【政治哲学】政治哲学中的人民、文化和国家

【政治哲学】政治哲学中的人民、文化和国家

\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYqw\nThispageintentionallyleftblank\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYqwPAULGILBERTEDINBURGHUniversityPress\n©PaulGilbert,2000EdinburghUniversityPressLtd22GeorgeSquare,EdinburghTypesetinBembobyPioneerAssociatesLtd,Perthshire,andprintedandboundinGreatBritainbyTheUniversityPress,CambridgeACIPRecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibraryISBN074861091X(paperback)TherightofPaulGilberttobeidentifiedasauthorofthisworkhasbeenassertedinaccordancewiththeCopyright,DesignsandPatentsAct1988.\nCONTENTSqwPrefaceviiIntroduction1PartIConcepts7Chapter1RaceandEthnicity9Chapter2CulturalIdentity32Chapter3Nationality57PartIITheories77Chapter4Cosmopolitanism,ConservatismandLiberalism79Chapter5Communitarianism101Chapter6MarxismandPostmodernism123PartIIIIssues145Chapter7Citizenship,ImmigrationandIndigenousPeoples147Chapter8Multiculturalism167Chapter9Self-determinationandSecession189Conclusion210Index216\nThispageintentionallyleftblank\nPREFACEqwThisbookisintendedasanintroductiontoatopicthathas,inrecentyears,cometotheforefrontofpoliticalphilosophy:howcanethnic,culturalandnationalgroupingsbeaccommodatedintothepoliticalarrangementsofstates?Thebookreflectsmyownattemptstoclearthegroundforthinkingaboutthesehighlychargedproblemsinacoolandorderlyway.Perhapsinevitably,giventhetimesinwhichwelive,ithasturnedoutmorepolemicalandimpatientthanIanticipated;thoughthiswill,Ihope,provokereadersasmuchasitmayexasperatethem.AsalwaysIamindebtedtoinnumerablefriendsandcolleaguesatHullandelsewherewhohavestimulatedordisciplinedmyownreflections.Iamespeciallygrateful,however,toMatthewFestensteinandKathleenLennonfortheirvaluablecommentsonthebookindraft.Mythanks,too,tomyeditors,JaneFeoreandNicolaCarr,mycopyeditorAnnaClaybourne,andtoChrisCoulsonforpreparingthemanuscriptforpublication.Unlessthecontextindicatesotherwise,‘he’and‘she’areusedthroughoutthisbookwithoutanyspecificimplicationsastogender.vii\nThispageintentionallyleftblank\nINTRODUCTIONqwPoliticalphilosophyreflectsitsowntimes.SincetheSecondWorldWarthesehave,untilrecently,beendominatedbyaColdWarwhichhadtwoeffectsonthephilosophicalagenda.Thefirstwastofocusattentiononwhatconstitutesajustsocialorder;isitonemodelledonsocialistprinciplesoronethatembodiessomeversionofliberaldemocracy?Inansweringthisquestiontheindividualisusuallyunproblematicallyconceivedofassimplyanundifferentiatedmemberofthesocialorder,albeitoneoccupyingdifferentpossiblesocialpositionswithinit.Politicalarrangementsaretobejudgedonwhetherornotthewaytheyservetheinterestsofindividualssoconceivedsecuresjustice.ThesecondandindirecteffectoftheColdWarwas,inlargemeasure,tooccludequestionsaboutthelegitimacyofstates,forthepracticaleffectofraisingthequestionofwhetherexistingstatescorrespondedappropriatelytothepeopleswithinthemwastothreatenthefragilebalanceofpowerwhichpreventedtheColdWarfromeruptingintopotentiallycatastrophichostilities.Thesocietiesthejusticeofwhosearrangementswasdebatedwere,then,forthemostpartsimplyassumedtobesocietiescorrespondingtoestablishedstates.AllthishaschangedwiththeendoftheColdWar.First,thecollapseofsocialiststatesleavesliberaldemocracieschallenged,notfromwithintheirownculturaltraditions,asMarxismchallengedthem,butfromwithout,byradicallydifferentsocialformationssuchasIslamiccommunitiesoraboriginalgroups.Politicalarrangementsarethenjudgedbywhethertheyadequatelyrecogniseandsupportthese1\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYalternativesocialformations,whichmayhavetheirownstandardsofjustice.Whatarrangementscandealsatisfactorilywithsuchdiffer-ences?Thesecondchangeisthatthedestabilisationofinternationalpowerrelationsallowsthelegitimacyofstateboundariestobecalledintoquestionandnationalistmovementstoflourish.Whatsocialgroupingsdohaveagoodclaimtotheirownstates?Thesequestionsareamongtheprincipalconcernsofcontemporarypoliticalphilosophy.1Theyreflect,indifferentways,theissueofhowcertainsortsofsocialidentityarerelevanttopolitics.Theyarenotquestionsthatcanbestraightforwardlydealtwithintermsoftheinterestsoftheundifferentiatedindividualsofearlierpoliticaltheory,fortheydealpreciselywiththepoliticallyrelevantwaysinwhichcitizensorpotentialcitizensaredifferentiatedonefromanother.Theydealwithwhathascometobeknownas‘thepoliticsofdifference’.2Whatsortsofsocialidentityarerelevanthere?Thepoliticsofdiffer-encehasbeentakentocomprisethepoliticsconsequentuponclaimsarisingfromawholevarietyofdifferences–ofgender,sexualityorphysicalcapacityaswellasofrace,ethnicity,cultureornationality.Hereweshallbeconcernedonlywithidentitiesofthelattersorts.Wecancharacterisetheseasidentitiesrelevanttoclassifyingtheirbearersaspeoples.Theformersortsofidentitydonotsocharacterisethem;forapeopleconstitutesormightconstituteacomplete,continuingsocietywithitsowninternaldifferencesofgenderandsoforth.Manykindsofpoliticalquestionariseconcerninghowdifferentpeoples,howeverconceived,aretobetreated.Theseincludeimportantquestionsaboutthedistributionofresourcesand,inparticular,aboutwhatmeasurescanadequatelypreventdiscriminationwhichresultsinunfairdistributions.Theyinclude,too,questionsabouthowthepubliccultureofastate,notablyitseducationsystem,canaccommo-datedifferencesbetweenthepeopleswhomaycompriseitscitizens.Bothtypesofquestionraisephilosophicalissues,buttheyarenotwhatweareprimarilyconcernedwithhere.Ratherweshalllookatsomeissuesarisingfromathirdrangeofquestions,whichconcernwhatpoliticalarrangementsareappropriateinthelightofthefactthatindividualscanbeconceivedof,andcanconceiveofthemselves,asconstitutingvariousdistinctpeoples.Suchquestionsconcern,ontheonehand,clearlyconstitutionalmatterssuchaswheretheboundariesofstatesshouldbedrawnintermsoftheirpopulations.Ontheother,theyconcernmatterslessexplicitlyconstitutionalbutnonethelessaffectingtheverygeneralpoliticalcharacterofastate,suchaswhetherand,ifso,inwhatwaysthestaterecognisesvariousconstituentpeoples,2\nINTRODUCTIONeitherasformingpoliticalgroupsorascontributingdifferentiallytotheidentitiesofcitizensassubjectsofthelaw:doesit,forexample,recog-nisecertainspecificlanguages–andifso,how?–ordoesitmerelypermitcertainindividualrightsinrelationtounspecifiedlanguages?Bothofthesegroupsofmattersraisefundamentalphilosophicalquestions.Thefirstraises,inparticular,thequestionofthelegitimacyofastatetoconstitutethepoliticalorganisationofthepeopleorpeopleswithinitsboundaries,andacorollaryquestion,therightofpeoplestosetuptheirownseparatestate.Thesequestionsareevi-dentlyalsoquestionsaboutwhatformsofgovernmentarejustandwhatsortsoffreedompeoplecanreasonablyenjoy–andissuesregardingsuchfreedomsariseevenwhenthelegitimacyofastate,inastrictlyconstitutionalsense,isnotunderchallenge,asinthesecondsortofpoliticalmattersketchedabove.Itiswhetherpeoplearebeingtreatedjustlyinthepoliticalarrangementsthataremadeforthem,andwhethertheycanenjoyfromsucharrangementsthefreedomtowhichtheyareentitled,thatconcernsuswhenweaskhowtheirdifferentcollectiveidentitiesshouldbereflectedinthewaytheyaretreatedasmembersofastate.Doesitslegalsystem,forexample,treatculturalminoritiesfairlyandallowthemthefreedomsthatmembersofthedominantculturehave?Questionsoflegitimacy,justiceandfreedomare,ofcourse,thestaplesofpoliticalphilosophy:legitimacybecauseitisnecessaryifcitizensaretoacknowledgepoliticalobligationstothestateratherthansimplybecoerced;justicebecauseitiswhatcitizenslooktothestatetoprovide,ratherthanorderbasedpurelyonrepression;andfreedombecausewhatmakesoneacitizenofastate,ratherthanaslave,isthatoneenjoysafullmeasureoffreedomfromthedictatesofothers.Thereare,thatistosay,constitutivelinksbetweencitizenshipofastateandthelegitimacy,justiceandfreedomatwhichthestateshouldaim.Allthisissowhateverculturallyspecificconceptionsoflegitimacy,justiceandfreedomparticulargroupsofpeoplemayenter-tain,assumingthattheylooktoamodernstatefortheirgovernance.Theassumptionthattheydosois,however,forthemostpartjustifiedbythefacts;sowearenotalreadystartingoffonthewrongfootintreatingquestionsoflegitimacy,justiceandfreedomasfundamentaltoourdiscussionofthepoliticalarrangementsappropriatetodifferentpeoples.Nordoesouremploymentofthesenotionsneedtodemandmorethanthebarestunderstandingofwhattheyamountto.Anyricherconceptionwillneedtobedefendedtothosetowhomarrangementsembodyingitaretobeapplied.3\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYThislastpointillustratesamoregeneralone.Weneedtobecon-cernednotonlywithwhatmayseemtobeappropriatepoliticalarrangementstothoseinapositiontocontrolthem,butalsowiththereceptionsucharrangementswillencounterfromthosetowhomtheyareapplied.Forexample,inassessingwhethersomesetofpoliticalarrangementstreatssomeculturalgroupfairlyorisoppressivetothem,weshouldaimtoputourselvesintotheshoesofthegovernedaswellasintothoseofthegovernors,withwhompoliticalphilosophersoftentooreadilyidentify.Thisinitselfwillmakeusmoresensitivetopossibleclashesbetweentheculturalstandpointsofeachparty.For,althoughwecannotavoidtakingupsomespecificstandpointindeter-mining,say,whethersomepoliticalarrangementsarejust,toimposearrangements,howeverjusttheyarethemselves,mayitselfbe,byanybody’sstandards,unjust.Thisisinmanycasesacauseofresentmentandagroundforpoliticalclaims.Itisimportanttobearinmindwhetheragivenphilosophicalapproachtocollectiveidentitycansupportawayofsuccessfullynegotiatingthisproblem.Thereisafurthercorollaryofthispointconcerningtheviewpointfromwhichpoliticalarrangementsshouldbeassessed.Itisthatthenotionofasharedidentitywhichcreatesapeoplecanitselfbetakeneitherasoneimputedtothembyothersorasonewhichtheyclaimforthemselves.Evidentlypoliticalarrangementsbasedonanidentitywhichpeopledonotacknowledgemaybethecauseofgrievance.Yet,equally,arrangementswhichreflectedaquitemisguidedclaimtosharedidentitywouldbeopentocriticism.Inthefirstpartofthebookweshalllookatanumberofdifferentkindsofcollectiveidentity;some,likerace,areimputed;others,likeethnicity,involveself-identification;whileyetothers,suchasculturalornationalidentity,maybetreatedintheonewayortheother.Ouraiminthefirstthreechapterswillbetoclarifytheseconceptionsofidentityandindicateinverygeneraltermshowtheymightbearonpoliticalarrangements.Thethreechaptersinthesecondpartofthebookinvestigatephilosophicaltheoriesofpoliticalorganisationandtheroleofthecit-izen.MostimportantamongtheseforcontemporaryAnglo-Americanpoliticalphilosophyareliberalismandcommunitarianism.Therearedifferentvarietiesofthese,eachwithitsdistinctiveaccountofhowthecollectiveidentitiesdeemedrelevantcanbeaccommodatedintoasuitablesetofpoliticalarrangements.OntheContinent,however,andwhereidentityisstudiedwithinaframeworkofculturalstudiesratherthanofphilosophymorenarrowlyconceived,Marxistandpost-modernistapproacheshavebeeninfluential.Whythisshouldbeand4\nINTRODUCTIONwhattheycanofferbywayofacritiqueofliberalismandcommuni-tarianismareexploredinthefinalchapterofthispartofthebook.Thethirdandfinalpartaimstobringtogethersomeofthematerialintheothertwoinordertoaddressthreetopicsofcurrentconcern.Thefirstisthequestionofwhoisentitledtocitizenshipofastate,and,inparticular,whatrestrictionscanfairlybeimposedonimmigrationleadingtocitizenship.Thesecondishowpeopleofdifferentcultures,whetherindigenousorimmigrant,canbestlivetogetherwithinthesamestate:whatpoliticalarrangementsareconducivetothis?Thethirdconcernsthepointatwhichpeoplewhocannotordonotwishtolivetogetherarejustifiedinsecedingfromthestateandformingaseparateone.Noneatanswersemergefromthesediscussions,andthebook’sconclusioncounselsagainstexpectingthem.Mostofthetheoriesbroughttobearhavebeendevisedforsocialandpoliticalcircumstanceswidelydifferentfromthoseofthepresentday,inpar-ticularonesinwhichpeopleidentifiedthemselvesandeachotherdifferentlyfromthewaysthatnowtheydo.Yethowpeopleidentifythemselvesisitselfpartlyaproductofphilosophicaltheories.Politicalphilosophydoesnotonlyreflectitsowntimes–itchangesthem.NOTES1.SeeforexampleW.Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship(Oxford:OUP,1995)andD.Miller,OnNationality(Oxford:OUP,1995)–workswhichhavesettheagendaformuchrecentpoliticaltheory.2.SeeforexampleI.M.Young,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton:PrincetonUP,1990).5\nThispageintentionallyleftblank\nPARTIqwConcepts\nThispageintentionallyleftblank\n1RACEANDETHNICITYqwRACIALCATEGORIESInHeartofDarknessJosephConradarticulates,thoughnotwithoutauthorialironyattheexpenseofhisEnglishnarrator,Marlow,acertainstereotypeofAfricans:Suddenly,aswestruggledroundabendtherewouldbeaglimpseofrushwalls,ofpeakedgrass-roofs,aburstofyells,awhirlofblacklimbs,amassofhandsclapping,offeetstamping,ofbodiesswaying,ofeyesrollingunderthedroopofheavyandmotionlessfoliage.Thesteamertoiledalongslowlyontheedgeofablackandincomprehensiblefrenzy.1ThestereotypeisaracialoneinthatAfricansarecategorisedasraciallydistinctfromConrad’sEuropeantravellersintwointimatelyconnectedways.Theydifferinappearanceandinbehaviour.Theformercomesintoprominencebecauseofthelatter–‘awhirlofblacklimbs’–andthelatterisperceivedasdifferentbecause‘incomprehensible’:whethertheAfricans,asMarlowgoesontoreflect,were‘cursingus,prayingtous,welcomingus–whocouldtell?’Itisanincomprehensionwhichresultsfromtheirbeinglocated–thatistosayfromtheEuropeanslocatingthem–inadifferentsocialworld.Yet,andthisiscrucial,theywerenotinhuman...Theyhowledandleaped,andspun,andmadehorridfaces;butwhatthrilledyouwasthethoughtof9\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYtheirhumanity–likeyours–thethoughtofyourremotekinshipwiththiswildandpassionateuproar.2Raceasacategoryisawayofclassifyinghumanbeings,andfromthiscommonhumanityMarlowmovesontoderiveasubversivethoughtabouttheirbehaviour:‘adimsuspicionoftherebeingameaninginitwhichyou–yousoremotefromthenightofthefirstages–couldcomprehend’.Itisasubversivethoughtbecauseitsuggeststhatthereis,infact,anoptionofparticipationintheAfrican’ssocialworld,anoptionwhichtheEuropeanshaverejectedquitedeliberately.3Race,then,isawayofclassifyingpeopleintermsofsimilaritiesanddifferencesindicatedbyappearanceandrevealedinbehaviourwhicharedeemedrelevanttosocialrelationswiththem,and,whatismore,similaritiesanddifferenceswhicharethemselvesconceivedofasunchangeableandconferredbybirth.Racialdescriptionisaformofsocialcategorisation,4thatistosay,itembodiesamodeofclassificationarrivedatbyclassifiersactingasobserversofthosetheyclassifyandclassifyingthemintermsindependentofanythatthoseclassifiedmightusetoclassifythemselves.Moreparticularlyitclassifiesthemas,inoneimportantsenseoftheword,peoples,markedoutandmain-tainedassuchbyreproductivelytransmittedphysicalcharacteristicsandtheirlongstandingbehaviouralconcomitants.Itisaspeoplesthusdistinguishedthatdifferentiatedsocialrelationshipswiththemandpoliticalarrangementsforthemaredeemedappropriate.Peoples,howevertheyareclassified,areboundedcollectionsoffolk,inthesensethatnoonecanbeamemberoftwodistinctpeopleswithinthesameclassificatorysystem.Thusnooneisdeemedbothblackandwhite,mixedraceclassificationsrequiringanaugmentationofracialcategories,ratherthantheacknowledgementofdualmember-ship.Linguisticcategoriesarenotboundedinthissense,sincepeoplecanspeakmorethanonetongue,sothatlanguagespeakingpersecannotmarkoutdistinctpeoples.Peoplesare,furthermore,generallyassumedtobesystemicallybounded,(though,asweshallsee,itisnotalwaysclearwhatthisassumptionrestsupon).Thatistosay,itisassumedeveryoneisamemberofsomepeopleorother,sothatthisclassificationofthemformsacomprehensivesystem.Racialclassifi-cationisanobviousexample.Geographicallocation,bycontrast,doesnotalwaysgiverisetosystemicallyboundedcollectionsofpeople,sincenoteveryoneislocatedsomewhereinapermanentway.Nomadicpeoples,forexample,maytravelwidelyandotherpeoplesmayhavemigratedordispersed.Thisisnottosay,ofcourse,that10\nRACEANDETHNICITYpeoplesthuspickedoutindependentlyoftheirlocationaretherebybeingcategorisedracially.Racialcategorisationisonlyonewayofclassifyingpeoplesamongothers,eachwithitsownsystem.Isthere,though,anyprincipledwayofcategorisingpeopleracially?Onetheoryisthatracesarebiologicalcategories,analogous–orevenequivalent–tobiologicalspecies.Themodernnotionofracecorrespondstotheriseofscientifictaxonomyintheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,andinthatperiodavarietyoftheoriesofthebiologicalnatureofraceswerepropounded.5Theyincludethecon-flictingviewsthatraceswereactuallyseparatespecies(polygenesis)orthesame(monogenesis),thisquestionturninginpartuponthevia-bilityofinter-racialreproductiveunion.6Itisotiosetoobservethat,forobviousreasons,monogenesisprevailed,butthisdidnotsettlethequestionofwhethertherearesignificantbiologicaldifferencesbetweenso-calledracesandbiologicalsimilaritieswithinthem.Butonlyiftherearewouldtherebeanystrongreasontosupposethatthesuperficialfeaturesofappearanceorbehaviouronthebasisofwhichracesareidentifiedarenon-contingentlylinkedtodifferencesofcapacityordisposition.Onlyiftherearedifferencesincapacityordis-position,however,wouldtherebeaprimafaciecasefortakingfeaturesofappearanceorbehaviourasrelevanttothesocialrelationsbetweenraces.Theshortansweristhattherearenosignificantbiologicaldiffer-ences.Ofcourse,skincolour,totakeanobviousexampleofafeatureusedtodiscriminateraces,dependsonunderlyinggeneticfactors.Butthereisnogoodevidencethatthemechanismsresponsibleforskincolourhaveanyeffecton,say,intellectualcapacityoremotionalten-dencies.Skincolourindicatesnosignificantunderlyingcharacteristicsatall,andthisisborneoutbythefactthat‘black’people,commonlythoughtofasconstitutingasinglerace,displayenormousgeneticvariety,indicatingthelackofanyunifyingfactorofwhichtheircolourissomehowindicative.Geneticdifferencesbetweenmembersofthesameracialcategorycanbegreaterthantheaveragedifferencebetweenmembersofdifferentraces.7Clearlytherearepopulationswhichdivergefromeachothergeneticallyasaresultofavarietyoffactors–mutation,geographicisolationandsoforth.Nodoubtthesepopulationscanoftenbediscriminatedonthebasisofappearance.Butthereseemstobenoprincipledwayofclassifyingthemintoraces,andnogroundforthinkingthatsuchclassificationsrevealsignificantbiologicaldifferences.Thisisnottheplacetopursueadiscussionofbiologicalcategories.11\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYThepointisthatwhileraceshaveevidentlybeenthoughttobebiologicalcategoriesthebeliefsinvolvedherearelargelyfalse.Canwesimplyconcludethattherearenoraces,putthebeliefinthemdowntobadscience,andleavethematteratthat?THESOCIALCONSTRUCTIONOFRACEUnfortunatelywecannotjustjettisonrace.Itisunderstandablethat‘thereis,’asSarupreports,‘loudlaughterwheneverItellblackaudiencesthatracedoesnotexist.’8Thereasonforthisisthatsocialcategorisa-tioninracialtermscontinuestogoondespitethefactthatthescienceatonetimeusedtojustifyithasbeendiscredited.Raceexistsasanentrenchedcategoryofsocialdifferentiationwhichanyoneisabletoapply.Butshouldthey?Mightitnotbearguedthatinviewofitsdependenceonadiscreditedscience,racialcategorisationshouldbeabandonedanditsuseabjuredinsocialdescriptionandpoliticaltheorising?Thisisinmanywaysanattractiveposition.RobertMileshasadvocatedit,arguingthatracialcategorisationinvolvesanideologyofracism,9whereanideologyistakentobeasetofbeliefswhichprovidesaninaccuraterepresentationoftheworld.Whatisneeded,heargues,is,ontheonehand,anexplanationofhowthisideologycomestobegeneratedandreproduced,and,ontheother,anaccuratepictureoftheworldtowhichitisapplied.Thiswillinvolvemodesofclassificationotherthanthoseofrace.Thereare,however,anumberofproblemswiththisapproach.First,itisfarfromclearthatthosewhodeployracialcategorisationsneces-sarilyneedtopossessthefalsebiologicalbeliefsbrieflyexposedabove.Allthattheyneeddoisapplytheconceptof‘black’orwhateverintheusualway.Whatmaymaketheirthinkingracistisnotthattherearenonaturalkindspickedoutbysuchconcepts,butratherthattheyapplytheconceptsinawaywhichinvolvesthedifferentsocialtreatmentofthosecategorisedasraciallydistinct.Suchdifferentialtreatmentandhencethecategorisationswhichsupportitcanpersistafteraparticularsetofbeliefs,forexamplescientificones,hasbeenabandoned.Arguablythisisalreadyhappeninginthecaseofrace,withthebiologicalunderpinningsofthecategorygivingwaytosupposedlymorerespectableculturalones,10yetwithoutmarkedchangesinthewaythecategoryisappliedorinthesocialdifferentiationarisingfromit.Second,itisanillusiontosupposethatwecandescribethework-ingsofsocietywithoutemployingtheconceptsthatsocialactors12\nRACEANDETHNICITYthemselvesuse,flawedasthesemaybe.Indeedthesuggestionthatweshoulddispensewithracialcategoriesinordertocounterraciallybasedsocialdifferentiationisself-defeating.Forwemustuseracialcategoriesinordertodescribethesocialdifferentiationtheyinvolve.Thereisnoreasontothinkthatwecancapturethecategorieswhosemembersaretreateddifferentiallyinanyotherterms.TheassumptionthatMilesmakesisthattheonlyconceptsthatareproperlyemployablearethosewhichpickoutkindsofthinginawayindependentoftheconcernsofthesocialactorswhodeploythem:theypickkindsoutintermsoftheiressences.Perhapssomeconcepts,especiallythoseofscience,arelikethis.Butthereisnoreasontothinkthatthesortsofconceptcharacteristicallyemployedinsocialdescriptionareofthissort.Thereisnoreason,thatistosay,forustobeessentialistsaboutsuchconcepts,andthusaboutracialcategories.Thesecategoriesarenotdiscovered;theyaredrawnforparticularsocialpurposes.Andifwedissociateourselvesfromracistpurposes,asMilesrightlyurgesustodo,thenewcategorieswemaydeployarenottobethoughtofasnecessarilydifferentinkindfromthosehewishesustoabandon.Theytooare,wemaysay,sociallyconstructed.Thenotionthatrace,likemanyothercategoriesofsocialdescrip-tion,issociallyconstructedisnowwidelyaccepted.Itisimportant,however,tobeclearexactlywhatisinvolvedinthisclaim.Thedifficultyisthatdifferenttheoristsusethenotiondifferently,sothatanelementofstipulationisunavoidable.Socialconstruction,asIusethetermhere,occurswhenanitemisidentifiedthroughasociallymotivatedpracticeofclassification,whichtherewouldbenoreasontosoiden-tifyhadsuchapracticenotbeenadopted.Itiseasytoseethattoregardtheiteminquestionasthussociallyconstructedistoabjureanessentialistviewofit,foritispreciselytodenythatthereisareasonforidentifyingitintermsofthedisclosureofitsessence.Now,giventhatracialcategoriesdonotdiscloseessences,itisplausibletosupposethatraceissociallyconstructed,sincethissuppositionallowsustoconnectthefeaturesbywhichracesarepickedoutwiththepracticesofsocialdifferentiationthatdependupontheiridentification.But,whereasunderessentialismthesepracticesareexplainedintermsofbeliefs,trueorfalse,aboutraces,undersocialconstructionismthefactthatbeliefsaboutracesareavailableatallistobeexplainedintermsofthemotivesforengaginginthesepractices.Therearetwopointsitisnecessarytonoteabouttheclaimthatraceisasocialconstructionassounderstood.Thefirstisthatitdoesnotimplythepropositiontouchedonabovethatracedoesnotexist.13\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYAlthoughsomesocialconstructionistshavewantedtotreatallsociallyconstructeditemsthewaywetreat,say,witches,andconsignthemtotherealmoffictions,themerefactofconstructiondoesnothavethisconsequence.11Witchesdonotexistbecause,toputitcrudely,theconceptofawitchisthatofonewithmagicalpowers,andnospaceexistsinthecausalrealmfortheoperationofsuchpowers.Therearenosimilartightlinkagesbetweentheconceptofraceandouronto-logicalbeliefs.Theremaybeapointtoassertingthatracedoesnotexist,either,aswehaveseen,tochallengeabiologicalviewofitortodenyitsethicalrelevancetosocialtreatment,butthereisalsoadanger:namelythatofoverlookingtherolerace–andnotsomesurrogateforit–playsinsocialrelations.Andinthatcaseweneglectthenatureofandreasonsforthesocialconstructionofrace.12Thesecondpointtonoteisthat,ontheunderstandingofsocialconstructionismherepresented,itdoesnotfollowthatraceisonlyasoldasisitssocialconstruction.If,asweshallsee,itsconstructionisarelativelyrecentphenomenonitdoesnotfollowthatraceitselfis.Whetheritiswillbeaquiteseparatequestiondependinguponthewayraceisconstructed;andinfactitissoconstructedthatwewanttobeabletotalkabouttheexistenceofracesinthepast,eveniftheirexistencewentunrecognisedanddidnotprovideabasisforthesamesortsofsocialdifferentiationasitdoesinmoderntimes.Anotherwayofputtingthispointistosaythatcertainsocialcategories,likerace,canbesociallyconstructedwithoutthefactsaboutthembeingsocialfacts–thatistosay,factsthatexistonlywithinthecontextofcertainsocialpractices.13Factsaboutracearenotsocialfacts,becauseraceisaformofsocialcategorisationthatpickspeopleoutnotintermsoftheirplacewithinsocialrelationsbutintermsofpropertiesindepen-dentof,thoughsupposedlyrelevantto,suchrelations,forexampleputativelybiologicalones.What,weneedtoask,isthenatureofracialcategorisationandhowdoesitcomeabout?RACISMNeedlesstosaythereareavarietyofdifferentanswerstotheseques-tions,partlyasaresultofdifferencesinwhatracismistakentoinvolve.Foritisracism–thetreatmentofpeopledifferentlyonaccountoftheirrace–whichconstitutesthesocialpracticeunderlyingthesocialconstructionofrace.Whatisrequiredforracismonthisunderstanding?WasConradhimselfforexample,astheNigeriannovelistChinuaAchebedescribeshim,a‘bloodyracist’?14ForarguablytheAfricansin14\nRACEANDETHNICITYHeartofDarknessarepresentedasdifferentinawaythatwouldmakeitsimplynotpossibletotreatthemasEuropeanstreateachother.Wemustremember,ofcourse,thattheyarepresentedthroughtheeyesofConrad’snarratorMarlow,buteventhroughhiseyesitisdoubtfulthattheyarepresentedasdifferentbecauseoftheirrace.CulturaldifferenceinthetribesalongtheCongoiscertainlysignalled,butwhenindi-vidualAfricansaremetwiththeyareclearlyshownasthebrutalisedvictimsofcolonisation,inawaythatcallstomindthewordsofDrLivingstone:InreferencetothestatusoftheAfricansamongthenationsoftheearth,wehaveseennothingtojustifythenotionthattheyareofadifferent‘breed’or‘species’fromthemostcivilised.TheAfricanisamanwitheveryattributeofhumankind.CenturiesofbarbarismhavehadthesamedeterioratingeffectsonAfricans,asPritcharddescribesthemtohavehadoncertainoftheIrishwhoweredrivensomegenerationsback,tothehillsinUlsterandConnaught.15Indeed,itisagainstthedifferentialtreatmentofAfricansonracialgroundsthatConrad’sbookwaswritten,followinghisownjourneyuptheCongointothecolonyrunforthepersonalbenefitofKingLeopoldIIofBelgium.ThehorrificcrueltiespractisedinthiscolonywerejustifiedonthegroundsofthesupposedracialdifferenceofblackAfricansby,ironically,Livingstone’srescuer,H.M.Stanley.TheywerebeingexposedatthetimeofpublicationofHeartofDarkness,andConrad’smessageisofapiecewiththisexposure.Itis,inTerryEagleton’swords,that‘WesterncivilisationisatbaseasbarbarousasAfricansociety’.16Thisisnotamessagethatsupportsachargeofracism,howeverpessimisticallyunfittedtoopposecolonialismitmaybeandhoweverquestionableitsrepresentationsofAfricansare.Whatsortoftreatment,then,doesconstituteracism?Theanswerwhichimmediatelycomestomindisthatracistsmakepeopleofanotherracetheobjectofaversionandevenhatred.Suchfeelingsof‘aversiveracism’17areheldtoexplainthedifferentialtreat-mentofmembersofotherraceswhichmanifestsitselfinsocialseparation.Butthis,thoughundoubtedlyaformofracism,isnottheonlyform,sinceitunderestimatestheextentofracismeveninsophis-ticatedliberalsocietieswheresuchfeelingsaredisavowed.18Aversiveracismmaybedistinguishedfrom‘dominativeracism’whichmanifestsitself,instead,inpracticeslikesystematicexploitationandevenslavery.Butthisagainmayseemtoonarrowtocoverallcases,pervasiveasit15\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYis,foritfailstocoverracismtowardsaneconomicallyorsociallysupe-riorgroup.Ithasbeensuggestedinsteadthatwhatiscommontoallracismisexclusion,19whetherfromthesociallifeofothers,asinapartheid,orfromtheirpositionsofeconomicorsocialadvantage,asinracialexploitation.Thedifficultieswiththisaccount,however,arefirstlythatitseemstoowide,and,secondlythatitseemstoaddlittletothefactofsocialdifferentiation,theracistnatureofwhichisbeingscrutinised,exceptperhapsthatthedifferentiationinquestionisunfavourabletothosedeemedraciallydifferent.Maybethereislittleelsetoadd,andraceisacategorywhichsupposedlylicencesanindeterminatevarietyofunfavourabletreatments,andcanbecalledintoplaytojustifyanindefiniterangeofsocialexclusions.Ifthisissothenitisunlikelythatanysingleexplanationofracismwillbeforthcoming.Yetitisworthglancingatsomeexplanatorytheories,sincetheyatleastbringoutwhatdiversesortsoffactormightbeinvolvedintheconstructionofrace,andthushowasinglecategorycanserveavarietyofsocialpurposes.Oneclassoftheoriesstressestheeconomicbenefitstoparticulargroupsofasystemofracialcategori-sationwhichenablesthemtodominateorexploitothersintheirowninterest.TheoriesofthissortmaytakeanexplicitlyMarxistviewofraceasaninstrumentforcapitalistexploitation.20Supportforsuchviewsisdrawnfromthefactthatworking-classpeoplehaveoftenbeenconceptualisedasraciallydifferentfromtheirsocialsuperiors,asinVictorianBritain.21OtherviewsmayfastenmorespecificallyuponWesternimperialismasresponsibleforracialcategorisation.CharlesMills,forexample,arguesthatthecategoryofnon-whiteracialtypewasconstructedatthebeginningofthecolonialperiodtolegitimisethetreatmentofcolonisedsubjectsasmorallyandpoliticallyinferiorsub-persons.Theyareconceivedofasin,orcloseto,astateofnaturebut,unlikewhites,asconstitutionallyincapableoffullyleavingittoenterpoliticalsocietythroughasocialcontract.Thustheyareexcludedfromfullparticipationinapoliticsfoundedupona‘racialcontract’madebetweenwhitesandareplacedunderwhitehegemony,in,forexample,thecolonialregimesaboutwhichConradwrote.Thishegemonycontinuestoday,afteritsfoundingprinciplesandcolonialmanifestationshavebeenformallydisavowed.22InarelatedviewKenanMalikarguesthatracialcategorisationarisesasawayofrationalisingthepersistenceofsocialinequalities–asexemplifiedinslaveryandcolonialrule–againsttheparadoxicalbackgroundofanEnlightenmentbeliefinuniversalhumanequality.23ClearlysuchinequalitiesaretothecontinuingadvantageofEuropeansandparticularlyEuropean16\nRACEANDETHNICITYelites,andthisexplainsthepersistence,throughconceptualreshaping,ofracialcategories.Theoriesliketheseseedominationastheprincipalpurposeofracialcategorisationandseektolocatespecificbeneficiariesasresponsibleforit.AcontrastingtypeoftheorydrawsontheworkofMichelFoucault24toviewraceasonecategoryamongmanyotherswherebypeoplearesubjectedtoadisciplinaryregimeinwhichthepowertocontrolthemstems,notmainlyfromcoercion,butfromthedeploymentofadiscoursewhichrationalisessystematictechniquesforsuchcontrol.Accordingtothistypeofview,thetaxonomiesoftheEnlightenment,likethatofrace,arethemselvesinstrumentsofdisciplinarypower,theorderthatresultsfromtheirapplicationbeingitsmanifestation.DavidGoldbergtakestheEnlightenmentprojectitself,then,toexplaintheconstructionofrace.25Althoughtherearebeneficiariesthereisnogeneralanswertothequestionofhowtheybenefitandnopossibilityofseeingracialcategorisationasmerelyaninstrumentfashionedfortheiradvantage.Inthisvein,however,theroleofthestatemaybeemphasisedasinstitutionalisingracialcategoriestoachievestabilityandincreasestatepower.Yetwhatracialcategoriesareinstitutionalisedisfluidandcontingentuponcircumstances.Forexample,asaresultofcomplexsocio-politicalcausesthecategoryofMulattoofficiallydisap-pearedintheUSAintheearlytwentiethcentury.26AnewcategoryofHispanichasrecentlyarisentounderminetheresultingbipartiteblack/whiteclassificatorysystem.Suchfactspointtothedependenceofsuchsystems,foralltheirepistemologicalpretensions,uponthechangingrequirementsforthemaintenanceofpower.Thereis,asIsuggestedearlier,noreasontoassumethatthepoweremployedintheconstructionofraceshouldtakeonesingleform,orthattheprocessesinvolvedshouldbeuniform:perhapsaMarxistexplanationmaysometimesbeappropriate,sometimesaFoucauldianone,andsome-timesneither.27GROUPIDENTITIESWehavedeferredtillnowanobjectiontotheemploymentofracialcategorieswhichwillhavesuggesteditselftomanyreaders.Itisthatracialcategorisationiswrongbecauseitisappliedtopeopleindepen-dentlyofthewaythattheythinkaboutthemselves.Conrad’sMarlow,forinstance,obliteratesthedifferenttribalidentitiesoftheAfricansheobservesincategorisingthemallas‘black’.Thecategoryof‘Hispanics’intheUSA,totakeacontemporaryexample,comprisespeoplefrom17\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYMexico,PuertoRicoandCubawhomaythinkofthemselvesintermsofthesediverseorigins,notassharinganycommonracialcharacter,especiallysincetheinhabitantsofthesecountriesarethemselvesraciallycategorisableasAmerindian,Mulattoandsoforth.Racialcategoriesareconstructedbygroupssufficientlypowerful,withrespecttotheintellectualandinstitutionalcontrolofsuchcategorisations,todeter-minetowhatcategoriesothersareassignedinwaysthathaveradicaleffectsupontheirlivesandoverwhichtheyhavenocontrol.That,itisobjected,istheprincipalandoriginalinfringementoffreedominvolvedinracialcategorisation.Thisobjectionenablesustodrawavitaldistinctionbetweensocialcategorisation,asinvolvedintheconceptofrace,andgroupidentifi-cation.28Thelatterconsistsinpeopleclassifyingthemselvesasbelongingtogetherinvirtueoftheirsharedcharacteristicssothattheymaybesaidtoconstituteasocialgroup.Thusasocialgroup,properlyspeaking,isindividuatedintermsofitsmembers’wayofclassifyingthemselves,whileacategoryisindividuatedintermsofaclassificationemployedbyothers.Asocialgroupis,then,inacertainsenseself-conscious:itisacollectionofpeopleacknowledgingtheircommonmembership,abletorecogniseothermembersandtomarkthemofffromnon-members.Nothingstrongerthanthisisnecessarilyintended:nothing,forexample,bywayofinternalcohesionorstructure.Nonetheless,agroupismorethanmerelyacollectionofpeopleabletoapplyanother’scategorisationofthemtothemselves.Theiracknowledgementofcommonmembershipcomestomorethanthis,thoughexactlyhowisasubtlequestion.Whatwecansayisthateveniftheclassifica-tioninvolvedisborrowedfromothersitmustbemadethegroup’sown,inthesensethatitfunctionsjustasifthegrouphaddeviseditsownclassification.Toputthisdifferently:ifweassumethatgroups,likesocialcategories,aresociallyconstructed(which,asweshallsee,ishighlyplausible),themembersofagroupmustperceivethemselvestobeinvolvedinitsconstruction.Forthefactthattheyplayapartindetermininghowaclassificationistobeapplieddifferentiatesasocialgroupfromthesimplecaseofsocialcategorisation,wheretheydonot.Itwillnowbeevidentthatthoughwehavetreatedraceassimplyasocialcategoryitsstatuscan,insomecircumstances,beambiguous.Peoplewhoarecategorisedas‘black’byothersmayidentifythemselvesas‘black’andtherebyformasocialgroup.Theprocessesofgroupidentificationconsequentuponsuchracialcategorisationareinstructive.Thosecategorisedtogetherwillbetreatedsimilarlyandtherecogni-tionofthiscanleadtoanacknowledgementofsomethingincommon18\nRACEANDETHNICITYbywayofsharedexperience,interestsandsoforth.If,asislikely,theexperienceisofoppressioninsomeformandtheinterestisinremovingit,thenthebasisonwhichthegroupmembersareoppressed–namelyrace–willbethatwhichtheyseeascollectingthemtogetherintoagroup.29Consciousnessofthiskind–‘blackconsciousness’,forexample–maybeanecessaryconditionforeffectivecollectiveactionagainstoppression.Thisprovidesafurtherobjectiontothedenialoftheexistenceofracediscussedearlier:forsuchadenialmayalsoobstructtheverygroupformationthatisnecessarytocombattheinjusticesconsequentuponracialcategorisation.How,though,canacategorylike‘blackness’,whichisusedtorelegateitsmemberstoaninferiorposition,beusedbythemasanacceptablecriterionofgroupidentification?Clearlyarejectionoftheassump-tionsusedtojustifytheirrelegationisrequired,anddifferentformsof‘blackconsciousness’,forexample,canindifferentcircumstancesproceedtobuildgroupidentificationbyappealtodifferentfeaturesof‘black’experience.Négritudewasaculturalmovementinitiatedwiththisintentioninthe1930sbytheMartinicanpoetAiméCésaire.30ItsaimwastoopposetheEuropeanpictureofblackpeopleasuncivilisedandtorecoverforthemanAfricanculture,which,themovement’sproponentsbelieved,wouldrevealanessentialAfricannessinwhichblackpeoplecouldunitewithpride.Thismodelof‘blackconscious-ness’,whichmanifesteditselfpoliticallyinPan-Africanism,hasbeenopposedrecentlyby,forexample,KwameAnthonyAppiah,onaccountofitsessentialism,whichledtoafancifullyhomogenisedpresentationofAfricanculture.Appiahholdsthat:theveryinventionofAfrica(assomethingmorethanageo-graphicalentity)mustbeunderstood,ultimately,asanoutgrowthofEuropeanracialism;thenotionofPan-AfricanismwasfoundedonthenotionoftheAfrican,whichinturnwasfoundednotonanygenuineculturalcommonality,butontheveryEuropeanconceptoftheNegro...Simplyput,theoverdeterminedcourseofculturalnationalisminAfricahasbeentomakerealtheimag-inaryidentitiestowhichEuropehassubjectedus.31PaulGilroy,whoconcursinthesecriticisms,hasofferedanalternativepicture,whichaims,forpoliticalreasons,topreserve‘blackconscious-ness’buttogroundgroupidentificationin‘black’people’scommonculturalresponsetotheexperienceofslavery,aresponsethatisopentodevelopmentinthelightoftheircontinuingoppression.32SophisticatedasGilroy’saccountis,however,arguablyitistobepreferredto19\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYCésaire’sonlybecauseitisitselfaresponsetoquitedifferenthistoricalcircumstancesfromthecolonialonesthatCésairefaced,sothattheessentialistcategoriesofcolonialismarenolongerrelevanttoshapingblackconsciousness.Ifthisissoitillustrateshowavarietyofsupposedlysharedcharacteristicscancontributetoidentificationwithasimilarlygroundedgroup.Whatisrequiredisthatthesecharacteristicsbeonesvaluedbythegroup,evenifthefeatureswhichbindthegroup,suchasracialones,arenot.Notallsocialcategorisationleadstogroupidentificationbecauseitmaynotleadtosimilaritiesofexperiencewithincategorialbound-aries.TheelaboratesystemsofracialcategorisationinBrazilandotherpartsofSouthAmerica,whichreflectthevariablemixofpeopleofAmerindian,EuropeanandAfricanoriginsdonot,byandlarge,giverisetoself-consciousraciallydistinctgroupssince,althoughraciallydistinguishedindividualsaretreateddifferently,therearewidevariationsofsocialexperiencewithinracialcategoriesandlittlesegregation.Wheregroupidentificationcananddoes,bycontrast,runalongraciallines,membersofone’sowngrouparenotseenasthemembersofanotherare.Theirappearanceandbehaviourarenotattendedto,eveniftheyarethebasisforgroupidentification,fortheirappearanceandbehaviourareseenassimilarandfamiliar.Thereactionsoffellowmemberstooneselfreciprocatetheseattitudes,sothatoneis,sotospeak,drawnintothegroup,notexcludedfromit,andalongwiththisgoesthemakingofassumptionsaboutsharedexperience,interestsandsoforthwhichgiverisetogroupidentification.Itshouldnotbethoughthoweverthatthefactthatagroupisconstitutedbyitsmembers’self-identificationsimpliesthatmember-shipofthegroupisoptional.Ifpeople’sfreedomisinfringedbyafailuretoacknowledgetheirowngroupidentifications,thenthisisnotbecausetheseidentificationsnecessarilyreflectthewayinwhichtheychooseasindividualstogroupthemselves.Somegroupsmayhavethisoptionalcharacter,butotherswillbeconstructed,justassocialcategoriesare,inawaythatleavesnochoiceastomembership:ifIhavethequalifyingcharacteristicsthenIshallbedeemedamemberwilly-nilly.Thatthiscanhappendepends,ofcourse,uponthepowerofthegroupasawhole.Sufficientdisinclinationonthepartofindi-vidualstobearitsnamemayunderminethatpowerandchangethecharacterofthegroupordestroyitutterly.Butthisfactdoesnothingtoshowthatmembershipisoptionalallalong.Itraisesthequestion,inconsequence,ofwhatsortoffreedomisinfringedbysocialcategori-sationifapparentlysimilarprocessesofclassificationofsomeindividuals20\nRACEANDETHNICITYbyotherscanbeinvolvedingroupidentification.Theanswermustlieintheclaimsofpeoplecollectivelytodeterminethewaytheyclassifythemselves.Thequestionofwhatsortsofgroupscanmountsuchclaimsandwhattheirpoliticalramificationsarewillpreoccupyusinthenexttwoandahalfchapters.ETHNICITYWearenowinapositiontointroduceanotionofcentralimportancetothesubjectmatterofthisbook–ethnicity.Itisanotion,weshouldnotice,ofwhichdifferentaccountshavebeengiven.Someolderthe-orists33distinguishethnicityfromracesimplyonthegroundsthatethnicityinvolvesculturalratherthanphysicaldifferentiation.Inneithercaseisgroupidentificationheldtoberequired,sothatso-called‘ethnicgroups’arenotnecessarilygroups,aswehavebeenunderstandingtheterm,ratherthancategories.Mostrecenttheorists,however,followingMaxWeber,34takeethnicgroupstorequiregroupidentification.Manydonot,however,takethemtobegroupswherethereneedsbeactualcommonkinshipbetweenthemembers,againfollowingWeberinholdingthatonlyabeliefincommondescentisnecessary.Thisseemsindangerofconfusingtwoconditions:thefirst,whichissurelynecessaryforethnicityasordinarilyunderstood,isthatmembershipofanethnicgroupistransmittedbybirth;thesecond,whichisnot,isthatmem-bersshouldsharesomecommonbiologicalorigin.Recenttheoristsalsotendtoagreewitholderonesinmakingcultureanindividuatingfeature.This,asweshallsee,ispotentiallymisleading.Wecanperhapsagreethatethnicidentificationisfocuseduponapresumedcommonculture.Thatiswhatwesawinthecasesof‘blackconsciousness’discussedintheprecedingsection.Butinthesecasesitisrace,notculture,thatactuallyindividuatesthesocialgroupssoformed.Itwouldbeundulyrestrictivetoruleoutsuchgroupsasthesefromtheclassofethnicgroups.Indeeditseemsthatbecauseethnicity,unlikerace,requiresgroupidentificationitispreferabletocallthemethnicratherthanracialgroups.Ethnicity,understoodasmembershipofasuitablysizedsocialgrouptransmittedbybirth,providesaquitedifferentcriterionfortheexistenceofapeoplefromrace,sinceanethnicgroup,unlikearacialcategory,hastobeapeopleintheeyesofitsownmembers,notjustintheeyesofothers.Thiscreatessomedoubtastowhetherwearejustifiedinsupposingthatethnicgroupsaresystemicallybounded,aspeoplesaregenerallyassumedtobe.Forthereseemsasyetnoreasontosuppose21\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYthateveryoneshouldidentifythemselvesasmembersofethnicgroups,notjustbecausesomeindividualsareignorantoftheirmembership,butbecausenotallsocietiesmayprovideforgroupidentificationalongethniclines.Insome,peoplemightidentifythemselvesquitedifferently,sothatethnicgroupsdonotformacomprehensivesystem.Therecanbenodoubtingthefact,however,thatagreatmanypeopledoidentifythemselvesasmembersofethnicgroups,andthequestionarisesastowhatisinvolvedinthis.Anethnicgrouphasanameforitself–indeedthisisoftenviewedasanecessaryconditionofitsexistence35–andthisfactprovidesstrongevidencethatethnicgroupsaresociallyconstructedand,furthermore,sociallyconstructedbytheirmembers.Itwouldbeimplausibletosupposethatpeoplesimplynoticesomefeaturethattheyshared,acommonculturesay,andonthatbasisappliedanametothemselvesquiteindependentlyofitformingpartofsomesociallymotivatedpracticeofclassification.Manywaysofdrawingethnicboundarieswillbepossiblegiventhesortsofsimilarityneighbouringpeopleswillshareandthedifferencesthatwillexistwithinanypeople.Whichonesareselectedtodelimittheethnicgroupissociallymotivated,inthesensethatitdependsuponthepreferencesofitsmembersaboutwithwhomtheyshouldthinkofthemselvesassharinggroupmembershipandthecommonnamethatgoeswithit.WhetherHispanics,totakeanexamplementionedearlier,aretothinkofthemselvesasconstitutingasingleethnicgroupdependsuponwhethertheircommonlanguageistakenasabondwhichoutweighsdifferencesofcultureandexperience.AparticularlyinfluentialsocialconstructionistaccountofethnicityhasbeenthatoftheanthropologistFredrikBarth.36Barthwishestoemphasisethepointthatwhatisconstructedintheformationormaintenanceofanethnicgroupisaboundarybetweenmembersofthegroupandothers.Therequirementthatmembershipberecognisableassuchimpliesthatnon-membersshouldalsoberecognisableassuch.Onemechanisminvolvedhereisthesocialcategorisationofothersoutsidethegroup,although,sincetheformationofonegroupisnotcommonlyaprocesscarriedoninisolationfromthatofothers,thedeterminationofboundariesbetweengroupswillusuallybeamattertransactedbetweenthem.37Somegroupswillbeinmorepowerfulpositionstocontroltheprocessthanothers.A‘black’ethnicity,forexample,wouldhavebeeninconceivablewithouttheracialcategori-sationthatexcluded‘black’peoplefromEuropeanethnicgroups.WhatBarthwishestostress,however,isthatitistheboundariessodeterminedwhicharecrucialtotheidentityoftheethnicgroup22\nRACEANDETHNICITYratherthanthecommoncharacteristics–the‘culturalstuff’ashecallsit–whichgroupidentificationfocuseson.Theseculturalcharacteristicscanchangeovertime,asinthedevelopingconceptionsofblackcul-tureunderpinningacontinuingblackethnicitywhichwediscussedearlier;ortheycanvary,astheconceptionsheldbydifferentmembersofthegroupmayvary.38Itisthislastpointconcerningthemutabilityandvariabilityofanethnicgroup’s‘culturalstuff’thatdemonstrateswhyitismisleadingtoviewethnicgroupsasindividuatedbytheircultures.Weneedtolookinsteadatthescopeofthegroup,whichmayinrealitybedeterminedbyotherfactors,sothatacommoncultureservesasafocusforgroupidentificationratherthanbeingwhatgeneratestheboundariesofthegroup.Insomecasesthesemaybefixedastheextentofcertainsocialrelationships,thoughitisimportantnottoinflatewhatpeoplewithacommonethnicityhaveincommon.Agroupisnotnecessarilyacommunityinanyofthemanysensesofthisterm,andanethnicgroupneednotinvolveanyprivilegedsocialrelationships.Itmay,forinstance,existasagroupevenwhenitsmembersarewidelydispersedamongothergroupssothatsuchrelationshipsareimpossibleeventhoughgroupidentificationpersistsandthegroupisreproduced,per-hapsexogamously.Itis,furthermore,importanttonoticethatethnicdistinctionsmayexistwithincommunities:communities,atleastintheweaksenseofcollectionsofpeoplemarkedoffbysocialrelationshipswithinthemthatdonotextendbeyond,obviouslyneednotcoincidewithethnicgroups,and,asweshallsee,communitiesinthestrongersenseofpeoplepossessingacommonpurposeandmutualconcernneednoteither.Thekindsofargumenttheremaybeforrecognisingethnicgroupsinpoliticalarrangementsare,therefore,differentfromthoseforrecognisingcommunities.PRIMORDIALISMANDINSTRUMENTALISMToassertthatethnicgroupsaresocialconstructions,maintainedbytheirmembers’actsofgroupidentification,doesnotsettleadisputewhichhasagitatedtheoristsforseveraldecades,namelythatbetweenso-calledprimordialistsandthosevariouslyreferredtoasmodernists,situationalists,orinstrumentalists.Theplethoraoftermsforthoseononesideofthedebatesuggests,asweshallshortlyverify,considerableambiguityastowhatisatissuebetweentheparties.Butwecantake,fornow,Jenkins’sdefinitionofaprimordialistasonewhobelievesthatethnicityis‘afundamental,primordialaspectofhumanexistenceand23\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYself-consciousness,essentiallyunchangingandunchangeable’.39Ifprimordialismistruethenitfollowsimmediatelythatethnicgroupsdoformacomprehensivesystem.Forthenpeopleeverywhereandalwayswillidentifythemselvesethnically,whetherthisistheresultofsomesocio-biologicalimperative40or,inGeertz’swords,of‘the“givens”...ofsocialexistence’,41suchasloyaltytokin.Withoutprimordialisminoneofitsformsthereis,asindicatedearlier,noobviousreasontosupposethatethnicgroupsdoformasystemofpeoples.Itshouldbeevidentthatitiswrongtosuppose,however,asmanytheoristsdo,42thatprimordialismcontrastswithsocialconstructionism.Ifanethnicgroupisidentifiedonlythroughasociallymotivatedprac-ticeofclassificationthenthisisquitecompatiblewiththatkindofpracticeitselfbeinganunchangingfeatureofhumanlife,motivatedbysomefundamentalhumandrivesforgroupidentificationoftheappropriatekind.Whatmayhavesuggestedotherwiseisthatwhileracecanpre-existitsconstructionasacategory,ethnicgroupscannot,sincetheprocessesofself-identificationwhichconstructthemarealsothosewhichbringthemintoexistenceassocialentities.Butprimor-dialistsneedonlydenythemodernityofthistypeofidentification,whileinsistingonitsnecessityforindividuatingpeoplesasethnicgroups,torebutthechargeofessentialism.However,itisnecessarytounpackthevariouscontraststhatcanbedrawnbetweenprimordialismanditsopponents.Wehavejustnoticedone–thecontrastwithmodernism,whichistheviewthatcertainsortsofpeople,andhereethnicgroups,areaspecificallymod-ernphenomenon:‘anewword’–ethnicity–‘reflectsanewreality.’43Accordingtothisviewitisanillusiontosupposethatthesamesocialformsaretimeless,asConrad’sMarlowforexampledoes,ashetellshistraveloguebytheThamesandreflects,‘darknesswashereyesterday’44–likeningtheinhabitantsofpre-RomantimestothoseoftheCongonearlytwomillennialater.Onemodernistargumentis,instead,thatethnicityisgeneratedbyamodernformofidentificationthatresultseitherfromthebreakdownoftraditionalhierarchiesthatconferredidentitiesonpeople45orfrom‘thedifficultproblemsthatarisefromhavingtolivewithdifference’46–asituationproducedbymodernpopulationmovements.Theprocessesinvolvedinethnicgroupidentificationseem,however,torequirenomodernrootlessnessordislocationtobeintelligible.Adistinctkindofmodernistargumentholdsthatitisonlyinthemodernperiodthatethnicgroupswithhereditarymembershipappear,asforexamplethe‘tribes’recognisedandpartlycreatedbycolonialistswithracialassumptionsabouthuman24\nRACEANDETHNICITYgroupings.47Priortothis,analogoussocialgroupspermittedmorefluidmembershipwithpossibilitiesforvoluntaryreclassification.Thisisamoreplausiblestory.Wedonotneedtoacceptitsdetailstorecognisetheneedtolookatthespecificsituationinwhicheachethnicgroupisconstructedratherthantoassumeablanketstorylikeprimordialism.Situationalism,so-called,maybethoughtofasamoregeneraltheorythanmodernism,holdingonlythatethnicityisnotaconstantaspectofsociallifebutafeaturethatitpresentsinsomesituationsandnotothers.Situationalismisoftenequatedwithinstrumentalism,48thatistosaywiththeviewthatethnicgroupsareformedandmaintainedtoserveparticularsocialends,principallyeconomicandpoliticalones,sothatunlesspeopleareinasituationinwhichethnicitywillservesuchendsitwillnotbeappealedtoingroupformation;otherkindsofsocialgroupings,self-consciousclassessay,maybecreatedinstead.Butwhatexactlydoesinstrumentalismcontrastwithwhenitisopposedtoprimordialism?Onesuggestionisthat‘theprimordialistviewoftheethnie[thatis,theethnicgroup]wouldbethatitexistslargelyforitsownsake’,49ratherthanforsomefurtherends.Presumablythismeansthatgroupmembersidentifythemselvesassuchbecausetheyfindtheexistenceofgroupmembershipvaluableinitself,andnotjustforsomeadditionalbenefitswhichitbringsthem.Yetitishardtoseewhythisdistinctionbetweendifferentsortsofsocialmotivationforethnicidentificationshouldgoalongwiththedistinctionbetweenanunchangingfeatureoflifeandanhistoricallycontextualisedone.Apossiblereasondrawsonthesuggestionthatinstrumentalistsneglectthe‘overpoweringemotionalandnon-rationalquality’ofethnicbonds,whichare‘recur-rentandlargelyinexplicable’.50ButnotonlyhasJenkinsrightlypointedoutthat‘thereisnonecessarycontradictionbetweeninstru-mentalmanipulation,andsentiment’,51italsoseemsthatemotionsmayexplainindividualattachmenttothegroupwhiletheendsitservesmakeplainthegroup’scharacterandboundaries.Primordialistsandinstrumentalistshereappeartopasseachotherbyinactuallyexplainingdifferentphenomena.Asimilarsituationconcernstheclaimthatpri-mordialattachmentsaregiven,notadoptedfortacticalreasons.Arguablythissimplyspellsoutthenatureofethnicmembershipwhich,aswehaveseen,isgivenratherthanchosen.Itneedcontradictnoinstrumentalistexplanationoftheshapeoftheethnicgroupscom-mandingsuchattachments.Again,thegivennessofethnicmembership,whichconcernsthelimitationsonindividualchoiceintheformation25\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYofsocialidentity,needsdistinguishingfromtheclaimthatwhatethnicgroupstherearemustbetreatedasgiven,assomehowinexplicable.Itisonlythelatterthatinstrumentalistsneedtodeny.WhatIsuggest,then,isthatprimordialismisbestunderstoodasholdingboththatethnicityisarecurrentfeatureofhumansocialorganisationindependentoftheparticularcircumstancespeoplearein,andthatitdrawsondeep-seatedhumanattachments.Situationalists–includingmodernists–denythefirst,holdingthatethnicityisinvokedonlyincertainsituations.Buttheydonotneedtodenythesecond.Instrumentalistsneeddenyneither,holdingonlythatwhichethnicityisinvokedistobeexplainedintermsoftheendsitsinvoca-tionserves.Onthisunderstandingtheprimordialist/instrumentalistcontrastpositsafalsedichotomy,thoughitisworthnotingthatifprimordialismisrejectedthenaresorttoinstrumentalismisattractive,forthephenomenonofethnicitycanthenbeexplainedonacase-by-casebasis.Conversely,ifitcanbesoexplained,thenthegeneralitiesofprimordialismarelikelytoseemotiose.Thedebateisindeedanintellectualmire,withthedisputantsoftenatcross-purposesandinvariablyoversimplifyingthevarietyofpossiblepositionsonbothsides.Beforeweleave,however,weshouldnoteonelastpairofdistinctionswhoseimportancewillemergeonlylater.Instrumentalistsareoftenaccusedofhavinganover-rationalistic,means/endsviewoftheconstructionofethnicity.52Yet,itmaybeclaimed,peopledonotconsciouslyshapetheirethnicgroups.Rathertheyunconsciouslydosothroughidentifyingwithotherswhosharetheirexperienceoflife.Aninstrumentalistcanaccepttheimportanceofunconsciousprocessesandstillgoontoaskwhatpurposesareservedbysuchidentifications.Theconscious/unconsciousdistinctionisrelatedtoanother,betweenindividuallyandcollectivelycontrolledconstructions.Instrumentalistsneednotthinkofanethnicgroupascreatedbyanumberofindividualswithcommoninterestswhochoosetopursuethemthroughtheformationormaintenanceofsuchagroup.Instrumentalistscan,instead,takethepurposesservedbytheconstructionofthegrouptobethoseofthegroupasawhole(oratleastofsomedominantpartofit)sothatthereisnoreasontothinkthatindividualmemberscouldformulateandpursuethem.And,furthermore,thepurposestheydoavowmaybeself-deceptive.Theexploitativeendsofagroup–ofConrad’swhitecolonists,say–arenotredeemedbyavowalsofhigherpurposes.26\nRACEANDETHNICITYPOLITICALRECOGNITIONOFETHNICGROUPSThedebateoverprimordialismandinstrumentalismisrelevanttothequestionofwhetherethnicgroupsassuchhaveaclaimtosomesortofpoliticalrecognition–anissuetowhich,indifferentformsandapplications,weshallbereturningthroughoutthisbook.Wecanseenow,however,thatprimordialismcreatesapresumptioninfavourofrecognitionwhichinstrumentalismdoesnot.Forifethnicgroupsreallyarebasicunitsofsocialorganisationandtheobjectsofdeepattachmentswhichensuretheircontinuity,thenpoliticalarrangementswhichignorethemarelikelytoproveineffectual.Thereseemsnoreasontothinkthatthisformofsocialorganisationhasstrongerpoliticalclaimsthananyotherwithouttheprimordialistassumptions,which,itmustbenoted,donotconfersuperiorvalueonsuchaform,merelysupe-riorviability.Ifthefactualbasisofprimordialismisdisputed,thentheethicalstandingofethnicityasaprincipleofpoliticalorganisationmaybecalledintoquestion.Sincethisprincipleislikelytoinvolvethesocialcategorisationandexclusionofothers,itmaybethoughtthatitsdangersareatleastasprominentasitsadvantagesinprovidinganexusforsocialattachment.Forwithouttheassumptionsofpri-mordialismwecanalwaysaskwhysuchattachments,valuableastheymaybe,shouldbedirecteduponethnicgroupsratherthanuponsomeothersort.Aninstrumentalistaccountofethnicgroups,which,Ihavesuggested,ishighlyplausibleinexplainingtheirspecificformsanddevelopment,focusesattentionupontheparticularpurposesservedbythem.Inthatcaseweshallassesstheclaimsofindividualethnicgroupsinthelightoftheirethicalcharacterasrevealedbythesepurposes.How,though,arewetoclassifysuchpurposesinordertoarriveatanethicalassess-mentofthegroupswhichhavethem?Althoughnodoubtinalmostallcasestheidentificationswhichformonegroupandthosewhichformanotherwillhaveamutualimpact,wecanusefullyoversimplifymattersbydistinguishingethnicgroupswhichlargelyexistindepen-dentlyofthesocialcategorisationsthatothersmakeofthem,andthosewhichexistlargelybyvirtueofsuchcategorisations–byvirtue,wemaysay,ofthegroup’sreactiontothem.Letusstart,then,byconsideringcategorisation-independentor,asIshallcallthem,non-reactivegroups.Non-reactiveethnicgroupsmayexistforawidevarietyofreasons,notallofwhichareofanyethicalrelevance.Wecanveryroughlydistinguishtwokindsofcase:groupsconstitutedbya27\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYcommoninterest,fairlynarrowlyconceived,andgroupsconstitutedbyacommonculture.Thelatter,tobeinvestigatedmorefullyinthenextchapter,involveethnicgroupidentificationforreasonsofcommonlanguage,customsandsoon,whichwillnodoubtshowupmoresharplybycontrastwiththedifferentlanguagesandcustomsofothers.Thereasonsforgroupformationinthesecircumstancesmust,however,involvemorethanmereboundarymarking:forexample,thedesireforrichersocialrelationshipswithco-culturalists–thedesire,tousethenotiontobedevelopedlater,toformnotonlyagroupbutacommu-nity.Yetwhiletherelationshipsenteredintooftrust,reciprocityandsoforth,mayhaveanethicallyfavourablecharacter,otherpeoplewill,ofnecessity,beexcludedfromthem.Andthismayormaynotbeethicallyjustifiable.Thecaseforpoliticalrecognitionmayturnonwhetheritis.Thiscanbeseenmoreclearlybylookingatethnicgroupsconsti-tutedbycommoninterests.Herewecandistinguishbetweeninterestsmemberssharebyvirtueoftheenvironmenttheyandonlytheyfindthemselvesin,andtheintereststheyshareincontrastwiththeinter-estsofothersinthesameenvironment.Intheformercase,othersintheenvironmentarenotexcludedandthisethicallyfavourableaspectofthecommunitythegroupmayformcountsinfavourofgrouprecognition.Inthelattercase,therearesomecommoninterestswhosepursuitclearlymilitatesagainstrecognition.Anethnicgroupformed,forexample,todominateothers,asincolonialcontexts,scarcelyhasagoodclaim,howeveradmirableitsinternalrelationships.ThewhitesoftheAmericansouthernstatesformed,perhaps,inthisposition,asAllenhasargued,53a‘whiterace’(inourtermsawhiteethnicgroup),bringingtogethertheotherwiseconflictinginterestsofvariouswhitepeopleinordertosustaintheinstitutionofblackslavery.Othersharedinterestswhichexcludeothersmaynothavesuchamorallyrepugnantcharacter,buttheyshouldstillbeviewedwithscepticismasgroundingaclaimforethnicgrouprecognition.Ifwelookbycontrastatreactiveethnicgroupswecanviewtheirformationinmanycasesasattemptstorightthewrongsby,forexample,dominativegroups;andthuswecanviewthemashavingagoodclaimtorecognition,whichfurtherstheirchanceofsuccess.This,however,itmaybeobjected,isanundesirablyadhocresponse.Itaddressesitselftothequestionofwhatrightsshouldbeaccordedtogroupsgiventhecircumstancestheyfindthemselvesin,nottothequestionofwhatrightstheyhaveinvirtueofbeingethnicgroups.Wewillhavecauselatertoseewhatargumenttheremightbeforrecognisingethnic28\nRACEANDETHNICITYgroupswhetherornottheyareactuallybeingdominated(or,forthatmatter,inadominantposition).Fornow,though,wemaynoticesomevarietiesofreactiveinterest-basedethnicgroups,recallingthedifferencesbetweentypesofwrongbroughtaboutthroughsocialcat-egorisationwhichweobservedindiscussingracism.Anti-dominativeethnicgroupsmaybebroughttogetheraroundresistanceeithertoinjustice,causedbyexploitationsay,ortothedenialoffreedom,asinslavery,colonialruleormoresubtleattacksuponautonomy.Anti-aversivegroupsmaybeseenasunitedinresistancetothedenialofrespect,ortothelackoffreedomtoentersocialrelationshipswithanothergroupwhicharisesfromthedenialofrespect.Wemaynote,however,thatanethnicgroupcanbeculture-ratherthaninterest-basedandyetbereactive.Forasocialcategorisationthatfailstoacknowledgeculturaldistinctivenessmayitselftriggergroupidentificationthatfocusesonpreciselythisdistinctiveness.Thisexpressesademandforrecognition,thoughthatsuchrecognitionshouldbeaccordeddoesnotfollowsimplyfromthefactsasstated.Itdepends,asmentionedearlier,onaconsiderationofthekindofculture-basedgroupthatresultsfromthem.Thisisasperilousasitisunavoidable,asisillustratedbythewayConrad’scolonistsblurovertheethnicdis-tinctivenessofthedifferentAfricantribesalongtheCongobecausetheyseesimplysomethinguniformlyunworthyofmoralconsideration.AgainstthisintoleranceandunimaginativenessConradsubversivelydiscernsculturalcontinuitiesbetweenpeopleswhichshouldleadustotreattheclaimsofotherstoequalrecognitionwithsympathy.Inthenextchapterweshallinvestigatewhatsuchculturally-basedclaimsarefoundedon.NOTES1.JosephConrad,HeartofDarkness[1902](Harmondsworth:Penguin,1994),p.51.2.Ibid.pp.51–2.3.AnoptionthatthecolonistKurtz,towhosestationMarlowistravelling,hastakenupbygoingnative.4.Cp.R.Jenkins,RethinkingEthnicity(London:Sage,1997),pp.22–3.5.SeeM.Banton,RacialTheories(Cambridge:CUP,1998),chs2–4.6.SeeR.Young,ColonialDesire(London:Routledge,1995),p.9.7.SeeS.Jones,InTheBlood(London:Flamingo,1996),ch.4.8.M.Sarup,EducationandtheIdeologiesofRacism(Stoke-on-Trent:Trentham,1991),p.18.9.RobertMiles,Racism(London:Routledge,1989).29\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY10.SeeK.Malik,TheMeaningofRace(London:Macmillan,1996),ch.6.11.Cp.E.Stein,‘Conclusion’,inE.Stein(ed.),FormsofDesire(NewYork:Garland,1990),pp.341–2.12.SeeL.M.Alcoff,‘Philosophyandracialidentity’,RadicalPhilosophy75(1996),pp.5–14.13.SeeJ.Searle,TheConstructionofSocialReality(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1995),p.26.14.QuotedinAniaLoomba,Colonialism/Postcolonialism(London:Routledge,1998),p.93.15.QuotedinM.E.Chamberlain,TheScrambleforAfrica(Harlow:Longmans,1974),p.104.16.TerryEagleton,CriticismandIdeology(London:Verso,1976),p.135.17.TheclassificationderivesfromJoelKovel:seeI.M.Young,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton:PrincetonUP,1990),pp.141–2.18.SeeD.T.Goldberg,RacialSubjects(London:Routledge,1997),p.23.19.SeeD.T.Goldberg,RacistCulture(Oxford:Blackwell,1993),ch.5.20.ForexampleO.C.Cox,Caste,ClassandRace(NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress,1948).21.SeeMalik,MeaningofRace,pp.91–100;Jones,IntheBlood,pp.173–7.22.CharlesMills,TheRacialContract(Ithaca:CornellUP,1997).23.Malik,MeaningofRace,ch.2.24.SeeChapter6ofthepresentwork.25.Goldberg,RacistCulture.26.SeeP.Starr,‘Socialcategoriesandclaimsintheliberalstate’,inM.DouglasandD.Hull(eds),HowClassificationWorks(Edinburgh:EdinburghUP,1992),pp.162–3.27.Theobjectiontoracismimpliedinthissectionisthatdifferentialtreat-mentisbasedonethicallyirrelevantgrounds.Thepoliticalissuesarisingfromthisarethosethatconcernhowsuchtreatmentshouldbecounter-acted–byaffirmativeaction,forexample.But,sincetheseissuesdonotconcernpoliticalarrangementsasweareunderstandingthemhere,theyarenottakenupinthisbook.28.SeeJenkins,RethinkingEthnicity,p.23.29.SeeIrisMarionYoung’saccountoftherelationbetweenoppressionandsocialgroups,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference,ch.2.Ifpeopleareoppressedonthegroundsoftheir(inherited)membershipofaracialcat-egorythentheywillformanethnicgroup,asIgoontousethisnotion.30.SeeG.R.Coulthard,RaceandColourinCaribbeanLiterature(Oxford:OUP,1962).31.KwameAnthonyAppiah,‘OutofAfrica:Typologiesofnativism’,YaleJournalofCriticism2(1988),p.164.SeealsoAppiah,InMyFather’sHouse(NewYork:OUP,1992).32.SeePaulGilroy,TheBlackAtlantic(London:Verso,1993).33.ForexampleJ.Rex,RaceandEthnicity(MiltonKeynes:OpenUP,1986),ch.2.30\nRACEANDETHNICITY34.SeeM.Weber,‘Theoriginofethnicgroups’inJ.HutchinsonandA.Smith(eds),Ethnicity(Oxford:OUP,1996),pp.35–40.35.ForexampleA.Smith,NationalIdentity(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1991),p.21.36.SeeF.Barth,‘Ethnicgroupsandboundaries’,inHutchinsonandSmith,Ethnicity,pp.75–82.37.SeeR.Jenkins’SocialIdentity(London:Routledge,1996),ch.10.38.AsinthevariedculturalcharacteristicsregardedascrucialtoUlsterProtestantidentitydiscussedbyA.P.CoheninTheSymbolicConstructionofCommunity(London:Routledge,1989),pp.56–7.39.Jenkins,RethinkingEthnicity,p.44.40.ForexampleP.vandenBerghe,TheEthnicPhenomenon(NewYork:Elsevier,1979).41.C.Geertz,TheInterpretationofCultures(London:Fontana,1973),p.259.42.ForexampleC.Calhoun,Nationalism(Buckingham:OpenUP,1997),p.30;T.K.Oommen,Citizenship,NationalityandEthnicity(Cambridge:Polity,1997),p.37.43.N.GlazerandD.P.Moynihan(eds),Ethnicity:TheoryandExperience(Cambridge,Mass:HarvardUP,1975),p.5.AnthonySmithcontrastsmodernismwith‘perennialism’–theviewthatsocialgroupsofsometypeprovidethe‘essentialbuildingblocksofanyconceivableneworder’.SeeAnthonySmith,NationsandNationalisminaGlobalEra(Cambridge:Polity,1995),p.5.Primordialismthen,infact,explainsperennialism.44.Conrad,HeartofDarkness,p.8.45.SeeA.Giddens,ModernityandSelf-Identity(Cambridge:Polity,1991).46.S.Hall,‘Ourmongrelselves’,NewStatesmanandSociety,19June1992,p.6.47.SeeT.Ranger,‘TheinventionoftraditionincolonialAfrica’,inE.HobsbawmandP.Ranger(eds),TheInventionofTradition(Cambridge:CambridgeUP,1983).48.ForexampleJ.Rex,‘Thenatureofethnicityintheprojectofmigration’,inM.GuibernauandJ.Rex(eds),TheEthnicityReader(Cambridge:Polity,1997),p.270.49.Ibid.p.272.50.Ibid.p.271.51.Jenkins,RethinkingEthnicity,p.46.52.SeeJenkins,SocialIdentity,p.96.53.T.W.Allen,TheInventionoftheWhiteRace(NewYork:Verso,1994).31\n2CULTURALIDENTITYqwCULTUREInV.S.Naipaul’snovel,AHouseForMrBiswas,thehero,aTrinidadianofIndianextraction,diesatlastinhisownhouse,afteralifetimelivingwithstrangersorthefamilyofhiswife.But‘howterribleitwouldhavebeen,atthistime,tobewithoutit...tohavelivedwithoutevenattemptingtolayclaimtoone’sportionoftheearth;tohavelivedanddiedasonehadbeenborn,unnecessaryandunaccomodated.’1Thehouse–ramshackleasitis–servesasametaphorforMrBiswas’sachievementofhisownindividualidentity.Itisanidentityofgreatculturalcomplexity–thatofamemberofanimmigrantfamilyinasocietyitselfdiasporic,speakingEnglishaswellasHindi,readingtheStoics,SamuelSmiles(theVictorianauthorofSelf-Help)andEnglishnovels,andallthetimeattemptingtoavoidabsorptionintotheregu-latedBrahminicallifeofhiswife’srelations,whichwouldbeatoncesoeasyandsounsatisfyingforhim.Hestrugglestoholdthedisparateelementstogether,constantlyresortingtoironyandparody.Hesuffers,asothersseektoimposeaculturalconformityuntruetohisexperience.MrBiswasmayserve,asthischapterwillaimtodemonstrate,foranimageofculturalidentityingeneral,notjustthatofimmigrantsandcosmopolitans.Butwhat,wemayask,isculturalidentity,andhowisitrelevanttopoliticalarrangements?Itis,wemaystipulate,theidentitythatsomeonehasinvirtueofpossessingtheculturalchar-acteristicsthattheydo;whichobviouslythrowsusbackuponthe32\nCULTURALIDENTITYquestion,‘whatisculture?’Cultureisanotoriouslyslipperynotion.Itissurprising,then,thatpoliticalphilosophersintheAnglo-Americantraditionwhoareconcernedwithquestionsaboutthepoliticalrele-vanceofculturehavedevotedsolittleattentiontotheconcept.Theirunconcerntends,asweshallsee,tomaskthetacitacceptanceofsomeveryquestionableassumptions.Butnowforsomedistinctions.First,weneedtocontrastthenotionofcultureasapeople’s‘wholewayoflife’,2thetotalityofsocialpracticesinwhichtheyengage,withtheso-called‘ideational’conceptofcultureastheideasandsymbolsthroughwhichthislifeisrepresentedandregulated.Weshallfollowthemajorityofsocialtheoristsinadoptingthelatterusage,sincewedoneedtobeabletodistinguishcultureaswhatguidesbehaviourfromthepatternsofbehaviourwhichitguides.Butthisisbecausewhatweneedtorecogniseaspatternsofbehaviour,asrecognisablesocialpractices,arethosepatternsthattheirpractitionersrecognise,andthisdependsupontheideasofthemthattheyhave.Thusthe‘wholewayoflife’conceptionofcultureis,despiteappearances,dependentupontheideationalone.Nonethelessthe‘wholewayoflife’notiondoesforceustointro-duceaseconddistinction.Itisadistinctionbetweencultureaswhatguidespeople’sbehaviour,andcultureaswhatmakesthem,inonesupposedsenseoftheterm,theparticularpeoplethattheyare.The‘wholewayoflife’notionwascoinedtocapturepreciselythislatteridea,foritembodiesaconceptionofawayoflifeaswhatpicksoutoneparticularpeople,namelyasjustthosewhoarelivingit.Thisconceptionpresentsculturesasboundedwholesthatcorrespondtotheparticularpeoplesindividuatedbythem.Thiswayofthinkingofculturesasparticularisedtospecificgroupsofpeopleisnotpeculiar,however,tothe‘wholewayoflife’notion.Itisjustaseasytothinkofideationalculturesaspickingoutpeoplesbecausetheirbodiesofideasandsymbolsareboundedtotalities.Ishallrefertoculturesthusthoughtofasparticulartopeoplesas‘groupcultures’,andtothepeoplessupposedlydemarcatedbythemas‘culturalgroups’.3Culturalgroupsarethusconceivedofasboundedand,itisassumed,systemicallyso,suchthatculturalgroupsaresupposedtoformasystemintermsofwhichpeoplescanbeidentifiedanddemarcated,inoneunderstandingoftheterm–anunderstandingdis-tinctinprinciplefromthatofracesorethnicgroups–aspeoples.Itisimportanttonoticethatinthisusagealanguagegrouporareligiousgroup,say,isnotnecessarilyaculturalgroup.For,followingLévi-Strauss,agroupcultureistakentoconsistofagroup’s‘multiplicityof33\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYtraits,someofwhichitshares,invaryingdegrees,withnearbyordis-tantcultures,andsomeofwhichdistinguishitmoreorlesssharplyfromothers.’4Oneculturalgroupisdemarcatedfromanotherbythefactthatitexhibitsaspecifictotalityofsuchtraits.Itisnotagroupconstitutedbyallthosepeoplepossessingsomegiventrait.Peoplemayinanycase,aswenoted,speakmorethanonelanguageorpracticenoreligion,sothatthesetraitswouldnotpickoutsystemicallyboundedgroups.Now,accordingtothisconception,culturalidentityisthoughtofasmembershipofaculturalgroup.Itspoliticalimportanceistakentoarisepreciselyfromthefactthatitmarkspeopleoutasmembersofsuchgroups,sothatthepoliticalclaimsarisingfromculturalidentityareessentiallyclaimstothecontinuedexistenceofthegroupswhichgiverisetoit,claimssupportedbyreasonsweshallinvestigateshortly.JustsuchaconceptionofcultureisimplicitintheusetowhichcultureisputintheworkofWillKymlickaorYaelTamir.Kymlickatakes‘aculture’tobe‘synonymouswith“anation”or“apeople–thatis,asanintergenerationalcommunity,moreorlessinstitutionallycomplete,occupyingagiventerritoryorhomeland,sharingadistinctlanguageandhistory’.5Hereitisthepeoplemarkedoutculturallythatistaken,quiteidiosyncratically,tobetheculture.WhileTamiragreesthat‘twopeopleareofthesamenationif,andonlyif,theysharethesameculture’,forherthatcultureis,rathermoreplausibly,‘thesetofspecificfeaturesthatenablemembersofanationtodistinguishbetweenthemselvesandothers.’6Inbothcasesculturalidentityisequatedwithmembershipofapeople,ofwhichanationistakentobeanexample;thatis,ofaboundedgroupofacertainsortmembershipofwhichis,ingeneral,incompatiblewithmembershipofothersuchgroups.Inthenextsectionweshallgoontoseehowconvincingsuchanaccountofculturalidentityis,butweconcludethisonebynoticingthat,despiteitsprevalence,itisatbestoptional.Thereis,ofcourse,ausageof‘culture’whichwehavenotsofarremarkedupon,sometimesreferredtoasthe‘humanistic’sense,whichwouldnoteventemptustothinkintermsoftheculturalgroupscurrentlyunderdiscussion.Inthisusageculture–notaculture–iswhatsomepeople,culturedpeople,haveandotherslack.Itis,inMatthewArnold’swords,‘toknowthebestthathasbeenthoughtandsaidintheworld’.7Culturesuchasthisisclearlylocatedintheideationalsphere,butitisnotadeterminatebodyofideasthatmarksonegroupofffromanother,foritisuniversalinitsgeographicalscopeandinitspossibleapplication;inprinciple,anyonecanhavesomemeasureofitandbeguidedintheirbehaviouraccordingly.Itiswhat34\nCULTURALIDENTITYMrBiswassoughttoacquireinreadingtheStoicsand,lesssuccessfully,Shakespeare,ratherthanbeingconfinedtoIndianepics,anditwasthis,inpart,thatmadehimwhathewas.Andthathas,itwouldseem,nothingtodowithhisbeingamemberofsomeculturalgroup.INTEGRATIONTHEORYWhatareculturalgroups,asweintroducedthemintheprecedingsection,andwhyshouldmembershipofthembethoughtpoliticallyimportant?Theideathattherearesuchgroupsandthatmankind,atleastwhennotdisruptedbysuchseeminglyartificialprocessesascolonisation,immigrationandsoforth,dividesupintothem,derivesultimatelyfromtheGermanRomantic,Herder.ItisHerderwhoisacknowledgedbyanthropologistslikeClaudeLévi-Straussashavingoriginatedtheconceptofculturebymeansofwhichtheydistinguishpeoplesculturally.Forthis,theconceptofcivilisation–connotingasetofgeneral,universal,andtransmissibleabilities–hadtogivewaytotheconceptofcultureinitsnewmeaning:itnowsignifiedparticularlifestylesthatarenottransmissible.8Whatresultsis,aswehaveseen,asupposedwayofindividuatingthedistinctpeopleswithsuchlifestyles.Butwhyshouldwesupposethatthereareanysocialunitstowhichsuchaconceptofcultureapplies?Theleadingassumptionbehindthesuppositionisthatparticularculturesaresystemsofculturaltraits,ratherthanhaphazardassemblages.Itisbecausetheyaresystemsthatculturescanbeindividuatedwith-outarbitrariness.Andwhatliesbehindtheassumptionthatculturesaresystemsisthelargeronethatthesocialgroupstheycharacterisearesystemsintheirturn.Thecrucialingredienthereisthatthesocialgroupsinquestionareintegratedwholes.Toincludethisassumptioninone’sthinkingistoadoptwhathasbeencalledan‘integrationtheory’9ofsociety,thatistosay,toholdthatsocialgroupsarerelativelystableasaresultoftheirelementsbeingintegratedintoafunctionalsystem,maintainedbysomerelevantconsensusamongitsmembers.Itisintegrationtheorywhichisembeddedinthesuppositionthatthereareculturalgroupsofthekindunderdiscussion.Withoutittherewouldbenoapparentreasontodiscerngroupsaseachsharingacommonbutcomplexculture,ratherthanobservingawidevarietyofindividualswithdifferentculturalcharacteristics.Theclassicexpressionanddefenceofintegrationtheoryisthe35\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYfunctionalismofEmileDurkheim,whichinfluencedLévi-StraussaswellasseveralgenerationsofBritishandAmericananthropologists.10Functionalismholdsthatsocietyissoorganisedastomaintainitsownstability,sothatthebehaviourofindividualmembersconducestothisend.Culture,then,asaforcethatguidesindividualbehaviour,mustitselfhavethisintegrativefunction.Themodelatworkhereisananalogywithbiologicalorganisms,whichpermeatedGermanRomanticimageryandinfluencedDurkheimthroughitsmoreempiricallyinclinedEnglishexponent,HerbertSpencer.Justlikeorganisms,soci-etiesworktomaintaintheirexistenceinachangingenvironment,andtheirparts–evenindividualmembers–aretobeunderstoodintermsofthewaytheycontributetothis.Butitishardtoseewhatthereistorecommendtheanalogyasamodelforsociety.Thereis,forexample,noequivalentforsocietiestothetheoryofevolution,whichiswhataccountsforthedevelopmentoffunctionalsystemsintheorganicrealm.11Anydecisionwhetherornottoadoptthemodelhastodependuponitsexplanatoryproductiveness.Itcannotsimplybeassumed.Infacttheproductivenessofthefunctionalistmodelisnothigh.Thisispartlybecause,unlikeorganisms,socialsystemswhichconstitutefunctionalwholesaredifficultorimpossibletoindividuate.Consider-ationofanexamplefromDurkheim’streatmentofreligionasanaspectofculturewhichplaysitspartinmaintainingsocialstabilityillustratesthepoint.ThereligiousritualsofAustralianAborigines,hemaintained,functionedtodrawmembersoftheclanstogetherandincreasetheirsolidarity.ButinfactthelifeofAboriginesislivedinsmallhuntinggroupsorganisedintotribes.Theclansarewidelydis-persedformationsplayingnopartinordinarylifeandexistingapparentlyonlyforritualpurposes.Itisthusquiteunclearwhyitisthey,andnotthegroupsortribes,whichrequirethesolidaritysupposedlymaintainedbyreligion.12Andthisgoesgenerallyforfunctionalistaccounts.Itisnotclearwhatconstitutesasingleculturalsystem,andwhenwecharacteriseitintermsofthecultureofapeoplethereisnonon-circularwayofindividuatingthatpeopleinculturalterms.13Despiteitsdefects,however,thefunctionalistmodelcontinuestoexerciseanunacknowledgedinfluenceonthethinkingofmanyAnglo-Americanpoliticalphilosophers,particularly,thoughnotexclusively,thoseofacommunitarianturnofmind,ofwhomweshallhavemoretosayinalaterchapter.Themodelisatworkinthesortofargumentsoftendevelopedforgivingrecognitiontoculturalgroups.Thesecommonlycentreonthebenefitstheyoffertheindividual36\nCULTURALIDENTITYmember,bycontrastwiththepredicamentinwhichsheisplacedasaresultofhergroup’sdissolution.MargalitandRaz,forexample,offerargumentsfornationalself-determinationpredicatedonthevalueofencompassinggroupswith‘pervasivecultures’–theirterm,somewhatover-simplifying,forwhatwearecallingculturalgroups.Thisvalueconsistspartlyinthefactthatmembershipofsuchgroups‘greatlyaffectsone’sopportunities,one’sabilitytoengageintherelationshipsandpursuitsmarkedbytheculture’,partlyinthe‘brutefactthatpeople’ssenseoftheirownidentityisboundupwiththeirsenseofbelongingtoencompassinggroups’.