美学：哲学基础

美学：哲学基础

\nAesthetics\nFundamentalsofPhilosophySerieseditor:JohnShandThisseriespresentsanup-to-datesetofengrossing,accurate,andlivelyintroductionstoallthecoreareasofphilosophy.Eachvolumeiswrittenbyanenthusiasticandknowledgeableteacheroftheareainquestion.Carehasbeentakentoproduceworksthatwhileeven-handedarenotmereblandexpositions,andassuchareoriginalpiecesofphilosophyintheirownright.Thereadershouldnotonlybewellinformedbytheseries,butalsoexperiencetheintellectualexcitementofbeingengagedinphilosophicaldebateitself.Thevolumesserveasanessentialbasisfortheundergraduatecoursestowhichtheyrelate,aswellasbeingaccessibleandabsorbingforthegeneralreader.Togethertheycompriseanindispensablelibraryoflivingphilosophy.PiersBennEthicsAlexanderBirdPhilosophyofscienceStephenBurwood,PaulGilbert,KathleenLennonPhilosophyofmindRichardFrancksModernphilosophyDudleyKnowlesPoliticalphilosophyHarryLesserAncientphilosophyColinLyasAestheticsAlexanderMillerPhilosophyoflanguageMuraliRamachandranLogic\nAestheticsColinLyasUniversityofLancaster\n©ColinLyas1997ThisbookiscopyrightundertheBerneConvention.Noreproductionwithoutpermission.Allrightsreserved.Firstpublishedin1997byUCLPressThenameofUniversityCollegeLondon(UCL)isaregisteredtrademarkusedbyUCLPresswiththeconsentoftheowner.UCLPressisanimprintoftheTaylor&FrancisGroupThiseditionpublishedintheTaylor&Francise-Library,2002.BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataAcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.ISBN0-203-13682-9Mastere-bookISBNISBN0-203-18020-8(AdobeeReaderFormat)ISBNs:1-85728-678-2HB1-85728-580-8PB\nForHildLeslie\n\nButoften,intheworld’smostcrowdedstreets,Butoften,inthedinofstrife,ThererisesanunspeakabledesireAftertheknowledgeofourburiedlife;AthirsttospendourfireandrestlessforceIntrackingoutourtrue,originalcourse;AlongingtoinquireIntothemysteryofthisheartwhichbeatsSowild,sodeepinus—toknowWhenceourlivescomeandwheretheygo.Andwehavebeenonmanythousandlines,Andwehaveshown,oneach,spiritandpower;Buthardlyhavewe,foronelittlehour,Beenonourownline,havewebeenourselves—HardlyhadskilltoutteroneofallThenamelessfeelingsthatcoursethroughourbreast,Buttheycourseonforeverunexpressed.AndlongwetryinvaintospeakandactOurhiddenself,andwhatwesayanddoIseloquent,iswell—but’tisnottrue.Only—butthisisrare—Whenabelovedhandislaidinours,WhenjadedwiththerushandglareOftheinterminablehours,Oureyescaninanother’seyesreadclear,Whenourworlddeafen’dearIsbythetonesofalovedvoicecaresss’d—Aboltisshotbacksomewhereinourbreast,Andalostpulseoffeelingstirsagain,Theeyesinksinwardandtheheartliesplain,Andwhatwemeanwesay,andwhatwewould,weknow.MatthewArnold,Theburiedlife\n\nContentsPrefacexiIntroduction:thedisconsolationsofphilosophy11Anglo-Kantianattitudes172Nature’smirror:imitation,representationandimagination373Ne’ersowellexpressed(I)594TalesfromtheViennaWoods:afterWittgensteininaesthetics835Ne’ersowellexpressed(II)976Theproofofthepudding1137Theemptytombandtheresurrectionoftheartist1358Thestructuresoftheself-sufficientword1599Helen’sBeethoven:truthandmorality18710Thepointofitall215Envoi:therapeoftheHolyMother225References229Index233ix\n\nPrefaceThisisnotabookforthosewhoknowbutforthosewhowanttoknow.InwritingitIhadinmindthreepossibleaudiences.Thefirstisthegeneralreaderwhohearsfromafarofexcitingcontroversiesaboutartandwhowouldliketoknowwhatisgoingon.Thesecondisthestudentwhomightbethinkingofembarkingonacourseinphilosophicalaestheticsandwantsasurveyofthatfield.Thirdly,thepublishersofthisworkwishtoofferitasatextforundergraduateaestheticscourses.Withthatinmindthisbookisofferedasaspringboardintothesubject.Ittriestoorientatethereaderbyoutliningacentralprobleminaestheticsandsomesolutionswhichhavebeenofferedtoit.IhavenogreatconfidencethatanythingthatIsayisrightinanyabsolutesense.Noristhatimportantaslongasthebookprovokesthinking.Iwillbehappyifreaderstakeawayanimpressionofavigorouslyboilingpot,andevenhappieriftheyaremovedtoaddfueltothefireunderit.Thisbookowesmuchtothethinkingprovokedinmebyvariousphilosophers,someofwhomIhave,alas,nevermet,andwhoIenvyfortheirachievementsincombiningaloveof,andoftenhighskillsin,theartswiththeabilitytothinkwithpowerandimaginationaboutthem:CyrilBarrett,StanleyCavell,TedCohen,RayElliot,LydiaGoehr,GaryIseminger,PeterKivy,RogerScruton,BobSharpe,MichaelTanner,BenTilghmanandRichardWollheim.OvereverythingIhavewrittenhoverstheinfluenceofxi\nPREFACEthelateFrankSibley,whosefriendshipandexampleover30yearsinfluencedmythoughtandenhancedmylife.PartsofthisbookwerewrittenatCarletonCollegeinMinnesotaandoweaverygreatdebttotheinfluenceofthelifeofthatadmirableinstitution.Edinburgh25May1996AnoteonreferencesTwokindsofreferencesareincludedinthetext.Attheendofeachchapterthereareguidestofurtherreading.Thefullreferenceisgivenonlyonthefirstoccurrence.Inadditiontherearereferencesinthetextofeachofthechapters.Theseconsistofthenameofthepersoncitedandadate.Attheendoftheworkabibliographygivesthefullsourceforeachsuchreference.xii\nIntroductionThedisconsolationsofphilosophyThebedrockEverythingwearetostudyrestsonthebedrockofthespontaneousreactionsthatwemake,fromearliestinfancy,tonatureandtocreatedthings.Achildhearsapieceofmusicandreactsbymarchingupanddown,swingingitsarms:itlistensenrapturedtostorytellings:itmaybeginbysimplythrowingpaint,butsoontakesanintenseinterestintheprecisechoiceandpositioningofcolours:itdelightsinthemovementoftreesandcloudsandthetexturesandfragrancesoftheworld.Theseresponsesareaformourlifetakes,asnaturaltousaseatingandsleeping.Theyarethebeginningofwhatwouldissue,wereeducationsystemsdesignedtoreinforceratherthantofrustrateouraestheticdevelopment,inbeingmovedbyJanác?ek,entrancedbyKunderaandfascinatedbyKitaj.Thesebedrockresponsesareinitiallyspontaneous.Theymay,byeducation,individualpsychologyandsocialpressurebedeflectedintothisorthatsetofpreferences,butif,initially,we1\nTHEDISCONSOLATIONSOFPHILOSOPHYdidnotspontaneouslyrespondaswedo,wecouldnotdevelopasaestheticbeings.Suchresponsesare,moreover,ubiquitous.Weknowofnocultureinwhichpeopledonotdance,listentostories,ornamentthemselvesandconstructrepresentations.Thattheseformsofactivityhavebeensuppressed(asareligionmightsuppressartasinfringingonGod’smonopolypositionasasupplierofcreatedobjects)merelytestifiestotheirubiquitousexistence.Whatmaydifferisthereasonspeoplegiveforengaginginsuchactivities.Adanceinoneculturemaybedancedtobringtheraindown,amotivation,eveninthedryseasons,farfromthemindsoftheBalletRambertanditsclients.Thebedrockresponsesareubiquitousinanotherway.Thewayswefulfilourselvesaestheticallyareextraordinarilywideandvarious.Ourfictionsincludenovels,filmsandplaysthatembraceTarantino,Bergman,Tolstoy,BarbaraCartland,Kundera,EastEnders,BayWatchandTwinPeaks.MusicrangesacrossDireStraits,Wagner,MichaelNyman,TakeThat,JoniMitchell,raga,Elgar,reggae,yard,garage,Mozartandjungle.ThevisuallyaestheticrangesacrossAmerindianbodydecoration,Pollock,Warhol,Vermeer,Hopisand-painting,Hindutempledecoration,subwaywall-paintingandGothicsartorialembellishments.Buttothatwecanaddanotherfact,fromwhichintheendourstudygetswhateverimportanceithas.Forallthataestheticscanbemarginalizedbythosewhothinkofitasanoptionalextra,tobeenjoyedwhentheseriousbusinessofvocationaltrainingisdone,weknowthatourencounterswithartandnaturegonotmerelywidebutalsodeep,and,moreover,goasdeepasanythinginourlivescango.Thus,Wordsworth,recallinganearliervisittotheWyeaboveTinternAbbey,feltthathehadintheinterimpossessed,byvirtueofthatearliervisit,somethingdeeperthanmerelypleasingmemoriesofanenchantmentofhiseyebycertainscenicbeauties.Heowedtoit:ThatblessedmoodInwhichtheburdenofthemystery,InwhichtheheavyandthewearyweightOfallthisunintelligibleworldIslightened:—Thatsereneandblessedmood2\nTHEBEDROCKInwhichtheaffectionsgentlyleaduson,—Until,thebreathofthiscorporealframe,AndeventhemotionofourhumanbloodAlmostsuspended,wearelaidasleepInbody,andbecomealivingsoul:WhilewithaneyemadequietbythepowerOfharmonyandthedeeppowerofjoy,Weseeintothelifeofthings.(LinescomposedaboutTinternAbbey)Astrikingexpressionofthefeelingthatart,too,reachesdeeplyintousistobefoundintheremarkableChapter5ofE.M.Forster’sHowardsEnd,inwhichthecentralcharactersattendaperformanceofBeethoven’sFifthSymphony.HelenSchlegelfeelsherlifetohavebeenchangedbythemusicthatshehears:Helenpushedherwayoutduringtheapplause.Shedesiredtobealone.Themusichadsummeduptoherallthathadhappenedorcouldhappeninhercareer.Shereaditasatangiblestatement,whichcouldneverbesuperseded.Thenotesmeantthisandthattoher,andtheycouldhavenoothermeaning,andlifecouldhavenoothermeaning.Shepushedrightoutofthebuilding,andwalkedslowlydowntheoutsidestaircase,breathingtheautumnalair,andthenshestrolledhome.Thatsuchexperiencesarenotconfinedto“highart”istestifiedtobyoneofmystudentswhowrote:Iwaswalkingtoafriend’shouselisteningtoU2…onmyWalkman…Thesong“One”startedtoplay…Lookingatthelyricsbythemselvesfailstostirmuchemotioninmeatall.However,whenthiswasmixedwiththemusicalarrangementitturnedmeintoamess.Evennow,whenIlistentothetrackashiverjuddersmetoastandstill.IntheintroductiontoEndymionKeatsasserted,somewhatdubiously,asthosewhotireoflastyear’sfashionsmightsuspect,thatathingofbeautyisajoyforever.Morepertinently,afteralistofthethingsthatentranceus,includingsuchnaturalobjectsas3\nTHEDISCONSOLATIONSOFPHILOSOPHY“daffodilsandthegreenworldthattheylivein”,andsuchworksofartas“alllovelytalesthatwehaveheardandread”,heremarkedonsomethingthathasalwaysstruckme,namely,thesheervolumeofthestreamofaestheticstimulationinwhichweareimmersed.Hespeaksofitas“anendlessfountainofimmortaldrink”.Soitis.AsenseofdeprivationAndyetmanyfeelaestheticallydeprived.AtOpenUniversitysummerschoolsinaestheticsoneencounterspeoplewhofeelthattheyhavemissedoutonart,whoareanxioustoparticipateinaformoflifethat,theyareconstantlytold,offersmoresolidjoysandmorelastingtreasuresthantheworldofgettingandspending,onthereceivingendofwhichmanyofthemhavebeen.Newlyarriveduniversitystudents,too,scentaworldinwhichpeopletalkofMichelangeloandcanpronounceTannhäuser.Sincethatisheldupastheacmeofcivilization,theywanttobeinthatworld.Ofcourse,theyarenotdeprivedofarichaestheticlife.TheychoosetheirclotheswithanattentiontoaestheticdetailscarcelysecondtothatwithwhichCosimoMediciwouldhavechosenanetching;thebodiesofthosewhofrequenttheraveclubsoftheworld’surbanjunglesareadornedwitharichnessnotlessthanthoseofthebodiesoftheAmazonians;theirearsareconstantlystimulatedbymusic;theydancewithastonishingrhythmanddynamism;theyaresaturatedwiththenarrativedramaofthescreen;theywalkthehills,climbtherocks,ridethewatersandareupliftedbythoseexperiences;theirpoetryisthesometimesgreatpoetryofthecontemporarysonglyric.Sowhatistheworryaboutaestheticdeprivation?Someworryforasimplereason.Theyseecertainthingsheldupasaestheticicons,worthyofveneration:thingsproducedbysuchpeopleasRembrandt,Monteverdi,Mahler,JoyceandHenryMoore.Butmyfriends,inallhumility,concedethatalthoughthesethingsmaybegreat,theygetnothingfromthem.Then,too,theyworrybecausewhattheydogetfromartisoftenderided,aswhentheirgenuinedelightinthescenespaintedbyConstableiswrittenoffasirrelevantcomparedwithsomethingmysteriouslycharacterizedas“theformalfeatures”ofapainting.Someone,too,deeplymovedbyAuden’sbeautifulLullaby,istoldinsteadtoattendtosomehocus-pocusinvolvingsuchbarbarisms4\nASENSEOFDEPRIVATIONas“signifier”and“metonymy”.Manymusicstudents,too,willknowofthewayinwhichthedeepstirringsengenderedbyThedreamofGerontiuscanvanishintotheorificeofSchenkerianmusicalanalysis(seeSharpe1993andTheNewGrovedictionaryofmusic).Then,again,theyworrythat,althoughtheyaremoremovedbyQueen’s“Bohemianrhapsody”thanbySchubert’sAndieMusik,theyaretoldthattheSchubertisvastlybetter.Thentheyfeelputdownandcan’tseewhy.Thesituationofthesewould-beappreciatorsissummedupbysomeonewhoaskedmewhatsheshouldlookatonhervisittotheWalkerGalleryinLiverpool.IsuggestedarecentlyacquiredPoussin.“No,”shesaid,“Idon’twanttoknowwhatpicturetolookat.IwanttoknowwhatIshouldlookatwhenIlookatapicture”.Itisasoberingfact,inacountryinwhicheventhemostbarbaricpoliticianpayslipservicetoartasaprimemanifestationofcivilization,whichspendsextraordinarysumsofmoney,andatleast11years,oneducatingeachofitschildren,thatsomanypeopleinBritaincanreachtheageof22(oreven92)andhavenoideawhattodowhenstandingbeforeapicture.Formany,artgalleriesareplaceswherestains,largelyrectangular,hangonwalls.Standingbeforethesestains,otherpeople,oftenwithacertainkindofaccent,proclaim,ofteninvoicesmeanttobeoverheard,thatlookingatthesestainshasgiventhemexperiencessoprofoundthatafailuretohavethemwouldhavelefttheirlivesimpoverished.Andotherslookandjustcan’tseeanyofthis,justasotherscanmakenosenseofthenoisesinthesonicmuseumoftheconcerthall,orresolvethewordsofThewastelandintosense.Thecollisionbetweenthosewhoseeavalueinsuchartandthosewhocannotgeneratesavarietyofresponses.Oneistoclaimthattheworksofartthatarestandardlyheldupasiconsareonlysotothosewhohavehadacertainkindofeducation.Further,thatkindofeducationistheclass-basedprerogativeofaneconomicelite,aconclusionreinforcedbythefactthattheaccentsinwhichtheappreciationofartisexpressedaremoreoftenthoseofthecorridorsofpowerthanthecorridorsofaninner-cityhospital.Ifthisapproachismeanttodealwiththosewhocan’tseewhypeoplehavebeensodrawntoBotticelli,Rembrandt,Monteverdi,Eliotandothericonsofart,andwhoworrythattheyaremissingsomething,itcanonlydosobydrawingtheconclusionthatthere5\nTHEDISCONSOLATIONSOFPHILOSOPHYisnothingbeingmissedbythoseunabletoparticipateintheartpreferredbyamoreprivilegedculturalgroup.But,asidefromthefactthatpreferencesforthisorthatsortofartdonotcorrespondneatlytothetastesofthisorthatculturallydeterminedgroup,thatconclusionsimplydoesnotfollow.ThetrueclaimthatonegroupisculturallydisposedtolikeVerdiandanotherculturallydisposedtolikegraffitiartdoesnotentailthatthereisnothingwecanmissintheartpreferredbyadifferentgroup.Indeedthecontraryistrue.Peoplecomelovinglytovaluethingsforwhichnopreviouseducationpreparedthem.Theboundariesbetweensuchgrouppreferencesasdoexistarenotimpermeablemembranes.SomeonebroughtuponBarryManilowcancometoseewhatistobefoundinHandel,nolessthansomeonebroughtuponMonteverdimightcometoseewhatistobefoundinKingOliver.Suppose,however,onedoeshaveareasonforbelievingoneismissingoutonsomethingtobeseeningalleriesandheardinconcerthalls.Howisonetogetaccesstoit?ThedisconsolationsofphilosophicalaestheticsAtemptinginclinationistobelievethatonecangetaccesstoartbythestudyofphilosophicalaesthetics,anditisbecauseadecisiontostudythatsubjectissometimesthusmotivatedthatitcanbesuchadisappointment.Thisisbecauseasubjectbearingsuchatitlecreatesthenotunreasonableexpectationthatitsstudywillimpartagreatercapacitytoreapthoserewardsoftheartthataresoloudlytrumpetedbythosewhosehandsarealreadyontheropes.Peoplehopetocometoseewhatisgreataboutcertainworksofartandwhysomesoconfidentlyclaimtheseworkstobebetterthansomeoftheiconsofpopularculture.And,asgenerationsofstudentsofaestheticshavecomplained,thissimplydoesnothappen.Oneexplanationforthisdisappointmentisthatbeginnersconfuseaestheticswithphilosophicalaesthetics,andwronglyexpecttogetfromthelatterwhatonlytheformercouldgivethem.ToexplainthisIneedtotouchonaproblemaboutphilosophy.Oneoftherecurrentembarrassmentsforaphilosopherishavingtoexplaintononphilosopherswhatbeingaphilosopherinvolves.Foralthougheveryoneunderstandsthenotionofsomeonebeinga6\nTHEDISCONSOLATIONSOFPHILOSOPHICALASTHETICSphysicistoramortician,evenprofessionalacademicscanbevagueaboutwhatbeingaphilosopherinvolves.Itisnotdifficulttotellastoryabouthowthisuncertaintyaboutthenatureofphilosophyarises.Atonetime,sothestorygoes,philosophywasphilosophia,theloveofwisdom.Intheinnocentdawnthatisallegedtohaveprecededthedivisionoflabourthatnowcharacterizesintellectuallife,philosophiawasanundifferentiatedcuriosityaboutanythingwhatsoever.Gradually,thestorycontinues,thespecialistdisciplinescarvedout,fromthehugeundifferentiatedcarcassofaboriginalhumanenquiry,theirownsubjectmatters,tobestudiedbytheirdistinctivemethodologies.Mathematicswasfirst,perhaps,then,intheRenaissance,physics,then,inthelatenineteenthcentury,psychology,andsoontolinguisticsinthiscentury.Thefurnitureoftheuniverseisthusdivided,eachparttoitsowndiscipline,eachdisciplinewithitsowndistinctivemethodology.Nowacrisisforphilosophyarises.Forwhatwillbeleftforphilosophyafterthespecialdisciplineshaveannexedtheirareasofstudy?Whatcategoryofthefurnitureoftheuniversewillbeleftforphilosophy,andwhatdistinctivemethodologyhasphilosophyforstudyingit?Thisiswhatpuzzlesmanyaboutphilosophy.Theywishtoknowwhatstandstothatsubjectasatomsstandtophysics,numberstomathematics,neurosestopsycholoanalysisandmumbo-jumbotoresearchselectivityexercises.Andtheproblemappearstobethatnothingisleftoverthatisnotalreadythesubjectmatterofsomeotherspecialdiscipline.Facedwiththat,onetacticistoretreattohigherground.Insteadofpractisingadiscipline,westepbackandthinkaboutwhatisdonewhenitispractised.Totakesomesimpleinstances:amathematicianusestheword“number”(“aproofthatthereisnohighestprimenumberis…”).Likewiseareligiouspersonusestheword“God”(“InthebeginningGodcreatedtheheavensandtheearth”).Anaestheticappreciatormightusetheword“better”,asin“thewiderlapelslookbetteronyou”.Mostofususetheword“ought”(“YououghttohavepassedittoCantona”),andtheword“mind”(“Iknowexactlywhatyouhaveinmind”).Inthesepracticeswealsousearguments:“theproofthatthereisnohighestprimenumberis…”;“areasonforbelievingGodexistsis…”;“thoselapelslookbetterbecauseofyourbroadshoulders”;“yououghttohavepassedtoCantonabecauseGiggs’srundrewthedefender”;“Iknew7\nTHEDISCONSOLATIONSOFPHILOSOPHYwhathehadinmindbecause…”.Inthesepracticesweusewords.But,sotheargumentgoes,wecanstepbackandthinkabouttheseuses.Then,sotheclaimis,wearephilosophizing.Inthatactivityourquestionscantaketwoforms.First,wecanaskwhatismeantbyaterm:“whatdidthePopemeanwhenheusedtheterm‘God’?”;“whatarenumbers?”;“whatistheforceoftheword‘ought’?”;“whatismind?”.Andsecondlywecanaskaboutarguments.Wecanaskaboutparticulararguments,aswhenweask“istheontologicalargumentagoodreasonforbelievinginGod?”;“isthatasoundmathematicalproof?”.Orwecanaskabouttypesofarguments,aswhenweask:“canwesupportourjudgementsaboutwhatoughttobedonebyanyargumentsatall?”.Ofcourse,wethenusetheterms“meaning”and“argument”,andwecanthinkabouttheseintheirturn:“whatismeaning?”,“whatisargument?”,questionsthatgeneratewhatiscalledphilosophicallogic.Andsincequestionsaboutmeaningandargumentaresocentraltophilosophizing,philosophicallogic,whichseekstounderstandtheseterms,becomesafundamentalareaofphilosophy.Nowwecanunderstandonenotionofphilosophicalaesthetics.Thereis,wesaw,abedrockofresponsetoartandnaturearticulatedininfinitelyrichandvariedwordsandbehaviour.BeingstruckdumbbytheTajMahalisonecase;beingreducedtosilencebyJulietStevenson’sperformanceinThedoll’shouseorbyHurtandKeitelinSmokeisanother;GeorgeI’sspontaneouslystandingupduringthe“HallelujahChorus”isyetanother.Therearedifferentformsof-verbalresponses,too:“Iloveit”,“It’sstupid”,“YououghttohearThehissingofsummerlawns”,“Pavarotti’sisthebettervoice,butDomingoisthebetteractor”,“It’stheuseoftheclarinetthatmakesGlennMiller’ssounddistinctive”,“SullivanwrotethemusicforIolanthejustafterhismotherdied”,“It’sbeenbadlyrestored”,“Idon’tlikeMahler”,“Likeapotofpaintthrownintothefacesofthepublic”,“AudenwroteLullabyforamalelover”,“HowamItotakeHardy’slatepoems,inwhichhepurportstogrieveforthewifehetreatedsobadly?”,“Ugh!”,“Bis!”,“Boo!”,“Toosentimental”,“Notblueenough”,“Sheavoidedthetemptationsoftheminorkey”,“WhyisLear’swifenevermentioned?”,“Menconspiredtoconcealtheworkofgreatwomenpainters”,“Thatairagain:ithasadyingfall”,“HowbluetheMediterreaneanis!”,“Howcanasawn-upcowbeart?”Inthese,andincountlessotherways,wearticulateencounterswehavewithartandnature.8\nTHEDISCONSOLATIONSOFPHILOSOPHICALASTHETICSTobeinitiatedintoandtogrowinthosewaysofexpression,tobeabletoreactthuswithunderstanding,istobeanenfranchisedmemberoftheaestheticcommunity.Whenpeopleexpressasenseofmissingsomethingabout“greatart”,whattheyaresayingcomestothis:theycannotusethekindsofaestheticvocabularythatIhavejustinstancedinthepresenceofthoseworksofart,becausethoseworksdonotoccasioninthemanyresponsethatneedsarticulationinthoseways.Ontheonehand,then,thereisthebedrockofaestheticresponse.And,giventherecentlysketchedmodelofphilosophizing,abovethishoversphilosophicalaesthetics.Itsquestionswillinclude,“whatdidyoumeanwhenyousaid‘better’?”,“arethereasonsgivenforthosejudgementsgoodones?”,and,moregenerally,“doesthenotionofagoodreasonmakesenseinthesecontextsanyway?”,or“isn’titallsubjective?”.Nowwecanseewhyaesthetics,astaughtinphilosophydepartments,mightdisappoint.Ishallargueinthisworkthattheproblemforthosewhofeelleftoutbyartisthattheysimplycan’tseeorhearsomething.Ishallalsoarguethatthecorrectivetothis,theacquisitionofanabilitytoperceivethefeaturesofartandnature,isamatterofpractice.Webeginbymarchingupanddowninresponsetowhatweperceiveinsimplerhythms.Givenwecandothat,therestispractice.Ifweareconstantlyexposedtomusicofdevelopingcomplexity,weendupabletorespondtomorecomplexmusicalformsandtoarticulatethatresponse,justasoureyescanbetrainedtodiscriminatefinershadesofcolour.So,whatisneededisguidedexposuretotheartonewishestounderstand.That,ontheaccountIhavegiven,willnotcomefromphilosophicalaesthetics.Forthatexplicitlystandsbackfromthepracticesofthecompetentinordertoreflectonwhatthecompetentdo.Thenotuntypicalstudentwishestoacquirethecompetencetorespondtoart.Thephilosophicalaestheticianwishestoreflectontheutterancesofthosewhohaveacquiredthecompetence.Putbluntly,thestudentwantedaesthetics,butisofferedphilosophy.Thisexplainsthebleaknessthatsurroundssomeessaysincoursesonphilosophicalaesthetics.Manywhocometothesubjecthavelittleexperienceof“high”art.Theymayevenhaveenrolledinordertoremedyasenseofinadequacyinthisrespect.Butphilosophicalaesthetics,asitisoftenpractised,reflectsuponthewordsusedbythosewhocantalkabouthighartandassumesthat9\nTHEDISCONSOLATIONSOFPHILOSOPHYthosewhowishtostudyphilosophicalaestheticsarealsocompetentenoughtocallupexamplesfrom“high”arttoillustratetheircontentionsaboutthoseusesofwords.Inthistask,becauseoftheinadequacyoftheaverageaestheticeducation,thestudentisoftenpredeterminedtofail.(Thesamehappensinphilosophyofscience,alas,toooften,taughttoandbypeoplewhohavenocultureofactivescience.)RemediesFourremediessuggestthemselves.Thefirstissimply,inthespiritofaTradesDescriptionsAct,towarnoffthosepossessedofnoknowledgeofthehighartsfromthosecoursesinphilosophicalaestheticsthattakethoseartsasgristforthemillsfortheirphilosophizing.Thesecondalternativewouldbetotakeone’sexamplesfromwideraestheticsituations,forexample,fromrecentfashionandmusic.Thattacticwillbeunderminedbythefactthatacademicteacherscanhaveanignoranceofnewwavemusicandfashionthatissymmetricalwiththeignoranceofhighartinmanyofthosebeingtaught.Thethirdalternativeistodevisewaysbothofgivingthegroundinginaestheticsthatthestudentseeksandshowinghowphilosophyarisesfromthat.ThoughIdosomeofthisinmycourses,thiswouldgobeyondwhatabookofthislengthcando.Thefourthalternativeistodemonstratethat,whetherornotphilosophicalaestheticssatisfiesthosewhowishtolearnabouthighart,thequestionswithwhichitdealshaveacompellinginterestforanyonewhowishestobealivetowhatishappeninginourculture,globallyconceived.Thephilosophicalproblemsofaestheticsarenotsimplyproblemsabouthighart(althoughhighartisoneofitsproblems).Theyare,simply,problemsaboutaesthetics,andsinceeveryoneispartofaubiquitousaestheticcommunity,theyareeveryone’sproblems.HerearesomeexamplesofthekindsofquestionsIhaveinmind.First,whydoweneedartatall?Wecanbeimmersedintheaestheticinwaysthatdon’tneedtheterm“art”.StandinMarksandSpencerandlistentotheaestheticdiscourseaboutclothes:10\nREMEDIES“it’stoolong”,“justrightforyourcheekbones”.Theparticipantsdon’tthinkofthisasart.Watchthedancersatanyrave:theyhavenoconsciousnessofbeingpartoftheartworld.OverwhelmedbythesunsetseenfromGreatGable,Idon’tcallit“art”.Yetalongsideallofthiswehaveart.Thereareplaceswherethingsaremarkedoffasartandsolemnized,evensacralized,assuch:therearegallerieswherethesethingsarestored,lockedupatnight,protectedbypatrollingguards;therearehallswherepeoplepayart-musicthetributeofformaldress,highpricesandhushedattention;therearebuildingsthatstoreliteraryartinsilentrows.Whyisthis?Whyarethosethingsmarkedoff?Whatadditionalimportancearetheythoughttohaveoverthelesserandpossiblymorepopularmanifestationsoftheaesthetic?AndhowdoIgetmyworkintothatclub?Doesapickledsharkdeservetobethere?Orvideostakenthroughvariousbodilyorifices?OrtheFourminutesandthirty-threesecondsofsilencethatJohnCageofferedtoaconcertaudience?Thesequestionstakeonaspecialformwhenwerealizethatarthasacost.Partofthisissimplyfinancial.Thetemplesinwhichartispractised,thepriestswhopractiseinthosetemplesandtheacolyteswhoattendthem,claimpublicmoneythatquitesimplycouldbe(thoughitneverwouldbe)spentonotherdesirablethings,forexample,soupforthestarving.Whatisthebasisofthatclaimonourfiniteresources,aclaimthatwillbecomemorepressingastheresourcesincreasinglydiminish?Asecondquestion:itisclaimedthatcertainobjects,usuallythoseassociatedwithwhatIhavecalled“highart”,aresuperiortootheraestheticproducts.BeethovenisrankedabovePaulSimon,VermeeroverSupermancomics,LesenfantsduparadisoverBatmanforever,andMiddlemarchoverGonewiththewind.Somewillsimplyshrugandgoonlikingwhattheylike.Butfewcandothis,andfortworeasons.Firstly,theeffectofmakingonethingbetterthananotherisseldomcharitabletothethingoflesserworth.TosayBeethovenissuperiortoPaulSimonistoputthelatterdown.Andifmytasteisforthelatter,Ifeelputdown,too.ThenI’dliketoknowwhatrightsomeonehastodothistome.Secondly,whatisraisedupisnotsimplyraisedup.Itisraisedveryhigh,sothathighartissaidtobesupremelyworthwhile.Thatcanmake11\nTHEDISCONSOLATIONSOFPHILOSOPHYussuspectwearemissingsomething.Againwewouldliketoknowwhetherweare,andifsowhat.Athirdsetofquestionsariseswhenwenotethatwedonotmerelyfindpeoplearticulatingtheirresponsestoartandnature.Wealsofindmassivevolumesoftalkabouthowothersshouldrespond.Soonepersonsaysthat,whenlookingatpaintings,weshouldignorerepresentationalfeatures;anothersaysthat,whenreadingbooks,weshouldignoreinformationabouttheirauthors;yetanotherwillsaythat,whenlisteningtomusic,weshouldnotimaginepictures.Thesepeoplepurporttotellothers,includingthosewhowouldliketogetaccesstowhataretreasuredasthegreaticonsofourculture,whatthebestwayistoattendtoartandnature.Wehavetoaskwhethertheygetitright.Foriftheydon’t,thentheyimpoverishresponse;Ishallarguelaterthatthosewhosaythatweshouldignorerepresentation,authorsandemotionshavemaimedratherthanenhancedtheresponsesofthosethattheyinfluenced.Asmallexample:purportingtoteachtheappreciationofpoetry,Itakeapoem,sayOwen’s“Anthemfordoomedyouth”,andIpointoutanalliterationinlinethree.Thestrong-mindedstudentwillask“Sowhat?”.Forlotsofuselesspoemshavealliterationsinthem.Thetypicallearner,anxioustoplease,willassumethatalliterationisarelevantthingtocitewithoutknowingwhy.Hencethestandardessay,whenaskedtoassessapoem,simplylistsitsalliterations,itslitotes,andothersuchfruitsofoxymoronicteaching.Finally,thereisthedeepquestionthatunderliesallthis.Whenwelook,fromthatsupposedvantagepointofphilosophy,atthepracticesofthosewhodealwithartandtheaestheticwecomeacrossresponsessuchasthosearticulatedonbehalfofHelenSchlegelbyForster.Weareremindedthatartandnatureseemtohaveprofoundimportance.Wemightjustnotethisfact.ButIamnotintheendquitecontenttodoso.HereperhapsImayconfessthatIlovethepracticeandenjoymentofthearts.IfIhadthreehourstoliveandachoicebetweenattendingamagnificentperformanceandphilosophizingaboutwhymagnificentperformancesmattersomuchtome(otherpossiblewaysofspendingthetime,alas,being12\nGUIDETOREADINGexcluded),Iwouldgototheperformance.ThatmayshowIamnotatheartreallyaphilosopher.ButhereandnowIdon’thavetomakeachoice.Asitstandswithme,Ilovethemagnificentinartandnature(andmanylessersplendours,too).ButIalsohaveawonderthatIamsomovedandawishtounderstandwhyIam.Andif,asSocratesisreportedassaying,philosophybeginsinwonder,andifitsgoalis“knowthyself”,thenmyphilosophicalaestheticsbeginswiththatself-wonder.This,itseemstome,istherightreasonforaskingwhatartis.IfIknewthat,Imightknowwhysomanythoughtgreatartsupremelyworthpursuing,andwhyanycultureworthyofthatnameshouldfosterandsupportit.Thatinturnmightgenerateatrulyradicalcriticismoftheculture,hintedatintheenvoiofthiswork,inwhichIandyounowlive.Inthefirstpartofthisbook,then,IshallbelookingatthestoriesthathavebeentoldaboutthesourceofthepowerofartandinthenextchapterIshallbeginwithaplausibleandinfluentialaccountofthepowerofart.GuidetoreadingReferenceFirstofall,agooddictionaryofphilosophyisnotabadthingtohave.Atoneendofthescalethereisaveryusefulshortdictionary,A.Flew(ed.),Thedictionaryofphilosophy(London:Pan,1979).AttheotherendIcommendT.Honderich(ed.),TheOxfordcompaniontophilosophy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995),whichhasmuchonaestheticsandaestheticiansinit.Academiclibrariesatleastshouldhavethemulti-volumedP.Edwards(ed.),Theencyclopediaofphilosophy(NewYork:Macmillan,1967)thathasarticlesoneverythingandeverybodyinaesthetics.ItwillshortlybeupdatedbyEdwardCraig’sEncyclopediatobepublishedbyRoutledge,London,withacomprehensivecoverageofaesthetics.Keepaneyeout,too,fortheappearanceinlibrariesofthemagisterialMacmillandictionaryofart,whichwilldoforthevisualartsandtheirtheorywhattheequallymagnificentGrovedictionarydoesformusic.D.Cooper(ed.),TheBlackwellcompanionto13\nTHEDISCONSOLATIONSOFPHILOSOPHYaesthetics(Oxford:Blackwell,1992),nowinpaperback,isadmirableforbrowsingaboutinandagoodplacetostartonanyofthetopicsImention.PhilosophyPhilosophicalaestheticsisapartofphilosophyandisaffectedbywhathappensinphilosophy.Forthatreasonitisnotabadideatohavesomegraspofthehistoryofphilosophy.Heretry,first,J.Shand,Philosophyandphilosophers(London:Penguin,1994)fortheoverallpicture.IalsocommendtheeminentlyreadableR.Scruton,Ashorthistoryofmodernphilosophy(London:Routledge,1995).A.C.Grayling,Philosophy:aguidethroughthesubject(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995)isjustwhatitsaysitis,andwillauthoritativelytakeyoufurther.Thoseinterestedinpursuingthequestionofwhatphilosophyandphilosophicalaestheticsmightbe,canbereferredtoR.Shusterman,Analyticalaesthetics(Oxford:Blackwell,1989).Thisbookpromotesalternativeartformssuchasrap.AveryinformativeandintelligibleessayontheissuesaboutwhatphilosophyoughttobeisEssayXIIIinG.P.Baker&P.M.S.Hacker,Essaysonthephilosophicalinvestigationsvolume1:Wittgenstein;meaningandunderstanding(Oxford:Blackwell,1980).AnalternativetraditiontotheoneIsketch,emanatingfromHusserlandrunningthroughHeidegger,SartreandMerleau-Ponty,isthephenomenologicaltradition.Thatisexplored,forthoseinterestedinmoreadvancedanddifficultthings,inM.Hammond,J.Howarth&R.Keat,Understandingphenomenology(Oxford:Blackwell,1991).ExcellentandauthoritativediscussionofrecentcontinentalEuropeanaestheticsistobefoundinP.Crowther,Criticalaestheticsandpost-modernism(Oxford:Clarendon,1993).AninterestingoffshootofthatisMerleau-Ponty’sremarksonCezanne,tobefoundinhisEssentialwritings,ed.A.L.Fisher(NewYork:HarcourtBrace&World,1969).OnthismatterseeP.Crowther,“Merleau-Ponty:perceptionintoart”,BritishJournalofAesthetics22,1982,pp.138–40.HistoriesofaestheticsAgoodoverallhistoryisM.Beardsley,AestheticsfromclassicalGreecetothepresentday(NewYork:Macmillan,1966).14\nGUIDETOREADINGAestheticsA.Shepherd,Aesthetics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1987)isausefulshortintroductionasisM.Eaton,Basicissuesinaesthetics(Belmont,California:Wadsworth,1988).Themostup-to-dateintermediatebookisO.Hanfling(ed.),Philosophicalaesthetics(Oxford:Blackwell,1992)(thebasisfortheOpenUniversitydegreecourseinphilosophicalaesthetics).Whenyouknowyourwayaroundaestheticsyoushouldbereadyforsomeinfluentialandmoreadvanced(sometimesmuchmoreadvanced)recentworksincludingR.Wollheim,Artanditsobjects,2ndedn(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1980),N.Goodman,Languagesofart(Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,1976),R.Scruton,Artandimagination(London:Methuen,1974),A.Savile,Thetestoftime(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1982)andM.Mothersill,Beautyrestored(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1984).Grayling’sPhilosophy:aguide(1995)hasaverywell-informedsectiononaestheticsbySebastianGardnerthatwillhelpyoubuildamapofthewholefieldofaesthetics,includingwhatishappeningnow.CollectionsMostlibrariesshouldhaveF.Tillman&S.Cahn(eds),Philosophyofartandaesthetics(NewYork:HarperandRow,1969),whichisavaluablecollectionofmuchofthematerialcitedinthisbook.Amodern,goodandveryaffordablecollectionhasbeenputtogetherbytheadmirableA.Neill&A.Ridley(eds),Philosophyofart:readingsancientandmodern(NewYork:McGrawHill,1995).JournalsTheBritishJournalofAestheticspublishesawiderangeofarticles,oftenaccessibletothelessadvancedreader.It,anditsAmericanequivalent,TheJournalofAestheticsandArtCriticism,arethewaytokeepupwithwhatishappeningnearthecuttingedge.PhilosophyandLiteraturealsopublishesarticlesofinteresttoaestheticiansthatarereadilyaccessibletothenonspecialist.TheartsSincephilosophicalaestheticsasIhavedescribeditisparasiticonaestheticsitisaswelltosupplementyournativegraspofmattersaestheticwithsomemoredetailedknowledge.Somefuncanbe15\nTHEDISCONSOLATIONSOFPHILOSOPHYhadbyreadingR.Hughes,Theshockofthenew,rev.edn(London:ThamesandHudson,1991).(EvenmorefuncanbehadfromacruellittlesquibbyT.Wolfe,Thepaintedword,Toronto:Bantam,1976.)Thegreatcompendiumoftwentiethcenturywritingaboutthearts(oftenbyartiststhemselves),withsomegloriousnonsenseinit,isC.Harrison&P.Wood(eds),Artintheory:1900–1990(Oxford:Blackwell,1992).Thisisabooktobrowsein.AstowhetherartisanelitistimpositionseeR.Taylor,Artanenemyofthepeople(Brighton:Harvester,1978),elegantlydissectedbyTomSorrellinHanfling,Philosophicalaesthetics,pp.328–35.Finally,therearenowlavishInternetresourcesinaesthetics.ThesearebestaccessedviatheAmericanSocietyforAesthetics-hostedAestheticsOn-Line(http://www.indiana.edu/~asanl).Fromthissitetherearelinksinalldirectionsinphilosophyandthearts.Ialsorecommendjoiningtheaestheticse-maillistthatisbothanoticeboardandoftenaveryamusingforumfordiscussion.AestheticsOn-Linewilltellyouhowtojoin,oryoucanemailmajordomo@indiana.eduwiththemessage“subscribeaesthetics”(noquotationmarks).Thereafteryoujoininbysendingane-mailtoaesthetics@indiana.edu.16\nChapter1Anglo-KantianattitudesNaturalandman-madethings,aswehaveseen,exciteourattention.Butthenquestionsarise.Firstly,sincenoteverythingthatattractsattentiondoessoaesthetically(aswhenone’sattentioniscaughtbyarustleinthegrasswhennervousaboutsnakes),whichattractionsareaesthetic?Asecondquestioniswhytheseattractionscanbe,andinwhatwaystheycanbe,sopowerful.Whichattractionsareaesthetic?Althoughthisisacommonquestioninintroductionstoaesthetics,Iamuncertainaboutwhatisbeingaskedwhenitarises.Letusnotefirstthatourwordsreflectthevariousformsourevolutionhastaken.Wedidnotfirsthavecertainexperiencesandtheninventwordswithwhichtoexpressthem.Ourwordsemergedasourlivesdeveloped,andemergedtoexpresscapacitiesacquiredduringthatdevelopment.Itwas,forexample,inthecourseofourdevelopmentascolour-sightedbeingsthatourcolourlanguage17\nANGLO-KANTIANATTITUDESemerged.Itisbecauseweevolvedascreatureswhomakemistakesthatsuchwordsas“doubt”,“belief”,and“knowledge”gainedtheirfunctions.Soitiswithaestheticterms.Itisbecausewearestruckbyrainbows,entrancedbyfictions,movedbyrhythms,unsettledbycertaincolourcombinations,thatwedevelopedthewordsandbehaviourthatarticulateaestheticresponses.Assmallchildrenwesimplymarchedupanddowntomusicorturnedfromdiscordantcolours.Todevelopaestheticallyis,inpart,toaugmentthoseresponseswithwordsandgesturesthatallowinfinitelymorecomplexandsubtlewaysofarticulatingouraestheticreactions:wordslike“too”,“trite”,“garish”,“beautiful”,andcountlessothers.Inknowinghowtousethatvocabulary,weshowaknowledgeoftheattractionsthatareaesthetic.Butwhat,then,inadditiontothat,doesthephilosopherwanttoknowwhenaskingwhatthecharacteristicfeaturesareofaestheticresponses?Itcannotbehowandwhyweevolvedourcapacitiesforaestheticresponse.Thatisaquestionforevolutionarybiology.Itcannotbehowtouseaestheticterms,forthatisalreadymastered.Itcannotbehowtoextendone’scapacitiessothatonecanusethesetermsofpaintingsbyGiottoaswellas,orinsteadof,paintingsbyHolmanHunt.Thatisamatterforexperienceandforarthistoriansandcriticsandnotforphilosopherstoteachus.Itcannotbewhetherweshouldrespondtosomethingaesthetically,asifwehadanychoiceinthematter.Andifthequestioniswhetheritismoreworthwhiletoenjoyafilmthantoplaykorfballorworkinahospice(grantedthattheseareexclusivealternatives),thatisnotaquestionaboutthenatureofaestheticexperiencebutaboutitsranking.Sowhatdrivesthesephilosophicalquestionsaboutthedefiningcharacteristicsofaestheticexperience?Firstly,somephilosophershaveanimpulsetoclassifythings,apparentlyjustforthesakeofdoingso,soastoreport,forexample,thataestheticexperiences,say,aretheclassofexperiencesmarkedoffbytheseorthosesortsofcharacteristics.Whetherornotthatmotivationappealswilldependonwhetheronehasthatclassificatoryimpulse.Idon’t,butletthatnotstopanyonewhodoes.Secondly,someseemstruckbythefactthatwecannotalwayssaywhetheraresponseisaesthetic.Beingstartledbyarustlinginthegrassseemsclearlynottobeaesthetic,whereasbeingstirred18\nWHICHATTRACTIONSAREAESTHETIC?bythecoloursofapictureclearlyis.ButthenIfindmyselfstirredbythetiltofaretroussénose.Isthataesthetic,too?MyheartmoveswhenIseeeaglessoar.Isthatanaestheticresponse?IamelatedbythetryscoredbytheBarbariansin1973.Isthataesthetic?Ilookintotheeyesofabatandamstirredbyitsotherness.Howaestheticisthatreaction?Andthenthehopemightemergethatifwecoulddistilthecharacteristicfeaturesofaestheticresponse,wewouldbeabletodeterminewhetherthesecasesareorarenotaesthetic.ButagainIneedtoknowwhythatquestionisapressingone.WhyisitimportantthatIbeablethustoclassifymyexperiences?AbetterreasonissuggestedbyKant,whosephilosophicalaestheticswillbemorefullyexaminedlaterinthischapter.Kantcertainlysoughtthedefiningcharacteristicsoftheaesthetic,onebeingthataestheticexperiencebe“disinterested”.However,hedidnotleavethematterthere.Healsoaskedwhydisinterestedexperiencesaresoimportanttous.Thissuggeststhatareasonforenquiringintothedefiningqualitiesofaestheticexperienceisthatananswermightalsosolvethefundamentalquestionofwhyartandnaturecanhavesuchpoweroverus.Wecanfindanothergoodreasonforseekingdefiningfeaturesoftheaestheticbyfollowingupthestrikingfactthatwecanuseawordperfectlywellandyetfallintoconfusionanderrorwhenaskedtosaywhatwearedoinginusingit.Icanaskifyouhavethetime,admireyourmind,knowwhereIleftabook,believethatyouarelyingandyet,whenaskedwhattime,mind,knowledgeandbeliefare,Icanfallintoconfusion.Soitisinaesthetics.Wecandelightatasunset,gaspatthedenouementofSeven,laughatBulletsoverBroadwayandbemovedtotearsbytheconclusionofVanyaon42ndStreet.Butwhenaskedwhataestheticresponseis,peoplesaythedaftestthings.Thatwouldnotconcernme(IsimplycarryonlaughingatBulletsoverBroadway),savethatthosesamepeopledon’tleaveitthere.Theyhavethetemerity,onthebasisoftheirmischaracterizationsofaestheticexperience,tosayhowothersshouldrespondaesthetically.Others,takingthisadviceseriously,missoutonsourcesofenjoyment.Forexample,theyaretold(Bell1920)thataestheticresponsesshouldignorerepresentation.AndsotheymissthesignificanceoftheexpressionsinRembrandtself-portraits.Thatimpoverishestheirresponse.So,onereasonfor19\nANGLO-KANTIANATTITUDESinvolvementindiscussionsaboutthedefiningfeaturesoftheaestheticistodetectmisleadingcharacterizations.Ibeginthere,withawayofgoingwrong(andonewithperniciousconsequences)incharacterizingtheaestheticandItakeasmyexampletheinfluentialattempttodefinetheaestheticintermsofsomethingcalledthe“aestheticattitude”.TheaestheticattitudeConsiderthedangeroussituationinwhichfogdescendswhileIamsailing.Themanualsindicatepracticalthingstodowhenthishappens,suchassoundingaudiblewarnings.Butthecaptainfindsmeadmiringhowcreamythesealooks,howvaporouslydelicatethefog.HemightjustlysaythatIamtakinganundulyaestheticattitude.Consider,next,amanlookingforwardtoaneveningoutwithhiswifeataperformanceofOthello.Hecomeshomeandfindsanotereading“HavegoneoffwithGordon”.Inaturmoilofrageandjealousyhestillgoestotheplayand,atthemomentwhenDesdemonaiskilledbythejealousOthello,applauds.Hereonemightsaythathisparticularsituationhaspreventedhimfromtakingtheproperaestheticattitude.Thesecasesfueltheinfluentialnotionthattheaestheticinvolvesputting“psychicaldistance”betweenoneselfandtheobjecttowhichoneresponds.Inthefog,Irespondedaestheticallybydistancingmyselffrompracticalaction.Attheplay,thejealousmancouldnotdistancehimselfenoughtorespondaesthetically,nomorethandidthose,possiblymythical,earlycinemaaudienceswhofiredatthescreen.Sowehavetheclaimthatacertainstancedefinestheaesthetic.Thisistheso-called“aestheticattitude”,whichestablishes“psychicaldistance”betweenviewerandwork.Iobjecttothisstillpopularaccountthatitisfeeble,thatitgivesnoanswertothefundamentalquestionsaboutthesourceofthepowerofartandtheaesthetic,andthatitresultsindamagingadvicetowould-beappreciators.Thattheaccountisfeebleiseasilyshown.Itistruetosaythatwecanswitchourattentiontotheaestheticaspectsofoursurroundings.Moreover,ifIamindanger,itmay,indeed,takeaspecialefforttofocusontheaestheticaspectsofmyenvironment.Thisisbecausedangerdivertsmefrompayingattentiontothem.ButwhenIdoattendtothem,Idonottakeupaspecialsortof20\nTHEAESTHETICATTITUDEattitude,asasycophantmightonmeetingaprincess.Isimplyattend,oftenwithnosenseofeffort,totheaestheticfeaturesofthesituation.AndthewayIattendtothemisnodifferentfromthewayIattendtoanythingelse.Whatmakesmyattentionaesthetic,then,iswhatIattendto,nothowIattendtoit.Theaccountisequallyfeeblewhenappliedtoartratherthannature.Myuncomfortableseatmayinterferewithmyattentiontomusic,mystiffneckmayinterferewithmyeffortstoviewthearchitecturalfeaturesoftheLloyd’sbuilding,andmytoothachewithmyattentiontoTrainspotting.Butthisisnotbecausesomethingcalled“distance”islost.ItissimplythatmyattentionisdistractedfromtheaestheticaspectsofthosethingsandeventstowhichIwishtogivemyundividedattention.Dramaandotherfictionsmayseemtooffermorescopetonotionsofdistance.ThereissomethingnotquiterightaboutshootingatDirtyHarry,servingavagrancyorderonEstragonandVladimir,applyingforajobattheRover’sReturn,orwritingtoDrWatsonforsomemethadone.Butif,asthecaseofthefogatseawasmeanttoshow,distancingrequiresaneffortofsomesort,thenfictioninvolvesnodistance.ThenotionthatIspendmytimeataplayholdingmyselfbackfrominterveningisplaindaft.Ilearnthenotionoffictionasinvolvingthelogicalimpossibilityofinterventionandthatisallthereistoit.Thenotionofdistanceisradicallyuseless.Thetheorydoesnotevensaythattodistanceoneselfistohaveanaestheticexperience.Itsaysnomorethanthatcertainthingscaninterferewithenjoymentoftheaestheticpropertiesofthings.Thisexplainsnothingabouttheaesthetic.Foruntilweknowtowhatexperienceoftheaestheticdistancinggivesusaccess,weknownothingabouttheaesthetic.Weare,tobesure,toldthatsomeexperiencesareaesthetic,forexample,thedelightwetakeinthevisualqualitiesoffogs.Butnowwereallyaremakingnoisesinavacuum.Wealreadyknewaboutthepossibilityofdelightinthevisualqualitiesoffogs.Whatwewereexpectingwassomeaccountofthecentralfeaturesofsuchexperiences.Insteadwegetarecipeforobtainingthem.Theotherclassofexperiencesthatismentionedasaestheticistheexperiencestobehadbyattendingtofictions.Theclaimisthatweneedtoputourselvesintoacertainconditioninordertohavetheseexperiences.Butagainwearenottoldwhatthese21\nANGLO-KANTIANATTITUDESexperiencesarenorwhyitisworthwhileputtingoneselfintheconditiontohavethem.Sowehavebeentoldnothingaboutwhatmakesexperiencesaesthetic.EdwardBullough,towhomtalkaboutpsychicaldistanceisdue,spokeof“theantinomyofdistance”.Heclearlysawthataplaymustengageandinvolveoursympathies.Tothatextentwecan’tbetotallydistanced.Yetatthesametimehenotedthatifwebecometooinvolved,asajealousmanmight,wecanlosetheproperexperienceoftheplay.Soheconcludedthatthereweredegreesofdistance,thebestapproachbeingtogetasinvolvedaspossiblewithoutfinallylosingthelastbitofdistance.However,itiswrongtosupposethatdistanceinthecinemaortheatre,say,existsonaslidingscale,sothatthelossofdistanceofthejealousmanataperformanceofOthelloisfurtheralongthescalethanthechildwhoshouts“he’sbehindyou”orthecinema-goerwhoyelpswithfearastheBlobapproaches.ThiscanbeseenbyconsideringourearlierexampleofthejealousmanattheperformanceofOthello.IfwhenheapplaudsthekillingofDesdemonahebelievesthatarealmurderistakingplace,heissimplyunbalanced.Orifheisparticipatingempatheticallyinthemake-believeheisjoininginthefiction.Therearenodegreesbetweenthesetwoalternatives.Note,too,thatalthoughinthesecondcase,thejealousmanhasmaintaineddistance,sinceheknowsheisjoininginafiction,yethestillgetstheplaywrong,sincetoallyoneselfwithOthelloisentirelytomissthevaluationtheplayputsonthatcharacter.Wecannotexpressthataestheticerrorintermsoflossofdistance,forthemanhaspreservedthat.Accountsoffictionaldistance,moreover,entirelyignoreproblemstowhichIreturninthenextchapter.Oneisthatitseemspossibletobecomeemotionallyinvolvedwithfiction.Butnothingintalkaboutthedistancenecessarytofictiontellsushowwecanbecomeemotionallyinvolvedwiththingsthatdon’texist.If,havingdistancedmyself,Isimplyknowthatno-oneisreallyleavinganyoneattheendofCasablanca,howcanIbemovedtorealtears,anymorethanIcanstayangrywithyouifIfindthatyoudidn’t,contrarytomybelief,reallyinsultmebehindmyback.Myfinalobjectiontothenotionofdistanceistothenoxiouseffectsonourdealingswithartandtheaesthetic,oftheconnotationsthatthetermingloriouslytrails.“Distance”suggestsanon-involvementandcooldetachmentandislikelytoencourage22\nKANT’SPROJECTthenotionthatsomesortoficycontemplationisderigueur,sothat(andthecaseofthefogatseasuggeststhis)one’spostureinfrontofartoughttobelikethatofastiffupperlipatthefuneralofalover.Thismightappealtosomeonesufferingfromemotionalconstipationbutisnorecipeforenjoyingart.Aswehaveseen,Bulloughdidnotruleoutthepossibilityofemotionalinvolvementwithawork,thoughhegavenosensibleaccountofwhatthisinvolves.Wouldthatsomeofhisdiscipleshadreadhimmorecarefully,especiallythecrazyindividualwhosuggestedthatthenecessityofdistanceforproperaestheticresponseentailedthatchildrenshouldn’tclaptheirhandswhenaskedtobyPeterPan,arecommendationthatentirelyoverlooksthewaysinwhichoneis,fromearliestchildhood,activelyinvolvedwithone’sfictionalimaginings.Talkofaestheticdistancefromaworkisofapiecewiththatwholetraditionthatmakesaestheticexperienceamatterofdetachmentanddisinterestedness.Thenotionofdetachment,Isuspect,collapsestothenotionofdistanceandispreytoitsills.Butthenotionofdisinterestedness,whichisalsothereinBullough’swriting,inheritsthethoughtofaformidablydifficultphilosopher,whoforgoodorillhastoweredoverphilosophicalaesthetics,ImmanuelKant.Tohisvastlymoredemanding,andinstructive,characterizationoftheaestheticInowturn.Kant’sprojectItisnotdifficulttogiveenoughofanideaofKant’sgeneralprojecttomakesenseoftheplaceallottedtotheinvestigationoftheaestheticinthatproject.Traditionally,Kantsupposed,itwasbelievedthatanorderedworldimpingesuponoursensesandthatthosesensesconveyaknowledgeofthatworldintothemind.Theworldimposesitsorderonus.Andnow,justasCopernicusreversedtheclaimthatthesungoesroundtheearth,soKantreversedtheclaimthattheworldgivesitsordertothemind.Themind,rather,givesordertoaworld,whichhasnostructuresavewhatthemindgivesit.Itis,Ithink,important,asweshallseewhenwecometotalkofKant’saesthetics,tounderstandthatonewhothinksthatthemindstructuresrealitymuststartbyacceptingtheworldasitactuallyshowsitselfinourdealingswithit.Theworld,asitisforus,cannot23\nANGLO-KANTIANATTITUDESbuthavethestructurethatourmindhasinfactimposedonit.(Thefunstartswhenweimaginethepossibility,asKantdidnot,thatdifferentculturesmightimposedifferentstructuringsontheworld,includingsomewefindrepugnant.GrantedKant’sviewthatthereisnoworldindependentofhumanstructuringsagainstwhichthecorrectnessofthisorthatstructuringcanbechecked,howarewegoingtoobjecttothewaysinwhichothersstructuretheirworlds?)GiventhisaccountthereareanumberofquestionsthatconstitutetheKantianphilosophicalprogramme.Oneis:“Whatisthecharacterofthestructuringthemindhasimposed?”Well,forexample,wehavesostructuredtheworldthatwethinkofitascontainingphysicalobjectswithspatio-temporallocationsandwhichcausallyaffecteachotherinlaw-likeways.Again,aswehavestructuredtheworld,wethinkofitascontainingmoralagents,freetoactincertainwaysandhavingadutytoactinsomeoftheseways.Wethink,too,thattheseagentshavefeelings,desiresandinclinations.Finally,wehavesostructuredthingsthatwethinkoftheseagentsasmovedbythebeautifulandthesublimeinartandnature.ToappreciatethefullflavourofKantianphilosophy,anditsbearingonaesthetics,however,considerthis:ifwearetotalkofthemindasstructuring,thentheremustbetwodistinctthings:somethingtowhichstructureistobegiven,andsomethingthatgivesthestructure.Thelatterisprovisionallyindicatedinsayingthatthemindiswhatgivesthestructure.Whatreceivesthestructureislessclear,butwecangetbywiththenotionofourbeingbombardedbyaninchoatewelterofsensorystimulitowhichthemindgivesstructure.WilliamJamesspokeofthemindofthenew-bornasbombardedbywhatmustseemtotheinfantablooming,buzzingconfusion.ThatisawayofgraspingKant’sinitialnotion.NowwecanasksomeKantianquestions.Grantedweknowthatthemindhasgivenordertotheworld,weknowwhatorderithasgivenbyseeingwhatordertheworldhas.Butwecanalsoaskwhatstructurethemindmusthaveinordertomakeitpossibleforthestimulithatbombardittohavebeenstructuredinthewayinwhichtheyhavebeen.Togiveasimpleexample:thestimuliwereceivehavebeenorganizedsothatwedonotmerelyreceivearandomsetofdisconnectedsensoryimports,butperceivediscrete24\nKANTIANAESTHETICSthings.Sotheremustbesomepowerofthemindthatmakesthatpossible.Next,wetalkofthesamesortsofthingsasencounteredatdifferenttimesandplaces.Sotheremustbesomepowerofthemindthatmakesitpossibleforustohavethenotionnotmerelyof,say,aparticularcathereandnow,butofthegeneralnotionofacat.ForKanttheorganizationofrandomstimuliintoperceivedobjectsistheworkoftheimaginationandtheproductionofconceptualcategorizationsofthoseobjectsistheworkoftheunderstanding.KantianaestheticsVastlymorethanthatisgoingtobeneeded,ofcourse,beforewehavethefullstoryofwhythingsarestructuredthewaythattheyare.(What,forexample,makespossibleaworldstructuredinspaceandtime?)Wehaveenoughnow,however,tograspthemainfeaturesofKant’saccountoftheaesthetic.Hisinvestigationmustberootedinwhathetooktobethestructureofourpracticesinrespondingtoartandnature.Fortheseamounttothewayinwhichthemindhasstructureditsworldaesthetically.Thenheaskedhowtheminditselfmustbestructuredifthatkindofaestheticstructuringoftheworldistobepossible.Theoutcomeofthatenquirywillbenothinglessthanafullunderstandingoftheplaceoftheaestheticinthewholelifeofthemindand,withthat,answerstoquestionsaboutthepowerofartoverus.WhatapparentfactsaboutourpracticesstruckKant?Oneisthattheaestheticisasourceofacertainsortofdelighttotheindividual.Thequestionsthenbecomewhatthemindmustbeliketomakethatsortofdelightpossibleandwhythatpleasureanddelightissoimportanttous.ToappreciateKant’sanswertothefirstofthesequestions,thinkagainabouthisaccountofwhatisinvolvedinseeinganobject:aflower,say.Inthroughtheavenuesofthesensespoursawelterofchaoticstimuli.Theimaginationsynthesizesthemintothediscreteobjects.Tothatsynthesistheunderstandingappliesconceptsandclassifications,whichmakethesynthesisknowableandcommunicable.Heretheunderstandingconfinestheimaginationbybindingitssynthesistoageneralconcept.However,intheaestheticcase,theimaginationisnotthusconfined.For,Kantsays,somewhatobscurely,thatinaestheticjudgementimaginationand25\nANGLO-KANTIANATTITUDESunderstandingenterintoa“freeplay”.Itisfromthisfreeplaythataestheticdelightarises.Thehardparthereisunderstandingthenotionthatinaestheticsthereisa“freeplay”betweenimagination,whichorganizestherandomlybombardingstimuli,andunderstanding,whichimposesconceptualunderstandingonthatorganization.Tohelpmakesenseofthisconsider,first,thecaseinwhichIsay“Turnatthetreebythepub”.Here,onKant’sview,theimaginationisonlyactiveminimallyinorganizingthestimulithatwillbeconceptualizedastreesandpubs.Nowconsiderthewayinwhichachild,inplay,doesnotmerelythuslabeltreesbutimaginessometreeasaspectralfigureand,moreover,richlyembroidersthatimagining,sothatthetreeispersonified,givenalife,historyandarole,thedetailsofwhichmightproliferateforever.Heretheimaginationplays.Second,considernextthatImightsay“Trueloveisn’tfickle”.HereIformulateasomewhatdrypieceofthinking.ButthenIreadthisShakespearesonnet:LetmenottothemarriageoftruemindsAdmitimpediments.LoveisnotloveWhichaltersasitalterationfinds,Orbendswiththeremovertoremove.O,no!itisaneverfixèdmark,Thatlooksontempestsandisnevershaken;Itisastartoeverywanderingbark,Whoseworth’sunknown,althoughhisheightbetaken.Love’snotTime’sfool,thoughrosylipsandcheeksWithinhisbendedsickle’scompasscome;Lovealtersnotwithhisbriefhoursandweeks,Butbearsitouteventotheedgeofdoom.Ifthisbeerror,anduponmeproved,Ineverwrit,nornomaneverloved.Againmyimaginationisreleasedtoplay.ThesewordstriggerinmeacomplexofimagesthatinturntriggerthoughtsandassociationsofmyownwhichImightweaveaboutthem:imaginingsofstars,andships,legalproceedingsandofsickles.Herethereisdelightinthatplay.Consider,too,thislovelypieceofwriting:26\nKANTIANAESTHETICSWhenourattentionisabsorbedinasymphonysometimesamelodywillappearasasinglebeingfloatingorglidingormakingatendergesture;themusicofthesymphonyitselfmayappearasasinglebeingmakingsomesortofjourney,turningthiswayandthatinsearchofsomething,andwemayidentifywithit,asweidentifywithacharacterinaplayorpicture;ahorn-callmaybeheardasifitwereavoice,whichsomeotherinstrumentseemstoanswer;thesoundsofthevariousinstrumentsoftheorchestraasamultitudeofvoicesrestlesslydiscussingorexpressingsomething,orasacrowdofbeingsmovingrestlesslyabout;orthesoundsmaysuddenlyseemtoflyup,likeaflockofbirds;ortheybecomeagainonethingandassumethemomentumofanimmenselypowerfulforceormachine.