersenne,whoputhimintouchwithRenéDescartes.1ThereisabsolutelynodoubtthatDescarteswashisgeneration’sleadingthinker,anditisunlikelythatnothingwouldhavecomefromtheencounter.Therefore,itisworthabriefdigressiontoconsiderthelatter’sachievement,andtoreflectonwhatHobbesmayhavelearntfromhim.Thesedays,Descartesismainlyrememberedastheauthorofashortwork,usuallyknownastheDiscourseontheMethod.However,itsfulltitleisDiscourseontheMethodofRightlyConductingtheReasonandSeekingforTruthintheSciences(Descartes1954a).WhenDescarteswroteit,itwashisintentionthatitshouldappearastheprefacetoalongerwork,TheWorld,inwhichDescarteswastopresenttheconclusionshehadreached,asascientist,onastronomy,opticsandgeometry.Asitstitleindicates,thesubjectoftheDiscourseitselfisscientificmethod.Infact,itspurposeistojustifyDescartes’sownaccountofcorrectscientificprocedure.(Asthingsturnedout,TheWorldwasneverpublishedinitsentirety.)2So,whatwasthis‘method’meanttobe?Justbriefly,thestoryisthattheintellectualsofDescartes’stimebelievedthemselvestobelivingatthebeginningofanewageofscientificdiscovery.Asmorewasfoundout,theAristotelianismwhichhaddominatedphilosophythroughoutthemedievalperiodwasincreasinglyperceivedasirrelevant.Asanexample,takethecir-cumnavigationoftheearthbyadventurerssuchasFerdinandMagellanandSirFrancisDrake.ItistrueenoughthatAristotlehimselfhadarguedthattheearthisround,butthistimetheconclusionhadbeenestablishedonceandforall,notbyratiocination–thatis,notthroughskeinsofargumentdrawnfromtheheadofsomemonkintheprivacyofhiscloister–butbyadirect,straightforward,observationaltest.3Yousimplypointedyourshipwestwardandkeptgoinginthesamedirectionuntilyouarrivedbackatyourstartingpoint.Or,takeWilliamHarvey’sdiscoverythatthebloodcir-culatesaroundthebody.This,too,wasmadewiththehelpofobservation,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012thistimethroughanatomy,inwhichpeopleweretakinganincreasinginterest.Moreover,thereweresomediscoverieswhichactuallyconflictedwithAristotle’sworldpictureandcalleditintoquestion.OnecelebratedexampleisGalileo’sdiscovery,in1610,thattheplanetJupiterhasmoons.4Thisdemonstrated,againbysimpleobservation,thattheprevailingworldpicture,accordingtowhichtheearthisatthecentreoftheuniverse,justcouldnothavebeentrue.(Iftherearecelestialbodieswhichorbitanotherplanet,thenitcan’tbetruethatallcelestialbodiesorbittheearth.)\nHobbesgoestoParis85Thesearchforamethodresultedfromtheoptimistichopethattherateofdiscoverycouldbeincreased–andtheprogressofhumanityaccelerated–iftheprocessofdiscoverycouldbesystematised.Likemanyphilosophers,Descartesfeltthatthediscoveriesofhistimehadbeenmadefortuitously,almostbyaccident.Ashesawit,hiscontemporariestendedto‘conducttheirmindsalongunexploredroutes,havingnoreasontohopeforsuccess,butmerelywillingtorisktheexperimentoffindingwhetherthetruththeyseekliesthere’(Descartes1931:9).Tothis,Descartesaddedthedrycommentthat‘Aswellmightamanburningwithanunintelligentdesiretofindtreasure,continuallyroamthestreets,seekingtofindsomethingthatapasser-bymighthavechancedtodrop’(Descartes1931).Procedureswereneeded.InDescartes’sversion,theseweretotaketheformofacodifiedsetof‘certainandsimplerules,suchthat,ifamanobservethemaccurately,heshallneverassumewhatisfalseastrue’and‘willalwaysgraduallyincreasehisknowledgeandsoarriveatatrueunderstandingofallthatdoesnotsurpasshispowers’(Descartes1931).However,itisonethingtobelieveinthedesirabilityofemployingamethodinscience,butquiteanothertofigureoutwhatthecorrectprocedureactuallyis.Itishere–significantlyfromourpointofview–thatgeometryentersthepicture.Forourpurposes,themostrelevantfeatureofDescartes’sphilosophyishisrecom-mendationthatscientistsshouldfollowthemethodsemployedbymathematicians,asexemplifiedespeciallyinthestudyofgeometry.Why?TheansweristhatDescartes,andthe‘Rationalist’philosophers5whofollowedhisexample,wereinspiredbythecertaintythatmathematicianscanachieve.Forexample,onceithasbeendemonstratedthat,foranytrianglewhatsoever,thesumofitsanglesmustequaltworightangles,youcanbeabsolutelysureofthefact.Mathematicsisthusuniqueinthewayitcandemonstratenew,previouslyunknowntruthswhicharehenceforthknownforsure.Atleast,thatishowitseemed.ItwasDescartes’soptimisticbeliefthatthemethodwhichhadturnedouttobesosuccessfulinmathematicscouldalsobedeployedelsewhere–incosmology,inbiology,eveninmorality.Infact,therulesDescartesattemptstojustifywiththeargumentoftheDiscourseareintendedtodescribethementalactsamathematicianperformswhenattemptingtoworkoutthesolutiontoaproblem.(Youcouldsaythattheysupposedlydescribe‘whatgoesoninsomeone’shead’.)Theartistobeginwithsimple,self-evidentcomponents–componentswhichcanbeDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012graspedbymental‘intuition’–andtoproceed,likeageometer,tothedis-coveryofmorecomplex,moreinteresting,truths.Ofcourse,noneofthiswouldmakesenseunlessyoubelievethatthenaturalworld–theworldstudiedbyscience–canbedescribedbyasetofpropositions,eachofwhichislogicallylinkedtoothers,asifinachain;whichisjustwhatDescartesdidbelieve.Heonceputitinthefollowing,almostpoetic,terms:Thesciencesnowhavemasksonthem;ifthemasksweretakenofftheywouldappearsupremelybeautiful.Onsurveyingthechainofthesciencesonewill\n86Reasonandrevolutionsregardthemasnotbeingmoredifficulttoretaininone’smindthanthenumberseriesis.(1954a:3)Still,havingreachedthispointweneedfollowDescartesnofurther.ItonlyremainstonotethatHobbes’smasterpiece,Leviathan(1981),isimbuedwithasimilarvision.InLeviathanHobbesattemptsanexplanationofhumannature,beginningwiththesimplestelementsandproceedingtothemostcomplexand,fromthatfoundation,heattemptsanexplanationofthestateintermsofitselements–i.e.ourselves.NoticehowthisideaofamovementfromsimpletocomplexunderliestherhetoricalopeningparagraphofLeviathan’s‘Introduction’.ForseeinglifeisbutamotionofLimbs,thebeginningwhereofisinsomeprincipalpartwithin;whymaywenotsaythatallAutomata(Enginesthatmovethemselvesbyspringsandwheelesasdothawatch)haveanartificialllife?ForwhatistheHeartbutaSpring;andtheNerves,butsomanyStrings;andtheJoynts,butsomanyWheeles,givingmotiontothewholebody,suchaswasintendedbytheartificer?Artgoesyetfurther,imitatingthatRationallandmostexcellentworkofNature,Man.ForbyArtiscreatedthatgreatLEVIATHANcalledaCOMMON-WEALTH,orSTATE,(inlatineCIVITAS)whichisbutanArtificiallMan;thoughofgreaterstatureandstrengththantheNaturall,forwhoseprotectionanddefenceitwasintended.(Hobbes1981:81)Anditisn’tjusttheideaofamethodwhichproceedsfromsimpletocomplexinwhichwefindanechoofDescartes.ItwasDescarteswhobelievedthatthehumanbodyisjustamachine,andDescarteswhocomparedtheuniversetoaclock.ThewholepassageismodishlyCartesian.Paris,1640–51:exileAndthatwasjustoneParisvisit.HobbesreturnedtoEnglandin1637–asithappened,itwastheyearinwhichDescartespublishedhisDiscourse–butin1640hewasback,thistimeforaverydifferentreason.InEngland,therehadbeenserioustensionbetweenParliamentandthemonarchyforsomeDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012time.Sensingtroubleahead,Hobbeshadgoneintoexile.Sureenough,civilwarbrokeoutin1642.TherefollowedoneofthemostturbulentperiodsofBritishhistory.Thewaritselfendedwiththesurrenderoftheking,CharlesI,totheparliamentaryforces,ledbyOliverCromwell,buttheconstitutionalcrisisitselfpersistedforsometimeafterthat.Itwasnotuntil1649thatCharleswasexecuted.(Hewasbeheaded.)Cromwellbecame‘LordProtector’in1652and,fortheonlytimeinitshistorysofar,Britainwasarepublic.Thistime,althoughHobbesmaintainedhisintellectualcontacts,hewasalsoconstrainedtokeeplessintellectualcompany.However,itwasalsomore\nHobbesgoestoParis87exaltedinitssocialstatus,forHobbeswastoserveasmathematicstutortotheyoungPrinceofWales,theboywhowouldlaterbecomeCharlesIIofEngland.AlongwithHobbes,thequeen(herselfFrench)andmostoftheEnglishcourtwerealsolivinginParis,inexile.Inthecourseofday-to-dayconversation,Idon’tsupposeHobbeswouldhavecomeacrossmuchtocontradicthisownstaunchlyroyalistviewofevents.HobbesreturnedtoEnglandin1651,havingjudgeditsafeenoughtodoso.(Bythen,Cromwellhimselfhadstartedtobehavelikeasovereign.)Themonarchywaseventuallyrestoredin1660.Thedisturbingeventsofthecivilwarperiodleftaprofoundimpressiononthosewholivedthroughthem.Thesewereviolentandterribleyearsduringwhich–accordingtooneauthoritativeestimate–agreaterpercentageoftheBritishpopulationlosttheirlivesthanduringtheFirstWorldWarof1914–18.6Thetitleofacontemporarypopularsong,TheWorldTurnedUpsideDown,capturesaprevailingviewofevents.(Asanidea,Aristotle’sGreatChainhadobviouslyfallenwelloutoffavour.)Hobbes’sownrecordedcommentwasthat,betweentheyearsof1640and1660,anyonewho‘asfromtheDevil’sMountain,shouldhavelookedupontheworldandobservedtheactionsofmen,especiallyinEngland,mighthavehadaprospectofallkindsofinjus-tice,andofallkindsoffollythattheworldcouldafford’(Hobbes1969:1).TheywereeventswhichpromptedHobbestorevisehisphilosophicalproject.Originally,ithadbeenhisintentiontoconstructanentirephilosophicalsystem.Thiswastoappearinseveralvolumes,withatreatmentofpoliticalquestionsoccurringquitelateintheseries;buthenowdecidedtofocusonthepoliticalwork.TheresultwasLeviathan(Hobbes1981).Itsargumentformsthesubjectofthenextchapter.LeviathanisnamedafteraterriblemonsterdescribedintheBible’sbookofJob.AccordingtoJob,‘Outofhis[Leviathan’s]nostrilsgoethsmoke,asoutofaseethingpotorcaldron;Hisbreath,kindlethcoals,andaflamegoethoutofhismouth’(Hobbes1981:20–21).And,ifthatisn’tscaryenough,‘Theflakesofhisflesharejoinedtogether:theyarefirminthemselves;theycannotbemoved;Hisheartisasfirmasastone;yea,ashardasapieceofthenethermillstone’(Hobbes1981:23–24).Mostimportantly,though,‘Uponearththereisnothislike’and‘heisakingoverallthechildrenofpride’(Hobbes1981:33–34).ThismeansthatonlyLeviathanisamatchforBehemoth,themonsterdescribedinthepreviouschapterofJob.Behemothisalsoterrifying.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012‘Hisstrengthisinhisloins,andhisforceisinthenavelofhisbelly’,saysJob.‘Hemovethhistaillikeacedar:thesinewsofhisstonesarewrappedtogether’and‘Hisbonesareasstrongaspiecesofbrass;hisbonesarelikebarsofiron’(Hobbes1981:XL,16–18).JustasLeviathanwasthetitleofHobbes’sdefenceofabsolutesovereignty,soBehemothwasthetitleofhishistoryofthecivilwar(Hobbes:1969).LeviathanwrestlesBehemoth:picturethisclashoftitans–theawesomedevastationandturmoil–andyougetsomeideaoftheawfuldreadwhichtheeventsofthecivilwarperiodinspiredinHobbesandsomanyofhiscontemporaries.\n88ReasonandrevolutionsNotes1Apparently,Mersennewasthe‘onlyeffectivechannelofcommunication’withDescartesatthistime.Descarteswas‘virtuallyinhidinginTheNetherlands’.HobbesandDescarteseventuallymet,butnotuntil1648.MysourceforthisisTuck(1989:5).2InLeMonde,Descartesarguesforaheliocentricuniverse;thatis,hestatesitashisviewthatthesun,nottheearth,isatthecentreoftheuniverse.ItissaidthathewithheldpublicationforfearofoffendingtheCatholicauthorities.Afterall,DescarteshadbeenraisedasaJesuit.Itisprobablynotthecasethathewouldhavesufferedtheseveretreatmentmetedouttohiscontemporary,Galileo,bytheCatholicauthoritiesinFlorence.Galileohadalsoarguedthattheuniverseisheliocentric.3Youwillhaverealised,ofcourse,thatallthisisgrosslyunfairtoAristotle,whowasavirtuosooftheempiricalmethod(seechapter3.)4HobbeshadmetGalileo,inFlorence,in1636.5ThemostfamousoftheseareBenedictdeSpinoza(1632–77)andGottfriedWilhelmLeibniz(1646–1716).6SeeSchama(2001:13).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n6Hobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathanLeviathancontainsoneoftheEnglishlanguage’sbest-known,mostfrequentlyquotedlines,thelineinwhichHobbesdescribesthelifeof‘man’inthe‘stateofnature’as‘nasty,brutish,andshort’.Thephraseissowellknownthatwemayaswellbeginwithitand–ratherthantakingitinisolation–weoughttostartwiththefulltextoftheparagraphinwhichitoccurs.Hereitis.WhatsoeverthereforeisconsequenttoatimeofWarre,whereeverymanisEnemytoeveryman;thesameisconsequenttothetime,whereinmenlivewithoutothersecurity,thanwhattheirownstrength,andtheirowninventionshallfurnishthemwithall.InsuchconditionthereisnoplaceforIndustry;becausethefruitthereofisuncertain:andconsequentlynoCultureoftheEarth;noNavigation,noruseofthecommoditiesthatmaybeimportedbySea;nocommodiousBuilding;noInstrumentsofmoving,andremovingsuchthingsasrequiremuchforce;noKnowledgeofthefaceoftheEarth;noaccountofTime;noArts;noLetters;noSociety;andwhichisworstofall,continuallfeare,anddangerofviolentdeath;Andthelifeofman,solitary,poore,nasty,brutish,andshort.(Hobbes1981:186)ThewayHobbesportraysit,lifeinthestateofnatureisindeedafearsomething.Itisn’tjustfearanddangerofviolentdeaththatyouhavetocontendwith.Asthefullquotationshows,prettywelleveryactivityyoucanthinkof–anythingyoumightwanttocountasacomponentofacivilisedexistence–isabsent.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Butwhatisthisterrifying‘stateofnature’?Well,inthepassagequotedHobbessaysthatitisastateinwhichpeoplehaveonlytheirownstrengthandingenuitytorelyonforprotection.Thatisbecausethestateofnatureis,bydefinition,asituationinwhichthereisnopoliticalauthority.Thismeansthatthereisnocivilorcriminallawand,obviously,nobodytoenforcethelaw.AndwhyshouldHobbesthinkthatlifeinsuchastatewouldbesoterrible?Wecan’tjusttakeitforgrantedthatitwouldbe,asthereare–nodoubt–anarchistsandotherswhowoulddisagree.Anarchistswouldarguethatlifewithoutany(political)stateatall,evena\n90Reasonandrevolutionsbenignlyrunstate,mustalwaysbepreferabletosubmissiontoanysortofpoliticalauthority.ToobjectionsalongsuchlinesHobbeswouldreply,ashedoesinthesubsequentparagraph,thatexperiencecanonlyconfirmhisdescription.Thedoubter(oranarchist)needonlyremindhimselfthat‘whentakingajourney,hearmeshimselfe,andseekstogowellaccom-panied;whengoingtosleep,helockshisdores;wheneveninhishousehelockshischests’(Hobbes1981:186–87).Hobbes’spointisthat,evenwheretherearelaw-makingandlaw-enforcingauthorities,wehavetotakesuchordinaryprecautionsbecauseotherpeopleare,ashethinks,intrinsicallyuntrustworthy.However,healsoregardssuchevidenceassubsidiary.Sofarasheisconcerned,observationcanonlyprovideadditionalsupportforaconclusionwhichhasalreadybeenreachedbyreason.Perhapstherewasonceastateofnature.Perhapstherehasneverbeenanysuchthing.Again,perhapsourconditionhas,attimes,approachedthestateofnatureasHobbesdescribesit,butperhapswehavealwaysmanagedtopullbackfromthebrinkoftheabyssinthenickoftime(whichis,nodoubt,thewayhewouldhavethoughtaboutthecivilwar).Allthatisbesidethepoint.ForHobbes,thecrucialpointisthathisconclusionis,asheputsit,an‘Inference,madefromthepassions’(Hobbes1981:186)(myemphasis).Thatis,hisdescriptionismeanttobeadescriptionofthewayastateofnaturewould,logically,havetobe,giventhetruthofcertainpriorassumptions.Thecomparisonwithgeometryismorethanappositehere.Takethestatementthatthesumoftheinternalanglesofatriangleisequaltothatoftworightangles(or,ifyouprefer,180°).Inthiscasetoo,observationlendssupporttoEuclid’sconclusion,justasit(supposedly)doestoHobbes’sdescriptionoflifeinastateofnature.Inthecaseofthetriangle,‘observation’meanstakingyourprotractor,measuringtheinternalanglesofagiventri-angleandaddingthemtogether.Ifyoumeasurecarefullyenough,youwillalwaysfindthattheytotal180°.But,likewise,observationissecondarytoreasonhere,forEuclid’sconclusionthat,foranytriangle,itsanglesmusttotal180°wouldholdtrueeveniftherewerenotrianglesactuallyinexistence.Thatisbecauseitstruthisderivablebyreason–inthiscasebymeansofEuclid’sproof–fromcertainpriorassumptions,justasHobbes’sdescriptionoflifeinthestateofnatureissupposedtobe.Asthecomparisonshows,Hobbes’sdescriptionformspartofadeductiveDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012argument;thatis,anargumentwhichreliesonreasonratherthanobservationandattemptstoproceedlogically,stepbystep,frompremisetoconclusion.Infact,itismorethanthat.Itispartofaveryparticularsortofdeductiveargument,namelyasocialcontractargument.Inthisrespect,theargumentofLeviathanstandsatthebeginningofalonganddistinguishedline.Inthehandsoftherightphilosopher,asocialcontractargumentcanbeapowerfultool.So,weshouldn’tletHobbes’selegantseventeenth-centuryEnglishfoolusintothinkingthathisphilosophicalargumentisjustasarchaicashisspelling.Farfromit.1\nHobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathan91Whatisasocialcontractargument?AsPartIIofthisbookisdevotedtotheworkofthegreat,‘classical’socialcontracttheorists–ThomasHobbes(1588–1679),JohnLocke(1632–1704)andJean-JacquesRousseau(1712–78)–IshouldexplainwhatasocialcontractargumentisbeforeIgoanyfurther.Tostartwith,then,weshouldnotethattheargumentsoftheclassicaltheoristsshareabasicstructureand–withit–aterminology.Tobeginwith,people(‘men’)arepicturedasinhabitinga‘stateofnature’.Thisisdefinedbytheabsenceofanyformofpoliticalauthority.Inthestateofnaturethereisnoonetomakelawand,consequently,nocivillaw.AsHobbesputsit,thereareno‘publikeOfficers,armed,torevenge[all]injuries’(Hobbes1981:187).Hadtherebeensuchthingsaspoliceforcesbackintheseventeenthcentury,thestateofnaturewouldnodoubthavebeendefined,inpart,bytheabsenceofpolice.Lifeinthestateofnatureisportrayedaslessthanideal.Ithasits‘inconveniences’(Locke’sword).Therefore,peoplearepicturedasseekingameansofescape,andthemeanstheyemployisa‘socialcontract’.Whensomeone,asitwere,‘signsup’tothecontract,thatpersonagreestosetasidecertainlibertiesandtorespecttheliberties(or‘rights’)ofothers.Thecontractisalsothemeansbywhicha‘sovereign’isestablished.Afterthecontract,everyoneissupposedtoobeythesovereign,withtheresultthatthestateofnature’sinconveniencesareovercome.Afterthesocialcontract,whenpeoplearenolongerlivinginastateofnature,theyaresaidtoinhabit‘civilsociety’.Itisimportanttobearinmindthat,inthetechnicalterminologyofthistypeoftheory,theword‘sovereign’doesnotnecessarilyrefertoasingleindividual.Itreferstotheultimatelaw-makingauthority,andeachphiloso-pherIdiscussinPartIIcanbedistinguishedfromtheothersintermsoftheformofauthorityheprefers.Thus,sofarasHobbesisconcerned,asingleindividual–amonarch,say–ispreferabletoanyotherform;althoughevenHobbesispreparedtoentertainthepossibilitythatanassembly,suchasaparliament,canbesovereign.ForLocke,authoritymustbelimitedinthesensethatitcanremaininplaceonlywiththeconsentofthegoverned.(Otherwise,Lockeislessconcernedwiththepreciseformaconstitutiontakes,althoughhemostprefersa‘mixed’systeminwhichthepowerofamonarchischeckedbyparliament.)ForRousseau–anultra-democrat–truesovereigntycanonlyresideinanassemblyofthewholepeople.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Anyonenewtosocialcontracttheorycouldbeforgivenforinterpretingtheforegoingstoryasanattemptathistory.Thereisanapparentnarrative:onceuponatimepeoplelivedinastateofnature.Thentheybecamepartiestoasocialcontract.Afterthattheylivedunderasovereignincivilsociety(hap-pilyeverafter?).Onafirstreading,youcouldeasilygaintheimpressionthatthesocialcontracttheoristsbelievedintheliteraltruthofthisstory.Indeed,thereissometextualevidencethatatleastoneofthem,Locke,actuallydid.2But,whatevertheclassicaltheoriststhemselvesmayhavebelieved,itisclear\n92Reasonandrevolutionsthatnoonelivingatthebeginningofthetwenty-firstcenturycantreatsocialcontracttheoryasliteralhistory.(Thereareplentyofsocialcontracttheoristswritingnow,butnonewhowouldpresenthisorherargumentasrealhistory.)Asthingspresentlystandtheconsensusviewofsocialcontracttheoryisasfollows:inordertoappreciatethefullexplanatorypowerofthistypeoftheoryyoumustfirststripitofanyquasi-historicalbaggagewithwhichitmaybeencumberedandtreatitasaformofrationalchoicetheory.Toseewhatthismeans,suppose–first–thatyouhavetogivethereasonforsomething’sexistence,orthereasonwhysomeeventhasoccurred.Thatsomethinghastobethesortofthingwhichcanbebroughtintoexistencethroughhumanagency.Itmaybeaninstitution,suchas‘thestate’or‘themarket’,oraseriesofevents,suchasawar.Now–second–trytoimagineaworldfromwhichthethingwhoseexistenceyouaretryingtoexplainisabsent.Onthisview,thatisjustwhatthe‘stateofnature’is.Itisapurelyimaginary,hypothetical,situationfromwhichwhateveritisyouaretryingtoexplainismissing.InHobbes’scasethismeanstryingtoimaginelivingwithoutastateandwithoutasovereign,notbecausehumanseverlivedinsuchacondition,butbecauseitistheexistenceofastateandasovereignforwhichHobbesistryingtogivearationale.(Ifyouprefer,youcouldcallthe‘stateofnature’the‘no-statesituation’.)3Thenextstepintheprocedure–thethird–isthis:havingimaginedawaywhateveritisyouaretryingtoexplain,youthentrytofigureoutwhatreasonspeoplewouldhaveforintroducingit.Bythiscriterion,Hobbesqualifiesasarationalchoicetheoristbecause,havingimaginedawaythestate,hethinkshecanjustifyitsexis-tenceintermsofwhatpeoplewhofoundthemselvesinano-statesituationwouldchoosetodoiftheywererational.Ifheisright,thenhecanclaimtohaveaccountedfortheformofstatehefavoursintermsofitspurposeorpoint.Thatshouldexplainthebasicprincipleunderlyingsocialcontractargu-ment,construedasanexerciseinrationalchoicetheory.Toappreciatetheforcethatthistypeoftheorycancarry,notethatjustifyinganinstitutionsuchasthestateintermsofthereasonspeoplewouldhaveforchoosingitfromano-statesituationiftheywererationalisnotthesameasjustifyingeverystatewhichactuallyexists.It’spossiblethatrationalpeoplewouldchoosestatesofacertaintype.Forexample,theymightonlychoosestateswithconstitutionswhichguaranteecertainbasicrights.Again,likeLocke,theymightinsistthatagovernmentmustberemovableoncethepeoplehaveDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012withdrawntheirconsent.Actuallyexistinggovernments–whichhavemoreoftenthannotbeenestablishedbymeansofwar,revolutionandbloodyvio-lence–maynotsatisfysuchcriteria.Itisforthisreasonthatasocialcontracttheorycanbeapowerfulcriticalweapon.Youcanuseittojustifycertainformsofstate,butyoucanalsouseittoarguefortheremovalofothers.Finally,atthispointitisalsoworthnotingoneofrationalchoicetheory’smoreinterestingfeatures.Itcansooftenbeusedtodemonstratethat,wheneveryindividualmakesthemostrationalchoiceheorshecanmakeinthecircumstances,theoveralloutcomecanbesomethingnoonecouldrationally\nHobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathan93want.Forexample,noonecouldrationallywanttheretobeaneconomicrecession,andyetarecessionis,inthemain,theoutcomeofahugenumberofindividualchoices,eachmadeinaperfectlyrationalway.Again,adestructivewarissomethingnoonecouldseriouslywant,andyetawarcanbetheoutcomeofindividualdecisions,eachmadeforthebestofreasons.Youcouldsaythatthestateofnature,asHobbesdescribesit,mostresemblesthelastofthese.Infact,wehavealreadyseenhowhecomparesitto‘atimeofWarre,whereeverymanisEnemytoeveryman’(1981:186).Leviathan’spurposeistoshowustheescaperoute.4Hobbes’sconclusion:thegreatLeviathanItfollowsthatunderstandingHobbes’sargumentmeansfollowingthestepsbymeansofwhichhetriestoderivehisconclusionfromhisinitialpremises.Inotherwords,itmeansunderstandingwhyheshouldthinkthatpeoplewhofindthemselvesinastateofnaturewould,iftheywererational,subjectthemselvestoasovereignofthetypehedescribes.Weshallbetracingthosestepsshortly.However,beforewedo,letmefirstoutlinetheconclusionHobbessetsouttoestablish.Itcouldbehelpfultohaveanideaofwherehisargumentismeanttobetakingus.Infact,manyreaderswillalreadyknowthatHobbesadvocatesabsolutesovereignty;butthen,‘absolutesovereign’isarathervaguephrase,andifwearetounderstandhimweneedtobemorespecific.So,tobeginwithweshouldnotethatwhatHobbesfearsmostissovereigntywhichisdivided.Here,itisusefultocontrastHobbes’sviewofthingswiththeconventionalaccountofmodernliberal-democraticconstitutions,accordingtowhichtheyrelyonasystemofchecksandbalances.Onthelatterview,thepowerof–say–theUSPresidentcanbecheckedbyCongress,thepowerofCongressbytheSenate,thejudiciarycanacttocheckanyofthese,andalldecisionshavetobemeasuredagainsttherequirementssetoutinawrittenconstitution.Similarly,intheUK,Parliamentcanactasacheckonthepowerofthesovereign,whocaninturn(and,atleast,intheory)actasacheckontheexcessesoftheformer.Hobbes’spreferred‘commonwealth’alsocontrastswiththesupra-nationalinstitutionswhichhaverisenininfluenceduringourowntimes–theUnitedNations,forexample,ortheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.Thesearenotstatesthemselves,buttheycanactinwayswhichDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012checkthepowerofindividualnation-states.Hobbeswouldhavenoneofthis.Sofarasheisconcerned,therecanonlybeasingleultimatelocusofpowerandauthority.ForHobbes,itisamatteroftherelationshipbetweendifferentwills.Asheseesit,therecanbenomorethanonedominantwillwithinanystate(or‘commonwealth’).Wherethereismorethanone,onlypoliticalcollapseandterrifyinganarchycanresult.Leviathan’scentralideais,thus,theunitingofmanywillsintoone.Thisiswhatissupposedtohappenatthetimeofthesocialcontract.AccordingtoHobbes,itisforreasonsofself-defencethat,atthetimeofthe\n94Reasonandrevolutionscontract,peopleerecta‘CommonPower’byconferring‘alltheirpowerandstrengthupononeMan,orupononeAssemblyofmen,thatmayreducealltheirWills,bypluralityofvoices,untooneWill’(1981:227).ThelattervisionpermeatesLeviathanthroughout,andinmorethanthebook’sformalargument.Forexample,youwillfinditexpressedintheoriginalcoverillustration,whichdepictsanenormousartificialperson(lookingalotlikeCharlesI)whoiscomposedofavastnumberofmuchsmaller,naturalpersons.YouwillfinditinthegrudgingreluctancewithwhichHobbesacknowledgesthatitisjustaboutpossiblethatanassemblycouldbesovereign,anarrangementwhichheneverthelesscompareswithagameoftennisinwhichtheplayer‘iscarriedtotheball,thoughbygoodPlayers,yetinaWheele-barrough’whichmanypeoplearetryingtosteer,eachinthedirectionhejudgescorrect(Hobbes1981:310).YouwillalsocomeacrossitintherepeatedcomparisonsHobbesdrawsbetween‘diseasesofthecommonwealth’anddiseasesofthehumanbody;forexample,whenhewritesofasystemwhichpurportedlyreliesonathreefolddivisionofpower,that:Ihaveseenaman,thathadanothermangrowingoutofhisside,withanhead,armes,breast,andstomach,ofhisown:Ifhehadhadanothermangrowingoutofhisotherside,thecomparisonmightthenhavebeenexact.(Hobbes1981:372–73)AnotherfeatureoftheabsolutesovereigntypreferredbyHobbesliesinthesovereign’spowertomakelaw.Allcontracttheoristsagreethatitisthesover-eign’sjobtointerpretlaw.Ithastobe,forsocietywouldbeunabletofunctionwithoutasettledstandard.ButonHobbes’saccount,he/she/it(dependingonwhetherthesovereignisapersonoranassembly)doesfarmorethanthat.Thesovereignsimplydecideswhatthelawisgoingtobe,andthatsettlesthings.Lawissimplythecommandofwhoeverhasthepowertoenforceit–nothingmore.Here,too,thereisacontrastbetweenHobbes’sdoctrineandaprevalentmodernorthodoxy,thistimetheviewthatpeoplearethebearersoffundamental‘natural’or‘human’rights.Ifthelatterviewiscorrect,then,morallyspeaking,therearecertainthingsyoujustcannotdotootherpeoplebecause,ifyoudid,thenyouwouldbeviolatingthoseotherpeople’srights.Humanrights–iftherearesuchthings–placelimitsonthepowerofthesovereign.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012SuchadoctrinewouldbeanathematoHobbes.Takehisattitudetoprivateproperty.AccordingtoHobbes,thedoctrinethatthereisanabsoluterighttoprivateproperty,‘suchasexcludeththeRightoftheSoveraign’(1981:367)isoneofthosethingswhichweakenandtendtothedissolutionofacom-monwealth(bylimitingthesovereign’sabilitytoraisetaxes,forexample).Againstit,Hobbesinsiststhatthepropertyyouhavearighttoholdissimplythepropertythesovereignletsyouhold,nothingmore,nothingless.Or,considerHobbes’sattitudetowhatwewouldnowcalltherightsto‘freespeech’and‘libertyofconscience’,thelatterbeingtherighttofollowyour\nHobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathan95conscienceinmattersofmoralityandreligion.Thesedays,suchrightsfeatureassignificantitemsoneverylistofhumanrights.Bycontrast,Hobbesisallforcensorship.‘ItisannexedtotheSoveraignty’,hewrites,‘tobeJudgeofwhatOpinionsandDoctrinesareaverse,andwhatconducingtoPeace’.Likewise,itisthesovereign’sprerogativetojudge‘howfarre,andwhat,menaretobetrustedwithall,inspeakingtoMultitudesofpeople;andwhoshallexaminetheDoctrinesofallbookesbeforetheybepublished’(Hobbes1981:233).Asforprivateconscience,Hobbesinsiststhatthedoctrineaccordingtowhich‘everyprivatemanisJudgeofGoodandEvillactions’isjustseditionand‘poyson’(Hobbes1981:365).(Itiseasytoappreciatewhyheshouldhaveheldsuchviews.Ashesawit,amajorcauseofthecivilwarwasthatParliamenthadbecomejustaspowerfulastheking,sothattherewere,infact,twocentresofpowerandauthority,andaninevitabletensionbetweenthetwo.Youcanseewhyhewouldhaveinsistedonthesovereign’sindivisibility.Likewise,thedoctrineofprivateconscience–especiallyfavouredbythePuritansoftheparliamentaryside–wasanobviousculprit.)Thatsaid,nowfortheargumentitself.Hobbes’sargumentThepremises:humannatureandlifeinthestateofnatureWhenexamininganargumentwhichclaimstoproceedfromtruepremisestoatrueconclusionviaasequenceoflogicallyvalidsteps,itisoftenagoodideatostartwiththepremises.Takethestandardexampleofalogicallyvalid,three-stage‘syllogism’,theoneyouwillfindinprettywelleveryintroductorytextbookonlogic.Thisstatesthat‘allmenaremortal’(firstpremise);that‘Socratesisaman’(secondpremise);and‘therefore’that‘Socratesismortal’(conclusion).Thelogicisimpeccable,butitdoesn’tyieldatrueconclusionif‘Socrates’is,infact,yourpetnameforyourdesktopcomputer(inwhichcase,onepremise–thesecond–willbefalse).InHobbes’scase,examiningthepremisesofhisargumentmeanstakingacloserlookathisaccountoflifeinastateofnature.Thestateofnature,youwillrecall,isanapoliticalconditionfromwhichlawandauthorityareabsent.Asyouwillalsorecall,hecomparesitwithastateofwar.Itis,hesays,a‘warreofeverymanagainsteveryman’(1981:186),asituationinwhicheveryonehastobeconstantlyonguardagainsttheincursionsoftheothers,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012andinwhichlifeis,asaconsequence,fairlyterrible.Butwhyshouldthisbe?Iflifeinthestateofnatureissoterrible,thatcanonlybeasaresultofthewayothersbehave.Infact,ifotherpeoplewere,ingeneral,caringandaltruistic–ifeveryoneautomaticallyregardedeveryoneelseastheirbrotherorsister,andifeachpersonwasalwayspreparedtohelptheothersout–thenthestateofnaturemightnotbesobad.Infact,therewouldprobablybenoreasonforquittingitinfavouroflifeunderasovereignatall.ForHobbes,lifeinastateofnatureisnasty,brutish,andshort,preciselybecausepeoplearenot,asarule,socaringandaltruistic.\n96ReasonandrevolutionsWhyaren’tthey?Well,rightatthecoreofHobbes’sphilosophythereliesaparticularviewofhumanmotivation.Onthatviewweare,eachofus,motivatedbydesire(orappetite)andaversion.Wedesirethosethingswhich,sofaraswecansee,tendtoourownpreservation,andwetrytoavoidthosethingswhich,sofaraswecansee,tendtoourowndestruction.Inadditiontothiswearecreaturesoflimitedsympathy.(Hobbes’swordis‘diffidence’.)Wefinditdifficulttoempathisewiththeplightofothers,whichmeansthat,whenitcomestothecrunch,wetendtoprioritiseourowndesiresoverthoseofotherpeople.Wearealsorationalcreatures,butthefunctionofourreasonissimplytohelpusfigureouthowbesttoobtainthosethingswedesire.SaysHobbes,‘theThoughtsaretotheDesires,asScouts,andSpies,torangeabroad,andfindthewaytothethingsDesired’(1981:139).Inshort,itisHobbes’sviewthatwearestronglyegocentricbynature.IsHobbesright?Infact,itispossibletocallHobbes’saccountofhumannatureintoquestion,asitistheinferenceshedrawsfromit.However,beforecriticisingHobbes,Ithinkitisworthtracinghisargumentthroughtoitsconclusion.Thereisquitealottobelearntfromseeinghowitworks.So,nownotethatHobbes’saccountofmotivation(supposedly)hastwocorollaries(orlogicalimplications)towhichheattachesspecialemphasis.Onetakestheformofathesisconcerningthemeaningsofmoralterms.AccordingtoHobbes,inthestateofnaturetheseareusedsubjectively.Thus,‘whatsoeveristheobjectofanyman’sAppetiteofDesire;thatisit,whichheforhispartcallethGood’.Likewise,theword‘Evill’isreservedfor‘theobjectofhisHate,andAversion’(Hobbes1981:120).Therelevanceofthis‘subjectivist’thesisreallybecomesclearafterthecontract,whenthesovereignisinplace.Aswehaveseen,itisafunctionofthesovereigntosupplyasettledstandardofrightandwrong.Thesecondcorollaryisthatthedesireforpowerisinsatiableinthesensethat,howevermuchpowerapersonhas,thatpersonwillalwaysdesiremore.Forfuturereference,notethat‘power’isdefinedbyHobbesasa‘presentmeanstoobtainsomefutureapparentGood’(Hobbes1981:150).Notealsothat‘power’,thusdefined,coversalotmorethanbrutephysicalability–thestrengthtobeatsomeoneinafight,ortorunfast.TherearealsowhatHobbescalls‘instrumental’powers,namely,thosepowerswhichare‘meansandInstrumentstoacquiremore:asRiches,Reputation,Friends,andthesecretworkingofGod,whichmencallGoodLuck’(Hobbes1981).Poweris,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012thus,theabilitytogetwhatyoudesire,bywhatevermeans,andthemoreyouareabletoinfluenceothers–togetthemtodowhatyouwantthemto–themorepoweryouhave.Theconclusionthateachofusconstantlydesiresmorepowerovertheothersisdirectlyimpliedbythethesisthatwearemotivatedbydesireforthosethingswhichtendtoourownpreservationplustheassumptionthat,howevermuchapersonmayachievewhatheorshedesires,thereisalwayssomethingelsetobedesired.AsHobbesputsit,‘Norcanamananymorelive,whoseDesiresareatanend,thanhe,whoseSensesandImaginationareatastand’(Hobbes1981:160).Moreover,youoftenneed\nHobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathan97extrapowerifyouaretohangontothepoweryoualreadyhave.Itis,therefore,‘agenerallinclinationofallmankind’thatthereshouldbe‘aperpetuallandrestlessdesireofPowerafterpower,thatceasethonleyinDeath’(Hobbes1981).Ifallthisistrue–andifitisalsotrue,asHobbesclaims,thateveryoneisprettywellequalinpower–hisdescriptionoflifeinthestateofnature(asbeingnasty,brutish,andsoon)follows–orsohecontends.Thisishow:whenthereisaconflictofinterestbetweenegocentric,power-seekingpeoplewhoare‘diffident’towardsothers,theywillinevitablycomeintoconfrontation.‘Whenanytwomendesirethesamething,whichneverthelesstheycannotbothenjoy’,saysHobbes,‘theybecomeEnemies’.Headdsthat‘inthewaytotheirEnd’theywill‘endeavourtodestroy,orsubdueoneanother’(Hobbes1981:184).Giventhatnooneisstrongorcunningenoughtosubduetheothers–‘thedifferencebetweenman,andman’being‘notsoconsiderable,asthatonemancanthereuponclaimtohimselfanybenefit,towhichanothermaynotpretend,aswellashe’(Hobbes1981:183)–everyonewillbeconstantlyontheirguardagainst‘invasion’byothers.Bearinginmindthatwar‘consistethnotinBattellonely,ortheactoffighting;butinatractoftime,whereintheWilltocontendbyBattellissufficientlyknown’,itisaccuratetodescribethiscon-ditionasawar‘ofeveryman,againsteveryman’(Hobbes1981:185–86).Hobbes’sconclusionthat‘whatsoeverisconsequenttoatimeofWarre,whereeverymanisEnemytoeveryman’isalso‘consequentto’thestateofnaturefollows(Hobbes1981:186).Orsoheclaims.Infact,itispossibletoquestionthisreasoning,but,asIhavealreadysaid,IampostponingcriticalanalysisofHobbes’sargumentforalatersection.Forthemoment,letusjustnotethatthereare,infact,twomajorques-tionsraisedbyHobbes’saccountoflifeinthestateofnature.Thefirstrelatestohisunflatteringdescriptionofhumansasegocentric,power-hungrycreatures,anditissimply,isittrue?Thesecondis:Wouldlifeinthestateofnaturebeasnastyasheclaims,evenifhisdescriptionofhumannatureistrue?Frompremisetoconclusion:(i)contractsLetusnowturntoHobbes’sclaimthattheonlywaytoescapethestateofnatureistoestablishanabsolutesovereignbymeansofasocialcontract.Onthispoint,onethingIwouldparticularlylikeyoutoappreciateisjusthowDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012crucialthenotionofacontractistoHobbes’sphilosophy.Itshowsupinhisaccountofthesocialcontractitself,ofcourse,butforHobbestherearemorecontractsatstakethanjustthat.Infact,Leviathanisshotthroughwithtalkofcontracts.Takehisdescriptionofthestateofnatureitself.Aswesawatthebeginningofthischapter,itisn’tjust‘continuallfeare,anddangerofviolentdeath’(1981:186)whichmakelifeinthestateofnaturesointolerable.Itistheabsenceofeverythingwhichmakesexistencecivilised.InthepassageIquoted,Hobbesalsomentionsindustry,agriculture,trade,buildingandconstruction,‘knowledgeofthefaceoftheearth’,thearts,literatureand\n98Reasonandrevolutions‘society’(Hobbes1981).Noneoftheseissupposedtobepossibleinthestateofnature.Whynot?Hobbes’sansweristhatsuchactivitiesareonlypossiblewherepeoplecandrawupagreementsandmakecontractswitheachotherandwhere,havingdoneso,theycanbereliedupontokeeptheirsideofthebargain.Asthisisnotpossibleinthestateofnaturethen–orsoHobbesargues–neitheraretheactivitieshelists.Theconceptofacontractis,inthisway,centraltoHobbes’sargument.ThecentralityofcontractstoHobbes’sargumentappearsespeciallystrikingifyoucontrasthimwithearlierthinkers.InthetheoriesofPlatoandAristotle,forexample,contractshardlyfigure.Itcouldbearguedthatthereisareasonforthisdifference,onewhichisconnectedwithHobbes’s‘atomised’representa-tionofhumanexistence.IntheidealisedpoleisoftheGreekphilosophers–where‘virtue’orarete-istherule–eachpersonfulfilsthesocial/politicalrolethatheorsheisbestfittedbynaturetoperform.Bycontrast,inHobbes’sworldthereisnosuchnaturalorder.Onhisview,weare–bynature–self-interestedcentresofdesireandaversion,eachofusconstantlyjostlingforpositionwiththeothers.Thereisnonaturalsocialorderandnonaturallyordainedroleforanyofus.Atheorywhichrepresentshumanrelationsinthelatterwayrequiressomesortofdeviceforreconcilinginterestswhichwouldotherwiseconflict–butamoreartificialone.ForHobbes,thatdeviceisthecontract.Thinkofitthatwayanditseemspracticallyinevitablethatheshouldhaveattachedsuchprominencetocontracts.Thatsaid,letusnowaskwhyHobbesshouldhavethoughtitsoimpossibletobecomepartytoacontractinthestateofnature.Tothis,hisansweristhat,inthenormalcase,agreeingtoacontractisamatterofcommittingyourselftoafutureaction.Forexample,supposethatyouandIagreetoacontract.Iagreetodosuch-and-suchajobforyouifyouagreetopaymesuch-and-suchasumofmoney.Thepointisthat,whenwemaketheagreement,thethingsweagreetodoremaintobedone.Thismeans,inturn,thateachofushastotrusttheother.However,ifheisrightabouthumannature–thatis,ifthemostrationalthingforeachofustodoistopursueourself-interest(asdefinedbyhim)–thenneitherofuscantrusttheother.Intheexample,Ican’ttrustyoutopaymebecause,forallIknow,youmightfindanopportunitytodosomethingelsewiththemoney,somethingwhichismorelikelytohelpyouachieveyourself-interestedends.Likewise,youcan’ttrustmetodotheworkbecause,forallyouknow,self-interestmightleadmetodosomethingDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012else.AsHobbesputsit,IfaCovenantbemade,whereinneitherofthepartiesperformepresently,buttrustoneanother;intheconditionofmeernature,(whichisaconditionofWarreofeverymanagainsteveryman,)uponanyreasonablesuspition,itisVoyd.(Hobbes1981:196)Infact,‘voyd’istooweakaterm.Itisn’tjustthatcontractsagreedinthestateofnatureareautomaticallyrenderedvoid.Inthestateofnature,\nHobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathan99conditionsaresuchthatagreeingtoacontractwouldbepointless,becausenoonecouldevertrustanyoneelse.Frompremisetoconclusion:(ii)thelawsofnatureTheactorsinHobbes’s‘stateofnature’dramaareplayinga‘non-cooperative,non-zero-sumgame’,as‘rationalchoice’terminologywouldhaveit.Inthistypeofgamethereisabestoutcome,onewhicharationalpersonmustprefertootherpossibilities,butthebestoutcomeisactuallyruledoutwhereeveryindividual,judgingtheworldfromhisorherownstandpoint,actsrationally.(Quiteoften,suchtheoristsillustratetheirpointwiththehelpofaparticularexample,theexampleof‘theprisoner’sdilemma’.)5Earlier,Iremarkedthattheapplicationofrationalchoicetheorytoparticularsituationsquiteoftendemonstratesjustthis;thatalthougheveryindividualismakingthemostrationalchoiceheorshecanmakeinthecircumstances,theoutcomeissomethingnoonecouldrationallywant.Aneconomicrecession,awar,afuelshortage–allcanresultfromindividualdecisions,eachrationallymade.Rathersimilarly,inthestateofnature,the(absolutely)bestoutcomewouldresultifeveryoneweretolaydownhisorherarmsandagreenotto‘invade’,deceiveoractaggressivelytowardstheothers.Noonecouldrationallywantthestateofnaturetopersist.However,solongasnoonecantrustanyoneelsetokeepanagreement–andchooses,quiterationally,onthatbasis–thatisexactlywhatitdoes.Hobbessummarisesthisand,related,pointsintermsofasetof‘LawesofNature’which–inlinewithmycharacterisationofhimasarationalchoicetheorist–hedescribesas‘dictatesofReason’and‘Conclusions,orTheoremes’(Hobbes1981:216–17).Hobbesdefines‘lawofnature’asfollows:ALAWOFNATURE(LexNaturalis)isaPreceptorgeneralRule,foundoutbyreason,bywhichamanisforbiddentodo,that,whichisdestructiveofhislife,ortakethawaythemeansofpreservingthesame;andtoomitthat,bywhichhethinkethitmaybebestpreserved.(Hobbes1981:189)Hobbes’sfirstlawofnatureisthis:Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Thateveryman,oughttoendeavourPeace,asfarreashehashopeofobtainingit;andwhenhecannotobtainit,thathemayseek,anduse,allhelps,andadvantagesofWarre.(Hobbes1981:190)Itisnoticeablethattherearetwoelementstothisformulation.First,itdescribesabestpossibleoutcome,namely‘peace’,which–asHobbestellsus–‘everymanoughttoendeavour’.Butsecond,italsocontainsastatementofwhatitisrationaltodowhenthebestpossibleoutcomeisforeclosedbythebehaviourofothers.Inthelattercircumstances,itisrationalto‘seekanduse\n100Reasonandrevolutionsallhelpsandadvantagesofwar’.6Anequivalentpairingof‘bestpossibleoutcome’with‘mostrationalcoursetopursueinthecircumstances’iscon-tainedinthewayHobbesformulateshissecondlawofnature,whichisthis:Thatamanbewilling,whenothersaresotoo,asfarre-forth,asforPeace,anddefenceofhimselfeheshallthinkitnecessary,tolaydownthisrighttoallthings;andbecontented,withsomuchlibertyagainstothermen,ashewouldallowothermenagainsthimself.(Hobbes1981:190)Thistellsus–first–thatthebestpossibleoutcomewouldresultifeveryonewereto‘laydown[this]righttoallthings’(whicheveryonehasinthestateofnature)butthat–second–thiscanonlybedone‘whenothersaresotoo’.Wheretheyarenot,thebestpossibleoutcomeisforeclosed.Thethirdlawofnatureissimplerandmoredirect.Itisjust:ThatmenperformetheirCovenantsmade.(Hobbes1981:201)Inotherwords,‘keepyourcontracts’.Ishan’titemiseanddiscusseverysingleoneofHobbes’slawsofnature–thereare19,andthingscouldgetverytediouswereIeventotry.Instead,letusnowconsidertheroleplayedbythesovereigninthisscenario.Contractsenterthepictureheretoo,for,oncethesovereignhasbeeninstituted,sohavetheconditionswhichmakeitpossibletomakeandkeepcontracts.Aswehaveseen,inthestateofnaturemakingcontractswouldbeapointlessactivitybecausenoonecouldtrustotherpartiestoabargaintokeeptheirword.Theintroductionofthesovereignchangesthis.Thisisnotbecausethesovereign’sappearanceonthesceneisfollowedbyaradicalimprove-mentineveryone’smoralcharacter.Peopleremainjustasegocentricallymotivatedand‘diffident’astheywerebefore.Itisbecausethesovereignispreparedtouseforceagainstanyonewhostepsoutofline(thatis,ifheisdoinghisjobproperly,unlikeCharlesI).Thismeansthat,ifInowmakeacontractwithyou,Icantrustyoutokeepyourword,becauseIknowthatyouarescaredofthesovereignwhowill,inanycase,forceyoutosticktoit.Forthesamereason,youcannowtrustme.Hobbessummariseshispositionasfollows:Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012FortheLawesofNature(asJustice,Equity,Modesty,Mercy,and(insumme)doingtoothersasweewouldbedoneto)ofthemselves,withouttheterrourofsomePower,tocausethemtobeobserved,arecontrarytoournaturallPassions,thatcarryustoPartiality,Pride,Revenge,andthelike.AndCovenantswithouttheSwordarebutWords,andofnostrengthtosecureamanatall.ThereforenotwithstandingtheLawesofnature,(whicheveryonehaththenkept,whenhehasthewilltokeepthem,whenhecandoitsafely,)iftherebenoPowererected,ornotgreatenoughforoursecurity;everymanwillandmaylawfullyrelyonhisownstrengthandart.(Hobbes1981:223–24)\nHobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathan101‘CovenantswithouttheSwordarebutWords,andofnostrengthtosecureamanatall’and,alittlelater,‘Covenantsbeingbutwords,andbreath,havenoforcetooblige,contain,constrain,orprotectanyman,butwhatithasfromthepubliqueSword’(Hobbes1981:231).Itisinsuchpronounce-mentsthatthedistilledessenceofHobbes’spositioniscontained.Giventherolehissovereignisrequiredtoplay,itiseasytoappreciateHobbes’sinsistencethatthesovereignshouldhaveunbridledpowerandbepreparedtouseit.Frompremisetoconclusion:(iii)howthesovereignisestablishedTocompletethepictureofHobbes’sargument,wemustnowconsiderwhathethinkspeopledowhentheysubmitthemselvestotheauthorityofasovereignandtherebymovefromthestateofnaturetocivilsociety.Bywhatprocessisthisachieved?ToappreciateHobbes’saccount,weneedtounderstandadistinctionhedrawsbetween‘natural’and‘artificial’persons.Theformerconceptionisrelativelyunproblematic.Toexplainit,itshouldbesufficienttopointoutthatyouandIarebothnaturalpersons.Anartificialperson,inHobbes’ssense,iscreatedwhenonenaturalpersonauthorisesanothertoactashisorherrepresentative,or–toputitanotherway–inhisorherperson.7Inthissenseof‘represent’,alawyerrepresentsyou,oractsinyourperson,whenincourtanddefendingyourcase.Thelawyerisyour‘stand-in’sotospeak.Likewise,apoliticianrepresentsthepersonsofthoseinhisorhercon-stituencywhenspeakingatmeetingsofthegoverningassembly.Itisinthiswaythatpeople,havingtiredofthestateofnature’s‘inconveniences’,arepicturedasauthorisingasovereign–bethatsovereignasingle(natural)personoranassembly–to‘Presentthepersonofthemall,(thatistosay,tobetheirRepresentative)’(Hobbes1981:228)whentheyestablishacommon-wealthbyinstitution(oneofthetwomethodsHobbesdescribes).ThisisthepointinHobbes’snarrativeatwhichallpeoplelaydownthe‘righttoallthings’andallowthemselvesonlysomuchlibertyastheywouldallowothersagainstthemselves,asrequiredbythesecondlawofnature.Havingdonethat,they‘conferrealltheirpowerandstrengthupononeMan,orupononeAssemblyofmen,tobearetheirPerson’(Hobbes1981:227).ThegreatLeviathanis,thus,born.(TheotherformofcontractdescribedbyDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Hobbesiswhathecallscontractbyacquisition.Thisisadealmadebyadefeatedpeoplewiththeleader(s)ofaconqueringpower.Thesovereignpowerisacquiredbyforce.Butitmakeslittledifference.Hobbesremarksthatsovereigntyacquiredinthisway,‘differethfromSoveraigntybyInstitutiononelyinthis,That,menwhochoosetheirSoveraign,doitforfearofoneanother,andnotofhimwhomtheyInstitute:Butinthiscase,theysubjectthemselves,tohimtheyareafraidof’[Hobbes1981:252].Evenso,thecontractisjustasbindinginbothtypesofcase–orsoHobbeswouldhaveusbelieve.)\n102ReasonandrevolutionsDoesHobbes’sargumentwork?HavingcompletedmybriefoutlineofHobbes’sargument,Inowproposetogobackoverit,thistimeexaminingitforweakspots.AsIshallshow,thereareseveralpointsatwhichHobbesfailstomakethelogicalconnectionshewantstoestablish.Ithastobesaidthat,asphilosophersgo,thishardlymakeshimunusual;andnorismypurposeentirelynegativeandcritical.YoucouldsaythatIamtreatingHobbesasacasestudy.Inwhatfollows,Ishallconcentrateondifficultieswithhisargumentwhicharisefromthefactthatitisanexerciseinrationalchoicetheory;andunderstandingwheresuchanargumentcangowrongseemstomeaverygoodwaytodeepenourunderstandingofthistypeofargument.Thepremise:isHobbes’saccountofhumannaturetrue?Areweessentiallypower-hungryandegocentric,asHobbessaysweare?Well,itwasHobbes’sownbeliefthathecouldderivethetruthofhispremisefromatheoryaccordingtowhichthefundamentalcomponentsoftheuniverse,theunitsoutofwhicheverythingelseisconstructed,aresmall,imperceptible,motions.Whenitisappliedtohumanbehaviour,itissupposedtofollowfromthistheorythateachofusisakindofmachine,appetitebeingamovementtowardssomething,aversionamovementawayfromsomething,andsoon.Bearinmindthat,whenHobbeswaswriting,therewasnothingunusualaboutsuchambition.InHobbes’stime,manyphilosophersandphilosopherscientistsweretryingtoexplainthenatureoftheuniverseintermsoffundamentalcomponents.Forexample,justasHobbesthoughtthatallismotions(or‘endeavours’)soNewtonwastoclaim,laterinthecentury,thateverythingiscomposedofsmallhardcorpusclesoratoms.Hobbes’stheoryofmotionsmaywellappeararchaicthesedays,butinhisowntimesuchall-embracingexplanationswerethestuffofup-to-the-minutescientifictheory.Unfortunately,though,thatisnotareasonwhyweshouldacceptHobbes’sdescriptionofhumannature.However,IwouldliketosuggestherethatitispossibletoacceptHobbes’sdescriptionwhilerejectinghisownargumentforit.Inotherwords,youdon’thavetobelieveanysortofcosmologicaltheory–old-fashionedorotherwise–totakehisaccountofhumannatureseriously.AllyouneedtodoisrecognisethathisportraitissufficientlyaccurateasaDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012representationofthewaypeoplebehaveinpoliticalsituationsforittofigureinexplanationsofwhathappensinthosesituations.ThereisaparallelherebetweentheHobbesian‘politicalman’(orperson)andthe‘economicman’(orperson)whofiguresintextbooksofeconomictheory.8Economicmanbehaveswith100percenteconomicrationality.Whenfacedwithachoiceofalter-natives,economicmanalwaysdoeshisutmosttomaximisebenefitsandminimisecosts.(Forexample,howeverwealthyhemaybe,giventhechoicebetweenpurchasingatinofbeansat35penceandanotherat34pence,economicmanwillalwaystakea15-minutewalktopurchasethelatter,\nHobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathan103provided–ofcourse–thatintakingthewalkitselfhedoesnotincuraquan-tifiablecostofmorethanonepenny.)EconomicmanissuchanunattractivecharacterthatwereyouorItomeethimwewouldhatehimonsight.Butfortunately–orsoIhope–thereisnobodyexactlylikeeconomicman.Thatisnotthepoint,however.Economicmanisnotsomuchafictionasanabstraction,andthepointisthat,inthesituationswithwhicheconomictheoryisconcerned,ourbehaviourdoesresembleeconomicman’s.Infact,itresemblesitsocloselythattheoristsareabletoformulateviabletheoreticalprincipleswithitshelp,aswellaspredictthebehaviourofactualmarkets.Now,ifHobbes’sdescriptionofhumannatureisaccurate,thesamegoesfortherelationbetweenthatdescription,treatedasanabstraction,andhumanbehaviourinthesituationswithwhichpoliticaltheoryisconcerned.Atleast,thatishowweshouldtreatit–orsoIsuggest.(Ofcourse,whetherpeoplereallydobehavelikeHobbesian‘politicalman’eveninthosesituationsisafurtherquestion.Ileaveittoyou,thereader,todecideaboutthat.)Toillustratethepoint,takeHobbes’sclaimthateveryoneisprettymuchequalinpower.(Imentionedthisearlier.Seepage97.)Hereiswhathesays:Naturehathmademensoequall,inthefacultiesofbody,andmind;asthatthoughtherebeefoundonemansometimesmanifestlystrongerinbody,orofquickermindthananother;yetwhenallisreckonedtogether,thedifferencebetweenman,andman,isnotsoconsiderable,asthatonemancanthereuponclaimtohimselfbenefit,towhichanothermaynotpretend,aswellashe.(Hobbes1981:183)Now,ifyoutakewhatHobbessayshereatfacevalue,itisactuallyfalse.Imagineagroupofthreepeopleandsupposethatoneofthemhasmuchmorephysicalstrengththantheothertwo,thatheistheIncredibleHulk,say.Inthissituation,andcontrarytowhatHobbessays,itisobviousthattheHulkwouldhavethepowertosubduetheothersifhewantedto.Or,supposethattenpeoplearecompetingforaprizeinaquiz.Thesubjectisnuclearphysics.OnecompetitorisAlbertEinsteinandtheotherninehavebeenselectedthatafternoon,atrandom,fromamongsttheshoppersatthelocalsupermarket.Unlesssomethingfunnyisgoingon,Einsteinwillwinhandsdown.Noonewillbesomuch‘ofquickermind’thatheorshewillbeableto‘outwit’Einstein,soHobbeswouldbewrongaboutthiscasetoo.ButtheDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012pointisthatpolitics–thesubject–takeslittleifanyinterestinsuchsmallgroups.Typically,politicsisconcernedwiththerelationshipswhichholdbetweensocialclasses,nation-states,supportersofpoliticalpartiesandgroupsofsuchlikesize;thatis,withgroupswhichtendtobethousands,tensofthousands,millions,tensorhundredsofmillionsstrong.And,whenitcomestogroupsofthatsize,Hobbesisabsolutelyright.NoteventheIncredibleHulkcouldcontrolanentirepopulationwithonlythehelpofhisownstrengthorcunning.Insuchcases,itistrue,ashesays,that‘astothestrengthofbody,theweakesthasstrengthenoughtokillthestrongest,\n104Reasonandrevolutionseitherbysecretmachination,orbyconfederacywithothers,thatareinthesamedangerwithhimselfe’(Hobbes1981).Asageneralisation,then,Hobbes’sstatementissufficientlyaccuratetodescribehumanbehaviourinthecontextstowhichitismeanttoapply.Frompremisetoconclusion?ThedecisiontoquitthestateofnatureButifHobbes’sportraitofhumanpsychologyisaccurate–oraccurateenough–ifhispremiseistrue,whatofthemovefrompremisetoconclusion?BecauseHobbes’sargumentisasocialcontractargument,assessingthevalidityofitsinternalstructuremeansassessingthecredibilityofhisclaimthatpeoplereallywouldmakethechoiceshesaystheywould.Infact,itisnotsoobviousthattheywould,notevenifhumannatureisjustashedescribesit.AsIseeit,thereareseveralclaimsatissuehere.Tostartwith,thereistheclaimthatHobbesianpeoplereallywouldchoosetoleavethestateofnature,ratherthanremaininit.Eventhisisquestionable.Toseewhy,bearinmindthatasocialcontractargumentreliesonacontrastbetweentwoconditions:lifeinthestateofnatureandlifeunderasovereign.Tojustifytheexistenceofthestate,suchanargument,ifitistopersuadeus,mustshowthattheformerconditionisworsethanthelatter.Onlythenwouldpeoplehaveareasonformovingfromonesituationtotheother.Ifitcannotpersuadeusofthepoint,thenwemayaswellembraceanarchismandrejectthestatealto-gether.Thepointisthat‘worse’and‘better’arerelativeterms.Itcouldbethatneithersituationisterrific.Butthatisirrelevant.Allthatmattersisthatoneisworse,relativetotheotherone.So,eveniflifeinthestateofnaturewerejustasterribleasHobbesportraysit,itcouldstillbethecasethatlifeunderasovereign–especiallyanabsolutesovereign–wouldbeevenworse.(Wouldtheformerreallybeanyworsethanlifeunder…?Fillintheblankwiththenameofyourleastfavouritetyrant.)But–tomoveon–weneedn’tevensupposethatlifeinthestateofnaturewouldnecessarilybeasterribleasHobbesmakesitouttobe.Evenifhisaccountofhumannatureistrue,lifeinthestateofnaturemightnotbeasbadasallthat.Thatisbecausealotdependsonthe‘backgroundconditions’weassumetoprevail.Forexample,whatiftherearerelativelyfewpeople,andwhatifresourcesarerelativelyplentiful?Forexample,supposeyouareamemberofasmallgrouplivingattheedgeofavast,fertileplainandanothergrouplivesattheotherDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012edge.Thereislittlereasonforthinkingthatawarofallagainstallwouldariseinthissituation,astherewouldbelittleornothingforpeopletocompetefor.FerociouscompetitionofthesortHobbesenvisageswouldariseonlywhenresourcesbecamerelativelyscarceinrelationtothenumberofindividuals.Acontradiction?RationalchoiceandpowerNowforafurtherquestion:EvenifthemostrationalcourseofactionforHobbesianindividualstotakeistoquitthestateofnature,doesitfollow\nHobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathan105thattheonlyremedyforthestateofnature’s‘inconveniences’issubjectiontotheruleofanabsolutesovereignofthetypeHobbesprefers?Relatedtothis,itisnoticeablethatHobbestendstopresentuswithachoicebetweentwostarkalternatives.Thewayhetellshisstory,eitherweliveinastateofnatureorweareruledbyanabsolutesovereign.Therearenointermediatepossibi-lities.EvensystemsinwhichpowerislimitedordividedareportrayedbyHobbesasstepsontheslipperyslopewhichcanonlyleadusbacktotheabyss.Theconsequenceofthewantofabsolutepower–herepeatedlytellsus–is‘perpetuallwarreofeverymanagainsthisneighbour’(Hobbes1981:260).Now,ifthechoicefacingthemwereasclearcutasHobbessuggests,thenitis,atleast,arguablethathisindividualswould,iftheywererational,choosesubjectiontoanabsolutesovereign.Butifthingsarenotsostark,thenthelatteroptionlooksdistinctlyunattractivewhencomparedwithotherpossibilities.Forexample,ifitwereopentothemtochooseasystembasedonthedivisionofpowers,boundariescouldbedrawnbeyondwhichthesovereignwasnotpermittedtostep.Iftherewere,inaddition,democraticcontrols–periodicelections,forexample–thenthesovereigncouldbechangedifthatiswhatpeoplewanted.ThislooksfarmoreattractivethanthesystempreferredbyHobbes,wherethesovereign’srightsareunlimited,9andunderwhichthesovereign,havingbeenchosen,cannotberemoved.(Whymakeacommitmentfromwhichyoucouldneverescape?)Notonlythat,adivisionofpowersisjustonepossibility.Ratherthanquittingthestateofnature,itisarguablethatrationalindividualswouldchoosetojoin‘mutualprotectionagencies’,ratherlikeinsurancecompanies,whosefunctionwastoprotecttheirmembersandtoresolvedisputesontheirbehalf.10Aswehaveseen,itisHobbes’sviewthatsuchpossibilitiesareclosedoff.Hethinksthatonlyanabsolutesovereignwouldbestrongenoughtokeepothers‘inawe’,andtherebyensurethatcontractsarekeptandcivilisationpreserved.ButHobbescouldbewrong.Infact,itcanbearguedthathisinsistencethatonlyabsolutesovereignsarecapableofdoingthejobsovereignsaresupposedtodoinvolveshiminalogicalcontradiction,inwhichcasehisargumentfailsatesteverypurportedlylogicalargumentmustpass.Letmespellthisoutinmoredetail.Accordingtotheobjection,thereisacontradictionbetweenHobbes’sconclusion–thatonlyabsolutesovereignscandothejob–andoneofhispremises.ThisisthepremisewhichDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012statesthateveryoneisfairlyequalinpower,somuchsothat‘theweakesthasstrengthenoughtokillthestrongest,eitherbysecretmachination,orbyconfederacywithothers,thatareinthesamedangerwithhimselfe’(Hobbes1981:183).(Wediscussedthisearlier,butforadifferentreason.)Theobjectionstatesthat,ifthepremiseistrue,politicalpowercanonlyarisewheremanypeopleactinagreedandpredictableways.Fromthis,itisheldtofollowthatless-centralisedsystemsarenolessviablethanthesystemHobbesadvocates.Ifthisisright,itfollowsthatHobbes’sconclusionisinconsistentwithoneofhispremises.\n106ReasonandrevolutionsToappreciatetheobjection’sforce,imaginewhatwouldhappenifyouweretogoalongtoyournearestmajorroad,standinoneofthetrafficlanes,andraiseyourhandinanauthoritativegesture,clearlysignallingthatyouwantthetraffictostop.Ifyouwerelucky,carsandtruckswouldswervetoavoidyou,althoughyouwouldnodoubtbetreatedtosomeabuse.Ifyouwereunlucky,youwouldberunover.Nowcomparethiswithwhatwouldhappenifyouweretogodownthereinauniform,andtravellinginawhitecarwiththeword‘POLICE’inscribedontheside.Policeofficersdojustthat,andareabletomakethetrafficcometoahalt,justbymakingthesamegesture.Sohowisitthatapoliceofficercanstopthetrafficjustbyraisingahand,whereasyoucan’t?Thereisnoreasontobelievethattheaveragepoliceofficerisanystrongerthantheaveragepersongenerally,andcertainlynopoliceofficerisphysicallystrongenoughtostopaspeedingtruck,soitcan’tbeaquestionofbrutestrength.Canitbethatpoliceofficershavemagicpowers,then?No,ofcoursetheydon’t.Driversstopwhensignalledbythepolicebecausetheyknowwhatwillhappeniftheydon’t,andwhatwillhappeniftheydon’tisthatotherpeople,awholemultitude,willbehaveincertainways.Forastart,theofficerwhomadethe‘stop’gesturewillcallupotherofficerswhowillchasethemotoristandwhoarecapableofusingphysicalforcetostophim.Whenarrestedhecanbetakenbeforeamagistrate,whoseauthorityissupportedbyabureaucraticapparatusformakingsurethatpeoplepaytheirfines.Supportingthis,therewilllie,initsturn,asystemofprisons,andofficesandprisonsonlyfunctionassuchbecausethosewhoworkthemoperateincertainways(bysendingoutremindersandwarningstonon-payers,forexample,andbykeepinginmateslockedup).Otherwise,theywouldjustberooms.Asthisshows,thepoliceofficerhaspoweronlybecauseheorshecanrelyonawholenetworkofotherstobehaveinaregularandpredictablemanner.Now,thesamegoesforpoliticalpower,includingthepowerofasovereign.Infact,Hobbesiswellawareofthis.‘TheGreatestofhumanePowers’,hesays,isthatwhichiscompoundedofthePowersofmostmen,unitedbyconsentinoneperson,NaturallorCivillthathastheuseofalltheirPowersdependingonhiswill;suchasisthePowerofaCommowealthDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012(Hobbes1981:150)Actually,Hobbes’suseoftheword‘consent’hereistoostrong,andweshouldnotethis.Itisanexaggerationtodescribethepowerofthesovereignasrestingonthe‘consent’ofothers,asHobbesdoeshere,justasitwouldbeanexaggerationtodescribethepoliceofficer’spowerasarisingfromthe‘consent’ofothers.Atleast,itisanexaggerationif‘consent’istakentomean‘expressconsent’;thatis,consentwhichisopenlyandconsciouslygiven.Butinmyexample,theprisonofficersandotherswhobehaveinregularand\nHobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathan107predictablewaysandwhothereforesupportpoliceofficersintheexerciseoftheirpowerdonothavetogivetheirexpressconsentto,say,apoliceofficer’shavingsuch-and-suchapower(forexample,thepowertostoptraffic).Theyonlyhavetobehaveinregularandpredictableways,andwhereconsentisinvolveditneedonlybe‘weak’consentto,e.g.,workasaprisonofficerinreturnforsuch-and-suchawage.Still,evenwiththatreservation,theobjectionisleftunaffected.Itstatesthat,becauseitreliesonthepredictablebehaviourofothers,thepowerofanabsolutesovereignis,inthatrespect,nodifferentfromanyotherpoliticalpowerarrangement.Thus,ifpeoplecanconsenttoanabsolutesovereign–ifonlyintheweaksenseof‘consent’justoutlined–thentheycanequallywell‘consent’toasysteminwhichpowerisdivided.Becausebothtypesofsystemrestonagreement,thereisnoreasonforthinkingthattheformerisanymoreorlesspronethanthelattertodisintegration.So,eitherHobbesrejectshispremise–thatallpowerrestson‘consent’–orherejectshisconclusion,thattheonlyrationalthingtodoischooseanabsolutesovereign.Thatiswheretheinconsistencylies.(Personally,Iwouldgoforrejectingtheconclusion.)Ifthisobjectionisright,thingsareseriousforHobbes,foritisanobjectionwhichaffectstheverybasisofhisposition.Thecontract:realorhypothetical?Bynow,IhavesaidenoughtosuggestwhereweaknessesintheinternalstructureofHobbes’sargumentmaylie.Nowforamoregeneralquestion,onewhichrelatestothetypeoftheorythisis.Thatquestionis:Whatarewetomakeofthe‘socialcontract’onwhichsomuchofHobbes’sargument(andsomuchsubsequenttheory)hangs?Broadlyspeaking,therearetwopossibilities.Ontheonehand,itcouldbethatweareintendedtotakethesocialcontractstoryliterally;thatis,itcouldbethatwearesupposedtobelievethattherereallywasapasteventatwhichrealpeoplereallydidmakeanagreementtoestablishasovereignauthority.(Or–avariantonthesametheme–wecouldbemeanttobelievethattherehavebeenanumberofsuchevents.)Ontheotherhand,perhapstherewasneverarealcontractand–perhaps–wearemeanttoaccordthecontractapurelytheoreticalrole;thatistosay,perhapswearemeanttobelieveinahypotheticalcontract.Letustakeeachpossibilityinturn.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012So–first–whatiftherewasarealsocialcontract?Hobbes’s‘geometrical’approachmakesitunlikelythatheintendsustothinkofitthisway,butitisstillworthnotingthat,hadthisbeenhisintention,thenhisargumentmightwellhavecontainedthepotentialtoestablishoneoftheconclusionshewants.Thisistheconclusionthatwearemorallyobligedtoobeyalawwhenitisthecommandofanabsolutesovereign,evenif–onindependentgrounds–wemaydislikeordisapproveofthelawinquestion.(ThisisHobbes’sproposedanswertooneofpoliticalphilosophy’straditionalproblems–‘theproblemofpoliticalobligation’asitissometimescalled.)\n108ReasonandrevolutionsLetmeexplainthepointwiththehelpofastory.SupposethatPandQarenext-doorneighbours.Everysooften,P,whoisinbusiness,hastospendaweekorsotravellingabroad.EachtimePgoesaway,PasksQtolookafterandfeedP’sbelovedcat.Qagreesand,aftereachtrip,PreturnswithapresentforQ.(Thisisatokenofgratitude–abottleofwine,orwhatever.)Thisisaregularoccurrence.Ithasbeengoingonforyears,somuchsothatQhascometoexpectapresenteachtimePcomesback.Nowsupposethat,oneday,Preturnswithoutapresent.Qobjects,andexclaims,‘Whereismypresent?!’Tothis,P’sindignantresponseis,‘Wedon’thaveacontractyouknow!’Now,P’sresponseis–surely–correct.Toseewhy,considerjusthowdifferentthesituationwouldhavebeenifPandQhadactuallyagreedacontract.Supposethateachofthemhadsignedapieceofpaperstating,‘I,P,agreewithyou,Q,thatintheeventofmygoingonatrip…’,andsoon.Inthiscase,PisunderanobligationtoreturnwithapresentforQ,anobligationwhichwouldnotexistiftherewerenoactualcontract.ThatisbecauseitistheveryfactofP’shavingsigned–thefactthatthecontractisthereforereal–whichcreatestheobligation.Signingthecontractislikesaying,‘Ipromise…’.AsfortherelevanceoftheexampletoHobbes’sargument,itisthis:ifthereisanobligationtoobeythelaw,thentheremustbeareasonwhyI(likeeveryoneelse)ought(morally)toobeythelaw–bypayingmytaxes,forexample–evenwhenIaminclinedtobreakit.Now,Hobbesisclaimingthatthereissuchanobligation.Moreover,heisclaimingthatIoughttopaymytaxeswherethelawstatingthatIshouldisthecommandofanabsolutesovereign.Butfromwheredoesthisobligationarise?Ifitismeanttoarisefromacontract–ifthatisHobbes’sclaim–then,astheexampleshows,itcouldonlyarisefromarealcontract.Itfollows,asIamclaiming,thatitwouldhelphimagreatdealifthesocialcontractwere,itself,arealcontract.However,itisworthaddingherethatitwouldn’treallyhelphimthatmuch.Thereisafurthermajorproblemwithsocialcontracttheory,thefollowing.Evenifitcouldbeestablishedthatagroupofourancestorshadatapointintheremotepastmadeanagreementwhichcouldbedescribedas‘asocialcontract’–andthereisnoevidencewhatsoeverthatanysuchthingeverhappened–therewouldremaintheproblemofexplainingwhy,andhow,suchanagreementshouldbebindingonus.Supposethatmygreat-great-Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012great-great-grandfatherdiedowingyourgreat-great-great-great-grandmothermoney.DoesthatmeanIoweyoumoney?Or,supposethatwecanbothtraceourancestrybacktotheNormanConquestin1066.IamadirectdescendantoftheNormanaristocratwhoconfiscatedlandwhich,asitturnsout,belongedtotheSaxonfromwhomyouaredirectlydescended.DoesthatmeanthatIshouldgiveyoumyhouse?DoesitmeanthatIshouldgiveyoumyball-pointpen?ItisbynomeansobviousthatIshoulddoeither,becauseitisbynomeansobviousthatamoralobligation–includingtheobligationtokeepacontract–istransmittedgeneticallyfromgenerationtogeneration.\nHobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathan109AsthephilosopherDavidHume,whowasscepticalofthewhole‘socialcontract’idea,putit,‘thissupposestheconsentofthefatherstobindthechildren,eventothemostremotegenerations’and,asheadded,‘itisnotjustifiedbyhistoryorexperienceinanyageorcountryoftheworld’(Hume1953:47).Whatoftheotherpossibility,thepossibilitythat,forHobbes,thesocialcontractishypotheticalinitsstatus.(AsIhavesuggested,outofthetwoviewsIdistinguished,itwouldcertainlybefairertoattributethisonetohim.)Toreturn,foramoment,tothestoryofPandQ,youcouldsaythat,withtheirregularbehaviour–Pgoingaway,Qfeedingthecat,Pcomingbackwithapresent–PandQarebehavingasiftherewasacontractbetweenthem.Ifyouwantedto,youcouldaddthatitisintherationalself-interestofeachtobehavethatway–Q’sreasonforfeedingthecatistogetthepresent;P’sreasonforbringingthepresentistokeepQsweet,sothatQwillfeedthecatnexttime.Byanalogy,ifLeviathanismainlyanexerciseinrationalchoicetheory,thenperhapsitwouldbefairertoHobbes’sintentionstothinkofhimasstatingthat,ifpeopleactrationally,theywillbehaveasiftherehadbeenasocialcontract?Well,perhapsitwould,butthetroublewithinterpretingHobbesthatwayisthatitenmesheshisargumentinadifferentsetofdifficulties.Forexample,itfaceshimwiththeproblemofexplainingwhyanyoneshouldobeyalaw(i.e.acommandofthesovereign)whenitseemsquiteapparentthatthereisnogoodreasonarisingfromself-interestfordoingso.Takeanexampleofatrivialmisdemeanour.Supposethatitislateatnight.Youhavebeenvisitingfriendsandyouarewalkinghome.Youurgentlyneedtosleepas,thenextmorning,youwillhavetogetupandgotowork.Theshortestroutehomeinvolvescuttingthroughthepark,butthereisaby-law:‘KEEPOFFTHEGRASS–BYORDER,THESOVEREIGN’.Shouldyouobey?Thereisnoonearoundtoseeyou,soyouwon’tbesettingabadexample,andjustonepersonwalkingacrossthegrassjustonceishardlylikelytodamageit.Youwouldbebreakingthelawifyoudid,butwhynotgoaheadandwalkacrossthegrassanyway?Iftherehadbeenarealcontract,andonewhichisbindingonus,Hobbescouldclaimthatwemorallyoughttoobeythelaw,eveninthiscase.Butwhatifthereisnorealcontract?Behavingasiftherewasacontractmeanskeepingoffthegrassevenso,butwhyshouldyou?Hobbesthinksthatwearerationalcreatureswhoaremotivatedbyself-interest,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012sohewouldhavetoshowthat,despitefirstappearances,itwouldneverthelessbeinyourself-interesttokeepoffthegrassandtakethelongwayhome.And,sofarasIcansee,hecouldonlydemonstratethepointbyassumingthateverylaw-breakingactisastepontheslipperyslopebacktothestateofnature;and,asheconstantlyremindsus,noworsecalamitycouldpossiblybefallus.ButifthatisHobbes’sargument,itisunconvincing.Topersuadeus,Hobbeswouldhavetodemonstratethatifyouwalkacrossthegrassyouwouldincreasethelikelihoodofsociety’scollapsingintobarbarism,thata\n110Reasonandrevolutionswarofeverymanoneverymanwouldensue,andsoon.Inshort,Hobbeswouldbeforcedtofallbackon(whatIcall)a‘whatifeverybodydidit?’argument,andthetroublewithsuchargumentsisthattheyusuallyfailthroughmakingfalsefactualassumptions.Inotherwords,forsuchanargumenttoworkithastobereasonablycer-tainthatpeoplereallywilldoit(whatever‘it’maybe).Inthecaseofmy‘crossingthepark’story,thismeansthatHobbeswouldhavetoconvinceusthatbycrossingthegrassyouincreasethelikelihoodthateverybody(oratleastaconsiderablenumberofpeople)woulddothesameasyou.Ofcourse,somethingcouldhangonwhat‘doingthesamething’meanshere.Incrossingthegrassyouboth‘crossthegrass’and‘breakthelaw’.Itmakeslittledif-ferenceinthiscase,though.Totakethefirstpossibility.Itisnodoubttruethatifeverybody,orasubstantialnumberofpeople,turnedupatyourlocalparkandstartedwalkingaboutonthegrass,thelawnwouldsuffer.But,inthestoryasItoldit,itisprettycertainthatthisisnotgoingtohappen.(Itislateatnight.Thereisnoonearoundtoseeyou,sootherswillnotbeencouraged.)Likewise,wecanbeequallyconfidentthat,ifeveryoneweretobreakanylawtheyfeltlikebreaking,whenevertheyfeltlikeit,civilisationwouldcollapse.But,ifwearetobelieveHobbesweneedareasonforthinkingthatyourwalkingacrossthegrasswillencourageageneraldisrespectforthelaw.However,thereisnosuchreason.Hobbes’spro-‘lawandorder’argumentassumesthatmostpeopleareincapableofdistinguishingtrivialmisdemeanourssuchaswalkingonthegrass–or,say,exceedingthespeedlimitby5mphonasunnydaywhenthereishardlyanytrafficonthemotorway–and‘rapine’,‘revenge’andsuchlikeseriousandevildeeds.Butthereisnoreasontoassumeanysuchthing.Hobbes’slegacyInthischapter,IhaveconcentratedondisplayingthewayHobbes’sargument–construedasanexerciseinrationalchoicetheory–isstructured.AsIthinkIhavejustshown,outofthetwomostsympatheticinterpretationstowhichthatargumentisopen,neitherallowsHobbestoestablishtheconclusionhewants.Doesthismeanthathisphilosophycanbeignoredordismissed?Abso-lutelynot.LetmeaddthatIamonlytoowellawareofhoweasyitcanbeforsomesmartypantsphilosophyteachertoshowofftoacrowdbytakingaDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012classicargument,suchasHobbes’s,andostentatiouslytearingitintolittlepieces.EveryoneisleftwonderingwhyanyoneeverbotheredtoreadHobbesinthefirstplace.Thisapproachisguiltyofseveralfalsifications.Foronething,itmisrepresentsphilosophybytreatingcertainarguments–smarty-pants’sown–asconclusivewhen,inreality,theyarejustasprovisionalaseveryotherargument.Italsoignoresthefactthatamajorworkofphiloso-phylikeLeviathanismorethanjustasetofarguments.Itisalsoaworkofimagination,andspecificarguments,orgroupsofthem,canquiteoftenbesubsidiarytoawork’sguidingconception.\nHobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathan111Thatsaid,whathaveweinheritedfromHobbes?Iwouldsaythatthemostvaluableitemsinhislegacyare,first,anapproachtopoliticalphilosophyand,second,avision.Theformeristhesocialcontractapproach.Hobbesmayhavebeenthefirstwritertopresentalengthy,developed,socialcontractargument;buthisgifttolatergenerationsisnotjustthat.Itisthat,inLeviathan,wehaveaworkingexampleofamethodwhichispregnantwithpossibility.Thepointisamplydemonstratedbythewaysinwhichlaterphilosophersweretoworkandreworkthesocialcontractidea.Asforthevision,alongwiththesocialcontractapproachtheregoesawayofrepresentingfundamentalaspectsoftherelationshipswhichholdbetweenindividualsthemselves,andbetweenindividualsandinstitutionssuchasthestate.Onewaytothinkofthestateofnatureisasaschematic,almostadiagrammatic,representationoftheformthoserelationshipstake.Differentphilosopherswillrepresentthemdifferently,ofcourse,but–aswehaveseen–forHobbesthebasicformofhumanrelationshipiscontractual.InLeviathan,individualsareportrayedashaving‘desires’,wants,needs,interestsandsoonwhichinevitablyconflict,andasseekingresolutionsthroughcontractualagreement.Itisnottheonlywaytoportraythehumancondition,butnorisitsillyorpatentlyinaccurate.Arguably,itisaportraitofourconditionwhichispeculiarlyappropriatetomodern(i.e.post-medieval)times.Finally,somethingwhichhasnotsurvivedovertimeisHobbes’snotoriety.Itishardformodernreaderstoappreciatebut,duringhislifetime,hisworkwasregardedasshockingbymany,scandalouseven.Whyshouldthishavebeen?Theanswerisnotthatheadvocatedrulebyanabsolutesovereign.Thatviewwouldhavebeencommonplaceinaperiodwhenmonarchsroutinelyclaimedtorulebydivineright.(Inthisconnection,itisnoticeablethatHobbessaysagreatdealtosuggestthat,sofarasheisconcerned,thesovereign’sabsolutepowerisdistinctfromarbitrarypower;thatthesovereigncannotsingleanindividualoutforspecialpunishment–orforpreferentialtreatment–simplyforconvenience,oronawhim,orjustbecausehehap-penstohavetakenadisliketothatindividual.)11Onthecontrary,totheextentthatHobbesscandalisedpublicopinion,hedidsobysubvertingareceived,conventional,view;theviewthattheactionsofthesovereignarelimitedbyanindependentlydeterminablenaturallaw,institutedbyGod.(Thisistheviewoutlinedintheworkof‘naturallawtheorists’suchasSamuelPufendorfandHugoGrotius.)12InEngland,thisconventionalpictureDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ofthingswasfurtherreinforcedbyaconstitutionalismaccordingtowhichthepowerofasovereignshouldbeheldincheckorbalancedbythepeople.Hobbessubvertedthisinanumberofways.Forexample,bymakingthesovereigntheinterpreterofGod’slawheappearedtodenytheformer’ssub-serviencetothelatter.Nodoubt,itwasthiswhichledtothesuspicionofatheismunderwhichHobbesfell.Thenagain,Hobbes’sroyalismnotwith-standing,therewasthefactthathisargumentcouldeasilyhavebeenusedtosupportCromwell’srule.(Whatdiditmatterwhowasincharge,providedthatpersonbehavedasastrongsovereignshould?)\n112ReasonandrevolutionsInthenextchapter,weturntoatextinwhichthemoreconventionalviewoftherelationshipbetweennaturallawandpoliticalauthorityisrevivedandreworked.Ironically,itisalsoaprogressiveworkinwhichthefoundationsofthemodernworldviewarelaid.Morethanthat,itdeservestoberanked,foritsinfluence,withasmallnumberofworld-historicaltexts:theBible,theKoran,Marx’sCapital,Darwin’sOriginofSpecies,andahandfulofothers.ThetextinquestionisJohnLocke’sSecondTreatiseofCivilGovernment.SuggestionsforfurtherreadingHobbesTheliteratureonHobbescontainsinterpretationsofhisworkwhicharerelativelycontroversial.ExamplesareHowardWarrender’sThePoliticalPhilosophyofHobbes(1957)andLeoStrauss’sThePoliticalPhilosophyofHobbes(1963).WarrenderfocusesuponHobbes’stheoryofobligationandconcludesthathisinterpretationofnaturallawtheoryismoretra-ditionalthanhasbeengenerallysupposed.StraussdiscussesHobbes’srelationshiptoseventeenth-centuryscienceandarguesthatitsinfluenceonhispoliticalthoughthasbeenoverplayed.(ItshouldbeobviousthatIagreewithneitherWarrendernorStrauss.)C.B.Macpherson’sThePoliticalTheoryofPossessiveIndividualism(1964)tracestheoriginsofmodernjustificationsof‘possessivemarketsociety’backtoHobbes’swork,andD.P.Gauthier’sTheLogicofLeviathan(1969)concentratesonthe‘rationalchoice’structureofHobbes’sargument.IparticularlyenjoyedJ.W.N.Watkins’silluminatingHobbes’sSystemofIdeas(1973).RichardTuck’sHobbes:AVeryShortIntroduction(2002)isalsogood.ThecivilwarwasbynomeansthefirstpoliticalupheavaltohaverockedEngland,butitwasoneofthefirsttohavetakenplacewhenpeoplewere,generallyspeaking,literate.Thequantityofpoliticallit-eraturedatingfromthatperiodisimmense.AninterestingcollectionisA.S.P.Woodhouse,ed.,PuritanismandLiberty(1974).AnenjoyablediscussionofliteraturewhichwasspecificallyaimedatHobbesisJohnBowle’sHobbesandhisCritics(1951).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Notes1Thewaymore-recentphilosophershavetendedtoconcentrateuponthisaspectofHobbes’sargumentexemplifiesaphenomenontowhichIreferredinchapter4,namelythe(perfectlyreasonable)tendencyofcontemporaryphilosopherstodevotetheirattentiontothoseaspectsofpastworkwhichreflecttheirownpreoccupations.Itexplainswhyphilosophers,butnothistor-ians,havetendedtoignoreLeviathan’ssecondandthirdbooks.Theseareentitled,respectively,‘OfaChristianCommon-wealth’and‘OftheKingdomeofDarknesse’.\nHobbes:raisingthegreatLeviathan1132AtonepointinhisSecondTreatiseofCivilGovernmentLocketetchilyrespondstothesuggestionthattheremayhavebeennosocialcontractwiththeremarkthat‘ifwemaynotsupposeMenevertohavebeenintheStateofNature,becausewehearnotmuchoftheminsuchaState,wemayaswellsupposetheArmiesofSalmanasser,orXerxeswereneverchildren,becausewehearlittleofthem,tilltheywereMen,andimbodiedinArmies’(Locke1964:II,101).Inotherwords,theremusthavebeenasocialcontract,andLockeisnotgoingtobeswayedbymerelackofevidence.3Theexpression‘no-statesituation’isRobertNozick’s.4Althoughsocialcontracttheoryisaformofrationalchoicetheory,theconversedoesnotapply.Notallrationalchoicetheoryissocialcontracttheory.Forexample,wheneconomistsseektoderivegeneraleconomiclawsfromaconsiderationofwhatrationalpeoplewoulddoinmarketsituations–mainlywhentheybuyandsell–theyareconductinganexerciseinrationalchoicetheory.However,itwouldbewrongtodescribethisassocialcontracttheory.5JohnRawlsgivesthefollowingexampleofaprisoner’sdilemma.‘[Thus]imaginetwoprisonerswhoarebroughtbeforetheattorneygeneralandinterrogatedseparately.Theybothknowthatifneitherconfessestheywillreceiveashortsentenceforalesseroffenceandspendayearinprison;butthatifoneconfessesandturnsstate’sevidence,hewillbereleased,theotherreceivingaparticularlyheavytermoftenyears;ifbothconfesseachgetsfiveyears.Inthissituation,assumingmutuallydisinterestedmotivation,themostreasonablecourseofactionforthem–thatneithershouldconfess–isunstable.…Toprotecthimself,ifnottotrytofurtherhisowninterests,eachhasasufficientmotivetoconfess,whatevertheotherdoes.Rationaldecisionsfromthepointofviewofeachleadtoasituationwherebothprisonersareworseoff’(Rawls1971:269n).6HowardWarrendergivesaratherdifferentexplanationforthislawofnature’stwo-partstruc-ture.ItisWarrender’sthesisthatHobbesiswritingwellwithinthenaturallawtraditionaccordingtowhichthesovereignismorallyboundtopromulgatelawswhichfallwithintheremitofthenaturallaw.