‘Allthis’,theauthorsgoon,‘ismerecommonsense’.14Buttherelationshipsonwhichindividualwell-beingdependsare,theyaver,‘culturallydetermined’.Perhapssoinsomesenseof‘culture’.Butwhyinthegroupculturesensethattheyespouse?15Isnotthethreattosomeone’sidentityfromthelossofgroupmembershipnoneotherthantheanomiethatthebreakdownofsocialintegrationmenaceshimwithinDurkheim’stheory?Thisisfarfromacommon-senseoutcome,butaninevitableonefromfunctionalistassumptions.ThislastpointisalsoillustratedbyWillKymlicka’sliberalargumentforminorityrightsfromthevalueofculturalmembership.HereKymlickasaysheusestheterm‘culture’‘torefertotheculturalcommunity,orculturalstructure,itself’.Hepresentsnoargumentforsupposingthattherearesuch‘structures’,butheviewsthemaspro-viding‘acontextofchoice’whichdeterminestherangeofoptionsformembersofculturalcommunities.‘Thesenseofbelongingtoaculturalstructureandhistory’hecontinues‘isoftencitedasasourceofemo-tionalsecurityandpersonalstrength.Itmayaffectourverysenseofagency.Thishasbeenrecognised...bysociologists.’16Againthelossofsuchastructurethreatenstoproduceanomieandpowerlessnessbecausetheindividual’sidentityisseenasgivenbyherplaceinit,sothatwhenthe‘mechanism’breaksdownshebecomesjustanidlecog.17Kymlicka’suseoftheplightofAmericanIndiangroupstoexemplifythethreatreinforcesthisinterpretationofit,foritwaswithjustsuchindigenouspeoplespriortocolonialinfluencesthatanthropologistswerewonttoillustratetheirfunctionalistanalyses.ThatfunctionalismiscovertlyatworkinKymlicka’sthinkingisevidencedalsobyhisargumentthatnationalstatehoodisajustifieddemandofculturalgroupsbecauseitprotectstheirmembers’culturalcontextsofchoice.First,itistheassumptionoffunctionalwholesthatenablesculturalgroups–which,aswesawearlier,Kymlickaidentifieswithnations–tobeidentifiedaswhatprovidethesecontexts,rather37\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYthanmorelocalormorewide-rangingcultures.Second,itisfunc-tionalismwhichdictatesthattheculturalgroupssopickedoutshouldbetheentitiestowhichstateboundariescorrespond;foranysmallerpolity,whileitmayworktoprotecttheculturalcontextagainstexternalthreats,willnotbeabletopreserveitasafunctioningwhole.Itisworthnoticingthatitisthesesamefunctionalistassumptionswhichgeneratethesharpdistinctionbetweeninternallyinitiatedandexter-nallyimposedchangethatiscrucialtoKymlicka’snationalistargument.Nationalstatehoodpermitstheformer,butquiteproperlypreventsthelatter,foranychangeinitiatedinsidetheculturalgroupmustoriginatefromwithinitscontextofchoiceandhencecannotdestabiliseit,whileanyimposedfromoutsidemustdrawuponadifferentcontextandistherebyboundtothreatentheculturalintegrityofthegroup.Withoutthesecovertfunctionalistassumptionsthereseemsnocom-pellingreasontosupposethatsuchgeneralisationsabouttheculturalbenefitsofnationalself-governmentcanbesustained.18CONFLICTTHEORYTogiveupintegrationtheoryisnotnecessarilytoabandontheideathatthereareculturalgroups,understoodascompletepeoplespickedoutbysetsofculturalcharacteristics;butitdoesrequirethosethatholdthattherearesuchgroupstogiveadifferentexplanationoftheirexistenceand,inconsequence,toofferadifferentaccountofculturalidentity,albeitstillintermsofmembershipofaculturalgroup.Thekindsofaccountwewillbelookingatarethosethatseeculturalcharacteristicsasbroughttogetherintheconstructionofsocialgroups,justasinthelastchapterwelookedataccountsofethnicgroupsassociallyconstructed.Onasocialconstructionistaccounttherelationofaparticularculturetothegroupitsupposedlyindividuatesisquitedifferentfromthatpositedbyfunctionalism.Ratherthanconstitutingadiscerniblesystemwhichreflectsthewaythatsocialrelationswith-inthegroupformaboundedtotality,acultureisthoughtofasframedpreciselywiththeeffectofdeterminingtheboundariesofsuchrelations.Rather,thatis,thanthegroupsimplybeingrecognisedassuchthroughitsculture(whichnonethelessplaysacrucialroleinitsmaintenance),peoplesupposedlyexistasaboundedgrouponlybecauseacultureisfashionedpreciselytodemarcatethemfromothers.Thisleads,ofcourse,toadifferentviewofculturalidentity.Theculturalgroupmemberisnotsomeonewhoseculturalidentityreflectsthefunctionalsystemofthegroupasawhole,andwhoisnecessarily38\nCULTURALIDENTITYthreatenedwithinternaldislocationifthatsystemisradicallydisturbed.Heis,instead,someonewhoseownculturalcharacteristicsarenotnecessarilyanymoresystematicallyorganisedthanaretheculturalmaterialsthroughwhichthegroupisconstructed.Thethreattosomesinglecharacteristic–thespeakingofaparticularlanguage,say–maybeveryserious,butnotbecauseitinevitablyleadstoananomicinternalbreakdown.Noticethatthisisnottodenythatagroupcultureisinternalisedbygroupmembers,justasitisunderfunctionalism.Itis,thatistosay,madepartofamember’spersonalrepertoireofresourcesforcopingwiththeworld,ratherthanbeingpartoftheworldwithwhichshemustcope.Butthatitisaculturespecifictoaparticulargroupishereirrelevanttothisinternalisation.Religion,say,issimilarlyinternalisedbutisnotnecessarilyacharacteristicofanyparticulargroupculture.Whatthenistheroleofcultureintheconstructionofagroup?Nosimpleanswercanbereturned;itmaywellvaryfromcasetocase.Yetsomefeaturesarecommontoall.First,asnotedabovebyYaelTamir,groupculturecanservetoenablememberstodistinguishthemselvesfromnon-members.Itwouldbewrong,however,tocharacterisethewholeofagroupcultureasbeingwhatservesthepurposesofmutualrecognition.Certainaspectspatentlydo–onethinksimmediatelyofnationaldressandsuchdistinctivecustomsofagroupasareinvolvedingreetings,mealsorotherhabitualsocialinteractions.Butotherculturalcharacteristicswhichbelongtothegroupandwhichmaybeinvolvedinitsconstructionorbepeculiartoitdonotatallobviouslysoserve:agroup’sdistinctivehistory,forexample,needservenopublicpurposeofboundarydemarcation.Ratheritcontributestoamember’ssenseofmembership,ofbeingpartofadistinctivegroup.Itisimportanttodistinguishthisspecificwayinwhichaculturecancontributeto‘people’ssenseoftheirownidentity’19fromothercasesinwhichasenseofidentityhasnothingtodowiththerecognitionofgroupmembership.Inthesecasesculturegivesoneasenseofidentitybecauseitsinternalisationmakestheoutlookontheworldwhichitprovidesone’sown–anoutlook,thatis,withwhichonecanidentify.Thereisapersistentambiguityinsuchphrasesas‘asenseofidentity’whichreadilyleadsfromthelatterconstructiontotheformer,andthusreinforcestheassumptionthatallcultureisgroupculture.Why,wemightaskatthispoint,shouldcertainculturalcharacter-isticsbedeployedtoconstructaboundedgroup?Thegeneralanswerasocialconstructionistislikelytoreturnwillbeintermsofthepowerrelationswhichcanbeestablishedormaintainedbyconstructingthis39\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYculturalgroupratherthananotheronepickedoutbyculturalcharac-teristicsofadifferentscope,orbyconstructingagivengroupbymeansoftheseculturalcharacteristicsratherthanbyothers.Itispowerrelations,hewillsay,whichareneglectedinfunctionalistaccountsofgroupindividuationandgroupstructure.Considerasanexamplethelanguageofagroup,whichmayseemonthesurfacetoprovideacul-turalcharacteristicthatservesforthemutualrecognitionofgroupmembership.Yet,asiswellknown,dialectsoftenshadeoffimpercep-tiblyintoeachothersothatitisnotobviouswhereitcanbesaidthatonelanguageendsandanotherbegins.Wheretheboundaryisdrawn,andthuswhatgroupsaredeterminedand,asaresultofincreasinglin-guisticdifferentiation,firmlyentrenched,isoftenamatterofpoliticaldecisionandaction.ThusSerbo-CroatwasforgedfromaCroatiandialectsharedwithsomeSerbstoformasinglelanguageforthesouthernSlavs,andwasrecognisedassuchintheformerYugoslavia.20FollowingtheFederation’sdisintegrationthedifferencesbetweensupposedlydistinctSerbianandCroatianlanguageshavebeenempha-sised.Changesinpowerrelationshavegonesidebysidewithculturalchange.Totalkofpowerisalmostinevitablytotalkofconflict.Itisthusunsurprisingthatthesocialconstructionistaccountofgroupculturescontrastswithfunctionalistonesnotonlyinrejectingintegrationtheorybutinespousingitsopposite,conflicttheory.Conflicttheorystressestheubiquityofchangeinsociety,ratherthanstability–changewhichresultsfrompervasiveconflictswithinsocietyforthepossessionofpower.Marxisttheories,asweshallseeinalaterchapter,mayberegardedasaspeciesofconflicttheory.AssuchtheyhaveexertedagreaterinfluenceoncontinentalphilosophersthanonAnglo-Americanonesand,throughcontinentalphilosophy,on‘culturalstudies’,adisci-plinewhichaimstoinvestigatethecharacterofsocialgroupsandtheidentitiessustainedwithinthemthroughtheirculturalproductions.This,thoughithasanobviousrelevancetothepoliticalclaimsofsuchgroupsandtheirresolution,hasbeenlargelyignoredbyAnglo-Americanpoliticalphilosophers,withtheresultthattheycommonlyacceptasthecultureofagroupwhatispresentedassuchforpoliticalpurposes,withoutsubjectingittothesortofscrutinythatmightcalltheclaimsbaseduponitintoquestion.Accordingtoaconflicttheoryapproach,however,itisunlikelythattherewillbesomesingleunitarycultureforagivengroup.Rathertherewillbeavarietyofculturalconstructionsresultingfromcontestationbetweenconflictinginterestsintheformationordevelopmentofthe40\nCULTURALIDENTITYgroup.Naipaul’snovelAHouseforMrBiswasmightitselfberegardedasamoveinsuchacontestationovertheconstructionofTrinidadianidentity.Themovementleadingtoindependencefromcolonialrulein1962hadbeenledbyEricWilliamsandwasbasedonimagesofblackidentityandJudaeo-Christianconceptionsofdeliverancefrombondage.ThemovementwasopposedbyHinduIndiansinTrinidadwhofearedmarginalisation.IndeedNaipaul’sfather,theoriginalofMrBiswas,becametheleaderofamultiracialpartyopposingWilliams.Buttheirstanceledtoaccusationsoftreachery.21AgainstthisbackgroundNaipaul’snovelmaybeseenasassertingadifferentconceptionofTrinidadianidentityintheculturallypolymorphousfigureofitshero.Yettheclaimsofthisconceptionrestupontheforceofitsrepresen-tationinthisbookandelsewhere.Theconceptionis,however,innowayaspecificallynationalistone.ForthoughitlocatesTrinidadianidentityinamotleyofill-assortedculturalcharacteristics,thereisnowayinwhichthesecharacteristicspickoutsomegroupasTrinidadiansoreven,perhaps,WestIndians.Theaim,thoughpartofacontestovergroupconstruction,isnotitselftoprovidethecharacterisationofaparticularculturalgroupsomuchastounderminetheveryprojectofprovidingsuchacharacterisation.Weshallturnintheremainingpartofthischaptertothedifferentwaysinwhichculturalgroupsmaybeconstructedandtothepoliticalclaimsthatmaybeassociatedwithsuchdifferentconstructions.LANGUAGENaipaul’scontributiontotheformationofaTrinidadianculturalidentitywasprincipallyaliteraryone,andonemadeintheisland’sofficiallanguage,English.EvidentlyEnglishitselfcouldnotservetoindividuateaTrinidadianculturenor,asamatteroffact,couldanycreolisedformofEnglish.Yetitislanguagethatisoftenviewedaswhatdistinguishesoneculturefromanotherwhenthepoliticalclaimsofadistinctiveculturalidentityareinquestion.Weneed,then,toconsiderthebasisforclaimsmadeonthebasisofthepossessionofacommonlanguage.Foralanguagemaybethoughttoprovideitsspeakerswiththeirideationalculture.Whatarewetounderstandbythis?Initsbroadestsenseanideationalcultureconsistsofpeople’sconceptsandotherpubliclytransmissiblewaysofunderstandingtheworldinwhichtheylive–the‘websofsignificance’whichtheyhavespun,inCliffordGeertz’sphrase.22Publicityisimportanthere.Culturedoesnotconsistoftheprivatecontentsofindividualminds,asis41\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYsometimesimpliedbythosewhocontrastthepublicdrawingofgroupboundarieswiththe‘culturalstuff’containedtherein,23whichmayvaryfrommembertomemberaccordingtotheirdifferentconceptionsofthegroup.Suchdifferencesmustbepubliconesiftheyarereallytobethoughtofascultural.Wehavenoticed,however,thatlanguagescaninprinciplebecounteddifferentlyfrom‘websofsignificance’,forexamplewhenlanguagesarefairlyfullyintertranslatableorwhenthesamelanguageconveysdifferentunderstandings(aswiththeBritishandtheAmericans,whoaresupposedlydividedbyacommonlanguage).Theassumptionthattherecannotbesuchmismatchesbetweenlan-guagesandunderstandings,itselfderivedfromHerder,shouldnottooreadilybemade,thoughtheextentofitinpracticewillnodoubtvaryfromcasetocase.Inpolyglotcultures,whicharethenorminAfrica,thescopeforintertranslatabilitymaybeveryhigh.‘Websofsignificance’makeunderstandingtheworldandcopingwithitpossible.Theypermittheformationofbeliefsandregulatebehaviourinthesenseofconstitutingbitsofitasrecognisablypur-posefulactivity.Theydonotspecifywhatbeliefsoneshouldhaveorwhichactionsmightbeperformed.Ideas,inthesenseofbeliefs,includingevaluativebeliefsthatregulatebehaviourinthisnormativeway,makeupcultureinanarrowersense,whichweshallcometointhenextsection.The‘humanistic’culture,metatthebeginningofthischapter,ifnarrowlyconstruedintermsofthebestthatisthoughtandsaid,formsasubspeciesofthiscategory.Buthumanisticcultureisgenerallymorewidelyunderstoodtoencompassthebestofaestheticproductionstoo,inwhichcaseitincludesrepresentations,broadlyconceived,thatinviteresponsesdifferentfromassentorobedience.Theimportanceofsuchaesthetic,andmoregenerallyaffectiveresponsesshoulddiscourageusfromaccordingtoonarrowlyaclassificatoryroletothe‘websofsignificance’thatconstitutecultureinthesenseunderdiscussion.Withthesedistinctionsinmindwecanaskwhatisthebasisforpoliticalclaimsmadeinrespectofpeople’spossessionoftheirownlanguage.Nineteenth-centuryattitudestotheWelshlanguagesuchasthatofMatthewArnold–‘thelanguageofaWelshmanisandmustbeEnglish’24–ledtodemandsthatWelshbeaccordedrecognitionandtoalinguistically-basednationalistcampaignforindependence.Why,ontheonehand,shouldalanguagebeprotected?Why,ontheother,shoulditformacriterionforaseparatepoliticalexistence?Letusscepticallysetasidethoseargumentstouchedonabove,whichseethe42\nCULTURALIDENTITYlossofalanguageasleadingtoanomicbreakdown.Thereis,however,anotherlinewhichdependsuponthepresumptionthatdifferentlan-guagesoftendoofferdifferentunderstandingsoftheworld.OnereasonadducedfortheabolitionofWelshwasthatitcouldnotexpressthepropositionsofpoliticsandscience.Conversely,peculiarlyexpressivepowersinpoetryhavebeenclaimedforit.Thebeautiesofalanguage,theparticularpleasuresthatitsdescriptiveresourcesandmelodiescanprovide,theseareasmuchapartofanunderstandingoftheworld,ofcapturingandcopingwithit,asitsmorenarrowlyclassificatoryregimes.Theysuggestthesamesortofargumentforprotectingthelanguageasthereisforpreservingworksofart,namelythatitextendsandenrichesourunderstanding.Thisdoesnotrequire–thoughimportantlyitcannotruleout–thatothersshouldlearnthelanguagebesidesitsnativespeakersandcometoenjoyitspleasuresforthemselves.Thefactthattherearethosewhocanspeakandenjoyitisenough,andtheirpassing,likethatofthelastCornishspeaker,whichgave‘amoment’sdistress’toArnold,25isalossforusall.Amodeofhumanunderstandinghasvanished.Butthereisasupplementaryargumentavailableherewhichstemsfromthewaythatthespeakingofalanguagecancontributetoone’sindividualidentity.IfIamwhoIaminvirtueofmyoutlookontheworld,aswellasmyactiverolewithinit,thenthespeakingofalanguage,andpossiblyseverallanguages,willbepartofmyidentitysincethelan-guageshapesthatoutlook.ThelanguageorlanguagesinwhichIam‘athome’haveaparticularsignificancehere.ForthepleasureIcantakeinlanguageisindicativeoftheinvolvementIhaveinthecognitionoftheworlditgivesme,anditisthroughsuchspontaneousinvolvementthatwhoIam,bycontrastwithmerelywhattasksImustperform,revealsitself.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatitisthroughtheaestheticpotentialitiesofalanguagethatsuchpleasurescanbemostkeenlyfelt.Itiscrucialtograspthattheseargumentsinnowaydependuponthespeakingofacommonlanguageconstitutingpeopleintoasys-temicallyboundedculturalgroup,norupontheculturalidentitythatresultsfromspeakingitresidinginmembershipofsuchagroup.Perhaps,inordertoprotectthelanguage,somegroupofspeakersneedstobeidentifiedwhoseintegrityandsocialrelationsmustbepreserved.Theforegoingargumentsarenotconcernedwiththewaythatthespeakingofalanguagemightbetakentodefineasocialgroup.Yetonlyifspeakingthesamelanguagediddefinesuchagroupcoulditserveasacriterionforsomemeasureofpoliticalindepen-43\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYdenceorautonomy.Independentgovernment,weshouldremember,isdifferentfromself-government.26Agroupcanbegovernedseparatelyfromotherswithoutgoverningitself,andagivenkindofgroup–alinguisticone,say,cangovernitselfwithoutbeingfullyseparatefromanother–whilehaving,thatis,alinguisticminoritywithinitsborders.Theargumentsforindependenceandautonomyaredifferentones.Theformerturnpresumablyonthedesirabilityofthosewhoaregovernedtogetherbeingabletocommunicateefficiently,andthatdependsontheirhavingsharedunderstandingsofwhattheydeliberatetogetheraboutpolitically.Yetarguablythisdemandsnotasinglelanguage,butonlylanguagessufficientlyintertranslatableovertherangeoftopicsthatisrelevanttopoliticaldeliberation,orsufficientbilingualism,oranon-nativeofficiallanguage,asEnglishisinmanyex-colonies.Theaspectsinwhichcertainlanguagesmaydifferexpres-sively,forexampletheiraestheticaspects,maysimplynotberelevanttopoliticalorganisation.Self-governmentforalinguisticgroupmustbearguedfordifferently,namelyfromthedesirabilityofspeakersexercisingcontrolofthecul-turebasedupontheirlanguage.Thismay,asamatterofcontingentfact,benecessarytoprotectthelanguageitself.Oritmaybeneces-sary,throughthedirectionofeducationandculturalproduction,tocontrolthewayinwhichitsspeakersarerepresentedinitsliteratureorotherartisticmanifestations.Thatistosay,tocontrolthewaythatspeakingthelanguageconfersaculturalidentitybydeterminingwhatarethecanonicalexamplesofthelanguage.Certaintextsandliteraryformswillbemadepartofthelanguage’scanonandothersmargin-alised.Andthis,aswesawearlier,maybepartofabroaderprocessofgroupconstruction,whichiscontestedbetweendifferentprotagonists.Certainlyitisimportantthataswideaspossiblearangeofspeakersshouldcontroltheirlanguageandliterature;forthemnottodosoistolosecontrolofthewaystheirculturalidentitiescanbeframed.Aparticularpoliticalformationmayinhibitthisratherthanbeingconducivetoit.Butitisfarfromclearthatthisamountstoageneralargumentforlanguage-basedautonomy.Whetheritdoessoinapartic-ularcasewilldependuponthewaylanguagespeakersaredistributed,thekindsofcontroltheycanexerciseoverthecanonandthelikelynatureofalanguage-basedstate.Thereisnoguaranteethatpoliticalautonomywouldnotcausemoreharmthroughculturalregimentationandrepressionthanisexperiencedinitsabsence.Andthechoiceoflanguageasthebasisforanareaofautonomywillservesomeinterests,andnotothers.Itisnotneutralornatural.44\nCULTURALIDENTITYVALUESThecultureofacollectionofpeoplemay,aswesawearlier,becon-ceivedofintermsnotofasharedlanguagebutofacommonbodyofbeliefs,inparticularevaluativebeliefs.Letusturn,then,tothepoliticalsignificanceofasharedethicalsystem,inthebroadestsenseofthisnotionasasystemofnormsregulatingbehaviour.Itisworthdistin-guishingwithinanethicalsystemsoconceivedbetweenthosenormsthatactuallyfigureinpeople’sreflectivethinkingaboutwhattodoandthosewhichdonotoratleastdosomuchlesslargely.Theformerwecanrefertoastheirmoralstandards;thelatter,toborrowatermfromthesociologistPierreBourdieu,astheirhabitus27–theirhabitualdispositionstoactinonewayratherthananother,whichareacquiredthroughsocialisationwithinaparticularsectionofsocietybutwhichremainlargelyunconscious.Wecanseeinconsequencethatculturalidentity,inthesensepertinenttoourpresentdiscussion,canbecon-ceivedofeitherassomeone’smoralstandardsorastheirhabitus.Intheformercasethatidentitymaybeself-declared,aswhensomeoneidentifiesherselfthroughareligiousaffiliationthatinvolvesspecificmoralstandards.Inthelatteritwilltypicallynotbe,despitebeingrecognisableforwhatitisbyobserversconversantwiththerelevantsocialnuancesofclass,regionorwhatever.Inneithercasedoesculturalidentitydependuponmembershipofaculturalgroupinthenowfamiliarethnographicsenseofacompletesocietysystematicallydemarcatedfromothersbyitstotalculture.Thusaccordingtoaliberalview,ofthesorttobediscussedinalaterchapter,widevariationsinindividualmoralstandardsarecontainablewithinasinglesocialgroup.Itmay,however,bearguedthatagroupshouldbeindividuatedlargelybyitsmoralstandardsasneedingseparateorself-government.Suchpoliticaldemandsmightbedefendedbyclaiming,respectively,thatacommonmoralityisneededtounder-pinacommonlaw,andthatthelawmakersmustbedrawnfromthosewhosemoralstandardsunderpinit.Weshouldnoticethat,whilepoliticaldemandscannotbegroundedinsomesharedhabitusinviewofitslargelyunconsciouscharacter,neverthelesstheymaybeassessedthroughcomparingdeclaredmoralstandardswithactualhabitualdis-positions.Despitedeclareddifferencesinmoralitytheremaybecloseagreementinhabituswhichwillmakeacommonlifepossible.Agroupthatidentifiesitselfintermsofitsmoralstandardsmay,thatistosay,simplybewrongaboutthesourcesofthesocialcohesivenessbetweenitsmembers.45\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYThereis,furthermore,somecausetobesuspiciousoftheconstruc-tionofculturalgroupsintermsofmoralstandards.Thisstemsfromthefactthatthereareatleasttwokindsofreasonforadheringtoastandard:one,theprimaryand,onemightsay,the‘proper’reason,isthatadherencetothestandardleadsonetoactaright:theotherissimplythatithappenstobethestandardofone’sgroup,towhichonedesirestodisplayallegiancethroughsuchadherence.Thesecond,derivativekindofreasonisclearlyavailableonlyifthereisagroupconstructedintermsofone’sstandards,butitisakindofreasonwhichcanunderminethefirst.Forconformitytothestandardsofthegroupbecausetheyareitsstandardscanbebothanintellectualandamoralvice.Itisanintellectualviceifoneisnolongerconcernedtoensurethatoneactsaright,aconcernthatdemandsaresponsivenesstotherealcharacteroftherelationshipsinwhichoneisinvolvedandtheclaimstheymakeonone.Itisamoralviceofnarcissismanddecadentself-absorption,inwhichconcernswithwhoIamreplaceaproperconcernwithwhatIoughttobe.Buttheidentityitgeneratesis,ofcourse,aphoneyone,asubstituteforsincereandseriousmoralidentity.ItisthiskindofidentitythatMrBiswasrepudiatesinrejectingtheconventionalisedHinduismofhiswife’sfamily.Allthisis,intheory,onlyaperilofgroupconstructionintermsofmoralstandards.Inpracticeitisanever-presentandinescapableone.Succumbingtoitstemptationsbringssuchcohesivepowertoagroupastoinducealmostallculturalgroupconstructionstorely,inpart,uponsuchmoralstandardisation.Thatsaid,themoralcharacterofsomegroupsisworsethanthatofothers,andtheworseitisthelesstheirpoliticalclaimsforindependenceorautonomywillstandscrutiny.‘But’,willcomebackthereply,‘bywhosestandardsistheirmoralcharacterbeingjudged?Presumablybythoseofsomeothergroup,inwhichcasethejudgementisrootedinthatothergroupandirrelevanttotheonebeingjudged,sothatproperpoliticalassessmentcannottakeaccountofsupposedmoralcharacter.’Thisculturalrela-tivismhasnothingtorecommendit.Tostartwith,itsassumptionthatthemoralstandardswhichwebringtobearonourassessmentsarenecessarilythoseofsomeculturalgrouporotheris,aswehaveseen,untenable.Buteveniftheywere,theprincipalreasonforsupposingthattheymustbeirrelevanttothegroupbeingassessedembodiesahiddenfunctionalism.Itisthatthemoralstandardsofasocialgrouparejustthoseneededtopreserveitsstability,sothatanysuggestionthatthecharacterofthegroupismorallydefectiveisnotonethatcanhaveanapplicationwithinit.Theremayindeedbedifficultiesin46\nCULTURALIDENTITYapplyingsuchasuggestion,andtherearelargequestionsastowhatitmightbebasedupon,butageneralculturalrelativismgroundedinfunctionalismisnotplausible.Letusturntogroupsconstructed,instead,throughasharedhabitus,thatissaythroughsocialisationintowaysofactingwhicharerecog-nisedasdistinguishingmembersfromnon-members,evenifwhatpreciselyitisthateffectsthedistinctionisnotreadilyapparent.Itis,perhaps,throughthesedispositionsthatpeople’scharactersareshaped–thatwhatarethoughtof,forexample,asnationalcharactersareformed.MrBiswashimselfiscaughtupinaconflictofsuchdispositions.Thereis,ontheonehand,thefatalismofthewayoflifebroughtfromIndia;ontheother,theindividualstrivingthatcharacterisestheEuropeanlifestyleofthecolonisers,whichisovertlypromotedbySamuelSmilestowhomBiswasturnsinhisreading.MightMrBiswas’sproblemsderivefromthefactthatgroupswithdifferentmodesofhabitushavebeenmingled,wheretheywouldhavebeenbetterkeptpoliticallyapart?Well,thatiscertainlynotthemessageofthenovel,whichcelebratescomplexityandcoexistence.Theopposing,conservativeanswerwillbelookedatinalaterchapter.Butthisisnottosaythatdifferencesofhabitusshouldnotbetakenaccountofpolitically,toavoid,forexample,undesiredandundesirableculturalassimilation.Suchhabitusmaycharacteriseagroupand,throughbecomingsomethingofwhichtheyareaware,enteritsmembers’senseoftheirownidentity.ThisisonewayofreadingPaulGilroy’ssuggestionthatblackpeoplerecog-nisethemselvesashavingacommon‘BlackAtlantic’identity,foundedinacommonexperienceoftheslavetrade.28Whatthisgivesrisetois,ontheonehand,anovertlyeroticandirreverentlycarnivalisticmusicand,ontheother,whatGilroycallsan‘anti-productivism’,whichthemusicexpresses.Inthebehaviouraldispositionswhichmanifestthisanti-productivism,‘theblackbodyis...celebratedasaninstrumentofpleasureratherthananinstrumentoflabour’.29Thisisadifferentwayofconstructingblackidentityfromthatofnégritude,aswenotedinthelastchapter,butitalsosuggestsdifferentpoliticalstances,stanceswhichcanchallengeEuropeanculturalnormsfromwithin,ratherthanembracingaseparatistblacknationalism.Differencesinhabitusarenotclearlyarticulableandthuscannotwithconfidencebemadethesubjectofexplicitethicaldebate,unlikethemoralstandardswhichtheyunderpin.Perhapstheyarebetterregardedasdifferentwaysofunderstandingtheworld,demandingthekindofrespectfordiversityandilluminationwhichthedifferent47\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYunderstandingspresentedbydifferentlanguagesprovide.Policiesofassimilationwithholdthatrespect,butthekindofprotectionthatthosewithadifferenthabitusdemandisnotthatofseparateexistenceasaculturalgroup.Rathertheydemandthekindoffreedomfromdominationwhichleadingalifeinaccordancewithone’shabitusrequires,andaccesstocontroloftheinstitutionsofsocialisationwhichtransmitit,forexampleeducationalones.Habitus,unlikelanguagespeaking,cannotbeprohibited,nor,unlikelanguageagain,canitbefostered,soculturalprotectionwithrespecttoitisnecessarilyindirectanddependentuponpoliticalequalityforthosewhoseidentityandself-esteemdependsonit.HISTORYANDAUTHENTICITYAnotherbodyofbeliefs,differentfromevaluativeones,whichisoftentakentobepartlyconstitutiveofaparticularculture30isthatwhichconstitutesthehistoryofagroup.Hereagain,though,beingpartofsomehistory,asanaspectofone’sculturalidentity,doesnotdependuponmembershipofsomedemarcatedculturalgroup.Historycanfulfilthisidentity-bestowingroleforavarietyofreasons.Itcandosothroughsomeone’sidentifyinghimselfasthedescendantofcertainancestors,asacurrentinhabitantofaplacewithanhistoricpast,orasaparticipantinanartisticorintellectualtraditionwithitsownhistoricalsuccessionofcanonicalproductions.Eachofthesemayformsomeaspectofasingleindividual’sculturalidentitywithoutimplyingmembershipofanyculturalgroup.Itisonlyifdifferencessurfaceincontestedconstructionsofagrouptowhichpoliticalallegianceisdemandedthatanytensionbetweentheseculturalidentitiesneedbefelt.Historyentersindividualidentitybecausetohaveasenseofwhooneisrequiresbeingabletotellastoryaboutoneself,and,furthermore,astorywhichrelatesonetoothersbyconnectingwiththestoriestheytellaboutthemselves.Itrequires,inshort,makingoneselfpartofasharednarrative.31Suchanarrativestretchesintothepast,andtherebybecomesabsorbedintoamoregeneralhistory.Itisevident,though,howagroupcanbeconstructedintermsofahistorythattiesmembersintothegroupthroughengagingwithandconnectingtogethertheirpersonalnarratives,sothattheirsenseofwhotheyarecomestodependuponmembershipofthegroupsoconstructed.Thiskindofgroupidentificationwilltendtohappeniftheirhistoryisoneinwhichotherpeoplecannotshare,sothatasystemofdiscretehistories48\nCULTURALIDENTITYdevelops,as,forexample,inthecaseofnationalhistory.Indeed,toconstructsuchculturalgroupsistoinducepeopletoengageinjustthosepersonalnarrativesthatmeshtogetherintothesediscretegrouphistories.Historyisappealedtoinattemptstoestablishthatagroupidentityisanauthenticone.This,asweshallsee,isanotionfraughtwithdiffi-culty.Butthereisatleastonecommendableaspectofthedemandthatagroupwhichconfersidentityshouldbeauthentic,namelythatitshistoryshouldbeatrueratherthanafraudulentorseriouslydistortedone.Thisdemandfortruth,naturalasitappears,has,however,beencontested.Manypoliticalphilosophers32seemtothinkthatthetruthofanhistoricalnarrationisirrelevantifthestorysucceedsincon-structingaculturalgrouptowhichpeoplecangiveallegianceandinwhichtheyfindfulfilment.Butagrosslydistortedhistoryisanunsoundbasisforgroupformation.Thetemptationwenotedinconnectionwithgroupsbasedonsharedvaluesissuccumbedtohere,namelytoabandontheepistemicrequirementstowhichcultureingeneralisanswerableandembraceinsteadthereassuringsecurityofmember-ship.Amyth–astorythatisnottakenastrue,andthusentersintoapersonalnarrationnotlikeone’shistory,butlikeone’sfate–thatissomethingthatanswerstodifferent,andprincipallyethical,demands.Butthefactthathistorycanserveasmythisnoreasontothinkthatmythshouldserveashistory.Similarstricturesapplytotheinventedtraditionsthatcharacterisemanyculturalgroups.TheWelshEisteddfodau,forexample,havebecomeafocusforthecelebrationoftheWelshlanguageandtheyperpetuatethemedievalmeetingsofbards,albeitafteraperiodofdesuetudeandthedecayofthebardicorder.ButthetrappingsofancientDruidismwithwhichtheyareinvestedlackanyhistoricalprovenance,beingthelateeighteenth-centurycontrivanceofaGlamorganstonemason.TheyaredesignedtolocateWelshidentityinacontinuousCeltichistory–anidentitywhichistherebyethnicallyopposedtothatoftheEnglishandrootedinWelshlanguage-speaking.33Now,asHobsbawmhasobserved,theobjectandcharacteristicof‘traditions,includinginventedones,isinvariance’.34Thesocialcohesiontowhichtheyareconduciveis,designedly,anunchangingone,bolsteredupagainstthepressureofchangebytheirfixityandrepetitiveness.Inthisrespect,Hobsbawmnotes,theydifferfrom‘customs’whichcanaccommodatechanges,whileretainingcontinuitybyfindingprecedentsforthem.Itistheinflexibilityofsuchtraditions,aswellasthefrequentficti-tiousnessoftheircredentials,whichrendersthemobjectionableas49\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYbasesforidentity.Foronceagainsuchanidentitywillnotbegroundedinanarrativewhichtakesaccountofhowthingsare,withalltheirchangesandcomplexities,butinacomfortingillusionofthingsbeingastheyoughttobe.Thisindicateshow,evenwhentraditionalpracticesaregenuine,thedemandfor‘authenticity’inculturecanbeopentocriticism.DespitetheculturalmixwhichhecelebratesasanovelistinAHouseForMrBiswas,Naipaulasareflectivethinkersometimesviewsasworthwhileonlythosecultureswhichmaintainacontinuitywiththeirorigins.35Suchaculturehefindsamongsttheso-calledBushNegroesofSurinam,thedescendantsofslaveswhohadescapedsoonaftertrans-portation.