(Elliott1973,p.94)There,tootheimaginationplays.ButKantsaysthattheoriginofaestheticdelightisafreeplaybetweentheimaginationandtheunderstanding.Howistheunderstandinginvolved?Considertherandomfreeplayofthemindindaydreaming,wherethestreamofconsciousnesshasnoconstraints.Contrastthatwithmycases.Thechild’smindisactiveinweavingimaginingsaroundthetree,butthetreeconstrainsthoseimaginings.Ifitlendsitselftospectralandskeletalimaginings,itwillnotlenditselftoimaginingsofFriarTuck.Again,thewordsofthepoemandthesoundsofthemusicconstrainandshapeourimaginings.The“play”towhichKantrefersoccursbecauseinimaginationwepushthelimitsofthoseconstraints.Buttheunderstandinglodgedinthosewordsandsoundspushesback.GrantedthispicturewecanunderstandthepowerfuldelightinwhatKantcallsthe“purposelesspurposiveness”ofthebeautyofnaturalthings,aswhenwemarvelatthewayasnowflakeseemstobewroughtlikeajewel.Fortheretheimaginationplayswithfindingapurposefulnesswheretheunderstandingknowsthereisnone.Thatnowleavesthequestionwhythedelightoccasionedbythisfreeplayissoimportanttous.ThisbringsustoanotherKantiantheme,thenotionofdisinterestedness.27\nANGLO-KANTIANATTITUDESDisinterestednessKantassertsthataestheticjudgementisdisinterested.Therearethreepartstothis.Firstlythereistheclaimthatanexaminationofourpracticesrevealsthatwehavesostructuredtheworldthataestheticjudgementisdisinterested.Secondlythereisaninvestigationofwhatinthestructureofthemindmakesthatstructuringpossible.Thethirdpartistherolethatthenotionofdisinterestednessistoplayinquestionsabouttheobjectivityofaestheticjudgement.AestheticjudgementasdisinterestedWhatmightleadKant,oninspectingourpractices,totheconclusionthataestheticjudgementisdisinterested?Firstlyimaginethatweareoutsideatheatreonthenightthatanewplaytakestheaudiencebystorm.Onepersoncomesoutsmilingbecauseheinvestedintheplay,anotherbecauseherdaughterwroteit,anotherbecausetheboss—wholikeshisemployeestoenjoyculture—sawhimthere,andanotherbecauseshesimplyenjoyedtheplay.Ifaskedwhichistheaestheticresponse,thetemptationistosaythelast,andtogofromthattosayingthatthisaestheticresponseisdisinterested.Thisdoesnotmeanthatitisuninterestedorthatthosewhoresponddisinterestedlysattherepassively(ordistanced).Rather,theyhadnopersonalstakeinthefateoftheplay.Secondly,manyofourpersonalinterestspresupposeaconcernwiththerealexistence.IfIamavidlyinterestedinowningaFerrari,I’dbetterbelievethatFerrarisexist.Butnow,ifIlookatPicasso’sWomanweeping,Icanreactintwoways.Icanaskwhetherthisisapictureofsomerealwoman.ButIcanalsobeintenselymovedbythatpicture-facewithoutworryingaboutwhetherithadanyrealcounterpart.AndthatisoneofthethingsthatmaysuggesttoKantthataninterestintheaestheticis“disinterested”,meaningnotinterestedintherealexistenceoftheobjectcontemplated(whichisentirelycompatiblewithbeingdeeplymovedbythatpicturedface).Thirdly,anexampleofapersonaljudgementis“Ilikeit”.Hereoneexpressesone’spurelyprivatepersonalinterest.ButforKanttheexampleofanaestheticjudgementwouldbe“thisisbeautiful”.Herewehavedifferentclaims.Theclaimtolikeathing,sayjam28\nDISINTERESTEDNESSonone’skippers,doesnotassertthatothersshoulddosotoo.Buttheclaimthatathingisbeautifuldoesappeartoassertthatothersshouldlikeittoo.Sincethejudgementoflikingexpressesapersonalinterestandthejudgementofbeautyisnotlikethat,so,Kantcouldconclude,thelatterisdisinterested.Fourthly,IthinkKantwasalsotemptedtosupposethatourinterestinartdifferedfromourinterestin,sayhammers.Inthelattercase,partofourinterestliesinwhatwecouldusethehammerfor.Theinterestwouldbepracticalorutilitarian.But,wemightsuppose,anaestheticinterestinapicture-facewouldnotinvolveaskingwhatonecouldusetheimagefor(thoughonecoulduseitasapropforone’sfantasies),butwouldcontentitselfwithsolelycontemplativeattention.Thepossibilityofaesthetics:realityGrantedwetreataestheticjudgementsasdisinterested,weturntothequestionofwhatmakesthispossible.Herewemeetforthefirsttimethenotionofrepresentation.Kantusestheterm“representation”morewidelythanthewayweusuallynowdo.OnKant’saccount,wheneverimaginationfusesthebombardmentsreceivedbythesensesintotheperceivedobjectitdoessobyformingarepresentation.Ithelpstothinkofrepresentingsomethinginthiswayaslikecreatingarepresentationalpicture.ConsiderTurnerpaintingasunset.Thesensoryinputhereceivesfromthesunsetisfusedbyhimintohispicture.Nowwecanseewhatmakesitpossibletobedisinterested,inatleastoneofthesensesinwhichKantthoughtaestheticresponsestobedisinterested.Grantedwehavearepresentation,sayofasunset,wehavethepowertodelightinthepicture-sunsetwithoutevertakinganinterestinwhethersomerealsunsetwasitsmodel.Whatgoesforthecontemplationofpaintingsgoesforthecontemplationofnaturalobjects.Toseeaflower,onKant’sview,istoimposeanorderonoursensoryinputinjustthewaythatapainterimposesorderontheimpingingstimuliofasunset.Theimaginationcreatestherepresentationofaflower.Theneitherwecantakeaninterestinwhetherthereissomesuchflower,oralternativelywecanjustenjoytherepresentationaswemayenjoyanyrepresentational29\nANGLO-KANTIANATTITUDESpicture,thatis,withoutaskingwhetherwhatitrepresentsreallyexists.Wesimplyattendtothelookoftheflower.Sowhatmakesadisinterestedresponsepossibleisthepowertoformrepresentationsandthepossibilityofignoringquestionsabouttherealexistenceofwhatisrepresented.Howdoesthisconnectwiththeexampleswegaveofbeingdisinterested?Whymightwebeinterestedintherealexistenceofsomething,sayaFerrari?Onereasonisthatwewantit.Thatbindsaninterestinrealexistencetosomethingthatisnotdisinterestedbutpartial.Wecouldnotwishtopossessthepicture-faceinthisway(althoughwecouldwishtopossesstheoriginalpictureinwhichthatfacefirstmadeitsappearance).Anotherreasonisthatwehavehopesandfearsthatwouldbeaffectedbyrealexistence.Thesetooarepartial.Alternativelywecanaskwhyonemightthinkignoringrealexistencetobeaestheticallyrelevant.Oneansweris,havingabdicatedinterestinrealexistences,wecanonlyattendtothepicture-object.Allwecandoiscontemplateit.Thatwillmeanenteringimaginativelyintotheworldofthepicture,themindbeingfreedtoweaveitscontrolledimaginingsaboutit.Disinterestinthiscaseengenderstheverydelightthatwasearliersaidtoarisefromthefreeplayofimaginationandunderstanding.Thepossibilityofaesthetics:objectivityandsubjectivityKantisquitecertainmyaestheticjudgementsappeartoberootedinmyfeelingsofdelight.Yetonthebasisofthesepurelypersonal,subjectivefeelings,Iappeartoclaimtherighttosayhowothers,too,shouldrespond.Theaestheticjudgementis,thus,entirelyrootedinmysubjectivelikings,and,yet,atthesametimemakesclaimsonothers.Kant’sgreatproblemiswhatmakesthispossible.Idealwiththismattermorefullylater.HereInotethatthenotionofdisinterestednesshasaroletoplay.Theargumentgoesthus:ifmyinterestispersonalandpartial,IhavenorighttoclaimthatsimplybecauseIhavesuchaninterest,youshouldshareit.Butifpurelypersonalinterestsdon’tcomeintothematter,thereismorehopeofagreementbecausenopartialitygetsintheway.Soifwecouldshowthatourattentiontotheaestheticwasdisinterested,insomewayimpersonal,thenwewouldhavesome30\nIMPORTANCE:COMMUNITYrighttoexpectmoreagreement.Forwhatpersonalinterestcoulddivideus?IreturntothatimportantargumentinChapter6.Importance:raptureWhateveronethinksofKant’saccountitattemptsananswertothequestionwhytheaesthetichassuchpower.Onthataccountanintensedelightarisesasthemindroamsincontrolledactsofimaginationthroughtheworldofartandnaturalthings.Thisdelightisrapture.Thinkoftheutterdelightofmusicheardsodeeplythat,asT.S.Eliotputit,itisnotheardatallbutyouarethemusic.Norisrapturemerelymental.Manyofmyreaderswillhavebeenlostinthekindofdancinginwhichthebodyspontaneouslyactsoutwhatweimaginethemusicisintimatingthatweshoulddo.InastrikinganalysisRayElliott(1973)deepensthis.Rapturousimagination,hesays,isvaluedbecauseinitourfreedomiscelebrated.Wearenotpassivereceiversoftheworldbut,asthechild’simaginingsremindus,activeinshaping,glorifyingandconsummatingit.Inthesemomentsitisasifwerisetransfiguredfromthedeadnessofourhabituallives.Andwehave,too,thepromiseofthecontinualpossibilityofsuchspiritualrenewal.That,indeed,isanexperienceofraptureofferedbythegreatestart.Importance:communityItispossibletofeelthatgreatthoughraptureis,itdoesnotgiveusallwewantfromanaccountoftheimportanceofart.Wearetoldhowcertainexperiencesarevaluabletoindividuals.Butsomehavethoughtthatartoughtnotmerelytocelebratethepowersofhumansconsideredinisolation,butsomemoresocialvision.Kantappearstomenotunmindfulofthisandofferstwothoughts,oneclearenough,onedeeplyobscure.Firstlyhestressestheroleoftheaestheticimaginationinhelpingusalltocomprehendwhathecalls“rationalideas”,abstractnotionssuchasjustice,peace,honour,whichdonotappearamongthephysicalobjectsoftheworldandwhicharenotasfullycomprehendedasphysicalobjectsare.Thesenotions,heclaims,cantakeonanappearanceofrealitythroughbeingrepresentedinimagesthatthesensescantakein.Hesays:31\nANGLO-KANTIANATTITUDESThepoetattemptsthetaskofinterpretingtothesensetherationalideasofinvisiblebeings,thekingdomoftheblessed,hell,eternity,creation,…death,envyandallvices…love,fameandthelike…topresentthemtosensewithacompletenessofwhichnatureaffordsnoparallel.(Kant1951,pp.157–8)Consider.asanexampleherethefollowinglinesfromThemerchantofVenice:Thequalityofmercyisnotstrain’d,ItdroppethasthegentlerainfromheavenUpontheplacebeneath:itistwiceblessed,Itblessethhimthatgives,andhimthattakes,’Tismightiestinthemightiest:itbecomesThethronedmonarchbetterthanhiscrown.Herethepoeticimaginationweavesaboutthenotionofmercyawealthofimagesthatenrichourconceptionofthenatureofthatqualityinawayinwhichmerelysaying,howevereloquently,thatmercyisagoodthingcannotdo.Onlytheactiveimaginationcanthussensuouslyembodytheideaofsuchabstractideas.Sincetheseareintegraltousassocialbeings,artservesthosecommunalpurposes.Secondly,Kantpositsaconnectionbetweentheaestheticandthemorallygoodthattakestheaestheticoutoftherealmofprivateindulgence.Kantdoesnotmeanthatwehavepictures,likethoseVictorianmasterpiecesTheawakeningconscienceandTheself-abuser’sdoom,thecontemplationofwhichmightbemorallyuplifting.Ratherhesuggeststhatanintenseattentiontotheaestheticallyvaluableleadstoreflectiononthemorallygood.Thisisdeeplyobscure.TherearesimilaritiesbetweentheaestheticandthemorallygoodasKantperceivesthem.Attentiontotheaestheticisdisinterested,asweexpectmoralactiontobe.Theaestheticcelebratesfreedom,aprerequisiteformoralaction.Buttheseparallelsdonotnecessarilybringcommunalmoralconcernsintotherealmofart.32\nABOUTKANTAboutKantIthinkthatKant’saestheticoughttobeattemptedbyanyonewhoseriouslywishestobeaphilosophicalaesthetician,andhisphilosophybyanyonewhowantstobeaseriousphilosopher.Thisisbecauseoftheintrinsicinterestoftheviewhehasofphilosophyandtheseriousnessofthequestionsheraises.Moreoverhesettheagendaformuchthathashappenedinaesthetics.IndeedhesetsanagendatowhichIturnnext.ForcentraltoKant’sanalysisisthebeliefthattheproperobjectsofaestheticinterestarerepresentationsandtheattempttosaywhyweshouldbesointerestedinthem.ThatanalysisofrepresentationislinkedtoKant’sbeliefthatourconstructionoftheworldinvolvescreatingrepresentationsofit.Thathasadvantages.Kant’stheoryenableshimtogiveaunifiedaccountofourinterestinnatureandourinterestinart.LookingatawildflowerisasmuchlookingatarepresentationasislookingatapaintingofMacbeth.Ofcourse,ifwedropKant’snotionthattolookatanythingistocreatearepresentation,andattachthenotionofrepresentationsimplytothenotionofthingslikerepresentationalpaintings,thenariftopensbetweenwhatwearedoingwhenweenjoynatureandwhatwearedoingwhenweenjoyart.FormyselfIwelcomethisconclusion,ifonlybecause,asIargueinChapter10,ourenjoymentofartdiffersfromourenjoymentofnature,particularlyif,asIshallargue,representationispartoftheessenceoftheformerandnotofthelatter.Apaintingoraplaycanbearepresentationinthewayinwhichatreecannot(thoughatreemayfigureinarepresentation,asinthoseparksinwhichtreesareplantedintheformationsoftheregimentsatthebattleofWaterloo).However,evengrantedthatrepresentationliesattherootofourdealingswithartandtheworldwestillneedanaccountofwhatgoesonwhenweseearepresentation.How,forexample,dowemanagetoseesmearsofpaintonatwo-dimensionalsurfaceasathree-dimensionalobject?Wemightwonder,further,whetherKanthasgivenanentirelysatisfyingaccountofwhytheimaginativeinterestinrepresentationsshouldbesocompelling.33\nANGLO-KANTIANATTITUDESTrue,hegivesanaccountthatexplainswhyindividualsshouldfindsuchraptureinimaginativeenjoymentofrepresentations.Butthenwemightwonder,ashedid,ifareferencetoindividualsatisfactionisallthereistoit.WemightthinkhereofthewayinwhichTolstoy,inawaytobeexamined,thoughtthatthegreatfeatureofrepresentationalartwasitspowertobindhumanstogether.OrwemightthinkofCroce,whowishedtostressthatrepresentationsareimportantbecausetheyareboundupwithexpression.Weneed,then,totakealongerlookatrepresentationandthelong-standingclaimthatrepresentationliesattherootoftheaesthetic,ifonly,asweshallnowsee,becausetheclaim,inoneformoranother,thatartisessentiallyamatterofrepresentationisasoldaclaimasthereisinaesthetics.GuidetoreadingThenotionsofaestheticattitudesanddistanceareassociatedwithEdwardBulloughandcanbestbeapproachedbyhisdeceptivelystraightforwardarticle“‘Psychicaldistance’asafactorinartandasanaestheticprinciple”,BritishJournalofPsychology5,1912andreprintedinTillman&Cahn,Philosophyofartandaesthetics,pp.397–414.Thisisasplendidarticleforaseminardiscussion,determinedtowinkleoutandscrutinizeitsvarioustheses.SomefurthertwentiethcenturyexamplesofaestheticattitudetheoriesaregiveninJ.Stolnitz,Aestheticsandthephilosophyofartcriticism(NewYork:HoughtonMifflin,1960),pp.29–64.ThenowclassicpieceofscepticismaboutaestheticattitudesisG.Dickie,“Themythoftheaestheticattitude”,AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly1(1),1964,pp.56–65.Seealsohis“Psychicaldistance:inafogatsea”,BritishJournalofAesthetics,13(1),1973,pp.17–29.AmoresympatheticviewisthattakenbyDianeCollinson’s“Aestheticexperience”inHanfling’sPhilosophicalaesthetics.AnyfirstreadingofanythingbyKantisaformidableundertaking.TherelevantprimarytextisThecritiqueofjudgement,trans.J.H.Bernard(NewYork:Hafner,1951).I’dbeinclinedtotrytogetthehangofwhatisgoingonbefore(orsimultaneouslywith)gettingstuckintotheoriginal.Onthegeneral34\nGUIDETOREADINGphilosophyR.Scruton,ModernphilosophyisinstructiveasisJohnShand’sPhilosophyandphilosophers.TherearehelpfulremarksonKant’saestheticsinDianeCollinson’scontributiontoHanfling’sPhilosophicalaesthetics.AlsotobecommendedasyougetdeeperintothematterisD.Crawford,Kant’saesthetictheory(Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress,1974).Amoreadvanced,buthelpfularticlebyanotedKantscholarandaestheticianisE.Schaper,“Taste,sublimityandgenius:theaestheticsofartandnature”,inTheCambridgecompaniontoKant,P.Guyer(ed.)(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992),pp.367–93.AndanythingbyGuyeronKantisworthreading.ThescopeofthepresentintroductionpreventsmefromgoingintotheoriesthatarerelatedtoKant’s,ofwhichoneofthemostrousingisSchopenhauer’sTheworldaswillandidea,Vol.1,Book3.ThereisafairintroductiontothisintheCollinsonpiecereferredtoabove.SeealsoC.Janaway,Schopenhauer(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1994).Kant’sinfluenceismanifestedinanentirelydifferentwayinHegel’sphilosophy,onwhichseeScrutonandShand.Inthetext,bywayofgettingapurchaseonthenotionofdisinterestedness,Irefertothevariouswaysinwhichanaudiencemightbeinterestedinaplay.ThisisderivedfromaninfluentialarticlebyJ.O.Urmson,“Whatmakesasituationaesthetic?”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,supp.vol.31(1957),pp.75–92.TheRayElliottarticletowhichIreferistheremarkable“Imaginationintheexperienceofart”,inPhilosophyandthearts,G.Vesey(ed.)(London:Macmillan,1973),pp.244–82.Thereisadiscussionoftheshortcomingsofdisinterestedness(especiallyinourdealingswithnature)inA.Berleant,Artandengagement(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1991).IhavenotdealtwithJohnDewey’simportantArtasexperience(NewYork:Putnam,1934).ThisistouchedonintheCollinsoncontributiontoHanfling’sPhilosophicalaesthetics(pp.150–6).SeealsoT.Alexander,JohnDewey’stheoryofart,experienceandnature(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1987).DeweymuchinfluencedM.BeardsleywhosketchesanaccountofaestheticexperienceinBeardsley(1958),pp.527–43.Croce,incidentally,35\nANGLO-KANTIANATTITUDESthoughtthatmuchofDewey’sworkinaestheticswasderivativefromCroceanaesthetics,inwhichcasewhatIshallsayaboutCroceinChapters3and5willapplyalsotoDewey.ThematterisfullydiscussedbyAlexander.36\nChapter2Nature’smirror:imitation,representationandimaginationIfwewishtounderstandthepowerofart,awaytostartisbylookingatsituationsinwhichpeopleclaimtofeelthispower.Herelegend,artandhistoryallsupplyexamplesofcasesinwhichviewersaremovedtoawebypictorialrepresentations.Inthisoriginatedanancientandstillpopularaccountthatlinksartwithimitation,representationor,usingaGreekterm,mimesis.Fromremoteantiquitypeoplewerepowerfullystruckbyrepresentationsandthepowertoproducethem.Hencethelegend,towhichIshallreturn,ofPygmalion,whosesculpturesexcitedawedmarvelandoneofwhichwasgoodenoughtobegrantedlifebythegoddessVenus.Browning’s“Mylastduchess”begins:That’smylastDuchesspaintedonthewall,Lookingasifshewerealive.IcallThatpieceawonder,now:FràPandolf’shandsWorkedbusilyaday,andthereshestands.Notethestrengthofthelanguageused.Thethingiscalled“a37\nNATURE’SMIRROR:IMITATION,REPRESENTATION&IMAGINATIONwonder”.People,indeed,standinamazementbeforerepresentations.Somethingpowerfulisgoingonhere.Interestinrepresentationisasubiquitousasourinvolvementwiththeaesthetic.PicturesareboughtinWoolworth’sbecauserepresentationappeals.ThewaterfrontportraitistatKeyWesttradesonafascinationwithrepresentation.Peopleseemdriventofestoonwalls,trainsandbridgeswithrepresentationalgraffiti.Thereisaninsatiabledrivetorepresenttheworld,aninsatiablewishtoviewthoserepresentations,andapropensityferventlytocherishthosegiftedasrepresenters.Thatsuggestsacentralroleforrepresentationinanyaccountofthepowerofart.Ifrepresentationistobemadecentraltothataccount,twothingshavetobedone.Firstly,weneedtoknowwhatrepresentationis.Ifthetermisleftvaguethenanyaccountofartbasedonitisvague.Secondly,wemustshowthatthepowerofartcanbeadequatelyaccountedforintermsofrepresentation.Bywayofaglimpseofsomedifficultieshere,wemightnotethatalthoughmusic,asHelenSchlegelfound,hasenormouspower,itseemsnottoberepresentationalatall.Howthen,isthepowerofartgenerallytobeaccountedforintermsofrepresentation?RepresentationasimitationItissaidthatsome,Platoforexample,havethoughtofrepresentationasimitation.Thisissoimplausibleastoraisedoubtsthatithaseverbeenseriouslyentertained.Imitationisquiteuselessasageneralaccountofart,becausesolittleinarthastodowithimitation.Thinkofobviouscasesofimitation:youhaveanoddgaitandIfollowyou,imitatingyourwalk;PercyEdwardscouldimitatetoperfectiontheflutingsofthenightingale.Littleofarthastodowithimitationinthissense.Theremaybecasesinwhichacomposerputsintomusicasoundsuchthatifoneweretohearthatsoundinisolation,onemightthink“Ah!acorncrake!”.Butthecomposerisnotimitatingabird,and,evenifheorshewere,musicdoesnotgenerallydothat.Again,AnnieLennoxdoesn’timitatelostlovein“NomoreIloveyous”,evenifshefeelsthesentimentofthatsong.Thereareworksofliterature,Browning’sDramaticmonologuesforexample,wherethewritertriestocatchthetoneofvoiceof,say,anirritablemonk.But,again,tosuggestthatliteraturegenerallydoesthis,orthat38\nREPRESENTATIONASCOPYINGwhenitdoesitisimitative,issimplytounderstateandmischaracterizethevarietyofliteraryphenomena.Eveninperformance,actorsdonotgenerallyimitatethecharacterstheyplay.Onemightnotethewalkofarealpersonandbuildthatintoone’sacting,butthatdoesnotmakeone’sactinganimitation.ThenotionthatCharlesLaughtonwasimitatingCaptainBlighorQuasimodoissimplyfar-fetched.Actorsdonotimitatecharacters:theyinhabitthem.HenceWarrenMitchell’sripostetosomeonewhoqueriedhisrenderingofacharacter:“You’veonlyseenhim:I’vebeenhim”.Whatofpictorialrepresentation?For,justasducksaretakeninbyimitationsofducksissuedfromthereedbedsbythelurkinghunters,sotherearereportsofpeopleandevenanimalsbeingtakeninbypictures.Butagainthereisnothingtobesaidfortheviewthatpaintingsgenerallytakepeopleinoraregenerallymeanttodoso.Eventrompel’oeiltakesoneinonlymomentarily.Whatwoulditspointbe,ifneverdetectedwithasmileofadmiration?RepresentationascopyingAccountsofartasimitationsometimessuggestthatimitationisakindofcopying.Copyingcanhappeninthecourseofimitation.Icanimitateyourwalkoryoursignaturebycopyingit.Butthenotionofcopyingisneithergeneralenough,norgoodenough,norcreativeenoughtocaptureourdealingswithart.Firstly,itisnotgeneralenough.Therearecasesofartthatinvolvecopying,notablysomemime.Itisunclear,however,whatiscopiedinEdwardScissorhands,“Nessundorma”,ortheJudgeDreddcomicstrip.Secondly,theaccountmissesthegoodnessofart.Copiesarenotalwaysgreetedwiththeapprobationwithwhichwetendtogreetart,ourreactiontofindingawell-forgedfiverinourchangebeing,atbest,amixtureofapprobationfortheskillanddisapprobationforthedeceit.Thirdly,theaccountleavesoutcreativity.Acopy,foralltheskillitcommands,needsexhibitnoneofthecreativeorimaginativeoriginalitycharacteristicofart.MuchsporthasbeenhadwithPlato’sviewsonthismatter.ForPlatoarepresentationisacopy,andassuchalwayssuspect,beingamisleadinganddeceitfulderivationfromatrueoriginal,this39\nNATURE’SMIRROR:IMITATION,REPRESENTATION&IMAGINATIONbeingsomethingexistinginsometranscendentworld.ManyofthosewhoridiculePlato’sviewsconfusearejectionofhisclaimsabouttheexistenceofatranscendentreality,copiedthird-handbyartists,withrejectionofhisclaimthatacopyisasecond-best,aclaimthattheywould,hadPlato’smetaphysicalviewsnotcloudedtheissue,probablyaccept.Apartfromthistherearemorerecent,powerfulobjectionstotheviewthatrepresentationalartinvolvescopying.Thecopyingmodelsuggeststhatapainterstandsbeforesomethingandthencopieswhatisseen,lookingfromtheonetotheothertocheckthematch.Thatviewpresupposesthatthereissomewayofidentifyingtheworldbeingcopiedorrepresentedindependentlyoftheactofcopyingorrepresentingit.Howelsecouldwecomparetheonewiththeother?AgainstresemblanceTherearetwoapproachestothiscopyingmodel.Oneissimplytodenythatonecanthusproduceresemblancesoftheworld.Theotheristoconcedethatonecandoso,butthentodenythatrepresentationalartdoesthat.IassociatethefirstapproachwithKantianinclinations.Tothosewithsuchinclinations,aswehaveseen,thenotionthatwepassivelyreceiveapre-existentlystructuredworldisdenied.Wedonotcopytheworld.Wemakeit.Morerecently,similarviewshavebeenexpressedbyErnstGombrichand,inanextremeform,byNelsonGoodman.Wedonotpassivelyperceiveaworld,whichwecopydowninordertoproducearepresentationalresemblance.Whatisreceivedisinterpretedaccordingtoexpectation,memory,culturalbackgroundandindividualpsychology.Thereisnorealitytoberesembledindependentlyoftheseconditionedseeings.HenceGoodman’sclaimthatartistsmakeratherthantakereality.Letuslookalittlemorecloselyatthis,takingGombrichandGoodmaninturn.40\nAGAINSTRESEMBLANCEGombrichGombrichsuggeststhattalkofcopyingapre-existentrealityrequiresustothinkofaninnocenteyeconfrontingandcopyingapre-existentlystructuredworld.Hedeniesthatthereareinnocenteyes.Ourseeingsarealwaysconditionedandthatconditioningaffectswhatwesee.Iamsuspiciousoftalkofeyesasinnocentornot.Eyesareneither.Itisthepeoplewhohavetheeyeswhoareinnocentornaiveorconditioned.Theclaimisbetterputasassertingthatthewayapersondrawstheworldisconditionedbythatperson’spersonalandculturalbaggage.Thentherearetwowaysofcontinuing.Oneistosaythattherearenorightorwrongwaysofdrawinghowthingslook,onlythedifferentwaysthatdifferentpeople,withdifferentbaggages,infactdrawthem.ThatiscertainlyGoodman’sview.Theotheristosaythatalthoughthewaysinwhichwerepresenttheworldareconditionedbyourpersonalorculturalbaggage,somewaysofrepresentingitcaptureitbetterthanothers.Thisis,Ithink,whatGombrichsays.ThuswhereasGoodmanfeelsthatperspectivedrawingisonlyonerepresentationalconvention,Gombrichthinksofitasallowingusmorecloselytocapturehowthingslook.AndforGombrich,unlikeGoodman,therereallydoesseemtobesomepointinsayingthatapictureofagreenappleonaredtableclothmightbettercaptureascenethanapictureofablueappleonayellowtablecloth.Butthentheviewthatinrepresentationwetrytocapturehowathingreallylooksisnotwhollyundermined.GoodmanGoodman,however,doeswanttoundermineit.Wereallydo,hesays,makeratherthancopytheworld,arguing,indeed,inoneplace,thatwemakethestarsthemselves.TheargumentsGoodmangivesinthefirstchapterofhisLanguagesofartdonotengenderconfidence.Afirstargumentisthatthereareverymanythingsanobjectmightbe.Amanmaybeaviolinist,abuffoon,abilliardplayerandsoonandsoon.Howisthisplenitudetobecapturedbyonepicture?Thisisaverbaltrick.Itmaybedifficulttoportraysomeonesimultaneouslyasaviolinistandasabilliardplayer.Onecan’tdoitbecauseintheworldasitexistsindependentlyoftheportrayal,onecannotsimultaneously41\nNATURE’SMIRROR:IMITATION,REPRESENTATION&IMAGINATIONplaysnookerandtheviolin.Butthereisabsolutelynoproblemindepictingsomeone,sayRodney,whoisatoneandthesametimeaviolinist,abuffoonandabilliardplayer.IsimplydepictRodney,sinceifRodneyisaviolinist,billiardplayerandbuffoon,anypictureofhimisapictureofsomeonewhoisallthosethings.Secondly,Goodmanpointstothefactthatundertheinfluenceofprejudice,indoctrination,acculturationorwhatever,wemayseethingswrongly.Wedoindeed.ButthatisnohelpwhatsoevertoGoodman.Theverytalkofprejudiceentailsthatthereissomethingagainstwhichourviewscanbechecked.Thirdly,Goodmanarguesthatconventionalperspectivaldrawingdoesnotshowhowthingslookbecauseanundoctoredphotographdoesn’tlooklikethat.Inphotographs,thepolesbesidetherecedingrailwaytrackaren’t,asconventionaldrawinghasthem,recedingparalleluprights.Butfarfromthatbeingaproofthatthereisnowaythingsreallylook,itisanargumenttothecontrary.Thecamerashowsusthatthingsdon’treallylookastheconventionaldrawingshowsthem.Idonotdenythatourpreconceptions,howeverformed,caninfluenceourwaysofseeinganddepictingthings.Convincedantecedentlythatyoungblackmalesaredangerous,someonewillexaggeratecertainfeaturesindepictingthem.Buthowdowegetfromthattotheconclusionthatthereisnorealityagainstwhichthosedepictionscanbechecked?NorcouldIdenythatthereareconventionsinrepresenting,forexample,theconventionofrepresentingtheVirginMaryinabluerobeorStLawrencebyamancarryingagridiron.Butthatdoesnotshowthatallrepresentationisthusconventional.Idonotwishtoclaimthatrepresentationalpaintingscansimplybecheckedagainstreality.ForweknowthatTurner,Constable,MonetandCezanne,confrontedbythesamesunset,willproducedifferentlookingpaintings.Supposeweaskwhichproducedthemostaccuratepictureofasunset?Whatstandsinthewayofachoiceisthatweseesunsetsthroughpaintings.Wesaythingslike“howTurneresque”.Eachartistgaveawayofrepresentingsunsets.Collectivelytheygiveusarepertoireofsuchways.Butwecanbelievethiswithoutdenyingthatthereis,independentlyofthedepiction,asunsettoberepresented.42\nAGAINSTRESEMBLANCESoIamnotsurethereisenoughinGoodman’sradicalargumentstoundermineafeelingthat,evenifaworkcannotsimplybecheckedagainstreality,itmaycertainlybeassessedforitsresemblancetohowthingslook.But,andthisisthesecondapproachImentioned,tosaythataresemblancemayexistbetweenapictureandrealityisnottosaythattheartistcopiesreality,evenwhentheartistcapturesthatresemblance.For,onething,asCrocetrenchantlyargued,artistsmaybeunclearwhenstartingwhattheoutcomewillbe.Thattheycansay,afterfinishing,thatthatishowtheworldindeedlookstothem,doesnotentailthatthiscouldbeknownandsimplycopiedbeforethepicturewaspainted.InVirginiaWoolf’sTothelighthouse,LilyBriscoefindstheonelinethatwilluniteherpaintingsothatitrepresentshervisionoftheworld.Butshedidnotfinditbycopying.Untilshefoundhervisionshehadnothingtocopy.Thenotionofartasakindofcopyingfaresbadlyintheliterature.Inthoseattacksonartasimitationorascopying,however,somethingisoverlooked.Wedodelightinimitations,andimitation(thinkhereofmime)canbeanartform.Moreover,asweshallsee,imitationthrowslightonanestofproblems.Ishallreturntotheseafteralookatsomeotherproblemsaboutrepresentation.TheverypossibilityofrepresentationWhetherornotarepresentationdoesordoesnotresemblereality,thereremainsabasicquestionofhowwecanseearepresentationatall.Howisitthatpigmentonatwodimensionalsurfacecanbeseenasahorseoradog?Goodmanisrightinonething:thereisnosenseinwhichatwo-dimensionalsurfaceresembles,inthesenseofsharingallthepropertiesof,athree-dimensionalobject.Sohowcanweseethatthree-dimensionalobjectrepresentedonthattwodimensional-surface?Atfirstsightthisseemsmoreaquestionforphilosophicalpsychologythanaesthetics,whichasks,grantedwecanseerepresentations,howtheyfigureinanystoryofthepowerofart.Butoneanswerdoessuggestsomethingaboutthepowerofart,sohereareafewwordsonapossibilitysuggestedbyRichardWollheim.43\nNATURE’SMIRROR:IMITATION,REPRESENTATION&IMAGINATIONOnWollheim’saccountwhenIseethegirlportrayedinManet’sThebarattheFolies-BergèreIseethatgirlinthosepigments.Herethemindgeneratesvisualexperiencesoutofitself.WhenIseeaninkblotasabat,oracloudintheshapeofacamel,animagegeneratedbythemindisfusedwithanexternalobject,aninkblotoranoilpainting.Sothepaintingrepresentsanobjectifitisconfiguredinsuchawaythatthatobjectisseeninit.Thisaccountbecomesimportantwhenitislinked,asIshalllinkitinChapters5and7,tothenotionofartasameansofexpressingandsomakingclearourinnerlives.AnalternativeaccountisofferedbyKendalWalton.Consideradollthatintheimaginativeworldofachildbecomesababy.Thislifelessobjectistuckedup,consoledand,insomemoreostentatiousmodels,isfedbyandevenwatersuponitssurrogateparent.Thechildmakesbelieve,andthedollbecomesapropforitsimaginativemusings.That,Waltonsuggests,iswhathappensinrepresentation.ToseeapaintingthatrepresentsBatmanI,nolessthanthechild,engageinthemake-believethatthatsetofconfiguredpigmentsisBatman.Thesetwoviewsarekindred.Inbothcasestheimaginationisexercisedandsomethingisseeninsomething.Walton’saccountmay,however,maketheperceptionofpicturestoovoluntary.OnemakesbelievethatthepigmentsareBatman.Iamawareofnosuchprocess.IsimplyseeBatman.Wollheim’saccountseemstometostressthatfact.IshallreturntoWollheim’saccountwhenIcometotalkaboutexpressioninart.NonrepresentationalartIhavediscussedwhetherrepresentationisimitationandhowweseerepresentations.Thesearehotlydisputedmatters.Isuspect,though,thattherearedeeperquestionsthanthese.Forevenifweknowhowwecanseerepresentations,andevenifwehavesomethingbetterthanimitationasouraccountofrepresentation,wearestillnonearertoexplainingthepowerofartbyreferencetorepresentation.For,sincenotallartisrepresentational(musicforexample),howcanrepresentationbeageneralcharacteristicofart?Indeed,notevenallvisualartisrepresentational.Consideranyso-called“abstract”designwithwhichyouarefamiliar.NothingseemstoberepresentedthereinthewayinwhichGodisrepresentedontheceilingoftheSistineChapel.44\nPHOTOGRAPHYThisistoohasty.Firstly,eventhemostabstractofworkscanhavespatialdepth.Certainlinesorcolourpatchescanbeseenaslyingbehindothers,eventhoughthepictureistwo-dimensional.Toseethisistoseethree-dimensionalconfiguringsinthetwo-dimensionalsurface,andthatisrepresentationalseeing.Secondly,whetherornotabstractpaintingsarerepresentationaltheyshareafeaturewithrepresentations.Wemaysayofthemthattheyareangry,brooding,joyful,calmandjolly.IfitisareasonforsayingthatapicturerepresentsChristthatChristisseenintheconfigurationofitspigments,thenitseemsthereissomereasontosaythatan“abstract”picturedoessomethinglikethatinthatangerisseenintheconfigurationsofitspigmentation.Thisgoesformusic,too.Imaynotmerelyhearabeatingofdrums.Ihearanangrybeatingofdrums.Ihearitinthosesounds.Similarly,whenIreadaliterarywork,Idonotmerelyseeinkmarks,Iseemeaningfulwordsinthosemarks,andinthosemeaningfulwords,inturn,Iseedescribedpeople,placesandevents.Somethinghappensinthesecasesthatseemsrelatedtoseeingafaceinapainting.Iamrequiredtogobeyondasubstratumtowhatissignifiedinit.BeforeIcometothequestionastowhythiskindofrepresentationisimportant,Imentionforcompletenesstwoothermuchdebatedissuesaboutrepresentation.PhotographyAwomansitsinPicasso’sfearsomepicture,Nudedressingherhair.Aboutheronemightask,“Isthisapictureofanactualwoman,and,ifso,wasshelikethepicturepaintedofher?”.Alternativelywecanputasidequestionsofwhetherthepicture-womanhasacorrelateandsimplystudythepicture-woman.Wecantakeaninterestinthefactthatsheisinastateofgreattensionandfindsherbodyloathsomeandalsotakeaninterestinthewayinwhichthepainterhasorganizedthedetailsofthepaintingtoproducejustthatimpression.Indeed,Wollheimhasarguedthatthistwo-foldednessofourinterest,asimultaneousinterestbothinwhatisrepresentedandinthemannerofitsrepresentation,isessentialtoourdealingswithpaintingasanartform.Todothiswemustdetachourselvesfromquestionsofrealexistenceand,byanactofimagination,engagewithapicture-figure.That45\nNATURE’SMIRROR:IMITATION,REPRESENTATION&IMAGINATIONPicasso,Womandressingherhair,1940.Oiloncanvas,51¼”×38¼”.TheMuseumofModernArt,NewYork.engagement,inwhichtheimaginationfocusesonandiscontrolledbytheimage,isrewardingtous,thisbeingpartofthevalueoftheaesthetic.46\nPHOTOGRAPHYNowScrutonarguesthatthereisacleardifferencebetweenpaintingsandphotographs.WhenIseetheharrowingimageofthenapalmedchildinafamousphotographfromtheVietnamwar,Icannotputasidethequestionsofrealexistenceinordertocontemplatethepicture-childasarepresentation.Thereissomethingmorethanfaintlydisgustinginsayingsuchthingsas“seehowthedispositionofthelimbsisusedtoreinforcetheeffectofterror”.Nor,sincethephotographercannotcontrolthedetailofthephotographinthewayinwhichthepaintercontrolsthedetailofthepainting,woulditmakesensetodoso.Scrutonisrightthatthereisacleardifferencebetweenimageinarepresentationalpaintingandaphotograph.Doesitfollowthatphotographyisn’tanartform?Onecanseewhythismightbealleged.Whatmakesaestheticcontemplationpossibleforrepresentationalpicturesisthefactthatonecanseparatethequestion:“Wastherearealcorrelatetothepicture-thing?”fromthequestion,“Whatisthecharacterofthispicture-thing?”.Moreover,thewayinwhichpainterscancontroleverylastdetailtoachieveaparticulareffect,ispartofthecontemplativepleasure.Photographersdonothavethiscontrol.Theflythathappens,tohumorouseffect,tolandonanoseasaphotographistakenisagraceoffateratherthanart.AsCroceputit,theelementofnatureisnotsubduedinphotographyasitisinthegreatestofart.Tothisconclusion,generationsofstudents,forwhomtheepitomeofthepictorialisthephotographandthefilm,haveobjectedstrenuously.Oneapproachistoimputetothephotographerpainterlyelementsofcontrol.Thatmaybepossible.Somephotographersmaybebetterthanothersbecausetheyhavegreatercontrolovertheireffects.Butnatureisnevertotallytobesubdued.Anotherapproachistothinkofportraitpainting,wherewedoconcernourselveswithrealexistence,andtoaskwhetherportraitureisanartform.Ifitis,itmaybebecauseaportraitcan,insomeway,catchthenatureofthesitter,arealizationsodistressingtoChurchillandhisfamilythattheydestroyedaremarkableportrait.ButKarsh’sphotographs—andChurchillisagainacaseinpoint—showthatphotography,throughthewaythatthephotographer,nolessthanthepainter,hascontrolledthewayinwhichthefigureistobeseen,candothat.47\nNATURE’SMIRROR:IMITATION,REPRESENTATION&IMAGINATIONButaworryremains.Therepresentationalpaintinggivesustheoptionofdetachingitfromitssourceinanactofimaginativefreedom.Thephotographdoesnot.Wealwaysknowthattheobjectphotographedactuallyexisted.Howeverallisnotlosttothosewhowishtoarguethatphotographyisanartform.Firstly,notallrepresentationalpaintingsaretobetreatedinthesameway.ItseemsimportantthatapicturelikePicasso’sGuernica,orGoya’sSoitgoes,bothofwhichportrayactualhorrors,benotdetachedfromthoseevents.Sincethisdoesnotunderminethemasart,itneednotdosointhecaseofphotographyeither.Secondly,theimageinaphotographcanbecontemplativelydetachedfromitssubject.Withtimeanypossibleconcernwiththehistoricalidentityofthepicturedfigurewithers,leavinguswithonlytheimagetocontemplate.TheremaywellcomeatimewhentheappearanceofthehistoricalChurchillisofnomoreconcerntoanyonethanthatofStHildofWhitby.SomeonecouldthensimplylookattheKarshimageforitsoveralleffectandthecunningnesswithwhichthephotographerachievedthateffect.Astotheclaimthatthereissomethingdisgustingincontemplatingaphotographofanapalmedchildasonemightcontemplatearepresentationalpainting,thereisthisreply.Noteveryphotographisdisgustinglyviewedwhencontemplatedasonemightcontemplateapicture,andnoteveryrepresentationalpaintingcanbesimplycontemplatedwithoutthatcontemplationbeingdisgusting.AnyonewhocontemplatedaGoyaetchingofawartimerapepurelyaesthetically(“Howinterestingthearrangementisofthelimbs!”),wouldcommitacrimeagainstthatpicture.Paintershavefeltthesamerepugnanceincreatingrepresentationalartofsufferingasphotographershavefeltinsimplyphotographingit.SylviaPankhurst,agiftedpainterofthescenesofhorrorineastLondon,onedaylookedatthefacesofthepoorandfeltagreatwrongnessincreatingfromthemanarttobecontemplatedwithaestheticsatisfaction.Thirdly,wemightadmitthatphotographydiffersfromrepresentationalpaintingbyvirtueofthefactthattheimageinthephotographcannotbedetachedfromitsconnectionwithsomethingreal.Butthenonemightclaimthatthisopensapossibilitynotopentorepresentationalpainting.Forthereisadistinctivepleasurableexperiencethatsurroundsthecontemplationofaphotographthatisconnectedwiththeill-48\nFICTIONunderstoodphenomenonofnostalgia.Innostalgiathepastreturnsandexcitesaspecialkindofexperienceinwhichthepastlivesinthepresent.AVictorianboyinthesepiaprint,staringatthecamera,frozenbyitsMedusa’seye,wasarealpersonwhostoodjustthere,whoturnedandwalkedaway,grewupanddiedandisreturnedtothispresentbearingtheactualpastinawaythatoccasionsthespecialfeelingofthepastrestoredofwhichProustsowondrouslywrote.Representationalpaintingscannotgiveusthatexperience,saveinthesensethattheymaygiveusapresentimageofapasttimewhenpeoplepaintedlikethat.Butthatistoroottheminpastreality.FictionThesecond,muchdebated,issueImentionisfiction.Forinanovel,too,toaskwhetherMrPickwick,say,hadareallifemodel,istodeflectattentionawayfromtheaestheticact,whichistheimaginativecontemplationofthefiction.Somequestionsaboutfictiontranscendphilosophicalaestheticsandreachintophilosophicallogic.Thus“AceVenturawaskindtoanimals”isaperfectlymeaningfulstatementaboutAceVentura.Buthowcanitbeabouthimifhedoesn’texist?Furtherifwe(wrongly)supposethatthemeaningofatermiswhatitrefersto,thenhowcanthatstatement,whichreferstonothing,bemeaningfulatall?Thatproblem,whichgetsanearlyairinginPlato’sdialogueThesophist,andarigorousworkoutin,interalia,theworkofPeterStrawsonandBertrandRussell,is,however,moreaproblemforphilosophicallogicthanaesthetics.Moredirectlyrelatedtoaestheticsisthequestion:whyarewesointerestedinfictions?PeoplewillqueuetogetintofictionalfilmsandI’dguessmorefictionisreadthanfact.Allsortsofreasonssuggestthemselves.Oneisescapism.WhenthefourwallsbegintocloseinperhapsevenescapetotheglamourofJillyCooper’spoloplayerscanhaveitsallure.Anotheristhatafictionalworlddemandsimaginativeinvolvement,thatbeingasourceofenjoyment.Next,whydoweenjoycertainfictions?Igotoseeaplayinwhichanoldsenilemandivideshiskingdomandisdrivenmad,hislovingdaughterishangedandamanisbrutallyblinded.YetI49\nNATURE’SMIRROR:IMITATION,REPRESENTATION&IMAGINATIONmightbetemptedtoanswer“Yes”ifaskedwhetherIenjoyedtheplay.Howisthatpossible?Hereonehastobecarefulinsayingwhatwasenjoyed.HadIbeenaskedwhatIenjoyedandrepliedthatitwastheputtingoutoftheeyes,anddidnotmeanthecleverwayitwasdone,thensomethingwouldbeseriouslywrong.WhatIenjoyedwastheplay,theacting,thecontrivanceofplot,themajestyofthewriting,thethoughtsarticulatedforme,thescenery,thelightingandthecumulativeeffect.WhenIenjoyKingLear,IneednotenjoywhathappensinitandIneedtakenopleasureinblindinganddementia.AndIsuspectthatsomeeventsaretoohorribletobeencompassedinaplay.DrJohnsoncertainlythoughtthisofKingLear.Buttheproblemthatmostexercisesmanyofmycontemporariesistheapparentirrationalityoffiction.Bywayofintroductiontothisintriguingmatter,letusnotethatwhenIhaveanemotionsuchasfear,rageorsorrow,Imustbelievesomethingactuallyobtainstowardswhichmyemotionistargeted.IfIamafraidbecauseIthinkmyemployerwantstodismissme,Imustreallybelievehewishessotodo.IfIfindthatmyemployerdoesnotwishtodoso,thenthereissomethingirrationalincontinuingtofearthat.Anemotionseemstoinvolvethebeliefthatthesituationthatisitsobjectactuallyobtains.NowconsiderthatgreatfilmclassicTheBlob.AsIsitmunchingmypopcorn,theBlobcomestowardsme.Myhandssweat,mybowelsturntowater;ifsomeonetappedmeontheshoulderIshouldjumpgalvanically.Inshort,I’mafraid.Buthowcanthisbe?Formeactuallytobeafraid,ImustbelievethatIamactuallythreatened.ButIdon’tbelievethis,elseIwouldn’thavecome.Andnow,again,IwatchtheendofBriefencounter,andhe’sgone,andthetearsflowbecauseLaura,withherridiculoushatsandemaciatedvoice,isdesolate.Iamsadforher.YetIdonotbelievethatthereisanysuchperson.Sometrytosavetherationalityoffictionalgriefandfearbyfindingrealobjectsforit.IcrybecauseLaura’sconditionremindsmeofrealcasesofsuffering,orsomegeneraltruthaboutit,andthesethoughtsmakemeweep.Thatseemsunhelpful.IsitnotLauraIcryfor?SecondlyhowdoesthisworkforfearoftheBlob.Whatgeneraltruthsdoesthatbringhome?Isitthatjelliescangetoutofhand?Thirdly,theaccountseemssimplytoodepressing.50\nFICTIONTheoutcomewouldbethatIleavethecinemamopingoranxious,whereasIcomeoutofBriefencounterexhilarated.ColinRadfordtakestheoppositetackofsayingthatemotionalresponsestofictionareirrational.Iknowthereisnothingtocryover,yetIcryoverit.Thataccountdoesnotexplainhowwecanknowinglyactinirrationalwaysandsodoesn’texplainfictionalresponses.Confrontedwiththefactofmylover’sinfidelity,Icanshutmyeyestoitandthismightbearationalwaytobehave.WhatIcan’tdoissimultaneouslyactoutthebeliefthatsheisfaithfulandfaithless.HowthencanIcryforsomeonewhileknowingshedoesnotexist.Inthecaseofmylover’sinfidelityIsimplyshutthefactout.DoIperhapsdeliberatelyshutmyeyestothefactthattheBlobdoesnotexistinorderthatIcanenjoymyemotions?Butifitispossibletoshutmyeyesinthisway,andifIhaveareasonfordoingso,theactionisnot,asRadfordclaims,necessarilyirrational.Ifthequestionis,howcanIcryforLaurawhenIknowshedoesnotexist,oneansweris,byshuttingmyeyestothatfactandactingasifshedoes.Iengage,protem,ininnocentself-deception.Thematterthenceasestobeoneforaestheticsandbecomesamoregeneraloneofhowthatkindofactionispossibleinawiderangeofcases,aestheticandnonaesthetic.Thequestionisnot,“Isself-deceptionpossible?”.Norisit“Canself-deceptionberational?”(itcan).Thequestioniswhataccountofthemindexplainsitspossibility?Sometimesshuttingone’seyestosomething,self-deception,isperfectlyreasonablebehaviour,asinthecaseofthecancersuffererwhoistoldhopeofameliorationliesinnotthinkingaboutthedesperateaspectsofthematter.Canitbereasonableinfictionalcases?Yes,ifsomethingwegetoutoffictionalencountersmakesthisreasonable.Onethingistheenjoymentofimaginativeactivity.Butthatcan’tbeall.IactuallyenjoybeingterrifiedinfilmsinthewayinwhichIwouldnotenjoythisinlifeandIamwillingtoshutmyeyestothefictionalityinordertobeterrified.Theexplanationofwhythisissomustgoverydeepandthefullexplanationwillberelatedtoanswerstosuchquestionsaswhypaincanpleaseandtheforbiddenattract.Thosecanonlycomefromexplorationsofthemind’spsychology.Asfarasaestheticsgoes,thefactthatterrorexcitesusandthatfictionalterrorofferstheexcitementswithout51\nNATURE’SMIRROR:IMITATION,REPRESENTATION&IMAGINATIONtheinconveniencesmakesitspursuitseemareasonableandnotanirrationalone.RepresentationandartLetusreturntothequestionofwhetherthefactthatartisrepresentationalhelpsustounderstanditspower.Ihavetriedtodealwiththedifficultyposedbythefactthatnotallartisrepresentational.Amorefundamentalobjectionisthatrepresentationisnotrelevantatall,evenwhenitispresent.CliveBell(1920)writesthatrepresentationisalwaysirrelevant,forthepowerofartliesintheattractionsofform.Thisisdubious.FirstlyitisunclearthatBelldoesdismissrepresentation,atleastinthelargersensethatIhavegiventothatnotion.Hesaysthatweshouldattendto“form,colourandthreedimensionalspace”.Buttoseeathree-dimensionalspaceonatwo-dimensionalplanesimplyistoseesomethinginsomething,andthustoseearepresentation.Secondly,wecannotexcludeaninterestinrepresentationfromconsiderationsofform.InStubbs’pictureTheDukeofRichmond’sracehorsesatexercise,wecanonlyseetheformalcompositionofthepictureifweseeinittherepresentationofamanpointingawhip.Thatdirectsoureyestotheorganizationofthepictureasamerelinewouldnot.Butforallthat,Bellhashadanunfairpress,asleastasfarashisworriesaboutrepresentationgo.ForheisraisingagainanobjectionfirstenvisagedbyPlatoandreiteratedmorerecentlybyOrtegayGasset:Whypaintreplicasofbeds,tobelookedatasbedsarelookedat,whenwealreadyhaveperfectlygoodbedstohand.PartofwhatworriesBellstemsfrominclinationstobelievethataninterestinarepresentationcanonlybeaninterestintheobjectrepresented,thesurfaceofapicturebeingaclearwindowthroughwhichonelooksatthesethings.AndcountlesspeopledobuypicturesofpondsandfieldsandBenidormassurrogatesforviewingtherealthing.ThisiswhyBellthinksthatphotographyhasmaderepresentationalpaintingotiose.Aphotographcannowdobetterwhatrepresentationtriedto,sorepresentationcanbedropped.Thatconfrontsuswithachallenge:whatwouldweloseifwelostrepresentationfromart?52\nIMITATIONAGAINImitationagainIapproachthatchallengebylookingatoneformthatrepresentationtakes,aforminwhichtheanswertothechallengeshowsitselfinitsclearestform,andthatisimitation.Idonotsaythatrepresentationisalwaysimitation(whatdoesarepresentationofBartSimpsonimitate?).Buttherearegroundsforthinkingthatimitationisaformofrepresentation.IfIwalkdownthestreetwithafunnygait,Imaypresentaridiculousspectacle.Ifyouimitatemeexactlyyoure-presentthatspectacle.ThefirstthingIwanttopointoutisthatnoteveryimitationisasubjectofdelight.Thediscoverythatasplendidshowofdaffodilsonyourlawnconsistsofplasticflowersishardlylikelytoplease,andtoupeesaremoreamatterforjestthanaestheticdelight.Imitations,then,needtobedividedbetweencaseswhereonewantstheimitationtobeenjoyedassuchandcasesinwhichwehopetheimitationwillnotbedetected.(Whenonesignssomeoneelse’snameonachequeoneishardlylikelytopointouttothecashierhowperfectlyonehascaughttheverycurlicuesoftheGettyhand.)Artisticactsofimitation,thoseintendedforourdelight,are,unlikefakeminkcoats,intheclassofthingsthataremeanttodrawattentiontothemselves.Secondly,whenanimitationisappreciated,thereisnonecessitythatonelikeswhatisimitatedinordertoenjoytheimitation.TheobjectofmyimitationwhenIimitateatoothlessmanwithawalrusmoustacheeatingspaghettiwithoutaforkdoesnothavetobeaspectacleofdelightforyoutodelightinmyimitationofit.Whatyoudelightinisnotwhatisimitated(althoughyoumightindependentlydelightinthis,aswhenIdoaperfectimitationofthespeakingvoiceofJohnGielguld).Whatyoudelightinistheactofimitatingit.Andwecangeneralizethis.Whenwerepresentsomethingitisnottheobjectthatisrepresentedthatisofinterestwhenweareinterestedintherepresentation(although,asintheGielguldcase,wemightindependentlybeinterestedinthis).Itistheactofimitatingit.Thatallowsustodealwithtwoconundrums.Thefirstiswhywebothertocopywhatwealreadyhave.Hereweseethepointofafamouspieceofrepresentationalart.Magritteexhibitedarepresentationaldrawingofapipethatlooksverylikeapipe.Includedinthedrawingarethewords“Thisisnotapipe?”