(ThisiscontrarytothereceivedviewofHobbes.)AccordingtoWarrender,onepartofHobbes’sformulationstatesanobligationthatwehaveundernaturallaw,theobli-gationto‘endeavourpeace’.Thesecondpartstatesthatweareonlyboundtoactontheobli-gationwhenthereis‘hopeofobtainingit’.AccordingtoWarrender,itisHobbes’sviewthat,inthestateofnature,thelatter‘validatingcondition’isabsent.Forthis,seeWarrender(1957).SeealsoTaylor(2009)[1938].Iamunconvinced,butitwouldbebeyondthescopeofthischaptertoarguethepoint.7Onthisdefinitionof‘naturalperson’arobotwouldbeanaturalperson.Still,I’mnotsurethatcomplicationwouldhaveoccurredtoHobbes.8Here,Ihavedecidedtostickto‘economicman’ratherthanusethephrase‘economicperson’.9InHobbes’sscenario,thesovereignhimselfisnotapartytothecontract,whichsuggeststhathecandowhateverhelikes.However,seealsonote10below.10ThisisarguedbyRobertNozickinAnarchy,State,andUtopia.SeeNozick1974:PartOne.11Hobbes’ssovereignisnotHitlerorStalin,andHobbesinsiststhatjusticerequiresequity.Forhim,itisarequirement‘fromhim,orthemthathavetheSoveraignPower,thatJusticebeequallyadministred’(1981:385).‘TheInequalityofSubjects’,hewrites,‘hasnomoreplaceinthepre-senceofTheSoveraign;thatistosay,inaCourtofJustice,thantheInequalitybetweenKings,andtheirSubjects,inthepresenceoftheKingofKings’(Hobbes1981).LiketherequirementforDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012absolutesovereigns,thisbeliefinequalitybeforethelawispresentedasalogicaloutcomeofHobbes’sargument.ExactlyhowthissquareswithotherpartsofHobbes’sargumentisnotaquestionIshallconsiderhere.12BothPufendorfandGrotiusbelievedinadivinelyinstitutednaturallaw.Grotiusisbestknownastheauthorofoneoftheearliesttreatisesoninternationallaw,ProlegomenatotheLawofWarandPeace(Grotius1957).\n7LockeandthemodernorderForaroughindicationofJohnLocke’simportancetothehistoryofpoliticalthought,youneedonlylisttheconclusionshesetsouttoestablish.First,Lockeholdsthatwearefundamentallyequal.Nooneisanyoneelse’snaturalsuperiorornaturalinferior.Second,andcloselyrelatedtothis,Lockeholdsthatwehavecertainfundamentalrights.Third,heclaimsthattheserightscruciallyincludetherighttolifeandtherighttoliberty.(Nowadays,suchrightstendtobelabelled‘humanrights’.Lockecallsthem‘naturalrights’.)Fourth,Lockeholdsthatnogovernmentislegitimateunlessitremainsinplacewiththeconsentofthegoverned,somuchsothatwhenthatconsentiswithdrawnthepeoplehavearighttorebel,tooverthrowthegovernment(usingviolenceifnecessary)andtoreplaceitwithanother.Bynow,suchviewsareorthodox.TherecanbefewwhodonotclaimtorespectprinciplessimilartoLocke’s–whodonotclaimtorecognisethe‘humanrights’ofothers,forexample–evenamongstthosewhoflouttheminpractice.ButinLocke’stimethereweremanywhowouldhaveconsideredhisSecondTreatiseofCivilGovernmenttobedangerousandsubversive(Locke1993).Locke’spoliticalphilosophyisimportantbecauseitisoneofthefirstseriousattemptstoarticulatetheprinciplesIjustlistedwithinthecontextofaphilosophicaltheory,therebysupplyingthemwithaparticularinterpreta-tionandsupportingthemwithanintellectualdefence.Itwouldbenoexaggeration–ornotmuchofone–todescribehimasthepoliticalphilosopherwholaidthemoralfoundationsofthemodernworldview.NorshouldweforgetthatLockewasoneofthefirstphilosopherstoelaborateanargumentindefenceofprivateproperty.ThisisathemeDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012whichfrequentlyrecurswithinpoliticalargumentstakingplaceinourowntime.Notallmodernpoliticalphilosophersbelievethereisarightofprivateownership,ora‘naturalrighttoproperty’asLockecallsit.Nevertheless,onerough-and-readywaytodistinguishmodern‘isms’–liberalismfrom,say,socialismorconservatism–isintermsofthewaysupportersofthoseposi-tionsthinkthatpropertyoughttobedistributed.(Toputitbroadly,socialiststendtofavourtheredistributionofproperty,whereasconservativesdonot.)Morethanthat,thereare,evennow,philosopherswhotakeLockeanandanti-Lockeanpositionsonthesubjectofproperty.1(Locke’sdefenceofproperty\nLockeandthemodernorder115is,insomeways,separablefromtherestofhisargument.Ihavemadeitthesubjectofaseparatechapter,thefollowing.)Inshort,wehaveplentyofverygoodreasonsforpayingattentiontoLocke’spoliticalphilosophy;andbecause–inadditiontoeverythingIhavementionedsofar–theSecondTreatiseisanexerciseinsocialcontracttheory,therightplacetostartiswithLocke’saccountoflifeinthestateofnature.ThestateofnatureLikeHobbes,Lockeportraysthestateofnatureasaconditionfromwhichpoliticalauthorityandthepowertoenforceitareabsent.Thathastobesofor,withinthecontextofasocialcontracttheory,itistruebydefinitionthatthestateofnatureisapolitical.Butthatiswherethesimilaritybetweenthetwophilosophersends.Forexample,whereasHobbesthinksthatlifewithoutauthoritycanonlybeinsecureandbleak,Lockeismoreinclinedtostressitspositivefeatures.‘Thestateallmenarenaturallyin’,hewrites,is‘astateofperfectfreedomtoordertheiractions,anddisposeoftheirpossessionsandpersonsastheythinkfit,withintheboundsofthelawofnature,withoutaskingleave,ordependinguponthewillofanyotherman’(Locke1993:II,4).2NordoesLockeequatethestateofnaturewiththestateofwar,the‘plaindifference’betweenthetwobeing,inhisopinion,‘asfardistant,asastateofpeace,goodwill,mutualassistance,andpreservation,andastateofenmity,malice,violence,andmutualdestructionareonefromanother’(Locke1993:II,19).So,whereasforHobbesthestateofwarissimplytheconditionofdefensivemutualsuspicionwhichresultswhenauthorityisabsent,sofarasLockeisconcernedyouonlygetastateofwarwhenonepersondeliberatelysetsouttodestroyanother’slibertyandlife.Waris‘adeclareddesignofforceuponthepersonofanother’(Locke1993:II,19).UnlikeHobbes,Lockeclearlybelievesthat,generallyspeaking,peoplearecapableof‘livingtogetheraccordingtoreason,withoutacommonsuperioronEarth’(Locke1993:II,19).ThelawofnatureButoneofthemoststrikingdifferencesbetweenLockeandHobbesisthat,sofarasLockeisconcerned,peoplehaverights,dutiesandobligations,evenDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012inthestateofnature,wherethereisnocivilauthority.‘[But]thoughthisbeastateofliberty’,hewrites,‘yetitisnotastateoflicence’for‘thestateofnaturehasalawofnaturetogovernit,whichobligeseveryone’(Locke1993:II,6).ThiscontrastssharplywithHobbes’sviewthat,withinthestateofnature,thereisonlya‘rightofnature’whichis‘theLibertyeachmanhath,tousehisownpower,ashewillhimself,forthepreservationofhisownlife’.Inotherwords,everyoneisentitledtowhattheycangrabandholdonto,byforceifnecessary(Hobbes1981:189).Hobbesmightaswellhavestatedthatthereare,innature,norightsatall.Locke’sidea–thatwearemorallybound\n116Reasonandrevolutionsbya‘lawofnature’–isquitedifferent,andbeforewegoanyfurtherweshouldconsideritsmainfeatures.Tobeginwithitiscrucialtograspthedistinctionbetweenthenaturallaw,asitisconceivedbyLockeandothers,andthecivillaw.3Civillawis,quitesimply,thelawasweallknowit.Itisthelawyouwillfindtran-scribedinstatutebooks,orembodiedinthedecisionsmadebymagistratesandjudgesastheyfollowprecedent.Thecontentofthecivillawiswhateverthelaw-makingauthoritiesdecidethatitshouldbe.Itmayspecifythat,asacitizen,youhavecertainrights,butthesewillbe(mere)legalrights;thatistherightswhich,asithappens,thecivillawspecifiesyoushouldhave.Likewiseforobligations.Thisbeingso,itisclearthatthecivillawcanvaryovertime,orfromstatetostate.Totakeacontemporaryexample,formostroadsintheUKandAustraliayouhavearighttodriveontheleftandadutynottodriveontheright.Bycontrast,inFranceandtheUSA,thingsaretheotherwayround.Thereisnorealpointtothesedifferences.Itisjustthat–forwhateverreason–therelevantauthoritieshappentohavedecidedthatthingsshouldbethatway.Notice,too,that–becausethecivillawis,inthisrespect,amatterofconvention–thereisnoreasonforthinkingthatyourlegalduties,asspecifiedbythatlaw,mustcoincidewithyourmoralduties.Totakeanobviousexample:underNazilawyouhadalegaldutytorevealthewhereaboutsofanyoneJewishwhoyouknewtobeinhiding.However,thereisnowaythiscouldbecountedamoralduty.Inthiscase,itwouldbeyourmoraldutytobreakthecivillaw.Bycontrastwiththecivillaw,thenaturallaw(ifthereissuchathing)isbindingoneveryoneequally,wherevertheyliveandunderwhateverauthority.Itisheldtoapplyevenwherethereisnocivilauthorityand,hence,nocivillaw.Thenaturallawisthemeasureofthecivillawand,wheretheformerisviolatedbythelatter,youmaybeentitledtobreakthecivillaw.Youmayevenbemorallyobligedtobreakit,foryourrightsanddutiesasdefinedbynaturallawareyourmoralrightsandduties.Thenaturallawis,thus,themorallaw.Toputitanotherway,itismoralityconstruedonthemodeloflaw.Fromthis,Ithinkitshouldbeclearhowtheideathatthereisalawofnature–alawwhichtranscendsthecivillaw–canserveasapowerfulcri-ticalweapon.Thus,ifthereissomeobjectionableregimewhichis,say,denyingvotestoblacks,oreducationtowomen,orill-treatinganethnicminoritygroup,ithelpsyoucriticiseitifyoucanarguethatitisguiltyofDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012violatingalawofnaturebywhichweareallbound.(Likewise,shouldyoupreferthecontemporaryrhetoric,ithelpsyoucriticisetheregimeifyoucanarguethatitisguiltyofhumanrightsviolations.)Ofcourse,suchbehaviourmaybeperfectlylegalsofarastheregime’s(civil)legalsystemisconcerned.Itmayevenbeconsideredacceptablebyasizeableproportionofthepopu-lation.But,ifyoucanarguethatitviolatesalawofnature,youcancondemnitevenso.4However,thatsaid,theideathatmoralitycanbeconstruedonthemodeloflawalsohasitsdifficulties.Thisbecomesapparentonceyoustarttopress\nLockeandthemodernorder117theanalogybetweencivilandnaturallaw.Forexample,thereisthefairlyfundamentalquestionofhowwecanknowwhatthelawrequires.Inthecaseofcivillawitisarelativelystraightforwardmattertofindthisout.Youcanconsulttherelevantlaw-book.Failingthatyoucanphonealawyer.Buthowdoyoufindoutwhatthenaturallawrequires?If,likeLocke,youthinkthatthenaturallawisthecommandofGod,thenyoucouldtryconsultingaholytext.Butholytextsarenotoriouslyopentointerpretationand,inanycase,onlythefollowersofthereligionstowhichtheyareholyregardthemasauthoritative,soyouwouldbefacedwiththeproblemofexplainingtothosewhodonotshareyourbeliefswhytheyshouldtakeanynoticeofthem–andyoucan’tphoneGodeither.Equality,libertyandrightsHowdoesLockeresolvethisdifficulty?Well,Lockebelievesthatthecontentofthenaturallawcanbediscoveredbyreason.Forexample,takethefollowingcrucialpassage.Lockeopensbywritingofthestateofnaturethatitis:astatealsoofequality,whereinallthepowerandjurisdictionisreciprocal,noonehavingmorethananother:therebeingnothingmoreevident,thatcreaturesofthesamespeciesandrankpromiscuouslyborntoallthesameadvantagesofnature,andtheuseofthesamefaculties,shouldalsobeequaloneamongstanotherwithoutsubordinationorsubjection,unlessthelordandmasterofthemall,shouldbyanymanifestdeclarationofhiswillsetoneaboveanother,andconferonhimbyanevidentandclearappointmentundoubtedrighttodominionandsovereignty.(Locke1993:II,4)Inthispassage,Lockeisarguingthatthereisnonaturalcharacteristicbymeansofwhichonepersoncanbedistinguishedfromanotherandthattherebyrendersitevidentthattheformerisentitledtoexertauthorityoverthelatter.Ofcourse,thereareplentyofnaturaldifferencesbetweenus.Whenitcomestotheexerciseofcertainskills–philosophyorfootball–someofusarebetterormoreadeptthanothers.Thisisnottomentionobviousnaturaldifferencesinage,sex,colourandsoon.ButLocke’spointisthat,whenitcomestomoralstatus,thesejustdon’tcount.Weare‘equaloneDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012amongstanotherwithoutsubordinationorsubjection’.AsLockeseesit,itispartlyaquestionofwhatGodmusthaveintended.Thereisno‘manifestdeclarationofhiswill’bywhichthe‘lordandmaster’ofusallhasset‘oneaboveanother’.Still,youdon’thavetobelieveinGodtoaccepthisfundamentalpoint.Further,sinceitisthelawofnature’sfoundationalprinciplethatweareeachboundtorecogniseothersasequals,itfollowsquitedirectlythatweeachhavecertainfundamental‘natural’rights,notablyarighttolifeandarighttoliberty.Infact,youcouldsaythatthetwostatements–the\n118Reasonandrevolutionsstatementthatwearebasicallyequalandthestatementthatwehavenaturalrightstolifeandliberty–arejusttwodifferentwaysofmakingthesamepoint;forwhatcanitbetorespectothersasequals,ifitisnottorecognisethattheyhavelivesoftheirowntolive?Andwhatcanitbetointerferewithsomeone’slibertyorlife,ifitisnottosubordinatethatpersontoone’sownarbitrarywill?(AsLockeremindsuslater,tobefreeis‘nottobesubjecttotheinconstant,uncertain,unknown,arbitrarywillofanotherman’(Locke1993:II,22).)ThecoreofLocke’sargument,asIhaveoutlineditsofar,iswellsummarisedbyLockehimself,asfollows:Thestateofnaturehasalawofnaturetogovernit,whichobligeseveryone:andreason,whichisthatlaw,teachesallmankindwhowillbutconsultit,thatbeingallequalandindependent,nooneoughttoharmanotherinhislife,health,libertyorpossessions.(Locke1993:II,6)Butisheright?Tospeakpersonally,Idon’tseehowanyonecanseriouslydenythatheis.Atleast,Idon’tseehowamodernpersoncouldseriouslydenyLocke’scentralpoint,whichisthatasimplenaturalcharacteristiccannot,justbyitself,entitleitsbearertoclaimanyspecialstatus.(WhetheryouchoosetoexpressitquiteasLockedid,intermsofrights,maybeadifferentmatter.)Inourtimethepointhasbecomeintegraltomanyapro-gressivebeliefsystem,mostnoticeablyintheargumentsofthosewhocam-paignagainstracism,sexismandotherformsofdiscrimination.Forexample,mostmodernfeminismispremisedontheclaimthatasimplebiologicalfeaturecannotbeusedtojustifytreatingapersonincertainways.Inthecaseoffeminism,thebiologicalfeatureisthefactofbeingfemale,andmostfeministsarguethatthisisnotsomethingwhichautomaticallyjustifiescon-signingapersontoasubordinatestatusorrole.TheparticularversionofthefallacyinquestiontowhichLockehimselfwasespeciallyopposedwasthedoctrineofthe‘divinerightofkings’.Thisisthedoctrinethatabiologicalfeature–inthiscase,thefactofhavingagivenancestryandsex–entitlessomeonetoexercisesupremeauthority.Specifically,LockewantedtodenythatJamesII’s‘natural’relationshiptotherestoftheStuartfamily,takentogetherwiththefactofhishavingapenis,weresufficienttoendowhimDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012withaGod-givenrighttorulethecountry.Admittedly,Locke’sviewispeculiarlymodern.YouonlyhavetoconsiderjusthowdifferentitisfromAristotle’s.Aswesaw(inchapter3)Aristotlebelievedthatsomepeoplearenaturallyinferiortoothers.Forexample,hebelievedthatwomenareinferiortomenand–even–thatsomepeopleareborntobeslaves.Butthen,hewasabletoviewacertainformofstate–theancientGreekpolis–asanaturalphenomenon;akindoforganisminwhicheverythingmusthaveitsrightplaceifitistofunctionproperly.HecouldalsothinkofGreece’srigidclasssystemasanunalterablegiven.All\nLockeandthemodernorder119thiswouldhavehelpedmaintainhiminhisinegalitarianview,butnosuchthingwaspossibleforLocke.ItistruethatinLocke’stimeitwasstillfareasiertobelievethatsomearethenaturalsuperiorsofothers,fareasierthanitisinourown.Asheinsisted,‘ThoughIhavesaidabove…that“allmenbynatureareequal”,Icannotbesupposedtounderstandallsortsofequality.Ageorvirtuemaygivemenajustprecedency;excellencyofpartsandmeritmayplaceothersabovethecommonlevel’,andsoon.Andyet,ashegoesontostress,‘allthisconsistswiththeequalitywhichallmenarein,inrespectofjurisdictionordominiononeoveranother’(Locke1993:II,54).Andthatisthepoint.5FromthestateofnaturetocivilsocietyButhoweverpersuasiveLocke’sargumentmaybeuptothispoint,wearestillfacedwithproblems;foritisonethingtoestablishthefundamentalprinciplethatwearefreeandequalunderthelawofnature,butquiteanothertodetermineexactlyhowthatprincipleappliesinparticularcases.Likeeverylaw,thelawofnaturewillsometimesrequireinterpretation.Incivilsociety,wherecivillawprevailsandwherethereisauthorityandalegalsystem,thejobofinterpretationisdonebylawyers.Itisforjudgestodeterminehowthecivillawappliesindifficultcases,andtherebysetpre-cedentsforthefuture.Aseconddifficultyrelatestothesanctionswhichaccompanybreachesofthelaw.Inthecaseofordinary,civil,lawthesecanbespecified:‘ifyoudosuch-and-suchyouwillbefinedsuch-and-such’;‘ifyoudosuch-and-suchthepolicewillarrestyouandyoumaygotoprison’,andsoon.However,inthecaseofthelawofnature,itisdifficulttoseewhattheparallelcouldbe.Evenifthereissuchalaw,thereseemstobenotariffof‘naturalpunishments’toaccompanyit.And,compoundingthis,thereisathirddifficulty,thedifficultyofhowsanctionsaretobecarriedout.Forallhisbeliefthatweare,generallyspeaking,capableofgettingalong,Lockeleavesusinnodoubtthattherewillbelawbreakers,andhisrhetoricbecomesquiteharshwhendescribinghowtheyshouldbedealtwith;forexample,whenhewritesthatthecriminalhas‘declaredwaragainstallmankind,andthereforemaybedestroyedasalionoratiger,oneofthosewildsavagebeastswithwhommencanhavenosocietynorsecurity’(Locke1993:II,11)orthat‘suchmenarenotunderthetiesofthecommonlawofDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012reason,havenootherrule,butthatofforceandviolence,andsomaybetreatedasbeastsofprey’(Locke1993:II,16).Butthequestionis,whoistohuntdownanddestroysuch‘dangerousandnoxiouscreatures’(Locke1993:II,16).Thereare–bydefinition–nopoliceinthestateofnature.ItisLocke’sviewthat,insuchconditions,everyonehastobehisorherownmagistrateandlawenforcementofficer.Hewrites:ifanyoneinthestateofnaturemaypunishanother,foranyevilhehasdone,everyonemaydoso.Forinthatstateofperfectequality,wherenaturallythereis\n120Reasonandrevolutionsnosuperiorityorjurisdictionofone,overanother,whatanymaydoinprosecutionofthatlaw,everyonemustneedshavearighttodo.(Locke1993:II,7)Insummary,Locke’sargumentisthis:because(i)itisnecessaryforourpre-servationthatthelawofnatureshouldbeobserved(thelawwouldbe‘invain’otherwise)(Locke1993:II,7)andbecause(ii)weareequals,withequalrights,itfollows(iii)thateveryonehastherighttointerpretthelawofnatureandtopunishthosewhobreakit.Youareentitledtoseekreparationfromthosewhomyoubelievetohaveharmedyou,andyouareevenentitledtopunishthosewhocommitcrimesofwhichyouarenot,yourself,thevictim.AsLockeseesit,thereisan‘executivepowerofthelawofnature’suchthat‘everymanhatharighttopunishtheoffender,andbeexecutionerofthelawofnature’(Locke1993:II,13,8).Bynow,itshouldbeclearwhyitisthatLockethinkspeoplewouldquitthestateofnature.IntheSecondTreatise,chap.9,heliststhelatter’smain‘inconveniences’(Locke1993:II,124–26).Therearethree.Thefirstisthatthestateofnaturelacksasettledstandardor‘commonmeasure’oflaw.Asaresult,therewillbeconstantquarrelanddisagreement.For‘thoughthelawofnaturebeplainandintelligibletoallrationalcreatures’,writesLocke,‘men’willbe‘biasedbytheirinterest’whenapplyingittotheirowncases(Locke1993:II,124).Thesecondreasonisthatinthestateofnaturethereisnosettled,recognised,judicialauthority.Therelacks‘aknownandindiffer-entJudge’.Inthatstate,everyoneis‘bothjudgeandexecutionerofthelawofnature’and‘menbeingpartialtothemselves,passionandrevengeisveryapttocarrythemtoofar’intheirowncases;lackofconcernto‘makethemtooremiss’,whenitcomestootherpeople’s(Locke1993:II,125).Third,enforcingthelawofnaturerequiresacentralisedpower,apowerthestateofnaturelacks(Locke1993:II,126).Wearemeanttoconcludethatlifeinthestateofnaturewouldbeinsecureanduncertain,somuchsothatpeoplewouldinevitablysurrendertheirrightstointerpretandenforcethelawofnaturetoacentralisedauthority,a‘sovereign’.Lockeputsitthisway:Ifmaninthestateofnaturebesofree,ashasbeensaid;Ifhebeabsolutelordofhisownpersonandpossessions,equaltothegreatest,andsubjecttonobody,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012whywillhepartwithhisfreedom?Whywillhegiveupthisempire,andsubjecthimselftothedominionandcontrolofanyotherpower?towhich‘tisobvioustoanswer,thatthoughinthestateofnaturehehathsucharight,yettheenjoymentofitisveryuncertain,andconstantlyexposedtotheinvasionofothers.Forallbeingkingsasmuchashe,everymanhisequal,andthegreaterpartnostrictobserversofequityandjustice,theenjoymentofthepropertyhehasinthisstateisveryunsafe,veryunsecure.Thismakeshimwillingtoquitthiscondition,whichhoweverfree,isfulloffearsandcontinualdangers.And’tisnotwithoutreason,thatheseeksout,andiswillingtojoininsocietywith\nLockeandthemodernorder121otherswhoarealreadyunited,orhaveamindtouniteforthemutualpre-servationoftheirlives,liberties,andestates,whichIcallbythegeneralname,property.(Locke1993:II,123)TherecanbenodoubtthatLocke’saccountofthetransitionfromthestateofnaturetocivilsocietyisopentocriticismsandquestionswhichparallelthoseIraisedagainstHobbesinhisaccountofthesametransition.Forexample,itcouldbethatsomethinghangsonthenumericalratioof‘noxious’lawbreakerstolaw-abidingothers.Ifthenumberoflawbreakersisrelativelyfew,andthereforerelativelycontrollable,thenperhapsitcouldbearguedthatpeoplewouldhavenoreasonatallforleavingthestateofnature.6Again,thereare,conceivably,methodsforcontrollinglawbreakerswhichfallshortofafullyfledgedstate.LikeHobbes’s,Locke’sargumentisopentotheobjectionthat–perhaps–‘mutualprotectionagencies’woulddothetrick.However,Ishan’tboreyoubyrepeatingthesameargumentsinadifferentcontextandinanycaseIamsurethatreadersarecapableofworkingouttheparallelsforthemselveshere.Instead,letusmoveontooneoftheargumentsforwhichtheSecondTreatiseisbestknown:theargumentthatgovernmentmustrestonconsent.ConsentTheroleplayedbyconsentinLocke’sargumentConsententersLocke’sargumentatanumberofpoints.Oneisthepointatwhichpeopledecidetomoveoutofthestateofnatureandformacommu-nity.Each‘devestshimselfofhisnaturalliberty,andputsonthebondsofcivilsociety’by‘agreeingwithothermentojoinanduniteintoacommu-nity’;thisbeing‘onebody,withapowertoactasonebody’(Locke1993:II,95,96).Theparticularsystemofgovernmentunderwhichpeopleareruledisalsosaid,byLocke,torestonconsent.SofarasLockeisconcerned,thefactofconsentismoreimportantthantheprecisenatureofthesystemitself.Therearemanypossible‘formsofcommonwealth’,andpeoplecanevenconsenttoasysteminwhichdecisionsaremadebyasingleindividual(Locke1993:II,151).However,LockehimselfpreferswhathecallsaDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012‘moderatedmonarchy’(Locke1993:II,159);thatis,asysteminwhichthepowerofasovereignislimitedbyanassembly,suchasaparliament.ThiswasthesystemthatbecamesecurelyestablishedinEnglandwiththe‘GloriousRevolution’of1688,inwhichLockeplayedaprominentrole(ofwhichmoreshortly).ConsentplaysanimportantroleinLocke’sdefenceofpropertytoo.Thiswillbediscussedinchapter9.Bynow,itshouldbeclearwhyLockethinksthatgovernmentmustrestontheconsentofthegoverned.Theconclusionfollowsdirectlyfromhispremisethatweareallequalunderthelawofnatureandfundamentallyfree(or\n122Reasonandrevolutions‘autonomous’);creaturesforwhomfreedomisthe‘Foundationofalltherest’(Locke1993:II,17).Itisdifficulttoseehowanythingotherthanconsentcouldlegitimiseauthorityforsuchcreatures.Onthisview,itcanbeper-missibleforyoutomakerulesformetoobey,ortogivemeorders,butonlyifyouhavemypermissiontodothesethings.TheproblemoftacitconsentSofar,sogood.However,thingsstarttogorapidlydownhillonceyoustarttoask:Whatisitthatpeopleactuallydowhentheygivetheirconsenttoapoliticalsystem,ortoagovernment?Onthis,Locke’sunhelpfulnessisnotorious,thankstohisattempttodistinguish‘express’from‘tacit’consent.Theformerisrelativelyunproblematic.Expressconsentisconsentfreely,openlyandknowinglygiven.Thetroublestartswiththenotionoftacitconsent,whichLockeattemptstoexplainasfollows:Thedifficultyis,whatoughttobelook’duponasatacitconsent,andhowfaritbinds,i.e.howfaranyoneshallbelookedontohaveconsented,andtherebysubmittedtoanygovernment,wherehehasmadenoexpressionsofitatall.AndtothisIsay,thateveryman,thathathanypossession,orenjoyment,ofanypartofthedominionsofanygovernment,doththerebygivehistacitconsent,andisasfarforthobligedtoobediencetothelawsofthatgovernment,duringsuchenjoyment,asanyoneunderit;whetherthishispossessionbeofland,tohimandhisheirsforever,oralodgingonlyforaweek;orwhetheritbebarelytravellingfreelyonthehighway;andineffect,itreachesasfarastheverybeingofanyonewithintheterritoriesofthatgovernment.(Locke1993:II,119)Whatarewetomakeofthis?Forastart,itisprettyobviousthat–asstatedabove–Locke’sdefinitionoftacitconsentisnotmuchgood.Supposethatyouliveinamodernliberaldemocracy,andthatyouvotedwiththeminor-ityatthelastelection;i.e.thatyoudidnotvoteforthegovernmentpresentlyinpower.Ifasked,youwouldprobablysaythatyoudidnotconsenttothatgovernment’sexistence;anditwouldbenousetellingyouthat,really,youdidbecausethismorningyoudrovetothesupermarketandpurchasedsomegroceries(i.e.thatyouwent‘travellingfreelyonthehighway’).Or,supposeDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012thatyouspendaholidayinacountryruledbyaruthlessmilitarydictator.Youstayinahotel(‘alodgingonlyforaweek’).Someofyourfriendsmaytellyouthatyoushouldn’thavegonethere,butitwouldbearidiculousexag-gerationtosaythat,simplybygoing,youconsentedtothedictator’sregimeandhispolicies.Onthefaceofthings,Locke’sdefinitionof‘tacitconsent’wouldappeartohavetheseandothersimilarlyabsurdimplications.ThepassagequotedhaspersistentlybaffledcommentatorsonLocke.CouldapowerfulintellectuallikeLockereallyhaveexpectedhisreaderstoswallowsuchahopelessdefinition?7However,ithastoberecognisedthatany\nLockeandthemodernorder123attempttojustifyapoliticalsystemwiththeclaimthatitrestsonthecon-sentofthegovernedhastorecognisethatitisnevertruethateveryoneconsentsexpressly.Formodernreaders,thepointisespeciallypressing,becauseitissometimesclaimedthattheliberaldemocraticsystemswithwhichwearefamiliararebasedonconsent;or,ifnotquitethat,thattheelectoralmachinerybywhichtheyaretypifiedensuresthatthe‘willofthepeople’prevails.Butinmodernliberaldemocraciesgovernmentsareusuallyelectedwithonlyaround40–50percentofthetotalvotescast.Therefore,wecantakeitthattheother50–60percentofthevotersdonotconsenttothegovernmentwhichgetselected,ornotexpressly.Tothat,youhavetoaddthenumberofpeoplequalifiedtovote,butwhodon’t.(Someofthesejustdon’tbother.Perhapsthereareotherswhoarenotattractedbythealter-nativesonofferatelectiontime.)Itfollowsthat,eveninliberaldemocracies,mostpeopledonotconsenttoberuledbythegovernmentinpower–or,atleast,notatelectiontimes,notopenly,andnotliterally.If,despiteallthis,youwanttopersistwithyourclaimthatdemocraticgovernmentrestsontheconsentofthepeople,youhavetoaccountforsuchfacts.Perhapsyouwilltrytoarguethatsimplybyvotingpeoplegivetheirconsent,notdirectlytoagovernmentbuttotheelectoralsystem,andthereforetoitsoutcome.8Orperhaps–likeLocke–youwilltrytoarguethateveryoneconsents,butsomeonlytacitly.TacitconsentreconsideredInshort,itisworthtakingacloserlookatthenotionoftacitconsentbecause–inourowntimes–theideathatthegovernmentmustrestonconsentissowidespread.So,isitpossibletoreachadefinitionof‘tacitcon-sent’whichrepresentsausefulimprovementonLocke’s?InthissectionIshallsuggestthatitis.Inthefollowing,IshallsuggesthowanimproveddefinitioncanbeusedtohelpLocke’sargument.Here,then,isadefinitionof‘consent’.(Uptothispoint,Ihavetriedtokeeptechnical-seeming,ratherformal,definitionsoutofmydiscussion;but,inthiscase,Ithinkadefinitionwouldbehelpful.)Person,P,doesaction,x,withtheconsentofpersonQifP’srighttodoxisconditionaluponQ’sexpressingthewishthatPshouldhavethatright.9Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Thisdefinitioncapturesthesenseof‘consent’bywhichaboycanonlymarryagirlifhefirstgetstheconsentofherfather,ashappensinstories.(Inthiscasetheboy’srighttomarrythegirlisconditionaluponthefather’sexpresslystatingthathecan,whichisinaccordancewiththedefinition.)Italsocap-turesthesenseof‘consent’inwhichthosewhovotewiththemajoritycanbesaidtoconsenttoagovernment’shavingpower.Insuchcases,thegovern-ment’srighttoholdofficeisconditionaluponthemajority’sexpressionofthewishthatitshoulddoso.(Perhapsthereareothersensesof‘consent’,but\n124Reasonandrevolutionsthisistheonerelevanttoourenquiry.)Now,hereismysuggesteddefinitionof‘tacitconsent’:Person,P,doesaction,x,withthetacitconsentofanotherpersonQ,ifboth(i)thecontextissuchthatQwouldnormallybeexpectedtoexpressthewishthatPrefrainfromdoingx,and(ii)Qrefrainsfromexpressingthatwish.Thisisconsistentwiththedefinitionof‘consent’Igaveamomentago,butitappliesonlyincaseswhereaperson’sfailuretomaketheabsenceofawishexplicitcanitselfbetakenastheexpressionofthatwish.Totakeanexample(borrowedfromJean-PaulSartre):10supposethatawomanisinvitedtoasocialgath-eringwhereshemeetsastranger,amanshehasnotmetbefore.Supposethat,duringthecourseofconversation,hetakesherhand.Thereisanormalexpectationthatshewillwithdrawit,butsupposethat–instead–shecon-tinuestoletitrestinhis.Inthiscase,itwouldbefairtotakeherinactionasanindicationofhertacitconsenttowhateverislikelytocomelater.(Toputitintermsofthedefinition,shehasnotmadeexplicitthewishthatheshouldnothavetherighttodowhateverheseemslikelytodo.)Or,ifyoudon’tlikethatexample,hereisanother,borrowedfromA.JohnSimmons.ChairmanJonesstandsatthecloseofthecompany’sboardmeetingandannounces,‘TherewillbeameetingoftheboardatwhichattendancewillbemandatorynextTuesdayat8.00,ratherthanatourusualThursdaytime.Anyobjections?’Theboardmembersremainsilent.(Simmons1979:79–80)AccordingtoSimmons,‘Inremainingsilentandinactive,theyhavealltacitlyconsentedtothechairman’sproposaltomakeaschedulechange’(Simmons1979:79–80).Ithinkthisisright.TherearethreefeaturesofthisaccountoftacitconsenttowhichIwouldespeciallyliketodrawyourattention.ThefirstisthatitisanimprovementonLocke’sview,atleastasitisstatedbyLockeinthepassageIquotedearlier.Mydefinitiondoesnotentailthatyougiveyourtacitconsenttoagovernmentsimplybytravellingonthehighway,orlodgingsomewhereforaweek.Second,thedefinitionentailsthatwhatcountsasanindicationoftacitconsentmustbeafunctionofcontext.Thiscanvary.SometimesitcanDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012varywithcultureorconvention.Forexample,awomanwholeavesherhandrestinginaman’smaybelendinghertacitconsenttowhateverislikelytohappenlaterintheevening,butonlywherethereisanexpectationthatshewillwithdrawherhandotherwise.Wheretheexpectationisabsent–asitmightbeifholdinghandsbecamenothingoutoftheordinary–heraction(or,rather,herinaction)wouldloseitssignificance.Third,itisclearthat,inthistypeofcase,consentgiventacitlycanonlybewithdrawnexplicitly.(Thewomanhastomakeapointofwithdrawingherhand.Theboardmembershavetosaythattheydon’tliketheproposedtime.)\nLockeandthemodernorder125SofarasIcansee,theabovedefinitionaccuratelycaptureswhatpeoplequiteoftenmeanwhentheyusetheexpression‘tacitconsent’.But,althoughitisanimprovementonLocke’sstatedview,thequestionofwhetheritisanimprovementwhichcouldactuallyhelphimremainsopen.Ithinkitsanswerdependsonthesecondandthirdfeaturesjustlisted(thefactthattacitcon-sentrequiresacontextandthefactthatitcanonlybewithdrawnexplicitly).So,letusnowask:ForLocke,wasthereacontextwithinwhichcertainactions(orfailurestoact)couldbetakentoindicatetacitconsent,andothersasitsexplicitwithdrawal?Tacitconsentandtheeventsof1688Ichose‘Reasonandrevolutions’asthetitleforPartIIbecauseeverytextonwhichIconcentrateinthispartofthebookisrelated,inonewayoranother,toamajorpoliticalupheaval.Aswesawinthelastchapter,Hobbes’sLeviathan(1981)isaresponsetotheEnglishcivilwar,thatseriesofuphea-valswhichculminatedintheexecutionofCharlesIandtheruleofOliverCromwell.ThetextIdiscussinthefollowingchapter–Rousseau’sSocialContract(Rousseau1968)–embodiesidealswhichhelpedfueltheFrenchRevolutionof1789.Likewise,Locke’sSecondTreatiseiscloselyassociatedwitheventswhichsubsequentlybecameknownas‘theGloriousRevolutionof1688’.Briefly,whathappenedwasthis:in1685CharlesIIdied,andhewassucceededbyhisbrother,James.(JamesthusbecameJamesIIofEngland.)FortheBritish–ormostofthem–thiswasbadnewsindeed.Foronething,JameswassympathetictoCatholicism.Morethanthat,hehadactuallycon-vertedtotheCatholicreligion,and–inthosetimes–thisindicatedmorethanadherencetoaparticularsetofreligiousbeliefs.ItmeantthatyoutendedtotakeaparticularsideinthepowerstruggleswhichwerethengoingonthroughoutEurope,thesideofcentralised,authoritarian,govern-ment.IntheBritishcontext,itmeantthatyouwouldbehostiletopopularruleand,specifically,toattemptsbyParliamenttocompromisethesover-eign’spower.ForthelargelyProtestantBritish,forwhomsuchacompromisehadbeentheoutcomeofdecadesofunrest–abloodycivilwar,arevolution,amilitarydictatorship–thiscanonlyhaverepresentedaretrogradestep.True,CharlesIIhad,himself,beensympathetictoCatholicismandhostiletoDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Parliament,buthehadcometopower,post-Cromwell,onatideofpopularsupport.Also,throughouthiseasy-goingreignhehadtriedtoruleinaspiritofcompromise,maintainingreligioustolerationandwithagrudgingrespectforParliament.Evenso,hehadbeentreatedwithconsiderablehostilityandsuspicionbycertainsectionsofthepopulation.But,whenJamescametopower,thingsrapidlydeteriorated,forJamessoonprovedhimselftoberigidlyminded,ruthlessandtyrannical.Herearesomeofthethingsthathappenednext.ArebellionledbytheDukeofMonmouthwasviciouslyputdown(1685).Thedefeatedrebelswere\n126Reasonandrevolutionsputthroughashowtrialatthe‘BloodyAssizes’heldinthewestofEnglandandpresidedoverbytheinfamousJudgeJeffreys.About800weredis-patchedtoBarbados,asslaves,andtherest–about200–werebrutallyexecuted.AwitnessdescribeshowJeffreys‘wasperpetuallyeitherdrunkorinarage’andhow,having‘requiredtheprisonerstopleadguilty’,he‘orderedagreatmanytobehangedupimmediatelywithoutallowingthemaminute’stimetosaytheirprayers’(seeLee1998:157).InSeptember1685,poorLadyAliceLisle,anelderlywomanwhohadgivenrefugetotwofleeingrebels,waspubliclybeheadedinthesquareatWinchester(eventhoughshemaywellhavebeenignorantoftheirtrueidentities).Whileallthiswasgoingon,Jameswasforciblyremovingseniorpoliticalfiguresfromtheirpositionsofinfluence.TheLordPrivySeal,holderofonethehigheststateoffices,wasdismissed(1685),asweresixofthecountry’s12seniorjudges(1686).TheBishopofLondonfoundhimselfsummonedtoappearbeforethenewlycreatedCourtofHighCommissionandsuspendedfromhisposition.Atthesametimeothers,sympathetictoJames’sambitions,werepromotedtoinfluence,includingtheaforementionedJudgeJeffreys.Thatisabrief,selective,listofeventsofcourse,butitshouldgiveyouanideaofhowthingswere.ThewayJameswasbehaving,itwasinevitablethathewouldencounterincreasingresistance;andsohedid,fromalllevelsofsociety.In1688sevenbishopsrefusedtocooperatewithJamesinissuingaDeclarationofIndulgence.(ThiswasadeclarationsuspendinglawsagainstdissidentsandCatholics.Thebishopsrefusedtoallowittobereadinchur-chesthroughouttheland.)Thekinghadthembroughtbeforeacourtbut–inanotheractofdefiance–thecourtacquittedthem.Thatsameday(30July1688)agroupofconspiratorsdispatchedalettertotheDutchking,WilliamofOrange,inwhichtheyinvitedhimtoinvade.Thishedid.InNovember,WilliamlandedinEnglandwithhisarmy.Incitiesthroughouttheland,thepopulationroseinhissupportand,aboutaweeklater,Jameswaschasedfromthecountry.Sothatwasthe‘GloriousRevolutionof1688’.(Wastheperiodreallyturbulentenoughtoqualifyforthetitle‘revolution’,orwasitacontinuationofmuchthathadgonebefore?ThatisaquestionIshallleavetothehistor-ians.)11NowwhathasthisgottodowithLocke?Morespecifically,whathasittodowithhisSecondTreatise?Morespecificallystill,whatdoesittellusabouthisdefinitionoftacitconsent?Letmetakeeachquestioninturn.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Theanswertothefirstisthat,priortorevolution,therewerevariouswaysinwhichLockebecameimplicatedinpoliticalevents.Hisinvolvementdatesfromtheperiod,beginningin1672,duringwhichheservedassecretarytoAnthonyAshley-Cooper,EarlofShaftesbury.Shaftesburywasapowerfulfigurewhoplayedaninstrumentalroleinvariousplotsandintrigues,anditseemsunlikelythatLocke–whowasnotjustanemployeebutaclosefriendandapillarofShaftesbury’shousehold–wouldnothavedonelikewise.In1683Lockewasactuallyforcedtofleethecountry.HetookrefugeinHolland,wherehelivedforatimeundertheassumednameofDrvanderLinden;and\nLockeandthemodernorder127in1688,whenhereturned,itwasonboardashipofthefleetwhichcarriedWilliam’sarmy.Whatofmysecondquestion,thatoftherelationshipbetweentheseeventsandtheSecondTreatiseitself?Well,becauseitwaspublishedin1690,twoyearsaftertherevolution,itwasthoughtforalongtimethatthebookwasakindofapologia;thatis,ajustificationfortheeventswhichhadrecentlytakenplace.However,morerecentevidencesuggeststhatitwaswrittenwellbeforetherevolution,inoraroundtheyear1680,inwhichcaseweshouldthinkofitmoreasamanifesto.Eitherway,itisclearthatLocke’sprimeintentionwastodefendtherighttoresistthosewithpretensionstoabsolutepower,andtorebelwherenecessary.Forexample,andasthetitleoftheSecondTreatisesuggests,thereisalsoaFirstTreatiseofCivilGovernment(1964:135–263).ThisisacritiqueofPatriarcha(Filmer1949),aworkinwhichSirRobertFilmerdefendstheclaimofabsolutemonarchstorulebydivineright.OneofFilmer’sargumentsisthecontentionthatmonarchsstandinthesamerelationtotheirsubjectsasparentsdototheirchildren.Asyouwouldexpect,Lockeisopposedtothisconclusion,anditisthiswhichexplainswhyhetakespains,intheSecondTreatise,todistinguishtheparentalformofauthorityfromotherforms,especiallypoliticalauthority.Thelatter’sfinalchapterisentitled‘OftheDissolutionofGovernment’;and,inhisclosingparagraph,Lockeconcludesthat,wherethepeoplehave‘setlimitstothedurationoftheirlegislative’orelse‘whenbythemiscarriagesofthoseinauthorityitisforfeited’,it‘revertstothesociety,andthepeoplehavearighttoactassupreme’(Locke1993:II,243).HowaretheseeventsrelevanttoLocke’sconceptionof‘tacitconsent’(thethirdquestionIraised,above)?Well,earlierIproposedadefinitionof‘tacitconsent’whichappliesincaseswhereaperson’sfailuretowithdrawconsentcanitselfbetakenastheexpressionofconsent.(Thewomanleavesherhandintheman’s.Theboardmembersremainsilent.)Ialsodrewyourattentiontotwoimplicationsofthisdefinition.Onewasthatitappliesonlyincertaincontexts.(Thereisanexpectationthatawomanwhodidnotconsentwouldwithdrawherhand.Therulespermitthememberstoobject.)Theotherwasthat,whereitapplies,consent,ifitistobewithdrawn,mustbewithdrawnexpressly.(Thewomanmustmakeapointofwithdrawingherhand.Boardmembersmustspeakup.)Now,mysuggestionisthateventssuchasthosewhichtookplacebetween1685and1688provideacontextinwhichtheDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012people’sfailuretoactwouldcountasanindicationoftacitconsent,andinwhichrebellionwouldcountasitsexplicitwithdrawal.Ofcourse,iftheSecondTreatisewaswrittenasearlyas1680,thentheeventsLockehadinmindcan’thavebeentheeventsof1688itself.Butwecanbesurethat,in1688,peopledidprettymuchwhathewouldhavewantedthemtowhenfacedwitharbitraryandtyrannicalgovernment.Inotherwords,ifweassumethatpeoplewhoarenaturallyfreeandequal(and‘autonomous’)wouldobjecttotyrannicalrule,thereisanexpectationthattheywillmaketheirobjectionclear,or–toputthepointintermsof\n128Reasonandrevolutionsconsent–thattheywillexpresslywithdrawtheirconsent.Iftheydonot,theycanbeassumedtohaveconsentedtacitly.Iftheydo,thenpreciselyhowtheydoitwilldependonthemeanstheyhaveavailabletothem,andthiswillvaryacrosslevelsofsociety.Andthatiswhathappenedin1688.ArichandpowerfulgroupwrotealettertoWilliamofOrange.Theyproceededtoraiseanarmy.ThebishopsrefusedtopermitthereadingoftheDeclarationofIndulgence.Thecourtrefusedtofindthemguilty.Asforthepeople,‘Cityaftercityroseinrebellion.Byonespontaneous,tremendousconvulsion,theEnglishnationrepudiatedJames’(Churchill1956:324).Initsownway,eachgroupsignifieditsrefusaltoconsenttoJames’srule.ThatisascenarioofthetypeLockehadinmind.WheredoesthisleaveLocke’sargumentforgovernmentbasedonconsent?Tosummarise:Ihavesuggestedaninterpretationof‘tacitconsent’whichis(i)inlinewithonewayinwhichthephraseisordinarilymeantand(ii)inlinewiththepoliticalpositionLockewasouttodefend.PerhapsitiswhatLockehadinmindallthetime.Afterall,theSecondTreatiseisarevolutionarymanifesto–itisnotmeanttobeascrupulouslyarguedphilosophicaltext–soweshouldnotexpectLocke’severypointtobeelaboratedindetailanddefendedagainsteveryobjectionhecouldthinkof.Moreover,itisimportanttorememberthatLockewasnotouttodefendtheclaimthat,byvotingatelectiontimes,theelectoratelendsitsconsenttotheactionsoftheincominggovernment.Asnotedearlier,theproblemofdefiningtacitconsentarisesforsuchaviewbecauseitisnecessarytoexplainhowconsentcanbegiven,ifitis,bythosewhovotewiththeminority.Itmustalsofacethequestionofwhatelectoralsystem,ifany,isbestequippedtoproduceanoutcomewhichreflects‘thewillofthepeople’–‘firstpastthepost’orsomeformofproportionalrepresentation.ButsuchquestionswereofnoconcerntoLocke.Infact,heonlydrawsontheideaofmajorityconsentatonepoint,andthatisthepointatwhichhediscussesthewaypeoplemovefromthestateofnaturebyformingacommunity.Majorityconsentisnecessary,hesays,because‘itbeingnecessarytothatwhichisonebodytomoveoneway;itisnecessarythebodyshouldmovethatwaywhitherthegreaterforcecarriesit’(Locke1993:II,96).ThisisdifferentfromthepointDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012atwhichthecommunityestablishesasystemofgovernment,oratwhichitputsaparticulargoverningparty,orindividual,inpower.(Aswesaw,Lockemostprefersthesysteminwhichthemonarch’spowersarelimitedbypar-liament,but,inhistime,thefranchiseonwhichparliamentwasbasedwasfarmorelimitedthananythingwithwhichwearefamiliar.)Inshort,althoughLockefavouredgovernmentbyconsent,itdoesnotfollowthathefavouredgovernmentby,say,ademocraticallyelectedrepresentativegovern-ment.Thisiscontrarytowhatamodernreader,comingtoLockeforthefirsttime,islikelytoexpect.\nLockeandthemodernorder129ButdoesthismeanthattheSecondTreatiseisofnorelevancetomorerecentconcerns?Certainlynot.Onthecontrary,itisagoodexampleofthewayaworkofpoliticalphilosophycantakeonadoubleaspect,fortherearetwodifferentaudiencestobearinmindhere.Oneisthelateseventeenth-century,post-revolutionary,audienceforwhomthebookwasintended.Asnoted,thisaudiencewouldhaveunderstoodittobeadefenceoftherighttorebel,asindeeditwasmeanttobeunderstood.Theotheraudienceisthepresent-dayaudience.ThereisnogettingawayfromthefactthatyouandIcan,ifwelike,gotoabookshopandbuyacopy;andwecan’tjusttreatitasa‘periodpiece’asifitwereanexhibitinamuseum.Asmodernreaders,wewilltendtoequate‘governmentbasedonconsent’withdemocracy.Lockemaynothavebeenespeciallyconcernedtodothis,butthatdoesnotabsolveusfromtryingtofindwaysofbringingLocke’sargumentstobearontheideathattheinstitutionsofliberaldemocracyaremechanismsforsecuringgovernmentwiththeconsentofthepeople.Certainly,theauthorsoftheUnitedStates’DeclarationofIndependencewerenotslowtoseetheconnection.Hereareitsfamousopeninglines:Weholdthesetruthstobeself-evident,thatallmenarecreatedequal,thattheyareendowedbytheirCreatorwithcertainunalienableRights,thatamongtheseareLife,LibertyandthepursuitofHappiness.Thattosecuretheserights,GovernmentsareinstitutedamongMen,derivingtheirjustpowersfromtheconsentofthegoverned.(USDeclarationofIndependence1776)TheauthorsoftheDeclarationgoontostatethat‘wheneveranyFormofGovernmentbecomesdestructiveoftheseends,itistheRightofthePeopletoalterortoabolishit,andtoinstitutenewGovernment’,allofwhichisentirelyinthespiritofLocke,asistherestofthesecondparagraph.ItwasjustoveradecadelaterthattheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates–theblueprintforamajordemocraticsystem–wassigned.Locke’sSecondTreatisebecameamanifestofornotjustone,buttwo,majorrevolutions.Notes1ThemostnotableexampleofacontemporaryphilosopherwhotakesaLockeanpositiononDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012propertyisRobertNozick,whoseAnarchy,State,andUtopia(Nozick1974)ismeanttobeamodernreworkingofLocke’sargument.2LockewrotetwoTreatise[s]ofCivilGovernment,theFirstandSecond.Ineach,theparagraphsarenumbered.Asiscustomary,myreferencestotheseworksarebytreatiseandparagraph.So,forexample,(II,4)referstotheSecondTreatise,paragraph4.Incidentally,IdecidedtousetheversionofLocke’sTreatisecontainedinDavidWootton’seditionofLocke’sPoliticalWritings(Locke1993),ratherthanPeterLaslett’seditionoftheSecondTreatise(Locke1964).Thelatterisattractive(tomeatleast)becauseitpreservesLocke’sseventeenth-centurygrammarandspelling.However,intheendIdecidedthatusingtheformerwouldmakeforgreaterclarity.\n130Reasonandrevolutions3Inlegalcontexts,‘thecivillaw’issometimescontrastedwith‘thecriminallaw’.PerhapsIshouldemphasisethatIamnotusing‘civillaw’inthatsensehere.Thecontrastbetween‘civil’and‘natural’lawisadifferentone.4Notethatthismoveisnotopentomoralrelativists,accordingtowhomwhatisrightorwrong‘for’membersofonecultureneednotbeso‘for’membersofanother.5However,Lockedidnotbelieveinthenaturalsuperiorityofmenoverwomen.Inthis,hewas–perhaps–unusualforhistime.(See,forexample,hisremarkson‘paternal’and‘parental’authority(Locke1993:II,52,53).)6ThisdifficultyisdiscussedbyMacpherson,whomakestheinterestingsuggestionthatthereisanambiguityinLocke’sdescriptionofthestateofnature.Ontheonehand,Lockethinksofsociety‘ascomposedofequalundifferentiatedbeings’.Ontheother,hethinksofsociety‘ascomposedoftwoclassesdifferentiatedbytheirlevelofrationality’,the‘industriousandrational’propertyownersandthelabouringclasses.MacphersonsuggeststhatLocke‘wouldnothavebeencon-scious’ofthecontradictionbetweenthemthankstothe‘socialassumptions’hewouldhavemade(seeMacpherson1964:especially238ff.).Thesuggestionthatpeoplecouldform‘mutualprotectionagencies’ismadebyNozick(1974:especiallychap.2).7One(JohnPlamenatz)hasdescribeditasan‘oddexpedient’towhichadesperateLockecanonlyhaveresortedinordertosavehisargument(Plamenatz1963:I,225).Morerecently,another(DavidLloydThomas)hasconfessedhimselfunabletoproposeareadingofLockewhichisconsistentwitheverythingLockesaysonthesubjectoftacitconsent(LloydThomas1995:38).8InhisDemocracyandDisobedience,PeterSingermakesthesuggestionthatparticipationinanelectoralprocedurecannormallybetakentoindicateconsenttoitsoutcome.Singerwrites,‘itisreasonabletoassumethatsomeonedoesconsentifhevotes,voluntarilyandwithoutindicatingthathedoesnotconsent’(Singer1973:51).Idisagree.Itseemstomethatinrepresentativedemocraciesvotersnormallythinkoftheelectoralsystemassomethingwhichissimplytheretobetakenadvantageof,likethetransportsystemorthehealthservice.9Inthis,IfollowPlamenatz,thoughroughly(seePlamenatz1968:5ff.).Ofcourse,thereisapar-alleldefinitionwhichappliestocasesinwhichP’snotdoingxiscontingentuponQ’sconsent.ForreasonsofclarityIhavenotincludedtherelevantparenthesisedsubclauses.IthinkIamsafeinassumingthatreadersarebrightenoughtoworkouttheparallelsforthemselves.10SeeSartre(1969:55ff).11Iwouldnotliketogivetheimpressionthattherevolutionwasentirelybloodless.Irishreaderswillbeespeciallyawarethattherevolutioninquestionwasfollowedbysomeverybloodyevents,includingtheBattleoftheBoyne(1690).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n8Locke:theargumentforpropertyPresent-dayphilosophers,lookingbackatLocke,aresometimesapttodescribehimasadefenderof‘capitalism’orthe‘freemarketeconomy’.SuchexpressionswouldnothavebeenavailabletoLockehimself.Theiroriginslieinthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies.Evenso,thereissomethingrightaboutthedescription,forthekeyelementsofthepositionhetakesonpropertyareasfollows.First,Lockeholdsthatthebearerofrightsoveragivenitemofpropertymustalwaysbeaspecific,identifiable,individual–youorme,thispersonorthatperson.Heis,aswewouldnowsay,anadvocateof‘private’property.Second,heholdsthat,whenapropertyrightistransferredfromonepersontoanother,thisshouldonlyhappenwhenbothpartiesconsenttothetransfer.Normally,consentisinvolvedwhenonepersonsells,orgives,anitemofpropertytoanother,orwhenonepersonleavesittotheotherinhisorherwill.Third,andbythesametoken,Lockeisopposedtothetransferofpropertybyforce,ashappenswhenonepersonstealsfromanother,orwhenthestate–or,asLockewouldsay,the‘sovereign’–imposesataxwithoutpermission.Itispossibletothinkofa‘freemarketeconomicsystem’inoperationasnothingmorethantherepeatedtransferofpropertyfromindividualtoindividualbysale,giftorinheritance.Insuchasystem,thestate’sonlyfunctionistomakesurethateveryone’sabilitytoengageinconsensual,‘free’,transactionsisnotinterferedwith.Thestatemustbea‘minimal’state,withthejobofpreventingtheftandfraud,andthat’sall.So,ifthatisafaircharacterisationofafreemarketeconomythen–fairenough–Lockeisadefenderofafreemarketeconomy.However,weshouldnotbemisledbythisintomisreadingLocke’sinten-Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012tions.Inourowntime,anyonesupportingapositionsuchasLocke’swouldbeself-consciouslyplacinghimself,orherself,onthepolitical‘Right’.NotethatthesystemadvocatedbyLockecontrastswiththetypeofsystemunderwhichproperty(orasizeableamountofit)is‘collectively’or‘commonly’owned.Undersystemsofthelattertype,everymemberofthecommunityorgrouphasrightsofaccesstoanduseofthepropertyprovidedthatcertainconditionsarefulfilled.(Ifyouwouldlikeanexample,thinkoftherightsofaccessanduseyouhave,asamemberofthepublic,toalocalpark.)Thesedays,themostprominentadvocatesofcollectiveand/orcommonownership\n132Reasonandrevolutionstendtobesocialists.ItisalsoworthremarkingthatLocke’sviewcontrastswiththe‘redistributivism’accordingtowhichademocraticallyelectedstateis,indeed,entitledtoraisetaxesfromtherelativelybetteroffinordertohelptherelativelyworseoff;eitherthat,ortofinanceprojectsgenerallythoughttobepublicgoods.Thisisthe‘welfarestate’systemwithwhichmostreaderswillbefamiliar,orsoIguess.Inourtime,apro-capitalist,anti-socialist,anti-welfarestatephilosopherwouldimmediatelyqualifyasasupporteroftheRight.(Imeantheanti-stateRight,notthefascist,nationalistorracistRight.That’sdifferent.)ButjustasLockecouldnothavedescribedhimselfas‘pro-capitalist’,sothedistinctionwesoreadilymakebetween‘right’and‘left’wasequallyunavailabletohim.(ItoriginatedwiththeFrenchRevolution.)1Notthat‘collectivist’viewswereunknowntohim.Only40orsoyearsbeforetheSecondTreatisewaspublished,the‘TrueLevellers’or‘Diggers’hadarguedthattheearthwas,byright,commonlyowned,thatprivatepropertyistheft,andputtheirideasintopracticalactionbyuninvitedlysettingupcommu-nitiesandstartingtocultivatetheland.Notonlythat,throughoutLocke’stime,privatelandownershadbeensteadily‘enclosing’landwhichhadpre-viouslybeencommonlyheld.Asfortaxationbythestate,thishadbeenclaimedbymonarchs,suchasCharlesI,whobelievedthemselvesentitledtoruleabsolutely.(Inconnectionwiththis,wehavealreadyencounteredHobbes’sviewthatapropertyrightderives‘onlyfromtheSovereignPower’(Hobbes1981:367).)But,inopposingthisclaim,Lockewastakingtheattitudeofarevolutionary,notareactionary,andstandingupfortheindividualagainstarbitrarypower.Ifthatmattersitisbecausethisbookis,inpart,ahistoryofthought,whichmakesitimportanttogetLocke’sintentionsright.However,asphi-losophers,itisvitaltograsptheessentialsofLocke’sargumentwhateverhisintentionsmayhavebeen,andwhereverwemayhappentostandonthepoliticalspectrum.Thatisbecausehisargumentforpropertyremainsoneofthemostinfluentialthereis.Locke’sargumentinperspectiveFortherestofthischapter,IshallbetryingtorepresentLocke’spropertyargument,inoutline,asclearlyandaccuratelyasIcan.AsIgo,IshallDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012indicatewhere(inmyopinion)itsmajorstrengthsanditsmajorweaknesseslie.However,beforegettingdowntodetails,itwouldbehelpfultostandbackalittleandtrytogetLocke’sargumentintoabroaderperspective.Firstofall,then,exactlywhatconclusionistheargumentdesignedtoestablish?Well,anyonewhohasreadthepreviouschapterwillknowwhattoexpect.Lockeholdsthattherighttoproperty(bywhichhemeansprivateproperty)isspecifiedbythelawofnature.Itisoneofourthreemostfun-damentalnaturalrights(theothertwobeinglifeandliberty).Asreaderswillalsoknow,Lockealsoholdsthatthecivillawmustreflectthenaturallaw;to\nLocke:theargumentforproperty133putitanotherway,thatthelegalordermustreflectthemoralorder.Inthecaseofpropertythismeansthat,foranyactualpropertydistribution–thatis,wherespecificitemsofpropertyareownedinspecificwaysbyspecificindividualsorgroups–thatdistributionmustnotviolateanyone’snaturalright.Sincewehaveanaturalrighttoprivateproperty,itfollowsthatonlysystemsbasedonprivateownershipareinaccordancewiththelawofnature,orsoLockeholds.Second,whatsortofargumentisLockeofferingforthatconclusion?Inraisingthisquestion,Iamthinkingparticularlyofaveryusefuldistinctionwhichisdrawnbythe‘neo-Lockean’,pro-freemarketphilosopherRobertNozickinhisAnarchy,State,andUtopia(Nozick1974).Thisisthedistinc-tionbetween‘historical’and‘patterned’justificationsforspecificdistributionsofproperty(Nozick1974:153ff.).Lockeisadvancing(whatNozickcalls)ahistoricalargument.Inotherwords,itisLocke’sviewthattherightnessorwrongnessofaperson’sclaimtoownagivenitemofpropertyisamatterofhowtheownershipcameabout.ForLocke(asforNozickandsimilarfreemarketeers)consentmusthavebeeninvolvedeachtimetheitemchangedhands.Forexample,supposethatyouownsomethingasproperty.(Ifithelps,supposethatit’sabuilding–ahouse–orapieceofland.)Ifyouboughtitfromsomeonewho–inturn–boughtitfromsomeoneelse,whoinheriteditfromaparent,whowasgivenitbyafriend…andsoon,thenyourownershipisrightful.(Thejustificationis‘historical’inthesensethatitlooksbackthroughtime.)Ontheotherhand,ifyoustoletheproperty,orifyouboughtitwithmoneyextortedfromsomeinnocentvictim,thenitisnot.Accordingtoa‘patterned’justification,aperson’sownershipofanitemismorallyjustifiedifthatownershipisconsistentwithawiderarrangementunderwhichpropertyisdistributedinaccordancewithacertainpattern.Inphilosophy,patternstendtobespecifiedbyprinciples,soagoodexampleofapatternedjustificationwouldbetheutilitarianargumentthatpropertyoughttobedistributedinaccordancewith(someversionof)thegreatesthappinessprinciple.Onsuchaview,yourownershipofsomethingismorallyjustifiedifitisinaccordancewith,orifitpromotes,‘thegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber’.(Itseemstomethat,inordinarylife,peoplesome-timesappealtoonesortofjustification,andsometimestoanother.Forexample,ifyousay‘SomanypeoplearepreparedtohearthatrockstarplayDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012thathedeservestoberich’,youareinvokingahistoricalprinciple.Atanyrate,youareappealingtohowitcameaboutthatheissomuchricherthanothers.Ontheotherhand,ifyousay‘Itmustbewrongthatso-and-soshouldhavesomuchwhenothersaresopoor’,youareimplicitlyappealingtoapattern,e.g.‘discrepanciesinwealthshouldnotexceedacertainlimit’.)Now,sowhat?Forfuturereference,itisworthplacingaspecialemphasisontwopointshere.Thefirstconcernstherelationbetweenthetwoformsofjustification.Itisthatjustificationsofoneformarelogicallyinconsistentwiththoseoftheother.Thatisbecause,wherepeopleexercisetheirrights\n134Reasonandrevolutionsovertime,andtherebyacquirelegalrightstopropertyinmorallyacceptableways,thereisnoguaranteethataspecificpatternwillbetheoutcome.Onthecontrary,anythingcouldhappen.Forananalogy,takethegameMonopoly.Atthestartofagame,everyplayerisdealtasetnumberof‘titledeed’cardsandthesameamountofMonopolymoney.Thegamebegins,andeachplayertakesturntorollthediceandmovehisorhercounteraroundtheboard.Therulesofthegamearesystematicallyappliedthroughout–althoughsomeplaywithmoreskillandcunningthanothers,andsomehavemoreluck.Someoneeventuallywins.Notice,though,thatthesystematicapplicationoftherulescarrieswithitnoguaranteethattherewillbeaspecificoutcome.Ifthesamepersonalwayswins,oralwaysloses,thereisnopointincomplain-ingthatit’snotfair.Onthecontrary,it’sjusttoobad.Soitiswithhistoricaljustificationsforgivenpropertydistributions.Thesecondpointrelatestohistoricaljustificationsonly,anditisthis.Politicalphilosopherswhogivehistoricaljustificationsfor,say,propertyorthestatearenotdoingrealhistory.Theyaredoingsomethingquitediffer-ent,namelyjustifyingtheexistenceofprivateproperty,thestate,orwhateverwithanaccountofhowitcouldhavecomeintoexistence.Howthephe-nomenoninfactcameintobeingis–supposedly–neitherherenorthere.YoumayrecallthatImadethispointearlier,whenintroducingsocialcon-tracttheoryasaformofrationalchoicetheory.2SocialcontracttheoristssuchasHobbesandLockejustifytheirpreferredformofstatewithanaccountofwhatrationalpeoplewouldhavechosenfromaninitialno-statesituation(thestateofnature).Thisisdifferentfromrelatingthehistoryofhowrealstatesactuallycameintobeing.Bythesametoken,wehavetothinkofLockeasattemptingtojustifytheinstitutionofprivatepropertywithanaccountofhowitcouldhavecomeintobeing.(Forreasonsweshalleventuallycometo–andwhateverLockethoughthewasdoinghimself–itisimpossibletocredithimwithhavingdescribedtherealoriginsoftheinstitution.)So,letmejustsummarisetheupshotofthis‘stage-setting’discussion,asfollows.First:Locke’sargumentisdesignedtoestablishthattheprivateownershipofpropertyisafundamentalrightembodiedinthenaturallaw(i.e.themorallaw).Second:hisconclusionissupposedtofollowfromanaccountofhowtheinstitutionofprivatepropertycouldhavearisen,eventhoughitdidnotarisethatway.Infact,Locketriestoshowhowtheinsti-tutioncouldhavearisenbymorallylegitimatesteps.Third:asyoualreadyDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012know,Locke’sargumentisasocialcontractargument.Letusnowfollowitthrough,startingfromthebeginning.Locke’sargumentFromthecommonstocktoprivateownershipAsocialcontractargumentmustbeginwithasituation,realorimaginary,fromwhichthephenomenonitistryingtoexplainorjustifyisabsent.\nLocke:theargumentforproperty135Accordingly,Lockebeginswithasituationinwhichthereisnoprivateproperty.Inthebeginningtherewasonlycommonownership,orsoLockeholds.Weare,supposedly,taughtthisbyreason,‘whichtellsus,thatmen,beingonceborn,havearighttotheirpreservation,andconsequentlytomeatanddrink,andsuchotherthingsasnatureaffordsfortheirsubsistence’(Locke1993:II,25)andbyrevelation,fromwhichwe(supposedly)learnthatGodgavetheearthto‘mankindincommon’(Locke1993:II,25).(Thisgetsinterestingalready.NotethatLockecouldhavestartedwitha‘noownershipsituation’;thatis,asituationinwhichnobodyownsanything.Buthedoesn’t.Instead,heimaginesasituationinwhichthereispropertyownership,butinwhichallsuchownershipiscommonownership.Itcouldmakeadifference,andI’llcometothepointlateron.)Lockethensetshimselfthetaskofexplaininghowtheinstitutionofpropertycouldhavearisenfromthisinitialsituation.Heexplainstheprocedurethisway:Ishallendeavourtoshew,howmenmightcometohaveapropertyinseveralpartsofthatwhichGodgavetomankindincommon,andthatwithoutanyexpresscompactofallthecommoners.(Locke1993:II,26)Intheinitialsituation,wherecommonownershipprevails,peoplefaceaproblem,onewhichcanbesummarisedinaword–‘survival’.Evenifyoudon’tagreewithLockethatitisafundamentalprincipleofthelawofnaturethat‘everyone’is‘boundtopreservehimself’,thisbeingacommandofGod(Locke1993:II,6),youhavetoagreethat,inmostofus,thedrivetosurviveisstrong.Butthetroublewithnatureinitsrawstateisthatitis,inmostcases,useless.Tosurvive,peopleintheinitialsituationwillneedtoconvertittoausableformiftheyaretosupplythemselveswithfood,shelter,clothingandothernecessities.Theywillhavetohuntanimals,growcrops,buildhousesorhuts,andsoon.Inshort,theywillhavetowork.‘Theearth,andallthatistherein’mayhavebeen‘giventomenforthesupportandcomfortoftheirbeing’,hewrites,but‘thoughallthefruitsitnaturallyproduces,andbeastsitfeeds,belongtomankindincommon’theremust‘ofnecessitybeameanstoappropriatethemsomewayorotherbeforetheycanbeanyuse,oratallbeneficialtoanyparticularman’(Locke1993:II,27).Now,asLocke’sDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012useoftheword‘appropriate’indicates,itisatthispoint–whenapersonfirstlaboursonapieceofrawnature–thatheorsheacquiresarightofprivateownershipinthethingworkedon.Whatofotherpeople?Ifyouhavearighttoremovesomethingfromthecommonstockbyyourlabour–thatis,aprivaterighttosomethingwhichwaspreviouslyownedbyeveryoneincommon–howcomeyoudon’thavetoaskpermissionfromeveryoneelseintheworldfirst?Locke’sanswerispragmatic:‘Ifsuchaconsentasthatwasnecessary,manhadstarved,notwithstandingtheplentyGodhadgivenhim’(Locke1993:II,28).\n136ReasonandrevolutionsIhavealreadypointedoutthatconsenthasacrucialroletoplayinLocke’sargumentforproperty.Asthepassagesunderdiscussionshow,theconceptoflabourisequallycrucial.Infact,youcouldsaythatlabourandconsentaretheargument’stwooperativeconcepts.Labourjustifiesinitialactsofappropria-tion,thosebymeansofwhichthingsareremovedfromthecommonstockandtakenintoprivatehands.Consentjustifiesthetransferofpropertyrightsinthingswhicharealreadyownedfromonepersontoanother.FrompersonstopropertyLockeisassumingthatthefactofyourhavinglabouredonapreviouslyunownedsomethinggivesyouarighttowhatyouhaveproduced.Butisitsoobviouswhythisshouldbe?Youmaygointothewilderness–intoaforest,say–cutdowntrees,makeaclearing,ploughtheland,growcrops,andsoon.Youmayalsobepowerfulenoughtokeepoutintruders.Butalthoughthatwillgiveyoucontrolasapointoffact,itdoesnotfollow–ornotwithoutfurtherargument–thatyouhavearighttothefruitofyourlabours.Similarly,supposethatsomefutureexplorerslandinsomepreviouslyunoc-cupiedwilderness,thattheylandonMars,forexample.Supposethattheythenputinagreatdealofwork,excavatingforminerals.Suchtechnologi-callysophisticatedexplorerswouldhavetheedge.Theywouldhavedefactocontroloftheplanet,butitisnotsoobviousthatthey,orthenationfromwhichtheycame,wouldhavetherighttoownit.(Isurmisethattherewouldbeachorusofobjectionswereanysuchthingevertohappen.)Lockeanswersthequestionofhowthefactoflabourcancreatetherightofownershipwithanaccountofwhathethinksworkessentiallyis.AccordingtoLocke,whenyouworkyou‘mixyourlabour’withnature.Thefollowingpassageiscrucial.Thoughtheearthandallinferiorcreaturesbecommontoallmen,yeteverymanhasapropertyinhisownperson.Thisnobodyhasanyrighttobuthim-self.Thelabourofhisbody,andtheworkofhishands,wemaysay,areprop-erlyhis.Whatsoever,then,heremovesoutofthestatethatnaturehathprovidedandleftitin,hehathmixedhislabourwith,andtherebymadeithisproperty.Itbeingbyhimremovedfromthecommonstatenatureplaceditin,ithathbythislaboursomethingannexedtoitthatexcludesthecommonrightDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ofothermen.Forthislabourbeingtheunquestionablepropertyofthelabourer,nomanbuthecanhavearighttowhatthatisoncejoinedto,atleastwherethereisenoughandasgoodleftincommonforothers.(Locke1993:II,27)Hereisastep-by-stepsummaryoftheargument:1.Everyonehasapropertyinhisorherown‘person’.Thispropertyis‘inalienable’;thatis,nobodycantransfertheownershipofhisorher\nLocke:theargumentforproperty137persontosomebodyelseby,say,givingitawayorsellingit.(Forexample,youcan’tsellyourselfintoslavery.)2.Yourbodyispartofyourperson.Therefore,youhaveaninalienablepropertyinyourbody.Labouringissomethingyoudowithyourbody.Therefore,youhaveaninalienablepropertyinyourlabour,justasyoudoinyourbody.(Itis–asLockealmostputsit–thelabourofyourbodyandtheworkofyourhandsandthereforeproperlyyours.)3.Whenyouworkyoumixyourlabourwithapartofnature.(Forexample,whenyouploughafield,yourlabourandthatpartoftheearthyouhaveploughedbecomeinextricablymixed.)Becauseyouhaveaninalien-ablepropertyinyourlabouritfollowsthatyoumustnowhaveanequallyinalienablepropertyinthatpartofnaturewithwhichyourlabourhasbecomeallmixedup.Whatarewetomakeofthisfamousargument?Well,first,thecrucialnotionthatyouandIhave‘aninalienablepropertyinourownpersons’isclearlyrelatedto,ifnotquiteequivalentto,otherfundamentalLockeanprinciples.Itgoeshandinhandwiththeideathatweareequalsunderthelawofnature,that–innature–nooneisentitledtoexertauthorityoveranyoneelse,andthateveryonehasnaturalrightstolifeandliberty.ForLocke,thesearenotmuchmorethandifferentwaysofsayingthesamething.Second,Locke’sargumenthasonegreatstrength.(Youwon’tbesurprisedtolearnthatithasitsfaultstoo,andthatafterthreehundredyearsofcriti-cismthesehavebeenprettywelldocumented.Ishallmentionsomeoftheseinamoment,butletmeemphasisethepositivefirst.)ThestrengthofLocke’sargumentatthispointliesinthewayittriestoaccountforadeepmoralconvictionthatmanypeoplehave.Perhapsitisaconvictionweallhave.Thisistheconvictionthatitisthepersonwhoproducessomething–thepersonwhohasactuallydonethework–whomostdeservestobenefitfromthatwhichheorshehasproduced.Therecanbefewreaders,ifany,whowouldwanttodenythatthefarmerwhohaslabouredtogrowthewheathasafargreaterrightinitthandoessomeidlepasser-by,whochoosestohelphimself.(Whyshouldthatpersongetanything?)Or,totakeaparallelexample,fewwoulddisagreethatitisthestudentwhoactuallywrotetheessaywhodeservesthe‘A’grade(nottheplagiarist).Locke’sargumenttakesaccountofthisconvictionbyplacingaparticularconstructiononit;youhaveDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012‘apropertyinyourownperson’,etc.Butthereisplentywrongwiththelatter.EvenifLocke’smoralconvic-tions(or‘intuitions’)areintherightplace,hisargumentraisesquiteafewdifficulties.Letmeoutlinejustthree.Iwilltrytobebrief.Firstofall,thereisthedifficultyofspecifyingarelevantsenseoftheterm‘labour’.ThiscanbemoredifficultthanLockemakesitlook.Forexample,howisLocke’sargumenttodealwiththe‘mentallabour’of,say,writersorarchitects?Suchindividualsplaynopartintheprintingorbindingofthebookstheywrite–orinthebuildingofthestructurestheydesign–but\n138Reasonandrevolutionsdon’tour‘moralintuitions’tellusthattheyshouldhavesomesortofrightinthethingstheyhavetakensuchadecisivehandinproducing?(Minedo.)Considerthefollowingexample,whichfeaturesaphysicallydisabled,butintellectuallytalented,inventor.Thisinventorlivesalongtimeago,beforetheinventionoftheplough.Infact,heisthepersonwhoinventedtheplough.Inhisarea,thesoilisrichinnutrients.Histribecouldlivewellbyagriculture,ifonlytheyhadaplough–buttheydon’t,sotheyareforcedtoekeoutameagreexistencebyforaging.Then,oneday,theinventorthinksuptheplough.Beingdisabled,hecanplaynopartinitsconstructionhim-self,soheexplainsthedesigntotheothers,whothengoontodoallthephysicalthings–cutdowntrees,sawwood,constructtheplough,tillthefields,andsoon.Ithinkyouwillagreewithmethattheinventorisjustasentitledastheotherstoashareintheploughandthecropsitisusedtogrow.Butnowask:Hastheinventorcreatedtheploughbyhislabour?Here,youhaveachoiceofanswers.Youcouldsaythathehas,althoughnotwithlabourasLockethinksofit;notwith‘thelabourofhisbody,andtheworkofhishands’(Locke1993:II,27).ThismightleadyoutoconcludethatLockeemphasisesphysicallabourattheexpenseofotherformsoflabour,suchas‘intellectuallabour’.Ontheotherhand,youcouldsaythathehasnot,inwhichcaseyouwillhavetoconcludethatLockehasnotgivenacompleteoranadequateaccountofhowtheentitlementtopropertyarises.Second,thereisthequestionofhowmuchyourlabourentitlesyouto.ByLocke’saccount,asyouremovethingsfromthecommonstock,yourlabourentitlesyoutonomorethanyouhavemixeditwith.‘Hethatisnourishedbytheacornshepickedupunderanoak,ortheappleshegatheredfromthetreesinthewood,hascertainlyappropriatedthemtohimself.Nobodycandenybutthenourishmentishis.’Thissmallactoflabourisenoughto‘putadistinctionbetweenthemandthecommon’(Locke1993:II,28).Again,‘Thoughthewaterrunninginthefountainbeeveryone’s,yetwhocandoubtbutthatinthepitcherishisonlywhodrewitout?Hislabourhathtakenitoutofthehandsofnature’(Locke1993:II,29).Likewise,‘thislawofreasonmakesthedeerthatIndian’swhohathkilledit;‘tisallowedtobehisgoodswhohathbestowedhislabouruponit,thoughbeforeitwasthecommonrightofeveryone’(Locke1993:II,30).Asforagriculture,theformofproductiveactivitywhichliesatthefore-Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012frontofLocke’sconcerns,itismeanttofollow–equally–that‘Asmuchlandasamantills,plants,improves,cultivates,andusestheproductof,somuchishisproperty’because‘Hebyhislabourdoes,asitwere,encloseitfromthecommon’(Locke1993:II,32).Butnowsupposeafarmerdecidestoletafieldliefallowwithaviewtoimprovingitsfertility.Forawholeyear,thisfarmerinvestsnolabourinthefield.Doesthismeanthatthelandmustreturntothecommonstock,sothatotherscantakeitawayfromhimanduseitfortheirownpurposes?ByLocke’s‘labour-mixing’argumentitappearsthatitshould.However,thisisnottheconclusionLockewanted.\nLocke:theargumentforproperty139Whathewantstoshowisthatagricultureisanactivityfromwhichthosewhocarryitoutderivearighttothelandonwhichtheywork(providedthatitisnotfirstownedbysomeoneelse).Asthisillustrates,Locke’sbucolicexamplesoversimplifythingsbyfocusingonactivitieswhichinvolvephysicallabourandnothingelse–pickingupanacorn,drawingwater,shootingadeer.Butmostproductiveactivities–eventhosewhichinvolveagreatdealofphysicallabour–arenotlikethat.Inmostcases,physicallabourisjustonecomponentinarepertoireoftechniqueswhich,together,makeuptheactivityinquestion.Myexampleoflettingafieldliefallowisacaseinpoint.(Ofcourse,iffarming,theactivity,istocontinue,itissometimesnecessarythatfieldsshouldbeleftfallow.ButnoticethatitwouldnothelpLocketorespondalongsuchlines,fortheNativeAmericaninhisexamplecouldpointoutthatifhunting,theactivity,istocontinue,itisequallynecessarythatthereshouldremaindeer,roamingtheprairieandavailabletohunt.ItseemsthatLockewouldhavetoconcedeeitherthatboththefarmer’sfieldandtheremainingdeerremaininthecommonstock,tobeclaimedbyanyone,orthatneitherdo.)Locke’sexamplesoversimplifythingsinanotherwaytoo,byfocusingonactivitieswhicharecarriedoutbyjustoneperson.Butmostproductiveactivitiesarenotlikethis.Mostoftheminvolvethecoordinatedactionsofmorethanoneindividual.Thisisprobablytrueofmodernagriculture,exceptforthemostprimitive.Itistrueofoperatingafishingboat,anditiscertainlytrueof,say,carproductioninafactoryemployingmanythousandsofpeople,eachconcentratingonasingletask.It’sagoodquestionwhetherLocke’sargumentcanexplainexactlyhowmucheachpersonbecomesentitledtoownafterhavingcontributedlabourtotheprocess.ThethirddifficultyonmylistrelatestoLocke’sideathatwhenyouworkyou‘mixyourlabourwithnature’.Thecoreproblemhereisthatlabourisnotsomethingyou‘mix’atall–notliterally.Itisnotlikeaspoonfulofinstantcoffeegranules,somethingtobemixedwithboilingwater;orlikefertiliser,tobemixedwiththesoil.Locke’stalkof‘mixing’canonlybemetaphorical.Inphilosophy,theuseofmetaphoris–Isuppose–fairenough.However,troublecanstartonceyoutakeametaphortooliterallyand,inLocke’scase,thatiswhathappens;forthelogicalstepbymeansofwhichheseekstomovefrom‘thispersonhaslaboured’to‘thispersonhasarighttothefruitsofhis/herlabour’wouldbeimpossiblewithoutit.AnditisDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ametaphorwhichraisesallkindsofawkwardquestionsforLocke.Forexample,itraisesthequestionofwhymixingsomethingyouownwithsomethingunownedshouldmeanthatyoucometoownthelatterratherthanthatyoulosetheformer.Inawell-knownexample,RobertNozickhasputtheobjectionthisway:‘IfIownacanoftomatojuiceandspillitintheseasothatitsmolecules(maderadioactivesoIcancheckthis)mingleevenlythroughoutthesea,doItherebycometoownthesea,orhaveIfoolishlydissipatedmytomatojuice?’(Nozick1974:175).Thelatterseemsthemoresensibleanswer,eventhoughthetomatojuiceandtheseabecome\n140Reasonandrevolutions‘inextricablymixed’.Thereisnogoodreasonforthinkingthatthingsshouldbeanydifferentwhere‘labour’ismixedwith‘nature’,orsotheobjectiongoes.SomuchforthefirststageofLocke’spropertyargument,thestageatwhichhepicturesindividualsacquiringaninitialrightofownershipbylabour,therebyremovingthingsfromthecommonstock.ThereisplentymoreIcouldsay,butitistimetomoveon.Justtosummarise:thegeneralconclusionIwoulddrawhereisthat,althoughLocketriestodosomethinginterestingandworthwhilewithhisargument–bytryingtoexplainwhythosewhoactuallydotheworkshouldhaveaspecialentitlementto,or‘stake’in,whattheyproduce–his‘labour-mixing’metaphorisamisleadingconstruction.ThecriticismsIhaveraisedheresuggestthathegoeswrongbyoveremphasisingtheroleplayedbyphysicallabourintheproductiveprocess,aswellasbyoversimplifyingthenatureofthatprocessitself.Healsounderplaysthewaydifferentformsofproductioncandiffer;agriculturefromfishingormanufacturing,forexample.Thisraisesanobviousquestion:IftheweaknessesinthispartofLocke’sargumentcanbesoapparenttophilosopherswritingnow,howcomehedidn’tnoticethemhimself?Afterall,Lockewasnofool.Well,whenonepersonfailstonoticesomethingwhichisperfectlyapparenttoanother,quiteoftentheexplanationliesinadifferenceofperspective.Eachisstandinginadif-ferentplace.Iwouldhazardanexplanationalongsuchlineshere.Lockewaswritinginpre-industrialtimes,whenagriculturewasthedominantmodeofproduction.Moreover,itwasanagriculturebasedonaninheritedtechnol-ogy,whichhadbeenpasseddownovergenerations.Nobodyknowswhentheploughwasinvented,orwhoinventedit.Infact,thatpersonstandsinthesamerelationtogenerationsoffarmers–includingthoseofLocke’stime–asBillGatesdoestousersofMicrosoftWindows.Evenso,hisorhercon-tributionisscarcelyrecognisedbyLocke.Ofcourse,thisisquiteunsurpris-ingifyouconsiderthat,inLocke’stime,itwouldhaveseemedthatploughshadalwaysbeenaround.Theirexistencemusthaveseemed‘natural’inaway,almostasnaturalasthatoftheearthandthegrass.Fromprimitiveself-sufficiencytothedevelopedeconomyAlthoughyouacquirearighttotheelementsofrawnatureyouhavemixedDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012yourlabourwith,thelawofnaturealsoplacesrestrictionsontheamountyouareentitledtoacquire.Therearetwo.First,youmustletnothingspoilorgotowaste.‘Asmuchasanyonecanmakeuseoftoanyadvantageoflifebeforeitspoils,somuchhemaybyhislabourfixapropertyin.Whateverisbeyondthisismorethanhisshare,andbelongstoothers’(Locke1993:II,31).WearesubjecttothisrequirementbecausetheworldwasagiftfromGod,tomankindincommon,andintendedforouruseandpreservation,so‘NothingwasmadebyGodformantospoilordestroy’(Locke1993:II,31).Second,youmustleaveenough,andasgood,overforotherstouse.‘Forhethat\nLocke:theargumentforproperty141leavesasmuchasanothercanmakeuseof,doesasgoodastakenothingatall’(Locke1993:II,33).Lockethinksthat,inthefirststagesofappropria-tion,whenthepopulationwassmallandresourcesplentiful,itwouldhavebeenimpossiblenottoobservethisrestriction.‘Norwasthisappropriationofanyparcelofland,byimprovingit,anyprejudicetoanyotherman,sincetherewasstillenough–andasgood–left;andmorethantheyetunprovidedcoulduse’(Locke1993:II,33).ToimaginetheworldasitwouldhaveappearedasthefirststageofLocke’snarrativeprogressesistopictureanidyllic,pastoral,scene.Itistoimagineaworldinwhichresourcesaremorethansufficienttomeetevery-one’sneeds,andinwhichconflictisataminimum.Intermsoftheireco-nomicactivity,theearlytillersofthesoilheinvitesustopictureareonmuchthesamelevelastheacorn-pickers,water-drawersandprimitivedeer-huntersofhisexamples.Buttheeconomicworldsopicturedisnottheeco-nomicworldofLocke’stime.(Stilllessisittheeconomicworldofourown.)Nordoesitrepresenttheeconomicset-upitwasLocke’sintentiontojustify.Thedifferenceisthatintheformerworldpeoplecandolittlemorethanproduceenoughtosatisfytheirimmediateneeds(including,Isuppose,theimmediateneedsoftheirimmediatedependants).Itis,asIjustputit,aworldof‘primitiveself-sufficiency’.Bycontrast,thelatterischaracterisedbyadevelopedsystemoftradeandindustrybymeansofwhichtheactivitiesofnumerousindividuals–oftenseparatedbyvastdistances–arecoordinated.Underthissystem,mereself-sufficiencydropsoutofthepicture,foritisalsocharacterisedbythefactthatnatureisexploitedtothefull.Lockeapprovesandwrites,forexample,that,althoughGodgavetheworldtomenincommon,‘sincehegaveittothemfortheirbenefit,andthegreatestconveniencesoflifetheywerecapabletodrawfromit,itcannotbesupposedhemeantitshouldalwaysremaincommonanduncultivated’(Locke1993:II,34)(myemphasis).Toreachhisdesiredconclusion,Lockehastoshowhowitispossibleforpeopletomovefromtheformersituationtothelatter.Hedoesthisbyintroducingmoneyintohisstory.Aswenotedrightatthebeginningofthischapter,inadevelopedfreemarketeconomy,basedonconsent,propertyisnormallytransferredfromonepersontoanotherbysale,giftorinheritance.Now,ofcourse,thetransferofpropertybyconsentisalsopossibleinaneconomyofprimitiveself-sufficiency,buttoafarmorelimitedextent.GiftisDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012possible.Havingpickedupmyacornorshotmydeer,Icangiveittoyou.Inheritanceisalsopossible.Havingploughedupmypieceofland,Icanleaveittomyson.However,fromit,IwillhavebeenabletoproducelittlemorethanIrequireforthesatisfactionofmyimmediateneeds,andhewillbeabletodonomorethanthat.Saleandpurchase(asopposedtobarter)arecompletelyimpossible,fortheserequiremoney,andmoneyhasyettobeintroduced.So,letusnowconsiderhowLockethinksmoneymakesadifference.First,asanytextbookofeconomicswilltellyou,moneyisa‘mediumofexchange’.\n142ReasonandrevolutionsLockewouldconcur,and–asyoushouldexpectbynow–heinsiststhatitwasfirstintroducedbyconsent.Itdoesn’tmuchmatterwhatmoneyismadeofprovidedthatitsuseisamatterofmutualagreement.(Abanknoteis,afterall,‘justapieceofpaper’.)Lockeimaginesourearlyancestorsusingpiecesofmetal,shells,pebblesordiamonds(Locke1993:II,46).Butwhat-everthematerialused,sofarasLockeisconcerneditismostimportantthatmoneyshouldbemadeofsomethingwhichdoesnotrotorperish.Onhisaccount,itisthisfeaturewhichmakesitpossibletoaccumulatewealthwithoutviolatingthelawofnature’sfirstrestriction,theinjunctionnottoletthingsspoil.Thisisbecausethingswhichdonotrotcanbestored.Forexample,supposethatsomeonegrowsaplumtree.Beforetheintroductionofmoney,then,oncetheplumshaveripened,thisperson(andhisimmediatefamily)musteitherconsumetheentirecrop–whichcouldbeatallordergiventhatitwillonlylastforaboutaweek–orhemustconsumepartofit,andbartertheremainderinexchangeforthingswhichwill,themselves,onlylastforalimitedperiod.Aftermoneyhasbeenintroduced,thingsarequitedifferent,fortheplumscannowbeexchangedfordurabletokensofmetalorstone.Morethanthat,itwillnowbepossibletogrowmanyplumtrees,tensorhundreds,andexchangetheirfruitforsuchtokens.Allthesetokens(thismoney)canbestoredwithaclearconscience–thatis,withoutviolatingthefirstrestriction–‘theboundsofhis[thegrower’s]justpropertynotlyinginthelargenessofhispossession,buttheperishingofanythinguselesslyinit’(Locke1993:II,46).Thisexplainshowmoneymakesitpossibleforpeopletoaccumulatewealth.Italsoexplainshowafullydevelopedeconomycanemergebylegitimatesteps,forindividualswhohavebecomerelativelywealthywilleventuallypasstheirpropertyon.Theywillsellit,giveitaway,or–mostlikely–leaveittotheirchildren.Thosetowhomitistransferredwill,intheirturn,increaseitsvaluewiththeirownlabour–atleastthe‘industriousandrational’amongthemwill(Locke1993:II,34).Overthegenerations,industryandtradewilldevelopandnaturewillbecomeincreasinglyexploi-tedforthebenefitofhumanityasawhole.And,withthat,wereachtheendofLocke’sstory.TwoobjectionsfrominequalityInequalityofresourcesDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Somuchforthestep-by-stepdetailsofLocke’snarrative.IshouldnowliketoconsideracoupleofobjectionstoLockewhichtendtoberaisedatthemoregenerallevel.ThesearisefromthefactthatLockequiteevidentlyrationalisesandcondoneseconomicandsocialinequality.Withinhisscenario,asgenerationsucceedsgeneration,thequantityoflandwhichhasbeentakenintoprivatehandswillprogressivelyincrease.EventhegreatuncultivatedwildernessofAmerica(asLockebelievedittobe)wouldeventuallybecomeparcelledintoplots.Therewouldremainno‘raw’\nLocke:theargumentforproperty143uncultivatedpartsofnatureforthosewhocamealonglatertomixtheirlabourwith;notevenfortherationalandindustriousamongthem.Tosur-vive,suchlatecomerswouldhavenoalternativebuttoputtheirlabourouttohireinreturnforawage.Societywouldsoonbecomesignificantlydividedintotwoclasses:theclassofthosewhoseownershipofprivatepropertywassuchthattheycouldderivealivingfromit,andtheclassofthosewhohadnothingtosellbuttheirownlabour(the‘bourgeoisie’andthe‘proletariat’asMarxwaslatertocallthem).Ofcourse,therewillbesomereaderswhowillseenothingwrongwithLocke’sconclusion.