‘NootherNegroartformintheAmericas’,accordingtothearthistorianPhilipJ.C.Dark,‘ofwhichsomeAfricantraditionssurvive,canclaimthevitality,thelackofeclecticismandthefreedomfromotherculturalinfluencesofBushNegroart’.36Butwhyshouldsuchcontinuityandcultural‘purity’improvepeople’spoliticalclaims,even,asNaipaulseemstohavethought,tonationhood?Aninterestingsmaller-scaleexampleinwhichauthenticity,assounderstood,istakentoberequiredforpoliticalclaimsconcernsAustralianAboriginaldemandsforcontrolofsacredsites.Recognitionofthesedemandsrequiresevidencenotonlyofpresentbeliefandpractice,butofcon-tinuedandrelativelyunchanginguse.37Yetthisistoimposeatestofauthenticity–ofaculture’sreallybeingpeople’sown–thatisexternalanddivorcedfromtheusetheymakeofitintheircurrentcircumstances.InanothermoodNaipaulgraspsthis;forexampleincriticisingthepoliciesoftheCongoleseleaderGeneralMobutuinopposingEuropeaninfluences:Mobutusays...thathedoesn’thaveaborrowedsoulanylonger;hisparticularblackthingis‘authenticity’.Authenticity...isrejectionofthestrange,thedifficult,thetaxing;itisdespair.38Acultureisauthenticinaquitedifferentsensefromthisifpeoplecanthemselvescontrolitandadaptittotheworldtheyfindthem-selvesin;if,thatistosay,theycanmodifytheirnarrativesandadapttheritualsinwhichtheyparticipatesocially.Tworelatedaxesofassessmentarebeinginvolvedhere.Oneisaculture’samenabilitytoitsbearers’wishes,whichisincompatiblewithitsimposinganidentityuponher,aseitherimperialisingculturesorrigidlyautochthonousonesmaydo.Theotheraxisisaculture’sflexibility,necessarynotonlyaswehavealreadyseen,forepistemicandethicalacceptability,but,aswecannowobserve,foritsamenabilitytopopularwill.50\nCULTURALIDENTITYItisauthenticityinthisliteralsenseofself-writtenculturethatiswhatculturalnationalism,andanalogouspoliticalclaimsofculturalgroups,oughttodependupon.ThekindofcasethatmightbemadeforsuchaclaimcanbeillustratedbyglancingatTimothyBrennan’sstudyofthecultureofanotherCaribbeancountry–Cuba.39BrennanarguesthatAfro-Cubanmusicis,forallitsculturalmix,anindigenousmusicoftheCubanpeople,inparticulartheCubanpoor.Itis,hesuggests,whatdefinesthemasCubans,anditdoessobecausetheyseeitastheirown.Itisasymbolofresistanceand,moreprecisely,ofresistancetotheculturalcommoditiesmarketedbyAmericancapitalismfromwhoseconsumptiontheyareexcluded.YetAfro-Cubanmusicisadeveloping,notastaticform,movingthroughrumbaandmambotosalsa.Norisitanywayexclusive,itsrhythmsbeingconstantlyexportedtotheUSAandelsewhere.ThesortofsocialistpoliticsthatBrennantakesthismusicalculturetosymboliseandthevalueswhichitexpressesarealsoexportableandthus,heimplies,notopentothekindsofcriticismthatmightbedirectedagainstthepoliticsandvaluesofmanyotherculturalnationalisms.Thereis,then,acaseforallowingthattheidentityassociatedwiththiscultureinextricablyinvolvesgroupmembership.Itwould,inthiscase,beanationalidentity,withallthepoliticalimplicationswhichthathasandwhichwehavesofarskirtedaround.Yetitisagroupidentityonlybecausemembershipofagroupis,forparticularpoliticalreasons,requiredinorderforpeopletomaintaincontroloftheculturethatshapestheirgraspoftheworld.HYBRIDITYInthischapterIhaveoutlinedsomeofthefactorsthatcancontributetosomeone’sculturalidentity.Iwantedtoarguethatculturalidentitydoesnotdependuponmembershipofaculturalgroup,asifpeopledividedupneatlyintosuchunits,andIhaverejectedfunctionalistargumentsforsuchaviewandthepoliticalpositionsthatgowiththem.Theirmistakeistoassumethatthevariouselementsofculturedonecessarilyhangtogetherinwaysthatservetoindividuatediscretegroups,or,inthecaseswheretheydoindividuatesuchgroups,thattheynecessarilyhangtogetherincoherentandcognitivelysatisfyingwholes.Rathertheseelementsareoftensimplyputtogethertoindi-viduategroupswithoutconstitutingcoherentwholesindependentlyofthispoliticalfunction.Butcultureis,ofcourse,asocialproduct.HereIwantedtostressthewaythatthepossessionofpowerisboundupwiththeformationofcultures,andtheimportanceofpeople51\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYretainingcontroloftheircultureifitisindeedtobetheirownandtoconferuponthemidentitiestheycanproperlyacknowledge.Thisdoesnotnecessitatetheexistenceofculturalgroupsinwhichcontrolisvested.Insofar,however,aspoliticalactionisneededtosecurecontrol,suchboundedgroupsarelikelytoemerge,withalltheirattendantdangersofexclusionandrigidity.Therearetensionsherebetweenthedifferentrequirementsthatcultureneedstofulfiltobeabletoofferasatisfactoryidentity.PerhapswecaninvestigatethembestbyturningbacktoMrBiswasandseeinghowhisisanexampleofwhatStuartHallcalls‘diasporaidentities’,whichareconstantlyproducingandreproducingthemselvesanew,throughtransformationanddifference.Onecanonlythinkhereofwhatisuniquely–‘essentially’–Caribbean:preciselythemixesofcolour,pigmentation,physiognomictype;the‘blends’oftastesthatisCaribbeancuisine;theaestheticsofthe‘cross-overs’,of‘cutandmix’...whichistheheartandsoulofblackmusic.40Syncretismsuchasthisprovides,Hallimplies,amodelofculturalidentityingeneralthatismoresatisfactorythanonethatviewsitasreflectingarelativelyhomogeneouscultureand,assuch,notreadilyamenabletodevelopmentandindividualchange.Thereismuchinthiswithwhichtoagree,buttherearedangersofvulgarisingthemodel.Identifyingthemmaybringoutwhatculturalidentityisnot,oratleastshouldnot,be.First,thecelebrationof‘mélange,hotchpotch,abitofthisandabitofthat,’41ofwhichSalmanRushdie,authorofTheSatanicVerses,isthemostnotoriousexponent,cansuggestaconceptionofcultureasconsistingofarangeofcommoditiesfromwhichtheconsumermakeshisselection:food,furnishings,filmsandfunkymusicfromallovertheworld.Whilethisnodoubtcapturesanaspectoftheculturalexpe-rienceofmanyinthecontemporaryworld,itcannotbethewholestoryoftheiridentities.Tostartwithwecannotjustchooseourculture.Muchofitissimplygiven.Thelanguagewelearnaschildrenforexample;thehabitusweacquirethen;thefactsaboutusaroundwhichanarrativeandhistorymustbewoven.Muchofthiscanbesupple-mentedandchanged,butitprovidestheunchosenbackgroundforourchoices.Theconsequencesofthisshouldnotbeexaggerated.Itdoesnotentailthatthereisacoreofone’sculturewhichisinvariant,forthismaychangeasanindirectresultofone’schoices.Northatthereisanyaspectofone’sculturethatonemustsimplyaccept.Forifthe52\nCULTURALIDENTITYquestionarisesastowhetheroneshouldacceptitthenthereisalreadythepossibilityofchoosingotherwise.Suchchoicesareindeedmadepossiblebyjustsuchexposuretodifferentculturalinfluences,whichiswhyexposureisresistedbysomeofthoseopposedtoRushdie’svisionofculturalmélange.Second,however,thepictureofmélangesuggeststhattheculturalelementsavailablearealreadyshapedbyothers,asconsumerproductsinacapitalisteconomyare,sothattheonlyscopeforculturalcontrolisthatofindividualchoice.Againthisisamisleadingpicture,notonlyastothefactsbutastothepoliticsofculture.Culture,asagainsttheculturalproductsinwhichitismanifest,isthecreationofindividualsinteractingsocially,transmittingandreceivingtheelementsofculture.Butbythenatureofthesesocialrelationssomewillhavemorepowerthanothersindeterminingtheseculturaloutcomes.Togaincontrolofone’scultureistoapplythispower,andthis,whereitoccurs,isacol-lectiveratherthananindividualachievement.Gainingthispowermayrequiretheformationofculturalgroupswithorganisedstructuresofculturalcontrol.Themembersofthesegroupsmay,asBhikhuParekhwritesoftheimmigrantMuslimsopposedtoRushdie,‘solaceeachotherwithinacommonfellowshipandleadindividuallyheteronomousliveswithinanautonomousgroup’.42Itisunclearwhethersuchatrade-offbetweenindividualchoiceandcollectivecontrolofcultureisinevitable;somedegreeoftensionseemstobeso.Third,andconnectedly,themélangepictureleavesnoroomfortheideaofculturalelementscomingtogetherintoarichandcomplexwhole:theyareonlythe‘hotchpotch’resultingfromindividualchoice.Wedonotneedtoembracefunctionalismnortothinkintermsofboundedculturalgroupstoformulatethenotionofanidentifiableculture,differentiatedfromothers.TospeakoftheculturesoffifthandfourthcenturyAthensorofRenaissanceItaly,say,istoindividuateculturesinthismanner.Forherewaysofthinkingandwritingcometogetherwithrituals,artandarchitectureinwaysthatunitetheseelementsintoanorganisedwhole.Butparticipationinsuchculturesinnowayestablishedgroupidentities,fortheirparticipantsdidnotidentifythemselvesbyreferencetothesecultures,whichplayedadifferentanddeeperrole.Culturessuchastheseprovidescopeforacomprehensiveandunconfusedgraspofreality,ratherthanamerelyepisodicanddisconnectedone.Itshouldnotsimplyberepliedthatunderthechaoticconditionsofmodernitysuchaunifiedgraspoftheworldhasbecomeimpossible.Forthedesiretowardsitisaninescapablepartofwhatitisforasubjectofthoughtandactiontoseekepistemic53\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYandnormativeunityinherdealingswiththeworld.Itispartofwhatitistohaveasingleidentity,inthewayinwhichMrBiswastri-umphantlyachievesit,thoughhisisanindividualachievement,notpartofawidersocialone.NOTES1.V.S.Naipaul,AHouseforMrBiswas(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1968),pp.13–14.2.ThisnotionseemstoderivefromHerder;seeG.JordanandC.Weedon,CulturalPolitics(Oxford:Blackwell,1995),p.565.3.Ishallassumethattheconditionofself-identificationmentionedinthelastchapterissatisfied.4.C.Lévi-Strauss,TheViewFromAfar[1985](Harmondsworth:Penguin,1987),p.17.5.WillKymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship(Oxford:OUP,1995),p.18.6.YaelTamir,LiberalNationalism(Princeton:PrincetonUP,1993),pp.67–8.7.MatthewArnold,LiteratureandDogma[1873](London:Nelson,undated),p.16.8.Lévi-Strauss,ViewFromAfar,p.26.9.SeeR.Dahrendorf,ClassandClassConflictinIndustrialSociety(London:Routledge,1959),p.159.DahrendorfattributestheinsightunderlyingthedistinctionbetweenintegrationorconsensusandconflictorcoerciontheoriestoDavidLockwood.10.AsophisticatedexampleinpoliticaltheoryisprovidedbytheworkofNiklasLuhmann,forexampleTheDifferentiationofSociety(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1982).11.ArecentsociobiologicalaccountisofferedbyW.G.RuncimaninTheSocialAnimal(London:HarperCollins,1998).FollowingHerbertSpencer,TalcottParsonssupposedtherewerelawsofsocialevolution:seehisSocieties:EvolutionaryandComparativePerspectives(EaglewoodCliffs:Prentice-Hall,1966).ForsuccinctcriticismofSpenceriananalogiesseeD.LeeandH.Newby,TheProblemofSociology(London:Hutchinson,1983),pp.73–80.12.ThisobjectionisdrawnfromE.E.Evans-Pritchard’sTheoriesofPrimitiveReligion(Oxford:OUP,1965),pp.58–65.13.Cp.MargaretCanovan’scriticismofTamir,NationhoodandPoliticalTheory(Cheltenham:EdwardElgar,1996),pp.53–4.14.A.MargalitandJ.Raz,‘Nationalself-determination’,repr.inW.Kymlicka(ed),TheRightsofMinorityCultures(Oxford:OUP,1995),pp.86–7.15.Cp.J.Waldron,‘Minorityculturesandthecosmopolitanalternative’,repr.inKymlicka,RightsofMinorityCultures.16.WillKymlicka,Liberalism,CommunityandCulture(Oxford:OUP,1989),pp.164–6,167,175.54\nCULTURALIDENTITY17.Kymlickaquotessuchadescriptionofculturalgroupsapprovingly:ibid.p.176.18.IhavegainedclearerinsightsaboutKymlicka’spositionthroughconver-sationswithMatthewFestenstein;seehis‘NewWorldsforOld:KymlickaandLiberalNationalism’(forthcoming).FestensteinpointsoutthatKymlickacouldprovideotherreasonsfortheculturalbenefitsofnationalself-government,forexamplethegreatersympathyco-nationalswouldhaveforone’sculturalneeds.ButsuchcontingentconsiderationsscarcelyseemtocapturethevitalimportancefortheindividualthatKymlickaattachestoself-government.19.MargalitandRaz,‘Nationalself-determination’,p.87.20.SeeE.Hobsbawm,NationsandNationalismSince1780(Cambridge:CUP,1990),pp.54–5.21.SeeB.King,V.S.Naipaul(London:Macmillan,1993),pp.11–12,153–7.22.CliffordGeertz,TheInterpretationofCultures(London:Hutchinson,1975),p.5.23.ForexampleA.P.Cohen,TheSymbolicConstructionofCommunity(London:Routledge,1989),pp.18–19,55,73.24.QuotedinF.Delaney,TheCelts(London:HarperCollins,1993),p.172.25.Ibid.p.171.26.SeeP.Gilbert,ThePhilosophyofNationalism(Boulder:Westview,1998),p.18.27.SeeR.Harker,C.MahonandC.Wilkes,AnIntroductiontotheWorkofPierreBourdieu(London:Macmillan,1990),pp.10–12.Habitusmayseemtolieonthe‘wholewayoflife’ratherthanideationalsideofculture.Itconsists,however,intransmittedpatternsofactivity,notinactivityitself,andthusprovidesthebackgroundtomorearticulateideas.28.PaulGilroy,TheBlackAtlantic(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUP,1993).29.PaulGilroy,‘Onenationunderagroove’,repr.inG.EleyandR.G.Suny(eds),BecomingNational(NewYork:OxfordUP,1996),p.362.30.ForexamplebyKymlickainLiberalism,CommunityandCulture,p.165.31.TheimportanceofnarrativeidentityisemphasisedbyPaulRicœur,TimeandNarrative(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1984),andinterest-inglydiscussedbyM.R.SomersandG.D.Gibsonin‘Reclaimingtheepistemological“other”:Narrativeandthesocialconstitutionofidentity’inC.Calhoun(ed.),SocialTheoryandthePoliticsofIdentity(Oxford:Blackwell,1994).32.SeeGilbert,PhilosophyofNationalism,pp.160–5forinstancesanddiscussion.33.SeeP.Morgan,‘ThehuntfortheWelshpastintheRomanticperiod’,inE.HobsbawmandT.Ranger(eds),TheInventionofTradition(Cambridge:CUP,1983).34.Introductiontoibid.p.2.35.SeeF.Mustafa,V.S.Naipaul(Cambridge:CUP,1995),pp.77–87.36.P.J.C.Dark,BushNegroArt(London:AlecTiranti,1954),p.v.37.SeeJ.M.Jacobs,‘“Shake’imthiscountry”:themappingoftheAboriginal55\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYsacredinAustralia’,inP.JacksonandJ.Penrose(eds),ConstructionsofRace,PlaceandNation(London:UCLPress,1993).38.QuotedinKing,Naipaul,p.117.39.T.Brennan,AtHomeintheWorld:CosmopolitanismNow(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUP,1997),ch.6.40.S.Hall,‘Culturalidentityanddiaspora’,inP.WilliamsandL.Chrisman(eds),ColonialDiscourseandPost-ColonialTheory(HemelHempstead:Harvester,1993),p.402.41.SalmanRushdie,quotedanddiscussedbyS.Hallin‘Thequestionofcul-turalidentity’,inS.Hall,D.HeldandT.McGrew(eds),ModernityanditsFutures(Oxford:Polity,1992),p.311.42.BhikhuParekh,‘Betweenholytextandmoralvoid’,NewStatesmanandSociety,23March1989,p.31.56\n3NATIONALITYqwNATIONANDSTATE‘How’spoorouldIreland,andhowdoesshestand?’‘She’sthemostdistressfulcountrythateveryetwasseen,Forthey’rehangingmenandwomentherefortheWearin’o’theGreen’1SorunsasnatchfromafamousIrishCatholicsonglamentingthesuppressionofnationalidentitybytheEnglish.Butwhatisnationalidentity,2andwhyisitsexpression–orsuppression–ofsuchimpor-tance?Thenationalitythatappearsonaperson’spassportoridentitycardisnormallytheirmembershipofastate,or,forshort,theirciti-zenship.3Yetthislegalconceptionofnationalityisnottheoneweareconcernedwithhere.ThegrievanceoftheIrishwasforalongtimethattheylackedaseparatenationalityinthislegalsense,becausetheylackedaseparatestate.Butthisdidnotpreventtheminsistingontheirseparatenationalidentity,theirmembershipofaseparatenationor,inotherwords,ofaseparatepeople,inasenseofthetermappar-entlydifferentfromthosealreadyconsidered.Toaskwhatisnationalidentityis,then,toaskwhatnationsare,andwhymembershipofthemshouldbethoughttohavethesignificanceitdoes.Theequivocalnatureoftheconceptofnationalityprovides,how-ever,acluetowardsansweringthisquestion.Primordialismaboutnations–theviewthatnationsareanunchanginglocusofattachment57\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYinhumansociallife–isquiteuntenable.Themodernconceptofthenationisinextricablylinkedtotheconceptofthestate,sothatnation-alityconnotesmembershipofanationonlybecauseitcanconnotemembershipofastate.For,whileitmayseemasifjusttheconverseheld,andnationalitycouldbearthesenseofcitizenshiponlyontheassumptionthatallcitizensaremembersofthenation,itistheideathattherecouldbeabodyofpeoplecorrespondingtothemembersofthestateandyetcollectedtogetherbymorethanjustthisfactthatisvitaltotheconceptofthenation.Theconceptisamodernonebecausesoisthestate,understoodasanorganisationexercisingsovereigntyoveraspecificterritoryanddoingsoonbehalfofitsinhabitantsgenerally.Andtheconceptofthenationasabodyofpeopleinsomesenseproperlycorrespondentwiththestatebyvirtueofthewaytheyarecollectedtogetherisavailableonlywhentherearesuchstates.Whileitdoesnotfollowlogicallythattherewerenonationspriortostates–sincethingscanexistpriortoourhavingaconceptofthem–itisquiteunclearwhattheforceofclaimingthatthereweresuchpriornationswouldbe.Forthesocialformationsthatmaybeconceivedofasnationscanonlyreasonablybepresumedtohavedevelopedinresponsetothegrowthofstates.4Whatevercollectivitiesexistedbeforethestatedidnotexistasnations,eveniftheyexistedassomeothersortofsocialcollectivity,forexampleethnicgroups.FollowinginthefootstepsofHegel,MaxWebergraspstheneedtospecifyaconnectionbetweenstateandnationinordertocharacterisethelatter:‘anation,’hewrote,‘isacommunityofsentimentwhichwouldadequatelymanifestitselfinastateofitsown.’5Weberhereindicatesaprinciplethatcollectspeopletogether–theircommunityofsentiment–intoabodyofasortsuchthataseparatestateistheappropriateformforitspoliticalorganisation.This,Isuggest,exem-plifiesthegeneralrelationbetweenstateandnation:anationisapeoplecollectedtogetheronthebasisofsomeprinciplewhichmakesastateappropriateforthem.6Therelevanceofnationalmembershiptopoliticalarrangementsisimmediatelyevidentonthisaccount:atleastonewayofjustifyingsucharrangementsistorevealthemasprovidinganationwithitsstate.Butitisnotyetclearwhyastateshouldbeappropriatetoanation,andthat,Isuggest,willdependonthespecificprincipleofcollectionemployedinmarkingoutanation.Astateisappropriatetoacommunityofsentiment,say,becauseonlysuchsentimentscanprovidethecohesionrequiredforasuccessfulstate.Notice,however,thattheaccountsuggestedhereisnotquiteequivalenttothestrongerclaimwhichtheoristslikeErnestGellner58\nNATIONALITYtakenationalismtomake,namelythat‘thepoliticalandnationalunitshouldbecongruent’.7Thisstrongerclaimimpliesthatitisonlyforanationthatastateisappropriate,whichtooquicklyrulesout,forexample,federalstateswhereconstituentnationsthatcouldappropri-atelyhavehadseparatestateshaveoptedforasingleone.Membersofafederalstatearenotcollectedtogetherbyanythingmorethanthisfact,whereassupposedlytheyarecollectedtogetherintoitscon-stituentpartsbysomethingmore,namelybywhateveritisthatcol-lectsthemintonations.Thegeneralconnectionbetweenwhatcollectspeopleintonationsandwhatmakesstatehoodappropriatetothemis,Iclaim,constitutiveofnationhood.Nationalismistheclaimthattherearenationsassounderstoodandthatthelegitimacyofstatesultimatelydependsupontheirrelationtonations.Onthisaccountnationalidentityisinacertainsenseinherentlypolitical.Itisthekindofidentitywhichcollectssomepeopletogetherwithothersinawaythatmakesstatehoodappropriateforthecollec-tivity.Inclaimingacertainnationalidentity–IrishratherthanBritish,say–theyaremakingapoliticalclaim,howeverrootedininescapablefactsthatclaimistakentobe:Whenlawscanstopthebladesofgrassfromgrowin’astheygrow,AndwhentheleavesinsummertimetheircolourdarenotshowThenIwillchangethecolourtooIwearinmycaubeen;Buttilthatday,pleaseGod,I’llsticktotheWearin’o’theGreen.8Nationalidentitycanseemnaturalandimmemorial,butitspoliticalcharactershowsitisneitherofthesethings.Nationalconsciousnessisaresponsetospecificpoliticalcircumstances,thoughtowhatsortofcircumstancesexactlyisamatterofdisputeamongsttheorists,some,likeHobsbawm,locatingitsoriginsintheAmericanandFrenchRevolutionsofthelateeighteenthcentury,9otherslikeLiahGreenfeldinpoliticaldevelopmentsinsixteenth-centuryEngland.10Itis,inanycase,aconsciousnessofdifferentthings,ofdifferentwaysinwhichpeoplemaybecollectedtogetherintheirdifferingcircumstances.Itisforthisreasonthatitshouldnotbeviewedasaconsciousnessofsomepre-existingcollectivity.Ofcoursepeoplecanberegardedasformingcollectionsinaccordancewithsomeprincipleorotherpriortoanyrecognitionofthefact.Butthatthesecollectionsareputativelynationsdependsuponthepossibilityofmobilisingthemforthepolitical59\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYpurposesforwhichnationsaremobilised.Thoughone’sownnationalidentityisnotnecessarilysomethingofwhichoneisaware,thisdoesnotimplythatitissomethingthatcansensiblybeimputedtopeoplewholackthepossibilityofsuchawareness,anawarenessthatisinescapablyboundupwithasenseofitspoliticalrepercussions.Nowthepoliticalcharacterofnationalidentityhasanimmediateconsequence.Itisthat,becausepoliticsalwaysinvolvesastruggleforpower,anationalidentityisacontestableidentity.Whilesomenationalidentitiesarerelativelywell-sedimentedintoastableandpermanentpoliticalsystem,noneisimmunetocontestationandthusnonecanbeavowedorascribedwithoutfearofcontradictionoremendation.Contestationcanhappenintwoways.Oneconcernspeople’snominalidentity:bywhatnametheyaretobecalled–Irish,say,orBritish.Thisinvolvesadisputeeitherastowhatnationsthereare–astowhethertherewasaseparateIrishnation,forexample,orwhetherthereisaKurdishone–orastowhichoftwoormorepresumednationssomeonebelongs,IrishorBritish,KurdishorTurk.Inbothkindsofcasetheremaybeadisputeastowhichnationalnamesomeoneshouldbear.Theotherkindofcontestation,relatedinanobviousfashiontothefirst,concernspeople’saffiliativeidentity,aswemaythinkofit:withwhichotherpeoplearetheyaffiliatedinhavingthenationalnametheydo?DoessomeoneincontestablyIrishsharetheirnationalitywiththedescendantsofEnglishsettlersinIrelandorarethesetobeexcludedfromtheIrishnation?Theboundariesofthenationundergomoreorlessconstantcontentiousrevision,sothatitisindeterminatewhataffiliationssomeoneacknowledgesinavowingnationalidentity.Theresultisthatnationalidentityitselfisnofixedthing,butthesubjectofcontestedinterpretations.11Irishmaids,lovenonebutthoseWhowearthejacketsGreen12enjoinsanotherIrishsong.Butwhowearsthosejacketsandwhatisittowearthem?Towhom,indeed,istheinjunctionaddressed?SongslikethiscontinuetobesungasanexpressionofanIrishnationalidentitywhosescopeisstillunresolved.NATIONANDPLACEAstateexercisessovereigntyoveraspecificterritory.Anationalidentityis,therefore,innormalcircumstancesatypeoflocalidentity.Itidentifiessomeoneintermsoftheirrelationtoaspecificplace,asa60\nNATIONALITYtownorvillageidentityalsodoes.Thereareexceptions,aswhenmembersofanationhave,inactualfactorintheirtalesoforigins,movedfromthewholeorapartofsomehomeland,andstill,perhaps,carrythenameofit.Thenationmayyetlayclaimtoit.Moreusuallytheterritorytowhichaclaimislaidisthatinwhichitsinhabitantsreside,sothattheirlocalandnationalidentitiescorrespond.Aclaimthatstatehoodisappropriateforapeopleis,Ihavesuggested,essentialtothesuppositionoftheirnationhood.Nowsinceastaterequiresaterritoryitfollowsthattheargumentforstatehoodapeopleproducesmustinvolveanargumentforterritory,andgenerallyforsomespecificterritorywhichtheyclaim.Thisisacriticalaspectofthewaythatnationalidentitycanbearonpoliticalarrangements,namelyontheboundariesthataredrawnaroundstates.Whatkindofargument,then,mightapeopleusetoclaimsometerritory?TheUlsterProtestantpoetJohnHewittoffersonesuchargument:Wehaverightsdrawnfromthesoilandsky;theuse,thepace,thepatientyearsoflabour,therainagainstthelips,thechanginglight,theheavyclay-suckedstridehavealteredus...thisisourcountryalso,no-whereelse.13Arighttolandisclaimedonthestrengthofpeoplehavingworkeditandintheprocesshavingbecomeadaptedtoit.ThefirstpartoftheargumentderivesfromJohnLocke’sideathatsomeoneacquireslandbecause‘hehathmixedhislabourwithit’.14TheUlsterProtestantclaimtothenorthofIrelandwould,onthisconstruction,bebasedonaggregatingtogethertheirindividualpropertyrightssoacquired.Sofarnospecificfeaturesoftheirnationalidentityareinvolvedintheclaim.Thesecondpartoftheargument,however,takesadifferenttack:itisthelandofIrelandthathasalteredthem,andthisistakenbothtoconfirmtheirright–tounderlinetheirpersonalinvestment–andtoaffecttheirnationalidentityinawaythatgivesthemaspecificclaim.Irelandhasconferredthislocalidentityuponthem:thattheyareidentifiedasoftheplacegivesthemaclaimtoit.Andthisisthereforeoneform,atleast,ofIrishidentity,whatevertheirBritishallegiances.ThusHewittgoesontowrite,inthesamepoem:Thisismyhomeandcountry.LateronperhapsI’llfindthiscountryismyown.Thereare,then,twodistinctargumentsforterritoryhere,thefirstsofarindependentofnationalidentity,whichisdifferentlyestablished,61\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYtheseconddependentuponitasalocalidentity.Thefirst,inbrief,isthatthelandbelongstothem,thesecond,onemightsay,isthattheybelongtotheland–andtodosoconstitutesapartoftheiridentity.Neitherargumentis,ofcourse,theargumentfromindigenousoccupationthatotherinhabitantsofIreland,northandsouth,mayadvance.In‘AmongtheRuins’,astorybytheDonegalwriterBrianFriel,oneofthecharacters,Joe,ignoreshisfamily’sprotestsatthewayhe’sdrivingthroughtheIrishlandscape:Atthismoment,Idon’tgiveadamn...withMeenalaraganandPigeonToponmyleftandGlenmakennifandAltanureonmyright.Becausethesearemyhills,andIknewthembeforeIknewwifeorchildren.15Thattheyarehishillsformshisidentity,whichisherealocalandtherebyanationalone.Anationalrighttolandispresupposedinapeople’sidentifyingthemselvesasthosetowhomitbelongs,not,asinthepreviouscase,asindividualproperty,butasthelandthattheycollectivelyhavemadetheirownthroughinscribingtheircultureinit.TheplacenamesinFriel’sstoryareessentialtoestablishingthisrelation.ItisnotjustthatthehillsthemselvesbelongtoJoeandhiscountry-men;itisthatthehillsarehisunderthesenames,becausehispeoplehavebestowedtheminthecourseoftheirengagementwiththeland,anengagementwhichhasgiventhemahistoryandfolklore.TherelationisillustratedinFriel’splayTranslationswhichcentresaroundtherenamingofIrishplacesbynineteenth-centuryEnglishsurveyors.TheirIrishinformant,Owen,speaks:...wecallthatcrossroadsTobairVree...Tobairmeansawell...butwhatdoesVreemean?It’sacorruptionofBrian...andanoldmancalledBrian,whosefacewasdisfiguredwithanenormousgrowth,gotitintohisheadthatthewaterinthatwellwasblessed;andeverydayforsevenmonthshewentthereandbathedhisfaceinit.Butthegrowthdidn’tgoaway;andonemorningBrianwasfounddrownedinthatwell.Andeversincethatcross-roadsisknownasTobairVree–eventhoughthatwellhaslongsincedriedup.16Thesurveyors,unusually,decidetoretaintheIrishname.Forthemostpart,however,theychangethenamesintoEnglishonessothat,asoneoftheIrishcharacterscomestoadmit,‘wemustlearnwherewelive.Wemustlearntomakethemourown.Wemustlearntomakethemournewhome.’17Therenaminghasdestroyed,or,completedbythelossoftheIrishlanguage,willdestroy,theoriginalrelationtoplace62\nNATIONALITYthatsuppliedacertainsortofIrishidentityand,withit,aclaimtotheland.ThemessageofFriel’splayisthatthisidentityneedstobereconstructedand,byimplication,itsconcommitantpoliticalclaimsre-establishedinthelightofnewrealities.Thesituationheredescribedis,Iamsuggesting,paradigmatic.Indigenouslandclaimsdonotprincipallydependonhistoricentitle-mentstoproperty,whichlatersettlershavewronglyviolated,assomewhosupportsuchclaims,likeJamesTully,18haveaverred.Theydepend,rather,uponthewaythatculturalidentitiesareshapedbythesortofrelationtothelandthatIhaveindicated.Butthishasimportantrepercussions.Foraswehaveseenearlier,culturalidentitydoesnotnecessarilyconsistinmembershipofawell-demarcatedculturalgroup,stilllessanation.Itfollowsthatifanargumentforterritoryderivesfromthedesirabilityofpreservingcertainculturalidentitiesthenitneednotnecessarilyrequirethepoliticalrecognitionofaculturalgroup.Butunlessitdoes,whileitmaysupportpoliciesthattendtomaintainaculturallybasedrelationtoplace,itcanscarcelyservetodelimittheboundariesofstates.Forthiswouldrequiretherecogni-tionofgroupsasentitiestowhichcertainboundedterritoriesmightcorrespond.19ThesamestricturescouldbelevelledatthesecondsortofargumentinvolvedinJohnHewitt’slinesdiscussedatthestartofthissection:thefirsthasdifferentfailings,tobetouchedonlater.Noneofthisimpliesthattheremightnotbegoodargumentsforconcedingastateofacertaingeographicalshapeandsizetoaculturalgroupinordertoprotectitsmembers’identities.Itisjustthatnogeneralcasefromtheirindigenousnessmaybeavailable:thattherealstrengthoftheirculturalattachmentstoplace–shornofsentimentalityandself-deception–needstobegauged,andthatthepossibility,indeedthelikelihood,ofchangeinthatrelationneedstobeacknowledged.Underthepressuresof‘modernisation’imposedonpeoplebyagen-ciesnottheirown,itisinevitablethatclear-sightednessaboutthesemattersmaybeinshortsupply,andthoseinthisplightcannotbeblamedforlackofit.Indeedanappealtoavanishingculturalrelationtoapeople’splacemaybealegitimatetacticagainstfurtheroppressionanddispossession.Whilstsuchfactsgenerateargumentsforempoweringandrespectingindigenouspeoples,theygeneratenogeneralcaseforaculturallybasedterritorialnationalism.20THENATIONALCOMMUNITYWhatbindspeopletoaplaceis,oftenenough,thecommunitywhosecollectivelifeisshapedbyitandmadepossiblebyitsresources.Itis63\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYperhapsunsurprisingthatthenation’srelationtoitsterritoryhasbeenseeninsimilarterms,andthenationregardedasitselfakindofcommunity,asinWeber’sdefinition.NorecentaccounthasbeenmoreinfluentialthanthatofBenedictAnderson,whodefinesitas‘animaginedcommunity–andimaginedasbothinherentlylimitedandsovereign’.21Itislimitedbecausesharplydemarcated,bysomeprincipleofcollection,fromothernationsandsovereignbecauseappropriateforstatehood.Whatisrequiredisforittobeacommunityweshallcometoinamoment,butitis,Andersonallows,animaginedone,inthesensethat‘inthemindsofeach[member]livestheimageoftheircommu-nion’,22ratherthanthatcommunionsimplybeingafactoftheirrelationships.Itisbymeansofsuchimagesthatpeoplearecollectedintonationsdemarcatedfromoneanother.Anderson’sideaisonethattheIrishNationalistpoetGeorgeRussell–‘AE’ashecalledhimself–hadexpressedmuchearlier:‘anationexistsprimarilybecauseofitsownimaginationofitself’.23Russellhadaclearperceptionofthedifferentandcompetingformssuchimaginationmaytake:WewouldnoIrishsignefface,ButyetourlipswouldgladlierhailThefirst-bornoftheComingRaceThanthelastsplendouroftheGael.24AnimageoftheIrishcommunityderivedfromtheGaelicpastisherechallengedonbehalfofthose,liketheAnglo-IrishRussell,whowouldnotfiteasilyintoit.ForIrelandisacountrywheretheindigenousandthedescendantsofsettlersareintermingled.Thequestionariseswhetherthelatterarepartofthesamenationastheformer,anditaroseparticularlyacutelyaroundthetimeofIrishindependence.Itwasthiscontroversythaterupted,notoriously,atthefirstper-formanceofJ.M.Synge’sThePlayboyoftheWesternWorld.ForwhatSyngesoughttodowastocreateaHiberno-EnglishidiomavailableforaninclusivevisionoftheIrishcommunity,butrootedintherhythmsandimageryofGaelic.ItwascondemnedbyGaelicists,includingD.P.Morgan,asa‘hopelesshalf-wayhouse’25andbyotherssuchasJohnErvineasafake–‘contrivedliterarystuff,entirelyunrep-resentativeofpeasantspeech’.26Butitcaughton,asprovidingnotonlyavividimageofacommunitywhosesocialrelationshipscanbeconductedinthisspeech,butalso,somewhatcomically,asSynge’sdetractorscomplained,asavehicleforthestageIrishmanwhocametobeencounteredinreallife.Whatisimaginedinimagininga64\nNATIONALITYcommunity,then,isawayofconductingacertainsetofsocialrelations;whichiswhytheinvention–ortheacceptanceascanonical–ofamodeofspeechprovidesanimageofcommunity,forspeechisthevehicleofrelationships.Itdeterminestheirformandexpressesthevaluesthatcanberealisedinthem.Thespokenlanguageinwhichonefeelsathomeis,toborrowapertinentphraseofYeats,‘ahouseWhereall’saccustomed,ceremonious’.27Therelationalcharacterofcommunitybringsoutacharacteristicofnationalidentitywehavenotpreviouslynoticed.Ifone’snationisacommunitythentobeamemberofitistohaveasocietalidentity,inthesensethatitistobeidentifiedintermsofone’ssocialrelationships,justastohaveafamilialidentityis.Indeedthefamilyoftenservesasamodelofthenation,andsomesupposeitalwaysdoes.28Butitssocietalcharactersharplydistinguishesnationality,evenunderthefamilymodel,fromethnicity,despitetheunderpinningsofbothinkinship.Forethnicityisnotasocietalbutanon-societalidentity.Itidentifiespeopleintermsoftheirinheritedcharacteristicsquiteindependentlyofwhethertheymaintaintheappropriatesocialrelationswithothermembers.Nationalidentity,bycontrast,conceivedofasmembershipofafamily-likecommunity,requiresjustthoserelations,evenifitisthoughtthatitiswithinagrouprelatedbykinshipthattheywillbemaintained.Thefamilyprovidesonlyonepossibleimageofthenationalcom-munity.Butitbringsintoprominencetwofeaturescommontoallcommunities.First,acommunityisabodyofpeoplecollectedtogether,atleastinpart,throughthepossessionofcommongoals.Second,itisonecementedbyatleastsomedegreeofmutualconcern,whichfollowsfromthefactthatthegoalsinquestionarenotjustcoincidentbutcollectivelypursued,sothatthesuccessorfailureofeachmemberbearsonthatoftheothers.Onewayofputtingthesefeaturestogetherinanimagedrawnfromfamiliesisinthenotionoffraternity.ThusAndersonarguesthatthenationisimaginedasacommunity,because,regardlessoftheactualinequalityandexploitationthatmayprevailineach,thenationisalwaysconceivedasadeephorizontalcomradeship.Ultimatelyitisthisfraternitythatmakesitpossible,overthepasttwocenturies,forsomanymillionsofpeoplenotsomuchtokill,aswillinglytodieforsuchlimitedimaginings.29Yetthereisanevidenttensionherethatneedsinvestigation.ForontheonehandAndersonregardsrelationsoffraternityasevidenceof65\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYcommunity;ontheother,heallowsthepossibilityof‘actualinequalityandexploitation’whichseemtocountagainstit.Howcanthisbe?Andersonisatpainstostressthatanimaginedcommunitymightforallthatbearealcommunity:‘allcommunitieslargerthanprimordialvillagesofface-to-facecontact(andperhapseventhese)areimag-ined.’30Anationexists,hebelieves,whenenoughpeopleimaginethemselvestoformone,fortheirimaginingcreatesacommunity,makespossiblesocialrelationsofasortforwhichtheremaybenopriorbasis.Yetthisopensupapossiblegapbetweenthoseantecedentlyexistingrelationsandtherelationsbroughtforthfromthenationalimagination.Itisthisgap,surely,whichledErnestGellnertomaintainthat‘nationalismisnottheawakeningofnationstoself-consciousness:itinventsnationswheretheydonotexist.’31Andersontakesissuewiththeimplicationoffabricationandfalsityhere.ButsurelyGellnerisright.Ifrealrelationsofcommunitydonotantecendentlyexistthenthenationalimaginationdoesfabricatethem,anditfabricatesthemonthebasisofafalseperceptionofthoserelations.Inaword,itfakesthem,toharkbacktothecriticismofSynge’simaginedIrishcom-munity.ThequestionthatneedstobeaskedaboutSynge’spictureiswhetheritisinthissenseafake.Howeverpowerfulitseffect,diditmisrepresentcontinuingsocialrelationsinruralIrelandwiththeaimofevokinginadequatelygroundedsentimentsofnationalsolidarity?Therearevariouswaysinwhichtheimageofanationalcommunitycanmisrepresentsocialrelations,whicharetobejudgedbytheactualbehaviourofpeopleandthusbytheirimplicitintentionsasmuchormorethanbytheirexplicitandself-avowedones.Peoplecansupposethemselvestobewillingtoassociatewiththosetheyarenotinfactwillingtoassociatewith,ortobeunwillingtoassociatewiththosewithwhomtheyalreadyenjoysuccessfulcommunalrelations.Theremaybecommongoalsandconcernsamongthem,butthescopeofthesemaynotcorrespondtothatofthesupposititiousnation.Alter-natively,theremaybenoeffectivecommongoalbecauseasub-groupwithinthelargerwholeisabletodeterminetheagendaandcontrolothersforsectionaladvantage:oppressionandexploitationrenderthe‘horizontalcomradeship’ofthenationillusory.Forsuchcomradeshiptobeattained,thedominantsub-groupwouldeitherhavetomodifyitsbehaviourorbeexcludedfromthenationalcommunity.Ifitclaimstobepartofthenationthentheformeriswhatitshoulddo,andinanycasethisoptionexemplifiesabetterwayoflifethanthelatter,sinceitmakespossiblethevaluesofconcordandco-operation.Forstatehoodtobeappropriatetothemandthustoqualifyasanationapeoplemustatleastaimatandbeabletorealisesuchvalues.3266\nNATIONALITYThecriticismofthevisionSyngesetsforthwaslessthattheruralsocietyitdepictedprovidedaquiteinaccurateimageofanIrishnationalcommunitythanthat,througharticulatingthosecommunalrelationsintheEnglishlanguage,itmadeaplacefortheAnglo-IrishdescendantsofthecolonistsonanequalfootingwiththatoftheindigenousGaels.Indeed,itrepresentedanattemptbySynge,YeatsandtheotherAnglo-Irishmembersoftheliterarysettocontroltheagendaofnation-buildingtotheirownadvantage.