.Of53\nNATURE’SMIRROR:IMITATION,REPRESENTATION&IMAGINATIONcourseitisn’t.Itisadrawingofapipe,andassuchhasquitedifferentpropertiesfromapipe.Picturesofthingsofferusrewardsotherthanthoseofferedtousbythethingspictured.Consider,again,PygmalionandGalatea.Pygmalioncreatedamarvellousstatueofawoman,butifwhathewantedwasacompanion,astonestatueprobablyofferslessthanthevicarioussatisfactionsofaninflatabledoll.HencePygmalionbeseechedVenustogivehisstatuelife.Butofcourse,onceithadthat,hehadtoforfeitthecontemplativejoysthatstatuesoffer.Similarly,acharacterinTomStoppard’sRosencrantzandGuildensternaredeadexpressessurprisethatarealexecutiononstageseemedunappreciatedbyaudiences.Whateverdelightsareofferedbythespectacleofanexecutiontheyarenotco-extensivewiththedelightsofferedbyrepresentationsofanexecution.Whatarethesedelights?Oneisthedelightwetakeinactsofimitation—inthewit,perceptionandskillshowninsuchacts.Wedelight,too,inthewayinwhichanartistbendsallthe(sometimesrecalcitrant)elementsofapictureandthemediausedinitsproduction,toproduceitseffect:aswhenweareravishedbytheplacingofthecolours,theeyes,theknottedtendons,thebrightlight,thedeformedfigurethatproducesthehauntingimageofPicasso’snudeasshedressesherhair.Theotherconundrum,towhichwemaynowhavethebeginningsofananswer,maybeapproachedbyaskingwhywemightthinkthatcertainsubjectsare,sotospeak,offlimitstoart,apointhintedatbywhoeversaidthatinthefaceoftheNazideathcampsartissilent.IenjoyedMartinAmis’sTime’sarrowasaremarkablefeatofthenovelist’sskill.ButIhadaworryaboutusingtheHolocaustassubjectmatterforthatexercise.Similarly,Ihavestressedthewayinwhichinthepresenceofarepresentationwemightpointadmiringlytothewayinwhichtheeffectisachieved,aswhenwesay,notehowtheopenmouthofthesmallestchildinKatheKollwitz’sblisteringlyironicandcompassionatepictureMunicipallodgingclinchestheoverwhelmingpiteousnessofthescene.ButIfeeluneasyinsaying“NotehowcleverlythealmostluminousandputrescentgreenofGrunwald’sCrucifixionhelpscapturethedesolation”.CoulditbesaidthatifIaminterestedintheGrunwaldortheAmisasart,thenthewayitisdoneisallIcantakeaninterestin?Itismerelythatinthesecasesmyabilitytorespondaesthetically54\nIMITATIONAGAINisinterferedwithbywhatIknowofthehorroroftheHolocaustandtheCrucifixion.Somethingsaresohorribleastoruleouttheactivitiesofcreatingandenjoyingrepresentationsofthem.Inthefaceofthedeathcampsartissilentbecauseitnotmerelyshouldnotbutcannotcreateenjoyablethingsoutofthem.Iworryaboutthisanswer.Itseems,firstly,atoddswiththefactthatsomeofthegreatestarthasmadeartoutofthetrulyawful.Grunwald’sCrucifixionisgreatart.Secondly,itmarginalizesart.Onthisaccountitisfineforustomakerepresentationsofagreatrangeofthings,butwhenwecometothingsthatmostchallengecomprehension,representationisforbiddenandarthasnothingtosay.Ishallacceptthatonlyasalastresort.Thatthereareotherpossibilitiesheremightbeindicatedbyconsideringtheunlikelypeoplewhohavesuspectedthathowevermeaninglessandbleaklifemightbecome,artintervenestohelpus.AttheendofSartre’sNauseathesoundofmusic,eternallytranscendenttothescratchedrecordthatreproducesit,offersitsprotagonistaglimpseofacertainkindofsalvationfromtime.Withdeeplymovingpoignancyitismusic,attheendofKafka’sMetamorphosis,thatbringsthegiantinsecttemporarilybacktoabetterworld.Considertoothemostmovingthingofall.ArtwasnotsilentintheNazideathcamps.Thoseinthemproducedoperas,paintingandliterature.Whywasthat?Thewaytoananswerliesagaininthesimplercaseofimitation.Noteverythingthatisimitatedispleasing.Butneitheriseveryactofimitating,howeverwell-wrought.Ifsomeone,foracheaplaugh,hobblesafteracripple,anybrillianceoftheimpersonationdoesnoterasethenastytaste.Wefeelthatsuchactsexpressstatesofmoralunawarenessdiscreditabletotheirperpetrators.Thatsuggeststhis:representationsareexpressive.Thatfactbeginstoexplainwhythoseinthecampsthoughtitimportanttoproducerepresentations.Theywishedtoexpresssomethingbythem.Thatinturnsuggeststhatweshouldaskiftheimportanceofrepresentationliesnotmerelyinrepresenting,forallthatrepresentationscanravishusincapturingthelooksofthings.Representationsmighthaveadeeperexpressivesignificance,theexplorationofwhichmighttakeusdeeperintoanunderstandingofthepowerofart.SoitistoexpressionImustnowturn.55\nNATURE’SMIRROR:IMITATION,REPRESENTATION&IMAGINATIONGuidetoreadingImitation,copyingandresemblanceAnoverviewcanbehadfromRosalindHursthouse’s“Truthandrepresentation”,EssayVIinHanfling’sPhilosophicalaestheticsandpp.53–65ofMarciaEaton’sBasicissuesinaesthetics.AlsotobecommendedasyoubecomemoreadvancedisthechapteronrepresentationinW.Charlton’sratherneglectedAesthetics(London:Hutchinson,1970).IverymuchenjoyedD.Peetz,“Somecurrentphilosophicaltheoriesofpictorialrepresentation”,BritishJournalofAesthetics27,1987,pp.227–37,arousingpiecebyarousingphilosopher.Plato’seminentlyreadableandchallengingviewsonrepresentationassecond-handimitationcanbefoundinRepublic,Book10.Aristotle’sPoetics1–5isoftensaidtobeanattempttoanswerPlato’sobjectionsbyfindingaroleforrepresentation.MoreonthesewriterscanbefoundinBeardsley’sAestheticsfromclassicalGreektothepresent,pp.30–68.TomSorrellmakesremarksaboutPlatoandimitationintheHanflingvolume,pp.297–311.SeealsoAnneSheppard,Aesthetics,pp.4–17andR.Woodfield,“Resemblance”,inTheBlackwellcompaniontoaesthetics.OrtegayGasset’sproblemswithrepresentationareexploredinThedehumanisationofart,trans.H.Weyl(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1948).ErnstGombrich’sviewsaretobefoundinhisfascinatingandinstructiveArtandillusion(London:Phaidon,1977).Astartcanbemadewithpp.3–25,butthewholebookmeritsattention.ForacriticismofGombrichseeRichardWollheim,“Reflectionsonartandillusion”inhisOnartandthemind(London:AllenLane,1973).SeealsotheveryusefulR.Woodfield(ed.),TheessentialGombrich(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,1996)andR.Woodfield(ed.),Gombrich,artandpsychology(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,1996).Goodman’sviewsarebestapproachedbywayofChapter1ofhisenormouslycontroversialLanguagesofart.CriticismcanbefoundinD.Pole,“Goodmanandthenaiveviewofrepresentation”,BritishJournalofAesthetics14,1974,pp.68–80andinRichardWollheim,On56\nGUIDETOREADINGartandthemind,pp.290–314.Wollheim’sownviewistobefoundin“Seeing-as,seeing-inandpictorialrepresentation”inhisArtanditsobjects,EssayV.KendalWalton’sviewsaretobefoundinhisfascinatingandimportantMimesisasmake-believe(Cambridge,Massachussetts:HarvardUniversityPress,1990).SinceIsaidthatWollheimandWaltonhaveakinshipintheirviews,takeinalsoWalton’sattempttoreduceseeing-intomake-believeinhis“Seeing-inandseeingfictionally”inPsychoanalysis,mindandart:perspectivesonRichardWollheim,J.Hopkins&A.Savile(eds)(Oxford:Blackwell,1992).IwasimpressedbyAlexNeill’scriticismofWaltontobefoundinhis“Fear,fictionandmake-believe”,JournalofAestheticsandArtCriticism,49(1),1991,pp.47–56.RecentlythereisalsoM.Budd,“Howpictureslook”,inVirtueandtaste,J.Skorupski&D.Knowles(eds)(Oxford:Blackwell,1993),pp.154–75.Thoseadvancinginthesubjectshouldtakeintheremarksonseeing-asinRogerScruton’sArtandimaginationandtherightlypraisedthoughmoredifficultF.Schier,Deeperintopictures(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986).PhotographyThestartlingessaybyR.Scruton,“Photographyandrepresentation”inhisTheaestheticunderstanding(Manchester:NewCarcanetPress,1973,pp.102–26)startedtheharesrunningonthisone,thoughitelaboratesapointmadeinChapterIIofCroce’sEstetica(translated1992).ReadalsowhatScrutonsaysaboutfilminTheaestheticunderstanding.SSontag,Photography(London:Penguin,1979,pp.128–36)isalsoworthpondering.FictionMuchoftherecentdiscussioninthisareawaspromptedbyC.Radford,“HowcanwebemovedbythefateofAnnaKarenina”,ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,supp.vol.49,1975,pp.67–80.AfullreviewofallthematerialistobefoundinthemonumentalP.Lamarque&S.Olsen,Truth,fictionandliterature(Oxford:Clarendon,1994).DifferentviewsonwhyweenjoytragediesarefullydiscussedbyLamarqueandOlsen.57\nNATURE’SMIRROR:IMITATION,REPRESENTATION&IMAGINATIONAdifficultbutimportantdiscussionofvariousissuessurroundingtherationalityofself-deceptionistobefoundinS.Gardner,Irrationalityandthephilosophyofpyschoanalysis(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993).58\nChapter3Ne’ersowellexpressed(I)Wehavearrivedatagreatstoryofthepowerofart,thestoryofartasexpression.Manyofmyreaders,indeed,willalreadyintuitivelyfeelthatartisimportantlytodowithself-expression,forwearebroughtupintheaftermathofRomanticismwithitsimageoftheartistpossessedofpowerfulfeelingsofjoyorsufferingandpouringthemintoart.Keats’snightingale,which,fromtheheavens,poursitsfullheartintheprofusestrainsofunpremeditatedart,standsastheimageoftheromanticartistgivingvent,inWordsworth’sphrase,toaspontaneousoverflowofpowerfulfeelings.Ishalldiscussexpressionthroughtwoexemplaryfigures:TolstoyandCroce.Tolstoy’sWhatisart?Whatisart?isworthreadinginitsentirety.ThatTolstoywasagreatwriteriswellevidencedinthework,particularlyinthepassionateaccount,whichbeginsthebook,ofhisvisittoarehearsalatagreattheatre.(Note,too,thelatersardonicallyfunnyanddeeplyunfairdescriptionofhisnightattheopera.)Tolstoyisnot59\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(I)engagedinanacademicexercise,butcaresaboutartanditseffectsonthosewhoproduceandconsumeit.Heseemstometoasktherightquestionsaboutthehugecost,financialandemotional,ofartandaboutitsabsurdhierarchies.ThecontroversiesthatrageaboutsuchprestigeorganizationsasLondon’sRoyalOperaHouseshowthesequestionshavenotlosttheirrelevance.PartofWhatisart?isnegative,thedismissalofvariousclaimsaboutart.Inthecatalogueoftheserightlyforgottenclaims,boredomeasilysetsin.Howbeit,twoclaimsgetshortshrift.Oneisthattheimportanceofartliesinthepleasureitgives.HerethereisanechofromKant.ForinKantwenoticedthesuspicionthatalthoughartcangiveverygreatpleasure,itoughttodomorethansimplyprovidesatisfactionstoindividuals.Tolstoy,too,attemptstoshowthatarttranscendsitsindubitablepowertoprovideindividualsatisfactions.Sinceaestheticpleasurecanberapturous,thatbeginstoexplainitspower.Butanyonewhowishestoshowthatartshouldhaveacentralplaceinhumanlifemayhavetodomore,forthatlifeissocial.Soonemightaskhowartfitsintothefactthatwearenotsimplyindividualsseekingindividualpleasures.Tolstoyfurtherdeniesthataninterestinartissimplyaninterestinbeauty.Firstly,wearenotjustinterestedinthebeautiful.Aseveryeighteenthcenturyaestheticianknew,weareasinterestedinthesublimeandthepretty.Secondly,ifweaskwhyweareinterestedinthebeautiful,wearrivebackattheclaimthatbeautydelightsus,andsototheclaimthatpleasureisthechiefendofart.Theshortcomingsofsuchtheoriessuggest(andasaprimitivecommunitarianChristian,Tolstoywouldhavefoundthesuggestioncongenial)thatanyaccountoftheimportanceofartmustembedartinthesocial.Moreover,thesocietyofartcannotbeconfinedtoasubsetofrichaestheteswhopatronizehighart.Tolstoyisemphaticthatsuchhighartmustbecontinuouswiththeformsofaestheticlifepermeatingawholeculture.Weareaccustomedtounderstandarttobeonlywhatwehearandseeintheatres,concerts,andexhibitions;togetherwithbuildings,statues,poems,andnovels…Butallthisisbutthesmallestpartoftheartbywhichwecommunicatewithoneanotherinlife.Allhumanlifeisfilledwithworksofartofeverykind—fromcradle-song,jest,mimicry,the60\nTOLSTOY’SWHATISART?ornamentationofhouses,dress,andutensils,tochurchservices,buildings,monuments,andtriumphalprocessions.Itisallartisticactivity.(Tolstoy1994,pp.60–61)Grantedawishtoaddasocialdimensiontoart,itseemednaturaltoTolstoytogivethefollowingaccount.Imayhaveanexperience,sayafeelingofrevulsionatthetreatmentofserfs.IfIcangetyoutosharemyfeeling,abondisestablishedbetweenus.Giventhis,doesn’tthepowerofartlieinitscapacitytoestablishthatsharing?Thisleadsdirectlytotheso-called“infection”accountofart.Tolstoyputsitthus:“Artisahumanactivityconsistinginthis,thatonemanconsciouslybymeansofcertainexternalsigns,handsontoothersfeelingshehaslivedthrough,andthatothersareinfectedbythosefeelingsandalsoexperiencethem”(ibid.,pp.59).Thispicturerelatesthreecomponents.Therearetheartist’sfeelings,emotionsorattitudes.Thereistheworkinwhichtheartistembedstheseandwhichispassedtotheaudience.Thereistheaudiencethatcomestosharetheartist’sfeelings,emotionsorattitudes.Thusabondisestablishedbetweenhumanbeings,andthatdirectlyestablishestheimportantsocialdimensionofart.ItisessentialtounderstandthatTolstoy’saccountinvolvestwoclaims.Oneisthatartisamatterofpeoplecomingtosharefeelings,emotionsandattitudes.Theotherisaspecificationofthekindsoffeelingsthatoughttobeshared.ForTolstoy,asacommunitarianChristian,thesearefeelingsofloveofGodandone’sfellowhumans.Somehavefocusedonthesecondcomponentandwrittenoffthewholeaccountastheabsurdravingsofaborn-againChristian.ButTolstoyisemphaticthattheclaimthatartinvolvesasharingoffeelingcanbeseparatedfromanyclaimaboutwhatfeelingsshouldbeshared.Hethinksthattheseshouldbereligiousfeelings,butheistolerantenoughtonotethatdifferentlandshavedifferentreligions.Andsinceforhim,anyway,religionisnotamatterofdoctrinalsubscriptionbutamatterofwhateverisfundamentaltoalife,thisallowsalternativestohisownpreferences.When,therefore,wediscussTolstoy’saccountasanaccountofart,itistheclaimthatartisinfectivethatshouldoccupyus,notquestionsastowhattheinfectionshouldbewith.Tothataccountwefindthreemainobjections.Thefirstisthatitiswrongtoassume,asTolstoydoes,thatartistsmustactuallyhavethefeelingswithwhichtheyseektoinfecttheaudience.The61\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(I)secondisthatthetheoryplacestoolittleimportanceontheworkofartasanobject.Ifonesimplywantstogetastateofmindfromonepersontoanother,thenanythingthatwilldothatwillserve.Indeed,ifapillcouldbefoundtobringanothertofeelwhatIfeel,thenwecoulddispensewithworksofartaltogether.Thethirdisthattheaccountissimplymistakeninbelievingaudiencesshouldcometohavethefeelingsofthecreatorofthework.Ican,thankfully,appreciatetheworksofD.H.Lawrencewithoutcomingtoshareallhisviews.Thesecriticismsaretrottedoutinmostintroductorybooksandaredutifullyregurgitatedbytheirreaders.Theydeserve,however,acloserlookthantheyusuallyreceive.TheartistDoesTolstoywronglyassumethatartistsmustactuallyfeelwhataworkexpresses?AfirstobservationissimplythatTolstoydoesnotassumethis.Tolstoy’sexampleisachildwhogoesintoaforest,meetsawolf,isfilledwithterrorandescapes.Whenhetellsothersthetale,herelivestheterrorandthosehearinghimtellofitcometosharethatterrorandalltheotheremotionsofreliefandthelikethatthenarratorlivesthrough.Thisispreciselywhathappensingoodstorytelling,aswitnesstheeffectofthegreatJohnLaurie’seye-rollingsagastoldtotheWalmington-on-SeaplatooninDad’sarmy.NowevenasTolstoytellsit,itisobviousthatthetellerofthestoryisnot,whentellingit,infearofthewolf.Heimaginativelyrecreatesthatfear.Moreover,Tolstoyclearlysaysthatitisnotevennecessarythatthefearconjuredupbythenarratorbebasedonarealfearoccasionedbyarealevent.Hewritesthat“eveniftheboyhadnotseenawolfbuthadfrequentlybeenafraidofone,and…inventedanencounterwithawolfandrecounteditsoastomakehishearerssharethefeelingsheexperienced…thatwouldalsobeart”(Tolstoy1994,p.58).Somuchfortheclaimthattheartisticcreatormustactuallyhavetheemotionsexpressedinthework.AllTolstoyneedsistheprettyobviousclaimthatthecreatormusthavehadasufficientactualacquaintancewithemotionsinordertohavethematerialsoutofwhichtobuildimaginativeexpressionsofthem.Thereismoretobesaid,however.62\nTOLSTOY’SWHATISART?LetusbeginbynotingthatitwouldnotnecessarilybeanobjectiontoTolstoythattherecanbeemotionsinaworkthatarenot,andcouldnotbe,emotionshadbyitscreator.Munch’sPubertyportraysagirlwhosefaceclearlyexpressesaconfusionabouttheonsetofthatcondition.Munchcouldnothavehadthosefeelings.Browning’s“SoliloquyofaSpanishcloister”expressestheirritationofamonk.ButBrowningwasnotthatmonk.Hereitisessentialtomakeadistinctionbetweenwhatmaybeexpressedbythecharactersinaworkandwhatmaybeexpressedbyaworkinitsportrayalofthosecharacters.Camus’sTheplaguecontainsanumberofcharacterswhoexpresscertainviews,but,inaddition,thenovelitselfarticulatesanattitude.Rembrandt’sastonishingGirlsleepingshowsusagirlasleep,butthepictureitselfexpressesatendernesstowardsthesleeper.Ithasrecentlybeenargued(andseeheretheguidetoreading)thatthereareexamplesofthiskindofarticulationofattitudesinmusic.Ifwemakethisdistinction,thenitislessimplausibletosaythatinandthroughtheworkthecreatorarticulatesfeelings,emotionsandattitudestothethingsdepictedtherein.Theobjectiontothiswillbethatwecannotassumethattheattitudesoftheworkitselfarethoseexpressedtherebyitsactualcreator.Thatviewisheldbythosewhohavetalkedaboutthedeathoftheauthorandassertedtheirrelevanceofreferencestotheauthorsofworks.IshallanswerthatwhenIdealwiththoseviewsinChapters7and8.HereInoteonlythatwespeak,withnosenseofstrain,abouttheattitudesthatartistsarticulateintheirworks.DickensdoesnotmerelydepictSmikeexpressinghimselfbutinthatdepictionexpresseshisownreactiontothesufferingsofthoselikeSmike.TheworkitselfDoesTolstoy’saccountallowtoolittleautonomytotheworkitself,sothatitismerelyameans,inprincipledispensable,forgettingwhatisinonepersonintoanotherperson?ThatclaimwouldbetrueifTolstoyweresayingthatbeforeeverstartingtocreatetheirworksartistsknowexactlywhattheywishtoexpressinthem.Itwouldthenbejustamatteroffindingthemeanstogetthisacrosstosomeoneelse.IsupposeTolstoy’ssummaryformulationmightsuggestthat,butIcannotseethatitentailsit.WhenTolstoytalksofhavingafeelingthatoneseeksto63\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(I)embodyinawork,hemightindeedmeanthatthefeelingistherebeforetheworkbegins.Buthemightequallymeanthatthefeelingisinchoatelytherebeforetheworkbeginsandiscarefullyworkedoutinproducingthework.Considerheresomepassagesthatappearlaterinthebookthanmostcriticsreach.For,inremarksastonishinglylikethoselatermadeinWittgenstein’slecturesandconversationsonaesthetics,Tolstoystresseshowcomplextheworkofembodyingone’svisioninaworkis:Musicalexecutionisonlythenart,onlytheninfects,whenthesoundisneitherhighernorlowerthanitshouldbe,whenexactlythesmallcentreoftherequirednoteistaken…Theslightestdeviation…destroystheperfectionandconsequentlytheinfectiousnessofthework…Itisthesameinallarts…Infectionisonlyobtainedwhenanartistfindsthoseinfinitelyminutedegreesofwhichaworkofartconsists,(ibid.,p.137)TheeffectofthispassageistosuggestthatforTolstoytherewasnothingtobeexpressedthatcouldbeexpressedequallywellinanotherway.Tolstoycertainlybelievesthattheworkofartisthewayinwhichanemotionisconveyed.Thatleadstothisargument:onTolstoy’sviewifAnidealhusbandandWallStreet,say,bothsuccessfullyconveythedangersofloveofmoney-making,thenonewillserveaswellastheother,soonecanbedispensedwithwithoutloss.Buttherewouldbealossifoneweredispensedwith.SoTolstoy’sviewiswrong.Thatargumentinvitesthesimplereplythatifwedofeelweneedthemboth,thisissimplyevidencethattheydonotconveyexactlythesamething.Twoworkscan“conveythesamething”inthesenseofthesamegeneralsortofthing,loveofmoney,say,whilenotconveyingthesamethinginthesenseofaparticularformthatloveofmoneycantake.WhyshouldwesaddleTolstoywiththeformerandimplausibleview?TheaudienceIsittruethatthereisnorequirementthattheaudiencecometosharewhatisinthework?64\nTOLSTOY’SWHATISART?Itiscertainlytruethattherecanbenorequirementthattheaudiencecometosharethefeelingsexpressedbyacharacterinawork.Appreciationisharmedifweidentifywithacharacterandseetheworldoftheworkonlyfromthatpointofview.ThatindeedishowapersoninanearlierexamplemisperceivedOthellothroughseeingitOthello’sway.Butiftheclaimisthattheaudienceneedsharewhatisarticulatedthroughthework,thatislessclear.Wittgensteinwrites:“Onlyanartistcansorepresentanindividualthingastomakeitappeartouslikeaworkofart….Aworkofartforcesus—asonemightsay—toseeitintherightperspectivebut,intheabsenceofart,theobjectisjustafragmentofnaturelikeanyother”(1980,p.4).Tilghmanglossesthisthus:Toseeanobjectintherightperspectiveissurelytoseeitashavingacertainspiritorexpression,buttheworldcertainlydoesnotforceustoseeitintherightperspective;infactitisdoubtfulwhetherthereisarightwayofseeingtheworld.Thereare,ofcourse,ethicallypreferablewaysofseeingit—ashappyratherthanunhappy,forexample—buthowweseeisleftuptous.Aworkofart,bycontrast,showsusthingsasseenbysomeoneelseandthusdoesnotleaveitsvisionuptous,butforcesus,aswemightsay,toseethosethingsastheartistdid.(Tilghman1991,p.52)Ifaworkembodiesacertainperspective,thentoengagefullywithit,Ihavetomaketheefforttoseeitfromthatperspective,too.IfitisobjectedthatsomeperspectivesareonesIdon’tandcan’tadopt,fromsqueamishnessoronthegroundsoftheirmoralodiousness,say,thenthatistosaythatIcan’tengagewiththoseworksatall,notthatengagementdoesnotinvolvegraspingtheperspectivefromwhichaworkisconstructed.Itwill,however,bearguedthatitisonethingtoenter,protem,theattitudes,feelingsandemotionsthatconstitutetheperspectiveofawork,andanothertocometosharetheseinthefullersensethatTolstoyclearlyhasinmind.HereIhaveonesuggestion,thefullelaborationofwhichwillhavetoawaitthediscussioninChapter9,ofthewayinwhichconsiderationsoftruthorfalsitybearonourassessmentofart.Itdoessimplyseemthatwefindafullersatisfactioninworkswhose65\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(I)perspectivewecanshareor,asRonaldHepburn(1990)putsit,thatwecan“inhabit”(asopposedtovisitprotem).Thisisnottosaythatwesimplylookforworkswecanagreewith—thoughsomedo,andnotjustthosewhoseekoutthemuscularethicsofBulldogDrummond.Norisittosaythatourtastesarefixedforever.ImaycometowonderatthekindsofthingsIonceinhabited.Normustweforgetthataworkofartmightbringustoitspointofview.Indeed,asweshallsee,thesignificanceofimaginativerepresentationsrestsinpartontheepiphanicexperiencestheymaygiveus.Thereisnorequirement,moreover,thatwemakethetestofwhetherwecaninhabitaworkthesoletestofwhetheritisorisnotagreatworkofart.LeaviscouldthinkSwiftagreatwriteralthoughhefelt,rightlyorwrongly,thatinSwift’sworldviewthechannelsoflifeareblockedandperverted.AllIsuggestisthatifIcannotfullyinhabitaworkthenIwillwithholdsomeofmyunqualifiedassent.IfIcannotsharetheperspectiveofawork,Iamremindedthattherearedivisionsinhumanity.WhatelseisTolstoysayingwhenhesaysthatsharedartisticexperiencebringsustogether?ThatsuggeststhatTolstoy’sintroductionofreligionintohisdiscussionofartisnot,givenhisnotionofreligion,outofplace.ForTolstoy,religionisamatterofwhatoneholdstobefundamental,whatwouldexpresstheviewoflifethatoneultimatelyinhabits.Butthatwouldaffectboththesortsofworkonecouldcreate,thatis,thekindofattitudes,beliefsandemotionsthatonecouldexpress,andtheworksofartonecouldengagewith.Thatengagementwouldberelatedtowhatonecouldinhabit,givenone’slifeset,orwhatTolstoywouldcallone’sreligion.Tolstoy’sviewsdonothavetheknock-downstupidityoftenpredicatedofthem.ButalthoughwearetoldthatworksofartembodythefeelingsandemotionsoftheircreatorsandawakenthosefeelingsandemotionsinthosewhoencounterthemIstillfeel,afterthebestdefencethatIcanmuster,thatTolstoyhasnotmadeclearwhathappenswhenavisionisembodiedinawork.Moreover,wearegivennoclearideawhywefeelsomovedbysharingtheexpressedvisionsofartists.Inordertoprogress,weneedtogobeyondTolstoytoBenedettoCroce,thegreatestpioneerofthetheoryofartasexpression.66\nBENEDETTOCROCEBenedettoCroceCroce’sviewItalyhasbeenaunitedandindependentcountryfornotmuchover100years,thehistoryofthoseyearsbeingcomplexandcompelling.Intothathistory,asastatesman,philosopher,culturalcriticandasapoliticaleconomistiswovenBenedettoCroce,asif,forus,Churchill,Russell,LeavisandKeyneshadbeenrolledintoone.Crocepublishedover60volumes,butheassertedthathisfirstmajorwork,Theaestheticasthescienceofexpressionandofthelinguisticingeneral(1902;trans.1992)wastherockuponwhichhiswholetheoreticalandpracticalliferested.Theworkistrulyseminal.Itisnotaneasyread,inpartbecauseitwaswritteninthejoyofdiscovery,withideastumblingout,daringleapsofthought,andreferencescontinuallymadetounidentifiedopponents.Moreover,itisnotaworkaboutaesthetics,inthesenseofbeingabookaboutthebeautiesandvalueofartandnature.Theyarecertainlydealtwith,butthebookgoesfurtherthanthattogiveacompletepictureofwhatinItalianwouldbecalledlospirito.Thistermwouldbefeeblytranslatedby“mind”,sinceCrocewishestodealwithallourfacultiesandnotmerely,astheterm“themind”suggests,theintellectual.Someofthebookisoflittlerelevancetothosespeciallyinterestedinaesthetics,thoughitisneverirrelevanttothoseinterestedinphilosophy.Crocebegins,likeKant,withthenotionofstimulibombardingus.Butnowconsiderthedifferencebetweentheraysofthesunbombardingandwarmingastoneandtheraysofthesunbombardingoursenses.Thestoneispassive.Itsimplywarmsup.We,however,havethepowertorespondactivelytostimuli.Inparticularwehaveapower,whichCrocecalls“intuition”,toorganizethem.Intuitiondoesthisworkbyorderingthestimuliintorepresentationsofparticularthings.Mysteriousthoughtheword“intuition”sounds,itamountstonomorethanapowertoformrepresentations.Anexactanalogyisthewayinwhichpaintershavethepowervisuallytoorganizesunsetsincreatingrepresentationsofthem.Thoserepresentationsarenotcopiesofreality.Untilintuitionhasimposedorderontheworldbyproducingrepresentations,thereisnorealitytocopy.67\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(I)Croceidentifiestheaestheticwithintuition,thatis,withapowertoproducerepresentations,andtherepresentationsproducedbyaestheticintuitionareofparticularthings,thisstretchofwaterorthispen.Whentheactivityofformingtherepresentationsofparticularthingshasoperated,wecangeneralizefromtheserepresentationstoproducegeneralconcepts,sothatwecantalknotonlyofaparticularstretchofwater,butofwateringeneral.Thisistheprovinceoflogic.Buttheaestheticisthefoundationalactivity.Untiltheformativeactofproducingrepresentationsofparticularthingshasbeenperformed,thereisnothingfromwhichtoabstractgeneralconcepts.Theaestheticandthelogicalgiveusknowledgeofparticularsandconceptsandarethustheoretical.Butwealsowantandwillthingstohappen.ThisCrocecalls“theeconomic”.Thisisdependenton“thelogical”thathasgivenusconcepts.How,heasks,couldwewantsomethingifwehadnoconceptofit?Butthentheeconomicwillultimatelydependontheaesthetic,sincethelogical,onwhichitdepends,dependsinitsturnontheaesthetic.Finallywedonotmerelywill.Wewilltherightandwrong.Thisistherealmoftheethical.Therewouldbenoethicalwillingiftherewerenowilling,althoughtherecanbewillingthatisnotethical.Theethical,therefore,dependsonthepractical,thepracticalonthelogical,thelogicalontheaesthetic.Theaesthetic,then,isthefoundationofthewholeeconomyofthemind.Theaestheticisnot,asoftennowhappens,taggedontophilosophy,theseriousbusinessbeingdoneelsewhere.Itiscentral.Croce,likeKant,andlikeScrutonandWollheiminrecentyears,triestoshowtheproperplaceoftheaestheticinsomefullstoryofthemind’sstructure.That,asmyfinalchaptermakesclear,givestheiraccountsgreatdepth.Theaesthetic,thelogical,theeconomic,andtheethicalmakeuptheactivitiesofthehumanspirit.Crocewastowriteaseparatebookoneachofthelastthreeandtogetherthesebooksmakeupwhatisknownasthe“PhilosophyoftheSpirit”.Sincethespiritmakesitsworld,thatphilosophyisaformofidealism(theworldcreatedoutoftheideasofthespirit)ofwhichtheworkofKantandHegelareotherforms.68\nBENEDETTOCROCECroce’swork,togetherwiththatofGentile,whocertainlythoughtCroce’sidealismlackinginrigour,ledtoaresurgenceofidealisminItalyinthetwentiethcentury.Thisneo-idealismfellunderacloud,inpartbecauseGentilebecameforawhiletheofficialphilosopheroffascism.Itisquiteunclear,however,thatidealismis,assomehavebelieved,especiallycongenialtothefascisttemperament.Croce,forhispart,wasaheroicfigureintheintellectualresistancetoMussoliniandadeeplyinfluentialfigureintherestorationofsomekindofdemocraticruletoItaly.SofarCroce’sviewiscognatetoKant’s.Assailedwithasensorybombardment,wehavethepowertoimposeanorderonitbyformingrepresentations,organizingpicturesofreality.ButCrocegoesbeyondKantinawaythatistohavefar-reachingconsequencesforhisviewsonart.For,heclaims,therepresentationsproducedbytheaestheticpowerofintuitionareatthesametimeexpressions.Sowearriveatanaccountthatplacesartasexpressionattheveryrootofthewayinwhichwemakesenseoftheworld.WhydoesCrocesaythataestheticrepresentationisexpression?IhavesaidthatatthecoreofKant’stheoryliesapictureofourselvesatbirthassuddenlybombardedbyabloomingbuzzingconfusionofstimulithataretobeorganizedbythemind.Kant,however,doesnottouchonsomethingthatisatthecoreofCroce’saccount,namelythatitisfrustratingandpainful,perhapsintenselyso,tobeonthereceivingendofthismeaninglessbombardment.Wewanttoorganizeitinordertoridourselvesofthatdistress.Wordsworthspeaksinthe“Ode:intimationsofimmortality”ofourearlyyearsasatimeof…obstinatequestioningsOfsenseandoutwardthings,Fallingsfromus,vanishings;BlankmisgivingsofacreatureMovingaboutinworldsnotrealized,HighinstinctsbeforewhichourmortalnatureDidtremblelikeaguiltythingsurprised.Croce,too,believesthatthereisoftensomethingwecannotmakecleartoourselvesthatistroubling.Wearedriventoorganizeitandwedothisbycreatingarepresentationthatimposesaform.Thinkofanartistwhoseattempttoorganizevisualrealityina69\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(I)picturewon’tcomeright.Thinkoffeelingthatthereissomethingonewishestosay,butnotbeingabletofindthewords,andhowfrustratingthatcanbe.Thinkofthesearchforthelostchord.Notbeingabletosayit,pictureit,composeit,is,eveninthemostmundanecircumstances,aburden.Whenonefindstherightexpression,thereisasenseofrelief.InVirginiaWoolf’sgreatnovel,Tothelighthouse,LilyBriscoecannotfindthelasttouchthatwillallowhertocompleteapictureonwhichshehasbeenlongembarked.Then“shelookedathercanvas;itwasblurred.Withasuddenintensity,asifshesawitclearforasecond,shedrewalinethere,inthecentre.Itwasdone;itwasfinished.Yes,shethought,layingdownthebrushinextremefatigue,Ihavehadmyvision.”Crocemadesuchexperiencescentraltoart:IndividualAseeksanexpressionfortheimpressionhefeels,orofwhichhehasapresentimentbutwhichhehasnotyetexpressed.Seehimtryingoutdifferentwordsandphraseswhichmightgivehimtheexpressionheseeks,whichmustbethere,althoughhehasnotgotholdofityet.Hetriesacombination,m,andrejectsitasinadequate,inexpressive,defectiveandugly:hetriescombinationn,withthesameoutcome.Hecannotseeatallorhecannotseeclearly.Theexpressionstilleludeshim.Afterothervainattempts,inwhichhenowdrawsnear,nowdrawsawayfromthattowardswhichhestrains,ofasuddenhefindstheformoftheexpressionsought—(italmostseemsthatitformsspontaneouslyinhim)—andluxfacta,est.Heenjoysforaninstantaestheticpleasureorbeauty.Theugly,withitscorrespondingdispleasure,wasthataestheticactivitythatdidnotsucceedinconqueringtheobstaclesthatlayinitsway:thebeautifulistheexpressiveactivitythatnowtriumphantlyunfoldsitself.(Croce1992,p.132)Croce’suseof“expression”ItisessentialtounderstandCroce’spreciseuseoftheterm“expression”.Anexamplewillclarifythis.Supposetheretobeanout-of-workadolescent,imperfectlyloved,livingalifeoffrustrationwiththeangerthatfrustrationbreeds.ComeFridayhecollectshisunemploymentbenefitand,tonumbthehurt,getsdrunk.At70\nBENEDETTOCROCEnighthewalkshomethroughthebrightcity,thebarredwindowsofitsshopsofferinghimvisionsofconsumerdesirableshecanneverhave.Thenaragesurgesupandhekicksinawindowandgoesonhisway.Thereisasenseinwhichthatactexpressesanger.ThisisnotwhatCrocehasinmind.Fornowimaginethathavingkickedinthewindowtheyouthlooksatitandthinks“theglassisnotjaggedenoughhere”,and“theholeshouldbefurtherover”,andmakescarefularrangementsoftheglassuntilhecansay“that’sit!that’showIfeel”.ThatforCroceishowexpressionworksinart.Inthefirstcasesomeonewasinthegripofemotion,butinthesecondtheemotionwasinhisgripbecauseanexpressionhasbeenfoundforit,whichallowsthekindofself-understandingarrivedatwhenonecansay“That’showIfeel!”.Suchanaccountofexpressionilluminatesourthinkingaboutartandtheaestheticinarichvarietyofways.Firstly,itwillbenoticedthatexpressionisneitherrule-governednorreducibletorecipes.Whentheadolescentthoughtthatthefracturedwindowdidnotexpresshisinnerlife,therewerenorulestotellhimwhattodoaboutit.Itwasamatteroftryingthisandtryingthatuntilitlookedright,amattertowhichweshallhavetoreturn,ifonlybecausethequestionmightarise:canitlookrightandnotberight?Thispointbecomesfar-reachingwhenwerealizethatnotonlyaretherenorulesforcreatingexpressions,therearenorulesforjudgingthemeither.Thishasimplicationsforcriticalpractice.Itenableswhatmanyofmystudentstellmeisarichlyappealingmodelofwhatcriticismmightbe.WhenLilyBriscoefoundtherightline,whentheabusedadolescentfoundtherightconfigurationofglass,theycouldsay“That’swhatIwasafter”.Herewehaveachievedexpression.Tojudgethisistograspthatexpression,toseethatthesepaintmarksandtheseglasscracksexpresssomething.Crocesaysthattodothiswehavetorecreatetheexpressioninourselves,andthatislikewhatwesawWittgensteinandTilghmansayingaboutthenecessityofseeingtheworldfromthepointofviewofthework.ItisrelatedtootowhatWollheimmeantwhen,inasupplementaryessaytothesecondeditionofArtanditsobjects,hespokeofcriticismas“retrieval”.OnCroce’sview,thefirstquestionisalways“whatstateisarticulatedandexpressedinthiswork?”.Sowhenwediscussindividualworksofartthatiswhatwelookfor.Thusifwhatwe71\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(I)arediscussingisPicasso’sNudedressingherhair,Iwanttohelpotherstoseethetormentandself-loathingofthefigureintheclaustrophobic,harshlylityetsombrechamberofthepicture-space.Iwantthemtoseealsohoweverypartofthatpicture—colour,posture,useofmulti-perspective,theviletoenails,thelargeposteriorandthelike—hasbeenputtherebytheartisttoproducethateffect.ButIwantthemalsotoaskwhatattitudeisexpressedbythepicturetowardsthewomandepicted.Isthegazetender?angry?isitenjoyingitalltoomuch?Thisexpressioniswhatwehavetograspifwearetounderstandthepicture.Next,supposewetaketheselinesbyDavidMiddleton,whichwereoncequotedtomeasatypicalexampleofacertainsortofVictorianpoetry:Manproposes,Goddisposes.SoIwandereduptowhereyoulay,Alittleroseamongthelittleroses,Andnomoredeadthanthey.Isn’taneducationintastejustseeingthequalityofmindarticulatedthroughthesewords?Music,too,invitesthisapproach.WhatisthewaytocharacterizethemoodofthethirdofStrauss’sFourlastsongs,whichregularlyenchantsunsuspectingstudentswhothinkthatsuchmusicisnotforthem.Cantheyseethateverydetailcountstowardstheoveralleffect?Isn’tallthisatrainingintasteandawareness?Studentsnotonlyappeartolovedoingthis,theyaskwhytheydon’tdothissortofthinginstudyingtheliterary,musicalandvisualarts,sincethisiswhattheywantedtostudythosesubjectsfor.WeshallbeseeingsomeofthereasonswhytheydonotinChapter6,thesereasonshavingtodowitherroneoustheoriesaboutcriticismandthekindsofproofspossibleincriticism.BywayofillustrationofjusthowradicaltheimplicationsofCroce’sviewsareitisworthnotingthatstudentsaresometimesaskedtodopreciselywhathistheoryrendersunintelligible.Weneedfirsttonotetwopossibledirectionsofcriticism.Oneistotrytograspthearticulatedexpressioninthework,asItriedtodowiththePicassopainting.Havinggraspedthis,andonlythen,wecanaskhowtheelementsofthepicturecontributetothatarticulatedexpression.Onecannowsay“thechoiceofcolours72\nBENEDETTOCROCEcontributesimportantlytotheeffect”,andsimplymeanadifferentsetofcolourswouldhavemarredtheeffect.HavinggraspedthesenseoftheprecariousequipoisethatcharacterizesKeats’Odetoautumn,Icannowsaythateventheabsenceofacommaattheendoftheline“Andsometimeslikeagleanerthoudostkeep”inthesecondstanzacontributestothatexpressedmood.Everythingcanbetreatedthisway.HavingnoticedSinatra’sdistinctiveeffectswecanseehowhisparticularphrasingcontributestothem.AnAnnieLennoxperformancehasaneffecttowhichsuchthingsasthehairstyleandmannerofdresscontribute.Havinggraspedtheeffect,andonlythen,wecanlookforwhatmightbecalledcriticalexplanations,accountsofhowthedetailscontributetotheeffect.(Itiscompatiblewiththisthatweshouldfirstattendtothedetailsandwaittoseeifanoveralleffectemerges.)Crocelaidstresson(thoughhedidnotinvent)whatwastobecometheenormouslyinfluentialnotionoforganicunity.Thatmeansnomorethanthatallthepartscontributetoaneffectthatemergesfromthem.Butmerelytolistthepartsisnottocapturethateffect,nomore,hethinks,thantoseparateandlayoutthedifferentpartsofahumanbodyistolayoutahumanbeingembodiedinthem.Croce,therefore,writes“Itisintheoverallresult,inthedistinctiveeffectthateveryoneadmiresandthatdeterminesandbendstoitsservicealltheindividualparts,andnotintheseindividualparts,detached,andabstractlyconsideredinthemselves,that…aworkofart…resides”(Croce1992,p.3.),andheaddsthat“divisiondestroysthework,justasdividingalivingorganismintoheart,brain,nervesandmusclesandsoonchangesalivingthingintoacorpse”(ibid.,pp.21–2).Contrastthatnowwithanoppositedirectionofmovement.Withoutgraspingtheoveralleffectonedrawsattentiontoalistoffeatures:litotes,oxymoron,alliteration,verseform,colour,compositionalform,minorkey,marble,andthenoneattemptstoderiveaknowledgeoftheoveralleffectoftheworkfromthese.Croceisrightlyemphaticthatthiscannotbedone.InthisheistheprecursorofafamouspaperinwhichFrankSibleydistinguishestwoclassesofcomments.OneclassuseswhatSibleycalls“nonaesthetic”terms,termslike“red”,“square”,“madeofmarble”,“alliterative”.Theotheruseswhathecalls“taste”or“aesthetic”73\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(I)terms,termslike“graceful”,“garish”,“delicate”andthelike.Andhispointisthataknowledgethataworkofartoranythingelsepossessesfeaturesofthefirstkindcouldneverallowustodeducethatitpossessesfeaturesofthesecondkind.Forthoughitistruethatthispictureisbalancedbecauseithasaredpatchintheleftcorner,thenextpicturemightbeunbalancedforthatveryreason.LikeCrocehewouldarguethatonemustfirstseetheaestheticqualitybeforeonecanstartaskingwhatnonaestheticqualitiesitdependson.AgainstgenresThelineofapproachthatIhaveattributedtoCroceleadstofurtherthingsofgreatinterest.Thefirstishiscontroversialattackongenres,thatis,onthegroupingofworksofartintopaintings,statues,music,literature,andwithintheseintotragedies,landscapes,sonatasandsoforth.Croceallowsthatwecandothis,butheasksaboutthepointofsodoing.For,justasknowingthatthereisanalliterationinapoemwillnottellonewhetherthatpoemisanachievedexpression,soknowingthatsomethingisalandscapewillnottellonewhetherthatisanachievedexpression,norhelponetoseetheachievedexpression.Croceneednotdenytwothings.Oneisthatknowingthecategoryintowhichsomethingfallsmayopenthewaytoitsproperappreciation.KnowingthatSwift’ssearingcondemnationofthetreatmentoftheIrishinAmodestproposalfallsintothecategoryofparodiesmakesallthedifferencetoappreciation.That,however,doesnotavoidthepointthatknowingthatsomethingthatistobeclassedasironicisanachievedexpressionissomethingmorethanknowinghowitcanbecategorized.NorneedCrocedenythatdifferentgenresmaymakedifferentaestheticeffectspossible.Itmightbethatonecandothingswithmusicthatonecannotdowitharchitecture.Butagain,toknowhowtoclassifybygenresisnottoknowwhetheraparticularinstancewithinagenrecomesoff.WecancertainlyendorseCroce’scentralclaimthatthereissomethingunhealthyaboutacriticismthataskshowthingsaretobeclassified(“isPope’sRapeoftheLockamockepic?”)withoutaskinghowandwhyPope’sRapeoftheLockisworthstudying.Infactthatwholewayofproceedingisoftenintellectuallydishonest.74\nBENEDETTOCROCEItsimplyassumesthatcertainthingsareworthstudying(“inthecanon”astheyputit)andthenperformsvariousclassificatorydancesroundthem.Butthequestionforappreciationishowthosethingsdeservetobeinthecanon.BiographyandhistoryCroce’stheoryyieldssensibleanswerstoquestionsabouttherelevanceofbiographicalandhistoricalstudiestotheappreciation.HispointisonelatertobemadeintheinfluentialworkofBeardsleyandWimsatt.Onecanstudythehistoryofliteraryworksofart,say,butonecanonlydothisifonehassomewayofdeterminingwhichthingsareliteraryworksofart.Henceliteraryhistoryissecondarytothejudgementoftaste.(AskanyonewhythehistoryofPope’sliteraryworksisstudiedwithmorezestthanthehistoryoftheeffusionsofEbenezerEliotandtheanswerhastobethatPope’sworksareworksofart.)WestudyWordworth’sbiographybecauseweknow,independentlyofandpriortothatstudy,thatWordsworth’spoetryisgreatart.Thatmakessuchstudiesdispensablewhenappreciationiswhatweareafter.However,onecanalsostudyliteraryhistoryinordertoretrieveandreconstitutetheobjectofstudy,asDoverWilsonreconstitutedthetextofHamlet.ItmayevenbethattounderstandtheachievedexpressionofSpenser’sFairieQueenethatImayneedtoreconstitutemyselfhistorically.Soiftheanswertothequestion“Whyarewestudyingthehistoryofart?”,is“Inordertogetintoapositiontograsptheachievedexpressionofthework”,thenthatisanentirelyrelevantpartofthestudyofart.TheworkasinternalInsightscanleadtoerroraswellassenseandthereisonecaseinwhichsomethingCroceseesthatistrueleadshimtosaysomethingthatlooksobviouslywrong.ForCroce,notoriously,claimsthattheworkofartisalwaysinternalandthatwhatwecalltheexternalworkofart,thepaintingonthewall,forexample,isnevertherealworkofart.Thatlookssimplybizarre.Paintingsareonwallsandnotinheads.Crocewritesthat“theworkofart(theaestheticwork)isalwaysinternal,andwhatiscalledtheexternalworkisnolongertheworkofart”(1992,p.57).75\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(I)Thecontextofthispassageisimportant.Itoccursaspartofademonstrationthatartisticexpressionisindependentofmorality,amattertowhichwereturninChapter9.Thisissimplybecause,forCroce,moralityinvolveschoices,aswhenIchoosetolieorsteal.Croce,Ithinkrightly,saysexpressionisnotamatterofchoice.Theyouthwhostayedtoarrangethewindowinordertoexpresshimselfcertainlychosetodothat.Hewas,too,actingvoluntarilywhenmovingthepiecesofglass.Butthereisagoodsenseinwhichtheresultingexpressionwasnotchosen.Firstly,theyouthdidnotchoosewhathefelttheneedtoexpress.Secondly,untiltheexpressionwasachievedtheartistcouldnothaveknownwhatitwasgoingtobe,andsocouldnothavechoseninadvancetoproducethat.Crocenextallowsthatthereisonewayinwhichartbecomesinvolvedwithmorality.Foralthoughonecannotchooseinadvancewhatanadequateexpressionofone’slifewillbe,onecanchoose,onceonehasexpressedit,whetherornottopublishthatexpression,andonemightdecideonmoralgroundsnottodoso.Thissuggeststohimthattheworkofartissomethinginternalthatawaitspublicairing.ThatisfurthersuggestedbycaseslikethatinwhichWordsworthcomposedthe“LineswrittenaboveTinternAbbey”inhisheadduringthewalkhome.Whenhegothomehewrotethemdown.Thatisonesenseof“makepublic”.Hethenchosetopublishthem.Thatisanothersenseof“makepublic”.IthinkthatCrocehadhiseyetoofirmlyfixedontheWordsworthcase.Thatshowsthatapoemcanbekeptinthehead,andIthinkhefeltthatallartwaslikethat.Butitiswhollyunclearthatapaintingcouldbeintheheadinthewayinwhichapoemcouldbeinthehead.Idonotmeanbythisthatsomeone,Mondrianperhaps,couldnotcompletelyimagineapaintinginadvanceanddecidenotactuallytopaintit.ImeanforanythinglessschematicthanaMondriantheveryimaginingcannotbedone.IfyouaretemptedtothinkthatConstablecouldhaveenvisagedThecornfieldinadvance,askifhecouldhaveenvisagedtheeffectthatserendipitouslyemergedwhenthepaletteknifeslippedashewaspainting.Thereisamoreinteresting,andcorrect,thoughtthattemptsCrocetoclaimthatworksofartareinternal.Thisisthethoughtthatwehavenotsaidanythingaboutapaintingasaworkofartwhenwehavesimplylisteditsphysicalfeatures:saythecoloursonitssurface,describedifyouwillbymathematicalformulaso76\nBENEDETTOCROCEexactthatanotherpersoncouldexactlyreconstructthepicture,asthegreateighteenthcenturygardensattheUniversityofKeelewerereconstructedbyGeorgeBarnesfromtheoriginalplans.IthinkCrocethoughtthismeantthattheworkofartwasnotaphysicalthing.Butallheneededtosay,andwhatheoftendidsay,isthatobservationofamerecollectionofphysicalfeaturesisnotenough.Onehastoseewhatemergesfromthesephysicalconstituents.Heisemphaticthatifartisticmonumentsaredestroyed,“alltherichesofaesthetics,fruitofthelaboursofmanygenerationsrapidlydwindlesordisappears”(ibid.,p.108).Butalthoughthephysicaliswheretheaestheticvisionisembodied,itisnotreducibletothephysical.Herethefollowing,oftenneglected,passageisexemplary:Itcouldbeobjected:thattheartistcreateshisexpressionsintheactofpaintingandsketching,writingandcomposing;andthat,therefore,physicalbeauty,ratherthancomingafter,cansometimescomebeforeaestheticbeauty.Thiswouldbeasuperficialwayofunderstandingtheprocedureofartists,who,infact,donotmakestrokesofthebrushwithouthavingfirstseenbymeansoftheimagination;andiftheyhavenotseen,makebrushstrokesnottoexternalizetheirexpressions(whichdonotthenexist)butasiftotryoutandhaveasimplepointofsupportfortheirinternalmeditationsandcontemplations.Thephysicalpointofsupportisnotphysicalbeauty…butwhatonecouldcallanheuristicdevice.(Croce1992,pp.114–15)Hispointisthatpaintingisphysicalactionsinformedbythought.Fromthisitfollowsthattheworkofartisnotsimplyaphysicalobjectandthatpaintingitisnotsimplyaphysicalactivity.ScientificaestheticsThisbearsonanimportantimplicationofCroce’saesthetics.Forifapaintingcannotbereducedtoamatterofcoloursinspatialarrangement,ifpoetrycannotbereducedtocombinationsofwords,andmusictostructuresofsounds,althoughthesecanallbeinformedbyexpression,theninoneimportantsenseascientifictreatmentofaestheticsisimpossible.Sinceexpressiontranscendsitsmathematicalandphysicalbase,thosesciencesthatoperateonlyonthatbasecannottouchit.Some,spurredbyspuriousdreams77\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(I)ofimportingintoaestheticstheprestigeofscience,havetriedtodotheimpossible.Theyhavesoughtsomephysical,observable,measurablefactaboutobjectsfromwhichinferencesmightbemadeastothepresenceofartinthem.Onecommoncandidateistheso-calledGoldenSection,aratioendemicinnaturefromtheshellsofsnailstothespiralnebulae.Somebelievedthatthepresenceofthisratioisanindexofthepresenceofaestheticquality.QuiteapartfromthefactthattherearegreatworksthatdonotseemtoexhibittheratiooftheGoldenSectionandawfulworksthatdo,onemightaskhowthecorrelationbetweenthepresenceoftheGoldenSectionandthepresenceofaestheticqualitywasestablished.PresumablytheinvestigatorfirstfoundthatsomeworkhadmeritandthenfoundthatwhenitdidtheGoldenSectionwaspresent.ButthenthejudgementofmeritcanbemadeindependentlyofdetectionofGoldenSections.ThepassagesinwhichCrocedealswiththistomfoolery,whichhecallstheastrologyofaesthetics(ibid.,pp.121–3),stillalaswithus,are,intheirbitingsimplicity,ajoytoread,andIcommendthereadertothem.ProblemsCroceoffersapowerfulaccountofartanditsappreciation.Buttheaccounthasitsdifficulties—difficultiesthathauntallaesthetics—aboutsubjectivityandobjectivity,aboutart,truthandmorality,abouttheoftenproclaimeddeathoftheartist.ThesewillbediscussedfromChapter6onwards.Ibegin,however,withwhatmayseemafundamentalproblem.Croce’saccounthasthisincommonwithmanyothers.Ittriestofindcharacteristicsthatdefineart.Tofindtheseistohavefoundtheessenceofart.Thesecharacteristicswillbenecessaryconditions:artwillhavetohavethem;andsufficientconditions:onlyartwillhavethem.Croce’saccountthenseemsimmediatelysuspect.Foritoffersoneconditionastheessenceofart,namelyexpression.Butitdoesnotseemnecessaryforarttobeexpression(whatofmusicthatisjustnicetolistento?);norisitsufficient,sinceexpressiondoesnothavetobeart(whatofthesimpleexpression“Iloveyou”?).Thisbringsustocontemporaryphilosophyandphilosophicalaesthetics.TherewearetoldthatWittgensteinhasgivenaproofthatallattempts,suchasCroce’s,todefineartintermsofessencesareill-conceived.ThatwouldbeasevereobjectiontoCroce’sstory,soInowturntothatmatter.78\nGUIDETOREADINGGuidetoreadingL.Tolstoy’sWhatisart?isnowavailableinpaperback(London:Duckworth,1994).Irepeatthatitisaworthyread,ifonlybecauseofthepassionitbringstoaesthetics.Thiswasrecognizedbythatseverejudgeofthefrivolous,LudwigWittgenstein.C.Barrett(ed.),Wittgenstein:lecturesandconversationsonaesthetics,psychologyandreligiousbelief(Oxford:Blackwell,1966)bearsallthemarksofacloseengagementwithWhatisart?.R.Wilkinsonoffersagoodclearstandarddiscussioninhiscontribution,“Artemotionandexpression”toHanfling’sPhilosophicalaesthetics.TomSorrellalsoaddstrenchantcriticismsonpp.314–20ofthesamevolume.ThereisabookonTolstoy’saccountofartbyT.Diffey,Tolstoy’sWhatisart?(London:CroomHelm,1985).M.Budd,Musicandtheemotions(London:Routledge,1985)hascriticismstowhichIhavetriedtorespond.Asidenote:Tolstoy’saccountarguablyinfluencedthetheatricaltheoriesofStanislavskyand,throughhim,LeeStrasbergandtheMethodschool.So,outofTolstoycameBrando,forwhichTolstoymaybeforgivenmuch.SeeR.Hughes,“Tolstoy,Stanislavskiandtheartofacting”,JournalofAestheticsandArtCriticism51(1),1993,pp.39–48.IndiscussingTolstoyImadeadistinctionbetweenwhatisexpressedbycharactersinaworkandwhatmightbeexpressedbythework.Forsomeinterestingrecentworkonthewayacomposermightappearinaworksee,forexample,JustinLondon,“Musicalandlinguisticspeechacts”,JournalofAestheticsandArtCriticism54(1),1996,pp.49–46Croce’s1902EsteticahasbeentranslatedbymeasTheaestheticasthescienceofexpressionandofthelinguisticingeneral(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992).TheintroductiongivesanoverallpictureofCroce’sphilosophicalprojectandhowaestheticsfitsintoit.AslightlyoutofdatebutaccessibleworkonCroceisG.Orsini,BenedettoCroce(Carbondale:SouthernIllinoisUniversityPress,1961).Crocehad40moreyearsofaestheticsinhimafterthepublicationofTheaestheticin1902.TheyculminatewithLapoesia(1943)translatedbyG.GullaceasPoetryandliterature(Carbondale:UniversityofSouthernIllinoisPress,1981),theintroductionofwhich,thoughtaxing,isanauthoritativeguidetoCroce’saesthetics.Ifind,rightlyorwrongly,similaritiesbetweenCroce’sworkandtheworkofRichardWollheim,similaritiesto79\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(I)whichIshallreturninlaterchapters.SeeWollheim’sThemindanditsdepths(Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress,1993),notablyessayIX,“Correspondence,projectiveproperties,andexpressioninthearts”.IalsonotedsimilaritiesbetweensomeofCroce’sthoughtsandthoseofFrankSibley.Thelatterarebestseeninhisclassic“Aestheticconcepts”,PhilosophicalReview68,1959,pp.421–50,and“Aestheticandnon-aesthetic”,PhilosophicalReview75,1965,pp.135–59.Thelatterintroducesthenotionoftwodirectionsofcriticismandofcriticismasexplanation.Croce’sattacksongenreshavehadamixedreception,beingtrenchantlycriticizedbybothA.Quinton,“Tragedy”,ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,supp.vol.34,1960,pp.145–64andRichardWollheiminArtandisobjects.ThereisaverygoodguidetotheirobjectionswithamostjudiciousreplyinM.Paton,“GettingCrocestraight,”BritishJournalofAesthetics25,1985pp.252–65.R.G.Collingwood’sversionoftheviewthattheworkofartisinternalisdiscussedbyWollheiminOnartandthemind.ThatbringsmetoCollingwood,whoisthoughttogivethenearestversionofCroce’sthinkinginEnglish.CertainlyheclaimednottodifferinanyessentialrespectsfromCroce.