(Theywillsay,‘Andwhat’swrongwiththat?’)However,otherswillfindittroubling.IamnotthinkingespeciallyofreaderswhowillconsidertheveryfactthatLockedefendsinequalityasufficientreasonfordismissinghimoutright.(Therewillbesome.)TherewillbeotherswhoperceiveaninconsistencybetweenthepremiseonwhichLocke’spoliticalphilosophyisfoundedandthisimplicationofhispropertyargument.Asyouwillrecall,theformerisradicallyegalitarian.Lockeinsiststhatweareequalsunderthelawofnature;thatwehaveequalnaturalrights.Suchreaderswillbewonderinghowhecansaythisand,atthesametime,rationaliseeco-nomicinequality.Moreover,inourowntimesmanyoftheobjectionsmostcommonlyraisedagainstfreemarketsystemsinvokethefactthatmarkets,lefttothemselves,operateinwayswhichcreateandincreaseinequality.So,thereisanotherreasonforconsideringthistypeofobjection.AsLockeisthephilosopherwhooriginallyformulatedanarticulatedefenceofthenaturalrighttoproperty,itisinstructivetoconsiderhowhemighthavedealtwithobjectionsofthistype.AsforthespecificobjectionsIhaveinmind,thefirstcanbeputintermsoffairnessandunfairness.Everyoneneedsresources,soitisplainunfairthatsomeshouldhavemuchmorethanothers.Thatishowtheobjectionruns.Asthisobjectionhasit,itisn’tjustthatLocke’sconclusionisapparentlyinconsistentwithhispremises.Italsorelatestothesecondrestrictionheplacesontherighttoappropriate.Thisistheinjunctiontoleave‘enoughandasgood’forothers.HowcanLockepermitsometohavemorethanothersandinsist,atthesametime,thateveryoneshouldhaveenoughandasgoodaseveryoneelse?ItisplainfromthetextoftheSecondTreatisethatLockewouldrespondtothisobjectionbyinsistingthat,inadevelopedeconomybasedonprivateDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ownership,itispossibletoexploitnaturefarmoreefficiently,withtheresultthateveryonebenefits–propertyownersandnon-propertyownersalike.Inshort,itisLocke’sclaimthat,inasystembasedonprivateproperty,eventheworstoffarebetteroffthantheywouldbeunderanyothersystem.Takethefollowingpassage:hewhoappropriateslandtohimselfbyhislabour,doesnotlessenbutincreasethecommonstockofmankind.Fortheprovisionsservingtothesupportofhumanlifeproducedbyoneacreofenclosedandcultivatedlandare(tospeak\n144Reasonandrevolutionsmuchwithincompass)tentimesmorethanthosewhichareyieldedbyanacreofland,ofanequalrichness,lyingwasteincommon.And,therefore,hethatencloseslandandhasagreaterplentyoftheconveniencesoflifefromtenacres,thanhecouldhavefromanhundredlefttonaturemaytrulybesaidtogiveninetyacrestomankind.(Locke1993:II,37)TowhichLockeadds:IaskwhetherinthewildwoodsanduncultivatedwasteofAmerica,lefttonature,withoutanyimprovement,tillage,orhusbandry,athousandacresyieldtheneedyandwretchedinhabitantsasmanyconveniencesoflifeastenacresofequallyfertilelanddoinDevonshire,wheretheyarewell-cultivated.(Locke1993:II,37)ButisLockeright?Ishallrestrictmyselftothreecomments.Thefirstisthatapureuncultivatedwasteandaworlddividedbetweenprivateownersmaynotbetheonlyalternatives.Othermore‘collective’systemsofownershiparealsoconceivable.Itseemstomethatthequestionofwhich,outofthevar-iouspossibilities,mostefficientlypromotesthesituationoftheleastwelloffisaquestionforeconomicanalystsandhistorianstoanswer.Mostlikely,alotdependsoncircumstances.Forexample,itiscertainlyarguablethatafreemarket,lefttoitself,cansometimesworktothedisadvantageoftheworstoff;forinstance,thatthishappensintimesofrecession.Again,itisarguablethatasystembasedonprivateownershipisunlikelytodeliverthebestrailwaysystem(sodisadvantagingtheworstoff,whocan’taffordtheirowncars)orhelpusdealwithglobalwarming(whichthreatenseveryone).Thereismuchtobesaidontheseissues,butIdon’tthinkittakesaphilosophertosortthemout,soIshan’tpursuethem.Second,evenifLockeisright,itisnotsoobviousthathecantakethislineand,atthesametime,observethe‘leaveenoughandasgood’restriction.Eveniftheworstoffpeoplearebetteroffwhereprivateownershipprevailsthantheywouldbeunderotherarrangements–andeveniftheyhaveenough–ithastobetruebydefinitionthat,being‘worseoff’,theycan’t–atthesametime–have‘asgoodas’theothers.LockemaywellhavebeenrighttosayofNativeAmericansthat‘AkingofalargeandfruitfulterritoryDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012there[America]feeds,lodges,andiscladworsethanaday-labourerinEngland’(Locke1993:II,41),buthecouldnotdeny,either,thatthesamelabourerhadaworsediet,worsehousingandlessadequateclothingthanhisequallyEnglishlandlord,withwhosematerialvalueshewouldhavehadfarmoreincommon.3ItisinterestingtospeculateonhowLockecouldhaveansweredthis,apparentlyobvious,objection.Relatedtothis–mythirdcomment–thereisapointwhichcertainlydoesdeservementioninabooksuchasthis,foritconcernsthefundamentalstructureofLocke’sphilosophicalargument.Itisthat,byclaimingthata\nLocke:theargumentforproperty145systembasedonprivatepropertymostimprovesthesituationoftheworstoff,Lockeisinvokingapattern.Heisappealingtothedistributiveprinciplethatanarrangementwhichensuresthattheworstoffpeoplearebetteroffthantheywouldbeunderanyothersystemisbetterthananyother.(Ineffect,heisappealingtosomethinglikeJohnRawls’ssecondprincipleofjustice,ofwhichmoreinalaterchapter.)Now,ifsomethingIsaidmuchearlierinthischapterisright,itfollowsthatLocke’sargumentislogicallybroken-backed,forhisdefenceofpropertyisessentiallyhistoricaland–ifIwasright–patternedandhistoricalargumentsarelogicallyinconsistentwitheachother.Youcan’thaveitbothways.(Wouldanyonehavefoundhisargumentacceptableifithadbeenpurelyhistorical;thatis,ifhehadn’tintroducedthispatternedelement?It’saninterestingquestion,butoneIcan’tfollowuphere.)LabourandconsentWhatofthesecondobjectionfrominequality?Thisconcernstherelationshipbetweenlabourandconsent;thevaluesbymeansofwhichLockelegitimatestheacquisitionofproperty.Thequestionis,whathappenswhenthetwoconflict?Toillustratetheproblem,takethecaseofrationalandindustriouspersonP.Intheearlyperiodofprimitiveself-sufficiency,Pmixeshislabourwithnatureandsoacquiresthelandwithwhichhehasmixedit.Previously,thiswasundercommonownership.WhenPdies,thelandisinheritedbyhisequallyrationalandindustrioussonP2,whofurtherimprovesitwithhislabour,asdoesP3,P’srationalandindustriousgrandson.Infact,P3becomessorichthatheretires,havingfirstsoldthepropertytoP4,acharismaticandimaginativeentrepreneur.P4convertstheagriculturallandtoindustrialuse,andsobecomesricherstill,somuchsothathecangiveawaysomeofthepropertytohardworkingP5…andsoon.Eventually,wecometowastrelplayboyPN,whohaspurchasedalargecountryestatewithhisinheritedwealth.PicturePN,asheidlesawayhistimeinhiscastle:drinking,gamingandwhilingawaytimewithhismistresses.Actually,itdoesn’tmatterwhatyouimaginehimdoing,providedthat–whateveritis–itisquiteobviouslynotlabouring.Andnowpicturehonestandhard-workingdaylabourerQ,whoentersthestoryatthispoint.There,atanotherpartoftheestate,QislabouringhardDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012andlong,withhisspadeandhishoe,ashetillsthesoil.Now,whoisenti-tledtotheland?Ifitisconsentwhichlegitimatesownership,thenthelandshouldbelongtoPN.Everystepoftheprocessasaresultofwhichhehascometoowntheestatehasinvolvednothingbutconsent.Ontheotherhand,ifitislabour,then–bythatyardstick–shouldn’tthelandfallintothehandsofQ?Thereappearstobeaconflictofcriteria.Lockewantstosaythat,whereasitislabourwhichlegitimatesinitialactsofacquisition,itisconsentwhichlegitimatessubsequenttransfersofpropertyfromonepersontoanother.Theconclusionhewantstodrawisthat,asaresultofthetransfers\n146Reasonandrevolutionsinquestion,thelandshouldremainthepropertyofPN.Indeed,heisinsis-tentthat‘theturfsmyservanthascut’becomemyproperty,nottheservant’s(Locke1993:II,28).Butwhybesorestrictive?Whynotsaythattheown-ershiprightsinthelandmustgravitatefromthelandlordtothedaylabourer?Accordingtotheobjection,Locke’sprioritisationofconsentoverlabourinthistypeofcaseisnomorethantheexpressionofanarbitraryprejudiceinfavourofinheritedwealth.Thisisapowerfulobjection,butIthinktheSecondTreatisecontainsapotentialanswertoit.However,unlikeLocke’sanswertothefirstobjectionfromequalityithastobeteasedfrombetweenthelines.Itisananswerwhichinvokestheideathatlabourissomethingwhichcanbemixedandstored.Recalltheexampleofthepersonwhoexchangestheplumshehasgrownfortokensmadeofstoneormetal.Iflabourissomethingyoucanmixwithnature,youcouldsaythat,justastheplumscontainhislabourbeforetheexchangehastakenplace,so,afterwards,itbecomesinvested,or‘con-tained’inthestones.Overaperiodofyears,saytenyears,asthestone-tokensarerepeatedlysaved,so–bythisargument–themanwillhavesavedstoneswithinwhichtenyears’worthoflabourisstored.Thisstoredlabourwillthenbetransferredtowhateverhepurchaseswiththem,orsoyoucouldargue.Ifitisapieceofland,thislandwillnowcontainthetenyears’worthoflabourwhichwasoriginallyputintogrowingplums.Anyfurtherlabourinvestedinthelandwillbeaddedtothatand,whensubsequenttransferstakeplace,thislabourwillmovefromonemediumofcontainmenttoanother.Ifyoufollowthislineofargumentthrough,thenyouhavetocon-cludethat,whenPNbuystheestate,hedoesmorethanexchangesomemoneyforsomeland.Youhavetosaythatthemoneycontainsmanygen-erations’worthofstoredlabourandthat,afterthepurchase,thislabouristransferredtobecomestoredintheland.Ifthisisright,itmeansthatLockecanremovethecontradictionbetweenhispreferredcriteriaandarguethatbothPNandQhaveinvestedlabourintheestate;indeed,thatbothhave,inasense,actuallylabouredonit.Tothis,Iwillonlyaddthefollowing:lookwhatyouhavetodotoreachthisconclusion.Ordinarily,wethinkoflabourasphysicalwork.Buttoreachtheconclusion(withLocke’s‘labourtheoryofvalue’)youhavetostretchthenotionsofarthatlabourbecomesamysteriousandghostlyfluid;somethingwhichcanbemixedwiththesoil,withplums,stones,evenwithindustrialDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012machinery,butwithoutanyone’sbeingabletoseeordetectit.Exactlywherethisleavestheargumentisagoodquestion.LockeasasocialcontracttheoristIshallbringthischaptertoaclosewithafewobservationsonthestrengthsandweaknessesofsocialcontracttheoryasanapproachtoquestionsinpoli-ticalphilosophy.ThisisathemetowhichIhavereturnedmorethanonceduringthecourseofthisdiscussionofHobbesandLocke.Forexample,in\nLocke:theargumentforproperty147mydiscussionofHobbesIraisedthequestionofwhetherthecontractismeanttoberealorhypothetical.SomeofLocke’sargumentssupplygoodillustrationsoffurtherdifficultiesbywhichthisapproachcanbebeset.Thatapart,thisisagoodpointatwhichtolookbackoverthelasttwochapters,andtotrytoreachanoverview.Justtoremindyou,totakeasocialcontractapproachis–inessence–totrytofigureoutwhatrationalpeoplewoulddowhenplacedinanimaginarysituation(thestateofnature).Inthehandsoftherightphilosopher,thiscanbeapowerfulwaytoproceed.Forexample,ifyoucangiveaconvincingaccountofhowrationalpeople,findingthemselvesinasituationwherethereisnostate,wouldthensetupastateofacertaintype,youwillhavegivenanequallyconvincinganswertothequestionofwhatthepointofhavingstatesis.Youwillalsohaveacriticalweapontowieldagainstthosewhoclaimlegitimacyforstateswhichdonotmatchyourpreferreddescription.Theartistobeginwithadescriptionofhumanlifeinthestateofnaturewhich,incrucialrespects,accuratelyreflectshumannatureandthehumanconditionastheyreallyare.Inshort,peopleinthestateofnaturemustbejustlikeus,onlyrational.However,therelationshipbetweentheimaginary,rationalpeopleofsocialcontracttheoryandrealpeoplelikeyouandmecanvary,andthiscanaffectasocialcontractargument.Asanexampleofhow,taketheargumentdis-cussedinthepreviouschapter,Locke’sargumentthatlegitimategovernmentmustbefoundedontheconsentofthegoverned.Locketellsusthatrationalpeople,beingfundamentallyfreeandequal,wouldonlyagreetobegovernedonsuchterms.Healsotellsusthatrationalpeople,withnaturalrightstoprotect,woulderectagovernmenttoavoidtheinsecuritiesofthestateofnature,sorenderingtheirrightsmoresecure.Infact,youcouldputhisconclusionthisway:Rationalpeoplewouldonlyconsenttoagovernmentwhichrespectstheirnaturalrights.Butthetroubleisthatthe‘consent’criterionandthe‘naturalrights’criterioncanmoveindependently.Unliketherationalbeingshypothesisedbysocialcontracttheory,realpeople–youandI–canconsenttoanything.Realpeoplecanconsenttogovernmentswhichviolatetheirrights.Iwon’tgiveany,butIamsurethatahistoryofdemocracywouldsupplyplentyofexamples.Conversely,governmentsnotbasedonconsentcanrespectrights–the‘benevolentdictator’iscertainlyapossibility,ifonlyalogicalone.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012So,whathappenswhenthetwocriteriaconflict?Whereagovernmentrespectsnaturalrights,butruleswithoutconsent,mustitremaininplaceevenso,ormustitgo?Morecrucially,wherethepeopleconsenttoagov-ernmentwhichviolatesrights,isit,orisitnot,entitledtoremaininplace?ItisatleastarguablethatthisproblemisobscuredbythefactthatLockeisprimarilyconcernedwiththerighttorebel.ItisLocke’sopinionthat‘thepeoplearenotsoeasilygotoutoftheiroldforms,assomeareapttosuggest’;thatitisonlywhen‘thepeoplearemademiserable,andfindthemselvesexposedtotheillusageofarbitrarypower’thattheyareinclinedtorebel\n148Reasonandrevolutions(Locke1993:II,223,224).Heisprobablyrightand,ifheis,itfollowsthatpeoplewillusuallywithdrawconsentonlyfromgovernmentswhichviolatetheirrights.However,theconverseclaim–thatpeoplewillonlyconsenttogovernmentswhichrespectrights–doesnothold.Theproblemisarealone,anditmustbecomeespeciallypressingforanyonewhotriestouseanargumentlikeLocke’sto,say,legitimiserepresentativedemocracywiththeclaimthatevenrights-violatinggovernmentsareentitledtoremaininpoweruntilthenextelection,becausethepeopleconsentedtotheirruleatthelastone.AfurtherdifficultyforsocialcontracttheoryarisesfromsomethingImentionedearlier,theclaimthatasocialcontractargumentcanbeusedtojustifytheexistenceofaninstitution–suchasastateofacertaintype–withanaccountofhowitcouldhavecomeintobeing,eventhoughitdidnotinfactcomeintobeingthatway.Asithappens,wheretheinstitutioninques-tionisthestate,oracertaintypeofstate,thisclaimisquiteinorder.Ifitcanbeshownthatrationalindividualswouldchoosetoestablishastateofthattype,thenfairenough,thatiswhatyouandIwouldagreetoifwewererational;and,iftherationalthingistherightthing,thenitfollowsthatyouandIshouldagreetoit.Butproblemscanarisewherethesametypeofargumentisappliedtootherinstitutions,theinstitutionofprivatepropertybeingacaseinpoint.‘Historical’justificationsofthewaypropertyisdistributed,suchasLocke’s,scoreover‘patterned’accountsbecausetheyattachpropertyrightssecurelytospecificindividuals.Forexample,ifyouwanttoknowwhyLordSuch-and-SuchshouldbetheowneroftheSuch-and-Suchestate,thenahis-toricalaccountwhichtracesthetransactionsthroughwhichtheestate’stitlehaspassedcantellyou.(Bycontrast,appealtoapattern,suchasautilitarianpattern,mightyieldtheconclusionthatthegeneralhappinessisbestservedwhensomepeopleownmorethanothers,butitwon’ttellyouwhythosepeopleoverthereshouldhavethewealth,andnotyou.)However,thisisanadvantagethatahistoricalaccountderivesfromitsabilitytoshowhowagivendistributioncameaboutinfact.If–bycontrast–youinterpretLocke’spropertyargumentasanaccountofhowanactualdistributioncouldhavecomeabout,eventhoughitdidn’t,youhitaproblem.Toillustrateit,takethewell-knownfactthatallpropertyinEnglandoriginatedwithamassivetheft.Imeanthat,foreverypieceofEnglishland,evenifyoucantraceitsownershipbackathousandyears(itselfDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012atallorderinmostcases)–andevenifitcanbeshownthateverytimeitchangedhandsitdidsolegitimately,withtheconsentofthoseinvolved–youeventuallygetbacktotheNormanConquestof1066,whenallpropertyinlandwassystematicallystolenbytheNormansfromtheSaxons.(YoucanthinkoftheDomesdayBookasarecordofwhostolewhatfromwhom.)DoesLocke’sargumententailthatnooneinEnglandislegitimatelyentitledtoownanything,eventhepropertytheythinktheyhaveacleartitleto?Tome,thatseemsanabsurdconclusion.IfIamright,itfollowsthat,inthecaseoftheinstitutionofproperty,anexplanationofhowitcouldhavecomeabout\nLocke:theargumentforproperty149isnotsoobviouslyrelevanttoanexplanationofhowitdid.(Tobehonest,Ihavenotyetfiguredoutwhytheconclusionshouldbesoabsurd,butIthinkitis.Perhapstimehassomethingtodowithit.Idon’tthinkitwouldseemsoabsurdiftheNormanConquesthadhappenedmorerecently–lastyear,perhaps,oreventhreeorfourgenerationsago.Forthemoment,thatissomethingIcanleavetoyou.)WhatelseshallIsayaboutLocke?Wellthereissomuch.Forexample,justastheNormanConquestraisesaproblemforLocke’sargument,so–maybe–doesthecolonisationofNorthAmerica.JustastheNormanstookpropertyfromtheSaxons,didn’tEuropeansettlersstealfromNativeAmericans?Perhaps;butLockewouldsaynot,andhisargumentcouldeasilybepressedintoserviceasajustifyingrationaleforwhathappened.(Itisnoaccidentthatsomanyofhisexamplesinvolvethe‘wildindians’ofthatcontinent.)ThisissomethingonwhichIhavehardlytouched,and–Iamsure–thereismorebesides.However,IthinkIhavesaidenoughtogiveyouanideaofwhyitisworthtakinganinterestinLocke’sphilosophy.Heisthephilosopherwhofirstlentfulltheoreticalarticulationtosomecentralthemeswhichhave,sincehistime,continuedtostructurepoliticalthought;mostespecially,theideathatgovernmentshouldbebasedonconsent,andtheideathatpropertyownershipissomethingwhichneedstobedefendedwithanargument.ItwouldbehardtodescribetheSecondTreatiseasamodelofdisciplinedlogicalrigour,but–contrarytopopularbelief–logicalrigourisnottheonlyphi-losophicalvirtue,oreventhemostimportantone.Locke’smajorvirtuesarehisinventivenessandhisimagination.Thatsaid,itistimetomoveon.SuggestionsforfurtherreadingLockeThereareplentyofgoodbooksonLocke,butnotsomanyonhispoliticalthought.TwoexceptionsareA.J.Simmons’TheLockeanTheoryofRights(1992)andLockeonGovernmentbyD.A.LloydThomas(1995).Thisisthebestbookwithwhichtobeginifyouarethinkingoffollowingupthischapterwithfurtherreading.Anotherexception,ofacom-pletelydifferentkind,isC.B.Macpherson’sclassicThePoliticalTheoryofPossessiveIndividualism(1964).Seeespeciallychap.5.MacphersonDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012arguesthatitispossibletoresolvecertaindifficultiesinLocke’stext,oncecertainassumptionsaboutthenatureofsocialandeconomicreal-ityaretakenintoaccount,assumptionswhichwouldhavecomenat-urallytoanyonelivingintheseventeenthcentury.Macpherson’sargumentcausedacertainamountofcontroversywhenhisbookwasfirstpublished.Foracritiqueofthatargument,seethefirstchapterofAlanRyan’sPropertyandPoliticalTheory(1984).ForarelativelyrecentdiscussionofLocke’saccountofconsentseeP.Russell’s‘Lockeon\n150ReasonandrevolutionsExpressandTacitConsent’(1986).SeealsoHannahPitkin’sinfluentialarticle,‘ObligationandConsent’(1965,1966).Pitkinrelatesthediffi-cultiesinherentinLocke’sargumenttothenatureofhissocialcontractasanexerciseinrationalchoicetheory.ForanilluminatingcomparisonofLockeandMarxseeG.A.Cohen’s‘MarxandLockeonLandandLabour’(1985).MauriceCranston’sJohnLocke:ABiography(1985)isaterrificaccountofLocke’slifeandtimes.Notes1AtmeetingsoftheFrenchNationalAssembly,themoreradicalmemberstendedtooccupyseatstowardstheleftofthedebatingchamber,thelessradicalmemberstooccupyseatstowardstheright.2Seeabove,chapter6,pp.92ff.3Thisbizarrecross-culturalcomparisonspeaksvolumesaboutseventeenth-centuryEurope’sper-ceptionsoflifeintheNewWorld.PresumablyastereotypicalEnglishday-laboureroftheperiodwouldhavelivedinasoliddwelling,hadacoattokeephimwarminwinter,bigboots,aregulardailyroutineandagoodsliceofcheeseorbaconforbreakfast.Bycontrast,thestereotypicalNativeAmericanwouldhavebeenmorethinlycladandledanomadic,lessstructuredlife.Theideathatthereisacommonstandardofcomparisonintermsofwhichthelifeoftheformercanbejudged‘better’thanthatofthelatteris,sofarasIcansee,crazy.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n9RousseauThesubjectofpropertyisalsodiscussed,thoughbriefly,byJean-JacquesRousseauinhisDiscourseontheOriginsofInequality.Thisiswhathesays:Thefirstmanwho,havingenclosedapieceofland,thoughtofsaying‘Thisismine’andfoundpeoplesimpleenoughtobelievehim,wasthetruefounderofcivilsociety.Howmanycrimes,wars,murders:howmuchmiseryandhorrorthehumanracewouldhavebeensparedifsomeonehadpulledupthestakesandfilledintheditchandcriedouttohisfellowmen:‘Bewareoflisteningtothisimpostor.Youarelostifyouforgetthatthefruitsoftheearthbelongtoeveryoneandthattheearthitselfbelongstonoone’.(Rousseau1984:109)Asthepassagedemonstrates,Rousseau’sattitudetopropertywasquitedif-ferentfromLocke’s.ThepointisconfirmedalittlelaterwhenRousseauexpressesasentimentLockecouldneverhavesharedashereproachesthe(property-/slave-)ownerinthefollowingterms:Doyounotknowthatamultitudeofyourbrethrenperishorsufferfromneedofwhatyouhavetoexcess,andthatyourequiredtheexpressandunanimousconsentofthewholehumanraceinordertoappropriatefromthecommonsubsistenceanythingbeyondthatrequiredforyourownsubsistence?(Rousseau1984:121)TheDiscourseonInequalityisaspeculativeaccountofhowhumanityreachedDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012itspresent‘civilised’condition.Rousseau’snarrativebeginswithaportraitofthefirsthumansassolitaryforest-dwellers.Inthiscondition,asRousseauportraysit,humanneedswerefewandsimple,andhumanpassionscorre-spondinglyso.Of‘thesavageman’,hewritesthat‘theonlygoodthingsheknowsintheuniversearefood,afemale,andrepose,andtheonlyevilshefearsarepainandhunger’(1984:89).AccordingtoRousseau,thehumanconditionchangedovertime.Fromthissolitary,nomadicstatetherearose,first,amorecommunal,andthenamoresettledwayoflife.Itwaswithagriculturethatpropertycameonthesceneand,asRousseauseesit,itwas\n152Reasonandrevolutionswiththelatterthattherotreallystartedtosetin,forrulesofpropertybredeconomicandsocialinequality.Thisishow:Thestrongerdidmoreproductivework,themoreadroitdidbetterwork,themoreingeniousdevisedwaysofabridginghislabour;thefarmerhadgreaterneedofironorthesmithgreaterneedofwheat,andwithbothworkingequally,theoneearnedplentywhiletheotherhadhardlyenoughtoliveon.(Rousseau1984:118)And,asRousseaugoesontoexplain:Itisthusthatnaturalinequalitymergesimperceptiblywithinequalityofranks,andthedifferencesbetweenmen,increasedbydifferencesofcircumstance,makethemselvesmorevisibleandmorepermanentintheireffects,andbegintoexerciseacorrespondinglylargeinfluenceoverthedestinyofindividuals.(Rousseau1984:118)Aspeoplefallintorelationsofdominationandsubservience,itsoonbecomesnecessarytodissimulateandpretend.‘Beingandappearancebecametwoentirelydifferentthings,andfromthisdistinctionaroseinsolentostentation,deceitfulcunningandallthevicesthatfollowintheirtrain’(Rousseau1984:119).Eventually,wereachaconditioninwhichdespotismprevails.Rousseaudescribesthisasfollows:Thisisthelaststageofinequality,andtheextremetermwhichclosesthecirclefromwhichwestarted.Itisherethatallindividualsbecomeequalagainbecausetheyarenothing,herewheresubjectshavenolongeranylawbutthewillofthemaster,northemasteranyotherrulebutthatofhispassions,herethatnotionsofthegoodandprinciplesofjusticevanishoncemore.Hereeverythingisrestoredtothesolelawofthestrongest,andconsequentlytoanewstateofnaturedifferentfromtheonewithwhichwebeganonlythatonewasthestateofnatureinitspureformandthisoneisthefruitofanexcessofcorruption.(Rousseau1984:134–35)Liberty,lawandRousseau’sreputationDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012TheforegoingpassageembodiesoneofthemoststrikingdifferencesbetweenRousseau’sversionofthesocialcontractargumentandtheworkofhispre-decessors.(Thereareplentyofothers,andtheseshouldbecomeapparentasthischapterprogresses.)Thatdifferenceliesinhisconceptionoftherelation-shipbetweenthesocialcontractandthepoliticalconditionsofhisowntime.Thepointisthatwearenotintendedtotakehisdescriptionof‘despotism’asagloomyprediction,anaccountofhowthingsarelikelytoturnoutifwearen’tcareful.SofarasRousseauisconcerned,despotismhasalreadyarrived.Intheformofrulebyanabsolutemonarch,despotismhadprevailedin\nRousseau153Franceforsomecenturies.Rousseaugoesontosaythat‘thecontractofgovernmentissofullydissolvedunderdespotismthatthedespotisonlymasterforsolongasheisstrongest’(1984:135).AddtothisRousseau’sviewthatagenuinelypoliticalassociationcanonlybeestablishedwitha‘truecontractbetweenapeopleandthechiefsthatpeoplechooses,acontractwherebybothpartiescommitthemselvestoobservethelaws’(1984:128)andyouhavetoconcludethatnoexistinggovernmentislegitimate,or,asthefamousopeningsentenceofTheSocialContract’sfirstchapterwouldhaveit,Manwasbornfree,andheiseverywhereinchains.(Rousseau1968:49)Itfollowsthat,ifthereistobeatruecontract,itmustlieinthefuture.Inthemeantime,‘Theinsurrectionwhichendswiththestranglingordethro-nementofasultanisjustaslawfulanactasthosebywhichhedisposedthedaybeforeofthelivesandpropertyofhissubjects’(Rousseau1968:135).Ifanythingisarecipeforrevolution,thisis.TheSocialContract(1968)istheworkinwhichRousseausetsoutthepositivesideoftheequation.Withit,heprescribesaremedyforhumanity’sservilecondition.Tounderstandthebookproperly,therearetwopointsonwhichitisessentialtobeclearfromtheoutset,soletmenowmentionthem.ThefirstisthatRousseauisno‘back-to-nature’enthusiastforsomeidealised,pastoralsimplelife.Hedoesnotimagineforamomentthatthelifeofearlyhumans,asheportraysitintheDiscourseontheOriginsofInequality,issome-thingtowhichwecouldreturn.Hedoesnoteveninviteustoregarditasespeciallyenviable.Rousseau’spointisjustthat,becausetheirlifestylewassimple,theemotionsandneedsofearlyhumanswerecorrespondinglysimple;nothingmorethanthat.ItistruethatRousseauhasbeenheldresponsible–byhiscontemporariesandsubsequently–forromanticising‘thenoblesavage’,butthisisbasedonamisreadingofRousseau.Morethanthat,thereare,inhisview,advantagestolivingincommunities,governedbylaw.Weare‘perfectible’creatures,andgiventherightconditionswecouldthrive.Itisjustthat,havingreachedourpresentfallencondition,wehaveyettoberedeemed,butareturntothesolitaryexistenceoftheprimitive,nomadic,forest-dwellerisnotanoption.Thesecondpointisthat,forRousseau,themostimportantthing–theDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012fundamentalvalue–isfreedom.‘Theworstthingthatcanhappen’,hesays,is‘tofindoneselfatthemercyofanother’(1968:125).Rousseaubelievesthattheinstinctforlibertyissodeeplyingrainedbynaturethatonecanevenobserveitatworkinanimals,although,in‘civilised’humans,ithasbecomesubdued.‘Evenasanunbrokenhorseerectsitsmane,pawstheground,andrearsimpetuouslyattheveryapproachofthebit,whileatrainedhorsesuf-ferspatientlyeventhewhipandspur’,saysRousseau,‘savagemanwillnotbendhisnecktotheyokewhichcivilisedmanwearswithoutamurmur’(1984:125)and‘WhenIseeanimals,bornfreeandhatingcaptivity,\n154Reasonandrevolutionsbreakingtheirheadsagainstthebarsoftheirprison…Ifeelthatitisnotforslavestoargueaboutliberty’(1984:126).So,whereasthe‘savage’hadlibertybutlackedtheadvantagesderivedfromlivingsociallyunderlaw,so‘civilised’humanityhaslosttheformerintheprocessofgainingthelatter.Therefore,theproblemistoreconcilethetwo,andthatiswhatRousseausetsouttodowiththecommunity,or‘formofassociation’,hedescribesinTheSocialContract.Thereisakeypassageinwhichhedescribesthetaskasfollows:Howtofindaformofassociationwhichwilldefendthepersonandgoodsofeachmemberwiththecollectiveforceofall,andunderwhicheachindividual,whileunitinghimselfwiththeothers,obeysnoonebuthimself,andremainsasfreeasbefore.(Rousseau1968:60)Thisiscertainlyaworthwhileaimtosetyourself.Itisevenanobleaim,sohowcomeRousseau’sposthumousstandinghassooftenbeensodis-reputable?Well,theFrenchRevolutionhadsomethingtodowithit.InhislifetimeRousseauwasanimmenselypopularwriter.Afterhisdeath,in1778,hisstatusintheeyesoftheFrenchpublicbecamesaintlike.Thismakesitunsurprisingthatheshouldhavebecomecastastherevolution’sphilosopher,eventhough11yearsweretopassbeforethestormingoftheBastillein1789.Infact,Rousseau’sattitudetoviolencewasambivalent,andthereisnothinginhisworkyoucoulddescribeasadetailedmanifestoforanuprising.(Infact,hewaslesspopularforhisstrictlypoliticalwritingsthanhewasforhisotherwork.)1ButitwasRousseauwhosetthetone.AsSimonSchamaputsitinCitizens,hishistoryoftherevolution,‘Whatheinventedwasnotaroadmaptorevolution,buttheidiominwhichitsdis-contentswouldbevoicedanditsgoalsarticulated’(Schama1989:161).Asthingshavesubsequentlyturnedout,theassociationhasdoneRousseau’sreputationnogoodatall,for,unliketheAmericanRevolutionwhichshortlyprecededit,theFrenchRevolutiondegeneratedintoaprolongedorgyofbloodletting–‘TheTerror’asitbecameknown.Thereis,atleast,guiltbyassociation.Andthereissomethingelsetoo;somethingassociatedwithfarmorerecent–equally,ifnotmoreterrible–events,andwhichismorecloselyDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012relatedtotheargumentofmorestrictlypoliticalworks.AchargefrequentlylevelledatRousseauisthathelaidthefoundationsofaphilosophicalposi-tionwhichwouldlaterbecometheideologyof‘totalitarianism’;thatis,thebeliefsystemwhichinformedtheactionsof(amongstothers)HitlerandStalin,andinthenameofwhichsomuchterribledamagewasdoneinthetwentiethcentury.Accordingtooneversionofthisaccusation,J.L.Talmon’s,Rousseauisguiltyofadvocating‘totalitariandemocracy’(Talmon1952:38–49).Inasimilarvein,SirIsaiahBerlinimputesa‘sinisterparadox’toRousseau:\nRousseau155Thisisthesinisterparadoxaccordingtowhichaman,inlosinghispoliticalliberty,isliberatedinsomehigher,deeper,morerational,morenaturalsense,whichonlythedictatororonlytheState,onlytheassembly,onlythesupremeauthorityknows,sothatthemostuntrammelledfreedomcoincideswiththemostrigorousandenslavingauthority.(Berlin2002:48–49)Berlinaddsthat‘ForthisgreatperversionRousseauismoreresponsiblethananythinkerwhoeverlived’(2002:49).WhatIshouldnowliketodoisexaminethischargeinmoredetail.IamnotespeciallyouttodefendRousseauagainstit,althoughIamnotouttoattackhimeither.Thatisnotmypresentconcern.Asithappens,Ithinkthechargeisoverstated,butIalsothinkthereissomethingrightaboutit,evenso.Whatistrueisthathisinterpretationsofcertainkeypoliticalconcepts–theconceptoffreedom,forexample–areverydifferentfromthoseadvancedbymanyotherphilosophers.Itisworthexaminingthedifferencemoreclosely,becausetounderstanditistounderstand,notjustRousseau,butagreatdealofsubsequentpoliticalthought.Fromfreedomanddemocracytototalitarianism?A‘totalitarian’systemisasysteminwhichasinglegroup–suchasapartyoragangofgenerals–seekstoimposeitswillonthepopulation,absolutely,byeveryavailablemeans.Theaimistotalcontrol,hencetheword‘totali-tarianism’.Stalin’sSovietUnionandHitler’sGermanyusuallycropupindiscussionsoftotalitarianism,mainlybecausethetermwasinitiallycoined,intheearlierpartofthetwentiethcentury,withtheminmind.Theywerethoughtbymanytoexemplifyanewphenomenon.Ofcourse,thereareotherswhothinkthatthereisnothingatallnewaboutthemandthat‘totalitarianism’isjustanew-fanglednameforgoodold-fashioneddictator-ship.Scholarsdisagree,anditisaninterestingquestion.2However,itisnotaquestionIshalldiscusshere.Ishalljustcarryontalkingabout‘totalitar-ianism’,andIshallassume–Ithink,quitereasonably–thateveryonewillknowwhatImean.Forus,thesubjectisRousseau’sargument,andthequestionpresentlyatissuemustbe:HowcansomeonesocommittedtotheidealsoffreedomandDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012(asweshallsee)democracylayhimselfopentothechargeofhavingadvocatedtotalitarianism?Letustakefreedomfirst.Fromfreedomtototalitarianism?Theanswertothequestiondepends–ofcourse–onhowyoudefine‘freedom’.AccordingtoRousseau,freedomis‘obediencetoalawoneprescribestooneself’(1968:65)(myitalics).Isthisanaccuratedefinition?Well,itcertainlylooksfairenoughatfirstglance.Thereisnothingobviouslywildorpretentious\n156Reasonandrevolutionsaboutit.Morethanthat,itisadefinitionwhichrecognisesthat,whenapersonismadetoobeylawsprescribedbysomeoneelse,thatisusuallyareasonfordescribingthatpersonaslackingfreedom.Theslavemustobeytheslave-owner’srules,thecaptivemustfollowthecaptor’sinstructions,themenialworkermustdoasthebosssays.Inthesecasestheslave,thecaptive,theworkerlackfreedombecauseeachis‘subjecttothewillofanother’.Itseemstofollow,quitedirectly,that,ifeachofthemcouldmakehisorherownrules,eachwouldbefree.Ifitisatestofadefinitionthatitshouldaccuratelyreflectthewaywordsordinarilyapplytosimple,clear-cut,cases,thenRousseau’sdefinitionappearstopassthetest.Butthisiswhereitstartstogetinteresting.Notice,now,thatthereareotherwaystodefine‘freedom’,andthatthesealsopassthetest.Forexample,manyphilosophersthinkoffreedomastheabsenceofobstructionstoaction.Ifthisisright,youarefreetoperformanactionif,andonlyif,thereisnoobstruction,standinginyourway,sufficienttopreventyoufromdoingit.Thisdefi-nitionalsoapplies,quiteclearly,tosimpleclear-cutcases.Forexample,ifthepoliceweretoerectabarrieracrossmystreet,then–obviously–Iwouldlackthefreedomtodrivealongthestreetasaresult.Thisisthedefinitionof‘freedom’(or‘liberty’)whichunderpinstheargumentofJohnStuartMill’sOnLiberty(Mill1991a).‘[T]hereisasphereofaction’,hewrote,‘inwhichsociety,asdistinguishedfromtheindividual,has,ifany,onlyanindirectinterest.’TheindividuallibertyMillwantsprotectedistheunim-pededfreedomtomovearoundinsidethesphere.(Incidentally,perhapsIoughttopointoutthatIamusingthewords‘freedom’and‘liberty’interchangeably.)3Inhisfamousessay,‘TwoConceptsofLiberty’(1969b),IsaiahBerlindrawsadistinctionbetweenwhathecalls‘positive’and‘negative’concep-tionsoffreedom.Theformerdefinition,Rousseau’s,exemplifiesapositiveconception.Itqualifiesassuchbecauseitdefinesfreedomintermsofself-control,or‘autonomy’.‘The“positive”senseoftheword“liberty”derivesfromthewishoftheindividualtobehisownmaster’,writesBerlin.Hecontinues:Iwishmylifeanddecisiontodependonmyself,notonexternalforcesofwhateverkind.Iwishtobeaninstrumentofmyown,notofothermen’s,actsofwill.Iwishtobeasubject,notanobject;tobemovedbyreasons,bycon-Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012sciouspurposes,whicharemyown,notbycauseswhichaffectme,asitwere,fromoutside.Iwishtobesomebody,notnobody;adoer–deciding,notbeingdecidedfor,self-directedandnotacteduponbyexternalnatureorbyothermenasifIwereathing,orananimal,oraslaveincapableofplayingahumanrole,thatis,ofconceivinggoalsandpoliciesofmyownandrealisingthem.(Berlin1969b:131)‘IfeelfreetothedegreethatIbelievethistobetrue,andenslavedtothedegreethatIammadetorealisethatitisnot’(1969b),orsoBerlinadds.By\nRousseau157contrast,Mill’sconceptionoflibertyis,inBerlin’sterms,‘negative’.Berlinoutlines‘thenotionof“negative”freedom’asfollows:Iamnormallysaidtobefreetothedegreetowhichnomanorbodyofmeninterfereswithmyactivity.Politicallibertyinthissenseissimplytheareawithinwhichamancanactunobstructedbyothers.IfIampreventedbyothersfromdoingwhatIcouldotherwisedo,Iamtothatdegreeunfree;andifthisareaiscontractedbyothermenbeyondacertainminimum,Icanbedescribedasbeingcoerced,or,itmaybe,enslaved.(Berlin1969b:122)Andsoon.AccordingtoBerlin,politicalphilosopherscanberoughlycate-gorisedasfallingintooneortheotheroftwogroups,dependingonwhichconceptionoffreedom,outofthetwo,theytendtoendorse.(Perhapsheisright,butIshan’tgointothatquestion.)Doesanyofthismatter?AccordingtoBerlinitdoes,for–ashecontends–thisapparentlysmalldifferencebetweendefinitionshasfar-reachingimpli-cations.Atfirstglance,theymayappear‘nomorethannegativeandpositivewaysofsayingmuchthesamething’,buttheyrepresentnotionsoffreedom,which‘historicallydevelopedindivergentdirectionsnotalwaysbylogicallyreputablesteps,until,intheend,theycameintodirectconflictwitheachother’(Berlin1969b:131–32).AccordingtoBerlin,itisthe‘positive’con-ceptionoflibertywhichlendsitselftothesupportofrepressive,authoritariandoctrines.Berlinholdsthat,bycontrast,thetruefriendsoflibertyhavetendedtointerpretlibertyina‘negative’way.(InBerlin’sview,oneoflib-erty’struefriendsisJohnStuartMill.ThereisafulldiscussionofMillbelow,inchapter11.Imentionhimfromtimetotimehere,mainlybecausehisargumentsprovideagoodcontrastwithRousseau’s.)Now,Berlin’sargumentraisesplentyofinterestingquestions,butoursubjectisRousseau,soIshan’traisethemhere.4Ihaveintroducedhisposi-tive/negativefreedomdistinctionintothediscussiononlybecauseitwillhelpmeexplainhow,giventheimportanceRousseauattachestoliberty,hecanneverthelessberepresentedasatotalitarianatheart.So,letusnowgetbacktothedefinitionsof‘freedom’atissue–Rousseau’sandMill’s.Earlier,Ipointedoutthat,foreach,thereisarangeofsimplecasestowhichitclearlyapplies,andthatthereare,therefore,goodreasonsforacceptingDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012either.Butnownotethat,whenappliedtocertain,equallysimple,cases,thetwodefinitionsyieldcontradictoryimplications.Asimpleexamplewillhelpmeexplain.Suppose,then,thatsomepersonisheavily,butnothopelessly,addictedtosomedrug.Followingmyusualpractice,letmecallthispersonP.Forthepurposesofmyargument,itdoesn’tespeciallymatterwhatthedrugis,butletussupposethatitistobacco.Inshort,supposethatPisaheavysmoker.Nowsupposethat,oneday,Pdecidestogiveupcigarettes.Formypurposes,thisisagoodexample,becausedecidingtogiveupcigarettescanbeportrayedasamatterof\n158Reasonandrevolutionsprescribingaruletoyourself.P,asitwere,says‘FromnowonIshallnotsmokecigarettes.EvenwhenIhaveastrongcravingforacigarette,Ishan’thaveone.’Thatistherule.Nowsupposethat,forthreedays,Pmanagestosticktotheruleandrefrainfromsmoking.Recallthat,accordingtoRousseau,freedomis‘obediencetoalawoneprescribestooneself’(1968:65).Ifthisisright,itfollowsthat,atthispointinthestory,P’sactionsarequitefree.(Andsotheyare.Ofcourse,the‘negative’definitionalsoentailsthatP’sactionsarefreeatthispoint.Itisaclumsywaytoputit–buttrue–thatnobodyispreventingPfromnotsmoking.)Sofar,sogood.Butnowsupposethat,afterthreedays,Pattendsasocialgathering–thatPisinabarwithsomefriends,say–andthatsomeoneoffersPacigarette.Atthispoint,Pfindsitimpossibletosticktotheruleanylonger,takesthecigarette,andsmokesit.Nowask:IsP’sactionintakingthecigarettesafreeaction?Mypointisthat,accordingtoRousseau’sdefinitionitisnot(Phasbrokentherule)whereasaccordingtothe‘negative’definitionitis.(NobodystoppedPfromtakingthecigarette.)Atthispoint,somereaderswillbewonderingwhatanyofthishastodowith‘totalitarian’politicaltheory.Toseewhat,noticenowthatitisquitenaturaltousethelanguageoffreedomandunfreedomwhendescribingP’sbehaviour.Forexample,youcouldsaythatP‘isnolongerincontrol’,thatPhas‘givenin’toacraving,eventhatPisa‘slave’toanaddiction.Butnotice,too,thatalthoughPis–inasense–aslavehere,Pisnotaslavetoanotherperson,asarealslavewouldbe,buttooneofP’sownwants,inthiscasethecravingfortobacco.Thisshowsthat,todescribePasa‘slave’here(or,atleast,as‘lackingfreedom’),youhavetodistinguishtwoclassesofwantordesire;youhavetosaythattosatisfyonetypeofwantistoactasafreeagent,andthattosatisfytheothertypeistoactasaslave.(InthestoryPboth‘wantstogiveupsmoking’and‘wantsacigarette’.Insatisfyingtheformerwant,P,bystickingtotherule,actsfreely.Insatisfyingthelatter,Pactsunfreely.)Letmesummariseitthisway:forphilosopherswhointerprettheconceptoffreedomina‘positive’way,realfreedomisactioninaccordancewithwants(desires,etc.)ofonetype;phoneyfreedom,unfreedom,even‘slavery’,isactioninaccordancewithwantsofanothertype.Now,clearly,agreatdealhangsonhowyoucategorisewants.Whicharewantsofthefirsttype,andwhichofthesecond?Here,Ishouldsaythat,sofarasIamconcerned,theDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012factthatpositiveconceptionsoflibertymustinvokeafairlycomplexcon-ceptionoftheselfactuallycountsintheirfavour.(Wearecomplexbeings.Wedohavedifferenttypesofwant,andwedomakedistinctionsbetweenourownwants,thinkingofsomeaswantsweshouldnot‘givein’to.)IamfairlysurethatitispossibletoholdsuchaconceptionwithoutfallingintothetrapsagainstwhichBerlinwarnsus.Butthat’sanotherstory.Berlinissurelyrighttosaythataconceptionoffreedomwhichrestsonadistinctionbetweendifferenttypes,or‘levels’,ofwantisopentoexploitationbythosewhoseektocontrolus,inonewayoranother.If‘real’freedommeans\nRousseau159followingthosewantsanddesireswhichformpartofthe‘true’self,thenitalldependsonwhatyoucountasthelatter.ThereligiousasceticcansaythatrealfreedomistheserviceofGod;thehippymysticcansaythatrealfreedomistuningin,turningonanddroppingout;thefascistcansaythatrealfree-domisquickeningtheprogressofthemasterracetoitshistoricdestiny;andtheauthoritarian,or‘totalitarian’,cansaythatrealfreedomistheserviceoftheparty,orthestate.IsRousseauguiltyofthislast,dubious,manoeuvre?Tosee,wemustturntoadifferentaspectofhisargument.ThegeneralassemblyanditsplaceintheidealcommunityLikePlato’sRepublic,Rousseau’sTheSocialContractisadescriptionofanidealstate;but,whereasPlato’sstateissupposedtobethemostperfectrealisationofthevirtueofjusticetherecanbe,forRousseau,thesupremevalueisfree-dom.Asnotedalready,itisRousseau’saimtodescribea‘formofassociation’themembersofwhicharebothsubjecttolawandyetfree.Aswehavealsonoted,Rousseaubelievesthatfreedomisamatteroffollowingarule,orlaw,youprescribetoyourself.ItfollowsthatRousseau’sideal‘formofassociation’mustbeoneinwhichthesubjects–or,rather,‘citizens’–onlyfollowrulesofwhichtheyare,themselves,theoriginators.Isthispossible?Well,accordingtoRousseauitis,thankstothewaydecisionsaremadeinthegeneralassembly.Thisishisidealstate’scentralinstitution.Rousseaustipulatesthatitsmeetingsmustbe‘fixedandperiodic’(1968:137)andthateverycitizenmustbepresent.Onthisview,aparlia-mentarysystem,inwhichtheassemblyconsistsofrepresentativesor‘depu-ties’electedbythepeopleatlargeisnotlegitimate.EventheEnglishsystem,whichwasthemostprogressiveanddemocraticintheEuropeofRousseau’stime,won’tdo.SaysRousseau,‘TheEnglishpeoplebelievesitselftobefree;itisgravelymistaken;itisfreeonlyduringtheelectionofMembersofParliament’,andheaddsthat‘Inthebriefmomentsofitsfree-dom,theEnglishpeoplemakessuchauseofthatfreedomthatitdeservestoloseit’(Rousseau1968:141).Inthisversionofthesocialcontractargument,then,‘thesovereign’–i.e.thesourceofalllegitimateauthority–isameet-ingatwhicheverycitizenispresent;‘thesovereigncanactonlywhenthepeopleisassembled’,saysRousseau(1968:136).(So,hereisanotherdiffer-encebetweenRousseauandhispredecessorsinthesocialcontracttradition,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012HobbesandLocke,eachofwhomdefines‘thesovereign’quitedifferently.)OnethingwhichwillbeapparentfromthisisthatRousseau’sidealcom-munitywouldhavetobesmall,sosmallthatallthecitizenscanmeettogether.Thisis,indeed,howheportraysthem.Incertainrespects,Rousseau’scommunityisanidealisedversionofademocraticallyrunGreekpolis.(YoumayrememberAristotle’sinsistencethatonceatowncrier‘withthevoiceofastentor’isneededtocaptureeveryone’sattention,apolisisgettingtoolarge(Aristotle1981:1326b11).)5TwoothercommunitiesalsomentionedbyRousseauwithapprovalareGenevaandCorsica.Itwasintheformerthat\n160ReasonandrevolutionsRousseauhadhisupbringing.6TheGenevaofhistimewasanindependent,walledcity.Toanextent,itwasdemocraticallyrun,andthecitizenswere,inthemain,relativelyindependenttradesmenandartisans.Rousseaulikedtosignhimself‘CitizenofGeneva’,so,ratherasheidealisesthepolis,youcouldsaythatheidealisesGenevatoo.AsforCorsica,thesmall,mountainous,Mediterraneanislandis,accordingtoRousseau,‘theonecountryinEuropewhichisstillfittoreceivelaws’,andheadds‘IhaveapresentimentthatthislittleislandwillonedayastonishEurope’(1968:96).(Hewasright–thoughnotquiteinthewayheintendedtobe.Asthingsturnedout,Europe’snextgreatdictator,Napoleon,wastocomefromCorsica.)OnepotentialobjectiontowhichRousseauisexposinghimselfhere–Ishouldhavethoughtquiteobviously–istheobjectionthathisproposalisimpracticable.Aren’tthepopulationsofthemodernstateswhichactuallyexistfartoolargetopermitameetingwhicheverycitizenattends?Ontheotherhand,isn’titunrealisticallyidealistictoimaginethatthosestateswilleventuallyresolvethemselvesintoassemblagesofsmallercommunitarianunits,thesizeofanancientpolisorCorsica?Rousseau’sownresponsetothisobjectionis,Ithink,unconvincing.Heinsiststhatjustasitwaspossibleforthepeopletoassembleandenactlaws2,000yearsago,soitmustbepossiblenow.‘Hashumannaturesomuchchanged?’heasks(1968:136).Buttheevidencehecitestosupportthisargumentisunpersuasive.ThedecisionprocedurefollowedatmeetingsoftheRomanassemblywasnothingliketheprocedureheenvisagesforhisowngeneralassembly.(Weshallconsiderthelattermorecloselyinamoment.)Moreover,ifthepopulationofRomewasaslargeasRousseauclaims–‘morethanfourmillioncitizenswithoutcountingsubjects,foreigners,women,children,orslaves’(1968)–itwouldhavebeenimpossiblefortheRomanassemblytoadoptRousseau’sprocedure.Morerecently,ithasbeensuggested,inRousseau’sdefence,that,withmoderninformationtechnology,sizeofstateisnolongeraproblemforhisargument.Ifeverycitizenhasaccesstotheweb,viaaPC,thenavotingprocedureofthesortRousseauadvocatesispossible,howeverlargethepopulation.Weare,sotospeak,allmembersofa‘virtualgeneralassembly’.(Forthissuggestion,seeWolff1998:34ff.)Thisargumentstrikesmeasequallyunconvincing.(Ishallsaywhyshortly.)Inanswertotheobjection,itseemstomethatRousseauwouldhavebeenfarbetteradvisedtoinsistthatthepointofdescribinganidealstateisDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012tosetastandardagainstwhichactualstatescanbemeasured.Hecouldhavearguedthatactualstatescanapproximatetotheideal,eventhoughtheidealitselfisunattainable(justassomemachinescancreatelessfrictionthanothers,eventhoughnomachinecanbecompletelyfrictionless).Heshouldthenhaveleftitatthat.InRousseau’sidealcommunity,whenthegeneralassemblymeets,votesaretaken,andthoseproposalsforwhichthemajorityvotesbecomelaw.Sowhathasallthistodowithtotalitarianism?Itmaybeimpracticabletoenvisageaworldofsmallcommunities,inwhichdecisionsaremadeby\nRousseau161majorityvoteatageneralassemblyofallthecitizens,butsuchaworldseemsaboutasfarfromtheearlytwentiethcenturyworldofrepressivetotalitariandictatorshipsasyoucanget.So,howcanRousseaupossiblybeopentotheaccusationthatheisacovertapologistforasystemwhichprefiguresthelatter?Theanswerliesinthefactthattherearedifferentwaystodescribeexactlywhathappenswhenpeopletakeamajorityvote.Letusnowconsiderthis.ThegeneralwillThisiswhatRousseausayshappens:Whenalawisproposedinthepeople’sassembly,whatisaskedofthemisnotpreciselywhethertheyapproveofthepropositionorrejectit,butwhetheritisinconformitywiththegeneralwill,whichistheirs;eachbygivinghisvotegiveshisopiniononthisquestion,andthecountingofvotesyieldsadeclarationofthegeneralwill.(1968:153)Thepassagehastobereadcarefully.ItisimportanttoseethatwhatRousseauisactuallysayingisverydifferentfromwhatamodernreadermighteasilytakehimtobesaying.Forexample,heisnotsayingthat,whenavoteistaken,thepointoftheprocedureistoalloweachmemberoftheassemblytoexpressapreference(suchasawant,adesire,oranattitudeofapproval).Infactheexplicitlyrejectssuchaview,saying‘whatisaskedofthem[thevoters]isnotpreciselywhethertheyapproveofthepropositionorrejectit’.Onthecontrary,inRousseau’sassembly,themajorityvoteisusedtodeter-minetheanswertothequestion‘Whatisthegeneralwill?’,andthisismeanttobeaquestionoffact.Rousseau’scontentionthat‘When,[therefore],theopinioncontrarytomyownprevails’–i.e.whenIvotewiththeminority–‘thisprovesonlythatIhavemadeamistake,andthatwhatIbelievedtobethegeneralwillwasnotso’makesitplain(1968:153,myemphasis).Theformerview–thatvotesexpresspreferences–isprettymuchtheviewwhichunderpinstheclassicalutilitariandefenceof‘representativegovern-ment’,asfirstoutlinedinJamesMill’sEssayonGovernmentandlaterrefinedbyJohnStuartMillinhisRepresentativeGovernment.Forexample,itisthepresuppositiononwhichtheargumentofJamesMill’sEssayonGovernmentisDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012based(seeJamesMill1955andJohnStuartMill1991c).Onthisview,therepresentativesystemisthebestavailablemechanismforreconcilingconflictsof‘interest’betweenmembersoftheelectorate.Thisviewisalsothe‘received’versionofdemocracy;theviewwithwhichmostreadersofthisbookwillhavebeenbroughtupandwithwhichtheywillbemostfamiliar.ThismakesitespeciallyimportanttostressjusthowdifferentRousseau’sis.Onedifferenceisthis:onthereceivedview,itjustmakesnosensetosaythat,ifyouvotewiththeminority,youaremistaken.Ifyouthinkthatvotesexpresspreferences(wants,desiresorwhatever)thenyourvotingwiththeminority\n162Reasonandrevolutionsonlysignifiesthatmorepeoplethanyouhappenedtowantsomethingdif-ferentfromwhatyouhappenedtowant–andthat’sallthereistoit.Forexample,ifyouandagroupoffriendsdecidetogoforamealoneevening,andifeveryoneexceptyouvotestovisitanItalianrestaurant,whereasyouwouldpreferatriptothelocalcurryhouse,thatonlysignifiesthatyoumostpreferadifferentkindoffood.Itwouldbeabsurdtoinsist,againstthis,thatyouaremistaken,andthatyoureallywantanItalianmealjustlikeeveryoneelse(andthatit’sjustthatyouhaven’trealisedit).Bycontrast,onRousseau’sviewitmakesperfectsensetosaythatwhatyoureallywantandwhatyouthinkyouwantaretwoquitedifferentthings.Thatisbecause,whereanygiven‘proposition’isconcerned,thenatureofthegeneralwillis,asIhavesaid,afact,anditisthetaskofthepeopleasawhole,convenedasthegeneralassembly,todeterminewhatitis.So,whenRousseausaysthat‘thegeneralwillisalwaysrightfulandalwaystendstothepublicgood’,hemeansthatitisalwaysrightfulbydefinition.Thegeneralwillis,thus,somethingquitedifferentfromwhateveryonewants,orfromwhatmostpeoplehappentowant.Rousseaucallsthelatter‘thewillofall’.(Asweshallseelater,hethinksthat,inlessthanidealconditions,peoplewillvoteonthebasisofthelatter,ratherthanconsiderthegeneralwill.)Ifthatisn’tpuzzlingenough,thenthereareplentyofotherperplexingquestionsjustwaitingtobeaskedhere.Forexample,isn’ttheresomethinghighlyquestionableabouttheveryideathatamajorityvotecandetermineaquestionoffact?Inthethirteenthcenturyavoteonthequestionsofwhethertheearthisatthecentreoftheuniverse,ofwhetherthereareangels,orofwhetherGodcreatedAdam,wouldnodoubthaveyieldedagreatmajorityinfavour.Inthetwenty-firstcenturytherewould,mostlikely,beamajorityagainst.Thequestionablethingisthesuggestionthat‘whatthemajoritybelieve’hasanyrelevancetotheactualtruthorfalsityofsuchclaims.(Aren’ttheytrueorfalse,whateveranyonethinks?)Again,itisRousseau’sbeliefthat,onbecomingamemberofalegitimatecommunity,everycitizenacquiresanextrawill,a‘willasacitizen’.Whatonewills‘asacitizen’ismeanttobeequivalenttothegeneralwill,andthisissupposedlydifferentfromthatwhichonewills‘privately’,asanindividual.Butisn’ttheresomethingmys-tificatory,andhighlyquestionable,abouttheideathatthereissomesortof‘communitywill’,whichisbothoverandabovethewillsofindividualmembersofthegroupandnotattachedtoanyoneinparticular?InotherDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012words,howcantherebeawillwhichisnotyourwill,mywill,orhisorherwill?Asforthe‘commongood’,likewise,howcantherebeagoodwhichisnotyours,mine,hisorhers?Atfirstglance,anyway,noneofthisappearstomakemuchsense.Andnotonlythat,isn’ttheresomethingwrongwiththesuggestionthatyouorImightneverknowwhatwereallywant;thatitcouldhappenthatsomeoneelseisalwaysthebestjudgeofwhatwereallywill‘ascitizens’.Ordinarily,wetendtoregardindividualsthemselvesasthebestjudgesofwhattheirpreferencesreallyare.(Whatifoneofyourfriendsweretosay,‘Youmaythinkyouwantacurry,butwhatyoureallywantisan\nRousseau163Italianmeal’?)Rousseau’sthesisappearstodenytheobvious.Insummary,itseemsprettyclearthatthereisaseriousquestionastowhetheranyrealsensecanbemadeofRousseau’sconceptionofa‘generalwill’.Totalitarianlogicatwork?BeforeconsideringhowRousseaumightresponditwouldbeagoodideatosummarisetheobjectionunderdiscussion,thathisphilosophyisadefenceof‘totalitariandemocracy’.Wearenowinapositiontoseehowthatobjectionislentsupportbythewayheinterpretstwoconcepts,eachofwhichisfun-damentaltohisargument.Oneistheconceptoffreedomandtheotheristheconceptofa‘generalwill’,supposedlythewillofthecommunityconsideredasawhole.AsIhavepresenteditsofar,then,Rousseau’spositionisthis.First,heinterpretsfreedomasobediencetoalawoneprescribestooneself.Aswenoted,thereisnothingespeciallywildaboutthisdefinition.Itaccuratelycapturestheway‘freedom’isquiteoftenusedinmundane,day-to-daycon-texts.However,aswealsonoted,itraisesthequestionofwhatrulescountastherulesyouhavegenuinely‘prescribedtoyourself’;ofwhenyouarefol-lowingyour‘real’will,andofwhenyouareguidedbypreferenceswhichare–inasense–‘external’.Second,Rousseaupresentsuswithapictureofanidealcommunityinwhichthecitizens(supposedly)prescriberulestothem-selvesbyvotingatageneralassembly.Itisbytakingamajorityvotethattheydiscoverthegeneralwill,orsoRousseauholds.Consequently,theyremainfree,becausetheyfollowthewillstheyhave‘ascitizens’,whateverthepreferenceswhichdeterminedtheirvotemayhavebeen.Evencitizenswhovotedwiththeminorityremainfree.Inshort–orsotheobjectionruns–Rousseau’sdefinitionof‘freedom’andhisconceptionofthegeneralwill,takentogether,leadtotheconclusionthat,ifyouvotewiththeminority(orifyou,say,changeyourmindafteranelection)whatyouthinkyouwantandwhatyoureallywantaretwocompletelydifferentthings.Worse,theymeanthatwhatyoureallywantiswhatthosewithpowerandauthoritytellyouyoureallywant.(Nevermindwhatyouthinkyoureallywant.)Onthisview,thepowersthatbecantaxyou,imprisonyou,evenkillyou,whilsttellingyouthat(really)it’swhatyouwantthemtodoallthetime,soyou‘remainfree’.Thisisthesickjoke,the‘greatperversion’thatcriticssuchasBerlinhaveinDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012mind(Berlin2002:49).Andifthatstrikesyouasaparody,oranexaggeration,thosewhoraisetheobjectioncanalwayssummonthefollowingnotoriouspassageintheirsupport.[Hence],inorderthatthesocialpactshallnotbeanemptyformula,itistacitlyimpliedinthatcommitment–whichalonecangiveforcetoalltheothers–thatwhoeverrefusestoobeythegeneralwillshallbeconstrainedtodosobythewholebody,whichmeansnothingotherthanthatheshallbeforcedtobefree.(Rousseau1968:64)(myemphasis)\n164ReasonandrevolutionsCoulditbethat,withthispassage,Rousseauisrationalisingstaterepressionbytryingtopersuadeus(andhimself)thatitispreciselywhatitisnot–liberation.Ifso,heisguiltyofsomethingforwhichGeorgeOrwellcoinedtheterm‘doublethink’.ThatwasinNineteenEighty-Four(Orwell1954),hisfamousdescriptionoflifeinanimaginarytotalitariansociety.AnansweringcaseWell,thatisthecaseagainstRousseau;thecaseaccordingtowhich,forallhisprotestationsonbehalfoffreedom,heis,infact,anadvocateoftotali-tarianism.(Atleast,itisasubstantialpartofthecase.Therewillbealittlemoretoaddlater.)Ithinkyouwillagreewithmethatitisapowerfulcase,andIhavetriedtoputitaspersuasivelyasIcan.However,atthispointImustcomecleanandadmitthatevenIamnotentirelyconvincedbymyownefforts.SofarasIamconcerned,thereissomethingabouttheargumentwhichdoesnotquiteringtrue.Infact,thereareseveralreasonsforbeingsuspiciousofit.Oneisthat‘totalitarianism’isnotawordwhichwouldhavebeenavailabletoRousseauhimself.Morethanthat,ifitgenuinelydenotesadistinctphenomenon–somethingwhichdidnotreallycomeintobeinguntilthetwentiethcentury–thenRousseauwouldneverhaveknowntotalitarianism.Certainly,hecouldneverhavebeenawareofthegreattwentieth-centurytotalitarianisms,evenif‘totalitarianism’isreallyjustanewnameforsomethingmucholder.Suchconsiderationsareinsufficientlystrongtodefeattheargumentcompletely.However,theyshouldputusonourguard,foritisalltooeasytolookbackathistoryandreadintoit;thatis,tomisleadyourselfintothinkingyoudetectdramas,astheyunfold,whenthosedramasneverreallytookplace.Perhapsthestoryofhow,overthecenturies,supportersofliberaldemocracyandnegativeliberty(good)havesluggeditoutwithsupportersoftotalitarianismandpositiveliberty(bad)isacaseinpoint.Thenagain,thereisthefactthatthenearestthingto‘totalitarianism’thatRousseauwouldhaveknown–the‘despotism’exemplified,mostespecially,byFrenchabsolutemonarchy–wasexplicitlycondemnedbyRousseau.Aswesaw,hecondemnsitasthesystemunderwhich‘notionsofthegoodandprinciplesofjusticevanish’(1984:134).CanRousseaureallyhavebeensoblindtotheimplicationsofhisownargumentthatheunwittinglydefendedDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012theverysystemhesetouttosubvert?Putlikethat,thesuggestionseemsscarcelycredible.(AndthereisabsolutelynoevidencethatheactedasacovertagentforLouisXVI.Thatwouldbeastillmorepreposteroussug-gestion.)Finally,yetanotherreasonforsuspicionisthateighteenth-centurydespotismsandtwentieth-centurytotalitarianregimesranlargenation-states,whosepopulationsfellintoclassesandinterestgroups.Bycontrast,andaswehavealsoseen,Rousseau’sidealcommunitieshavetobesmall.ItiswiththislastpointthatthekeytoRousseau’sdefencelies,orsoitseemstome.WhatIshouldliketodonowisofferafewsuggestionsasto\nRousseau165howanargumentdesignedtocountertheobjectionunderdiscussionmightgo.Toputitbroadly,itstrikesmethattheportraitofRousseauasanapologistfortotalitarianismgoeswrongbyfailingtotakethestricturesheplacesonthesizeofhisidealcommunitiesseriouslyenough.Ishan’ttrytoshowthat,farfromadvocatingtotalitarianism,Rousseauwasasupporterofliberaldemocracy(asweknowitinthetwenty-firstcentury‘West’).Thatwouldbeanequallybaddistortion.However,whatIshallsuggestisthat,ifwearetogetRousseauright,wemustaskwhatlifeinacommunityrunalongthelinesheadvocateswouldactuallybelike.FreedomBeforethat,letusreturn,justbriefly,tohisdefinitionoffreedom.AsIhaveoutlinedit,oneoftheclaimsonwhichthecaseagainstRousseaurestsistheclaimthatheisguiltyofdistortingtheconcept.Againstthis,thereareatleasttwopointstobemadeinhisdefence.ThefirstisthatRousseau’sdefinitionoffreedomas‘obediencetoalawoneprescribestooneself’(1968:65)isnotfalse.AsIpointedoutearlier,wedoregardthefactthatapersonisfollowinghisorherownrulesasareasonfordescribingthatpersonasfree.IusedthecaseofsmokerP,whoistryingtogiveup,toillustratethis.Conversely,wheresomeoneis‘subjecttothewillofanother’–thatis,wheresomeoneelseismakingtherulesforapersontofollow–thatisusuallyreasonforsayingthatheorsheisnotfree.Rousseau’sdefinitionmaynotapplytoallcasesinwhichitisappropriatetousewordslike‘free’and‘unfree’,butitcertainlyappliesuncontroversiallytoagreatmany.IfRousseauisguiltyofanything,then,itisnotsomuchmisdefiningtheword‘freedom’asstretchingtheconceptbeyonditsnormalrangeofapplication.Thatiswhat‘totalitarian’thinkerssup-posedlydowhentheyequatefreedomas‘followingyourownrules’or‘doingwhatyoureallywant’with‘theserviceofthestate’or‘thedestinyofthenation’.Sotheymaydo,but–thesecondpoint–therearemanydefinitionsandconceptswhichcanbetwistedtoservedisreputableends.Takethe‘negative’conception,discussedearlier,accordingtowhichfreedomisessentiallytheabsenceofobstructionstoaction.Aswenoted,likeRousseau’s‘positive’conceptionthisisalsotrueforarangeofcases.ButnowsupposethatanevilDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012dictatormanagestospikethenationalwatersupplywithsomenew-fangleddrug.Theresultisadocilepopulationwhichcanbemanipulatedintodoingeverythingthedictatorwants.Thenthereisanelection.Thereisafullturnoutandthedictatorwinswith100percentofthevotes.Werethepeoplevotingfreely?Well,thedictatorcancertainlypointoutthatnoonepreventedthemfromvotingpreciselyastheywantedto,so–being‘negatively’free–theywerefreeineveryimportantrespect.Againstthis,youorImightfeelthathisfirsthavingsubjectedthemtohiswill,withthehelpofthedrug,issomehowrelevant.(Substituteapressbaronforthedictatorinthis\n166Reasonandrevolutionsstory,andtheopinioncolumnsofthetabloidpapersheownsforthedrug,andtheexamplelooksalotlessfar-fetched.)ButifRousseau’sdefinitionoftheword‘freedom’isunexceptionable,eventhoughphilosopherscanerrbystretchingtheconceptoffreedom,‘positively’interpreted,thequestionremainsofwhetherRousseauhimselfisguiltyofthelatteroffence.Theanswerdepends–ofcourse–onwhetherthosewhovoteattheassemblycanreallybesaidto‘prescriberulestothemselves’,eventhosewhovotewiththeminority;andevenheretherearepointstobemadeinRousseau’sdefence.Forexample,thereisthefactthatitcanbeacceptablelinguisticusagetosay,ofaperson,thatheorsheisfree‘inagivenrespect’butnotinanother.Youcouldsay,forinstance,thatanadultcitizenofademocracy,saddledwithahugedebt,is‘politicallyfree’(heorshecanvote)but‘economicallyunfree’(heorsheisinhocktothebank,andworkingallhourstoservicethedebt).Perhapsyoucouldsay,equally,thatcitizensinRousseau’sidealcommunityarepoliticallyfree;thattheyareinthatrespectmorefreethanthesubjectsofadespot.PerhapsitisapointwhichcanbeusedtosupportRousseau.Certainly,itlooksallthemoreplausiblethemoreyouimaginethecitizenstobelivelyparticipantsinanassemblywhichisthegoverninginstitutionofasmall,relativelysimple,community.Tothis,itcouldbeworthaddingthatwedo,infact,sometimestendtodescribedemocraciesas‘free’andlessdemocraticsystemsaslackingfreedom(evennow,evenwhencomparingmodernnation-states).Inmoderndemocracies,therearepermanentminorities,buttheusagepersists,evenso.NoneofthisaddsuptoanargumentinRousseau’sdefence.Itsimplysug-geststhathisusageof‘free’and‘unfree’isnotentirelyperverse.Itispossiblethattheforegoingcouldbedevelopedintoanargumentbut,asIhavesaid,IamnotouttoofferafullydevelopeddefenceofRousseauhere.ThegeneralwillWhatoftheotherclaimonwhichthecaseagainstRousseaurests,theclaimthathisideaofageneralwill,distinctfromthewillsofindividualmembersofthecommunity,isbogus.Contrarytothisobjectionitis–Ithink–possibletomakesenseoftheidea.Whatyouhavetodoisimagineanassociationformedforsomespecificpurpose.Hereisanexample.Supposethattherearetenindividualpeople,eachofDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012whombuysalotteryticketonaSaturdayafternoon.Eachknowsthatheorshehasaveryslimchanceofactuallywinninganything,buteachfiguresthatsomechanceisbetterthannochance,soeveryonegoesonbuyingthetickets.Then,oneday,somebodysuggestsforminganassociation,thepur-poseofwhichistoincreaseeverybody’schanceofwinningsomething,howeverlittle.Thetenagreeamongstthemselvesthat,shouldanyonehappentobuyaluckyticket,theresultingwinningswillbedividedequallybetweeneverymemberofthegroup.7Thatway,everyone’schanceofwinningsomethingismultipliedbyten.Wehavetosuppose,also,thateveryoneentersonequal\nRousseau167terms.(Obviouslytheydo;itwouldbeirrationaltoenteronanyotherterms.Inafreelyenteredagreement,whywouldyouagreetoanyoneelse’sgettingmorethanyou?)WhathasthisgottodowithRousseau?Well,forastart,noticethatthereisawayofdescribingwhatgoesonherewhichinvokesadistinctionbetweentwokindsof‘will’.Beforetheassociationisformedthen–orsoyoucouldputit–everyoneonlyhasanindividualor‘private’will.Tobeguidedbythiswillistosay,ineffect,‘ShouldIwin,letmekeepallthemoney.’Aftertheassociationisformed,eachpersonacquiresasecondwill,namelya‘willasamemberoftheassociation’.Thisissomethingverydifferentfromhisorherprivatewill.Tobeguidedbythissecondwillistobeguidedbythemaxim,‘Shouldanyonewin,includingme,letthemoneybedividedbetweenthemembers.’Thisisnotanarbitrarymaxim.Itislogicallyimpliedbythetermsoftheagreementbywhichtheassociationwasformed.Nowsuppose,further,thatonememberwinssomemoney.Letussaythatitis1,000pounds.Ameetingofallthemembersisheld,andaquestionisputtothem:‘Howshallthemoneybedivided?Whatisthewilloftheassociation?’Clearly,thisisaquestionoffact,andithasonlyonerightanswer,‘Dividethemoneyequallyandgiveeveryone100pounds.’Inthisexample,then,itmakesverygoodsensetospeakoftherebeingawilloftheassociation,whichissomethingquitedifferentfromthewillofanyindividualmember;anditalsomakessensetodescribethequestion–whatisthewilloftheassociation?–asaquestionoffact.PointsofanalogybetweenthisexampleandtheargumentofTheSocialContractareasfollows.First,justasthegamblingassociationisformedforaspecificpurpose,soisRousseau’slegitimatelyruncommunity.Itspurposeisto‘defendthepersonandgoodsofeachmemberwiththecollectiveforceofall’(1968:60).Second,eachpersonentersthecovenantonequalterms,for‘thegeneralwillisaninstitutioninwhicheachnecessarilysubmitshimselftothesameconditionswhichheimposesonothers’(Rousseau1968:76)and‘thesocialpactestablishesequalityamongthecitizensinthattheyallpledgethemselvesunderthesameconditionsandmustallenjoythesamerights’(Rousseau1968:76).Third,asintheexample,soinTheSocialContract,eachpersononlyhasanindividualor‘private’willbeforetheagreementismade,butacquiresafurther‘will’asaconsequenceoftheagreement–inthiscasea‘willasacitizen’.Fourth,itisbecausethecontentDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ofthegeneralwillisdictatedbythetermsofthesocialcontractthatitisnottobeidentifiedwiththeprivatewillofanygivenindividual.Fifth,forthesamereason,theanswertothequestion,‘Whatisthegeneralwill?’isarationallydeterminablequestionoffact.Withthehelpofthisanalogy,itis–Iamsure–possibletomakesenseoftheideaofageneralwill.8Butatwhatcost?Clearly,interpretingthenotionofthegeneralwillwiththehelpoftheanalogymustmeanthatitonlymakessensetospeakofageneralwillinthecontextofacommunitytowhichtheanalogyapplies.Whatwouldsuchacommunitybelike?Well,in\n168ReasonandrevolutionsRousseau’stime–beforetheadventofinformationtechnology–itwouldhavetohavebeensmall,smallenoughfortheentirecitizenrytomeetinthesameplaceonaregularbasis.But,inaddition,itwouldhavetolackcomplexity.Forexample,itwouldhavetobethecasethattheonlyquestionsfacingthemembersoftheassemblywerequestionsoffact,easilyresolvablewithrefer-encetothetermsofthesocialcontract.Morethanthat,thecitizenswouldhavetobesimilarlyplaced.Therewouldhavetobefew,ifany,differencesof‘interest’between,say,membersofdifferentsocialclasses,town-dwellersandcountrypeople,membersofdifferentethnicand/orreligiousgroups,andsoon.Withoutthis,itisdifficulttoseehowthesocialcontractcouldhavethesamepointforeveryone,orhoweveryonecouldthinkofthemselvesashavingenteredthecontractonequivalentterms.(ThisismyreasonforbeingscepticalofR.P.Wolff’ssuggestionthatinformationtechnologywouldbeenoughtocreatea‘virtualgeneralassembly’inamodernstate.)Imagineacommunityofrelativelyindependentpeasantfarmers,eachmoreorlessequalinwealthandpowertotheothers.Imagineameetingatwhichtheyaretryingtodecidewhoseturnitshouldbetousethecombinehar-vesternextweek.Imaginethat,andyouhaveimaginedsomethinglikeoneofthecommunitiesRousseauidealises.(‘Aslongasmenwerecontentwiththeirrustichuts,aslongastheyconfinedthemselvestosewingtheirgar-mentsofskinwiththornsorfishbones’writesRousseauintheDiscourseonInequality,‘theylivedasfree,healthy,goodandhappymensofarastheycouldaccordingtotheirnature’,therebyinvokingapastgoldenage.Thereisagreatdealofthatkindofthinginhiswork(1984:115–16).)Ontheotherhand,itisclearthatnomodernsocietycouldpossiblybeconstruedonthe‘gamblingassociation’model.Modernsocietiesarenotjustlarge,theyarecomplex.Inmyview,itisthis,ratherthanhisalleged‘totalitarianism’,whichexplainswhytheutilitarianviewoffreedomanddemocracy,andnotRousseau’s,hastendedtogaincurrencyoverthepast200yearsorso.Theformeriswelladaptedtothelarge,plural,societieswehaveincreasinglycometoinhabit.Rousseau’sisnot.‘Perfectibility’andthetotalitarianstateInmyearlierdiscussionofthe‘gamblingassociation’example,Iimaginedthatonememberwins1,000pounds,thatameetingisheld,andthattheDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012followingquestionisput:‘Howshallwedividethemoney?Whatisthewilloftheassociation?’AsIargued,thereisarightanswertothisquestion,namelythatthemoneyshouldbedividedequally,witheveryonegetting100poundseach.Butwillthemembersactuallycomeupwiththerightanswer?Theansweristhattheywill,butonlyiftheyarecorrectlymotivated;thatis,wehavetoassumethattheywillbepublicspiritedenoughtoplacetheinterestsofthegroupbeforetheirown‘private’interests,andconsiderthequestionsoberlyandseriously.Withthisassumption,theprobabilitiesarethateachmemberismorelikelytocomeupwiththerightanswerthan\nRousseau169thewronganswer.(OrsowehavetosupposeifwearetoagreewithRousseauthattakingamajorityvoteisagoodwaytodeterminethegeneralwill.Thesuppositiondoesnotseemunreasonable.)However,whatcouldhappenisthatthemembersaretoocorruptorself-interestedtoputthepublicwilloftheassociationfirst,inwhichcaseeachpersonwillbemotivatedbyhisorher‘private’will.Wherethishappens,‘thewillofall’prevailsand‘Thereisoftenagreatdifferencebetweenthewillofall[whatallindividualswant]andthegeneralwill’because‘thegeneralwillstudiesonlythecommoninterestwhilethewillofallstudiesprivateinterest,andisindeednomorethanthesumofindividualdesires’(Rousseau1984:72).PreciselythesamethingcanhappenwhenmotionsareputatmeetingsofRousseau’sgeneralassembly.Thatiswhy,withinhisidealstate,arrange-mentshavetobemadetoensurethatcitizensarepublicspiritedenoughtoputthecommongoodandthegeneralwillbeforetheirown,selfish,privatedemands.OnesucharrangementisthecompleteprohibitionofwhatRousseaucalls‘sectionalassociations’.Thesearesmallergroupsformedwithin–Rousseausays‘attheexpenseof’(Rousseau1984:73)–thelargerassocia-tion.WiththehelpoftheanalogyIhavebeenusing,thelogicunderlyingtheprohibitionshouldbefairlyevident.Itissimplythat,foreveryassociationofwhichyoubecomeamember,youacquireanadditional‘will’.Forexam-ple,inadditiontoyourprivatewill,andyourwillasacitizen,wheretherearesectionalassociationsyoucouldfindyourselfwitha‘willasamemberofsuch-and-suchapoliticalparty’,a‘willasamemberofsuch-and-suchatradeunion’,anda‘willasmemberofsuch-and-suchapressuregroup’.Withalltheseextrawills,itwillbeincreasinglydifficultforyoutocoollycontemplatethenatureofthegeneralwill.Theotherswillgetintheway.Thenagain,thereisRousseau’sinsistencethatthereshouldbea‘civilreligion’designedtoreinforcesolidarityamongthecitizens,andtheirsenseofasocialbond.Withit,theremustgo‘aprofessionoffaithwhichispurelycivilandofwhichitisthesovereign’sfunctiontodeterminethearticles,notstrictlyasreligiousdogmasbutassentimentsofsociability’(Rousseau1984:186).‘Thedogmasofthecivilreligionmustbesimpleandfewinnumber’,saysRousseau,‘expressedpreciselyandwithoutexplanationsorcommen-taries’.Theymustincludearticlesofreligiousbeliefin,forexample,‘Theexistenceofanomnipotent,intelligent,benevolentdivinitythatforeseesandDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012provides;thelifetocome’,andsoon,butalsoacommitmentto‘thesanctityofthesocialcontractandthelaw’(Rousseau1984:186).(Otherwisepeoplecanbelievewhattheylike.)Modernreaderswillfinditdifficultnottodetectintimationsoftotalitar-ianstatecontrolinsuchapassage.ContrastRousseau’sattitudetosectionalassociationswiththattakenbyorthodoxutilitariandemocratictheory,thetheoryIdescribedearlierasthe‘receivedview’.Itistheviewwithwhichmostofuswerebroughtup.Onthisview,sectionalassociationsareabso-lutelyessentialtotheoperationofdemocracy.Withoutthem,itwouldbe\n170Reasonandrevolutionsimpossibleforindividualstobringpressuretobearonthedecision-makingmachinery;to‘maketheirvoicesheard’.Bycontrast–orsocriticscanargue–aviewsuchasRousseau’sleavestheindividualpowerlessinthefaceofapowerful,unchecked,statemachine.Thisis,ofcourse,preciselytheendthattotalitarianrulersseektoachieve.Suchcriticscandrawadditionalsup-portfortheirviewfromRousseau’sclaimthatthearticlesofthecontractarereducibletoasingleone,‘namelythetotalalienationbyeachassociateofhimselfandallhisrightstothewholecommunity’(1984:60),orhisremarkthat,afterthecontract,thecitizen’slife‘isnolongerthebountyofnaturebutagifthehasreceivedconditionallyfromthestate’(1984:79).Thenagain,thereisthefigureof‘thelawgiver’.Rousseauimaginesthatapeoplecanbereadyforlawbutunsurehowtoestablishit;inwhich‘thegeneralwill’needstobe‘shownthegoodpathwhichitisseeking,andsecuredagainstseductionbydesiresofindividuals’(1984:83).Atthispointthelawgiver–whois,‘ineveryrespect,anextraordinaryman’(1984:85)–appearsonthesceneandshowsthepeopletheway.Rousseauhasthistosay:Whoeverventuresontheenterpriseofsettingupapeoplemustbeready,shallwesay,tochangehumannature,totransformeachindividual,whobyhimselfisentirelycompleteandsolitary,intoapartofamuchgreaterwhole,fromwhichthatsameindividualwillthenreceive,inasense,hislifeandhisbeing.Thefounderofnationsmustweakenthestructureofmaninordertofortifyit,toreplacethephysicalandindependentexistencewehaveallreceivedfromnaturewithamoralandcommunalexistence.Inawordeachmanmustbestrippedofhisownpowers,andgivenpowerswhichareexternaltohim,andwhichhecannotusewithoutthehelpofothers.Thenearermen’snaturalpowersaretoextinctionorannihilation,andthestrongerandmorelastingtheiracquiredpowers,thestrongerandmoreperfectisthesocialinstitution.Somuchso,thatifeachcitizencandonothingwhateverexceptthroughco-operationwithothers,andiftheacquiredpowerofthewholeisequalto,orgreaterthan,thesumofthenaturalpowersofeachoftheindividuals,thenwecansaythatlawmakinghasreachedthehighestpointofperfection.(Rousseau1984:84–85)Readinacertainlight,suchpassagescanmakeyourbloodruncold.Howcanamodernreaderfailtodetectinthisdescriptionof‘thelawgiver’acultDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012oftheleader?HowcanamodernreaderfailtopictureHitleratNuremberg,havingdescendedfromhisplanetothestrainsofWagner,addressinghisassembledacolytes,eachtransformed‘intoapartofamuchgreaterwhole’fromwhicheachreceives‘inasense,hislifeandhisbeing’(Rousseau1984:84–85).YetthiscannotbewhatRousseauhimselfhadinmind,and–sofarasIcansee–abetterexplanationforsuchpassagesrunsasfollows.Intheeighteenthcenturyitwasfashionabletodrawuponclassicalthemes.Youcanseethisfashionatworkinthearchitectureandtheartofthetimeand,intheabovepassage,youcanalsoseeitatworkinphilosophy.In\nRousseau171reality,Rousseau’slawgiverisnofascistdictator,butadrafterofconstitu-tions.Rousseauisself-consciouslyevokingsuchfiguresasSolon,whoredraftedtheconstitutionofAthens,andLycurgus,whogaveSpartaitsfirstconstitution.Asforthetalkof‘changinghumannature’and‘transforminghumannature’,well,itwasRousseau’sviewthatourcharacter,humannatureitself,isafunctionoftheprevailingsocialandpoliticalinstitutions.Inthisrespect,hediffersfrom,say,Hobbes,forwhomhumannatureremainsthesamewhateverpoliticalconditionsprevail.Butwiththis,RousseauisinvokingatraditionwhichcanbetracedbacktoAristotle–andisn’theright,atleasttotheextentthatyouorIwouldhavebeenverydifferentpeoplehadwelivedatadifferentplaceatadifferenttime?Inshort,itmakesmoresensetothinkofRousseau’sidealcommunityasaromanticisedpolisthanitdoestothinkofitasaproto-totalitarianstate,prefiguringhorrorswhichweretocome150yearsorsoafterhisdeath.Thatsaid,however,itisimportanttorememberthedualaspectthatsuchtextsasTheSocialContractinevitablypossess.AlotwilldependonwhereyoustrikethebalancebetweenRousseau’sownintentionsandthesignificancehisargumentsmustinevitablyholdforlaterreadersincludingourselves.KataklusmosAftertheFrenchRevolution,lifebecamecheapforawhile.SimonSchamarelateshow,inLyonsin1793:TheTerrorwentintoactionwithimpressivebureaucraticefficiency.Housesearches,usuallymadeatnight,wereextensiveandunsparing.Allcitizenswererequiredtoattachtotheirfrontdoorsanoticeindicatingallresidentswholivedinside.Entertaininganyonenotonthatlist,evenforasinglenight,wasaseriouscrime.Andthen,FromearlyDecembertheguillotinewentintoactionatamuchgreatertempo.AsinParis,pridewastakeninitsmechanicalefficiency.OntheeleventhofNivôse,accordingtothescrupulousaccountskept,thirty-twoheadswereseveredintwenty-fiveminutes:aweeklater,twelveheadsinjustfiveminutes.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ForthemosteagerTerrorists,though,thiswasstillamessyandinconvenientwayofdisposingofthepoliticalgarbage.CitizensinthestreetsaroundtheplacedesTerreaux,ontherueLafont,werecomplainingaboutthebloodover-flowingthedrainageditchthatledfrombeneaththescaffold.Anumberofthecondemned,then,wereexecutedinmassshootingsonthePlainedesBrotteaux–thefieldwhereMontgolfierhadmadehisascent.Yetanotherex-actor,Dorfeuille,presidedoversomeofthesemitraillades,inwhichasmanyassixtyprisonersweretiedinalinebyropesandshotatwithcannon.Thosewhowerenotkilledoutrightbythefirewerefinishedoffwithsabres,bayonetsandrifles.Onthe\n172ReasonandrevolutionsfourthofDecember,DorfeuillewrotetothePresidentoftheConventionthatahundredandthirteeninhabitantsof‘thisnewSodom’hadbeenexecutedonthatsingledayandinthosethatfollowedhehopedthatanotherfourtofivehundred‘wouldexpiatetheircrimeswithfireandshot’.