‘Itwas,’asTerryEagletonobserves,‘preciselybecausetheywereapoliticallydispossessedgroupthattheAnglo-Irishcouldshift,asthoughbywayofcompen-sation,toculturalproduction’,withtheeffectofrecastingIreland‘asasocietywithitshereditaryrulersstillsecretlyincommand.’33Suchanassessmentwouldrequirecarefulappraisal.ItisatleastnotobviousthatthesortofsocietywhichhasinfactbeenachievedintheRepublicofIrelandisnotonewheretheAnglo-IrishfindthemselvesonamoreorlessequalfootingwiththeindigenousIrish(inalltheirvariety),asocietyachievedinnosmallpartthroughAnglo-Irishimaginativeproductions.PerhapstheaimsofSyngeandhiscolleaguesshouldnotbetooreadilydismissed.Peoplewanttobeacommunity,andthinkingofthemselvesasonehelpstomakethemso.Butwhatisdesiredmaynotberealised,andsinceitiscomfortingtobelieveonereallyispartofacommunitythisfactmaybedisguisedfromone.Thenationalimag-inationispronetoself-deception,forthevaluesitaimsforareeasiertoenvisionthantorealise,thefactseasiertofalsifythantoconfront.Torealisecommunalvaluesonanationalscaleis,however,theresultofsuchimagination.Andifthatimaginationispotentandhasthesortofresiliencethatstemsfromclear-sightednessastothefacts,thenitmayproducerelationsofasortthatdidnotpreviouslyexist.Eachnationalclaimtoinstantiatethem,though,mustbeconsideredonitsparticularmerits.CIVICNATIONHOODWhatAnderson’saccountofnationhoodbringsoutisthattherearemanydifferentstylesinwhichthenationcanbeimagined.Thesecanbeclassifiedinvariousways.Adistinctionbetweensuchstylesthathasgainedwidespreadcurrencyisthatbetweencivicandethnicconcep-tionsofnationhood,orasitissometimesmisleadinglyput,betweenpoliticalnationsandculturalnations34orbetweenwesternandeasternnationalisms.35Ineachcasetheformercategoryisusuallyseenassomehowmodernandenlightened,thelatterasanachronisticand67\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYgivenovertodarkanddangerousforces.Intruth,however,bothcanbeviewedasproductsofdifferentfacetsofwhatcrystallisedasEnlightenmentthought.Thecivicconception,broadlyspeaking,seespeopleasessentiallyrationalcalculators,abletograsptheadvantagesofstatehoodandtoenterintoitbymutualagreement.Theethnicconception,paradigmatically,seesthemascollectedtogetherwilly-nillyintocollectivitiesclassifiedbysomescience,beitbiology,philology,orwhatever,sothatpoliticalarrangementsshouldbeshapedtocorre-spondtothem.Ineachcaseitisbecausepeopleaccepttherelevantassumptionofmodernthoughtthattheyseethemselvesasformingnationsinaccordancewithit,occupyingstandpointsunavailablepriortothesewaysofthinking.Thecivicconception,socalled,comprises,infact,awiderangeofdifferentaccountsofnationhood.Indeeditisunclearthatitreallyconstitutesasingleconceptionatall,fortherearetwoquitedistinctfeaturesthataretakentocharacteriseit.Thesearereadilycombinable,butcanasreadilycomeapart.Oneisanemphasisonthestateasthatwhichunifiespeopleandwhichinnormalcircumstancestheycangraspasadvancingtheircommoninterests.Astatewithgivenbound-ariesisappropriatetothemandmakesthemanationpreciselybecausearationalassessmentoftheirsituationwillrevealittodoso.Itwas,ofcourse,justsuchaviewthatmotivatedthosewhoopposedIrishindependencetodenyanIrishnationhoodseparatefromthatoftherestoftheUnitedKingdom;anditcontinuestomotivatethedenialofaseparateScottishorWelshone.ItalsounderpinstheviewthatinwesternEurope,andintheex-colonialterritoriesthatinheritedwesternEuropeaninstitutions,nationsareformedbystatesratherthanviceversa.36Andonthisviewitisonlyradicaldysfunctionalityinthestate,resultingfromitsattemptingtoholdtogetherinonepolityinterestswhichcannotbesocombined,thatwouldcallintoquestionthecorrespondenceofthestateandnation,andrenderitirrationalformembersofastatetocontinuetosupportit.37Itshouldnotbethought,however,thattorejectthissortofcivicviewofthenation–thestatistview,aswemaycallit–istoembraceanethnicone.Yeats,SyngeandtheircirclerejecteditinembracingIrishnationalism.ButnotonlydidtheynotaccepttheGaelicethnicismofmanyIrishnationalists,theyarguablyrejectedethnicismitselfandoptedforacivicviewoftheIrishnationofwhichtheytookthem-selvestobeapart.IndoingsotheyinheritedanolderAnglo-Irishtraditionofthoughtwhichheldaviewofnationsasvoluntaryassoci-ations,peoplescollectedtogetherwithcommongoalsbecausethey68\nNATIONALITYchosetocometogetherthus.ThisemphasisonindividualchoiceistheotherfeatureofthecivicconceptionthatIflaggedupearlier.Butontheinterpretationbeingconsideredhereitisactualchoicethatisinquestion.BritishruleinIrelandfailedtomakeitonenationwithBritainonthisview,becausetheIrishchosenottoassociatewiththeBritishinasharedstatehood.RathertheyformedaseparateIrishcommunitybecauseoftheirchoices,possiblyimplicit,toassociatetogetherinthebusinessoflife.Itissuchvoluntaryassociationthatmakessharedstatehoodappropriatetothem.TheclassicexpositionofthissortofviewisErnestRenan’s:‘theexistenceofanationisadailyplebiscite’.38Itispeople’scontinuingtochoosetoassociatethatholdsthenationtogether.Whytheychoosetodosoisunimportant,solongasitisnotforreasonsmerelyephemeralandopportunistic.Aplebisciteisnotanopinionpollwhichcanvassespeople’sviewsastothefactsoftheircollectiveidentity.Whateverthecurrentfactsofthematterconcerningtheunifyingcharacteristicsofsomepeoplemaybe,theyare,inRenan’sview,strictlyirrelevanttonationalidentity.Fornationalidentityistheupshotofthechoicespeoplemakewhichcreateanassociation,notofantecedentfactsaboutthem,bethesefactsabouttheirsocialrelationshipsoranythingelse.Itiseasytosee,then,whyYeatsandSyngethoughtoftheIrishnationassomethingtobefashionedbyinfluencingthosechoices,ratherthanassomethingalreadyformedbyfactsofculture,ancestryorlong-standingcommunalrelations.Thesemethodsofnation-buildingbringout,aswell,howmisleadingitistocomparecivicwithethnicnationalismintermsofacontrastbetweenthepoliticalandthecultural,asJohnHutchinson,forexample,does.39Bothinvolveculturalfactorsandeithercanbefocusedoncul-turetoagreaterorlesserextent.Accordingtoacivicconception,anassociationofakindforwhichstatehoodissupposedlyappropriatecanbeformedandmaintainedwiththeexplicitpurposeofcreatingorsustainingastate,orsimilarpoliticalorganisation.Butitneednotbeso.Itcanbeformedtoprotectordevelopaculture,thoughthiswillinevitablyinvolvepoliticalmethods.Whatmaythusbereferredtoas‘culturalnationalism’can,nonetheless,sharethesamefeaturesasmuchcivicnationalism,sinceitpickstheculturalgroupoutasthatforwhichstatehoodisappropriatebecauseastateistakentobelegitimateonlywhenitcorrespondstoavoluntaryassociation.Whatdifferentiatesitfromthemoreexplicitlypoliticalversionisthattheassociationforwhichitisappropriateisfocusedaroundaculture,aswhatisrequired,otherthingsbeingequal,foreffectivepoliticalcommunicationand69\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYsocialcohesion.Thislastassumptionis,perhaps,whatexplainstheimportanceforYeatsandSyngeofanEnglish-languagedepictionofIrishcommunalrelations,forapurelyGaeliconewouldhaveexcludedmanyoftheirkind,andotherstoo,fromequalpoliticalandsocialparticipation.Yettheother,moreexplicitlypoliticalcivicnationalismisnotdevoidofculturalobjectives.Evenifso-called‘cultural’nationalismisthoughtofasaimingat‘amoralregenerationofacommunity’,40explicitlypoliticalnationalismscouldqualifyforthelabel,whethertheyareofthestatistorassociationistvarieties.Forstateshavetheirownmoreorlessdistinctivepoliticalcultures–theirunderstandingsofhowpoliticsshouldbeconductedandofthevaluesthatcanberealisedpolitically–andthe‘moralregenerationofacommunity’maywellbeviewedasrequiringtherealisationofsuchvalues–of,forexample,civillibertiesorsocialjustice.Indeed,wholetraditionsofliberalorrepublicanthoughthave,asweshallseeinlaterchapters,beenfoundedonsuchbeliefs,thoughthesetraditionsareparadigmaticofcivicor‘western’conceptionsofthenationandofthestate’srelationtoit.Nodoubtnotallcivicnationalismissobenign:neitheranemphasisontheunifyingstatenoranemphasisontheroleofindi-vidualchoiceensuresitwillbe.Usually,asindicatedearlier,civicnationalismisseenascivilised,itsethniccounterpartaspotentiallybarbarous.Those,likeHutchinson,whoassimilatethisdistinctiontoapolitical/culturalone,however,sometimesentertain,asAnthonySmithexpressesit,‘theideaofsun-deringthenationfromthepoliticaldomainandreturningittothesphereofcultureandcivilsocietyfromwhichitsprang,asiftherebytheevilgeniecouldbesealedonceagaininhisproverbialbox.’Withouttheaimofseparatestatehood,theysuppose,‘thefangsofnationalismare...drawn’.TheconsiderationsofthelastparagraphshouldleadustoagreewithSmithinarguingthattheculturalandthepoliticalcannotbesoeasilyseparated.‘Thedevelopmentofanynationalism’,asheputsit,‘dependsonbringingtheculturalandmoralregenerationofthecommunityintoacloserelationship,ifnotharmony,withthepoliticalmobilisationandself-determinationofitsmembers.’41Whatthiswayofputtingitbringsoutisthat,howeverattenuatedlycivicinformanationalidentitymaybe,itwillmostlybe,forallthat,tosomedegreeatleast,aculturalidentity.70\nNATIONALITYETHNICNATIONHOODTheethnicconceptionofthenationalsomanifestsaconsiderablediversityofforms.Alongoneparameterthesedifferencesconcernthequalificationsrequiredformembershipofthenation.Someso-calledethnicnationalismsareovertlyracist,demandingdescentfromthesame,generallyindigenous,peopleasothermembers,sothatthoseofadifferentancestry,andoftenofacorrespondinglydifferentcolour,physiognomyorbodytype,areautomaticallyexcluded.Othersrequireonlycertainstipulatedculturalsimilarities,asharedlanguage,say,resultingfromearlysocialisation.Inbothsortsofcase,andotheranalogousones,nationalidentityisunchosenand,indeed,notevenapossiblesubjectofchoice.Itisthis,crucially,whichdistinguishesethnicfromcivicnationalism;for,onthelatter,nationalidentityispresumedeithertohavebeenchosen,inassociationistversions,oratleasttobewhatitwouldberationaltochoose,instatistones.Noneofthiscon-tradictsthepointnotedearlierindiscussingethnicgroupmembershipmoregenerally,thatethnicnationalidentitiesinvolveself-identification.Sincetheethnicnationistakentobeagroupthathasaconceptionofitselfasdistinctfromothersthenself-identificationmustbeinvolved.Butthisisaprocessofcollectivegroupconstructionthatbynomeansimpliesthepossibilityofthatself-identificationbeingsomethingwhichcanbefreelychosenbyeachindividualmember.Anotherparameteralongwhichethnicnationalismsvaryconcernswhethertheyoffersocietalornon-societalaccountsofnationhood.Althoughtherhetoricofthecommunityisprevalentinmostnation-alismsitonlyplaysaneffectiveroleinnationscharacterisedintermsoftheirmembers’socialrelations.Butifnationsarethoughtofaspeopleswithasharedethnicity,thentheyarenotbeingcharacterisedintermsofsuchrelations,sinceethnicgroupmembershipconsistssimplyinindividualpossessionoftheracialorculturalfeaturesrequired.Ifsuchgroupsdo,inlargepart,constitutecommunities–andcertainlynotallwhosharetheirethnicityneedparticipateinthem–thenthiswillbebecauseoftheirmembers’supposedaffinities,generatedeitherbynatureorbyculture.Itis,forexample,presumedthattheindigenousIrish,raciallyorculturallyakin,willbeabletoentercommunalrelationsfromwhichthedescendantsoftheEnglish,lackingsuchkinshiporculturalrapport,willnecessarilybeexcluded.Itisimportanttoseethatitisassumptionslikethis,highlyquestionableastheyare,thatareneededtomakeacaseforstatehoodbeingappro-priatetonationsconceivedascertainsortsofethnicgroup.Forthere71\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYisnoobviousreasonwhythemereexistenceofsuchgroupsshouldhaveanypoliticalconsequences.Ethnicconceptionsofasocietalsortidentifyanethnicgroupasanationinvirtueofitsforminganappropriatesortofover-archingcommunity.Civicnations,aswesaw,formedcommunitiesthroughbeingsuitablyunifiedbysharedgovernmentorthroughappropriatesortsofvoluntaryassociation.Theethniccommunity,however,isbothpre-politicalinthatitsunityispriorto,andnotderivativefrom,government,andinvoluntaryinthatthepursuitofitscommonpur-posesandconcernsisneitherexplicitlychosennorsomethingvaluedbecauserecommendabletoreasonasaninstrumentallyworthwhilesocialpractice.Itistheethniccommunityinparticularwhichis,intheserespects,comparabletothefamily–aninstitutionwhichisenteredinvoluntarily,whosecollectivegoalsarescarcelyevenarticu-latedandwhosemutualconcernsareunreflectivelymotivating.ThisisthemodelforthecommunityasGemeinschaft,touseFerdinandTönnies’famousterms,42ratherthanGesellschaft–thetraditionalsocietyinwhichconcordsupposedlyflowsfromunthinkingadherencetonormsandthespontaneoussuppressionofindividuality,bycontrastwiththemodernoneinwhichconflictsofindividualinteresthavetobedeliberatelyallowedforandresolvedthroughformalarrangements.Nineteenth-centurytheoristslikeTönniesharkedbacknostalgicallytosuchcommunities,generatingthefunctionalisttheoriesofculturewehavealreadytouchedupon.43Suchthinkinginfluencedthenationalistmovementsofthetime.Morerecentexperienceshavetendedtoreversetherelativeevaluations.Iftherereallyareanyethnicnationswiththecommunalcharactertheyclaim,thenwhetheritisappropriateforthemtohaveseparatestatehoodisaquestiontowhichweshould,perhaps,expectnogeneralanswer.Weshalllaterlookatattemptstoprovideoneonthepartofso-calledcommunitarianphilosophers.Butonefactorwhichmaybethoughtrelevanttosuchaquestion,andwhichweshouldlookatnow,istheissueofhowfirmlyrootedtheethnicnationisinacon-tinuingcommunallifeshapedbyitsdistinctiveculture.Onthismatterhistorianshaveadvancedwidelydivergentviews.Whileagreeingthatthenationis,aswehaveseen,anessentiallymodernphenomenonsome,likeAnthonySmith,haveneverthelesstakenmanynationstohaveoriginatedinpre-existingethnicgroups.44Theappealofthenationalidentitiestheyinvolveis,then,derivedinlargepartfromthatofthoseethnicidentities.Faced,forexample,withabsorptionintosomepolity,membershipofwhichinvolvesapurelycivicidentity,72\nNATIONALITYmembersofsuchanethnicgroupseektoretainorreturntotheirownricherandmoredeep-rootedculture,tobuildastateuponfamilialsortsofsocialrelationships,ratherthanoncooler,morecalculativecivicones.Itisnationswhichhavesuchstrongethnicroots,itmightbeclaimed,whichhaveaparticularlygoodcaseforstatehood.Othertheorists,however,havedeniedeithertherealexistenceortheimportanceofsuchethnichistories.EtienneBalibarexpressesthepositionthus:Nonationpossessesanethnicbasenaturally,butassocialforma-tionsarenationalised,thepopulationsincludedwithinthem,dividedupamongthemordominatedbythemareethnicised–thatis,representedinthepastorinthefutureasiftheyformedanaturalcommunity,possessingofitselfanidentityoforigins,cultureandinterestswhichtranscendsindividualsandsocialconditions.45Balibarlabelsthisas‘fictiveethnicity’,afeatureintheconstructionofnationalidentitywhichpreventsitfromappearingtoitsbearersassimplyanarbitrarydenomination.Solongasitsfictivecharacterisdisguised,suchan‘ethnicity’isseeminglysufficientforallthenation-buildingworkthatSmith’ssupposedlypre-existingethnicidentitiescanperform.Norisitclearthatacommunitywithonlyfictiveethnicoriginshaslessclaimtoberecognisedinsuitablepoliticalarrangements.Forifitsclaimisdependent,aspresumablyitmustbe,uponitsethicalcharacterasacommunitythenitshistoryisrelevantonlyasbearingontheresilienceandrealismofitscommunalrelationsinthefaceofcurrentfacts.Itmaybethatfictiveethnicityissymptomaticofmorewide-rangingillusions,butover-concentrationonsomeactualpastmaybejustascapableofinducingmyopia.That,afterall,isthepointofGeorgeRussell’sdisinclinationto‘hail...thelastsplendouroftheGael.’Itinvolvedthe‘FollowersofTradition’,hewrote,inworshipofanextinctfireInwhichtheydriftbeyondthevergeWhereracesalloutwornexpire.46ThetruthorfalsityofGaelictraditionisnottothepoint,for,asRussellsees,thecrucialquestioniswhetherthereareanycurrentcommunalrelationscorrespondingtothecommunityimaginedintraditionalterms.Eventhecontinuinghistoryofanethnicgroupdoesnotguaranteeitscontinuanceasacommunity.Andacommunitythat73\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYenjoyssuchahistoryhasnostrongerpoliticalclaims,otherthingsbeingequal,thanonewhichdoesnot.Inthecontemporaryworlditisexceedinglyunlikelythatwheretherearesocialrelationsonanationalscalewhichare,arguably,com-munalincharacter,theydoinfactcorrespondinscopetoanyethnicgroup,whetherconstitutedbyanhistoricalorafictiveethnicity.Therealrelationsofinterdependencebetweenpeoplewhichcangeneratecollectivegoalsandmutualconcernsderivefromtheircomingtogeth-erinaterritorytowrestalivingfromit.Solongastheyhavethenec-essarymeansofcommunicationandofconflictresolutionthereisnoobviousreasonwhydifferentethnicidentificationsshouldstandinthewayofco-operationandsharedcommitment.Thatiswhy,perhaps,ethnicidentificationisoftentakentobebasedonacommonlanguage,asnecessaryforeffectivecommunication,oroncommonvalues,assupposedlyrequiredtopreventirresolubleconflict.Butnotonlyaretheseassumptionslinkingcommunitytoethnicityhighlyquestionable,itisnotevidentthatethnicidentitiesarenecessarilyconstitutedbysuchfactors:ethnicdifferencescanbeconstructedwithinpopulationsthatsharealanguageandvalues.Inthesecircumstancestheconstructionofanethnicnationalidentitymustlookprimafacielikeadevicetojustifyunwarrantedexclusions.Initsowntime,theinjunctionIrishmaids,lovenonebutthoseWhowearthejacketsgreen47mayhaveservedasafittingwarningagainstcollaborationwithanenemyoroppressor.Atothertimessuchsentimentscanbechillinglyintolerant,forbiddingfraternisationwherefraternityisproperlydue.Politicalarrangementsdoubtlesshavetotakeaccountofsuchnationalistsentiments.Butthesearrangementsmayrepresentnomorethanaseparationofhostileforces.Itisquiteunclearthattheyreflectaprincipledwayofdividingupterritoriesbetweenthosemostfittedforsharedgovernment.NOTES1.Anonymous,repr.F.O’Connor(ed.),ABookofIreland(London:Collins,1959),pp.96–7.2.Iuse‘nationality’and‘nationalidentity’synonymouslyunlessotherwiseindicated.3.Exceptionsarethe‘personalnationalities’registeredforexampleintheformerSovietUnionanddiscussedinChapter8below.74\nNATIONALITY4.Thisgrowtharosefromthedecayoffeudalismandsorequiresnoexpla-nationintermsofpressurefrompre-existingnations.SeeH.Schulze,States,NationsandNationalism(Oxford:Blackwell,1996),ch.1.5.QuotedinH.H.GerthandC.WrightMills(eds),FromMaxWeber(London:Routledge,1970),p.176.TheideaderivesfromHegel:‘Intheexistenceofanationthesubstantialaimistobeastateandpreserveitselfassuch’:SeeG.W.F.Hegel,Hegel’sPhilosophyofMind,tr.WilliamWallace(Oxford:OUP,1971),p.279.6.ForextendeddiscussionseeP.Gilbert,ThePhilosophyofNationalism(Boulder:Westview,1998),ch.1.7.ErnestGellner,NationsandNationalism(Oxford:Blackwell,1983),p.1.8.O’Connor,ABookofIreland,pp.96–7.9.E.Hobsbawm,NationsandNationalismSince1780(Cambridge:CUP,1990),ch.1.10.LiahGreenfeld,Nationalism:FiveRoadstoModernity(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUP,1992),ch.1.BothsortsofviewarecriticisedbyAdrianHastings,TheConstructionofNationhood(Cambridge:CUP,1997).11.Thisisnotjustamatterofvaguenessattheboundaryofaconcept’sapplication,fordisputesabouttheboundaryderivefromthedifferingprinciplestakentocollecttogethermembersofthenation.12.‘TheJacketsGreen’byMichaelScanlon,inD.O’Keefe(ed.),TheFirstBookofIrishBallads(Cork:Mercier,1955),p.96.13.JohnHewitt,‘TheColony’,quotedanddiscussedbySeamusHeaneyinPreoccupations(London:Faber,1980),p.147.14.J.Locke,SecondTreatiseofCivilGovernment[1689],§27.15.QuotedinU.Dantanus,BrianFriel(London:Faber,1988),p.24.16.B.Friel,Translations(London:Faber,1981),pp.43–4.17.Ibid.p.66.18.J.Tully,StrangeMultiplicity(Cambridge:CUP,1995).ForanextendeddiscussiononthispointseeD.R.Lea,‘AboriginalEntitlementandConservativeTheory’,JournalofAppliedPhilosophy15(1998),pp.1–14.19.ThesamestricturescouldbelevelledatthesecondsortofargumentinvolvedinHewitt’slinesdiscussedabove.Thefirsthasdifferentfailings,tobetouchedonlater.20.Foranassessmentofthedangersofaculturallybasedterritorialnation-alismseeTomNairn’s‘Thecurseofrurality’inhisFacesofNationalism(London:Verso,1997).21.B.Anderson,ImaginedCommunities(London:Verso,1991),p.6.22.Ibid.p.6.23.G.Russell,TheLivingTorch(London:Macmillan,1939),p.183.24.G.Russell,‘OnBehalfofSomeIrishmenNotFollowersofTradition’,inB.Kennelly(ed.),ThePenguinBookofIrishVerse(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1981),p.314.25.QuotedinD.Kiberd,InventingIreland(London:Cape,1995),p.174.26.QuotedinD.Kiberd,SyngeandtheIrishLanguage(London:Macmillan,1993),p.174.75\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY27.W.B.Yeats,‘APrayerformyDaughter’,inSelectedPoems(London:Macmillan,1968),p.103.28.ForexampleRossPoole,MoralityandModernity(London:Routledge,1991),pp.100–5.29.Anderson,ImaginedCommunities,p.7.30.Ibid.p.6.31.E.Gellner,ThoughtandChange(London:WeidenfeldandNicholson,1964),p.169.32.Ofcourseitmaybethatnokindofgroupissuchthatstatehoodisespeciallyappropriatetoit,inwhichcasethebasisfornationalism’sdivi-sionofpeoplescollapses.33.T.Eagleton,HeathcliffandtheGreatHunger(London:Verso,1995),pp.300,306.34.DuetoFriedrichMeinecke.SeeP.Alter,Nationalism(London:EdwardArnold,1994),p.8.35.DuetoHansKohn.Seeibid.pp.9–10.36.Cp.A.Giddens,TheNationStateandViolence(Cambridge:Polity,1985).37.Theassumptionhere,whichIamnotattributingtosociologistslikeGiddens,isevidentlyaHobbesianone.38.E.Renan,‘WhatisaNation?’,inA.Zimmern(ed.),ModernPoliticalDoctrines(London:OxfordUP,1939),p.203.39.J.Hutchinson,ModernNationalism(London:Fontana,1994),p.17.40.Ibid.p.41.ForelaborationofthisideaseeK.Nielson,‘Culturalnationalism,neitherethnicnorcivic’,ThePhilosophicalForum28(1996–7),pp.42–52.41.A.Smith,NationsandNationalisminanGlobalEra(Cambridge:Polity,1995),p.13.42.SeeF.Tönnies,CommunityandSociety(NewYork:HarperandRow,1963).43.SeeP.James,NationFormation(London:Sage,1996),pp.127–9.44.ForexampleinSmith,NationsandNationalisminaGlobalEra,ch.3.45.E.Balibar,‘Thenationform’inG.EleyandR.G.Suny(eds),BecomingNational(NewYork:OxfordUP,1996),p.140.46.Kennelly,IrishVerse,p.313.47.D.O’Keefe,IrishBallads,p.96.76\nPARTIIqwTheories\nThispageintentionallyleftblank\n4COSMOPOLITANISM,CONSERVATISMANDLIBERALISMqwCOSMOPOLITANISM‘TheRomanworld,’wearetold,‘wasapolyglot,cosmopolitanworld,withfreedomofmovementforcivilians,andagreatdealofmobilityforpeopleintheadministration...second-centurygovernorsofBritain,forexample,canbeshowntohavecomefromAfrica,Spain,Cilicia(inmodernTurkey)andDalmatia(inmodernYugoslavia)aswellasfromItaly.’1Themodernworldisquiteotherwise,andgov-ernmentbythosewithidentitiesrelevantlydifferentfromthoseofthegoverned,inrespectofethnicity,culture,territoryorwhatever,isregardedasimproper,notjustbecauseitmaybeimperial,butbecauseitisaliengovernment.Isthereanyjustificationforsuchanattitude?Thisissimplyaninstanceofourgeneralquestion:aresuchidentitiesrelevanttopoliticalarrangements?Intheensuingpartofthebookweshalllookatthewaydifferenttheoriesinpoliticalphilosophymightapproachthisquestion.AdministrativeattitudesintheRomanworldwereinfluencedtoaconsiderableextentbyStoicphilosophy.‘Mynature’wrotethesecond-centuryemperorMarcusAurelius,‘isrationalandsocial;andmycityandcountry,sofarasIamAntoninus,isRome,butsofarasIamaman,itistheworld’.2ThisneatlyencapsulatesStoicpoliticalphilos-ophy.Humannatureissocial,sothat,asMarcusAureliusputsit79\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYmetaphorically,‘thatwhichisnotgoodfortheswarm,neitherisitgoodforthebee.’3Forwhatisgoodistobediscoveredbytheuseofreason,andthereis‘onelaw,onecommonreasoninallintelligentanimals,andonetruth’.4Thiscommonrationalnaturehaspoliticalimplications:‘justasitiswithmembersinthosebodieswhichareunitedinone,soitiswithrationalbeingswhichexistseparate,fortheyhavebeenconstitutedforoneco-operation’.5Humanbeings,thatistosay,areelementsofnothinglessthanasingleworldwidesystemmotivatedbyasharedsociabilityandproperlyoperatingunderthesamelawsbecausethesearediscoverablebyacommonhumanreason.Thisrationalistcosmopolitanism,aswemaycallit,isepitomisedinthefigureofthe‘citizenoftheworld’.Accordingtocosmopolitans,one’sfundamentalidentityisgivenbymembershipofnothinglessthanthewholehumanrace.Andtherationalistversionglossesthisasmembershipofthecompanyofthoseruledbyreason:one’sindividualidentityisgivenbytheends,andtheproceduresfortheirattainment,whichreasonofferseveryone,adaptedtothecircumstancesinwhichonefindsoneself.Itis,therefore,essentialtocosmopolitanism,asIamunderstandingit,toregardaperson’sgrouporothercollectiveidentityasirrelevanttopoliticalarrangements,inthesensethatthesecannotbejustifiedbyreferencetoit.Forgroupidentityhasnofundamentalethicalrole,socialrelationships,accordingtotherationalistaccount,beingproperlygovernedbyreason.Thecosmopolitangoesfurther,then,tourgethatpoliticalarrangementsoughttotakenoaccountofgroupidentityassomethinggeneratingspecialethicalobligations,except,perhaps,insofarasthisisagenerallybeneficialwayofpar-cellingoutobligations.6One’sfundamentalobligationsaretoone’sfellowhumanbeings,andpoliticalarrangementsshouldbestructuredaroundthisinsight.Thismayormaynotrequireworldgovernment,butitcertainlywillnotimplyasystemof,forexample,ethnicnation-stateswiththeirlimitedandnon-rationallybasedloyalties.CosmopolitanismwithsimilarlyrationalistfoundationscamedowntothemodernworldthroughStoicinfluencesonthethinkersoftheeighteenth-centuryEnlightenment,inparticularKant.Itcontinuestohaveitsadvocates,perhapsmostnotablytheAmericanphilosopherMarthaNussbaum.7Kanthadhimselfnotedthewayinwhichtheexpansionoftradecreatedinterdependencieswhichwereincompatiblewithexclusionandantagonisticpolities.‘Thespiritofcommerce’asheputit,‘cannotco-existwithwar’.8Now,thepost-ColdWarcapitalismspreadacrosstheworldcanbepresentedasaglobalsystemforwhichworldcitizenshipisamoreappropriateprimaryidentitythanany80\nCOSMOPOLITANISM,CONSERVATISMANDLIBERALISMmorerestrictedone.Theglobalinterdependenciesthatexistgenerateobligationsthatcannotbelimitedinscopetothemembersofsomeoneethnicornationalgroup,say.Andthisistakentoimplythatone’sfundamentalidentitiescannotbeanalogouslyrestricted.Contemporarycosmopolitanscanacceptthisconclusionwithoutderivingitfromanyrationalistconceptionofthesourceofsocialobligationoroftheessenceofhumanidentity.Toadoptsucharatio-nalistconceptionattracts,attheveryleast,achargeofculturalimpe-rialism.ItisaquitespecificallylocatedEuropeanconception.Onecannotexpectmembersofotherculturestoshareitortheethicaldeliverancesitsupposedlyvouchsafes.‘Whatkindofculturalimpositionisit’,asJudithButlerasks,bywayofcriticisingNussbaum,‘toclaimaKantianmaybefoundineveryculture?’9Tobaseageneralprescrip-tionforworldpoliticsuponsuchfoundationsisalmostasblinkeredassuggesting,aspeopledidwhenitstillexisted,thattheBritishEmpiremight‘contributeallthathashithertomadeitsmaintenanceworthwhiletothemakingofanevenwiderandmorebeneficentsystemofworldgovernment.’10Ithasscarcelydonethat.Itwouldbesimilarlyoptimistic–orarrogant–tosupposethatthespecificallyEuropeanidealsofcitizenshipwhichincorporaterationalistassumptionscanprovideamodelforaworldcitizenshipthatcangroundnewpoliticalarrangementsglobally.11Anti-rationalistcosmopolitanswillstresstheculture-specificcharacteroftheethicalinsightsonwhichtheimputationofglobalobligationdependsandrejecttheobscuremetaphysicsinvolvedinderivingthemfromtheuniversallyaccessibledeliverancesofreason.Thedifficulty,however,istoprovideanaccountofakindofidentitywhoseclaimstrumpthoseofgroupidentities,toparallelStoicaccounts.Whatisit,forananti-rationalistcosmopolitan,tobeacitizenoftheworld?Oneansweristhatitistobeamemberofthesamemoralcommunity,thatis,onewherethesameinsightsunderlyingglobalobligationsareavailable.12Thedifficultyistofleshthisoutconvincingly.Onepos-sibilityistoholdthatasamatteroffactthereisenoughcorrespondencebetweentheethicalsystemsofdifferentculturestoidentify,forexample,dutiestostrangersasthebasisforglobalobligations.Itis,tosaytheleast,doubtfulwhetheranysuchuniversallyacknowledgedethicalinsightsdoobtain.Amorepromisinglineistointerprettheworldwidemoralcom-munityasadialogicone.ThisistheapproachparticularlyassociatedwithJürgenHabermas,13whose‘criticaltheory’owesmoretoKantthantoitsmoreimmediateMarxistantecedents.Itpositsthenotion81\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYofacommunityconsistingofthosewhointeractinthetacklingofcommonproblemsandwhotherebyenteradialogueastothebestsolutionofthem.Theywillforverygeneralepistemologicalreasons,Habermasbelieves,adoptnormsthatdemandthereachingofconsen-susandtheinclusionofallinterestedparties,andthisinturnrequiresthattheirantecedentethicalinsightsbeopentore-examinationandrevision.Membershipofsuchacommunitythusconfersanidentitywhichtranscendsmorelimitedculturalonesandthisistheidentityonthebasisofwhichonefiguresasaparticipantinpolitics.Itis,however,acontroversialquestionwhetherthispositionescapesthechargeofimportingsubstantiveethicalvaluesintotheidentificationofthenormsofdialogue,inparticularidealsoffairandpeaceabledecision-making.Notallculturesseemtosubscribetosuchprocedures.Habermasmightreplythatthereisatleastnootherwayofconductingpolitics,andthatthiswayprovidesnogroundsforthekindsofexclu-sionwhichasystembasedongroupidentityproduces.Butsuchareplysimplyleavesthetheorist,likeCharlesBeitzforinstance,acosmopolitanbydefault,arguingforworldcitizenshipbecausenomorelimitedkindcanbedefended.14Thisargumentleavesopenthepossibilitythatnospecificsortofpoliticalarrangementsatallcanbedefended,andafortiorinotcosmopolitanones,whatevertheymayturnouttobe.CONSERVATISMThenaturalantithesisofcosmopolitanismisconservatism.Forwhiletheformerseekstojustifyasetofparticulararrangementsonthebasisofhowpeopleoughttoact,thelattercondemnsthemasutopianbecausetheyfailtotakeaccountofhowpeoplecanact.Groupidentityisrelevanttopoliticalarrangements,intheeyesofconservatives,notbecausewecanarguewhythisorthatgroupisentitledtoitsownstate,say,butbecausewecanarguewhythisoneisaptforviablestatehood,andthatisnot.Andthisaptitudewilldependuponfactsaboutwhatthosewithcertainidentitiescanandcannotdobywayofpoliticalco-operationorpoliticalallegiance.Itwasintheeighteenthcentury,as,inpart,areactiontothecosmopolitanismoftheEnlightenment,thatconservatismdevelopedapoliticaltheorytojustifypoliticalarrange-ments–usuallytheexistingones–onthebasisofsuchsupposedfacts.Theallegedfactsare,forexample,thoseofnaturalaffinitiesandantag-onisms,whichthecosmopolitan,ofcourse,disputes,possiblyarguingthattheyaretheresultofthestatesystem,notareasonforit.Thisis82\nCOSMOPOLITANISM,CONSERVATISMANDLIBERALISMthelinepursuedbytheAnglo-IrishwriterOliverGoldsmith,whogoesontoask:IsitnotverypossiblethatImaylovemyowncountrywithouthatingthenativesofothercountries...Mostcertainlyitis;andifitwerenot...Ishouldpreferthetitleoftheancientphilosopher,vizacitizenoftheworld,tothatofanEnglishman,aFrenchman,aEuropean,ortoanyotherappellationwhatever.15Thistypeoffactualquarrelisunlikelytoproveprofitableunlesssomereasonsofprincipleforacceptingtheonepositionortheotherareputforward.Wehaveseenhowacosmopolitanmightgroundworldcitizenshipinacommonkindofidentity.Whatkindsofgroundingforhispreferredpoliticalarrangementsdoestheconservativepropose?Foralltheconservative’savowedmistrustoftheory,anumberofprinciplesnotdirectlysusceptibletoempiricalconfirmationcanbeseentounderliehisanswer.Thefirstisrealism16–thedoctrinethattherearegroupswhichwillpursuetheirowncomprehensiveinterestsattheexpenseofothers,andthusthatpoliticalarrangementsmustbemadetotakeaccountofthis.Thestatesystemisseenbyconservativesasembodyingjustsucharrangements,whichiswhyitisthesystemweactuallyhave,foritisthedutyofstatestopursuetheinterestsofthegroupstheyrepresent.Anysensiblepoliticswillsimplyacceptthisfactaboutthesystemanduseittomaximisegroupinter-estsandminimisethedangerofseriouslossofpowertoprotectthem.Thesecondconservativeprincipleisnationalism;asAnthonyQuintonputsit:‘forconservativestheprimaryobjectofpoliticalloyaltyisthenation’.17Itwasnotalwaysthus.Earlierconservativesoftendefendedempires.Butthisisbecauseatthattimetheyconstituted,orsothoseconservativescouldhaveargued,groupswhichpursuedtheirownintereststhroughtheelaboratehierarchicalstructuresintowhichtheirmemberswerelockedinrelationsofallegiance.Nations,conservativesclaim,arewhatnowdoso,andperhaps,throughloyaltiesmorefundamentalthanthoseofempires,alwayshavedone.Theconserva-tivemovetowardsnationalismmayalsoreflectadevelopmentoftheory.Earlierconservativesstressed,inaHobbesianspirit,theimpor-tanceofinstitutionalstructuresinshapinggroupswithpoliticalclaims.Moremodernconservativeshavetendedtoemphasisemorebroadlysocialfactorsasbeingwhatgivegroupscoherence.Nations,itisclaimed,havesuchasocialcoherence,whetherinducedbyinsti-tutionalhomogeneityorothercauses.Nations,then,arethegroupswhichneedtoberepresentedbyseparatestates.Thereislittleroomin83\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYconservatismforidentitiesotherthannationalitytoplayaroleinpoliticalarrangements.Whatsortofnationalidentitiesplaythisrolewilldependpreciselyonwhatkindofmembershipgeneratestheloyaltyrequiredforagrouptopursueitsinterestsinthewaypostulatedbyrealism.Conservatismneedgivenogeneralanswertothequestionofwhatkindofmembershipwilldothis.Hostiletotheory,itcanholdthatthisisjustamatterofobservation.Buttypicallyitwilllocatenationalityinmembershipofgroupsaboutwhichcertainclaimscanplausiblybemadeastowhytheygiverisetoloyalty.Theobviousconservativeansweristhatnationalityconsistsinrace.Buthowarewetounderstandthis?Conservativerhetoricoftenturnsdisagreeablyonthesupposedevilsofracialmixing–‘theword“inte-gration”sumsup’saidEnochPowell,‘adangerousdelusion’.18Theindefensiblebiologismwhichthissuggestsis,however,nonecessarypartofconservativedoctrine.Fortheseevilscanbeheldtostemfromdefyinga‘naturalprejudice,andadesireforthecompanyofone’sownkind’which‘ariseinevitablyfromsocialconsciousness’,19ratherthanfromsomebiologicallaws.