(SeetheletterreprintedinA.Donagan,ThelaterphilosophyofR.G.Collingwood,Oxford:Clarendon,1962.)Ihavemydoubtsaboutthis,whicharecrystallizedbyMerleBrown’sadmittedlydemandingNeo-idealistaesthetics(Detroit:WayneStateUniversityPress,1966).ThelastchapterofthisseemstoshowhowCollingwood’saestheticisanuneasymelangeofincompatibleelementsofCroce,Gentileandsomeofhisownviews.Butthatisformoreadvancedstudy.CertainlyCollingwood’sTheprinciplesofart(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1938)meritsexaminationandisavigorousandentertainingread.Finallytwobooksatanintermediatelevelthatmakeimportantcontributionstodiscussionsofexpressioninart.OneisA.Tormey,Theconceptofexpression(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1971).TheotherisGuySircello,Mindandart(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1972).Expressioninmusicis,andalwayshasbeen,avigorouslydebatedtopic.EdvardHanslick’sviewsareworthdiscussion,andR.Wilkinson’scommentsinHanfling’sPhilosophicalaesthetics(pp.207–20)areagoodintroductiontothem.80\nGUIDETOREADINGPeterKivyhaswrittenaseriesofchallengingbooksonmusicalexpression,ofwhichThecordedshellisonetobeginwith;nowreprintedasPart1ofSoundsentiment(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1989).SeealsoMusicalone(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1990).MoreadvancedisMalcolmBudd’sMusicandtheemotions,whichisthoroughlyworthreadingifonlyforitsdemolitionjobsoncertainthinkerswhohavetriedtomakemusicalanguageoftheemotions.MorerecentlystillthereisA.Ridley,Music,valueandthepassions(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1994).IfyouwanttoknowwhateveryonehaseversaidaboutmusicandtheemotionstryStephenDavis,Music,meaningandexpression(Ithaca:Cornell,1994).ForexamplesofhowwellphilosopherscanwriteaboutmusicseeJ.LevinsonMusic,artandmetaphysics(Ithica:CornellUniversityPress,1990),hisThepleasuresoftheaesthetic(Ithica:CornellUniversityPress,1996)andL.Goehr,Theimaginarymuseumofmusicalworks(Oxford:ClarendonPress1993).81\n\nChapter4TalesfromtheViennaWoods:afterWittgensteininaestheticsAgainstessencesSome,aswehaveseen,believeditmadesensetoaskwhethersomecommonfeaturecouldbefoundinaestheticresponsesthatwouldgivetheessenceoftheaesthetic.Thatbringsustotheclaim,whichhasdominatedmuchofthediscussionofaestheticsinthesecondhalfofthiscentury,thatthiswholeapproachisflawed.Thatbringsus,inturn,toLudwigWittgenstein,afigurewholoomsoverthephilosophyofthisperiod.TwoportionsofthelegacyofWittgenstein’sthinkingenterthispresentwork.Firstly,Ihavealreadyinvokedhisviewthatlanguagegetswhateversenseithasfromthewayitiswovenintothelivesandpracticesofthosewhouseit.Secondlythereisthematterthatconcernsusnow.ForWittgensteinintroducedintophilosophytheterm“familyresemblances”,atermthat,misunderstood,exertsabalefulinfluenceonrecentaesthetics.Wittgensteinintroducesthenotionof“familyresemblances”inhisposthumouslypublishedPhilosophicalinvestigations.ThoseInvestigationsbeginwithaquotationfromStAugustine’s83\nTALESFROMTHEVIENNAWOODSConfessionsinwhichAugustinecharacterizeshisacquisitionoflanguageasamatterofconnectingthenoisesandgesturesmadebyhisparentswithobjectsinthevicinity.Forexample,oneofAugustine’sparentsmighthaveutteredthesound“dog”whilegesturingtoanobject.Hethenmadetheconnectionandlearntwhatwasmeantby“dog”.PartofthefirstpartoftheInvestigationsisademonstrationofthewoefulinadequaciesofthisaccount.Forconsider:theaccountismeanttoexplainhowachildacquiresanunderstandingofmeaningbyfollowingpointinggestures.Butinordertograspwhatitistodowhenthispointingceremonyoccurs,thechildmustalreadyhaveanunderstandingofthemeaningofthegestures.Concurrentlywiththisdemolitionjob,Wittgensteinsketchesanalternativeview.Ourlivestakevariousforms.Oneformourlifetakesisaninterestinstories.Anotherisaninterestincolours.Anotherisapropensitytojudgethebehaviourofothers.Anotheristoexpressdoubtandcertainty.Thecentralthoughtisthatwordslike“lovely”,“red”,“lifelike”,“wicked”,“doubtful”,“mind”,“know”,“meaning”,gettheirsensefromthevariousformsthatourlivestakeandareonlytobeunderstoodintheformsoflifethataretheirhome.Therearethewordsweuseinaesthetics,tobeunderstoodbytheirplaceinacertainsetofpractices.Therearethewordsweuseinphysics,alsounderstoodintermsofanother,differentsetofpractices.Soitmightbeamistaketosuppose“right”asusedinthepracticesofendorsingsomeone’scommentonafilm,isusedinthesamewayasitisusedinthedifferentpracticesofassessingascientifictheory.ThroughouttheInvestigationsappearsanalterego,usuallymarkedoffbyinvertedcommas,whoraisesproblemsanddifficulties.Atparagraph65thisalteregoburstsoutwiththecommentthatevenifWittgensteinhassaidsomethingabouthowwordsmightgetmeaninginthisorthatsegmentoflivedpractices,hehasnottoldustheessenceoflanguage.Theobjectionisthatthetermsthatweuseinaestheticsmightbecalledtheaestheticlanguage,andlikewisethereisascientificlanguage,amorallanguageandareligiouslanguage.ButWittgensteinhasnottolduswhatmakesthemalllanguages.Inreply,Wittgensteinsimplydeniesthatlanguagehasanessenceandinthatcontextintroducesthenotionof“familyresemblances”.Considersomemembersofafamily.Thereisthe84\nWEITZgrandmother,Maud,whohasblueeyes,fairstraighthair,aprominentjaw,andarollinggait.ThereisherdaughterPriscillawhohashermother’seyesandgaitbuthasbrowncurlyhairandlargelobedears.SheismarriedtoDerekwhohasblackcurlyhair,ahookednose,prominentteethandgreyeyes.Theyhaveadaughter,Kirsten,whohashergrandmother’shairandjawandherfather’snoseandteeth.Seethemalltogetherand,becauseofthatsharedpoolofresemblances,theycanbeseenalltobelongtothesamefamily.ButKirstenandMaud,takeninisolation,neednotlookalike.Whatthefamilyhasisanoverlappingseriesofresemblanceswithnothingnecessarilyincommonbetweenanytwopeopleinthatseries.So,itisargued,asetofthingscanallbelanguages,eventhoughthereisnocommonfeaturethattheyallpossess.Theymaymerelyhavefamilyresemblances.And,sotheargumentgoeson,itiswrongtosupposethatallworksofartmusthavesomethingincommon.Henceitfollowsthatitisamistaketoattempttodistil,fromthevariousaestheticobjectsandaestheticresponseswithwhichIbegan,someessenceoftheaesthetic.WeitzLestitbethoughtthatwearedealingwithstrawmen,letusturntoMorrisWeitz,whomadehisnamebysubscribingtothefamilyresemblanceaccountandattackingtheviewthatarthasanessence.Weitz’sargumentisintwoparts.Thefirstpartclaimsthatartsimplycannotbedefinedbysinglingoutoneorafewfeaturesastheessenceofart.ThesecondpartinvokesWittgenstein’sterm“familyresemblance”asgivingusabetterpictureofthematter.Thesepartshangtogether,sinceoneonlyneedstoinvoketheWittgensteinianpositioniftheclaimthatartcannotbedefinedintermsofessencesistrue.TheargumentagainstessentialistdefinitionsissimplythatartiswhatWeitzcallsan“open”concept.Takethenotionoftragedy.AristotlecollectedallthetragediesproducedinGreeceanddistilledcommonfeaturessharedbythem.Forexample,allseemedtoinvolvedisasterbefallinganimportantperson.Thatseemedtohimtoheightenthetragedy,sincethespectacleofsomeonebigbitingthedustislikelytobemoreawesomethanthefallofsomelessermortal.But,andhereWeitzisright,althoughwemayget85\nTALESFROMTHEVIENNAWOODSfromthisadefinitionofGreektragedy,wecannotforecloseonfuturedevelopmentsinthatartform.Indeed,weknowthatArthurMillerdeliberatelytookWillieLoman,asalesman,ashistragicherotoshowthattragediescouldenterthelivesoflesserpeoplewithnolessanexemplaryforce.SoWeitzclaims,firstly,thatartisopen.Nomatterwhatweknowaboutartsofar,wehavenobasisforconcludinghowartwilldevelop.Itisgiventocreativelytranscendingitspresentstateandanyaccountwemightgiveoftheessenceofthatpresentstate.Secondly,aninsistenceonessentialistdefinitionswillnotonlymisunderstandart,butwillhaveperniciouspracticalconsequences.SupposesomeoneclaimedthatAristotle’sdefinition,whichisatbestadefinitionofGreektragedy,wasadefinitionoftragedyassuch.Thetemptationwouldbetoinsistthatpeoplemakeonlythatsortoftragedy.Thiswouldclosedowncreativity.Thatindeedhappened.Aristotlewassupposedtohavesaidthatgoodtragediesmustobserve“theunities”.One(superblycastigatedbyDoctorJohnson)isunityofplace,since,itwasthought,audienceswouldbedisturbedbybeingatonemomentinAthensandthenextinLondon.Didn’tthislead,inpractice,totheslavishmechanicalobservationofrulestothedetrimentofdrama?Wecannowasktwoquestions:oneiswhetherartisanopenconceptinawaythatdefeatsanyattempttostateitsessence.Theotheriswhetherfamilyresemblanceaccountsdoanybetter.Astothefirst,aninitialproblemisthatitisneverentirelyclearwhatWeitzmeansbyartbeingopen.Onethinghesaysisthatnewworksofartcontinuallyappear.Thisisentirelyunhelpfulassupportfortheclaimthatartworkshavenoessenceincommon.Newgardenpeasappearonthestalkwithoutthatpreventingthebeliefthatgardenpeashavedefiningfeatures.MoreoverIamtemptedtoarguethatthefactthatwecallnewthings“art”showsthattheysharesomethingwiththeirpredecessors.Whyelsecallthemthat?Weitzalsosaysthatnewtypesofartarrive.Themobile,thenovel,thefilmandeartharttranscendtheartwealreadyhave.Anyattempttolimitarttoexistentoperativegenresis,indeed,foolish.Artis,inthatsense,open.Again,thisdoesnothingtoestablishtheclaimthatarthasnoessence.Whenmobilesappeared,theywerecalled“art”becausepeoplesawthattheydidwhatthingsalreadycalled“art”weredoing.86\nWEITZWeitzhastworeplies.Oneistoaskwhatfeatureisthoughtessentialandthen,foranycandidate,showitisn’t.Ifthefeatureisrepresentation,hemightaskaboutmusic.Suchareplyforcesthepersonofferingthatfeature,asitrecentlyforcedme,toaskwhetheritispossibleproperlytoextendthenotionofrepresentationinordertomaketheaccountwork.ThatpossibilityisnotexcludedbyanythingWeitzsays.Theotherstrategyistoclaimthatalthoughnewworksandtypesofworkmayhavesomethingincommonwithwhatwentbefore,thisdoesnothingtoshowthattheyandtheirpredecessorsshareonecommonfeature.For,Weitzcanargue,Wittgensteinhasshownusthatthesenewworksmaymerelyhavefamilyresemblancestopreviousworksandmayhavenoonecommonfeaturewithalltheirpredecessors.TodealwiththisletuslookcloseratwhatWittgensteindidsay.LetusfirstnotethatWittgensteinsaysnothingthatsupportsattributiontohimoftheviewthatwithinthatformoflifecalledtheaestheticthereisnothingsharedbytheobjectsandresponsesthatwecall“aesthetic”or“artistic”.Infacthispractice,asshowninCultureandvalue,wastomakeexpressioncentraltoart.AllhesaysintheInvestigationsisthatthedifferentlinguisticformsoflife(aesthetics,science,religion)needhavenoonethingincommon.Heappearstobedenyingthatactivities(doingaesthetics,doingscience,beingreligious)havetoshareonecommonfeaturebutappearsnottobetalkingatallabouttheobjectsdealtwithintheseactivities,suchasindividualworksofart.Butdoesn’tWittgensteintake“game”ashisexampleofafamilyresemblanceterm.Sodoesn’thesaythatevenwithinanactivity,sayplayingofgames,orart,oneshouldnotlookforcommonfeaturesofindividualgamesorindividualworksofart.Note,however,thealteregoobjectedthatWittgensteindoesnotsaywhatalltheformsoflanguagelife(religion,art,science,morality,forexample)haveincommonthatmakesthemallformsoflanguage.Inordertobeananswertothatobjectionthegamesexamplemusttreateachtypeofgameasadifferentformoflife.ButthenitlooksasifWittgensteinissayingthateachgameisaself-containedpractice,sothatrugbyunionstandstoblackjackasartstandstomorality,suchgamesbeingrelatedtoothergamesonlybycriss-crossingandoverlappingfeatures.Thatdoeslookright.Butfromthatitdoesnotfollowthatthereisnothingthat87\nTALESFROMTHEVIENNAWOODSgameswithinthepracticeofrugbyuniongameshaveincommonthatmakesthemrugbyuniongames.Thenotionoffamilyresemblances,then,isnotmeanttoshowthatindividualworksofartdonothavesomethingincommon.Itisintroducedtoshowthatthevariousformsoflinguisticlifedonotshareacommonfeature.Thoseformsoflife,asthefamilyresemblanceimagesuggests,do,ofcourse,sharefeatures.Thewaysinwhichwetalkaboutsunsetsaestheticallymightbelikethewaysweassessscientifictheoriesintermsofeleganceandsimplicity.Thatistheforceofsayingthattherearefamilyresemblancesbetweendifferentformsoflife.Itiscompatiblewiththisthatjustaswhatarelooselyclassedasgamesmayincludemanydifferentformsofactivity,soourdealingswiththeaestheticmayhavesub-divisionsbetweenwhichthereislittleincommon.Aninterestinsunsetsmightdifferfromaninterestsinpaintings.Thatstillallowsourdealingswithpaintings,andindeed,worksofartgenerally,tohavesomeunifyingcharacteristic.Onmyaccount,therefore,thenotionoffamilyresemblancesallowsnoroomwhatsoeverforWeitztoeliminatethepossibilityoftherebeingcommonfeaturesoftheobjectsinwhichwetakeanaestheticinterestoroftheinterestthatwetakeinthem.SeeingtheresemblanceThereis,however,anotheraspecttothenotionofseeingfamilyresemblancesthatestablishesshortcomingsincertainkindsofdefinitionsofart,notably,asweshallsee,thoseofferedbytheso-called“institution”accountofart.Itispossibletobetoldthatthereisafamilyresemblancebetweenamotheranddaughter,tobelievethis,andyetnotbeabletoseeit.SimilarlyImightbetoldthatDuchamp’sFontaineisartbecauseitsharesafeaturewithRodin’sThekiss,takethisontrust,andyetnotseeit.Thisiswhydefinitionscanseemunhelpful.Imightacceptthatartisexpression,butunlessIcanseehowthisworkisexpressive,thedefinitionmaybenousetome.Further,herethereisasensetotalkingaboutopenness,asenseinwhichmanyofourconceptsareopenones.Whenwelearntouseatermlike“dog”wedonotlearnitasthenameoftheparticulardoginwhosepresencelearningtookplace.ThatiswhyWittgensteinrejectedAugustine’saccount.Howisthechildtoknowthatthe88\nSEEINGTHERESEMBLANCEsound“dog”ismeanttobeappliedtoalldogsasopposedtojustthisone?Wearecreativeintheprojectionoftermsthatwelearn,sothat,withoutfurtherguidance,theterm“dog”learntinthepresenceofaspanielisthenappliedtodachshunds.Languagewouldnotbepossibleifwecouldnotdothis.Wecandothisbecauseweseethatthisnewcaseisliketheoldones,althoughnothingcanguaranteethatwewilldoso.StanleyCavellexpressesthisperfectly:Welearnandteachwordsincertaincontexts,andthenweareexpected,andexpectothers,tobeabletoprojectthemintofurthercontexts.Nothingensuresthatthisprojectionwilltakeplace(inparticularnotthegraspingofuniversalsnorthegraspingofbooksofrules),justasnothingwillensurethatwewillmake,andunderstand,thesameprojections.Thatonthewholewedoisamatterofoursharingroutesofinterestandfeeling,modesofresponse,sensesofhumourandofsignificanceandoffulfillment,ofwhatisoutrageous,ofwhatissimilartowhatelse,whatarebuke,whatforgiveness,ofwhenanutteranceisanassertion,whenanappeal,whenanexplanation—allthatwhirloforganismWittgensteincalls“formsoflife”.Humanspeechandactivity,sanityandcommunity,restsonnothingmore,butnothinglessthanthis.(Cavell1966,p.160)Sometimes,indeed,wedivideinourprojections.SomeofusseearesemblancebetweenwhatCleeseisdoingandwhatWildeisdoingandmayeventhinkthattheyarefunnyinthesameway.Otherscannotseethis.Thatkindofdisagreementwillfigureprominentlyinourlaterdiscussionofsubjectivity.TheinstitutionofartSofarwehavelookedatthewayinwhichthenameofWittgensteinwasinvokedtounderminethetaskofdefiningartintermsofacommonfeature.However,strikingly,theworkofWittgensteinhasalsobeenusedbysupportersofwhatiscalledthe“institutionaccountofart”,toarguethataconditioncanbestatedthatdefinesandmarksoffwhatisartfromwhatisnot.89\nTALESFROMTHEVIENNAWOODSTheaccountrestsonthecorrectnotionthatartisasocialinstitution,thisbeingnomorethanthepreviouslystatedviewthatacomplexsetofwaysofrespondingtoartandnatureisaformthatlifetakes.Itmaybethatdifferentsocieties,differentsubgroupsinasocietyandeventhesamesocietyovertime,mayhaveverydifferentinterestsinnatureandmadethings.TheinteresttakenbythedevoutintherepresentationalfiguresthatdecorateHindutemplesmaybequitedifferentfromtheinteresttakenbyaEuropeanvoyeur.TheinterestinthealtarpiecesinItalianmedievalchurchestakenbyworshippersinthetwelfthcenturydiffersfromtheinteresttakenbyacontemporaryitinerantconnoisseur.Toknowwhattheseinterestsarewehavetointernalizethelivesofothercultures.Andsincethemeaningofawordisdeterminedbyitsuseinasetofpractices,theremaybenowordinanotherculturethatmeanswhatwemeanby“art”.Itisquiteunclear,forexample,whethertheGreekshadanywordmeaningwhatwemeanby“art”.InourculturethereiswhatArthurDantohascalled“theartworld”.Itincludesgalleries,concerthalls,artschools,theinstitutionsfortradingart,collectingart,studyingitshistory,restoringandcommissioningit.Itinvolvesalsothemyriadofverbalandotherexpressionsthatdifferentbutoverlappinggroupsusetoexpressaninterestinart.Whydidthatinterestthosewhoproposedtheinstitutionaccount?Althoughtheeventualdefinitioncoversallart,thosewhoofferitinitiallyhadtheireyesontheavant-garde,thatis,theoftenbafflingnewart.Manyofmyreaderswillunderstandthisbafflement.TheymayhavenoprobleminacceptingthattheworksofRembrandt,Constable,Rodin,Mozart,BeethovenandShakespeareareart,evenifnotsurewhyornotcaringparticularlyforthem.Butthenthereareobjectsthatdefeatanyunderstandingofthemasart.Someofthemhavebecomeiconicproblemcases.90\nTHEINSTITUTIONOFARTDuchamp,Fontaine,1964.CentreNationalD’ArtetdeCulture,GeorgesPompidou,Paris.Duchamp’sFontaineisaurinalsigned“R.Mutt,1917”andbearingthetitleFontaine.HisBottledryerissimplyabottledryerfoundinthestreetandexhibitedunalteredinagallery.CarlAndré’sEquivalentVIIIis120bricksarrangedsymmetricallyinatwo-brick-highrectangle.ApianistperformsJohnCage’s4’33”bysimplysittingatapianoforthatperiodoftime.Thereisnoletup.There,pickledinformaldehyde,hangshalfacow,hailedinMinneapolisasbrilliantBritishart.Andthequestionrisesupirresistibly:“Isitart?”,towhichtheinstitutionaccountoffersasimpleanswer.91\nTALESFROMTHEVIENNAWOODSTounderstandthatanswer,beginwiththisoddquestion:doesanewlychristenedbabylookdifferentbeforeandafterthechristening?Giveortakeafewdropsofwater,theansweris“no”.Whatmakesthebabyachristenedbabyisnotthewayitlooksbutthefactthataceremonyconferredmembershipofaninstitutiononitsunwittinghead.Analogously,aworkofartneednotlookanydifferentfromsomethingthatisnotart.Itisaworkofartbecausemembershipofaninstitutionhasbeenconferredonit.SoDickie,towhommuchofthisisdue,wrote:“Aworkofart…is(1)anartefact(2)asetofaspectsofwhichhashadconferreduponitthestatusofcandidateforappreciationbysomepersonorpersonsactingonbehalfofacertainsocialinstitution(theartworld)”(Dickie1974,p.34).Thisismeanttosolvetheproblemofavantgardeart.Foraworktobeacceptedbytheartworld,intoagalleryforexample,istohavethestatusofartconferredonit.SoFontainesimplyisart.Dickieaddsthatthiswillnotguaranteethethingisgoodart,nomorethanbaptismguaranteessaintlycomportment.Butartitis,inaclassificatorysense.Muchsporthasbeenhadwiththisaccount,oneaspectoftheanalogywithotherceremoniescausingmuchconcern.Thusachristeningisnotlegitimateifsomeonesnatchesthebabyandsays“IbaptisetheeBabetheSheeppig”,nomorethananuclearsubmarineisnamedifsomeoneleapsoutfromthecrowdandsays“InamethisvesselRainbowWarriorVI”andkicksthechocksaway.Thecandidatemustbeinductedbyaproperlyauthorizedperson.Some,therefore,haveaskedwhoisauthorizedtoallowthingsintotheartworld—who,thatis,correspondstothevicarinthechristeningservice.Othershaveaskedwhetherthismakesitimpossibleforsomethingtobeaworkofartifkeptunderwrapsbyitsmaker.Somehavesmelledaratinthenotionofcandidateforappreciation.Forsinceappreciationmaybebasedonanumberofdifferentgrounds(aswhenoneappreciatesacoinwhenbegging)weneedtoknowwhatsortofappreciationDickiehasinmind.Iftheansweris“thekindofappreciationappropriatetoart”wemerelygoroundincircles.ToalloftheseDickie,insuccessiverefinementsofthetheory,hasofferedrepliesthatthecuriouswillfinddocumentedintheguidetoreading.Iwanttotakeadifferentapproach.92\nLEVINSONInote,first,thatthereissomethingrightabouttheaccount.Anobjectisaworkofartifthosewhocanseesomepointinusingtheword“art”,whothereforeparticipateintheartworld,seesomepointinusingitofthatthing.Next,manywhoencounteravant-gardeartanddonotunderstanditarequitepreparedtomakethecharitableassumptionthatifathingisinagallery,thenthereissomepointinitsbeingthere,andsoitmustbeart.SoDickieisrightthat,ifyoucangetthethingintotheartworld,thenitacquiresanartstatus.However,althoughthosewhoworryaboutFontaine,say,maynotbeworriedaboutwhetheritisart,eventhemostignorantknowsthattocallit“art”makesaclaimonbehalfofthevalueofthething.WhattheythenwanttoknowisnothingotherthanwhatsomeonewhodoesnotunderstandwhypeoplerhapsodizeaboutBotticelliwantstoknow:whatvaluedoesithave.Heretheinstitutionaccountissimplyuseless.Itassumesthatpeoplewhoask“Whyisthatinthegallery?”areasking“Isitart?”whereastheyareasking“Whyisitart?”Peopledon’tputthingsingalleriesjustsotheycancallthem“art”,butbecausetheyseesomepointindoingso.Toknowthepointistoknowwhatvaluetheobjectisthoughttohave.Thatiswhatthepuzzledwanttoknowaboutallart,andsincetheinstitutionaccountissilentaboutthatittellsusnothingaboutart.LevinsonAdifferentversionoftheinstitutionaccountisofferedbyJerroldLevinsonwhowrites:“Aworkofartisathingintendedforregard-as-a-work-of-art:regardinanyofthewaysworksexistingpriortoithavebeensuccessfullyregarded”(Levinson1979,p.234).TounderstandthisapproachaskwhatwouldhelpsomeonewhocannotseewhyDuchamp’sFontaineisart.Heretherearetwocases.OneisthepersonwhocanseewhyThehaywainhasvalueasartbutcan’tseewhyFontainedoes.Theotheristhepersonwhodoesn’tknowwhyeitherisartandsimplywantstoknowwhattheclaimofartis.ToanswerthefirstpersononecouldtrytoshowthatDuchamp’sFontainehasthesortsofthingsthatmakeThehaywainart.Evenif,asBenTilghmanhasargued,thissimply93\nTALESFROMTHEVIENNAWOODScan’tbedonefortheDuchamp,thatisstilltheonlystrategythatcouldwork.ThisliesattherootofLevinson’saccount.Somethingisaworkofartifitisintendedtobeappreciatedinthewaysinwhicharthashithertobeenappreciated.Thatisalsoaninstitutiontheory,inthatthewaysinwhichpeoplehaveappreciatedartconstituteourinstitutionofart.Thereissomethingrightaboutthis.Onewaytosolvepeople’spuzzlementaboutwhatisgoingoninavant-gardeartistogetthemtoseethatthesamethingisgoingonasisgoingonintheartthattheydoaccept.However,thisdefinitionisasunhelpfulastheoriginalinstitutiontheory.Ithelpssomeonewhoknowsaboutpreviousartbutitdoessonotbysayingwhatartis,butbyassumingaknowledgeofthat.Itisofnousetoanyonewhowantstoknowwhypeoplepraiseart,becauseitdoesnotsaywhatartis.Howthencanitbeadefinition?Alltheseinstitutionaccountsfounderonaconfusionbetweentwosensesofthequestion“whatisart?”.Onesenseis“Underwhatconditionswouldsomethingproperlybecalled‘art’?”.Tothatonecanrightlygivetheanswer“Ifitgetsintotheartworld”or“Ifitisintendedtodowhatarthasalwaysbeenintendedtodo”.Buttheothersenseofthequestion,thequestionthatexpressesacommonbewildermentabouttheavant-garde,andmuchelsethatisestablishedintheartworld,is“Whyarethingswhicharecalled‘art’valued?”.Onthatcentralquestiontheinstitutionaccountissilent.GuidetoreadingTheverybestwaytogetinterestedinWittgensteinistoreadRayMonk’sbiography,LudwigWittgenstein:thedutyofgenius(London:Cape,1990)whichyouwillputdownwithdifficulty.TryalsoNormanMalcolm’sshorterandequallycompellingLudwigWittgenstein:amemoir(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1958).AflavourofWittgenstein’sthinkingaboutparticularartistsandartiswellobtainedfromsnippetsassembledfromhisnotesbyPeterWinchandpublishedasCultureandvalue(Oxford:Blackwell,1980).IenjoyedB.Tilghman,Wittgenstein:ethicsandaesthetics94\nGUIDETOREADING(Basingstoke:Macmillan,1991)whichseemedtometocapturemuchofthespiritofWittgenstein’sthinking.AcentralWittgensteinworkisThephilosophicalinvestigations(Oxford:Blackwell,1953).Ifyouaredeterminedtoreadit,youmayfindhelpfulO.Hanfling,Wittgenstein’slaterphilosophy(London:Macmillan,1989)andN.Malcom,Nothingishidden(Oxford:Blackwell,1986).EventuallyyouwillgraduatetothemonumentalexegeticalworkofBaker&Hacker,forexampletheAnalyticalcommentary(Oxford:Blackwell,1983).Weitz’sco-optionofWittgenstein’snotionoffamilyresemblancedefinitionoccursintheseminal“Theroleoftheoryinaesthetics”,TheJournalofAestheticsandArtCriticism15,1956,pp.27–35.ThisisquitebeautifullycriticizedinaminiaturebyFrankSibley,“Isartanopenconcept?”,Proceedingsofthe5thInternationalCongressinAesthetics,Athens,1960,pp.545–8.AdefinitivereviewofalldefinitionsofartistobefoundinS.Davis,Definitionsofart(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1991).Thenotionofthe“artworld”wasintroducedinArthurDanto,“Theartworld”,JournalofPhilosophy61(19),1964,pp.57–87.ItisaninfluenceontheinstitutionaccountthatgetsitsmainairingintheworkofGeorgeDickie.TheearlyversionistobefoundinhisArtandtheaesthetic(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1974),thelatest(withagood,readable,collectionofcriticalmaterial)inG.Dickie,R.Sclafani&R.Roblin,Aesthetics(NewYork:StMartins,1989).Therearegood,notalwayseasy,commentsbyWollheim(insuppplementaryessayItothesecondeditionofArtanditsobjects)andT.Cohen,“Thepossibilityofart”,PhilosophicalReview82,1973,pp.69–82.Levinson’saccountistobefoundin“Definingarthistorically”,BritishJournalofAesthetics19,1979,pp.232–50.ThemostrecentandinterestingworkthatgrappleswiththeinstitutiontheoryisR.J.Yanal(ed.),Institutionsofart(Harrisburg:PennsylvaniaSateUniversityPress,1992).SeealsoM.Rollins(ed.),Dantoandhiscritics(Oxford:Blackwell,1993).Ifyouareinterestedintheavant-gardetryreadingRobertHughes,Theshockofthenewforastart.Itisdeliberatelyprovocativeand,evenwherecontestable,informative.BrowsinginHarrisonandWood,Artintheoryisnotabadwayoffindingoutwhatsomeoftheartistsinvolvedsaidtheywereupto.Ben95\nTALESFROMTHEVIENNAWOODSTilghmanhasalsowrittencriticallyaboutFontaineinButisitart?(Oxford:Blackwell,1984),towhichwemayaddIanGround’s,Artorbunk?(Bristol:BristolClassicalPress,1989),commendedtomebymanystudents.TherearemanyusefulremarksaboutDuchampinP.Humble,“Duchampsready-mades:artandanti-art”,BritishJournalofAesthetics22,1982,pp.52–64.96\nChapter5Ne’ersowellexpressed(II)Thereis,then,noreasonnottolookfordefinitionsofartintermsofnecessaryandsufficientconditions.Thequestionbecomeswhetheranyplausiblecandidateisforthcoming.ToillustratethestrategiesfortestingdefinitionsItakeCroce’sdefinitionofartintermsofexpression.ArtdefinedasexpressionInthesecondchapterofTheaestheticCroceequatesartandexpression.Worksofart,suchaspaintings,inwhichartistsorderthestimulitheyreceivebycreatingexpressiverepresentations,areparadigmcasesofproductsofapowerweallpossesstoimposeaformontheworldbycreatingexpressiverepresentationsfromoursensorystimuli.Croce’sclaimisthatbeinganexpressionisbothnecessaryandsufficientforbeingart.Tosayitisnecessaryistosaythatifsomethingisart,itnecessarilymustbeexpression.Tosayitissufficientistosaythatifsomethingisexpression,thenthatsufficestomakeitart.Wefalsifytheformerclaimbyfindingsomething97\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(II)thatisartandnotexpression.Wefalsifythelatterclaimbyfindingsomethingthatisexpressionandnotart.(Aninterestingproblemforphilosophyinthisconnectionisthattodothistestingwehavealreadytoknowwhatartis.Theproblemofdefinitionpresumablyarisesbecause,asIsaidintheintroduction,wehavesomesortofprobleminmakingcleartoourselveswhatweknow,seeLyas1971.)Thataside,andsinceitseemsobviousthattherearethingsthatareexpressionswithoutbeingart,Istartwithquestionsaboutthesufficiencyofthecondition.SufficiencyTosubverttheclaimthatartsimplyisexpressionwehavetoshowthatsomeexpressionsarenotart.Toshowthisistoshowthattherearetwoclassesofexpressionswhichdifferinkind:thosethatareartandthosethataren’t.Croce’sclaimisthatthiscannotbeshown.Allthatcanbeshownis,firstly,thatexpressionsdifferindegreeandnotkind,andsecondly,thatalthoughwecallsomeexpressions“art”andwithholdthattitlefromothers,thisisnotrootedinanyrealdifference.Letusbeginwiththethoughtthatthedifferencebetweenartisticexpressionsandordinaryexpressionsliesinthefactthatartisticexpressionshaveagreaterintensity.Butitisunclearthatartisticintuitionsaremoreintensethanthoseofordinarylife.Asimpledeclarationoflovecanbeasintenselyfeltasthatsentimentexpressedbyagreatpoet.Whatdistinguishesexpressionswecall“art”frommoreordinaryexpressionsiswhatCrocecalledthegreater“range”oftheexpressionenshrinedin,say,agreatpoem.Thinkfirstofsomeonewithdeeplyandsincerelyfeltpassionbreathingthesimplewords“Iloveyou”.Thosewordscanbeasrepleteinfeelingasanywrittenbythegreatestpoet’spen.ThenconsiderAuden’sLullaby:LayyoursleepingheadmyloveHumanuponmyfaithlessarmTimeandfeversburnawayIndividualbeautyfromNature’schildrenandthegraveProvesthechildephemeral.Butinmyarmstillbreakofday98\nSUFFICIENCYLetthelivingcreaturelieMortalguiltybuttomeTheentirelybeautiful.(Lullaby,1937fromCollectedshorterpoems1927–57.London:Faber,1966)Althoughthispoemdoesnotdifferfromahumblerexpressioninintensity,itdoessoinrange.Thereismorelanguageinthepoem,andsotherangeofreverberations,resonancesandassociationsofthewordswillbeimmeasurablygreater.Thepoemshowsusthatfaithlessness,andtime,andbeauty,andthegraveandguiltareinvolvedwiththisparticularspeaker’slove.SoCroceisrighttosaythathumblewordsfromhumblemouthscanbeperfectintheintensityoftheirfeelingandyetmorelimitedinrangethanthe“complexexpression”enshrinedinacomplexpoem.Toseethatthisdoesnotestablishthedifferenceinkindbetweentheordinaryandtheartisticexpressionsconsiderthis:thereisatechnicaldistinctionthatphilosophersmarkbyusingthewords“intension”and“extension”,wheretheintensionofatermcorrespondsroughlytoitsmeaningandtheextensionofatermreferstotherangeofcasestowhichitisapplied.Thustheterms“themorningstar”and“theeveningstar”differinmeaningorintensionbut,somewhatsurprisingly,havethesameextension,sincetheybothrefertothesameobject,Venus.WhatCroceclaimedisthattheterm“art”andtheterm“expression”havethesameintensionormeaningbutthat,becauseofaccidentsoflanguage,therangeofcasestowhichweapplytheterm“art”happensnottocoincidewiththerangeofcasestowhichweapplytheterm“expression”,thelatterrangingoverawiderrangeofcases.“Art”and“expression”havethesameintensionbutadifferentextension.Ifso,wehaveasyetfoundnodifferenceinkindbetweenartisticandordinaryexpressions.Thereareonlydifferencesindegreebetweentheirranges.ThoughwecallthepoemIjustquoted“art”,wedonotdignifysimplestatementslike“Iloveyou”withthattitle.Buttheyarebothexpressionsandbothbelonginthesameclass.Itisaquestionforempiricallinguisticswhere,onascaleofgraduallyincreasingcomplexityinexpression,weputthedividinglinebetweenwhatiscalled“art”andwhatisnot.Ourquestioniswhatthecommonnatureisofthethingsonthatcommonscale.99\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(II)Indeedthedecisionastowherewedrawthelinebetweenwhatiscalled“art”andwhatisnotmaycometoseempurelyarbitrary.Ifanexpressionintheformofanepigrambelongswithart,whynotasimpleword?Ifalandscapepaintingisart,whyisn’tasimpletopographicalsketch?Crocewaswellawarethatasamatterofempiricalfacttheterm“art”isappliedinhislanguagetoanarrowerrangeofcasesthantheterm“expression”.Butthatfactdoesnotestablishthat,whenwelookmorecloselyintothislinguisticdifference,wewillfindadifferenceinkindbetweenartisticandotherexpressions.ThatiswhythefactwithwhichIbegan,thatwecallonlysomeexpressions“art”,isashakybasisforclaimsthatsuchexpressionsdifferinkindfromothers.Itistemptingtothinkthatcomplexexpressiveworksofartmustdifferinsomethingessentialfromlesserexpressiveutterances.Butnowconsider:intheJewishcemeteryoffMileEndRoadinLondonliesastonetoatwo-year-oldchildwiththesimpleinscription“Peacetohisdearsoul”.Theinscriptionhasitsownexpressiveperfection.Aswiththebestpoetry,eachworddoesitsjob.“Peacetohissoul”wouldhavelostsomething,aswould“Mayhissoulrestinpeace”.Itdoesnotseemtometoofar-fetchedtoclaimthatwecanseeinsuchsmall-scaleexpressionsjustwhatweseeinthegreatest,thedifferencebetweenthembeingnotoneofkindbutofdegree.Tomakethedistinctionbetweenartisticandotherexpressionsoneonlyofdegreehasprofoundimplications.ThetendencytoputartisticexpressionsacutabovesupposedlymorehumbleexpressionsisoneofthereasonswhyaestheticsandtheartsaresometimesthoughtofaswhatCrocedubbedan“aristocraticclub”towhichhumblefolksaredeniedentry.Tobeinclinedtoclaimadistinctioninkindbetweenartisticandordinaryexpressionsistobetemptedtothinkthatwhathappensinartisunconnectedwithwhathappensinordinarylife.This,Crocesays,isoneofthe“chiefthingsthathaspreventedtheaestheticfromreachingitsrealrootsinthehumansoul”(1992,p.15).Hence,too,thesadnessthatIfeelwhenIseesomanypeoplewho,aschildren,showedcapacitiesforintenseaestheticdelight,debarredfromaccesstoartbyaneducationsystemthathasfailedtoexerciseanddeveloptheirnativecapacitiesforjoy.100\nNECESSITYCroce’sbelief,whichIshare,isthatthehighestartisticexpressionsarerootedinthesamesoilasthehumblest.Wittgenstein,too,assertedthatourconcepts,howeverloftytheymayseem,havetheirrootsinordinaryactivities.Aesthetics,forexample,althoughitmayinvolveuswithworksofgrandeurandcomplexity,andwithgrandioseconceptslikebeautyandsublimity,hasitsrootsinthekindsofthingsthatwedowhen,forexample,werejectajacketbecausethelapelslooktoowide.Ifthiswerenotsowecouldnotlearnaestheticterms.Thatwecantalkofacomplexsymphonyasmoving,acomplexpaintingasbalanced,restsontherootednessofsuchtalkinspontaneousreactionsdisplayedwhenaschildrenwemovewithmusicandfindshapespleasing.Furtherevidenceofthecontinuumbetweentheexpressionsthatarecalledartandthosethatarenotisthewayinwhichgreatartistscanrevealustoourselves.Aworkofartmaygiveusameanstoexpressourselves.SomeonereadingThelovesongofJ.AlfredPrufrockmayofasuddenthink“thatishowIam”andthereafterthink“there’sabitofthePrufrockinme”.So,too,onemaycome,afterreadingKafka,toseethesituationinBritishuniversitiesasKafkaesque,or,afterviewingaTurnerpainting,toseeasunsetasTurneresque.Worksofartgiveuswaysoforganizingandexpressingourthinkingaboutourselvesandourworlds.Buthowcouldanartistspeaktousunlesstherewereacommonnaturebetweenus?Itisbecauseofacommunitybetweenwhatthegreatartistdoesandwhatwealldothatwecansharetheintuitionsofthegreatartistsandmakethemourown.NecessityWecanmakeaplausiblecasethatexpressionsthatarenotcalled“art”arenotdifferentinkindfromthosethatare.What,though,oftheclaimthatthereareworksofartthatarenotexpressions.Wilkinson,forexample,arguesthatminorpiecesofmusic,listenedtoforthemildpleasuretheygive,arenotthoughtofasexpressionsyetarenonethelessthoughtofasart.Letusfirstaskabouttheseminorpieces,saidtobeartwithoutbeingexpressions;whyaretheyart?Not,presumably,becausetheysoundpleasanttotheear.Thatwouldmaketheflutingsof101\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(II)nightingalesart.Theyareartbecausetheyinvolvedacomplexkindofmaking.Considersomeoneproducingapieceofmusicthatisanexpression.Acomposer,starvinginagarret,iscommissionedtoproducearequiemforadeceasedmonarch.Thepieceislugubrious,movestheaudiencetotears,andbecomesaclassicoftenplayedonoccasionsofpubliclamentation.Therecanbenorequirementthatthecomposerfeelgriefwhilecomposing.Thefeelingmaybejoyatgettingacommission.Duringthewritingthecomposermightthinkwithglee“thiswillgetthem”,andmay,duringtherites,watchfromthegallerysmilingbroadlywhenithasthedesiredeffect.Themusiccanbeexpressiveeventhoughitdoesnotexpresstheemotionsofitscomposer,justasthemelancholyattributedtothefaceofabloodhoundrequiresnoassumptionsaboutitsvisceralstates.DoesthismeanthattherequiemisnotanexpressioninCroce’ssense?Notintheleast.Thecomposer,thoughhappytoreceivethecommission,hadtoexecuteit,andprobablyhadsomeideaofhowheorshewantedittocomeout.Butitmighthavebeenastruggletogetitsotocomeout.WemustnotassumethatwhenCrocesaysthataworkofartisanexpressionhehastomeanthatitexpressesonlysuchthingsasjoyandgrief.Onecanaswellseektoexpressone’sideasofhow,say,arequiemshouldsound,orhowahard-boiledSanFranciscodetectivemightbehave.Whenonesolvesone’sproblembymakingtheworkasonewantedit,thenthatisachievedexpressioninCroce’ssense.NowwecanhandleWilkinson’scounter-examples.Ifthesearemusic,theyaresobecausesomeonehadaconceptionandthenworkedtogiveittheappropriateembodiment.Thattheconceptionswereslightandtheproblemsofexpressingthemnotdemanding,doesnotmeanthatthatprocessdidnotoccur.Howelseisittobethoughtaboutandassessedasmusic.Thisismorethanamatterofitmerelysoundingnice.Itrequiresthatwecanmakesomeassessmentoftheworthoftheconceptionthatthemusicianhadandthedegreeofsuccessinfindingasolutionthatexpressesthatconception.Moreoverinthatworkingoutthepersonalityoftheartistisexpressed,aswhenwedelightintheingenuitywithwhichMozartresolvesamusicalproblem.102\nDEFINITIONAGAINDefinitionagainLetusreturntotheclaimthatthedifferencesbetweenthemostordinaryexpressionsthatweutterandthefinestartisticexpressionsaredifferencesnotinkindbutindegree.Heremayliearadicalanswertosomeperennialquestionsaboutthedefinitionofart.IbeginningwithaquotationfromTolstoy:“Artinallitsformsisboundedontheonesidebythepracticallyuseful,andontheotherbyunsuccessfulattemptsatart.Howisarttobemarkedofffromeachofthese?”(Tolstoy1994,pp.18–19).Nowif,aswedo,wecallonlysomethings“art”,then,althoughtherewillalwaysbeborderlinecases,wemusthaveaprinciplethatwillallowustodividethefurnitureoftheuniverseintothingsthatareartandthingsthatarenot.ButTolstoydoesnotputitasIjustdid.Hesaysthattheproblemishowtodividethethingsthathumanbeingsmakeintothosethatareartandthosethatarenot.Dickiedoesthesame.Heseesavastarrayofmadeobjects,fromurinalstocarvedmarble.Some,hesupposes,areartandsomearen’t.Soheseeksawayofsortingthehumanlymadeobjectsthatareartfromthosethatarenot.Foratleastahundredyearspowerfulmindshavespenthugeamountsoftimetryingtofindsuchaway.Giventhepoweroftheminds,itisstrikingthatnowayhasbeenfound.Supposenowweconjecturethattheproblemisnottofindawayofdividingmadethingsintothosethatareartandthosethatarenot.Supposewesaid(astheLatinoriginoftheword“art”suggests)thatallmadethingsareart,sothattheonlydivisionthatweneedisbetweenthingsthataremadeandthingsthatarenot,artandnature.ThisistheimplicationofCroce’sclaimthatthedifferencebetweenwhatisartandwhatisnotisamatterofdegreeandnotkind.Noteveryculturewouldhavefoundthisodd.IfwelookatGreekculture,forexample,wefindthatthenotionofartasasubsetofhumanlymadethingsseemsnottobethere.Ratherthereisthenotionofmaking,simpliciter(anotionalsounderlyingthefactthatforustermslike“artisan”,“artefact”,and“artificer”areallcognatewith“art”).Thequestionwasmoreaboutthedifferentthingsthatcanbedonewiththingspeoplemake.Croce’sproposaldoesnotentailthatthereisnodifferencebetweenwhatisartandwhatisnot.Willowleavesarenotart,thoughtheymay,asintheremarkableworkofAndyGoldsworthy,103\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(II)becomponentsofart.Explosionsofragearenotart,thoughdramaticrenderingsofthemmightbe.Nordoesitentailthatwecannot,amongthingsthatdifferonlyindegreeofexpression,havereasonsforcallingsomethings“art”andsomethingsnot,nomorethanthefactthattemperaturesdifferonlyindegreestopsuscallingsomethingshotratherthancold.Wemightsingleoutfromthevarietiesofwaysinwhichweexpressourselvesthosewheresomethingcomplexandpowerfulissuccessfullyachievedandcallthat“art”.Butthiswillnotmarkadifferenceinkindamongexpressions.Oneadvantageofthisproposalisthatwecansimplystoptheunendingandfutilesearchforawayofdistinguishinginkindbetweenthosethingswemakethatareartandthosethatarenot.Insteadwewillhavethegeneralnotionofmakingsomethingandavarietyofinterestsinwhatismade.Anotheradvantageisthatwestopanytendencytoelevateartintosomesortofaristocraticclubbyhintingthatthatactivityisconfinedtothemakingofhighart,wherethathasnothingtodowithravedancing,DireStraits,Batmancomics,Reservoirdogs,bodypiercingandtheplayactingofchildren.AsTolstoyremarkedinapassagequotedearlier“Itisallart”(ibid.,p.59).Croce’ssuggestionhasadeeperaspect.RichardWollheimhascorrectly,tomymind,laidemphasisonthewayinwhichourinterestsinartareboundupwithexpression.That,herightlyargues,canonlybeunderstoodifweseeexpressionasrelatedtotheplaceofprojectioninthegeneralmechanismsofthemind’seconomy.Strangethenthatoneshouldeverhavethoughtthatexpressioninartcouldbeisolatedfromitsplaceinawholelife.Thatsuggestionoftheplaceofexpressioninamoregeneralpictureofthemind,whichisclearlyrelatedtowhatCrocehassaid,suggestsasourceofthepowerofart.Projectionsarerootedintheterriblestormsofinfantileadjustment.Theyarenolessthanthewayinwhichwecometolivewiththedemonsofourwishtolosewhatwehateandpossesswhatwelove.Ihavecomeclosetosayingthatallourmakingsareexpressive.OnereplyisthatnoteverythingthatwedoisexpressiveinCroce’ssense.TothatIaminclinedtoreply,thatnoteverythingthatwedo(thinkhereofroutineworkandtalk)issomethingthatwedo.104\nILLUMINATIONSAgainitmightbesaidthatIignorethedifferencebetweenart,wherewhatismadeisnotonlyconsciouslymadebutmadeinordertogetsomethingclearthatisinone’smindandheart,andcrafts,likemakingdoorframes,whichareconsciouslymadebutnotforthatreason.That,Ithink,simplyunderestimatesthewaythatourwholelivesareshotthroughwiththeefforttoarticulatewhatisinchoatelyinus.Artisanswhothinkachairlookswrongandfiddlewithituntiltheycansay“that’sit”aredoingsomethingcontinuouswithwhatthegreatestartistdoes.WorkerswhosimplychurnoutMFIfurnituretopatternaren’tinsomefullsenseactiveatall,afactthatunderlaymuchthatMarxhadtosayaboutalienation.Thesuggestionthatallmadethingsbethoughtofasartandasexpressiveismeanttostartadiscussion,notendit.Itinvitestheattempttoreinstateadifferencebetweenthemadethingsthatareartandthosethatarenot.Onedifference,suggestedtomebyBobSharpe,andinvolvedinsomeversionsoftheinstitutiontheoryofart,isthattoclassifysomethingasartistoopenittoadistinctiveapproach,whichistoinvitetheactivityofinterpretingit.Thatsuggestioniscertainlyworthexploring.Onedrawbacktoit,towhichIreturninalaterchapterinwhichIdiscusstheworkofDerrida,isthatitisunclearthatanyofourutterancesareexemptfromthekindofinterpretationthatwehithertothoughtspecialtoart.(That,indeed,istheburdenofanotablearticlebyRichardRortyonphilosophyasakindofwriting,referredtointheguidetoreadingtoChapter8.)IlluminationsBeuysThesuggestionIhavebeenexploringisonethathasimplicationsforourunderstandingoftheoftendeeplypuzzlingartofourtime.IbeginwithJosefBeuys,oneofthemostinterestingfiguresintheavant-garde.Althoughmanythinkhimsimplyacharlatanwemightgetdeeperthanmerelyname-callingbyconsideringthisproblem:whatwouldbeasuitablememorialtothevictimsofaconcentrationcamp?ItwouldnotbeatriumphalarchoraWhitehallCenotaph.ThenaskwhyBeuysmadethememorialthathedid.Again,ifIaskedyoutoproduceaworkentitledTheendof105\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(II)thetwentiethcentury,whatwouldyoudo?Thenmeditate,asmystudentsdidwithincreasingunderstanding,whatBeuysdid.Wollheimsayssomewherethatconfrontedwithwhatfloorsusinart,wealwayshavetoaskwhymakingthatatthattimeseemedtosomeonetheonlypossiblewaytomakeart.ButofmoreinteresttomeinthecontextofthepresentdiscussionisthatwemayunderstandwhyBeuyspersistentlyclaimedthatweneedtoelidethedifferencebetweenwhatisartandwhatisnotamongourhumanproducts.Inthisheissimplyarguing,asCroceargued,thattheattempttodistinguishwithintheproductsofhumanitybetweenthosethatareartandthosethatarenot,andtodistinguishbetweentheproducersofthoseproductswhoareartistsandthosewhoarenot,hasbeenbothsociallyperniciousandintellectuallysuspect.Duchamp,BeuysandCageMentionofBeuysleadsmetowaysinwhichaconceptionofartasexpressionhelps,muchmorethaninstitutionaccountshaveeverdone,withpuzzlingcasesofavant-gardeart.Herearesomeexamples:DuchampOfeachoftheelementsinaworkofartwecanask“whythatandnotthat?”,“whythereandnotthere?”“whythatword,colour,keychange?”.Duchamp’sFontaineisnotjustaurinal,randomlyputwhereitis.Itiscunning.Sowecanaskthesequestions:Whyaurinal?Howisitmounted?Notanyoldway,butinapositionthatrendersitquiteuseless.Itissigned.Whysignedandnotunsigned?Itissignedwiththenameofacartooncharacter.Why?Whynotsignit“Duchamp”?Ithasadate,1917.Why1917andnot1913or1812?Ithasatitle,Fontaine.Why?Istart,asallgoodappreciationstarts,inlettingmyimaginationengageinaplaycontrolledbythework.Whatdofountainssuggesttome?IthinkofthegreatmonumentalfountainsofVersailles,paradigmsofthetasteofaculturewhosepoliticalsystemerectedintoasystemofgovernmentasimulacrumofGod’skingdomhierarchicallyconceived.Inthatculturethekingownedthepeople,themagnateownedtheworkers,thefatherownedthefamily,theegorepressedtheid,theauthorownedtheworkandGodowned106\nDUCHAMP,BEUYSANDCAGEtheworld.ThenImeditateon1917.Whatwashappeningaroundthattime?ThentheworldlivedintheimmediateaftermathofmassacresoftheFirstBattleoftheSomme,andwaseventhenlivingthroughthebattlesofYpres,includingPasschendaele.Theseatrocities,orsotheavant-garde,andmanyothers,believed,werenotsimplyaccidents.Theirseedslayinaculture,theverycultureofthefountainsofVersailles,andthatculturenurturedthemintofullness.Acertainkindofartwasimplicitinthatcultureandthatcrime.Thatculturemustbesweptaway.Thepeoplearetobeliberatedfrompossessionbytheking,theboss,thefamily,and,inabattlethatisstillbeingfought,fromthefatherconceivedasGodandfromGodconceivedasfather,kingorfactoryboss.And,ofapiecewiththis,artistsarenolongertobethedictatorsofthemeaningoftheirwork.ThenIrememberthat1917isalsotheyearoftheRussianRevolutioninwhichallculture,includingallart,istobemadenew.What,then,werethefountainsofVersaillesworthasemblematicoftheculturethatproducedtheterrifiedhumanbeingsatomized,dismembered,castratedandlobotomizedastheymarchedtowardstheenemy?Nothingmorethanurinals.Whoownsthework?NotDuchamp.Whothen?Anyoneorno-one.Youarenowfreetomakeityours,asyouarefreetomaketheworldyours.AndnowIcanbegintothink:wasthereabetterwaytoexpressallthis?BeuysagainInabrightlylit,spaciousandparquetedroomofthePompidoustandsagrandpiano.Butitisapianowithadifference.Itissewnintoasuitofgreyfeltwithsuchmanicprecisionthateverycontourofthepianocanbeseen.SoIsetmymindfreetoplayandstartasking:Whyagrandpiano?Whygreyfelt?Whygrey?Whyfelt?Feltmuffles,sothepianoissilenced.Grandpianossuggesttomyimagination,initscontrolledfreeplay,theaccoutrementsofgrandculture.GreyfeltisthematerialoftheGermanfielduniform.Soherehighcultureissilencedbythat.Butbyadefttrick,thepianofitsitssuitperfectly.Theyweremadeforeachother.Whichistosaythatthecultureaskedforit.Icouldexpressthisbysimplysayingthatacertainculturebreditsowndiscontents.Butthisimageexpressesitwithadeeperandmoreunsettlingpower.107\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(II)CageApianistcomesonstageandsitsatapianofor4minutesand33secondsanddoesnothing.(Itistoocommontoheartalkaboutthispiecebythosewhohaven’tsatthroughit.Mystudentshaveonoccasionstagedarangeofavant-gardepieces,intheproperformalsettingofamusicroom.Theseareimmenselyenjoyedbyaudienceswhoareunusedtobeingshakenup,intrigued,madetolaughandencouragedtoactinformallyinmusicrooms.TheCagepiece,which,Cage’sfirstproducerinBritaintellsme,receivedastormofapplauseatitspremiere,neverfailstoreachthem.)Iaskwhy4’33”?(4’33”is273secondsand273isabsolutezeroontheKelvinthermometer—nicelittlejokehere,buteventhemostminimalistcomedianwouldn’tbehappywithjustthat.)Whynoscore?Whynoconductor?Whynostructureofsound?Ithinkaboutconductors.Theytellpeoplewhattodoasscorestellperformerswhattodo.Togethertheycontroltheaudience.So4’33"isanexerciseinanarchy.Youareonyourown.Allyoucandoislistentowhatevercomesintothatsilence.Forthefirsttime,perhapsyoubecomeattentivetosounds.ThenZenthoughtsmayenter,orthoughtsofthepulsinglifeoftheworldofwhichyouandthesoundsyourbodymakesinthatsilenceareallpart.Sotheexperiencemaybereligious.Isitmusic?Cagesaysthatifitisn’twemayfeelfreetocallitsomethingelse.Whocaresaboutthelabel?Isitart?Thatisthequestionwhetheritsuccessfullybringssomethingtoarticulatedexpression.Ask,then,whetherthisdoes.Thereisabeliefthatmuchoftheavant-gardecannotbeartbecauseitisnotpleasurabletolookat,asifaGrunwaldcrucifixionwereathingtohanginthebedroom;orbecauseitistooeasytocomeupwith,asifPicassofoundanygreatdifficultyindrawingoreveryoneatthetimeofDuchampwerecomingupwithFontaine.Whatpeoplereallyworryaboutisthattheycannotseethepointofthesethings.Ihavearguedthattoseetheirpointistounderstandandbetakenbywhattheyexpress.IcannowneverseethegloriousfountainsofVersailleswithoutmymindbeingtroubledbytheimagesofFontaine.Idonotfindthatthefountainsdelighttheeyeless,nomorethanIwanttodenythatonereasonforseekingoutartisthatitdelightstheeye(whichiswhyimpressionistsareso108\nEXPRESSIONANDHORRORvalued).ButDuchamponcesaidthatartisnotmerelyretinal,elsewhynotsettleforthebeautiesofnature.Themindisexpressedthere,too.ExpressionandhorrorThatBeuysfeltabletodesignamonumenttothevictimsoftheconcentrationcampssuggestsawayinwhichtheclaimthatartinvolvesexpressionbearsonaproblemraisedinanearlierchapter.IreportedthatsomehavesaidthatinthefaceoftheNazideathcampsartmustbesilent.Theymustfeelthattomakeartoutofthatsufferingistomakeanobjectforaestheticenjoymentoutofit,andthatseemsasobsceneastheactivitiesoftheemperorHeliogabaluswhoslaughteredslavesonthelawnbecausetheredbloodwentsonicelywiththegreengrass.SoSylviaPankhurstlookedintotheeyesofthedispossessedofeastLondonandrealizedthatshemustgiveupherart.ForshecouldnotanymorecapturethosesufferingfacessothattheBloomsburyGroupmightindulgetheirtasteforthepurelyaestheticdelightsofsignificantform.Itwould,indeed,bewrongtousetheformsofthesufferingtoproduceobjectsforthedelightofviewersinterestedincompositionalandotheraestheticfeatures.Butifsayingthatartaboutsufferingcausesunease,asmuchuneaseisoccasionedinmebythesuggestionthatarthasnothingtosayaboutsuffering.Thatiscounter-intuitive.Thoseinthecampswhoproducedartdidnotthinkso.AndAuden,atleast,thoughtthattheoldmasterswereneverwrongaboutsuffering.If,however,wereplacetheconceptionofartassimplyamatterofproducingthings,thecontemplationofwhichwillbeinsomenarrowsenseaestheticallyenjoyable,withtheconceptionofartasexpression,wemaycometoabetterunderstanding.Thosewhoproducedartinthecampswishedtoarticulatehowitwaswiththem,partlytogetthatinchoateburdenclear.I,too,havemyburdens,inchoateandstrugglingtobebornintoclarity,aboutthosehorrors.Ineedartiststoarticulatethese.Whenthathappensthepainofthesethingswillnotbeeased,buttheburdenoftheinchoatewillbeliftedbythatexpression.Eventosay“Inthefaceofthecampsartissilent”istoarticulateandtoexpressapossiblefeelingaboutthoseevents.109\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(II)Moreover,unliketheviewthatartistoproducepleasurablecontemplation,theviewthatartisamatterofarticulatingandexpressinghowitwas,givesamotiveforwhatthosedidwho,inthehorrorsofthecamps,producedtheirartandwhatI,too,mightdoinwritingaboutthem.Whatwasdonewasdonenotmerelytolifttheburdenoftheunarticulated,butdonealsothatotherscouldknowhowitwas.ThatmotiveismovinglysummedupbyDrRieux’sdeterminationattheendofCamus’sTheplague—thatpartialanalogyoftheNazioccupationofEurope—towritethechronicleofthoseeventssothatsomerecordbeleftoftheinjusticeandviolencethathadbeendonetothoseplague-strickenpeople.TheartofothersWeareoftentoldthatartfitsdifferentlyintodifferentcultures.WhattheSiennesedidwiththeiraltarpiecesisnotwhatwedowithvanGogh’sSunflowers,andtheinterestofHindusintheirerotictempleartisdifferentfromanyinterestwemighttakeintheeroticaofSchiele.TheplacetheIliadhadinitsGreekculturewas,Tilghmantellsus,quitedifferentfromtheplaceithasinours.Ifallthisisso,Iwonderwhywecallitall“art”,unlesswemeanbythatthatwecan,imperialistically,treattheartefactsofotherculturesthewaywetreatcertainofourown.Thatisdangerouslyclosetosayingthatwearetheonlypeoplewhohavetheconceptofart.However,ifartisboundupwithexpression,weseenotdifferencesbetweencultures,whichmakeitunclearwhyweusetheterm“art”ofthemall,butsimilaritiesthatmakeitplausibletodoso.SienneseartsoughttoarticulateafeelingaboutGod,anddoubtlessgaveitsviewersawayofrecognizingtheirowninchoatefeelingsaboutthat.Sotoofortheartsofothercultures.Tobesure,ImaynotbeabletoempathizewithwhatisexpressedinaSiennesealtarpainting.ShornofthatIhavetosettleforthingslikecolour,formandthelike.(Althoughitwill,likeanyart,expressitsauthor’sproblemsandsolutionstoproblemsabouttherepresentationofsuchthingsasbodyandspace.)Theartofanotherculture,themusicofHarlem,forexample,maybeinaccessibletomebecauseIdonotsharetheculturethatwouldallowmetocomprehendwhatthatartexpresses.Butthatdoesnotstopme110\nGUIDETOREADINGfromthinkingthatitisartbecauseitisexpressive.Culturalimperialismwillshowitselfinthedemandthatothersexpresswhatone’sownculturethinkstobeimportant,sothat,forexample,certainpartsofthebodymustbeconcealedbyconvenientlyfallingleaves.SalmanRushdiehasbeenonthereceivingendofthatkindofattitude.Butitneednotshowitselfinignoringthefactthattheartofothersisartlikeourownbecauseexpressive.WhatnextIhavebeenlookingatthestorieswetellaboutthepowerofartandIhavesuggestedthatthenotionofartasexpressionpointsusinthedirectioninwhichanaccountofthatpowercanbefound.Butevenifthatisrightmuchremainstobedone.Ifwemakeartexpression,whoseexpressionisit?Canweignoretheartistintalkingofexpression,asmanyhavearguedwemust.Againsomeexpressionsseemquestionable.MeinKampfmayperfectlyexpressitsauthor’scrazedviews,butisnonethebetterforthat.Thatsuggeststhatquestionsaboutthetruthandmoralityofwhatisexpressedmayenter.Howdothey?Andif,asIsay,someexpressionsaremoreimpressivethanothers,whatrighthaveItosuchjudgements?Aren’tsuchjudgementsaboutartpurelysubjective?SincethatlastquestionsumsupaverywidelyheldviewIshallbeginwiththat.GuidetoreadingThecoreofCroce’sdefinitionofartasexpressionistobefoundinthelastsectionsofChapterIandtheearlysectionsofChapterIIofTheaesthetic.Wilkinson’scriticismsofthataretobefoundinhis“Art,emotionandexpression”inHanfling’sPhilosophicalaesthetics.Ihavetosaythattheyareexpressedwithsomehesitancy.Wilkinsonquitecorrectlyaskswhethertheexpressionaccountisrefutedbyfindingonlyminorartthatisnotexpressive.OntherelationbetweenexpressionandthemoregeneralmechanismsofprojectionseeWollheim’sThemindanditsdepths(1993)andThethreadoflife(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985).ThegreatattempttodistinguishartfromcraftismadeinCollingwood’sPrinciplesofart.Theattempt,towhichIreturninalaterchapter,meritsclosescrutiny.FormoreonBeuysseeH.Stachelhaus,JosefBeuys,111\nNE’ERSOWELLEXPRESSED(II)trans.D.Britt(NewYork:Abbeville,1991).SinceIhavementionedAndyGoldsworthyyoumightliketolookatthebookStone(London:Viking,1994).GoldsworthyisrepresentedattheGrizedaleSculpturePark,avenueIcommendforyouraestheticenrichment.112\nChapter6TheproofofthepuddingTheterms“objective”and“subjective”Theterms“objective”and“subjective”seemeasytocharacterize.Theworld,itissaid,containstwoclassesofthings.Thereareobjectsoutthere:trees,stonesandclouds,whichhavepropertieslikeweightandshape.Thentherearesubjectsthathaveapsychologicallife:me,yourdog,theirhamsterandherpig.Anobjectiveassertionreferstoapropertyoutthere,intheobject.Asubjectiveassertionexpressessomestateofthepsychologicallifeofthesubject.Tosayastrawberryhasacertainmassistosaysomethingobjective.Tosayonelikesthetasteofstrawberriesistosaysomethingsubjective.Onemight,asIdealistsdo,querythedistinctionembeddedinthatworldpicture.This,asGentile’sThephilosophyofartshows,leadstostrikingconclusionsabouttheallegedsubjectivityofaesthetics.AmorerecentqueryingofthedistinctionistobefoundinMerleau-Ponty’sphenomenology.Hereaestheticquestionsintertwinewithdeepphilosophicalissues.If,however,the113\nTHEPROOFOFTHEPUDDINGdistinctionisaccepted,thentoclaimthataestheticsissubjectiveistoclaimthatjudgementsthataworkofartisfeeble,elegant,brilliant,ordire,donotrefertopropertiesithas.Itistodescribetheeffectoftheobjectonthejudger.Hume,inaclassicessay,writes:Allsentimentisright;becausesentimenthasareferencetonothingbeyonditself,andisalwaysrealwheneveramanisconsciousofit.Butalldeterminationsoftheunderstandingarenotright;becausetheyhavereferencetosomethingbeyondthemselves,towitrealmatteroffact…Nosentimentrepresentswhatisreallyintheobject…Itexistsmerelyinthemindthatcontemplates…andeachmindperceivesadifferentbeauty.(Hume1969,p.117)Ifaestheticjudgementsaresubjective,theniftwopeoplemakedifferentclaimsaboutawork,theclaimsdonotconflict.IfIsay,“It’sgrand”andyousay“It’strite”,whatIamreallysayingis“Itimpressesme”andwhatyouaresayingis“Itirritatesme”.Bothassertionscanbetrue,astheycouldnotbewereyoutosay“thatisacube”andIsay“itisasphere”.HencetheLatintag—degustibusnondisputandemest.Inmattersoftastethereisnodisputing.Thiswholeproblem,then,onlyarises,onthenatural-seemingassumptionthatwecandivideuprealitybetweensubjectsandobjects.Anyonewhodoesthisimmediatelyrunsintoaproblem.Anyaccesstoobjectshastobethroughexperiencesofsubjects.Butaren’tthese,asexperiencesofsubjects,simplysubjective?How,asBishopBerkeleypertinentlyasked,canIbeassuredthatthereisanyobjectiveworldbeyondmyexperiences,sinceallIhaveistheexperiences?Butthenaestheticjudgementisnoworseoffthananyotherjudgement.Thismattergoesbeyondaestheticsintothetheoryofknowledge.HereIadoptamorelimitedstrategy.Ishallsimplypointoutthat,Berkeleytothecontrary,allofusassumeanabilitytotalkabouthowtheworldis,aswhenawitnesssays“Thetraffic-lightwasredwhenBugsBunnyrocketedthroughit”.ThenIshallsimplypointoutthataesthetictalkislikethatsortofobjectivetalkandentitledtothesamestatus.Itwillbeopentosomeonetoreplythat,ondeeperinspection,nojudgementsarereallyobjective.Butthenaestheticswillnotbe,asisusuallysupposed,especiallysubjective.114\nSIBLEYANDOBJECTIVITYApresuppositionguidesmythinking.Ifwaysofspeakinghaveemergedandcontinuetohavearoleinourpractices,aninitialpresumptionisthattheyhaveapoint.Inthosepractices,asKantnoticed,theresimplyisadifferencebetweensayingapaintinghasgrandeurandsayingthatonelikesit.Ifthejudgementthatathinghassomethinggoodaboutitalwaysreducestotheassertionthatonelikesit,itremainsquitemysteriousthatweshouldhavetwoways,withapparentlyentirelydifferentimplications,ofsayingoneandthesamething.Therecanbetwowaysofsayingthesamething.“You’llfindittoughwhenyougraduate”saysthesamethingas“soonyou’llbeslidingdowntherazorbladeoflife”.Butinthecasewearedealingwithwedon’thavetwovariationsonacommontheme,buttwoentirelydifferent-lookingclaims.Thataestheticjudgementsdon’tsimplyreducetoassertionsaboutlikingsissuggestedbyotherthings.Wefeelwegrowinourpowersofjudgement.When17ImaylikeTakeThat.When23ImaysimplywonderhowIcouldhavelikedanythingsobanal.Idon’texpressthisbymerelysayingthatmylikingshavechanged.Thiscanhappen,aswhensomeonecomestolikeDonne’slaterreligiouspoetrymorethanhisearlierlovepoetrywithoutthinkinganytheworseoftheearlier.Butinothercasesonethinksanearlierjudgementmistaken.Thatwouldbehardtoexplainifallwehadweremerelytransientlikings.Thissuggeststhatwemischaracterizeourlivesinsomeasyetunexplainedwaywhenwesay,ofaestheticpreference,thatitisallsubjective.SibleyandobjectivityIwantnowtodeployanargument,developedoutofremarksbyFrankSibley,thatunderminesacommonproofofaestheticsubjectivity.Twothingsaboutsubjectivismneedtobeexplained.Firstly,theassertion“aestheticjudgementissubjective”isseldomaneutralobservation.Itisaderogatorycommentaboutsomesupposeddeficiencyofaestheticjudgement.Odderyet,thepeoplewhosaythissortofthingneedhavenothingagainstsubjectivityelsewhere.