(Schama1989:781–83)Schamaaddsthat,bythetimethekillingshadfinished,‘onethousandninehundredandfivepeoplehadmettheirend’.AndthatwasjustLyons.SchamaisdescribingjustoneinstanceoftheatrocitieswhichweretakingplaceacrossthegreaterpartofFrance.ThesewereeventswhichtraumatisedtheEuropeanconsciousnessand,likeaselectnumberofhorrorstofollow–‘thewartoendallwars’(1914–18),theHolocaust,11September2001–theirinfamywassogreatthatashort-handexpressionbecamesufficienttoevokethem:‘theTerror’.Itisasoberingthoughtthat,ifyouarenowaged25or30,yourgenerationisonlytheeighthtohavecomeintobeingsincetheoldorderwasdespatchedinthisorgyofhacking,gouging,stabbingandslicing;ofguttersrunningwithblood.Imagineeightpeopleinaroom.That’snotmanypeople.SuggestionsforfurtherreadingRousseauOneofthefewessaysonRousseauwhichadoptstheanalytical,directlycritical,approachIhavetakeninthischapterischap.10ofthefirstvolumeofJohnPlamenatz’sManandSociety(1963).ItisquitealongtimesincePlamenatz’sbookwaspublished,butitisstillcitedbymostauthoritiesonRousseau.TheessaysonRousseauinCranstonandPeters’scollectionHobbesandRousseau(1972)arealsoworthconsulting.RobertWokler’sRousseau:AVeryShortIntroduction(2001),isagood,short,introductiontohisphilosophy.SallyScholz’sOnRousseau(2001)isalivelyandentertainingstudy.SeealsoChistopherD.Wraight,Rousseau’s‘TheSocialContract’:AReader’sGuide(2008).AsforRousseau’sownwork,onetextthatIhavenotdiscussedinDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012thischapter,butwhichstudentsofpoliticalthoughtshouldfindinteresting,isTheGovernmentofPoland(1985).ItisadraftproposalforaconstitutionthatRousseauproducedattherequestofaPolishdele-gation.Writtenin1771,butpublishedposthumously,itshouldgiveyousomeideaofthewayheconceivedtherelationshipbetweentheidealstateofTheSocialContractandpracticalreality.AusefulcollectionofRousseau’swritingsisJohnHopeMason’sTheIndispensableRousseau(1979).ThiscontainsextractsfromÉmile,LaNouvelleHeloise,theother\nRousseau173Discourses,andmuchelsebesides.Rousseauledaninterestinglifeandhisautobiography,TheConfessions(1954),iswellworthreading.Asforsomeoftheothertopicscoveredinthischapter,JoanMcDonald’sRousseauandtheFrenchRevolution,1762–1791(1965)isastudyoftherelationshipbetweenRousseau’sideasandtheFrenchRevolution.HannahArendt’sTheOriginsofTotalitarianism(2004)[1951]isthedefinitivestudyofthetopic.Arecentstudyoftheconceptofliberty,includingBerlin’sdistinctionbetween‘twoconcepts’isKatrinFlikschuh,Freedom(2007).GeneralsuggestionsforfurtherreadingPartIIRossHarrison’sHobbes,Locke,andConfusion’sMasterpiece(2003)isapowerfulstudyofseventeenth-centurypoliticalphilosophy.Forhistor-ical‘background’,IwouldsuggestSimonSchama’sAHistoryofBritain:TheBritishWars,1603–1776(2001)andhisCitizens:AChronicleoftheFrenchRevolution(1989).Notes1Duringhislifetime,Rousseau’smostpopularworkswereÉmile,atreatiseoneducation,andJulieouLaNouvelleHéloise,aromanticnovel(1974and1987).2SeeespeciallySchapiro(1972).3Thisoughttogowithoutsaying,butitdoesn’tbecauseitissometimesclaimedthatthetwowordsdifferinmeaning.Forexample,fairlyrecentlyIattendedameetingatwhichRonaldDworkinmadejustthatclaim.However,Ithinkthetruthisasfollows:becauseEnglishisahybridofaGermaniclanguage(Saxon)andFrench,itquiteoftenhappensthat,inEnglish,yougettwowordsforthesamething(orprettymuchthesamething).Herewehaveacaseinpointfor‘freedom’isclearlyrelatedtotheGermanFreiheit,whereas‘liberty’isrelatedtotheFrenchlib-erté.Thefactthat,forsomecenturiesaftertheNormanConquest,EnglandwasgovernedbyaFrench-speakingrulingclassmaygosomewaytowardsexplainingDworkin’sclaimed‘intuition’that‘liberty’ismorelegalisticinitsconnotation.Evenso,thetwowordsarenowidenticalinmeaning,eventhoughtheiretymologyisdifferent.4FormyownopinionofBerlin’sessay,seeHaworth(1991).5Seeabove,chapter3,pp.44–5.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December20126Fordetails,seetheearlierchaptersofRousseau’sTheConfessions(1954)[1781].7Inreallife,theresultingincreasewouldbeinfinitesimal,but–forthesakeofargument–pleasecanweignorethat.8Here,myargumentechoesargumentsadvancedbyBrianBarryandJonathanWolff(seeBarry1965:190ff.andWolff1996:87ff.).\nPartIIIMODERNTIMES,MODERNTHEMESDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n10AfterthefloodReactionstotheFrenchRevolutionvaried.WilliamWordsworth,whopassedtheautumnof1790inParis,describedhisexperiencethisway:Blisswasitinthatdawntobealive,Buttobeyoungwasveryheaven!(ThePrelude,BookXI,lines108–09)(Wordsworth1932:736)AsWordsworthsawit,theseweretimesInwhichthemeagre,stale,forbiddingwaysOfcustom,law,andstatute,tookatonceTheattractionofacountryinromance!WhenReasonseemedthemosttoassertherrights,WhenmostintentonmakingofherselfAprimeEnchantress–toassisttheworkWhichthenwasgoingforwardinhername!(ThePrelude,BookXI,lines110–16)(Wordsworth1932)Othersweremorecircumspect.Forexample,JeremyBenthamreservedaspecialcontemptfortheDeclarationoftheRightsofManandoftheCitizen,issuedbytheFrenchNationalAssemblyin1789.WithadistinctechoofRousseau,thedeclarationopenswithadescriptionoftheassemblyas‘therepresentativesoftheFrenchpeople,organisedasaNationalAssembly’.Rousseauisechoedstillmoredistinctlyintheopeningsentenceofthedeclaration’sfirstarticle.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Thisstatesthat‘Menarebornfreeandremainfreeandequalinrights.’(Presumably,wearemeanttotakeitthat‘men’arenolonger‘inchains’thankstotherevolution.)SofarasBenthamwasconcerned,thistalkofnaturalandimprescriptiblerightswasmere‘bawlinguponpaper’which‘proceedsfromthesametemperandthesamesortofdistressasproducesbawlingwiththevoice’(Bentham2000c:391).Thelineoccursinthe‘Preamble’toBentham’sAnarchicalFallacies,anessayinwhichBenthamconductsapiecemealdissectionofthedeclaration’sclaims.ItisthetextwhichalsocontainsoneofBentham’smostfamousremarks,thefollowing:\n178Moderntimes,modernthemesNaturalrightsissimplenonsense:naturalandimprescriptiblerights,rhetoricalnonsense–nonsenseuponstilts.(Bentham2000c:405)Bentham:happinessandreasonNotthatBenthamwasareactionary:onthecontrary,likeRousseaubeforehim,hewasachildoftheEnlightenment,afighteronthesideofreasonandprogress.AndyetBentham’sintellectualtemperissodifferent.Onreadinghismajorwork,ThePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation(2000b),itishardtobelievethatitwasfirstpublishedin1789,amere11yearsafterRousseau’sdeath.WhereasRousseau’sstyleishigh-flownanddeclamatory,andhisargumentpronetoabstraction,Bentham’sisicilypragmatic.ToappreciatethedifferenceyouonlyhavetocomparethewayRousseauimaginesthattheassembledcitizenryinhis(imagined)idealstatewillearnestlydeliberateoverthenatureofthegeneralwillwithBentham’sscornfuldismissaloftheveryidea:Butanywhere–eveninFrance–howcanthelawbetheexpressionoftheuniversaloreventhegeneralwillofallthepeople,whenbyfarthegreaterparthaveneverentertainedanywill,orthoughtatallaboutthematter;andofthosewhohave,agreatpart(asisthecasewithalmostalllawsmadebyalargeassembly)wouldratherithadnottakenplace.(2000c:421)Benthamiswidelyknownasafounderoftheutilitarianmovement;and,asreaderswillknowbynow,utilitarianismisthatmoralandpoliticalphiloso-phywhichclaimstobaseitsargumentsandprincipleson‘theprincipleofthegreatesthappiness’or‘principleofutility’.AsBenthamputsitinoneplace,‘itisthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumberthatisthemeasureofrightandwrong’(2000a:3)(Bentham’sitalics).HereistheopeningparagraphofThePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation:Naturehasplacedmankindunderthegovernanceoftwosovereignmasters,painandpleasure.Itisforthemalonetopointoutwhatweoughttodo,aswellastodeterminewhatweshalldo.Ontheonehandthestandardofrightandwrong,ontheotherthechainofcausesandeffects,arefastenedtotheirthrone.TheyDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012governusinallwedo,inallwesay,inallwethink:everyeffortwecanmaketothrowoffoursubjectionwillservebuttodemonstrateandconfirmit.Inwords,amanmaypretendtoabjuretheirempire:butinrealityhewillremainsubjecttoitallthewhile.Theprincipleofutilityrecognisesthissubjection,andassumesitforthefoundationofthatsystem,theobjectofwhichistorearthefabricoffelicitybythehandsofreasonandlaw.Systemswhichattempttoquestionitdealinsoundsinsteadofsenses,incapriceinsteadofreason,indarknessinsteadoflight.(Bentham:2000b:87;Bentham’sitalics)\nAftertheflood179Utilitarianismwasmorethanaphilosophy.Itwasapoliticalmovement,whichachievedrealprominenceintheearlierhalfofthenineteenthcentury.Sincethen,ithascontinuedtowieldaninfluence.Itis–ifyoulike–one‘modern“ism”’;soletusbeginPartIIIbyaskingwhatitwasthatoriginallymadeutilitarianismsoattractive.Iwouldattributeutilitarianism’ssuccesstothreefactors,twoofwhichcanbedetectedatworkinthepassagequotedabove.Thefirstisutilitarianism’spromisetosweepawayclutter;toreplacemuddleandmystificationofallkindswithasingle–simpleandeasilycomprehensible–criterion.Whenfacedwithachoicebetweenactionsorpoliciesyousimplyselecttheonewhich,sofarasyoucantell,willmostincreasethesumofhumanhappiness.Inaloosesenseof‘scientific’,thereissomethingappealinglyscientificaboutthis.Moreover,thereissomethinganti-pretentiousaboutit.OneofBentham’sgreatattractionsasawriteristhewickedsenseofhumourwithwhichheexpresseshishostilitytoallformsofself-importance.Thisattitudeispro-gressiveaswell,becausetheindividualswhodealinpomposities,‘insoundsinsteadofsenses,incapriceinsteadofreason,indarknessinsteadoflight’tendtobethose(philosophersandothers)whobasetheirreactionaryclaimsonappealstotraditionandintuition.ThesecondfactoristhetheoryofmotivationwithwhichBenthamcon-nectstheprincipleofutility.Asthepassageshows,Benthamholdsthateveryoneismotivatedbythedesireforpleasureandthefearofpain(eventhoughsomepeoplepretendotherwise).ForBentham,happinessissimplyapositivebalanceofpleasuresoverpains.Thisisalsoappealinglystraightfor-ward.Tobe‘utilitarian’istovalue‘usefulness’,ofcourse,andwhatonearthcanusefulnessbeifitisnotservingthehappinessofhumanity.Also,itiseasytoappreciatehowsuchanaccountofmotivationcouldcarryaringoftruthwithit.Tothis,Iwouldadd–third–that,whentakentogether,theprincipleofutilityandthetheoryofmotivationmakeutilitarianismparticularlyattrac-tivetothoseindividualswhosejobitistoframeandadministerpolicyinpluralsocieties.Bya‘plural’societyImeanasocietycomposedofmanydifferentgroups,eachwithitsownwants,needs,characteristiclifestyleandplans.Followingtheutilitarians,letuscallallsuchwants,preferencesandplans‘interests’forshort.Throughoutthenineteenthcentury,thesocietiesofEuropeandNorthAmericaweretobecomeincreasinglyplural.Withindustrialisationtherecamealargenewclassofindustrialworkers.(Bentham,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012wholiveduntil1832,wouldhavebeenawitnesstothis.)Alongsidethisclass,thereremainedaclassofagriculturallabourers.Mid-nineteenth-centurysocietywasdividedbetweenthese,betweentownspeopleandcountry-dwellers,betweentheoldaristocracyandthenewlyricharistocracyof‘trade’,andinotherwaystoo(and,ofcourse,anyindividualcouldbelongtomorethanoneofthesecategories).Inadditiontoallthisitis,nodoubt,thecasethatmenandwomencanbecategorised,forcertainpurposes,asfallingintoseparateinterestgroupsand–ontopofallthat–therearedifferencesbetweenreligiousandethnicgroupstobeconsidered.\n180Moderntimes,modernthemesInapluralsociety,the‘interests’ofsuchgroupsaremorethanlikelytocomeintoconflictand–insuchacontext–‘politics’becomestheartofcompromiseandconflictresolution.Thetaskcanlookforbidding–especiallytothosewhowanttoreachsolutionswhicharefair,andnotjustpragmatic–bututilitarianismoffersaprospectofhelp.Thisitdoesintwoways.First,withitstheoryofmotivationitofferstoexplainallbehaviourinasinglewayas‘thepursuitofhappiness’.Thispromisestosimplifythepoliticaltaskbecauseitsuggeststhat,whilemembersofdifferentinterestgroupsmayappeartobepursuingdifferentends,theyarereallypursuingthesameend,i.e.happiness.Ifthisisright,thenalltheadministratorhastodoisdividethatthing–the‘happiness-cake’–betweeneveryoneinafairandjustway.Second,theprincipleofutilitytellsyouhowtodividethecake.Youjustarrangethingsinsuchawaythat‘thegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber’results.Ishouldaddthat,with200yearsofhindsight,utilitarianism’stheoryofmotivationappearsopentoquestion,andtheprincipleofutilityappearsfarfromeasytointerpretandapply.ButthatisasubjectwithwhichIshalldealinthefollowingchapter.Forthemoment,myonlypointisthatitiseasytoseewhyutilitarianismshouldhaveheldsuchapowerfulappeal,especiallyforsocialreformers,andtheleadingutilitarianswerecertainlythat.Bentham’sownworkcoveredmanyaspectsofsocialpolicy,includingprisonreform.Hisutilitarianassociate,JamesMill,wroteafamousdefenceofdemocracy,AnEssayonGovernment(1955).TheaimofBentham’sPrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation(2000b)wastoadvocateareformofthelawalongutilitarianlines.Everylawandlegalpenaltywhoseexistencecouldnotbejustifiedintermsofthegreatesthappinessprincipleshouldbeerasedfromthestatutebook,orsoBenthamargued(hisgreatsuccessor,JohnStuartMill,saidthatBenthamhad‘foundthelawachaosandleftitascience’(1987:158)).EvenBentham’sfuneral–whichmusthavebeenoneoftheweirdestever–hadapoliticalpointtoit.ItwasBentham’sstatedwishthatheshouldbepubliclydis-sected,andsohewas.Inhistime,theonlycorpsestowhichtraineesurgeonswerepermittedaccessbylawwerethoseofexecutedcriminals,andthe‘ceremony’waspartofacampaign,inthenameofscienceandprogress,tohavethisaccesswidened.Theremainsofhisbody,dressedinacoatandhatandseatedinhisfavouritechair,areplacedondisplayinaglasscabinet–the‘auto-icon’–inthefoyerofUniversityCollegeLondon.1Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012HistoryandcommunityCommentingonwhathedescribesasRousseau’s‘contributiontothesearchforthisconcept’–i.e.theconceptofthestate–Hegelhasthistosay:Unfortunately,[…]Hetakesthewillonlyinadeterminateformastheindividualwill,andheregardstheuniversalwillnotastheabsolutelyrationalelementinthewill,butonlyasa‘general’willwhichproceedsoutofthis\nAftertheflood181individualwillasoutofaconsciouswill.Theresultisthathereducestheunionofindividualsinthestatetoacontractandthereforetosomethingbasedontheirarbitrarywills,theiropinion,andtheircapriciouslygivenexpressconsent;andabstractreasoningproceedstodrawthelogicalinferenceswhichdestroytheabsolutelydivineprincipleofthestate,togetherwithitsmajestyandabso-luteauthority.Forthisreason,whentheseabstractconclusionscameintopower,theyaffordedforthefirsttimeinhumanhistorytheprodigiousspectacleoftheoverthrowoftheconstitutionofagreatactualstateanditscompleterecon-structionabinitioonthebasisofpurethoughtalone,afterthedestructionofallexistingandgivenmaterial.Thewillofitsre-founderswastogiveitwhattheyallegedwasapurelyrationalbasis,butitwasonlyabstractionsthatwerebeingused;theIdeawaslacking;andtheexperimentendedinthemaximumoffrightfulnessandterror.(Hegel1967:156–57)EvenhisgreatestadmirersconcedethatHegel’sstylecanbedifficultandobscure–eventhatheis,onoccasions,completelyincomprehensible–sodon’tbesurprisedifyouhaven’tgraspedthemeaningoftheforegoingpas-sageinitsentirety.However,evenifyouhaven’t,itwillcertainlygiveyouanimpressionofwhathethoughtabouttheFrenchRevolution.Forastart,itisprettyclearthat,likemanyothers,hethoughtoftheTerrorasacatas-trophe;thatitwas,ashesays,anexperimentwhichended‘inthemaximumoffrightfulnessandterror’.Infact,alsolikemanyothers–likeWordsworth,forexample–Hegelhadinitiallytakenapositiveattitudetowardstherevolution,viewingitwithoptimismandhope.But,ashesawit,thingshadgonebadlysoursincethen.Thereissomethingelsetoo;Hegelattributesthecatastrophetoanobsessionwithintellectualabstractions,anattempttoreconstructthestateabinitio,‘onthebasisofpurethoughtalone’.Again,thisjudgementwaswidelymade,byBentham,forexample,withhissuspicionof‘naturalrights’talk,and,asweshallseelater,byEdmundBurke.ButthepassagealsocontainssomemorespecificallyHegelianelements.TakethewayhethinksofRousseauasengagedinaspecificenterprise,namelyasearchfor‘theconcept’ofthestate.ThatisnotquitehowIwoulddescribeRousseau’spurposeandnordoIthinkitishowRousseauwouldhavedescribedithimself.Aswesawinthepreviouschapter,thepointofTheSocialContract(Rousseau1968),asstatedbyRousseauhimself,istodescribeDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012aformofassociationinwhichpeoplearesubjecttolawandyetremainfree.Itisalso,quiteclearly,anattempttosolvetheproblemofpoliticallegiti-macythroughanaccountofwhatwouldbedictatedunderthetermsofagenuinesocialcontract.However,noneofthisseemstoadduptoanattempttograspthestate’s‘concept’.InfactHegel’saccountofRousseau,asgiveninthepassage,isinaccurateandrathersketchy.ItisjustnotfairtodescribethedecisionsmadeinRousseau’sidealcommunityasrestingon‘capriciouslygivenfreeconsent’.Still,givenHegel’sownpurpose,maybethatdoesn’tmatter,forhisthumbnailsketchofRousseauispartofagreatstory\n182Moderntimes,modernthemesaccordingtowhich,asHegelseesit,allpoliticalphilosophers,whethertheyknowitornot,areengagedinthesameenterprise,theenterpriseoftryingtoapprehendaconceptinitsentirety.Hegel’spointisthatRousseau’seffortsonlymetwithincompletesuccess.Ashegoesontosayinthenextpara-graph,aconceptionsuchasRousseau’s‘comprisesonlyonemoment,andthereforeaone-sidedmoment,oftheIdeaofarationalwill’(Hegel1967:157).Rousseau’sphilosophy,andwithittheFrenchRevolution,arethusportrayedbyHegelasaparticular‘moment’,amilestoneevent,ontheroadtophilosophy’sultimategoaland,withit,history’sultimategoaltoo.Now,inwritingabooksuchasthis,oneisforcedtobeselective.Some-thinghastogo,andIhavechosennottodevoteanentirechaptertoHegel.Thatmeansthattherewouldbenopointinmyeventryingtogiveafullaccountofhisphilosophy.Ithinkthat’stherightdecision,becauseIbelievethatpresent-dayreaderswillfindmanyofhisclaimslessinterestingthanthosemadebythewritersonwhomIdoproposetoconcentrate.Forexam-ple,Idoubtthatmany,readingthis,willbeimpressedbyHegel’sclaimthat‘Thestateistheactualityofconcretefreedom’(Hegel1967:n.160),orhisargument’s(apparent)implicationthatphilosophy’sfinalgoalhasbeenachievedwiththepublicationofhisownwork.However,whatIshoulddoissaysomethingaboutHegel’slegacy,foritseemstomethatthethingsofvaluewehaveinheritedfromHegelarenotsomuchaparticularviewofwhattheendofhistoryactuallyis,orofwhatthebeststateactuallyis,butcertainpatternsofthinking.Itisthelatterwhichhavewieldedsomuchinfluenceoversubsequentthinkers,andmostespeciallyasfollows.Firstofall,andasyouwillhavegathered,Hegeltakesacertainviewofhistory.Hebelievesthatitfollowsadefinitecourse.InhisPhilosophyofHis-tory(Hegel1956)hetracesthatcoursefromancient,pre-Greek,timestohisown,passingashegoesfromtheGreeks,totheRomans,totheriseofChristianity,andthentotheReformation.However,unlikeconventionalhistories,Hegel’saccountismorethanarecordofevents,adescriptionof‘whathappenedtooccur’.Particularhistoricaleventsareportrayedasthemanifestationsofanunderlyingprocess,workingitselfthroughatamorefundamentallevel.Thatiswhatmakesitaphilosophyofhistory,andnotjustanexerciseinhistory.AcontrastwithRousseauisworthdrawinghere.Aswesawinthepreviouschapter,inhisDiscourseontheOriginsofInequality(1984)Rousseaualsotracesthecourseofhistoryand,withit,thedevelop-Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012mentofhumanconsciousness.Hegeldoesthesame,sothereisasenseinwhichyoucoulddescribeRousseauasoneofHegel’sprecursors.However,therearedifferences.Rousseautakescaretoemphasisethathishistoryisapurelyspeculativeaccount,thatitconsistssolelyof‘hypotheticalandconditionalreasonings,betterfittedtoclarifythenatureofthingsthantoexposetheiractualorigin’(Rousseau1984:78).2Bycontrast,Hegelthinksheisdescribingwhatactuallyhappened.Also,youdon’tgetthesamesenseofinexorabledestinyfromRousseauasyoudofromHegel.Rousseaumakesitclearthat,asheseesit,thepeopleareinastateofwarwiththesovereign,\nAftertheflood183buthedoesn’tgivetheimpressionthatarevolutionisjustaroundthecorner,oreventhatoneisinevitableinthelongrun.Hegel,however,leavesyouwithnodoubtthateventscan,andwill,onlymoveinonedirection.Alongwithallthis,theregoeshisviewthattheunderlyingprocess,ofwhichpar-ticularhistoricaleventsarethemanifestation,willeventuallyworkitselfthrough.ThesecondfeatureofHegel’slegacyworthnotingbecomesapparentonceweaskpreciselywhatthatunderlyingprocessissupposedtobe.ItisherethatgraspingHegel’sthoughtcanproveespeciallydifficult.InhisworkHegelsetsouttocharttheprogressofwhathecallsGeist.InEnglishtrans-lationsofHegelthistendstoberenderedas‘mind’or‘spirit’.Whatcanthismean?Well,Geist,‘mind’and‘spirit’arenouns,sothereisanaturalten-dencytothinkthatHegelistalkingaboutakindofentityhere.However,Hegelisreallydescribingthestagesthroughwhichhumanitypassesinitsattemptstoreachsomegoal;‘mind’isreallyasortofcollectivenounforhumanity,consideredasawholeasitseekstograsptheessentialnatureofreality.(So,youdon’thavetopictureagiantbrain,galumphingacrossthelandscapeasithooversupeverythinginitspath.)ThegoalitselfisspecifieddifferentlyindifferentHegeliantexts.InthePhenomenologyofSpirititis‘absoluteknowledge’.Thisissupposedlyachievedoncethemindhasgraspedrealityandunderstoodthelatterasitsowncre-ation,or–asHegelputsit–‘whenconsciousnessitselfgraspsthisitsownessence,itwillsignifythenatureofabsoluteknowledgeitself’(1977:57).Thestagesthroughwhichhumanitypassesincludeformsofawareness(suchas‘sense-certainty’andself-consciousness),intellectualandreligiousmove-ments(stoicism,Christianity)andsocialforms.(Slaveryissaidtobeunstablebecauseneithermasternorslaveisabletorecogniseanequalconsciousnessintheother.)InthePhilosophyofHistoryandthePhilosophyofRight(Hegel1967)thegoalisfreedom,orrather,‘mind’sprogresstowardsconsciousnessofitselfasfree’.Notthatthisisadifferentgoal.Itisthesamegoal,thegoaldescribedinthePhenomenology,butviewedunderadifferentaspect.Thereal-isationofacertainformofstateisthesamegoalviewedunderyetanotheraspect.Bearthatinmind,anditispossibletomakesomesenseoftheparagraphwithwhichHegelbringsthePhilosophyofRighttoaclose:Inthestate,self-consciousnessfindsinanorganicdevelopmenttheactualityofDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012itssubstantiveknowingandwilling;inreligion,itfindsthefeelingandtherepresentationofthisitsowntruthasanidealessentiality;whileinphilosophicscience,itfindsthefreecomprehensionandknowledgeofthistruthasoneandthesameinitsmutuallycomplementarymanifestations,i.e.,inthestate,innatureandintheidealworld.(1967:222–23)Actually,Ithinkyoushouldgetthegeneralidea,althoughthedetailsclearlyneedfarmoreexplanationthanIcangivethemhere.Twothingsshouldbe\n184Moderntimes,modernthemesclear,though.Oneisthat,whateverHegelmeansby‘freedom’ithastobemorethanthemere‘negative’freedomfromobstructionstodothisorthataction.Infact,Hegelcastigatesthisas‘mereabstractfreedom’,a‘stageinthedevelopmentoftheideaoffreedom’(1967:34).ForHegel,truefreedomcanonlycomewithmind’sconsciousnessofitselfasfree.Theotheristhat,what-evertheprecisemeaningofallthismaybe,itisastoryaboutself-realisation.ForHegel,the‘endofhistory’comesoncethishasbeenachieved.So,thatisthesecondfeatureofHegel’sphilosophytohavebeeninheritedbyhissuccessors–theideathathistoryculminatesinself-realisation.Thethirdisaparticularaccountof(whatyoucouldlooselycall)themechanismwhichdriveshistoricalchangeandthroughwhich‘mind’sup-posedlyachievesself-realisation.AccordingtoHegel,changeisbroughtaboutbywhatcouldbedescribed(againloosely)as‘theinterplayofculturalmovements,ideas,andsocialforms’.Thus,stoicismisreplacedbyscepticismandthenearlyChristianity.Supposedlythankstothenegativemannerinwhichthelatterportrayshumanity’srelationshiptoGod,thelatterissuper-sededbyaChristianityofamorepositive(Protestant)form;slaverydis-appearsfromthescene,supposedlybecausemasterandslaveareunabletovieweachotherasequals,and–aswehaveseen–theFrenchRevolutionissucceededbytheTerror,supposedlythankstothepredominanceofanabstractmodeofthinking.Now,sofarasIcansee,thereissomethingrightaboutthis.Historicalchangecansometimesbeexplainedintermsofculturalinteractionsofonesortoranother.OnepartofHegel’slegacycanbetracedtoNietzsche,whocharacterised‘truth’asa‘mobilearmyofmetaphors’(1995:92).AcentralthesisofhisBeyondGoodandEvil(1990)isthatphilosophicalethics,theattempttoformulatemoralityintermsoffundamentalprinciples,shouldbereplacedbyadescriptiveaccountofmoralchange.Ashesaysatonepoint,‘Philosophersoneandallhave,withastrait-lacedseriousnessthatprovokeslaughter…wantedtofurnishtherationalgroundofmorality–andeveryphilosopherhithertohasbelievedhehasfurnishedthisrationalground’(Nietzsche1990:108).Againstthis,Nietzschearguesforthereplacementofsupposedly‘scientific’ethicswitha‘naturalhistoryofmorals’.Ifthisisright,differencesbetweenmoralities,andbetweencultures,areratherlikediffer-encesbetweenlanguages.Infact,learninganotherlanguageis,inaway,aquestionoflearninganotherculture.ItisnotalwayspossibletotranslateDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012directlyfromonetoanother.Notealso–andcrucially–thatthereisnooverarchingmeta-languageagainstwhichotherlanguagescanbetested.Thereisjusttheinterplayofdifferentlanguages,nothingmore.(ItisnoaccidentthatNietzschewasaspecialistincomparativephilology.Itseemsthat,ratherasAristotleconstruedpoliticalphilosophyonthemodelofbio-logicalscience,andratherasHobbesconstrueditonthemodelofgeometry,soNietzscheconstruedmoralphilosophyonthemodelofcomparativelin-guistics.)Thinkofitlikethat,andyoucanalsotraceHegel’sinfluencetotheself-styled‘postmodernists’ofourowntime,forwhomthehistoryofthought\nAftertheflood185isnothingmorethantheconstantinterplayof‘discourses’,withnoobjectivestandardor‘grandnarrative’againstwhichtoassesstheirrelativemerits.3Butifthereissomethingrightaboutthatwayofexplainingchange,thereis–fairlyclearly–quitealotwrongwithittoo.Thetroubleisthatitonlyappliestocertaincases.Whenappliedtoothers,itisunconvincing.Asacaseinpoint,takeHegel’sexplanationoftheTerror.Asheportraysit,thiswasaconsequenceofthewaythoughtwasdominatedbyabstractions–‘naturalright’,‘abstractliberty’andsoon.Ifthisweretrue,itwouldbeconvenientforHegel,becauseitwouldfitinwithhistheorysoneatly.However,thereisreallynoreasonforthinkingthatitistrue.Toraiseanobviousquestion:Whywasn’ttheAmericanRevolution(whichprecededtheFrenchbyamere13years)alsofollowedbyareignofterror?TheUSA’sfoundingdocumentsareitsDeclarationofIndependenceanditswrittenConstitution,eachofwhichlaysheavyemphasisonnaturalrights,sotheAmericanRevolutionwasframedintermsofprettymuchthesameabstractionsastheFrench.ThissuggeststhatHegel’sexplanationiswrong.Moreover,sofarasIcanseethereisnoreasonwhyweshouldconfineourselvestotherealmofideasinoursearchforananswer.Theanswercouldjustaseasilylieinsocialoreconomicfactors,oreveninthefactthatcertainindividuals‘justhappened’tobehaveincertainwaysandnotothers.Inshort,itseemstomethatHegel’saccountofthemechanismwhichdriveshistoricalchangeisunconvincing.Also,manyreaderswillknowthatitwaspreciselythisaspectofHegel’sphilosophywithwhichMarxfoundhimselfmostdissatisfied.TherewillbeafulldiscussionofMarx’sthoughtinalaterchapter,but,havingmentionedhim,letmenowbrieflydescribeanotherdevelopmentwhichtookplaceintheearlyyearsofthenineteenthcentury,onewhichisrelevanttoourunderstandingofhisideas.Thesewereyearswhichsawtheriseofanumberofcommunitarianmovements.Some–theAmish,theShakers–werefoundedonreligiousprinciples,butothersjustifiedtheirwayoflifewithsocialistarguments.Alladvocatedtheabandonmentofconventionalmodesofexistenceforlifeinfairlysmall-scalecommunities,andquiteafewcommunitieswere,infact,established.InEurope,theendoftheNapoleonicWarshadbeenfollowedbyasevereeconomicrecession,andtheirmembershipwaslargelydrawnfromthepoolofotherwiseunemployedworkerswhichresulted.Giventhepre-vailingeconomicconditions,andthetime,itisnosurprisethatmanyoftheDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012communitiesgravitatedfromEuropetotheNewWorld.Forexample,theShakermovement–whichbeganlifeintheindustrialBritishcityofManchester–movedtotheUnitedStatesandisstillgoingstrong.ItwasnodoubtwithasimilarintentionthatRobertOwen,theindustrialistwhohadmadehisfortuneinScotland,offeredtobuythestatesofCoahuilaandTexasfromtheMexicangovernmentin1828.(Asyouwillgather,hewasmorethanordinarilyrich.Eventhen,noteveryonecouldaffordTexas.)Hisaimwastosetupawholenetworkofideal‘Owenite’communitiesinthosestates.\n186Moderntimes,modernthemesTheintellectualleadersofthesocialistcommunitarianswere,inBritain,RobertOwenand,inFrance,FourierandSaint-Simon.TotakeOwenasanexample,hiscommunitarianideashad,infact,begunlifeasarationaleforthelivingconditionswithwhichheprovidedtheworkersinhisfactoryatNewLanark,notfarsouthofGlasgow.Owenprovidedthemwithhousing,andtheirchildrenwitheducation.Inmanyways,theirexistencewasspartan.Arigidlyorganisedroutineprevailedthroughouttheworkingday,mealsweretakencommunally,andsoon.Drinkwasbanned.Evenso,conditionswerecleanandhealthy,andtherewasasteadysupplyofwork.Itwasmostlikelythis,morethanidealism,whichattractedworkersfromtheGlasgowslums.Youcanfindthesystemdescribed,togetherwithOwen’sproposalsforthetotalreformofsociety,inhisReporttotheCountyofLanark(1970a).YouwillhavegatheredthatOwenwasnoliberal.Hewasasocialist,ofcourse–heenvisagesafutureworlddividedintosmall‘villagesofco-operation’,aworldinwhichcompetitionnolongerprevails–and,ratherasyouwouldexpect,hewasalsoautilitarian.‘Thatgovernment[then]isbest’,hewrote,‘whichinpracticeproducesthegreatesthappinesstothegreatestnumber;includingthosewhogovern,andthosewhoobey’(1970b:163).Betweentheyearsof1825and184523Owenitecommunitieswereestablished,seveninBritainand16inNorthAmerica(Harrison1969).Butnoneofthemlastedforverylong.Theywere,asMarxwaslatertosay,too‘utopian’.However,theveryfactoftheirhavingexistedmeantthateveryoneknewexactlywhatMarxandEngelsweretalkingaboutwhentheyopenedtheirCommunistManifestowiththefollowingwords:AspectreishauntingEurope–thespectreofCommunism.(MarxandEngels2000:245).BurkeandconservatismReflectionsanddistortionsAndthentherewasEdmundBurke,forwhomrevolutionaryFrancepresentednothingmorethan‘amonstroustragi-comicscene’(Burke1986:92).Burke’sReflectionsontheRevolutioninFrancewasfirstpublishedin1790.TheTerrorhadyettoreachitsworstexcesses.Evenso,therehadalreadybeensomeextra-Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ordinaryviolenceandmayhem.Forexample,inthepreviousyear–on6October1789,tobeexact–acrowdhadforceditswayintotheroyalpalaceatVersailles,andmarchedthekingandqueenthe12milesorsotoParis,wheretheyweretospendtherestoftheirdays.Burkedescribestheeventinblood-curdlingterms.Asheportraysit,theabductionbeganwithamobsettinguponthesentinelguardingthequeen’sbedchamber:‘Instantlyhewascutdown.’Then,Abandofcruelruffiansandassassins,reekingwithhisbloodrushedintothechamberofthequeen,andpiercedwithanhundredstrokesofbayonetsand\nAftertheflood187poniardsthebed,fromwhencethewomanhadbutjusttimetoflyalmostnaked.(Burke1986:164)Afterthat,itseemsthattheroyalpairandtheirinfantchildren,‘whooncewouldhavebeentheprideandhopeofagreatandgenerouspeople’,were‘forcedtoabandonthesanctuaryofthemostsplendidpalaceintheworld,whichtheyleftswimminginblood,pollutedbymassacre,andstrewedwithscatteredlimbsandmutilatedcarcasses’.Twomembersoftheroyalbody-guardwereselectedatrandom,beheaded,andtheirheads‘werestuckuponspears,andledtheprocession’.Meanwhile(saysBurke)theroyalcaptivesweremovedalong,‘amidstthehorridyells,andshrillingscreams,andinfa-mouscontumelies;andalltheunutterableabominationsofthefuriesofhell’(1986:164–65).Afewpageslater,Burkedescribeshisownencounterwiththequeen,MarieAntoinette,asfollows:ItisnowsixteenorseventeenyearssinceIsawthequeenofFrance,thenthedauphiness,atVersailles;andsurelyneverlightedonthisorb,whichshehardlyseemedtotouch,amoredelightfulvision.Isawherjustabovethehorizon,decoratingandcheeringtheelevatedsphereshejustbegantomovein,–glitteringlikethemorning-star,fulloflife,andsplendour,andjoy.Oh!Whatarevolu-tion!AndwhatanheartmustIhavetocontemplatewithoutemotionthatelevationandthatfall!(Burke1986:169)Buthangon:let’snotgettoocarriedaway!Isn’tthistheverysameMarieAntoinettewhoisreputedtohavesocallouslydismissedthepeople’scryforbreadwithhersuperciliousremark,‘Letthemeatcake!’?Indeeditis.The‘letthemeatcake’anecdotemaybeapocryphal,butitsveryexistencesug-geststhatthereisanothersidetothestory,andsothereis.Youcanfindthatotherside,oronevariantofit,inTomPaine’sRightsofMan(Paine1985),thefirstpartofwhichwaspublishedin1791.YoucanfindanothervariantinMaryWollstonecraft’sAVindicationoftheRightsofMen(Wollstonecraft1995a).RightsofManisadefenceoftherevolution’sideals,anditwaswrittenDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012specificallyasaresponsetoBurke’scritique.LikeBurke,Painealsodescribestheeventsof6October,anditisinterestingtocomparethetwoaccounts.Foronething,thereisagreatdifferencebetweenthetwooverwhatactuallyhappened.Forexample,whereasBurkeportraystheRoyalGuardasinnocentvictims,Painedescribestheirbehaviourashavingbeendeliberatelyprovoca-tive;andwhereasBurkedescribesthekingandqueenashavingbeenseizedbyamobandforciblymarchedtoParis,Paineclaimsthattheywentoftheirownaccord.Healsoclaimsthat,farfrombeingaccompaniedby‘horridyells,andshrillingscreams’(Burke1986:165),‘notanactofmolestationwas\n188Moderntimes,modernthemescommittedduringthewholemarch’(Paine1985:64).Wollstonecraft–whoseessaytakestheformofanopenlettertoBurke–alsothinkshisdescriptionexaggerated,andsheconsidersittobesnobbishlyone-sidedaswell.Forexample,herretorttohisstatementthatthecrowdincluded‘thevilestofwomen’(Burke1986:165)is:‘Probablyyoumeanwomenwhogainedalivelihoodbysellingvegetablesorfish,whoneverhadhadanyadvantagesofeducation’(Wollstonecraft1995a:30).Thequeenmaydeservepity,sheconcedes,but‘Idonotliketomakeadistinctionwithoutadiffer-ence’(Wollstonecraft1995a:30).HercommentonBurke’sattitudetotherevolutionandtheensuingTerrorissimplythis:‘thatweoughttoremaininfrozeninactivity,becauseathaw,whilstitnourishesthesoil,spreadsatem-poraryinundation’;andthefearofriskinganypersonalpresentconvenienceshouldpreventastruggleforthemostestimableadvantages.Thisis‘soundreasoning,Igrant,inthemouthoftherichandshort-sighted’(Wollstonecraft1995a:8).Whoisright?Asmysubjectisphilosophy,historicaleventsarenotmymainconcern,soIshan’tconsiderthequestion(althoughIsupposeIshouldpointoutthatPainealsohadhisaxetogrind).However,itiscertainlyworthremarkingthatBurke’sstyle,asevidencedbythepassagesIhavequoted,oughttobeenoughtoputusonourguard.Everythingisexpressedinvalue-loadedtermswhichmakeBurke’sownpointofviewonlytooapparent.Takehisdescriptionofthequeen’sassailantsas‘cruelruffiansandassassins’(Burke1986:164).Youcan’tdenythatitratherprejudgestheissue.Or,takehisstatementthattheroyalchildrenwouldoncehavebeen‘theprideandhopeofagreatandgenerouspeople’(Burke1986:164).Itisreallynothingmorethanastatementofopinion.Butrealhistorianstrytoavoidmakingsuchopinionatedstatements,evenwhentheyaretryingtopersuadeyoutotakeacertainpointofview.Anotherthingrealhistorianstrytodoisconstantlyrefertoevidence,todocumentaryrecords,eyewitnessaccountsandsoon.Insofarastheycan,theytrytoletthefactsspeakforthemselves.4ButBurkedoesnosuchthing.Wehavetotakehiswordforitthateventsinthequeen’sbedroomtookplacejustashedescribes.Thenagain,howdoesheknow?Hetellsusthat‘Itisnowsixteenorseventeenyearssince[he]sawthequeenofFrance’(Burke1986:169)sowecanbesurethathewasnotthere,hidinginthewardrobeorunderthebed.Andwhataboutthatprurient,faintlypornographic‘almostnaked’,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012asin‘thewoman[MarieAntoinette]hadbutjusttimetoflyalmostnaked’(Burke1986:164)?Atabloidnewspapercouldhardlyhavedoneitbetter.Andsoitgoeson.Paine’sassessmentofBurke’sessayasaseriesof‘theatricalexaggerations’seemsaboutright(Paine1985:59).Certainly,withhisdescrip-tionofapalaceleft‘swimminginblood,pollutedbymassacre,andstrewedwithscatteredlimbsandmutilatedcarcasses’andsoonandsoforth,Burkeseemstobestrivingsohardforeffectinthesepassagesthattheydon’tringtrue.ButifBurkeisapoorhistorian,andifReflectionsontheRevolutioninFranceismorerhetoricthanhistory,perhapswearenotmeanttotreatitasawork\nAftertheflood189ofhistoryatall.Or,ifweare,perhapsweshouldtreatitassomethingelseaswell.Burke’suseofrhetoricsuggeststhatitcouldbeso.Hisrelianceonrhetoricissoblatant.Burke’sconservativepoliticalphilosophyIfthereissuchathingasadistinctivelyconservativepoliticalphilosophy,thenBurke’sessayembodiesit.Ofcourse,by‘conservativepoliticalphiloso-phy’IdonotmeanthephilosophicaldoctrineswhichhappentohavebeenembracedbythisorthatpartyoftheRightatgiventimesinhistory.Thosehavevariedwithhistoricalcircumstance.Forexample,conservativephiloso-phyisnotequivalenttopro-freemarket‘economicliberalism’,thedoctrineoflaisser-faire.Youcouldbemistakenforthinkingotherwise,becausethelatterhasbeenpopularwiththeRightquiterecently,mostrecentlyduringthe1980s;5butlaisser-fairesitsjustaseasilywithcertainformsofliberalism,andthereisnothingspecificallyconservativeaboutit.Norisconservatismequivalenttofascism,eventhoughconservativepartiesquitefrequentlytendtoattractnear-fascistsandneo-fasciststotheirextremes.Onthecontrary–andastheterm‘conservative’implies–thatpoliticalphilosophywhichisgenuinelyconservativeisgenerallyresistanttochangeandsupportiveofthestatusquo.Conservatismproperlyso-calledemphasisestheimportanceoftraditionandorder,notprogressandreform;itprioritisesinstinctandfeelingoverreasonandargument;itvaluestheparticularandspecificabovetheabstractandgeneral.AllthreeelementsareconspicuouslypresentinBurke’sargument,soletusnowtakeacloserlookatit.Ishallfocusonjustthreestrandsofthatargument,eachofwhichischaracteristicallyconservative.Firstofall,then,Burkeissuspiciousofintel-lectualabstraction.Sofarasheisconcerned,thedoctrineofnaturalrights,asembodiedintheDeclarationoftheRightsofMan(1789),isanabstraction.Ofsuchrights,hesaysthat‘theirabstractperfectionistheirpracticaldefect’(1986:151).Likewise,heissuspiciousoftheideathataconstitutioncanbedesigned,fromscratch,onthebasisofabstractfirstprinciples(suchastheprinciplethatthereare‘rightsofman’).‘Thescienceofconstructingacom-monwealth,orrenovatingit,orreformingit’is,hesays,‘likeeveryotherexperimentalscience,nottobetaughtapriori’(Burke1986:152).Inhisview,itisfaithinabstractions–notably‘libertyintheabstract’andtheDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012rightsofman–whichhasbeenamajorcauseofallthetrouble.Heasks:‘Isitbecauselibertyintheabstractmaybeclassedamongtheblessingsofmankind,thatIamseriouslytofelicitateamadman,whohasescapedfromtheprotectingrestraintandwholesomedarknessofhiscell?’(Burke1986:90),and‘AmItocongratulateanhighwaymanandmurderer,whohasbrokeprison,upontherecoveryofhisnaturalrights?’(Burke1986:90).Youaresupposedtoreply:Ofcoursenot!Burkeisnotamantohidehisprejudices.GivingexpressiontoapeculiarlyEnglishbiasagainsttheFrench–thattheyarestylishbutsuperficial–he\n190Moderntimes,modernthemesdescribes‘thenewestParisfashionofanimprovedliberty’asathing‘thepeopleofEnglandwillnotape’(Burke1986:111).(IshouldthinkthatparticularversionofchauvinismhasbeenaroundsincetheNormanCon-quest.)OneespeciallynoteworthyprejudiceisBurke’shostilitytotheprojectoftheEnlightenment,themovementofideaswhichhadcometoprominenceintheeighteenthcentury.TheEnlightenmentnaileditscolourstotheidealofreason,andsetitsfaceagainst(whatitsawas)ignoranceandsuperstition.Thereissarcasmandinvectiveagainst‘ournewlightandknowledge’ofwhichthehorrorsof6Octoberaresupposedtohavebeenthe‘work’;the‘converts’and‘disciples’ofRousseau,VoltaireandHelvetius;‘thewholeclanoftheenlightened’;andthe‘incantation–“Philosophy,Light,Liberality,theRightsofMan”’(Burke1986:167,181–82,183and218)(Burke’semphasis).NotthatBurkeisagainstliberty.Onthecontrary,heisallforit–orsoheclaims.Hewrites:‘IflattermyselfthatIloveamanly,moral,regulatedliberty’.Byhisownaccount,Burkeisonlyopposedto‘asimpleviewoftheobject,asitstandsstrippedofeveryrelation,inallthenakednessandsoli-tudeofmetaphysicalabstraction’(1986:89–90)–to‘libertyintheabstract’inotherwords.ThisbringsustoasecondstrandofBurke’sargument.ForBurke,‘liberty’,strictlyspeaking,isaspecificsetofliberties(orrights),andthesearetheoutcomeofcompromiseandnegotiationwhichhastakenplaceovergenerationswithinthecontextofaparticularpoliticaltradition.Onthisaccount,thereisreallynosuchthingas‘liberty’perse,orintheabstract;butthereisEnglishlibertyand,fortheFrench,thereusedtobeFrenchliberty.FortheEnglish,thehistoryoflibertyis–thus–thehistoryofthelibertiesestablishedbyactssuchasthesigningoftheMagnaCartaand,later,bythecompromiseof1688.TheEnglishneverhadtherighttochooseorcashiertheirgovernors,asclaimedbyrevolutionarygroups;buttheydohavetherighttoelectMembersofParliamentandsocheckthesovereign’spower.Bythesametoken,theFrenchhavegonewrongbythrowingoutthebabyoftraditionwiththebathwateroftheancienrégime.‘Youhadalltheseadvan-tagesinyourancientstate’,writesBurke,‘butyouchosetoactasifyouhadneverbeenmouldedintoacivilsociety,andhadeverythingtobeginanew’(1986:122).(Burke’sessayiswrittenintheformofanimaginarylettertoaFrenchman.)Burke’spositioniswellsummarisedinthefollowingpassage:Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Youwillobserve,thatfromMagnaChartatotheDeclarationofRight,ithasbeentheuniformpolicyofourconstitutiontoclaimandassertourliberties,asanentailedinheritancederivedtousfromourforefathers,andtobetransmittedtoourposterity;asanestatespeciallybelongingtothepeopleofthiskingdomwithoutanyreferencewhatevertoanyothermoregeneralorpriorright.(1986:119)Itfollowsthatpoliticalchangemustalwaystakeplacewithinatraditionas‘Ourpoliticalsystemisplacedinajustcorrespondenceandsymmetry\nAftertheflood191withtheorderoftheworld’(Burke1986:120).‘Peoplewillnotlookforwardtoposterity,whoneverlookbackwardtotheirancestors’(Burke1986:119).Inshort,Burke’sadviceisjustthis:‘Ifitain’tbroke,don’tfixit.’Asadvicegoes,thatisnotsuchabadruletofollow,ifonlysometimes.Evenso,therearesomefairlyobviousquestionsdirectlyraisedbyhisaccountofthings.Onequestionis:Howdoyouknowwhenthemachine–theunwrittenconstitution,basedoninheritedtraditionandfinelytunedbygenerationaftergeneration–isactuallybroke?Afterall,aconstitutionisnotreallyamachine,designedforaspecificpurpose,asifitwereacaroraphone.Youcantellwhentheseneedrepair:thecarwon’tgo;thephonewon’tpickupmessages.Butexactlywhatmustaconstitutionfailtodobeforewedecidethatitneedsrepair?Thereisnoobviousanswer.Moreover,conservativesandtheircriticswill,bydefinition,givedifferentanswers–itispartofwhatmakesthemconservativesandtheotherstheircritics–sothequestionispoliticallyloaded.Thesameconsiderationsapplytoarelatedquestion:Justsupposethatcompromisesandreadjustmentsdoneedtobemade–andthatwecantellthattheydo–howdoweknowwhatreadjustmentsitisrighttomake?ItisherethatathirdstrandofBurke’sargumentcomesintoplay,hisemphasisonwhathesometimescalls‘natural’wisdomandwhathesome-timescalls‘prejudice’.Naturalwisdomis‘wisdomwithoutreflection,andaboveit’(Burke1986:119).‘Prejudicerendersaman’svirtuehishabit’(Burke1986:183).So,prejudiceaccordingtoBurkeisagoodthing.Histhesisisthat,justasconstitutionalchangemusttakeplacethroughadjust-mentsmadewithinatradition,sothoseraisedwithinatraditionlearntoknow,asifbyinstinct,whenachangeisrightandwhenitisnot.Allyouhavetodoisavoidbeingmisledbyfancyabstractionsandfollow‘nature’.TheEnglisharesupposedtobeespeciallygoodatthissortofthing,thankstotheir‘sullenresistancetoinnovation’and‘thecoldsluggishnessof[their]nationalcharacter’(Burke1986:181).Infact,BurkespendsagreatdealoftimelecturingtheFrenchonthevirtuesoftheEnglishnationalcharacter.Apparently,‘thepeopleofEngland,farfromthinkingareligious,nationalestablishmentunlawful,hardlythinkitlawfultobewithoutone’(Burke1986:197);‘TheEnglishpeoplearesatisfiedthattothegreattheconsola-tionsofreligionareasnecessaryasitsinstructions’(Burke1986:201);‘TheDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012peopleofEnglandwillshewtothehaughtypotentatesoftheworld,andtotheirtalkingsophisters,thatafree,agenerous,aninformednation,honoursthehighmagistratesofitschurch’(Burke1986:202),andsoon.(Burke’sargumentisfocusedontheEnglish,but–ofcourse–similarconsiderationswillapplytoothertraditionswithinothernation-states.)Burke’sidealcitizen–orrather‘subject’–is,thus,anone-too-reflectiveindividualwhoinstinctivelyrecognisesthevalueoftraditionandfollowsit.Thesamecharacter,similarlyidealised,appearsintheworkofBurke’stwentieth-centuryfollowers.AccordingtoMichaelOakeshott,‘themanof\n192Moderntimes,modernthemesconservativedisposition’followsrulesofconduct,knowingthat‘theyaresusceptibleofchangeandimprovement’,butrecognisingthat‘ifweweredisposedtoargueaboutthemandchangethemoneveryoccasion,theywouldrapidlylosetheirvalue’(Oakeshott1991:421).Andlikewise,accordingtoRogerScruton,‘argumentisnotthefavouritepursuitofconservatives’.Theconservativemaybe‘for’certainthingsbut,‘heisforthem,notbecausehehasargumentsintheirfavour,butbecauseheknowsthem,liveswiththem,andfindshisidentitythreatened(oftenheknowsnothow)bytheattempttointerferewiththeiroperation’(Scruton1980:12–13).Butthereisafairlyevidentproblemwiththisanswer,namelythatitjustpushesthequestiononestepback.Inotherwords,ifknowingwhatisrightisaquestionoffollowingyourinstincts–ifyouareapersonwiththe‘rightinstincts’,thatis–thenyouhavetoaskyourself:‘HowdoIknowthatIamapersonwiththerightinstincts?’Itisherethattherhetoriccomesintoitsown,orsoitseemstome.Earlier,IobservedthatBurke’suseofrhetoricissoblatantthatitishardtotreathisdescriptionsofeventsashistory,orashistoryonly.Ithinkwearenowinapositiontoseethathisrhetoricalstylehasafurtherpurpose.Itistoleavethereaderinnodoubtastowherethedistinctionbetween‘us’and‘them’lies.‘We’arethepeoplewith‘theright’instincts,uncorruptedbymischievoustheoreticalabstraction.‘We’supporttheestablishedorder.‘We’trustourprejudicesand‘we’recognise,forexample,thatallarenotequalandthat‘Theoccupationofanhair-dresser,orofaworkingtallow-chandler,cannotbeamatterofhonourtoanyperson’(Burke1986:138).‘They’arethefollowersofabstractprinciple,thecontemptible‘clanoftheenlightened’(Burke1986:183).Thefollowingpassageiswellknown.Somewoulddescribeitasnotorious.Becausehalfadozengrasshoppersunderafernmakethefieldringwiththeirimportunatechink,whilstthousandsofgreatcattle,reposedbeneaththeshadowoftheBritishoak,chewthecudandaresilent,praydonotimaginethatthosewhomakethenoisearetheonlyinhabitantsofthefield;that,ofcourse,theyaremanyinnumber;orthat,afterall,theyareotherthanthelittleshrivelled,meagre,hopping,thoughloudandtroublesomeinsectsofthehour.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012(Burke1986:181)Withthispassage–andlikemanyajournalistafterhim–Burkedistin-guishes‘thechatteringclasses’from‘thesilentmajority’.Ofcourse,youdon’thavetoacceptthathisdescriptionistheonlywaytoportraysociety.Itcouldbethatthenoisygrasshoppersreallydohavesomethingtosayworthlisteningto.Itcouldbethatthebig,apparentlystupid,cattlearenotfol-lowinga‘naturalwisdom’asifbyinstinct.Theycouldbejustwhattheyappear.\nAftertheflood193Wollstonecraft’sownobjectionstoBurke’santi-rationalismaresimilartotheonesIhaveraisedhere.Forexample,shedismissesrepeatedclaimstoknowwhat‘we’theEnglishthinkasappealsto‘inbredfeelingsandsecretlights’(1995a:35).Shehasherownlineinrhetorictooand,inoppositiontoBurke’sportraitofanEnglishsociety,imbuedwiththewisdomoftraditionandsteeringacoursethroughhistorywiththehelpofitslight,shepaintsadifferentpicture–apictureofacorruptsociety,riddledwithcruelandirrationalclassdivisions.Asmanyreaderswillknow,MaryWollstonecraftwasapioneeringfemin-ist.SheisbestrememberedforherAVindicationoftheRightsofWoman(1995b).ThereisapassageinherVindicationoftheRightsofMeninwhichshecastigatesBurkeforfosteringastereotypeofwomenasfluffy,empty-headedhouseornaments,andtheBritishclasssystemforencouragingthemtocon-formtoit.Itmustbeoneoftheearliestexamplesofitskind,soitisworthquoting.Shebeginswithareferencetotheattitudethatthewivesanddaughtersofslave-ownersinthecoloniesarereputed,bysome,totaketowardstheirslaves:Whereisthedignity,theinfallibilityofsensibility,inthefairladies,whom,ifthevoiceofrumouristobecredited,thecaptiveNegroescurseinalltheagonyofbodilypain,fortheunheardoftormentstheyinvent.Itisprobablethatsomeofthem,afterthesightofaflagellation,composetheirruffledspiritsandexercisetheirtenderfeelingsbytheperusalofthelastimportednovel.(Wollstonecraft1995a:46)ThesearewomenwhowouldbeconvincedbyBurke’sarguments.(Thiswasatimewhentheanti-slaverymovement,likefeminism,wasgettingintogear.)Wollstonecraftcontinuesasfollows:Youmayhaveconvincedthemthatlittlenessandweaknessaretheveryessenceofbeauty;andthattheSupremeBeing,ingivingwomenbeautyinthemostsupereminentdegree,seemedtocommandthem,bythepowerfulvoiceofnature,nottocultivatethemoralvirtuesthatmightchancetoexciterespect,andinterferewiththepleasingsensationstheywerecreatedtoinspire.Thuscon-finingtruth,fortitude,andhumanity,withintherigidpaleofmanlymorals,theymightjustlyargue,thattobeloved,woman’shighendandgreatdistinction!Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Theyshould‘learntolisp,tototterintheirwalk,andnick-nameGod’screatures’.(Wollstonecraft1995a:47)DidIhearsomebodywhisper,‘plusçachange,plusc’estlamêmechose’?Modern‘isms’Bynow,itshouldbeapparentthatliberalism,socialismandconservatismarenottheonlymodern‘isms’.Itistrueenoughthat,incontemporarysocieties,\n194Moderntimes,modernthemespeopletendtocategorisetheirpoliticalallegiancesunderoneortheotherofthesethreeheadings.Itisalsotrue–Isuppose–that,withinpoliticaltheory,agreatdealofdiscussioncanberepresented,albeitinroughandreadyterms,asanongoingargumentbetweenliberals,socialistsandcon-servatives.Buttorepresentthedebateasonlythatistomissagreatdeal.Mostespecially,itistounderplaytheroleofmovementsinideaswhicharelessobviouslyconnectedwithparticularideologicalstandpoints,butwhichare–nevertheless–essentialtoourunderstandingofpoliticalthought.Thesecancutacrosstheconventionaldistinctions.Forexample,thereisnospecialconnectionbetweenutilitarianismandliberalism.Aswelookbackthroughtime,thefactthat,withintheutilitarianmovement,BenthamwassucceededbyJ.S.Millsometimestendstoobscurethis;forMillwasoneoftheworld’sgreatestutilitariansaswellasoneofitsgreatestliberals.ButthereisnospecialreasonforportrayingBenthamasaliberal,althoughhewascertainlyautilitarian.Again,aswehaveseen,RobertOwenwasautilitarian,althoughhewascertainlynoliberalandhewascertainlyasocialist.Thatsaid,Ishallnowendeavourtomovethisnarrativefromtheearlyyearsofthenineteenthcenturytothepresent,whichmeansthatfromnowonIshallbedealingwiththetheoreticalpositionsbywhichtheparametersofpresent-daydiscussionareset,notjustwithinpoliticalphilosophybutwithinpoliticsgenerally.Inotherwords,theissueswithwhichIshallnowgoontodealwillbecomeincreasinglyliveasIprogress.Asaresult,thingswillstarttogetalittlemoretricky–trickyforme,thatis–andIshouldjustsaywhy.Briefly,therearetwodangers.Oneisparti-ality.Thereisnopointinmypretendingthatit’spossibletotakeaneutralpositiononeveryissueIdiscuss.Everyoneknowsyoucan’tdothat.(Burkeisanexample.Therewouldbenopointinmypretendingtolikehim.Ijustdon’t.)However,IshalltrytogiveeveryargumentIconsiderareasonablerunforitsmoney,andIshallalsotrytoavoidpolemic.Theotherdangerisselectivity.Sincethebeginningofthenineteenthcentury,somanypoliticalphilosophershavelivedandwrittenthat,ifIweretodealwitheachinthesamewaythatIhavesofardealtwithPlato,Aristotle,Hobbesandtherest,thisbookwouldbemuchtoolongandnobodywouldwanttoreadit.ThethreewritersonwhomIhavechosentoconcentrateareJohnStuartMill,KarlMarxandJohnRawls.ThatisbecauseIbelievethemtobethepoliticalphilosopherswhoseworkhasdonemosttoshapepoliticalthinkinginDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012moderntimes.Idon’tjustmeanthatliberalism(asexemplifiedbyMillandRawls)andsocialism(asexemplifiedbyMarx)havebeenthedominantpoli-ticalmovements–althoughIdomeanthat.Ialsomeanthattheirrespectivephilosophicalapproacheshavesettheframeworksofthoughtwithinwhichothershavetendedtomove.Butdoesn’tthisexposemetoachargeofpartiality?Doesn’ttheparticularselectionIhavemadeshowthatItakeaparticularviewofwhoisimportantandwhoislessso,anddoesn’tittherebycommitmetoaparticularviewofthehistoryofphilosophy?Ofcourseitdoes,butthen–justasitis\nAftertheflood195impossibletomaintainaneutralstanceoneveryissue–soeveryonehastotellastoryintheirownway.AllIcansayisthatIamsurethateventhosereaderswhowouldhavetoldthestorydifferentlywillnotthinkmyapproachtooeccentric.SuggestionsforfurtherreadingBentham,Hegel,conservatism,WollstonecraftTherearemanycollectionsofBentham’swork,butIthinkRossHarrison’sSelectedWritingsonUtilitarianism:Bentham(2000)isgood.NotonlydoesitcontainthefulltextofThePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation,italsocontainsAnarchicalFallacies,andsomeothermaterialwhichwouldotherwisebehardtocomeby.OneofthebeststudiesofBentham’sthoughtisJohnStuartMill’sessay‘Bentham’(1987).Relativelyrecent,BenthamstudiesincludeRossHarrison’sBentham(1983),andPhilipSchofield’sUtilityandDemocracy:ThePoliticalThoughtofJeremyBentham(2009).TurningtoHegel,ifyoudon’tfeellikeploughingyourwaythroughhisentirebodyofwork,ausefulcollectionisStephenHoulgate’sTheHegelReader(1998).ThereareplentyofbooksonHegel,butIfoundPeterSinger’sHegel:AVeryShortIntroduction(1983)veryhelp-fulandilluminating.IalsogreatlyenjoyedDudleyKnowles’sHegelandthePhilosophyofRight(2002).Asthetitleindicates,thisconcentratesonHegel’sPhilosophyofRight.KarlPopper’switheringattackonHegelinTheOpenSocietyanditsEnemies(1945)iswellworthreading,eventhoughmostcommentatorsseemtoagreethathisargumentmissesthemark.(Hegelisyetanotherphilosophertohavebeenaccusedofadvo-cating‘totalitarianism’.)SofarasIknow,thereisnofull-lengthtreat-mentofEdmundBurke’sthought.However,foracontemporaryequivalent,youcoulddoworsethanconsultRogerScruton’sTheMeaningofConservatism(1980)orMichaelOakeshott’sRationalisminPolitics(1991)Finally,V.Sapiro’sAVindicationofPoliticalVirtue:ThePoliticalTheoryofMaryWollstonecraft(1992)isdescribedbySusanKhinZaw,intheRoutledgeEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,as‘thefirstbook-lengthstudyofWollstonecraft’sphilosophy’and‘generallyDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012reliable’.Notes1IfyouwanttoseewhatBenthamnowlookslike,youcanvisitthewebsiteofUniversityCollege’sBenthamprojectatwww.ucl.ac.uk/Bentham-Project/who/autoicon.Thesitealsogivesmoreinformationabouttheauto-icon.2Likeanygoodsocialcontracttheorist,Rousseaugoesontocomparehismethodwiththat‘usedeverydaybyourphysiciststoexplaintheformationoftheearth’(1984:78).\n196Moderntimes,modernthemes3Isay‘self-styled’becausetheword‘postmodernism’suggeststhatitisaprogressivenewdevel-opment,andnotjustasideshow.Wemustn’ttakethepostmodernists’ownvaluationoftheiractivitiesforgranted.4CompareBurke’sdescriptionwiththepassagefromSimonSchama’sCitizens(1989)thatIquotedinthefinalsectionofthepreviouschapter.UnlikeBurke,Schamarepeatedlyreferstoevidence,statisticsandeyewitnessaccounts,forexample.5OrsoIwroteinthefirstedition.Sincethen,pro-freemarket‘neo-liberalism’asitissometimescalledhasbeenenjoyingaresurgenceinboththeUKandtheUSA–mostnotablywiththeriseofthe‘TeaParty’.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n11JohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalismAsamoralphilosopher,JohnStuartMillwasautilitarian.Morethanthat,hewastheforemostutilitarianphilosopherofhisgeneration.Infact,youcouldsaythathewasborntoit,forhisfather,JamesMill,broughthimuptobeautilitarianinboththeoryandpractice.1Mill’sreputationhasper-sisted,andhisessayUtilitarianism(1991b)remainstheclassicstatementofthe‘classical’utilitarianposition.AsapoliticalcriticandcampaignerMillwasaradicalandaliberal.Hewasaprolificessayist,buthisbest-knownpoliticalworksare,nodoubt,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy(1999),OnLiberty(1991a),ConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment(1991c)andTheSubjectionofWomen(1991d).Intheseworks,hetakesaliberalapproachto–respectively–economicquestions(includingtherightsandwrongsofprivateownership,andofcommunism);thelibertyoftheindividualandthepress;democracy;andfeminism.Inallcases,heseekstodefendthatapproachinutilitarianterms.Twothingsshouldbeclearfromthis.Thefirstisthat,intheearlierhalfofthenineteenthcentury,utilitarianismwasmuchmorethananesotericphilo-sophicalthesis,itsproponentsconfinedtoasmallgroupofacademicphil-osophers.Farfromit;itwasthecreedofanactivemovementwitharoletoplayintherealworld.ThesecondisthatthereisacloserelationshipbetweenMill’sutilitarianismandhisliberalism.ItisforthelatterreasonthatIhavechosentofocusonthatrelationshipinthischapter.Asweshallsee,reconcilingutilitarianismwithliberalismisnotquiteaseasyasitmightatfirstappeartobe.Tostartwith,then,IshouldsaywhatImeanby‘utilitarianism’and‘lib-eralism’.Actually,readerswillknowbynowthatutilitarianismisthemoralDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012andpoliticalphilosophyfoundedontheprincipleofutilityor‘greatesthap-pinessprinciple’.Inthepreviouschapter,Isuggestedthatonereasonforitssuccessintheearlieryearsofthenineteenthcenturywasitssimplicityandstraightforwardness.Withasingleprinciple,utilitarianismpromisestosweepawayallmannerofmuddleandmystification.Atleast,thatitishowitlookedtoBentham.Butthen,perhapsthesimplicityismerelyapparent.Millcertainlythoughtso.HealsorealisedthatBentham’sconceptionofhumannatureanditsrelationtohumansocietyistoosimpletodojusticetothewaythingsare.Evenso,Millneverabandonedutilitarianism.Rather\n198Moderntimes,modernthemesthandothat,hetriedtodevelopaversionofutilitarianismwhichcouldadequatelymatchreal-lifecomplexities.Asaresult–andasweshalleventuallysee–someinterestingstressesandstrainsshowupinhisarguments.ThestatementthatMillwasa‘liberal’needsalittlemoreexplanation,for‘liberal’isoneofthosewordswhichtendstobeusedinanumberofways.Forexample,itisquiteoftenusedbythosesympathetictothepoliticalright,asapejorativetermforthosewhostandtotheleftofthemselves.Forthosewhouse‘liberal’thisway,Millwouldcertainlyqualifyasaliberalsimplyforhisprogressiveviews.However,ifwearetounderstandwhatMill’sliberalismamountedto,wehavetospecifyitmorepreciselythanthat.Again,‘liberalism’issometimesusedasashorthandtermfor‘economicliberalism’,thedoctrinethatthemarketworksbestwhenlefttoitself,orlaisser-faire.Yetagain,Ihavetendedtousetheexpression‘liberaldemoc-racy’,throughoutthisbook,asashorthandforthetypeofsystemwhichprevails,atpresent,throughout‘theWest’.Infact,Milldidputacaseforlaisser-faireinhisPrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,albeitaqualifiedone.2Hewasalsoasupporterof‘liberaldemocracy’.However,theliberalismforwhichMillismostrememberedisneitherofthese,ornotexactly;so,beforegoinganyfurther,IshouldstatemorepreciselywhatItakeMill’sliberalismtobe.Mill’sliberalismWhatisliberalism?Whatwasit,then?IwouldsaythatMill’spoliticalphilosophyqualifiesas‘liberal’becauseitpassesthreetests.First,itattachesagreatdealofimportance–ifnotsupremeimportance–tofreedom.3Infact,thisissomethingofanunderstatementwhereMillisconcerned,forhisessayOnLiberty(1991a)remainsthemostinfluential,mostfrequentlycited,textonthesubject,eventhoughitwasfirstpublishedaslongagoas1859.Inaway,youwouldthinkthisenough.Afterall,whatcould‘liberalism’referto,ifnot–purelyandsimply–anydoctrinewhichvaluesfreedom?However,adoctrinewhichonlymatchedthisonecriterion,andneitheroftheothers,wouldnotqualifyasliberalinthesenseof‘liberal’atissue.TheDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012reasonisthatvaluingfreedomcanberatherlikevaluingnicenessandgoodness.Whocouldpossiblybeagainstit?EvenEdmundBurkevaluesfreedom–oratleasthesayshedoes.4However,youcouldhardlydescribeBurkeasaliberal(andnorisitadescriptioninwhichhecouldhaverecog-nisedhimself).Liberalism–realliberalism–hastopaymorethanlipservicetoliberty.Itneedsteeth.Itisherethatasecondcriterioncomesintoplay.Millholdsthatitisonlywherecertainlibertiesarerespectedthatasocietycanbedescribedastrulyfree.Inafamouspassage,heputsitasfollows:\nJohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism199thereisasphereofactioninwhichsociety,asdistinguishedfromtheindivi-dual,has,ifany,onlyanindirectinterest:comprehendingallthatportionofaperson’slifeandconductwhichaffectsonlyhimselfor,ifitalsoaffectsothers,onlywiththeirfree,voluntary,andundeceivedconsent.(Mill1991a:16)Millthengoesontospecifythelibertieswhichfallwithinthe‘sphere’.Theseare‘first,theinwarddomainofconsciousness,demandinglibertyofcon-science,inthemostcomprehensivesense,libertyofthoughtandfeeling,absolutefreedomofopinionandsentimentonallsubjects,practicalorspec-ulative,scientific,moral,ortheological’.Thisfirstlibertyisalsomeanttoinclude‘thelibertyofexpressingandpublishingopinions’.‘Secondly’,saysMill,‘theprinciplerequireslibertyoftastesandpursuits,offramingtheplanofourlifetosuitourowncharacter,ofdoingaswelike,subjecttosuchconsequencesasmayfollow’providedthatwedonoharmtoothers.And‘Thirdly,fromthislibertyofeachindividualfollowstheliberty,withinthesamelimits,ofcombinationamongindividuals;freedomtouniteforanypurposenotinvolvingharmtoothers’(Mill1991a:16).Millstateshisopinionthat:Nosocietyinwhichtheselibertiesarenot,onthewhole,respectedisfree,whatevermaybeitsformofgovernment;andnoneiscompletelyfreeinwhichtheydonotexistabsoluteandunqualified.(Mill1991a:16)Thisidea,thatcertainlibertiesmustremainprotectedifasocietyistocountasfree,isabsolutelycrucialtothosephilosophicaltextswhichlieatthecoreoftheliberaltradition.WehaveencountereditoncealreadyintheformofLocke’sargumentthatwehavefundamental‘natural’rights;notablytherightstolifeandliberty.Inthetwentiethcentury,thesameideawasre-expressedbyRawls,accordingtowhomour‘basicliberties’include:politicalliberty(therighttovoteandtobeeligibleforpublicoffice)togetherwithfreedomofspeechandassembly;libertyofconscienceandfreedomofthought;freedomofthepersonalongwiththerighttohold(personal)property;andfreedomfromarbitraryarrestandseizureasdefinedbytheconceptoftheDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ruleoflaw.(Rawls1971:61)LikeLocke,Rawlsdescribetheselibertiesasrights.Inthis,Milldiffersfromtheothertwo.Hewrites:‘ItispropertostatethatIforgoanyadvantagewhichcouldbederivedtomyargumentfromtheideaofabstractrightasathingindependentofutility.Iregardutilityastheultimateappealonallethicalquestions’(1991a:17).ThisisjustwhatyouwouldexpectfromMill.\n200Moderntimes,modernthemesOtherwise,eachwriter’slistoffundamentalfreedomsissimilar.Foreachthelistcruciallyincludeslibertyofaction,libertyofconscienceandthelib-ertytohaveasayoverwhorulesyouandwhattheydo.(Aswesaw,forLocke,thelastofthesemeansthefreedomtowithdrawyourconsentfromthegovernment.Asbefitsatwentieth-centurywriter,Rawlsconnectsitmorespecificallywiththe‘righttotakepartin,andtodeterminetheoutcomeof,theconstitutionalprocess’(1971:221).)Thissimilarityis,nodoubt,acon-sequenceofathirdfeature,characteristicofliberalphilosophy,namelythattheideaofaprotectedsphereisgroundedinamoregeneralconceptionoffreedomconstruedasthelibertytoliveyourownlifeinyourownway(ortolive‘autonomously’asonecurrentlyfashionabletermhasit).InMill’scase,thisideafindsexpressioninhisviewthattobefreeistobeunpreventedfromactingasyouwouldlike.Consequently,the‘object’ofOnLibertyistoassert‘oneverysimpleprinciple,asentitledtogovernabsolutelythedealingsofsocietywiththeindividualinthewayofcompulsionandcontrol’.Ashegoesontoexplain:Thatprincipleisthatthesoleendforwhichmankindarewarranted,individu-allyorcollectively,ininterferingwiththelibertyofactionofanyoftheirnumberisself-protection.Thattheonlypurposeforwhichpowercanberightfullyexercisedoveranymemberofacivilisedcommunity,againsthiswill,istopreventharmtoothers.Hisowngood,eitherphysicalormoral,isnotasufficientwarrant.(Mill2000b:115ff.)Whybealiberal?Mostreaderswillagreewithme,oratleastIthinktheywill,thatliberalismascharacterised–thatis,thepolitical/philosophicalpositionwhichmatchesthethreestatedcriteria–hasbecomeaprevailingorthodoxybynow.Argu-ably,itistheprevailingorthodoxy.Itwouldbeanexaggerationtodescribeitas‘whateverybodybelieves’,butitwouldcertainlybedifficult,thesedays,tofindanyonewhowoulddisagreethatwehavecertainfundamental(or‘human’)rights,orwiththeclaimthattheindividualshouldbesovereignoverhisorherownbodyandmind.Notice,too,thatliberalism,sochar-acterised,iscompatiblewithmanyotherbeliefsystems.Forexample,youcanbealiberalandtakeaconservativeattitudetosocialchange.Alternatively,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012youcanbealiberalandasocialist.Ineithercase,itwilldepend,notonyourliberalism,butonwhatelseyoubelieve.Youmaybelievethatchangeisagreatthreattopeople’sfundamentalfreedoms,asitistotheirautonomy.Or,youmaybelievethatfreedomandautonomyarebestprotectedundersocialism.(So,whereassocialismisincompatiblewitheconomicliberalism,manyformsofsocialismareperfectlycompatiblewiththepoliticalliberalismexemplifiedbyMill.)Itfollowsthatanswerstothequestion,‘Whybealiberal?’,cantakedif-ferentforms.Theymaybetraditionalist,socialist,utilitarian,ortheymay\nJohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism201takesomeotherform.(Asweshallseelater,Rawlsoffersacontractualistanswer.)InMill’swork,weshouldexpecttofindautilitariananswer.Utili-tariansholdthattheprincipleofutilityisfundamentaltoeverythingelse,so–ifMillisright–hisliberalismhastobederivablefromhisutilitarian-ism;thatis,ithastofollowfromitasalogicalconsequence.Letusnowseeifitdoes.Utilitarianism:thepursuitofhappiness‘Classical’utilitarianism’stwomostbasicfeaturesarethese.First,thereisanaccountofhumannature,ofwhatwearefundamentallylike.Thistakestheformofthethesisthatweare,allofus,motivatedbythedesireforhappiness(and,ofcourse,thecorrespondingdesiretoavoidunhappiness).Second,thereisanethicalprinciple,theprincipleofutility.Sofarasclassicalutilitariansareconcerneditisoneoftheprinciple’sgreateststrengthsthatitrecognisesthetruthabouthumannature,andthatitis,therefore,realistic.AsBenthamputit,systemswhichattempttoquestiontheprincipleofutility‘dealinsoundsinsteadofsense,incapriceinsteadofreason,indarknessinsteadoflight’(2000b:87).Letustakeeachfeatureinturn,beginningwithutilitarianism’saccountofhumannature.ValuingpleasureTostartwith,then,thereisclearlysomethingrightabouttheclaimthatweare,atroot,seekersofhappiness.Forexample,‘Iwanttobehappy’isnotastatementwhichrequiresfurtherexplanation,ornotusually.Inthis,itdif-fersfrom‘Iwanttoberich’(orfree,powerful,orfamous).Imeanthat,whereasitcanmakeperfectsensetoasksomeone‘Whydoyouwanttoberich/free/powerful/famous?’–andwhereasthequestioncanbeespeciallypointedwherethereisasuppositionthatbeinganyoftheseisnotlikelytomakethepersontowhomitisaddressedhappy–thereseemstobesome-thingnotquiteinorderabout‘Whydoyouwanttobehappy?’Somehoworother,thequestionseemstohavebeenforestalledbytheinitialstatement.Ontheotherhand,thestatement‘Iwanttobeunhappy’requiresagreatdealofexplanation.Inthesepost-Freudiandaysyouwouldexpecttheretobe,attheveryleast,apsychoanalyticaccountofhowitcanbepossibleforDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012anyonetosaysuchathing.Sofar,allthatseemsobviousenough,butitisnotsoeasytogobeyondtheobvioushere.Benthamattemptedtotheorisethespecialrolethathappinessappearstoplayintheexplanationofactionbyequatinghappinesswithpleasure,andpleasurewithhavingpleasurablesensations.Hemadethelatterequationbecausehethoughtofpleasureandpainasopposites.Apainisasensation.Thatisquiteobvious,soitfollowsthatapleasuremustbetoo,orsoBenthamassumed.ThePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislationcontainsachapterinwhichBenthamoutlineshis‘felicificcalculus’.Asheseesit,therearesix\n202Moderntimes,modernthemescharacteristicswhichdetermine‘thevalueofapleasureorpain’.Theseare(whathecalls)itsintensity,itsduration,itscertaintyoruncertainty,itspropinquityorremoteness,itsfecundity(i.e.‘thechanceithasofbeingfol-lowedbysensationsofthesamekind:thatis,pleasures,ifitbeapleasure:pains,ifitbeapain’),anditspurity(i.e.‘thechanceithasofnotbeingfollowedbysensationsoftheoppositekind’).IfBenthamisright,itfollowsthat,whenmakingadecision,youmustconsider–inturn–everyalter-nativefacingyou.Foreachalternative,youmustthenestimatethepleasuresandpainsyouarelikelytoexperienceasaresultoftakingitandassessthemagainstthecriteriaBenthamlists.Thealternativewiththehighestscore–thatis,withthegreatestbalanceofpleasuresoverpains–istheoneyoushouldtake.Legislatorsandotherswhoformulatepolicymustcarryoutthesamecalculationforeveryonelikelytobeaffectedbytheirdecisions.(Forallthis,seeBentham2000b:115ff.)TherearespectaculardrawbackstoBentham’saccountofhowtomakeadecision.Nottheleastoftheseistheimpossibilityofknowingexactlywhatyouaresupposedtodowhenyouattacha‘value’tosomefeatureofasensa-tion.Doyouranktheseonascaleoften,with‘pluses’forpleasuresand‘minuses’forpains?Ifso,howdoyouknowwhatnumberstoattachtowhat?Forexample,whendoesasensationscore,say,sevenforintensityandwhendoesitonlyscoresix?It’snotasifpleasuresandpainscomewithnumbersattached,likethepriceditemsinasupermarket.Theveryideaseemsbizarre(althoughitisprobablynomorebizarrethanmanyapresent-dayexercisein‘cost–benefitanalysis’,aprocedureofwhichBentham’scalculusisapre-cursor).Thenagain,itisjustnottruethatpleasureisalways,orevenusually,aquestionofhavingpleasurablesensations.Imagineaskingsomeonewho,quitecredibly,claimstoderivepleasurefromthestudyofphilosophyhowmanypleasurablesensationsheorshegetsoveraperiodofhalfanhourwhenreadingtheaveragephilosophybook.Imagineaskingthatpersonwhetherthesensationsinquestionare,say,tickly,throbbingorwarm.Youonlyhavetoimaginethepossibilitytoseehowridiculousthequestionis.Norisitsoobviousthatlivingahappylifeandlivingalifeofpleasurearenecessarilyidentical.(It’seasytoimaginesomeonelookingbackandsaying,‘IfonlyIhadn’tspentsomuchtimehavingfun’.Youmayrecallthatwehavealready,once,contrastedBentham’saccountofhappinesswithanalternative,Aristotle’s.Aristotleisnotopentothisparticularobjection.)5Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ButitisonethingtoderideBentham’smanifestlyinadequatetheoryofmotivation,andquiteanothertocomeupwithasatisfactoryaccountofone’sown.TakeMill’sdistinctionbetween‘higher’and‘lower’pleasures.ItisanimplicationofBentham’stheorythat,foranytwoactivities,providedthateachyieldsequalpleasure–andprovidedthatthereis,foreach,anequalbalanceofpleasureoverpain–thetwoareequivalentinvalue.AsMillparaphrasesthis,itwasBentham’sviewthat‘quantityofpleasurebeingequal,push-pinisasgoodaspoetry’(Mill1987:173–74,myemphasis).(Itisusuallythoughtthat,by‘push-pin’,Benthamwasreferringtoachild’sgame,\nJohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism203buthecouldhavebeenalludingtosomethingmoresaucy.)6Againstthis,itisMill’scontentionthat‘Itwouldbeabsurdthatwhile,inestimatingallotherthings,qualityisconsideredaswellasquantity,theestimationofpleasuresshouldbesupposedtodependonquantityalone’(Mill1991b:138–39).Alittlelater,headdsthat,although‘Itisindisputablethatthebeingwhosecapacitiesofenjoymentarelow,hasthegreatestchanceofhavingthemfullysatisfied’,whereas‘ahighlyendowedbeingwillalwaysfeelthatanyhappinesswhichhecanlookfor,astheworldisconstituted,isimperfect’,evenso,Itisbettertobeahumanbeingdissatisfiedthanapigsatisfied;bettertobeSocratesdissatisfiedthanafoolsatisfied.Andifthefool,orthepig,isofadif-ferentopinion,itisbecausetheyonlyknowtheirownsideofthequestion.Theotherpartytothecomparisonknowsbothsides.(Mill1991b:140)AsIhavealreadypointedout,MilltooktheviewthatBentham’sphilosophywasover-simple,andherewehaveanexampleofthatviewatwork.Evenso,asaresponsetoBentham,thisisinadequate,ifonlybecauseitisinaccuratetodescribeBenthamashavingsidelinedqualityofpleasureforthesakeofquantity.Farfromit.Bothwritersassesspleasureintermsofquality.Itisjustthateachmeasuresqualitybyadifferentstandard.ForBentham,thequalityofapleasureisdeterminedbysuchfactorsasitsintensityanddura-tion,whereas,forMill,the‘higher’pleasurestendtobethepleasuresofthehigh-mindedintellectual–philosophy,poetryandpublicservice.Thetroubleisthat,ratherasBenthamprovidesnosatisfactorycriterionforassessingthe‘value’ofapleasure,Millisn’tmuchhelpwhenitcomestodistinguishing‘higher’from‘lower’pleasures.AccordingtoMill,itispossi-bletoapplyasortofbehaviouraltesthere.Hethinksthatapersonwhoisequallycapableofappreciatingbothtypesofpleasurewillnormallyoptforthe‘higher’whengivenachoice.‘[Now]itisanunquestionablefact’,hewrites,‘thatthosewhoareequallyacquaintedwith,andequallycapableofappre-ciatingandenjoying,both,dogiveamostmarkedpreferencetothemannerofexistencewhichemploystheirhigherfaculties’(Mill1991b:139).Butthisisquestionable.Certainly,ifMillmeansthatapersoncapableofexperiencingbothtypesofpleasurewillinvariablychoosethehigher,thenhisclaimisDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012false.Forexample,whenIcastmyeyealongtherackofCDsinmylivingroom,myfingerisjustaslikelytoalightonGreatRockandRollHitsofthe’SeventiesasonarecordingofBeethoven’sworkorJohnAdams’s.Evenso,IamquitesurethatIamcapableofappreciatingandenjoyingthelatter.Itseemsreasonabletodescribemeaschoosingthe‘lower’pleasurehere,eventhoughIamcapableofappreciatingbothtypes,inwhichcaseMilliswrong.Butthen,perhapsthatisnotquitewhatMillmeans.Allhesaysisthatpeoplecapableofbothtypesofpleasure‘giveamostmarkedpreferencetothemannerofexistencewhichemploystheirhigherfaculties’,whichneed\n204Moderntimes,modernthemesonlydenoteatendency,andnotaninvariablerecurrence.Itcouldbethat,whenIlistentoCDs,Iamnormallyquitetired.Ioptfor‘lower’pleasuresontheseoccasions,eventhoughIamsomeonewhogenerallychoosesthe‘higher’.(That’swhyIboughttheBeethovenCDinthefirstplace.)Ifsomethingispossibleononeoccasion,whycan’titbepossiblethroughoutalife?IsuggestthatMillisconfusingtwosensesof‘preference’here.Oneisthesenseinwhichapreferencecanbetheresultofareasonedevaluation.(Forexample,acriticsays‘Ipreferthisoperatothatonebecausethescorehasgreatmelodicqualityandthenarrativestructureisstrong.’)TheotheristhemorestraightforwardsenseinwhichwhatIpreferiswhatIliketodo.Isuggestthat,foranyactivity,itisperfectlypossibletoholdonesortofpreferencebutnottheother.IfIamright,itisperfectlypossibleforsomeonetoappreciate,say,Wordsworth’spoetry(firstsenseof‘preference’)whilenotlikingitmuch(secondsense).GiventhechoicebetweenaneveningreadingWordsworthandaneveninginthebar,suchapersonwillalwayschoosethelatter.WouldMillthenhavetotakethisasevidencethatgettingdrunkisa‘higher’pleasurethanreadingWordsworth?Hecertainlywouldn’twantto.FoundationandsuperstructureWhatisgoingonhere?Ishan’tpursuetheforegoinglineofargumentanyfurtherbecauseIamlessinterestedindemonstratingtheinadequacyofMill’sdistinctionthanIaminsimplypointingoutthatitisquestionable.Inphil-osophy,itquiteoftenhappensthatthereallyinterestingquestionisnot‘Exactlywhatiswrongwithsuch-and-suchanargument?’but‘Whydidthephilosopherwhothoughtofitwanttocomeupwiththatargumentinthefirstplace?’Here,wehaveacaseinpoint.AsIseeit,therootcauseofMill’sdifficultyliesinhispoliticalphiloso-phy’sattempttoerectaliberalsuperstructureonautilitarianfoundation.Unfortunately,thefoundationistooflimsyandill-adaptedforthepurposeheintendsittoserve.Asaresult,tensionsandweaknesseshaveahabitofshowingupinthesuperstructureand,inthiscase,thereisatensionbetweenliberalism’sambitionsforthehumanindividualandutilitarianism’sportraitofthatsameindividualasarationallychoosingseekerofhappiness.Hereishowitarises.Aswehaveseen,liberalismplacesahighvalueonDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012individualfreedomconstruedaspersonalautonomy.ForMill,theidealpersonistheindependent,self-determiningchooser;thatis,thepersonwhoisinchargeofhisorherownlife,whoreallycanactas‘sovereign’overhisorher‘ownbodyandmind’(1991a:14).Butintherealworld–theworldasitis–peoplearenotalwayssoautonomous.Theyaresubjecttointerfering,paternalistic,legislation.Worse,theyaresubjectto‘thetyrannyofthemajority’.Thisisthe‘tyrannyoftheprevailingopinionandfeeling’.Itis‘thetendencyofsocietytoimpose,byothermeansthancivilpenalties,itsownideasandpracticesasrulesofconductonthosewhodissentfromthem’.It\nJohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism205seeksto‘fetterthedevelopmentand,ifpossible,preventtheformationofanyindividualitynotinharmonywithitsways,andcompelallcharacterstofashionthemselvesuponthemodelofitsown’(Mill1991a:9).Itwasatyr-annythatMillparticularlyfeared,anditisagainsttheconformitythatitimposesthathisautonomousindividualisjuxtaposedasanideal.Inshort,hispoliticalliberalismidealisespeopleastheycouldbe.Itdoesnottakepeopleastheyare.Bycontrast,theutilitarianaccountofmotivationsetsthingsupinawaywhichtendstotakepeopleastheyareandnotastheycould(orshould)be.Itpullsinthereversedirection.Thishappensbecausetheprincipleofutilityis,inessence,adeviceforreconcilingthediverseandconflictingwantsofmanyindividuals,whateverthosewantshappentobe.(Thatmaynotbeutili-tarianism’swholepoint,butitiscertainlyoneofitsmainpoints;and–asIsuggestedinthepreviouschapter–itexplainswhyutilitarianismcanholdaspecialattractionforpolicymakersworkinginpluralsocieties.)Consistentlywiththis,Bentham’sattitudetothedesiresandwants,the‘pleasures’,ofothersiscompletelynon-judgemental–hencetheequationof‘pushpin’with‘poetry’.Theonlydistinctionshewillallowaredistinctions,betweenpleasures,ofintensity,duration,purity,andsoon.Benthamneversays‘Youmaywantx,butitwouldbebetterifyouwantedy’.Butthen,Benthamwasnoliberal.AsocietyrunonBenthamitelinescouldbeasocietyofhappyslaves;thatis,asocietyinwhichthemassofthepopulationiskeptdocile,andreconciledtoitsplacewithtechniquesforkeepingpeoplehappy,with‘breadandcircuses’,astheRomansputit.(Whyuseforcewhenatabloidpress–orawatersupplylacedwithtruckloadsofProzac–willdoyourworkforyou?)Insuchasociety,peoplewouldquiteevidentlynotbethefree,autono-mous,individualsofMill’sliberalideal,and,bycontrastwithBentham,Milldoeswanttosay‘Youmaywantx,butitwouldbebetterifyouwantedy’.Asaresult,thereisatensionbetweenhisliberalism,whichidealisespeopleastheycouldberatherthantakingthemastheyare,andhisutilitarianism,whichtakespeopleastheyareratherthanastheycouldbe.Infact,utilitar-ianismhastotakepeopleastheyare,because–bydefinition–aworldinwhichpeoplewereforcedtodothingstheydidnot,infact,wanttodocouldnot,atthesametime,beaworldinwhichtheprincipleofutilitywasusedtoreconcileconflictingwantsinordertoproducethegreatesthappiness.CanDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012thesevariouspositionsbereconciled?ForallIknow,theycanbe.Forthemoment,though,Iamsimplypointingoutthat,ifyouwanttobealiberalandautilitarian,youcanmakelifedifficultforyourself,andthattheweak-nessesinherentinMill’sattempttodistinguishlevelsofpleasureisasymp-tomofthedifficulty.Nothingmore.(Ofcourse,itwouldhelpMillagreatdealifitweretrue,asheclaims,thatpeoplecapableofexperiencingbothinevitably,ornormally,optforhigherpleasures.Ifitwere,theworldofpeopleastheyshouldbewould,atthesametime,betheworldofpeopleastheyare.UnfortunatelyforMill,itisn’ttrue.)