‘Race’astheconservativeapologistRogerScrutonunderstandsit,‘denotesacontinuityacrossgenerations,basedinkinshipandinter-marriage,butsupportedalsobyconsciousnessofcommondescent.’20Itisroughlyequivalent,inotherwords,towhatwehavetermedethnicity.Itconsistsofself-identifyingethnicgroupswhosemembershipisgivennotconstructed,socialnotpolitical,whichgeneratetheloyaltiesofnationality,loyaltieswhichextendtothedeadwhohavegonebeforeaswellastotheyetunborn.Thesesortsofloyaltiesarewhatmakeagroupaptforviablestatehood.Thesensethat,asDavidMiller,himselfnoconservative,putsit,‘becauseourforebearshavetoiledandspilttheirbloodtobuildanddefendthenation,wewhoarebornintoitinheritanobligationtocontinuetheirwork,’21isitselfacharacteristicallyconservativesenti-ment.Itpointsustowardsanotherfeatureortoanotherwayofcharacterisingakindofgroupthatconservativestaketobeaptforstatehood,namelyonewithacertainsortofcommonhistory–ahistorywithwhichmemberscanidentifythemselves.AhistoryoftheappropriatesortisexemplifiedbytheGermantaleoftheircommonoriginsinthetribeswho,undertheleadershipofArminius,defeatedtheRomansinAD9attheSaltusTeutoburgiensis,thusensuringforGermanyafuturelesspolyglotandcosmopolitanthanthatoftheRomanprovinces.Ironically,though,thestorycomesdowntothemthroughtheRomanhistorianTacitus.SotoodoestheideathattheheroicvirtuesoftheGermansstemfromthefactthattheyare‘a84\nCOSMOPOLITANISM,CONSERVATISMANDLIBERALISMgenuinelypureanduniquerace’,not‘taintedbyinter-marriagewithotherpeoples,’andhaving,asaresult‘aremarkablesimilarityofbodilyappearance’.22Fichte’sconstructionofGermannationalidentitydependsuponthisTaciteanhistory,ahistorystillsopotentthatwhen,in1975,itwassubjectedtosomeacademiccriticismatthe100thanniversaryoftheunveilingofamonumenttoArminiustherewasastormofnationalprotest.23Whatmakesracialmixingdangerous,accordingtothishistoricistviewofnationalidentity,isthatitcomplicatesthenarrativethatmembersofanationcanshare.Thesecomplications–suchasarealsoproducedbyunwelcometruths–threatennationalloyaltiessupposedlygroundedinthenarrative.Theyalsoendangerthetraditionswhicharebaseduponitandwhichprovidethemostpowerfulconservativeargumentagainstchange.24Conservativevenerationfortradition–forthewaysapeoplehaveofdoingthingswhichhavebeenhandeddownwithandthroughtheirhistory–impartsapredispositioninfavourofexistingpoliticalarrangementsovernewones,andfortheclaimsoflong-standinggroupsoverrecentformations.Thereasonforthisvenerationisnotonlythatthelongevityoftraditionatteststoitssocialefficacy.Itisthebelief,derivedfromthatotherAnglo-IrishmanandcontemporaryofGoldsmith,EdmundBurke,thatthehistoricalgrowthofnations,andthelayingdownoftraditionswhichthisinvolves,isanalogoustothatofanaturalorganismandthusnotlightlytobetamperedwith.Organicismofthissort,inAnthonyQuinton’swords,takesasocietytobeaunitary,naturalgrowth,anorganisedlivingwhole,notamechanicalaggregate...notcomposedofbareabstractindividualsbutofsocialbeings,relatedtooneanotherwithinatextureofinheritedcustomsandinstitutionswhichendowthemwiththeirspecificsocialnatures.25Organicism,then,isathirdprincipleunderlyingconservativethoughtaboutthekindsofidentitywhicharerelevanttopoliticalarrangements.Itthrowsupananswerslightlydifferentfromtheracialorethnic,andhistoricistonesjustglancedat,thoughallthreecanreadilybecom-bined,namelyintermsofmembershipofaculturalgroupthoughtofintheorganicallyfunctionalistwaydescribedinChapter2.Agroupofthissortisaptforthestatehooditmayormaynotalreadyenjoybecauseitconstitutesanorganicunitywhichpoliticaladditionsorsubtractionscouldonlydestabiliseandadmixturesupset.Thissortofviewmergesintotheculturalcommunitarianonesweshallexamine85\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYindetaillater.Itisenoughtosaynowthattheargumentsagainstfunc-tionalismalreadylookedatapplywithsomeforcetothisconservativeapplicationofit,notleastbecause,unlikeitsethnographiccounterparts,itisentirelyapriori–anarticleoffaith,notthefindingofscience.Andthatisalargepartoftheproblem.Foritisonlyasanarticleoffaiththatorganicismcanfuelcontemporaryethnicnationalism,sincethetransformingfactsofmodernitywhichconservativeshaveunsuccess-fullyresistedtelladifferentstory.Ethnicnationalistsseektochangethosefactsbypoliticalaction,andthatisnotconservatismbutfascism.REFORMATIONLIBERALISMConservatism,aswehaveseen,doesnotseektojustifypoliticalarrangementsintermsofentitlements:itmerelycomparesthemwithapictureofhumansocietytoseeiftheyareworkable.Thosearrange-mentsthathaveworkedcommandrespect,sincetheycanberegardedashavingarisenasapeople’snaturalresponsetotheircircumstances.Ontheseprinciples,asystemofabsolutemonarchy,say,may,foraparticularsociety,bequitedefensible,andtheonlyrightsallowabletoitsindividualmembersmaybethosehonouredbyitsspecificcustomsandpractices.Tenetssuchasthese,groundedinreligionratherthanintheorganicismofmoremodernconservatism,werewhat,intheseventeenthcentury,sparkedofftheprototypeofaliberalreaction.TheReformation,withitspluralityofdenominations,broughttoprominenceavarietyofopinionsandwaysoflifethatrecalledthediversityoftheclassicalpre-Christianworld,andwithittheStoicperceptionofhumanunityamongdiversity.Now,however,itwasnotcosmopolitanismgroundedinacommonrationalnaturethatansweredtheneedsofthosecaughtinasystemofstateseachwithitsofficialreligion.TwootherrelatedfeaturesofStoicism26werecalledintoservice,andbothareantagonistictoconservatism.Bythencommon-place,theywereneatly,ifintemperately,digestedinaversebytheseventeenth-centurypoet,Rochester:Thenfarewellsacredmajesty,Let’sputallbrutishtyrantsdown;Whenmenarebornandstilllivefree,Hereeveryheaddothwearacrown.27First,majestyisnotsacredbecauseithasnonaturalplaceintheorderofthings:government,andthisisthefirstliberalprinciple,isartifical,ahumancontrivanceforparticularpurposeswhichneedsto86\nCOSMOPOLITANISM,CONSERVATISMANDLIBERALISMbejustifiedassuch.Second,‘allmennaturallywerebornfree’,28asJohnMiltonputitin1649,defendingtheexecutionoftyrants.Government,then,mustbejustifiedtoindividualsonthebasisoftheirmoralclaims,andinparticulartheirclaimstofreedom.These,Ishalltakeit,arethetwofundamentalprinciplesofliberalism,andcommontoallitsforms.How,then,dogroupidentitiesbearonthepoliticalarrangementsthatliberalswouldfavour?Theidentitiesrelevanttotheseventeenth-centurysituationwerereligiousones,oftengeneratingaminglingofpeopleofdifferentreligionswithinthesamesociety,ratherthanapatchworkofseparateandrelativelyself-sufficientgroups.ItwastothisproblematicthatthespeciesofliberalismwecancallReformationLiberalismwasdirected.Butitspoliticalscopeiswiderthanthatofmerelyreligiousdiversity.Thesolutionsitappliestothiscaninprinciplebeadaptedtootherkindsofculturalorethnicidentity,whethergroupidentityinthestrictsenseisinvolvedornot.Whatarethey?ReformationLiberalismasIamunderstandingitischaracterisedbytwofeatures:freedomofpoliticalassociationandtoleration.Freedomtoassociatewithothersunderacommongovernmentmaybeheldtofollowfromtheideathatsincewearebornfreewecannotjustifiablybecompelledbygovernmentunlesswehavegivenouractualconsenttothatgovernment.Beingfreetogiveorwithholdsuchconsentimpliesafreedomofpoliticalassociation–afreedomnecessary,perhaps,forindividualswiththesamereligiouspersuasiontoprotectthemselvesagainstdespoticpersecution–afreedomexercised,forexample,inthesixteenthcenturyintherevoltofProtestantHollandagainstitsCatholicSpanishoverlords.Accordingtothisaccountthefactofmembershipofsomedistinctivesortofgroup,religiousorwhatever,doesnothingtoconferarightofseparatestatehood,orindeedofanykindofdistinctorganisation.Whatdoessoistheindividualcon-sentofmemberstoastate,anditisasessentiallyfreebeings,notinvirtueofsomemorespecificidentity,thattheygivetheirconsentandearntherighttostatehood.Orrather,theyearntherightonlybyvirtueofwhateverspecificidentitytheyconferuponthemselves,whetherthroughvoluntarypoliticalassociationoractofallegiance.Thiscouldbeanationalidentityifthenationisconceivedasanassociationoftheappropriatesortorasagroupwithasuitablefocusofcommonloyalty.ItmightappearfromthisthatReformationLiberalismcouldbeusedtodefendstatesofaculturallyhomogeneousoreventheocratickind,ifthesearethesortthattheirmembersvoluntarilysignupto.It87\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYisindeedtruethatthisaccountimposesnoparticularlimitationsontheshapeofthestateortheproceduresitshouldfollow.Itsmemberswilltypicallyhavemuchincommonthathasbroughtthemtogether,whetherbywayofinterestsorculturalcharacteristics.Theywillnatu-rallyenoughsupportformsofgovernmentandpoliciesthatprotectandreinforcethesecommonfeaturessothattheassociationcontinuestobeonethattheywouldwishtojoin.Thismayinvolvetheadoptionofarrangementsspecificallydesignedtoservecertainculturalorter-ritorialidentities–by,forexample,afederalorconsociationalsystemofgovernment.Partofthepointofsuchsystemsistoallow,inastatewithavarietyofidentities,thatcertainofthembefavouredincertainplacesorpreservedagainstcertainthreats.AndthereisnothinginReformationLiberalismthatmilitatesagainstthis,thoughequallythereisnothingpositivelytorequireit,exceptthethreatofwithdrawalofconsent.29Yetthisisonlyhalfthestory.AtheocraticstatecouldnotemergeonReformationLiberalprinciplesbecauseitwouldnotbeatolerantone.Itwouldnotsimplyfavourbutenforceaparticularwayoflife.ReformationLiberalism,however,demandsthatanystatetoleratedivergentbeliefsandbehaviour,solongastheydonotinfringeotherpeople’sfreedoms.Thewaysuchtolerationisexpressedinpoliticalarrangementsisthroughasystemofindividualrights,orlibertiesastheyaremoreaccuratelycalled.Fortherightsinquestionaretherightsnottobeinterferedwithinvariousways–toenjoywhatisknownasnegativeliberty30inrespectofsuchthingsasreligiouspractice,expressionofopinion,domesticmoresandthepursuitofone’severy-dayactivities.Accordingtheserightstoalliswhattoleratingminoritycultures,forexample,comesdownto,accordingtothisliberalview.Theyarerightstodowhatonebelievesisright,orwhatoneother-wisevalues,whateverotherpeople’sbeliefsandvaluesare.Therightsarefundamentalandabsoluteonesandthustypicallysetdownintheconstitutionofstates.Theytherebydifferfromtheparticularrightsthatmayfromtimetotimebegrantedtoindividualsasmembersofaculturespecificallytoprotecttheirculturalidentities,onmatters,say,ofeducation.31Thereisnosharplinehere.Thelibertiesrequiredfortolerationarenotclear-cut,asisdemonstratedbycourtbattlesoverjustwhatsomeconstitutionalrightallows:isfreedomofreligion,forexample,compatiblewithacompulsoryseculareducation?32Butthisindeterminacydoesnotimplythattheliberalstatemustbeonlyaminimalstate,legislatingaslittleaspossiblesoastomaximisethescopeforindividualfreedom.ReformationLiberalismdoesnot88\nCOSMOPOLITANISM,CONSERVATISMANDLIBERALISMrequirethestatetomaximisefreedominthisway,foritsmembersmayconsenttohavingitabridgedandinthistheyexercisetheirfreedom.ButReformationLiberalismdoesrequirethattherebeconstitutionalsafeguardsonhowmuchfreedomcanbeabridged,soastoprotectthosewhosedivergentopinionsorbehaviourwouldleadthemtosufferfromitsabridgementbynotpermittingthemtodowhattheybelievetheyoughttodoor,atworst,compellingthemtodowhattheybelievetheyoughtnottodo.OnewayofputtingthisistosaythatReformationLiberalismdoesnotrequirethemaximisationoffreedom,butitmustallowfreedomforwhatitviewsasconscientiousacts.Morallyitisadeeplyseriouscreed.Thatiswhyitcantakeculturaldifferencesoseriouslyandlaydownspecificrightsdesignedtorespectit.Theserights,ofreligiousfreedomforexample,mayallowculturalgroupstoimposeinternalrestrictions33ontheirmemberswhicharequiteilliberalinthesenseofnottoleratingindividualdifferences.Theymayseektosuppresstheexpressionofheterodoxopinionsorcertainsexualmores.YetReformationLiberals,truetotheiroriginsinasocietyofchurcheswhichdidexactlythat,willwishtotoleratesuchgroups.Howisthispossible?Onlybecausemembershipmustitselfbevoluntaryinthesenseofpermittingarightofexit.34Byplacingthemselvesinthegroupmembersacceptitsrestrictionsandlimitthescopeforthedeliveranceofindividualconscience,ill-advisedastheymaybeasindividualssotodo.Butbytherightofexittheycanavailthemselvesofthefreedomswhichthestateguarantees.TheReformationLiberalstatedoesnotseektocreatethebestconditionsfortheexerciseofindividualfreedom.Itseeksonlythatpeopleshouldnotbeunwill-inglyconstrainedwithoutnecessity.Theformer,moreambitioustaskisnottheaimofthestatenotleastbecausenotallculturalgroupswithinitwouldacceptthatpursuingindividualchoicesisalwayspreferabletothefollowingofauthoritativepronouncements.Toleration,inthesecircumstances,canbedefendedaswhatisrequiredforamodusvivendibetweengroupswithdifferentvalues.Itisembodiedinrightseachmustallowtomembersofothergroupsbecausetheyclaimthemforthemselvesandhavefreelychosentoliveunderthesamepolity.Withoutthem,theycouldnotconscientiouslydoso.Thesecuringofpersonallibertiesthroughasystemofrightscreates,inReformationLiberalism,adistinctionbetweentheprivatesphere,inwhichlibertiesareexercisedwithouttheinterferenceorinvolve-mentofthestate,andthepublicarena,inwhichthebusinessofthestateisconducted.Sincetheprivatesphereisthatinwhichlibertyof89\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYconscienceisexercised,asparadigmaticallyinthepracticeofreligion,soitisherethatwhatismostvaluableinthelivesofindividualsmightbeexpectedtoflourish.Theculturalidentitiesthatindividualsholddeararegivenfreescopeintheprivatesphere.Theirinstitutionalisedappearanceinthepublicarena,ifithappensatall,doessoonlythebettertopreservetheprivatespaceinwhichtheycanbecelebratedanddeveloped.ItisforthisreasonthattheReformationLiberalcanviewwithequanimitythedevelopmentofapublicculturearoundthestatewhichmirrorsthedominantcultureorculturesinthelanguageofpoliticaldebate,civicarchitectureand,indeed,publicmoresgener-ally.Thatthisoccludesminorityculturesisoflittleimportancesolongastheirpracticescanbefullyenjoyedwhereallculturesprinci-pallyare–inprivate.Thisviewrests,however,onbothanover-optimisticpresumptionoftheresilienceofprivatelife,andanunrealdivisionbetweenprivateandpublicaspirations.Quiteindependentlyofanygrouployalties,wewanttoexpressourculturalaffiliationspublicly,whichiswhy,forinstance,debateoverstandardsofpublicarchitectureanditsrelationtotraditionaresointense.EvenifReformationLiberalismprotectedthelibertiesofminorities,marginalisingthempubliclywouldscarcelyseemtobefair.AndindeedthereisnothinginReformationLiberalismwhichguaranteessuchfairness.Justiceentersthepictureonlyasfree-domfromtyranny,construedastheinfringementofliberty,andequalityonlyinitsnarrowaspectofpoliticalandlegalequalityformembersofthepoliticalassociation.Ethnicdiscrimination,forexample,couldgouncheckedsolongasfundamentalfreedomswerenotdeniedandlegalequalitywasnotprejudiced;andtheeconomicdis-paritiesoftenevidentbetweenethnicgroupsneedattractnoadverseattention.Whateveritsmerits,andtheyaremany,ReformationLiberalismisanarrowpoliticalcreed,atbestinadequatetocopewithsociallydivisivedifference,atworstantagonistictopoliciesthataredesignedtodojustthat.ENLIGHTENMENTLIBERALISMAttherootofthesedeficiencies,itmaybeargued,isReformationLiberalism’sfailuretomakeclearwhythefreedomitprotectsisvaluable.Thegeneralanswerthatfreedomistobeprotectedsothatpeoplearenotconstrainedtoactcontrarytotheirconsciencesisilluminating,itmaybesaid,onlyifwehaveatleastatacitgraspofwhatisgoodaboutconscientiousaction.Furthermore,itmaybecontinued,thetoleration90\nCOSMOPOLITANISM,CONSERVATISMANDLIBERALISMwhichprotectsitwillbepossibleonlyifotherscanbeassumedtovaluesuchafreedom.Wheresomeculturesplaceadifferentrelativevalueonindividualchoiceasagainstdeferencetoauthority,theremustbesomeunderlyingvalueinfreedomonwhichtheycanagree.ItisinthisspiritthatthinkersintheeighteenthcenturyEnlightenment,inparticularKant,devisedaformofliberalismwhichwecancallEnlightenmentLiberalism,predicateduponaparticularunderstandingofwhatfreedomis,anunderstandingpresumedtocommanduniversalacceptance.Itisthatfreedomisautonomy.ThemostcelebratedrecentexponentofthissortofliberalismistheearlierJohnRawls,whogroundshistheoryinaKantianconceptionofautonomyexpressedasfollows:apersonisactingautonomouslywhentheprinciplesofhisactionarechosenbyhimasthemostadequatepossibleexpressionofhisnatureasafreeandequalrationalbeing.Theprinciplesheactsonarenotadoptedbecauseofhissocialpositionornaturalendowments,orinviewoftheparticularkindofsocietyinwhichhelivesorthespecificthingsthathehappenstowant.Toactonsuchprinciplesistoactheteronomously.35EnlightenmentLiberalismcommendsthepoliticalarrangementsthatsuchanautonomoussubjectwouldchooseandthatwouldenhanceherautonomy,maximisingherfreedomtoliveoutalifeofherownchoosing–alifethatisvaluablepreciselybecauseitistheonethatshechoosestolive,notsomeheteronomoussubstitute.EnlightenmentLiberalismthen,doeshaveanaccountofthevalueofconscientiousaction,andonethatdemandsagreaterscopeforitthanisallowedforbyReformationLiberalism.ThejobofthestateaccordingtotheEnlightenmentaccountistocreateconditionsinwhichindividualmemberscandecidewhatisbestforthemselvesonthebasisofthemostclear-sightedandunblinkeredconsiderationofreasons,ratherthansimplytoleratingwhateachdecidesforwhateverreasonand,mostprobably,onthebasisofwhattheirreligionorcul-turalgroupexpectsofthem.Thishastwoimportantconsequencesforthesortofstatethismustbe.Firstitmustbeaneutralstate.Thatistosay,thestatemustbeneutralinregardtothedifferentconceptionsofagoodlifethatitsmembersmayentertain.Itsarrangementsandpoliciesmustnotfavouranyoneoverothers,fortodosowouldlimitthefreedomofthosewhoseconceptionwasnotfavoured.Ratheritmustadoptprocedureswhichguaranteesuchequaltreatmentandimpartiality.Itmustadoptprocedureswhichensurejusticeforits91\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYmembers,sothatnoneofthemaredeprivedoftheopportunitiestoliveagoodlifebytheirownstandardsthatothershaveaccessto.Thisfirstrequirementofneutralitygenerates,viaitsdemandforjustice,another,namelythattheopportunitiesandresourcesforlead-ingagoodlifebemadeaccessibletoallonanequitablebasis.Itisthebusinessofthestatetoensuresuchafairdistribution.Whatpreciselytheprinciplesofdistributionaredonotconcernushere.Itisenoughtosaythattheyaresupposedlysuchthatanyrationalbeingwillassenttothem.Itisbecausetheyshouldcommandsuchassentthatastatewhichoperatesinaccordancewiththemislegitimate.Thestate’sarti-ficialexistenceiscompatiblewithitsmembersfreedomnotbecausetheyactuallyhaveconsentedtoit,butbecausetheywouldconsenttoit,iftheywerebeingreasonable,asthestatethatmaximisestheirscopeforindividualfreedom.UnliketheReformationLiberalstate,then,theEnlightenmentstatethatconformstoprinciplesofjusticeisnotinanyordinarysenseavoluntaryassociation.Indeed,itisquiteunclearonwhatbasisthebordersofsuchastatemightbedrawn.AscriticsofRawlshavenoted,36hesimplyassumestheexistenceofsuchborders.PerhapsKantwasrighttoinfercosmopolitanismfromtheserational-isticfoundationsandthustheirrelevanceofgroupidentitiestothestate’spoliticalarrangements.Itwould,however,beprematuretoleaptothisconclusion.Couldthebasisofstatehoodreside,perhaps,inasharednationalidentity?BuildingonEnlightenmentLiberalthinking,acaseforthismightbemade.Tostartwith,theEnlightenmentstateisnottobethoughtofasbasedonameremodusvivendi:37itisapoliticalcommu-nityfoundedonacommonconsensusabouttheprinciplesofjusticewhichlegitimateit.Socialunityandstability,itissuggested,requiresmorethanamerewillingnesstoputupwithone’sfellows.Itrequiresaprincipledagreementonthearrangementsunderwhichindividualsaretobegoverned.Thiscouldbeachievedinatheocraticstate,say,butinanilliberalway.Inastatewithapluralityoffaithsandothercompetingculturalconceptionsofthegoodlifetheremustbeagreementonwhatwouldbeafairwayofgivingallanopportunityforlivingit.Suchanagreementcouldprovidethebasisofnationalidentityunderacertainconception–andaparticularlyAmericanoneatthat,reminiscentofAbrahamLincoln’sremarkthatwhatpicksouttheAmericansisthattheyare‘dedicatedtoaproposition’.38Butsuchdedicationis,unlikethereligiousprofessionsofmembersofatheo-craticstate,notsomethingthatcouldmakethemanationpriorto92\nCOSMOPOLITANISM,CONSERVATISMANDLIBERALISMmembershipofthestate.OthersmayshareitapartfromAmericans:butAmericannationalityrequiresstatemembership.Sharednationalidentitysoconceivedisnot,therefore,somethingwhichcandeterminepeople’sstatehood,unlikeanassociationintowhichtheymayenter.Yetitcouldbearguedthatwhethersomesetofpoliticalarrangementsareappropriateforpeopledependsonwhethertheyshareaconsen-sualidentity.WhatwouldholdEnlightenmentLiberalsbackfromthisconclusionis,however,theirinsistencethatthereisjustonewayrecommendabletoreasonformakingsucharrangements,sothatfailuretoacceptthemimpliesnotthatthearrangementsneedtochange,butthatthosegovernedunderthemshoulddoso.ItisthisuniversalisingaspectofEnlightenmentLiberalismthatRawlshimselfeventuallyabandoned,acceptingthatnotallcultureswouldgrantthecardinalimportanceofautonomywhichitposits,andlimitingtheapplicationofthepoliticaltheorybasedonittothemodernEuropeansocietiesfromwhosecultureitderivesandthoseinfluencedbythem.Rawlscallshistheoryofthestate,assomodified,‘politicalliberalism’,becauseitviewsthefreedomwhichitfostersasamerelypolitical,ratherthanacomprehensivelymoralvalue.Thisapproachtiespoliticalarrangementstoculture,oratleasttopublicculture–tothecultureinwhichpublicreasoningaboutpoliticstakesplaceandwhichtherebygeneratesaconceptionofjusticewhichis‘asfaraspossible,independentoftheopposingandconflictingphilosophicalandreligiousdoctrinesthatcitizensaffirm’.39Thereseemsconsiderablescopeinpoliticalliberalismforjustifyingpoliticalarrangementsbyreferencetoanationalidentity,understoodintermsofsuchasharedpublicculturealongthelinesofthepreviouspara-graph.ButthereasonthatthisispossibleispreciselythattheabstractrationalsubjectoftheEnlightenmenthasbeendiscardedasthatwhichcharacterisespeople’sprimaryidentities.ReturningtoEnlightenmentLiberalism,however,wemayenquirewhatitsgeneralimplicationsareforgroupidentities.Atfirstsightitmayseemthatitcompelsustobeblindinpoliticstodifferencesofidentity.Itisafterallas‘freeandequalrationalbeings’thatthestatemusttreatitsmembers,orrisknotmaximisingtheirfreedomsfairly.Thismayseemtorequirestrictpoliciesofnon-discrimination,inwhichracial,ethnic,culturalornationalidentitiesareignoredinthearrangementsthataremadeforgovernance,eachpersonenteringthepolitynotundersuchanidentitybutsimplyasamemberofthestate.4093\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYYetthismightbedeniedonthegroundsthattheprovisionofopportunitiesandresourcesforindividualself-developmentrequiresrecognitionofgroupmembershipandtheprovisionofrightswhichsafeguardit.WillKymlickahasadoptedsuchanapproach‘toshowthatthesamearguments...forequalrightsandresourceswithinanation-statecanbeusedtodefendspecialstatusforminorityculturesinaculturallypluralstate’.41Kymlickabelievesthatmembershipofaculturalgrouphasaninstrumentalroleinpermittingindividualstodeveloptheirlifeplansfreely.Hisparticularaccountofthisis,aswesawinanearlierchapter,thatsuchmembershipiswhatmakespossibletheexercisingofchoice.Butthisviewmaybedispensable,ifsomeotheraccountofthevalueofculturalmembershipcanbegiven,asnodoubtitcan.Kymlickaobservesthatminoritygroupsoftenfacedisadvantagesthatothersdonotandthereforethattheprovisionofminorityrightstoovercomethemissometimesjustified.Thesemayberightstodetermineresidence,languageuseandsoonwithinapartofthestate,proceduresforgrouprepresentationor,atthelimit,arrangementsforsecession.ThisversionofEnlightenmentLiberalismsuggestsadifferenttreat-mentofminoritygroupsfromthatofReformationLiberalism.Ontheonehandtheformermayrequire,aswehavejustseen,thepro-visionofculturalrightsintheinterestsofjustice,whilethelatterauthorisesthemonlyasneededforastableassociation.Yetthelatterpermitssuchgroupstoadoptintolerantpracticesjustsolongastheyallowarightofexittomembers.EnlightenmentLiberalism,bycontrast,isreluctanttoconcedethatculturalgroupsshouldhavesuchpowers,preciselybecauseitdiscountenancestheheteronomytowhichexercisingsuchpowersgivesrise.Accordingtosuchaview,therightsofreligiousgroupstowithdrawtheirchildrenfromseculareducationaredeniedinordertoprotectthechildren’sautonomy.EnlightenmentLiberalistslikeKymlickamayfindspecialreasonstoallowsucharight,whetherasexceptionallynecessaryforculturalprotectionorashallowedbytraditionandnotnowwithdrawablewithoutunacceptableculturaldisruption.42Butthewholetenoroftheirtheoryrunsagainstit.Equalopportunitiesforindividualself-developmentarecrucialtotheEnlightenmentprogrammefortheliberalstate,andthesemilitateagainst,ingeneral,thefosteringofilliberalgroups.Yetsomegroupsdovaluegroupsolidarityhigherthanindividualchoice.ItishardtoescapetheconclusionthattheyarebeingdiscriminatedagainstintheEnlightenmentstate.EnlightenmentLiberalismdoesnothingtorecognisesuchprofoundmoraldiversity.94\nCOSMOPOLITANISM,CONSERVATISMANDLIBERALISMROMANTICLIBERALISMEnlightenmentLiberalismprovidestheideologyforthemodernwelfarestatethatseeksequalityofopportunity,providessafetynetsfordisadvantagedgroupsandadoptsapermissivepatternofsociallegislation.Itisessentiallyprogressive,asaresultofitsoptimismthattheexerciseofhumanfreedom,diverseasitmaybe,willbringaboutimprovementswhichconformitytocustomandtradition–heteronomy,inaword–canonlyimpede.Long-livedastheEnlightenmentvisionhasbeen,however,itwasalreadythreatenedbytheRomanticMovementattheendoftheeighteenthcentury,which,inthenext,gaverisetoitsownspeciesofRomanticLiberalismaswecancallit.43RomanticLiberalismcontinuestogiveprideofplacetofreedom,construedintermsofindividualautonomy,asthesupremevalue.Butitviewsautonomyasachievableonlywithintheambitofadistinctculturalgroup–inparticular,thenation.Itistheroleofthestatetopromotethegoodofsuchaculturalgroup,andastateislegitimateifandonlyifithasarrangementsenablingittodoso.Themodelofthisrelationisthenation-state,forthenation-statecanpursuethegoodofthenationbecauseitisanexpressionofnationalautonomy.Individualautonomyisrealisable,accordingtothisRomanticLiberalconception,onlyiftheindividual’sculturalgroupisitselfautonomous–abletochooseforitselfwhatisgoodforthegroupandtoactinordertoachieveit.Astatemustbejustifiedtoindividualmembersasthatwhereintheirfreelychosenlivescanflourish;butitwillbejustifiedassuchonlybecausetheyalreadyacknowledgeacertainculturalidentity.Whilegroundingitspoliticaltheoryinindividualautonomy,then,RomanticdivergesfromEnlightenmentLiberalisminrejectingtheideaofauniversalrationalnaturewhichthelatterhadimportedalongwithittosupplytheexplanatorylacunaintheReformationideaoffreedom.InsteadRomanticLiberalismpositshumanidentitiesas,inJohnGray’swords,‘alwayslocalaffairs,precipitatesofparticularformsofcommonlife,nevertokensoftheuniversaltypeofgenerichumanity’.44Theexistenceofsuchgroupidentitiesneednotleadtoheteronomy,fortherearestillconscientiouschoicestobemadebetweenalternatives,evenifwhatalternativesareavailabledependuponone’sbackgroundculture.Noraresuchidentitiesnecessarilyunrevisable:exposuretootherculturescanleadtochange.Andwhileculturalidentitiesarefundamentallygiven–‘byinheritanceandbyrecognition’45–one’scultureprovidesafocusofallegiance,and,inthisway,adherencetoittakesonanatleastpartlyvoluntarycharacter.95\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYTherelevantculturalidentitiescannotberelegatedtoaprivaterealm,fortheindividualmust,asRazsays,beable‘toexpressinpublicanddevelopwithoutrepressionthoseaspectsofhispersonalitywhichareboundupwithhissenseofidentityasamemberofhiscommunity.’46Ifhecannot,thenhedoesnothavefullscopefortheexerciseofindividualautonomy.TheRomanticLiberalstateisobviously,therefore,notaneutralstateliketheEnlightenmentone.Itstaskistosupporttheformsoflifethatitsconstituentculturesvalueandtosupplythegoodsthatarerequiredforthem.Somethinkersinthistradition,likeJosephRaz,haveclaimedthat‘itisthefunctionofgovernmentstopromotemorality...thatgovernmentsshouldpromotethequalityoflifeofthosewhoselivesandactionstheycanaffect,’andthatthisdoesnotrequirethem‘toprotectworthlessletalonebadoptions’.47Itisactuallyworthwhilelivestheymustsupport,notthosebelievedtobevaluable,andthisissupposedlynotaninfringementofautonomybecausethatrequiresonlyachoicebetweengoodoptions.Whiletheargumentmaybequestioned,theoverallpointseemstobethatitisnotjustanykindsoflifethatthestateshouldsupport,butthosegroundedincultureswhichconfervalueonlife.Thismaywellinvolveimpermissivepoliciestowardssomelifestyles.Buttherewillpresumablybeadefenceagainsthavingsuchpoliciesappliedwhenthesearethelifestylesofmembersofsomeconstituentculture.RomanticLiberalsarelikelytobenationalists,inthesenseofidentifyingthenationastherelevantkindofculturalgrouptohavearighttostatehood,sothatthepoliciesastatepursueswill,inidealcircumstances,bethosethatpromotethegoodofthenationsocon-ceived.Some,however,likeYaelTamir,acknowledgethat‘theeraofhomogeneousandviablenation-statesisover,’48ifthereeverwassuchanera,andthatthepoliticalarrangementsofthestatemustthereforemakeitpossibletosupportanumberofnations.Others,likeRaz,believethat,inanycase,thestatecannotsupportasingleconceptionofthegood,butmustfosterapluralityofculturaloptions.Indeed,thisisclaimedtoberequiredfortheproperexerciseofchoiceinvolvedinautonomousactivity.Whetherthisissoornot,itwouldbeinconsistentofRomanticLiberalstodenytoculturalminoritiestheopportunitiestheyseekforculturalgroupsingeneral,sincetodosowouldunfairlydenysomethechancetolivetheirlivesautonomously.Buttodosomaynotbeeasy.Raz,likemanyotherRomanticLiberals,isapluralist.Thatistosay,hebelieves‘thepluralityofvaluableactivi-tiesandwaysoflifetobeultimateandineliminable’,each‘beinggood96\nCOSMOPOLITANISM,CONSERVATISMANDLIBERALISMandnotsusceptibletocomparisonofdegree’.Choiceshavetobemadeandtheywillbringtheclaimsofincommensurableculturesintoconflict,for,Razbelieves,‘conflictisendemictomulticulturalism...itis,infactendemictovaluepluralisminallitsforms’.49Thisview,derivingimmediatelyfromIsaiahBerlinandthroughhimfromRomantictheoristslikeHerder,supportsliberalpoliciesoftoleration,but,puttogetherwiththenon-neutralityofthestate,thesepoliciescannotbeexpectedtoproducepermanentandstablesolutionstotheproblemsofinter-grouprelations.YetRomanticLiberalism’spluralismscarcelyseemstogofarenough.Bylocatingculturalidentityingroupmembershipitfailstorecognisetheculturaldiversitywhichlieswithinthesubject,atleastundermodernconditions–adiversityironicallyrecognisedintheclassicalworld’sdisinclinationtorecognisegroupidentitiesforpoliticalpurposesandtodespisesuchpracticesasfitonlyforbarbariantribes.ButifwecastoffthisHerderianassumptionofgroupcultures,itishardtoseehowaRomanticLiberalpoliticswouldwork–whatmakingspaceforallthemultitudinousculturalidentitiestherereallyarewillcometo,orevenhowtodecidewhichwereatallrelevanttopoliticalarrangementsandwhichwerenot.Thedifficultyturnsontheideaofautonomyitself,evenwhenthisisset,morerealisticallythanintheEnlightenment,againstabackgoundofthereallydiscernibleoptionsaculturecanprovide.ItisquiteunclearthatautonomycanbearthepoliticalweightplacedonitbyliberalphilosopherssincetheEnlightenment,asthatwhosemaintenanceandenhancementjustifiestothegovernedthepoliticalarrangementsforgoverningthem.Forsupposeautonomyisthoughtof,asStanleyBennsuggests,50intermsofanindividual’scapacitytosubjectherevaluativebeliefstocriticismfromwithinherculture,andthatthisinturnrequiresthatherculturebepluralistic,itisstillquiteunclearwhatpoliticscancontributetofosteringit.Unless,perhaps,itcandososimplybyopposingthecreationofmonolithicculture-basedregimes.Butthispolicymightseemtoattractthecriticismthatifthisisthesortofregimepeoplewantthenitwouldbeilliberaltoputobstaclesinthewayofit,sincepeoplewouldtherebybepreventedfromdoingwhattheychoosetodoonthegroundsthattheirpresentchoicerestrictstheirlateroptions.Indeed,thisisthecriticismoftenmadeofwesterninterventionsintheaffairsofcountrieswithoutatraditionofvaluingautonomy.Bennremarksthatsuchcultures‘wouldsimplylacktheincoherenceswhichleavespaceforautonomousdevelopment’andthattherefore‘autonomyisanidealfortroubledtimes’,thesortoftimeswiththeir97\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY‘influxofstrangeandchallengingideas’51thatgaverisetoStoicismintheclassicalworld.Nodoubtweliveinsuchtimesandtheattempttoresistthemthroughmonolithicculturesisaregressivereaction.ButitisunclearthattheEnlightenmentvalorisationofautonomycanofferacoherentresponsetosuchcultures.ReformationLiberalism’ssimplernotionoffreedomsthatcanbeinfringedinconcretewaysbydespoticstatesandwhichcanbesafeguardedinlegitimateonesdoesnotattractsuchstrictures.Andifitisaskedwhatiswrongwithsuchinfringe-mentsperhapsweshouldpointtoparticularexamplesofoppressionandmisery,ratherthanglossthem,inthestyleofmanycontemporaryAnglo-Americanphilosophers,asviolationsofsomeuniversalgood.Whetheranyformofliberalismcandealwiththepoliticalprob-lemsarisingfromethnicandculturaldiversityissomethingwecanassessonlybyseeingwhatsolutionsitsvariousvarietiesofferinspecificsituationswherequestionsofstatemembership,statecohesionandstateboundariesarise.Weshallexaminetheseinthethreechapterscomprisingthethirdpartofthisvolume.Hereweshallproceedtosomedifferenttheoreticalapproachestojustifyingpoliticalarrangements.NOTES1.A.Birley,LifeinRomanBritain(London:Batsford,1981),p.153.2.MarcusAurelius,Meditations,tr.G.Long[1862],VI.44.‘Antoninus’wasthenameMarcusAureliustookfromhisimperialpredecessorandadoptiveparent,AntoninusPius.3.Ibid.VI.54.4.Ibid.VII.9.5.Ibid.VII.13.6.Cp.M.Nussbaum,‘Kantandcosmopolitanism’,inJ.BohmanandM.Lutz-Bachmann(eds),PerpetualPeace(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1997),p.33.7.Seeher‘Patriotismandcosmopolitanism’inJ.Cohen(ed.),ForLoveofCountry(Boston:BeaconPress,1996).8.QuotedinH.Reiss(ed.),Kant’sPoliticalWritings(Cambridge:CUP,1970),p.114.9.J.Butler,‘Universalityinculture’inCohen,ForLoveofCountry,p.52.10.E.A.Walker,TheBritishEmpire(Oxford:OUP,1943),p.4.11.AsAndrewLinklaterdoesinTheTransformationofPoliticalCommunity(Cambridge:Polity,1998),ch.6.12.Cp.N.Dower,WorldEthics(Edinburgh:EdinburghUP,1998),ch.5.13.SeeparticularlyhisMoralConsciousnessandCommunicativeAction(Cambridge:Polity,1990).ForadiscussioninrelationtocosmopolitanismseeLinklater,TransformationofPoliticalCommunity,ch.3.Forcriticismsee98\nCOSMOPOLITANISM,CONSERVATISMANDLIBERALISMM.Festenstein,PragmatismandPoliticalTheory(Cambridge:Polity,1997),ch.6.14.C.Beitz,‘Cosmopolitanidealsandnationalsentiment’,JournalofPhilosophy80(1983),pp.591–600.15.O.Goldsmith,‘Nationalprejudices’,Essays,Moral,PoliticalandLiterary[1741–52](manyeditions).16.IusethisnotioninitsInternationalRelationssense:seeforexampleC.Brown,UnderstandingInternationalRelations(London:Macmillan,1997),pp.26–35.17.A.Quinton,‘Conservatism’inR.E.GoodinandP.Pettit(eds),ACompaniontoContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy(Oxford:Blackwell,1993),p.259.18.QuotedinM.andA.Dummett,‘TheroleofgovernmentinBritain’sracialcrisis’,inC.Husband(ed.),‘Race’inBritain:ContinuityandChange(London:Hutchinson,1987),p.137.19.R.Scruton,TheMeaningofConservatism(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1980),p.68.20.R.Scruton,‘Indefenceofthenation’,inThePhilosopheronDoverBeach(Manchester:Carcanet,1990),p.305.21.D.Miller,OnNationality(Oxford:OUP,1995),p.23.22.QuotedinC.J.Christie,RaceandNation(London:I.B.Tauris,1998),p.23.FortheinfluenceofTacitusseeM.Thom,Republics,NationsandTribes(London:Verso,1995),pp.259–60.23.SeeH.Schulze,States,NationsandNationalism(Oxford:Blackwell,1998),p.95.24.ThoughthispointiscuriouslyunmentionedinQuinton,‘Conservatism’,whichconcentratesonargumentsfromthedisruptiveandunpredictableresultsofchange.25.A.Quinton,ThePoliticsofImperfection(London:Faber,1978),p.2.26.BothderivefromChrysippusandtheearlierGreekStoicsratherthanfromlaterRomanoneslikeMarcusAurelius,whosuppressedChristianityasadangertothestate.SeeG.H.Sabine,AHistoryofPoliticalTheory(London:Harrap,1963),chs8–9.27.QuotedinC.Hill,TheWorldTurnedUpsideDown(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1975),p.413.28.QuotedinA.N.Wilson,TheLifeofJohnMilton(Oxford:OUP,1983),p.162.29.ChandranKukathas,whoisinmanyrespectswhatIamcallingaReformationLiberal,arguesthattheroleofthestateissolelythepreser-vationofpeaceandorder,sothattheintentionalpromotionofculturalobjectivesisillegitimate,andthestateshouldbe,inthissense,neutral;thoughthisisnottosaythatitmustaimatculturaleven-handedness.Seehis‘Liberalismandmulticulturalism’,PoliticalTheory26(1998),pp.686–99.30.SeeI.Berlin,‘Twoconceptsofliberty’inD.Miller(ed.),Liberty(Oxford:OUP,1991),pp.34–43.31.Cp.C.Taylor,Multiculturalism(Princeton:PrincetonUP,1994),p.59.32.ForaninterestingdiscussionoftheAmishcasethatitisnot,seeJeff99\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYSpinner,TheBoundariesofCitizenship(Baltimore:JohnHopkinsUP,1994),ch.5.33.AsKymlickacallsthem,TheRightsofMinorityCultures(Oxford:OUP,1995),p.14.34.SeeC.Kukathas,‘Arethereanyculturalrights?’,inKymlicka,TheRightsofMinorityCultures,pp.245–50.35.J.Rawls,ATheoryofJustice(Oxford:OUP,1973),p.252.36.Forexample,MichaelSandel,‘Theproceduralrepublicandtheunen-cumberedself’,inS.AvineriandA.de-Shalit(eds),CommunitarianismandIndividualism(Oxford:OUP,1992),pp.20–4.37.AsRawlsinsistsinPoliticalLiberalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1996),pp.144–50.38.QuotedinB.Russell,‘BritishandAmericannationalism’,inA.F.Scott(ed.),TopicsandOpinions(London:Macmillan,1961),p.14.39.Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism,p.9.40.ForadiscussionseeTaylor,Multiculturalism.41.W.Kymlicka,Liberalism,CommunityandCulture(Oxford:OUP,1989),p.162.42.SeeW.Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship(Oxford:OUP,1995),ch.8.43.Thereadershouldbewarnedthat,while‘Reformation’and‘Enlighten-mentLiberalism’arefairlystandardlabels,‘RomanticLiberalism’istheauthor’sowncoinage.44.J.Gray,Enlightenment’sWake(London:Routledge,1997),p.79.45.Ibid.p.124.46.J.Raz,TheMoralityofFreedom(Oxford:OUP,1986),p.207.47.Ibid.pp.415and411.48.Y.Tamir,LiberalNationalism(Princeton:PrincetonUP,1993),p.3.49.J.Raz,‘Multiculturalism:Aliberalperspective’,inhisEthicsinthePublicDomain(Oxford:OUP,1994),p.164.50.S.Benn,ATheoryofFreedom(Cambridge:CUP,1988),pp.178–81.51.Ibid.pp.182–3.100\n5COMMUNITARIANISMqwCOMMUNITYAswehaveseen,liberalismseekstojustifypoliticalarrangementsonthebasisofthemoralclaimsofindividuals,and,inparticular,theirclaimstoexercisepersonalfreedom.Bycontrastcommunitarians,asweshallunderstandtheterm,requirepoliticalarrangementstobejustifiedonthebasisofthemoralclaimsofcommunities.Weneedtoask,then,whattherelevantcommunitiesareandwhatmoralclaimsmightbemadeforthempertinenttothejustificationofpoliticalarrangements.Neitherquestioncanbeansweredeasilyoruncontroversially,butitmaybethought,onceanswered,thatcommunitarianismshouldpro-videamorepromisingaccountoftherelevanceofethnicornationalidentitytopoliticalarrangementsthanliberalism.Forsuchidentitiesderivefrommembershipofgroupswhichdoorcanconstitutecom-munities,sothattheclaimsofthesecommunitiesmaybeusedtojustifytherecognitionoftheseidentitiesinpoliticalarrangements.Totacklethequestionofwhatkindofcommunityhasamoralclaimthatcanjustifypoliticalrecognitionweneedtolookbackwellbeyondtheperiodinwhichliberalismoriginated.WeneedtolookbacktotheworldofancientGreeceinwhichcosmopolitanismdevelopedpreciselyastheantithesisoftheviewthatmembershipofparticularcommunitieswasrelevanttopoliticaljustification.Aristotle’saccountoftheGreekcity-stateorpolisprovidesthelocusclassicusforthisview.