“Loveisasubjectivematter”seemsnottoimportthesameopprobrium.Indeedthatsubjectivityisoftencelebratedratherthansneeredat.Soonequestioniswhyaestheticsattractssneering115\nTHEPROOFOFTHEPUDDINGaccusationsofsubjectivity.Onereasonisthattheignorant,unabletoexercisetaste,denyit.Butthereismoretoitthanthat.Secondly,whydopeoplethinkthataestheticsisasubjectivematter?AfirstargumentOneargument,aspuerileinaestheticcontextsasitisinmoralones,isthis:P1:TherearemassivedisagreementsinaestheticsSoaestheticjudgementsaresubjective.Thisisawretchedargument,nobetterthananotherperennialfavourite:P1:CriminalsbreakthelawSotheyshouldgotoprison.Someonewhopresentsuswithanargumentsaystous,“Ifyouacceptthispremise,thenyoushouldacceptthisconclusion”.Aboutanargument,therefore,wecanaskatleasttwoquestions:firstly,shouldIacceptthepremise(s)uponwhichtheconclusionisbased?And,secondly,ifIdidwouldtheconclusionfollow?Bothconditionshavetobemet.ImaygrantyouthatifIacceptedyourpremise,thenIshouldacceptyourconclusion.ButifIdon’tacceptthepremiseswhyshouldIacceptwhatfollowsfromthem?Alternatively,Imayconcedethatyourpremiseistrue,butthattheconclusionsimplydoesn’tfollowfromit.Thefirstsubjectivistargumentisheirtobothoftheseills.Itissimplyuntruethatthereismassivedisagreementinaestheticmatters(orevenmoralonescometothat).Indeedwhatimpressesmeistheamountofagreement.Whatdistractspeoplefromseeingthisisconcentrationonsuchavant-gardeextremesinartasFontaine,andinmoralityasHannibalLecter,andeventherethereismoreagreementthanisoftensupposed.Butevenifitweretruethattherearewidespreaddisagreements,theconclusionthataestheticjudgementsaresubjectivedoesnotfollow.Disagreementsneednotbeevidencefor116\nSIBLEYANDOBJECTIVITYsubjectivity.WereItoaskanylargegroupofpeoplementallytodothesum768×654÷397inthenextminute,Iwouldgetafairlyheftydisagreementbetweentheanswersofeventhosepreparedtohaveago.DoIassumethatmathematicsissubjective?CreationistsandDarwinianshavehadfiercedisagreementsaboutevolution.Doesthatestablishthatbiologyisasubjectivematter?Fromthefactofdisagreementnothingwhatsoeverfollowsaboutanything(exceptthatthereisdisagreement),leastofallaboutsubjectivity.AsecondargumentThereplyislikelytobethatmathematicsandsciencehaveanobjectivitythatislackingtoaestheticsbecausetheyhavemethodsandproofproceduresforsettlingthesedisagreements.Ifthereisdisagreementastowhethertheanglesofatriangleaddupto180degrees,wecangiveadeductiveproof.IfthereisdisputeastowhetherareasoflowpressureoverIcelandareareliableindicatorofrainwithindaysinLancashire,thenwecancallontheevidenceofpastexperiencetoestablishthedegreeofprobabilitythatthisisso.Thissuggeststhefollowingargumentforthesubjectivityofaestheticjudgements:P1:Atypeofjudgementisobjectiveifmethodsexistbywhichdisagreementsonsuchjudgementscanbesettled.P2:Mathematicsandsciencemeetthistest.P3:ThemethodstheyuseareinductionanddeductionP4:AestheticsdoesnotusethesemethodstosettledisagreementsinaestheticjudgementsSo,C1:IthasnomethodsforsettlingdisagreementsSo,C2:ItsjudgementsaresubjectiveIcouldcreatetroublefortheearlystagesofthisargument.Thus,inP1,istherequirementthatthedisagreementactuallybesettledbythemethods?Ifsowedon’tyetknowwhetherornotbiologyisobjectivesincethecreationistshaven’tagreedwiththeiropponentsyet.Again,itisnotclearthatthemethodsofscientistsand117\nTHEPROOFOFTHEPUDDINGmathematiciansaresoeasilyreducedtoacoupleofproofprocedures.ButletusgrantP1,P2andP3.ThatbringsustoP4.P4istrue,butitisimportantforaproperunderstandingofcriticismtobeabsolutelyclearwhyitis.InordertoshowthisIneedtolayoutthestructureofcriticism.Wecanthinkofthisashavingthreelevels,whichIfirstindicate,thenannotate.Level3OverallaestheticverdictsExamples:Thisworkisbrilliant,magnificent,patheticLevel2AestheticjudgementsExamples:Thislineiselegant,thecolourisvibrant,thiscompositionisbalancedLevel1NonaestheticjudgementsExamples:thereisaredpatchinthecorner,thislineiscurved,thereisanalliterationinlinethree.Atlevel3wemakeoveralljudgementsofworksofart.Havingfoundoutaboutallthecomponentsofthework,weputeverythingtogetherandgiveaverdict.Atlevel2wearestilldealingwithelementsofthework.Eventosaythataworkasawholehasanelegance,say,isnottoclaimthatitis,overall,asatisfactoryworkofart.Fortheelegancemightbeatoddswithsomeotherelementofthework,sayitssubjectmatter.Atlevel1wehavethefeaturesoftheworkuponwhichitsaestheticqualitiesdependandfromwhichtheyemerge.Thattheworkisbalanceddependsontherebeingthispatchhereandthismassthere,forexample.Oftenwhenwecitearemarkatahigherlevelwelinkittosomethingatalowerlevelusingtheword“because”.Wemightsaythat“Itisagreatworkofartbecauseofthesheerstrengthofthecomposition,andastonishingvibrancyofthecolour”.Andwe118\nSIBLEYANDOBJECTIVITYmightsay“Itisbalancedbecausethiscolourpatchhereisoff-setsoexactlybythepositioningofthatcolourpatchthere”.Ifaestheticsistousedeductiveorinductivemethodsinanysignificantway,thentheymusthaveanimportantroleinconductingusfromthefirstleveltothesecondlevelorfromthesecondleveltothethird.Thisisnotso.Letustakethemovefromlevel1tolevel2.Supposefirstthatwecanallseearedpatchinacertainpositionoranalliterationinapoemandwewouldlikeaproofthatthismakesthepicturebalancedorthepoemwitty.Deductionwon’thelp.Wesimplycan’tdeducethatbecausethereisanalliterationinlinethreethepoemiswitty.Foralliterationiscompatiblewithwitlessness.Indeedtheverysamecolourpatchthatmakesoneworkbalancedmaymakeanotherunbalanced.Inductionfareslittlebetter.Wearenotgiventoarguingthat,becausethelast27picturesinwhichtherewasaredpatchintheleftcornerwerebalanced,soprobablythisonewhichhasthatfeaturewillbe.Itwouldalsobeunhelpfulforthoseseekingtodevelopcapacitiesforappreciativeexperience.Whattheywantisnotproofsthatwouldbringthemtobelievethataworkhasacertainvaluefeature.Theywanttoseeandenjoythatfeature.Beingtold,astheyoftenare,thatmostworksbyRembrandtaregood,mayleadthemtoinferthatthiswork,beingbyhim,isprobablygood.Notonlyisthisunreliable,sincenotallRembrandt’sworksarenecessarilygood,buttheystillcan’texperiencethosefeatureswhereintheexcellenceofRembrandtlies.Whatofthemovefromthevaluefeaturesofaworktojudgementsaboutitsoverallmerit?Inductionfaresnobetterhere.Beingtoldthatmostworksthathavewitinthemhaveturnedouttobegoodoverall,onemightinferthatthiswork,whichhaswit,isprobablygood.Butthatisnohelptosomeonewhowantstoexperiencethegoodness.Lestitbethoughtthatthisistoattackastrawman,thatseemstobethewayinwhichoneprominentaesthetician,MonroeBeardsley,proceeded.Forheseemedtosuggestthatfromthepresenceofunity,complexityandintensity,wecansafelyinfermerit.Wecan’t.Aworkcanhaveanoverallunityoftoneandbesimplytediousintheintensityofitscomplexity,asseemstobethecaseswiththebizarrestructuresofLyly’sEupheuesandtheByzantinewanderingsofDynasty.119\nTHEPROOFOFTHEPUDDINGWhenwecometothedeductionofanoveralljudgementfromthepossessionofmeritfeatures,thecaseismorecomplex.Weareentitledtosaythatifaworkpossesseselegance,thenthereissomethinggoodaboutit,sothatifIweretosaythatwhatmakesaplaysobadisitselegantplot,oritswit,Iwouldhavetogivesomespecialexplanation.Fortosayaworkiselegant,withoutqualification,istosaythatthereissomethinggoodaboutit.Thisisnot,however,toshowthatonecandeductivelyestablishthataworkhasanoverallmerit.Forworksofart,unlikekitchenknives,arenotsuchthatonecansaythemoremeritsthebetter.Inartthemeritshavetofittogether.Thus,humourisameritfeature.Butitcanbeoutofplace,assomehaveargueditisintheportersceneinMacbeth.Eleganceisagood-makingfeature,butitspresencemightbedamagingiftheoveralleffectbeingsoughtisroughforce.Inassessingaworkofartweneednotmerelytoknowthatacollectionofmeritfeaturesispresent.Weneedtoknowthattheygotogetherintherightway.Iknowofnomethodofinductionanddeductionthatcoulddemonstrateforanyparticularworkofartthatthisisso.Wesee,then,thetruthofP4aswellasthetruthofP1–3.Fromthisthefirstconclusionisdrawn,namelythataestheticshasnomethodsforsettlingdisagreements.Fromthatitfollows,giventhefirstpremise,thataestheticsissubjective.ButthatfirstconclusionsimplydoesnotfollowfromP1–4.Wecanconcedethatasubjectisobjectiveifithasmethodsforsettlingdisagreements.Wecanallowthatsciencehassuchmethods,inductionanddeduction,andisthereforeobjective.Wecanallowthataestheticjudgementsareneitherdeductivenotinductive.Butitsimplywillnotfollowfromthatthataestheticsissubjective.Thisisbecausenowheredoestheargumentsaythattheonlymethodsbywhichtosettledisagreementsareinductionanddeduction.Thisleavesopenthepossibilitythataestheticsisobjective.Forthoughitdoesnotuseinductionanddeductionthereisanothermethoditdoesuse.AllthatwillfollowfromP1–4isthatinnotusingdeductionandinductiontosettleitsdisputes,aestheticsisnotlikescienceandmathematics.Thatbeginstoexplainwhyasneerattachestotheassertionthataestheticsisonlysubjective.Formathematicsandsciencehave,orhad,prestigeinourculture.Sinceaestheticsdoesnotusetheirmethods,itsclaimsareill-grounded.Somefeeble120\nSIBLEYANDOBJECTIVITYmindsimpressedbythegenuinelymarvellousachievementsofscience,havesupposedaestheticsoughttobereformedalongscientificlines.Onewaytodothiswouldbetoeliminateanyinclinationtomakevaluejudgementsandtoconfineoneselftotalkingabouttheobservablefactsaboutthephysicalpropertiesofworks.Butsinceworksofartarenothingifnotobjectsofvalue,thisisnottoreformaestheticsbuttokillitoff.Theotheralternativeistotrytofindscientificlawsoftaste.Theseareusuallyinductive.Onelooksforthingsthataresimplyobservable(thisisusuallydressedupas“empirically”observable):patchesofcolour,figuresofspeech,soundtones.Thenonetriestoinfervalueconclusionsfromthese.AgainIaskCroce’squestion:howisthecorrelationbetweenthephysicalfeature,sayapatchintherightcorner,andthemeritfeature,saybalanceoroverallbrilliance,tobemade.Onepresumablyhastomakeacorrelationbynotingthatwhenevervalueispresentthisfeatureispresentalso.Butthenthepresenceofvaluehastobeascertainableindependentlyofascertainingthatthephysicalfeaturesarepresent,elsetherewouldbenothingtocorrelatewithanything.Butifvaluecanthusbeascertaineddirectly,whyistheinductionneededatall?ThebestcommentonallthisisTrotsky’sswingeingcommentsonthoseRussianFormalistswhotriedtoscientizeliteraryappreciation:Havingcountedtheadjectives,andweighedthelines,andmeasuredtherhythmsaformalisteitherstopssilentwiththeexpressionofamanwhodoesnotknowwhattodowithhimself,orthrowsoutanunexpectedgeneralizationwhichcontainsfivepercentofFormalismandninetyfivepercentofthemostuncriticalintuition(Trotsky1957,p.172).AestheticproofItisonethingtosaythataestheticsmayhavemethods,unlikethoseofthesciencesandmathematics,forsettlingdisagreements,andsohavesomeclaimtoobjectivity.What,though,isthatmethod?Considerthis:Youcomeinandsay“It’sraining”.Ireply,“Surelynot”.Wedon’tnowtrotoutinductionsordeductions.Youcansimply121\nTHEPROOFOFTHEPUDDINGsay,“Ifyoudon’tbelievemegoandlook”.Thereisavastareaofourliveswheredisagreementsaresettledbysimplylooking.Thatthatistrueinaestheticsissuggestedbytwothings.Firstly,aestheticsisimportantlytodowithperception.Wehavetoseethegraceofapainting,heartheplaintivenessofthemusic,seetheexpressionemergentfromastatue.Thisiswhyinductionanddeductioncanseemsoinappositeinaesthetics.Atbesttheycanbeusedtogetustobelievethataworkhasacertainpropertybutdonothingtohelpusperceiveit.Secondly,bringingsomeonetoaworkinordertosettleadisagreementaboutitissimplywhatwedo.IfIsaythatpartsofD.H.Lawrence’swritingarepretentious,Icangowithyoutothenovelandpointouttheexactpassagesthatseemtosupportmycontention.Imaginethecaseofanaccidentatatrafficlight.Thereisadisputeastowhetherthelightwasredorgreen.Herethedefendant,askedincourtwhyhewentthroughtheredlight,wouldbeill-advisedtoreplythatcolourisasubjectivematter.Thatmaywell,insomephilosophicaltheorizing,betrue.InthetrafficoflifeandtheM6,however,itisnonethelessthecasethatlightsarered,yellowandgreen,andthatpeoplecanberightorwrong,withtragicconsequences,insayingwhichofthesetheyare.Thisbyitselfisenoughtoestablishthepossibilityofthekindofrightnessandwrongnessaboutthelightsthatenablesustotreatthatasanobjectivematter,evenif,whenphilosophizing,wemaycometodoubtthis.Whatgaverisetoourpracticeofsayingthattrafficlights,say,aretrulyredorgreen?Nothingscientific.Wavelengthsmayattachtodifferentcolours,butwehadourcolourwordslongbeforeweknewthat.Whatunderliesourpresentpracticeisourbiologicalemergenceascolour-sightedbeings.Asurvivalvaluebecameattachedtoasharedcapacitytosortthingsincertainwaysbytheuseoftheeyes,andthiscapacitycontinuestobeusefultousinawiderangeofways.Talkaboutcolours,then,reflectsourcapacitiesandpractices.Colourdiscriminationneednot,infact,besomethingthatamajorityofuspossesses.Colourdiscriminationcouldbeaminorityskill,thosenotpossessingitlearningbyexperiencetorelyonthosewhodo(forexample,whencamouflageisneeded).Thosewhodonothavethecapacitycaninferthatothersdo,buttheinferencewillnotgivethemthatabilitytosee,anabilityof122\nSIBLEYANDOBJECTIVITYwhichtheymaykeenlyfeelthelack.Moreover,evenwhereallhavethecapacity,somemayhaveitinamoredevelopedform,maydiscriminatemoreshadesandsubtletiesofcolour,anabilitythattheynoticegrowswithpractice.Thereis,too,thepossibilityofaphysicaldefect,sothatpeoplecan,perhapscurably,beaffectedintheircapacitiestodiscriminatecoloursbytheconditionofphysicalorgansliketheeye.Otherfactors,too,theymaylearn,canaffectdiscriminationandcausedisagreement:factorssuchaslightingconditions,hasteandtiredness.Whatliesattherootofallthisisthoseagreementsinourjudgementsemployedinourexerciseofourevolvedcapacitiesandthepractices,liketakingacoloursampleintobetterlight,thatemergefromthoseevolvingagreements.WhatIhavesaidaboutcolourdiscriminationsuggestsawayofthinkingaboutaestheticobjectivitythatisfarfromcertainscientificmodels.Wehavedevelopedascreaturesthathavethecapacitytogroupthingstogetherincertainways.Wesimplydo,evenaschildren,naturallyfindthingsfunny,musicmartial,compositionsbalanced,certainanimalspleasingintheirmovements.Thosegroupings,naturallyexpressedincryandgesture,areaugmentedaswelearnthewordslike“balanced”,“elegant”,“graceful”,“funny”andthelike.Wefindagreementsthatdeeraregraceful,coloursvibrant,movementsdynamicandsoforth.So,ifthatsortofagreementisenoughtoestablishsomeobjectivityincolourdiscrimination,whydoesitnotestablishacaseforthatinaestheticdiscrimination?Oneansweristosuggestdisanalogiesbetweenthetwocases.Afirstisthatthereismoredisagreementinaestheticsthatincolourcases.Atthelevelatwhichfairlybasicsortingsofcoloursandaestheticfeaturesaremadethisisnotobviouslyso.MostpeoplefindspectacularsunsetsprettyrousingandTorvillandDeanprettyelegant.True,fewerpeopleseemabletomakethefinerdiscriminationsinaesthetics.Butthentheanalogywithcolourdiscriminationismaintained.ForfewercanseethedifferencesbetweenBS2100andBS2101onthecolourchart.Finerdiscriminationtakespractice,aswitnessthecaseofwinetasting.Weshouldnotconfusethefactthatsomedon’tdeveloptheiraestheticcapacitieswiththeclaimthatineliminabledifferencesareriferinaestheticsthanelsewhere.123\nTHEPROOFOFTHEPUDDINGThissamelineofreasoningwoulddealalsowiththeclaimthatarelevantdifferencebetweenaestheticandcolourdiscriminationisthatasmallminorityhastheformerandalargemajoritythelatter.Infact,minoritiesareneitherherenorthere.Thecolourlanguagecouldperfectlywellsurviveifmostofuslostthatcapacity.Anotherimportantdisanalogybetweenthecasesofaestheticandcolourdiscriminationissometimesthoughttobethis:wethinkacolourtobeeitherblueorred,say,soifonepersonsaysitisredandanothersaysitisblue,onemustberightandtheothermustbewrong.But,theargumentgoes,thatdoesnotseemtobesointheaestheticcase.Twoexperiencedpeople,whoagreeaboutBrahmsandMozart,mightsimplyagreetodifferaboutMahler,withnottheleastinclinationtothinkthattheothermustbewrong.Itisasiftheyagreedwhichthingsareredandwhichthingsarebluebutagreedtodifferonwhichthingswereyellow.Butagaintheanalogyholds,sinceevenincolourjudgementthereissomeslack.TomysurpriseIfindthatalthoughpeopleinfullpossessionofwell-workingvisualapparatusesagreethatgrassisgreenandPaulNewman’seyesareblue,forawiderangeofjudgementstheycannotagreewhethercertainthingsaregreenorblue.Thatdoesnothingtoinclineustothebeliefthatthereisnorightandwrongaboutcolourattributions.Whyshoulditdosoinaestheticcases?Moreinterestingisthisthought:bothaestheticandcolourjudgementscanbedisqualifiedbecauseofdefectsintheorgansofperceptionandintheviewingconditions.Acolour-blindpersonoronedazzledbythesunisbetrustedneitherintheirjudgementsaboutredandgreennoraboutthecolourharmoniesinaCézanne.Theinterferencefactorsinthecaseofcolourdiscriminationarephysical.Whatmakesustendtothinkofreportsofaestheticdiscriminationsasmoresubjectiveisthefactthattheyareaffectedbypsychologicalaswellasphysicalinterferenceconditions.Jealousy,forexample,canaffectone’sjudgements.Iftheclaimisthatbeingincertainpsychologicalconditionscanmakeourjudgementssuspect,thenthatsupportswhatIhavebeensayingaboutaestheticobjectivity.Theforceofsayingthatamatterhasarightandwrongaboutitisthattherecanbereasonsforrulingoutcertainclaims,asweruleoutsomeofthecolourjudgementsofthosewhoarecolour-blind.IfIamnowtoldthatwequestionsomeaestheticjudgementsnotmerelyonphysicalgroundsbutonpsychologicalones,thatsupportstheanalogy.Thatwecan124\nBEYONDOBJECTIVEANDSUBJECTIVEanddoruleoutjudgementsbecauseofperceiveddeficienciesinthepsychologicalapparatusofthejudgermakesnodifferenceaslongasweretainsomenotionofrulingout.Forthatiswhatimportstheascriptionofobjectivity.Tosaythatsomeoneistooignorantortooprejudicedtomakeafairjudgementofaworkissimplytosaythatthatperson’sjudgementsarelikelytobewrong,andthat,farfromunderminingthenotionofobjectivitysimplyservestostrengthenit.BeyondobjectiveandsubjectiveLetusreviewourprogress.Thefirststepwastosaythatifobjectivitygoeswithfindingauseforthetermstrueandfalse,rightandwrong,thenthereseemtobegroundsforattributingobjectivitytoremarksaboutthecoloursofthings.Secondly,thatpossibilityrestsonacertainagreementinjudgements,displayedintheirpracticesbypeoplepossessedofcertaincapacities.Thirdly,thatsamesortofagreementseemsalsotopertainincasesofaestheticdiscrimination.Fromthisitfollowsthatthosejudgementstoohaveaclaimtoobjectivity.Thedifferencebetweenthetwocases,towhichwehavetoreturn,isthatourjudgementthatathingisredseemsnottobeconditionedbyouremotionalorotherpsychologicalstatesasaestheticjudgementseemstobe.Thiskindofaccountaccordswithourinclinationtosaythatwillowtreesaregraceful,deerelegant,coloursgarish,soundsmellifluous,paintingsbalanced,linesdynamicandtintsdelicate.Thisistosaythatsuchaestheticjudgementsareasobjectiveasanyjudgementofcolour.Ioncethoughtthatthatwasasufficientrefutationofsubjectivisminaesthetics.Itisnot,andthereasonitisnotisbecausesomeonemightseethatacolourisgarish,apicturebalanced,adanceelegant,amovementgracefulandstillnotlikeanyofthosethings,saying,perhaps,“I’mnotmuchintothedelicate”.Thatlooksdamaging.ForasIsettheproblemup,objectivitywentwithsettlingdisputesbyshowingthatoneoftwoconflictingjudgementscouldberuledout.Thatiscertainlypossiblewhenthedisputeis,say,astowhetherathingisorisnotdelicateorgraceful.Welookandsee.Butnowanotherdisputearisesinwhich,althoughtwopeopleagreeontheaestheticqualitiesofathing,onepersonexpressesalikingforitandtheotherdoesnot.125\nTHEPROOFOFTHEPUDDINGSincewhatmightseemtoustobeimportantinaestheticsishowintheendwerespondtoawork,andsincethatresponseexpressesitselfinexpressionsoflikingordisliking,whicharesubjectiveifanythingis,weseemforcedtotheconclusionthataestheticsisatheartsubjective.Herewemayadd,too,thatourjudgementsaboutworksofartseeminevitablyconditionedbyfactorsotherthanthepurelyphysicalvariationsinphysicalorgansandviewingconditions.Thesefactorshavetodowiththepersonalhistoryofthosewhomakesuchjudgements,theirspecialemotionalconstitutions,theirinterests,theiridiosyncraticselvesastheyareconditionedbyindividualpsychologicalhistories.Sinceweareunavoidablydifferentintheserespects,soourjudgementsareconditionedbyoursubjectivitiesand,so,areradicallysubjective.OneattempttodealwiththisisKant’s.Heaskswhatmightdisqualifymyjudgementaboutaworkofartfromhavingaclaimonothers.Hisanswerwouldbe“itsbeinginvolvedwithinterestswhichareparticulartome”,aswhenaninterestinbowlsleadsmetooverrateapictureofDrakefinishinghisgameastheArmadaheavesintosight.Kantmayhavethought,therefore,thathisproofthataestheticjudgementisdisinterestedshowsthataestheticjudgementrestsonnointerestspersonaltomealoneandsoisobjective.Ithasauniversalityratherthanaparticularityofappeal.Ajealousmanwho,becauseofconditionsidiosyncratictohimself,thinksthatOthelloisafineplaybecauseDesdemonagetskilledisnotmakinganaestheticjudgementbythistest.Wecanconcedethatifpartialinterestsenterintojudgementswearelikelytofeelthatthejudgementissubjective.Kantisrightthatadisinterested,nonpartialjudgementisnotgoingtobeopentothataccusation.Thequestioniswhatexactlyitisforajudgementtobethusdisinterested.HereithasbeenfeltthatKantdefinesthisinunhelpfullynegativeterms.Wecanbetoldthatadisinterestedjudgementisonethatdoesnotinvolveprivatefinancialinterests,personalvanity,spiteandthelike.Thissayswhatitisnotandnotwhatitis.Mightwesaythattheobjectivenonpartialjudgementexpressesaninterestthatallshareratherthanoneprivatetome?Anobjectiontothisisthatitseekstomakeillegitimatewhatisperfectlylegitimate,whichistoletone’spersonallifeenterintoone’sdealingswithart.Thatisreflectedinthefactthatwearetolerantofways126\nBEYONDOBJECTIVEANDSUBJECTIVEinwhichdifferencesoftemperamentaffectaestheticjudgements.IammoreintellectualandlikeBach,youaremorepassionateandlikeRachmaninov.Soweletsubjectivityenterouraestheticjudgementsinawayinwhichwedonotletitenterourcolourjudgements.Itistimenowtorethinkthiswholematter.Theproblemarisesbecausewearepresentedwithachoicebetweensayingthatsomethingisobjectiveandsayingthatitissubjective.Thischoiceisnotofferedinaneutralway.Theclearimplicationisthatitissomehowbetterifajudgementbeobjective,wherethatmeansinsomesensedemonstrableinsuchaswayastosettledisputes.Thealternativeis,itisthought,awelterofpersonalopinions,eachofwhichsimplyexpressesaliking.Onethingthatinclinessometothisisthebrilliantsuccessofthephysicalsciencesthatbecomethemodeltowhichanywell-foundeddisciplinemustaspire.InfluentialtooisthekindofthinkingthatBernardWilliamsclaimsoriginatedwithDescartes,thetendencytodividewhatthereisbetweenanobjectivephysicalworldwhichexistsandhasitspropertiesindependentlyofus,andtheinnersubjectiveworld.Toexposetheassumptionsthatdrivethetendencytodividewhatthereisintotheobjectiveandthesubjectivewouldbe,asthewrestlingsofHeideggerdemonstrate,atortuoustask.Foritwouldbetolaybarethemodelsofthoughtthatdominateandshapeourthinking,andthentoaskwhetherthesearemorethanlocaleffectsofthekindofinterestswehappenedtohavehadataparticulartimeinourhistory.Heremytaskisthemoremodestoneofshowingthatwearesimplynotforcedtochoosebetweentheterms“subjective”and“objective”indescribingouraestheticcomments.Assenttothenecessityofsuchachoicewouldindeedforceonusdemandsastohowaestheticsmustbeifitistobeacceptableasa“proper”,“objective”discipline.Andsinceaestheticsmanifestlydoesnotmeetthosedemands,itwillbedismissedassubjective.Letusbeginbynotingacommonforceoftheword“subjective”inthesecharacterizationsoftheaesthetic.Theclaimthataestheticsissubjectiveoftenrepresentsaestheticclaimsasegoistic.Aestheticjudgementsarecharacterizedas“IlikeBarryManilow”,saidwithadefiantairandwithanarroganttonethatrefusesdiscussion.This,however,isnothowassertionsthatonelikessomethingaretypicallymade.Oneleavesthecinemawithsomeoneonelovesandsays,“Good,wasn’tit?”.Onesaystoafriend,“Ilikedthepart127\nTHEPROOFOFTHEPUDDINGwhereCleesedidthesillywalk”or“Ilikedthewaysheplayedtheadagio”.Thesearenotsubjectiveremarks,iftobeasubjectiveremarkistobeofferedinawaythatbrooksnoargument.Theseremarksareattemptstoengagewithanother.Theyinvitereplieslike,“Yes,wasn’titgood?”,or“Icouldn’tseemuchinit.Whatdidyoulikeaboutit?”;“No,IthoughtBrendeldiditbetter.Toomuchrighthand”.Inthesecontextsthequestionwhetherourremarksareobjectiveorsubjectivesimplydoesnotariseforus.Indeed,whenaskedtocharacterizethem,usingtheseterms,wemightsimplyfumble.Sincewearetalkingaboutwhatweliked,wemightthinkthattheyaresubjective.Yetweweretalkingaboutthefilmormusic.Ifwedonotfindanaturaluseoftheterms“subjective”and“objective”inthesecontexts,thenthesecontextsarenotitshome.Whythendemandtheremarksbeoneorother?Whynotlookandseewhathappenshere?Whathappenswhenwemaketheseremarksisthatwereachoutinanefforttoestablishcommunity.Tofindthatsomeoneelsefindsthatparticularthingfunnyistofindoneisnotalone.Tofindthatanotherdoesnotshareone’sreactionistohaveariftopenup.Objectivistsseemtowantittobethecase,whensuchriftsopenup,thatwehavesomeargument,aswedoinmathematics,thatisguaranteedtoclosetheriftagainandtobringusintounity.Wehavenosucharguments,leastofalldeductiveandinductiveones.Itdoesnotfollowfromthatthatwehavenothingatourdisposal.Whatwedoistrytogetsomeonetoseewhatwethinkwesee,muchasonetriestogetsomeoneelsetoseeafaceinapuzzlepicture.Insodoingweplaceourselvesattheriskthattheymayinsteadgetustoseeittheirway.Sibleyhasacompellingpictureofthekindsofthingswemightdoinsuchcases.SomeonecannotseethejokeinBrueghel’sFallofIcarusandwesay,“Didyounoticethetinysplashinthecorner?”:forafailuretoseeorhearorunderstandwhatistheretobeheard,seenandunderstoodmakesadifference.Sometimeswesimplypointtowhatwewanttheothertosee(aswedowhenthequestionmightbeaboutatrafficlight):“Lookatthegracefulline”,“Listentothequietresolution”,“Seetheimpudentwit”.Weusemetaphorsandanalogies:“Itisasifthepainthadbeenthrownatthecanvas”,“asifbirdswereflyingup”.Weinvite“whatifs”:“Ifyouwanttounderstandwhyitissosolid,imaginethefiguremovedtothe128\nCONCLUSIONSrightalittle;theeffectwouldbelost”.Wegesturewithhands,faceandbody,asaconductormightwhowishedtogettheorchestratoseetheeffectthatwasbeingsought.Andsometimestheothersays:“yes,nowIseeit”,“nowIbegintosee”,“ofcourse”,“right”,aswemightbebroughttosaythesethingsbyothers.Andthendelightrisesinus.Sinceitismydelight,itissubjective,ifyoureallywanttousethatterm.Butbecausethedelightisreferredtotheworkasitsobject,itisalsoobjective,ifyouwanttousethatterm.Butneitherreallyfits.ItisamistaketothinkthatwhenIsay“Idon’tlikeit”,thatisanend.Itisabeginning.Itinvites“Whydon’tyoulikeit?”.AndwhatIsaymaygetyoutoseeit,too:aremarklike“Itshumourissophomoric”mightdothetrick.Aestheticsisdismissedassubjective(inawayinwhichlove,significantlyisnot)becausewhatIsayaboutsomethingisconditionedbyhowitiswithme.Ibringmywholelifetothework.Butthatfact,althoughitmaybeareasonfordismissingsomeofmyjudgements(I’mgiventooverhasteandviolentandshort-livedenthusiasms),can’tbeareasonfordismissingallmyjudgements,especiallywhenothersspontaneouslysharethem.Althoughmyjudgementsexpressmylikings,Iaminclinedtosaythatthereisthepossibilityofarightandwronginaesthetics.Isaythisbecausewesimplydosay“That’sright”asaresponsetothejudgementofanother.Thatmeans“Iseeitasyoudo”.Thesejudgementsarerevisable(seeChapter9)asIamrevisable.AsmylifechangesImightcometoseewhyyousawitacertainway.AndthenIwillsay“That’sright”.Kantwasrightsofarasthis:anytendencytothinkofouraesthetictalkasobjectivetalkrestsuponintereststhatarenotpartialbutshared.WhatIthinkhefailedtoseewasthatthereisnotonesharingbutanextraordinaryrangeofcross-cutting,patchyandnonpatchysharings.ConclusionsFirstly,somesaythataestheticsisobjectiveifaestheticpropertiesare“in”objects.Itis,however,whollyunclearwhatitisforpropertiestobeinobjects,wherethespatialterm“in”suggeststhattheyarestuckinobjectslikecurrantsinapudding.Somehavearguedthatanypropertyisadispositionorpowerofanobjecttoaffectus,andifthataccountworked,wewouldhaveasmuch129\nTHEPROOFOFTHEPUDDINGrighttosaythataestheticpropertiesareinobjectsastosaythatanyotheroftheirpropertiesare.Herewehavetoremindourselvescontinuallythatthecolourlanguageexistsbecauseobjectsaffectsentienthumanbeingswithcertaincapacitiesincertainways.Thisisentirelycompatiblewithourhavingevolvedawayoftalkingaboutthecoloursofthingsthatadmitsatrueandfalse,arightandwrong.Soitiswiththeaesthetic,includingtheaestheticsofourlikings.Secondly,doubtsariseabouttherealpropertiesofthingsbecausewemakeanabsoluteriftbetweenaworldofobjectsandaworldofselves.Some,IdealistslikeKantandGentile,simplyrefusetostartthere.WhetherornotIdealismisdefensible,therearemodelsofourdealingswiththeworldthatspoilthatsimplebifurcation.Considerthewayinwhichwesayofalandscapethatitismelancholyorsmiling.Herethereissomesenseinsayingthatweprojectthesepropertiesontheworld.Themechanismofthisandthewaytheseprojectivecapacitiesfitintotheeconomyofourpsychologicallivesisamattertowhichweshallreturnwhenwecometoourfinalanswertothequestionwhereinliesthepowerofart.Butthephenomenonofprojectionremindsusthatitisnotalwaysasimplequestion:isthequalityintheworkorinus?Wereferaninnerlifetoanobjectfittedtoreceiveit.Isupposetherewillbeaworryaboutwhetherthefactofprojectioniscompatiblewiththerebeingatruthandfalsity,rightandwrongaboutsuchassertionsastheassertionthatanobjectismelancholy.Theansweristhatwedousethesetermsinthesecontexts:weareinclinedtoagreethatitisrighttosaythatawinterlandscapeismelancholyandabalmysummereveningistranquil.Thequestionisnotwhetherthesecommentscanberightandwrong,trueorfalse.Thequestioniswhatmakesthatpossible.Whatmakesthatpossibleisthatweagreeinthejudgementsthatwemake.Theseagreementsneednotbeuniversal,canbechangeable,canalterasourlivesalter,canbeaffectedbytheliveswehavehadandwillhave.Butthattherearetheseagreementsisallthatunderpinsthislanguage.Therearethosewhowouldliketheretobesomethingthatunderpinstheseagreements,sothatthereasonwesaythatalandscapeismelancholyisthatthereissomeproperty,beingmelancholy,tranquillityorwhatever,thatitpossessesindependentlyofourjudgementthatitisso.Certainly130\nGUIDETOREADINGtherewillbequalitiesthatamelancholylandscapewilltendtohave—darkercoloursforexample.Butthesecanneverentailthatitismelancholy,asopposedtodreary.Butasfarasmelancholygoestherecanbenosuchpropertyinathingoverandabovetheoneassignedtoitinencountersbysentientbeings.Allthishasprofoundimplicationsforeducationalpractice,particularlyaneducationinthearts.Theteachercannot,inonesense,beanauthority.Whenteachersdohaveaninclinationtoascribeapropertytoawork,thejobisnottotellpeoplethatithasthatpropertybuttotrytogettheotherstosee,hear,understandorfeelwhattheteachersees,wherethatistoputoneselfatriskthattheothersmaygetonetoseeittheirway.Ihaveindicatedsomeofthewaysinwhichthatcanbeattempted.Buthonestyisrequiredoftheothers,too.Forinthebusinessofthespinningofwordsoftenthemostpersuasiveimage-makercangetpeopletosaytheyseewhatisnotreallyseen.Theonlysafeguardagainstthatishonestyandcourage,thehonestytorealizethatonehasn’tyetseenandthecouragetosayso.Thechildwhosaidtheemperorhadnoclothescoulddothisoutofinnocence.Moreisusuallyrequiredofus.GuidetoreadingAmoredetailedversionofsomeoftheremarksinthischaptercanbefoundinmycontributiontoHanfling’sPhilosophicalaesthetics.ThebestplacetostartonprimesourcematerialiswithHume’sdelightfulandinfluentialessay“Ofthestandardoftaste”inTillman&Cahn(eds),Philosophyofartandaesthetics.Itwillbeapparentthathiswholeaccountrestsonthesubject-objectdistinction.Forademonstrationofhowanaestheticsmightlookthatdidn’tstartwiththat,tryGentile’spassionate(thoughoftenveryobscure)Thephilosophyofart,trans.G.Gullace(Ithaca,NY:Cornell,1953).ForacontemporaryexampleofhowphilosophymightlookwithoutthatassumptiontryacquaintingyourselfwithMerleau-Ponty,towhomHammond,Howarth&Keat’sUnderstandingphenomenologycontainsagoodguide.BernardWilliamshastracedmanyofthefeaturesofobjectivismtoDescartesinDescartes:theprojectofpureenquiry(London:Penguin,1978).Sibley’sworkonobjectivityislargelycontainedin“Colours”,Proceedingsofthe131\nTHEPROOFOFTHEPUDDINGAristotelianSociety,1967–8,pp.145–66and(inasymposiumwithMichaelTanner)“Aestheticsandobjectivity”,ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,supp.vol.42,1968,pp.31–54.OtherusefulessaysareG.Sircello,“Subjectivityandjustificationinaestheticjudgements”,JournalofAestheticsandArtCriticism27,1968–9,pp.3–12and,moreadvanced,DavidWiggins’s“Asensiblesubjectivism?”,inhisNeeds,valuesandtruth(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1987),pp.185–214.Sibley’sremarksoncriticismanditsstructure,which,soNickMacAdootellsme,haveoftenbeenfoundofgreatusebypractisingteachers,canbedistilledfromthesecond,usuallymoreneglected,halfofhis“Aestheticconcepts”andfromhis“Thegeneralityofcriticalreasons”inEssaysinaesthetics,J.Fisher(ed.)(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress1983),pp.3–20.ThelattercontainsafullaccountandcriticismofBeardsley’sinductivism.MentionofTrotskyinthetextleadsmetocommendhisLiteratureandrevolution(NewYork:RussellandRussell,1957),ifonlyforthevisionofaestheticsintheredeemedclasslesssocietywithwhichthatworkends.MysketchofaestheticjudgementasasearchforcommunityisultimatelytraceabletoStanleyCavell.AgoodwaytobeginastudyofthisveryimportantandoftenverydifficultwriterisviaStephenMulhall’ssplendidlyachievedlabouroflove,StanleyCavell:philosophy’srecognitionoftheordinary(Oxford:Clarendon,1994).TheintroductorymaterialtoaseriesofessaysdedicatedtoCavell,T.Cohen,P.Guyer&H.Putnam(eds),Pursuitsofreason(Lubbock:TexasTechPress,1993),givesfurtherhelp.TheessayinthatvolumebyTedCohen“Somephilosophy,intwoparts”(pp.385–401)arguesdirectlythatcriticismgoeswiththenotionofseekingcommunity.Inthatessayhereferstoanearlieressayalongthoselines,“Jokes”inEvaSchaper(ed.),Pleasure,preferenceandvalue(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1983),pp.137–57.Manyofthearticlesinthatbook,forexampleJohnMacdowell’s“Aestheticvalue,objectivityandthefabricoftheworld”,aregermane,inamoreadvancedway,tothepresenttopic.Ultimatelysomeoftheconcernsinthischapterwilllinkupwithwiderconcernsthatpresentlyengagephilosophers,ofakindtobefoundinCrispinWright’sTruthandobjectivity132\nGUIDETOREADING(Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress,1992)andJohnMcDowell’s,Mindandworld(Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress,1994).133\n\nChapter7TheemptytombandtheresurrectionoftheartistInmuchoftheforegoingIhavespokenofartistsaspresentintheirworks.Ispokeofthewayinwhich,inPicasso’sNudedressingherhair,onemightadmirethewaytherepresentationhadsobeenarrangedthateachdetailcontributedtotheoveralleffect.InsomethinglikeScorcese’sCasinoonemightadmirethejudiciousnessofthecutting,awarethatdifferentdecisionswouldhaveproducedalessimpressiveeffect.Inmusiconeadmirestheartistrywithwhichaneffectisachieved,aswhenHelenSchlegelnoticedtheeffectofthekeychangeinthelastmovementofBeethoven’sFifthSymphony.Wespeak,too,asifanartist’squalitiesmanifestedthemselvesinthework:thedistinctiveironyinJaneAusten’snovels,themawkishnessDickenscanshow,thediscriminationshownbyMozartinhisdevelopmentchoices,thecharacteristicwitofWilde,thescatologicalinterestSwiftandPicassocandisplay,thepretentiousnesssometimesshownbyPeterGreenaway.Whatissostriking,giventhefamiliarityandubiquityofthesewaysoftalking,isthatvirtuallythewholeofthiscenturyhasbeencharacterizedbytheattempttoeliminateanyreferencetothe135\nTHEEMPTYTOMBANDTHERESURRECTIONOFTHEARTISTartist.Today,asthecenturydrawstoanend,westillheartalkof“thedeathoftheauthor”and,fromDerrida,thattheworkis“cutofffromanyfather”,aremarkreminiscentofBeardsley’sandWimsatt’sremarkthattheliteraryworkofartis“cutofffromtheauthoratbirth”.StrategyAttemptsonthepersonoftheartistvary.Some,Beardsley,Wimsatt,BarthesandDerrida,forexample,attempttoshowthatreferencetowhatanartistintendedisnotnecessarywhenwhatisatissueisdeterminingthemeaningofaworkofart.Thereisalso,inBeardsleyandWimsatt,themoregeneralattempttoshowthatnoreferenceofanykindtoanartisthasanybearingonthecriticalappreciationofaworkofart.Ifthelatterthesisistrue,theformerwillbetrue.For,ifnoreferencetoartistsislegitimate,thennoreferencetotheirintentionsislegitimate.Letusthereforebeginbyexaminingthegeneralthesis.DescartesOverallthesediscussions,inboththeAnglo-AmericanandthecontinentalEuropeantraditions,hoverstheinfluenceofDescartes.Thisinfluenceinterestinglydiffersinthetwotraditions.BeardsleyandWimsattseemtosubscribetohisworld-pictureanddeducetheirrelevanceoftheartistfromthat,whereasstarkoppositiontothatpicturefuelstheworkofDerrida,BarthesandFoucault.Ibegin,therefore,withDescartesandwhatiscalledthe“Cartesian”picture.Thatpicturepositstwokindsofsubstances,thementalandthephysical.Ourbodiesaremodesofphysicalmatter,ourmindsaremodesofmentalsubstance.Hencewhatiscalled“Cartesiandualism”.Giventhatpicture,howamItoknowthemindofanother?WhereasIcandirectlyobserveabodyIcannotdirectlyobservethemindthatisyokedtoit.Theformerispublic,thelatterprivate.TheCartesianaccount,therefore,givesrisetothevigorouslydebatedproblemofknowledgeofotherminds.Dualism,anditsattendantproblemoftheprivacyofthemind,figuresprominentlyinwritingsofBeardsleyandWimsatt,whoseinfluentialarticle“Theintentionalfallacy”,andwhosemany136\nDESCARTESsubsequentwritings,deniedtherelevancetocriticismofknowledgeofandreferencetothecreatorsofworksofart.TherewefindaninclinationtorulesuchreferencesoutbecauseofaCartesian-likebeliefthattheyinvolveareferencetotheprivateandsounknowablemindoftheartist.ThusWimsattwrites:Letussaythatanartworkissomethingthatemergesfromtheprivate,individual,dynamic,andintentionalisticrealmofitsmaker’smindandpersonality…Inthemomentitemerges,itentersapublicandinacertainclearsenseanobjectiverealm.(Wimsatt1976,p.131)Hetalksofthosecriticswhoseetheartwork“asmainlyatokenofitssource,amanifestationofsomethingbehindit,thatis,theconsciousnessorpersonalityoftheartist”(ibid.,p.117).Speakingjointly,WimsattandBeardsleyspeakofanintentionassomething“intheauthor’smind”(Beardsley&Wimsatt1976,p.4),asentimentrepeatedbyBeardsleyinhisbookAesthetics(Beardsley1958,pp.18–19).Insuchutteranceswefindtheviewthatthereisaprivateplacecalled“themind”,inhabitedbytheprivatementallifeofanartist,whichlies“behind”thepublicworldofthework.Theuseofsuchspatialprepositionsas“in”themind,“behind”the“objective”world,andtheuseoftermslike“private”showthegripoftheCartesianpicture.Havingacceptedsuchapicture,twoapproachesclearlytemptedBeardsleyandWimsatt.Thefirstlaysstressonthenotionofprivacy.Theyweretemptedtoarguethatalthoughthereisindeedaprivate,mentalworld,itcanbeknownneitherbythecriticnoranyoneelse.Consequentlywhatgoesontherecannotbeaconsiderationforinterpretersandcriticsofliterature.Hencetheyclaimedthatknowledgeofintentionisnot“available”.Butalthoughthereisaninclinationtodismissreferencestotheartist’smindasunverifiablereferencestoanunknowableentity,whatwemoreoftenfindinBeardsley’sworkisasecondapproachinwhichtheargumentrestsnotontheunknowableprivacyofthemindbutratheronthedualisticCartesianpictureofmindandbody.Ishallcallthisthe“two-objectargument”.Itrunsthus:137\nTHEEMPTYTOMBANDTHERESURRECTIONOFTHEARTISTP1:Aworkofartisoneobject,existinginapubliclyobservablewayinan“external”world,whereastheintentions,emotionsandmoregenerallythemindofitscreator,isanother,entirelyseparateobject,existinginanother,separatelyexisting“internal”,privateworld.P2:Itisself-evidentthattheproperobjectofstudyforthosewhostudyartistheworkofartitself.Ifthosewhoundertakethisstudydivertattentiontoanyother,discreteanddifferentobject,thentheydeviateintoirrelevance.But,P3:Themindoftheartistisadiscreteanddifferentobjectfromthepublicworkofartitself.So,C:Toturnone’sattentiontothatobjectistodivertone’sattentionawayfromtheproperobjectofstudy,namelythepublicworkofartitself.Hence,evenifonecanknowaboutminds,andthusaboutthemindsofartists,torefertothosemindsistodeviateintoirrelevance.EvidencethatBeardsleysubscribestowhatIhavecalledthetwo-objectviewisreadilyfound.Thus,inhisAesthetics,havingquotedapassageinwhichEdmundWilsoncommentsonanovelbyMalraux,Beardsleycomments:“Theclausesinitalicsareaboutthenovel,therestaboutthenovelist;andtheparagraphpassesfromonetotheotherasthoughtherewerenochangeofsubject”(Beardsley1958,p.19).Moregenerally:Inthecaseofaestheticobjectandintention,wehavedirectevidenceofeach:wediscoverthenatureoftheobjectbylooking,listening,reading,etc.andwediscovertheintentionbybiographicalenquiry.Butalso,whatwelearnaboutthenatureoftheobjectitselfisindirectevidenceofwhattheartistintendedittobe,andwhatwelearnabouttheartist’sintentionisindirectevidenceaboutwhattheobjectbecame.Thus,whenweareconcernedwiththeobjectitself,weshoulddistinguishbetweeninternalandexternalevidenceofitsnature.Internalevidenceisevidencefromdirectinspectionoftheobject;externalevidenceisevidencefromthe138\nDESCARTESpsychologicalandsocialbackgroundoftheobject,fromwhichwemayinfersomethingabouttheobjectitself.(ibid.,p.20)Thispassagemakesitclearthatalthoughworkandartistaretobetreatedasdiscreteobjects,inferencesbetweenthemarepossible.However,iftheinferenceisfromtheartisttothework,thenitiseliminable.Forthatinferencewillfirsthavetoascertainsomefactabouttheprivatemindoftheartistandtheninferfromthatthatthepubliclyobservableworkhasacertainpubliclyobservablefeature.Ifthatisso,thenthereferenceiseliminable.Iftheworkindeedhasthepublicpropertyinquestion,itoughttobepossibletodetectthatpropertyintheworkbydirectinspectionwithoutfirstlyhavingtodiscoverfactsabouttheartistandinferringthepresenceofthatpropertyfromthem.Suppose,alternatively,thattheinferenceisfromaperceivedpropertyoftheworktosomeconclusionabouttheartist,aswhenoneinfersfromHamletthepresenceofsomementalperturbationpresentinitsauthoratthetimeatwhichtheplaywaswritten.Inthatcasetheinferencetotheartistisirrelevanttocriticism(although,asBeardsleyandWimsattnoted,itmaynotbeirrelevanttoliterarybiography,“alegitimateandattractivestudyinitself”Beardsley&Wimsatt1976,p.10).Fortheinferencehastakenusawayfromwhatweshould,ascritics,betalkingabout,thepublicworkofartitself,tosomethingseparatefromthatwork,theprivatemindofitsartist.Thisistodeviateintowhatis,fromacriticalpointofview,irrelevant.Thuswehaveaproofthat,ifartistandworkarediscreteentities,betweenwhichinferencesarepossible,thoseinferences,andtheknowledgeofandreferencetotheartistthattheypresuppose,areeithereliminableorirrelevant.Eitherwayreferencetothemindoftheartistisotiose.AcertainviewoftheprocessofinterpretationandcriticismemergesfromBeardsley’sarguments.Aworkofartisapubliclyobservableobjectwithpubliclyobservableproperties,someofwhicharerelevanttoitsstatusasaworkofart.Thejoboftheinterpreter,andcriticistoestablishthepresenceofsuchart-relevantproperties.Allthatinterpreterorcriticneedstorefertoincarryingoutthatjobisthepublicworkofartanditspubliclyobservableproperties.True,thatworkofartexistsbecauseithadacause,thatcausebeingtheproductiveagencyofanartistpossessedofintentions,emotionsandbeliefs.Butthecauseisonething,namelytheprivate139\nTHEEMPTYTOMBANDTHERESURRECTIONOFTHEARTISTmindoftheartist,theeffectisanother,towhit,apublicworkofart,andtheeffectcanbestudiedindependentlyofitscause.ThusBeardsleywrites:“Literaryworksareself-sufficiententities,whosepropertiesaredecisiveincheckinginterpretationsandjudgements.ThisissometimescalledthePrincipleofAutonomy”(Beardsley1970,p.16).Theartist-in-the-workThetwo-objectaccountderivessupportfromthefactthat,formanyofthetermsusedintalkingaboutworksofart,wecanmakeadistinctionbetweenusingthosetermsoftheworkandusingthosetermsofitscreator.Thus,take,first,suchtermsas“elegant”,“delicate”and“graceful”,astheymightbeusedofthelinesandcoloursofapainting.Ourabilitytrulytoassertthatapainting,oracomponentofapainting,possessesoneorotherofthesefeaturesrestsnotuponthediscoverythatitscreatorintendedittopossess,orbelievedittopossess,suchafeature,butuponanexaminationofthepaintingitself.Thesameseemstoapplytowhatmightbecalledthe“expressive”qualitiesofawork,aswhenwecallapainting“cheerful”orapieceofmusic“sad”.Againwecanmakeadistinctionbetweensayingthatapieceofmusicissadandsayingthatitscreatoris,orwas,sad.Foritisnot,aswesawinanearlierdiscussionofthecompositionofaRequiem,anessentialpreconditionofsomething’sbeingasadpieceofmusicthatitscomposerhadbeensadwhenproducingit.Todiscoverthatmusicsoundssad,welistentothemusic.Totakeafinalexample,towhichweshallreturnforalengthydiscussion,wecandistinguishbetweentalking,ontheonehand,aboutthemeaning-propertiesofthewordsofatextand,ontheother,aboutanauthorialintentiontomeansomethingbythosewords.Beardsleywrites(1958,p.25),thatwecanasktwoquestionsaboutanyutterance,“(1)whatdoesthespeakermeanbythosewords?and(2)whatdothewordsmean?”.Thelatterisdeterminedbyexaminingthewordsofthework,utilizingwhatBeardsleycallsthe“publicconventionsofusagethataretiedupwiththehabitpatternsinthewholespeakingcommunity”(ibid.)andwhichexist140\nTHEARTIST-IN-THE-WORKindependentlyofthewillofanyparticularspeakerorauthor.Soagainthetwo-objectaccountfindssupport.Wecandistinguishbetweenaskingaboutthemeaningoftheworkofliteratureandaboutthemeaningintendedbytheartist.Ifthecategoriesoftermssofarmentionedembracedallthetermsusedindescribingandpraisingart,thenthedemonstrationthatageneraldistinctionexistsbetweentalkingaboutartistsandtalkingaboutpropertiesofworks,thetwo-objectargument,wouldbecomplete.However,ifotherart-relevanttermsexist,forwhichitisnottruethatwecanalwaysdistinguishbetweentheuseofthesetermstorefertoworksofartandtheirusetorefertothecreatorsofthoseworks,theargumentfails.Take,then,thefollowingterms,whichIshallcallthe“personalquality”terms,allofwhichIhavetakenfromactualwritingsofcriticsaboutworksfromallbranchesofthearts:mature,intelligent,sensitive,perceptive,discriminating,witty,poised,precise,self-aware,ironic,controlled,courageous,simple-minded,shallow,diffuse,immature,self-indulgent,pretentious,gauche,glib,smug.Theproblemforthetwo-objectargumentpresentedbythesepersonalqualitytermsisthatthequestion:“Isthattermbeingusedoftheartistorofthework?”doesnotalwaysadmitaclearanswer.Whenanoveliscalled“self-indulgent”andweareasked:“Isitthenovelthatisself-indulgentorthenovelist?”,wemightrefusetochoose.Insteadwemightclaimthatthereferenceistosomecompositeentitythatwemightcallthe-work-conceived-as-a-performance-of-its-creator,aperformanceinthepublicrecordofwhichtheartistdisplaysthequalityinquestion.Wearetalkingaboutanartist-in-the-work.LadyChatterley’slover,ifWayneBooth’sRhetoricoffiction(1961)isright,manifestsapretentiousness.ButthepretentiousnessisLawrence’spretentiousnessasitisdisplayedthere,inthenovel.Wehavefoundasetofcriticaltermsthatresiststhetwo-objectanalysis.Thesearetermswhich,whenusedbythecritic,involveareferencetotheworkthatisinseparablefromareferencetothecreatorofthework.Referencetotheartistthenbecomesanintegralpartofcriticism.141\nTHEEMPTYTOMBANDTHERESURRECTIONOFTHEARTISTOnBeardsley’saccountwhatIhavecalledthepersonalqualitytermswillhavetobegivenatwo-objectanalysis.Therewill,forexample,havetobeoneinstanceof,say,perceptivity,whichwillbeapropertydirectlydiscernibleinthepublicworkofart,referencetowhichimpliesnoreferencetoanyperceptivitypossessedbytheprivatemindoftheartist.Itisthetaskofthecritictoconcentrateontheinstanceofperceptivitypresentinthepubliclyobservablework.Oneclearwaytoshowthecoherenceofthiswouldbetoshowthatitispossibleforittobetruethataworkisperceptiveandfalsethatitscreatoris.Suchademonstrationwouldimmediatelysubvertmycontentionthattosaythataworkisperceptiveisnecessarilytosaythattheartisttheredisplaysaperceptivity.Then,evenforthepersonalqualityterms,wecouldgetridofreferencetotheartist.Isn’tsuchademonstrationeasytogive?Foritiscommonplacethatsensitiveandperceptiveworkscanbeproducedbyboorishartists.Thinkofthehostesswhoinvitesanauthortodinneronthebasisofthewitofthatauthor’sworks,onlytobetreatedtoboringandegocentricallymonopolizingdisplaysofthewriter’struementality.Inthesecasestheperceptivityoftheworkisdistinguishablefromtheperceptivityoftheartist.Sothepersonalqualitiesoftheworkandthepersonalqualitiesofitscreatorseemeasilydistinguishable.Theargumentisunconvincing.Itistruethatifaworkhasacertainpersonalquality,sayperceptivity,thentheinferencethatitscreatorhasthedispositionregularlyandcommonlytodisplaythatqualityinlifeisashakyone.ButwhenIsaythatincallingaworkofart“perceptive”wearereferringtoaperceptivitydisplayedtherebyitscreator,Idonotlicenseanyinferencetotheconclusionthattheartistpossessesadispositionregularlytodisplaythatquality.Anartistmaybeperceptiveonlywhenwritingorpaintingorcomposing.WhatIdoassertisthatwhatevertheartist’sgeneraldisposition,thatcreatortheredisplayedperceptivity,andthatincallingthework“perceptive”Iamreferringtothatperformance.Thus,LeaviswasrighttoclaiminthatHardy’spoem“Afterajourney”displaysHardy’ssensitivity,andwrongtoinferfromthatthatHardycouldbeexpectedgenerallytodisplaythatquality.142\nIMITATIONAGAINImitationagainAmoreinterestingapproachisprefiguredinaremarkinthe“Theintentionalfallacy”.BeardsleyandWimsattwrite:Themeaningofapoemmaycertainlybeapersonalone,inthesensethatapoemexpressesapersonalityorstateofsoulratherthanaphysicalobjectlikeanapple[sic].Butevenashortlyricpoemisdramatic,theresponseofaspeaker(nomatterhowabstractlyconceived)toasituation(nomatterhowuniversalized).Weoughttoimputethethoughtsandattitudesofthepoemimmediatelytothedramaticspeaker,andiftotheauthoratall,onlybyanactofbiographicalinference.(Beardsley&Wimsatt1976,p.5)Giventhisaccount,thetwo-objectviewcanbereinstated.Thepersonalqualityterms,whenusedofthepublicwork,refertoaspeakerinthatpublicwork.Theiruseinreferringtothatspeakercanandmustbedistinguishedfromtheirusetorefertotheartist.Beardsleylaterdevelopedfromthisageneralattackonthetendencytoidentifythequalitiesofthespeakerintheworkwiththequalitiesofthecreatorofthework.Allthoselaterdevelopmentsrestultimatelyontheviewthatthecreationofworksofartinvolvesakindofactingorimitation.Thus,inThepossibilityofcriticismhesays:Theso-called“poeticuseoflanguage”isnotarealuse,butamake-believeuse…Thewritingofapoem…isthecreationofafictionalcharacterperformingafictionalillocutionaryact.Theutterance…takesonthecharacterofbeinganappearanceorashowoflivinglanguageuse.(Beardsley1970,p.59)Thisistosaythereisananalogybetweenwhatanauthordoesincreatingaliteraryworkofartandwhatanactor,mimicorimpersonatordoes.Theworkofartisanimitation,andweshouldnomoreassumethatitsproperties,includingitspersonalqualities,arethoseofthepersondoingtheimitationthanweshouldassumethatthequalitiesoftheFrenchlieutenant’swomanarethequalitiesofMerylStreep.143\nTHEEMPTYTOMBANDTHERESURRECTIONOFTHEARTISTTake,then,thecaseinwhichoneperson,theimitator,intentionallyexhibitsbehaviourcharacteristicofanotherpersonorthing,theimitated,andaskifwecanconstructuponthisanargumentfordistinguishingbetweenthepersonalqualitiesoftheworkitself(thoughtofasanimitation)andthepersonalqualitiesofitscreator(thoughtofastheimitator).LiteraturepresentsuswiththestrongestcaseforBeardsley’sthesis,forthereauthorsdo,asBrowningdid,adoptvoices.Ifthethesisfailstoworkthere,weneedgonofurtherwithit.Thefirstdifficultyisafactualone.Beardsleywouldhaveusbelievethatineveryworkofliteraryartthereisanintentiontoengageinimitation.Sometimes,asinTennyson’s“Northernfarmer”orBrowning’sdramaticmonologues,thisisso.Butnoteveryliteraryworkofartislikethis.Itisnotobvious,forexample,thatMrsBrowningwasintendingtoimitateanexpressionofloveinherSonnetsfromthePortuguese.Theattempttomakeitadefiningconditionofsomething’sbeingaworkofartthatitsmakermusthaveintendeditasanimitationthusrunsimmediatelyfoulofthefactthatmanyartistswhoproducedparadigmcasesofartdidnothavesuchanintention.VanGogh,Isuspect,wouldvehementlyhavedeniedanyintentiontoengageinsomekindofimitativeplay.HenryMillerwritesofhisTropicsequence:“Thethemeismyself,andthenarrator,orthehero,asyourcriticputsit,isalsomyself…Ifhemeansthenarrator,thenitisme….Idon’tuseheroes,incidentally,nordoIwritenovels.Iamthehero,andthebookismyself”(citedinBooth1961).ThesecondproblemisthecoherenceofBeardsley’saccount.Heassertsthatallworksofliteraryartareimitations.Heassertsthatwhencriticsaddressthemselvestoworksofart,theymustfocusonlyontheworkitselfandmustnotimportintotheiractivitiesanyknowledgeofthecreatoroftheworkorthatcreator’sintentions.For:“Itisnottheinterpreter’spropertask…todrawourattentionofftopsychologicalstatesoftheauthor…Histaskistokeepoureyeontextualmeaning”(Beardsley1970,p.74).Canoneassert,withoutaknowledgeofanartist’sintention,thataworkisanimitationandistobeappreciatedaccordingly?No.IfIputontheradioandhearwhatappearstobearecordingoftheflutingsofanightingale,Ihavenowayofknowing,justbyattendingtothesoundsthemselves,whetherornotthisisanimitation.Toknowthatitisanimitation,andsotoappreciateit144\nIMITATIONAGAINproperly,Ihavetoknowsomethingthatthesoundsthemselvescannottellme,namelythattheywereorwerenotproducedbyapersonwithacertainintention.IfIhaveonlythesounds,Ihavenorighttoassertthattheyareanimitation.And,similarly,ifmytaskistoattendonlytothewordsofElizabethBarrettBrowning’seffusionthatbegins“HowdoIlovethee?Letmecounttheways”,Ihavenorighttoassertthattheyareanimitationofsomeonelovelorn.TohavethatrightIhavetogoawayfromthewordsthemselvesandfindoutsomethingabouttheintentionoftheirproduction.AndthisisjustwhatBeardsleyforbidsmetodo.OnBeardsley’sownaccount,aworkofartisanimitation.Inorder,therefore,formetoknowthat,Imustknowtheintentionwithwhichitisoffered.Butsince,onhisaccount,Iamalsoforbiddentoenquireintointention,itisnotclearhowIcanknowthis.Thefullandrelevantcriticaldescriptionofatextcanonlybeachievedwiththeaidofaknowledgeofitssurroundings,wherethisknowledgemayincludeaknowledgeoftheintentionwithwhichitisoffered.Theclearestcaseispresentedbyironicwritings.ItispossibletoimagineSwift’sAmodestproposaltohavebeensoconvincinglydonethat,ifallwehadwasaknowledgeofthewordsofthetext,wewouldbeforcedtotakeitasagenuine(albeithorrific)proposal.Sototakeitwouldbetomisdescribeit.Trulydescribed,andthedescriptionwouldhavetorefertotheintentionwithwhichitisoffered,itisapieceofirony,andnothingthatomittedreferencetothisfactcouldcountasaproperandfulldescriptionofit.Thisimmediatelyfalsifiestheviewthatafulldescriptionofatextcanbeachievedwithoutreferencetothesurroundingsofthattext,includingareferencetotheintentionwithwhichitwaswritten.ButtoseethefundamentalincoherenceofBeardsley’saccountweneedtoponderonhisremarkthat“theso-called‘poeticuseoflanguage’isnotarealuse”.Behindthisliesacomparisonbetweenwhatawriterdoesinproducingaliteraryworkofartandwhattheactordoesinperformingarole,wherewhatisproducedinthelattercaseiswhatHamletcallsa“fiction”or“adreamofpassion”.Beardsley’sclaimisthatintheliteraryworkacharacter,adramaticspeaker,isimitated.Suchcharactersmaybedescribedasturbulent,distracted,intelligent,crafty,noble,deranged,pretentiousandsoforth.Theauthors,actorsorimpersonatorswhoproducesimulacrumsofsuchacharactermayindeedalsobethesethings,145\nTHEEMPTYTOMBANDTHERESURRECTIONOFTHEARTISTbutiftheyare,thatisacoincidencethatisofnointeresttothecritic.So,Beardsleysays:Oncewelearnfromtheworkitselfthecharacterofthespeakerwecan,ifwewish,askhowsimilarheistotheauthor.Whenweask,“IsStephenHeroanautobiographicalwork?”,weinvitethiscomparison.ButtocompareStephenHerowithJoyceistocomparetwodifferentpeople.