\n206Moderntimes,modernthemesAlookbackandaglanceforwardAlookbackBeforeconsideringfurthersymptomsofthesamedifficulty,letuspauseforamomentandtakestock.WehavenowmovedallthewayfromthefourthcenturyBCtothemiddleyearsofthenineteenthcenturyADand,asIwrite,onlyjustover150yearshavepassedsinceOnLiberty’spublicationin1859.Itoughttobepossibletolookbackalongtheroadwehavetravelled,anddetectafewrecurringpatterns.Oneisespeciallyworthmentioningatthispoint,andthatistherecurrenceoftwocontrastingconceptionsoftherelationbetweenstateandindividual.Accordingtooneconception,therelationshipis,sotospeak,instrumental.Individualsareportrayedascomingtothestatemoreorless‘fullyformed’.Ifthestate,orthepoliticalenvironmentmoregenerally,hasplayedanyroleintheformationoftheirwants,needs,beliefsortalents,thefactisofnospecialsignificance.Itissimplyadeviceforhelpingthemsatisfyneedsandwantsmoreeffectively.WefirstencounteredthisconceptioninPlato’sargumentthatwithinastate,orcommunity,everyoneshouldspecialiseinexercisingthespecialtalentsheorshehappenstohave.Platoarguesthat,withinthestate,thereisdivisionoflabour,withtheresultthateveryonebenefits.Later,weencountereditagainintheargumentofHobbes’sLeviathan(Hobbes1981).ForHobbes,instinctivelycompetitiveindividualsrequireastrongstate,withastrongsovereign,tokeepthemincheck.Inaword,thestate’spurposeissecurity.YetanotherversionofthisconceptionisBentham’s,thatthelawandthestateexisttoreconcileconflictsof‘interest’betweenindividualsinawaywhichsatisfiesthegreatesthappinessprinciple.Accordingtotheotherconception,therelationshipisportrayedinmoreorganicterms.Emphasisisplacedonthewayindividuals’characteristics–wants,needs,values–canthemselvesresultfromparticulartypesofsocialandpoliticalarrangement.Youcouldsaythat,onthistypeofaccount,thestateisrepresentedasthesoilfromwhichtheindividualgrows.Forthedesignerofpoliticalinstitutions,theproblemis,thus,todeviseanenviron-mentwithinwhichtheindividualcandeveloptohisorherfullpotential.WeencounteredoneversionofthistypeofaccountintheworkofAristotle,accordingtowhomthefullandappropriateexerciseofvirtue(orarete-)requiresthe(rightsortof)polis.WeencounteredanotherinRousseau’sideaDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012thathumansare‘perfectible’creatures,whocanonlydeveloptotheirfullpotentialintruecommunitiesgovernedinaccordancewiththegeneralwill.(Recallhiscontrastbetweenthelatterandthelifeofthe‘savage’whosesimpleneedsmatchasimplelifestyle;andbetweenitandtheostentationanddeceitcharacteristicofthe‘despotism’hesawallaroundhim.)TowhichconceptiondidMillsubscribe?Theanswerisboth.TheformerispresupposedbytheprincipleheexplicitlysetsouttodefendinOnLiberty,theprinciplethat‘theonlypurposeforwhichpowercanberightfully\nJohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism207exercisedoveranymemberofacivilisedcommunity,againsthiswill,istopreventharmtoothers’(1991a:14).Later,whendiscussing‘thelimitstotheauthorityofsocietyovertheindividual’,heexpandsupontheprincipleasfollows:Assoonasanypartofaperson’sconductaffectsprejudiciallytheinterestsofothers,societyhasjurisdictionoverit,andthequestionwhetherthegeneralwelfarewillorwillnotbepromotedbyinterferingwithit,becomesopentodiscussion.Butthereisnoroomforentertaininganysuchquestionwhenaperson’sconductaffectstheinterestsofnopersonsbesideshimself,orneedsnotaffectthemunlesstheylike(allthepersonsbeingoffullageandtheordinaryamountofunderstanding).Inallsuchcasesthereshouldbeperfectfreedom,legalandsocial,todotheactionandstandtheconsequences.(Mill1991a:83–84)Millinsiststhateachindividualisbyfarthebestjudgeofhisorherowninterests.‘[But]neitheroneperson,noranynumberofpersons’,hewrites,‘iswarrantedinsayingtoanotherhumancreatureofripeyears,thatheshallnotdowithhislifewhathechoosestodowithit.’Thisisbecause‘heisthepersonmostinterestedinhisownwell-being’,sothat‘withrespecttohisownfeelingsandcircumstances,themostordinarymanorwomanhasmeansofknowledgeimmeasurablysurpassingthosethatcanbepossessedbyanyoneelse’(Mill1991a:84–85).Withthispremise,yougetapictureofthesocialworldascomposed,fundamentally,ofdiscreteindividuals,eachpursuinghisorherchosentrajectory,withthelegitimatestateactingastrafficcop.Inotherwords,ifeachindividualisthebestjudgeofhisorherowninterest,itfollowsthatthestate’sonlyjobshouldbetopreventharm-producingcolli-sions.Itisapicturewhichinevitablyholdsastrongappealforanyonewhohatestobebulliedorpatronised,andwho,inthatsense,valuesindividualfreedomhighly.Butthen,Millalsobelievesthatthestatecanactmorepositively,bycreatingtheconditionswithinwhichhumanscandevelopandfulfiltheirpotential.Itiswithsentencessuchasthefollowingthathegivesexpressiontooneofhismostdeeplyheldconvictions:Humannatureisnotamachinetobebuiltafteramodel,andsettodoexactlyDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012theworkprescribedforit,butatree,whichrequirestogrowanddevelopitselfonallsides,accordingtothetendencyoftheinwardforceswhichmakeitalivingthing.(Mill1991a:66)Here,MillisinvokingthesecondofthetwoconceptionsIdistinguishedabove.ThechapterofOnLibertyinwhichthesentenceoccursisentitled‘OfIndividuality,asOneoftheElementsofWell-Being’.Init,Millarguesthatitisonlywherepeopleareleftfreefrominterferencetopursuetheirchosen\n208Moderntimes,modernthemesendsthatthereisanychanceoftheirrealisingtheirpotential.Butisthistrue?Whysupposethatpeopleleftfreefrominterferencetopursuetheendstheyinfacthave(firstconception)aremorelikelytoflourishintotheindi-vidualstheycouldideallybecome(secondconception)?ItwouldcertainlyhelpMillifthiswerethecase,butwhynotsupposethatallyouwillreallygetisasocietybasedon‘breadandcircuses’?Weshallreturntothequestion.Beforethat,letusconsideronemoreexampleofatextinwhichbothidealshaveaparttoplay.AglanceforwardMillopensTheSubjectionofWomen(1991d)withthefollowingparagraph:Theobjectofthisessayistoexplain,asclearlyasIamable,thegroundsofanopinionwhichIhaveheldfromtheveryearliestperiodwhenIhadformedanyopinionsatallonsocialorpoliticalmatters,andwhich,insteadofbeingweakenedormodified,hasbeenconstantlygrowingstrongerbytheprogressofreflectionandtheexperienceoflife:Thattheprinciplewhichregulatestheexistingsocialrelationbetweenthetwosexes–thelegalsubordinationofonesex–iswronginitself,andnowoneofthechiefhindrancestohumanimprovement:andthatitoughttobereplacedbyaprincipleofperfectequality,admittingnopowerorprivilegeontheoneside,nordisabilityontheother.(Mill1991d:471)Itisbeyonddoubtthat,evenasrecentlyasthemid-nineteenthcentury,thesituationofwomen,relativetothatofmen,wasverypoor.(TheSubjectionofWomenwaspublishedin1869.)Millwasespeciallyangeredbythefactthat,onmarriage,awoman’spropertybecameherhusband’s.Thatwasthelaw.Hewasequallyangeredbythefactthatwomenweredeniedthevote,whichrenderedthemunabletousethepoliticalsystemtochangetheirsituation.AsMillsawit,suchfactorscombinedtorobwomen–especiallymarriedwomen–oftheirindependence.Thesystemmadeslavesofthem.Worsethanthat,ittormentedtheslavesbyforcingthemtoliveincloseproximitytotheirmasters.Everyoneofthesubjectslivesundertheveryeye,andalmost,itmaybesaid,inDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012thehands,ofoneofthemasters–incloserintimacywithhimthanwithanyofherfellowsubjects;withnomeansofcombiningagainsthim,nopowerofevenlocallyovermasteringhim,andontheotherhand,withthestrongestmotivesforseekinghisfavourandavoidingtogivehimoffence.Instrugglesforpoli-ticalemancipation,everybodyknowshowoftenitschampionsareboughtoffbybribes,ordauntedbyterrors.Inthecaseofwomen,eachindividualofthesubjectclassisinachronicstateofbriberyandintimidationcombined.Inset-tingupthestandardofresistance,alargenumberoftheleaders,andstillmoreofthefollowers,mustmakeanalmostcompletesacrificeofthepleasuresorthe\nJohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism209alleviationsoftheirownindividuallot.Ifeveranysystemofprivilegeandenforcedsubjectionhaditsyoketightlyrivetedonthenecksofthosewhoarekeptdownbyit,thishas.(Mill1991d:482)Asthispassagedemonstrates,Mill’sinvectivecouldbequiteaspowerful,andquiteasmilitant,asyouwillfindinmanyasubsequentfeministtext.Fromourpointofview,however,thepointtonoteistheformMill’sargumentstake.Veryroughly,thesefallintothreecategories.First,thereareargumentsfromjustice.Itisgenerallyrecognisedthat,betweenequals,thereshouldbeequalityoftreatmentandopportunity,andsincethereisnoreasonforthinkingthat,inmatterswhichconcernlegisla-tion,womenarenotrelevantlyequal,theirsubordinationisunjust.‘Innoinstanceexceptthis’,saysMill,‘whichcomprehendshalfthehumanrace,arethehighersocialfunctionsclosedagainstanyonebyafatalityofbirth.’Inthisway,‘Thesocialsubordinationofwomenthusstandsoutasanisolatedfactinmoderninstitutions;asolitarybreachofwhathasbecometheirfundamentallaw’(Mill1991d:491).Second,thereareutilitarianargumentsthatthehappinessofwomenastheyarewillbeincreasedoncetheirlegalsubordinationisremoved.Inthecaseoftheunhappilymarriedwomenforwhomtheyokeofsubjectionis‘tightlyrivetedonthenecksofthosewhoarekeptdownbyit[thesystem]’(Mill1991d:482),thispracticallygoeswithoutsaying.Inadditionthereistheconsiderationthatpersonalindependenceisitself‘anelementofhappi-ness’(Mill1991d:576)and–forexample–theconsiderationthatdoorswillbeopenedtothosewomencapableofparticipatinginpublicoffice.Afterall,saysMill,‘Thereisnothing,afterdisease,indigence,andguilt,sofataltothepleasurableenjoymentoflifeasthewantofaworthyoutletfortheactivefaculties’(Mill1991d:578).(Argumentsofthistypearereinforcedbythesimilarlyutilitarianargumentthateveryonewouldbebetteroff‘ifwomenwerefree’(Mill1991d:557ff.).)Third,thereistheargumentthatitisonlywhenlegalbarriersareliftedthatwomenwilldeveloptotheirfullpotential.Inapassagewhichechoeshisclaim,inOnLiberty,thathumannatureis‘atree,whichrequirestogrowanddevelopitselfonallsides,accordingtothetendencyoftheinwardforceswhichmakeitalivingthing’(1991a:66)Millwrites:Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Whatisnowcalledthenatureofwomenisaneminentlyartificialthing–theresultofforcedrepressioninsomedirections,unnaturalstimulationinothers.Itmaybeassertedwithoutscruple,thatnootherclassofdependantshavehadtheircharactersoentirelydistortedfromitsnaturalproportionsbytheirrelationwiththeirmasters;for,ifconqueredandslaveraceshavebeen,insomerespects,moreforciblyrepressed,whateverinthemhasnotbeencrusheddownbyanironheelhasgenerallybeenletalone,andifleftwithanylibertyofdevelop-ment,ithasdevelopeditselfaccordingtoitsownlaws;butinthecaseof\n210Moderntimes,modernthemeswomen,ahothouseandstovecultivationhasalwaysbeencarriedonofsomeofthecapabilitiesoftheirnature,forthebenefitandpleasureoftheirmasters.(Mill1991d:495)Lookingon,men‘indolentlybelievethatthetreegrowsofitselfinthewaytheyhavemadeitgrow’(Mill1991d:496)buttheyaremistaken.WiththispassageMillraisesaspectrewhichhascontinuedtohauntmodernfeministtheory,thedowntrodden‘Stepfordwife’7whohasbecomesoinwardly‘socialised’tohersubordinaterolethatsheisperfectlyhappywithit.Inshort,thisisthespecificallyfeministvariantofthe‘happyslave’problem.AsMillputsithimself,mostmen‘desiretohave,inthewomanmostnearlyconnectedwiththem,notaforcedslavebutawillingone;notaslavemerely,butafavourite.Theyhavethereforeputeverythinginpracticetoenslavetheirminds’(Mill1991d:486).WhatoftherelationshipbetweenthethreetypesofargumentIhavedis-tinguished?Well,tostartwith,therelationshipbetweenthefirst–theargumentfromjustice–andtheothertwocouldbeproblematic,butthatissomethingweshallconsiderlater.Forthemoment,itistherelationshipbetweenthesecondandthirdtypesofargumentwhichismosttothepoint.Thisisbecauseargumentsofthesecondtypetakewomen(andsometimespeoplemoregenerally)astheyare,whereasargumentsofthethirdtypeinvokeanidealofwomenastheycouldbe–soapatternwehavenotedinotherpartsofMill’sworkrecursheretoo.IsthereatensionbetweenthesetwoformsofargumentwhichisstrongenoughtothreatenMill’spro-feministcase?Iwouldsaynot,atleast,notinthesensethatthetwoformsofargumentarelogicallyinconsistentwitheachother.Thereisnocontradictioninmaintainingthat,ifwomen’sequalitywereachieved,thosecapableofdevelopingmorefullywoulddoso,whereasthelesscapablewouldremainastheyare.Nevertheless,perhapsthereissomethingwhichhangsonthequestionofhowlikelyitisthathappilysocialisedwomenwouldremaincontentwiththeirsubordinaterole.Millconsidersthepossibilitythat‘theruleofmenoverwomendiffersfromalltheseothersinnotbeingaruleofforce:itisacceptedvoluntarily;womenmakenocomplaint,andareconsentingpartiestoit’(1991d:484).However,hefindsthathecan’ttakeitseriously.Butwhatifheiswrong?AsevidenceforhisscepticismMillpointsoutthat‘agreatnumberofwomendonotDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012acceptit’,andthat‘anincreasingnumberofthemhaverecordedprotestsagainsttheirpresentsocialcondition:andrecentlymanythousandsofthem,headedbythemosteminentwomenknowntothepublic,havepetitionedParliamentfortheiradmissiontotheParliamentarySuffrage’(Mill1991d:484).8Hethengoesontodescribetheriseofawomen’smovementwhichwas,ashesawit,takingplaceacrosstheworld.Buttothisitis–Isup-pose–possibletoobjectthateven‘manythousands’ofwomenisnotaverylargeproportionofallthewomenthereareandthat,inanycase,the‘mosteminentwomenknowntothepublic’arethestrong,literary,radically\nJohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism211politicisedwomenofthesortMilladmired,and–assuch–unrepresentativeofwomentakenasawhole.Ishan’tcontinuewiththislineofthoughtbecauseIonlywanttosuggestthatitwouldmakeadifferencetoMill’sargumentifitweretruethatmostwomenwouldremaincontentedlyreconciledtotheirrole,whatevertheirlegalstatus.So,TheSubjectionofWomenisanotherexampleofaworkbyMillinwhichhearguesthatpeopleleftfreefrominterferencetopursueendstheyinfacthavearemostlikelytoflourishintotheindividualstheycouldideallybecome;butinwhichhecanonlyberightifafurther,factual,claimistrue.Inthiscase,itistheclaimthat,inreality,veryfewwomenarehappytoassumeasubordinaterole.(Inotherwords,theworldinwhichwomenhavebeenreleasedfromtheirchainsmightnot–quite–turnouttobetheworldMillwouldliketosee.)Althoughitwaswrittenbyaman,TheSubjectionofWomenisoneoffem-inism’searlytexts.However,itwasnotthefirst.AsMillhimselfsays,‘Itisscarcelythreegenerationssincewomen,savingveryrareexceptions,havebeguntotrytheircapacityinphilosophy,science,orart’(1991d:545).WehavealreadydiscussedMaryWollstonecraft.HerAVindicationoftheRightsofWoman(Wollstonecraft1995b)waspublishedin1792,notquite80yearsbeforeMill’swork,sohisestimateseemstobeaboutright.Also,manywomenreaders–perhapsallwomenreaders–willbereflecting,wryly,thatmynarrativehadtocomequitealongwaybeforeawomanphilosopher,letaloneafeministtext,appearedonthescene.Tothis,Icanonlyrespondwiththecommentthatithas,indeed,beenalongtime,butthattimewilltell.AsMillsays,‘ItcannotbeinferredtobeimpossiblethatawomanshouldbeaHomer,oranAristotle,oraMichaelAngelo,oraBeethoven,becausenowomanhasyetactuallyproducedworkscomparabletotheirsinanyofthoselinesofexcellence’(1991d:528).Ifhewerealivenow,Iliketothinkthathewouldconsiderhisoptimismtohavebeenjustified.9Utilitarianism:thegreatesthappinessprinciple‘Utilityversusrights’AsIstatedearlier,therearetwofundamentalcomponentstoclassicalutili-tarianism.OneisthetheoryofhumannatureaccordingtowhichweareallDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012motivatedbythedesireforhappiness(andthecorrespondingdesiretoavoidunhappiness).Wehavenowdiscussedthisatsomelength,soletusnowturntotheother.Thisistheprincipleofutility,or‘greatesthappiness’principleitself.Infact,theprinciplethat‘thegreatestgoodisthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber’isfraughtwithdifficulties.Here,though,Ishallcon-centrateonjustone.Itisadifficultywhicharisesfromthefactthattheprincipleisconsequentialist,inotherwordsthatitenjoinsyoutoconsiderthelikelyconsequencesofthevariouspossibilitiesfacingyouwhendeciding\n212Moderntimes,modernthemeswhatyoushoulddo.Thisitclearlydoes.Initssimplestform,utilitarianismappliesthegreatesthappinessprincipleatthelevelofeverysingleactyouperform.Itstatesthat,eachtimeyouact,youmustassessthelikelycon-sequencesofeachalternativefacingyou,andchoosetheonewhich(inyourview)isthemostlikelytoincreasehappiness–or,atleast,nottocreateunhappiness.Moreover,thisverysimple‘act’utilitarianismstatesthatthereisnootherfactortoconsider.(Forthemostpart,itwillbesufficienttoconcentrateonsimple‘act’utilitarianismhere,althoughIshallmentionamorecomplexvariantlater.)Whenappliedatthepoliticallevel,theprinci-plestatesthat,outofarangeofpolicies,anadministratormustalwaysselectthealternativewhich,onthebestevidenceavailable,isthemostlikelytoincreasethegeneralhappiness.Accordingtotheobjectioninquestion,utilitarianismfailsbecause–restingasitdoesonaconsequentialistprinci-ple–itcannotaccountforsomeverybasicfeaturesofmorality.Thelatterarenon-consequentialistincharacter.Fromthepointofviewofpoliticalphil-osophy,thisisespeciallyserious–orsotheobjectionruns–asitmeansthatutilitarianismcannotaccountfortheexistenceofnaturalor(ifyouprefertheexpression)humanrights.Inamoment,Ishalloutlinetheobjectioninmoredetail,butletmefirstexplainwhyIwanttoconcentrateonthatobjectioninparticular.Itissimplythatagreatdealofrecentworkinpoliticalphilosophytakestheobjectionasitsstartingpoint.Iamthinkingespeciallyofworkwhichhasbeenproducedsince1971,whenJohnRawls’sATheoryofJusticewaspublished(Rawls1971).Openanyacademicjournalofphilosophypublishedsincethenandyouarealmostcertaintofindatleastonearticleonthesubjectof‘utilityversusrights’,inwhichtheauthoreithertriestodefendsomeversionofutilitarianismagainsttheobjectionorelsetriestopressithome.Indeed,RawlshimselfformulateshisowntheoryasaresponsetothedifficultyIamabouttooutline.Inshort,then,unlessyouunderstandwhyitisthatutili-tarianismissupposedlyunabletoaccountfortheexistenceofrights,youwillfinditimpossibletofollowagreatdealofcontemporaryargument.Sohowdoestheobjectionrun?Thebestwaytointroduceitiswithanexample.Suppose,then,thatyouandIarecolleagues.Weworktogether.OneFriday,Ifindmyselfshortofcash.Iamunabletogettothebankbeforeitshuts,soIaskyoutolendmeasumofmoney–say,20pounds.Youagree,butonlyonconditionthatIpromisetorepayyouinoneweek’sDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012time.Iaccept,and–placingmyhandonmyheart–Isay,‘Ipromisetopayyouback20poundsthistimenextweek’.Youthenhandmea20poundnote.Sofarsogood,butnowconsiderwhathappensnext.AsIamathomethateveningIdecidetore-readBentham’sPrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation(Bentham2000b).Thistime,Ifinditsargumentpowerfulandutterlyper-suasive,somuchsothatIbecomeaconverttoBenthamite(‘act’)utilitar-ianism.Inotherwords,Iresolvethat,infuture,wheneverIamfacedwithachoice,Iwilltakethealternativewhich,sofarasIcansee,willmostincrease\nJohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism213thesumofhappiness.Nothingelsewillcount.Fromthatmomenton,quiteanumberofpracticaldifficultiesthreatentobesetme.(Forexample,whatifIhavetochoosebetween,ontheonehand,makingoneortwopeopleveryhappyindeedand,ontheother,makingalargenumberofpeoplejustalittlebitmorehappy?Whatdoestheprincipleofutilitytellmetodo?Itlooksasthoughtheinjunctiontoincreasethegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumbercouldturnouttobeambiguous.Oragain,whatofverylong-termconsequences?AnythingIdocouldhave‘knock-on’effectswhichcontinuewellintothefuture–for20or30yearsor,maybe,evenlonger–andthereisnowayinwhichIcanforeseethese,ortakethemintoaccount.Thesearestandarddifficultieswithutilitarianism.Still,Iputthesetoonesideandconcentrateonjusttheoneinhand.)Evenso,thingsgorelativelysmoothlyuntilFridaycomesaroundandIamonmywaytowork,onfoot,withacrispnew20poundnoteinmypocket,readytogiveyou.IhavealmostreachedourworkplacewhenIamapproachedbyadesperateandneedy-lookingdown-and-out.Hetellsmealongandheart-rendingstoryfromwhichIgleanthatheisinurgentneedofcash;infact,thatheisinneedofprecisely20pounds.(Thereisaplacehehastogetto,andthatisthecostofthefare.)Ithenassessthealternativesfacingme.Ontheonehand,Icanseethatthedown-and-outisinabadway,andthathecouldreallyusethemoney.Ontheother,Iknowthatyouareamiserlycharacter.Allyouwilldowiththenoteisaddittothestockof20poundnotesyoualreadyhave,andwhichyoukeepinajaronyourshelf.(Foryou,theincreasein‘marginalutility’createdbytheextra20poundnotewouldbesmall.)WhatshouldIdo?Thereisreallynoproblem.AsanactutilitarianallIcanreasonablydoisgivethenotetothetramp–soIgiveittohim.Now,aswellascreatingextrahappinessforthedown-and-out,Iexperiencealittleglowofmyown.Thiscomesfrommyknowledgeofhavingdoneagooddeed,anditlastsrightuptothemomentatwhichImeetyou.Whathappensnextisthis:yousay,‘PleasecouldIhavethat20poundsback’,towhichIrespondbytellingyouthewholestoryofhow,lastweek,IbecameaconverttoBenthamiteutilitarianism,ofhowIwasapproachedbyadown-and-out,andalltherestofit.Howdoyourespond?Well,ofcourse,whatcouldhappenisthatyoutellmethestoryofhowyoualsore-readBentham’sbooklastweekandofhow–Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012similarly–youhavealsobecomeconvertedtoactutilitarianism.Youagreewithmethat,asautilitarian,myonlyoptionwastogivethemoneytothedown-and-out.Wesmile,shakehands,andremainfriends.However,asIthinkyouwillagree,thatisnotthemostlikelyeventuality.Itisfarmorelikelythatyouwouldobjectandexclaim,e.g.,‘Butyoupromised!!’Moreover,Ithinkmostreaderswillagreethatyouwouldbequiteentitledtodoso.Thestorymaybeusedtoillustrateanumberofpoints.Thefirstisthat,whenyoumakeapromisetosomeone,youcreateanexpectationontheother\n214Moderntimes,modernthemesperson’spart.Morethanthat,youcreateanentitlement.Thus,inthestory,asaresultofmyhavingsaid,‘Ipromise…‘youhaveamoralclaimonmybehaviour,inthiscasetheclaimthatIshouldrepayyouontheappointedday.Second,asaresultofthepromise,youhaveaclaimthatIshouldactinsuch-and-suchaway,evenifIcouldmakeagreatercontributiontothegeneralgoodbybreakingthepromise.(Howcoulditbeaclaim,unlessthiswereso?)InthestoryasItoldit,itisquiteobviousthatIwouldcreatemorehappinessbybreakingthepromiseandgivingthemoneytothedown-and-out.Evenso,thankstothepromise,youareentitledtorepayment.Third,thestoryillustratesthatutilitarianism,thankstoitsconsequentialiststruc-ture,iscompletelyunabletoaccountforsuchfacts.Ofcourse,therearelimitstotheforcecarriedbyeveryclaim.Ifthedown-and-outhadbeenonthepointofstarvation–orifIhadtoldastoryinwhich,bybreakingapromise,Iwouldpreventnuclearwar–everyonewouldagreethatthepro-miseshouldbebroken.Butthoseareextremecases.Notice,though,thatitfollowsfromactutilitarianismthatapromiseshouldbebroken,evenwhenthereareveryslightdifferencesbetweentheamountsofhappinesswhichcanbecreatedbydifferentactions.Forexample,supposethatbygivingthemoneytothedown-and-outIcouldcreatejustslightlymorehappinessthanIcouldifIrepaidyou.Ifactutilitarianismwerecorrect,itwouldstillfollowthatIshouldbreakthepromise,whichisnotaconclusionwhichaccordswiththewaypromisesarenormallythoughttobindtheirmakersinnormal,less-than-extreme,cases.Theclaimthatapromiseehasonthebehaviourofapromiserisaclaimofright;youhavearightthatIshouldpayyouthemoneyback.Itfollows,inlinewiththeobjection,thatutilitarianismcannotaccountfortheexistenceofatleastoneright,namelytherightyouhavethatpromisesmadetoyouarekept.Itis–Isuppose–possibleforautilitariantorespondtothisbyinsistingthattheprincipleofutilityisindeedtheonlyrationalbasisforamoralsystem,andthatallthestoryshowsisthatthepracticeofpromisingshouldbeabandonedasirrational.Well,maybeso,butjustimaginehowmuchwewouldhavetogiveupifweweretoabandonpromising.Ifactutilitarianismweregenerallyembraced,noonewouldevermakeapromisetoanyoneelse(becausenobodycouldbetrustedtokeepapromise).Promising,asapractice,wouldloseitspoint.Wewouldhavetojettisonalargeandsignificantfeatureofmoralityasweunderstandit.GiventhechoicebetweenDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012abandoningthepracticeandabandoningutilitarianism,mostofuswould–Ithink–agreetoabandonthelatter.10Theforegoingconclusionscanbegeneralisedtocoverotherrights.Toseehow,youonlyneedtothinkupparallelstoriesinwhich,forgoodutilitarianreasons,morallyreprehensiblethingsaredone.Forexample,supposethat,(i)inordertodetercrimeanexampleismadeofsomeinnocentpeople.Theyarepunishedhorriblyandwithgreatpublicity.Ifthatiswrong,itisbecausetheinnocenthavearightnottobe‘punished’or,rather,victimised.Orsupposethat,(ii)theaveragestandardoflivingisgreatlyenhanced(initselfa\nJohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism215goodthing)bytheeffortsofslaves,whoareforcedtoworkveryhardfornothing.(Butthereisarighttoliberty.)Orsupposethat,(iii)insearchforacureforcancer(good)lethalexperimentsareperformedonhumans,withouttheirconsent(butthereisarighttolife),andsoon.Suchexamplesmaybeusedtoillustratethatutilitarianismcannotaccountforrights–justastheobjectionstates.Morethanthat,somecriticswouldsaythattheobjectionpositivelydemonstratestheexistenceofhumanrights.Philosopherswhoadvancethistypeofobjectionsometimesdescribethemselvesas‘Kantians’,afterImmanuelKant,whoheldthatitisadefiningfeatureofmoralitythat,withinit,individualsaretreatedas‘endsinthemselves’andneveronlyasmeanstotheendsofothers(seeKant1948).Onthisview,thetroublewithutilitarianismisthatitsanctionsthe‘use’ofonepersonbyanotherforthelatter’spurposes.11Howmightautilitarianrespondtothiscriticism?Iwillonlymentiononepossibleresponsehere,mainlybecauseitappearstobetheresponseMillhimselfwouldhavemade.Accordingtothis,theobjectiononlyappliestoaverysimple–evennaive–versionofutilitarianism.Againstthis,itisarguedthatitismoreplausibleandrealistictothinkoftheprincipleofutilityasapplyingnotatthelevelofindividualactsbutatthelevelofmoralrules,rulessuchas‘keeppromises’and‘don’ttelllies’.Onthis‘ruleutilitarian’view,IoughttokeepmypromisebecausethereisamoralrulestatingthatIshould,andtheruleexistsbecauseitsexistencecontributestothegreatesthappiness.ThisiswhatMillsays:Itisastrangenotionthattheacknowledgementofafirstprincipleisincon-sistentwiththeadmissionofsecondaryones.Toinformatravellerrespectingtheplaceofhisultimatedestination,isnottoforbidtheuseoflandmarksanddirection-postsontheway.Thepropositionthathappinessistheendandaimofmorality,doesnotmeanthatnoroadoughttobelaiddowntothatgoal,orthatpersonsgoingthithershouldnotbeadvisedtotakeonedirectionratherthananother.Menreallyoughttoleaveofftalkingakindofnonsenseonthissubject,whichtheywouldneithertalknorlistentoonothermattersofpracticalconcernment.Nobodyarguesthattheartofnavigationisnotfoundedonastronomy,becausesailorscannotwaittocalculatetheNauticalAlmanack.Beingrationalcreatures,theygotoseawithitreadycalculated;andallrationalcreaturesgooutupontheseaoflifewiththeirmindsmadeuponthecommonDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012questionsofrightandwrong,aswellasonmanyofthefarmoredifficultquestionsofwiseandfoolish.(1991b:156–57)Howconvincingisthis?ThatisnotaquestionIshallpursueherebecausetocontinuewithitanyfurtherwouldbetodeviatetoofarfromthischapter’smaintheme.Inanycase,astheargumentbetweenactandruleutilitarianscontinues,sotheamountofrelevantliteraturegrows.Itisthereforinterestedreaderstoconsult.\n216Moderntimes,modernthemesTwoillustrations:democracyandfreespeechDemocracyThischapter’smainthemeisMill’sutilitarianismandtheliberalismheattemptstofounduponit.Theobjectiontoutilitarianismthatwehavejustbeenconsideringsuggeststhattheformercouldhaveoddconsequencesforthelatterand,moreover,thattherehastobeaserioustensionbetweenthetwo.Thereasonisthat,whereasutilitarianism(apparently)cannotaccountforrights,liberalism,inthesenseof‘liberalism’atissue,ispartlydefinedbytheclaimthewedohavecertainfundamentalrights–or,ifnot,atleastthat‘thereisasphereofactioninwhichsociety,asdistinguishedfromtheindi-vidual,has,ifany,onlyanindirectinterest’(Mill:1991a:16).YouwouldexpectanomaliesandtensionstoshowupinMill’sarguments,andsotheydo,quitefrequently.Ishallgivejusttwoexampleshere.Thefirstisapro-posalhemakesinRepresentativeGovernment,namelythatsomepeopleshouldhavemorevotesthanothers(Mill:1991c:336ff.).Theotheristhefamousdefenceof‘thelibertyofthoughtanddiscussion’whichyoucanfindinthesecondchapterofOnLiberty(Mill1991a:20ff.).Totaketheformer,then,inRepresentativeGovernmentMilldefendsapoli-ticalsystemwhichis,prettymuch,thesystemnowinplaceinthe‘liberaldemocracies’ofEuropeandNorthAmericaandincertainothernationstoo.Unsurprisingly,thesystemMilldescribesmostresemblestheBritishsystemofhis,andourown,time.Millportraysitasthesystembestfittedforapluralsociety,thatisasocietycomposedofnumerousanddiverseinterestgroups.Eachgeographicalconstituencyelectsrepresentativeswhoserve,foraperiod,inageneralassembly.Theassembly’sjobistomakelawsandtokeepacheckonthepowerofapermanentexecutive(orcivilservice).Iwouldsaythat,inourowntime,thisversionofdemocracyhasbecomethe‘receivedview’.Mill’sargumentsorargumentsverylikethemare,ifyoulike,theargumentsfordemocracywithwhichmostushavebeenbroughtup.(Foracontrast,thinkofRousseau,whoseargumentsfordemocracywerediscussedinchapter9.)Andyet,therearestrangeanomalies,oneofwhichisMill’sproposalforasystemofpluralvoting.‘[But]thougheveryoneoughttohaveavoice’,hewrites,‘thateveryoneshouldhaveanequalvoiceisatotallydifferentproposition’(1991c:334).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012If,withequalvirtue,one[person]issuperiortotheotherinknowledgeandintelligence–orif,withequalintelligence,oneexcelstheotherinvirtue–theopinion,thejudgement,ofthehighermoralorintellectualisworthmorethanthatoftheinferior:andiftheinstitutionsofthecountryvirtuallyassertthattheyareofthesamevalue,theyassertathingwhichisnot.(Mill1991c)Inotherwords,peoplewhoarewiserandmoreintelligentthanothersshouldhavemorevotesthanothers.Butwhoqualifiesasmoreintelligent?\nJohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism217Unfortunately,thereisno‘reallynationaleducation’andno‘trustworthysystemofgeneralexamination’,soMillsuggeststhatoccupationcanbeusedasaroughguide:Anemployeroflabourisontheaveragemoreintelligentthanalabourer;forhemustlabourwithhishead,andnotsolelywithhishands.Aforemanisgen-erallymoreintelligentthananordinarylabourer,andalabourerintheskilledtradesthanintheunskilled.Abanker,merchant,ormanufacturerislikelytobemoreintelligentthanatradesman,becausehehaslargerandmorecomplicatedintereststomanage.(Mill1991c:285)Alittlelaterheadds:Theliberalprofessions,whenreallyandnotnominallypractised,imply,ofcourse,astillhigherdegreeofinstruction;andwhereverasufficientexamina-tion,oranyseriousconditionsofeducation,arerequiredbeforeenteringonaprofession,itsmemberscouldbeadmittedatoncetoapluralityofvotes.Thesamerulemightbeappliedtograduatesofuniversities;andeventothosewhobringsatisfactorycertificatesofhavingpassedthroughthecourseofstudyrequiredbyanyschoolatwhichthehigherbranchesofknowledgearetaught,underpropersecuritiesthattheteachingisreal,andnotamerepretence.(Mill1991c:285)Ithinkyouwillhavegotthepoint.Now,isthis‘democratic’orisn’tit?Whatdoyou,thereader,think?Itseemstomequitelikelythatmanyreaders,evensomeofthosewhoarenotthoroughlyhorrifiedbyMill’ssug-gestion,willwanttoobjectthat,farfrombeingdemocratic,itisthoroughlyelitist.Ifthatisyourresponsethen,unlikeMill,youarethinkingofdemocracyasmorethana‘decision-makingprocedure’,amechanismforchoosinggovernmentsandpolicies.Youthinkthat,toqualifyasdemocratic,anarrangementofpoliticalinstitutions,orapolicy,mustbeinsomewayegalitarian,whichmakesitallthemorelikelythatyouwillwanttogiveeachpersonjustonevote,irrespectiveofintelligenceoroccupation.And,ifthatiswhatyouthink,youcan,infact,drawuponsomestrongargumentstosupportyou.Forastart,thereisarecognisedsenseof‘democratic’asDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012‘favouringorcharacterisedbysocialequality;egalitarian’(TheNewOxfordDictionaryofEnglish).Thenthereistheconsiderationthat,asadefinition,thatoneisfairlyclosetotheoriginalGreek.InGreece,de-mokratiameantrulebythede-mos,ortheordinarypeople,asopposedtorulebythisorthatelite–thearistocracyortheoligarchs.Youcanalsodrawonthesupportofsomepowerfulrecentworkinpoliticalphilosophy.Forexample,JohnRawlshimselfincludes‘politicalliberty(therighttovoteandtobeeligibleforpublicoffice)’inhislistof‘basicliberties’.Suchlibertiesare‘requiredtobeequal’byRawls’stheoryofjustice(Rawls1971:61).Sothereisatension\n218Moderntimes,modernthemeshere.ItisnotatensionwithinMill’sargumentsomuchasatensionbetweenMill’sconclusionandonewidelysharedunderstandingofwhatitmeanstobedemocratic.So,unlikeRawls,Millthinksitpossibletobealiberal,ademocratand–atthesametime–anelitist.Howcome?TheansweristhatMill’sargumentfordemocracyisconsequentialist.Infact,itisutilitarian.OnafirstreadingofRepresentativeGovernment,itcanbealittlehardtoappreciatethelatter,becauseMillseemstospendfarlesstimetalkingabouthappinessthanhedoes‘improvement’.One‘criterionofthegoodnessofagovernment’is,thus,saidtobe‘thedegreeinwhichittendstoincreasethesumofgoodqualitiesinthegoverned,collectivelyandindividually’(Mill1991c:193);agreatvirtueofa‘representativeconstitution’isheldtobethatitis‘ameansofbringingthegeneralstandardofintelligenceandhonesty,andtheindividualintellectandvirtueofitswisestmembers,moredirectlytobearuponthegovernment’(Mill1991c:195);thepossessionofavotegivesyouaninflu-enceonpublicaffairs,albeitasmallone,andthis,initsturn,createsaninterestintheworldaroundyou.SaysMill,itis‘frompoliticaldiscussion,andcollectivepoliticalaction,thatonewhosedailyoccupationsconcentratehisinterestsinasmallcircleroundhimself,learnstofeelforandwithhisfellowcitizens,andbecomesconsciouslyamemberofagreatcommunity’,whereas‘politicaldiscussionsflyovertheheadsofthosewhohavenovotes,andarenotendeavouringtoacquirethem’(1991c:328–29);oneadvantageofthesystemofproportionalrepresentationthatMilladvocatesisheldtobethatitmakesiteasierfortheperson‘whohasonlytalentsandcharacter’(i.e.whohasnoaffiliationtoapoliticalparty)‘togainadmissionintotheHouseofCommons’(Mill1991c:264).Thatway,although‘thesuperiorintellectsandcharacterswillnecessarilybeoutnumbered’theywillatleastbeheard(Mill1991c:266);andsoon.Thereismoreinthesamevein.Ofcourse,hereMillisdescribingwhathehaselsewherecalled‘utilityinthelargestsense’(1991a:15).Itistheutilitysoughtbythosecapableofappreciatingthe‘higher’pleasures.Still,thepointnowatissuesofarasIamconcernedisnottheintelligi-bilityorotherwiseofthatlastconception.Itisjustasfollows.Ifyouthinkofavotingsystemasasortofmachine–thatis,asadevicewithaparticularfunction–itishighlyunlikelythatyouwilldesignasysteminwhicheveryonehasonevoteeach.Whatyouwilldois‘weight’.YouwilltrytoDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012makesurethateachperson’sinputintothesystemhelpsthemachinetofunctioninthewayyouwantitto.Inshort,thisisaconsequentialistwayofthinkingwhichisalmostguaranteedtoyieldaresulttooffendanyonewhobelievesthateachpersonhasarighttojustonevotebecauseeachhasanequalrighttovote.So,asIsaid,thereisaconflictbetweenconsequentialismandrightshere.(NotethesimilaritybetweenPlatoandMill.Neitherbelievesthatdemocracycanbeguaranteedtoyieldthebestdecisions.Thedifferenceisthat,whereastheformerreliesonphilosopherrulerstosolvetheproblem,thelatterreliesonpluralvoting.)\nJohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism219Millthinksthatonepurposeofgovernmentisto‘improve’peoplemorallyandintellectually,sohetriestomakesurethatthewiseandthegoodhavemoreinfluencethanothers.Thereissomethingelsethatworrieshimtoo,anditisworthmentioning.OneinterestingfeatureofRepresentativeGovernmentistheglimpseitgivesyouintotheclassstructureofnineteenthcenturyBritain.AsIsaidearlier,Millthoughthissystemthemostsuitableforapluralsociety,sohequiteoftenreferstodifferentsocialclassesandgroups.What,then,werethesocialgroupswhoseexistencehethoughtnoteworthy?Well,then–justasnow–therewereethnicandreligiousgroups:Supposethemajoritytobewhites,theminoritynegroes,orviceversa:isitlikelythatthemajoritywouldallowequaljusticetotheminority?SupposethemajorityCatholics,theminorityProtestants,orthereverse;willtherenotbethesamedanger?OrletthemajoritybeEnglish,theminorityIrish,orthecontrary:istherenotagreatprobabilityofsimilarevil?(Mill1991c:249)Andthen,ofcourse,‘Inallcountries,thereisamajorityofpoor,aminoritywho,incontradistinction,maybecalledrich.Betweenthesetwoclasses,onmanyquestions,thereiscompleteoppositionofapparentinterest’(Mill1991c:249).Infact,itisthefollowingpassagewhichrevealstheclassdivisionbywhichMillwasmostconcerned:Amoderncommunity,notdividedwithinitselfbystrongantipathiesofrace,language,ornationality,maybeconsideredasinthemaindivisibleintotwosections,which,inspiteofpartialvariations,correspondonthewholewithtwodivergentdirectionsofapparentinterest.Letuscallthem(inbriefgeneralterms)labourersontheonehand,employersoflabourontheother.(Mill1991c:225)Asboththesepassagesshow,Millwasworriedbytheprospectofoneclassdominatinganother.Somethingheespeciallyfearedwas‘tyrannyofthemajority’.Onepurposeofpluralvoting,proportionalrepresentation,andtherestofit,istoensureabalanceofpowerbetweenclasses.Asthesecondpassageshows,Millwastryingtocometotermswiththeexistenceofaworkingclass.Inanearlierchapter,IremarkedthattheeventsoftheFrenchDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Revolution‘traumatisedEurope’.But,ofcourse,therevolutionwasn’tallthathappened(and,inanycase,bythetimeMillwaswritingoverhalfacenturyhadpassedsince1789).Anotherphenomenon–new,surprising,andalarmingtomany–towhichtheVictorianshadtoadaptwasindustrialisa-tion.Overashortperiod,hugenewtownsdevotedtomanufacturing,withtheirfactoriesandtheirterracesofshoddyhouses,hadsprungintobeing.Tosome,itmusthaveseemedthattheycamefromnowhere.Andwiththetownstherehadcomeanumerousnewclassofindustriallabourers.Itwasathemewhichpreoccupiedmanywritersoftheperiod.12\n220Moderntimes,modernthemesFreespeechWhatoftheotherexample?WeshouldcastabriefglanceinthedirectionofMill’sdefenceof‘thelibertyofthoughtanddiscussion’ifonlybecauseitissofamousandsoinfluential.ThesecondchapterofOnLibertycontainsahelpfulpassageinwhichMillsumsuphisargument,soratherthantrytosummariseitinmyownwords,letmejustquotehim.Millclaimstohave‘recognisedthenecessitytothementalwell-beingofmankind…offreedomofopinion,andfreedomoftheexpressionofopinion,onfourdistinctgrounds’.The‘grounds’areasfollows:First,ifanyopinioniscompelledtosilence,thatopinionmay,foraughtwecancertainlyknow,betrue.Todenythisistoassumeourowninfallibility.Secondly,thoughthesilencedopinionbeanerror,itmay,andverycom-monlydoes,containaportionofthetruth;andsincethegeneralorprevailingopiniononanysubjectisrarelyorneverthewholetruth,itisonlybythecol-lisionofadverseopinionsthattheremainderofthetruthhasanychanceofbeingsupplied.Thirdly,evenifthereceivedopinionbenotonlytrue,butthewholetruth;unlessitissufferedtobe,andactuallyis,vigorouslyandearnestlycontested,itwill,bymostofthosewhoreceiveit,beheldinthemannerofaprejudice,withlittlecomprehensionorfeelingofitsrationalgrounds.Andnotonlythis,but,fourthly,themeaningofthedoctrineitselfwillbeindangerofbeinglostorenfeebled,anddeprivedofitsvitaleffectonthecharacterandconduct;thedogmabecomingamereformalprofession,inefficaciousforgood,butcumber-ingthegroundandpreventingthegrowthofanyrealandheartfeltconvictionfromreasonorpersonalexperience.(Mill1991a:59)Mill’sargumenthasitselfbeenasubjectofmuchthoughtanddiscussion.ThereisagreatdealIcouldsaybut,here,Ishallconfinemyselftojusttwoobservations.ThefirstisthatMill’sargumentisconsequentialistthroughout.Asyoucansee,itstatesthatwherepeopleareleftfreetothinkanddiscussthen,asaconsequence,theirchancesofarrivingatthetruthareincreased.Withhisfour‘grounds’Milldrawsourattentiontothevariouswaysinwhichthiscanhappen.Thus,to‘assumeinfallibility’(firstground)istopretendthatyouareinpossessionofthetruthwhenyouarenot.ItisalsotoDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012depriveothersofthechanceofreachingthetruththemselves;itisthe‘col-lision’ofopinionswhichtakesplacewhenideasarediscussedthatmostfacilitatesthesearchfortruth(secondground);‘prejudice’and‘dogma’aretobecondemnedforthewaytheyimpedethesearchfortruth(thirdandfourthgrounds).(Theargumentisutilitarianbut–asIamsureIdon’treallyhavetotellyoubynow–itis‘utilityinthelargestsense’whichconcernsMillhere.Peoplecapableofintelligentlydiscussingideasandopinionsare,hethinks,peoplewhoemploytheir‘higher’faculties.Itworrieshimthat,ashis\nJohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism221fourthgroundstates,whereadoctrinecannotbediscussed,itcanbe‘deprivedofitsvitaleffectonthecharacterandconduct’.)Now,thankstoitsconsequentialiststructure,Mill’sargumentimmedi-atelyfacesuswiththequestionofwhetheritis,infact,truethatthecon-nectionsMilldescribesactuallyhold.Doesthelibertyofthoughtanddiscussionreallyincreaseourchancesofarrivingatthetruth?Well,I’llleaveyoutodecidethatforyourself.Theimportantthingistopointoutthatitispossibletoraisethequestion.Forwhatit’sworth,letmejustaddthat,inmyopinion,Mill’sclaimistrue,butthatitisonlytrueforsituationsofacertaintype.Thus:imagineagroupofintelligent,informed,people.Theyaremeetingtogetherbecausetheyareinterestedinaparticularquestion.Perhapstheyarephysicists,intriguedbysomeaspectofthelatestcosmolo-gicaltheory,orperhapstheyareliterarycritics,tryingtoassessthemeritsofarecentlypublishednovel.Withinthis‘seminargroup’eachpersonisfreetostatehisorheropinionwhiletheothersrespectfullylisten.Everyoneisatlibertytobeascriticaloftheothersasheorshecan,andsoon.Ibelievethat,wheresuchconditionsprevail,thereisanincreasedchanceofreachingtruth.(Thephysicistswillmostprobablyrefinetheirtheoreticalpositionsandincreasetheiraccuracy.Asforthecritics,evenifyouthinkthatthereisnosuchthingas‘truth’inliterarycriticism,youmuststilladmit–Ithink–thateachcriticwillhaveincreasedhisorher‘comprehension’and‘feeling[for]therationalgrounds’oftheopinionsdiscussed.)Itismybeliefthatthemoreasituationresemblesthis‘seminargroup’model,themoreMill’sargumentsapply;butthelessitresemblesthemodel,thelesstheydo.13Now,althoughMillisdefending‘thelibertyofthoughtanddiscussion’andnot‘freespeech’,hisargumentismoreoftenthannottakentobeadefenceofthelatter.Noneofthiswouldmattersomuchotherwise.ItisameasureofMill’sinfluence,Ithink,thatevenpeoplewhohaveneverheardofhimwilltellyouthatthesilencingofanopinionisanassumptionofinfallibility,orthatthecollisionofideasisanecessarypreconditionforthediscoveryoftruth–justasMilldoes–whenseekingtodefendanindivi-dual’srighttopublishsomething,ortospeakpubliclyonsomeparticularoccasion.So,thequestionis:canMill’sconsequentialistargumentforthelibertyofthoughtanddiscussionbeusedtodefendanindividual’srighttofreespeech?Inanswer,itfollowsfromwhatIhavejustbeensayingthatitcan,butonlyforsituationswhichresemblethe‘seminargroup’model.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Forexample,justsupposethatasmallneo-Nazi,ultra-racist,groupwantstoholdarallyinyourlocalparknextmonth.Iftheydo,therewillbespeakers,skilledatrhetoric,whoraveandrageagainstthemoderncorrup-tion,thealienmenacethreateningtoswampourcultureandourpublicservices–andsoon,andsoforth.Thecrowdwillbewhippedintoafervourandtheirsenseofsolidaritywillbereinforced.Somelocalresidentswillfeelcowedandintimidatedonthatday.Ifthelocalauthoritiesweretopreventtherallyfromtakingplace,wouldtheybeviolatingthespeakers’‘righttofreespeech’?Idon’tknow.However,IdothinkitisclearthatMill’sargument\n222Moderntimes,modernthemescouldnotbeusedtoshowthattheywould,forthesituationIhavejustdescribedisinnowayanexampleofthesoberpursuitoftruthbypeopleinarationalframeofmind.Finallyonthispoint–andtogeneralise–similarconsiderationsapplytomanyothercases.Weareallfamiliarwiththetypeofsituationinwhichthetabloidpressconductsacampaignagainstsomewell-knownmediapersonality,publishingembarrassingdetailsofthatperson’sprivatelife,andpotentiallydestroyinghisorherreputationandcareer;orinwhich,forreasonsbestknowntohimself,somecrankyfascistpublishesabookinwhichheargues,quiteimplausibly,thattheHolocaustnevertookplace,therebycausinggreatoffencetoHolocaustsurvivorsandmanyothers.CanthetabloidsortheNazipleadarighttofreespeechindefenceoftheiractivities?Well,iftheycan,it’shardtoseehowMill’sargumentcouldhelpthem.Inconclusion,recallthatMill’sinsistencethatthereisa‘sphereofaction’overwhichtheindividualissovereignisanessentialconstituentofhislib-eralism.Recall,too,thatthe‘sphere’ismeanttoencompass,amongstotherthings,‘absolutefreedomofopiniononallsubjects,practicalorspeculative,scientific,moral,ortheological’.Tothis,Milladdsthat‘thelibertyofexpressingandpublishingopinions’is‘practicallyinseparable’fromtheformerbecauseitrests‘ingreatpartonthesamereasons’(1991a:16–17).Againstthis,myargumentsuggeststhatsuchaconclusioncannotbederivedfromMill’sconsequentialistargumentforthelibertyofthoughtanddiscussion.ConclusionInthemiddleyearsofthenineteenthcentury,politicalthoughtwaslargelyshapedbytheworkoftwogreatphilosophers.JohnStuartMillwasone.Throughoutthatcenturyandthetwentieth,andintoourown,hisspirithascontinuedtoinformthewaypoliticalphilosophersconstructtheproblemswithwhichtheyarepreoccupiedandtheapproachtheytaketotheirsolu-tion.Thatiswhyitmattersthatthereisatensionbetweenhisutilitarianismandhisliberalism.Itisatensionwehaveinherited.Inourowntime,theprevailingtemperhastendedtobesecularandpragmatic–inthatsense,ithasbeenthetemperofMill’sutilitarianism–andtheprevailingpoliticalorderhastendedtobeliberal.ItisjustaswelltobeawarethatthetwodoDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012notsitsoeasilytogether.Mill’scharacter,likehisphilosophy,wasfraughtwithinnertensions.Inhislife,asinhiswriting,hetirelesslystruggledtoreconciletheutilitarian-ismhehadinheritedwithacomplexvisionwhichtheformerwas,inreality,toosimpletosupport.Thistookitstoll.Itwasthetensionbetweenthetwowhich,nodoubt,helpsexplaintheterriblenervousbreakdown,the‘mentalcrisis’hesufferedin1826,whichhedescribessomovinglyinhisAuto-biography(seeMill1989:chap.5).Inhislife,Millalsogavethelietothestereotypicalideathataphilosophermustbeother-worldly,thedisengaged\nJohnStuartMill:utilitarianismandliberalism223residentofanivorytower.Farfromit;Milltookanactivepartinmanymovementsforpoliticalreformandinpublicaffairsgenerally.Foratime,heservedasMemberofParliamentforWestminster.HespenthiscareerworkingintheExaminer’sOfficeoftheEastIndiaCompany.ThiseventuallybecamethebranchoftheForeignOfficeresponsibleforBritain’srelationswithIndia.Inshort,hewastheequivalentofaseniorcivilservant.WhenMillwasworkingthere,theEastIndiaCompany’sofficeswerelocatedinLeadenhallStreet,intheCityofLondon.Lessthanthreemilesaway–onlyafewminutes’walkfromthecabinetinwhichBentham’sremainsareplacedondisplay–therestandstheBritishMuseum,withitscircularlibraryandreadingroom(nowmuseumpiecesthemselves).Itwasthere,duringthesameperiod,thatnineteenth-centurypoliticalphilosophy’sothertoweringgenius–KarlMarx–spenthisdayslaboriouslyforginghismasterpiece.SuggestionsforfurtherreadingJohnStuartMillTherearesomanycollectionsofMill’swritingsavailablethatitseemsridiculoustosingleanyoneoutforspecialmention.However,JohnGray,ed.,JohnStuartMill:OnLibertyandOtherEssays(1991)isusefulmainlybecauseitcontainsTheSubjectionofWomeninadditiontomorereadilyavailablematerial.GeraintWilliams,ed.,JohnStuartMillonPoliticsandSociety(1976)containsagoodselectionofMill’sessays.IfyouwantafullerpictureofMill’ssocialandpoliticalideas,itiswellworthreadingthrough.IwouldrecommendMill’sAutobiography(1989)toanyone,whetherornottheyareinterestedinpoliticalideas,andRichardReeves’srecentbiography,JohnStuartMill:VictorianFirebrand(2007)isexcellent.TwoveryusefulintroductorycommentariesonMill’sthoughtareRogerCrisp’sMillonUtilitarianism(1997)andJonathanRiley’sMillonLiberty(1998).MostcommentariesconcentrateonOnLiberty.Someinfluential,in-depthstudies,eachofwhichtakesaparticularinterpretation,areMauriceCowling’sMillandLiberalism(1963)andGertrudeHimmelfarb’sOnLibertyandLiberalism:TheCaseDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ofJohnStuartMill(1974).(CowlingarguesthatMillwasanelitistandHimmelfarbholdshimresponsibleforeverythingthathappenedinthe1960s–badinheropinion.)JohnGray’sMillonLiberty:ADefence(1983)isadefenceofMillagainstsomecommoncriticisms.OnMill’streatmentofspecificissuesmentionedinthischapterIrecommendJuliaAnnas’sarticle‘MillandtheSubjectionofWomen’(1977)andDennisThompson’sJohnStuartMillandRepresentativeGovernment(1976).PartOneofmyownFreeSpeech(Haworth:1998)isanextendedtreatmentofMill’sargumentforthelibertyofthoughtanddiscussion.\n224Moderntimes,modernthemesOnutilitarianismandconsequentialismmoregenerally,SamuelScheffler,ed.,ConsequentialismanditsCritics(1988)isausefulcollectionofarticles,andIthinkeveryonewillenjoyreadingJohnHarris’smuch-collectedarticle,‘TheSurvivalLottery’(1975).Notes1Millreceivedanintensive‘hothouse’educationfromhisfather.Fordetailsofthis,andotherremarkableepisodesinMill’slife,seehisAutobiography(1989).2SeeMill’sPrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy(1999),especiallyBookFive.3Iamusing‘freedom’and‘liberty’interchangeably.Forthereasonswhy,seeabove,chapter9,note3.4Burkeboasts,‘IflattermyselfthatIloveamanly,moral,regulatedliberty’(Burke1986:89).5Analternativeistothinkofhappinessastheconceptintermsofwhichoneevaluatesthecourseofalife.Ifthisisright,then‘happiness’doesnotrefertoastateofmind,suchasasensation,atall.(Thereisadiscussionofthis‘Aristotelian’view,anditsmeritsrelativetoutilitarianism,inchapter3;seeabove,pp.49–52.)6ChambersTwentiethCenturyDictionarydefines‘pushpin’as‘achildren’sgameinwhichpinsarepushedoneacrossanother’.However,IprefertogobythePenguinDictionaryofHistoricalSlang(1971)accordingtowhich‘pushpin’isaneighteenth-centuryeuphemismforsex,asin‘Shewouldnevertell/Whoplay’datpushpinwithher’.7TheStepfordWives(1975),Dir.BryanForbes–starringKatharineRoss,PaulaPrentiss,PeterMasterson,NanetteNewmanandTinaLouise.8ThisisareferencetoapetitionforaWomen’sSuffrageBill.Itwasorganisedin1865byagroupknownas‘TheLadiesofLanghamPlace’.Mill’sclosecompanion,HelenTaylor,wascloselyalliedtothegroup,andMillwastobetheMemberwhopresentedittoParliament.9Withtwenty-firstcenturyhindsightitisdifficulttocreditthedegreetowhichMillwasvilifiedandlampoonedforhisfeministstand.Cartoonistsoftenportrayedhimdressedinwomens’clothes,andreferredtohimas‘thewomens’member’.Foranaccountofallthis,seeRichardReeves(2007,especiallychap.14).10Suchconsiderationshavebeenused,bysomewriters,asthebasisforanargumentthatactutilitarianismisparadoxicallyself-defeating.See,forexample,Mackie(1977:133ff.)andParfit(1984:24ff.).11BothJohnRawlsandRobertNozickclaimtobeKantians.12Seealso–e.g.–Dickens’sHardTimes(1969)andEngels’sTheConditionoftheEnglishWorkingClass(1999).13IarguethisatlengthinFreeSpeech(Haworth:1998).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n12MarxKarlMarxhasbeendescribedas‘themostinfluentialthinkerofthemodernperiod’(Simon1994:ix)andtherearemanywhowouldagreewiththat.Itisn’ttrue,butthat’sonlybecausethereisnosinglephilosopherwhoyoucoulddescribeasthemostinfluentialthinkeroftheperiod.Itistrue,how-ever,thatMarxisoneofahandfulofphilosopherswhosevision,andwhosearguments,haveshapedmodernpoliticalthought.Itisalsotruethat,unliketheothers,hisworkinspiredamovementofideaswhichhascontinuedtobearhisname.Wedonotcallliberalism‘Millism’,eventhoughJ.S.Mill’swritingswere,andremain,themajorinspirationforsomuchmodernliber-alism.Nordowecallconservatism‘Burkeism’.However,theusualepithetforMarxismisjustthat–‘Marxism’.Insomeways,thishasbeenunfortunateforMarx’sreputation.Commen-tatorswhodescribeMarxasthemodernworld’smostinfluentialpoliticalthinkertendtocite,asevidence,thefactthattherewere,untilquiterecently,plentyof‘Marxistregimes’intheworld.SuchregimesclaimedMarxfortheirown.TheycitedMarxastheinspirationforpolicieswhichwere,moreoftenthannot,asrepressiveastheywereeconomicallyinefficient.(Doesn’teveryoneknowthat,initsofficialideology,Stalin’sSovietUnionwasMarxist-Leninist?)However,itcouldbeamistaketoblameMarxforeveryatrocitycommittedinhisname.Afterall,JohnLocke’sSecondTreatisewasamajorinspirationforthe‘foundingfathers’whodraftedtheUSconstitution,butwedonotnormallydescribetheUnitedStates’governmentasa‘Locke-istregime’,nordowelaytheblameforitslessattractiveactionsonLocke.Inshort,therecouldbeguiltbyassociationhere.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Itiscertainlythecasethat,whereMarxisconcerned,theascriptionofguiltbyassociationisatraditionwhichbeganquiteearly.Forexample,youcanfinditinthereportofthepoliceagent,sentfromPrussiatospyonMarxandhisfamilywhiletheywerelivinginexileinLondon.(Itwouldhavebeenwrittensometimebetween1850and1856,whentheMarxeswerelivinginasmalltwo-roomapartment.)1‘WhenyouenterMarx’sroom’,reportedtheagent,‘smokeandtobaccofumesmakeyoureyeswatersomuchthatforamomentyouseemtobegropingaboutinacavern’,and‘Everythingisdirtyandcoveredwithdust,sothattositdownbecomesathoroughlydangerous\n226Moderntimes,modernthemesbusiness.…Hereisachairwithonlythreelegs,onanotherthechildrenareplayingatcooking.’Moreover,Inprivatelifeheisanextremelydisorderly,cynicalhumanbeing,andabadhost.Heleadsarealgypsyexistence.Washing,groomingandchanginghislinenarethingshedoesrarely,andheisoftendrunk.Thoughheisoftenidlefordaysonend,hewillworkdayandnightwithtirelessendurancewhenhehasagreatdealofworktodo.Hehasnofixedtimesforgoingtosleepandwakingup.Heoftenstaysupallnight,andthenliesdownfullyclothedonthesofaatmiddayandsleepstillevening,untroubledbythewholeworldcomingandgoingthroughtheroom.(Briggs1982:39,40)2Forsomereaders,thedescriptionwillcastMarxinanattractivelight,makinghimappearalittlewildandlargerthanlife.However,itiseasytoseethat,totheorderlymindedpoliceman,Marx’slifestylemusthaveepito-misedthemostshockingbohemianism.Also,Ithinkwecantakeitthathewastellinghissuperiorswhattheywantedtohear.(Canwereallybelievethepoliceman’sclaimtohaveknownjusthowinfrequentlyMarxchangedhisunderwear?)Thereport’sunspoken‘subtext’is‘Whatelsecouldyouexpect?Amanwithsuchdisreputableideascouldonlyhaveadisreputablelifestyle.’Inreality,however,qualityoflifestyleandqualityofideasneednotgotogether,handinhand,whichmeansthatitisimpossibletomakeaninfer-encefromonetoanother.IfMarxwasbadlybehavedonoccasions,itdoesn’tfollowthathisphilosophyisflawed,norcanthesameconclusionbedrawnfromthebadbehaviourofself-styled‘Marxist’regimes.Inshort,wemustnotprejudgetheissue.ItisimportanttogetMarxright,andthatiswhatIshalltrytodointhischapter.WhatdidMarxunderstandby‘capitalism’?Themeaningof‘capitalism’OnethingeveryoneknowsaboutMarxisthatthegreaterpartofhisworkisdevotedtothecritiqueoftheeconomicsystemhecalled‘capitalism’,soagoodwaytobeginisbyaskingpreciselywhathemeantbythat.Actually,thereisDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012nothingmysteriousaboutit.ThesystemMarxattacksispreciselythesystemLockedefendsinhischapteronproperty.Ofcourse,thingshadmovedonbythetimeMarxwaswriting.InLocke’stime,theeconomyhadbeenlargelybasedonagriculture,whereas,byMarx’s,manufacturinghadcometoplayafarmoreprominentrole.Thatapart,though,theeconomicsystemwithwhichbothwritersareconcernedis,inessence,asystemwhichfunctionsthroughtherepeatedexercise,bymanyindividuals,oftwodistinctkindsofpropertyright.First,thereiswhatLockeconceivestobethepropertyeachofushasinhisorherown‘person’.Asyouwillrecall,Lockeholdsthisrighttobe\nMarx227‘inalienable’.Marxdoesnotbelieveininalienablerights,ofcourse,butthereisaparallelwithinhissystem,namelythefreedomeachofushastobuyandsell.Undercapitalism,eachpersonisequallyfreetosellwhatheorsheownsandtobuywhatheorshecan.Eventheworkerwhoownsnothingelseisfreetohirehisorherlabour(or‘labour-power’asMarxwouldsay)toanemployer,foraperiod,inreturnforawage.Thisisonefeaturewhichdis-tinguishescapitalismfromfeudalism,thesystemwhichprecededithistori-cally.Underfeudalism,therearegradationsofrank–‘feudallords,vassals,guild-masters,journeymen,apprentices,serfs’(MarxandEngels2000:246)–andeachstatuscanbedefinedintermsofthedistinctsetofrightswhichgoeswithit.Itisafeaturewhichalsodistinguishescapitalismfromcom-munism,thesystemMarxbelievedwouldeventuallycometopass.Inacommunistsystem,workersceasetobecompetingagentsinamarketforlabour–eachwithapropertyinhisorherownperson,andnothingmore–buttheowners,eachincommonwiththeothers,oftheentiremeansofproductionandexchange.Thesecondtypeofpropertyrightistherighteachpersonhasovertheitemsofpropertyheorsheowns.Thisincludestherightto‘alienate’apropertyrightinanitembytransferringittosomeoneelse.Inacapitalist,or‘freemarket’,system,thisisnormallydonebysale,gift,bequestor,asinthecaseoflabour-power,byloaningorhiringitouttosomeoneelseforaperiod.Youcanthinkofapure‘capitalist’systematworkas–inessence–therepeatedexerciseoftheserights,overtime,byalargenumberofindividualsastheyexchangepropertyrightforpropertyright;again,includingpropertyrightseachpersonhasinhisorherownlabour.Ishouldemphasisetwopointshere.Thefirstisthatwherea‘pure’capi-talistsystem,thusdefined,isatwork,thefunctionofthestatemustbeconfinedtotheprotectionofproperty.Inotherwords,itmustensurethatpeopleobservetherules,anditmustdonomorethanthat.(Ifitdidmore,forexample,ifitbeganto‘redistribute’wealthfromtherichtothepoor,itwouldnolongerbeapurecapitalistsystem.Itisarguablethattherearenoabsolutely‘pure’capitalistsystemsintheworld,althoughthereare,nodoubt,somewhichapproximatetotheideal-type.)Thesecondpointisthatthereisnothingaboutcapitalism,asIhavecharacteriseditsofar,fromwhichyoucanconcludethatthereisanythingwrongwithit.Infact,bythetimeMarxwaswriting,quiteanumberofphilosophershadDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012arguedthatcapitalismhasgreatvirtues.Lockewasone.Asyouknow,sofarasLockewasconcerned,thegreatvirtueofthesystemisthatit(supposedly)respectsnaturalrights.MorerecentlythanLocke,AdamSmithhadadvancedadifferent,consequentialist,defenceofcapitalism.InTheWealthofNations(Smith1937),Smitharguedthatitisonlywherepeopleareleftfreetotrade,withoutinterference,thatthesystemisguaranteedtoworkforthegreatestadvantageofall,eventhoughindividualsactfrompureself-interestwhentheytrade.In1776,whenTheWealthofNationswasfirstpublished,itbecameanimmediatebestseller,andthefollowingpassageisfamous:\n228Moderntimes,modernthemesGivemethatwhichIwant,andyoushallhavethiswhichyouwant,isthemeaningofevery[such]offer;anditisinthismannerthatweobtainfromoneanotherthefargreaterpartofthosegoodofficeswhichwestandinneedof.Itisnotfromthebenevolenceofthebutcher,thebrewer,orthebakerthatweexpectourdinner,butfromtheirregardtotheirowninterest.(Smith1937:14)LaterinTheWealthofNations,thereisaverywell-knownpassageinwhichSmithremarksthat,withinthecontextofafreemarket,althougheveryindividual‘intendsonlyhisowngain’,heis‘ledbyaninvisiblehandtopromoteanendwhichwasnopartofhisintention’(1937:423).Marxagreedwithnoneofthis.Toseewhynot,weneedtodigalittledeeper.EmergentfeaturesInthechapteronLocke,Icomparedtheoperationofacapitalist,or‘freemarket’economywithagameofMonopoly.Thecomparisonisaptheretoo.Forastart,thereisthefactthatjustasMonopolyisdefinableasasetofrules,soaretheprivatepropertyrelationshipswhichprevailundercapitalism.Inthecaseoftheformer,therulesstatethateachplayermustbeginwithanequalsupplyofMonopolymoney,anequalnumberofcounters,etc.;thatplayersmusttaketurnsatthrowingthedice,andsoon.Moreover,justaspropertyrulesdefinerights,sodotherulesofMonopoly.Forexample,inthecaseofthelatter,thereisarulestating,insomanywords,thateachplayeronlyhasarighttothrowadicewhenhisorherturncomesround.Thereissomethingelsetoo.AsagameofMonopolyprogresses–witheachplayerobservingtherules–thesituationofeach,relativetotheothers,beginstochange.Theymayhavestartedoutequalbut,aftertime,somewillhavemore(money,houses,hotels,title-deedcards)thanothers,andsomewillhavebeenforcedtoquitthegamecompletely.ThesituationofinequalitywhichinevitablytranspiresasagameofMonopolyprogressesisanexampleofwhatIshallcallan‘emergentfeature’.Thereare‘emergentfea-tures’tothecapitalist‘game’aswell,featureswhichshowupovertimeasindividuals,boundbytherulesofprivateproperty,tradeonewithanother.ItisinsuchfeaturesthatwecanbegintolocateMarx’sobjectionstocapitalism.Inequalityisjustone,andMarxlaysspecialemphasisonthefollowing.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Bourgeoisieandproletariat‘Thehistoryofallhithertoexistingsocietiesisthehistoryofclassstruggles’,saysMarxinTheCommunistManifesto(MarxandEngels2000:245)and,alittlelater,Ourepoch,theepochofthebourgeoisiepossesses,[however],thisdistinctivefeature:ithassimplifiedtheclassantagonisms.Societyasawholeismoreand\nMarx229moresplittingupintotwogreathostilecamps,intotwogreatclassesdirectlyfacingeachother:BourgeoisieandProletariat.(MarxandEngels2000:245)ForMarx,thebourgeoisieandtheproletariataredistinguishedintermsofwhattheyown.Thebourgeoisieownpropertyintheformofcapital;thatis,inordertosurvive,theycanuseittogeneratewealthforthemselves.Capitalcantakeanumberofforms–moneyforlendingataprofit,landforrentingout–oritcantaketheformofbuildings,machinery,etc.,andsobeusedtomanufacturecommoditiesforsaleataprofit.Bycontrast,theproletariatownnothingbuttheirownlabour.Iftheproletarianistosurvive,heorshemustworkfora(bourgeois)capitalistinreturnforawage.Ofcourse,Marxwasnotsonaivethathethoughtthateverysinglepersonmustneatlyfallintooneortheotherofthesetwocategories.Onthecontrary,sofarasMarxwasconcerned,thedistinctionbetweenbourgeoisieandproletariathadaparti-cularsignificancebecauseitwastheinevitableconflictofinterestbetweenthetwowhichwasdrivinghistory.Ashesaysinthepassage,theyare‘twogreathostilecamps’.Ashesawit,soonerorlatertherewouldbearevolution,withtheproletariatseizingthepropertyofthebourgeoisie,andinstitutinganewera(the‘dictatorshipoftheproletariat’).ThedivisionoflabourThephrase‘thedivisionoflabour’originatedwithAdamSmith,thefirstchapterofwhoseTheWealthofNationsisentitled‘OftheDivisionofLabour’(Smith1937).Init,Smithcomparesthetimeitwouldtakeonemantomakeapinallbyhimself,withthetimeitwouldtaketomakeoneinafactory,wherethetaskisdividedintoanumberofoperations,eachperformedbyadifferentworker.Thisiswhathappensinthefactory:Onemandrawsoutthewire,anotherstraightsit,athirdcutsit,afourthpointsit,afifthgrindsitatthetopforreceivingthehead;tomaketheheadrequiresthreedistinctoperations;toputitonisapeculiarbusiness,towhitenthepinsisanother;itisevenatradebyitselftoputthemintothepaper;andtheimportantbusinessofmakingapinis,inthismanner,dividedintoabouteighteendistinctoperations,which,insomemanufactories,areallperformedbyDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012distincthands,thoughinothersthesamemanwillsometimesperformtwoorthreeofthem.(Smith1937:4)AccordingtoSmith,thedivisionoflabourhasanumberofadvantages;workersbecomemoreskilledthroughconcentratingonasingletask;thetimeitwouldtakemovingfromonetasktoanotherissaved;and–mostofall–itbecomespossibletousemachinery.(Bytheway,justincaseyouarepuzzledbythepassage,by‘pins’Smithmeanslargeflat-headednails,and\n230Moderntimes,modernthemesnotthetypeofpinsusedinsewing.)Smithestimatesthat,inatypicalfac-tory,withthedivisionoflabourtenpersons‘could,whentheyexertedthemselves,makeamongthemabouttwelvepoundsofpinsaday’.That’sabout48,000pins.‘Eachperson,thereforemakingatenthpartoffortyeightthousandpins,mightbeconsideredasmakingfourthousandeighthundredpinsinaday.’Comparethiswiththefactthat,‘byhimself,andwithoutthedivisionoflabour,aworkman,couldscarce,perhaps,withhisutmostindustry,makeonepinaday,andcertainlycouldnotmaketwenty’(Smith1937:4).InSmith’sopinionthedivisionoflabourhasbroughtaboutthegreatestincreaseintheproductivepowersoflabourever,andhissoleaimistoillustratethepoint.NowcomparetheforegoingpassagewiththefollowinglinesfromTheCommunistManifesto:Owingtotheextensiveuseofmachineryandtodivisionoflabour,theworkoftheproletarianshaslostallindividualcharacterand,consequently,allcharmfortheworkman.Hebecomesanappendageofthemachine,anditisonlythemostsimple,mostmonotonous,andmosteasilyacquiredknack,thatisrequiredofhim.(MarxandEngels2000:251)3SmithandMarxdescribethesamephenomenon,butfromcompletelydifferentperspectives.MarketforcesTosaythat‘marketforcespredominate’inacapitalisteconomyistouseamodernexpression.ItisnotanexpressionMarxhimselfwouldhaveused.Nevertheless,itisquiteclearlywhathehadinmind.AsMarxseesit,com-petitionisall-pervading.Capitalistsmustcompetewithothercapitalistsiftheyaretoremaininbusinessascapitalists.Workersmustcompetewithotherworkersiftheyaretosurvive.Itiscompetitionwhichinevitablygivesrisetotheotherphenomenajustlisted–theincreasingpolarisationofbourgeoisieandproletariat,andtheincreasingdivisionoflabour.FromdescriptiontocritiqueDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Butthenwhatiswrongwithallthat?Sofar,Ihavedescribedcapitalismasafreemarketsystembasedontheprivateownershipofproperty,andIhavepointedoutthatitsoperationmustinevitablyresultintheexistenceoftwomajorclasses,anincreaseinthedivisionoflabour,andthepredominanceofmarketforces.Thisisadescriptionwhichthemostoutrightdefenderofcapitalismcanaccept.Typically,defendersofcapitalismwillarguethataneconomicsystemwithinwhichmarketforcesprevailisfarmoreproductive–andfarmoreefficientatsatisfyingpeople’swants–thananyothersystem.Theywillarguethattheexistenceoftwomajorclasses–bourgeoisieand\nMarx231proletariat–isonlytobeexpected,andthatthereisnothingatallobjec-tionableaboutit,andthat,likewise,thedivisionoflabourisonlytobeexpected.It’sjustapriceyoupayforefficiency.Itfollowsthat,ifwearetomovefrom‘value-neutral’descriptiontocritique–thatis,ifwearetounderstandwhatMarxthoughtwaswrongwithcapitalism–wemustlookdeeperstill.Youwon’tbesurprisedtolearnthat,inMarx’sview,therewereplentyofthingswrongwithcapitalism.Amongstotherthings,hebelievedthatoneconsequenceofcapitalismis‘alienation’.Healsobelievedthat,undercapitalism,theworkerproduces‘surplusvalue’whichthecapitalistpockets.ThesearespecificallyMarxianobjectionstocapitalism,andweshallconsidertheminthefollowingsection.Beforethat,letmejustmentiontwofamiliarobjections.Botharefrequentlyraisedbysocialistsandothersalthoughthefirstisnot–Ithink–anobjectionMarxwouldhaveraisedhimself.Thesecondis.Accordingtothefirstobjection,theinequalitywhichinevitablyresultsfromtheoperationofafreemarket,capitalist,systemis,initself,objection-able.Suchinequalityis‘unfair’,or‘unjust’,orsotheobjectionruns.(Ihaven’tattributedthisobjectiontoanyoneinparticular,butIamsurereaderswillrecogniseitassomethingoneoftenhearssaid.)Tothis,defendersofcapitalismareapttoreplythatthereisnothingespeciallyobjectionableaboutinequalityitself.Perhapstheywilladdthatcomplaintsaboutinequalityaresometimesnothingmorethanexpressionsofenvy.Theywillarguethat,wherethereareinequalities,thiscansometimesmeanthateventheworstoffpeoplearebetteroffthantheywouldotherwisebe,andthat,insuchcases,inequalityisagoodthing.Sometimestheywilladdthatitis,inanycase,impossibletoformulateacoherentdefinitionof‘socialjustice’.(Again,Ihaven’tattributedsuchargumentstoanyoneinparticular,althoughyouwillfindallthesepointsmadein,forexample,F.A.Hayek’sTheMirageofSocialJustice(1982).Ifyouwantmyopinion,theyaremistakenarguments,butthat’sanotherstory.)4Marx’sresponsetotheobjectionwouldhavebeendifferent,butequallycontemptuous.Sofarasheisconcerned,itisnotthatobjectionsalongsuchlinesgetcapitalismwrong(theydon’t)butthattheyconcedefartoomuchtotheopposingcase.Bywayofillustration,takehisCritiqueoftheGothaPro-gramme(2000h).TheGothaProgrammewasajointmanifestodrawnupbytheleadersofGermany’smainsocialistpartiesatameetingintheGermantownDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ofGotha,heldin1875.TheCritiqueiscomposedfromtheangrynotesMarxscribbledinthemargin.5Atonepoint,theprogrammestatesthat‘theemancipationoflabour’demands,amongstotherthings,‘afairdistributionoftheproceedsoflabour’(sothisisaversionoftheobjectionunderdiscus-sion).ThispromptsMarxtoraisesomerhetoricalquestions.‘Whatis“fair”distribution?’,heasks,and‘Donotthebourgeoisassertthatpresent-daydistributionis“fair”?Andisitnot,infact,theonly“fairdistribution”onthebasisofthepresent-daymodeofproduction?’(Marx2000h:612).However,hecommentslaterthatitishardlysurprisingthattheGothaProgramme’s\n232Moderntimes,modernthemesauthorsshouldhavemadesucharemark,becauseafterallwearedealingwithacommunistsociety‘asitiswhenithasjustemergedafterprolongedbirth-pangsfromcapitalistsociety’(Marx2000h:615).Thatiswhy‘equalrighthereisstillinprinciple–bourgeoisright’(Marx2000h:614).AsMarxgoesontoexplain,thisequalrightisstillconstantlystigmatisedbyabourgeoislimitation.Therightoftheproducersisproportionaltothelabourtheysupply;theequalityconsistsinthefactthatmeasurementismadewithanequalstandard,labour.Butonemanissuperiortoanotherphysicallyormentallyandsosuppliesmorelabourinthesametime,orcanlabourforalongertime;andlabour,toserveasameasure,mustbedefinedbyitsdurationorintensity,otherwiseitceasestobeastandardofmeasurement.Thisequalrightisanunequalrightforunequallabour.Itrecognisesnoclassdifferences,becauseeveryoneisonlyaworkerlikeeveryoneelse;butittacitlyrecognisesunequalindividualendow-mentandthusproductivecapacityasnaturalprivileges.Itis,therefore,arightofinequality,initscontent,likeeveryright.(Marx2000h:614)ButifMarxisright,isn’titjustinevitable–underanysystem–thattreat-ingpeopleasequalsaccordingtoonecriterionofequalitymeanstreatingthemasunequalsaccordingtoanother(aswhenpayingpeopleequallyforequalhoursworkedmeansignoringthefactthatsomearestrongerormorecapablethanothers)?Marxthinksnot.Ashegoesontosay:Inahigherphaseofcommunistsociety,aftertheenslavingsubordinationoftheindividualtothedivisionoflabour,andtherewithalsotheantithesisbetweenmentalandphysicallabour,hasvanished;afterlabourhasbecomenotonlyameanstolifebutlife’sprimewant;aftertheproductiveforceshavealsoincreasedwiththeallrounddevelopmentoftheindividual,andallthespringsofcooperativewealthflowmoreabundantly–onlythencanthenarrowhorizonofbourgeoisrightbecrossedinitsentiretyandsocietyinscribeonitsbanners:fromeachaccordingtohisability,toeachaccordingtohisneeds!(Marx2000h:614)Thesearewell-knownpassages,andtheyillustrateatleastthreefeaturesofDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Marx’sapproachtophilosophy.Thefirstisthatheregardedoneofthetrad-itionalproblemsofpoliticalphilosophyasanon-problem.Thisistheproblemofformulatingaprincipleforthedistributionofresourcesinawaywhichisjustandfair.YoucanthinkofLocke’sdefenceofpropertyandtheprin-cipleofutilityas,eachintheirownway,attemptstosolvethisdifficulty.(ThesamegoesforJohnRawls’ssecondprincipleofjustice,whichisdis-cussedinthefollowingchapter.)Forexample,iftheutilitariansareright,thenthefairestdistributionistheonewhichmostservestoproducethegreatesthappiness.However,thisisonlyaproblemwhereresourcesare\nMarx233scarce,eveniftheyareonlyalittlescarce.Whyworryotherwise?Wherethereisplentyofairtogoaround,wedonotseekaprincipleforthefairdistributionofair.AsRawlswastosay,laterthanMarx,questionsofjusticeariseonlywherethereis‘moderatescarcity’(Rawls1971:127ff.).But,sofarasMarxwasconcerned,suchscarcityisbourgeoisscarcity.Forhim,theproblemisnottoformulateaprincipleofjustdistribution,buttoovercometheconditionswhichmakeitnecessary.So,thesecondfeatureofMarx’sphilosophyillustratedbythesepassagesisthat,likemanyaVictorian,hewasanoptimistwhenitcametothepossibilitieslatentinnewtechnology.Inhisview,scarcityarisesundercapitalismnotbecauseitisinevitablebutbecauseproductionis,inasense,organisedirrationally.Machinesareourmasterswhentheyoughttobeourslaves.Asthepassagesshow,Marxthinksthatoncecommunistsocietyhasreached‘ahigherphase’,‘productiveforces’willincreaseand‘allthespringsofco-operativewealth[will]flowmoreabundantly’.Third,then,theyillus-tratemypointthatMarxdidnotacceptatleastonefamiliarobjectiontocapitalism.However,thereisanothersuchobjectionforwhichMarxwouldhavehadmoretime.Accordingtothis,capitalismisdetrimentaltofreedom,especiallythefreedomoftheproletariat.Thepointcanbearguedinanumberofways.Marxhimselfwouldfrequentlypointoutthatthesituationsoftheslaveandtheproletarianaremateriallyequivalent.Itistruethateachdiffersfromtheotherinlegalstatus–theslaveisownedaspropertywhereastheproletarianisafreeagentinthelabourmarket–butforallthedifferenceitmakestotheproletarian’sconditionsoflife,thetwomightaswellbeequivalent.6Again,itcanbearguedthat,becausetheproletarianworkssuchlonghoursforlittlemorethanasubsistencewage–asMarxthoughtallproletariansmust–thereisverylittleheorsheisfreetodo.(Marxwouldnodoubtagreewiththis,althoughitisnotthepointhewasespeciallyconcernedtomake.)Moreover,itcanbearguedthatthepowerrelationshipbetweencapitalistandworkeris‘coercive’.Marxwouldcertainlyagree.Asheputsit,theworker’slabouris‘notvoluntarybutcompulsory,forcedlabour’(2000a:88).Withincontemporary‘analytic’philosophy,defendersofcapitalismhavetendedtorespondtosuchpointsbysuggestingthattheyrestonamis-interpretationoftheconceptsoffreedomandcoercion.Forexample,agreatDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012dealhasbeenmadeofSirIsaiahBerlin’sinsistence,inhis‘TwoConceptsofLiberty’,thatamereinabilitytodosomethingdoesnotnecessarilycountasalackoffreedomtodoit.AccordingtoBerlin,‘IfIsaythatIamunabletojumpmorethantenfeetintheair…itwouldbeeccentrictosaythatIamtothatdegreeenslavedorcoerced’(Berlin1969b:122).Berlinmayormaynotberighttoclaimthatitisamistaketothinkofgravitationalforceassomethingessentiallyfreedomrestricting,buthisimplicationisthatthesame(therefore)goesforamarketforce.Ashegoesontosay,‘Itisargued,veryplausibly,thatifamanistoopoortoaffordsomethingonwhichthere\n234Moderntimes,modernthemesisnolegalban’–forexample,aloafofbread–‘heisaslittlefreetohaveitashewouldbeifitwereforbiddenhimbylaw’but‘ifmypovertywereakindofdisease,whichpreventedmefrombuyingbread…aslamenesspre-ventsmefromrunning,thisinabilitywouldnotnaturallybedescribedasalackoffreedom’(Berlin1969b:122).Clearly,ifBerlin’ssuggestionisright,itisfalsethattheproletarian’slongworkinghoursandlowpayadduptoadeprivationofliberty.Again,ithasbeenargued–mostnotablybyRobertNozick–thatsimplybeing‘forced’(bycircumstances)tochoosefromarangeofhighlyunattractivealternativesisnotequivalenttobeingcoercedintochoosing.Ifyouhavetochoosebetweenmarryingsomeoneunattractiveandstayingsingleyouarenotcoerced(saysNozick)and,likewise,thelabouroftheproletarianfacedwithachoicebetweenanunattractivejobandstarvingisnot(asMarxthought)coerced.Needlesstosay,othercontemporaryphilosophershavecontestedsucharguments.7Itisveryimportanttogettheseargumentsright,ifonlybecausecapital-ismisstillwithusinabigway.Gettingthephilosophicalargumentsrightispartofwhatyouhavetodoifyouaretounderstandcapitalism.Evenso,Ishan’tpursuethemfurtherbecausetheyarenotMarx’sarguments,ornotespecially.AsIhaveindicated,hewouldhavegonealongwithsome,thoughnotothers,buthiscentralcaseagainstcapitalismisdifferentfromthese.Inmanyways,itrunsmoredeeply.ProductionIfwearetounderstandhumannature,humanhistoryandagreatdealelsebesides,itisfirstofallcrucialtounderstandtheroleplayedbytheactivityofproduction,orsoMarxthought.Thefollowingpassageshowsjusthowcrucialhethoughtitwas.Thepracticalcreationofanobjectiveworld,theworking-overofinorganicnature,istheconfirmationofmanasaconsciousspecies-being,thatis,asabeingthatrelatestothespeciesastohimselfandtohimselfastothespecies.Itistruethattheanimal,too,produces.Itbuildsitselfanest,adwelling,likethebee,thebeaver,theant,etc.Butitonlyproduceswhatitneedsimmediatelyforitselforitsoffspring;itproducesone-sidedlywhereasmanproducesuniversally;itproducesonlyunderthepressureofimmediatephysicalneed,whereasmanDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012producesfreelyfromphysicalneedandonlytrulyproduceswhenheisthusfree;itproducesonlyitselfwhereasmanreproducesthewholeofnature.Itsproducebelongsimmediatelytoitsphysicalbodywhereasmancanfreelyseparatehim-selffromhisproduct.Theanimalonlyfashionsthingsafterthestandardsandneedsofthespeciesitbelongsto,whereasmanknowshowtoproduceaccord-ingtothemeasureofeveryspeciesandknowseverywherehowtoapplyitsinherentstandardtotheobject;thusmanalsofashionsthingsaccordingtothelawsofbeauty.(Marx2000a:90–91)\nMarx235YouwillfindthepassageinoneofMarx’searlierworks,anessayentitled‘AlienatedLabour’.ItisoneoftheEconomicandPhilosophicalManuscriptsof1844,whichrepresenttheearliestdraftoftheprojectwhichwaseven-tuallytobedevelopedbyMarxandpublishedasCapital.ThereareseveralcharacteristicallyMarxianthesesatworkwithinthepassage8but,ifwearetogettotheheartofMarx’sphilosophy,itisthefollowingthreeweneedtograsp.ProducinganimalsClearly,itisMarx’sviewthatthefeaturewhichdistinguisheshumansmostsharplyfromotheranimalsisthefactthatweproduce.Welabourand,withourefforts,wetransformnature.Equallyclearly,thereareechoesofLockehere.LikeLocke,Marxthinksthatifwearetosurvivewehavetolabourtomakenatureusable.Butthereismoretoitthanthat.Marxthinksthatproductionissofundamentalthatitpermeatesandconditionseveryaspectofourbeing.(Thisisnottrueofanimals.Eventhosewhodoproduceworkinlimitedandroutineways.)So,justasAristotledefined‘man’as‘bynatureapoliticalanimal’(Aristotle1981:1253a1)–meaningthatwearecreatureswho‘bynature’inhabitapolis(acity-state)–youcouldsaythatMarxdefinesthehumanasa‘producinganimal’;thefactissocrucialtotheunderstandingofthetypeofcreaturesweare.Tothis,IthinkitisworthaddingthatMarxis,surely,right.Atleast,hiscontentionthatweare,fundamentally,producinganimalsisborneoutbysomefairlyobviousbiologicalfactswithagoodevolutionaryexplanation.Anyzoologistwilltellyouthatthephysiologicalfeatureswhichdistinguishhomosapiensmostsharplyfromotheranimalsarebipedality(havingtwofeet),avoluminousbrain(relativetobodysize),andanopposablethumb.Thereisarelationshipbetweenthesefeatures:eachisexplainedbythefactthat,asaspecies,weareadaptivecreatures.Thereisnospecificenvironmentalnichetowhichwehavebecomepeculiarlyfittedbyevolution.Onthecontrary,wesurvivebyadaptingthewaywelivetoawiderangeofenvironmentalcon-ditions,andwecandothisbecauseweareintelligentandbecausewearetoolusers.Itistherelativelylargebrainwhichexplainsourintelligence(relativetootherspecies),butitisthebipedalitywhichleavesourarmsfreetomanipulatetoolsandtheopposablethumbwhichenablesustogripthem.ItDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012followsthatMarx’sdefinitionisbynomeansarbitrary.Thereissomethingelsetoo.Humansdifferfromotheranimalsinthat,forhumans,productionis‘[T]hepracticalcreationofanobjectiveworld’(Marx2000a:90).AsMarxgoesontosayinthefollowingparagraph,‘he[man]duplicateshimselfnotonlyintellectually,inhismind,butalsoactivelyinrealityandthuscanlookathisimageinaworldhehascreated’(Marx2000a:91).Thisisundoubtedlytruealso.Foreverygenerationofhumanstheworldisdifferent,thankstothewaythepreviousgenerationhaschangedit.Inthissense,wedoproduceaworldinourownimage,andthisisnotso\n236Moderntimes,modernthemesinthecaseofanyotheranimal.AsMarxthinks,thisyieldsafurtherreasonfortreatingproductionasfundamental(thenextonmylist)foritmeansthatitisproductionwhichsupplieshistorywithitsdynamic.ProductionandhistoryRoughlyspeaking,theargumentrunsasfollows.First,humansarecreaturestowhomtheactivityofproductionisfundamental.Tothisithastobeadded–justincaseitisn’tobvious–thatwearecreatureswho,forthemostpart,producebyworkingtogether,notinisolation.(Ifeachperson,workinginisolation,wereabletoproduceenoughtosatisfyhisorherownneeds,historywouldhavebeenverydifferent.)Second,aswework,weconstantlytransformtheworld.AsMarxputsit,‘man’duplicateshimself‘activelyinrealityandthuscanlookathisimageinaworldhehascreated’(2000a:91).However,thefactthatwetransformtheworldbyoureffortsdoesnotmeanthatwechangeitinwaysweintendorlike.Therearesuchthingsas‘unin-tendedconsequences’and,asproductioniscarriedonovergenerations,patternsemergewhichnoonecanhavewantedordeliberatelyplanned.AsMarxputsit,‘Inthesocialproductionoftheirlife,menenterintodefiniterelationsthatareindispensableandindependentoftheirwill’(2000e:425).Whataretheserelations?Well,asyouwouldexpect,therelationsonwhichMarxfocusesarewhathecalls‘relationsofproduction’.AccordingtoMarx,thesumtotaloftheserelations‘constitutestheeconomicstructureofsociety’.Themuch-quotedpassageinwhichtheselinesoccurissuchaclearrepre-sentationofMarx’spositionthatImayaswellpresentittoyoumorefully.Marxdescribesitas‘ThegeneralresultatwhichIarrivedandwhichoncewon,servedasaguidingthreadformystudies’,andhesays:Inthesocialproductionoftheirlife,menenterintodefiniterelationsthatareindispensableandindependentoftheirwill,relationsofproductionwhichcor-respondtoadefinitestageofdevelopmentoftheirmaterialproductiveforces.Thesumtotaloftheserelationsofproductionconstitutestheeconomicstructureofsociety,therealfoundation,onwhichrisesalegalandpoliticalsuperstructureandtowhichcorresponddefiniteformsofsocialconsciousness.Themodeofproductionofmateriallifeconditionsthesocial,political,andintellectuallifeprocessingeneral.ItisnottheconsciousnessofmenthatDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012determinestheirbeing,but,onthecontrary,theirsocialbeingthatdeterminestheirconsciousness.(Marx2000e:425)NotethedistinctionMarxdrawsbetweeneconomic‘foundation’andideo-logical‘superstructure’.(Itisonereasonwhythepassageissofrequentlyquoted.)WhereastheformerissaidbyMarxtoconsistofthe‘sumtotalof[these]relationsofproduction’andtoconstitute‘theeconomicstructureofsociety’,thelatterissaidtobe‘legalandpolitical’initsnatureandto\nMarx237manifestitselfin‘definiteformsofsocialconsciousness’.Moreover,itisintermsofrelevantaspectsofthefoundationthataspectsofthesuperstructurehavetobeexplained.(Inthepassage,Marxusestheterms‘condition’,‘corre-spond’and‘determine’–althoughheiscertainlynosimple-minded‘causaldeterminist’.)ThisisoneofthosepointsonwhichcriticsofMarxhavetendedtofocus.Thequestionis:Canthedistinctionbetweenfoundation(or‘base’)andsuperstructurebecoherentlydrawn?Ifitcan’t,thenhis‘materialistic’accountofhistoricalchangefails–orsoonetypeofobjectionruns.Naturallyenough,defendersofMarxhavebeenunimpressedbythistypeofcharge,andforvariousreasons.Itwouldbebeyondthescopeofthispresentbooktoenterintothecontroversy(whichisfortunateforme,Ithink).Moreover,evenifthefoundation/superstructuredistinctioncanbedrawncoherently,thereremainsthequestionofpreciselyhowthefoundationismeantto‘condi-tion’or‘determine’thesuperstructure.Thatisanotherquestionwhich,having‘flagged’itsexistence,Icanleaveyou,thereader,tofollowup.Thepassagemakesonethingveryclear.ItisMarx’sviewthatthefundamentaldeterminantsofhistoricalandsocialchangeareeconomic.Itistheeconomicstructureofsocietybywhichthesuperstructureisconditioned.Andwhatoftherelationsofproduction(includingpropertyrelations)whichgotomakeupthat?Well,asMarxsays,these‘correspondtoadefinitestageofdevelopmentoftheirmaterialproductiveforces’(Marx2000e:425).TheremarkisclearlyrelatedtosomethingMarxsayselsewhere(thoughwithadegreeofsimplification),namelythat‘Thehand-millgivesyousocietywiththefeudallord;thesteam-millsocietywiththeindus-trialcapitalist’(2000c:219–20).So,whereveryoumaygetafterpickingatdetails,Marx’scentralideaisquiteapparent.Itisjustthis:witheconomic‘advance’–thatis,withthedevelopmentofmanufacturing,theexpansionofmarkets,andsoon–yougetcorrespondingchangesintheeconomicstruc-ture;thatis,intheprevailingsetofrelationsofproduction,includingpropertyrelations.Withthelatteryouget,inturn,correspondingsuperstructuralchanges.AsMarxsawit,capitalismwasitselfapartoftheprocess,amanifestationofthedynamicatworkataparticularpointinitsprogression.(ItisoneofthefeatureswhichmadeMarx’scontributiontothecritiqueofpoliticaleconomysodistinctive.OthershadconcentratedupondynamicprocessesatDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012work,butonlywithincapitalism,notonthe‘outside’forceswhichbroughtitintobeing.AdamSmith’s‘invisiblehand’thesisisagoodexample.)ItwasMarx’sbeliefthat,withdevelopmentsintheeconomicfoundation,historyhadmovedinaparticulardirection.‘Inbroadoutlines’,hewrote,‘Asiatic,ancient,feudal,andmodernbourgeoismodesofproductioncanbedesig-natedasprogressiveepochsintheeconomicformationofsociety’(2000d:426).Inhiswritings,however,hetendedtoconcentrateonthetransitionfromfeudalismtocapitalism(see,forexample,theaccounthegivesinTheCommunistManifesto(MarxandEngels2000)).Asforthefuture,inhis\n238Moderntimes,modernthemespredictionsMarxtendedtoemphasisewhat(ashebelieved)wasabouttohappennext.Forexample,inthe‘Preface’toACritiqueofPoliticalEconomy,afterdistinguishingfoundationfromsuperstructure(inthepassageunderdiscussion),Marxgoesontosaythis:Atacertainstageoftheirdevelopment,thematerialproductiveforcesofsocietycomeincontactwiththeexistingrelationsofproduction,or–whatisbutalegalexpressionforthesamething–withthepropertyrelationswithinwhichtheyhavebeenatworkhitherto.Fromformsofdevelopmentoftheproductiveforcestheserelationsturnintotheirfetters.Thenbeginsanepochofsocialrevolution.Withthechangeoftheeconomicfoundationstheentireimmensesuperstructureismoreorlessrapidlytransformed.(2000e:425)ThatisoneofMarx’smanypredictionsofrevolution.Afterwards–what?Well,iftheproletariatisto‘wrest,bydegrees,allcapitalfromthebour-geoisie,tocentraliseallproductioninthehandsofthestate’,andsoon,itwillinevitablyhavetomake‘despoticinroads’ontheprevailingpropertyrightsandconditionsofproduction(MarxandEngels2000:261).Onlya‘dictatorshipoftheproletariat’canfollowtherevolution.Buteventually,when‘allproductionhasbeenconcentratedinthehandsofassociatedindi-viduals,thepublicpowerwillloseitspoliticalcharacter’,and‘Inplaceoftheoldbourgeoissociety,withitsclassesandclassantagonisms,weshallhaveanassociation,inwhichthefreedevelopmentofeachisaconditionforthefreedevelopmentofall’(Marx2000e:262).ProductionandhumanflourishingYetathirdcharacteristicallyMarxianthesisconcerns(whatyoucouldcall)the‘appropriateness’orotherwiseoftherelationshipswhichholdbetweenhumansandvariousaspectsofproduction.Inthepassageunderdiscussion–thatis,thepassagefromthe1844ManuscriptswithwhichIopenedthissectiononproduction–thismanifestsitselfinMarx’sremarksthat‘manproducesfreelyfromphysicalneedandonlytrulyproduceswhenheisthusfree’andthatman‘knowseverywherehowtoapplyitsinherentstandardtotheobject’sothat‘manalsofashionsthingsaccordingtothelawsofbeauty’Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012(2000a:90–91).IntheimmediatelyprecedingparagraphMarxusestheexpression‘consciousvitalactivity’.Accordingtohim,itisthiswhich‘dif-ferentiatesmanimmediatelyfromanimalvitalactivity’,andheadds:‘Itisthisandthisalonethatmakesmanaspecies-being.’ToreadersunfamiliarwiththeterminologyMarxemployshere–i.e.mostreaders–hismeaningwillnotbeimmediatelytransparent.(Itisatermi-nologywhichderivesfromHegelandfromhis‘YoungHegelian’followers,mostnotablyLudwigFeuerbach,bywhomtheyoungMarxwasheavilyinfluenced.)However,toanyonewhoreadsMarxmoreextensivelyhis\nMarx239meaningwill,Ithink,becomeclearenough.ForMarx,anappropriaterela-tionshipholdsbetweenapersonandthethingheorsheproduces–the‘object’ofproductionashecallsthelatter–when,forexample,thatthingsatisfiesagenuineneedorpurpose(orashesometimesputsit,whenithas‘usevalue’).Sucharelationshipalsoholdswhenathingisproducedtosatisfyaestheticstandards,fashioned‘accordingtothelawsofbeauty’.Therecanalsobeappropriaterelationshipsbetweenproducersandtheactofproductionitself.Theseholdwhentheproductionisa‘free’anda‘consciousvitalactivity’(asMarxwastosayinalaterpiece,‘Reallyfreelabour,thecom-posingofmusicforexample,isatthesametimedamnedseriousanddemandsthegreatesteffort’(2000f:403)).Third,aproducercanberelatedtohisorherfellowproducersinappropriateorinappropriateways.‘[Thus]itisintheworkingoveroftheobjectiveworldthatmanfirstreallyaffirmshimselfasaspecies-being’saysMarx(2000a:91).Ihavebeenusingtheratherinadequateterm‘appropriate’totrytocaptureMarx’sview.I’mafraiditisthebestIcanthinkof.OnereasonforitsinadequacyisthatitfailstocapturethefactthatMarxisconcernedwithwhatyoucouldcall‘humanflourishing’.Ihavealreadydrawnonecompar-isonbetweenMarxandAristotleinthischapter,namelythatbothfixuponaparticularfeatureofhumannatureandtreatitasfundamental.ForAristotle‘man’is‘bynatureapoliticalanimal’(Aristotle1981:I,2,59)–thatis,amemberofapolis–andforMarx‘man’isa‘producinganimal’.Twofurtherparallelsareusefulhere.Thefirstisthat,forbothphilosophers,thereisaparticularenvironmentinwhich–humannaturebeingwhatitis–people‘dowell’ashumans,orflourish.ForAristotle,itisthepolis.ForMarx,itistheenvironmentinwhich‘appropriate’relationshipsholdbetweenproducersandvariousaspectsofproduction.Thesecondisthat,accordingtoboth,alifelivedoutsidethe‘best’environmentiscompromisedanddegraded.AsAristotleseesit,amanwithoutacityislikeanisolatedpieceinagameofdraughts.AsMarxseesit,thelabouroftheproletarian,undercapitalism,isinevitably‘alienatedlabour’.AlienatedlabourWhatdoesMarxmeanby‘alienation’?Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Youcan’treallysummarisethemeaningMarxattachesto‘alienation’inabriefdefinitionorasimpleformula.Farbettertolethimspeakforhimself,soletustakeafairlylengthypassagefromhis1844essay‘AlienatedLabour’,thepassageinwhichhedescribestheworker’salienationinrelationtothe‘object’ofproduction(i.e.thecommoditiestheworkerproduces).‘Westartwithacontemporaryfactofpoliticaleconomy’,writesMarx,namelythat‘Theworkerbecomespoorerthericherishisproduction,themoreitincrea-sesinpowerandscope.Theworkerbecomesacommoditythatisallthecheaperthemorecommoditieshecreates.’Then:\n240Moderntimes,modernthemesWhatthisfactexpressesismerelythis:theobjectthatlabourproduces,itsproduct,confrontsitasanalienbeing,asapowerindependentoftheproducer.Theproductoflabourislabourthathassolidifieditselfintoanobject,madeitselfintoathing,theobjectificationoflabour.Therealisationoflabourisitsobjectification.Inpoliticaleconomythisrealisationoflabourappearsasalossofrealityfortheworker,objectificationasalossoftheobjectorslaverytoit,andappropriationasalienation,asexternalisation.Therealisationoflabourappearsasalossofrealitytoanextentthattheworkerloseshisrealitybydyingofstarvation.Objectificationappearsasalossoftheobjecttosuchanextentthattheworkerisrobbednotonlyoftheobjectsnecessaryforhislifebutalsooftheobjectsofhiswork.Indeed,labouritselfbecomesanobjecthecanonlyhaveinhispowerwiththegreatestofeffortsandatirregularintervals.Theappropriationoftheobjectappearsasalienationtosuchanextentthatthemoreobjectstheworkerproduces,thelesshecanpossessandthemorehefallsunderthedominationofhisproduct,capital.(Marx2000a:86–87)Inthepassage,Marxisdescribinghowcapitalism,initsnormaloperation,workstodistortanddegradetherelationshipbetweentheworkerandtheobjecttheworkerproduces.Rememberthe‘emergentfeatures’Ilistedearl-ier.Onewasthefactthat,withinacapitalistsystem,marketforcespre-dominatetotheextentthatcompetitionbecomesallpervasive.Capitalistscompeteamongstthemselvestosellcommodities,and–likewise–thereisalabourmarketwithinwhichworkerscompetewitheachother.Itis,quiteclearly,Marx’sbeliefthatthelattercanonlyculminateinthesystematicimpoverishmentoftheworker,aslabourbecomesincreasinglycasualisedandwagesdecreaseprogressivelytowardssubsistencelevel.Ashesays,‘Theworkerbecomesacommoditythatisallthecheaper’,and‘labouritselfbecomesanobjecthecanonlyhaveinhispowerwiththegreatestofeffortsandatirregularintervals’.Theprocessisexacerbatedbythefactthatcom-petitionbetweencapitalistsforcesthemmoreandmoretointroducepro-ductivetechniqueswhichrelyuponthedivisionoflabour(anotheroftheemergentfeaturesIlisted).Asaresult,thetypeoflabourrequiredbecomeslessskilledandmoreroutine.Thereforeitwillcommandalowerpriceonthelabourmarket.Thenagain,thereisthequestionofwhatitisthattheworkerproduces.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Wherecapitalismholdssway,theanswerhastobecommodities;thatis,objects(orservices)thecapitalistcanmarket.Doesitmatterwhatthosecommo-ditiesare–sparkplugs,trianglesofprocessedcheese,cansofdeodorant,partsfornuclearmissiles,orwhatever?No,itdoesnot.Giventhe‘logic’ofthesystemthen,fromtheworker’spointofview,allthatmattersisthatheorshecansuccessfullymarkethisorherlabour.(Ofcourse,italsomeansthat,forthecapitalist,allthatmattersisthathecanfindacommoditytomarket.)Thismeansthatthedesirable,or‘appropriate’,relationbetweenworkerandobjectisbroken.Ratherthancreateobjectsdirectlyfortheir‘usevalue’,the\nMarx241workercreatescommoditiesforthecapitalist,forwhomtheirprimevalueisrealisedas‘exchangevalue’.Moreover,giventhepowerrelationshipbetweencapitalistandworker(afurtheremergentproperty)thisalsomeans,asMarxsays,thatthe‘object’oflabour‘confronts’labouritself‘asanalienbeing,asapowerindependentoftheproducer’.InTheEssenceofChristianity,LudwigFeuerbachhadarguedthattheChristianideaofGodis,infact,aprojectionofourunrealisedideals.Unlikeus,Godisalmighty,mercifulandloving,andheinhabitsaworldinwhich–unlikeourown–immortalitycanbeachieved.Itisawayofcompensatingforourinadequacieswhichinhibitspracticalattemptstodealwiththemhereonearth(Feuerbach1989).Marxexpressesasimilaridea,onlyinhiscaseitisthecommoditywhichdoestheworkofGod.‘Itisjustthesameinreligion’,hewrites,‘ThemoremanputsintoGod,thelessheretainsinhimself.Theworkerputshislifeintotheobject,andthismeansthatitnolongerbelongstohim,buttotheobject’(Marx2000a:87).Apageorsolater,Marxturnsfromtheobjectofproductiontoalienation(or‘externalisation’)intheactofproductionitself.Hewrites:Whatdoestheexternalisationoflabourconsistofthen?Firstly,thatlabourisexteriortotheworker,thatis,itdoesnotbelongtohisessence.Thereforehedoesnotconfirmhimselfinhiswork,hedenieshimself,feelsmiserableinsteadofhappy,deploysnofreephysicalandintellectualenergy,butmortifieshisbodyandruinshismind.Thustheworkeronlyfeelsastranger.Heisathomewhenheisnotworkingandwhenheworksheisnotathome.Hislabouristhereforenotvoluntarybutcompulsory,forcedlabour.(Marx2000a:88)Andsoon.Here,too,theworkingsofcapitalismareportrayedasdistortingtherelationshipwhichoughttoholdbetweentheworkerandworkitself.(Theworker‘doesnotconfirmhimselfinhiswork,hedenieshimself’.)Also,thereisasimilarreferencetoreligion:Asinreligionthehumanimagination’sownactivity,theactivityofman’sheadandhisheart,reactsindependentlyontheindividualasanalienactivityofgodsordevils,sotheactivityoftheworkerisnothisownspontaneousactivity.Itbelongstoanotherandisthelossofhimself.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012(Marx2000a:89)Aswehaveseen,Marxthinksthat‘itisintheworkingoveroftheobjectiveworldthatmanfirstreallyaffirmshimselfasaspecies-being’(i.e.abeingwhosenatureitistoproduce)(2000a:91).Alineorsolater,heremarksthat‘alienatedlabourdegradesman’sownfreeactivitytoameans,itturnsthespecieslifeofmanintoameansforhisphysicalexistence’.Andthen,ofcourse,thereisthefactthatan‘immediateconsequence’ofallthisis‘thealienationofmanfromman’(Marx2000a).\n242Moderntimes,modernthemesIsittrue?Marxpaintsapowerfulandcompellingportraitoftheplightoftheworkerundercapitalism,butishedoinganythingmorethanthat?IfMarx’salien-ationthesisisreallyjustaportrait,drawnfromacertainperspective,thenwemusttreatitasnomoreauthoritativethanthat.Ontheotherhand,ifwearetotakeitseriouslyasphilosophy,wemustask:Isitreallytruethatworkersundercapitalismsufferalienation,inMarx’ssenseoftheterm?(Iwon’tbediscussingotherusesoftheword‘alienation’here.)IfIwereaskedtomakeoutacaseagainstMarx,thenIwouldconcentrateonthefactthattheconceptofalienationhasbothstructuralandpsycholo-gicalelements.WhatImeanisthis:first,inthepassagesIhavebeenquot-ing,thealienationoftheworkerisquiteclearlydefinedintermsoftherelationshipswhichholdbetweentheworkerandvariousfeaturesofthecapitalistsystemitself–therelationshipoftheworkertotheobjectofpro-duction;therelationshiptotheactofproduction;therelationshipbetweenbourgeoisandproletarianfromwhichtheseinevitablyflow;andsoon.Second,though,Marxdefinesalienationintermsoftheworker’sstateofmind.Sometimeshedoessodirectly,forexamplewhenhestatesthattheworker‘doesnotconfirmhimselfinhiswork,hedenieshimself,feelsmis-erableinsteadofhappy’(2000a:88).Sometimeshedoessobyimplication,forexamplewhenhewritesthat‘Therealisationoflabourappearsasalossofrealitytoanextentthattheworkerloseshisrealitybydyingofstarvation’(Marx2000a:86).(Noonecanfeelgoodwhenstarvingtodeath.)Clearly,thisraisesthequestionofwhathappenstotheconceptofaliena-tionifweprisethestructuralandthepsychologicalelementsapart.Forexample,supposethatcapitalismisworkingquitewell.Thesystemisbasedonprivateproperty,thereareownersandworkers,thereisafreemarketincommoditiesandanotherinlabour,andsoon;butsupposethattheworkersareneitherimpoverishednorunhappy.Ofcourse,thisisthescenarioenvi-sagedbyenthusiastsforcapitalismwhobelievethatAdamSmith’s‘invisiblehand’will,iflefttoitself,ensurethateveryone’sneedsandwantsaremet.However,youdon’thavetobesuchanenthusiasttoagreethattherecanbetimeswhentheworkingsofafreemarketdonotresultintheimpover-ishmentandmiseryoftheworkingclass.Forexample,itcanbeargued–quiteplausiblyIamsure–thatsincetheendofWorldWarIItheeconomichistoryofWesterncountrieshas,toagreatextent,beentheoutcomeofDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012compromisesstruckbetweenpowerfulworkingclassmovementsandequallypowerfulgovernments.(Itisbecauseithasbeen‘boughtoff’inthiswaythatMarx’spredictedrevolutionhasneverhappened,orsoitcanbeargued.)Asaresultofsuchaprocessyougetworkerswho–ifnotentirelyhappy–areatleastnotmassivelydiscontentedeither.Or,ifnotthat,justsupposethatcapitalismisundergoingaperiodicboom,withtheresultthattheworkersincertainindustriescannegotiategoodwagesandconditionsforthemselves.\nMarx243Inshort,supposethatyouhavebothcapitalismandahappy,oratleastacontented,workforce.Justtofleshitout,suppose–ifyoulike–thatyouarearesearcherinindustrialpsychology.Youvisitafactoryandyouaskagroupofproductionlineworkerstocompleteaquestionnaire.Theworkisroutineand,initself,boring.However,theworkerstellyouthattheyenjoythefactoryatmosphere,theywelcomethechancetomeettheirfriendsandexchangegossip(plusthereisMTV,adrinksmachine,goodcoffee,andsoon).DoesitfollowfromMarx’sargumentthattheseworkersarenolongeralienated?SofarasIcansee,thequestionplaceshiminsomethingofadilemma.Ontheonehand,ifMarxweretoreplythat,beinghappy,theyarenotalienated,thiswouldmeanjettisoningthestructuralcomponentsofhisaccount,fortheseworkerscouldstillbeproducingcommoditieswithno‘usevalue’,theywouldstillbecreatingaworldofcommoditieswhich‘confronts’them‘asapowerindependentoftheproducer’,andsoon.Infact,jettisoningthesecomponentswouldseemtomeanjettisoningtheveryideathatcapit-alismgeneratesalienation.Thatapart,thereissomethingquitefacileabouttheideathatsimplymakingworkershappymeansendingalienation.‘Happyworkers’couldbehappybecausetheyareondrugs,andaMarxistcouldarguethatsuchworkersarepreyto‘falseconsciousness’,theinabilitytoappreciatethetruenatureoftheirsituation.Ontheotherhand,ifMarxweretoreplythathappyworkersremainalienatednevertheless,thiswouldinvitethequestionsowhat?Ifworkersarehappy,itisdifficulttoseewhyitshouldmatterthattheirrelationshiptotheirwork,tothethingstheyproduce,andsoon,isnotasMarxthinksitshouldbe.(AnyMarxisttakingthislinewouldbeexposedtotheobjectionthatheorsheissimplyexpressingacondescending‘bourgeois’prejudicethatworkshouldbe‘meaningful’.)Havingsaidthat,letmenowaddthat,sofarasIcansee,theforegoingobjectiontoMarxisright,butonlyuptoapoint.Itistrue,Iamsure,thatthepresenceofbothstructuralandpsychologicalelementsinhisaccountofalienationcreatesdifficultiesforhim,butIalsofeelthattheobjectionfailstocapturethespiritofMarx’sargument,andthatitmissesitsmarkasacon-sequence.Inthatway,itisquitetypicalofmanyoftheargumentswhichtendtobedirectedagainstMarx,notjusttohisaccountofalienation,buttootherpartsofhisphilosophy.Now,itisnotmyintentiontomakeoutananti-Marxistcasehere.Rather,becausethisismeanttobeanintroductiontoDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012thesubject,whatIshouldtrytodoissetouttheparameters;thatis,togiveyouanideaofhowsuchacasecouldbemadeandhowitcouldbeanswered.So,withthatinmind,letusnowconsiderhowaMarxistmighttrytoanswertheobjectionIhavejustraised.Well,forastart,theMarxistcouldtrytotaketheobjectiononitsownterms;thatis,heorshecouldtrytoshowthatthereis,infact,norealten-sionbetweenthestructuralandpsychologicalelementsinMarx’saccountofalienation.SinceIhavenoideahowsuchacounter-argumentwouldgo,Ishan’tconsiderthispossibility.ButthereissomethingelsetheMarxist\n244Moderntimes,modernthemesmightdo,andthatiscountertheobjectionwithachargewhichisquitefrequentlyraisedagainstMarxhimself,thechargeofpsychologicalnaivety.ItissometimessaidthatMarx’santicipationofafuturecommunistsociety–‘anassociation,inwhichthefreedevelopmentofeachisaconditionforthefreedevelopmentofall’(MarxandEngels2000:262)–ispsychologicallynaive,becausepeopleareinsufficientlyaltruistictosatisfythedemandswhichlifeinsuchanassociationwouldplaceonthem.However,itseemstomethatthesamechargecouldbemadewithequaljustification(perhapsmore)againstmysuggestionthatpeopledoingroutineandboringworkcould,atthesametime,behappy.Justhowrealisticisthissupposition,really?Per-hapsit’struethatallofthemcouldbehappyforsomeofthetime,eventhatsomeofthemcouldbehappyforallofthetime,butthesuppositionthatthemajorityofthemcouldbehappyforthegreaterpartofthetimecouldwellbeafantasy.Ifthisisright,myobjectionstillstandsbut–becauseitlackspointexceptwhereanunrealisticsuppositionismade–ithasnoteeth.ThatisthesortofconsiderationwhichappliestoagreatmanyobjectionstoMarx’sargument–orsoitseemstome.Youcanpickawayatthedetails,butfailtograsptheseriousnessofthepointslyingattheheartofhismoralvision.Ofcourse,nophilosopherwritingnowwouldattempttoframeamoralvisioninthesortofneo-HegeliantermsusedbyMarx.However,inMarx’scaseweshouldnotletthedifficultiesinherentinthelatterblindustotheformer.Surplusvalue:exploitationIhavefocusedonMarx’sthesisthat,withinacapitalisteconomy,thelabouroftheproletarianisalienatedbecauseittakesusrighttotheheartofhisworldview.TheparticularmanuscriptuponwhichIhavebeenconcentrat-ing,‘AlienatedLabour’(Marx2000a:85–94),isoneofMarx’searlierworks.However,alienationisathemewhichrecursthroughouthiswritings,andtherearediscussionsofalienatedlabourinCapital,thefirstvolumeofwhichwaspublishedmuchlater,in1867(Marx2000g).Itisalsoathemewhich,oncegrasped,castslightuponcertainotherwisepuzzlingaspectsofMarx’sphilosophy.Forexample,Marx’swritingscontainnodetailedorspecificdescriptionoffuturecommunistsociety.Exactlywhatdoeshethinkitwillbelike?Onethingareadingofhisworkdoesmakeclear,though,isthatMarxDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012isanticipatingatimewhenalienationwillhaveended.Communistsocietywillbe‘theonlysocietyinwhichtheoriginalandfreedevelopmentofindi-vidualsceasestobeamerephrase’(Marx2000b:207).The‘enslavingsub-ordinationoftheindividualtothedivisionoflabour,andtherewithalsotheantithesisbetweenmentalandphysicallabour[willhave]vanished’(Marx2000h:615).However,thereismoretoMarx’sphilosophythanthealienationthesis–muchmore–anditwouldberemissofmenottogivesomesortofaccountofcertainothercharacteristicallyMarxianthemes.Unfortunately,ifIwereto\nMarx245dealwiththeminthesamedetailasIhavealienation,IwouldendupbywritingabookonMarx–andthatisveryfarfrommyintention.Instead,IshallofferafewobservationsonjusttwootherMarxiantheses,the‘theoryofsurplusvalue’asitissometimescalledand,inthischapter’sconcludingsection,theideathathistorydevelopsinacertaindirection.Verybriefly,then,the‘theoryofsurplusvalue’isfoundedonthepremisethatlabourisacommodity.Thelabourer’swageis,thus,thepricethecapi-talistispreparedtopayforlabour.Toputitanotherway,thewagerepre-sentsthe‘exchangevalue’oflabour.Fromthisitfollows,orsoMarxthinks,thatthewageswilltendtogravitatetosubsistence;thatis,thelevelrequiredtomaintaintheproletariatinexistenceasaclass,andnothingmore.And,indeed,thiswouldfollowif,asisoftenthecase,thereisafreemarketinlabourwithinwhichsupplyexceedsdemand.Theargumentthengoesontopointoutthattheworkercreates‘surplusvalue’,asdemonstratedbythefactthatthecapitalistisabletomakeaprofitfromthesaleofthecommoditiestheworkerproduces.Inshort,theclaimisthat,undercapitalism,theworkercreatessurplusvaluewhichgoes,nottotheworker,buttothecapitalist.Theworkeris,thus,exploited.Althoughtheforegoingsummarymaybebrief–andalthoughitomitsthetechnicalitiesMarxfrequentlyintroducesintohisdiscussion–Idonotbelievethatitrepresentsanoversimplificationofhisview.So,noticefirstthat–statedthusbaldly–thesurplusvaluethesisappearsexposedtoafairlyobviousobjection.Thisstatesthatthereare,infact,onlytwovaluesatworkinMarx’sscenario,andthatbothareexchangevalues.Thereis,first,theexchangevalueofthelabour(or‘labour-power’)thatthecapitalistemploystomanufacturecommodities.Second,thereistheexchangevalueofthecom-moditieshesells,i.e.thepricehegetsforthem.And–astheobjectioninsists–thatisallthereistoit.AllMarxhasdoneisdescribeafairlyevidentfeatureofthecapitalisteconomyatwork,but,orsoitcontinues,hehasfailedtoconvinceusthatthereisanythingwrongwithwhatgoeson(apartfromthefactthattheworkerispaidatsubsistencelevel,thatis).Thesurplusvalueargumentsuggeststhatthecapitalistis,inasense,stealingfromtheworker.So,eitherthesurplusvalueargumentissuggesting,quitesimply,thattheprofitwhichgoestothecapitalistshouldinfactgototheworker,oritissuggestingthatthereissomeghostlythirdvalue–a‘surplusvalue’–somethingwhichisnotanexchangevalue,whichiscreatedbytheworker,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012butwhichisexpropriatedbythecapitalist.Iftheformer,thenweneedafurtherexplanationofwhyitisthatmakingaprofitshouldcountastheft,orsotheobjectionholds.(Whyisn’tMarxjustexpressingaprejudice?)Ifthelatter,weneedtoknowpreciselywhatitisthatthecapitalistissupposedtosteal.Well,inpart,Marxcouldanswerthistypeofobjectionwithhis‘labourtheoryofvalue’,accordingtowhichthevalueofaproductisafunctionoftheamountoflabourwhichhasgoneintoproducingit.Fromthis,itwouldfollowthatthevaluecreatedbytheworkeris,indeed,afunctionofthe\n246Moderntimes,modernthemesworker’slabour,hisorherownlabour.Ifthisisright,thenitclearlyfollowsthatthecapitalistisstealingfromtheworker.However,IwouldnotwanttorestadefenceofMarxuponalabourtheoryofvaluealone,ifonlybecausetherearefewcontemporarythinkers,includingMarxists,whowouldtakethistypeoftheoryseriously.Moreover,thereseemstobemoretoMarx’sviewthanthat.Forexample,inWageLabourandCapital,hegivesthefol-lowingaccountofwhathappenswhenacapitalist,havingpaidaworker–inthiscaseaweaver–frompreviouslyaccumulatedstock,proceedstomarkettheproduct:Itwaspossiblethathedidnotgeteventheamountofthewagesbyitssale.Itispossiblethathesellsitveryprofitablyincomparisonwiththeweaver’swages.Allthathasnothingtodowiththeweaver.Thecapitalistbuysthelabouroftheweaverwithapartofhisavailablewealth,ofhiscapital,justashehasboughttherawmaterial–theyarn–andtheinstrumentoflabour–theloom–withanotherpartofhiswealth.Afterhehasmadethesepurchases,andthesepurchasesincludethelabournecessaryfortheproductionoflinen,heproducesonlywiththerawmaterialsandinstrumentsoflabourbelongingtohim.Forthelatterincludenow,trueenough,ourgoodweaveraswell,whohasaslittleshareintheproduct,orthepriceoftheproductastheloomhas.(Marx2000d:275)Marxconcludesthat‘Wagesare,therefore,nottheworker’sshareinthecommodityproducedbyhim’.But,sowhat?Well,inthiscase,Marxgoesontoconnectthecharacteristicworker–capitalistrelationship,asdescribed,withalienation.Hecontinuesasfollows:Buttheexerciseoflabouristheworker’sownlife-activity,themanifestationofhisownlife.Andthislife-activityhesellstoanotherpersoninordertosecurethenecessarymeansofsubsistence.Thus,hislife-activityisforhimonlyameanstoenablehimtoexist.Heworksinordertolive.Hedoesnotevenreckonlabouraspartofhislife,itisratherasacrificeofhislife.Itisacommoditywhichhehasmadeovertoanother.(Marx2000d:275–76)Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012So,inthiscase,itistheworker’s‘life-activity’ofwhichheisbeingrobbedbythecapitalist.Inthesameessay,Marxwritesthat‘itisjustthisnoblereproductivepowerthattheworkersurrenderstothecapitalistinexchangeformeansofsubsistencereceived’andthat‘Hehas,therefore,lostitforhimself’(2000d:282–83).AsMarxseesit,capitalism(ratherthantheindi-vidualcapitalist)hasrobbedtheworkerofhis‘essence’,his‘vitalactivity’bydistortingtherelationshipbetweentheworkerandproduction–itsproductsandtheactofproductionitself.Clearly,whetheryoufindMarx’sargument\nMarx247convincingherewilllargelydependonhowconvincedyouarebyhisalienationthesis.Inhislaterwork,Marxsometimesanalysed‘thelabourer’sworking-day’intothatpartwhichis‘assignedtothereproductionofthevalueofhisownlabour-power’andthatpartduringwhichthelabourerproducessurplusvalue.Forexample:Itisobviousthatifthelabourerneededhiswholedaytoproducehisownmeansofsubsistence(i.e.commoditiesequaltothevalueofhisownmeansofsubsistence),therecouldbenosurplusvalue,andthereforenocapitalistpro-ductionandnowagelabour.Thiscanonlyexistwhentheproductivityofsociallabourissufficientlydevelopedtomakepossiblesomesortofexcessofthetotalworking-dayoverthelabourtimerequiredforthereproductionofthewage–i.e.surpluslabour,whateveritsmagnitude.(Marx2000i:436)Butonceagain,pacethelineofcriticismunderdiscussion,isn’titjustafactthatworkersmustspendpartoftheirdayproducingcommoditiesforcapi-taliststosell,andifthatisallthereistoit,whereistheobjectiontocapit-alism?Marxwritesasifsomethingisbeingtakenfromtheworker,butwhatcanitbe?Isitjusttime?Well,it’scertainlytruethatthetimetheworkerspendsproducingcommoditiesforthecapitalisttosellistimewhichcouldotherwisebespentdoingotherthings.However,thisisnotequivalenttotheclaimthattheworkercreatesextravalue.Tothis,Iwilladdjustonemorecomment,namelythatthereseemstometobeakindofinverseLockeanintuitionatworkinMarx’s‘surplusvalue’argument.Aswesaw,Lockearguedthatarightofownershipcanbederived,initially,fromthefactthatsomeonelabouredonnature,makingitusefulandsoremovingitfromthecommonstock.SaysLocke,‘thislabourbeingtheunquestionablepropertyofthelabourer,nomanbuthecanhavearighttowhatthatisoncejoinedto’(Locke1964:II,27).9Lockederivesarighttoprivateownershipfromthisargument.Bycontrast,Marxisinsistingthattheindustriallabourersthemselvesshouldhavearightofownershipinwhattheyhaveproduced.Isitpossibletoexplainthesurplusvaluethesismorespecifically?Thatsaid,IamsurethattherewillbereaderssympathetictoMarx’spositionwhowillhavequiteafewcommentstomakeonwhatDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Ihavesaidhere.Iamequallysurethatothers,criticalofMarx,willhavequitealottosay.Bethatasitmay,however,Ishallnowmoveon.Conclusion:MarxandhistoryTwoquestionsremain.First:WasMarxrightabouthistory?Second:HashistorybeenrightaboutMarx?Theformerquestionitselfresolvesintotwosubquestions.Thefirstcon-cernsthemechanismwhich,Marxthinks,drivessocialchange.Aswehave\n248Moderntimes,modernthemesseen,itisMarx’sstatedviewthatchangesintheideological‘superstructure’are‘conditioned’or‘determined’bychangesintheeconomic‘foundation’.Theformeris‘legalandpolitical’innature.Thelatteris‘thesumtotalof[these]relationsofproduction’andit‘constitutestheeconomicstructureofsociety’.Marxwritesthat,forexample,‘Themodeofproductionofmateriallifeconditionsthesocial,political,andintellectuallifeprocessingeneral’.(ForallthisseeMarx2000e:425.)Somecriticshavequestionedthecoher-enceofthisdistinction.Forexample,JohnPlamenatz(1963)hasarguedthatitisimpossibletodefine‘foundation’and‘superstructure’independently.Inroughsummaryhisreasonisthat‘relationsofproduction’mustincludepropertyrelations(suchastherelationbetweentheownerofprivatepropertyandtheworker)butthatpropertyrelationsareinfactlegalrelations.AccordingtoMarx,relationsofproductionarefoundational,whereaslegalrelationsformpartofthesuperstructure,soitfollowsthatMarxhas–sotospeak–positionedpropertyrelationswithafootinbothcamps.Itisnotmyintentiontoenterintothisparticularcontroversyhere,soIwilljustcommentthatIfindPlamenatz’sargumentunpersuasive.Plam-enatzwouldhaveapointifMarxhadintendedustoconstrue‘foundationdeterminessuperstructure’asasimplecausalstatement,like‘drinkingcoffeekeepsyouawake’or‘petrolmakesthecargo’.FollowingHume,10manyphilosopherswouldagreethat,ifsomethingistocountasagenuinecausalstatement,itmustbepossibletospecifycauseandeffectindependently(whichiswhy,onthisaccount,‘opiummakesyousleepbecauseithasa“dormativepower”’isnotagenuinecausalstatement).However,asIseeit,theclaimthatthefoundationdetermines,orconditions,thesuperstructure,neednotbeconstruedonsuchasimplecausalmodel.Foracomparison,taketheclaim–familiarwithinevolutionarytheory–thatfeaturesoftheenvir-onmentcondition(or‘determine’)biologicalfeaturesofanorganism.Forexample,thelengthofthegiraffe’sneckisconditionedbythefactthattheleavesitneedstoeatgrowatacertainheight.(Wecanexplaintheformerfactintermsofthelatter.)Thisistrue,butitdoesn’tfollowthattheleavesmakethegiraffe’sneckgrow.ThesecondsubquestionrelatestoMarx’spredictionofhowthingsarelikelytoturnout.Certainly,therehas,sofar,beennorevolutionofthesorthepredicted.Butistheregoingtobe?Well,noonecoulddenythat,withincapitalism,thereareinequalitiesofwealthandpowerwhichcouldsupplytheDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012dynamic.Couldthetensionsbecomesoseverethatrevolutionfollows?EarlierImentionedtheargumentthattherevolutionhasneverhappenedbecausegovernmentshaverepeatedly‘boughtoff’theworkerswithaseriesofcom-promises.11Thatmaybeso,butIthinkit’sworthremarkingherethattheargumentgainsagreatdealofitsplausibilitybyfocusingontherelation-shipsbetweengovernmentsandworkerswhichholdwithinnation-states,orsmallgroupsofthemsuchasthestateswhichformtheEuropeanUnion.However,everyoneknowsthattradeandcorporatepowernowcrossinterna-tionalboundaries.Ifyoufocusupontherelationshipbetweentherichofthe\nMarx249veryrichnationsandthepoorofthe‘thirdworld’,theargumentstartstolooklessconvincing.WhatofMarx’spredictionthatthestatewilleventuallywitheraway,tobesucceededbyafuturecommunistsociety?Whoknows?Itdependsonwhatafuturecommunistsocietyissupposedtobelikeanduponhowmuchournaturecontainsthepotentialforchange.ButwhatifMarxiswrongonthelastpoint?Thisbringsmetothesecondofmytwoquestions.Withhindsight,whatarewetomakeofMarx’scon-tributiontopoliticalphilosophy?Thesedays,onesometimeshearsitsaidthat,becauseMarx’spredictionofarevolutionfollowedbythedawningofanewcommunisterahasfailedtocometrue(sofar),itfollowsthathisphil-osophyisanirrelevance,andthatwemightaswellignoreit.Inotherwords,Marxhasbeenoutoffashionforawhile.Onthis,Icanonlycomment–first–thatMarxisnotaloneinhavingmadepredictionswhichfailedtomaterialise.AnothergoodexampleisJohnStuartMill.InRepresentativeGov-ernment,Millpredictedthatthesystemofpluralvotingheadvocated–thesystemunderwhichthe(supposedly)moreknowledgeableandintelligenthavemorevotesthaneveryoneelse–wouldsoonbewidelyadopted.‘[T]hetimewillcertainlyarrive’,hewrote,‘whentheonlychoicewillbebetweenthisandequaluniversalsuffrage,whoeverdoesnotdesirethelast,cannottoosoonbegintoreconcilehimselftotheformer’(Mill1991c:338).(Millhadpreviouslyarguedthatnorationalpersoncoulddesire‘equaluniversalsuf-frage’.)Nosuchthinghashappenedand,withhindsight,Mill’spredictionappearslaughable.DoesitfollowthatMill’sphilosophyasawholehasbecomeanirrelevance?Ofcoursenot.Mill’slegacyliesinthecriticalappa-ratusheelaborated–hisliberalpictureofthepoliticalworld–andtheunderstandingwhichcomeswithit.Likewise,Marx’simportanceliesnotinthesuccessorotherwiseofthisorthatpredictionbutinhiscritiqueofcapitalismandtheinsightsityields.So,howshallIsummarisethisaccountofMarx’sphilosophy?InthechapterwithwhichIopenedPartIII(chapter10)Icommentedthat,asthisnarrativebeginstoapproachourowntimes,itwillbecomeincreasinglydif-ficulttotakeanimpartialposition.Marxisacaseinpoint,forthereare,atpresent,manyMarxistphilosophersandsocialscientists,andtherearestrik-ingcontrastsbetweenthepositionstheytake.ThebestIcandohereisofferyoumyownopinion,forwhatit’sworth.Itisthis:itisimportanttodistinguishthetheoreticalframeworkwithinDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012whichMarxtriestoorganisehisinsights,andthoseinsightsthemselves.Iftheformerisinsomewayscreakyandalittleantiquated,thisshouldnotleadustoignorethelatter.Totaketheframeworkfirst,Marx’sthesisthatthehumanessence(asaproductivebeing)mustpassthroughseveralstagesbeforeitachievesfullrealisationinade-alienatedfuturesocietyis,ofcourse,a‘materialised’versionofHegel’sviewthat‘mind’must,similarly,undergomanytransformationsbeforeitachievesfullrealisation.MarxbeganhisintellectuallifeasafollowerofHegelanditistheneedtodrawa‘materi-alistic’parallelwhich,asmuchasanythingelse,fuelshismoreoptimistic\n250Moderntimes,modernthemes(andprobablymoreunrealistic)predictions.Indeedsomethingelseonesometimeshearssaidisthat‘youcan’tunderstandMarxunlessyouunderstandHegel’.Marxisfrequentlydescribedashaving‘stoodHegelonhishead’.ButthisbelittlesMarx’sachievementincertainways,foritsuggeststhatMarxwasnomorethanaHegelian,someonewhofollowedinHegel’sfootstepsbutjustgavehisargumentanewtwist.ThereismoretoMarxthanthat.ForreasonsIhavealreadygiven,youmightjustaseasilydescribehimashavingturnedLockeonhishead,andyoucancertainlydescribehimashavingturnedtheBritish‘politicaleconomists’,AdamSmithandDavidRicardo,ontheirheads.(Isn’thismajorworkjustthat–a‘critique’of‘politicaleconomy’?)Indeed,Marxhasleftquiteafewpeoplestandingupsidedown,andLenin’sobser-vationthatthethree‘componentparts’ofMarxismare‘Germanphilosophy,Englishpoliticaleconomy,andFrenchsocialism’(Lenin1991:23ff.)isnearerthemark.ThisisameasureofMarx’sbreadth,althoughitalsoignoresanothersourceofdifficultyfor–asIhaveargued–itisnotsoobviousthatMarx’sintuitionsonthesubjectof‘surplusvalue’canbeeasilyincorporatedwithintheconceptualframeworkofconventionaleconomictheory.Asfortheinsights,whocoulddenythefollowing:(i)thatthedegreetowhichwehavetoproduceinordertosurvivedistinguishesusmarkedlyfromeveryotheranimal?;(ii)thatthemannerinwhichweproduce–consciouslyandinaccordancewithstandards–alsodistinguishesusmarkedlyfromeveryotheranimal?(iii)thatsuchfactsrundeep,andexplainagreatdealaboutthesortsofbeingsweessentiallyare?;(iv)thatouractionshaveunintendedconsequencesandthat,overtime,thesecanmanifestthemselvesinhistoricalmovementsandsocialstructures?(v)thatthereissuchathingas‘meaningfulwork’?;(vi)that,inarationalworld,machineswouldbeourslavesandnot–astheyareatpresent–ourmasters?and(vii)thattherehastobeabetteralternativetothepresentorder?Noneoftheforegoingis,specifically,a‘Marxian’thesis,butweoweittoMarxforhavingbroughtthemtoourattentionandforhavingbeenoneofthefirstphilosopherstoincorporatethemwithinthecontextofapowerfulphilosophicaltheory.Moreover,ifyouwanttoquestionanyoftheseclaimsthen,asthingsstandatpresent,youwouldneedverygoodreasonsfordoingso.Itisthat,morethananythingelse,whichdemonstratestheextenttowhichourtimesarestillinfusedbyMarx’sspirit.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012SuggestionsforfurtherreadingMarxIfyouareunfamiliarwithMarx’sthought,thenonewaytobeginiswithTheCommunistManifesto.Init,MarxandEngelsgiveaclearoverviewoftheirpositionand–afterall–itwaswrittenbythem\nMarx251specificallyforpeoplewithlittleornopreviousknowledgeofMarxism.Therearemanyeditionsavailable.Otherwise,IwouldsuggestgettingholdofacollectionofMarx’swritingsandreadingthroughit.Afterall,Marxwas–amongstotherthings–apoliticalactivistandpamphleteer.Hisideasarearticulatedinmanyplaces,thoughnotalwaysinfullinanyone.Readingacollectionthroughwillgiveyouabetterimpressionthanreadinganyonework.(MuchbettertodothatthanstartbyattemptingCapital.)Therearemanycollectionsavailable,but,inmyopinion,thebestisDavidMcLellan’sKarlMarx:SelectedWritings(2000).ThereareseveralgoodbiographiesofMarx.Inmyopinion,IsaiahBerlin’sKarlMarx(1978)remainsthebest.Berlintellsagoodstorybut,unliketheothers,healsohasamaster’sgraspofpoliticalideas.Inhisnarrativehemovesbackandforthbetweenbiographyandphilosophicalexpositioninthemostextraordinaryway.TherearemanycommentariesonMarx’swork–thelistinMcLellan’sSelectedWritingsrunstomanypages,soIwilljustmentionafewhere.OneisPeterSinger’sMarx:AVeryShortIntroduction(1980).JonathanWolff’sWhyReadMarxToday?(2002)isaccessibleanduptodate.Inrelativelyrecentyears,oneofthemostsignificantandscholarlycontributionstothestudyofMarxhasbeenG.A.Cohen’sKarlMarx’sTheoryofHistory:ADefence(1978).PeterSingerdescribesthisasabrilliantargumentfor‘amoreold-fashionedinterpretationofMarxismasascientifictheoryofhistory’(Singer1980:105).(Singerhasapoint,butIthinkhisdescriptionunderestimatesCohen’swork.)AnotoriouslyunsympatheticcritiqueofMarx’sargumentiscontainedinKarlPopper’sTheOpenSocietyanditsEnemies(1945).Therearesomegoodcollectionsofarticlesbyphilosophers,ofvariouspersuasions,onMarx’sideas.Seeforexam-plethethree-volumecollectioneditedbyJohnMephamandDavidHillel-Ruben,IssuesinMarxistPhilosophy(1979).Notes1ReadersfamiliarwithLondonmaybeinterestedtoknowthattheaddresswas64DeanStreet,W1.Thereisnowablueplaqueonthehouse.2ThesourcefromwhichIamquotingisBriggs(1982),althoughIsaiahBerlintellsthesamestory(seeBerlin1978:142–43).BerlincitesitsoriginalsourceasNicolaievskyandMaenchen-HelfenDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012(1976).3Awordofwarning:sometimesMarxuses,orMarxandEngelsuse,thephrase‘thedivisionoflabour’tomean‘specialisation’andnothingmore,andnottheextremesubdivisionofataskintosimplecomponentsinordertoboostproductivity.AcaseinpointisthedistinctionMarxandEngelsdrawbetween‘mental’and‘material’productioninTheGermanIdeology(seeMarx2000b:184).4Formyopinion,seemyAnti-Libertarianism:Markets,PhilosophyandMyth(Haworth:1994).5Fordetailsoftheseevents,seeBerlin(1978:195–97).6Forexample,inTheCommunistManifestoMarxandEngelswrite,‘Notonlyaretheyslavesofthebourgeoisclass,andofthebourgeoisstate;theyaredailyandhourlyenslavedbythemachine,bytheoverlooker,and,aboveall,bytheindividualbourgeoismanufacturerhimself’(2000:251).\n252Moderntimes,modernthemes7ThankstoWittgensteinandothers,philosophyinthetwentiethcenturytooka‘linguisticturn’.Philosophersbecamefarmoreawareofthewayphilosophicalproblemscanoriginatewithcon-fusionsaboutmeaning,andwereconsequentlyfarmoreinterestedintheanalysisoflanguageandmeaning.Foranti-MarxistsandMarxistsalike,thishasmeanttryingtospecifythemeaningsofkeypoliticaltermsmoreaccurately.ForNozick’s‘marriage-market’example,seehisAnarchy,State,andUtopia(1974:262).Formy‘analytic’philosopher’scritiqueofsuchargumentsseemyarticlesinEconomyandSociety(Haworth1990,1991,1992).8Idon’tpayanyspecialattentiontoMarx’snotionthatmanisa‘species-being’here.9Idon’tmeanthatMarxisconsciouslyechoingLocke,thoughhemayhavebeen.It’sjustthattheparallelstrikesmeasclear.10ForPlamenatz’scriticismsofMarxonthefoundation/superstructuredistinction,seePlamenatz(1963:279).ForG.A.Cohen’srejoinder,seeCohen(1978:166ff.).Foracompletelydifferentaccountofthedistinction(writtenbyaprominentleft-winghistorian)seeThompson(1978).11Thisisarguedby,forexample,PopperinTheOpenSocietyanditsEnemies.SeePopper(1945,Vol.2,chap.19,pp.146ff.).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n13Rawls:throughreasontojusticeWhenJohnRawls’sATheoryofJustice(1971)wasfirstpublished,StuartHampshire,writingintheNewYorkReviewofBooks,describeditas‘themostsubstantialandinterestingcontributiontomoralphilosophysincethewar’(Hampshire1972).Threeyearslater,RobertNozickfeltabletoremarkthat‘PoliticalphilosophersnowmusteitherworkwithinRawls’stheoryorexplainwhynot’(Nozick1974:183).Almost30yearsafterthat,inhisobituaryofRawls,BenRogerscommentedthat‘theEnglish-speakingworld[has]lostitsleadingpoliticalphilosopher’(Rogers2002).Thesearenoexaggerations.BecausethetimesofRawlshavealsobeenmyowntimes,Ithinkyoucantakemywordforit.Throughouttheperiodinquestion,Rawls’stheoryhassetthebackground–orasizeablesectionofit–againstwhicheveryseriouspoliticalphilosophermustdefinehisorherownwork.ItisjustasthelinesIhavequotedsuggest.Thingswilleventuallychange.Ofcoursetheywill.Evenso,theinfluenceofRawlshasbeensuchthatitisclearlyessentialtograspthenatureofhisachievement.So,whatdidhedo?IamsurethattheenthusiasmwithwhichATheoryofJusticewasreceivedcanbeexplained,inpart,bythefactthat,sincetheendofWorldWarIIattheveryleast,fewphilosophershadtakenmuchinterestinpoliticalideas.Infact,politicalphilosophyhadbecomedeeplyunfashionable.Onthewhole,professionalphilosophershadtendedtoportrayphilosophyas‘linguisticanalysis’,theactivityofuntanglinglanguagewithaviewtoshowinghowapparentproblemsarisefromamisunderstand-ingofhowitworks.Moreover,theyhadtendedtoconcentrateonproblemsoflogic,languageandphilosophicalpsychology(whichoftenlendthem-selves,quitereadily,tothe‘analytic’approach),somuchsothat,writinginDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December20121958,IsaiahBerlinfeltabletocommentthat‘avisitorfromMarstoanyBritish–orAmerican–universitytodaymightperhapsbeforgivenifhesustainedtheimpressionthatitsmemberslivedinsomethinglikethisinnocentandidyllic[i.e.utopian]state,foralltheseriousattentionthatispaidtofundamentalproblemsofpoliticsbyprofessionalphilosophers’(Berlin1969b:118).Onepoliticalphilosopher,PeterLaslett,proclaimedthat‘Forthemomentanyway,politicalphilosophyisdead’(Laslett1956:vii).Infact,Laslettwasexaggerating.Somesignificantworkinpoliticalphil-osophyhadbeenproducedduringtheperiodinquestion.Examples–some\n254Moderntimes,modernthemesofthemoreprominent–areKarlPopper’sTheOpenSocietyanditsEnemies(publishedin1945)andhisThePovertyofHistoricism(in1957(1961)),C.B.Macpherson’sThePoliticalTheoryofPossessiveIndividualism(publishedin1962(1964)),MichaelOakeshott’sRationalisminPolitics(in1962(1991))andBrianBarry’sPoliticalArgument(in1965).Moreover,IsaiahBerlinwaspro-ducingessaysataprolificrateand,ironically,Laslett’sclaimisalsobeliedbythecollectionofessayscontainedintheveryvolumetowhichhewaswritinganintroduction,andinwhichthatclaimiscontained.Itisworthnoticing,however,that,foralltheiroriginalityandimpact,theseare,mostly,workswhichcanbeplacedatonepointoranotheralongafamiliar,‘left–right’spectrum.Popper’sworkis,thus,pro-liberal,anti-fascistandemphaticallyanti-Marxist;MacphersontakesabroadlyMarxianline;whereasOakeshott’sargumentistraditionally(i.e.Burkean)conservative.1Whatwasmissingwasnotsomuchpoliticalphilosophyperse,butathesiswithanoverarchingvision–anew‘paradigm’,ifyoulike–anditwasthiswhichRawls’sambitiousaccountof‘justiceasfairness’provided.Whereasphilosophyoutsidethefieldofpoliticshadtendedtobedescriptiveand‘analytic’–andwhereaspoliticalphilosophersthemselveshadtendedtoarguefromonefamiliarideologicalstandpointoranother–Rawlshadarticulatedageneralthesisfromwhichanewperspectiveonawiderangeofissuescouldbegained.Thatwashisachievement.So,whileitistrueenoughthatRawlsgaveprofessionalpoliticalphilosopherssomethinginterestingtotalkabout–somethingtogettheirteethinto–toexplainthesignificanceofhiscontributionmerelyintermsofitsnoveltywouldbetobelittleit.Inthischapter,then,IshallfocusupontheargumentofATheoryofJustice,and–letmestress–onlyuponthatargument.IemphasisethepointbecauseitsrelationtotheargumentofRawls’ssecondmajorbook,PoliticalLiberalism(1993)remainsamatterofcontention.Thisbeingso,Ihavethoughtitwisetodevoteaseparatechapter(chapter15)toRawls’s‘later’philosophy.Thepresentchapterisstructuredasfollows.First,inthefollowingsection,IshalldescribetheconclusionRawlssetsouttoestablishinhisearlierbook.Thiswillinvolveintroducinghisfamoustwoprinciplesofjustice.Asyouwillsee,theseembodyaformofliberalism(and,althoughRawlsrarelymadehisopinionuponday-to-dayeventspublic,onecanmakeanintelligentguessDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012astowhomhewouldhavebeenlikelytovotefor.)Afterthat,IshallturntothemostinterestingfeatureofRawls’sphilosophy,namelytheargumentwithwhichhesupportshisconclusions.Inthecourseofmydiscussion,Ishallofferafewcriticalcommentsuponhis‘derivation’ofthetwoprinci-ples.Thereisastrongly‘universalist’flavourtoRawls’s‘earlier’project,andIshallbringthechaptertoaclosewithadiscussionofthat,foritcouldbethattheuniversalismismerelyapparent.ItisthepointuponwhichRawlsclaimedtohavebeenradicallymisunderstood–andthatdespitetheprofundityandrigourofhisfirstbook.\nRawls:throughreasontojustice255ThequestionofjusticeThequestionThequestionRawlssetsouttoansweris–toputitloosely–‘thequestionofjustice’.‘Justice’,hesays,‘isthefirstvirtueofsocialinstitutions,astruthisofsystemsofthought’.Inotherwords,itistheconceptintermsofwhichweevaluate,atthemostfundamentallevel,allsocialandpoliticalarrangements.‘Atheoryhoweverelegantoreconomicalmustberejectedorrevisedifitisuntrue’,saysRawls,and‘likewiselawsandinstitutionsnomatterhoweffi-cientandwell-arrangedmustbereformedorabolishediftheyareunjust’(1971:3).Thatiswhyhethinksthequestionimportant.Isupposeyoucouldsaythatitis–prettymuch–thequestionPlatoaddressesintheRepublic,althoughitwouldnotbequiteaccuratetoequatethetwo.ThatisbecausePlatoisinterested,notsomuchinwhatwewouldcall‘justice’asinwhattheGreekscalledarete-.Aswesawinchapter2,itisPlato’sthesisthatthevirtue,arete-,ismanifestincertainpoliticalrelationships,withthephilo-sopherrulersincharge,theordinarypeople‘mindingtheirownbusiness’,andsoon.But,bycontrastwithPlato,sofarasRawlsisconcerned,thejusticeofanarrangementisaquestionofthedegreetowhichitmatchescertainprinciples.Theproblemistoworkoutwhatthose‘principlesofjustice’are.Rawls’sanswer:thetwoprinciplesInanswertothequestion,Rawlsformulatestwoprinciples,thesebeinghisfamous‘twoprinciplesofjustice’.TheprinciplesaresaidbyRawlstoapply,primarily,tothe‘basicstructureofsociety’,ashecallsit;inotherwords,to‘thewayinwhichthemajorsocialinstitutionsdistributefundamentalrightsanddutiesanddeterminethedivisionofsocialadvantagesfromsocialcooperation’(1971:7).Asheexplains,heunderstands‘themajorinstitutions’tocomprise‘thepoliticalconstitutionandtheprincipleeconomicandsocialarrangements’.Examplesofsuchinstitutionsare,hesays,‘thelegalprotec-tionoffreedomofthoughtandlibertyofconscience,competitivemarkets,privatepropertyinthemeansofproduction,andthemonogamousfamily’(Rawls1971:7).(Clearly,somethingmusthanguponpreciselywhatoughttobeincludedinthislist.The‘monogamousfamily’isespeciallyproble-Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012matic,but,forthemomentanyway,Ishallsetthatquestiontooneside.)2Rawls’sclaimisthatanysocialorpoliticalarrangement,any‘setofpractices’,whichformspartofthebasicstructureisthemorejustthemoreitcanbedescribedintermsofthoseprinciples,andthatitisthelessjustthelessthiscanbedone.Letmetakeeachprincipleinturnandofferafewwordsofexplanationineachcase.So,hereisthefirstprinciple,asformulatedbyRawlsatonepointinATheoryofJustice:\n256Moderntimes,modernthemesFirstPrincipleEachpersonistohaveanequalrighttothemostextensivetotalsystemofequalbasiclibertiescompatiblewithasimilarsystemoflibertyforall.(1971:302)Whentheprincipleisstatedthusbaldly,andoutofitssupportingcontext,theprinciple’smeaningishardlyapparent.PerhapsitwouldhelpifIweretoputRawls’spointlessformally.Roughlyspeaking,then,Rawlsisstatingthat,inajustsociety,libertyisdistributedequallybetweenindividuals,witheachpersongettingasmuchlibertyasheorshecan(compatiblywitheveryoneelse’shavinganequallylargeamount).NoteespeciallythatRawls’spoliticalorientationisevidentfromthisfirstprincipleandthewayheatta-chessomuchimportancetoit.Itis,thus,clearthat,likeJohnStuartMillbeforehim,Rawlsisouttodefendaversionofliberalism.Infact,itwouldbeanunderstatementtodescribebothasliberalsfor,justasMillwastheforemostliberalpoliticalphilosopherofthenineteenthcentury,soRawlswillberememberedasthatofthetwentieth.Now,youmayrecallthat,inthechapteronMill(chapter11),Ispecifiedthreecriteriathatapoliticalphilosophymustsatisfyifitistoqualifyasliberal.Thesewereasfollows.First,Istatedthataliberalphilosophymustembodythebeliefthatfree-dom(orliberty)ishugely–ifnotsupremely–important.InRawls’sphilo-sophythisbeliefisexpressed,notsimplybythefactthatlibertyformsthesubjectofhisfirstprinciple,butinhisstrictinsistencethatthefirstprinciplemustalwaystakepriorityoverthesecond.AsRawlsputsit,‘adeparturefromtheinstitutionsofequallibertyrequiredbythefirstprinciplecannotbejustifiedby,orcompensatedfor,bygreatersocialandeconomicadvantages’(1971:61).(Equalityandinequalityinthedistributionofsocialandeco-nomicadvantagesformthesubjectofthesecondprinciple.Weshallbecomingtothatinamoment.)Second,Istatedthat,tocountasliberal,apoliticalphilosophymustembodytheclaimthatitisonlywhereaparticularsetofspecifiedlibertiesisrespectedthatasocietycanbedescribedastrulyfree.InMill’scase,thistakestheformofhisinsistencethatthereisa‘sphereofaction’withinwhichspecificlibertiesare‘comprised’andwhichoughttobeprotected(MillDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December20121991a:71).Inaparallelmanner,Rawlsintendsustounderstandliberty,asdistributedinaccordancewithhisfirstprinciple,asthelibertyembodiedinasetoffundamentalrightsor‘basicliberties’–therighttovote,freedomofspeech,libertyofconscience,andsoon(seeRawls1971:61).Astheprinci-pleitselfputsit,intheversionquotedabove,eachpersonistohaveanequalright‘tothemostextensivetotalsystemofequalbasicliberties’.Third,Istatedthat,withinaliberalpoliticalphilosophy,theformerbeliefisunderpinnedbyamoregeneralconceptionoffreedom,construedasthelibertytoliveyourownlifeinyourownway(or‘autonomously’).InMill’s\nRawls:throughreasontojustice257case,thistakestheformofhisviewthat‘theonlypurposeforwhichpowercanberightfullyexercisedoveranymemberofacivilisedcommunity,againsthiswill,istopreventharmtoothers’andthat‘hisowngood,eitherphysicalormoral,isnotasufficientwarrant’(1991a:14).InRawls’sphilo-sophy,itisembodiedinhisargumentthathistwoprincipleswouldbechosenbyrationalindividualswithaninterestinfulfillingplansandpurposesoftheirown(apointIshallexplainmorefullyinamoment).TherelationshipbetweenMill’sphilosophyandhisownisacknowledgedbyRawlsinhisposthumouslypublished,LecturesontheHistoryofPoliticalPhilosophy,inwhichhestates,‘IbelievethatthecontentofMill’sprinciplesofpoliticalandsocialjusticeisveryclosetothecontentofthetwoprinciplesofjusticeasfairness’somuchsothat,‘forourpresentpurposes,wemayregardtheirsubstantivecontentasroughlythesame’(Rawls2007:267).RawlsclearlybelieveshimselftobeestablishingapositionwhichisverysimilartoMill’s,thoughwithadifferentsetofarguments(contractualistasopposedtoutilitarian).3IfRawlsisright,thenthisclearlyraisesthequestionofwhetherhisargumentsfortheliberalpositionare,infact,anybetterthanMill’s.Itisn’taquestionIshalladdressdirectly,butyoumaywanttobearitinmindasyoureadthischapterthrough.WhatofRawls’ssecondprincipleofjustice?InjustthesamesectionofATheoryofJustice,Rawlsformulatesitasfollows:SecondPrincipleSocialandeconomicinequalitiesaretobearrangedsothattheyareboth:a)tothegreatestbenefitoftheleastadvantaged,consistentwiththejustsavingsprinciple,andb)attachedtoofficesandpositionsopentoallunderconditionsoffairequalityofopportunity.(1971:302)Thefirstpartofthesecondprinciple–‘thedifferenceprinciple’asithascometobeknown–ismeanttogovernthedistributionof‘primarysocialgoods’which,‘togivetheminbroadcategories,arerightsandliberties,opportunitiesandpowers,incomeandwealth’and–orsoRawlsadds–‘asenseofone’sownworth’(1971:92).(Ishan’tdwelluponRawls’sunexcep-tionableinsistencethatrelativeadvantagesmustbe‘attachedtoofficesandDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012positionsopentoallunderconditionsoffairequalityofopportunity’or,forthatmatter,onthetechnicalitiesintroducedbyhissubsequentreferencetothe‘justsavingsprinciple’(1971:284–93).)Rawls’sformulationoftheprinciple,asquoted,is,ifanything,evenmoretechnicalthanthatofhisfirstprinciple,4sohere,too,itisworthmytryingtoputhispointlessformally.Inthiscase,letmejuststresstheprinciple’sessentialfeature,namelythatRawlsisnotagainstinequalityperse.Inhisview,inequalityisunjust,butonlyifitworkstothedetrimentoftheworstoffindividuals.Bycontrast,whereaninequalityimprovesthesituationoftheworstoff,byraisingittoa\n258Moderntimes,modernthemeslevelhigherthanitwouldotherwisebe,inequalityisacceptable.Inthelattercase,objectionstoinequalityare,hesays,nothingmorethanexpressionsofirrationalenvy(Rawls1971:530ff.).Icouldbewrong–Ihaven’tcarriedoutasystematicsurvey–butmyguessisthattheattitudetoinequalitytowhichRawls’ssecondprinciplegivesexpressionischaracteristicofagreatdealofmainstreampoliticalopi-nion.TherearemanywhowouldagreewithRawlsthatthereisnothingwrongwithinequalityinitself,butthatinequalityisobjectionablewherethebetteroffcanbecharged,inonewayoranother,withlivingattheexpenseoftheworseoff.IfIamright,thatwouldhardlybesurprisingfor,likeeveryphilosophertohavebeendiscussedinthisbook,Rawlsisachildofhistime.Imeanthat,asitispossibletothinkofHobbesasthephilosopheroftheEnglishcivilwar,forexample,andMarxasthephilosopherofnine-teenth-centuryindustrialisation,soitispossibletothinkofRawls’ssecondprincipleasanexpressionofthe‘post-warconsensus’whichprevailedthroughouttheWestfromtheendofWorldWarIIuntiltheearly1980s(roughlyspeaking).IntheUSA,theconsensuswasfirstgivenpracticalexpressionatthelevelofpublicpolicybythe‘FairDeal’reformsinstitutedbyPresidentHarryS.Trumanfrom1945onwards.AsTrumanputitinhis1949StateoftheUnionaddress,‘EverysegmentofourpopulationandeveryindividualhasarighttoexpectfromourGovernmentafairdeal.’Ashesawit,‘nounfairprejudiceorartificialdistinctionshouldbaranycitizenoftheUnitedStatesofAmericafromaneducation,orfromgoodhealth,orfromajobthatheiscapableofperforming’(Truman1949).(IntheUK,theequivalentmeasureswerethesweepingreformswhichintroducedtheBritish‘welfarestate’.Theseincludedthe1944EducationActandthesettingupoftheNationalHealthService.)Now,IsaythisknowingverywellthatRawlsrarelymadepublichisviewsonthisorthatissueofpolicy.ThegreatexceptionisthehorrorheexpressedatthenuclearattacksonHiroshimaandNagasakilaunchedbytheUnitedStatesin1945(seeRawls1995a).However,therearefundamentalfeaturesofhisapproachwhichrenderhissympathiesperfectlyevident.Forexample,thereisRawls’sinsistence,throughouthiscareer,thatsocietymustbeviewedasa‘systemofco-operation’,andthatthepurposeofanytheoryofjusticemustbetoestablish‘fairterms’onwhichcooperationcantakeplace(see,forexample,Rawls2001:5ff.).Inlinewiththis,hissecondprincipleisDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012quiteclearlyredistributive.Inotherwords,Rawlsbelievesthatitisperfectlyinorderforastatetotakefromtherelativelywelloffforthebenefitoftherelativelybadlyoff,wherefaircooperationrequiresthatthisshouldbedone.JusttosummarisethisaccountofRawls’sprinciples,then:Rawlsisbothaliberal(bythefirstprinciple)and,thoughnotastrictegalitarian,aredis-tributivist(bythesecond).Ithinkyouwillagreewithmethat,whenviewedfromthestandpointofthetwenty-firstcentury,Rawls’splaceontheleft–rightpoliticalspectrumappearsneitheroriginalnorwildlyextreme.(It’s\nRawls:throughreasontojustice259unlikelythatanyfurthereditionsofRawls’sbookwillbeboundintheskinsofthosewhodidn’ttakethefirsteditionseriouslyenough.)Thatsaid,letusnowturntothemostinterestingfeatureofRawls’sphilosophy,namelytheargumentwithwhichhesupportshisviewthathistwoprinciplesembodythevirtueofjustice.Rawls’sguidingconceptionTheoriginalpositionSo,thequestionis:Whythosetwoprinciplesratherthansomeother(s)?(Theobviouscandidatesherearevariousversionsoftheprincipleofutility.)TothisRawls’sansweristhathisaretheprincipleswhichwouldbeselectedbyanimaginarygroupofrationalchooserswhofindthemselvesinahypothe-ticalsituationwhichhecalls,‘theoriginalposition’.ThisistheideawhichliesrightattheheartofRawls’sphilosophyand–forallthetechnicalitywithwhichRawlsarticulatesit–itis,nevertheless,simple,straightforwardandpowerful.Rawls’sgeniusliesinthepersistencewithwhichheworksthatideaout,andwithwhichheconstantlyrevisesandreinforcesit.How,then,shallIexplaintheoriginalposition?Well,hereisoneexpla-nation(myown,notRawls’s).Imagineagroupofpeoplewho–forwhateverreason–findthemselveshavingtocooperatewitheachother.It’snotessen-tialbut,ifyoulike,youcanimaginethemmaroonedonanisland.Theyknowthatitwillprobablybesometime–monthsoryears–beforeapassingshipturnsuptorescuethem.Inthemeantime,theyhavetosurviveandso–knowingthis–theyareholdingameeting.Itspurposeistodetermine‘groundrules’.Theseruleswillgovernthewaytheybehavetowardseachother,thewaytasksaretobeallotted,thewayfoodistobedistributed,howfuturedecisionsaretobemadeandmuchelsebesides.Nowsupposethattheysucceedinagreeingasetofrules.Thefirstpointtonoteisthatthesetofrulestheyagreecan,quitenaturally,bedescribedinanumberofways.Forexample,itseemsrighttodescribetherulesasthecommunity’s‘con-stitution’,fortherecanbenodoubtthat,wheneverdisagreementssubse-quentlyarise,peoplewillreferbacktotherulesasawayofsettlingdisputes.Also,thereisasenseinwhichyoucoulddescribetherulesas‘principlesofjustice’,ifonlyforthespecificgroupofindividualsinquestion.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Doesitfollowthattherulesembodytheprinciplesofjustice;thatis,dotheyembodyprincipleswhichyouorIwouldrecogniseasprinciplesofjus-tice,eventhoughwearenotmembersofthegroupmaroonedontheislandandwerenotpresentatthemeeting?Rawlswouldarguethattheydonot,althoughIamsurethattherearesomephilosopherswho,onreadingthis,wouldwanttoinsistthatmystoryshouldstoprighthere.Suchphilosopherswouldarguethat,whetherornotyoucallthetermstowhichthecharactersinmystoryagreeprinciples‘ofjustice’,themostthatcanbehopedforinpracticeisthattheyestablishsomeminimallydecentmodusvivendi.For\n260Moderntimes,modernthemesexample,JohnGrayrejectstheideathattherecouldbean‘ultimatecon-vergenceonvalues’here,onewhichembodies‘theidealofrationalcon-sensus’,aschimerical(Gray2000:105ff.).Or,totakearatherdifferentexample,RichardRortyarguesthattheonly‘socialglue’requiredbyliberalsocietyis‘littlemorethanaconsensusthatthepointofsocialorganisationistoleteverybodyhaveachanceatself-creationtothebestofhisorherabil-ities’(Rorty1989:84).Onthisview,‘foundationalism’–theattempttoderiveliberalismfromprincipleswhichare(supposedly)moreprofound–ispointlessandmisguided.Maybeso;but,forthemoment,Ishallsetthepossibilityofsustainingobjectionsalongsuchlinestooneside,andcontinuewithmyexplanationofRawls’s‘originalposition’idea.(Weshallbeconsideringsuchobjectionsmorefullyinchapter15.)Accordingly,Ishallsupposethatthetermstowhichthecharactersinmystoryhavesofaragreeddonotembodyprinciplesofjustice,thereasonbeingthat,foranygroupofrealpeople,itisalwayspossiblethattherewillbecircumstanceswhichwouldbiastheoutcomeofameetinginsomeway.Forexample,supposethatthereisasubgroupofintimidatingbullies.Thissubgroupsucceedsingettingtheotherstoagreetoruleswhichconferspecialprivilegesuponitsmembers.Evenso,itwouldbewrongtodescribesuchrulesas‘just’foritisarequirementofanyconceptionofjusticethatitappliestoindividualsimpartially.Oragain,supposethatonepersonhasaspecialtalentwhicheveryoneknowswillbeinshortsupply.(Forexample,supposethispersonisadoctor,skilledatcuringdiseases.)Whatifheorsheusesthetalenttoextortconcessionsfromtheothers?Again,theoutcomecouldbeabiasedrulegrantingspecialprivileges,andnotsomethingyouorIcouldrecogniseasaprincipleofjustice.Butnow–bycontrastwiththeforegoingscenario–imagineagroupofindividualsplacedinasituationfromwhichanythingwhichcouldarbitrarilybiastheirchoiceofprincipleshasbeeneliminated.Wouldtheythenchooseprinciplesunmistakablyrecognisableasprinciplesofjustice?Rawls’sansweristhattheywould.The‘veilofignorance’ItisinordertoeliminatethethreatofsucharbitrarybiasthatRawlsplaceshisimaginarychoosersbehindahypothetical‘veilofignorance’.HereiswhatDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012hesays.It[theoriginalposition]isunderstoodasapurelyhypotheticalsituationchar-acterisedsoastoleadtoacertainconceptionofjustice.Amongtheessentialfeaturesofthissituationisthatnooneknowshisplaceinsociety,hisclasspositionorsocialstatus,nordoesanyoneknowhisfortuneinthedistributionofnaturalassetsandabilities,hisintelligence,strength,andthelike.Ishallevenassumethatthepartiesdonotknowtheirconceptionsofthegoodortheirspecialpsychologicalpropensities.Theprinciplesofjusticearechosenbehinda\nRawls:throughreasontojustice261veilofignorance.Thisensuresthatnooneisadvantagedordisadvantagedinthechoiceofprinciplesbytheoutcomeofnaturalchanceorthecontingencyofsocialcircumstances.Sinceallaresimilarlysituatedandnooneisabletodesignprinciplestofavourhisparticularcondition,theprinciplesofjusticearetheresultofafairagreementorbargain.(Rawls1971:12)Withitsveilofignorancethisisnotasituationweare,anyofus,likelytofindourselvesin,althoughwecanallgothereimaginatively,withthehelpofa‘thoughtexperiment’(asRawlssays,itisa‘purelyhypothetical’situation.Inalaterspecification,heevendeniesthepartiesknowledgeoftheirownrace,ethnicityandsex(seeRawls2001:15)).Butthatishardlythepoint.Withhisdescriptionoftheoriginalposition,andwhatevermodificationshemadetoitoverthecourseofhislife,Rawls’spurposewasalwaystomirror–ontheonehand–thoseelementswemusttaketostructureanyconceptionofjustice(impartialityandsoon)and,ontheother,certaindeep,all-pervasivefeaturesofthehumanconditionitself.Thelatterconsiderationapplies,similarly,tohisdescriptionoftheindividualshepic-tureschoosingprinciplesfromwithintheoriginalposition.Theyarepicturedaslimitedinaltruismandascapableofforming‘rationalplansoflife’forthemselves;thatis,offormulatinggoals,makingplansandoftryingtocarrythemthroughinarationalandsystematicway.Itisassumedthateveryonestandstogainfromcooperatingwiththeothersandthat,whenchoosingprinciples,nooneisinapositiontocoerceanyoneelse.Mostimportantly,itissupposedthatthehypotheticalindividualsinthishypotheticalsituationarerational.ContractualismandutilitarianismAsthelastfeaturelistedindicates,wecanthinkofATheoryofJusticeasanexerciseinrationalchoicetheory.Infact,Rawlsdescribesitasthat(1971:408ff.),justasheexplicitlydrawsaparallelbetweentheroleplayedbytheconceptionofanoriginalpositioninhisownargumentandtheroleplayedbytheconceptionofastateofnatureinclassicalsocialcontracttheory.‘Myaim’,hesays,‘istocarrytoahigherlevelofabstractionthefamiliartheoryofthesocialcontractasfound,say,inLocke,Rousseau,andKant’(Rawls1971:11).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Specifically,ratherasHobbesseekstoresolvetheproblemofpoliticalobli-gationwithanaccountofwhyrationalindividuals,placedinastateofnature,wouldchoosetoinstituteanabsolutesovereign,soRawlsseekstoresolvethequestionofjusticewithanaccountofwhatrationalindividualswouldchoosefromacarefullyspecifiedoriginalposition.This‘con-tractualism’isanotherreasonwhyRawls’sargumentarousedsomuchinter-estwhenATheoryofJusticefirstappeared.Priorto1971,socialcontracttheoryhadappearedlittlemorethanahistoricalcuriosity.Sincethen,ithasturnedouttobeverymuchalive.\n262Moderntimes,modernthemesFinallyinthissection,weshouldtakenoteoftherelationshipbetweenRawls’sapproachandutilitarianism.Earlier,inthechapteronMill,Iraisedthe(bynowveryfamiliar)objectiontothelatterthat,beingacon-sequentialistphilosophy,utilitarianismcannotaccountfortheexistenceofrights.Ofcourse,likeeverythinginphilosophy,theaccuracyoftheobjectionisitselfopentoquestion.However,thepointtonotehereisthatRawlsacceptsit.Indeed,itisRawlshimselfwhowaslargelyresponsibleforbringingitsoforcefullytotheattentionofphilosophersworkinginrecenttimes,andoneofhisexplicitlystatedaimsistoformulateatheoryofjusticewhichgivesabetteraccountofrightsthanutilitarianismcan.Thatisonereasonwhyheascribeslimitedaltruismand‘rationalself-interest’tohishypotheticalrationalchoosers.Thelatterarenotrabidlycompetitiveandegocentric–theyarenotliketheindividualsportrayedbyHobbes–buttheywillbeconcernedtodefendtheirabilitytoworktowardsthefulfilmentoftheplanstheyhavesetthemselves.Thispromisesabetteraccountofrightsbecauseaclaimofrightis,inasense,aself-interestedclaim.Nopurelyaltruisticpersonwouldeversay:‘Youcan’tdothat.Youmustdothis.Ihavesuch-and-suchrights.’HowtothinkcriticallyaboutRawls’sargumentAsnotedinchapter6,Hobbesdescribedhisownsocialcontractasa‘theo-reme’,therebylikeningittoachainofreasoninginmathematics(Hobbes1981:216–17).Thismadeitpossibletorepresenthisargumentasproceed-ingdeductivelyfromasupposedlycrediblepremise,orsetofpremises,throughsupposedlylogicallyvalidstepstoitsconclusion.AsIalsopointedout,anyargumentwhichmatchesthisgeneralpatternisvulnerabletocriti-cismatanumberofpoints.First,thecredibilityofthepremisemaybeopentoquestion.InHobbes’scase,thismeantquestioningwhetherpeoplereallyareasself-centred,competitiveandpower-hungryasheclaims.Second,thevalidityofthereasoningbymeansofwhichtheargumentmovesfrompre-misetoconclusionmaybeopentoquestionand,inHobbes’scase,thismeantquestioninghisargumentthattheradicallyself-centredindividualshedescribesreallywouldoptforrulebyanall-powerful,absolutesovereign.Inthissection,IshalltreatRawls’sargumentasanexerciseindeductivereasoning,justasIdidHobbes’s.However,inthecaseofRawlsIshallDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012reversetheorderofexposition;thatis,Ishallbeginwithhisargument’sinternalvalidityandthenturntothecredibilityofitspremise.InthecaseofRawls’sargument,questioningitsinternalvaliditymeansexamininghisclaimthattherationalindividualshepictures,situatedintheoriginalposi-tion,wouldinfactchoosetofoundthemanneroftheircooperation,socialandpolitical,uponthetwoprincipleshedescribes.Questioningthecred-ibilityofhispremisemeans–well–whatprecisely?Asweshallsee,thewaytheoriginalpositionismeanttobeunderstood,andtheroleitplayswithinRawls’sphilosophy,aremattersofsomecontroversy.Moreover,itisonly\nRawls:throughreasontojustice263whentheoriginalposition’sstatushasbeencorrectlyunderstoodthatwewillhavegraspedthetruedifference(ifthereisany)betweenRawls’s‘earlier’and‘later’work.Theappropriatepointtodiscussthatstatus,then,willcomelater,whenwecometothedifferencesbetweenthetwophasesofRawls’sthinking.Beforethat,letmetakeeachprincipleinturnandconsiderits‘derivation’.Thefirstprinciple:reason,liberty,liberalismRecallthatthefirstprincipleofjusticedistributesliberty.IntheformulationIquotedearlier,itstatesthat‘Eachpersonistohaveanequalrighttothemostextensivetotalsystemofequalbasiclibertiescompatiblewithasimilarsystemoflibertyforall’(Rawls1971:60).So,wouldRawls’srationalchoosersselectthisprinciple?Inanswer,itseemstomethattheywould,atleasttotheextentthatlibertycanbethoughtofasakindofundifferentiated‘stuff’,somethingwhichcanbeeasilydividedandshared,ratherasifitwerecake.Infact,exampleswhichinvolvethedivisionofcakereadilylendthem-selvestotheillustrationofthereasoningbehindRawls’sfirstprinciple.Thus:imaginealargecakeandagroupofpeople,eachofwhomisquitehungryandcould,himselforherself,easilypolishoffquitealargeportionofthecake.However,thecakeistobedivided,andnobodygetsanycakeuntilaprincipleofdivisionisproposedwhicheveryoneagreesto.Everyoneisrationalandnooneisinapositiontocoerceanyoneelse.Ifthesepeoplewerealtruistsofcompleteselflessness,everyonewouldsay,‘Afteryou’,toeveryoneelse,andnoonewouldgetanycake.Iftheywereutilitarians,theywouldcarryoutacomplicatedsurvey,designedtoestablishexactlyhowmuchhappinesseachpersonderivesfromagivenquantity(say,agram)ofcake.(Somepeoplewillbehungrierthanothers.Somewillenjoycakemorethanothers,andthecakewillbedividedunevenlywithaviewtobringingaboutthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber.)ButtheindividualsweareaskedbyRawlstopictureareneither.Theyarerationalegoists,andeachisself-interestedlyconcernedtodefendhisorherinterestsagainsttheothers.Whatprincipleofdivisionwouldtheychoose,then?SofarasIcansee,theonlypossibilityisaprincipleofequaldivisionaccordingtowhicheachDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012persongetsthelargestsliceofcakeheorshecanhave,consistentlywitheveryoneelse’shavinganequallylargeslice.Toputitmoreformally,yougetthefollowingprinciple:Eachpersonistohaveanequalrighttothemostextensivesliceofcakecom-patiblewithasimilarlybigsliceofcakeforall.Youwillseethepoint:Deletethephrases‘mostextensivesliceofcake’and‘similarlybigsliceofcake’fromtheforegoingsentence,\n264Moderntimes,modernthemessubstitute–respectively–‘mostextensivetotalsystemofbasicliberties’and‘similarsystemofliberty’,andyouareleftwiththefollowing:Eachpersonistohaveanequalrighttothemostextensivetotalsystemofequalbasiclibertiescompatiblewithasimilarsystemoflibertyforall.Inotherwords,yougetRawls’sfirstprincipleofjustice.IthinkthatshouldbeenoughtogiveyouanideaofthethinkingbehindRawls’sclaimthathishypotheticalchoosers,situatedastheyareintheori-ginalposition,wouldselecthisfirstprinciple.Nowforafewcriticalobser-vationsuponthatargument;butpleasebearinmindthatwhatIamabouttosayhereismeanttobeillustrativeandnotdefinitive.Inotherwords,itisonlymeanttogiveyouanideaofhowtoapproachRawls’sargumentforyourself(whichiswhythissectionisentitled,‘HowtothinkcriticallyaboutRawls’sargument’andnot‘WhatiswrongwithRawlsargument?’).AlthoughIwouldcertainlystickbythepositionforwhichIamabouttoarguehere,itisobviousthatIdon’thavethespacetodealwithobjectionsthatotherRawlsscholarsmightbeinclinedtomakehere,tomeetthoseobjectionswithcounter-objections,andsoon.So,whatIwouldmostlikeyoutodohereisreadtheargumentsofthissectionthrough,familiariseyourselfwithRawls’sargumentandthenjudgetheaccuracyofmycriticismsforyourself.Withthatsaid,letusnowturntothetwoquestionswhicharemostobviouslyraisedbyRawls’sargument,asIhavejustoutlinedit.Theseare(i)Towhatextentisitrealistictothinkoflibertyassomethingwhichcanbedividedintoportionsanddistributed,asifitwerecake?;and(ii)Whyshouldthechoosersselectaprinciplewhichattachesfundamentalimportancetoliberty?Therearealternativesafterall.Forexample,theymighthavemadesolidaritytheirfundamentalvalue,ortheymighthavechosenequality,sowhydon’ttheychooseeitherofthose?Forthatmatter,theymighthavechosencake.(Oristheideathataperfectlyjustsocietyisoneinwhichpeoplegetlotsofcaketoosilly?)Now,inanswertotheformerquestion,Iwouldsaythatitisperfectlyrealistictothinkoflibertyasdivisible,asifitwerecake,providedthatoneconstrueslibertyonthemodelof‘negativeliberty’asarticulatedby,forexample,SirIsaiahBerlin.AccordingtoBerlin,‘politicalliberty’inthisDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012‘negative’senseis‘simplytheareawithinwhichamancanactunobstructedbyothers’,sothat,‘IfIampreventedbyothersfromdoingwhatIcouldotherwisedo,Iamtothatdegreeunfree’(Berlin1969b:122).(Berlin’sdis-tinctionbetween‘positive’and‘negative’conceptionsoflibertywasdiscussedearlier,inthechapteronRousseau.)Now,itis–Ithink–fairlyclearthat,tothinkoflibertyinthatwayistoconstruethedegreeoflibertyapersonhasastheamountofspace(literalormetaphorical)heorshehastomovearoundin;and,ofcourse,spaceissomethingwhichcanbedividedintoshares–justlikecake.\nRawls:throughreasontojustice265Butwhatifthereismoretothestorythanthat?Specifically,whatifthereismoretolibertythannegativeliberty,somuchsothatitcannotalwaysbeconstruedona‘cakemodel’?ThequestionisappositebecauseRawlsdoesbelievethat,inagenuinelyfreesociety,thegovernment,orstate,mustdomorethanrespectthe‘spaces’withinwhichindividualsarefreetomovesofarasitpossiblycan.Aswehaveseen,hiscontractualistpremisesaremeanttosupplyafoundation,notjustforliberty,butforliberalism–andthat’sdifferent.Toappreciatethedifficultywhich,asIseeit,Rawls’sargumentfaceshere,notice–first–thatforeverysingleoneofusthereisanenormousnumberofactionswhichwearenegativelyfreetoperform,therebeingnoobstaclesuf-ficienttopreventourperformingthem.Forexample,thinkofacitythou-sandsofmilesfromwhereyouliveandwhichyouhavenoneedordesiretovisit.Thereisastreetinthatcityalongwhichyouwouldbenegativelyfreetodriveifyouweretogothere,andthesamegoesformanyotherstreetsinmanyothercities,noneofwhichyouhaveanydesiretovisit.Youarenega-tivelyfreetodrivealongthosestreetstoo.But,sowhat?Byhypothesis,youhavenodesiretogothere,sowhyshoulditmattertoyou?Likewise,thereis,foreachofus,ahugenumberofactionswearenegativelyunfreetoperform.Supposethatthereisanotherstreetinthesamecityacrosswhichtheautho-ritieshaveplacedabarrier,makingitimpossibletodrivealongitfromoneendtotheother.Youlackthefreedomtodrivealongthestreet.But,again,sowhat?Itisclearenough,Ithink,thatitonlymatterstousthatweshouldbenegativelyfreetoperformcertainactionswhenthoseactionsareoneswewant,orneed,toperform(or,atleast,whentheyareactionswethinkwemayatsomepointwanttoperform).Second–andhereisthepoint–notethatasocietyinwhichpeopleare,onthewhole,negativelyfreetodowhattheywantisnotnecessarilyequivalenttoaliberalsociety.Italldependsonwhatpeoplewanttodo.Imagineaverytraditional,hierarchicallystructured,society.Thereisaher-editaryaristocracyinwhompoliticalauthorityanddecision-makingpowerisinvested.Thereisanall-embracingsystemofreligiousbelief,towhichnearlyeveryonesubscribesandintermsofwhichtheauthoritystructureisrationa-lisedandjustified.Mostpeoplearepeasantswhosewayoflifehasbeenunchangedforgenerationsandwhichwillremainunchangedforthefore-seeablefuture.Womenandmenhaveclearlycircumscribeddomesticroles.