(Beardsley1958p.238)Sothetwo-objectargumentsurvives.Totalkaboutthepersonalqualitiesoftheworkistotalkaboutthosequalitiesoftheimitatedcharactersinit;andthiscanbedistinguishedfromtalkingaboutitsauthor.Acrucialobservationnowhastobemadeaboutimitation,apointobscuredbyBeardsleywhenhesaysthatthepoetic,thatistheimitative,useoflanguageis“notarealuse”.Foralthoughwhatisimitatedneednotbereal,theactofimitationisarealact.EventhoughthereisnorealWatsonwhospeakstousintheHolmesstories,thereissucharealthingasAstudyinscarlet.Thisisthedepositofarealactofsomeone’sassumingthepersonaofWatsoninordertopresentaliteraryworkofart.Fromthisfollowsthecollapseoftheimitationtheoryassupportfortheclaimthatreferencetothecreatorofaworkcanbeeliminated.Forrealactsofimitation,can,likeanyactualperformance,displaythementalandpersonalqualitiesoftheiragents.Theymaybeclumsy,clever,perceptive,glib,slick,ill-judged,subtle,brilliant,unfortunate,callousandthelike.Whenthesetermsareappliedtosuchperformances,itisanagent’squalitiesinthoseperformancesandnotthepersonalqualitiesoftheimitatedagentthatisbeingjudged.If,then,anovelisanimitation,itisarealactofimitationandinvitestheapplicationtoitofsuchterms.Thereferentofsuchtermsistheauthorasdisplayedinthatimitativeperformance.Thenotionofimitation,farfromreducingthepossibilityofreferencestothecreatorofawork,hasactuallyincreasedthescopeforsuchreferences.Iftheworkjustis,asBeardsleysays,anactofimitation,totalkaboutitsqualitiesseemsinevitablytobetotalkaboutitasanactofitspresentingagent.146\nIMITATIONAGAINItwillnotdotoreplythatonecanalwaysdetectintheworkitselfevidenceofitscreator’sironicintention.Notonlyisthisnotself-evidentlythecase,forexamplewheretheimitationisparticularlywellachieved,butthereplyconcedesthatauthorsare,contrarytothetwo-objectargument,detectablyandrelevantlypresentintheirworks.Itisnohelpeithertosuggestthat,perhaps,thequalitiesoftheimitatorasevidencedintheworkarethemselvesthequalitiesofsomefurtherimitation.Thisfallsfoul,firstofadangerofinfiniteregress.Forthenewimitationwillitselfbearealactwithitspersonalqualities.Secondly,thereisamoreawkwarddifficultyforBeardsleyinsuchaproposal.Forsomepersonalqualitiescannotbeimitated,ifthatmeansthattheagent,althoughlackingsuchqualities,producesasuccessfulimitationofsomeonewhopossessesthem.Forsupposethequalitytobeperceptivity.Wearethenaskedtoimaginethatawriterlackingsuchaqualitymightproduceawholeworkthatsuccessfullyimitatesaperceptivitythatwriterdoesnotpossess;whereassuchaperformancewouldinfactestablishthatthewriteractuallydidpossessthatqualityandhasmanifesteditinthework.Manyofthementalpersonalqualitiesseemtohavethisproperty:theycannotbesuccessfullyimitatedbyproducingaperformancethatactuallydisplaysthem.Tosummarize:ifBeardsleyistousethenotionofimitationtomakeageneraldistinctionbetweenreferringtoaworkandreferringtoitscreator,hehastodotwothings.Firstly,hehastoestablishthattheimitatedspeakerinaworkcanbedistinguishedfromtheimitatingspeakerwhocreatesthework;thatis,hehastodistinguishthespeakerintheworkfromthespeakerofthework.Thisheindeeddoes,usingasanexamplethedistinctionbetweenConanDoyle,thecreatingspeakeroftheHolmesstories,andJohnWatson,thespeakerinthoseworks.Thisisaspecialcaseofthegeneralfactthatwecan,inanyimitation,distinguishbetweenthequalitiesofwhatisimitatedandthequalitiespossessedbytheimitator.Theimitationofthesongofthenightingalemaybemellifluous,butthisisnottrueoftheactofimitatingit.Giventhatwecandistinguish,withinthetotalactofimitation,bothwhatisimitatedandtheimitatingofit,Beardsleyhas,secondly,toshowthattheimitativeworkofartmustbeidentifiedwithonlyoneofthese,namely,withwhatisimitated:withthespeakingvoiceofWatsonforexample.Ifhecoulddo147\nTHEEMPTYTOMBANDTHERESURRECTIONOFTHEARTISTthis,thengiventhatthepersonalqualitiesoftheauthordoingtheimitatingcanbedistinguishedfromthepersonalqualitiesoftheimitatedspeaker,itwouldfollow,fromthefactsfirstly,thattheworkisidenticalwiththeimitatedspeakerand,secondlythatthecriticandinterpretermustconcentrateonlyontheworkitself,thatreferenceincriticismtothepersonalqualitiesoftheauthorisirrelevant.Theonlyreferencetopersonalqualitiesthatispossibleisreferencetothepersonalqualitiesoftheimitatedspeaker.Itis,however,thissecondstep,theidentificationofthetotalworkofartwiththatcomponentofthetotalactofimitation,whichisthethingimitated,thatisillegitimate.Theproofissimple.If,touseBeardsley’sexample,weidentifytheHolmesstorieswiththeimitatedresponseofJohnWatson,whospeaksthem,thenitfollowsthatthepersonalqualitiesofJohnWatsonarethepersonalqualitiesoftheworkitself:andsinceheisobtuse,slow,bluffandover-hearty,itwouldfollowthattheHolmesstoriesareobtuse,slow,bluffandover-hearty.Sincethisisabsurd,itfollowsthatthepersonalqualitiesoftheworkarenotidenticalwiththoseofthespeakerinthework.Theyare,rather,thequalitiesoftheothercomponentinthetotalactofimitating,theimitatingspeaker:andwhoisthatifitisnotthecreatorofthework?(Itisnouseinvoking,asCatherineBelseydoesinherelegantreadingoftheHolmesstories,thefactthatthepresentingspeakershowsevidenceofanonunitarymind,notalwaysawareofwhatitisdoing.Thatdoesnotshowwearewrongtorefertotheartist’smindaspresentinthework.ItshowsonlythatwewouldbewronginassuminganymanifestedmindmustbeaCartesianunifiedone,alwaysfullyawareofwhatitisdoing.)Beardsley,then,quiteclearlyshowsthatthepersonalqualitiesofaspeakerinaworkcannotsimplybeattributedtoitsauthor.Heoffersnoproof,however,thatthepersonalqualitiesoftheworkarenotthoseofitscreator.Hewrites:ClearlyConanDoyle’suseoftheword“I”intheSherlockHolmesstoriesdoesnotgivethispronounareferencetoanyactualperson…Why,then,mustweassumethatwhenKeatsorShelleyusesthepronounheisalwaysreferringtohimself?(Beardsley1958,pp.239–40)148\nIMITATIONAGAINTheansweris,“Wedon’t.”When,in“Thecloud”,Shelleywrites,“Ibringfreshshowersforthethirstingflowers”,itwouldbeaformofinsanitytothinkthatShelleyhimselfwasclaimingtodothis.ButwhenShelleywrites,in“OdetotheWestWind”,“Ifalluponthethornsoflife,Ibleed”,thenintheabsenceofanyevidenceofimitativeorironicintent,theresponsibilityforanyemotionalinadequacyexpressedinthelinerestswithhim.Thedifferenceisthatinthefirstcasewefeelourselvestobereferringtoaspeakerinthework,inthesecondtothespeakerofthework.Thereisanimportantimplicationofthisdistinctionbetweenthespeakerintheworkandthespeakerofthework.Itissometimesaskedwhetherthecorrectwaytorespondtoaworkoffictionisbyidentificationwithaspeakerinthework(sothatonemighttrytoseethewaythingsaregoingfromLear’spointofview)orwhetheroneoughttotakeaspectatorview,thatistomakeone’sownresponse,whichmaybepityandsorrowforLear(whichisnotincompatiblewithanadversejudgementofhisbehaviour).Thereis,thatis,achoicebetweenseeingornotseeingtheworkfromwithin,or,assomehaveputit,betweenempathyandsympathy.IfwhatIhavesaidiscorrect,thenanappraisaloftheworkrequiresonenottoseeitfromwithin,or,evenifonetakesthatviewpoint,nottoremainthere.Fortheevaluationoftheworkistheevaluationofitforthequalitiesthatithas,andthesearenotidenticalwiththequalitiespossessedbyanyspeakerwemightidentifywithinit:norareitsjudgementsnecessarilythejudgementsofanyspeakerinthework.TodenythisistofallintotheabsurditydisplayedbytheprosecutorinthetrialofLadyChatterley’slover,whowasunabletodistinguishbetweenthebehaviourofConstanceChatterleyandthebeliefsofLawrence.Onelooseendremainstobetidiedup.Iclaimedthatcertainpersonalqualitiesoftheartist,notablythoseexemplifyingpositivementalqualities,cannotbeimitated.ForIcouldimagineitbeingsaidthat,evenifthesepositivequalitiesarebeyondpretence,negativepersonalqualities,suchasmawkishness,pretentiousness,smugnessandglibnessarenot.Onecansuccessfullypretendtohavethesekindsofqualities.Ifsomeonedoesproduceaworkthatsuccessfullypretendstobemawkish,orpretentious,thisisasuccessfulactofimitation.However,itisthenunclearthattheworkitselfhasthesenegativefeatures.Forthediscoveryofcertainfactsaboutsuchawork149\nTHEEMPTYTOMBANDTHERESURRECTIONOFTHEARTISTmightentitleustoredescribeitmoreaccuratelyasabrilliantparodyof,say,alow-graderomanticnovel.Ouroriginalclaimthatitismawkishwas,infact,false:whatitisisthesuccessfulimitationofamawkishwork.Theimitatedcontentoftheworkismawkish:theworkastheactofimitatingmawkishnessisnot.Herewehaveanothercase,inwhichthecorrectdescriptionofaworkrequiresustoknowsomethingaboutthewayinwhichitscreatorconceivedit.Toasserttheforegoingisnottodenythatanauthormaydeliberatelygiveaworktheappearanceofpossessingdefectivepersonalqualities.Thiscanbedoneasanactofimitation,whichinturnmaybeundertakenforavarietyofreasons;perhapstomakemoneyoutofagulliblereadingpublic,perhapstocockasnookatart.Butalthoughwemaybeginbyattributingthesedefectivequalitiestothework,oncethefullstoryoftheworkisknown,ourdescriptionmustbechanged.Wemuststopthinkingofitasadefectiveworkwithnegativepersonalqualitiesandconsideritinsteadasamoreorlessadequateimitationofsuchadefectiveworkundertakenforthisorthatpurpose.Thereisanimportantcorollaryofthisforcriticism.Ifweareingenuinedoubtastowhetheraworkisthebrilliantpasticheofthedisplayofadefectivesetofpersonalqualitiesormerelythereallydefectivedisplayofsuchaset,if,forexample,wecannotdeterminewhetheranovelistheravingsofachauvinistpigortheironicrepresentationofsuchravings,criticismisstultified.Wehavecases,ofcourse,wherewehavereasontobelievethatwearedeliberatelybeingleftindoubtwhichwaytotakeawork.Butthenwehavereasonstobelievethatweknowtheintentionandcanjudgetheworkaccordingly.FreedomsThereisaversionoftheargumentaboutthelegitimacyofreferencestotheartistthatfocuseslessonthepossiblerelevanceofsuchreferencesandmoreonthequestionoftheirdesirability.Thatargumentseeks,rightly,toquerytheauthorityoftheartistoverthereaderofthework.ThusBeardsleyandWimsattdenythatwhatauthorssayabouttheirfinishedworksofart,andabouttheirpriorintentionsin150\nFREEDOMSwritingthemhaveanyspecialauthorityoverthecritic,interpreterorreader.For:Thepoemisnotthecritic’sownandnottheauthor’s(itisdetachedfromtheauthoratbirthandgoesabouttheworldbeyondhispowertointendorcontrolit).Whatissaidaboutthepoemissubjecttothesamescrutinyasanystatementinlinguisticsorthegeneralscienceofpsychology….InEliot’s“TheLoveSongofJ.AlfredPrufrock”…occurstheline:“Ihaveheardthemermaidssingingeachtoeach”,andthisbearsacertainresemblancetoalineinaSongbyJohnDonne,“TeachmetoheareMermaidessinging”,sothatforthereaderacquaintedtoacertaindegreewithDonne’spoetry,thecriticalquestionarises:IsEliot’slineanallusiontoDonne’s?…Thereis…thewayofbiographicalorgeneticenquiry,inwhich,takingadvantageofthefactthatEliotisstillalive…thecriticwritestoEliotandaskswhathemeant…Ourpointisthattheanswertosuchanenquirywouldhavenothingtodowiththepoem“Prufrock”;itwouldnotbeacriticalenquiry…Criticalenquiriesarenotsettledbyconsultingtheoracle.(Beardsley&Wimsatt1976,p.5,17–18)LaterBeardsleywrote:Ofcoursewemustadmitthatinmanycasesanauthormaybeagoodreaderofhisownpoem,andhemayhelpustoseethingsinitthatwehaveoverlooked.Butatthesametime,heisnotnecessarilythebestreaderofhispoem,andindeedhemisconstruesitwhen…hisunconsciousguideshispenmorethanhisconsciousnesscanadmit.Andifhisreportofwhatthepoemwasintendedtomeanconflictswiththeevidenceofthepoemitself,wecannotallowhimtomakethepoemmeanwhathewantsittomean,justbyfiat.(Beardsley1958,p.26)Allthisistruebutgivesnogroundsforanygeneraleliminationofreferencestoartists.Timeandagainwritersinthisarea,inalltraditions,confusetheclaimthatwecanignorewhatartistssayabouttheirworksandtheclaimthatwecanignoreartistsaltogether.Evidencethatworksexhibitpersonalqualitiesoftheirmakersistestedbyreferencetotheworks.Theirartistsmaynot151\nTHEEMPTYTOMBANDTHERESURRECTIONOFTHEARTISThaveintendedandmaynotevenknowthatthisorthatqualityoftheirmindisexhibitedthere,nomorethanImayintendorknowthatmypresentremarksaretriteandbanal.But,forallthat,thesearequalitiestheartistsshowintheworks.Further,evenifstatementsbyartistsabouttheirintentionsareunreliable,itdoesnotfollowthatreferencetotheirintentionsareirrelevantwherethatknowledgemaycomefromothersources(includingtheworkitself)thantheartists’statements.Aswellarguethatbecausepoliticiansareoftenunreliablesourcesofinformationabouttheirintentions,weshouldnottrytodiscoverandtakeintoaccountwhattheirintentionsreallyare.Itistrue,secondly,thatartistsmaynotbethebestcriticsandinterpretersoftheirworksandmaybemistakenastowhatisimportantorsignificantaboutthem.Composers,forexample,arenotalwaysthebestconductorsoftheircompositions,andplaywrightsaregenerallynotthebestpeopletodirecttheirownplays.Evenifartistsarerightinbelievingthatthefeaturestheyintendedtoputinaworkareindeedthere,thereisstillthepossibleerrorofbelievingthatthefeaturesonesucceededinputtinginaworkareitsmostimportantones.Again,however,this,althoughitdeniesaspecialauthoritytotheartist,doesnothingtoshowtheirrelevanceofreferencestoartistsortheirintentions.Theevidenceoftheintentiontobeironicmaynotbetheprofessedstatementoftheintentionofanironist,butIneedtoknowthatthatintentionexistedifIamproperlytocharacterizethework.Again,artistsmaybelieveandassertthattheirworkisperceptivewhenitismerelypretentious,butthatdoesnotstopthereferencebeingtotheirpretentiousnessasdisplayedintheirwork.Thatwedenytheauthorityoftheauthorovertheworkdoesnotentailthatwehavetodenyaplaceforreferencestotheauthorofawork.ThismayneatlybeillustratedfromBeardsley’sandWimsatt’sownpracticalcriticism.BothdiscussthequestionwhetherHousman’sJubileeOde“1887”isorisnotironic,giventhatHousmandeniedanyironicintention.BeardsleywritesthatHousmanmaynotbethebestreaderofhispoemandmaymisconstrueit“whenhisunconsciousguideshispenmorethanhisconsciousnesscanadmit”(Beardsley1958,p.26).Butalthoughthatcastsadoubtontherelevanceofconsideringstatementsofintention,itdoesnothingtoeliminatereferencetointention(albeitunconscious).WimsattsaysofHousman’sdisavowalofironic152\nFREEDOMSintentionthat“itstandsinsharpcontradictionnotonlytothecunningdetailsofthepoeminquestionbuttothewellknownandscepticalcastofthepoet’scanon”(Wimsatt1976,p.131).Notonlymightweaskwhosecunningandscepticismisbeingreferredto,ifnotHousman’s,butthereisaclearimplicationthatthe“cunningdetailsofthepoeminquestion”areabetterguidetoHousman’sintentionsthanhisavowalsare.Andthatisastrangeproofoftheirrelevanceofreferencestoauthorialintentions.Thereis,however,adifferentandmoreradicalargumentastothedesirabilityofignoringartistsintheworkofSartre,anargument,asweshallsee,presentalsointheworkofBarthes,DerridaandFoucault.Heretheundesirabilityofreferringtotheartistisarguedonthegroundsthattogiveanartistauthorityistounderminethefreedomofthereader,viewerorlistener.Toallowtheartistintocriticismandinterpretationistogivehouseroomtoadictator.Thattheartististhusconceivediseasilyestablished.Writing,disparagingly,ofMauriac,Sartresaysthatthisnovelist“istohisowncreatureswhatGodistohis…WhathesaysabouthischaractersisGospel…ThetimehascometosaythatthenovelistisnotGod”(Sartre1955,p.14).ThesameimageofthedivinedictatorisusedbyBarthes,DerridaandFoucault.Forexample,asweshallseeinthenextchapterBarthesassertsthat“itisthelanguagethatspeaks,nottheauthor;weknowthatthetextisnotalineofwordsreleasingasingle‘theological’meaning(the‘message’oftheAuthor-God)”(Barthes1977,pp.143,146).IspokeinChapter5aboutabroadmovementoftwentiethcenturythoughtinwhichthereisarejection,intheinterestsofhumanlibertyandfulfilment,ofauthorityfigures,includingGod,fathers,bosses,kingsandeventheegothatrepressestheid.TheenthronementwithinthefamilyofthefatherasGodcurtailsthefreedevelopmentofthechildren,sothatthethronemustbetoppled.TheownerofthemeansofproductionistheGodovertheworkforcewhoalienatesthemfromtheirlabour.Hetoomustgo.Kingsinhibitthefulldevelopmentofthefreelifeoftheirsubjectsandmustbeoverthrown.AndGod,too,mustdiethathispeoplecantaketothemselvestheresponsibilitiesfortheirownlives.SoNietzschewrote:“WhoisthegreatdragonwhichthespiritnolongerwishestocallLordandGod?Thegreatdragoniscalled‘Thoushalt’.Butthespiritofthelionsays‘Iwill!’”(Nietzsche1961,p.55).153\nTHEEMPTYTOMBANDTHERESURRECTIONOFTHEARTISTThephilosophersoftheartscannowaddtheircontribution.Theartist,conceivedasagod,adictatoroverthework,mustgothewayofallgodsandalldictators.Thenthereader,viewerorlisteneristurnedfreebytheliterarytheoristas,forNietzsche,forexample,thereligiousbelieverwasturnedfreebythedeathofGod.Thedeathoftheauthor,Barthesasserted,isthebirthofthereader(1977,p.148).Artists,too,joinedin.Hence,aswesaw,Cage’s4’33”,whichrequiresaninstrumentalisttositdoingnothingforthatlengthoftime,thuseliminatingthecomposerasakindofdictatorwhotellsthemusicianswhattoplay,andtheconductoraswhatCagecallsakindof“policeman”.Oneshould,hewrites,“giveupthedesiretocontrolsound,clearhismindofmusicandsetaboutdiscoveringmeanstoletsoundsbethemselvesratherthanmanmadetheoriesorexpressionsofhumansentiments”(Cage1966,p.10).Fortraditionalmusic:…controlsahumanbeing[giving]thealarmingaspectofaFrankensteinmonster.ThissituationisofcoursecharacteristicofWesternmusic,themasterpiecesofwhicharethemostfrighteningexamples,whichwhenconcernedwithhumancommunicationonlymoveoverfromFrankensteinmonstertodictator.(ibid.,p76)Doesthepassionforlibertyjustifytheconclusionthatreferencetotheartistintheworkoughttobeeliminated?Herethequestionisnotwhethertheattemptbyartiststodictatetotheiraudienceshowtheirworksaretobetakeniswrong.Toshowthatsuchattemptsarewrongweneedonlytosee,asBeardsleyandWimsattpointout,thatartistsarenotnecessarilythebestauthorityontheirworks.Thequestioniswhetherreferencetoartistsastheyshowthemselvesinworksentailsasubordinationtoanydictatorialinclinationsthattheymaypossess.Idoubtthatitdoes.Ihavearguedthatartistsshowthemselvesinthoseworkswhichitisthetaskofcriticstocharacterizeandjudge.Thisfact,inasense,doesindeedputarestrictiononthecritic.Forifcriticsareproperlytocharacterizeworkstheycannotsaywhatevertheywant.ThatrestrictiononfreedomisnotonetowhichSartreisinanypositiontoobject.Forconsiderthefollowingstatementhemakesintalkingaboutliterature:154\nFREEDOMSTheliterarysubjecthasnoothersubstancethanthereader’ssubjectivity;Raskolnikov’swaitingismywaitingwhichIlendhim.Withoutthisimpatienceofthereaderhewouldremainonlyacollectionofsigns…Ontheotherhandthewordsarethereliketrapstoarouseourfeelingsandtoreflectthemtowardsus.Eachwordhasapathoftranscendence;itshapesourfeelings,namesthem,attributestothemanimaginarypersonagewhotakesituponhimselftolivethemforusandwhohasnoothersubstancethantheseborrowedpassions.(Sartre1950,pp.31–2)Thispassagemakesitclearthatreadersarenotabsolutelyfree,whenreading,tomakewhattheywishofawork.Thereareelementsinworksofart,forexample,words,colourpatchesandsounds,thatworkonreaders,viewersandlisteners,whichshapetheirfeelingsandresponses,andwhichdictatehowtheworkshouldbecharacterized.Tocharacterizetheworkaccordingtothedictatesoftheelementsinitistosaywhatistrueaboutit.Thefactthatwemustbetruetowhatisintheworkdoesnotconstituteanillegitimatelimitationofourfreedom.Howcouldit?Whatworthwhilefreedomisitthatwouldrequireustoshutoureyestothetruthaboutathing?But,now,Ihavearguedthatthemindoftheartististhereinthework,asmuchasanyword,soundorcolourpatch.Andifmyfreedomisnotimproperlycircumscribedbyarecognitionofsuchelementsintheworkaswords,notesandcolours,whichshapemyresponsetothework,itisnotillegitimatelycircumscribedbytherecognitionthattheelementsoftheworkincludequalitiesthattheauthordisplaysinit.Moreover,itsimplydoesnotfollowfromthefactthatIrecognizeauthorsintheirworks,thatIhavetotakethoseauthorsattheirownestimation.IndeedImay,asafreereader,beabetterjudgeofthequalitiesdisplayedbyanauthorintheworkthanisthatveryauthor.SamuelJohnsonbelievedhimselftohavefoundShakespeare’sfaultsinShakespeare’splays,faultsonthepresenceofwhichShakespearewasnotthebestauthority.Buthecoulddosoonlybecausehewasfree,havingmadethefreechoicetoattendtothework,tosaywhatistrueaboutit.Toignoretheartist’sdictatesabouttheworkisnottoignoretheartistinthework.155\nTHEEMPTYTOMBANDTHERESURRECTIONOFTHEARTISTSartrewouldbeonstrongergroundifhecouldargue,asBeardsleyandWimsattareinclinedtoargue,thattheartistisnotdetectablypresentinthework.Forthentheartistwouldcomeuponthesceneonlyasapossiblydictatorialcommentator.Buthearguestheexactopposite.Onhisaccounttheworkistheresidueofasetofchoiceswhichitselfshowstheartist’shand.Soforexample,makingthetimespanofanoveladay,ratherthananhouroraminute,isachoicemadebytheartist,andinmakingthatchoicetheartistshowshimorherselfandispresenttousinthework.Hereisacrucialpassage.Ingivingupthefictionoftheomniscientnarrator,wehaveassumedtheobligationofsuppressingtheintermediariesbetweenthereaderandthesubjectivities—theviewpointsofourcharacters.Itisamatterofhavinghimenterintotheirmindsasintoawindmill.Hemustcoincidesuccessivelywitheachoneofthem.WehavelearnedfromJoycetolookforasecondkindofrealism,therawrealismofsubjectivitywithoutmediationordistance.Whichleadsustoprofessathirdrealism,thatoftemporality.Indeed,ifwithoutmediationweplungethereaderintoaconsciousness,ifwerefusehimallmeansofsurveyingthewhole,thenthetimeofthisconsciousnessmustbeimposeduponhimwithoutabridgement.IfIpacksixmonthsintoasinglepage,thereaderjumpsoutofthebook.Thislastaspectraisesdifficultiesthatnoneofushasresolvedandthatareperhapspartiallyinsoluble,foritisneitherpossiblenordesirabletolimitallnovelstothestoryofasingleday.Evenifoneshouldresignoneselftothat,thefactwouldremainthatdevotingabooktotwentyfourhoursratherthantoone,ortoanhourratherthantoaminute,impliestheinterventionoftheauthorandatranscendentchoice.(Sartre1950,p.229)Ifartistsarethusinevitablyintheworktheonlythreattoourfreedomcomesfromthosewhowouldforbidustorefertothem,andthatisanoffencenotmerelyagainstfreedombutagainsttruth-telling.156\nGUIDETOREADINGSofar,wehavefoundnoargumentforthegeneraldeathoftheartist,wherethatmeanstheeliminationfromcriticismofallreferencestothem.That,however,leavesthepossibilitythatsomelessgeneralclaimmightbetrue.Anexamplewouldbetheclaimthatwhatevertherelevanceofreferencestothepersonalqualitiesofartists,referencestotheirintentionscanatleastbeexcludedwhenweareinterestedinthemeaningoftheirwords.Idealwiththeextraordinaryramificationsofthatclaiminmynextchapter.GuidetoreadingDetailsofwritingsinthecontinentaltraditionwillbegiveninthenextchapter,whichlargelydealswiththem.Beardsley&Wimsatt’s“Theintentionalfallacy”,tobefoundinD.NewtondeMolina(ed.),Onauthorialintention(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,1976).istheseminalarticlethat,in1946,startedthingsoff.Itishowever,notthebestintroduction,beingundulyramblinganddiscursive.BetterisBeardsley’sAesthetics(NewYork:HarcourtBrace&World,1958).HislaterthoughtsaretobefoundinThepossibilityofcriticism(Detroit:WayneStateUniversityPress,1970).ThiscontainsastormyrejoindertoFrankCioffi’snowclassic“Intentionandinterpretationincriticism”reprintedinaverygoodcollectionofmaterialinC.Barrett(ed.),Collectedpapersinaesthetics(Oxford:Blackwell,1965).Wimsattseparatelypublished“Genesis:afallacyrevisited”,tobefoundintheNewtondeMolinavolume.OneoftheirtargetsisE.D.Hirsch’sValidityininterpretation(NewHaven,Yale:ConneticutUniversityPress,1967).Themostup-to-datethinginthisstillflourishingfieldisG.Iseminger’smuchpraisedcollectionofnewessaysentitledIntentionandinterpretation(Philadelphia:Temple,1992)whichisthoroughlydiscussedbyG.Dickie&W.KentWilson,“Theintentionalfallacy:defendingBeardsley”,TheJournalofAestheticsandArtCriticism,53(3)1995,pp.233–50.CatherineBelsey’sinterestingremarksontheSherlockHolmesstoriesaretobefoundinherCriticalpractice(London:Methuen1966).TheremarksbySartrearedealtwithinasplendidandaccessiblediscussioninW.J.Harvey,Characterandthenovel(London:ChattoandWindus,1965).MuchofthatisrelatedtotheequallyimportantdiscussionsoftheinexcludabilityofauthorsinWayneBooth’shighly157\nTHEEMPTYTOMBANDTHERESURRECTIONOFTHEARTISTinformative,tightlyreasonedandhighlyreadableTherhetoricoffiction,2ndedn(London:Penguin,1991).158\nChapter8Thestructuresoftheself-sufficientwordIshalllookatthreesourcesoftheclaimthattheintentionsofartistsareirrelevanttothedeterminationofthemeaningoftheirworks.Theseare:BeardsleyandWimsatt,whosearticle“Theintentionalfallacy”beganAnglo-Americandebate;structuralism;andthepoststructuralismofDerrida.BeardsleyandWimsattThisistheviewtowhichBeardsleyandWimsatt,BarthesandDerridaareopposed:Almostanywordsequencecan,undertheconventionsoflanguage,legitimatelyrepresentmorethanonecomplexofmeaning…Adeterminatemeaningrequiresadeterminingwill…Verbalmeaningiswhateversomeonehaswilledtoconveybyaparticularsequenceoflinguisticsigns.(Hirsch1967,pp.250,266)159\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDAgainstthisBeardsleywrites:“Itisnottheinterpreter’spropertask,then…todrawourattentionofftothepsychologicalstatesoftheauthor”(Beardsley1970,p.34).InasimilarveinBartheswritesthat“itisthelanguagethatspeaks,nottheauthor”(Barthes1977,p.143).This,asweshallsee,isathoughtthatwillbemorefullyexploitedinthewritingsofDerrida.AllobjectionstoanyattempttoassertaconnectionbetweenmeaningandintentionimplicitlyopposeCartesianism.TheCartesianphilosopher,wesaw,maintainsthattherearetwokindsofsubstance:thementalandthephysical.Withthisgoesacertainviewoflanguage.Thereare,ontheonehand,physicalentities,forexample,soundsandinkmarks.Ofthemselvesthesearemerelybruteandmuteelementsofphysicalreality.Iftheyhaveameaning,itisbecausebehindthemliesamindthatwillsmeaningontothemanddictatesthattheyshallhavethatmeaning.Wittgenstein,muchofwhoselaterphilosophyunderminesthisview,characterizesitthus:Wearetemptedtothinkthattheactionoflanguageconsistsoftwoparts;aninorganicpart,thehandlingofsigns,andanorganicpart,whichwemaycall…meaningthem…Theselatteractivitiesseemtotakeplaceinaqueerkindofmedium,themind.(Wittgenstein1958,p.3)TheCartesianmindmightbesaidto“transcend”thephysical,inthesensethatthephysicalworlddoesnotcontainitand,additionally,inthesensethatitgivesthephysicalworldanymeaningthatitmighthave.When,astheyoftendo,Derrida,BarthesandSartreattackthenotionofthetranscendentself,theyareattackingthisCartesianself,whichasmeaning-givertotheworld,canalsobedescribed,astheyoftendescribeit,asakindofGodorsovereignorfatherwhodictatesameaningtothings.Theanti-CartesianargumentusedbyBeardsley,bystructuralistsandbypoststructuralists,demonstratesthattheattempttolinkmeaningtoanintendingCartesianmindwouldmakecommunicationimpossible.Thiscrucialcentralargumentcanbeexplainedbyreferencetotheproceduresofanarch-Cartesianinthefieldofmeaning-determination,LewisCarroll’s160\nBEARDSLEYANDWIMSATTHumptyDumpty.Attheconclusionofamorethanusuallyspeciouspieceofreasoning,HumptyDumptyremarks,“There’sgloryforyou!”.“Idon’tknowwhatyoumeanby‘glory,’”Alicesaid.HumptyDumptysmiledcontemptuously.“Ofcourseyoudon’t—tillItellyou.Imeant‘there’saniceknock-downargumentforyou!’”“But‘glory’doesn’tmean‘aniceknock-downargument’,”Aliceobjected.“WhenIuseaword,”HumptyDumptysaid,inaratherscornfultone,“itmeansjustwhatIchooseittomean—neithermorenorless”.(Carroll,Throughthelookingglass,Chapter6)HumptyDumpty’sattitudeisCartesian.Aspeakerwillsameaningontootherwisemeaninglessmarksorsounds.Thisisincoherent.Supposethespeakerwillsontothesoundormark“glory”themeaning“aniceknock-downargument”.Howisthespeakertomakeitclearwhathehasdonehere?ForsupposeAlicehadasked,“Andwhatdoyoumeanbythemarksorsounds‘niceknock-downargument’?”.Onhisownaccountthespeakerwillhave,byafurtheractofwilltointendafurthermeaning,say“dog”,ontothosemarksorsounds.Butthenhecanbeasked,“andwhatdoyoumeanbythatmarkorsound?”.Therearetwopossibleoutcomes.Oneisaninfiniteregressofintentionalactsofmeaning-assignment,sothatthatmeaningisneverassigned.Theotheristhattheregressendswiththespeakerappealingtopublicmeaning-givingstructuresofsyntaxandsemantics,andthatistogiveuptheclaimthatthespeaker’swilldeterminesmeaning.Beardsleyandstructuralistsagreedintheirbeliefinameaning-determiningstructureofpublicrules.Beardsleyisemphaticthatatexthasadeterminatemeaning,butisequallyemphaticthatadeterminatemeaningdoesnotrequireadeterminingwill.Instead,thedeterminatemeaningofanutteranceisreadablebyanyonepossessedofaknowledgeofthestructureofrulesofmeaningandgrammarinthepubliclanguage.Thatisalsoastructuralistclaim.HencethesimilaritiesbetweenBeardsley’sassertionthat“itisinitslanguagethatapoemhappens.Thatiswhythelanguageistheobjectofourattentionandofourstudywhenitsmeaningisdifficult161\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDtounderstand”(1970,p.34)andBarthes’sclaimthat“Itisthelanguagethatspeaks,nottheauthor”.Sothemeaningofatextdependsuponastructureofrulesofgrammarandmeaningandnotuponthewillofanauthor.CentraltoBeardsley’sargumentisthebeliefthatanywordsusedbyawriterhaveameaningindependentlyofthatwriter’swill.Whoeverusesawordusesitasalreadyhavingameaning,ameaningithadbeforeitsspeakerwasborn,andwhichitwillstillretainwhenthespeakerisdead.IfIwishtoknowthemeaningofawordIdonotunderstandinapoem,Igotothedictionaryofthesepublicuses.Beardsleyfurtherassertsthatwhenindividualwordsarecombinedtogether,usingpublicgrammaticalrules,afurther“textualmeaning”emerges.Wecandeterminethisemergenttextualmeaningwithoutreferencetoauthorialintention.“Textualmeaning”,heasserts,“isnotreducibletoauthorialmeaning”.Forthequestion,“Whatdoesasentenceorcombinationofsentencesmean?”isnotthesameasthequestion,“Whatdidaspeakermeanbythatcombinationofwordsorsentences?”(Beardsley1958,p.21).Themeaningofasentence,oracombinationofsentences,inatextcanbedeterminateorunambiguousandthatdeterminatemeaningcanbeknownwithoutappealtoanintentiontomeansomethingdeterminatebyit.Itisthestructureofrulesofmeaningandgrammarthatdeterminethemeaningofutterances,nottheutterer’sintentions.Whatofambiguity?Ifmyremarksareambiguousdon’tyouhavetoaskmewhatImeantinordertounderstandme?Beardsleywrites:“Anambiguoustextdoesnotbecomeanylessambiguousbecausetheauthorwillsoneofitspossiblemeanings.Willashewillhecannotwillawayambiguity”(Beardsley1970,p.29).Theargumenthereisthis:supposeaformofwords,totakeBeardsley’sexample,“Ilikemysecretarybetterthanmywife”couldbeusedtosayeitherthatIlikemysecretarybetterthanmywifedoesorthatIprefermysecretarytomywife.Itwouldbeamistaketobelievethatinsuchcasesonecanmakethissetofwordsmeanoneofthesethingsratherthantheother,bysomeprioractofintention.Foritisaconditionofhavingsuchanintentionthatonebeabletorepresentone’sintendedmeaningtooneself.Thispresumablymeansbringingbeforeone’smindaformofwordsthatdoeshavethemeaningonewishestoexpress.162\nBEARDSLEYANDWIMSATTThiscannotbe“Ilikemysecretarybetterthanmywife”,forthatistheveryphrasewhosemeaningisindeterminate.Whateverphraseonedoesbringbeforeone’smind,ifithasadeterminatemeaning,onemustimmediatelyconcedetheimpossibilityofwillingthisasthemeaningoftheambiguousphrasewithwhichonebegan.Forthatoriginalphrasewasgenuinelyandinitsownrightindeterminateinmeaning,whereastheonebeforeone’smindisnot.How,then,canthelatterbewilledasthemeaningoftheformer?ThusBeardsleysaysthat“anambiguoustextdoesnotbecomelessambiguousbecauseitsauthorwillsoneofitspossiblemeanings”.Sowhenthemeaningofanutteranceisdeterminate,whatgivesititsdeterminacyisnottheintentionofitsspeakerbutthestructureofrulesofgrammarandmeaningofthepubliclanguage.Andwhenthemeaningofanutteranceisindeterminate,itissobythosepublicrulesandnointentionofitsutterercanmakeitanythingelse.Fromthisitseemstofollowthattheintentionsofwritersareirrelevanttoquestionsabouttextualmeaning.IbeginmyreplytothisargumentbynotingsomethingsaidbyBeardsleyandWimsattin“Theintentionalfallacy”:Onemustaskhowthecriticexpectstogetananswertothequestionaboutintention…Ifthepoetsucceededindoingit,thenthepoemitselfshowswhathewastryingtodo.Andifthepoetdidnotsucceed,thenthepoemisnotadequateevidence,andthecriticmustgooutsidethepoem—forevidenceofanintentionthatdidnotbecomeeffectiveinthepoem.(Beardsley&Wimsatt1976,p.4)ThislookscontrarytotheconclusionoftheargumentIhavejustoutlined.ForthewaythatBeardsleyandWimsattputthemattersuggeststhatwhenaspeakersucceedsinsayingsomethingdeterminate,itispossibletoseeinthatutteranceanintentiontosaysomeparticulardeterminatething.For“thepoemitselfshowswhathewastryingtodo”.ThisisconnectedtoacuriouspassagefromWimsatt’s“Genesis:afallacyrevisited”inwhichheoffers,inwordsthat,comingfromsodeterminedanopponentofthereferencetoauthorialintentions,haveacertainpiquancy,thefollowingglossontheintentionbehind“Theintentionalfallacy”:163\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDWhatwemeant,andwhatineffectIthinkwemanagedtosay,wasthattheclosestonecouldevergettotheartist’sintendingormeaningmindoutsidehisworkwouldstillbeshortofhiseffectiveintentionoroperativemindasitappearsintheworkitselfandcanbereadfromthework.(Wimsatt1976,p.136)Thispassageconcedesthatitispossibletoseetheartist’sintentioninthework,and,readinconjunctionwiththepassageIhavequotedfrom“Theintentionalfallacy”,infactsupportstheintentionalistviewthatifwecangraspthedeterminatemeaningofawork,itisbecausetheuttereroftheworkmakescleartousinthatworkpreciselywhatheorsheissaying.Anintentionisembeddedinpublicactivitiesandisrecognizedbyseeingitembodiedthere.Whatistrueofintentions,saytorunforPresident,istruealsoofintentionstosaysomething.Theymayshowthemselvesinbehaviourinsuchawayastomakeitentirelycleartouswhataspeakerorwriterintendstosay.Andwhenthathappenswehavedeterminatemeaning.Indeedthepossibilityofdeterminate,communicatedmeaningdependsonthepossibilityofrecognitionsofpubliclydisplayedintentions.Tobesure,ourabilitytohaveintentionsisboundupwithourpossessionofalanguageinwhichwecanrepresentourintentionstoourselves.ThisiswhyIcanintendorhopetodosomethingtheweekafternextwhereasacatcannot.AndthisiswhyIcandirectlyexpressmyintentionsinlanguage,whereasacatcan,throughitsbehaviour,atbestonlygiveusevidenceonthebasisofwhichtoascribeintentionstoit.Butfromthefactthattherehastobeapre-existentlanguageifIamtohaveandexpressintentionsitdoesnotfollowthatmyutterancesinthatlanguagecanbedeterminatewithoutmyintentionsbeingmanifestedinthoseutterances.Hirschclaimed,then,that:“Adeterminatemeaningrequiresadeterminingwill…Verbalmeaningiswhateversomeonehaswilledtoconveybyaparticularsequenceoflinguisticsignsandthatcanbeconveyed(shared)bymeansofthoselinguisticsigns”(Hirsch1967,pp.250,266).Ifthismeansthatwhatmakesanutterancedeterminateinmeaningisaprior,Cartesian,privateactofintendingthatmeaning,thisisdefeatedbytheargumentsthatdefeatHumptyDumpty.If,164\nTHESTRUCTURALISTMODEL:BARTHES’SDEADAUTHORhowever,itmeansthatwherewefindadeterminatemeaninginanutteranceitisbecauseweseeinthatutterancetheintentionofitsspeakertosayacertaindeterminatething,thennotonlyhaveBeardsleyandWimsattofferednothingtorefutethatclaim,buttheirclaimtohavebeeninterestedin“operative”intentionsseemsactuallytoassenttoit.Oneisnotrequired,Ishouldadd,tobelievethatthemeaningofanutteranceisexhaustedbywhatitsutterersuccessfullyintendedtosay.Thereismoreinanyworkofartthananymakercouldhaveintended.ReadingWordsworthwillbeaffectedbywhathappenssubsequently,andthewholelessonofsomeofthebestfeministcriticismisthatthesignificanceofaworkmayemergeassomethingratherdifferentfromwhatitsmakercouldhavesupposed.(Itneednotbethecase,assomehaveargued,thattheworkchangesinthelightofchangesintheculturalworldthatreceivesit.Itmaymoreplausiblybesupposedthatagreaterawareness,broughtaboutbytheseculturalchanges,allowsusbettertoseetheworkasitis.)Further,someelementsofawork,forexampleitssymbols,mayhavearichnessthatevenitscreatorcouldnotfullyexplicate.MobyDick,thewhitewhale,wasasinexhaustiblymysteriousasymboltoMelvilleasitistous.Butfromthefactthattheremaybemoreinapoemthanitscreatorcouldhaveknown,itdoesnotfollowthatwhatthatcreatormeanttosaycannotbeorbecomeobvioustous.Thestructuralistmodel:Barthes’sdeadauthorTheargumentstowhichInowturnhavesomeoftheiroriginsintheworkoftheBelgianlinguisticscientistFerdinanddeSaussure.IbeginwithaborrowingfromdeSaussurebystructuralists.WhatdeSaussurecallslaparoleisthetotalcorpusofallactualwrittenandspokenutterances.Somewillbegrammatical,somenot;somewillmakesense,somewillnot.Underlyingthiscorpusofutterance-episodeslieslalangue,astructureofrulesbywhichreadersandlistenersunderstandthemeaninganddecideuponthegrammaticalityoftheactualutterancesthattheyencounter.Thisstructureofrulesistranspersonal.Theindividualspeakerentersintoitatbirthanditcontinuesafteranyspeakerdies.Givenpossessionofthestructureofrules,rulesthatspecifythecontributionsthatelements,suchaswords,canmaketocomplexes165\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDofelements,suchassentences,wecanassignadeterminateemergentoverallmeaningtoutterances.Itseemsinexorablytofollowthatreferencetotheauthorofaliteraryworkisunnecessary,ifourpurposeistounderstandthemeaningofaworkofliterature.Theauthorissuesthatworktotheworld.Butthereaderbringstothesewordsasetofrulesgoverningthemeaningofthesewordsandtheircombinationintoutterances.Theserulesarethecommonpossessionofallwhospeakorreadthelanguage.Theserules,possessedbyreaders,arethesourceofanymeaningthatatexthas.Reference,therefore,totheauthorasasourceofauthorityoverthemeaningofthetextdropsout.“Thedeathoftheauthor,”Bartheswrites,really“isthebirthofthereader”.Thismodeltranscendedthelinguistic,insomenarrowsense,tobecomeatoolforunderstandingsociallifeinallitsforms.Sociallifeismadeupofmeaningfulepisodes,andthussharesaproperty,meaningfulness,withlanguage.Meaningisgiventotheseepisodes,too,bystructuresofmeaning-givingrules.Inordertoseethataneventisawedding,itisnecessarytounderstandtherulesconstitutiveofweddings.Visitorsfromanotherculture,unacquaintedwiththeserules,simplycouldnotunderstandthemeaningofwhatisgoingon.Tounderstandtheelementsofsociallife,eitherwithinacultureor,aswithmyths,acrossaculture,istounderstandtherulesthatgivetheseelementstheirmeaning.Itwastothediscoveryofthemeaning-givingstructureunderlyingthecomplexwebofmythsacrossallculturesthatLévi-Straussdevotedmuchofhislife.Thestructuralistmodelofmeaninghasanotherimplication.ItcastsdoubtonthepossibilityoftranscendentalCartesianindividualconsciousnessesthat,fromsomepointoutsidelanguageandculture,givelanguagesandculturetheirmeaning.Ratherthanbeingthetranscendentalproducerofmeaningforastructureofwordsorothermeaningfulitems,anyconsciousnessisitselfaproductofsuchstructures.For,whateverconceptwehaveofaperson,whatwemeanwhenweusethattermisdeterminedbythatsubsetofthetranspersonalrulesoflanguagewhichassignthattermameaning.Thisimmediatelyestablishestheimpossibilityofconsciousnessesthatsomehowgivemeaningtolanguagefromsomemysteriouspointtranscendenttolanguage.Theterm“I”isafunctionofthepublic,transpersonal,meaning-166\nTHESTRUCTURALISTMODEL:BARTHES’SDEADAUTHORgivingrulesforthatitemofthelanguage.Moreoverthoserulesmaychangeandwiththemtheconceptofaperson.ThisiswhyLévi-Strausssaidthatthe“goalofhumansciencesisnottoconstituteman[bywhichhemeantCartesianman]buttodissolvehim”(Lévi-Strauss1962,p.326)aprojectcentraltotheworkofFoucault.Thecorollaryofallthisisthatartistsarenotindividualtranscendentconsciousnessesthatgivemeaningtotheirproducts.Thereareonlythewordsofthoseproducts,givenmeaning,asaretheartiststhemselves,bytranspersonalmeaning-givingstructures.SoDerridacanassert:“Thesubject…isinscribedinlanguage,isa‘function’oflanguage,becomesaspeakingsubjectonlybymakingitsspeechconform…tothesystemofrulesoflanguage”(Derrida1981a,p.15).Thestructuralistaccountisoneofaclosed,underlyingstructurethatismechanicallyoperatedtogiveaneffectiveprocedurefortheassignmentofadeterminatemeaning.Thisnotion,inawaythatDerridawastoexploit,fails,however,toallowforthecreativeopennessthatisanessentialfeatureoflanguage.SupposeIhavelearnedtheword“deep”,accordingtotherulesofthemeaning-givingstructuresofmylanguage,totalkofoceansandcertainponds.OnedayIsimplysay,“Ifelttheslightdeeply”.Whatismore,no-oneseemsconfusedorsurprisedbythis,althoughIhavegonebeyondtherulesIhavelearnedfortheuseoftheword“deep”.Soitisthroughoutthedailylifeofourtalking:feelingsaredeep,peoplefeelblue,notesarehighorlow,musicissad,andsoon.Cavellwrote:Welearnandteachwordsincertaincontexts,andthenweareexpected,andexpectothers,tobeabletoprojectthemintofurthercontexts.Nothingensuresthatthisprojectionwilltakeplace(inparticularnotthegraspingofuniversalsnorthegraspingofbooksofrules),justasnothingwillensurethatwewillmake,andunderstand,thesameprojections.(Cavell1968,pp.160–1)Thisistosaythatouruseoflanguageisessentiallycreative,and,indeed,unlessitwereso,itwouldnotbeauseoflanguage.Itisonethingtolearnaphrasebookforaforeignlanguagesoastoproducephraseslike“mypostilionhasbeenstruckbylightning”byrote,andanothertospeakalanguage.Thisiswhyacomputer167\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDthatcanmerelyapplytheruleswithwhichithasbeenprogrammedcannotspeakandwhycomputershavesuchdifficultytranslatingpoetry,wherethecreativeprojectionoflanguageisespeciallymarked.OnewouldhaveexpectedthosewhousedeSaussureastheirinspirationtohavenotedthathewaswellawareofthepossibilitythatIamcanvassing.Hewrites:Whoevercreatesalanguagecontrolsitonlysolongasitisnotincirculation;fromthemomentwhenitfulfilsitsmissionandbecomesthepropertyofeveryone,controlislost…Amanproposingafixedlanguagethatposteritywouldhavetoacceptforwhatitiswouldbelikeahenhatchingaduck’segg:thelanguagecreatedbyhimwouldbebornealong,willy-nillybythecurrentthatengulfsalllanguages,(deSaussure1959,p.76)Thisopennessandprojectabilitycastsdoubtontheeliminationofthesubjectwhospeaks.Alanguagewouldnotbealanguageunlessindividualhumanbeingsconstantlyprojectedtheirwordsintonewsituationsinwaysthatcouldnotbeanticipatedmerelybyaknowledgeoftherulesinoperationataparticulartime.Ifthestructuralistdismissaloftheauthordependsuponthetruthoftheclaimthatitisthestructureoftherulesofthelanguagethatisimportantandnottheindividualsthatoperatethem,thenthatdismissalisill-founded.Indeeditwouldrenderspeakingalanguageimpossible.HereIwishtoobservethatevenwhatwasappropriatedfromdeSaussurebyanti-authorialstructuralistswasselectivelyappropriated.DeSaussureofferedadistinctionbetweenlaparole,thetotalcorpusofactualspeechepisodes,andlalangue,astructureofrulesthatunderlaytheseepisodes.Thestructuralistadoptsthisdistinctionbutthenconcentratesonlyonlalangue.Ifattentionisthusfocusedonlalangue,thentherewillbeatemptationtoignoretheindividualconsciousness,forlalangueisthetranspersonalstructureofrulesintowhichindividualsarebornandthatsurvivesthedeathofanyoneofthem.Butonlyanalreadydecideddeterminationtoeliminateauthorsandallotherindividualconsciousnessescouldbegintoexplainthetotalattentiongiventolalangueandthetotalindifferencetolaparole.BothareintegraltodeSaussure’saccount,andnecessarilyso.Hewrites,inapassage168\nTHESTRUCTURALISTMODEL:BARTHES’SDEADAUTHORignoredbythosewhowishtousehisaccounttosubstitutetheimpersonalstructuresoflalangueforthehumanlyimpregnatedactivityofspeaking:Withinthetotalphenomenonrepresentedbyspeechwefirstsingledouttwoparts:languageandspeaking.Languageisspeechlessspeaking.Itisthewholesetoflinguistichabitsthatallowaspeakertounderstandandtobeunderstood…Butthisdefinitionstillleaveslanguageoutsideitssocialcontext;itmakeslanguagesomethingartificialsinceitonlyincludestheindividualpartofreality;fortheactualizationoflanguage,acommunityofspeakersisnecessary.Contrarytoallappearances,languageneverexistsapartfromthesocialfact…Itssocialnatureisoneofitsinnercharacteristics.Itscompletedefinitionconfrontsuswithtwoinseparableentities…Undertheconditionsdescribedlanguageisnotliving—itonlyhaspotentiallife,(ibid.,p.76)Thereishumanlanguage,speakingandwriting,onlyiftherulesoflalangueareapplied(andcreativelyapplied)byindividualactsofindividualspeakers(laparole),justasthereareonlyfootballmatchesiftherulesofsoccerareputintoeffectinindividualgamesinwhichindividualcreativityisshown.Lalangueneedslaparoleifitistobecomeconcreteinactualutterances(includingactualworksofliterature).Butonceweadmitthisnecessity,individualconsciousnesses,nomatterhowstructuredtheymaybebytheirculture,areinescapablyinvolvedinactsoflanguage,includingworksofliterature.NoonesawthismoreclearlythanMauriceMerleau-Ponty.Nounandverb,heagreed,mayonlybeallowedbytherulestocombineincertainwaystoformgrammaticalsentences.Buttheyareonlycombinedintosentenceswhensomeoneactuallyspeaks.“Betweenthenounandtheverb”,asheputit,“liesthegapthateachpersonwhospeaksandwritesmustleap”(Merleau-Ponty1960,p.30).Inourcapacitiestoprojectwords,inwaysthatthesystemofrulescouldneverallowustopredict,liesthepossibleofourfreelytranscendingtheotherwisedeterminingstructuresintowhichweareborn.169\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDPoststructuralismWehavefollowedaprogressionofthoughtwhichbeginswithBeardsleyandWimsattassertingthepossibilityofdeterminacyofmeaningbutdenyingthatwhatgivesanutteranceitsdeterminacyistheintentionsofindividualconsciousness.Determinatemeaning,rather,ispossiblebecauseofstructuresofrulesofgrammarandmeaning.Thatviewissharedbystructuralists.Theyhave,however,adeeperscepticism,whichwedonotfindinBeardsleyandWimsatt,abouttheexistenceofindividualmeaning-determiningconsciousnesses.Thissupportsthenotionthatdeterminacydependsontheexistenceofstructuresofrulesofgrammarandmeaning.For,intheabsenceofadeterminingconsciousness,whatelsecouldgiveutterancesdeterminatemeaning?Thenextstageinthisprogressionoccursbecause,justasdeterminacyisnotgiventoanutterancebyanindividualactofwilling,neitherisadeterminatemeaningguaranteedbytheexistenceofstructuresofrulesofgrammarandmeaning,forthoserulescouldnotclosedowntheopennessofourlanguage.Butnowwhatseemstofollowistheimpossibilityofdeterminacyofmeaning.Wherewoulditcomefrom?Notfromtheindividualactsofwillingadeterminatemeaningandnotfromstructuresofrulesofmeaningandgrammar.Sincetheseseemedtheonlypossibilities,theconclusionseemstofollowthatdeterminacyisnottobehadatall.SuchanargumentforindeterminacyispowerfullyevidencedinthewritingsofDerrida.ThefirstpremiseFirstly,likemanyofhispredecessors,DerridasubscribestothepremisethattheintentionofatranscendentCartesianindividualconsciousnesscannotdeterminemeaning:Itremainstothesigntobelegible,evenifthemomentofitsproductionisirredeemablylost,andevenifIdonotknowwhatitsallegedauthor-scriptormeantconsciouslyandintentionallyatthemomenthewroteit,thatis,abandonedittoitsessentialdrifting.(Derrida1981a,p.317)Derridahasafamiliarargument,crypticallyexpressed,forhis170\nPOSTSTRUCTURALISMclaimthatintentioncannotdeterminemeaning.Hesays,first,that“mydeathisstructurallynecessarytothepronouncingoftheI”,thenadds:AssoonasIspeak,thewordsIhavefound…nolongerbelongtome…Henceforth,whatiscalledthespeakingsubjectisnolongerthepersonhimself…Thespeakingsubjectdiscovershisirreduciblesecondarity,hisoriginthatisalreadyeluded;fortheoriginisalwaysalreadyeludedonthebasisofanorganizedfieldofspeechinwhichthespeakingsubjectvainlyseeksaplacethatisalwaysmissing.Thisorganizedfield…is…theculturalfieldfromwhichImustdrawmywordsandsyntax.(Derrida1978,pp.177–8)IfIamtoarticulatemyselfasaconsciousness,Ineedtobeablesaythingslike“Iamtired”or“Iaminpain”.Mysenseofmyself,andthefeelings,beliefs,experiences,memoriesandawarenessesthatgivememysenseofmyself,canbearticulatedonlyiftheycanbethusarticulatedintheassembledelementsofdiscourse.Supposeweaskhowtheseutterancesgettheirmeaning.Itwouldbeabsurdtosuppose,forreasonsalreadygiven,that,byanactofintention,Icangivetheseutterancesameaningtheywouldnototherwisehave.ThatCartesianpicturewouldhaveusbelievethatwebringsomephysicalandmutesoundormarkbeforethemindandwillameaningonit.ButifIamtodothis,IhavetobringbeforemymindthemeaningthatIamgoingtowillonthemarkorsound.TodothatIwillhavetobringbeforemymindsomesetofwordswiththemeaningIwantthemutemarkstohave.Howdothesewordsgettheirmeaning?Bysomefurtheractofwilling?Andsooninaninfiniteregress?Weareforcedtotheconclusionthatifthesewordshaveameaning,theyhaveitindependentlyofmywilling.Hence,theveryword“I”,bywhichthepureconsciousnessistoexpressitsself-awareness,isasoundormarklikeanyotherinthelanguageandIloseauthorityoverwhatthatmeans.The“I”ceasestobeapureconsciousnessstandingbehindlanguageandbecomesenmeshedwith,anddependentforitsmeaningupon,theverylanguagethatitwasmeanttoilluminate.Ratherthanbeingthegiverofmeaningtolanguageittakesanymeaningitmayhavefromlanguage.SoDerridawrites:“Thesubject…isinscribedinlanguage,isa“function”oflanguage,becomesaspeakingsubject171\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDonlybymakingitsspeechconform…tothesystemofrulesoflanguageasasystemofdifferences”(Derrida1981a,p.15).ThisliesbehindDerrida’sassertionthat“mydeathisstructurallynecessarytothepronouncingoftheI”.“Mydeath”herereferstovanishingofmyselfconceivedasapureCartesianego.Thatpureegocannotgivetheword“I”itsmeaning.Tobeabletopronouncetheword“I”andmeansomethingbyit,somethingotherthanthepureegomustgivethatwordmeaning.Thiscanonlybethelanguageitself.ThisiswhyDerridaremarksthat“thesubjectbecomesaspeakingsubjectonlyincommercewiththesystemoflinguisticdifferences”(Derrida1981a,p.16).Theeliminationofthepureconsciousnessis,ofcourse,welcomedbyDerrida,for,likemanywehaveencountered,heconceivesthisCartesianegoasadictator,ofapiecewithanall-powerfulGodoradictatorialfather,seekingtoimposeitsmeaningonthings.“Onecouldsay”,Derridawrites,“thatthe‘speakingsubject’isthefatherofhisspeech”andthattogivesuchaspeakerauthorityoverthemeaningofwordsisto“tiespeech…tothemasterandlord”.“Parricide”isneeded,hewrites,toopen“theplayofdifferenceandwriting”(Derrida1981b,pp.77,164).Freedfromdictatorialfiatsaboutthemeaningofthewords,releasedfromthe“authorGod”whowillsthatwereadwordsacertainway,weareatlibertytoreadthemaswewill.Thenwewillfindinthewordsthatconfrontus“theaffirmationofaworldofsignswithoutfault,withouttruth,withoutorigin,offeredtotheactiveinterpretation”(Derrida1978,p.292).So,too,wehavethenotionofthesovereignauthorasaGodtobedeposed,sothat“notranscendenttruthpresentoutsidethesphereofwritingcantheologicallycommandthefield”.Atextisonitsown.BeardsleyandWimsattwrotein“Theintentionalfallacy”that“thepoemisnotthecritic’sownandnottheauthor’s(itisdetachedfromtheauthoratbirthandgoesabouttheworldbeyondhispowertointendorcontrolit)”(1976,p.3).InverymuchthesamelanguageDerridawrites:Towriteistoproduceamarkwhichconstitutesinitsturnakindofproductivemechanism,whichmyabsencewillnot…preventfromfunctioningandprovokingreading…Forwritingtobewritingitmustcontinuetoactandbereadableevenifwhatwecalltheauthorofthewritingbeprovisionallyabsentornolongerupholdwhathehaswritten,whatheappearsto172\nPOSTSTRUCTURALISMhavesigned…Thissituationofthewriterorunderwriteris,withrespecttothewritingfundamentallythesameasthatofthereader.Thisessentialdrift…astructurecutofffromanyabsoluteresponsibility,orphanedandseparatedsincebirthfromthesupportofthefather,isindeedwhatPlatocondemnedinthePheaedrus.