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Thereisapastoralpriesthood,whosejobitistointerpretthereligionandtohelppeopleastheytravelthepre-ordainedcourseoflife.Totheextentthatpeopleacceptthetraditionalviewofthings,thiswillbeasocietyinwhichpeopleare,onthewhole,negativelyfreetodothethingstheywanttodo.However,itishardlyaliberalsociety–andcertainlynotaliberalsocietyasconceivedbyRawls–for,init,peoplearenotfreetoexercisethe‘basicliberties’which,asheseesit,arenecessaryconditionsfortheexistenceofaliberalpoliticalorder.Indeed,aswehavealreadysupposed,politicalauthor-ityisinvestedinahereditaryaristocracy,sothereisnodemocracyand,\n266Moderntimes,modernthemesconsequently,nofreedomtovote.Becausetheexpressionofopinioniscontrolledbythegoverningclass,includingthepriesthood,itiseasytoimaginethatthereisnofreepressinthiscountry,nofreedomofspeechandexpression.And,thankstothedominantreligion,thereisnolibertyofconscience.Hereticsareburnt,orsowemayimagine.But,sofarasthesubjectsoftheregimeareconcerned,noneofthismattersfor–withtheexceptionofafew‘extremists’perhaps–nobodywantstoexercisesuchliberalfreedoms.Inshort,theproblemisthat,althoughRawls’sargumentyieldstheconclusionthat,inajustsociety,everyindividualwouldpossessasmuchnegativelibertyaspossible(consistentlywitheveryoneelse’spossessinganequalamountofnegativeliberty),itmaynotestablish,oratleastnotwith-outfurtherargument,thatthejustsocietyistheliberalsocietyinwhichthe‘basicliberties’areprotected;thebasiclibertiesbeinglibertyofcon-science,freedomofexpression,thelibertytoexertaninfluenceonthedecision-makingprocess,andsoon.Thedifficultyarisesinthefollowingway.QuiteearlyinATheoryofJustice,Rawlscategoriseslibertyasa‘primarygood’,thelatterbeingathingthat‘everyrationalmanispresumedtowant’(1971:62).Thisseemsright.Atleastitseemsrighttotheextentthat,inthenormalrunofthingsasleast,thereappearstobesomethingillogicalaboutclaimingtowanttodosomeactionx,whileatthesametimeclaimingnottowanttobefreetodox.(Whatsensewouldyoumakeofsomeonewhosaid,forexample,‘IwanttogotothecinematonightbutIdonotwanttobefreetogotothecinematonight’?)5Inlinewiththis,Rawlsaddsthatprimarygoods,likeliberty,‘normallyhaveausewhateveraperson’srationalplanoflife’(1971:62).Muchlater,hedistinguishesbetweenlibertyandits‘worth’,‘theworthoflibertytopersonsandgroups’being‘proportionaltotheircapacitytoadvancetheirends’(Rawls1971:204).Here,then,istheanswerRawlscouldgivetothesecondofthetwoquestionsIdistinguishedearlier,namely:Whyshouldthechoosersattachfundamentalimportancetolibertyratherthan,say,solidarity,equality,orcake?Hisanswerwould,presumably,bethatnoneoftheseisaprimarygood–andcertainlynotthelast,foritcannotbesaidofcakethatitissomethingthateveryrationalpersonmustwant,whateverelseheorshemaywant.6Now,asallthissuggests,thebasicthinkingbehindRawls’sargumentforDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012hisfirstprinciplerunsalongsomethinglikethefollowinglines.Intheori-ginalposition,situatedastheyarebehinda‘veilofignorance’,thehypothe-ticalrationalchoosershavenoideawhatplans,purposes,wants,desires,etc.theywillturnouttohaveoncetheveilisraisedandtheyfindthemselvesbackin‘normal’society.However,theydoknowthattheywillhavesomeplansandpurposes.AsRawlsputsit,everyoneknowsthatheorshewillhavea‘rationalplanoflife’,foritisdefinitiveofourhumanitythatwearecreatureswhoformsuchplans.(Itis,ifyoulike,anaspectof‘humannature’.)Therefore,knowingthis,thechoosersalsoknowthattheywillwant\nRawls:throughreasontojustice267thelibertytocarryouttheirplans.Toputitanotherway:knowingthattheywillwanttodosomething,itfollowsthattheywillwantthefreedomtodoit,whateveritturnsouttobe.Thatiswhytheychooseaprinciplewhichdistributesliberty.Fairenough:theargumentispersuasive,but,accordingtotheobjectionIamtryingtoraisehere,thetroublewithitisthat,byitself,itonlyestab-lishesthatthechooserswillselectaprinciplewhichdistributesnegativeliberty–thatis,thefreedomfromobstructionstodowhateveritistheywanttodo–andnotthefullpanoplyof‘basic’liberalfreedomsforwhichRawlswantstoargue.Forexample,itcouldbethat,aftertheprinciplehasbeenselected,theveilofignoranceisraisedandthechoosersfindthemselvesinhabitingthetraditional,hierarchicallystructured,societyIdescribedamomentago.Itappearsthat,byRawls’sargument,theywouldhavenoreasonforcomplaint,providedthattheyneverfoundthemselveswantingtostepbeyondtheconstraintsimposedbythatsociety.Here,then,isanapparentsourceofdifficultyforRawls.Itis,ofcourse,morethanlikelythatRawlswouldhavearesponsetotheobjectionIhavejustoutlined.Itwouldbeinterestingtoconsiderwhatthatresponsemightbeandtoconsider,also,whetheritwouldbesufficienttomeettheobjection.Still,hereiswherewemustleaveitforthemoment.Beforemovingontothesecondprinciple,however,letmeaddthefollowing:itisimportanttobearinmindthatthereismoreatstakeherethanapickyargument;some-thingwhichmightappealtophilosopherswhoenjoythatsortofthing,butwhichcarriesnospecialrelevancetoanythingelse.Onthecontrary,weshouldnotlosesightofthefactthatRawls’sthinkingisdrivenbyaseriousconcernwithaseriousproblem.Inthecaseofthefirstprinciple,onesourceofthatconcernisthefactthatonecanthinkofhumanrightsasfallingintooneortheotheroftwocategories.Ontheonehandtherearerightsofaccesstomaterialresourcesandtothoseinstitutionalarrangementswhichprovideandprotectessentialconditionsforthelivingofanysortofdecentlife.Theseincluderightstofood,shelterandequaltreatmentbeforethelaw(whichisaconditionforpredictabilityandstability).Itisthemarkofanycivilisedstatethatitshouldpaydueattentiontosuchrights.ThefactisrecognisedintheUnitedNations’DeclarationofHumanRights(1948),whichclaimstoset‘acommonstandardofachievementforallpeoplesandallnations’.Inthecaseofrightswhichfallintothisfirstcategory,sucha‘standardofachievement’Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012canbemet,eveninsocietiesresemblingtheverytraditionalsocietyIdescribedearlier.Butthen,logicallydistinctfromthefirst,thereisasecondcategoryofrights,acategorywhichincludestherighttoplayapartinpoliticaldecisionmaking,tofreespeech,totheexerciseoflibertyofcon-science,andsoon.Thesearemoreparticularlyassociatedwiththeliberalviewand–fortheliberal–thechallengeistodemonstratethatjusticerequirestherecognitionofbothcategoriesofrightasequallyfundamental.Forallthedetailandsophisticationofhisreasoning,wemustn’tforgetthatRawlsismakingaseriousattempttomeetthatchallenge.\n268Moderntimes,modernthemesThesecondprinciple:reason,riskandfairnessWhatofthesecondprinciple?Aswesaw,thisrelatestosocialandeconomicinequalitiesand,intheversionIquotedearlier,itsfirstclause–‘thediffer-enceprinciple’,asithasbecomeknown–statesthatsuchinequalitiesaretobearrangedsothattheyare‘tothegreatestbenefitoftheleastadvantaged’.Whyshoulditberationaltoselectthisprinciplewhenchoosingfrombehindtheveilofignorance?Afterall,thereareotherpossibilities.Oneisaprinci-pleofstrictequality;thatis,aprinciplewhichdistributesopportunity,power,income,wealth–thesortsof‘goods’ofwhichthosewhoexpressconcernoversocialandeconomicinequalitytendtobethinking–inpreciselyequalamounts.Anotheristhe‘principleofaverageutility’,aversionoftheprincipleofutilityaccordingtowhichresourcesshouldbedistributedinamannerwhichmakestheaveragepersonaswelloffaspossible.Whynotselectoneofthesealternatives?Well,onRawls’saccount,thechoiceoftheformerwouldbeirrational,becauseitisconceivablethat,wherestrictequalityapplies,everyonewouldbeworseoffthaneventhemostbadlyoffpersonwheregoodsaredistributedinaccordancewiththedifferenceprinciple.Likewise,wheretheaveragepersonisaswelloffaspossible,itcouldturnoutthattheworstoffpersonisverybadlyoffindeed.Toputitanotherway,supposeyouhadtochoosebetweenbeingtheworstoffpersoninasocietywhereeveryoneisstrictlyequal,onewheretheprincipleofaverageutilityapplies,andoneinwhichgoodsaredistributedinaccordancewithhissecondprinciple.Obviously–orsoRawlsthinks–itdependsonwhichworstoffperson,outofthesepossi-bilities,isthemostbadlyoff,notuponthepresenceorabsenceofinequalitiesthemselves.Asheseesit,therationalthingtodoisselecttheprinciplewhichrenderstheworstoffpersonbetteroffthanheorshewouldbeunderanyotherarrangement,i.e.thedifferenceprinciple.IthinkitshouldbeclearthatRawlsismakingtwosuppositionshere.Thefirstisthatthewayinwhichcooperationisorganisedcanmakeadifferencetothetotalquantityofgoodsavailable.(Rememberthathethinksofsocietyas‘asystemofco-operation’andthatoneofhisstatedpurposesistoestablish‘fairterms’underwhichcooperationcantakeplace.)Asheseesit,itisamistaketosupposethatthereisapotofsomefixedsize,fromwhicheveryonemaydrawanallottedshare.(Ifthereweresuchapot,then,ashethinks,strictequalitywouldobviouslyhavetoapply.)Onthecontrary,itcouldbeDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012that,byarrangingthingsinacertainway,peoplewillcooperateinamannerwhichservestoincreasethetotalavailable.(Justforexample,incertaincir-cumstancesitcouldbethat,byeasingthetaxburdenontherelativelywelloff,yougivethemanincentivetoinvestinnewequipment,takenewinitiatives,andsoon,therebygeneratingnewwealthandnewopportunitiesforemployment.Insuchcases,eventheworstoffpeoplearebetteroffthantheywouldotherwisebe,sothiswouldbeacaseinwhichinequalitiesworktothegreatestbenefitoftheleastadvantaged.)Second,Rawlsisclearly\nRawls:throughreasontojustice269assumingthattherationalpolicyforeachindividualsituatedintheoriginalpositiontoadoptisapolicyof‘leastrisk’.Reasoningfrombehindtheveilofignorance,eachhastoassumethat–oncetheveilislifted–heorshecouldturnouttobeamemberoftheleastadvantagedgroup.Itisariskfromwhichitfollows,accordingtoRawls,thatthemostrationalchoiceisaprinciplewhichamelioratesthesituationoftheworstoffasmuchaspossible.Butis‘leastrisk’alwaysthemostrationalpolicytoadopt?ThequestionisworthraisingbecausequiteafewofRawls’scritics7havefocusedtheirattentionuponthisaspectofhisargumentand–asthisillustrates–therecouldbeafurthersourceofweaknessinhistheoryhere.Ofcourse,itiscertainlytruethatmostpeoplewouldthinkitrationaltotakeoutaninsur-ancepolicyagainstfireandtheftwhenbuyingahouseoracar.Infacttheprobabilitythatyourhousewillcatchfireandburndownisextremelylow.Evenso,theypreparefortheworstinjustthesamewaythatRawls’schoo-serspreparefortheworstwhentheyselecthissecondprinciple.Butperhapsthatisonesortofcase.Contrastitwiththecaseofsomeonewhochoosesnottobuyalotteryticketonthesameprinciple.Now,asIwrite,thepriceofaUKlotteryticketisonepound,whichmeansthat,formostUKcitizens,thepurchaseofalotteryticketwouldmakenosignificantinroadintotheweeklybudget.Comparedwiththis,thegainforawinnercanbehuge.Itcanrunintomillionsofpounds.Thismeansthat,foraprospectiveticket-purchaser,(i)theworstthingthatcanhappenisthatheorshelosesonepound;and(ii)thebestthingthatcanhappenisthatheorshewinsseveralmillionpounds.Tothis,itisrelevanttoadd(iii),thattheprobabilitythattheworstwillhappenhereisextremelyhigh.Iwasoncetold,andIhavenoreasontodisbelieveit,thatintheUKyourchancesofwinningthelotteryareappre-ciablylowerthanyourchancesofbeingkilledinadomesticaccidentinvol-vingarefrigerator,i.e.vanishinglysmall.Givenallthis,whatwouldyouthinkofsomeonewho,whencontemplatingthepurchaseofalotteryticket,decidedagainstdoingsoonthegroundsthatthereisariskthattheworstcouldhappen?Wouldyouthinkthatpersonrational?Ithinknot.Iamsuremostreaderswillagreewithmethat,astheexampleillustrates,‘leastrisk’isnotalwaysthemostrationalpolicytopursue.Andthereareplentyofeverydayexampleswithwhichthesamepointmighthavebeenillustrated.WhatwouldyousayaboutsomeonewhoalwayscarriedaheavyDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012overcoat,evenonthesunniestday;orsomeonewhonevertookaforeignholidayforfearthattheplanemightcrash;orwhoneverateatarestaurantforfearoffoodpoisoning?(Suddenrainstorms,planecrashes,outbreaksoffoodpoisoningcanallhappen,althoughtheprobabilitiesoftheirhappeningarenormallyslight.)Ifyouareinclinedtothinkofsuchbehaviourasirra-tional,asIam,itfollowsthatitisquiteoftenirrationalnottorisktheworst.Isurmisethat,foreachofus,whatcountsasarationalchoiceisoftenafunctionoftherelationshipbetween(i)theseriousnessoftheharmordamagewhichwouldresultweretheworsttohappen,(ii)thedegreeof\n270Moderntimes,modernthemesbenefitwhichwouldresultwerethebesttohappen,and(iii)theprobabilitythattheworstwillhappen.Myguessisthatthereisvariationbetweenindividualsinthejudgementstheymakeastohowmuchriskitisrationaltotake,andthatsuchvariationalsoexistsacrosscultures.Still,bethatasitmay,mymainpointisthatitcanbefarfromrationalnottotakerisks.Now,ifthisisright,theimplicationsforRawls’sargumentwouldappeartobeconsiderable,andfortworeasons.First,andaswehaveseen,Rawls’sphilosophyis,inessence,anattempttoderiveprinciplesofjusticefromanaccountofrationalchoice.Butiftherecanbenosingle,universallyapplicable,standardofrationality–andtheargumentjustout-linedsuggeststhattherecan’tbe–thenitmustfollowthatarationalchoiceargumentcannotbeusedtoderiveprinciplesofjusticetowhicheveryrationalpersonmustagree,orsoyouwouldthink.Second,ifitissometimesrationaltotakerisks,itfollowsthatitcouldberationaltoselectsomeprincipleotherthanthedifferenceprinciplefromwithintheoriginalposi-tion.Theobviouscandidatehereisthe‘principleofaverageutility’.Asyouwillrecall,thisstatesthatthebestarrangementisthatunderwhichtheaverageperson(asopposedtotheworstoff)isbetteroffthanheorshewouldbeunderanyothersystem.Rawlsinitiallyrejectsthisonthegroundsthat,underit,theaverageperson’sadvantagedpositioncanbeboughtatacosttothepositionoftheworstoffperson.(Forexample,thiscouldhappenwhereasmallforceofslavesisforcedtoworkveryhardforthebenefitofeveryoneelse.)Butnowconsidertwosituations.Inthefirst–wherethingsarearran-gedinaccordancewithRawls’ssecondprinciple–theworstoffpersonisbetteroffthanheorshewouldbeunderanyotherarrangement.Inthesecond–wherethingsarearrangedinaccordancewiththeprincipleofaverageutility–90percentofpeoplearefarbetteroffthananyoneinthefirstsituation,although10percentareworseoffthananyoneinthefirstsituation.Whichisitrationaltoprefer?Well,onceriskentersthepicture,arationalchoosermightwellreasonthat,sincethereisahighprobability(9:1)thatheorshewillbeamemberofthewelloff90percent,it’sworthtakingachanceonit.Ifthisisright,itfollowsthatrationalchooserswouldnotnecessarilyselectthedifferenceprinciple,inwhichcaseitalsofollows–finally–thatRawlshasnoargumentagainstutilitarianismhere.Ifso,theseareconsiderationswhichgorighttothebasisofhissystem.8Now,Isay‘ifthisisright’and‘ifso’advisedly,becauseyoucanbesureDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012thatIhaven’tissuedthelastwordonthesubject.However,Ishallcontinuenofurtherwiththisparticularlineofthoughtbecause,asIhavesaid,mypurposehereismerelyindicative.ItseemstomethatIhavenowdrawnyourattentiontowhatis,infact,aseriousweaknessinRawls’sargument.How-ever,therearevariousstrategiesRawlsmightadopt–orwhichmightbeadoptedbydefendersofRawls–inordertosavetheargumentfromthistypeofobjection.Forexample,itmightbepossibletosavetheargumentwithacounter-argumenttotheeffectthattherearedifferencesbetweenthesitua-tionintheoriginalpositionandthatinthe‘outsideworld’;thatis,theworld\nRawls:throughreasontojustice271beyondtheveilofignorance.Sucharesponsewouldhavetoyieldthecon-clusionthat,intheoriginalposition,itcanneverberationaltotakerisks,eventhoughrisk-takingmaybeperfectlyrationalintheoutsideworld.Whywouldthisbe?Well,itcouldbethat,perhaps,theinterestsatstakeintheoriginalpositionaresoseriousthatoneshouldnevertakechanceswiththem;orcoulditbethatchoicesrelatingtothebasicstructureofsocietyare,forsomereason,ofadifferentorderfromothers?Eitherway,thestrategywouldhavetoprevent‘leakage’,inwardsfromtheoutsideworld,totheoriginalposition.Criticsaredividedoverwhetherthiscanbedone,9andIshallleavethesubjecthere.Instead,letmenowturntoanother–andpossiblymorefundamental–objection.Considerthefollowingexample:youareinneedofmoneytokeepyougoingforthenextfewmonths,soyougototheemploymentagency,lookingforajob.Therearetwoavailable.CalltheseJobAandJobB.Thetwojobsarepracticallysimilar.(Inboth,theworkisthesame.Wecansupposethatbothareroutineofficejobs,forexample,orthateachinvolvesworkingatatillinasupermarket.Thetwoworkplacesarenextdoortoeachother,andsoon.)TheonlydifferenceisthatthepayforJobAislowerthanthepayforJobB.(Thefiguresdon’treallymatter,but,ifithelps,supposethatJobApays100poundsperweekandJobB125poundsperweek.)Nowask:Which,outofthetwojobs,isitrationaltotake?Inthiscase,theanswerisobvious.YoutakeJobB.Howcouldyouchooseotherwise,when(i)yoursolepurposeinseekingajobistoearnmoney,and(ii)theonlysalientvariableisthedifferenceinpay?Notice,too,thesimilaritybetweenthesituationfromwhichyouchooseajob,inthisexample,andtheoriginalpositionfromwhich,accordingtoRawls,hischoosersselecthissecondprinciple.Inthelatteritisassumed,likewise,(i)thattheirmotiveistomaximisethedegreetowhichcertain‘primarygoods’(‘rightsandliberties,opportunitiesandpowers,incomeandwealth’,andsoon)areavailabletothem(seeRawls1971:92)and(ii)thattheonlyrelevantvariables,distin-guishingthesituationsbetweenwhichtheychoose,arethedegreetowhichsuchgoodsareavailableandthemannerinwhichtheyaredistributed.Butnowcontrasttheforegoingwiththefollowingexample.Therearetwoadjacentcountries,CountryAandCountryB.CountryAusedtobeacolonyofamajorWesternpower,but–afteralongstruggle–ithasrecentlygainedindependence.CountryAnowfacesenormousproblems.Forexample,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012theeconomyhaslongbeengearedtoproducingcashcropsforthecolonial-ists,butitmustnowbecomestrongerandmoreindependent.Still,thereisapopularleaderandastrongethosofequality.Becauseitisgenerallycon-sideredbythepublicthatallarecomrades–thateveryoneisabrotherorasistertotheothersandthatallareinittogether–theleaderisabletomobilisethepopulationintheefforttoreconstruct.Consistentlywithallthis,everyone’sincomeisroughlyequal.Letussuppose,then,thatinCountryAeveryoneispaid5,000currencyunitsperyear,whateverhisorherparticularskillandresponsibilitiesmaybe.(Asintheformerexample,\n272Moderntimes,modernthemesthefiguresdon’treallymatter.)Bycontrast,inCountryB–wherethecur-rencyisthesame–therearehugeinequalities.Theseniorexecutivesofitsmajorcorporationsarepaidinzillionsofcurrencyunits,sometimesevenmore.Middlemanagementarepaidfarlessthanthisandtheworkers–whoarequitepoor–evenless.However–andhereisthepoint–eventheworstoffpeopleinCountryBarebetteroffthananyoneinCountryA.Suppose,then,thatinCountryBtheworstoffpeoplearepaid5,500currencyunitsperyear.NowsupposethatyouarelivinginCountryAandthatyouhaveachoice.Eitheryouremaininthatcountry–whereeveryoneispoorbutallareequal–oryoutakeashortwalkacrossthebordertoCountryB,wheretherearegreatinequalitiesbutwhereeventhepoorestpersonisbetteroffthananyoneinCountryA.Ifyoudo,youwillbeoneofthepoorest,butyouwillstillearnmorethanyouwouldifyoustaywhereyouare.Thequestionis:Whatistherationalthingtodo?And,sofarasIcansee,Rawls’ssecondprincipleyieldsasingle,straightforwardanswerhere,namelythat,ifyouarerational,youwillmovetoCountryB.(Recallthat,accordingtoRawls,therationalthingtodoisselectthesituationinwhichtheworstoffpersonisbetteroffthanheorshewouldbeinanyothersituation.)However,itisextremelyhardtobelievethatthingsarereallythatsimplefor,inthisexample,thereismoretothestorythanasetofincomedifferences.ThisequalityofwealthwhichprevailsinCountryAispartofapackage.Itisinseparablefromtheprevalentethicofcomradeshipand,nodoubt,fromotherfeaturesofthatcountry’swayoflife.Inreality,makingachoicemeanstakingthewholesetoffeaturesintoconsiderationandevaluating.Likewise,inCountryB,therewill,nodoubt,beotherfeatureswhichgohandinhandwithinequalitiesofincomeandanindustrialisedeconomy.(Allthisisinadditiontotheimprobableassumptionthattherealvalueofa‘currencyunit’willbethesameinbothcountries.)Ofcourse,IamnotsayingthatitwouldbemorerationaltoremaininCountryAafterall,onlythatthereisnosingleanswerhere,becausedifferentpeoplewillevaluatethesesituationsdifferently.Theforegoing‘twocountries’objectionthreatensRawls’sargumentinanumberofways,asfollows.First,likethe‘aversiontorisk’objection,itsuggeststhattherecanbenosinglestandardofrationalitywhichisrelevanthere,andthereforethattherecanbenosingleprincipleofdistributiontoDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012whichitwouldberationaltoobject.ThepointisthatthepersonwhochoosestostayincountryAisneithermorenorlessrationalthanthepersonwhochoosestomovetocountryB–orsotheobjectionsuggests.Itisjustthattheformerpersonattachesfarmoreimportancetofactorssuchascom-radeshipandasenseofsolidarity.Second,itsuggeststhat,whenitcomestotherationalassessmentofasociety’sinstitutionalarrangements,therecanbemoreatissuethanthewaycertain‘primarygoods’aredistributed.Third,itthreatensRawls’sclaimthatthefirstprinciplemustalwaystakepriorityoverthesecond.Atleast,itdoesifonemakesthereasonableassumptionthatthe\nRawls:throughreasontojustice273equalityincountryAisestablishedwiththehelpofmeasureswhichviolatecertain‘basicliberties’.Withthefurtherassumptionthattheviolationsinquestionarefairlyminor,itsuggests–contraRawls–thatitcanberationaltosacrificeacertainamountoflibertyforthesakeofagreaterequality.10Again,therearevariousstrategiesadefenderofRawlsmightadoptinordertomeetthesethreats.Tomeetthefirst,onemighttrytoargue,forexample,thatfactorssuchascomradeshipandsolidaritycannotfigureinchoicesmadefrombehindtheveilofignorance.Tomeetthesecond,onemightadvancereasonstosuggestthatsuchfactorscan,infact,beclassifiedasprimarygoods.(Tomeetthethird–what?Iamunsure.)Still,Ishan’tconsiderthesepossibilities,foritistimetomoveon.Nowforthe64,000dollarquestion.IsRawls’stheoryuniversalist?ApparentuniversalismIsRawls’stheoryuniversalist?AnyonewhoreadATheoryofJusticewhenitfirstappearedcouldeasilybeforgivenforassumingthatitis,andintworespects.First,forallthatRawlssaystothecontraryinthatwork,itiseasytogaintheimpressionthathistwoprinciplesaremeanttoapplyequallytoanycommunity,whereveritislocatedandatwhatevertime.ResidentsofcontemporaryLosAngeles,medievalvillagersinEuropeorTibet–evencommunitiesoftinygreenalienslivingonotherplanets–itappearstobeRawls’sviewthatalloughttorecognisetheforceofhisprinciples;inshort,thattheyare,inthatsense,‘universally’binding.Second,inhisspecificationoftheoriginalpositionRawlsmakesreferencetoa‘constellation’ofconditionswhichhedescribesas‘thecircumstancesofjustice’,thesebeing‘thenormalconditionsunderwhichhumancooperationisbothpossibleandnecessary’(1971:126).AsRawlsgoesontoexplain:[A]sInotedattheoutset,althoughasocietyisacooperativeventureformutualadvantage,itistypicallymarkedbyaconflictaswellasanidentityofinterests.Thereisanidentityofinterestssincesocialcooperationmakespossibleabetterlifeforallthananywouldhaveifeachweretotrytolivesolelybyhisownefforts.ThereisaconflictofinterestssincemenarenotindifferentastohowtheDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012greaterbenefitsproducedbytheircollaborationaredistributed,forinordertopursuetheirendstheyeachpreferalargertoalessershare.(1971:126)ItwouldbehardtoquarrelwithRawls’sassertionthat,generallyspeaking,‘socialcooperationmakespossibleabetterlifeforallthananywouldhaveifeachweretotrytolivesolelybyhisownefforts’,orwithhisfurtherassertionthatsocialcooperationis,nevertheless,markedbyaconflictofinterestsbetweenindividualsastheycooperate.Somuchappearsplainobvious.\n274Moderntimes,modernthemesFurther,sinceuniversalismistheissuehere,notethatRawlsmakesnoreferencetospecificitiesoftimeorplaceinthesepassages.Ifthetypicalcitizenofapresent-dayliberaldemocracystandstogainfromtheeffortsoftheothers–and,inthatsense,from‘cooperationformutualadvantage’–thensodoes,ordid,thetypicalmemberofanycommunity,presentorpast.SodidthetypicalmemberoftheancientGreekpolis.Infact,Rawls’spointhereechoesPlato’sargumentthatthepointoflivinginacommunityistosecurethebenefitswhichderivefromthedivisionoflabour.TheforegoingfactorsaredescribedbyRawlsas‘objective’circumstancesofjustice.Other‘objective’circumstancesare,hesays,thefactsthat‘manyindividualscoexisttogetheratthesametimeonadefinitegeographicalter-ritory’;that‘[T]heseindividualsareroughlysimilarinphysicalandmentalpowers;or,atanyrate,theircapacitiesarecomparableinthatnooneamongthemcandominatetherest’;that‘theyarevulnerabletoattack,andallaresubjecttohavingtheirplansblockedbytheunitedforceofothers’;andthat‘thereistheconditionofmoderatescarcity’,suchthat‘[N]aturalandotherresourcesarenotsoabundantthatschemesofcooperationbecomesuperfluousnorareconditionssoharshthatfruitfulventuresmustinevitablybreakdown’(Rawls1971:126–27).Now,inwhatsenseofthetermcanitbesaidthattheseconditions‘uni-versally’obtain?It’sagoodquestionbecauseitis,afterall,conceivablethattherecouldbeindividualswhodonotfindthemselvesintheforegoing‘objective’circumstancesofjustice.ThinkofRobinsonCrusoealoneonhisisland.Perhapsthereissomesenseoftheexpressioninwhichitwouldbetruetosaythathewouldstandtogainfromtheeffortsofothers,butthatcanhardlybethesenseinwhichyouandIarebenefiting,rightnow,fromtheeffortswhichother,realandexisting,membersofourrespectivecommunitiesareactuallymaking.Asforconflictofinterests,well,inCrusoe’scasethereisnooneelsearoundwithinterestsforhisowntoconflictwith.Inanswertothequestion,IwouldsuggestthattheobjectivecircumstancesthatRawlsdescribesareuniversal,ratherinthewaythatgravityisuniversal.Likegravity,eachformspartof(whatyoucouldcall)‘thenormalbackground’;eachisanever-presentcomponentofthecontextinwhichprettywelleveryhumanisconstrainedtoliveouthisorherlife.Inthecaseofgravity,itis,likewise,conceivablethattherecouldbeindividualswhoarefreefromitsnormalforce.Thinkofastronautsfloatingaboutinaspace-capsule.YouDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012couldsaythattheirrelationtothenormaleffectofgravityonhumanliferesemblesthatofCrusoe’stothenormallawsofsocialandeconomicorganisation.WhatoftheconditionsRawlsdescribesas‘subjective’circumstancesofjustice?Unliketheformer,thesecloselyresemblelogicallynecessarytruths.Arguably,theyjustdostatelogicallynecessarytruths.Forexample,takehisstipulationthatthepartiesintheoriginalposition‘havetheirownplansoflife’(Rawls1971:127).Thisisanideauponwhichheenlargeslaterinthebook,where,citingJosiahRoyce,11heexplainsthatheisadapting‘Royce’s\nRawls:throughreasontojustice275thoughtthatapersonmayberegardedasahumanlifelivedaccordingtoaplan’,andthat,accordingtoRoyce,‘anindividualsayswhoheisbydescribinghispurposesandcauses,whatheintendstodoinhislife’(Rawls1971:408).Now,Idon’tsupposeRawlsmeansthat,foranyspecificindivi-dual–JimorSally–thatpersonisdefinedbyhisorherplansandpurposesinquitethewaythatthetriangleisdefinedbyitsthree-sidedness.JimandSallymighthavechosendifferentlywhileremainingthesamepersons,whereasatrianglewithanumberofsidesotherthanthreeisalogicalimpossibility.Rawls’spointis,rather,thatthepropertyofhavingplansandpurposesispartiallydefinitiveoftheconcept,‘person’.Clearly,thereissomethinginthis.Oneonlyhastoconsiderthatpurpo-sivenessonthepartofindividuals–theabilitytoframeintentionsandactuponthem–isafeaturewhichdistinguishesourownspeciesfromothers.Unlikejellyfish,whichjustdriftwiththetide,orants,whosemovementsareentirelypre-programmed,weact.Again,considerthedoubttherecanbeoverwhetheranindividualinanirreversiblecomastillqualifiesasaperson.(Shouldonesay,‘ThatpersoninthecomaisJohnSmith’,orshouldonesay,‘ThatindividualusedtobeJohnSmith’?Itiseasytoenvisagesituationsinwhichthereisnostraightanswer.)Theseareinterestingquestions,buthereweneedonlytonotethat,insofaraspurposivenessisdefinitiveofpersons,wecanthinkofRawls’sstatementthat‘individualshavetheirownplansoflife’asembodyinganindispensablecomponentoftheconcept,‘person’,and,inthatsense‘universal’.Allinallthen,itishardlysurprisingthatRawls’stheoryofjusticeshouldhavebeenconstruedasanattempttoderiveuniversallyapplicableprinciplesbylogicalstepsfromuniversallytruepremises.Moreover,oneonlyneedstoconsiderthemannerinwhichhetendstocharacterisethattheory;forexample,bydescribingitasasocialcontracttheoryorasanexerciseinrationalchoicetheory.Ortakethefollowingpassage,whichisdrawnfromthefinalparagraphofhisbook.[To]seeourplaceinsocietyfromtheperspectiveofthisposition[i.e.theori-ginalposition]istoseeitsubspecieaeternitatis;itistoregardthehumansitua-tionnotonlyfromallsocialbutalsofromalltemporalpointsofview.Theperspectiveofeternityisnotaperspectivefromacertainplacebeyondtheworld,northepointofviewofatranscendentbeing;ratheritisacertainformDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ofthoughtandfeelingthatrationalpersonscanadoptwithintheworld.Andhavingdoneso,theycan,whatevertheirgeneration,bringtogetherintooneschemeallindividualperspectivesandarrivetogetheratregulativeprinciplesthatcanbeaffirmedbyeveryoneashelivesbythem,eachfromhisownstandpoint.(Rawls1971:587)Notethephrasesubspecieaeternitatis.OnecanonlytakethisasanallusiontoSpinoza,andanyphilosopherreadingthepassagewouldimmediately\n276Moderntimes,modernthemesrecogniseitassuch.ItwasSpinozawhowrote,oftheunderstanding,that‘[It]perceivesthingsnotsomuchundertheconditionofdurationassubspecieaeternitatis’.InthetranslationofSpinozaIpossess,thelatterphraseisrenderedas,‘undercertainformofeternity’(Spinoza1951a:40).Now,theformofeternitySpinozahadinmindwasthatexemplifiedbynecessarytruthssuchas‘thetriangleisathree-sidedfigure’or‘threeplustwoequalsfive’.Tocallsuchtruths‘eternal’makesthemsoundimposingbut,inusingthatexpression,therationalistphilosophersoftheseventeenthcentury(Spinozabeingone)onlymeanttosaythatnochangeincontingentcir-cumstancescanshakethem.Inotherwords,iftheentireuniverseweretobeannihilated,itwouldremaintruethatanytrianglemusthavethreesidesandthatthreeaddedtotwomakesfive,eventhoughtherewouldbenobodyaroundtothinkabouttrianglesortodoarithmetic.(Itwouldbedifficulttodisagree.)Likehispredecessor,Descartes,Spinozabelievedthatcorrectmethodinphilosophyandscience–themethodoneshouldfollowinattemptingtodiscoverthestructureoftheuniverse–wasamatterofunveilingthechainoflogicalconnectionsbywhicheachtruepropositionisboundtoitsneighboursintheseries.Indeed,hisEthicsispresentedasaseriesofdeductionsfromaninitialsetofdefinitionsandaxiomswhosetruthis,asheholds,self-evident(Spinoza1951b:43–271).So,theapparentparallelbetweenSpinoza’sargu-mentandthatsetoutbyRawlsinATheoryofJusticearisesinthefirstinstancebecauseeachisfoundedonpremiseswhosetruthismeanttobeobvious.InSpinoza’scase,theyareheldtobelogicallynecessary,logicallyself-evident,truthswhosedenialwouldinvolvecontradiction.InRawls’scase,thepremises,thoughnotlogicallynecessary,areneverthelessmeanttobeso‘weak’thatitwouldbeimpossibletodenytheirtruthortheiruni-versality(1971:20).Eachargumentthenproceedsbyreasontoconclusionswhicharejustasuniversalasthepremises,orsowemustassume.Atanyrate,thatistheparallelweare–apparently–invitedtodrawbyRawlshimself;and,notonlythat,butinaparagraphtowhichheattachesspecialimportance,orsoyouwouldthink,theonewithwhichheconcludeshisprojectandsummarisesitsessentialcharacter.From‘metaphysical’to‘political’Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Evenso,andforallthetextualevidencetothecontrary,itcouldbethatRawlshasbeenthevictimofaseriousmisunderstanding.Atleast,hehasifwearetobelievehisrepeatedinsistencetothateffectinworkheproducedsubsequenttothepublicationofATheoryofJustice.Here,akeytextisanarticle,‘JusticeasFairness:PoliticalnotMetaphysical’,firstpublishedin1985(Rawls1999a:388–414).Initsopeningparagraph,Rawlsstatesthathewouldliketocorrecttheimpressionthathisconceptionof‘justiceasfairness’restsuponcertainphilosophicalclaimswhichhewould,infact,liketoavoid,thesebeing,‘forexample,claimstouniversaltruth,orclaimsabout\nRawls:throughreasontojustice277theessentialnatureandidentityofpersons’(Rawls1999a:388).Inotherwords,theyareclaimsofthetypeIhavebeencalling‘universalist’.Rawlsstressesthat,onthecontrary,ithasbeenhisintentionthroughouttodevelopaconceptionofjusticewhichis,sofaraspossible,freeofsuch‘philosophicalandmetaphysical’commitments.Itis,hesays,aconceptionwhichis‘workedoutforaspecifickindofsubject’,namely‘the“basicstructure”ofamodernconstitutionaldemocracy’(Rawls1999a:389).Inthatsenseitis,thus,‘politicalnotmetaphysical’.Mindyou,ifIhavebeenguiltyofmisunderstandingRawls,thenIhavebeeningoodcompany.12Forexample,RichardRortyconfessesthatmanypeople,includinghimself,initiallytookRawls’sATheoryofJusticetobe‘acontinuationoftheEnlightenmentattempttogroundourmoralintuitionsonaconceptionofhumannature(and,morespecifically,asaneo-Kantianattempttogroundthemonthenotionof“rationality”)’.Rortystatesthat‘Rawls’swritingssubsequenttoATheoryofJusticehavehelpedusrealisethatweweremisinterpretinghisbook’(Rorty1984:184–85)anddescribesRawls’sattitudeas,infact,‘thoroughlyhistoricistandantiuniversalist’,which,comingfromRorty,ispraiseindeed(Rorty1984:180).13Ontheotherhand,itcouldbethatIwasrightallalong,inwhichcaseIamalsoingoodcompany,forIcouldthenagreewithBrianBarrythatPoliticalLiberalismisa‘sweepingrecantation’andanillustrationofMontesquieu’sdictumthat‘abadbookbyafamousauthorcausesalotoftrouble’(Barry1995b:915).So,wasRawlsinitiallymisunderstood,andshouldwethenregardATheoryofJusticeandPoliticalLiberalismasformingpartofasingleproject?Wehavehiswordforitthatthisisso,andgoodpracticedictatesthatweshouldtakehimathisword.Ontheotherhand,didRawlschangehismind?Thereiscertainlytextualevidencetosuggestthathedid.Ishan’tdwellonsuchquestions.Onethingisforsure,though,namelythat–whetherornoteachcomplementstheotherinformingpartofasingleoverallproject14–therearedifferencesbetweeneachtextintheargumentsitsetsout.Thedifferencesaresuchthatthelaterworkmeritsachapterofitsown,andweshalldiscusstheminchapter15;but,first,abriefaccountoftheinitialimpactofRawls’sfirsttext.NotesDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December20121TheexceptionhereisBarry’sPoliticalArgument(1965),whichdoesnottakeanideologicalline.2Onthis,seeespeciallyG.A.Cohen,‘WheretheActionIs:OntheSiteofDistributiveJustice’,inCohen(2000:134–47).3AsRawlsgoesontopointout,‘Theproblemthatnowarisesisthis:Howdoesithappenthatanapparentlyutilitarianviewleadstothesamesubstantivecontent(thesameprinciplesofjustice)asjusticeasfairness?’(Rawls2007:267).Interestingly,RawlsthinksthatMillwouldendorsethesecondprincipleaswellasthefirst.4FormulationsoftheprinciplesrecurthroughoutRawls’sbodyofwork.Eachtendstobemoretechnicalthanitspredecessor.\n278Moderntimes,modernthemes5One(famous)exceptiontothisruleisUlysses,whohadhimselfropedtothemastashisshipcamewithinearshotofthesirens.Clearly,Ulysses(i)wantedtovisitthesirensand(ii)didnotwanttobefreetovisitthesirens.Thereareunusualfeaturestothis,andsimilar,casesandthereisnoneedtoexplorethemhere.6But,whataboutsolidarityandequality?7See,forexample,Barry(1973:89ff.).8Here,somethingmustdependuponthedegreeofdisadvantageexperiencedbytheworstoffpersonineachofthesecompetingarrangements.Underutilitarianarrangements,itcouldhappenthattheworstoffpersonisonlymarginallyworseoffthanheorshewouldbewhereRawls’ssecondprincipleisapplied,inwhichcasearationalpersonmightconsideritworthtakingariskhere.Ofcourse,suchanestimationcouldonlybemadeoncetheveilofignorancehasbeenlifted,ifonlytoacertainextent.Ishan’tconsidertheconsequencesofthispointforRawls’sargument,althoughtherearesome.And,ofcourse,thereisalsotheconsiderationthatwhatcountsasacceptably‘marginal’mayvaryfrompersontoperson.9Inhisonlinereviewofthisbook’sfirstedition,JonMahoneyexpresseshisopinionthatsuchleakagecanbeprevented.SeeMahoney,Jon(2005)‘Reviewof“UnderstandingthePoliticalPhi-losophers”’:http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol6/iss1/18.ComparethiswithCohen’sargumentin‘WheretheActionIs’(Cohen2000).ForRawls’sownresponsetothistypeof‘objectionfromrisk’,seeRawls(2001:87ff.and106ff.).Iamunpersuadedbyhisresponse,butIleaveyoutojudgeforyourself.10Ifyouwouldlikeanexample,thencomparetheUSAwithCuba.IntheUSA,thebasicliberalfreedomsareguaranteedbytheconstitution,whereasCubaiscertainlynotaliberalsociety.Ontheotherhand,thereisnosystemofuniversalhealthcareintheUSA,whereasinCubathereis.Iamsurethat,ifasked,manyCubanswouldtellyouthattheyarehappytosacrificeacertainamountoflibertyforagreaterequality.Youmayormaynotempathise,butwhoistosaythatUScitizensaremorerationalthanCubans,orindeedthatCubansaremorerationalthanUScitizens?11TheAmericanphilosopher,JosiahRoyce(1855–1916),wasanexponentofthe‘absoluteidealism’thatwascharacteristicofHegelandhisfollowers.12Rawlstakesgreatpainstodispelthemisunderstandinginquestion,ifsuchitis,soIcan’tbetheonlypersontohavefallenpreytoit.Atanyrate,Ididn’tnoticehimsittingatthebackasIwaslecturingtomyfirst-yearclassesatthePolytechnicofNorthLondon.Isupposeit’spossiblethathewasthere,butIdoubtit.13RortycomesclosetodescribingRawlsasapostmodernist,whichstrikesmeassomethingofanexaggeration.ForRorty’sgeneralpositionseeRorty(1989).14Onthis,seeWenar(2005).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n14InTheory’swakeRawlsfirstmajorbook,ATheoryofJustice(1971),wieldedfarmoreinfluenceuponthestateofpoliticalthoughtthananythingelsehewrote.Thisis,therefore,themostappropriatepointatwhichtogivesomeaccountofthatinfluence.Weshallturntohissecondmajorbook,PoliticalLiberalism(Rawls1993),inthenextchapter.Inthefollowingsection,Ishallgiveabriefaccountofthedebatebetweenliberals,libertariansandcommunitarianswhichhasenjoyedsuchahighprofilewithinphilosophysincethepublica-tionoftheformertext.Iincludeitherebecause,asIshallpointout,theargumenthastendedtobeconductedwithinaframeworksetbyRawls’sbook.Thatapart,however,nohistoryofrecentpoliticalphilosophywouldbecompletewithoutsomeaccountofthatdebate.Afterthat,IshallmakeafewmoregeneralcommentsonRawls’sinfluence.Liberalism,libertarianism,communitarianismWithincontemporaryphilosophy,theprimaryexemplarofliberalthoughthasbeen–ofcourse–ATheoryofJusticeitself.Asforlibertarianismandcommunitarianism,Rawls’sdominatinginfluenceisdemonstrated,ineachcase,bytextswhichself-consciouslysetouttoplacethemselvesinoppositiontohisargument.Thus,inhislibertariantext,Anarchy,State,andUtopia(1974),RobertNozicksetsouttodefendan‘entitlement’accountofjustice,onewhichismeanttobeanalternativetoRawls’s‘patterned’account.Likewise,inLiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice(1982),MichaelSandeldefendshisown‘communitarian’positionthroughacritiqueofRawls’sphilosophy.Havingreachedthispoint,thereshouldbenoneedtodefine‘liberalism’,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012asthesubjecthasbeenmuchdiscussedinearlierchapters.Butwhatis‘lib-ertarianism’,andwhat‘communitarianism’?Inanswer,theformer,libertar-ianism,isadefenceoftheminimalor‘nightwatchman’state;thatis,thestatewhichlimitsitsfunctionstotheenforcementofcontractsandtopro-tectionagainstforce,theftandfraud.Libertariansarestaunchsupportersofthefreemarketandtheystandopposedtoanyformofstate‘interference’,includingtheredistributionofwealthforthepublicgood(or,rather,forwhatthestatejudgestobesuch).Libertariansarehostiletosocialismas,indeed,theyaretoanyformofwelfarestate.(So,youcouldsaythat,ratheras\n280Moderntimes,modernthemesRawlsisthephilosopherofthe‘post-warconsensus’infavourofredis-tributivism,soNozick’sworkisadefenceofthepro-laisser-fairereactionwhichsucceededitandheldswaythroughoutthe1980s.)1Asthename‘libertarianism’indicates,libertariansbelievethat,wherethereisafreemarketandaminimalstate,humanfreedomisrespected,andthatfreedomiscompromisedandrestrictedbythearrangementstowhichtheyareopposed.(Libertarianstendtodescribethelatteras‘coercive’.)IntheUSA,therewasanactivelibertarianmovementbeforeNozickappearedonthescene–andtherestillis–butNozick’sbookremainsthemostphilosophicallysophisticatedtreatmentofthesubject,andthemostwellknown.Similarly,thereisacommunitarianmovement,practical,committedtochange,andbasedmainlyintheUSA.Roughlyspeaking,itsguidingprin-cipleisthatthewayforwardforAmericaliesinareturntocommunalvalues.Asonecommunitarianwebsitestates,‘Americanmen,women,andchildrenaremembersofmanycommunities,–families;neighborhoods;innumerablesocial,religious,ethnic,workplace,andprofessionalassociations;andthebodypoliticitself’andthat‘Neitherhumanexistencenorindividuallibertycanbesustainedforlongoutsidetheinterdependentandoverlappingcommunitiestowhichallofusbelong’.Itaddsthat‘Acommunitarianperspectiverecognizesbothindividualhumandignityandthesocialdimensionofhumanexistence’.2However,therelationshipbetweenthisandthephilosophicalcommu-nitarianismwithwhichweareconcernedhere–andwhichshouldinterestyouifyouhavereadthisfar,whetheryouareAmericanornot–appears,infact,toberathermoreobliquethanthatbetweenthepracticallibertarianmovementandNozick’swork.Broadlyspeaking,philosophicalcommu-nitarianismisthethesisthatliberalismmisportraystherelationshipbetweenindividualandcommunityincertaincrucialrespects;thatthelatter’srepre-sentationofthoserelationshipsis,inaword,‘thin’.(Clearly,thereisnotmuchresemblancebetweenthecommunitarianismofcontemporaryphiloso-phyandthecommunitarianismofRobertOwen’stimeand,asSandelacknowledgeshimself,thetermis‘misleading’(Sandel1994:1767).)AsIsaid,allIshalldohereissummarisethesepositions.Ishan’tattempttoanalysetheminanydetail,ortodefendanyoneofthemagainsttheothertwo.Inanycase,thereisavailableplentyofliteraturewhichattemptstodojustthat,andtheaimofthepresentchapterisnottosubjecttheirargumentstocriticalexamination,butonlytogiveyouanideaofhowRawls’searlierDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012workinfluencedthestateofpoliticalphilosophy.So,withthatinmind,letmetakesomeofthequestionswhichhavetendedtorecurthroughoutthisbookandgiveabriefaccountofhowliberals,libertariansandcommunitariansrespectivelytendtoapproachthem.Ishallbeginwiththefollowing.Whatisaperson?Ishouldputthisquestionmorespecifically,asfollows:Whatfeaturesofthepersonaremostrelevanttotheunderstandingofthepoliticalaspectsofour\nInTheory’swake281nature?YouwillseewhatImeanifyourecallthat,forthe‘classical’utili-tarians–BenthamandMill–apersonisessentiallyalocusofexperiences,aseekerofpleasuresandashunnerofpains.Onthisview,aworldofmanypersonsis,inasense,an‘atomised’world,aworldinwhicheachindividual,inpursuitofhisorherown‘interests’,issetonatrajectorywhichismorethanlikelytocrossthoseoftheothers.Oneoftheclassicalutilitarians,Mill,wasalsoaclassicalliberal,andsothisviewofthepersonis–inthatsenseatleast–aliberalviewaswell.Rawls’sviewis,inaway,similartothisalthough,asyouwouldexpect,itismoresubtleandnuanced.ForRawls,itisanimportantfeatureofpersonsthateachpersoniscapableofforminghisorherownconceptionofthegoodandfollowinga‘rationalplanoflife’inpursuitofthatconception.Rawls’spersonsarenotBentham’ssimplycon-ceivedatoms,busilyzappingabout,but–similarlytoBentham–Rawlsbelievesthatthepathsofindividualsinpursuitoftheirrationalplanswillinevitablycross.Forlibertarianstoo,thedisparitybetweenindividualsoftheiraspirationsandplansisaninescapablefactoflife,somethingwehavetotakeasgiven.However,sofaraslibertariansareconcerned,themostimportantdefiningfeatureofthe‘moralperson’isnotthat,butthefactthatwearebearersofrights.Thus,NozickopensAnarchy,State,andUtopiawiththeassertionthat‘Individualshaverights,andtherearethingsnopersonorgroupmaydotothem(withoutviolatingtheirrights)’(1974:ix).Ineffect,libertarianstakeseriouslyoneimplicationoftheanti-utilitarian,anti-consequentialist,argu-mentIoutlinedinthechapteronMill.Consequentialism(atleastinitsmorestraightforwardversions)hastheimplicationthatitismorallypermissibleforonepersontouseanotherasameanstoanendwherethatendisagoodend.Thisimplicationismorallycounter-intuitive,atleastitcanseemthatwayifyoutelltherightstory:astoryofinnocentpeoplebeing‘pun-ished’todetercriminals,forexample,orastoryinwhichthemajority’shappinessisgreatlyimprovedthankstotheeffortsofaminoritygroupofbadlytreatedslaves.Libertarianism’sguidingthought–oroneofthem–isthatthecounter-intuitivenessofthisimplicationdemonstratesthatpeoplehaverightswhichothersareboundtorespect.AsNozickputsit,aperson’srightsactas‘side-constraints’onthebehaviourofothers.Forcommunitarians,thingsaremorecomplex.Writingagainsta‘deon-tologicalethic’(i.e.Rawls’sethic)which‘insiststhatweviewourselvesasDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012independentselves,independentinthesensethatouridentityisnevertiedtoouraimsandattachments’(1982:179),Sandelhasthistosay:[But]wecannotregardourselvesasindependentinthiswaywithoutgreatcosttothoseloyaltiesandconvictionswhosemoralforceconsistspartlyinthefactthatlivingbythemisinseparablefromunderstandingourselvesastheparti-cularpersonsweare–asmembersofthisfamilyorcommunityornationorpeople,asbearersofthishistory,assonsanddaughtersofthatrevolution,ascitizensofthisrepublic.AllegiancessuchasthesearemorethanvaluesIhappen\n282Moderntimes,modernthemestohaveoraimsI‘espouseatanygiventime’.TheygobeyondtheobligationsIvoluntarilyincurandthe‘naturalduties’Iowetohumanbeingsassuch.TheyallowthattosomeIowemorethanjusticerequiresorevenpermits,notbyreasonofagreementsIhavemadebutinsteadinvirtueofthosemoreorlessenduringattachmentsandcommitmentswhichtakentogetherpartlydefinethepersonIam.(Sandel1982:179)Inshort,thepersonyouare–theprecisenatureofyouridentity–isverymuchaquestionofyourspecificculturalandhistoricalsituation.Itis‘moreorlessenduringattachmentsandcommitments’which‘partlydefine’thatperson.Thisisathesisconcerningpersonalidentity.So,thequestionforRawlsianstoask,andforSandeltoanswer,ispreciselywhyitshouldberelevanttothequestionofjustice.Still,asIsaid,Iamtryingtogiveyouapictureofthepresentstateofthedebate,nottotakesides,soletusmoveon.3Rights:Dowehaverights?Ifso,howdoweknowwehavethem,andwhatrightsdowehave?Inpoliticalphilosophyitiscustomarytodistinguishmoralrightsfrompositiverights.Ourpossessionoftheformer–whicharesometimescalled‘natural’rightsandsometimes‘human’rights–is(iftheyexistatall)inde-pendentoftheexistenceofanylegalsystem.Bycontrast,our‘positive’rightsaresimplytherightswearespecifiedashavingbytheprevailinglegalsystem.Itisadistinctionwhichhasbeendiscussedatanumberofpointsthroughoutthisnarrative.YouwillrecallthattheclassicalutilitariansdeniedtheexistenceofnaturalrightsandthatBenthamdescribedtheveryideaas‘nonsenseuponstilts’(Bentham2000c:405).Similarly,inthefirstchapterofOnLiberty,JohnStuartMillwrote,‘ItispropertostatethatIforgoanyadvantagewhichcouldbederivedtomyargumentfromtheideaofabstractrightasathingindependentofutility’(Mill1991a:15).Onthisaccount,theonlyrightswehavearepositive,legal,rights.So,forutilitarians,thequestionis,whatrightsoughtwetohavebylaw,andtheiranswer–obviously–hastobethatweshouldhavetherightsderivablefromtheprincipleofutility.Inotherwords,thebestlegalsystemistheonewhichmostservestopromotethegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber.ThisDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012createsadifficultyforutilitarianssuchasMill,whoarealsoliberals,foritmeanstheyhavetoshowhowtherights(or‘liberties’)characteristicoftheliberalview–freespeech,therighttoliveyourlifeinyourownway,andsoon–canbederivedfromthatprinciple.Rawlsianliberalsconstruerightsdifferently,asdolibertarians.Forboth,wecanbesaidtohavemoralrightsindependentofourpositiverightsand,forboth,theformersetastandardagainstwhichwecanmeasurethelegalsystemwhichdefinesthelatter.AccordingtoRawls’sargument,themoralrightswehavearedefinedbythetermsoftheagreementwhichwouldbe\nInTheory’swake283reachedbyrationalchoosers,negotiatingfromtheoriginalposition.LikeMill,hehastoderiveacharacteristicallyliberalsetofrightsfromhisbasicphilosophicalposition.Bycontrast,libertarianstendtoarguethat,becausewehaverightswhichothersmustrespect,thereisageneralrightnottobecoercedbyothersintosurrenderinganyofourrights,mostespeciallyourrightstoanyitemsofpropertywemayown.Andthat–ofcourse–ishowlibertarianismservesasadefenceofthefreemarket,forifitcanneverberighttocoercepeopleintosurrenderingtheirproperty,thentaxationmustalwaysbemorallywrong.Moreover,ifcoercionissowrong,thenanyrighttoaspecificitemofpropertycanonlybelegiti-matelytransferredfrompersontopersonincaseswherebothpartiesconsenttothetransaction.Accordingly,libertarianstendtoportraythefreemarketasanongoing,andvast,setofmutuallyconsensualbilateralexchanges.Onthisview,thejusticeofadistributionisdetermined,asitwere,histori-callythroughaconsiderationofhowpropertyownerscametoownthepropertytheyhave.Nozick’sis,thus,an‘entitlement’asopposedtoa‘patterned’accountofjustice.4Otherwise,libertarianstendtobefairlyunspecificastowhatrightsweactuallyhave.Thatisprobablybecausewhatlibertariansdoisconstructrightsingeneralonthemodelofpropertyrights.TheconsequenceisanaccountofjusticewhichmodelsitselfonthepatternofLocke’sdefenceofproperty.Indeed,Anarchy,State,andUtopia(Nozick1974)isaself-consciousreworkingofLocke’sargument.(Indeed,wehavealreadydiscussedthistypeofargument,andinmoredetail,inchapter8,above.)Asforcommunitarians,wehaveseenthatSandelisopposedtotheideaofa‘deontologicalethic’.Onhisaccountwehave‘allegiances’–‘loyaltiesandconvictionswhosemoralforceconsistspartlyinthefactthatlivingbythemisinseparablefromunderstandingourselvesastheparticularpersonsweare’(1982:179).Ifthisisright,itfollowsthattherecanbenogeneralanswertothequestionofwhatrights(orwhatduties)wehave.Onthecontrary,argumentsoverobligation,duty,etc.mustbeconductedbetweenindividualswhosecommitmentsandsenseofidentityflowfromtheirrelationshiptoaspecificcommunity.Thisisacharacteristicallycommunitarianview.Forexample,itisquitesimilartoAlasdairMacIntyre’sviewthat,inethics,meaningfuldiscussioncanonlytakeplacewithinaculturalcontext,a‘tra-dition’.LiberalswillfindthisabandonmentoftheideathattherecanbeDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012generalprinciplesdisturbing.Intheirturn,communitarians,orsomeofthem,maywanttoaccuseliberalsofasortofculturalimperialism.Eitherway,itwillbeclearthatseriousissueshangonthistypeofdispute.Individual,communityandstate:Whatistherelationshipbetweenthem?Forcommunitarians,asthenameimplies,alliscommunity–or,atanyrate,agreatdealis.Therelationshipbetweenindividualandcommunityis,soto\n284Moderntimes,modernthemesspeak,symbiotic.Theindividualispartlydefinedbythatrelationship;asaretheloyaltiesandallegiancesheorshehastowardsit.Communitariansareapttocriticiseliberalsfortreatingthatrelationshipas‘instrumental’.Whenappliedtotheclassicalutilitarians–certainlywhenappliedtoBentham–thedescriptionisfairenough.Thepleasure-seeking,pain-shunning,social‘atoms’ofclassicalutilitariantheorycanonlytreatthecommunity–andthestatelikewise–asdevicesforhelpingthemachievetheirendsmoreeasily.InthecaseofRawls,however,weshouldbemorecircumspect.Heisperfectlyhappywiththeideathatcitizens‘mayhave,andoftendohaveatanygiventime,affections,devotions,andloyaltiesthattheybelievetheywouldnot,indeedcouldandshouldnot,standapartfromandevaluateobjectively’(Rawls2001:22),andthattheymay‘regarditassimplyunthinkabletoviewthemselvesapartfromcertainreligious,philosophical,andmoralcon-victions,andfromcertainenduringattachmentsandloyalties’(Rawls2001:22).Sofarasheisconcerned‘community’and‘politicalsociety’aretwodifferentthings.‘Politicalliberalismdoesnotviewpoliticalsocietyasanassociation’,hewrites.‘Quitethecontrary,itinsistsonthedistinctionbetweenapoliticalsocietyandanassociation’(Rawls2001:94).5Hisprin-ciplesofjusticearemeanttoapplyonlyinthecaseoftheformer.(Ofcourse,theproblemistodeterminethedividingline.)Asforlibertarians,sofarastheyareconcerned,thereisreallynosuchthingas‘community’.AsNozickputsit,‘thereisnosocialentitywithagoodthatundergoessomesacrificeforitsowngood.Thereareonlyindividualpeople,differentindividualpeople,withtheirownindividuallives’(1974:94).And,asforthestate,whereastatedoesmorethanmaintainanenvironmentwithinwhichmarketrelationscanoperate,libertarianscanonlythinkofthestateas‘coercive’.Politicalphilosophysince1971Ifyouhavebeenreadingthisbookthroughfromthebeginning,thenthethemesdiscussedintheforegoingsectionwillbefamiliartoyou.Afterall,Rawlsisbynomeanshistory’sfirstliberalphilosopher,andnorisNozicktheearliesttheoreticiantohavedefendedthefreemarketandtheminimalstate.Locke’spropertyargumentcanbeconstruedasadefenceoftheformer,asNozickfreelyacknowledges,andyoucanfindargumentsforbothintheworkofAdamSmith.TheideathattherelationbetweentheindividualandDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012societyismorethaninstrumental–thattheverycharacteroftheformeris,inasense,afunctionofthelatter–hasrecurredthroughoutthisvolume.ItistobefoundinthewritingsofAristotleforexample,intheworkofRousseauandthatofMarx,soitisbynomeansoriginaltolatetwentieth-centurycommunitarianism.Inshort,theoriginalityofourcontemporaryliberals,libertariansandcommunitariansdoesnotlieinthepositionstheydefend,somuchasintheirreworkingofthem.AsfortheinfluenceofRawls,themoststrikingfeatureofthecon-temporarydebateistheextenttowhichtheparameterswithinwhichithas\nInTheory’swake285beentakingplacehavebeensetbyhisthinking.Unliketheothers,Rawlsisnomereplayerinthegame.Hehasalsomadetherules,setthegoalpostsanddefinedtheboundariesoftheplayingfield.ConsiderNozick’semphasisuponthestronglyinviolablecharacterofrights,forexample.ThistakesitscuefromRawls’sargumentsagainstconsequentialism.Likewise,hisdistinctionbetween‘patterned’and‘entitlement’accountsofjusticeisdevelopedwithRawlslargelyinmind.(Onthispoint,Anarchy,State,andUtopiacontainsanextendeddiscussionofRawls’s‘differenceprinciple’(Nozick1974:183–231).)Again,Sandel’sentirecommunitarianpositionislargelydefined,inLiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice,throughacritiqueofRawls’searlierposi-tion.ContemporaryphilosophersofsocialismandMarxismhavealsotendedtoconducttheirdiscussionswithinthesameparameters.6Butthen,thecharacteroftheforegoingdebateisjustoneillustrationofRawls’sinfluence.Ithasrangedmorewidelythanthat.Ithasalsoshownupinaprevalenttendencytointerprettheproblemsofpoliticalphilosophyasproblemsconcerning‘justice’,inarenewedinterestinsocialcontracttheoryandintheappearanceofotherworks,besidesATheoryofJustice,inwhichthesocialcontractideaisreworked.7Notthatanyofthisisatallsurprising,forthesituationinwhichphilosophyisdominatedbytheworkofasinglefigure–somuchso,thateventhosewhodisagreewiththepositionthatpersontakesmustdefinetheirowninrelationtoit–isarecurringone.WhenAristotlefirstcametotheAcademy,intellectuallifeinGreecewouldhavebeendominatedbythethoughtofPlato.ThroughouttheDarkAgesandintothemedievalperiod,EuropeanthoughtwasdominatedbytheideasofAristotlehimself.WithLeviathan’ssocialcontractargument,Hobbessettheconceptualagendafollowedbypoliticalphilosophersforthenextcenturyorso.Marxandhiscontemporariesstartedoutas‘youngHegelians’,andtherearemanyotherinstances.Ifitistruethat,atpresent,politicalphilo-sopherswritinginEnglishmustdefinetheirpositionsinrelationtoRawls’sarguments–that,asNozickthought,‘PoliticalphilosophersnowmusteitherworkwithinRawls’theoryorexplainwhynot’(Nozick1974:183)–then,onthebasisofpastexperience,wecanbeconfidentthatthingswilleventuallychange.Forthepresent,Iamsurethatopinionsuponjusthowbeneficialthatinfluencehasbeenmustbedivided.However,thereisonerespectinwhichithasbeenundeniablytothegood,andthatisinitsrevivalofinterestinDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012politicalphilosophy,thesubject.Farfrombeing‘dead’,asPeterLaslettfeared50yearsago(Laslett1956:vii),politicalphilosophyisaliveandkicking.IfRawlsistobecongratulateduponanything,itisjustthat.Notes1Youcouldsaythat,ratherasRawls’stheoryofjusticeisthepoliticalphilosophyofthepost-war‘welfarist’consensus,soNozick’sworkisaphilosophicallysophisticateddefenceof‘Reaganomics’–or,ifyou’reBritish,theeconomicphilosophyof‘Thatcherism’.\n286Moderntimes,modernthemes2‘TheCommunitarianNetwork’,homepage:www.gwu.edu/~ccps/platformtext.html.3Butseemy‘Liberalism,AbstractIndividualism,andtheProblemofParticularObligations’Haworth(2005).4Thisdistinctionwasdiscussedinchapter8,pp.133–4above.5Here,IamquotingfromoneofRawls’s‘later’works.However,heisexpressingaviewwhichremainedconstantthroughouthiswriting.6SeeespeciallyCohen(2000,2009).7ExamplesareNozick(1974),asalreadymentioned,Scanlon(1982,1998)andBarry(1995a).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n15Rawls:constructinga‘political’liberalismPoliticalLiberalism,thebookinwhichRawlsfirstpresentedthevariouscomponentpartsofhis‘later’philosophyasaunifiedwhole,wasfirstpub-lishedin1993.LikeATheoryofJustice,itimmediatelysparkedmuchinterestandcontroversy–farmorethanIcouldhopetodealwithinoneshortchapter.Therefore,Ishallconcentrate,here,uponthemostapparentdifferencesbetweenRawls’slaterposition1andthe‘earlier’argumentsetoutinATheoryofJustice.Thosedifferencesare,first,Rawls’semphasisonthe‘political’characteroftheliberalismheisseekingtodefend;second,hisinsistencethathisargumentshouldbeconstruedasanexercisein‘Kantianconstructivism’;and,third,hisincreasedemphasisuponmaintaininga‘basicstructure’whichiscapableofremainingstableovertime.Forreasonsofbrevity,IshallfocusuponjusttwowaysinwhichthelatterconcernisreflectedinRawls’sargument;onebeinghisintroductionoftheideaofan‘overlappingconsensus’(towhichthereisnoreferenceinATheoryofJustice),theotherbeingtheideaof‘publicreason’(ofwhichthereissomediscussioninthelatersectionsoftheearliertext).Ishouldaddherethat,inwritingthischapter,IhavebeenwellawarethattherealreadyexistsagreatdealofcriticalmaterialonRawls’slaterphiloso-phy.Withthatinmind–andinthehopeofdoingrathermorethanmerelyrehearsingcriticalpointswhichhavealreadybeenmadebyothers–Ishalltry,asIproceed,tobringtotheforesomeofthelargerassumptionswhich,asitseemstome,underpinRawls’sargument.InthelatersectionsofthechapterIshallalsoofferafewobservationsonRawls’splaceinthehistoryofpoliticalthought.However,Ishouldbegin,asIdidinchapter13,withtheproblemRawlssetsouttosolve.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012‘Theproblemofpoliticalliberalism’‘Theproblemofpoliticalliberalism’,ashecallsit,isformulatedbyRawlsasfollows.[H]owisitpossiblefortheretoexistovertimeajustandstablesocietyoffreeandequalcitizens,whoremainprofoundlydividedbyreasonablereligious,philosophical,andmoraldoctrines?(Rawls1993:4)\n288Moderntimes,modernthemesThetwomostobviousdifferencesbetweenthisandthequestionRawlsaddressesinhisearliertextareasfollows.First,theproblemwithwhichheisnowconcernedisrepresentedastiedtoaspecificsocialandpoliticalform,theformtowhichhereferswithexpressionssuchas‘democraticsociety’,‘democraticregime’and‘constitutionaldemocracy’.(Rawlssaysthatheusesthesephrasesinterchangeably(1993:11).)Second,withthisnewformula-tion,Rawlsemphasisesinconsistencyandconflictbetweenthedifferingbelief-systemstowhichdifferentindividualcitizensadhere.Thiscontrastswiththeearlierformulation,whichonlyemphasisesconflictsofinterestbetweenthe‘freeandrational’personswhoselectRawls’sprinciplesfromthestandpointoftheoriginalposition.ToappreciateRawls’sthinkinghere,youwillneedtograspthreerelatedconceptions,eachofwhichplaysaroleinRawls’sschematisedaccountofhumanmotivation.Thefirstishisconceptionofa‘comprehensive’doctrine.Adoctrineis‘comprehensive’hesayswhenitincludescon-ceptionsofwhatisofvalueinhumanlife,aswellasidealsofpersonalvirtueandcharacter,thataretoinformmuchofournon-politicalconduct(inthelimit,ourlifeasawhole)(Rawls1993:175).Onthisaccount,themajorsystemsofreligiousbeliefarecomprehensivedoctrines,clearlyso,andRawlsfrequentlyreferstothemassuch.Christianity,forexample,combinesacertaincosmology–thatis,acertainviewofthewayGodandtheworldarerelated–withavaluesystemwhichholdscertainimpli-cationsforaction;thesebeing,broadlyspeaking,thatoneshouldfollowtheexampleandtheteachingsofChrist.Butthen,notallgeneralandcomprehensivedoctrinesarereligiousincharacter.Youcan–ofcourse–beanatheistandholdaworldviewwhichembodiescertainpracticalmaxims.Itisalsotrue,ofcourse,thatanyrelativelysystematicsetofpoliticalbeliefscanqualifyascomprehensiveonRawls’scriteria.Forexample,Marxismembodiesaworldviewandasetofvalueswithpracticalimplica-tions,asdoes(whatRawlsdescribesas)the‘comprehensive’liberalismofJohnStuartMill.Itisinthelightofdoctrineswhichare‘comprehensive’inthissensethatweare,eachofus,saidbyRawls,toforma‘conceptionofthegood’,thatis,‘aconceptionoftheendsandpurposesworthyofourdevotedpursuit,togetherwithanorderingofthoseelementstoguideusoveracompletelife’(1993:104).Inturn,itisonthebasisofsuchconceptionsthatDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012membersofademocraticsocietyaresaidtoframea‘rationalplanoflife’;thatisaplan,‘inthelightofwhichtheyscheduletheirmoreimportantendea-voursandallocatetheirvariousresources(includingthoseofmindandbody,timeandenergy)soastopursuetheirconceptionsofthegoodoveracom-pletelife’(Rawls1993:177).(Incidentally,notethesimilaritiesbetweenthisandAristotle’sviewthatthelifewelllivedisthelifewhichhastakenacertainpath.)2WithinRawls’sschema,then,theseideas–‘comprehensivedoctrine’,‘conceptionofthegood’and‘rationalplanoflife’–formafamily.\nRawls:constructinga‘political’liberalism289Now,itisprettyobviousthatcomprehensivedoctrinescancomeintoconflict,justasRawlsmaintains,notmerelythroughinconsistenciesbetweenthedifferingbelief-systemsbywhicheachisdefined,butthroughthevaluesystems–theconflicting‘conceptionsofthegood’–thattheyembodyandtheirequallyconflictingimplicationsforpracticalaction.Butwhyshouldthiscreateaproblemfordemocraticsocietyalone?Afterall,itis,pre-sumably,truethateveryoneformsplansandprojectsinthelightofavaluesystem,or,asRawlswouldhaveit,framesa‘rationalplanoflife’inthelightofa‘conceptionofthegood’.So,whydon’tnon-democraticarrangements–autocraticandhierarchicalsystems,forexample–giverisetotheproblemRawlshasinmind?Tothis,Rawls’sanswerwouldbethatitisonlyunderdemocraticconditionsthatindividualcitizensconfronteachotherasequals,andunderwhicheachmusttreattheothers–includingthebeliefsandvaluestowhichothersadhere–withequalrespect.Indeed,itisthesituationinwhichindividualsconfronteachotherinthisway,onequalterms,whichRawlstreatsasdefinitiveofthedemocraticcon-dition.Asheportraysthesituation,eachindividualhas(i)acapacityforasenseofjusticeand(ii)acapacityforaconceptionofthegood(e.g.1993:19).‘Theproblemofpoliticalliberalism’is,thus,thatofdefiningtermsuponwhichindividualswhopossessthese‘twomoralpowers’andwhosejudgementsuponquestionsofjusticeandmoralityinevitableconflict,canneverthelessagree.Here,itmaybeusefultoemphasisethatRawlsisattachingaratherpar-ticularsensetotheword‘democracy’.Ofcourse,‘democracy’isawordwhichcanbedefinedinanumberofways.Forexample,inonefamiliaruseoftheterm,ademocracyis,bydefinition,apoliticalsystemwithinwhichdecisionsaremadeinacertainwayand,crucially,oneinwhichtherulingpartymustdependforitscontinuationinpowerupontheoutcomeofperiodicelections.ItisimportanttonotethatRawlsisnotusingthewordinthatway.Rather,ademocraticsociety,asconceivedbyRawls,isessentiallyasocietyinwhichcitizensstandinacertainrelationshiptooneanother,thatofmoralequality.(Thisisnottodenythat,sofarasRawlsisconcerned,thetypeofmachineryexemplifiedbyanelectoralsystemwouldhaveanessentialroletoplayinademocraticsocietyfor,inhislaterwork,hecontinuestoholdthat‘politicalliberty’,includingthe‘fairopportunitytoholdpublicofficeandtoinfluencetheoutcomeofpoliticaldecisions’isa‘basicliberty’.MypointisonlythataDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012referencetowhatmaybeanessentialcomponentofdemocracyinpractice,neednotnecessarilybeincorporatedintothedefinitionoftheterm,‘democracy’.SoitisinRawls’scase(1993:327).)Asfor‘political’,whenRawlsrefersto‘politicalliberalism’,heisnotusingtheterminitsusual,ratherbroad,sense,but–moreprecisely–todistinguishthespecificformofliberalismheisseekingtodefend,fromthe‘metaphysical’liberalismexemplifiedbyMill’sworkand,ashenowthinks,bytheargumentofATheoryofJustice.Bywayofsummary,then,youcouldsaythatRawlsis–ifyoulike–attemptingtoestablish‘commonground’uponwhichproponentsof\n290Moderntimes,modernthemesotherwiseconflictingcomprehensivedoctrinescanestablishatruce.Or,tochangethemetaphor–andtosuggestadiagrammaticrepresentationofRawls’sthesis–youcouldsaythatheistryingtodefinetheareaatwhichanumberofcirclesoverlap,witheachcirclerepresentingacomprehensivedoctrine,andtheareaofoverlapoccupiedbypoliticalliberalism.(Thatwayofputtingitisrathermorethananelaboratemetaphor,bytheway,asshouldbecomeapparentlaterinthechapter.)IthinkitshouldbeclearthatRawls’sguiding(pre-philosophical)thoughthereisthatreasonablepeoplecandisagreeandyetgetalongtogether;andheisnodoubtrightaboutthat.However,thequestioniswhethertherecanbeaformalisedsetofprinciplestowhichthosewhodisagreecan,asitwere,‘signup’.Itisanideawhichappearstoraiseanumberofdifficulties,so,beforegoinganyfurther,letmenotesomeofthese.Oneisthat,whileRawls’sconceptionofa‘comprehensivedoctrine’isfairlyclear,itisnotsoobviouswhatprinciplesshouldbeconsignedtotheboxmarked‘political’.Or,coulditbethat,bya‘comprehensivedoctrine’,Rawlsjustmeanswhatmostofuswouldcall,quitesimply,a‘doctrine’?Clearly,ifitshouldturnoutthat,infact,nocoherentdistinctionbetweenthe‘political’andthe‘comprehensive’canbedrawn,thenRawlswouldbeunabletosustainhisargument.Evenso,havingnotedthisundoubtedlyimportantpoint,Ishallsetittooneside–mainlyforreasonsofbrevity–andmoveon.AnotherproblemarisesfromtheapparentdifficultyofreconcilingRawls’sassertionthatpoliticalliberalism‘aimsforapoliticalconceptionofjusticeasafreestandingview’,onewhich‘offersnospecificmetaphysicalorepistemo-logicaldoctrinebeyondwhatisimpliedbythepoliticalconceptionitself’(1993:10),withhisassertionthatthepoliticalconceptions,‘canbesup-portedbyvariouscomprehensivedoctrinesthatendureinthesocietyregu-latedbyit’(1993:144–45);for,whereastheformersuggeststhatthereisajustificationforthepoliticalconceptionwhichisindependentofanydoc-trine,thelattersuggeststhatithasmanyjustifications,eachofwhichderivesfromonecomprehensivedoctrineoranother.(ThinkoftheattitudetothesabbathdaytakenbyJudaism,ChristianityandIslam,respectively.Eachholdsthatthesabbathshouldbeobservedandkeptholy,buteachderivesthatprinciplefromitsowncoretenets.)Finally,thereistheconsiderationthatRawls’sderivationofthetwoprinciplesfromaspecified‘originalposition’Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012isretainedthroughoutRawls’slaterargument,althoughitisnowsetinadifferentcontext(e.g.1993:5ff.).Thisinevitablyraisesthequestionofhowcomfortablyitsitswithinthatnewcontext.Therecouldbeaninconsistencyhere,asMichaelSandelhaspointedout,for,iftherecanbedisagreementovertheclaimsmadebydiffering,‘reasonablereligious,philosophical,andmoraldoctrines’shouldn’tRawls’sprinciplesofjusticethemselvesbeequallyopentocontroversy?(Sandel1994:especially1784ff.).Theseareproblemstowhichweshallbereturninglaterinthechapter.Forthemoment,though,havingnotedtheirexistence,letusmoveon.\nRawls:constructinga‘political’liberalism291KantianconstructivismInRawls’slaterwork,hisobjectofanalysisisnoordinarydemocraticsociety.Itisthe‘well-ordered’democraticsociety;thatisaformofsocietydefinedbyRawlsas,‘effectivelyregulatedbyapublicpoliticalconceptionofjustice’(1993:35).Asheexplains,inawell-orderedsociety,(i)‘everyoneaccepts,andknowsthateveryoneelseaccepts,theverysameprinciplesofjustice’;(ii)‘itsbasicstructure–thatis,itsmainpoliticalandsocialinstitutionsandhowtheyfittogether–ispubliclyknown,orwithgoodreasonbelieved,tosatisfytheseprinciples’;and(iii)‘itscitizenshaveanormallyeffectivesenseofjusticeandsotheygenerallycomplywithsociety’sbasicinstitutions,whichtheyregardasjust’(Rawls1993:35).Inaddition,Rawlsspecifiesthatthewell-orderedsocietyis‘tobeviewedasacompleteandclosedsystem’.Itis,thus,‘completeinthatitisself-sufficientandhasaplaceforallthemainpurposesinhumanlife’,anditisclosed,‘inthatentryintoitisonlybybirthandexitfromitisonlybydeath’(1993:40–41).Thewell-ordereddemocraticsocietyis,thus,anabstraction,‘ahighlyidealisedconcept’asRawlsputsitatonepoint(1993:35).Clearly,thisraisesthequestionofhowtheidealisedconceptionisrelatedtotheflesh-and-blooddemocraticsocietiesoftherealworld.Ishalltakeitthatwearemeanttothinkofitasanidealtowhichrealsocietiescanapproximatebutneverquitematch,likethesocietydescribedbyPlatointheRepublic,orthosedescribedbyRousseauinTheSocialContract.Ifthisisright,theremustbesomepointofconnection,someresemblancebetweentheidealised,well-ordereddemocracyandrealnot-so-well-ordereddemocracies.Laterinthechapter,weshallbereturningtothequestionofwhatthatresemblancemightbe.Asfor‘Kantianconstructivism’,thepointhereisthatasocialcontractargumentcantakeoneofanumberofforms.Oneisthetypeofargumentwhichtakesasitspremisesstatementswhichare(supposedly)obvious(eitherbecausetheyarelogicallyself-evident,orforsomeotherreason)andproceeds,stepbylogicalstep,toitsconclusion.Aswesawinchapter6,Hobbes’scaseforabsolutesovereigntyisanargumentofthisform(Hobbesdescribeshis‘LawesofNature’as‘dictatesofReason’and‘Conclusions,orTheoremes’(Hobbes1981:216–17)).ItisalsopossibletorepresenttheargumentofATheoryofJusticeinsuchaway,asIdidinchapter13.Bycontrastwith‘Hobbesiandeductivism’,KantianconstructivismisaDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012procedureof‘spellingout’.InRawls’svariant,justiceasfairnesstakesthewell-orderedsociety,theidealisedabstractionand,withitshelp,‘triestouncoverthefundamentalideas(latentincommonsense)offreedomandequality’.ThatishowRawlsputitin1980,inthefirstlectureofaseriesentitled,‘KantianConstructivisminMoralTheory’.Inthesecondlecture,Rawlsexplainedthat‘aKantianview,inaddressingthecultureofademo-craticsociety,hopestobringtoawarenessaconceptionofthepersonandofsocialcooperationconjecturedtobeimplicitinthatculture,oratleast\n292Moderntimes,modernthemescongenialtoitsdeepesttendencieswhenproperlyexpressedandpresented’(Rawls1980:307,355).Theitalicisedphrasescaptureconstructivism’scharacterasanattempttorenderexplicitthatwhichisimplicit.ThemethodisanalogoustothatfollowedbyKantin,forexample,hisGroundworkoftheMetaphysicofMorals(Kant:1948),hencetheepithet,‘Kantian’.Inthatwork,Kantsetsout,ashesays,to‘elucidatetheconceptofawillestimableinitselfandgoodapartfromanyfurtherend’(Kant:1948:64).Hethenexplains,Thisconcept,whichisalreadypresentinasoundnaturalunderstanding,andrequiresnotsomuchtobetaughtasmerelytobeclarified,alwaysholdsthehighestplaceinestimatingthetotalworthofouractionsandconstitutestheconditionofalltherest.Kant:1948:64–65)Kant’sideaisthatclarifyingtheconceptionofagoodwill,alreadypresentintheunderstanding,willenableustoaccuratelydistinguishtherealmofmoralityfromtherealmsofprudenceorself-interest,forexample.Weshouldthenachieveaclearspecificationofthatwhichthemorallawenjoins;thelatterbeingembodied,accordingtoKant,inhisformulationsofthe‘cate-goricalimperative’.(IntheGroundwork,oneformulationofthelatteris,‘Actasifthemaximofyouractionweretobecomethroughyourwillauniversallawofnature’,anditrequirestreatingothersas‘endsinthemselves’andneverasmeremeanstoends(Kant:1948:89).)Still,weneedn’tdwellontheprecisionwithwhichRawls’sargumentmayormaynotparallelKant’s,forRawlsacknowledgeshimselfthattheparallelisinexact.Weneedonlynotethat,likeKant,Rawlstakesaconception–inhiscasetheconceptionofawell-ordereddemocraticsociety–andseeksto‘elucidate’itbydrawingoutitsimplications.Theformofhisargumentis,thus,asfollows:iftherewereawell-ordereddemocraticsociety,thenitsfeatureswouldbesuch-and-such.Summary:whatRawlshastoachieveBeforegoinganyfurther,itwouldbeaswellifIweretosummarisethecriteriathatRawls’slaterargumentmustsatisfyifitistobejudgedaDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012success–asuccessinhisownterms,thatis.Ishalllistthree,asfollows.1.Itmustdescribethe‘basicstructure’ofawell-ordereddemocraticsociety.Inchapter13wenotedthat,bythe‘basicstructure’Rawlsmeans‘asociety’smainpolitical,social,andeconomicinstitutions,andhowtheyfittogetherintooneunifiedsystemofcooperation’(1993:11).AccordingtoRawls,thoseinstitutionsare‘thepoliticalconstitution,thelegallyrecognisedformsofproperty,andtheorganisationoftheeconomy,andthenatureofthefamily’(1993:258).Aswealsonoted,Rawls’sfocusonthebasicstructure\nRawls:constructinga‘political’liberalism293ispotentiallyopentoquestion.Specifically,thereisthequestionofwhyRawlsshouldthinkthatprincipleswhichapplytothebasicstructureneednotapplytoasociety’sothersocialinstitutions,orwithincivilsocietygenerally.Tothis,letmenowaddthequestionofwhetherRawls’sinclusionofthefamilyinthebasicstructureisappropriate.(Forexample,itmightbearguedthatalthoughasociety’scharacteristicfamilystructurecanhaveenormousconsequences,ascanthegeneralhealthoffamilyrelationshipsatanyparticulartime–thesebeingreasonsforthefamily’sinclusionwithinthebasicstructure–thefamilyisneverthelessanareawithinwhich,belowacertainminimallevel,onedefinedbythemanip-ulativeandabusiverelationshipsbywhichtoomanyfamiliesarechar-acterised,fastidiousrespectforprinciplesofjusticeisinappropriate.Astheadagehasit,justicetakesoverwherelovefailsand,inthefamily,itislovewhichshouldpredominateoverjustice.)3Theseareinterestingquestions,but–again–havingraisedthem,Ishallsetthemtooneside.IhavealreadyexplainedwhatRawlsmeansbya‘well-ordereddemocraticsociety’,soletmenowmoveontothesecondandthirdcriteriaonmylist.Bothareimplicitinhisformulationofthe‘problemofpoliticalliberalism’.(Justtoremindyou,itis:‘[H]owisitpossiblefortheretoexistovertimeajustandstablesocietyoffreeandequalcitizens,whoremainprofoundlydividedbyreasonablereligious,philosophical,andmoraldoctrines?’(Rawls1993:4).)2.Thearrangementofprinciplesembodiedinthatdescriptionmustbejust.Rawlsemphasisesthatthepoliticalconceptionofjusticeisa‘moralconception’,onewhichis‘affirmedonmoralgrounds’(1993:147).Wearetotakeit,then,thatcitizensmustregardtheirobligationtoabidebytheprinciplesitembodiesasbinding,evenwhenthereisnoespeciallygoodreasonderivingfromprudenceorself-interesttodoso.Oneimplicationofthis–anditisanimplicationofwhichweshouldtakespecialnote–isthatthepoliticalconceptionismeanttorepresentmorethanamodusvivendi–amodusvivendibeinganarrangementtowhichitspar-ticipantsagree,butonlyforpragmaticreasons.SofarasRawlsisconcerned,theproblemswithamodusvivendiare,first,thatanysucharrangementDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012mustbefoundedongroup-orself-interest(andthereforethattheconceptionofamodusvivendicannotbetruly‘moral’)and,second,thatanymodusvivendiisinherentlyunstable.(Itisnoticeablethat,inRawls’swork,theexpression‘modusvivendi’tendstobeprefacedbytheadjective‘mere’.)InillustrationoftheseobjectionsRawlspointsoutthatatreatybetweentwostateswillbeadheredto,only‘becausedoingsoisregardedbyeachasinitsnationalinterest’(hencetheelementofself-interest)andthat‘ingeneralbothstates[willbe]readytopursuetheirgoalsattheexpenseoftheother,andshouldconditionschangetheymaydoso’(hencetheinstability)(Rawls\n294Moderntimes,modernthemes1993:147)Likewise,hearguesthat,inthesixteenthcentury,‘theacceptanceoftheprincipleoftoleration[betweenCatholicsandProtestants]wouldindeedbeameremodusvivendi,becauseifeitherfaithbecomesdominant,theprincipleoftolerationwouldnolongerbefollowed’(Rawls1993:148).Rawlsalsoraisesathirdobjectiontotheidea,namelythat,wherethereisamodusvivendi,‘socialunityisonlyapparent’(1993:147).Clearly,thisclaimrestsupontheassumptionthatthereisagenuinedistinctiontobedrawnbetween‘apparent’and‘true’socialunity,butthatisapointtowhichweshallreturninamoment.3.Itmustdescribeabasicstructurewhichiscapableofremainingstableovertime.Thereare,nodoubt,manyreasonsforwhichitisdesirablethatapoliticalstructureshouldbestable.Inadditiontothese–whatevertheymaybe–thereis,inRawls’scase,areasonwhichderivesfromhisconceptionofthepersonasanindividualwhoframesa‘rationalplanoflife’inthelightofa‘conceptionofthegood’.Accordingly,itisintheopeningparagraphofPoliticalLiberalismthatRawlsraisesthequestionofhowtospecify‘fairtermsofcooperationbetweencitizensregardedasfreeandequal,andasfullycooperatingmembersofsocietyoveracompletelife’(1993:4)(myemphasis).Now,clearly,therewouldbelittlepointinframingsuchaplaniftheenvironmentwithinwhichoneproposestocarryitoutweresounpredictablethatonewouldbemorethanlikelytofailand,forthecitizenofademocraticsociety,thatenvironmentwillincludetheframe-workofsocialandpoliticalinstitutions,whichcomposethatsociety’s‘basicstructure’–hencetherequirementforstabilityinthelatter.InPoliticalLiberalism,Rawlsstatesthatstability‘involvestwoquestions’,thefirstbeing‘whetherpeoplewhogrowupunderjustinstitutions(asthepoliticalconceptiondefinesthem)acquireanormallysufficientsenseofjus-ticesothattheygenerallycomplywiththoseinstitutions’(1993:141).This,hesays,isansweredbysettingoutthemoralpsychologyinaccordancewithwhichcitizensina‘well-orderedsociety’acquiresucha‘normallysufficientsenseofjustice’.Thesecondisthequestionofwhether‘thepoliticalcon-ceptioncanbethefocusofanoverlappingconsensus’(Rawls1993:141).So,withthecriteriaIhavejustlistedinmind,letusnowturntothelatterconception.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012‘Overlappingconsensus’AccordingtoRawls,onefeatureofawell-ordered(i.e.perfect)democraticsocietywouldbean‘overlappingconsensus’.Theobjectofthatconsensuswouldbetheprinciplesembodiedinthedesignofthesociety’sbasicstruc-ture.Citizenswoulddisagreeaboutmanythings–inevitablyso,forthesystemsofbelief(the‘comprehensivedoctrines’),towhichsomeadhere,willnotbesharedbyall.However,allwillbeagreedupontherightnessofthe\nRawls:constructinga‘political’liberalism295principlesinquestion.Thisispossiblebecause,inthewell-orderedsociety,thoseprincipleswillexpressa‘political’formofliberalism.Rawlsholdsthatsuchaconsensuswouldservetomaintainthesociety’sstability.Heissurelyrightaboutthisfor,whereeverycitizenisagreedupontherightnessofasociety’smaininstitutions–andwhere,bydefinition,thesocietyisclosed,andthereforeimmunefrominvasionorotheroutsideinfluence–whatcouldtherepossiblybetoshakeit?Inelaboratingtheideaofanoverlappingconsensus,Rawls’spurposeis,hesays,todemonstratethatpoliticalliberalismisactuallypossible(1993:135).Ofcourse,hewouldonlybeabletodothisiftheideawaslogicallycoherent.Ifitwereincoherent,thenanoverlappingconsensuswoulditselfbeanimpossibility,andIcanwellimagineacriticofRawlstryingtodemon-stratethatitisjustthat.ThatisnotanapproachIshalltrymyself,however,becauseitdoesseemtomethattheconceptionofanoverlappingconsensusisperfectlycoherent.So,ratherthanexplorethatavenue,Ishallsuggest–anditcanonlybeasuggestionhere–thatRawls’sthesisassumesamodelofsocialrealitywhichisonlypartiallyaccurate.IfIamright,then–asIshallalsosuggest–therelevanceofRawls’sdescriptionofthewell-orderedsocietytothewaythingsareintherealworldmustbecalledintoquestion.