(Derrida1981a,p.316)ThesecondpremiseThesecondpremiseoftheargumentforindeterminacyofmeaningisthatnostructureofrulesofgrammarandmeaningdetermineorclosedownthemeaningofanutterance.“WhatIcanneverunderstandinstructure”,Derridawrites,“isthatbymeansofwhichitisnotclosed”(Derrida1978,p.160).Ofsuchamarkasawordhewrites:“nocontextcanencloseit.Norcananycode”(Derrida1981a,p.317).ItistoDerrida,indeed,thatweowethemostpowerfulimageoftheshortcomingsofthenotionthattoinvestigateaworkistoinvestigatethestructuresthatdetermineit,aninvestigationthat,asStuartSimdemonstrates,candescendtoamathematicaldrynessinwhichthelifeoftheworkdies.Derridaaptlycomparestheseprobingstoinvestigationofacityfromwhichalllifehasfledleavingonlyitsdeadstructuresbehind(Derrida1978,p.11).Rules,then,donotcovereveryeventuality.Wittgenstein,whoseworkhasbeenilluminatinglycomparedwithDerrida’sbyHenryStaten(1985),noticedthesamething:Isay“Thereisachair”.WhatifIgouptoit,meaningtofetchit,anditsuddenlydisappearsfromsight?—“Soitwasn’tachair,butsomekindofillusion”.—Butinafewmomentsweseeitagainandareabletotouchitandsoon.—“Sothechairwasthereafterallanditsdisappearancewassomekindofillusion.”Butsupposethatafteratimeitdisappearsagain—orseemstodisappear.Whatarewetosaynow?Havewerulesreadyforsuchcases—rulessayingwhetheronemayusetheword“chair”toincludethiskindofthing?Butdowemissthemwhenweusetheword“chair”;andarewereallytosaythatwedonotattachanymeaningtothisword,becausewearenotequippedwithrulesforeverypossibleapplicationofit?(Wittgenstein1953,para.80)173\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDButDerridagivesafurtherreasonforassertingtheopennessoflanguageandtheinabilityofrulestodetermineandconfineitsmeaningwhichisdistinctivelyhisownandthat,again,owessomethingtodeSaussure.Considerchess.Understandingthisgamedoesnotconsistinknowingwhatthepiecesstandfor,butinunderstandingthedifferentrolesthepieceshaveandhowtheycombinetoformasystemthatisthegameofchess.So,too,languageisunderstoodnotbyaskingwhatitsunitsstandforbutbyunderstandingthedifferencethatusingthislinguisticunitratherthanthatwouldmake.DeSaussurewrites:“Justasthegameofchessconsistsentirelyinthecombinationofthedifferentchesspieces,languageischaracterizedasasystembasedentirelyontheoppositionofitsconcreteunits”(deSaussure1959,p.107).“Inlanguage”,deSaussurewrites,“everythingboilsdowntodifferences”.Atermacquiresitsvalueasaseparateelementoflanguage“onlybecauseitstandsinoppositiontoeverythingthatprecedesandfollowsit”.Thus“boat”isdifferentfrom“coat”onlybecausethesubstitutionofthelatterfortheformerinthesentence“Iboughtaboat”makesadifference.Ofthetwosigns“father”and“mother”hewrites:Betweenthemthereisonlyopposition.Theentiremechanismoflanguage…isbasedonoppositionsofthiskindandonthephonicandconceptualdifferencesthattheyimply…Whenisolated,neitherNachtnorNächteisanything:thuseverythingisinopposition…Language,inamannerofspeaking,isatypeofalgebra…Someofitsoppositionsaremoresignificantthanothers;butunitsandgrammaticalfactsareonlydifferentnamesfordesignatingdiverseaspectsofthesamegeneralfact:thefunctioningoflinguisticoppositions.(ibid.,p.121–2)HowthismightworkinpracticeisdescribedthusbydeSaussure:ModernFrenchmoutoncanhavethesamesignificationasEnglishsheepbutnotthesamevalue,andthisforseveralreasons,particularlybecauseinspeakingofapieceofmeatreadytobeservedonthetable,Englishusesmuttonandnotsheep.Thedifferenceinvaluebetweensheepandmuttonis174\nPOSTSTRUCTURALISMduetothefactthatsheephasbesideitasecondtermwhiletheFrenchworddoesnot.ThevalueofaFrenchpluraldoesnotcoincidewiththatofaSanskritpluralalthoughtheirsignificationisusuallyidentical;Sanskrithasthreenumbersinsteadoftwo…ItwouldbewrongtoattributethesamevaluetothepluralinSanskritandinFrench;itsvalueclearlydependsonwhatisoutsideandaroundit.(ibid.,p.115–16)Sothereemergesthenotionofasystemofdifferences,wherethevalueofalinguisticunitisafunctionofitsplaceinthesystemandthedifferenceitmakestotheutterancesinwhichitappears.“Boat”hasadifferentvaluefrom“coat”becausesubstitutionoftheonefortheothermakesadifference.Usersoflanguage,inusing“boat”mustbeimplicitlyaware,iftheyhavemasteredthelanguage,ofthepossibilityofusing“coat”insteadof“boat”andofthedifferencethiswouldmake.“Coat”,wemaysay,leavesatraceintheimplicitawarenessoftheuseroftheword“boat”.DerridaoftenexpressesacommitmenttodeSaussure’sanalysis:Thearbitrarycharacterofthesignandthedifferentialcharacterofthesign…Therecanbearbitrarinessonlybecausethesystemofsignsisconstitutedsolelybydifferencesintermsandnotbytheirplenitude…Theelementsofsignificationfunctiondue…tothenetworkofoppositionsthatdistinguishesthemandthenrelatestheonetoanother…Everyconceptisinscribedinachainorinasystemwithinwhichitreferstotheother,tootherconceptsbymeansofthesystematicplayofdifferences.(Derrida1981a,pp.10–11)Nowconsidersomethingthat,forDerrida,underminesthenotionofanyclosuretotheopennessandindeterminacyofmeaning.“Boat”meanssomethingdifferentfrom“coat”becausethesubstitutionoftheonefortheotherinanutterancemakesadifference.Butitisnotonlythesubstitutionoftheword“coat”for“boat”thatmakesadifference:similareffectswouldbeproducedbysubstitutingfor“coat”thewords“moat”,“groat”,“map”andindeedanyotherwordofthelanguage.Hencethemeaningofeachwordisboundupwiththemeaningofallotherwordsandthemeaningofallotherwordsremainsasatracewithinanywordofthelanguage.Derridawrites:“Eachelementappearingonthescene175\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDofpresence,isrelatedtosomethingotherthanitself,therebykeepingwithinitselfthemarkofthepastelement,andalreadylettingitselfbevitiatedbythemarkofitsrelationtothefutureevent”(Derrida1981a,p.12).Thetaskofplottingtheinfiniteplayofthesetracescanneverbecompleted,andhenceeveryinterpretationisprovisional.Everywordisimplicatedwitheveryotherword.Everycombinationoforrelationofmeaningisimplicitineverytext.HenceDerrida’sremarkthat“words…communicatewiththetotalityofthelexiconthroughtheirsyntacticplay”(Derrida1981b,p.129).Interpretationisnot,therefore,amatteroffindingthemeaningofthetext,butoftakingpartinandenjoyingtheinfiniteplayofmeaningsinatext.(Puns,ofcourse,haveaspecialinterestinthisactivity,autonomouslyandplayfullyremindingusofunlikelyconnections.)Theoutcome,inDerrida’swords,isthatintheabsenceofdeterminatemeaningthetraditionalprojectofcriticism,thatwas“todetermineameaningthroughatext,topronounceadecisiononit,todecidethatthisorthatisameaning”(ibid.,p.245),cannotbeaccomplished:“thelifeofthesignifierisproducedwithintheanxietyandthewanderingoflanguagealwaysricherthanknowledge,thelanguagealwayscapableofmovementthattakesitfurtherthanpeacefulandsedentarycertitude”(Derrida1978,pp.72–3).“Writingisread…anddoesnotgiverisetoahermeneuticdeciphering,tothedecodingorameaningortruth”.Allweareleftwithis“thelimitlessnessofplay”(Derrida1981a,p.329).TheconclusionTwoassertions,thatneitherthewillnortherulesoflanguagedeterminemeaning,becomepremisesthatentail,forDerrida,adenialofthepossibilityofdeterminacyofmeaning.Thustheabsenceofadeterminingwill“abandonslanguagetoitsessentialdrifting”(1981a,p.317).ThisbeliefintheindeterminacyofmeaningisnottobelamentedbutcelebratedinaNietzschianvisionof“thejoyousaffirmationoftheplayoftheworldandtheinnocenceofbecoming,theaffirmationofaworldofsignswithoutfault,withouttruth,andwithoutoriginthatisofferedtotheactiveinterpretation”(Derrida1978,p.292).176\nPOSTSTRUCTURALISMInthatinterpretationwedonotseekthemeaning.Forthat“playofsignifyingreferences”neverendsinadeterminatemeaningbut“substitutesincessantdecipheringfortheunveilingoftruth”.Theabsenceofthetranscendentalwill“extendsthedomainandplayofsignificationinfinitely”(ibid.,p.280).QueriesIamstruckbythefactthatinDerrida’swritingthereis,ontheonehand,thedramaticassertionthatsweepsawaymuchthatwewouldunthinkinglyacceptassheercommonsense.Ontheotherhandthereisasubtext,whichifreadcarefullyleavescommonsenseintactandpurgesonlysomephilosophicalerror.Inthepresentcasethedramaticassertionisthatdeterminacyisnottobehad.Weareenmeshedinaplayofwords,eachechoingeveryotherword,thatpreventsanydeterminacyofmeaning.Theabsenceofadeterminingwill“extendsthedomainandplayofsignificationinfinitely”.Thereisalimitlessnessofplay.Thereare“calculationswithoutend”,“incessantdeciphering”,“wanderingsofthesemantic”and“thereisnocentrethatarrestsandgroundstheplayofsubstitutions”(Derrida1978,p.289).“Writing”,inshort,“doesnotgiverisetoadecodingofameaningortruth”(Derrida1981a,p.329).Suchaviewcommitsitsholdertoascepticismaboutcommunication,wherecommunicationisamatterofunderstandingwhatsomeonewantstosay,whichinitsturnseemstorequireustograspadeterminatemeaninginanutterance.ThatscepticismsurfacesinDerrida’swriting,notablyin“Signatureeventcontext”inMarginswherehespeaksof“ageneraldisplacement”afterwhich“writingwouldnolongerbeaspeciesofcommunication”.Hespeaks,too,of“mynon-presenceingeneral,forexample,thenon-presenceofmymeaning,ofmyintention-to-signify,ofmywanting-to-communicate-this,fromtheemissionorproductionofthemark”andgoesontospeakofthebreakwiththehorizonofcommunicationasthecommunicationofconsciousnessesorpresences,andasthelinguisticsorsemantictransportofmeaning…thedisqualificationof…theconceptofthe“real”or“linguistic”context,whosetheoreticaldetermination…isstrictlyspeaking177\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDrenderedimpossibleorinsufficientbywriting.(Derrida1981a,p.316)Insum,“writingis…notthemeansoftransportofsense,theexchangeofintentionsandmeanings”.Itisacorollaryofthisthatcriticalinterpretationcannotbethetaskofdeterminingthemeaningofatext,forDerridatalksof“theimpossibilityofreducingthetextassuchtoitseffectsofmeaning,content,thesisortheme”,andqueriesthatnotionofcriticismthat“triestodetermineameaningthroughatext”(Derrida1981b,pp.7,245).Theseapocalypticpassagesseemradicallytosubvertallourassumptionsaboutthepossibilityofcommunicatingmeaninginourday-to-daydealingsonewithanother.Andyet,thisisarguablynotDerrida’sintention.Firstly,thereis,throughoutDerrida’swritingonthephilosopherstowhomhestandsinopposition,acommitmenttotheviewthatonecanandmust,priortoanycriticism,accuratelyrepresentwhatissaidinthosetexts.True,thismaybeapreludetoshowingbyacloseexaminationofthetexts(bywhatiscalled“deconstruction”)thatthosewhowrotethemhadblindspotsthatledthemtoattempt,unsuccessfully,toexcludecertainpossibilities,butthatdeconstructionrequiresonetrulytorecordwhatisinthosetexts.HerecontraryforcesinDerridasurface.Ontheonehandhetellsusthatwhenheusestermslike“Rousseau”,“Hegel”orwhatever,noreferenceisintendedtothebearersofthesepropernames:“Thenamesofauthorsordoctrineshavenosubstantialvalue.Theyindicateneitheridentitiesnorcauses.Itwouldbefrivoloustothinkthat‘Descartes’,‘Leibniz’,‘Rousseau’,etc.,arenamesofauthors”(Derrida1976,p.99).Inpractice,however,adifferentpictureemerges.Thusweread:AstoDescartesinparticular,nohistoricalquestionabouthim—aboutthelatenthistoricalmeaningofhisdiscourse,aboutitsplaceinatotalstructure—canbeansweredbeforearigorousandexhaustiveexternalanalysisofhismanifestintentions.(Derrida1976,p.99)178\nPOSTSTRUCTURALISMThefollowingpassageisdeeplysignificantforitseemstosaythatthereissomethingidentifiableasthedeterminableauthorialmeaningofthetext(eventhoughtheauthormightnotbethebestjudgewhatitis)thathastobeidentifiedbeforecriticalworkcanbeperformed:Thewriterwritesinalanguageandinalogicwhosepropersystem,laws,andlifehisdiscoursebydefinitioncannotdominateabsolutely.Heusesthemonlybylettinghimself,afterafashionanduptoapoint,begovernedbythesystem.Andthereadingmustalwaysaimatacertainrelationship,unperceivedbythewriter,betweenwhathecommandsandwhathedoesnotcommandofthepatternofthelanguageheuses.Toproducethissignifyingstructureobviouslycannotconsistofreproducing,bytheeffacedandrespectfuldoublingofcommentary,theconscious,voluntary,intentionalrelationshipthatthewriterinstitutesinhisexchangeswiththehistorytowhichhebelongsthankstotheelementoflanguage.Thismomentofdoublingcommentaryshoulddoubtlesshaveitsplaceinacriticalreading.Torecognizeandrespectallitsclassicalexigenciesisnoteasyandrequiresalltheinstrumentsoftraditionalcriticism.Withoutthisrecognitionandthisrespect,criticalproductionwouldriskdevelopinginanydirectionatallandauthorizeitselftosayalmostanything,(ibid.,p.158)This,Imightsay,isutterlyreminiscentof,andpossiblyderivativefrom,Kant’sviewthatthefreeplayoftheimaginationisnotuncontrolledbytheobjectofitsattention.Ifthisisso,thenwearenotatlibertytoplayaswewillwiththewordsofthattext.Secondly,havingarguedforadisappearanceofintentionandanindeterminacyofmeaning,Derridawrites:Iwillnotconclude…thatthereisnorelativespecificityoftheeffectsofconsciousness,oftheeffectsofspeech…noeffectofordinarylanguage,noeffectofpresence…Itissimplythattheseeffectsdonotexcludewhatisgenerallyopposedtothem.(Derrida1981a,p.327)179\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDThispassageseemstoconcedethatwecan,inourdaytodaydealingswithothers,makeourmeaningsclear,andagaindiluteswhatIhavecalledthemoreapocalypticclaimthatthedeterminacynecessaryforcommunicationisimpossible.IfDerridaallowscommunication,itisappropriatetoaskwhatmakespossiblethatunderstandingofanother’smeaningthatcommunicationrequires.Hereitistemptingtothinkthatwhenweunderstandthemeaningofanutterancewedosobyrecognizinginittheintention,whetherthespeakerknewitornot,ofthatspeakertosaysomeparticularthing.ThatreplywouldnotbeavailabletoDerrida,ifwhatIhavecalledhisfirstpremiseseversthelinkbetweenmeaningandintention.Butthepremisedidnotdothat,andIamnotsurethatDerridameantitto.WhatthepremiseestablishesisthatmeaningcannotbewilledontoanutterancebyanintentionconceivedasaprivateeventinatranscendentCartesianconsciousness.Thatisincoherent.ButthiswouldbeademonstrationofthelackofconnectionbetweenmeaningandintentiononlyifthedualisticpictureofaCartesianconsciousnessweretheonlypossiblepictureoftheconnectionbetweenmeaningandintention,mindandtheworld.Ihavearguedthatthisisnottheonlypicture.Isketchedaviewofthemindanditsbeliefs,emotionsandintentions,asvisibleinthepublicworld,visibleintheacts,includingthespeechacts,ofagents.SuchaviewwasalsoexpressedbyWittgensteinwhen,inPartIIoftheInvestigations,hespokeofthehumanbodyasthebestpictureofthehumansoul.Wearenotobligedtothinkofmindsasdetachedfromtheworldandthebodiesinit.Wecouldthinkofthemind,andthiswouldbetothinkofthegreatcontributionofMerleau-Ponty,asembodiedandvisible.HereagainInoteatensioninDerrida’swritingbetweenanapocalypticclaimandasubtextthatsubvertsitsforce.DerridatakesashistargettheCartesianorHusserliantranscendentalconsciousness.Suchaconsciousnessisconceivedasstandingapartfromthewordsofalanguageuponwhichitimposesameaningbyanactofwill,thisbeinganemblem,andpossiblytheroot,ofalltheformsofrepressionthathavedisfiguredhumanhistory.Thusheremarksthathisattackonthistranscendentalconsciousnessispartofan“analysisoftotalitarianisminallitsforms”(Derrida1986,pp.242–3).Argumentsthatunderminetheclaimthatatranscendentconsciousnesscanwillameaningontomutesigns180\nPOSTSTRUCTURALISMseemtometobeunanswerable,fromwhichitfollowsthattheconceptofatranscendentCartesianconsciousnessisalsoincoherent.Itisthenfatallyeasytomistakethisforthemoresensationalclaimthatindividualconsciousnessesassuchhavebeeneliminated.Thisiswhatcanleadtothesuspicionthatthereissomethinganti-humanisticinDerrida’swriting.Hecanseemtohaveajaundicedviewofindividualconsciousnesses.“Henceforth,whatiscalledthespeakingsubjectisnolongerthepersonhimself”.“Onemayimagineaconsciousnesswithoutman”.“Polysemiaputsusoutsidehumanity”.“Responsibilityandindividualityarevaluesthatcannolongerpredominatehere”.“Play…triestopassbeyondmanandhumanism”(Derrida1978,p.162).Yet,carefullyread,thisisnottheintentionofDerrida’swork.Hestates,equallyemphatically,“Ihaveneversaidthatthereisnosubject”(Derrida1978,p.292).Whathedoesclaimisratherdifferentand,strippedofitsrhetoric,ratherunsurprising.For,closelyread,theclaimisnotthattherearenopersons,butthatCartesianismcannotgiveagoodaccountofthem.That,however,wouldcountasageneralscepticismaboutpersonsonlyifDerridacouldbeshowntothinkthatCartesianismistheonlypossibleaccountofpersons.Thishedoesnotbelieve.Heremarksthatheisopposed“abovealltothethingificationofthesubject,ofthesubjectivityofthesubjectassupposedbyDescartes”(Derrida1989,p.15).ThatunitesDerridawithWittgensteinandGilbertRyle,bothofwhomresistthenotionofthemindasastrangekindofthing,existing,apartfromthebody,insomequeerkindofspace.Buttoresistthatnotionisnottobecommittedtosayingthatthemindisnothingatall.“Itisnotasomething,”Wittgensteinremarked,“butitisnotanothingeither”(1953,para.304).ThatmayalsobeDerrida’sview.Hewrites“thecategoryofintentionwillnotdisappear;itwillhaveitsplace,butfromthisplaceitwillnotbeabletogoverntheentiresceneandtheentiresystemofutterances”(Derrida1981a,p.326).AndI,too,havetriedtosketchanaccountofintentionthatwillmakeitrelevanttorefertoartwithoutgivingtheartistthelastauthoritativeword.AstowhatwouldbeamoreadequateaccountofmindthanthatofferedbyDescartes,Derridaislessclear.Ihavespokenoftheneedtoavoiddualismandtothinkofthemindasvisibleintheactionsandwordsofhumanbeings.Derridatoo,hasaviewofthe181\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDhumanmindasspreadoutinthewordsandactionsofahumanlife.Whenhesaysthat“thepersonwritingisinscribedwithinadeterminedtextualsystem”,wecanreadthatasawayofsayingthatwedonotstanddualisticallyapartfromourwords,butshowourselvesinthemaswemanipulatetheirpre-establishedmeanings.Derridawrites:“thusonecomestopositpresence…nolongerastheabsolutelycentralformofbeingbutasadeterminationandaneffect.Adeterminationoreffectwithinasystemwhichisnolongerthatofpresencebutofdifference”(Derrida1981a,p.16).Ourexistence,thatis,isnotconductedinthesilentroomofthedisembodiedmindbutmanifestedinlanguage,bywhoseeffectsitisknowntoothers,perhapsbetterknownthantheagentmightacknowledge.That,though,looksremarkablyliketheclaimthattheauthorsarenotthelastauthorityontheircreations,sincethatcreatedworkcantellusmoreaboutthemthantheymightknow.Butthatisentirelycompatiblewithabeliefthatwritersandotherartistscan,touseDerrida’sownterm,“manifest”themselvesintheirworks.PostscriptThemoststrikingexampleofthecompatibilitybetweentheaccountsthatDerridagivesofthedeathofthe(Cartesian)authorandareadingoftextsthatpaysthemostscrupulousattentiontotheimmanentauthorialmeaningofatext,istobefoundinthereadingthatDerridagivestothecontroversialarticleswrittenbyPauldeManinNazi-occupiedBelgium.Iaddthatthisreadingseemstometoexemplifyahumaneprocessofliteraryinterpretationinthesensethatitrespectsthepersonoftheimmanentwriterandisdeterminedneithertoconcealthetruthaboutthetextnortolackcompassioninitstreatmentofitswriterasrevealedinthetextuallymanifestedmind.PauldeMan,adeeplylovedandextraordinarilyinfluentialYalescholar,withwhomDerrida,adetesterofallthingstotalitarianandfascist,wasontheclosestofterms,wasdiscovered,shortlyafterhisdeath,tohavewritten,asayoungman,aseriesofallegedlyanti-semiticarticlesforacollaborationalistnewspaperinoccupiedBelgium.182\nPOSTSTRUCTURALISMDerrida’soverridingconcernistoreadwhatthereistobeseeninthearticles,havingnotimeforthosewhoinashoot-from-the-hipwitch-huntforgot“theelementaryrulesofreadingandphilologicalintegrity”.Hebeginswithastatementthatgivesthelietoanyonewhothinksthathisprocedureisobligedtodenyauthorship.“Nothingpermitsustoimaginethattheeditorialwaswrittenbyanyoneotherthanthejournal’seditor,thatisbyPauldeMan”.Itcontinueswithatestamenttotheneedforrespecttothetextasthebestevidence,regardlessofitswriter’sopinions,forthestateofmindofitsauthor.Sowemustbegin“preciselybylistening,totrytohearwhathesaidtous,him,deMan,already”(Derrida1986,p.239).Whatfollowsisasensitivereconstructionofwhatthetextstellusaboutthemanifeststateofmindoftheirwriter.Iamnotconcernedwithwhetherthataccountisorisnotcorrectsomuchaswiththegoverningpresuppositionofthemethodthatisdeployed.Thatmethodtracesthewindingsofanimmanentmind.ItutterlygivesthelietothebeliefthatDerrida’sbeliefscommithimtorulingoutaconsiderationof(andfor)thecreatorsofworksofartasheorsheismanifestedinthework,or,asDerridaputitelsewhere,astheyareis“inscribedinthelanguage”.That,too,isallIhavewishedtoargue.AttheendofMemoiresforPauldeManDerridarespondstothosewhohavereadhisworkasanti-humanisticandanti-rational.Certainthingshehassaidmightseemtosupporttheviewthatheisbothofthesethings.Hewritesofreasonasa“dictator”andofthe“jailer”thatis“classicalreasoning”(Derrida1986,pp.36,37).Hespeaksoftryingto“passbeyondmanandhumanism”(ibid.,p.292)andsaysthatitispossibleto“imagineaconsciousnesswithoutman”(Derrida1981a,p.118).Itis,however,possibletoreadthisinamorecharitableway.Itispossibletousetheterms“reason”and“humanism”assledgehammerwordsneversubjectedtocriticalexamination.Butitispossibletoaskwhethertheculturetowhichwebelong,whatDerridacalls“Westernculture”,withits“whitemythology”,aculturethatissupposedtoexemplifythecardinalvirtuesofrationalityandhumanism,hasliveduptothedemandsimplicitinthenotionsofrationalityandhumanism.Thenitmightemergethatwhatweproudlyclaimasourtraditionofrationalityinfactexcludeslargetractsofthehumanrace,women,forexample,fromit.Thehumanismthatissoproudlythoughttounderlie183\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDEuropeancivilizationturnsouttobecompatiblewithapenchantforcommittingobsceneatrocities.Thenonemightwanttoaskwhethertheremightnotbeburiedinourwaysofthoughtsomethingthathastobepurgedinordertocreateabetterhumanismandabetterunderstandingofrationality.Onemightaskthis,notinordertoabolishthesenotions,butinordertoreplacetheirdebasedformsinacorruptculturewithbetterones.HenceitseemsentirelyproperforDerridatoaskofhismorecarelesscritics,fewofwhomdisplayqualitiesofrationalityandhumanismintheirinvective:Whythechargeofirrationalismassoonasanyoneasksaquestionaboutreason,itsforms,itshistory,itsmutations?Orthechargeofanti-humanismwiththefirstquestionputtotheessenceofmanandtheconstructionoftheconcept?…Towhatorderarewebeingrecalledbythesinisterdisciplinarycounselswiththeirgravelyintonedlitanies…andthemostbrutaldisregardoftheelementaryrulesofdiscussion…(Imeandifferentiatedreadingorlisteningtotheother,argumentation,analysis,proof).(Derrida1986,p.259)Thetaskistorestore“againstacertainhumanism,aprofoundhumanism”.ThathumanismwillnotbeahumanismthatrepresentsthehumanasaCartesiantranscendentalconsciousness,confidentinitstotalself-understanding.ThatidealizedpictureislessablethanDerrida’salternativetoaccountfor“thewindingsandtwistingsoffearanddesire,weaknessandlust,sadismandmasochism,andthewilltopower,inthemindofeventhemostsincereman”(Staten1985,pp.126–7).ButitdoesnotfollowfromtheshortcomingsofCartesianismthattherearenohumanbeings,northatthesehumanbeingscannotmakethemselvesmanifestintheirworksofart,noreventhatthemeaningwegivethoseworkshassomerelationtowhattheirauthors,knowingorunknowingly,saidinthem.Thatistosaythattheartistlivesstill.GuidetoreadingBeardsleyandWimsatt’scontributionsarecoveredinmylastchapter.TheproblemwithBarthesisthathegoesthroughmanydifferentstagestobeclassifiedassimplyastructuralist.184\nGUIDETOREADINGStructuralismisbestapproachedobliquely,therefore.OnegoodstartistoreadStuartSim’s“Structuralismandpost-structuralism”inHanfling’sPhilosophicalaesthetics.ThisshouldgiveaprettyclearindicationofwhyanalysesofliterarystructureseemedtoDerridaliketheexplorationsofthestructuresofalifelessandabandonedcity.ThenitisworthreadingatleasttheearlypartsofJonathanCuller’sStructuralistpoetics(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1975),andhisBarthes(London:Fontana,1983).Thereisalsousefulmaterialtobeextractedfrompp.918–86ofHarrison&Wood’sArtintheory,especiallyaninstructivepiecebyanotherscepticaboutauthors,Foucault.ThosereadingthismaterialshouldpointouttothosecarelessenoughtosaythatstructuralistsabolishedauthorsthatBarthes(p.944)allowstheauthorin“asaguest”(thatis,assubjecttothereader’sjudgement).Whocouldobjecttothat?Foucault’swindingsaboutonthismatterarewellworthscrutinyintheHarrison&Woodextract.What,giventhatnotanythinggoes(seep.928),doeshethinkabouttherelevanceofreferencestoauthors?Andcouldthosewhoclaimthatpoststructuralistsalsoabolishedauthorshaveexplainedtothem(a)thattoabolishauthorsasCartesiansconceivethemisnottoabolishauthorsperseand(b)thosepassagesIhavequotedfromDerridathatacknowledgeauthorsandintentionsasimmanentintexts.(ButthenitiseasiertowaffleaboutDerridathantoreadhim.)ForapanaceatowaffleseethedeliciouslycoolandaptlytitledR.Tallis,NotSaussure(London:Macmillan,1988).ThatbringsmetoDerrida.Againthechallengeisformidableandbestapproachedobliquely.StartwithSimandwithChristopherNorris,Deconstruction:theoryandpractice(London:Methuen,1982),whichisveryshortand,someobscuritiesapart,prettyclear.(NorrishasalsowrittenDerrida(London:Fontana,1987).)BearinmindthatDerridaisfirstandforemostaphilosopher(thoughonewhoisalsoacriticandwhohasalsoinfluencedcriticism).Partofhistaskisnegative:toexposeatendency,runningthroughthewholeofWesternphilosophy,andsurfacinginthemostunlikelyplaces,topositadualismandthenelevateonetermofit(man-woman,isanobviouscase).Thisisshownbydeconstructingtextsinsuchawayastomakethemownuptotheirownprivilegingdeficiencies.AniceaccountoftheutilityofthisforfeministcriticismisgivenintheremarksonDerridainT.Moi,Sexualtextualpolitics(London:Routledge,1988).Theother185\nTHESTRUCTURESOFTHESELF-SUFFICIENTWORDpartofDerrida’sworkisanattempttosaywhatabetterviewofthingsmightbe(afrustratingtaskforonewhothinksthatcommunicationofdefinitemeaninghassomethingsuspectaboutit).SomeDerridaisaccessible:partsofMargins,forexample,“Signatureeventcontext”andtheMemoiresforPauldeMan.Therestthoughis,Ifear,amatterofchippingawayabitatatimeandlettingthelightgraduallydawn.Ihopemyexegesis,eveniflimitedtoaparticulartheme,willatleastgivesomepointers.AimportantfiguresympathetictoDerridaisRichardRorty:youwillfindhisessay,“Philosophyasakindofwriting”,NewLiteraryHistory,X(1)1978–9,pp.141–60somehelp.IalsoenjoyedHilaryPutnam’sfastidiousengagementwithDerrida’sthoughtinRenewingphilosophy(Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress,1992).Ajournalistic,unreliablebutrivetingreadaboutthePauldeManaffairisDavidLehman’sSignsofthetimes(London:Deutsch,1991).InaverydemandingbookH.StatenhasilluminatinglycomparedWittgensteinandDerrida(Oxford:Blackwell,1985).186\nChapter9Helen’sBeethoven:truthandmoralityHelenpushedherwayoutduringtheapplause.Shedesiredtobealone.Themusichadsummeduptoherallthathadhappenedorcouldhappeninhercareer.Shereaditasatangiblestatement,whichcouldneverbesuperseded.Thenotesmeantthisandthattoher,andtheycouldhavenoothermeaning,andlifecouldhavenoothermeaning.Shepushedrightoutofthebuilding,andwalkedslowlydowntheoutsidestaircase,breathingtheautumnalair,andthenshestrolledhome.HelenSchlegel,inForster’sHowardsEnd,saysthatBeethoven’smusicisimportantbecausehegotsomethingright.Herearesomeothercaseswhereappraisalappearstobeaffectedbyconsiderationsoftruthandmorality.Anobviouslyoldbutbeautifullyclearblackandwhitefilmbeginswithapropeller-drivenaircraftflyingoveracity.Sobeginswhatsomethinkamasterpieceofthecinema:LeniRiefenstahl’sThetriumphofthewill.ThenwerealizethatthisfilmcontainsnoobviouscondemnationoftheNurembergRalliesthatitmeticulouslyrecords.Somewillfindappraisalaffectedbythis.187\nHELEN’SBEETHOVEN:TRUTHANDMORALITYDavidMamet’sOleannaseemedtosomeofthosewhotookpartinthevariousfightsthatbrokeoutduringitsperformancetobetheworseforthewrongmessageitcontained,asimilarsentimentbeingexpressedbythosewhoheckletheendofThetamingoftheshrew.Think,too,ofthewaythetraditionofmalepaintingoffemalenudeshascometoseemsuspect.Thereiswidespreadevidence,inthesekindsofresponsesmadetoworksofart,ofabeliefthatthevalueofaworkofartcanbeinsomewayrelatedtoouropinionsaboutthetruthorfalsityofthebeliefsandattitudesarticulatedinit.Moreover,sincesuchattitudesareoftencharacterizedusingsuchmoraltermsas“offensive”,“repugnant”,“noble”orwhatever,considerationsabouttherelevanceoftruthtoartisticvaluetowintheirwakeconsiderationsabouttherelevanceofthemoralitytothatquestion.Ihavetosay,straightoff,thatIdonotseehowinthecaseofatleastsomeofthearts,notablytheartsofnarrativefiction,suchasthenovelandthedrama,inwhichthedoingsofcharactersinteract,wecanavoidtheentanglementofartwithmorality.Forfirst,thereisthesimplepointthateventounderstandaworkinvolvinghumaninteractionwecannotputasidewhateverweunderstandofmorality.HowelsecouldthenovelsofJaneAustenevenbeunderstood?Moreover,whateverunderstandingofmoralitythatwebringtoaworkmayaffectthequalityofourunderstanding.Thisissimplyaparticularinstanceofthegeneraltruththatourpreconceptionscanaffectourcharacterizationsofpeopleandevents.(Consider,here,thewidespreadassumptionthatallScotsarenearwithmoney.)If,andthisisamatterformoralphilosopherstodecide,itispossibletohaveerroneousmoralviews,thentheycancauseustomisunderstandworksinwhichmoralsituationsoccur.Thuswemightimaginethosewhohavephilosophizedthemselvesintothebeliefthatmoralityalwaysprogresses,sothatmoralitiesofpastagesarealwaysinsomewayslesssatisfactorythanourown.Suchpeoplemaymischaracterizethesituationin,say,EdithWharton’sTheageofinnocencethroughbelievingthatthemoralityofoldNewYorksocietymusthavebeenlessliberatingthananewer,andsomoreadvancedmorality,thatputspersonalhappinessbeforeduty.Asecondcasewouldbeoneinwhichone’smoralinadequacies188\nTRUTHANDMORALITYpreventonefromcharacterizingandappreciatingaworkaright.AcaseheremightbesomeoneoverdosedonBaden-PowellwhosimplycannotseethexenophobiaimplicitintheBigglesworksofCaptainW.E.Johns.MorecomplexperhapsisthecaseofsomeonetakeninbyOthello’spresuicideself-justification.Anycritic,determinedtoimposehisownviewsofChristianredemptivetragedyonthatplay,issimplyboundtogetitwrong.Andifonecangetmoralityright,thenonemightclaimtoseethemoralinadequacieslurkingineventhegreatestofworks,becauseoneisfreeenoughofthoseinadequacies.Anexamplehere,uponwhichIpassnojudgement,mightbethewayinwhichLeavis,forallthathefindsSwiftawriterofmagnificentforce,cannonethelessobservethatthisisanegativeforce,oneinwhichthechannelsoflife,asLeavisputsit,areblockedandperverted.Thesearewaysinwhichone’smoralunderstandingimpingesuponone’sunderstandingandcharacterizationofworksofart.Whatwehavetoexploreishowrelevantthisistothejudgementsofworksofartasart.Forsomehaveclaimedthatalthoughwecanmakemoraljudgementsaboutwhathappensinworksofart,thatisnotaestheticjudgement.Certainaspectsofthismatterwillnotconcernme.Thussomeonemightthink(indeedhasthought)thatThenakedMajaisamagnificentworkofartandyetdoubtonmoralgroundsthatitoughttobedisplayedwhereitwillcauseoffence.Whatisbeingjudgedmorallyhereisnotthepaintingbutthedecisionastowhetherornottohangit.NorshallIdirectlydiscussquestionsaboutpornographyorobscenity,questions,thatis,aboutwhatmakesthingsobsceneorpornographicandquestionsaboutwhetherthingsthatarethesethingsshouldbeavailableand,ifso,towhom.IfwhatIshallsayisright,thejudgementthatapaintingispornographicorobscene,asopposedtoerotic,doesnotstopitbeingartbutdoescountagainstitwhenitsartisticvalueisbeingweighed.Thequestionwhether,itbeingpornographicorobscene,theworkshouldbeallowedoutinpublic,isnotoneforaesthetics.Afinalpreliminary:ifwearelookingforawayofunderstandingtheimportanceofart,therelevanceoftruthandmoralitytoartisapromisingareatoinvestigate.Notonlyaretruthandmorality189\nHELEN’SBEETHOVEN:TRUTHANDMORALITYcentraltoourlives,soanyartinvolvedwiththeminheritssomeofthiscentrality,butinadditionwepersistentlyfindtheclaimthatartisinsomeimportantandspecialwayapathtotruthandunderstanding.Theopposite,too,hasbeenbelieved.Platothoughtthatthepowerofarttogetpeopletobelievefalsethingstothedetrimentofthemselvesandsocietywassogreatthatstory-tellingpoetsandrepresentationalpaintersweretobeexpelledfromhisidealrepublic.ReportandreflectionstatementsTherearetwoclassesofproblemsabouttruthandmorality,thedivisionbetweenwhichcanbedisplayedbyadoptingBeardsley’sdistinctionbetweenreportstatementsandreflectionstatements,thatis,betweenthestatementsthatcreateoroccurintheworldofaworkofartandstatementsmadebyaworkofart.Theformerincludesassertionsutteredbycharactersbutnotobviouslyendorsedorrejectedbytheworkitself,aswhenHamletsays“Denmark’saprison”.Italsocontainsstatementsthatestablishtheworldofthework,aswhenwearetoldthatSupermanisallergictoKryptonite.Suchstatementsmaybefictional(“TitaniafelloutwithOberon”),factual(“Corfuiscrowdedinsummer”),oramixofboth,aswhenwearetoldthatPerdita(whodoesnotexist)wasabandonedontheseacoast(whichitmaynothavehad)ofBohemia(whichmostcertainlyexists,beingthefirstcountrybeatenbyEnglandatsocceronacontinentaltour).Thereflectionstatementsincludeanystatementsmadeorimpliedbytheworkitself,aswhenitisclaimedthattheworksofBeckettexpressthethoughtthatlifeisonthewholemeaningless.Althoughmyinterestisinreflectionstatements,completenessrequiresalittletobesaidaboutthereportstatementsandthepossiblebearingoftheirtruth-valueonassessmentsofart.ReportstatementsAboutthesetherearevariousmattersmoreorlessworthmentioning.190\nREPORTSTATEMENTSThetruth-valueoffictionalstatementsSupposeIread,“MrPickwickwasfat”.Therebeingnosuchperson,iswhatIsaytrueorfalse?Thisisaproblemfortwosortsofpeople.Oneisthesortthatbelievesthatthemeaningofawordiswhatisstandsfor.Theyhavesomeexplainingtodo,forsince“MrPickwick”standsfornothing,“MrPickwickisfat”hastobemeaningless,whichisabsurd.Theotheristhosewhothinkthatastatementmustbeeithertrueorfalsewithnothirdalternative.Theyhavetoexplain,asRusselltriedtodowiththeTheoryofDefiniteDescriptions,whatthestatusisof“MrPickwickisfat”,sinceitseemstobeneitherclearlytruenorclearlyfalse.Thesearenotquestionsforaestheticsbutforthetheoryofmeaning.AreminderTobesuretherearequestions,touchedonearlier,whicharemorepuzzling,abouthowweareabletoengageimaginativelywithfictionsandrespondtothemwiththeappropriateemotionswhenweknowthattheobjectsoffictionsdonotexist.HereIreferthereadertothatearlierdiscussion.ReportstatementsandappreciationMoreinterestingiswhetherthewaysinwhichreportstatementscangowrongorgorightbearonappreciationofaworkofart.Anartistcansimplygetthefactswrong.Ignorancecanleadtoapaintingofasalmonheadingupstreamatthewrongtimeofyear.TheBondnovels,celebratedfortheirfactualdetail,areoftenmisinformed.InOnHerMajesty’ssecretservicesomeoneiskilledbybeingthrownontoabobsleightrackandskinnedbyfrictiononthewaydown.Itcouldn’thappen.Ifthereissomethingwrongwithgettingitwrongitissimplybecauseitsbeingwrongcaninterferewithone’senteringimaginativelyintoawork.Whethersuchinterferenceactuallyoccursisalwaysrelativetoastateofknowledge.Someoneignorantofsalmonfishingorfrictionmaysimplynotnotice,andsonotbeaffectedby,sucherrors.Evenwheresomethingisfactuallywrong,asintheanatomicalarticulationofadepictedfigure,thatwillbecondonedifanatomicalaccuracyissubvertedforexpressiveeffect,asinParmigiano’sMadonnaofthelongneck.191\nHELEN’SBEETHOVEN:TRUTHANDMORALITYPlausibilityTalkingaboutnovelsorpictorialrepresentations,evenfictionalones,wehappilyuse“plausible”,“implausible”,“truetolife”,“unrealistic”,“improbable”andthelike.Therearedifficultiesinmakingthetestherewhethertherepresentationmatchesreality.Iftherepresentationisfictional,forexampleanovelisticrepresentationofMrPickwickorapictorialrepresentationofSnoopy,thereisnothingwithwhichtocomparetherepresentedobject.Further,aswesawearlier,ifourinterestisinthepicturedobject,thenweshouldbeinterestedinitandnotinthequestionwhetheritdoesordoesnothaveacounterpartinreality.Thatiswhatleadssometobesuspiciousoftherelevanceofconsiderationsoftruthtotheappreciationofart.ThebestdiscussionIknowofwhatisgoingonwhenweusethesetermsisofferedbyPatrickDay(1962).Hiscentralclaimisthatwhenwetalkaboutthingsasprobableorimprobable,wedosoagainstabackgroundofbeliefsaboutwhatislikelyorunlikelyinthebehaviourofhumanbeingsandnaturalobjects.Thesebeliefsareultimatelyrelatedtobeliefsabouttheregularitiestobefoundinhumanbehaviourandthebehaviourofnaturalthings.Whenwerefertoanactioninanovelasimplausible,itisbecauseitdoesnotaccordwithourbackgroundassumptionsaboutthesenaturalorpsychologicalregularities.Aconsequenceisthatourjudgementsofplausibilityarerevisableasourassumptionsaboutsuchregularitieschange.TheplausibilityofeventsinH.G.Wells’Thetimemachinemaywellbeatthemercyofchangesinourunderstandingofthelawsofphysics.Thewaybackgroundassumptionsoperatecanaffectdecisionsonhowaworkisbeststructured.Asuddenwindfallseldomoccursattheverymomentwhenitismostneeded.Soifithappensinanovelattheverymomentwhenitisneededthatwillseemimplausible.ThecoincidencesinThomasHardy’snovelsaresometimescriticizedonthesegrounds.Yet,sincewindfallsdooccur,anansweristostartwithone(asdoesJohnFowles’snovelThecollector).Then,withwhateverdegreeofplausibilitythenovelistcanmuster,theconsequencesofthatcanbetraced.Sometimesimplausibilitiesaretolerated,aswhenAliceshrinksorgrowsaccordingastothecakesheeats,becausewegraspwhenanovel192\nREPORTSTATEMENTSexpectsustoignorethecausallawsofthephysicaluniverseandreacttoitasfantasy.Itisstrikingthatmanynovelssimplyfloutthepresentlyknownlawsofphysics.Alicefallsdownarabbitholeandhastimeonthewaydowntoreadthelabelsonvariousjars.Atimewarptakesustotheplanetoftheapeslongintothefuture,ortakestheStarShipEnterprisethroughlightyears.Thesametoleranceisnotextendedtoviolationsofassumedpsychologicalregularities.When,inanovel,naturallawsaresuspended,aswhentheprotagonistoftheSatanicversesfallssafelytoearthfromanaeroplane,westillexpectitscharacterstobehaveinwaysdeemedplausiblebyourbeliefsaboutpsychologicalregularities.KendalWaltonhasaskedtheinterestingandrelatedquestion,why,whenreadingafiction,doweseemabletosuspendourbeliefthatpeopledonotturnintoinsects,butnotourbeliefthatgenocideiswrong?OnesuggestionImakeisthatitisamistaketothinkthateverythinginafictionhasafictionalstatus.Kafka’sGregorSamsaisafiction,afactthatnotmerelysuspendsbuteliminatesanyantecedentbeliefsabouthim.Genocideisnotafiction(althoughsomeonewhobelievesitisrightmaybe)andcarriesitspropertiesintoitstemporaryfictionalrestingplace.Inthissenseaworkoffictioncanindeedbeanimaginarygardenwithrealtoadsinit.Andthereasonthatthereisanasymmetryisjustthatfictionmayhavetwocomponents,oneofwhichneednotbefictional.CompareheresomeonewhoembodiesPresidentClintoninafiction(thisbeingtheobverseofthecaseinwhichfictionembodieditselfinRichardNixon).SomerealpropertiesofClintonmustaccompanyhimintohisnewhomeoritwon’tbeClintonwhotakesupresidencethere.(IthinkthesamegoesforGregorSamsa,insofarasheisrepresentedasaman.)Thisgivesthesamechecktowhatwecanimagineastrueasincorporatingtherealphenomenonofgenocideinone’swork.Theseplausibilitiesandimplausibilitiescanaffectourappreciationinvariousways,butintheendtheyallcomedowntowhetherornottheyinterferewithourabilitytoenterimaginativelyintotheworldofthework.IftheexcuseIamgivenforalateessayissimplyimplausible,Ifinditdifficulttobelieveit.Ifwhathappensinanovelissimplyimplausible,Ifinditdifficulttoimagineit.Andsince,aswehaveseen,imaginationissoimportant,soplausibilityisimportant.193\nHELEN’SBEETHOVEN:TRUTHANDMORALITYReflectionstatementsButitisreflectionstatementsthatmostinterestme,forpeopledoseemtodeveloplikingsandaversionstoworksofartinaccordancewithjudgementsaboutthebeliefsandattitudesthataretherearticulated.Yetsomesaytheseconsiderationsareirrelevanttoaestheticjudgements.Icanthinkofatleastsevenreasonswhythismightbesaid.Firstly,thosewhodidmaketruthatestofvalue,Plekhanov,StalinandevenPlato,forexample,areinbadodourbecauseofwhattheydidorwouldhavelikedtohavedone,toartandartists.Secondly,thereisasetofreasonsforeliminatingconsiderationsoftruththatseembasedonassumptionsaboutthenatureofart.Thusareason,presentindiscussionsbyIsenbergandBeardsley,isthatinordertodeterminewhetheranassertionistrueorfalsesomethingotherhastobeinvestigatedthanthefactthatanassertionhasbeenmade.So,ifaworkcontainstheassertion,say,thatthepoorofIrelandintheeighteenthcenturyweretreatedinabominableways,then,inordertoascertainthetruthofthis,onehastoleavetheworkanddosomechecking.Aswehaveseen,somethinkthataproperinterestinaworkofartconfinesitselftowhatcanbereadfromtheworkitself.Andsincethetruth-valueofitsstatementscannotbereadfromtheworkitself,thesestatementsareirrelevant.Thirdly,webothertocheckthetruthonlyofutterancesthatwetaketobeseriouslyasserted.IfIhearyoutellsomeonethathismotherswimsaftertroopshipsandknowthatyouarerehearsingaplay,Itendnottobotherwiththetruthofwhatyousay.Beardsley,aswehaveseen,doesnotthinkthataworkofartcontainsgenuineassertions.Sohewillfeelthatthequestionsoftruthcannotarise.Fourthly,sincetruthissomethingthatthingsotherthanworksofartpossess,truthcannotbethethingweareinterestedinwhenweareinterestedinart.Twofurtherreasonshavetodowithwhatisinvolvedinsayingthatsomethingistrueorfalse.Thus,fifthly,fortheretobeconsiderationsoftruthatall,itmustbepossibletoidentifyanassertionthatsayssomethingaboutsomething.Thisisnotgenerallypossibleinart.Inmusicunaccompaniedbywords,itisimpossibletoidentifywhatisbeing194\nREFLECTIONSTATEMENTSsaidaboutwhat.Further,eventhoughinapaintingwemayidentifyasubject,ahaywain,forexample,itisnotclearwhatisbeingsaidaboutit.Further,sixthly,thedeterminationofthetruthofanassertiongoeswiththepossibilityofwaysofverifyingthattruth.Manyofthereflectivethoughtsofmanyworksseemnottoallowthis.EvenifBeckett’splaysdoembodythethoughtthatlifeisonthewholebleak,itisnotclearhowIwouldtestthatclaim.Finally,seventhly,itisargued,sinceweknowofworksthatembodyafalseviewoftheworldandaregood(Dante’sDivinacommedia?)andworksthatembodyatrueviewandarebad(HarrietBeecher-Stowe’sUncleTom’scabin?),truthseemsnottoberelevanttojudgementsofartisticvalue.Someoftheseargumentsaresimplyfeeble.Thus,firstly,theclaimthatsincethingsotherthanworksofartpossesstruth,truthisnotrelevanttojudgementsaboutart,wouldseverelyattenuateaestheticdiscourse.Eleganceandgracecharacterizenaturalobjectsasmuchastheycharacterizeart,sothese,bythislineofreasoning,willhavetobeignoredinourdealingswithart.Thetruthisthatonceathinghasbeenmarkedoffasart,thenmanyofthethingsitshareswiththingsthatarenotart,likewit,graceandthelike,becomeart-relevantproperties.Secondly,themoralstenchthatattachestothecrazedoperationsofStalinshowthatwhatwasdoneinthenameoftruthwasindefensible.Thatnomoreshowstheirrelevanceofaproperreferencetothetruth-valueofartthanStalin’squaintlyconservativeandbourgeoiscommitmenttopictorialrealismshowsthatweshouldabandonrepresentationasirrelevanttoart.Thirdly,itisdebatablethatmusicandpaintinghavenoassertioncontent.True,ifweknownothingofthecontextofawork,wemaynotrealizethatithassuchacontent.Shostakovich’sFifthSymphonyandPicasso’sGuernicadonotrevealtheirpropositionstotheignorantearoreye.Butthatonlyexcludesaninterestintheirprepositionalcontentif,aswedonot,wehaveaproofthatweshouldignorethecontextofawork.ThetruthisthatpeopledoseethatGoya’swarpaintingscontainthethoughtthatcertainactionsaredreadful,andShostakovich’smusicwastakentobeexpressingattitudestothestateoftheSovietUnion.WhyelsewouldStalinhavewishedtosilencehim?195\nHELEN’SBEETHOVEN:TRUTHANDMORALITYNext,thefactthatsomeworksarticulatingaviewtowhichweassentarebadandsomeworksarticulatingviewstowhichwedonotassentaregood,doesnotshowtheirrelevanceoftruth-valuetojudgementsaboutart.Someworkscontainingwitarebad.Perhapsthewitisoutofplace(asmightbeared-nosedcomedyroutineataQuakerfuneral).Butthatdoesnotmakewitirrelevanttojudgementsofmerit.So,too,somebadworksmaybetrueandsomegoodworksfalse.Butthebadmighthavebeenworseiffalseratherthantrueandthegoodbetteriftrueratherthanfalse.Whatoftheassumptionthatrelevantcommentsaboutaworkarethosethatareconfirmablesolelybyinspectingtheworkitself.Sincethatinspection,althoughitmighttellusthataworkcontainsareflectionstatement,cannot,ofitself,telluswhetheritistrue,thattruth-valuecannot,wearetold,berelevant.Theproblemisthattheassumptionishardlyself-evident.WheninThefourquartetsEliotusestheword“harruspicate,”mereinspectionofthisitemonthepagewillnottellusitsmeaning.IsmeaningthereforeirrelevantbecauseIhavetoleavetheworkandlookitupinadictionary?Thatanexcellentparodyisaparodymightnotbeclearfromanuncontextualizedinspectionofit.Isthefactthatsomethingisaparodyirrelevanttojudgementsofitasart?Theassumptionbehindthisobjectiontotherelevanceoftruthtoartissimplytooemaciating.Theclaimthatartisessentiallyakindofpretending,itspropositionsnotseriouslyassertedandsonottobeassessedfortruthorfalsityfaresnobetter.Firstly,manyworksofartarenotlikethis.Goyawasnotpretendingtothecondemnationsofwararticulatedinmanyofhispaintings,nomorethanDickenswaspretending,inBleakHousetoacondemnationofthelaw.Secondly,aswehaveseen,pretendingisarealactandonethatcanbeengagedin,asNathanengagedinitafterthemurderofUriahtheHittite,inordertomakeanassertion.Ifwecandetectinimitationsandpretendingstherealhandoftheimitatorsandpretenders,thereseemsnoreasonwhyweshouldnotdetectalso,aswedowithDickensandJaneAusten,beliefsorattitudesarticulatedbythoseimitatorsandpretendersthroughtheirimitationsandpretendings.Moreinterestingistheclaimthatquestionsoftruthorfalsitydonotapplysincetheproceduresofverificationandfalsificationseemnottohaveapurchaseonthereflectivecontentofaworkof196\nINHABITINGTHEWORKart.Forhowaresuchwork-embodiedreflectionsasthereflectionthatlifeisonthewholebleak,tobetested.Aren’ttheseexpressionsintheworkofattitudes,whichtellusabouttheresponseofanartisttoaworld,butnotsometruthaboutthatworld.HereIinvokethesuggestion,byJ.L.Austin,thattruthandfalsityareonlytwoofawholesetofappraisalsthatwehaveformeasuringthefitbetweenourbeliefs,emotions,andattitudestotheworldandtheworldtowhichtheyareattitudes.Thewords“true”and“false”belongtoagroupofappraisalwordsthatincludesalso“prejudiced”,“jaundiced”,“biased”,“slanted”,“sane”,“healthy,“intemperate”,“balanced”,“paranoid”,“gloomy”and“optimistic”.Thesewordsdonotmerelyapplytopropositionsbuttoawiderclassofitemsincludingbeliefs,attitudes,pointsofviewandperspectives.Thattheseappraisaltermsaresometimesdifficulttoapplyandareoftenused,like“insane”,merelytoexpressunthinkinghostility,doesnotestablishthattheycannotbeusedtosignalvarioussortsofappraisals.Althoughanarrowsortofempiricalverificationismdoesnotworkwiththecentralreflectivestatementsofworksofart,thisdoesnotestablishthatusableanaloguestotheterms“proposition”,“true”,and“false”cannotbefoundthatwouldoperateonthereflectivecontentofaworkofart.InhabitingtheworkEverythingsofarhasbeennegative.Noargumentshavebeenfoundthatabsolutelyruleoutthepossibilitythataworkofartmightbetrueorfalse,orsomethinganalogoustoit.Butnopositiveargumenthasbeengivenforthatpossibility.Suppose,then,thatitwerenopartofanyartist’stasktoarticulatehisorherbeliefs,feelings,attitudesandemotionstothesubjectmatterofhisorherart.ThatmeansthatGoyaconfrontedwiththehorrorsoftheWar,PicassoconfrontedwithGuernica,RonaldSearleconfrontedwiththeJapanesedeathcamps,SylviaPlathconfrontedwiththenatureofherlife,VerdiconfrontedwithcontemporaryeventsinItaly,hadnobusinessasartistsinexpressingattitudestothesesituations.Notonlyisthislaughablyinaccurateasapictureofwhatartistshavedone,butitfurtherentailsthatartistsarecutofffromcommentonseriousissuesinawaythattrivializesart.Worse,anartist,suchasGoya,canatbestonlycreatepicturesofsufferingasexercisesinpainterlydesign197\nHELEN’SBEETHOVEN:TRUTHANDMORALITYfortheaestheticedificationanddelightofhisaudience.Thatseemsintolerable.WhatIthinkworriessomeisthatifcommentontheimportantissuesoflifebecomespartofart,thereisnowayofdistinguishingartfromotherwaysofexpressingsuchcomments.However,Ihavearguedthatwearenotobligedtothinkthatthereisadifferenceinkindbetweenexpressionsthatareartandthosethatarenot.Ratherwemightthink,asCrocedid,ofacontinuumofcases,runningfromexpressionsthatwehavelittleinclinationtothinkofasart,throughcases,likethesermonsofDonne,uptothosecasesthatbecauseoftherangeandpowerwithwhichtheyengagetheimagination,weundoubtedlythinkofasgreatworksofexpressiveart.Artmaysimplybe,asPopeputit,“whatoftwasthoughtbutne’ersowellexpressed”.Anyaccountofarthastobetruetotheexperienceofthosewhohavedealingswithit.Formany,aresponsetoartisaffectedbyfeelingsofassentanddissenttotheattitudesarticulatedinit.(That,itseemstome,isacentralnotioninacertainkindof“feminist”criticism.)ForallthatIadmireLawrence’snovels,Iamstilluneasyabouttheattitudethattheyexpress.Again,IamutterlyimpressedbyPicasso’sartisticaccomplishments,but,attimes,thelavatorialattitudetothedepictionofthefemaleformaffectsmyappreciation.Icanthinkofcasesinwhichanover-indulgenceshowninapieceofmusicmakesmepauseinmyapprobation.Inallthesecasesitdoesseemthatappreciationisaffectedbysomefeelingthattheattitudesorbeliefsarticulatedinandthroughaworkaredefective.Contrariwise,when,aswithJaneAusten,HenryFielding,Rembrandt,andmuchofMozart,Ifeelanassenttotheattitudearticulatedinthework,thatleadsmetoamoreunqualifiedappreciation.Ofcourse,theexperienceofanimaginativeworkofartcanconvertustotheviewinit.Thatismerelytosaythatwecometoshareandapproveoftheattitudearticulatedinthework,andthatenhancesourapproval.IdonotclaimthatifIdonotsharetheworld-viewarticulatedinawork,thenImustdenyitallmerit.IamsuspiciousoftheattitudesexpressedinEliot’sThefourquartetsandDante’sDivinacommedia.Thatdoesnotstopmethinkingthatthesearegreatworks.Similarly,Imaysharetheattitudeofaworkwithoutthink—ingthatthatworkisunqualifiedlyagoodorgreatone.UncleTom’scabinmaybeacaseinpoint.Truthorfalsity,inawiderornarrower198\nAPOSSIBLEOBJECTIONsense,arenottheonlythingsofrelevancewhenweareassessingmerit,butthisdoesnotstopthemfrombeingamongthethingsthatarerelevanttothattask.AndIsuspectthattheworksofartwethinkofasunqualifiedlygreatarenotmerelyexemplaryintheirdeploymentofthetechniquesofartbutarealsoworkstotheattitudesofwhichwegiveourassent.Theyareworks,touseRonaldHepburn’sphrase,thatwecaninhabit.Thatmakesourappraisalsrelatedimmediatelytoourjudgementsastowhetherthereisorisnotsomethingrightorwrongabouttheattitude,belief,orjudgementarticulatedinaworkofartrelevant,thoughnotconclusivelyrelevant,toourappraisal.ApossibleobjectionSupposeourabilitytorespondtoaworkisaffectedbyourjudgementoftherightnessorwrongnessofanyviewitarticulates.Itcouldbesaidthatsuchjudgementsarestillnotrelevanttojudgementsofartasart.Touseananalogy:someone’ssufferingfromhalitosismaypreventmegettingnearenoughfullytoappreciatethebeautyofthatperson’steeth.Butthejudgementthatsomeonehashalitosis,althoughitaffectsmyabilitytomakeanaestheticjudgement,isnotrelevanttothataestheticjudgement.Similarly,myjudgementthatLeniReifenstahlwronglyadmiredHitlermightputmeofflookingattheaestheticmeritsofherwork,butisnotitselfpartofthataestheticjudgement.Inonesensethisistrue.Ifwethinkofanaestheticdelightasadelightinthelooksorappearancesofthings,thenjudgementsoftheattitudesdisplayedinaworkarenotaestheticjudgements.Thatonlybringsustotheconclusionthattheyareirrelevanttoartifonethinksthattheonlyjudgementsrelevanttoartareaestheticinthisnarrowsense.Thatlookssimplybizarre.Weareinterestedinfarmorethanthelooksandappearancesofart.Ifthethingisartweareinterestedintheartisticqualitiesofathing,thekindofchoicesthatweseemadeinitandthekindsofqualitiesofmindandemotiondisplayedinthosechoices,aswhenwenoticethediscriminationthatacomposershowsinavoidingthetemptationtomawkishdescentsintotheminorforcheapeffect.Wearealsointerestedinworksasexpressive—ingivinguswaysofarticulatingourattitudesandperceptions.Andthatisnotanarrowlyaestheticmatter.199\nHELEN’SBEETHOVEN:TRUTHANDMORALITYRevelationQuiteapartfromquestionsaboutwhetherworksofartcan,insomesenseorother,betrueandfalse,andquiteapartfromquestionsaboutwhether,iftheycan,thattruthorfalsitybearsonjudgementsabouttheirartisticmerit,thereisanotheraspecttothequestionofartandtruth.Forpeoplehavesometimesspokenofartasrevealingtruthstous.Whatarewetomakeofthis?Thereseemtobetwocaseshere.Firstly,aworkofartmightchangeinpartorinwholeone’swayofseeingsomething.Possessed,say,ofakneejerkdisapprovalofradicalsonemight,throughaworkofliterature,simplycometoadifferentunderstanding.ThatisnomoresurprisingorproblematicthanthatacquaintancewiththelifeofthetrenchesdisinclinedWilfredOwenorEdwardThomasfromcontinuingtofeelandexpressaheroicattitudetomodernwarfare.Ofcoursethisleavesopentheproblem,whichisnotintheendaproblemjustforaesthetics,ofthesourceofone’sassumptionthatoneischangedforthebetter.IknowoftoomanycasesofstudentswhohavebeenconvertedtotheviewsofAynRandthroughreadingAtlasshruggedtobeentirelyhappywiththethoughtthatepiphanicartisticexperiencesare,sotospeak,self-authenticating.Themoreinterestingcaseistheoneinwhichaworkoccasionsanexperience,commoninourdealingswithart,whichwearticulatebysayingthataworkofartexpresseswhatwealreadyinchoatelyknew.Insuchcaseswemayexclaim“that’sright!”,asifthetruthoftheworkwerealreadyinasenseknowntous.Thephenomenonmayoccurinmanycontextsandnotonlyinart.Wemaysoexpressourselves:afterstrugglingwithaproofinmathematics;afterwonderinghowtosayalineinaplay;onfindingasolutionwhenstrugglingwithapainting;onseeingtheaptnessofadescriptionofsomeoneorsomething;onsuddenlycomingtoseeone’slifeasansweringtoacertaincharacterization;onsuddenlyseeingthroughsomeone;onrealizing,asGlennMillerdid,whatcombinationofinstrumentsgavehimthesoundhehadlongsought;onsuddenlyseeingthefaceinapuzzlepicture;onstrugglingwithathoughtinaseminarandhavingsomeonearticulateitperfectly:onsimplyreadingsomething,assomeonemightfeel“yes,that’sit!”afterreadingBogart’sadvicetoLaurenBacallonhowtocopewiththedeathofalover.200\nREVELATIONHerearesomeparticularcases.Firstly,wemayfeelthataworkofartgivesusawayofexpressingwhatwealreadyinchoatelyknewwewere.Thatiswhyweexclaim,“that’sright!”