(Thewell-orderedsocietyisanabstractionofcourse;but,asIsaidearlier,therewouldbelittlepointinconstructingitunlessitwereinthehopeoflearningsomethingabouttherealworld’snot-so-well-orderedsocieties.)Whatisan‘overlappingconsensus’?Beforethat,however,itisessentialtoclarifythemeaningthatRawlsattachestotheexpression‘overlappingconsensus’.Here,therearetwodistinctionswhichitmayhelptobearinmind.ThefirstisthedistinctionbetweenRawls’s‘overlappingconsensus’thesisandthethesisthatmodernconditionsfavouranincreasingconsensusontheappropriatenessofliberalinstitutions.Iwouldguessthatmanyreaderswillbefamiliarwithoneversionofthelatteroranother.Onewell-knownexampleisFrancisFukuyama’sargumentthat,withtheemergenceof‘aremarkableconsensusconcerningthelegiti-macyofliberaldemocracyasasystemofgovernment’,wearewitnessing‘theendofhistory’(Fukuyama1992:ix).Infact,anotherisRawls’sownthesisthattheoriginsofliberalismcanbetracedtothenewconditionswhichcameDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012toprevailinEuropeduringthelateryearsoftheReformation.Now,youmayfeelthatthereisacertainplausibilitytoFukuyama’sclaim.Ontheotherhand,likeIsaiahBerlin,youmaytakeamorejaundicedviewoftheideaofhistoricalinevitability.4AsforRawls,itmaybehardtoquarrelwithwhathehastosayabouttheReformation.However,mypresentpointisthatneitherFukuyama’sclaim,norRawls’s,isequivalenttothe‘overlappingconsensus’thesis.Thedifferencesarethese:first,thelatterconnectsover-lappingconsensuswithacertainrelationship–therelationshipofequalitybetweenthecitizensofawell-ordereddemocraticsociety–andnotwitha\n296Moderntimes,modernthemeshistoricaltrendortendency.Second,theconsensusis,asthethesisclaims,noordinaryconsensus.Itisan‘overlapping’consensus.So,aseconddistinctionrequiredhereisthatbetweentheordinarycon-sensus–theconsensus‘pureandsimple’asIsupposeweshouldcallit–andthetypeofconsensuswhichisactuallyoverlapping.Weneedtoaskwhat,ifanything,theword‘overlapping’addstotheword‘consensus’.Consideranexample:supposethatyouandIandagroupoffriendsareplanningtovisitarestaurantthisevening.Initially,weareundecided,butaftersomediscussionweagreethatthesetmealonofferatthelocalChineseisalessappetisingprospectthanthefettuccinealfredoservedatLuigi’sTrattoria,soitistotherewehead.Inshort,wereachaconsensus,butisitan‘overlapping’consensus?Well,itwouldcertainlybetruetosaythat,aswetalk,ourjudgements‘converge’,thattheyeventually‘coincide’,andforpreciselythesamereasonsitwouldbetrueenoughsaythatthey‘overlap’.Buttheseareredundantfiguresofspeech–nomorethanthat–fortheinformationtheyconveyisalreadycarriedbytheword‘consensus’itself.Doesitfollowthat‘overlappingconsensus’designatesanon-category–thatthereisnogenuinedistinctionbetweenthe‘overlappingconsensus’andtheconsensuspureandsimple?Idon’tthinkso.Iwouldarguethatthereisatypeofcaseinwhichthequalificationofthenoun‘consensus’withtheadjective‘overlapping’canbegenuinelyinformative,andthatisthetypeofcasetowhichIalludedearlier,inwhichtherelationshipbetweendoctrinescanberepresenteddiagrammatically,andwithoutstrain,byasketchofoverlappingcircles.Inotherwords,itmakesgenuinesensetodescribeaconsensusasoverlappingwhere(i)thereexisttwoormorerelativelysys-tematic,relativelywell-formeddoctrines;(ii)thereisatleastoneprincipletowhichboth,orall,thosedoctrinessubscribe;andinwhich(iii)thatprincipleisindependentlyderived,inthecaseofeachdoctrine,fromitsowntenets.AsIpointedoutearlier,oneillustrationofthisphenomenonisthewayJudaism,ChristianityandIslamallsubscribetotheprinciplethatthesabbathdayshouldbeobservedandkeptholy,buteachforitsownreasons.OverlappingconsensusandsocialrealityNow,myreasonforemphasisingthepointis,asIsaid,tosuggestthatRawls’s‘overlappingconsensus’thesisisunderpinnedbutaparticularmodelDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ofsocialreality.Clearly,itisamodelaccordingtowhichindividualsaredistinguishablefromeachotherlargelyintermsoftherelativelysystematic,relativelywell-formed‘doctrines’towhichtheyadhere.(Eachviewstheothersfrominsidehisorherdoctrinal‘bubble’,asitwere.Occasionallybubblescollideand,toadegree,coalesce.)Ofcourse,IamnotsuggestingthatRawlsthinksindividualsareonlydistinguishableinthisway,bythedoctrinestheybelieve,butitisclear–Ithink–thathebelievesthiswayofdistinguishingthemtobefairlysignificant.Therefore,itiswellworthaskingwhetherthemodelisinfactaccurate.\nRawls:constructinga‘political’liberalism297Now,onereasonforquestioningtheaccuracyofRawls’sassumptionisthis:whereprinciplescomeintoplay–includingprinciplesenjoiningtol-eration,fairnessandequality–itisnotalwaysthecasethatthoseprinciplesareseenbytheindividualswhoholdthemasderivingfromsomedoctrinetowhichthoseindividualsadhere.Hereisanexample:PandQshareanapartment.BothliketowatchTV,especiallyinthelateeveningwhenthedayiswindingdown.However,thereisonlyoneTVsetand,whereasPlikestowatchthenewsandcurrentaffairschannel,Qpreferssoapsandchatshows.So,theyreachanagreementsuchthatonMondays,WednesdaysandFridays,Pgetstowatchthenews,whereasonTuesdays,ThursdaysandSaturdays,theTVistunedtoyetanotherrepeatofFriends.Thetermsofthisagreementdictatethateachshouldtreattheotherasanequal.Thankstotheirarrangement,therearedaysonwhichPtoleratesQandalternatedaysonwhichQtoleratesP.Wheneitherisaskedwhyheorsherefrainsfrominter-feringwiththeother’schoiceontherelevantdays,eachexplainsthatitwouldn’tbefair.Nownotethefollowing:(i)Intheexample,eachpersonismotivatedbyself-interest;thatis,eachwantstospendtheeveningswatchingTV.(Ofcourse,eachwouldmostprefertohavetheTVpermanentlytunedtohisorherfavouritechannel,butthatpossibilityhasbeenruledoutbythenecessitytocompromise.)(ii)However,oncetheirarrangementisestablished,itwouldbewrongtodescribethebehaviourofeitherasentirelyselfish.Onthecon-trary,(iii)onceithasbeenestablished,thevirtuesoftolerationandfairnessenterthepicture.Evenso,(iv)itwouldbewrongtodescribePandQasactingonthebasisofprincipleswhichderivefromdoctrinesinwhichtheyhappentobelieve.(Neithersays,‘IamtoleratingyoubecauseIamaliberal’,or‘becauseIamChristian’.)5(v)Itwouldbemoreaccuratetosaythattol-erationandfairnessare,sotospeak,‘embedded’inthepracticeitself.(Notethatitisnoobjectiontomyargumentherethattheexampleresem-blesthesituationenvisagedbyRawlswithhisaccountoftheoriginalposi-tion.Thesimilaritiesdoexist.Thus,intheexample,asintheoriginalposition,bothpartiesaremotivatedbyself-interest,inaweaksenseofthatexpression,andbothagreeonasystemwhichembodiesequaldivision.However,unlikeRawls,IdonotpicturethepartiesinmyexampletobefacedwithachoicebetweenprinciplesandnoramIsupposingthatitispossibletogeneralisefromtheexampletoanoverarchingdefinitionofjusticeDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012asembodiedinsuch-and-suchprinciples.ForallIhavesaid,therecouldbeotherexamplesofmodusvivendiwithinwhichdifferentprinciplesareembedded.Inshort,thisisnottheoriginalpositionindisguise.)6Thequestionwhichariseshere,then,is:Whatiftherealworldissuchthatmanyofthesituationswhichgiverisetoconsiderationsofprincipleresemblethe‘TV-sharing’examplemorethantheydocasesinwhichtheprinciple,orprinciples,fromwhichindividualsactareseenbythemasderivingfrom‘doctrine’towhichtheysubscribe–as,forexample,whenbelieverskeepthesabbathholyforreasonswhichderivefromtheirreligious\n298Moderntimes,modernthemesbeliefs?Theansweroughttobeclear.ItisthatthepictureofsocietyassumedbyRawls’smodelwouldbecomethemorepartial,andthelessaccurate,themorethatreal-lifesituationscanbesaidtoresembletheformercaseratherthanthelatter.Thisbeingso,therelevanceofhisdescriptionofthewell-ordereddemocraticsociety,theabstraction,toreal-lifedemocraticsocietieswouldbecomecorrespondinglyopentoquestion.Well,that–atanyrate–iswhatIshouldliketosuggesthere.Itwouldbeinterestingtoexplorethislineofargumentinmoredetailandconsidertheextenttowhichitcan,infact,bearguedthatrealityfailstomatchRawls’s‘socialmodel’.However,likesomuchelseinthischapter,thatwouldtakemebeyonditsscope,soImustleavethepointwithyou,thereader,asasuggestion.Whatissowrongwithmodusvivendi?The‘TV-sharing’exampleisamodusvivendi,ofcourse,and,ifyouareresistanttotheabovesuggestion,couldtheexplanationbethat,likeRawls,youareinclinedtobedismissiveofthatidea?Perhapsyousharehistendencytoassumethatanycooperativearrangementmusteitherbeamodusvivendi,orfoundeduponsomeconsiderationofmoralprincipleandthat,ifitistheformer,thenitisnecessarilyinferiortoanyarrangementofthelatterform.Letusnowconsiderthis.Itistrue,ofcourse,thattherearemanyreasonsforwhichtwoormoreindividualscanagreetoamodusvivendi,andthatsomeofthosereasonsmaynotbesoadmirable.Sometimesamodusvivendicanrestuponcoercion,forexample.StrongPmightthreatenweakerQ–saying,e.g.,‘WorkformesevendaysaweekorI’llbeatyou’–andQmightagreetoP’sdemands,ifonlyforthesakeofaquietlife.However,weshouldn’tbetoohastytogen-eralisefromtheworstcasetoallcases,so,withthatinmind,letusnowconsiderRawls’sobjectionstotheidea,eachinitsturn.Ilistedtheseearlierand,asyouwillrecall,therearethree.Accordingtothefirst,amodusvivendiis,byitsverynature,foundedupon(self-orgroup-)interest,andnot‘affirmedonmoralgrounds’.YouwillrecallthatRawlsillustratesthepointwiththeexampleofatreatybetweenstates,ofwhichhesaysthatitwillbeadheredto‘becausedoingsoisregar-dedbyeachasinitsnationalinterest,includingitsinterestinitsreputationasastatethathonourstreaties’(1993:147).Thisis–nodoubt–correct,butDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012itdoesn’tnecessarilyadduptoanobjection.Inthe‘TV-sharing’exampleitistruethatPandQ‘actoutofself-interest’,butonlyinthesensethateachwouldliketowatchhisorherfavouriteTVprogrammesoccasionally.Or,ifthatexamplestrikesyouasalittletoohomely,andyouwouldpreferanillustrationofmoreconsequence,thentakeHobbes’saccountoftheagree-menttothesocialcontract,whichis–youcouldsay–thedescriptionofamodusvivendi.Itis,thus,amatterofcompromise.InLeviathan,eachpersonissaidtoagree‘tolaydownhisrighttoallthings;andbecontentedwithsomuchlibertyagainstothermen,ashewouldallowothermenagainst\nRawls:constructinga‘political’liberalism299himself’(Hobbes1981:190).Themotivationto‘signup’is,ofcourse,toavoidthehorrorsofthestateofnature,inwhichlifeissolitary,poor,nasty,brutishandshort.Callthat‘acting’fromself-interestifyoulike,but,thewayHobbesdescribesthestateofnature,youcanhardlyblametheindivi-dualshedescribesforbehavingthatway.Moreover,aswenotedinchapter6,itisonlywiththesocialcontractthat,accordingtoHobbes,anythingresemblingacivilisedexistencebecomespossible,for–ashethinks–onlythesocialcontractcancreatetheconditionsforindustry,agriculture,trade,construction,science,history,artsandletters.7Iwoulddescribethoseasverygoodreasonsforsigninguptothisparticularmodusvivendiand,ifIamright,thisillustratesthataperson’sreasonsforagreeingtoamodusvivendimaybeprincipled,eventhoughthetermsofthemodusvivendiitselfcannotbedescribedasembodyingamoralprinciple.ItisapointRawlsoverlooks–orsoitcouldbeargued.Rawls’ssecondobjectiontotheidea–onetowhichheattachesmoreweight–isnotanobjectiontoself-interestperse.Itisthat,becauseamodusvivendiisnecessarilybasedonself-orgroup-interest,itis,forthatreason,unstable.Thus,onthetreatybetweenstates,hewritesthat‘ingeneralbothstatesarereadytopursuetheirgoalsattheexpenseoftheother,andshouldconditionschangetheymaydoso’(Rawls1993:147).But,againstthis,Iwouldreplythatthereisnoreasontosupposethatamodusvivendineedbeanymoreorlessunstablethanthesituationwhichgaverisetoit.TheTV-sharingarrangementbetweenPandQwillcometoanendonce(i)theTVbreaksdownirreparably;(ii)somebodybuysasecondTV;or(iii)eitherPorQmovesout.Withthepossibleexceptionof(i),Ican’tseethatanyofthiswouldbeespeciallyregrettable.AsforHobbes,ifheisright,itseemstomethatareversiontoastateofnaturewouldbesuchahorribleandever-presentpossibility,thatthemotiveforavoidingitwouldbestrongandpermanent.ContrarytoRawls,youwouldexpectthemodusvivendiestablishedbythesocialcontracttobeextremelystable.8WhatofRawls’sthirdobjection?Thisstatesthat,wherethereisamodusvivendi,‘socialunityisonlyapparent’(Rawls1993:147).Asnotedearlier,thispresupposesthatitispossibletodistinguish‘apparent’from‘true’socialunity.Mycommenthere–putbriefly–isthat,ifitshouldturnoutthat‘true’socialunityisinconceivableorimpossible,thenapparentsocialunityissomethingwewilljusthavetolivewith.Thatsaid,letmeexplainthepointDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012morefullywiththehelpofafewcommentsonRawls’splaceinthehistoryofphilosophy,asfollows.‘Trafficregulations’or‘truesocialunity’?Throughoutthemodernperiod,politicalphilosophershavebeenpreoccupiedwiththeexistenceofdifference,disagreementandconflictwithinsociety.Forsome,suchconflicthasbeenaninescapablefactoflifeand,forthesephilo-sophers,theproblemhasbeentoestablish‘trafficregulations’,asitwere–in\n300Moderntimes,modernthemesotherwords,toestablishacceptablegroundruleswiththehelpofwhichtheconflictcanbecontrolled,eventhoughitcanneverbeeradicated.ExamplesofphilosopherswhofallintothiscampareHobbes,BenthamandMill.Thus,accordingtoHobbes,peopledon’tchangeoncetheyhaveenteredcivilsociety.Theyremainjustasegocentricandcompetitiveastheydidbeforethesocialcontract.Itisjustthat,afterthecontract,thereisasovereigninplacetoensurethat‘thewarreofeverymanagainsteveryman’iskeptwithinacceptablebounds.Similarly,sofarasBenthamisconcerned,peoplewillalwaysbemotivatedbythedesireforpleasureandthefearofpain,whateverthecharacteroftheirlegalsystemand,forMill,societywillalwaysbeanarenawithinwhichtheinterestsofdifferentgroupscomeintoconflict.Fortheseutilitarians,theproblemistodevisealegalsystemwhichregulatessuchconflictsinamannerwhichmostservestomaximiseutility.Shouldwedescribethethinkerswhofallintothiscampas‘philosophersofmodusvivendi’?Itisanepithetwhichmightseemtobelittlethemunnecessarily.Otherwise,itisfairenough.Forotherphilosophers,theproblemhasbeentofindsomewaytotran-scendtheconflict,eventodissolveit.OneexampleofaphilosopherwhofallsintothiscampisRousseau.Rousseauneverdeniesthatconflictsofinterestwillcontinue,eveninhisidealrepublics.Asheputsit,eachcitizenwillhavea‘privatewill’,onewhichconflictswiththeprivatewillsofothers.However,inthetruerepublicasheconceivesit,suchconflictsaretranscendedbythedeterminationofthegeneralwillatmeetingsofthegeneralassembly.Rawlsalsofallsintothiscategoryfor,whilerecognisingthatcitizenswillalwaysbe‘profoundlydividedbyreasonablereligious,philosophical,andmoraldoc-trines’,heseekstodefineaarenawithinwhichconflictanddisagreementareneutralised;thatarenabeingdefinedbytheareaof‘overlap’betweencon-flicting‘comprehensivedoctrines’andconceivedasaconsensusupona‘moral’conceptionofjusticewhichcanbe‘affirmedonmoralgrounds’(1993:147).Thismaystrikeyouasaworthwhileenterprise.Ontheotherhand,ifyouaremorepersuadedbyphilosophersoftheformerschool,itmaystrikeyouaswishfulthinking.Is‘overlappingconsensus’anemptycategory?Beforemovingontothesubjectof‘publicreason’,itmaybeworthmen-Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012tioningonefurtherreasonforquestioningRawls’ssuppositionthat,wherethereareconflicting‘comprehensivedoctrines’,theycanneverthelessachieveanoverlappingconsensusupontherightnessofliberalprinciples.Itisareasonwhichis,ifanything,favourabletophilosophersoftheformer‘modusvivendi’camp,anditisthatthereis,infact,noevidencetosupportRawls’ssupposition.Nosuchevidenceisprovidedbythemajorreligions,forexam-ple.EventhoughRawlsreferstothemthroughoutasexamplesofdoctrineswhicharecomprehensive,thereis,sofarasIamaware,nomajorreligionwhosedoctrinesincludeanargumentforliberalprinciples–theprinciple\nRawls:constructinga‘political’liberalism301thateachpersonhasanequalrighttovote,forexample,oraprincipleguaranteeingfreedomofspeechandexpression.Tobehonest,IshouldsaythatthisisasubjectuponwhichIcanonlyspeakwithanyconfidenceaboutChristianity.Certainly,andsofarasIamaware,thereisnosuchdiscussionintheOldTestament(whichis,perhaps,hardlysurprising,giventhatitconsists,forthemostpart,ofdocumentswhichrecordthehistoryofvariousHebrewtribes,someofwhomlivedaround5,000yearsago,andnonelaterthantheRomanperiod).AsfortheNewTestament,well,onthesubjectofpoliticswehaveChrist’sinjunctionto‘RendertoCaesarthethingsthatareCaesar’s,andtoGodthethingsthatareGod’s’(Mark12,17)–andthat,sofarasIamaware,isaboutit.Idon’tknowforsurewhethersimilarcon-siderationsapplyinthecasesoftheTorahandtheKoran,butIwouldbesurprisediftheydidn’t.9Whenitcomestothemajorsystemsofpoliticalthoughtwhich,thesedays,tendtodominatethearena,theevidenceappearsevenlesssupportiveofRawls’shypothesis.Itisobvious–ofcourse–thatfollowersofJ.S.Millwouldendorseliberalprinciples,buteventheywouldbaulkatRawls’ssug-gestionthatthereshouldbeanequalrighttoparticipateinthepoliticaldecision-makingprocessfor,asweknow,Millbelievedthatsomepeopleshouldhavemorevotesthanothers.Again,anyoneatallsympathetictoMarxismmighteasilyagreewithMarxandEngelsthat‘Theexecutiveofthemodernstateisbutacommitteeformanagingthecommonaffairsofthewholebourgeoisie’(MarxandEngels2000:247).Itishardtoseehowsomebodywhobelievedthatcouldalsosubscribetoaconsensusuponliberalprinciples–‘political’orotherwise.Allthissuggeststhat,evenifweallowthatRawls’s‘overlappingconsensus’thesisiscoherent,thecategoryofdoc-trinewhoseadherentswouldinfactsubscribetosuchaconsensuscouldwellbeempty.‘Publicreason’Apoliticalsociety,andindeedeveryreasonableandrationalagent,whetheritbeanindividual,orafamilyoranassociation,orevenaconfederationofpoli-ticalsocieties,hasawayofformulatingitsplans,ofputtingitsendsintoanorderofpriorityandofmakingitsdecisionsaccordingly.Thewayapoliticalsocietydoesthisisitsreason;itsabilitytodothesethingsisalsoitsreason,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012thoughinadifferentsense:itisanintellectualandmoralpower,rootedinthecapacitiesofitshumanmembers.(Rawls1993:121–23)SoclaimsRawls.Liketheideaofanoverlappingconsensus,then,sotheideaofpublicreasonreflectshisconvictionthatasocietymaybeconsideredasaunity–inthiscaseasa‘reasonableandrationalagent’–andmorethanamereaggregateofindividuals.Atanyrate,itisRawls’sconvictionthatawell-ordereddemocraticsocietymaybeconceivedthatway.Atthesame\n302Moderntimes,modernthemestime,however,Rawlstakesitasafoundingpremisethatanydemocraticsocietyisinevitablymarkedbyadiversityofconflictingandirreconcilablereligious,philosophicalandmoralbeliefs.Thereis,therefore,thequestionofhowtheformerunitycanbereconciledwiththelatterdiversity.Inthepre-vioussectionofthischapter,wediscussedRawls’sviewthatunityandsta-bilitycanbemaintained,inoneway,byanoverlappingconsensusonapoliticalconceptionofjustice.Wearenowturning,then,tohisviewthat‘publicreason’canservearelatedfunction.Nowofcourse,althoughRawlsdrawsaparallelbetweenthepoliticalsocietyandtheindividual,asinthepassagequoted,hewouldhardlybesonaiveastoresthiscaseonafeebleanalogy,equatingsocietywiththeindi-vidualpersonbyinvoking‘thebodypolitic’orsomesuchconception.What,then,canhemeanby‘publicreason’?Onewaytoapproachthatquestionmightbethroughaconsiderationofwhathedoesnotmean;thatis,throughacontrastwithviewswhicharesimilartohisown,butwhichare,infact,nothisown.ThatisthestrategyIshalladopthere.PointsofcontrastandcomparisonAsastart,then,notethat,by‘anargumentwhichappealstopublicreason’,Rawlsdoesnotmeananargumentwhichappealstobeliefsandprincipleswhich,asitsohappens,aresharedbyamajorityofthepublic.WhatIhaveinmindisthis:supposethatyouare,forexample,aCatholic,andthatyouaretryingtopersuadeyourfellowcitizenstovoteagainstaproposaltolib-eralisetheabortionlaws.Ifmostofyourfellowcitizensfollowotherreli-gions,oriftheyholdsecularbeliefs,thenyouareunlikelytogetveryfar.Ontheotherhand,ifyoucanarguepersuasivelythatthefoetusisaperson–andpersuasivelyquestiontheviewsofthosewhoholdthatthefoetusisnosuchthing–thenyoumayentertainsomehopeofsuccess,ifonlybecauseamuchgreaterproportionofthepublicwillbelikelytotakenoteofwhatyousay.Again,if,asaMarxist,youadvocateanincreaseintaxationofthewealthybyinvokingrelativelytechnicalconceptionssuchastheexploitationofthepro-letariat,thenyouwon’thavemuchsuccessifyourfellowcitizensareunsympathetictoMarxistideas.However,youmightifyourely,instead,uponargumentswhichappealtoamorewidelysharedsenseofjusticeandfairness.Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012IfthatwereallRawlsmeant,theninvokingpublicreasonwouldsimplybeamatterofappealingtotheframeofmindthepublichappenedtobeinataparticulartime.ButRawlsismorespecific:‘publicreason’,hesays,‘isthereasonofequalcitizenswho,asacollectivebody,exercisefinalpoliticalandcoercivepoweroveroneanotherandinamendingtheirconstitution’(1993:214).Whatcountsastheexerciseofpublicreason,then,istheexerciseofreasonbyindividuals,onlywhentheyareviewedashavingacertainstatus,thatofequalcitizens.Moreover,publicreasonis,bydefinition,onlydirectedatcertainquestions,namely,‘thoseinvolvingwhatwemaycall“constitutional\nRawls:constructinga‘political’liberalism303essentials”andquestionsofbasicjustice’(Rawls1993).Thenagain,alsobydefinition,itcanonlybeexercisedwithinacertaintypeofcontext.‘Theidealofpublicreason’,hesays,‘doesholdforcitizenswhentheyengageinpoli-ticaladvocacyinthepoliticalforum,andthusformembersofpoliticalpartiesandforcandidatesintheircampaignsandforothergroupswhosup-portthem’(Rawls1993:215).Likewise,itholdsfor‘howcitizensaretovoteinelectionswhenconstitutionalessentialsandmattersofbasicjusticeareatstake’(Rawls1993:215).Asthesequotationsshow,Rawls’sideaofpublicreasonisoneversionoftheviewthattherecanbegroundruleswhichsetlimitsondebate,ruleswhichdeterminewhatcountsasadmissibleandwhatinadmissible,andwhichareafunction,intheirturn,ofthecontextwithinwhichdebateisconducted.So,ausefulpointofcontrastheremightbeanotherversionofthatview.Withthatinmind,considertheexampleofanidealisedacademicseminar–aphilosophyseminar,say.Thatisasituationinwhich(i)theparticipantsconfronteachotherasequals,justasthecitizensinRawls’swell-orderedsocietydo,andwhichis(ii)characterisedbyadiversityofconflictingopinions.(Otherwise,whatwouldbethepointinholdingtheseminar?)Intheseminar,(iii)itmustbepossibleforeachparticipanttoappreciatehowtheothers,beingrationalpersons,havebeenledtoholdtheviewstheyadvocate,evenwhenthoseviewsaredirectlyopposedtohisorherown;or,asRawlsputsit,eachmustregardtheviewsoftheothersas‘reasonable’.(iv)Thereareruleswhichsetstandardsofbehaviour–andwhichareenforcedbythechairifnecessary–andwhichspecifythateachpersonmustbehave‘reasonably’bynotattemptingtodominatethediscussion,bynotdoingwildandcrazythings,andsoon.(Thisisimplicitintheconsiderationthateachmustregardtheotherasanequal.)Implicitintheprocedure,thereare(v)ruleswhichdeterminethecontentofcontributions.Forexample,itisunderstoodthatcontributionsmustconformtorecognisedstandardsofreasonandevidence,thispointbeingdeterminedbythepurposeoftheseminarwhichis,ideally,togettothetruth.(RememberthatIamdescribinganidealseminar.Whathappensinreallifemightbequitedifferent.)Wehavealreadynotedthat,likewise,(i)thecitizensofRawls’swell-ordereddemocraticsocietyconfronteachotherasmoralequalsand(ii)thatitisasocietymarkedbyadiversityofconflictingdoctrines.Otherparallelswiththeseminarexampleare(iii)that,inthewell-orderedsociety,itmustDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012bepossibleforeachcitizentoviewthedoctrinestowhichtheothersadhereas‘reasonable’,the‘burdensofjudgment’beingsuchthat‘reasonabledis-agreement’between‘reasonablepersons’isbothpossibleandinevitable(Rawls1993:55ff.).(iv)Citizensmustalsobereasonableinthesensethattheymustbehavereasonablytowardseachother.‘Personsarereasonableinonebasicrespect’,saysRawls,‘when,amongequalssay,theyarereadytoproposeprinciplesandstandardsasfairtermsofcooperationandtoabidebythemwillingly,giventheassurancethatotherswilllikewisedoso’(1993:49).10\n304Moderntimes,modernthemesWhatof(v),thefactorwhichdeterminesthedistinctionbetweenadmissibleandinadmissiblecontributions?Well,asnotedamomentago,Rawlsholdsthatpublicreasonis,bydefinition,onlydirectedatcertainquestions,namely,‘thoseinvolvingwhatwemaycall“constitutionalessentials”andquestionsofbasicjustice’(1993:214).Healsospecifiesthatitscontentisformulatedbywhathehascalleda‘politicalconceptionofjustice’,bywhich,hesays,hemeansthreethings,namely(i)thatitmustspecifycertainbasicrights,libertiesandopportunities;(ii)thatitmustassignprioritytothoserights,libertiesandopportunities;and(iii)thatitmustaffirm‘measuresassuringallcitizensadequateall-purposemeanstomakeuseoftheirbasiclibertiesandopportu-nities’(Rawls1993:223ff.).Inotherwords,itscontentisthatdefinedbyRawls’stwoprinciples.(Ofcourse,therecanbedisagreementaboutwhichrightsandlibertiestakepriority,andwhentheydo.)Healsostressesthat,injustifyingpublicpolicy,‘wearetoappealonlytopresentlyacceptedgeneralbeliefsandformsofreasoningfoundincommonsense,andthemethodsandcon-clusionsofsciencewhenthesearenotcontroversial’(Rawls1993:224;myemphasis).Weare,thus,forbiddentoappealtothecomprehensivereligiousandphilosophicaldoctrinestowhichwehappen,asindividuals,toadhere.RawlsandRousseauNow,whynot?Putitthisway:supposethatyouandIarefellowcitizens,andthatyouwouldliketopersuademetoendorsesomeproposedchangeinpublicpolicy.Whyshouldn’tyouappealtoprincipleswhichderivefromtheparticularreligioninwhichyoubelieve,orfromtheparticular(right-orleft-wing)principlesyouhold?Ofcourse,itmightbethatIthinkyourviewsarehopelesslymisguidedandeccentric,inwhichcasetherewouldbenopointinyourinvokingthem;butthenyouwouldhaveapragmaticreason,notareasonofprinciple.Inanswer,itseemstomethat,onceagain,theargumentofRousseau’sSocialContractsuppliesausefulpointofcomparisonhere,forconsider:likeRousseau,Rawlsseekstodefineanarenawithinwhichtheindividualswhoconfronteachotheraredefinedashavingacertainstatus,thatofcitizens.InRousseau’scase,thatarenaisthegeneralassembly,itisthe‘politicalforum’withinwhich–toputitinRawls’sterms–citizensengageinpoliticaladvocacy,voteon‘mattersofbasicjustice’,andsoon(Rawls1993:215).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012AlsolikeRousseau,Rawlsenvisagesthat,wheninthatarena,citizensarefacedwithaveryspecificquestion.InRousseau’scase,theyareaskedtodeterminethegeneralwill;inRawls’s,thecharacterofthebasicstructure.Also,ratherascitizensinthegeneralassemblyareforbiddenbyRousseautobeswayedbythedictatesoftheirindividual‘private’wills,soparticipantsintheexerciseofpublicreasonareforbiddenbyRawlstoconsidertheprinciplesofindividualcomprehensivedoctrines.Therearealsosimilaritiesintheconcernswhichmotivatethesetwowri-ters.Forexample,bothprioritiseliberty.InRousseau’sidealsociety,thisisa\nRawls:constructinga‘political’liberalism305questionofobediencetoarulewhichonehasprescribedtooneself.InRawls’swell-orderedsociety,itisamatteroftherebeing‘asocialworld’inwhichreasonablepersons,whoregardeachotherasfreeandequal,cancooperatewithothersontermsallcanaccept.Likewise,bothareconcernedwithlegitimacy.ForRawls,thisisaveryimportantconsideration.Thediffi-cultyherearisesbecausepoliticalpowerisnecessarilycoercive.Itinvolvesforceandthethreatofforceand,ratherasRousseaubelievesthatforceislegitimisedbythegeneralwill,soRawlsholdsthat‘peoplearejustifiedinexercisingsuchcoercivepoweronlywhenitisexercisedinaccordancewithaconstitutiontheessentialsofwhichallcitizensmayreasonablybeexpectedtoendorseinthelightofprinciplesandidealsacceptabletothemasreasonableandrational’(1993:217).11Liberalism:‘political’or‘agonistic’JustasRousseau’sargumentprovidesausefulpointofcomparisonwiththatofRawlshere,so,asearlier,itistheutilitarianswhoprovideausefulpointofcontrast.InthiscasethemostappropriatecontrastiswithMill,whosefamousdefenceof‘thelibertyofthoughtanddiscussion’formsthesecondchapterofOnLiberty(Mill1991a:20–61).Itis,ofcourse,truethatbothRawlsandMillareconcernedwiththeexerciseofreason,andwithitspublicimplications.Evenso,Rawls’sconceptionofpublicreasonisnotatallequivalenttoMill’sargumentthatthereshouldbeaprotectedspherewithinwhichthereisnorestrictiononthefreeplayofargument.12Forastart,thereisthefactthatMillplacesnorestrictionuponthecontentoftheideaswhicharecontestedwithinthepublicarena,noruponthecriteriaagainstwhichthoseideasareassessed.Heisquitehappytorestwiththehopeandexpec-tationthatsomeideaswilleventuallybeshowntofailwhenmeasuredagainstordinarystandardsofreasonandevidenceandthat,consequently,theywilldropoutofthecountasthey‘collide’withothers.Earlier,wenotedMill’sviewthatsociety,beinganarenawithinwhichtheinterestsofvariousgroupscomeintoconflict,isinescapablyadversarialincharacter.Itnowtranspiresthathisdefenceofthelibertyofthoughtanddiscussionportraystherealmofideasasequallymarkedbyconflict–irreduciblyandinescapablyso.Thereis,thus,afundamentalcontrastbetweenMill’sworldviewandthatofRawls,forwhomsuchconflictcanbetranscendedDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012withinthespheresof‘overlappingconsensus’and‘publicreason’.Infact,theviewthattherealmofthepoliticalis,initveryessence,thesceneofconflictanddisagreementishardlynovel.Youcanfinditexpressedinmanyanintroductorytextbooktopoliticalscience.Totakejustoneexample,inthefirstchapterofhisInDefenceofPolitics,BernardCrickstatesthatpolitics‘canbesimplydefinedastheactivitybywhichdifferinginter-estswithinagivenunitofruleareconciliatedbygivingthemashareinpowerinproportiontotheirimportancetothewelfareandthesurvivalofthewholecommunity’(Crick1964:21).Asimilarviewiseloquentlyexpressed\n306Moderntimes,modernthemesbyIsaiahBerlin.Forexample,inanessay,‘ThePursuitoftheIdeal’,Berlindescribedhisrealisation,whichcamewithhisfirstreadingMachiavelli,and‘whichcameassomethingofashock,thatnotallthesupremevaluespursuedbymankindnowandinthepastwerenecessarilycompatiblewithoneanother’(Berlin1990:8).Laterinthesameessay,Berlinhasthistosay:Weareallawareoftheagonisingalternativesoftherecentpast.Shouldamanresistamonstroustyrannyatallcosts,attheexpenseofthelivesofhisparentsorhischildren?Shouldchildrenbetorturedtoextractinformationaboutdangeroustraitorsorcriminals?Thesecollisionsofvaluesareoftheessenceofwhattheyareandofwhatweare.Ifwearetoldthatthesecontradictionswillbesolvedinsomeperfectworldinwhichallgoodthingscanbeharmonisedinprinciple,thenwemustanswer,tothosewhosaythis,thatthemeaningswhichattachtothenameswhichforusdenotetheconflictingvaluesarenotours.Wemustsaythattheworldinwhichwhatweseeasincompatiblevaluesarenotinconflictisaworldaltogetherbeyondourken;thatprincipleswhichareharmonisedinthisotherworldarenottheprincipleswithwhich,inourdailylives,weareacquainted;iftheyaretransformed,itisintoconceptionsnotknowntousonearth.Butitisonearththatwelive,anditisherethatwemustbelieveandact.(Berlin1990:13)IfRawls’sidea–theideathattherecanbea‘political’liberalismuponwhichtheadherentsofconflicting‘comprehensivedoctrines’canneverthelessagree–shouldturnouttobechimerical,thenthe‘agonistic’worlddescribedbyBerlinistheworldwemustlivein.13Thisneednotbedepressing,however.Youcouldsaythatitiscontroversywhichmakesthestudyofpoliticalideassointeresting.Whywishitaway?ConclusionWithhindsight,itwasinevitablethatthisbookshouldhaveneareditsconclusionwithtwochaptersonthephilosophyofJohnRawls.Thatispartlybecause,forthepastfourdecadesorso,hisworkiswidelyconsideredtohavemadethemostinfluentialcontribution,byfar,toEnglish-speakingpoliticalDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012philosophy.Butitisalsobecausehewrotetwomajorbooks,thesecondofwhichwas,hesaid,designedtocorrectwhathedescribedasmis-understandingsoftheearlierwork.Inmyview,thesecondworkissuffi-cientlydifferentfromtheearlierworktomeritachapterofitsown–and,althoughIamsurethatIhavebynomeansgivenafullaccountofPoliticalLiberalism’sargumenthere,IdobelievethatIhavesaidenoughtogiveyouanideaofthatargument’smaindistinguishingfeatures.Butthen,aretheearlierandthelaterRawls’sreallysodifferent?Thisisamatterofcontroversy.IndeedtheinterpretationofthelaterRawls’sentire\nRawls:constructinga‘political’liberalism307argumentremainsamatterofconsiderablecontroversyamongpoliticalphil-osophers.Thatisonereasonforwhichthischapterhasbeensodifficulttowrite,forIamsurethat,forprettywelleverythingIhavesaidhere,therewillbesomephilosopher,morelikelysomephilosophers,whowillthinkitquestionable.ThebestIhavebeenabletodohereisstatemyownopinionandhopethatitisnottoooutoflinewithRawls’stext.Ithinkitshouldbeclear,though,that,inmyview,thereismorethanoneJohnRawls,thatinfacttherearetwo.14Myreasonforthinkingsoisthattheoriginalityofhiscontributionlies,notinthepoliticalpositionhesetsouttodefend,butinthemethodwithwhichheapproachesquestionsofpoliticalphilosophy.Thus,aswesawinchapter13,thepositionheseekstodefendinATheoryofJustice–thepositionembodiedinhistwoprinciples–isafamiliar,rela-tivelymiddle-of-the-roadliberalism.Inthattext,Rawls’soriginalitylies,rather,inhisattempttodefendthatpositionwitharationalchoiceargu-ment,anargumentwhichmanycriticsinterpreted(rightlyorwrongly)asaversionof(whatIhavetermed)‘Hobbesiandeductivism’.Thatwasthereasonforwhichitwasapplaudedbymany,includingme.Inhislaterwork,unlike–say–Locke,whoseSecondTreatisewasthemanifestoforamajorrevolution,orMill,whosoughttoinjectaradicallylibertarianspiritintoacomplacentandconformistVictoriansociety,orMarx,whosoughttosubvertandultimatelydestroythecapitalistorder,Rawlsrevealshimselftobeaphilosopherofconsensusandconsolidation.Hislaterwork’soriginalitylies,rather,init’s‘Kantianconstructivism’,thatis,initsattempttodrawoutimplicationsalreadylatentintheideaofademocraticsociety.Thesearedifferentformsofexercise.So,whatwillfollowRawls?Itis,afterall,unlikelythathewillremaintheEnglish-speakingworld’smostinfluentialpoliticalphilosopherforever,orevenformuchlonger.Withthatinmind,letmebringthischaptertoaclosewithaquestion.ThisarisesfromtheelementofrelativismintroducedintoRawls’sphilosophybythewayhetiespoliticalliberalismtoaspecificpoliticalform,namely‘democraticsociety’.Thereisahistoricaldimensiontothisview.Thus,accordingtoRawls,theriseofliberalismcanbetracedtotheReformation.PriortotheReformation,Europewas,hesays,dominatedbyasinglereligion;onewhichwas,asheputsit,‘authoritative,salvationist,andexpansionist’(1993:xxii).DuringthecourseoftheReformation,thatsinglereligionsplitintorivalfactions,andtheinevitableresultofthesplitDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012was,hesays,‘theappearancewithinthesamesocietyofarivalauthoritativeandsalvationistreligion,differentinsomewaysfromtheoriginalreligionfromwhichitsplitoff,buthavingforthesameperiodoftimemanyofthesamefeatures’.Hecontinues:Duringthewarsofreligionpeoplewerenotindoubtaboutthenatureofthehighestgood,orthebasisofmoralobligationindivinelaw.Thesethingstheythoughttheyknewwiththecertaintyoffaith,asheretheirmoraltheologygavethemcompleteguidance.Theproblemwasrather:Howissocietyevenpossible\n308Moderntimes,modernthemesbetweenthoseofdifferentfaiths?Whatcanconceivablybethebasisofreligioustoleration?(Rawls1993:xxiii)And:Thus,thehistoricaloriginofpoliticalliberalism(andofliberalismmoregen-erally)istheReformationanditsaftermath,withthelongcontroversiesoverreligioustolerationinthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies.Somethinglikethemodernunderstandingoflibertyofconscienceandfreedomofthoughtbeganthen.(Rawls1993:xxiv)Inshort,theviciousreligiouswarsbywhichEuropewasriventhroughouttheReformationperiodculminatedinastalemate.Nobodywonand,asaconsequence,peoplewereconfrontedbythenecessitytofindanaccom-modationwithotherswhosevaluesandbeliefswereverydifferentfromtheirown.Onthisaccount,itwasthen,andonlythen,that‘theproblemofpoliticalliberalism’arose.So,theintriguingquestionraisedbythishistoricalstoryisjustthis:IftheargumentscontainedinPoliticalLiberalismcouldhavebornenorelevancetotheconditionswhichpertainedpriortotheReformationandif,asRawlsmaintained,theyhadagreatdealofrelevancetothe(post-Reformation)conditionswhichpertainedin1993,whenhisbookwaspublished,coulditbethatthoseargumentshavelessrelevancenow–intheearlierpartofthetwenty-firstcentury–thantheydidbackin1993?Itisaquestiontowhichweshallreturn,albeitbriefly,inthefollowingchapter.SuggestionsforfurtherreadingRawlsRawlspublishedATheoryofJusticein1972andhisnextbook,PoliticalLiberalism,in1993.That’sagapof21years.Howcomehepublishednootherbooksduringthatperiod?Theansweristhathewaspub-lishinganenormousamount,butthatthiswasappearingnotintheDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012formofbooksbutintheformofarticlespublishedinacademicjour-nals.Infact,theargumentofATheoryofJusticewasfirstframedinanarticle,‘JusticeasFairness’(Rawls1958),andhehaddevelopeditinseveralmorebeforethebookwaspublished.Youcouldhardlysaythatitsurprisedanunsuspectingworldbyappearingunannounced.PoliticalLiberalism,thebook,wasalsoprefiguredbyanarticle,‘JusticeasFair-ness:PoliticalnotMetaphysical’(Rawls1985).Rawls’sarticleshavenowbeengatheredtogetherandpublishedasSamuelFreeman,ed.,\nRawls:constructinga‘political’liberalism309JohnRawls:CollectedPapers(Rawls1999a).CommentariesonRawls,byotherpeople,canbedividedintocommentariesontheearlyandthelaterRawls.BrianBarry’sTheLiberalTheoryofJustice(1973)fallsintotheformercategory.IwouldalsoplaceChandranKukathasandPhillipPettit’sRawls:ATheoryofJusticeanditsCritics(1990)inthatcategory,althoughitdoescontainonechapteronRawls’slaterwork.PartTwoofNozick’sAnarchy,State,andUtopia(1974)andMichaelSandel’sLiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice(1982)alsocountascritiquesoftheearlyRawls,althoughbothalsocountasdefinitivetextsof,respec-tively,libertarianismandcommunitarianism.NormanDaniels’scollec-tion,ReadingRawls:CriticalStudiesofATheoryofJustice(1975),isoneofthemostvaluablecontributionstothecritiqueofRawls’searlierwork.CriticalstudiesofRawls’slaterphilosophyarethinnerontheground,butseeVictoriaDavionandClarkWolf,eds,TheIdeaofPoli-ticalLiberalism:EssaysonRawls(1999).AmorerecentcollectionisThomBrooksandFabianFreyenhagen,eds,TheLegacyofJohnRawls(2005).Notes1Rawls’sfinalbook,JusticeasFairness:ARestatement,waspublishedin2001.2Rawlssubscribesto‘theAristotelianprinciple’ashecallsit.Thisstatesthat,‘otherthingsequal,humanbeingsenjoytheexerciseoftheirrealisedcapacities(theirinnateortrainedabilities),andthisenjoymentincreasesthemorethecapacityisrealisedorthegreateritscomplexity’(Rawls1971:426).3Itisobviousthatjustice,intheformofthelaw,shouldstepinwherefamilyrelationshipsareviolentorabusive.However,thatisaconsiderationwhichdoesnothingtodistinguishthefamilyfromassociationswhichRawlsdescribesas‘private’,suchaschurchesanduniversities.AccordingtoRawls,thesedonotformpartofthebasicstructure.Ontherelationbetweenthefamilyandthebasicstructure,seeSusanMollerOkin,‘PoliticalLiberalism,JusticeandGender’(1994).SeealsoG.A.Cohen(2000)chaps8and9.4SeeBerlin(1969a),‘HistoricalInevitability’.5Howcreepythatwouldbe!6Nor,obviously,arethepartiesinmyexampleplacedbehindaveilofignorance.Butthatoughttogowithoutsaying.7Onthis,seechapter6,p.89ff.8IntheintroductiontoPoliticalLiberalism,Rawlsremarksthat‘theproblemofstabilityhasplayedverylittleroleinthehistoryofmoralphilosophy’andthatthisissurprisingbecause‘theproblemDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012ofstabilityisfundamentaltopoliticalphilosophy’(1993:xvii).Inmyview,theexampleofHobbesillustratesthatRawlsiswrongaboutthis.9Onthispoint,BrianBarry’scommentismoreacerbic.Hewrites,‘TheGodsofMoses,Mahomet,andSaintPaul(Jesusisperhapsanexception)donotsoundlikeliberals’(Barry1995b:909).Actually,it’sapointIoughttoqualify,inthatitappliesonlytotheextentthatthereisnothinginthedoctrinesofJudaism,ChristianityorIslamfromwhichadefenceofliberalprinciplescanbelogicallyderived.Tothis,itmightbeobjectedthatbetweenthesereligionsthereisa‘consensusofindifference’,asitwere.Nonesubscribestoanexplicitprincipleoftoleration,buteachis,nevertheless,happytorubalongwiththeothers.Tothis,myreplywouldbe–maybeso,butinsuchacasetherewouldbefarlesspointindescribingtheconsensusasgenuinely‘overlapping’.In\n310Moderntimes,modernthemesPoliticalLiberalism,Rawlsdiscussesa‘model’caseinwhichtheliberalismsofKantandMillandless‘systematicallyunified’viewsaresaidtooverlap.SofarasIcansee,onlythefirsttwoaregenuinelyoverlappingaccordingtomycriterion(seeRawls1993:145ff.).10Ihavearguedelsewherethatthe‘seminargroupmodel’canhelpilluminateMill’sdefenceof‘thelibertyofthoughtanddiscussion’,Haworth(1998,PartOne),andHaworth(2007).ItseemsthatitcanalsohelpilluminateRawls’sconceptionofpublicreason,whichisnottosaythatMill’sviewandRawls’sareatallthesame.11ForRawls’sowndiscussionofRousseau,seeRawls(2007:191–248).Forarecentdiscussionoftherelationshipbetweentheideasofthetwowriters,seeJubb(2011).12Fortherecord,itseemstomethatKant’saccountofpublicreasonhasmoreincommonwithMill’sviewthanitdoeswithRawls’s.Forexample,Kantwritesoftheclergymanwhoisalsoascholarthat‘asascholar,heiscompletelyfreeaswellasobligedtoimparttothepublichiscarefullyconsidered,well-intentionedthoughtonthemistakenaspectsofthose[i.e.religious]doctrines’(Kant1970:56).13IbelieveitwasJohnGraywhoinitiallytermedBerlin’sliberalism‘agonistic’.SeeGray(1997).14Foracontrastingview,seeWenar(2005).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\n16ConcludingreflectionsUltimately,abooksuchasthiscanonlybearecordofthewaythingslookwhenviewedfromacertainperspectivebyaparticularindividualataparti-cularmoment.ThisbookhasbeentherecordofpastpoliticalthoughtasitappearstoaWesternEuropeanwhospeaksandthinksinEnglishandwhoislivingintheearlyyearsofthetwenty-firstcentury.Iamwellawarethat,hadIbeensituatedonlyafewhundredmilestotheeast–inGermany,say–thenImighthavewrittenadifferentbook.True,Iwouldhavecommencedfromthesamestartingpoint,theAthensofSocrates,PlatoandAristotle.However,thelineIwouldhavedrawnfromtheretomypresentlocationwouldhavetraverseddifferentculturalterritory.Forexample,it’slikelythatIwouldhavespentmoretimediscussingtheworkofKantandHegelandprettycertainthatIwouldhavespentlesstime,ifany,onJohnStuartMillandJohnRawls.Thenagain,Iwouldhavebeenheirtoasomewhatdifferenthistoricallegacy,andmyargumentsmightwellhavereflectedthefact.Here,IamthinkingespeciallyofWorldWarIIanditsaftermath,andwhatIhaveinmindisthis:Isuggestedinchapter13thatRawls’s‘differenceprinciple’reflectsthe‘post-warconsensus’whichprevailedthroughouttheWestfrom1945onwards.Itwasaconsensusinfavourofredistributivismandaroughegalitarianism,valueswhichareformalisedbytheprinciple.Thehistoricalstory–oroneversionofit–goesthat,havingenduredtherigoursoftheGreatDepression,andsubsequentlyriskedtheirlivesinbattle,thosewhoreturnedwereinsistentuponsecuringanewdealforthemselves.‘Theworkingclasswillhavetosufferterriblethings’wroteOrwellin1941,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Andtheywillsufferthem,almostindefinitely,providedthattheyknowwhattheyarefightingfor….Buttheywillwantsomekindofproofthatabetterlifeisaheadforthemselvesandtheirchildren.Theonesureearnestofthatisthatwhentheyaretaxedandoverworkedtheyshallseethatthericharebeinghitevenharder.(Orwell1968:109)(AsIsaid,thatisonlyoneversionofthestory–butitisapowerfulversion.)\n312Moderntimes,modernthemesButthen,whiletheUKandtheUSAwereEnglish-speakingnationswhoseforcesplayedamajorroleintheconflict,neitherwasactuallyinvadedbyHitler’sarmy,andsoneitherexperiencedthecrueldepredationsofNaziruleatfirsthand.Hadtheydoneso,thepreoccupationsofphilosopherswritinginEnglishnowmighthavebornemoreresemblancetothosereflec-tedintheworkof,say,HannahArendtorTheodorAdornoandMaxHorkheimer.ThefirsteditionofArendt’sTheOriginsofTotalitarianismwaspublishedin1951and,intheprefacetothesecondedition,Arendtreflectedthat‘Inretrospect,theyearsIspentwritingit,from1945onwards,appearlikethefirstperiodofrelativecalmafterdecadesofturmoil,confusion,andplainhorror–therevolutionsaftertheFirstWorldWar,theriseoftotali-tarianmovementsandtheunderminingofparliamentarygovernment,fol-lowedbyallsortsofnewtyrannies’(Arendt2004:387).AdornoandHorkheimerweremembersofthe‘FrankfurtSchool’who,seekingtocom-prehendthephenomenonofNazism,argued,intheirDialecticofEnlight-enment(AdornoandHorkheimer1979),that–ironically–itsseedsaretobefoundinthevaluesoftheEnlightenment.The‘theoryofcommunicativeaction’developedbyRawls’sGermancontemporary,JürgenHabermasorigi-natedinhisreactiontosuchpessimism(Habermas1986).1Inshort,thereareinterestingstoriestobetoldhere.However,tellingthemwouldtakeabookatleastaslongasthisone,andsoImustleavethattasktosomeoneelse.Withthatsaid,itonlyremainstoconsiderfuturepossibilities.Here–tobeginwiththetwopointsuponwhichIfeelmostconfident–Iamsure(i)thattheproportionofwomenwhocontributetopoliticalphilosophywillcontinuetobemuchgreaterthanithasbeeninthepast;and(ii)thattherewillbemanymorepoliticalphilosopherswhoseculturalrootsarenon-‘Western’.Itistrueenoughthat,inthesepages,Ihavepaidnospecialattentiontothebynowfamiliarclaimthattheargumentsofphilosopherscanbeguiltyofgenderbias(surreptitiousorotherwise),norhaveItothesimilarclaimthattheyreflectabiastowards‘Western’values.However,Iambynomeansscepticalofsuchclaims,althoughIdothinktheyare,quiteoften,expressedwithtoomuchglibconfidence.NordoIsubscribetotheviewthatanideaoratheorycanbeespecially‘female’or‘male’intheattitudesitmanifests,ortotheviewthatideascomewithpostcodesormapreferencesattached.(Itis–ofcourse–thecasethatanyideamustoriginateinacertainplaceandwithacertainperson,but,asIpointedoutintheintroduction,onceithasDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012enteredthepublicarenaitgainsalifeofitsownandmustthenbejudgedagainststandardsofreasonandevidence.)Evenso,itisentirelypossiblethatatheorycanreflectacultural,gender,orotherbias–myhunchisthat,werethisquestiontobeinvestigated,itwouldturnoutthatsometheoriesarebiasedinthesewaysrathermorethanothersare–and,ifIhavenotdealtwiththeseissues,thatisonlybecauseithasbeenbeyondthescopeofthisbooktodealwiththem.2AsanillustrationoftheviewItakehere,considerafactwhichhas,per-haps,beenratherlessremarkeduponthanitmighthavebeen,namelythat\nConcludingreflections313everymajorcontributortotheliberalcanonhasbeencalledJohn.Wehave,thus,discussedtheworkofJohnLocke,JohnStuartMillandJohnRawls.IsupposeJeanJacquesRousseaucouldbecountedaliberal,ifonlyforthewayheprioritisesliberty–butthen‘Jean’istheFrenchfor‘John’.Thenagain,earlierthanLocke,duringtheReformation,itwasJohnMiltonwhowroteAreopagitica,acelebrateddefenceofpressfreedom(Milton1974).Doesthismeanthatliberalismissurreptitiously‘John-ist’,inthatitcon-tainsabiastowardsthewritingsofpeoplecalledJohn?Ofcoursenot.ItissimplyacoincidencewhichreflectsthefactthatJohnisacommonEnglishname.Inmuchthesameway,accidenthascometoplayaroleinthedevelopmentofpoliticalthoughtand,ifsomanyphilosophershavebeenmale,Iamsurethatfeministreaderswillalreadybewellawareoftheexplanation.Asforthefactthat‘Western’ideashavecometoexertsuchenormousinfluence,thenitseemstomethattherearetwoaccidentswhichhaveplayedanespeciallydecisiverole.Thefirstistheaccidentofwritingor,moreprecisely,thedevelopmentofaliterarytraditioninGreeceduringthecenturieswhichfollowedtheTrojanWar.Thatisthetraditionwehaveinherited.Itwasthroughwritingthattheideaswehavebeendiscussingwerepasseddown;and,iftherewaseveranAztecoranIncaSocrates–astheremaywellhavebeenforallweknow–thatperson’sthoughtsmustremainforeverlosttous.Thesecondistheaccidentofcolonialismfor,fromthesixteenthcenturyonwards,itwastheEuropeanpowerswhocolonisedotherpartsoftheworld–andwithEuropeantraders,armiesandmis-sionaries,therealsocameEuropeanlanguages,ideasanduniversities.IfithadsohappenedthattheChinesehadfirstcolonisedNorthAmerica,thenwemightnowhavebeenstudyingConfuciusratherthanHobbes,butthingsdidn’thappenthatway.Inshort,Idonotsubscribetothetriumphalistviewthat‘Western’ideasaresomehowintrinsicallysuperior(whatever‘Western’maymeaninthiscontext).Itisjustthat,atpresent,thosearetheideaswehave.Whatelse?Well,throughoutthisbook,onethemehasbeentherelation-shipbetweeneventsandideas.Thisholds,ifonlybecauseitistheeventswhichdefinetheconcernswhichtendtomotivatepoliticalphilosopherswhentheyframetheirargumentsandideas.Whatmightthosefutureeventsbe,andhowmighttheybereflectedintheworkofphilosophers?Here,myguessisnobetterthananybodyelse’s,soletmejustmentionthreefairlyapparentDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012trends.Thefirstisthatwearelikelytoseeanincreaseinthesizeandpoweroftransnationalbusinesscorporationsand,withit,acorrespondingdeclineinthepowerandinfluenceofthestate.(Infactwearealreadyseeingthis.Already,thesalesofmanycorporations,measuredinUSdollars,areequiva-lenttothegrossdomesticproductsofsomesizeablenations.)3Inchapter4,wenotedthatthemedievalworldwascharacterisedbytheexistenceofrela-tivelyweakcentresofpoliticalauthorityandpower–callthem‘states’ifyoulike–and,ineacharea,asingle,dominatingandrelativelypowerful\n314Moderntimes,modernthemesreligion.InWesternEurope,thatreligionwasRomanChristianity.Coulditbethatweareenteringasimilarera,butwithbigbusinessratherthanthechurchplayingtheroleofcounterweighttothestate?Ifso,theremaybeanimplicationforpoliticalphilosophyhere,becauseitiswiththestate,itsclaimstolegitimacy,thatmodernpoliticalphilosophyhastendedtobepre-occupied–‘thestate’being,asMaxWeberdefinedit,ahumancommunitythatclaimsthemonopolyofthelegitimateuseofforcewithinagiventerritory(Weber1947:156).Inthepast,thishasbeenfairenough,forthehistoryofmodernpoliticalphilosophy,fromtheseventeenthcenturyonwards,hasbeenroughlycotemporaneouswiththatofthepowerfulnation-state.Butifthenation-stateiswaning,thenitislikelythatphilosopherswilleventuallytakemorenoteofotherorganisationalforms–anddesirablethattheyshould.Iftheforegoingtrendcanbesummarisedas‘economicglobalisation’,thentheseconditemonmylistreflectsadifferentaspectofglobalisation.Thus,itseemstomelikelythatpeoplewillbecomeincreasinglyawarethattheyaremembersofcategories,or‘communities’whichtranscendtheboundariesofthenation-state.Forexample,supposethatyouarearesidentofBirmingham,theUKcity,thatyouareaBritishcitizen,thatyouarethesecondgenerationdescendantofimmigrantsfromtheAsiansubcontinent,aHindu,afollowerofAstonVillafootballclubandafanofAmericancountrymusic.Noneofthiswouldmakeyouespeciallyunusual.Nowask:Whichofthesecategoriesdefinesyouasaperson?Theansweristhatnonedoes,or–rather–thateachexpressesadifferentaspectofyouridentity.However,mypointisnotjustthateverymemberofanation-stateisalsomanyotherthings.Thathasalwaysbeentrue.Itisthat,withtheincreasinglyplural,‘multicultural’characterofmodernsociety,andwiththeadventofglobalisedcommunica-tionssystemssuchastheinternet,ourawarenessofthe‘transnational’featureswhichdefineusislikelytobereinforced.(Inmyexample,yourfamilyties,yourreligionandyourinterestincountrymusicmeanthatyouareamemberofgroups,or‘communities’whosemembershipisnotconfinedtoyourfellownationals.Anddon’tforgetthatyoucanaccesstheCountryMusicHallofFamewebsitefromanywhereintheworld.4Inarecentbook,AmartyaSenmakesasimilarpoint.Hegivestheexampleof‘afeministactivistinAmericawhowantstodosomethingtoremedyparticularfeaturesofwomen’sdisadvantagein,say,Sudan’.Ofthisimaginaryperson,hewritesDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012thatshe‘wouldtendtodrawonasenseofaffinitythatneednotworkthroughthesympathiesoftheAmericannationforthepredicamentoftheSudanesenation’andthat‘Heridentityasafellowwoman,orasaperson(maleorfemale)movedbyfeministconcernsmaybemoreimportantinaparticularcontextthanhercitizenship)(Sen:2010).Bearsuchfactsinmind,anditbecomesapparentthatthereis,asitwere,acertainbuilt-inobsolescencetoRawls’sphilosophy.Thus,atthecoreofhisearlierworktherelies,aswesaw,theconceptionofan‘originalposition’,animaginarysituationwithinwhichhypothesisedrationalchoosersselect\nConcludingreflections315principlesofjustice.Picturethis,andyoupictureagroupofindividualssituatedinaspecificlocationataparticularpointintime.Hislaterargu-mentiscentreduponanotherabstraction,theconceptionofa‘well-ordereddemocraticsociety’,andawell-orderedsocietyisalsoaformationwhichmustexistwithinadefinedgeographicalarea.Theimaginativeuseofsuchabstractionsis–ofcourse–crucialtomuchpoliticalphilosophy,butitcanonlybeilluminatingwhenthereissomepointofcontactbetweentheabstractionandreality.Itseems,then,that,unlesstheworldcanberealisti-callyconceivedofasdividedintorelativelydiscrete,geographicallydefined,politicalunits,thelessthepurchasethatRawls’sargumentscangainupontherealworld.5Againstthis,Iamsuggestingthatfeaturesoftheworldwhichdonotfitthismodeltooeasilywillbecomeincreasinglyprominentinourconsciousnessandourthinking.Here,then,istheanswertothequestionIraisedattheendofthepreviouschapter;thequestionofwhetherRawls’sphilosophymighthavelessrelevancenowthanitdidbackin1993.Finally,outofthethreetrendsonmylist,thelastisbyfarthemostominous.However,itcanalsobedescribedmorebriefly.Itissimplythat,withanincreasingpopulationandwithclimatechange,weareboundtowitnessincreasedpressureontheearth’sresources.Thiswillinevitablypreoccupypoliticalphilosopherstoanincreasingextent.OnbloodanddraughtsHow,then,shallIbringthisnarrativetoaclose?Itiscustomarytoopenabookwithanappositequotation,soperhapsaquotationwouldalsobeinorderhere,attheend.Theliteratureofpoliticalphilosophyiscertainlyrepletewithmemorablelines.YouonlyhavetothinkofHobbes’sdescrip-tionoflifeinthestateofnature,thatitisnasty,poor,brutishandshort;ofRousseau’sproclamationthatmanwasbornfreebutiseverywhereinchains;orofMill’smanypronouncementsonthesubjectofindividualliberty.Itisironicthatthetheoreticalcontextswithinwhichsuchlineswereoriginallysetaresolittleunderstoodbythepublicatlarge,eventhoughthelinesthemselvesareverywellknownindeed;and,ifIcanhopetohaveachievedanythingwiththisbook,itis,perhaps,tohavedonesomethingtochangethatsituation.Iopenedthebookwiththepassage,drawnfromhisPolitics,inwhichDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Aristotledescribesthehumanas‘apoliticalanimal’(Politics:1253a1).Ithoughtthisappropriatebecausethepoliticalaspectofourcharacterreallyispartofourbiologicalnature.Itisoneofthefeaturesbywhichwearefundamentallydistinguishedfromothercreatures.So,whatshouldIchoosehere,attheend?Well,thereisWeber’sdefinitionofthestate,mentionedamomentago,accordingtowhichthestateisthebodywhichexertsamonopolyofforceoveragivengeographicalarea.Thisaccuratelycapturesthefactthat,attheheartofpoliticalthought,thereliesaconcernwithforceanditsexercise.For,whatisalawbutacrediblethreat,andwhatisa\n316Moderntimes,modernthemessovereignbutaperson,orbodyofpersons,whoclaimtoexercisethatthreatlegitimately?Evenifthenatureofthestateshouldchange,asIamsuggest-ingitwill,thisconcernwillremain;and,totheextentthatpoliticalphil-osophyisanattempttocometotermswithevents–eventswhicharefrequentlyterrible–thenyoucouldsaythatitisahistoryofhope.However,itisatthesametimeahistoryexpressedinsentencesofblood.Butthen,thereisanother,equallyappropriatelinehere.ThisisalsotobefoundinAristotle’sPolitics,anditoccursshortlyafterthepassagewithwhichIopenedthebook.IamthinkingofthelineinwhichAristotlestatesthatapersonwithoutacity‘islikeanisolatedpieceinagameofdraughts’.Earlier,inchapter3,Iarguedthatthisisalinewhichcapturesthecharacterofthepoliticalrelationshipwithinwhichwestand,eachtotheothers.However,itseemstomethatthereisalsomoretoitthanthat,forwecanthinkofitasametaphorfortheactivityofphilosophyitself,whichalsoproceedsbymoveandcounter-move,asinagameofdraughtsorchess.Agameofdraughtsplayedoutindarkanduncertaintimes–thatgetsitaboutright.Whoknowswhatnewcircumstanceswillarisetoframeitsplayers,orwhatnewstrategiestheywilladoptinresponse?GeneralsuggestionsforfurtherreadingPartIIIInrecentyears,politicalphilosophers(whowriteinEnglish)havetendedtoconcentrateontheargumentbetweenliberals,libertariansandcommunitariansasexemplifiedbyRawls,NozickandSandelrespectively.TwoauthoritativecritiquesofNozickareJonathanWolff’sRobertNozick:Property,Justice,andtheMinimalState(1991)andG.A.Cohen’sSelf-Ownership,FreedomandEquality(1995).SeealsomyownAnti-Libertarianism:Markets,PhilosophyandMyth(Haworth1994).CommunitariansotherthanSandelincludeCharlesTaylorand(Iwouldsay)AlasdairMacIntyre(eventhoughIknowhehasrejectedthelabel).SeeTaylor’sSourcesoftheSelf:TheMakingofModernIdentity(1989).ForagoodcollectionofMacIntyre’swritings,withaclearandinformativeDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012introduction,seeKelvinKnight,ed.,TheMacIntyreReader(1998).AusefulcollectionofreadingsisShlomoAvineriandAvnerde-Shalit’sCommunitarianismandIndividualism(1992).Finally,twoexcellentsur-veysofcontemporarypoliticalphilosophyareWillKymlicka’sCon-temporaryPoliticalPhilosophy:AnIntroduction(1990)andStephenMulhallandAdamSwift’sLiberalsandCommunitarians(1992).Inmyview,AnartyaSen’srecentTheIdeaofJustice(2010)offerstheprospectofmovingbeyondtheRawlsianmindset.\nConcludingreflections317Notes1Evenso,despitethedifferencesbetweenthe‘traditions’fromwhichtheyemanate,bothHabermasandthelaterRawlsare‘Kantianconstructivists’,andbothseektodefineaformofliberalism.Fortherecordsofanexchangebetweenthetwowhichtookplacein1995,seeHabermas(1995)andRawls(1995b).2ButseeOkin(1979)andSen(2010).3See,forexample,thetableatSteger(2003).Thisshows–e.g.–thatGeneralMotors’salesareequivalenttotheGDPofDenmark,thoseofExxonMobiltoSouthAfrica’sGDP,andHitachi’stoChile’s.4Incaseyou’reinterested,it’shttp://countrymusichalloffame.org.5ThedifficultiesRawlsexperiencesdealingwiththeclaimsoffuturegenerationsandwithinter-nationalrelationsarenotorious.See,forexample,hisdiscussionofthe‘justsavingsprinciple’(Rawls1971:284–93)andhisTheLawofPeoples(Rawls1999b).Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012\nTimelineChronologyYEARTEXTSEVENTSBeforeChrist469BirthofSocrates420Herodotus:TheHistories410Thucydides:HistoryofthePeloponnesianWar404PeloponnesianWarends399Plato:TheApologyTrialandexecutionofSocrates375Plato:TheRepublic367AristotlejoinsPlato’sAcademy350Aristotle:ThePoliticsAristotle:NichomacheanEthics347DeathofPlato335Aristotle:TheHistoryofAnimals334AlexandertheGreatlaunchesmilitarycampaigns323DeathofAlexander322DeathofAristotle52Cicero:TheRepublic51Cicero:TheLaws44JuliusCaesarassassinated43CiceroassassinatedAnnoDomini32Christcrucified398Augustine:Confessions410RomesackedbyVisigothsDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012455RomesackedbyVandals427Augustine:CityofGod510RomesackedbyOstrogoths529ClosureofPlato’sAcademy638MoorsconquerJerusalem929CordobadeclaredaCaliphate1260Aristotle’sPoliticstranslatedintoLatin1272Aquinas:Commentaryonthe‘Politics’\n(continued)YEARTEXTSEVENTS1275Aquinas:SummaTheologica1302JohnofParis:‘OnKinglyandPapalPower’1324MarsiliusofPadua:DefenderofthePeace1382WycliffeinitiatestranslationofBible(LatintoEnglish)1440IntroductionofprintingpressbyGutenberg1492ColumbuslandsintheAmericas1517Luthernails95thesestoWittenbergchurchdoor1532Machiavelli:ThePrince1610GalileoobservesmoonsofJupiter1611KingJamesBible(AuthorisedVersion)1625Grotius:LawofWarandPeace1628Harvey:OntheMotionoftheHeartandBlood1632Galileo:Dialogue–TwoChiefWorldSystems(arguesforheliocentricview)1637Descartes:DiscourseontheMethodandMeditations1642OutbreakofCivilWarinEngland1648PeaceofWestphalia(Treatiessigned)1649ExecutionofCharlesI1651Hobbes:Leviathan1652Cromwellbecomes‘LordProtector’1660RestorationofmonarchyinEngland1668Hobbes:Behemoth1680RobertFilmer:Patriarcha1683LockefleesEngland:gainsasyluminHolland1685JamesIIbecomesKingofEngland1688‘GloriousRevolution’:exileofJamesIIWilliamofOrangebecomesKingofEngland1690Locke:TwoTreatisesofGovernment1755Rousseau:DiscourseonInequalityDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December20121762Rousseau:TheSocialContract1776USDeclarationofIndependenceRevolutioninUSAKant:GroundworkSmith:WealthofNations1787ConstitutionofUnitedStates1789France:DeclarationofRightsofManRevolutioninFrance:BastillestormedBentham:PrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation1790Burke:ReflectionsonRevolutioninFrance\n(continued)YEARTEXTSEVENTS1790Wollstonecraft:VindicationoftheRightsofMen1792Wollstonecraft:VindicationoftheRightsofWoman1793France:executionofLouisXVI1794France:executionofRobespierre(‘Terror’ends)1814Owen:NewViewofSociety1820JamesMill:AnEssayonGovernment1821Hegel:PhilosophyofRightHegel:PhilosophyofHistoryOwen:ReporttoCountyofLanark1830UK:world’sfirstpassengerrailway(LiverpoolandManchester)1843Bentham:AnarchicalFallacies(Publishedin1843;writtenearlier)1844Marx:EconomicandPhilosophicalManuscripts1848RevolutionsthroughoutmainlandEurope1859J.S.Mill:OnLibertyDarwin:OriginofSpeciesMarx:Preface1861J.S.Mill:RepresentativeUSA:outbreakofCivilWarGovernment1865USA:CivilWarendsUSA:abolitionofslavery1867Marx:Capital1869J.S.Mill:TheSubjectionofWomen1886Nietzsche:BeyondGoodandEvil1888MarxandEngels:CommunistManifesto1917RevolutioninRussia1945AtomicbombingofHiroshimaandNagasakiAuschwitzliberated1948UN:UniversalDeclarationofHumanDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Rights1971Rawls:ATheoryofJustice1989CollapseofBerlinWall1993Rawls:PoliticalLiberalism2001NewYork:destructionofTwinTowers2040Predicteddisappearanceofarcticicecap\nReferencesNote:Thislistisconfinedtoworkswhicharereferredtointhetextand/orthesuggestionsforfurtherreading.Adorno,TheodorandHorkheimer,Max(1979)[1944]:DialecticofEnlightenment,London:Verso.Annas,Julia(1977):‘MillandtheSubjectionofWomen’,Philosophy,Vol.52,pp.179–94.——(2003):Plato:AVeryShortIntroduction,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Aquinas,Thomas(1963)[1270–72]:CommentaryonthePolitics,trans.ErnestL.FortinandPeterD.O’NeillinLernerandMahdi,eds,pp.297–334.Arendt,Hannah(2004)[1951]:TheOriginsofTotalitarianism,NewYork:SchockenBooks.Aristotle(1910)[circa335BC]:HistoriaAnimalium,ed.,SirDavidRoss,trans.D’ArcyWentworthThomson,Oxford: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rke,Edmund181,186–93,194,196n,198;arete-18–19,19–20,48,52–53,72,98,207,255seealsoconservatism,conservativepoliticalAristotleix,2,10;chapter3passim,61,65,68,philosophy72,74,76,84,87,88n,98,159,171,185,194,284–85,311,315,316;onfunctioninCaesar,Julius68natureandsociety42;onhappiness49ff;canonofmajorworks:inEnglishliterature74;HistoryofAnimals37–38,40,41,43,55,56,inpoliticalphilosophy74–7760n;on“man”the“politicalanimal”43,capitalismseefreemarket/freemarket45–46;andNicomachus38,59n,60n;andeconomyPlato37–38;“scientific”approachtopoliticscave,allegoryofseePlato39;onslavery53–54,118;“tableofvirtuesChaerophon9andvices47–48;onvirtue47–49;onCharlesI(ofEngland)86,94,100,125,women57,118;influenceonmedieval132politicalthought70–71;Millon211;MarxCharlesII(ofEngland)87,125and235,239;Rawlsand288;seealsoclass,checksandbalances,systemof93;seealsostateandindividualdivisionofpowersAshley-Cooper,Anthony,EarlofShaftesbury126Cicero:6268,71,78n;Platoand66–68,Aubrey,John83–8471,73Augustine61,65,68–69,70CivilWar(English)86–87,90,95,125Averroes61,65class;Aristotleon41–43,57–58;Lockeon130n,143;Marxon228–29;J.S.Millon219;Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Barnes,Jonathan38Platoon14;Wollstonecrafton193;seealsoBarry,Brian173n,254,277,277n,278n,286n,equalityandinequality,Marx310nCohen,G.A.252n,277n,278n,286n,Bentham,Jeremy2,62,177–81,194,206,281,309n300;auto-icon181,195n;conceptionoftheColeman,Janet78nperson280–81;felicificcalculus201–2;communitarianmovement(s)185–86,280funeral180;theoryofmotivation165–66;communitarianism280;conceptionoftheseealsopleasure,naturalrights,principleofperson281–82;onrights283;onstateandutilityindividual283–84\nIndex331consent:labourand136,145–46;propertyandEuclid83–90131,133,135–36;tacit122;130n;Hobbeseudaimonia49,51–52,52–53;seealsoon106–7;Lockeon114,121–28;Millonhappiness199;Nozickon283consequentialism:211–15,262,285,281;andFairDealseeTruman,HarryS.Mill’sargumentforpluralvoting218;andfascist(s)/fascism132,159,171,189,222Mill’sdefenceofthelibertyofthoughtandfeminist(s)/feminism35n,57,118,313,314;discussion220–22;andcapitalism227;RawlsWollstonecrafton193;Millon208–11,on262;libertarianismon281224nconservatism:114;Burkeand186–93Feuerbach,Ludwig238,241conservativepoliticalphilosophy189–93Filmer,SirRobert127ConstitutionoftheUnitedStates93,129,185,Fourier,Charles186226,278nfreemarket/freemarketeconomy189,contractualismseesocialcontractargument196n,198;Lockeon,chapter8passim;Córdoba64–65Smithon227–28;Marxon,chapter12Corsica159,160passim;Rawlson255;seealsoproperty,Crick,Bernard305libertarianismCromwell,Oliver86,87,111,125freespeech;Hobbesand94–95;Millon(libertyCuba278nofthoughtanddiscussion)220–22,305;Rawlson199,266,267Darwin,Charles3,39,41,112freedomofexpressionseefreespeechDeclarationofHumanRights(UnitedNations)freedomseeliberty267FrenchRevolution125,132,171–72,219;DeclarationofIndependence(USA)129,185Burkeon186–92;Hegelon181–82,184;DeclarationoftheRightsofManandofthePaineon187–88;Rousseauand154;Citizen(France)177,189Wordsworthon177;Wollstonecraftondemocracy:inAthens10–12;Ciceroon67;187–88;J.S.Millon216–19;Platoon23,24,33–35,Fukuyama,Francis29573;“receivedview”of161;Rousseauand154,159–64168;Rawlson288,289;seeGalileo40,76,84;andDescartes88n;andalsoconsent,liberaldemocracy,“totalitarianHobbes88ndemocracy”Gates,Bill140DescartesRené84–86,88n,276Geneva159–60Dickens,Charles3,224ngeometryseemathematicsdifferenceprinciple,seeRawls,secondprincipleglobalisation313–14ofjusticeGloriousRevolutionof1688121,Diggers,seeTrueLevellers125–26;andLocke’sconceptionofdivisionoflabour;Platoon21–22,64;Marxconsent126–28on229–30,232,240,244,251n;SmithonGothaProgramme231229–30;Rawlsand274Gray,John260,310nDomesdayBook148GreatChainofBeing76,87Drake,SirFrancis84greatesthappinessprincipleseeprincipleofutility“economicman”84–85,113nGrotius,Hugo77,111,113nDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012EdictofThessalonica63guardianclass,seePlatoeducation;Platoon15–16,22,32Gutenberg,Johannes65Einstein,Albert3,103Empedocles9Habermas,Jürgen312,317nEngels,Friedrich186,224nHampshire,Stuart253Enlightenment,the178,190,277,312happiness:Aristotleon46–47,51–53,224n;equalityandinequalityAristotleon54;HobbesBenthamon178–79,201–2;utilitarianon113n;Lockeon117–19,142–46;accountof49–51,178–80,201–4;seealsoRousseauon151–52,167;Millon209;Marxeudaimonia,pleasureon231–32;Rawlson257–58,268,272,289Harvey,William84\n332IndexHayek,F.A.23117–19;Sandelon282;socialjustice231;seeHegel,G.W.F.180–85,311;onfreedom182,alsoPlato,Rawls,utilitarianism183,184;Geist183;legacyof182–85;Marxand238,249–50,278n,285;onRousseauKant,Immanuel48,215,224n,261,292,309n,180–82310n,311Heraclitus9Kilcullen,John78nHerodotus78nKitto,H.D.F.45Hiroshima258Koran,the75,112,301historicaljustifications133–34,145,148,283;seealso“patterned”labourtheoryofvalue:inLocke146;inMarxjustifications245–46historyandphilosophy,howrelatedandhowLadiesofLanghamPlace224ndifferentiated1–2,71–74laisser-faire;andconservativepoliticalHitler,Adolf24,36n,113n,154,155,170,philosophy189;andliberalism189,198;312Nozickand280;seealsocapitalist,freeHobbes,Thomas;2,61,78n;chapter5passim,market,freemarketeconomychapter6passim125,132,184,206,258;onLaslett,Peter129n,253–54,285absolutesovereignty93;andDescarteslaw(s)ofnatureseenaturallaw,Hobbes,Locke84–86;onconsent106–7;oncontractsLeibniz,GottfriedWilhelmvon88n97–98;ondiseasesofthecommonwealthLenin,VladimirIlyich25094;ondividedsovereignty93–95;onhumanliberaldemocracy23,34,122,129,164–65,nature102,171;onthelawsofnature198,216,274,29599–101;legacyof110–12;onthemeaningofliberalism114,193;andlaisserfaire189,198;moralterms96;onmotivation96,102;andtheReformation307–8;andnotorietyof111;onpower96,103,104–7,utilitarianism194,204–5,216,222;and111;onprivateconscience94–95;asasocialism200;“agonistic”liberalism305;rationalchoicetheorist92,102,109–10;and“neo”-liberalism196n;“political”liberalismRawls261,262;onthesocialcontract101,(Rawls)chapter15passim;Mill’sversionof107–10113n;asasocialcontracttheorist198–200;Rawls’sversionof255,256–57;90,134,146–47;onthestateofnatureRortyon260;Sandelon28088–89,95,104,115;seealsosocialcontract,libertarianism279–80,281,283socialcontractargument,rationalchoiceliberty(freedom)173n;“negative”liberty156,theory157–58,164,165–66,184,264;“positive”Holocaust172,222liberty156–57,158–59,164,165–66;BerlinHomer15,19,46,70,211on154,233–34;Burkeon185,189–90,Horkheimer,Max312224n;Hegelon184;Lockeon114,115–16,humanrights94–95,114,116,200,212,215,118,120,132,137;Millon197,198–200,282;twocategoriesof267;seealsonatural220;Platoon23;Rawlson256–57,263–67,rights,naturallaw273,289,304–5;Rousseauon153–54,155–59libertyofthoughtanddiscussion;seefreespeechIncredibleHulk103Lisle,LadyAlice126individualandstate(relationbetween)seestateLloyd-Thomas,David130nandindividual(relationbetween)Locke,John2,3,61,307,313;onconsentindustrialisation179,219,258121–25,127–29,145;tacitconsent122–25,Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012inequalityseeequalityandinequality127;inequalityofresources142;“labourIslam,Islamicculture61,63,64–65,290,296,mixing”argument136–40,145;onthelaw309nofnature115–19;naturalrights114,117–18,132–33,137,143,147–48;JamesII(ofEngland)118,125–26,128199–200;onpropertychapter8passim;Jeffreys,Judge126asasocialcontracttheorist91–92,113n,JohnofParis61,70134–35,146–49,261;onthestateofnatureJudaism290,296,309n115–21;andMarx226,227,235,247,justice:Hobbeson100,113n;libertarianismon250,252n;andNozick283;andRousseau283;Nozickon283,285;thequestionof151,159\nIndex333LouisXVI(ofFrance)164Nagasaki258LutherMartin65Napoleon,NapoleonicWars160,185Lycurgus171nationstate,the44–45,63,314NationalAssembly(France)150n,177Machiavelli,Nicolò63,77,78n,306naturallaw77,111–12,113n,116–17;130n;MacIntyre,Alasdair36n,52,78n,283seealsonaturalrights,humanrights,HobbesMacPherson,C.B.130n,254(lawsofnature),Locke(thelawofnature)Magellan,Ferdinand84naturalrights;Benthamon178,181;MillonMahoney,Jon278n282;seealsonaturallaw,humanrights;Maimonides,Moses61,65Hobbes(lawsofnature),Locke(thelawofMarieAntoinette187,188nature)MarsiliusofPadua61,70Newton,Isaac3,39,102Marx,Karl2,112,143,186,194,258,284,285,Nicomachus38,59n,60n307;onalienation234–39;intheBritishNietzsche,Friedrich184Museum223;conceptionof“capitalism”noblesavageseeRousseau226–30;onclassstruggle228–29;divisionofNormanConquest108,148–49,173n,190labour229;on“fairness”231–33;on“forcedNozick,Robert113n,129n,130n,133n,labour233–34;foundationand139–40,224n,234n,234,252n,253,superstructure236–38,248;ontheGotha279–80,281,283,284,285,285n,286nprogramme231–33;legacyof247–50;onproduction234–39;surplusvalueandOakeshott,Michael191–92,254exploitation244–47;andHegel238–39,October61789186–87,190249–50;andLocke226,235,247Okin,SusanMoller35n,60n,309n,317nMarxism225,250,285,288,301;seealsoMarxOrwell,George164,311mathematics;63;Descartesand85;HobbesonOwen,Robert185–86,194,28083,262;Platoon29,32Mersenne,Marin84,88nPaine,Tom187–88Mill,James161,180,197patternedjustifications133,145,148,279,283,Mill,JohnStuart;2,3,10,61,194;chapter11285;seealso“historical”justificationspassim,225,283,312,313,315;on“abstractPeloponnesianWar10–11,22right”282;conceptionoftheperson207;onPericles11,22democracy(representativegovernment)PhillipIIofMacedon37,59,59–60n161,216–19;“higher”and“lower”pleasuresPickering,Rodney12n,36n202–5;liberalismof197–98,198–200,204,Plamenatz,John78n,130n,248,252n256–57;onthelibertyofthoughtandPlato2,7;chapter2passim,61,74,75,98,194,discussion220,305;mentalcrisis222;285,311;theAcademy37,59,68,78n,285;“negative”conceptionoffreedom156–57;allegoryofthecave32–33;ondemocracy“noharm”principle206–7,256–57;plural22–23,24,33–35;oneducation15–16,22,voting216–19,249;“sphereofaction”156,32;ontheidealstate14–16,291;mythof198–99,200,216,222,256;“trafficthemetals(noblelie)16;philosopherrulersregulations”view207,299–300;“tyrannyof(“guardians”)14–16;onspecialisation19–22,themajority”204,218;utilitarianismof44,53,64,274;theoryofforms25–33,34,197–98,201–5,211–15;onwomen208–11;35,36n,73;asa“totalitarian”24;andonBentham180;andRawls199–20,212,Aristotle37,38,44,58–59;andAugustineDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012217–18,256–57,262,277n,281,289,301,65,69;andCicero66–68,71,73,78n;and305,307,309–10n,Mill216,218;andRawlsonjustice17–19,mindingyourownbusiness,Pericleson255;andRousseau159;andSocrates7–8,11,22;Platoon15,19–20,33,64,10,12,3867,255pleasure:Benthamon178–79;J.S.Millonmodusvivendi259–60,293–94,297,202–5298–99,300pluralsociety168,179–80,205,216,219,314–15Monopoly134,228polis,the20,44–45,46,52,53,54,57,59,72,Montesquieu,Charles-LouisdeSecondat,118,159–60,171,206,235,239,274Baronde277Popper,Karl24,252n,254\n334Indexpostmodernism184–85,196n,278nReformation,the65,75,182,295,307–8,313post-warconsensus258,280,311representativegovernment,seedemocracy,principleofaverageutility268,270liberaldemocracy,Mill,JohnStuartprincipleofutility(“greatesthappiness”Ricardo,David250principle)18,48–50,133,178–79,180,186,rightsseehumanrights,naturalrights,utility197,201,205,206,211–15,232,259,263,andrights268,282;seealsoconsequentialism,Rogers,Ben253utilitarianismRome55,62–63,65,68,78n,160prisoner’sdilemma99,113nRorty,Richard260,277,278nproperty;Hobbeson94;Lockeon114,121,Rousseau,JeanJacques;2,264,284,291,313,130n;chapter8passim;232,284,292;Marx315;chapter9passim;civilreligion169;onon226–27,228,229,230,232–33,248;democracy156,161–65,216;ontheEnglishNozickon129n,283;Platoon16;159;andtheFrenchRevolution125,154,Rawlson199,232,255;Rousseauon177;thegeneralassembly159–62,163,169,151–52300,304;thegeneralwill161–64,166–68,Pufendorf,Samuel111,113n170;oninequality151–52;thelawgiverPythagoras9170–71;onliberty/freedom153–54,155–59,163,165–66;the“noblesavage”44;rationalchoicetheory;andHobbes92–93,99,on“perfectibility”206;onproperty151;102,109,110,113n,134;andRawls261,sectionalassociations169–70;asasocial270,275,307;seealsosocialcontractcontracttheorist91,195n,261;allegedargument“totalitarianism”of154;“totalitarianRawls,John;basicliberties199,219,256,263,democracy”154,163;the“willofall”169;264,265–66,273,274;“basicstructure”ofandAristotle44;andBentham178;Burkesociety255,271,277,287,291,292–93,on190;Hegelon180–83;andRawls261,294,304,309n;“circumstancesofjustice”300,304–5,310n273–75;“comprehensive”doctrine(s)Russell,Bertrand62288–90,294,300,304,306;firstprincipleofjustice255–56,258,263–67,272;andSaintAugustineseeAugustineglobalisation314–15;HiroshimaandSaint-Simon,Claude-HenrideRouvroy,ComteNagasaki258;Kantianconstructivism287,de186291–92,307,317n;liberalismof256–57;Sandel,Michael279,280,281–82,283,285,originalposition259–61,262–63,270–71,290272–76,283,288,290,297,314–15;Sartre,JeanPaul124,130n“overlappingconsensus”287,294–301,305;Scanlon,T.M.286n“political”conceptionofjustice290–91,293,Schama,Simon88n,154,171–72,196n302,304;“political”liberalism284;chapterScruton,Roger19215passim;“problemofpoliticalliberalism”Sen,Amartya314,317n287–89;“publicreason”287,301–6,310n;September112001172ontheReformation295,307–8;secondShakers185principleofjustice(differenceprinciple)18,Shakespeare,William:3;KingLearandHamlet145,232,256,257–58,268–72,277n,278n;76–77stability(concernwith)287,294;Simmons,A.John124“universalist”interpretationof254,273–77;Singer,Peter130nDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012veilofignorance260–61,266–67,268–69,Skinner,Quentin75,78–79n271,273,278n,309n;“well-ordered”slavery:Aristotleon53–57;Hegelondemocraticsociety291–92,294–95,298,183,184;Lockeon137;Wollstonecraft301,303,305,315;andHobbes261,262;on193andJ.S.Mill199–20,256–57,277n,280–81;Smith,Adam227–28,229–30,237,242,250,Nozickon279,285;andPlatoonjustice28417–19;andRousseau304–5;andSpinozasocialcontractargument,mainfeatures275–76of90–93,113–14,146–49,291–92;redistributivist(s)redistributivism132,258,seealsosocialcontract,the,rational280,311choicetheory\nIndex335socialcontracttheoryseesocialcontractutilitarianism;“act”and“rule”215;andargumentdemocracy161,168,169–70,216;socialcontract,therealorhypothetical?andfreespeech220;onhappiness107–10;Humeon109;inHobbes’s49–51;andliberalism194;chapter11argument102,107–10,298–99;Lockeonpassim;201;and“patterned”justifications91,113n;Rawlson161–62,275,285,forpropertydistribution133,148;291–92;Rousseauon152–53asapoliticalmovement179–80;andsocialist(s)/socialism114,132,183,186,virtueethics48–49;Rawlsand212,257,193–94,200,231,250,279,285261–62,263,270,277n,278n;andSocrates2,14,15,16,20,25–26,27,28,30,rights211–15,282;andRobert36n,37,38,95,203,311,313Owen186,194;seealsoconsequentialism,Solon71happiness,pleasure,principleofutility,sophists8–9BenthamMillJ.S.SovietUnion24,155,225Sparta10–11,23–24,36n,37,38,45,171virtualgeneralassembly160,168Spinoza,Benedictde88n,275–76virtueethics48ffStalin,Joseph24,113n,154,155,225virtue:andarete-19,52–53,72;Aristotlestateandindividual(relationbetween):on47–49,52–57,58;Socrates’sapproachAristotleon44,45ff,52–54,171,206;Benthamto8,9on206,284;communitarianismon283–84;Hobbeson111,171,206;instrumentalandWarrender,Howard113norganicaccountsof206;libertarianismon281;Weber,Max314,315J.S.Millon206–7;Nozickon281;Platoon44,welfarestate132,258,279206;Rousseauon170–71Wenar,Leif278n,310nstateofnature,stateofnaturetheoryseesocialWestphalia,Peaceof63contractargumentwhatifeverybodydidit?argument110Stepfordwife/wives210,224nWilliamofOckham61smartypantsapproachtophilosophy110WilliamofOrange126,128surplusvalueseelabourtheoryofvalueWilliams,Bernard60nsyllogism95Wilson,E.O.60nSyracuse45Wittgenstein,Ludwig30,31,252nWolf,Susan49tacitconsentseeconsentWolff,Jonathan173nTalmon,J.L.154Wolff,RobertPaul168Taylor,Jeremy78nWollstonecraft,Mary187–88,Thales9193,211Thomas,Keith78nwomenincontemporarypoliticalThompson,E.P.252nphilosophy312;Aristotleon54,Thucydides11118;Lockeon130n;Platoon15,totalitariandemocracyseeRousseau35n;J.S.Millon208–11;WollstonecrafttotalitarianismArendton312;andPlato’son193Republic24;Popperon24ff;andRousseau’sWordsworth,William177,181,204SocialContract154–71WorldWarI172,312Truelevellers132WorldWarII31,242,253,258,311Downloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012Truman,HarryS.Wycliffe,John65,66\nDownloadedby[NanjingUniversity]at16:5610December2012