.OnlyafterShakespearehadwrittenHamletwasitpossibleforPrufrocktoexpresshimselfinthefollowinglines(andonlyafterEliothadwrittenthemcoulditbepossibleforotherstorecognizethemselvesinthem):No!IamnotPrinceHamlet,norwasmeanttobe;Amanattendantlord,onethatwilldoToswellaprogress,startasceneortwo,Advisetheprince;nodoubt,aneasytool,Deferential,gladtobeofuse,Politic,cautious,andmeticulous,Fullofhighsentence,butabitobtuse;Attimes,indeed,almostridiculous—Almost,attimes,theFool.(ThelovesongofJ.AlfredPrufrock,Eliot,CollectedPoems1909–62.London:Faber,1963)Next,animaginativenarrativeworkofartmaygetustoseewhatwehavedone.So(in2Samuel12)NathanbroughthometoDavidwhathehaddoneinappropriatingthewifeofUriahtheHittiteanddisposingofherhusbandbytellinghimapurelyimaginativenarrativeaboutamanwhomisappropriatedalamb.Theresultwasthat:David’sangerwasgreatlykindledagainsttheman;andhesaidtoNathan,AstheLordliveththemanthathathdonethisthingshallsurelydie…AndNathansaidtoDavid,Thouarttheman…AndDavidsaiduntoNathan,IhavesinnedagainsttheLord.Finallyanimaginativenarrativemaygetustoseepossibilitiesimplicitinthemoralitytowhichwehavesubscribed.SuchwastheparableoftheGoodSamaritan,toldtothelawyerwhoknewthathehadtolovehisneighbourbutcouldnotseewhatrangeofpersonstoincludeinthatcategory.Hecametosee,throughanimaginativenarrative,thatneighboursarenotjustfellowmembersofone’stribe.201\nHELEN’SBEETHOVEN:TRUTHANDMORALITYTheexperiences,bothartisticandnonartistic,reportedby“that’sright!”seemtohaveanoddlydoublecharacter.Ontheonehandwefeelsomethinghasbeenrevealedtous:yet,ontheother,wealsofeelwealreadyknewit.Thatcanseemproblematic.Howcoulditberevealedifwealreadyknewit?Andhow,ifwealreadyknewit,didwehavetowaitforitberevealed?Howcouldonesay,withasenseofrecognition,“ThatisexactlywhatIwastryingtosay!”ifonewasnotalready,insomeway,awareofwhatonewantedtosay?HowcouldaLilyBriscoethink,“Yes!that’stheeffectIwasafter!”ifshedidnotalreadyinsomewayknowwhateffectwasbeingsought?(Andthatcarrieswithittheconcomitantquestionhow,ifoneknowsalreadywhatoneisafter,onehassomuchtroubleproducingitandsomuchreliefondoingso?)Thematterisanimportantonesincethese,sotospeak,epiphanicexperiences,havebeenthoughtcentraltoartinatleasttwoways.Firstly,theyoccurincontextsinwhichtheartisttriestosolveanartisticproblem,aswhentheartistisseekingtherightword,therightcombinationofnotesortherightcompositionalline.WesawhowLilyBriscoeinTothelighthouseexpressesherselfwhen,ofasudden,lightdawnedandsheresolvedhercompositionalproblem:Shelookedathercanvas;itwasblurred.Withasuddenintensity,asifshesawitclearforasecond,shedrewalinethere,inthecentre.Itwasdone;itwasfinished.Yes,shethought,layingdownthebrushinextremefatigue,Ihavehadmyvision.Croce,indeed,wesaw,madesuchexperiencescentraltoart.Secondly,whatinnumerablepeoplehavevaluedinartisthewayinwhichaworkofartmaybringtoexplicitandperfectarticulationhow,beforeitsarticulation,wealready,butinchoately,felttheworldandourselvestobe.SoloversappropriateShakespeare’ssonnets,findinginthemsomethingexactlyaptfortheirownexpressivepurposes;andthosewhosensethelossesoftimemightfindthispreciselyarticulatedforthemby,say,Hardy’sDuringwindandrain.Similarly,afterseeingaTurnerpainting,Imightseeasunsetandinsteadofthatbeingamereseeing,ImightexpressmyselfbysayingthatthesunsetisTurneresque.Imay202\nPUZZLESsay“that’sright!”notonlywhenaworkarticulatestheinnerlifeofmyemotions.ItmayalsoexpressthefeelingthattheworkhasgivenmeawayofarticulatingwhatIknowabouttheworld.RayElliott(1966–7,p.80)citesthelinesfromPope,“Sowellbredspanielscivillydelight/Inmumblingofthegametheydarenotbite”,asgettingustoseebothhowwefeelbothspanielsandthetargetofPope’ssatiretobe.Even(perhapsespecially)inthecaseofmusic,asHelenSchlegel’sexperienceremindsus,onecanthinkthatsomethingcorrectlyarticulatesbothhowitiswithoneandhowonebelievesitiswiththeworld.Onecanaswellsay“MyemotionsareallMahler”as“ThatsunsetisTurnesque”.Theinclinationtosay“that’sright!”,withitsimplicationsoffindingatruth,arisesasmuchinthecaseofmusicasitdoesinthecaseoftheotherarts.ThissortofilluminationiswhatWollheimisseekingtoclarifyandunderstand,whenhespeaksofthewayinwhichprojectingourinnerlivesontosomeobjectivecorrelatehelpstorestoreto,orimposeorderonto,thoseinternallives(Wollheim1993,pp.5–6).Whatcouldbemoreimportantthanthis?Andwhat,ifnotart,istodoit?PuzzlesAlthough“epiphanicexperiences”arefamiliarandofgreatimportance,therearetwothingsaboutthewaytheseexperiencesareexpressedthatcanseempuzzling.OneisputthusbyWittgenstein:“Oneistemptedtousethefollowingpicture:whathereally‘wantedtosay’,whathe‘meant’wasalreadypresentsomewhereinhismindevenbeforehegaveitexpression”(1953,para.334).LaterinthePhilosophicalinvestigations,Wittgensteinremarks:“James,inwritingofthissubject,isreallytryingtosay:‘Whataremarkableexperience.Thewordisnotthereyet,andyetinacertainsenseisthere,—orsomethingisthere,whichcannotgrowintoanythingbutthisword’”(ibid.PartII,p.219).IfIrecognizesomethingaswhatIwantedtosay,ImustalreadyknowthatthatiswhatIwantedtosay.Itmusthavebeensomewhere.Thenwearetemptedtothinkofitalreadybeinginsomeoccultplace,themind,andofbringingwhatwerecognizeintheexpressionupagainstitinordertocheckthatitiswhatisalreadythere.Thismodelmakesitmysterious,bothastowhere203\nHELEN’SBEETHOVEN:TRUTHANDMORALITYthisoccultplaceisand—grantedwedoknowalreadywhatwewanttoexpress—whywefinditsohardtoexpressit.Thisquestionisoneforthemoregeneralphilosophyofmind,ofseeingwhatiswrongwiththenotionofthemindasanoccultroom.HereIwish,rather,todealwithaproblemforphilosophicalaesthetics,namely,grantedpeoplefeelthattheseepiphanicexperiencesaresoimportantingivingthemwaysofexpressingthetruthaboutthemselvesandtheworld,howdotheyknowwhentheysay“that’sright!”thatitisright?ThatthisisaproblemwithepiphanicexperiencesinartissuggestedbyaquotationfromT.S.Eliot’sLittleGidding:LetmedisclosethegiftsreservedforageTosetacrownuponyourlifetime’seffort.First,thecoldfrictionofexpiringsenseWithoutenchantment,offeringnopromiseButbittertastelessnessofshadowfruitAsbodyandsoulbegintofallasunder.Second,theconsciousimpotenceofrageAthumanfolly,andthelacerationOflaughteratwhatceasestoamuse.Andlast,therendingpainofre-enactmentOfallthatyouhavedone,andbeen;theshameOfmotiveslaterevealed,andtheawarenessOfthingsilldoneanddonetoothers’harmWhichonceyoutookforexerciseofvirtue.Thenfools’approvalstings,andhonourstains.FromwrongtowrongtheexasperatedspiritProceeds,unlessrestoredbythatrefiningfireWhereyoumustmoveinmeasurelikeadancer.(LittleGidding,Thefourquartets.London:Faber,1944)Couldn’tonethinkthatonehadbeenbroughttoseeoneselfortheworldaright,and,indeed,liveone’swholelifeinthespiritofthatrevelationand,atthelast,cometorealizethatthiswasnotright,justasthefeelingthatonehad,ofasudden,cometoananswertoamathematicalproblemis,alas,compatiblewithnothavinggotitrightatall?Andcouldn’twethinkthatwehavefoundthesolutiontoanartisticproblemandothersseethatwehavenot?Andcouldn’t204\nPUZZLESwecometoseethatforourselvesatalaterstage?Bythesametoken,presumably,HelenSchlegel’sthinkingthatBeethovenhadtoldherwhatherlifewasiscompatiblewithherfindingout,asthatlifecontinued,thathehadn’t.Andcan’tIthinkthatsomeone’ssincerelyfelt,dollar-ladenpost-AynRandepiphaniesaresimplybarmy?AsWittgensteinasks“Can’twebemistakeninthinkingweunderstandaquestion?”.And“Don’tIalsosometimesimaginemyselftounderstandaword…andthenrealizethatIdidnotunderstandit?”(1953,para.517,p.53fn).Herearealdifficultyemerges.IfHelenfindsoutthatBeethovenhadnotrevealedherlifetoherasitreallyis,itispresumablybecause,atsomelatertime,shehasafurtherepiphanicexperiencethatrevealedthefalsityofwhatBeethovenhadapparentlyrevealedandthetruthofsomethingelse.But,then,byparityofreasoningshecouldnottrustthatlaterepiphanicexperienceasgenuinelyrevelatory.Andthenonemightbegintowonder,ifonecannottrustitsrevelations,whatthevalueisoftheclaimthatworksofarthavethisrevelatorypower.Couldsomeone,bethatpersontheartistoroneoftheaudience,think“Yes!That’sright!That’showIfeel!”andbemistaken?Couldanartistinitiallyfeelaninchoaterestlessness,feel,subsequently,thataworkexpresseditclearly,asLilyBriscoeinoneofmyearlierexamplesclaimedtofeel,andbewrong?Couldaperson,readingThelovesongofJ.AlfredPrufrock,think,“Yes!that’sme:I’mpastit”andbewrong?Inoneofthefewcoherentdiscussionsofthismatter(indeed,oneofthefewdiscussionsofanysort)JohnBenson(1967)suggeststhatifanexpressionfeelswrong,itiswrongandifitfeelsright,itisright.Isthisso?Twocasesneedtobedistinguishedhere.Firstly,thereisthecaseinwhichoneinchoatelyfeelspastit,thenfeels,afterreadingapoem,thatthepoemexpressespreciselythatincohatefeeling,andyetoneiswronginfeeling,firstinchoatelyandthenarticulatelythatoneispastit.Herethepoemtrulyarticulateswhatoneinarticulatelyfeelsaboutoneself,onlyoneiswronginfeelingthataboutoneself.Secondly,thereisthemoreinterestingpossibilitythatonemightbewronginasserting,withasenseofrecognition,thatapoemexpressesarticulatelyone’sinnerlife.Onesays,withasenseeitherofrecognitionorrevelation,“That’showitiswithme”,whenthatisnothowitis.205\nHELEN’SBEETHOVEN:TRUTHANDMORALITYThefirstofthesecasesiscertainlypossible,anditraisesproblems,towhichweshortlyreturn,abouttheepiphanicstatusofart.Butthelattercaseisbothintriguinginitsownright,aswellasworryingforthosewhothinkthatworksofartcanclarifyourlivesinaremindingway.Inthelattercase,onepossibilityseemstometoberelativelyuninteresting.Imightcarelessly(butsincerely,inthesenseofhavingnointentiontomislead,lieorwhatever)say,perhapsataBergmanfilm,“Yes,thataboutsumsupmyworldview”,onlytobepersuadedthatnothingofthesortisthecase.Wittgensteinremarks:“itisthecircumstancesunderwhichhehadsuchanexperiencethatjustifyhiminsayinginsuchacasethatheunderstands”(Wittgenstein1953,para.155).Andoneofthecircumstancesseemstometobehowseriouslythespeakertookthematter.Didthespeaker,sotospeak,shootfromthehip,speakhastily,carelesslyorwhatever?AndthenIwanttosaythatifapersonspeakswithdueseriousnessandconsideration,attentively,letussay,thenagapcannotopenbetweensayingthatapoem,forexample,expresseswhatweincohatelyfeelandwhatweinfactinchoatelyfeel.ThatisthetruththatBensonseemstometohavegrasped.Butthatstillleavesitopenthatboththeinchoateandexpressedbelieforfeelingaboutoneself,abouttheworld,aboutwhatonewantedtosay,aboutwhatwouldorwouldnotworkartisticallyinacertainpicture,couldsimplybemistaken.Inthatcase,onecouldsay“that’showitis(that’showtheworldis)”andbewrong,wrongnotindescribingone’sfeeling,inchoateornot,abouthowtheworldis,andassertingthatthepoemperfectlyexpressesthis,butwronginfeelingthattheworldisso.Moreover,astheEliotlinesremindus,wecancometothinkthatweerroneouslybelievedourselvestohavehadrevelatoryinsights.Whatthenbecomesoftherevelatorypowerofart?Variouspossibilitiesexisthere.Onewouldbetoinvokethenotion,canvassedinWittgenstein’sOncertainty,thatcertainbeliefs,likethebeliefthatthereareobjects,arenottobedoubted,butratherconstituteacontextinwhichdoubtbecomespossible.(Doubtaboutobjectsmakessenseonlyifthereareobjects.)Similarly,onemightsaythataworkofartmightbringsomethinghometouswithsuchforcethatdoubtisnotsomethingwecould206\nPUZZLESseriouslyentertain.AfterreadingTolstoy’sshortstoryaboutthematter,ImightbesostruckwiththehorrorofprostitutionthatIcouldnotseriouslyeveragainengagewithanyworkthatwasinanywaysympathetictothatinstitution.That,however,seemsnottoaddressthefactthatsomeseeminglyrevelatoryfoundationalexperiencesdocometobedoubted,asmightthefoundationalexperiencesmentionedinOncertainty(Bernecker,1995).Asecondpossibilityistoclaimthatonecanhaveaperfecttitletosay,onhearingtheexpressionofasentimentinapoem,“That’sexactlyright”,meaningthatonethinksboththatthepoemgetsitrightand,moreover,thatitexactlyexpresseswhatoneinchoatelyfelt,evenifonelatercomestofeelthatitdoesn’tgetitright.Thisseemstometobeofapiecewiththeclaimthatonecanhaveaperfecttitletosayoneisseeingapig,evenifthatclaimlaterturnsouttobefalse.Theerrorhereistobelievethatrevelationinartisofapiecewithincorrigibility.Thatiserroneousforvariousreasons.Firstly,itsupposesthatthereisintheendonlyonewaytoseethings.Thatthisisfalse,atleasttotheexperienceofart,isshownbythequestion“WhichofTurner,Constable,MonetorBlakecapturedthewayasunsetreallylooks?”.Thereisaperfectlygoodsenseinwhichtheseartistsrevealtouswaysofseeingsunsets,ratherthanthewayasunsetlooks(aconclusion,asIhavesaid,whichdoesnotentailthatthereexistsnosunsetindependentofthosewaysofseeing).Itisfurtheratoddswiththefactthatwemaylookbackonthepoemswelovedinlateadolescenceandthinkofthemasexpressingaworldviewthatisnotsomuchfalseasinappropriatetoourpresentcondition.Artaside,however,theclaimthatrevelationisofapiecewithincorrigibilityseemstomenottodojusticetothefactthatourmoralviews,andmoregenerallyourviewsoflife,areconstantlybroughttothebarofexperienceandcanalterinconsequence.Wecanneverbesurewhenthisisgoingtohappen.Oneexampleofthisisthecaseinwhichmybeliefastohowoneshouldcomportoneselfinthefaceofthedeathofsomeonelovedmaysimplynotbesustainablewhenthatactuallyhappenstome.207\nHELEN’SBEETHOVEN:TRUTHANDMORALITYPerhapsmoreimportantly,aconvictionthatasenseofgenuinerevelationisofapiecewithincorrigibilitysitsoddlywiththefactthatweengagewitheachotherinmoralandkindredinterchanges,interchangesthatcaneffectachangeinourviews,anengagementthatpersuadedmeearlierthattherewassomethingrightaboutsubjectivism.Thesedebatesarecomplex,andtheagreementsanddisagreementsthatarereachedareoftenpatchilyoverlappingandsometimesfugitive,astheymustbesinceweallbringtotheinterchangesourindividualpsychologicalhistories.Thisseemstometohappeninethicsandinourengagementswiththemoralexpressionsofart.Ibringtotheworkmypresentmoralandmetaphysicalpostureandaworkcanaffectit,andlaterworksmayaffectityetagain.AteachstageImayfeelarevelation,butImustalwaysbeconsciousthatthisrevelationisatriskofwhattimeandotherinsightsmaybring.AvoidingoversimplificationSofarIhavespokenasifonebringsone’smoralviewstotheworkandifoneseestheworksharesthem,oriftheworkconvertsonetoitsview,oneismovedtoassenttoit.Butthatistoosimplistic.Firstlyweshouldguardagainsthavingtooaustereaviewofwhatcountsasourmoralityinourinvolvementwithart.Oneoverlyausteremodelmightworklikethis:wearecommitted,say,tooppositiontogenocide(althoughWesternreactiontorecenteventsin,sayTimor,mightindicatethatthecommitmentislip-service).Wethenencounteraworkexpressinganendorsementofgenocide.Thisrepelsusenoughtopreventourenjoyingwhatevertheworkmighthavetoofferwereit,sotospeak,onourside.Thatcountsasadefectinthework.Nowonepossiblyminorpointofmoralpsychologyisthatsuchanaccountleavesoutcaseslike’Tilldeathdouspart(orThebunkersinitsAmericanincarnation).Ibecametiredofhearingtherighteousdefendingthisasdefeatingevilwithsavageparodywhenitwasobviousthatafairpercentageofthem(nottomentionthepublicatlarge)wereactuallyvicariouslyenjoyingthesayingoftheunsayable.IndeedtheveryexampleofThetriumphofthewillbringsbeforeusthespectacleoftheglamourofeviltowhichwemaybeattractedinthewayinwhichPlato208\nAVOIDINGOVERSIMPLIFICATIONclaimedweareattractedwhenwecannottakeoureyesoffarepellentcorpse.Itsimplywillnotdotorepresentourselvesassimplyswitchedoffbythespectacleofthattowardswhichweareatpainstovoiceourrepugnance.Weneedamoresophisticatedmoralpsychology.Moreimportantly,theaccount,castasitisintermsofbeingswitchedoffbyworksthatclashwithourmorality,leavesoutanyconsiderationofthefactthatsomeoftheverygreatestofartenactsitsprogrammeintheveryareaswhereourmoralityisnotsecure,howevervehementlywemayprotestitis.Tobesure,ifI,touseProfessorHepburn’sexcellentword,can“inhabit”thework,thenI’lllikeitbetter,andifIcan’t,I’llbetosomeextentturnedfromit.Butthisneedstobesupplementedbysomenotionofbeingmorallychallengedbyawork.ThoughIhavesomemoralcertainties,Idonothaveenoughtopreventmyexperienceofartfrombeingnotamatterofattractionandrepulsion,but(andhereIthinkofKafkaandBeckett,nottoforgetGenetandRobertMapplethorpe)ananxiety,thekindofanxietyfeltbyHuckFinn,trappedbetweenasenseofdutytohisracistsocietyandhisfriendshipwithanescapedslave.Butthereisanotherwayinwhichanaccountofmoralityanditsdealingswithartmaybetooaustere.Itwillbesoifitconcentratesoncasesinwhichourattractionandrepulsiontoartisamatterofitsaccordingornotaccordingwithsomemoralprincipletowhichweadhere.Thatcertainlyneedstobesupplementedbyawidersurveyandetiologyofthewaysinwhichwecanbeputoffart.Imay,withoutthisbeingstrictlyamoralmatter,beputoff,totakeafewexamples,bythepretentious(seeLadyChatterley’slover),thebanal(seeBetjeman’sLaureateverses),themawkish(seeKeats’s“OdetoPsyche”),theintellectuallyvague(seeParadiselostandpartsofThefourquartets)ortheinfantilelavatorial(seesomeofPicasso’slaterworksandsomeofSwift’swritingstoStella).Sometimesthefailingmightnotbesufficienttopreventmefromenjoyingoreventhinkinghighlyofthework.Whatthissuggestsisthatinsteadoftakingononlythemoralweshouldlookmoregenerallyatthewaysinwhichhumanqualitiesofaworkofartmayormaynotmakeitpossibleforustolivewithit.209\nHELEN’SBEETHOVEN:TRUTHANDMORALITYFinallyKafkawritesinMetamorphosis:“AsGregorSamsaawokeonemorningfromuneasydreamshefoundhimselftransformedinhisbedintoagiganticinsect.”Wecangoalongwithafictionalworldinwhichthatsortofthinghappenswithnoothersenseofstrainthanthefictionalworlditselfimposesonus,which,asDoctorJohnsonfoundinthecaseofLear,mightbeprettyconsiderable,butitwillbeaworldthatwecanonlyimaginativelyenterifithasapsychologicaltruth,whichistosay,ifitaccordswithourassumptionsaboutregularitiesshowninhumanbehaviour.Thenweread:Thyhusbandisthylord,thylife,thykeeper,Thyhead,thysovereign;onethatcaresforthee,AndforthymaintenancecommitshisbodyTopainfullabour,bothbyseaandland;Towatchthenightinstorms,thedayincold,Whilethouliestwarmathome,secureandsafe,Andcravesnoothertributeatthyhands,Butlove,fairlooks,andtrueobedience:Toolittlepaymentforsogreatadebt.Suchdutyasthesubjectowestheprince,Evensuchawomanowethtoherhusband.Andnowitseemshardertogoalongwiththosewords,aswitnessthedesperateattemptsofrecentdirectorstosalvageanironicintentionnotablyill-evidencedintheoriginalpassage.Thereisanasymmetrybetweenourwillingnesstoacceptworksofartinwhichunlikelyifnotimpossibleeventsoccurandourunwillingnesstoascribetoworksofartthatdiffermorallyfromourown.WefindithardertogoalongwiththefictionalworldinwhichKate’swordsarespoken.Heretheclaimthatartistsshowthemselvesinworksandmydiscussionoftherelevancetoartoftruthandmoralitycometogether.ForIamsurethatthereasonwemightrecoil,ifwedo,fromthosewordsofThetamingoftheshrewisnotthatwemightfindithardtoempathizewithafictionalspeakersayingthosethingsinarepressivefictionalworld.Ratheritisthatwesuspect,orbetterfear,thatthesesentimentsweresharedbyarealpersoninarealworld,namelythepersonwhowrotetheplay.210\nGUIDETOREADINGWhatupsetsourassessmentsisnotthemoralityofpeopleandsocietiesinworksofartbuttheattitudesoftendisplayed,wittinglyornot,bythecreatorsofthoseworksintheirveryrealactsofcreation.Foraworkofartcannotbeimmoral,asopposedtocontaininginstancesofimmorality,unlessthemoralityitcontains,ifonlybyomission,isendorsed.Themoralityofaworkofartcanonlybethemoralitydisplayedintherealactofarticulatingthatwork.Thatmakesitasmuchpartoftheworkasanyofitsotherproperties.Buttosaythatistosaythatmoralconsiderationsandwiththemconsiderationsofthetruthofthoseconsiderationsmustenterintoourassessmentsofart.GuidetoreadingAgoodplacetostart,sinceitisclearandmakesonevaluabledistinctionisBeardsley’sAestheticspp.368–91.NotealsohisoverviewofRomanticisminhisAestheticsfromclassicalGreecetothepresent.InHanfling’sPhilosophicalaestheticsthereisanotheroverview,“Truthandrepresentation”byRosalindHursthouse.ThosewholikeinterestinghistoricalfigureswillgreatlyenjoySirPhilipSidney’sApologyfor(sc.Defenceof)poetry,wherethereisalivelydebate(directedatPlato)aboutwhypoetsaretruth-tellersratherthanliars.Thelong,butIthinkessential,J.P.Dayarticleis“Artisticverisimilitude”,Dialogue,1(2&3)1962,pp.163–87,278–304.D.Z.Phillips’sThroughadarkeningglass(Oxford:Blackwell,1982)isaseriesofdiscussionsofexamplesofthewayinwhichmoralityandartgotogetheranddisplaysaknowledgeofandasensitivitytoliteraturethatisrareinthosewhophilosophizeonthatmatter.Ofalessexplicitlyphilosophicalintent,butexemplifyingthewayinwhichliteratureisboundupwithmorality,aretheworksofF.R.Leavis.HisviewsarewelldiscussedbyJ.Casey,Thelanguageofcriticism(London:Methuen,1966).IhavereferredtothewayinwhichJ.L.Austinwidensthescopeofwhatmustbeconsideredwhentruthisunderexamination.ThebestthinghereisHowtodothingswithwords(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1962).Twobooks,inrelativelyneglectedwayshavesaidinterestingthingsaboutarttruthandmorality.OneisPeterJones,Philosophyandthenovel(Oxford:Clarendon,1975),whereheintroducestheusefulnotionoftheavailabilityofaworkofartforuse.Thisseemstometothrow211\nHELEN’SBEETHOVEN:TRUTHANDMORALITYlightonthewaysinwhichweappropriateaShakespearesonnet,say,forourownexpressivepurposes.TheotherisR.Beardsmore,Artandmorality(London:Macmillan,1971),whichbothsurveyscriticallysomepopularviews(aestheticismandmoralism)andtriestoshowhowaworkofartmightgetustoseethewrongnessofsomethinglikeprostitution.OnthematterofsuspendingbeliefinwhatonedoesnotmorallyshareseeK.Walton&M.Tanner,“Moralsinfictionandfictionalmorality”,ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSocietysupp.vol.67,1994,pp.27–66.Wearenow,Iamtoldbyneophiliacs,intheeraoftheNewHumanism,thesuccessortopoststructuralism.Thismovementhascomeroundtoseeingthatethicsandliteraturedohavesomethingtodowitheachother.FormoreonthisseeDavidParker’s,Ethics,theoryandthenovel(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994)andNoëlCarroll“ModerateMoralism”,BritishJournalofAesthetics36(3),1996,pp.223–37.Variouspeoplehavesimplydeniedtherelevanceoftruth.OneisArnoldIsenbergin“TheproblemofbeliefmostaccessiblyavailableinBarrett’sCollectedpapersinaesthetics,pp.125–44towhichtheadmirableRayElliott’s“Poetryandtruth”,Analysis27,1966–7,pp.77–85wasofferedbywayofareply.AnotherisDouglasMorganin“Mustarttellthetruth?”,JournalofAestheticsandArtCriticism26,1967,pp.17–21.J.Jobeshasexploredtherevelatoryaspectofartinhis“Arevelatoryfunctionofart”,BritishJournalofAesthetics14,1974,pp.124–33.FinallynolistcanaffordtomissR.W.Hepburn’s“Art,truthandtheeducationofsubjectivity”,JournalofAestheticEducation24(2),1990,pp.185–98.Twogroupshaveaspecialinterestintruthinart:oneisMarxists,theotherisadherentstovariousreligions.Both,however,canbesubsumedundermydiscussion.Bothclaimtoknowhowthingsareandtojudgeworksonthewaysinwhichtheydoordonotshowagraspofhowthingsare:butthatiscompatiblewithmyviewthatone’sbeliefsabouthowthingsarecanconditionone’sopinionsaboutaworkofart.ItisworthreadingSimon“Marxismandaesthetics”intheHanflingvolume.FortotallightreliefIcommendC.H.RolphThetrialofLadyChatterley(London:Penguin1960)withitsrousingdemonstrationthathumbugisnotconfinedto(thoughitwasamplyspoutedby)theunrighteous.Thosewhowishtolookatarecentexaminationofpornographyandobscenity212\nGUIDETOREADING(byaphilosopher)cantryB.Williams,Obscenityandfilmcensorship(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1981)anabridgementofthereportoftheWilliamsCommitteeonObscenityandFilmCensorship.213\n\nChapter10ThepointofitallTowhatextenthasthisworkfulfilledtheprogrammewithwhichIbegan?TheavoidanceoferrorIsaidintheintroductionthatalthoughtheartsandnatureofferusexperiencesofintensevalue,itispossible,whenthinkingaboutthoseexperiences,togowrong.Ifthaterrorisconfinedtotheinterchangesoftheorists,littleharmisdone.Theseerrorsaremoreperniciouswhentheyaffectthosewhoteachthearts.InthisworkIhavetriedtoshowtheerrorsofcertainofthesetheories.Oneisthebeliefthatonlyaverynarrowrangeofthingsisrelevanttotheappreciationofthearts.Anextremeexampleofthisistheviewthataninterestinworksofartcanonlybeaninterestintheirformalqualities.Ihavearguedthatwemustcontinuallyresistattemptstorestricttheknowledgethatoneneedstoappreciateaworkofart.215\nTHEPOINTOFITALLAseconderroristotakethemodelforproofinaestheticsasthemodelofcitingthingsfromwhichconclusionsaboutmeritanddemeritlogicallyfollow.Anaestheticproof,rather,getssomeonetoseesomething,andalthoughIcangiveyoureasonsforlooking,Icannotgiveyoureasonsforseeing.Ihaveargued,therefore,thatthetaskofappreciationistobringsomeonetorespondwith,“Yes,nowIseeit”.Whatonewantstoseeisthevalueofaworkasitemergesfromandisdependentonthephysicalandsemanticfeaturesoftheworkinquestion.ItisclearthatthedrivingforcebehindmanyoftheillsthatIhaveattemptedtodiagnosehasbeenasuspicionthatappreciationoftheartsisasubjectivematter,wherethatmeansitrecordsmerelypersonalpreferenceandassuchisnomaterialfortheclassroom.Ifitistobestudiedacademicallywehavetofindsomethingmoreobjectivetodo,andwhatismoreobjectivethancountingvowels,measuringthewavelengthsoftones,expostfactomusicalanalysisortalkofshapesandmasses.Thatinturnleadstothatignisfatuusoftwentiethcenturystudiesinappreciation,thesearchforascienceofaestheticjudgement,wherethatmeansawayofdeducingorinducingconclusionsaboutthevalueofaworkfromstatementsaboutits“empiricallyobservable”physicalproperties.Facedwithaccusationsofsubjectivityonecantrytoshowthataestheticappreciationhasaclaimtobemorethan“just”subjective,whateverthatmeans(andwhatitmeansisalwaysworthaskingofthosewholooselybandythewordabout).Itriedtoindicatethatthatisaviablestrategy.ButIalsoindicatedthatonemightsimplyadmitthechargethatartinvolvesoursubjectivitiesandthenshowthatappreciationcanstillbecelebratedasawayofexploringtheformsandlimitsofourcommunalityaswediscoverthewaysinwhich,inrespondingtoartoursubjectivitiesdoanddonotcometogether.Attheveryleastthisseemstometoofferamoreinterestingwayofapproachingtheartsintheteachingsituation.Oneotherremarkwhilewearediscussingtheoriesofart:Ioverheardacolleaguesayrecentlythatliteratureexistedforhimonlyasastockofexamplesintermsofwhichtodiscusstheoriesofliterature.Thatattitudegoesalongwaytoexplainthedisaffectionthatmanystudentsfeelwithpresent-daymethodsofstudyingthearts.AsacorrectiveIcommendtheattitudeexpressedbyPhilipRoth’s“professorofdesire”inthenovelofthatname,anattitude216\nTHEAVOIDANCEOFERRORinthespiritofwhichIhavetriedtowritethisbook.(IndeedIcommendthewholeofthesoliloquyfromwhichthisextractistakenasaguidetowhatateacheroughttofeel.)Theprofessorofdesiresays:Youmayevenhavegrownalittlewearyofmyinsistenceupontheconnectionsbetweenthenovelsyouread…eventhemosteccentricandoffputtingofnovels,andwhatyouknowsofaroflife.Youwilldiscover(andnotallwillapprove)thatIdonotholdwithcertainofmycolleagueswhotellusthatliterature,initsmostvaluableandintriguingmoments,is“fundamentallynon-referential”…Iamgoingtorequestnonethelessthatyourestrainyourselvesfromtalkingabout“structure”,“form”,and“symbols”inmypresence.Itseemstomethatmanyofyouhavebeenintimidatedsufficiently…andshouldbeallowedtorecoverandrestoretorespectabilitythoseinterestsandenthusiasmsthatmorethanlikelydrewyoutoreadingfictiontobeginwithandwhichyououghtn’ttobeashamedofnow.Asanexperimentyoumightevenwant…totrylivingwithoutanyclassroomterminologyatall,torelinquish“plot”and“character”rightalongwiththoseveryexaltedwordswithwhichnotafewofyouliketosolemnizeyourobservations,suchas“epiphany”,“persona”,and,ofcourse,“existential”asamodifierofeverythingexistingunderthesun.IsuggestthisinthehopethatifyoutalkaboutMadameBovaryinmoreorlessthesametongueyouusewiththegrocer,oryourlover,youmaybeplacedinamoreintimate,amoreinteresting,inwhatmightbecalledamorereferentialrelationshipwithFlaubertandhisheroine…Aboveall,Ihopethatbyreadingthesebooksyouwillcometolearnsomethingofvalueaboutlifeinoneofitsmostpuzzlingandmaddeningaspects.(Theprofessorofdesire,PhilipRoth.London:JonathanCape,1978)217\nTHEPOINTOFITALLArtIsaidattheoutsetthatourtaskistounderstandthepowerofart.Whatprogresshasbeenmadewiththat?Anaccountofarthasnowbeguntoemerge.Someonehassomethinginchoatetomakeclear.Itmightbesomethingonewantstogetclearaboutoneself,perhapsbywritingapoem.Itmightbesomethingonewantstoarticulate,inapaintingperhaps,abouttheworldasitseemstous.Itmightbeanideaforabuildingorastory.Onethensetsaboutmakingsomethingthatwillbefinishedonlywhenonecansay:“that’swhatIwasafter”.Whenthatisdoneonewillhavecreatedsomething,allofwhoseelementswillhavebeenharnessedtoproducetheoveralleffect.Otherswhounderstandthatobjectwillgraspwhatisarticulatedinitandhowitscomponentshavebeenarrangedtoexpresspreciselythat.Inallthesecasesaninnerlifeisputintoanobjectandtherebyclarified.Thatobjectcanbeanaturalobject.Icanprojectmymoodontonatureandcallitmelancholy.Inart,however,mycontrolisgreater.Icreatetheobjectthatembodiesmyvisionandcanensurethatpreciselythatvisionwillbearticulatedbyit.Onecouldbeanartistinthissense,evenifonedidnotknowthatthisintentionissomethingthatpeoplecalled“artists”haveoftenself-consciouslyhad.Onemightthink,“IaminacertaininternalstateandIwillbecomeapainteroranovelistoramusicianandmakeitclear”.Butonecould,withoutknowinganythingaboutallthat,simplymakesomethinginordertoclarifyone’sinnerlife.WhatisdonebyseverelydisabledpeoplewhentheypainttoarticulatetheirvisionsmeetsWollheim’sconditioneveniftheyhavenograspoftheusesoftheterm“art”.ThisiswhyIearlierarguedthatitisnoteasytoseewherethelinebetweendeliberatelymadethingsthatareartandthosethatarenotistobedrawn.Thatinturndamagesanyattempt,likethatmadebyCollingwood,todistinguishbetweenartandcraft,oranyattempttoshowthatartslikearchitectureorthedesignofkitchenimplementsarenotpureartsbecausetheyareboundupwiththepractical.Inarchitecture,forexample,theintendedpracticalendforthebuilding(and,moregenerally,theintendedendofadesignobject,ateapot,say)ispartofwhathastobeforgedintotheaestheticendproduct.AdesignproblembombardsthedesignerwithwhatCroce218\nART’SPOWERwouldcall“unorganizedmaterialstimuli”.Theseinclude,inarchitecture,suchthingsasthelocation,theproblemsofthepossiblycrampedsizeofthesite,itsslopes,anditssurroundingbuildings,thewishtoavoidhackneyedderivation,theneedsoftheusers.Thetaskofreconcilingtheseelementspressesonthemindofarchitect-artistsandtheirtaskistoproduceanobjectthatleavesnolumpsstickingoutasunsolvedproblems.Thatoneoftheelementstobeincludedintheorganicwholeisapracticaldemanddoesnotshowthatthetaskofproducinganobjectthatmeetsallthedemandsisanythelessartistic.Thatachairhastobefittositondoesnotpreventachairexpressingitscreator’sconceptionofhowfurnituremightbe.Wefindfurniture,clothes,chinaware,cutleryandbuildingsexpressiveofarticulatedconceptions.Aestheticmatters,narrowlyconceived,can,indeed,interferewiththepractical.ThenewstationatEustonmaywellhavebeenamemorablyupliftingvisualspectacle,butwhenseatswereexcludedbecausethedesignersdidnotwishthepurityofthedesigntobecomeclutteredbyhumanbeings,thewholeenterprisebecamebizarre.Art’spowerHowdoesthekindofaccountIhavegivenhelpuswiththequestion,withwhichIbegan,ofthepowerthatartcanhaveoverus,apowerthatthosewhohavefeltittalkofasgoingasdeepasourlivescango?Firstly,wehavecometoafullercharacterizationofthevarietyoftheattractionsofart.Thereistheinterestinrepresentation.ThisAristotlerightlynotedissomethinginwhichwetakedelight.Sincedelightissomethingthat,invariousdegrees,upliftsus,thatexplainswhywemightseekoutrepresentations.Itdoesnot,though,explainwhywecanbesopowerfullyattractedtorepresentations.Againtherearethecasesoftherapturousengagementwithartinwhichallthecapacitiesarefullyengaged.Theintenselypleasurablequalityofsuchastateisagainareasonwhywemightseekit.Thentherearecasesinwhichwefind,perhapsafterastruggle,awayofexpressing,throughcreatingorengagingwithanobject,somethingthathasbeenhithertoinchoateinus.Thisisaccompaniedbyafeelingofreliefandillumination.219\nTHEPOINTOFITALLAllthesecasestellusthatcertainofourinvolvementswiththeartsliftandmoveus.Butthisisnotasyettohaveexplainedthepowerofart.Whatmoreistobesaid?IbeginwithastrikingremarkbyWittgenstein:“Anyonewholistenstoachild’scryingandunderstandswhatisheardwillknowthatitharboursdormantpsychicforces,terribleforcesdifferentfromanythingcommonlyassumed.Profoundrage,painandlustfordestruction”(Wittgenstein1980,p.2).Herewearenotmerelytoldthatababycries,butthatthereisagreatpowerinthatcry,apowerlinkedtodeeppassions.Thatsuggeststhatifwewanttobegintoexplainthedeeppowerofartwemighttrytolinkitwithothercasesinwhichwefindanequalpowerandseeifthatleadstoanyillumination.ThenIamremindedofaremarkbyWollheimthat“theexpressivenessofaworkofartderivesfromthehumanmind…thebroadcharacteristicsofart,includingexpressiveness,originateoutsideart”(Wollheim1993,p.5)Croce,too,wasatpainstostressthatwhatwecallartisadevelopmentof,andcontinuouswith,thepowersofthemind,althoughlackingaproperpsychologyhewasunabletoexplainwhythatgaveartsuchpower.Howwouldpsychologyhelphere?Considerthecaseinwhichwecallalandscape“melancholy”.Thereisawaythatlandscapelooksandthereisawaythatwefeel,saylostanddevastated.Wepossessapowertoprojectthatinnerstateontotheouterreality,andthelookofthelandscapeinvitesustodoso.Whyisthissoimportanttous?Crocecorrectlyobservedthatmerelytobeatthemercyofthefeelingsblindlyoccasionedbythestimulithatfallonusistobeatthemercyofsomethingthatisnotus.Whenweexpressthesefeelings,whenwebecomeclearaboutthem,whenwegivethemaformthatarticulateswhatweinchoatelyfeltundertheirbombardment,wemakethemours.Ifwedothisbyprojectingourinnerlivesontotheworld,wehumanizenatureandmakeourselvesathomeinit.WecannowaddthistoCroce’saccount:Ofgreatsignificancehoweverisanotherfeatureofprojectionthatisrootedinthefunctionsitserves.Overawidelyvaryingrangeofconditions,fromthebenigntothepathological,thefunctionofprojectionistohelpthe220\nROADSNOTTAKENindividualtoachieve,ortorestore,ortoimpose,internalorder.(Wollheimibid.,pp.6–7)Projection,withwhichexpressionisintimatelyconnected,isaninternalactinwhichwetrytopreservewhatwevalueandisthreatenedorinwhichwetrytocometotermswithwhatwedreadandthatthreatensus.Nowwebegintoseehowthepowerofart,whichwenaturallythinkofassomethingtodowithexpression,ispartandparcelofthepowerthatexpression,representationandprojectionhaveintheformationofourpersonalities.ItisinparticularrelatedtothoseinfantpassionsofwhichWittgensteinspokeandawayofcomingtotermswiththem.RoadsnottakenIamveryconsciousthattherearethingsIhavenotdonethatIwouldwishtohavedoneinafullerintroductiontoaesthetics.Oneistogiveaproperaccountofthevehementlyinterestinghistoryofaesthetics,including,forexample,anaccountofsuchextraordinarilyimportantwritersasHegelandNietzsche.ThebestIcandohereistosaywherethereadercangotoremedythatlack.Anotheristogiveaproperaccountofwhatmodernphilosophersindifferenttraditionshavedone,especiallyHeideggerandMerleau-Ponty.AgainIhavetriedtoindicatewhereguidestothemcanbefound.Ifreadersunderstandthisbooktheywillhavemadesomebeginningwiththestudyofaesthetics.ButIcannotleavethismatterwithoutindicatingwhatseemtomefruitfullinesofresearchforthosewhowishtodofurtherwork.AnobviousoneistofillouttheaccountthatIhavejustgivenofthewaythatthepowerofartisrelatedtothecentralplaceofrepresentationalexpressioninanyfullaccountofthemind.Whenwehavethat,webegintohavesomethingthatwillexplainthepowerofarttous.Itwill,moreover,dosobydemonstratingthetruthofaclaimwefindinKantandCroceandthathasbeenrightlystressedby,amongothers,ScrutonandWollheim.Wecanhavenoproperaccountofartuntilweknowhowartfitsintosomefullerpictureofthemind,intoanaccountofitspowersofimagination,thoughtandexpressionandoftheiroriginsanddevelopments.221\nTHEPOINTOFITALLAnotherplacewherethereadermayfindanopportunitytobecomeinvolvedinunsolvedproblemsisindiscussionsofthereasonswhyweare,asWordsworthinthepassageIquotedattheoutsetconfessedhimselftobe,sopowerfullyaffectedbynature.Thathasbecomeacentraltopicinphilosophy,inpartbecauseofarealizationthatweharmourenvironmentandfromawishtostopdoingso.Ifweaskwhyweshouldchangethemodeofourpresentdealingswithnature,oneansweristhatnaturehasaninstrumentalvalue.Weneedaflourishingenvironmentifwearetoflourish.Buttosomeitseemsthatthisinstrumentalistapproachisafacetofthatanthropocentricselfishnessthathasgotusintothepresentmess.So,too,ifwesaythatwewantnaturepreservedbecauseweenjoyseeingit,thattoo,itwillbesaid,takestoohumanapointofview.Onereactiontothisistoarguethatnaturehasvaluesthatareintrinsictoit,intrinsicinthesensethatevenhadthereneverbeenandweretheretobenohumans,naturewouldstillhavethesevalues.Andwiththatgoestheclaimthatthethingsthathavethesevalues,includingeventhemountainsthemselves,haverightsagainstus.Whateverthecoherenceofthatsuggestionitseemstometohavethedrawbackofmerelyemphasizingthedifferencebetweenusandourvaluesandnatureanditsvalues,thusagainseparatingusfromnature.Moreover,itgivesnoguidanceastohowconflictsbetweenthosevaluesshouldberesolved.Weshouldaskourselveswhynatureexertsoverusthepowerandfascinationthatitdoes.Thatitdoessoatallissimplyareasonforitspreservation,evenifwehavenoideawhyitdoes.Butifweknewwhyitdoeswemightknow,byknowinghowourliveswereboundupinit,whyweneedit.OnefinalareathatImentionasneedingfurtherstudyistherelationbetweenartandmorality.Weneedamuchfulleraccountofthewaysinwhichwhatwebringtoworksofartscanaffectourrelationswiththem,anaccountthatmightleadustoseewhysometimeswethinkthatwhatwebringdisqualifiesusfromsoundjudgement(aswhenthejealousmanapplaudsinthewrongplaceinOthello)andwhysometimesitseemsaprerequisiteforsoundjudgement(asonlyapersonwithmoralsensibilitiescanappreciatejustwhatisgoingonintheworksofGenet).Butweneed,too,afarbetteraccountthanwehaveyetofmoralityitself,ofitsrootsin222\nGUIDETOREADINGtheformativestagesofourindividualities,itsforms,anditsfunctions.Untilwehavethat,wecansaynothingofanyrealforceaboutartandmorality.Afinalword:philosophicalaestheticsowestophilosophyadutytoclarifyourthinkingaboutartandtheaesthetic.Butitowestoartadutynottomisrepresentit.Whetherornotitdoessowilldependonwhetherwhatissaysmatchestheexperiencesthatpeoplehaveofartbeforephilosophyeverthinksaboutthematter.Thosewhoreadthisbookthereforeshouldbringtheirownaestheticexperiences,ofwhateverkind,towhatIhavesaidandaskifthathelpstomakesenseofthem.Ifitevenpartiallydoesthensomeprogresswillhavebeenmade.Anddonotforget,asmyenvoiwillremindyou,thatyourownaestheticexperiences,althoughtheymayseemtoyououtsidethemainstreamofwhatistalkedaboutinacademicbooksaboutaesthetics,maynonethelesshaveavalueandimportance.GuidetoreadingIhavestressedtheneedtolookatthehistoryofaestheticsandmentioned,inparticular,Beardsley’sAestheticsfromclassicalGreecetothepresentday.Ihavetried,invariousoftheguides,tosupplementthatwithreadingonvariousfiguresIhavenotdiscussedinanydetail.Oneortwomorecanbeadded.ThusyoucanmakeupforthepaucityofmycommentsonPlatobyreadingC.Janaway,Imagesofexcellence:Plato’scritiqueofthearts(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995).ThenHegel’sIntroductorylecturesonaesthetics(London:Penguin,1993)issurprisinglyreadable,ifoneispreparedtomaketheeffort.ItisalsoworthreadingF.Schiller,[Letters]Ontheaestheticeducationofman,trans.E.Wilkinson&L.A.Willoughby,(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1989).ThoseinterestedinNietzsche’sspecialcontributioncanberecommendedMichaelTanner’sbriefbutmasterlyNietzsche(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1994)andJ.Young,Nietzsche’sphilosophyofart(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992).ThevariousworksofPaulCrowtherareausefulintroductiontoawidecollectionofconcernsincontemporaryEuropeanaesthetics.Onartandnature,beginwithAllenCarlson“Environmentalaesthetics”intheCooperCompaniontoaesthetics.JaneHowarth’s“Nature’smoods”,BritishJournalofAesthetics,April1995,pp.223\nTHEPOINTOFITALL108–20isaclearandstylishaccountofwhynaturemaybeimportanttous.Wearefortunateinthatacollectionisnowavailable:S.Kemal&I.Gaskell(eds),Landscape,naturalbeautyandthearts(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993).ProfessorHepburn,whoisinthiscollection,hasalsowritten“Contemporaryaestheticsandtheneglectofnaturalbeauty”inBritishanalyticalphilosophy,B.Williams&A.Montefiore(eds)(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1966pp.285–310).Myowntipistoexplorethepossibilitythattherift(ifany)betweenhumansandnaturewillbestbehealedbyadoptingidealistmodelsofknowledgethatundermineanytemptationtoposittheoppositesofdeadandintrinsicallymeaninglessnatureandlivingandmeaning-givingsubjects.Itisnoticeablethatablephilosophersarebeginningtonodtowardsmoreidealistwaysofthought,notablyJ.McDowell,Mindandworld(Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress,1994).IfyoucanignorethesplashinessofSuzyGablik’stheorizingaboutculture,thereismuchoffactualinteresttobelearnedfromherThere-enchantmentofart(London:ThamesandHudson,1991)abouthowartists,suchasAndyGoldsworthy,areseekingdifferentsortsofinvolvementswithnature.224\nEnvoiTherapeoftheHolyMothertoexposeyourassonpaperterrifiessomeanditshould:themoreyouputdownthemoreyouleaveyourselfopentothosewholabelthemselves“critics.”theyareoffendedbytheoutrightanticsofthemaddened.theyprefertheirpoesytobesecretivesoftandnearlyindecipherable.225\nENVOItheirgamehasremainedunmolestedforcenturies.ithasbeenthetempleofthesnobsandthefakers,todisruptthissanctuaryistothemliketheRapeoftheHolyMother.besidesthat,itwouldalsocostthemtheirwivestheirautomobilestheirgirlfriendstheiruniversityjobs.TheAcademicshavemuchtofearandtheywillnotdiewithoutadirtyfight.butwehavelongbeenreadywehavecomefromthealleysandthebarsandthejailswedon’tcarehowtheywritethepoembutweinsistthatthereareothervoicesotherwaysofcreatingotherwaysoflivingthelifeandweintendtobeheardandheardandheardinthisbattleagainstthecenturiesoftheInbredUndeadletitbeknownthat226\nTHERAPEOFTHEHOLYMOTHERwehavearrivedandintendtostay.CharlesBukowskiTherapeoftheholymother,©1990byCharlesBukowski.ReprintedfromSeptugenarianstew:storiesandpoems(courtesyofBlackSparrowPress)227\n\nReferencesBarthes,R.Thedeathoftheauthor.InImage,music,text(London:Fontana,1977).Beardsley,M.Aesthetics(NY:Harcourt,Brace&World,1958).Beardsley,M.Thepossibilityofcriticism(Detroit:WayneStateUniversityPress,1970).Beardsley,M.&W.Wimsatt.Theintentionalfallacy.InOnliteraryintention,D.NewtondeMolina(ed.)(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,1976),pp.1–13.Bell,C.Art(London:Chatto,1920).Benson,J.Emotionandexpression.PhilosophicalReview76,pp.335–57,1967.Bernecker,S.ThelogicalnecessityofworldpicturesinWittgenstein’sOnCertainty.InCultureandvalue,K.Johannessen&T.Nordenstam(eds)(TheAustrianLudwigWittgensteinSociety:KirchbergamWechsel,1995),pp.3–8.Booth,W.Therhetoricoffiction(Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1961).Cage,J.Silence(Cambridge,Massachusetts:TheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnologyPress,1966).Cavell,S.TheavailabilityofWittgenstein’slaterphilosophy.InWittgenstein,G.Pitcher(ed.)(London:Macmillan,1968)pp.151–85.Croce,B.Theaestheticasthescienceofexpressionandofthelinguisticingeneral(trans.C.Lyas)(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992).deSaussure,F.Courseingenerallinguistics(trans.W.Baskin)(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,1959).229\nREFERENCESDerrida,J.Ofgrammatology(Baltimore:TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1976).Derrida,J.Writinganddifference(trans.A.Bass)(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1978).Derrida,J.(1981a)Marginsofphilosophy(trans.A.Bass)(Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1981).Derrida,J.(1981b)Dissemination(London:Athlone,1981).Derrida,J.MemoiresforPauldeMan(NY:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1986).Derrida,J.Ofspirit(trans.G.Bennington&R.Bowlby)(Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1989).Dickie,G.Artandtheaesthetic(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1974).Elliott,R.Poetryandtruth.Analysis27,1966–7,pp.77–85.Elliott,R.Imaginationintheexperienceofart.InPhilosophyandthearts,G.Vesey(ed.)(London:Macmillan,1973).Hepburn,R.W.Arttruthandtheeducationofsubjectivity.JournalofAestheticEducation24(2),1990,pp.185–98.Hirsch,E.D.Validityininterpretation(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1967).Hume,D.Ofthestandardoftaste.InPhilosophyofartandaesthetics,F.Tillman&S.Cahn(eds)(NewYork:HarperandRow,1969).Kant,I.Thecritiqueofjudgement(trans.J.H.Bernard)(NewYork:Hafner,1951).Levinson,J.Definingarthistorically.BritishJournalofAesthetics19,1979,pp.232–50.Lévi-Strauss,C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4230Gombrich,Ernst40,41,56emotions12,22–3,140,180,Goodman,Nelson15,40,41–3,191,197,203expression61,5662–4,65–6,71,81,102fictionGoya48,195,196,197–850–1,191,197graffiti2,6,38epiphanicexperiences66,200,Grayling,A.C.14,15202,203–5Greenaway,Peter135235\nINDEXGround,Ian96institutionofart88,90–6,105,Grunwald54,55,108106Gullace,G.80,131intension99Guyer,P.35,132intentionsofartists135–58,206meaning159–65,171–3,178–Hammond,M.,Howarth,J.&81,185Keat,R.14,131–2internalityofart75–7,80Hanfling,O.15–16,34–5,56,95,intuition67–9,98,101131,185,211,213expressionIseminger,G.15779,81,111Isenberg,Arnold194,212Hanslick,Edvard81Hardy,Thomas8,142,192,203James,Willian24Harrison,C.&Wood,P.16,95,Janaway,C35,223185Jobes,J.212Harvey,W.J.158Johns,CaptW.E.189Hegel,G.W.F.35,68,178,221,Johnson,DrSamuel50,86,155–2236,210Heidegger14,127,221Jones,Peter212Hepburn,Ronald66,199,209,Joyce,James4,146,156212,224,230highart3,10,11–12,60,104Kafka,Franz55,101,193,209,Hindutemples2,90,110210Hirsch,E.D.157,159,164,230Kant,Immanuel23–8,29–32,Honderich,T.1333–5,40;179,221,230Hopkins,J.&Savile,A.57aestheticjudgement115,126,Housman,A.E.152–3129,130expression60,67,Howarth,Jane131–2,22468–9philosophicalaestheticsHughes,Robert16,79,9519,23,33humanism183–4Karsh(photographer)47,48Hume,D.114,131,230Keats,John3,59,73,148,209Humble,P.96Kemal,S&Gaskell,I224Hursthouse,Rosalind56,211Kivy,Peter81Husserl14,180Kollwitz,Kathe54idealistsandidealism68–9,113,Lamarque,P.&Olsen,S.57–8130,224language83–5,87–9,99–100,imagination25–32,44,48,51,122–4,130,153colour17–18,179,193,221truthand84,122–4,130meaning159–morality198,20169,171–6,179,182–3imitation37,38–9,43,44,53–6,langue165,168–9143–50Lawrence,D.H.62,122,141,indeterminacyofmeaning170–149,198,2096,179Leavis,F.R.66,67,142,189,induction118–22,128211infectionofart61,64Lehman,David186inhabitingthework65–6,197–Lennox,Annie38,739,209Levinson,Jerrold81,93–4,95,230236\nINDEXLevi-Strauss,C.166–7,230NathanandDavid196,201–2limitlessnessofplay176,177nature1,2,8–9,12–13,19,24–London,Justin795,222,223–4Kant29–30,33Lyas,C.97,230representation37–58Nazideathcamps54–5,105,109Macdowell,John132necessityofart97,101–2MacAdoo,Nick132Neill,Alex57Magritte54Neill,Alex&Ridley,A15Mahler4,8,124,203NewHumanism212make-believe44,57NewtondeMolina,D.157Malcolm,Norman94,95Nietzsche,F.154,177,221,223,Mamet,David188230Manet43nonrepresentationalart44–5Mapplethorpe,Robert209Norris,Christopher185MarxandMarxists105,212McDowell,John133,224objectivity28,30–1,78,113–33,meaning159–84137,216Melville,H.MobyDick165Olsen,S.57–8meritfeatures119–21openconceptofart85–7,89,95Merleau-Ponty,Maurice14,113,Orsini,G.80131–2,169,180,212,230OrtegayGasset52,56Middleton,David72Owen,Wilfred12,200Miller,Arthur86Miller,Henry144paintings18–19,122–3,130–1,Milton209140,195,203,220expressionmime39,4372–3,75–7,97portraits47Mitchell,Warren39Pankhurst,Sylvia48,109mobiles86–7Parker,David212Moi,T.185–6Parmigiano191Mondrian76parole165,168Monk,Ray94Paton,M.80morality32–3,76,78,116,187–Peetz,D.56213,222–3perceptivity142,147Morgan,Douglas212personalqualityterms141–2,Mothersill,M15143,147–50,157Mozart2,90,103,124,135,198phenomenology14,113Mulhall,Stephen132Phillips,D.Z.211Munch63philosophicalaesthetics6–10,music3,12,20,27,31,38,44–5,14–15,49,79,204,223Kant87children1,18,10119,23,33composers140,152,154philosophicallogic8,49expression63,64,72,74,78,photography45–9,52,5781,101–2,107–8objectivitypianocoveredwithfelt107andsubjectivity122,124,Picasso28,108,195,197–8,209127,128range2,4–5,6,9,Guernica48,195,197Nude10–11truthandmoralitydressingherhair45,46,54,187,194,195,198,201,20372–3,135237\nINDEXPlato173,190,194,209,211,Ridley,A.15,81223representation38,39–40,Riefenstahl,Leni187,19949,52,56,190Rollins,M.95plausibility192–3Rolph,C.H.213plays2,8,39,49–50,119–20,Rorty,Richard105,186145–6,152,195Roth,Philip216–17pleasureandrapture31,34,60Rousseau178poetry4,12,27,115,119,204–7,Rushdie,Salman111,193211,218expression72,74–7,Russell,Bertrand49,67,19198–9,100intentionofauthorRyle,Gilbert181143,151,152–3meaningandlanguage161–2,163,165,Sartre,J.P.14,55,153,155–7,168,172160,230Pole,D.57Savile,A.15,57Pope,Alexander75,198,203Schaper,Eva35,132pornography189,213Schier,F.57poststructuralism159,160,170–Schiller,F.22384,185,212Schopenhauer35powerofart13,20,25,130,190,scientificaesthetics77–8207,218,219–21expressionScruton,Roger14,15,35,47,57,59–61,104,111,219–2168,221representation37–8,43–4,self-deception5152,56,219,221Shakespeare,William90,155–6privacy137–40,142Hamlet75,139,145,190,201projection89,167–9,221KingLear8,49–50,149,210purposelesspurposiveness27Macbeth120MerchantofPutnam,Hilary132,186Venice32Othello20,22,64,126,189,222sonnets26,203,Quinton,A.80212Tamingoftheshrew188,210–11Radford,Colin51,57Shand,John14,35Rand,Ayn200,205Sharpe,R.A.5,105,230rangeofexpression98–100Shaw,G.B.37,54reality28–30,40–3,45,47–9,67Shelley,P.B.148–9reflectionstatements190,194–7Shepherd,A.15religion2,61,66,212Sheppard,Anne56Rembrandt4,5,19,63,90,119,Shusterman,R.14198Sibley,Frank73–4,80,95,115–reportstatements190–325,128,132representation2,12,19,29–30,Sidney,SirPhilip21137–58,87,135expression44,Sim,Stuart173,185,21355–6,66,67–9,97,110KantSimon,Paul1130,33–4powerofart37–8,Sircello,Guy81,13243–4,52,56,219,221truthSkorupski,J.&Knowles,D.57andmorality190–2,195Sontag,S.57resemblance40–4,56Sorrell,Tom16,56,79revelation200–3,205,206–8,SpenserFaerieQueene75212Stachelhaus,H.112238\nINDEXStalin194,195Vesey,G.35Staten,Henry173,184,186,230Stolnitz,J.34Walton,Kendal44,57,193Stoppard,Tom54Walton,Kendal&Tanner,M.Stowe,HarrietBeecher195,199212StraussFourlastsongs72Weitz,Morris85–8,95Strawson,Peter49Wells,H.G.Thetimemachinestructuralism159–61,165–9,192170,184–5Weyl,H.56structuringtheworld23–5Wharton,Edith188Stubbs52Wiggins,David132subjectivity9,30–1,89,113–33,Wilde,Oscar89,135156,208,216expression78,Wilkinson,E.&Willoughby,111L.A.223sufficiencyofart97,98–101Wilkinson,R.79,101,102,111sunsets11,19,29,42,67,88,Williams,Bernard127,132,213101,123truthandmoralityWilliams,Bernard&203,207A.Montefiore224Swift,J.66,74,135,145,189,Wilson,Dover75209Wilson,Edmund138Wimsatt,W.75,159–65,170,Tallis,R.185172,184,229,231artist136–Tanner,Michael212,2237,139,143,150–4,156–7taste11,65–6,72,74–5,114,Winch,Peter95116,121,131windowkickedin70–1,76Taylor,R.16Wittgenstein,Ludwig83–5,87–Thomas,Edward20090,94–5,220–1,231Tilghman,Ben65,71,94,95,96,expression64,65,71,79,101110,231familyresemblance83–5,87–Tillman,F.&Cahn,S.15,34,9,95meaning160,173–4,131180,181truthandmoralityTolstoy,L.2,34,59–66,79,103–203–4,205,206,2074,207,231Wolfe,T.16Tormey,A.81Wollheim,Richard15,95,203,Trotsky,L.121,132218,220,221,231expressiontruth65,78,130,155,157,187–68,71,80,104,106,111213representation43,45,56,57truth-value190,191,194–6Woodfield,R.56Turner29,42,101,203,207Woolf,Virginia43,70,71,202,Twain,Mark209205two-objectargument138,141–2,Wordsworth,W.2–3,59,69,75–143,146–76,165,222Wright,Crispin133understanding25–8,30Urmson,J.O.35Yanal,R.J.95Young,J.223vanGogh110,144239