‘Everypolis’hewroteintheopeningsentenceofhisPolitics,‘issome101\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYkindofcommunityandeverycommunityisestablishedforsomegood.’1Indeedthepolisistheover-archingcommunitywhichaimsatthecommongood,embracingthegoodsofitsconstituentcommunities,likehouseholdsandvillages.ThroughoutthebookAristotleassessesarrangementsforthepolisintermsofwhethertheyconducetothatgood,whichistheachievementofthegoodlifeforitsmembers.Butthegoodlifeispossibleforthemonlyasmembers,sothattheydonotaimatitindependentlyofaimingatthecommongood.Thisisbecausehumanbeingsarebynaturemembersofsomepolisandassuchshareacommonconcernforwhatisgoodinit,justasinahousehold.Thereareanumberofthemesherewhichwecanteaseoutanddevelop,someofthemcommontoandconstitutiveofallformsofcommunitarianism,othersspecifictotheformofcommunitarianismofwhichAristotlewasthefounder.Oneisthatacommunityisconstitutedbyitsmembers’pursuitofcommongoals.Thisisnotjusttosaythateachmemberhappenstohavethesamegoals,butthattheyaregoalssuchthateachmemberrecognisestheirachievementasgoodwhoeverhappenstoberesponsibleforit.Theirachievement,thatistosay,contributestothecommongoodofthecommunity.Wecancallthisthecommongoodthesis:communitiesareconstitutedbytheirhavingaspecificcommongood.Next,andconsequentially,eachcommunitymustpossessasubstantiveconceptionofthegood,atleastsofarasitscommongoalsareconcerned.Itmusthaveaconceptionofwhatagoodlifeforitsmembersconsistsin.Forunlessitsmemberssharesuchaconceptiontheywillbeunabletorecognisetheachieve-mentoftheirgoals.Thissharedconceptionthesisdoesnot,ofcourse,implythateachcommunitymustpossessadifferentanddistinctiveconceptionofthegoodoreventhateachone’sisuncontested–onlythatthereisenoughagreementonthecommongoodforeachcommunitytopursue.Thirdly,thereistheembeddedindividualthesis,whichstatesthattheidentityofindividualmembersofacommunityisgivenbytheirplaceinit,andisnotcompletelyintelligibleindependentlyofthis.Theforceofthethesisistwofold.Ontheonehanditdeniesthatacommunitycanberegardedasconsistingofanaggregationofatomicindividualseachwiththeirownhistoryandprojectstowhichmember-shipofthecommunityhappenstocontribute.Rather,whatitistobesuchanindividualandtobeamemberofacommunityareinter-dependent.Ontheotherhandthethesisdeniesthatthegoalsofindividualscanbeconceivedquiteindependentlyofthevaluesthey102\nCOMMUNITARIANISMhavethroughoccupyingtheirplacesinthecommunity.Thesearevaluestheynecessarilyhavefromsharingitssubstantiveconceptionofthegood.Butthisexplainswhytheycannotbeviewedasatomicindividuals,forthegoalswhichshapetheirhistoryandprojectsderivefromtheircommunitymembershipandthuscannotexplainit.Boththeseaspectsoftheembeddedindividualthesiscanbedis-cernedinAristotle’sownparticularglossonthiscommunitarianmetaphysics.Hisclaimthathumanbeingsarebynaturemembersofcommunitiesdeniesthattheycanbethoughtofasintheiressencesatomicindividualswhocometogetherinthevoluntaryassociationconceivedbyliberalism,forgoalsspecifiableindependentlyoftheexistenceofacommunity.Indeed,inastrikinglymodernecologicalvein,Aristotlereferstomenaspartsoftheircommunity.2AnditiswiththisimageinmindthatwecanunderstandAristotle’sclaimthatwhenmembersofthecommunitycometogethercollectivelytheycanbebetterthantheyareasindividuals,since,contributingeachone’s‘shareofvirtueandpracticalwisdom...theybecomeinamanneroneman...withregardtotheircharacterandthought’.3Heretheirpursuitofthecommongoodatteststovirtuousendswhichasindividualspursuingselfishgoalstheymaynotseemtopossess.Whattheyare,andthusthegoalstheyhave,virtuouslypursuedornot,aredeterminedbythekindsofcontributiontothecommongoodtheymake,whichAristotlecomparestothedifferentfunctionsofsailorsonaship.4Theidentitiesofmembersofthecommunitydependontheirplacesinit,justastheidentitiesofsailorsashelmsman,lookoutandsoforthdependontheirrolesintheship.ButasAristotleacknowledges,theconstitutionsofcommunitiesdiffer,sothatthepartstobeplayedinthemwilldiffertoo,andthevaluesrealisedintheperformanceofthem.Hereisforeshadowedanimportantcommunitarianthemederivingfromtheembeddedindividualthesis,namelythathumanidentitiesderivenotfrommodificationstoacommoncorebutfromvariationsinthediverseshapesthatmembershipofdifferentcom-munitiesprovides.Wecomenowtotheothertypesofcommunitarianthesis,namelytheethicalandpoliticalones.Twoethicalthesesmaybestated:thefirst,thevalueofmembershipthesis,asitmightbedubbed,characterisesthisvalueasanintrinsicgood,andthusonenotreducibletoitsinstrumentalvalueinsecuringthepurposesofindividuals.Thisistheethicalcorrelateoftheembeddedindividualthesiswhichviewscommunitymembershipnotasassociatingforindependentlyidentifi-ableindividualends,butasoccupyingidentity-constitutingroles.The103\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYvalueofmembershipthesisgoesbeyondthemetaphysicaltheses,however,indeclaringavaluetocommunitymembershipsocon-ceived.Asecondthesiswhichfollowsfromitisthatthecommunityhasethicalclaimsuponitsmembers,sothattheyhaveobligationstosecureitscommongoodarisingfromthevaluethatitbringsthem.Thisclaimofcommunitythesisdrawsouttheethicaldemandsthatmem-bershipimposes.Twopoliticalthesesareembracedbycommunitarianstospellouttheproperrelationsbetweenthestateandthecommunityascharacterisedbythemetaphysicalandethicaltheses.One,thepriori-tisationthesis,specifiesthattheroleofthestateistogiveprioritytosecuringthecommongoodinitsarrangementsandpolicies.Thisconnectsdirectly,ofcourse,totherequirementofcommunitarianismwithwhichwestartedthischapter,namelythatpoliticalarrangementsbejustifiedbythemoralclaimsofthecommunity.Thesecondpoliticalthesisfollowshardontheheelsofthefirst;itisanon-neutralitythesistotheeffectthatthestate’staskistomakepolicyinaccordancewiththecommunity’ssubstantiveconceptionofthegoodwhichis,afterall,whatdeterminesthatitscommongoalsconstituteagood.Thestatecannotbeneutral,asundersomeformsofliberalism,inregardtodifferentconceptionsofthegoodthatindividualswithinitmayespouse.Thesethesesconstitute,Isuggest,acoherentcommunitarianpictureoftheindividual,thecommunityandthestate.5Buthow,wemayask,doesthispicturerelatetotheproblemsofethnicityandnationalidentitywhichconcernushere?Well,sofarwehaveaveryabstractoutlineofthecommunitarianposition.Untilwecolouritintoarriveatacharacterisationofmorespecificformsofcommunitarianismthereislittlethatwecandeduceaboutitsimplicationsforourcurrentconcerns.Twothingsmay,however,strikeus.Oneisthatifpeoplearetobeidentifiedintermsoftheircommunitymembership,thennon-relationalcharacteristics,likerace,willinthemselvesbeirrelevanttotheiridentitiesandhencetothepoliticalarrangementswhichapplytothem.ButthisencouragingconclusionfadeswhenwenoticehowAristotle,forexample,usestherequirementthatmembersofthepolismustdeliberateinaccordancewithitsvaluestoexcludeslavesandwomenfromfullmembership,onthegroundseitherthattheylackthedeliberativefacultyorthattheydonotactonit.6Thisisabadportentforacommunitarianpoliticsofdifference.WhatmaymitigateitalittleisAristotle’sinsistencethat‘acityisnotmadeuponlyofsomanymen,butofdifferentkindsofmen;forsimilarsdonotconstituteacity’.7Theydonotdoso,becausedifferenceisneededfortheretobethe104\nCOMMUNITARIANISMrecognitionofsomethingasacommongoalamongindividualendsandthusfortheretobedifferentcontributionstowardsit.Theotherpointwhichmaystrikeusisthat,accordingtothecommunitarianview,apersonwithoutanyconnectionwithsomecommunitylacksameaningfullife.Aristotlelikensherposition,ifshehasbroughtituponherselfratherthansimplybeenunlucky,tothatof‘anisolatedpieceinagameofdraughts’8–uselessintheplaythatproceedsaroundher.Thisistroublingwithrespecttothesituationofimmigrantsorotherswhomayseemtostandapartfromthesettledlifeofthecommunity.AnditisperhapsironicthatAristotleshouldhaveinvitedtheseapprehensionsabouthisaccount.BorninStagira,hewashimselfa‘metic’orresidentalieninbothAthensandMacedonia,thestatesinwhichhespentmostofhislife.REPUBLICANISMAristotledevelopshisownaccountofcommunityinaquitespecificanddistinctiveway,includingfeatureswhichIhaveaimedtosuppressinmygeneralcharacterisationofcommunitarianism.MostnotableamongtheseisthefactthatAristotle’scommunityisapoliticalcom-munity,thepolisorcity-stateofancientGreece.Thestateisnotanorganisationtoregulateacommunitywhichisessentiallyindependentofit:itisjustoneaspectofthecommunityandindispensabletothemembersconstitutingthissocialformation.ItisthisconceptionofcommunitywhichwastakenupbyRomanthinkerslikeCiceroandwhich,throughtheirinfluence,gaveriseinthemedievalandmodernperiodtotheformofcommunitarianismwecanrecogniseinrepubli-canism.9Wecan,perhaps,identifyitsleadingfeaturesbylookingatCicero’saccountinDeRepublica.Cicerodefinesapeople,thoughtofasformingapoliticalcommunity,as‘anassociationunitedbyacommonsenseofrightandacommunityofinterest’.10Theyareagroupcollectedtogetherbythefactofcommonresidenceinacity(ormoregenerallyaterritory)andbyhavingsharedinterestsingettingalongtogethertomakethebestuseoftheresourceswhichtheirsimilarsituationbrings.Thisis,perhaps,thefirstpointtonotice.Thepeople’scommongoodconsistsinthefulfilmentofsharedinterests;andthattherearethesesharedinterestsissomethingwecanseefromthemerefactoftheirsituation.Thequestionthatarises,then,is:whatmakesagroupthatfindsitselfinthispositionacommunity?Whatisit,thatistosay,whichbringsitaboutthatthegroupisaimingatacommongood?105\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYCiceroisclearonthispoint.Hecomparesthecommunitytoasimilarlysituatedgrouplivingundertheruleofatyrant,afactionorevenanoppressivemajority.Whatislackinginthesecasesisa‘bondofjustice’.11Withoutitthereisnothingtofashionpeoplewhodohavecoincidentintereststopursueintoasinglebodyfittedtopromotetheminsuchawaythattheycanbeviewedasacommoninterest.Suchpeoplelackaneffective‘commonsenseofright’–anagreedsystemoflawandadministrationwherebythepursuitoftheirindi-vidualinterestscanberegulatedinawaythatcontributestothecommoninterestratherthantosectionalones.Andthisisthesecondpointtonotice:inacommunity,itisthefactthatsharedinterestsarepursuedinaccordancewiththecommunity’ssystemofjusticethatenablesitscommongoodtobepromoted.Sopursueditssharedinterestscanberecognisedascontributingtothecommongood,or,toputthesamepointdifferently,somethingcountsasasystemofjusticeifitenablesitssharedintereststoberecognisedassocon-tributing.ItisclearlyanelementofCicero’sthinking,asofAristotle’s,andathirdimportantfeatureofrepublicanism,thattheformulationoflawsthatco-ordinateindividualbehaviourinawaythatconducestothecommongoodisamatterfordeliberationbetweenmembersofthecommunity.Whatconstitutesthecommongoodisnotsimplygiven:itisamatterforpoliticaldebateanddecision-making.Byrelatingittothecommunitariantheseslistedintheprecedingsection,wecannowbringoutmorevividlywhatarepublicancom-munitarianismislike.Thecommongoodconceivedofintermsoftheservingofmutualinterestsismediatedbyasharedconceptionofthegoodlifemadepossiblethroughjustice.Cicerothinksofthegoodsocietyaspre-eminentlyajustsociety,sothatinsofarasthecommongoodisnotsecuredthatisduetoinjustices.Thecommunity’ssubstan-tiveconceptionofthegoodexpressesitselfinitsmembers’‘commonsenseofright’.Lawandadministrationarenot,therefore,tobethoughtofasprovidinganeutralframeworkforindividualprojects.Theymustbeconceivedasputtingintoeffectavisionofthegoodlife,whichisinescapablyasociallife.Indoingsotheyenforcetheethicalclaimsthatmembershipofthecommunitymakesuponitsmembers,memberswhoseessencesaresocial,embeddedastheyare,inthelifeofthecommunity.CicerohimselfmaintainedaStoicconceptionofjusticeasrecog-nisablebyreasonandthusgivingrisetolaws‘ofuniversalapplication,unchangingandeverlasting’.12Inconsequencehesoughttodiscoverthebestpoliticalarrangementsforanystate.Suchanapproachcharacterises106\nCOMMUNITARIANISMagooddealoflaterrepublicanismtoo,sharing,asitdoes,theuniver-salisingambitionswehavepreviouslynotedincosmopolitanism.Butitisadetachablefeature,andarepublicanviewofthegoodsocietyasajustsocietypermitsamoreparticularisticreading,sympathetictoacommunitarianemphasisonthespecificityofeachcommunity’scommongoodandthedistinctivenessofthesocialliveswhichthiscanproduce.Republicanismcanallow,aswenoticedfromAristotle’saccount,thatdifferent‘constitutions’,arisingfromvaryingcircum-stances,cangiverisetosuchdiversityinsocialidentities.Anditcandothiswithoutabandoningthefundamentalrepublicannotionthatagroupconstitutesacommunityonaccountofsomeobjectivelyassess-ablestructuralfeatures,namelythepursuitofsharedintereststhroughanagreedsystemofjustice.Foritissuchfeatureswhichwillenableus,whoarenotmembersofthecommunityanddonotshareitsconceptionofthegood,torecognisethegroupasacommunity,withthevaluethatthisbringsitsmembers,ratherthansomeotherkindofsociety.Ontheonehand,wedonotnecessarilyneedtoagreewithitssystemofjusticetorecognisethatitissuchasystem:awayofcoor-dinatingindividualintereststhatseemsfairtothem.Ontheotherhand,wedonotneedtoplacetheparticularvaluewhichtheydoonthefulfilmentoftheirsharedintereststograspthatitisintereststhatareshared:themerefactoftheircommonoccupancyofaterritoryisenoughtoestablishthatinterestsmustbesoviewedifconflictistobeavoided,andthissetsintrainthesearchforasharedconceptionofwhattheirfulfilmentmightamountto.Presentingthematterinthiswaybringsoutthatforrepublicansthebuildingandmaintenanceofacommunityisatask,ataskimposedbycircumstances.Thesharedconceptionofthegoodrequiredisnotsomethinggiven,asthosecircumstancesare.Itissomethingarrivedatthroughthesocialandpoliticalinteractionsinvolvedinfacingthesecircumstances.Thisistheimportanceofthethirdfeatureofrepub-licanismIhighlightedearlier:theneedforpoliticaldeliberationinidentifyingthecommongoodofthecommunity.Theformofsuchdeliberationisgivenitsclassicexpositionbyamuchlaterrepublicanthinker,Jean-JacquesRousseau,theapostleofFrenchrepublicannationalism.Inpoliticaldeliberationthejudgementwemustmakeis,‘thisisofadvantagetothestate’,not,‘itisofadvantagetothisorthatindividualthatsuchandsuchapropositionbecomeslaw’,howevermanyindividualsweconcernourselveswith.For‘thereisoftenaconsiderabledifferencebetweenthewillofallandthegeneralwill.Thelatterisconcernedonlywiththecommoninterest,theformer107\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYwithintereststhatarepartial,beingitselfbutthesumofindividualwills’.13Thegeneralwillarrivedatthroughproperlyconductedpoliticaldeliberationaimsatthecommongoodofthecommunitybecauseitabstractsfromtheparticularandprivateinterestsofitsmembersandtakesaccountonlyofwhatconcernsthemquamembers.Thecommongoodisnotseenastheaggregationofindividualinterestspickedoutindependentlyoftheirbeingtheinterestsofmembers,asunderliber-alismtheyare.Ratheritiswhatservestheinterestsanyonewouldhavesimplythroughbeingplacedinthecircumstancesinwhichthemembersofthecommunitycollectivelyfindthemselves.Itisthroughexpressingthegeneralwillsoconceivedthatthecommongoodisprioritised,anditisprioritisedbyembeddedindividualswhosecommunitymembershipisessentialtotheirbeingabletoshareaninterestinitsfulfilment.Thenotionofpoliticalactiontosecurethecommongood,ratherthanindividualinterests,presupposesadistinctionbetweenthepublicandtheprivaterealmswhichiscrucialtorepublicanism.Itisasamemberofthepoliticalcommunity,asacitizenforshort,thatoneaimsatthatcommunity’scommongood.One’sotherattachments–religious,culturalorwhatever–aresupposedlyleftbehindinrepublicanpolitics.Thisisnottosaythattheyhavetobeabandoned.Farfromit;theyarepreciselywhatmakeuptheprivatesphereinwhichoneacts,notasacitizen,butasamemberofallthosegroupingswhosecommoninterestscanhavenopoliticalexpression,for,weretheytodoso,thestatewouldbecomeabattlegroundbetweenconflictinginterestsratherthanaworkshopforthefulfilmentofcommonones.Itisinjustthisspiritthat,duringtheFrenchRevolution,Clermont-Tonnerrefamouslyenunciatedtheprinciple,asappliedtotheJewswhohadpreviouslyhadtheirownpoliticalcorporations,that‘onemustrefuseeverythingtotheJewsasanation,andgiveeverythingtotheJewsasindividuals’.14Nationalityasapoliticalidentityispossibleunderrepublicanismonlyinsofarasitisthenationalityofrepublicancitizen-ship.Butallmerelyculturalappurtenancesassociatedwithsupposedlynationalminoritiesintherepublicareallowableasthepurelyprivateaffairoftheindividualcitizensinvolvedwiththem.Theboundarybetweenthepublicandtheprivaterealmisnotfixedpriortotheoutcomesofrepublicandeliberation.Itisfixedbythem.Forsinceitistheythatdeterminewhatistocountasthecommongood,theyalsofixtheboundarieswhichdeterminethescopeofpublicandofprivateactionrespectively.Thismayitselfseemworry-ingifthereisnoprincipledwayofallowingforthefreedomthat108\nCOMMUNITARIANISMindividualsneedtopursuetheirprivatepurposes.Indeed,liberty,oneofthewatchwordsoftherepublic,isdeterminedinitsapplicationtoanyparticularstatebythedeliberationsofitsmembers.Forthisisnotlibertyinthesenseoffreedomfrominterference,asintheliberalstatewhichensuressuchfreedomintheprivatesphere,butlibertyinthesenseofeffectiveparticipationinaself-governingstate.15WhileFranceis,ofcourse,thenaturalhomeofthiskindofrepublicanthought,thereareelementsofitinAmericadespitethelatter’spre-dominantlyliberalcharacter.ThisJeffersonianstrainbreaksfromtimetotimeabovetheMadisoniansurfacewherediversityiscelebratedasaguaranteeoffreedomagainstmajorities.16ASSIMILATIONIhavesketchedouttheleadingideasofrepublicancommunitarianismandhintedatthewayinwhichitbearsupontheproblemsposedbyethnicandnationalidentities.Thebiggestoftheseproblemsconcernsthepositionofethnicminoritiesunderrepublicanism.Butbeforewediscussittwootherissuesshouldbebrieflyaddressed.Thefirstcon-cernsrace.WenoticedthatAristotledefendedtheinstitutionofslaveryinthepolisonthegroundsoftheunfitnessofthosewhowereslavestofullcitizenship,thoughhedidnotgroundthisintheirracialcharacteristics.Laterrepublicanshavebeenlessreluctanttodoso.InAmerica,asDrJohnsondrylyobserved,‘weheartheloudestyelpsforlibertyamongthedriversofnegroes’17andarepublicanconstitutioncommittedtofreedomleftblacksinchains.Nor,ofcourse,isracismabsentfromcontemporaryrepublicslikeFrance.Ontheonehandthisseemsaberrantandparadoxical:howcanracismgohandinhandwiththeenunciationofprinciplesofliberty,equalityandfraternity?Ontheotherhand,however,racismcanseemtobeaninevitableproductoftherepublicanprojectitself,aprojectinwhichacertaintypeofpoliticalsociety–therepublic–isvalorisedandcertainkindsofrelationshipareprescribedforit.Thesearerelationshipsinwhich,ideallyandinthesenseweshallinvestigatemorefullyinamoment,everyoneisassimilatedtothesamestatusasacitizen.Butthismeansthatthereis,inthewordsofEtienneBalibar,‘aconsequentneedtodifferentiateandrankindividualsorgroupsintermsoftheirgreaterorlesseraptitudesfor–orresistanceto–assimilation’.18Andthisisexpressedinthekindofsocialcategorisationwhich,aswehaveseen,ischaracteristicofracism.Itis,however,indefensibleonpurelyrepublicanprinciples,wherethequalificationformembershipderivesfromperformanceofa109\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYrolethatcontributestothelifeofthecommunity.Itisthisqualification,andnotsomesupposedlyhigherlevelcapacitytoappreciaterepublicanvalues,thatisrequiredofmembers,andfailuretoacknowledgeitisafailureofthefraternitythatconsistspreciselyinanaffectiverecognitionofacommonsituationandacommontask.Beforereturning,though,todiscussthesortofassimilationthatrepublicanismrequires,asecondissueshouldbebrieflysetaside.Itisthequestionofwhetherrepublicancitizenshipcanberegardedasaformofnationalidentity.Certainlyrepublicanismisoftencontrastedwithnationalism,but,Isuggest,onthebasisofanover-limitedcon-ceptionofnationalismandofthesortsofidentityinwhichdifferentnationalismscanlocatenationalidentity.Indeed,thereareatleasttwomoregeneralformsofnationalidentityofwhichmembershipoftherepubliccanbeviewedasaspecies.Oneisterritorialnationality.Therepublicisessentiallyastretchofterritoryinwhichpeoplefindthemselvesthrowntogetherwithconsequentialsharedinterests.Theircommoninvolvementwithanddependenceonthatterritoryiswhatgivesthemasharedidentity.Theyare,forexample,FrenchpeoplebecausetheyareborninthelandofFranceoradmittedtocitizenshipthroughresidence.ButtheyarealsoFrenchpeoplethroughsharingasecondformofnationalidentity,onethatresultsfromFrancebeingarepublic,namelyacertainformofculturalnationality.Forwhilewhatbringsthemtogetherinthefirstplaceisnotsharedvalues,therepublicinwhichtheyarebroughttogetherinvolves,asIhavetriedtoshow,thedevelopmentandpursuitofsharedvalueswhichbecomethepropertyofitscitizens.Wecancomenowtoconsiderthewaysinwhichtherepublicannationcancopewiththosewithinitsborderswhoespousedistinctiveethnicidentities,andthequestionwithwhichweareimmediatelyconcernedis‘whatisexpectedofmembersoftherepublicbywayofassimilation?Whatkindofadaptationisinvolvedinthisandhowdoesitbearonpre-existingidentities?’Letuslookthenatatestcase,theso-called‘affairedufoulardeislamique’–precipitatedin1989whenthreedaughtersofimmigrantswenttoschoolinFrancewearingtheMuslimheadscarf.19Thiswastakenbyteacherstobeanattackupontherepublicanethosofthestate’sschools,whosesecularismexpressesthecommoneducationforpubliclifeprovidedforfuturecitizens,blindtothereligiousorotherculturaldifferenceswhichmustremainwithintheprivatesphere.InfacttheStateCouncilfoundthatsuchsymbolsofreligiousaffiliationastheheadscarveswerenotincompatiblewiththesecularismoftheschoolssolongastheydidnotinvolve110\nCOMMUNITARIANISMproselytisation,butin1994theMinisterofEducationactedtobanthewearingofthem.TheaffairsparkedavigorousdebateamongFrenchintellectualsastowhetherrepublicanismdoesordoesnotrequiresuchapparentlyilliberalmeasurestobeenforcedagainstmembersofaminoritygroup–aminoritygroupthatisparticularlydisadvantagedanddiscriminatedagainstatthat.Whichsideisright?Thefirstthingtosayisthatalthoughassimilationintotherepublicdoesrequiretheadoptionofaspecificcultureitdoesnot,contrarytoappearances,requireachangeofculture.Itisforthisreason,asweshallnoticeinalaterchapter,thatrepublicanshaveoftenpreferredtodistinguishwhatisrequiredasintegrationratherthanthewholesaleculturaltransformationthatassimilationmayseemtoimply.ThoseborninFranceorcomingtoitfromoutsidedonot,ofcourse,enterasituationinwhichtheycancontributetoarepublicancultureabinitio.Arepublicanculturehasalreadybeenformedandinordertocontributetoittheymustfirstabsorbit.Thisiswhyeducationisofsuchimportanceinrepublicanism.Foritisbyeducationthattherepublicancitizenisformed.Itisnoaccident,then,that‘l’affairedufoularde’centresonschools.Inschoolsthingsarelearnt,notunlearnt;anidentityisformed,notdiscarded.Otherpre-existingidentities,religious,linguisticorwhatever,areatleastintheorycompatiblewiththenewidentitythroughtheirlocationintheprivatesphereasagainstthepubliconewherethenationalidentityisformedanddisplayed.True,thenewidentitymaybehardertoacquirefromsomeculturalbackgroundsthanfromothers.TheIslamicidentificationofreligiousandpoliticalprescriptionsmayseemtocreateaparticularlyunfavourablebackgroundfortheformationofrepublicanidentity.ButwhiletherepublicanstatemaynotbetheonetheMuslimwouldideallybein,thereseemsnoreasoninprinciplewhysheshouldnotbeabletograspitsguidingvaluesandparticipateinitwholeheartedly.Havingsaidthis,onemustgoonimmediatelytoobservethatthecultureoftherepublicanstatewillbeformedfromthematerialsprovidedbyitsdominantgroups,puttingothersatadisadvantagenotonlyintheirrepublicanacculturationbutintheirinfluenceonthewayitsvaluesaretobeunderstood.Forexample,aparticularlanguage,French,isadoptedasthelanguageofthestate–notBreton,Occitan,Basqueandsoforth.Or,toaddressourpresentexample,girlsgoingbare-headedindoorsistakenasthenorm,nottheirwearinghead-scarves.Nowitmayseemthatculturalminoritiesaredoublydisad-vantaged.Forinbeingaskedtoadoptanewidentitydotheynotrisklosinganoldone,whatevertheavowedaimofassimilation?Itis111\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYimportanttoseethatthereisnowaythattherepubliccantakecog-nisanceofthisdangerbyrecognisingtheexistencewithinthepoliticalarenaofculturalgroups.Allitcandoisappreciatethepositionofindi-vidualsandnotmaketherequirementsforcitizenshipmoreonerousthannecessary.Indeeditwouldbewisetobeaccommodating,forotherwisethosewhofeeltheirculturethreatenedmayseektoadvancetheirminorityinterestabovethatofthestateasawhole.Thestateshouldnotdo,whattheFrenchstatecertainlydiddo,namelysuppressminorityculturesinthefurtheranceofnationalunity.Nopurelyrepublicanprinciplescouldjustifysuchacourse.Whatline,then,shouldarepublicantakeontheMuslimscarves?TheaccountofrepublicancitizenshipIhaveofferedsuggestsnodefinitiveanswer.Butthisis,infact,justasitshouldbe.ThedebateinFranceexemplifiesexactlythekindofdeliberationthroughwhichsuchquestionsreceiveananswerinarepublic.Itconcerns,forexample,whatconstitutesequalityoftreatmentformembersofdifferentcul-tures.Itconcernswhatdegreeofpersonallibertyiscompatiblewithequalityoftreatment.Inparticularitconcernshowandwheretheboundarybetweenthepublicandtheprivateistobedrawn.Butitleaves,ofcourse,allthesemattersinthehandsofthepeopleasawhole.Itisnotaliberaloutcome,andthatispreciselytheobjectionthatliberalsmaketothewayinwhichrepublicancommunitarianismseekstoaccommodateculturaldifference.ItisinthisveinthatKymlicka,forexample,criticisesMichaelWalzer,whosecommunitarianismdisplayselementsofrepublicanism:Sincesensibilitiesandintuitionsaboutjusticearenotsharedinmultinationalstates,relationsbetweengroupscannotbebasedonjustice.Minorityrelationsmust,therefore,bedecidedongroundsof‘mutualaccommodation’...orbythesimpleexerciseofmajoritypower(asWalzerconcedeswilloccur).20Therepublicanresponsetosuchcriticismisthreefold.First,thatstatescomprisingdifferentculturalgroupsshouldnotbeviewedas‘multinational’,sinceitispoliticalnotantecedentculturalmembershipthatdeterminesnationality.Second,thatwhiledifferentculturalgroupsmayhavedivergentsensibilitiesandintuitionsaboutjusticethisdoesnotmeanthattheirrelations‘cannotbebasedonjustice’–onlythattheymustbebasedonprinciplesofjusticewhichtheycanagreebetweenthemselves;andnothingfollowsfromtheirconstitutingdifferentculturestoshowthistobeimpossible.Third,thatinarrivingatsuchprinciples‘thesimpleexerciseofmajoritypower’constitutes112\nCOMMUNITARIANISManabuseoftherepublicansystem;forintherepublicthefactthatthesearethe‘sensibilitiesandintuitions’ofone’sownculturalgroupshouldbeirrelevanttodeterminingwhatsensibilitiesandintuitionsoneshouldfollowindeliberatingupontheprinciplesofjusticeapplicableinamulticulturalsociety.Whetherthisresponsetoliberalcriticismisadequatewilldepend,however,notonlyuponwhethersuchrepublicandeliberationisinprinciplepossible,butonwhetheritisinfactpossibleforpeoplewhohavethekindsofsocialidentitiesthattheydo.ItisworthnoticingthatinthisrespectrepublicanismdiffersfromtheHabermasiandialogicalapproachdiscussedatthebeginningoftheprecedingchapter.Forrepublicanismneednotpresupposethattherearesomegeneralaprioriprinciplesforconductingpoliticswhichanyarbitrarycollectionofpeoplecandiscover.Whetherpeoplecanarriveatacommonpoliticsisacontingentmatterandwhatsortofpoliticstheyarriveatmayvaryfromcasetocase.CULTURALCOMMUNITARIANISMNearlyfivecenturiesafterCicero’sDeRepublica,StAugustinecom-posedanotherworkofRomanpoliticalphilosophy,andoneofaverydifferentcharacter,whoseinfluencewastobefullyfeltonlylongafterthatofclassicalrepublicanismandinsharpoppositiontoit.InDeRepublica,aswehavenoticed,Cicerodeniesthetitleofapeopleorcommunitytothosewhoarenotunitedbya‘bondofjustice’.ItisthisfeatureofCicero’srepublicandefinitionofcommunitythatAugustinedrawsuponinhisgreatworkTheCityofGod,toreachthemoreradicalconclusionthat‘thatcommonwealthneverexistedbecausethereneverwasrealjusticeinthecommunity’.21Republicancommu-nitieslikethosethatCicerodiscernedinRomeandAthensneverexisted,accordingtoAugustine,because:JusticeisfoundwhereGod,theonesupremeGod,rulesanobedientCityaccordingtohisgrace,forbiddingsacrificetoanybeingsavehimselfalone;andwhereinconsequencethesoulrulesthebodyinallmenwhobelongtothisCityandobeyGodandthereasonfaithfullyrulesthevicesinalawfulsystemofsubordination;sothatjustastheindividualrighteousmanlivesonthebasisoffaithwhichisactiveinlove,sotheassociation,orpeople,ofrighteousmenlivesonthesamebasisoffaith,activeinlove,thelovewithwhichamanlovesGodasGodoughttobeloved,andloveshisneighbourashimself.Butwherethisjustice113\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYdoesnotexist,therecertainlyisno‘associationofmenunitedbyacommonsenseofrightandbyacommunityofinterest’.22HereAugustinetakesCicero’sowndefinitionofacommunityanddeniesitsapplicationtothenon-ChristianstatesoftheancientworldonthegroundsthatonlytheChristianconceptionwillyieldasystemthatcanproperlyberegardedasasystemofjustice.Indoingsohedeniesthatadistinctioncanbedrawnbetweenasharedconceptionofthegoodthatpeoplemighthaveasmembersofapoliticalsociety,andtheconceptiontheyhaveasindividualswithspecificculturalattachments,inparticularthoseofChristianbelief.Theiridentitiesarehomogeneousinawaythatthepublic/privatefissureofrepublicanismpreventsthemfrombeing,and,whatismore,theydisplaynoneoftheinternalcomplexitythattheancients’abilitytoworshipatmorethanonealtarpermittedthem.Peopleare,instead,identifiedas,forexample,Christiansand,ideally,theyhavetheirown‘city’inconsequenceofthatidentity.ItisimportanttoseehowitisAugustine’squiteunrepublicanviewsaboutsocialidentitythatareatworkhere,inordertounder-standthemovehemakesafterrejectingCicero’saccountofpoliticalcommunities.ForAugustinedoesnotwanttodenythatwecaninsomesensedistinguishpeoplesorcommunitiesfrom‘anyandeveryassociationofthepopulation’,andheacceptsthattheRomanstate‘certainlywasacommonwealthtosomedegree,accordingtomoreplausibledefinitions’.23Histask,then,istoprovidesuchanalternativedefinition.Whatheoffersisthat‘apeopleistheassociationormultitudeofrationalbeingsunitedbyacommonagreementontheobjectsoftheirlove.’‘Itfollows’,hecontinues,‘thattoobservethecharacterofaparticularpeoplewemustexaminetheobjectsofitslove,’andheconcludesthat‘bythisdefinitionofourstheRomanpeopleisapeopleanditsestateisindubitablyacommonwealth.’24Thesamegoes,hecomments,fortheAtheniansorotherGreeks,theAssyrians‘orindeed...anyothernationwhatsoever’.Allthesecountascommuni-tiesonAugustine’salternativedefinition,althoughasexamplesof‘thecityoftheimpious’theyarespecificallycontrastedwiththeCityofGodwhichwouldaloneexemplifycommunityasunderstoodaccordingtoCicero’sdefinition.InhisdefinitionAugustinelocatesthecommu-nitynotinatypeoforganisationsostructuredastosecurecommoninterests,butintermsofthecommoncharacterofitsmembers–acharacterconstitutedbythesharingofvalues,sothatitisdifferentvalueswhichmarkoutthedifferentnationsonefromanother.Itis,inotherwords,culturalgroups,ononeunderstandingofculture,that114\nCOMMUNITARIANISMconstitutenationswiththeirattendantrightstostatehood.Anditisthisunderstandingofcultureandcommunitywhichgaverisetoculturalnationalism,some1,400yearsafterAugustine,intheworksofGermanRomanticthinkerslikeHerder.25Thekindofcommunitarianismwhichculturalnationalismexhibits,andwhichIshalldubculturalcommunitarianism,isverydifferentfromrepublicanism.Itidentifiesthecommongoalthatitsmembersseekandwhosefulfilmentconstitutestheircommongoodastherealisationofthegroup’ssharedvaluesitself.Whatunitesmembersinthepursuitofacommongoodisthattheyseethemselvesashavingsharedvalues:theyagreeabouttheobjectsoftheirlove,inAugustine’sphrase.Andtheydothisbecausetheiridentitiesareembeddedinthatofthecommunityinaverystrongsense,namelythattheyidentifythem-selves,perhapsfirstandforemost,asmembersofit.Theydonotjustfindthemselvesshapedbythevaluesofthosearoundthem:theyacknowledgethesevaluesthroughseeingthemselvesasmembersofthecommunityconstitutedbythepursuitofsuchvalues,whetherornottheycanbearticulateaboutthem.Thetwopointsarerelated.Forthevaluesinquestioncharacterisewhatistakentobegoodforthegroup,notnecessarilyforpeopleingeneral.Theyareanalogoustoindividualideals,whicharenotnecessarilygeneralisabletoothers.Butthenthoseespousingthevaluesneedtoknowforwhichgrouptheirrealisationisgood,andmustthusbeabletoidentifythosewithwhomtheyaregoingtopursueit.Thecriterionofmembershipis,toextendAugustine’smodelalittle,aconfessionalone.Furthermore,since–asindicatedearlier–culturalidentityisviewedashomogeneous,sothatitdoesnotcharacteriseonlyoneaspectoftheself,membershipoftheculturalcommunityisnotjustonesocialgoodamongothers:itistheover-archingonewhichmakesothergoodspossible,sincethevaluesofthecommunityarethosewherebythevalueofotherrelationshipsisjudged.Itisclearfromthisaccountthataculturalcommunitysounder-stoodisnotessentiallyapoliticalcommunity,asistherepublicanone.Itisratherthecasethatinordertobeawell-functioningpoliticalcommunityagroupalreadyneedstobeaculturalcommunityinsharingasubstantiveconceptionofthegood,whichpoliticscanthenputintoeffect.Therearetwoimportantconsequencesofthis.First,thegroupthatformstheculturalcommunityispickedoutbyvirtueofjustthosecharacteristicsthatmakeitacommunity,namelyitssharedculture,ratherthanbyvirtueoffeaturessuchascommonoccupationofaplacewhichmayormaynotleadtoagroupbecomingacommunity115\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYintherepublicansense.Second,whatmakestheculturalgroupacommunityisnotsomesetofinstitutionsorotherstructuralcharac-teristics:itisthesharedspirit–theloveofcertainobjects–whichunitespeopleintoone.Ofcoursethiswillnotcomewithoutsomeformofsocialorganisation.Butthereisnowayofspecifyingthissocialorganisationinsuchawaythatagrouppossessingitconstitutesacommunity,asunderrepublicanismacertainsetofrelationshipsandpoliticalinstitutionsregulatingthemcanbespecified.Forwhatkindofsocialorganisationthecommunityhaswilldependuponthevaluesitespouses,andthereforecannotbespecifiedingeneralterms.Thisexplainswhyitisthatcommunitarians,ofwhomculturalcommuni-tariansarebyfarthecommonersort,sooftenseemreluctanttoanswerthechargeofcriticsthattheyhavenotsaidwhattheymeanbycommunity.26Nevertheless,somethingcanbesaidaboutthenatureoftheculturalcommunity.Forcommunitariansofthesortunderdiscussioncriticisecontemporarypoliticalsocietiesonthegroundsthattheylackthebenefitsthatculturalcommunitiesdeliver.Theyaredeficientinthesocialgoodsthatarisefromrootednessinacomprehensiveandestab-lishedculture–thegoods,forexample,ofconfidenceinone’sownactionsandunderstandingofandtrustinthoseofothers.Theyaredeficient,inparticular,intheunreflectiveharmonywhichisbroughtbythesharingofvaluesandthecommonpursuitofthem,andforwhichnoformalinstitutionshavingthisasanexplicitobjectivearerequired.ThepoliticsoftheculturalcommunityimpliedhereisreminiscentofGemeinschaft(thenotionduetoTönnieswhichwemetearlier)bycontrastwithGesellschaft–thecommunityinwhichoneisbornandreared,discoveringone’sidentitythroughformingattach-mentsandallegiances,bycontrastwiththeassociationonejoinsforspecifiedpurposesthatonehasindependentlyofmembership.TheformeroperatesthroughwhatTönniescalls‘naturalwill’,wherebyonefindsoneselfpursuingendsincommonwithone’sfellows,thelatterthroughthe‘rationalwill’ofvoluntarypurposefulassociation.Theformerprovides,incontemporaryjargon,one’s‘primarysocialisation’,thelatteronlyasecondaryandderivativeone.TheshiftfromCicero’srepublicanaccountofcommunitytoAugustine’sconfessionaloneismirrored,Isuggested,nearlyamillen-niumandahalflater,intheriseofculturalnationalism.RecentwriterslikeMartinThom27andMaurizioViroli28havewantedtoemphasisetherupturethatoccurredaroundtheendoftheeighteenthcenturybetweenanEnlightenmentvisionoftherationalobjectsofpolitical116\nCOMMUNITARIANISMallegiance,andaRomanticdreamofthehistoricallysanctionedandculturallycompulsoryobjectsofallegiance–between,thatistosay,therepublicanismrootedinClassicalthoughtandtheculturalnationalismofHerderandFichte.Notleastimportantinthistransitionfromoneformofallegiancetoanother,differentlyfoundedonewasachangefromonetypeofentityaselicitingallegiancetoanother–fromthecitytothetribe,asThomcallsit.Allegiancetothecity,ormoregenerallytotheterritoriallyindividuatedgroup,consistsinbeingmotivatedtopursueacommongoodconceivedofasasetofinterestswhosevaluecanbenegotiatedandshared–aprocessforwhichsuitableinstitutionsarerequired.Allegiancetothetribe,bycontrast,isallegiancetotheculturallyindividuatedgroup.Itconsistsinkeepingfaith,innotdepartingfromthevaluestheadhesiontowhichmakesthegroupagroup.Fordeparturefromthesevaluesonanyscalewoulddestroythegroup’scollectiveexistence.Thechangefromthecitytothetribeasthefocusofallegianceismomentouspreciselybecauseitimposespreconditionsonthosewithwhomoneshouldassociateinthepursuitofacommongoodwhichwereabsentunderrepublicanism–precon-ditionsarisingfromthewaytheculturalcommunityisconstructed.CULTURALNATIONALISMCulturalcommunitarianismofthesortwehavebeenlookingaterectsaquitespecificmodeloftheculturalcommunity,namelyaself-iden-tifyingcommunityofcommonvalues.Thesevalues,wehaveassumed,arethosethatcanbethoughtofascharacterisingapeople’swholewayoflife.Butwehavenotyetlookedathowsuchacommunitymightrelatetoethnicornationalidentities.Threepossibilitiescometomind:thattheseculturalcommunitiescompriseethnicgroups;thattheycomprisenationalgroups;andthattheycomprisebothjustbecausenationalgroupsareethnicgroups.Thefirstposition,thatculturalcommunitiescomprisenon-nationalethnicgroups,ishardtocombinewiththeviewthatcommunityloyaltiesunderpinpoliticalones.Ifwerejectthisviewthenweneedaquiteseparateaccountofwhatgeneratespoliticalloyalty,perhapsaliberaloneinwhichthestateisseenasprovidinganeutralframeworkwithinwhichdifferentethnicgroupsmaypursuetheirdiversevaluesinsafety.Wehave,however,alreadyseensomeofthedifficultiesattendantonthisconception.Afurtherdifficultyarisesiftheroleofthestateisseenasmorethanminimalandincludestheprovisionofsocialwelfare.Forthisanacknowledgementofmutualobligationis117\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYrequired.Butifthissenseofsocialsolidarityisconfinedtotheethnicgroupthenarguablyastatewhichconsistsofacollectionofsuchgroupswillbeunabletocallonitinsupportofastate-widewelfaresystem.JustsuchconsiderationsarecalleduponbyDavidMillerincriticismofIrisMarionYoung’smulticulturalistposition.29Young,asweshalllaterseeinmoredetail,envisagescitizensparticipatinginpoliticsasmembersofethnicandothergroupsratherthanconsigningtheseidentitiestotheprivatesphere,althoughthepoliticsthatresultsmustshowequalrespectforallgroupsandcontributetotheirflourishing.ThisisnodoubtahardbalancetostrikeandMillerisoftheopinionthatitsactualresultwillbeconflictaboutthedistributionofresources,inwhichdominantgroupswillwinoutandmembersofsubordinateonesfailtoobtainafairshareofwelfare.Howeverthatmaybe,amulticulturalistlikeYoungwillhavetoargueforpoliticalloyaltytosuchastateonthegroundsthattheequalrespectshowntoethnicgroupsisagoodforeachofthem.Butthispresupposesadispositiontoseesomethingofvalueineachwhichmayormaynotbeforth-coming.Whetheritiswilllikelyhavetodowithwhetheropennessandtolerationarevaluesforthosegroupscalledupontoshowrespect.Yettheproblemsofethnicdifferenceoftenarisepreciselywhentheyarenot.Millerisledtoembracethesecondoptionmentionedabove,namelyoftakingthenationtobeaculturalcommunitywhoseinternalsolidaritycanunderpinpoliticalloyalties.Thusthescopeofthepolit-icalcommunityissetasthatatwhichawelfaresystemcanfunctionbestbyprovidingthewidestrangeofpeoplewithbenefits,forthenationisthehighestlevelofcommunitywithsufficientsolidaritytonurtureit.Indeeditispartlyconstitutiveofagroupbeinganationthatitinvolvessuchmutualcommitment.Butthesearenotcommitmentsgeneratedbyethnicity,whichMillerdistinguishesfromnationalityasrequiringcommondescentandcertainsharedculturalfeatures–‘language,religion,etc’–differentkindsofwhichcaninprincipleco-existwithinanation,suchthatitis‘possibleforethnicityandnationalitytoco-exist,neitherthreateningtodriveouttheother’.30Akeydifference,then,isthatonecanbecomeamemberofanationotherthanbybirthandwithoutabandoningkeyfeaturesofthecultureintowhichoneisfirstinducted.Iftheculturalcommunityrelevanttopoliticsisthenon-ethnicnationalgroupthenthepotentiallyexclusiveconsequencesoflinkingstatehoodtosharedethnicitymaybeavoided.YetMiller’sviewofthenationalcommunitydoeshaveclearconse-quencesforthetermsonwhichimmigration,forexample,maybe118\nCOMMUNITARIANISMundertaken,and,byextension,forthoseonwhichdifferentethnicgroupscanbecombinedintoasinglenationalone.ForwhileMillerholdsthatnationalcommunitiesareconstitutedbymutualrecognition,therecognitioninquestiondependsuponabeliefinsharedcharac-teristics,namelythosethat‘inthepast[were]oftenreferredtoas“anationalcharacter”,butwhichIprefertodescribeasacommonpub-licculture’.Thismaybetheresultof‘ethnicmixing’,sothat,Millercontinues,‘immigrationneednotposeproblems,providedonlythatimmigrantscometoshareinacommonnationalidentity,towhichtheymaycontributetheirowndistinctiveingredients.’31Thoughthismay,heconcedes,bedifficultforthem,it‘isnotanargumentagainstnationalidentities,butanargumentfornationalidentitiesthathaveaclearfocusandareasfaraspossibleindependentofgroup-specificculturalvalues’.32Millermayhaveunderestimatedthedifficulty.Forintacitlyrejectingtherepublicanjustificationformakingcommoncausewithothers,whichhedubsthe‘lifeboatmodel’,33namelythatweshareacommonpredicament,Millerdemandsthatthosewhowouldbecompatriotsmusttakeontheobligationsarisingfromthe‘historicidentity’whichnationalcontinuityconfers.Foritwouldseemtobeinnationalhistorythatnationalvaluesaredisplayed,andnationalhistory,therefore,mustplayakeyroleinnationaleducation.Itis,however,onethingtolearnaboutsomeone’shistory,quiteanothertomakeoneselfpartofit,anditisnotclearthatidentificationwithanationalcommunitysocon-ceivedispossibleforimmigrants,orindeedforpreviouslyoppressedgroupsliketheWelshorScotswithinGreatBritain.Miller’slikeningoftheprocessofimmigrantacculturationtomarryingintoafamily34isunhelpfulasareplytothisobjectionpreciselybecausetheanalogyinvolvestheverysameproblemsasthatwhichitisintendedtoillu-minate.Andtheproblemsofa‘mixed’marriagemaywellbesolvedbyappealtothe‘lifeboatmodel’anyway.TheotherprincipalobjectiontoMiller’soptionisthattheallegedlynationalcommunityisnocommunityanyway.35Thesupposedlycom-monculturewhichgroundstheidentitiesofmembersofthenationisapoliticalcontrivancewhichlacksthedepthnecessarytoperformthisfunction.Milleriscriticalofthesuggestionthatnationalidentityissomehowsecond-ratewhencomparedwithethnicidentity,because,hebelieves,noneispureandallanswertopoliticalimperatives.Buttotheextenttowhichnationalidentityisamatterofdeliberateformation–asMillerenvisagesanIrishidentitywhichresolvestheproblemofNorthernIrelandmightbe36–thenitishardtoseehow119\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYitcouldbetheembeddedidentityofculturalcommunitarianism.Ifitisthoughtthatsuchanidentitymustbeethnic,andthattheallegiancesitinvolvesneedtobedrawnupontounderpinpoliticalloyalty,thenthethirdoptionmentionedabovehastobeembracedandnationalgroupsidentifiedwithethnicones.Heretheverydepthofethnicidentitythatisdemandedcreatesproblemsinrespectofimmi-grantsandnationalminoritieswhichweshalllookatinmoredetaillaterinthebook.Why,though,shouldwetroubleourselveswiththisposition?Whyshouldweallowthatethnicitycaneverunderpinthekindsofpoliticalclaimthatnationalitymakes,whenreligion,forexample,removedfromitsethnicassociations,doesnot?Ifwediscardtheconservativeargumentslookedatinthelastchapterthennojustificatoryanswerappearstobeavailable.However,muchaswemayregretit,ethnicidentificationshavedevelopedaholdoverpeoplewhichcannotbeignored.Assoonaspeoplecometothinkofthemselvesaswhotheyarebyvirtueofvalueswhichtheysharewithalimitedgroupofpeople,thentheirscopeforthekindofconsensus-buildingengagementwithothersrequiredbyrepublicanism–orevenbythesortofnationalismfavouredbyMiller–diminishesandmaybedisappears.Foranyadoptionofwiderconsensualvalueswilllooklikeabetrayalofantecedentculturalonesandultimatelytheobliterationofthatculturalidentity.Butthiskindofself-identificationhas,itappears,becomethenormanditsethnicformispre-eminent,andpre-eminentpreciselybecauseitdoessupposedlyestablishacomprehensiveprimaryidentitytowhichotherkinds–religious,vocational,sexualorpolitical–takesecondplace.Ethnicidentitythencomestogroundclaimsmadeinthenameofnationality.Itshouldnot,however,bethoughtthattheseclaimsthereforereflectmember-shipofanyrealethniccommunity.Thekindofself-identificationwithwhichwearedealingnodoubtinvolvesabeliefinsuchacommunity.Butundercontemporaryconditionssuchabeliefismostlikelyfalse,andcommunitarianconsiderationscandonothingtojustifynationalclaims.Inthefollowingchapter,weshalllookatsometheoreticalcon-siderationsconcerningthenatureofcommunitiesandtheprocessesofidentityformationwhichtendtosupportthispessimisticconclusion.NOTES1.Aristotle,Politics,1252a1.Ihaveusedvarioustranslationsandadaptedtheminsomecases.2.Ibid.1253a19.120\nCOMMUNITARIANISM3.Ibid.1281a42.4.Ibid.1276b16.5.Theyareabstractedandsynthesisedfromtheworkofthosepoliticalphilosopherscommonlyviewedascommunitarian(notallofwhomwillholdtopreciselythesepositionsorthiscombination),namelyMichaelSandel,AlasdairMacIntyre,CharlesTaylorandMichaelWalzer.FordetailedanalysisanddiscussionseeS.MulhallandA.Swift,LiberalsandCommunitarians(Oxford:Blackwell,1992).6.Aristotle,Politics,1260a13.7.Ibid.1261a22.8.Ibid.1253a7.9.Thisisnottoclaimthatallrepublicanismiscommunitarianinanysense,onlythatanimportantstrandcanbesothoughtof.10.Cicero,DeRepublica,I.25(manytranslations:againIhaveadaptedthemformypurposes).Cicero’swordforpeople–‘populus’–meansapeopleunitedinapoliticalcommunity.11.Cicero,DeRepublica,III.31.12.Ibid.III.22.13.Rousseau,TheSocialContract,BookIV,ch.1;BookII,ch.III.14.QuotedinG.Kates,‘JewsintoFrenchmen’,SocialResearch56(1989),p.229.15.Itis,inBenjaminConstant’sphrase,‘libertyoftheancients’,not‘libertyofthemoderns’.16.SeeI.Hampsher-Monk,AHistoryofModernPoliticalThought(Oxford:Blackwell,1992),p.220.ThebestcontemporaryexponentisBenjaminBarber,StrongDemocracy:ParticipatoryPoliticsforaNewAge(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1984).17.S.Johnson,‘TaxationnoTyranny’[pamphletof1775],repr.inD.J.Greene(ed.),SamuelJohnson:PoliticalWritings(NewHaven:YaleUP,1977),p.454.18.E.BalibarandI.Wallerstein,Race,Nation,Class(London:Verso,1991),p.24.19.DiscussedbyCatherineAudardin‘PoliticalLiberalism,SecularRepublicanism:twoanswerstothechallengesofpluralism’,inD.Archard(ed.),PhilosophyandPluralism(Cambridge:CUP,1996).IhavebenefitedfromhearinganunpublishedpaperbyJeremyJennings.20.W.Kymlicka,Liberalism,CommunityandCulture(Oxford:OUP,1989),p.231.ItshouldbenotedthatKymlickawouldregardFranceasa‘poly-ethnic’ratherthana‘multinational’state,strictlyspeaking(seeCh.8,‘Pluralism’,below);sothat,thoughhewouldbeunhappyaboutademo-craticresolutionoftheheadscarvesissue,theculturalclaimsofMuslims,asimmigrants,arelimited.21.Augustine,TheCityofGod,II.21.22.Ibid.XIX.23.23.Ibid.II.21.24.Ibid.XIX.24.25.ItwasCarlJ.Friedrichwhoidentifiedthisinfluence:see‘Theconceptofcommunity’inhis(ed.)Community(NewYork:LiberalArtsPress,1959).121\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY26.ForexampleJ.Waldron,‘Minorityculturesandthecosmopolitanalterna-tive’,inW.Kymlicka(ed.),TheRightsofMinorityCultures(Oxford:OUP,1995),p.95.27.M.Thom,Republics,NationsandTribes(London:Verso,1995).28.M.Viroli,ForLoveofCountry(Oxford:OUP,1995).29.AsexpressedinherJusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton:Prince-tonUP,1990):seealsoD.Miller,OnNationality(Oxford:OUP,1995),pp.130–40.30.Miller,OnNationality,p.21.31.Ibid.pp.25–6.32.Ibid.p.137.33.Ibid.pp.41–2.34.D.Miller,‘Nationality:Somereplies’,JournalofAppliedPhilosophy14(1997),p.78.35.Cp.J.O’Neill,‘Shouldcommunitariansbenationalists?’,JournalofAppliedPhilosophy11(1994);andforMiller’sreply,‘Nationality:Somereplies’,pp.77–8.36.Miller,‘Nationality:Somereplies’,p.80.122\n6MARXISMANDPOSTMODERNISMqwTHEMARXISTCRITIQUETheRomanrepublic,whichwasamodelformanymuchlaternationstates,wasnotapoliticalcommunitywherealltheinhabitantswerecitizens.Amongthosewhowerenotwereslaves,uponwhoselabourtheeconomyoftherepublicdepended,butwhosewellbeingwasnopartofthecommongoodatwhichitaimed.Despiteboththeabsenceofsuchinstitutionalisedslaveryandtheformalequalityofemployerandemployeeinthemodernstate,thereis,KarlMarxargued,ananalogybetweenitandtheRomanrepublicwhichunderminestheRomanrepublic’sclaimtoprovideasatisfactorymodelofpoliticalcommunity.Thehistoryofallhithertoexistingsocietyisthehistoryofclassstruggles.Freemanandslave,patricianandplebian,lordandserf,guildmasterandjourneyman,inawordoppressorandoppressed,stoodinconstantoppositiontooneanother...Themodernbourgeoissocietythathassproutedfromtheruinsoffeudalsocietyhasnotdoneawaywithclassantagonisms.Ithasbutestablishednewclasses,newconditionsofoppression,newformsofstruggleinplaceoftheoldones.1SostartstheCommunistManifesto,inwhichMarxandEngelscalluponworkerstorecognisetheircommonclassinterestinoppositiontothatoftheircapitalistemployers.‘InthedaysofclassicalRome’,writes123\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYMarx,‘theslavewasboundinchains;thewageworkerisboundtohisownerbyinvisiblethreads.Theappearanceofindependenceiskeptupbymeansoftheperpetualchangefromonewagelordtoanother,andbythelegalfictionofthecontract’2–afiction,thatistosay,becausetheworkerhastosellherlabourpowertolive:shecannotchoosenottoenterintothissortofrelationship,fromwhichitisthecapitalistwhobenefitsbyexploitinghisemployees.Theconflictofinterestbetweencapitalistandworkervitiates,Marxargues,theclaimsofthestatetorepresentthegeneralgoodofacommunity.‘The“generalgood”’,hewrites,‘istheillusoryformofcommunallife’,whichis‘divorcedfromtherealinterestsofindividualandcommunity’,thoughthisillusorycommunallifeis‘alwaysbased...ontherealtiesexistingineveryfamilyandtribalconglomeration(suchasfleshandblood,language,divisionoflabour...andotherinterests)’.3Marx’scontentionisthatthefundamentaldeterminantofhistoricalchangeisclassconflict,not,asitmaysuperficiallyappear,conflictbetweennationalorothergroups.Classmembershipisfixedobjectivelybyone’splaceintheproductiveprocess,notsubjectivelybyone’ssharedidentificationwithothers,thoughthetransitionfroma‘classinitself’toa‘classforitself’whichisnecessaryforcollectiveactiondependsuponmakingsuchanidentification.Thusidentifica-tionwithanationorothergroupmayhampertheemergenceoftheclass-consciousnesswhichworkersneedinordertocombattheiroppression,anditcantherebyservetheinterestsofthecapitalistclass.TheMarxistcritiqueofcommunitarianismdepends,then,uponsubjectingtheclaimsofanysoi-disantcommunitytoscrutinyinordertoascertainwhethertherelationshipsitinvolvesaregenuinelycommunalorare,rather,illusorilyso,maskingarealityofexploitationandoppres-sion.Itisnotthecommunitarianidealassuchthatistheobjectofcritique.Rather,whatiscriticisedistheassumptionthatthecommu-nitarianidealcanberealisedsimplybysettingitbeforepeopleassomethingtobestrivenfor,withoutchangingthefundamentalrelationsofproductionwhichunderlieanysociety.Theserelationsinturndependuponthemodeofproductionwherebyoneclassmaycontrolthewealthneededfortheproductiveprocess.Inthesecircumstancesnoamountofexhortationcanbeexpectedtopersuadethemembersofthatclasstoadvancesomeinterestmoregeneralthanitsown.Thus,Marxnotes,thinkingnodoubtofthedecayoftheRomanrepublic,‘allpreviousformsofsocietyfounderedonthedevelopmentofwealth–or,whichamountstothesamething,onthedevelopmentofsocialproductiveforces.Thereforeancientphilosopherswhowere124\nMARXISMANDPOSTMODERNISMawareofthisbluntlydenouncedwealthasdestructiveofcommunity.’4Theconsequenceofthisanalysisforpoliticalphilosophyisthattheclaimsmadeonbehalfofanynationalorethnicgroupneedtobescrutinisedinordertoseewhatintereststheyserveand,Marxwouldhaveadded,whatcontributionacceptingthemwouldmaketoover-comingcapitalistoppression.MarxandEngelsconcludetheCommunistManifestowiththecall‘WORKINGMENOFALLCOUNTRIES,UNITE!’5–unite,thatistosay,tocombatglobalcapitalism,inrelationtowhichworkersshareacommoninterest,obscuredasthismaybebynationalorethnicdifferences.Earlier,MarxandEngelsanswerthechargethatcommu-nistsdesireto‘abolishcountriesandnationality’byremarkingthat‘theworkingmenhavenocountry.Wecannottakefromthemwhattheyhavenotgot.’6Nationsare,atleastforthemostpart,bourgeoisinstitutions,inthesensethatthemarkingofcertaindifferencesasnationalservestheinterestsofsectionsofthecapitalistclass.TothisextentMarxistshavenoreasontosupportanationalistagenda.AsEngelswroteinoppositiontotheItalianpatriot,Mazzini,‘TheInternationalrecognisesnocountry;itdesirestounite,notdissolve.ItisopposedtothecryforNationality,becauseittendstoseparatepeoplefrompeople,andisusedbytyrantstocreateprejudicesandantagonism’.7ThisinsistencethatnationalclaimsbetestedagainsttherealinterestsofordinarypeopleisoneofthemostvaluablelegaciesofMarxism.Itis,however,atmosthalfthestory.ForMarxandhissuccessorshavethreeothercriteriaintermsofwhichsupportfornationalistcausescanbejustified.ThefirstandleastattractivestemsfromtheMarxisttheoryofhistoricaldevelopmentwhichenvisagesaprogressionfromfeudalthroughcapitalisttocommunistformsofsocialproduction.Inparticular,theorganisationofcapitalistproductionanddistributionatacertainstageofthisdevelopmentrequiresaculturallyunified,territoriallyboundednation-state.Sincecapitalismisanecessaryprelim-inarytocommunism,nationalbourgeoisrevolutionsagainstfeudalismmayneedtobesupported.ThusMarxsupportedthePolishstruggleforindependencefromRussiain1848,sincetheformerwasindustrialisingandthelatterstilllargelyfeudal.ThedownsideofsuchprogressivismwastheMarxistattitudetowhat,borrowingfromHegel,8werethoughtofasnationswithnohistory,orasEngelsputit,‘theruinsofpeoples,whicharestillfoundhereandthereandwhicharenolongercapableofanationalexistence.’Thesewillbe‘absorbedbythelargernationsandeitherbecomeapartofthemormaintainthemselvesasethnographicmonumentswithoutpoliticalsignificance.’9Supportfor125\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYindependenceforsuchpeoples,forexamplethesouthernSlavsin1848,wouldbearetrogradestep,simplypreventingthemfromadvancingbeyondtheirpeasanteconomies.ThereislittletobesaidforthisstrainofMarxistthought.Infactithadlittleinfluenceonthepoliciesofsocialiststatestowardssmallernations,whichwereinfactdecidedlargelyonstrategiccriteria:whatpoliciestowardsnationsandothergroupswouldfurtherworking-classinterestsingeneral?Largergroups,pickedoutasnations,werecon-cededarightofself-determinationbyLenin–arightenshrinedintheconstitutionoftheformerSovietUnionwhicheventuallyfacilitateditsrelativelybloodlessdissolution.Not,ofcourse,thatthisoutcomewasenvisagedbyitsfounders,whothoughtoftherightasstrengtheningtheSovietstatebyinhibitingthecoercionofonenationbyanotherandtherebypreventingantagonismbetweennations,justastherightofdivorceissometimestakentostrengthentheinstitutionofmarriage.Thisis,ineffect,autilitarianjustificationfortheacknowledgementofcertainnationalrights.Similarly,inthecaseofsmallerormorewidelydispersedgroups–‘nationalities’astheyaresometimescalledinsocialistcircles,bycontrastwithnations10–culturalrights,inparticularlanguagerights,needtoberecognisedinordertopreventresentmentanddamagingdivisionsamongpeoplewhoseinterestsactuallycoincide.Thedifficultywithsuchutilitarianargumentsarises,ofcourse,whenonetriestocalculatewhatsystemofrightswouldbestservethegeneralgood,construedhereastheinterestsoftheworkingclass.ThethirdMarxistcriterionforsupportingnationalandothergroupsescapesthisdifficulty.Itissimplythatsuchgroupsdeservesupportwhentheyarethespecificvictimsofoppression.Leninsawnationalrevoltsagainstoppressionasarisingparticularlyinthecolonies,wherethecolonialpettybourgeoisieaswellastheproletariatwereexploitedbyimperialism.11Thefactthattherevoltsmight,inconsequence,bebourgeoisonesdidnotinvalidatethecaseforsup-portingthem.Forinsuchcasestheonlypoliticallypossiblefocusforcombiningtoresistoppressionwasanationalone.Inmanyinstancesanti-colonialiststruggleshaveinvolvedracialconflict,andtheoppres-sionofsomeracesbyelementsfromothersisregardedbyMarxistsasaparticularformofclassoppression.Racemay,forexample,asImmanuelWallersteinsuggests,12beawayofmarkingoffthelabourpoolintheperipheryoftheworldeconomyfromitscore–apooloflabourthatismarkedlymoreunjustlytreatedthanwhiteworkersare.Supportforanti-racistarrangementstopreventsuchoppressionis,inthesecircumstances,arequirementofjustice.Butitstems,according126\nMARXISMANDPOSTMODERNISMtotheMarxistanalysis,fromseeingessentiallythesameprocessesatworkinracismasoperateinthelegitimationofclassoppressiongen-erally,andnotdistinctivelydifferentones.ItistheinjusticeofsuchoppressionwhichisthedrivingforceofMarxistattitudestowardsraceandnationality.IDEOLOGYInMarxistphilosophythefailureofworkingpeopletorealisethattheirfundamentalidentityislocatedintheircommonclassmembershipisexplainedbythepowerofideology.Ideologyisthesystemofideasemployedinpolitics,law,morality,religionandsoforththroughwhichpeopleconceptualisetheirsociallives.Buttheseideasarenotinnocent.Theydonotsimplyreflecttherealitytheyareusedtodescribe,fortheyare,Marxstresses,humancreationsandassuchdeterminedbytheconditionsunderwhichtheyareproduced.(Readerswillrecogniseherethefundamentalthoughtunderlyingsocialcon-structionism.)Thusideologyisdetermined,inthefinalanalysis,bytheeconomicrelationswhichshapepeople’ssocialconditions,ratherthantheserelationsbeingdeterminedbyideology.ThisisanaspectoftheMarxistdistinctionbetweenthebase–constitutedbyeconomicrelations–andthesuperstructure–theformsofhumanconsciousnesswhichideologiesexemplify:‘lifeisnotdeterminedbyconsciousness,’asMarxandEngelsfamouslyexpressit,‘butconsciousnessbylife.’13Thebasethushasexplanatorypriorityoverthesuperstructure,eventhough,asaresultofideology,itwillappearthateconomicrelationsresultfromandarejustifiedbytheideasaboutsocietywhichwehave–ideas,forexample,offreecontractualrelationsbetweenmembersofaliberalnation-state.Theconditionsunderwhichideologyisproducedhave,accordingtotheMarxisttheoryofsociety,twocrucialandrelatedfeatures.First,sincesocialrelationsareinherentlyconflictual,ideologyprovidesthe‘formsinwhichmenbecomeconsciousofthisconflictandfightitout’.Yetitisevidentthattheconflictualnatureofsocialrelationsisnotimmediatelyapparentintheseideologicalforms–in,forexample,theformofacontractofemployment–sothat‘inallideologymenandtheircircumstancesappearupsidedown,asinacameraobscura’.14Thisisnotjustagenerallyobservedfact.Itstruthresultsfromtheroleofideologyinmakingsenseofsociallife.Whenthissocialrealityisconflictualitmaybeeasiertotrytomakesenseofitinnon-conflictualideologicaltermsthantograspthenettleandtrytoresolvetheconflict127\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYinapracticalway.Thisleadsustothesecondandconsequentialfeatureofsocialrelationswhichhasrepercussionsforthecharacterofideology.Itisthatinclassconflictadominantclasswillemerge,as,undercapi-talism,thebourgeoisiecomesoutontop.Nowevidentlythedominantclasshasnomotiveforchangingthestatusquoandeveryinterestinjustifyingit.Sincethisclasswillcontrolthematerialconditionsfortheproductionofideology–publishing,universitiesandsoforth–itfollowsthatideologywilllargelyconsistoftheideasofthedominantclass,whoseinterestsitservesandwhosepositionitreinforcesandreproduces.Asaresult,therealitytheirideologydescribeswillcontinuetoeludeamoretransparentinspection.Hereare,then,twoconnectedbutsomewhatdifferentexplanationsofthisfeatureofideologywhichMarxthoughtofasobfuscatingormystificatory,bycontrastwiththeclear-sightedcharacterofscience.Acrudewayofcharacterisingitisasfalseconsciousness–asystemofinac-curaterepresentationsofreality.Thisis,however,misleading,especiallywhencombinedwiththeviewthatideologyinthesuperstructureisonlyanepiphenomenonoftherealprocessesatworkinthebasewhicharewhatbringaboutsocialconsequences.Ideologyisnot,though,simplyrepresentational,differingfromgoodscienceonlyindepictingthingsincorrectly.Racialdiscourse,forexample,aswesawaboveindiscussingRobertMiles,isnottobethoughtofasprovidingjustascientificallygroundlesstaxonomyofpeoples.Ratheritprovidesawayofconstructingcategorieswhichregulatethewayinwhichpeoplearetobetreated.Assuchitdirectlyaffectssocialpracticejustasmuchas,say,theinstitutionofemploymentcontractsdoes.Ideologyprovidesnotjustawayofdescribingsociallifebutofconstitutingandregulatingtherelationshipswithinit,eveniftherelationshipsitconstructsareinthelastinstancetobeexplainedineconomicterms,asWallerstein,forexample,explainsracialdistinctionsintermsofdistinctpositionsintheeconomicorder.Wedonot,Ithink,needtogobeyondMarxhimselfinordertomakethesepoints.ButtheywerebroughtoutmoreexplicitlybyAntonioGramsci,theItalianMarxistconcernedtodefendItaliannationalunityasthenecessarybasisforproletarianpower–aunitythreatenedbynorthernItalianracismtowardssouthernItalians.Gramsciwishedontheonehandtocounterthe‘falseconsciousness’conceptionofideologybyinsistingontheuniversalityofideologicalprocesses,whichare,hebelieved,atworkasmuchinordinarypeople’sattemptstobecomeconsciousoftheirrelativepowerlessness,andtoovercomeitbyconstructingnewandresistantrolesforthemselves,as128\nMARXISMANDPOSTMODERNISMintheiracceptanceofthedominantconceptions.Ontheotherhand,hesoughttounderminetheepiphenomenalistinterpretationpreciselybyemphasisingthepowerofsuchnewideastoeffectsocialchange.Thetestforthemthenbecomesthatoftheirefficacyinenablingpeopletoresistoppressionratherthantheircorrespondencewithsomenon-ideologicallydiscerniblesocialreality.15TheseaspectsofGramsci’sthoughtareutilisedinhistheoryofhegemony,whichhasbeenofconsiderableinfluenceintheunder-standingofculturalidentity.Hegemonyisdominationachievedthroughconsentratherthancoercion,and,inparticular,throughgainingtheleadingplaceinabattleofideas.Nowwhilethedominantclasswillalwaysstrivetogainthisleadingplace,theexistenceofideologicalcompetitiondoesnotguaranteeitunqualifiedsuccessinwinningover,asitmustifitistosecureconsent,themassofordinarypeople.Thereisscope,therefore,forchallengestoitintheconstructionofculture.But,sincetheaimofsuchachallengeisequallytowinpeopleover,twoconsequencesfollow.First,anideologicalchallengemustbuilduponexistingculturalmaterial,expungingwhatrunscountertotheinterestsoftheoppressed.Second,andsimilarly,itmustallyitselfwithpositionswhichinitiallyrepresentdifferentclassinterestsinordertoformahegemonicunitwhichcanbetterachievetheconsentofsocietyasawholethantheonewhichitreplaces.Thisisachievedbycon-structingaculturewhichcanbetterrepresenttheexperienceofpeoplegenerally.GramscienvisagedjustsuchaprocessasneededfortheformationofanationalcultureinItaly,followingthefailureoftheItalianbourgeoisietolocateone,asaresultoftheirsemi-colonialexploitationofthesouth.Yetthatsemi-colonialsystemitselfwasimposedhegemonicallythroughthearticulationofoppositionsbetween,inStuartHall’swords,‘cityandcountryside,peasantryandproletariat,clientelismandmodernism,feudalisedandindustrialisedsocialstructures’16whichdisguisedthecommoninterestsofnorthernandsouthernworkers.TheFrenchstructuralistLouisAlthusserdevelopedGramsci’saccountofideologyinawaythatremoveditevenfurther,atleastinonedirection,fromfalseconsciousness,byinsistingthat‘inthemajorityofcasestheserepresentationshavenothingtodowith“consciousness”...itisaboveallasstructuresthattheyimposeonthevastmajorityofmen,notviatheir“consciousness”’.17Suchstructuresarepreciselywhatcreatehumansocietiesingeneral,takingontheroleofservingtheinterestsofadominantclassonlyinappropriateclass-basedsocieties.WhereideologyperformsthisroleitdoessothroughwhatAlthusser129\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYtermstheIdeologicalStateApparatus,whichreproducestherelationsofproductiontothesameendsastheRepressiveStateApparatusbutbydifferentmeans–byMarx’s‘invisiblethreads’ofemploymentcontractsandsoforthratherthanbytheactualchainsofslaveryorimprisonment.Here,however,Althusserunjustifiablynarrowsthescopeofideologicalprocessesfromtheirrealisationofclasspower,whichispervasive,tothatofthepowerofthestate,whichismorelimited.18Althusserdoesrecognise,though,thevarietyofIdeologicalStateApparatuses–edu-cational,legal,political,culturalandsoforth–therebyrevealingthekindofstakesthatareplayedforinattemptstogaincontrolofastate,by,forexample,anationalistmovement.Whatideologyaccomplishes,Althusserasserts,isinfactnolessthantheconstitutionofindividualsassubjectsofthoughtandaction.Itdoessobypositioningthematparticularpointswithinthestructureswhichformit,isolatedfromwhichindividualswouldbeincapableofintelligiblethoughtandaction,andthusnotbesubjectsatall.TheprocessbywhichtheybecomesoAlthusserreferstoasinterpellation.Iaminterpellatedas,say,aEuropean,anEnglish-speakerandsoforth.ItisaconceptasuncompromisinglyfunctionalistinitspictureofindividualidentityasanythingintheDurkheimianmodelofculturallyshapedsubjectswhichwelookedatearlier.‘Marxistphilosophy’,Althussercomments,‘mustbreakwiththeidealistcategoryofthe“Subject”asOrigin,EssenceandCause’.19ButAlthusserunderstandsthisbreakinawaythatmakeshumanagentsimpotenttoaffecttheirhistorybyreshapingtheirownidentities.For,insharpcontrasttoGramsci,hecanofferonlyastarkchoicebetweenthesubjectexistingpriortosocialstructuresandthesubjecttotallydeterminedbythem.Thestarkchoicebetween‘subjectivityasthepassiveeffectofstructuresorsubjectivityasself-determination’20isrejectedbyErnestoLaclau,whohasdevelopedAlthusser’sthoughtinadirectionthatdis-engagesitfromMarxistorthodoxy.Laclauconstruesinterpellationasaprocessbywhichindividualsidentifywithcertainsubjectpositions,whichtheymustdoifhegemonyistoachieveitsconsensualpurpose.Thestructuresofideologycan,therefore,neverfullydeterminethesubject,whoremains,asLaclauputsit,a‘lack’.Forthisreason,asubjectcantransformheridentitysince‘theproductionoftheeffectispartoftheconstructionoftheidentityoftheagentproducingit.’21Ingeniousasitis,however,thiswaybetweenthehornsofadilemmafailstobringoutwhy,accordingtoaMarxistaccount,thesubjectmightwishtotransformheridentity.Itisbecausetheidentitymadeavailabletoherinthedominantideologyisexperiencedasanoppressiveone;and130\nMARXISMANDPOSTMODERNISMtransformationisliberatorybecauseofthat,notjustbecauseitistheexerciseofexistentialfreedom.Marxhimselfmeasuredsuchoppressionbytheextenttowhichitrancountertoour‘species-being’,towhat,inanessentialisticsense,wereallyare.ButnosuchhomagetoAristotleandtheancientsisneededforustodistinguishidentitiesonwhichaliberatorypoliticscanbegroundedfromthoseonwhichitcannot.Thequestiontobeaskedfromabroadlysocialiststandpointaboutnationalandethnicidentitiesiswhethertheyareofthefirstorthesecondkind.Andthequestiontobeaskedabouttheanalysisofsuchidentitiesiswhetheritprovidesthetoolsweneedfordeterminingwhichtheyare.Thisisnotnecessarilytosetscienceinoppositiontoideologyasameansofunmaskingtheethicalpretensionsofidentities,butsimplytorecog-nisetheiressentiallypoliticalcharacterandtheconsequentneedtobeabletoemployananalysisofthemintheevaluationofpoliticalarrangements.TheMarxistlegacyistoforceustogetbeneaththetermsofpoliticaldebateinordertoprovideananalysiswhichcanservethisend.POSTSTRUCTURALISMContemporarythinkingabouttheconstitutionofidentitieshasbeengreatlyinfluencedbythepoststructuralistphilosopherMichelFoucault,aone-timepupilofAlthusser.Foucault’searlierworkcan,likeAlthusser’s,beviewedasstructuralist,inthesenseofseekingtouncoverpatternsofsignificationbytheapplicationofageneraltrans-historicalmethodofanalysis.Itis,aswehaveseen,theindividual’spositioninsuchapattern–ordiscourse,asFoucaulttermsit–whichconstituteshimastheparticularsubjectwiththekindofidentityhehas.Thisfeaturecarriesoverintopoststructuralism,butherethepos-sibilityofageneralmethodapplicable,thoughwithdifferentresults,todifferentperiodsisabandonedinfavourofaninsistenceonthehistoricalspecificityofanyanalysisofsubjectivity.InFoucault’sworkitmarksashiftfromwhathecalled‘archaeology’–theuncoveringofstructures–to‘genealogy’–thestoryoftheirhistoricaldevelopment.Ifdiscourseweresimplyasystemofrepresentationsofreality,thenourprincipalinterestwouldbeintheadequacyofanyparticulardiscourseforitsrepresentationalpurposes.Butdiscourseproducesthatwhichitrepresentsin,forexample,creatingcertainsortsofsubjectivi-tiesinaparticularepochandrenderingothersunavailable.Thedrivingforcebehindthisaspectofdiscourseis,thelaterFoucaultmaintains,131\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYpower.Theconstitutionofsubjectsis,inamorethanmerelypunningsense,subjection.22Individualsaresubjectedtoprocessesbeyondtheircontrolwhichdeterminewhatispossibleforthemandwhichshapewhotheyarebecausetheydeterminehowtheycaneventhinkofwhattheyareandofwhattheycando.Theyaretherebysubjectedtothepowerthatsetstheseprocessesintrainandisreinforcedbythem.Butinthemodernperiod,Foucaultargues,itisthekindofdiscoursewhichconveysknowledgethatdeterminesthissubjection,farmorethananyovertcoercion.Individualsareconstitutedassubjectsbyinternalisingparticularmodesofdiscoursewhichpurporttorevealtheworldasitreallyis,sothatthesortofsubjectivityallowedthemseemsrightandnatural.Itisthroughsuchdiscourses,Foucaultexplains,thatpowerisexercised:Inasocietysuchasours,butbasicallyinanysociety,therearemanifoldrelationsofpowerwhichpermeate,characteriseandconstitutethesocialbody,andtheserelationsofpowercannotthemselvesbeestablished,consolidatednorimplementedwithouttheproduction,accumulation,circulationandfunctioningofadiscourse.Therecanbenopossibleexerciseofpowerwithoutacertaineconomyofdiscoursesoftruthwhichoperatesthroughandonthebasisofthisassociation.Wearesubjectedtothepro-ductionoftruththroughdiscourseandwecannotexercisepowerexceptthroughtheproductionoftruth.23Sofar,onemightthink,onehasanaccountthatparallelsthatofferedbyAlthusser’sappealtoIdeologicalStateApparatusesaswhatbindindividualstothepurposesofthestatewithouttheneedforcostlyrepression.Foucault,however,explicitlyopposessuchaview:Poweriseverywhere;notbecauseitembraceseverythingbutbecauseitcomesfromeverywhere...thereisnobinaryandall-encompassingoppositionbetweenrulerandruledattherootofpowerrelations.24Indeed,hegoesfurtherthanthis,insistingthatWemustceaseonceandforalltodescribetheeffectsofpowerinnegativeterms:it‘excludes’,it‘represses’,it‘censors’,it‘abstracts’,it‘masks’,it‘conceals’.Infactpowerproduces;itproducesreality;itproducesdomainsofobjectsandritualsoftruth.25TheinspirationhereisnotMarxbutNietzsche,forwhomallactivity,132\nMARXISMANDPOSTMODERNISMincludingthesearchforknowledge,isdrivenbythe‘willtopower’,sothatitisthewaythatadiscoursecomesoutontopinabattleofideaswhichexplainsitsbeingtakenfortruth,notviceversa.ItisinpartsuchscepticismaboutEnlightenmentconceptionsofknowledgeaspro-gressivewhichmarksoutFoucaultaspostmodernist.Foucault’sanalyticalapparatus,orpartsofit,arecommonlyappliedtodiscoursesofraceandculturalidentityinordertobringoutboththeirhistoricallocatednessandtheiressentialconnectionwithrela-tionshipsofpower.Yetthissortofdiscoursecannotsimplybedetachedfromothers:itispartandparcelof,inthecaseofraceatleast,asystemofclassificationfundamentaltoscience.Thisis,furthermore,ascienceinwhichthebodiesofmenandwomencanbeviewedasphysicalobjectsandthussubjectedtothesamesortofmanipulationastheseare.26Thediscourseofracialclassificationandcontrolisabletoserveasavehicleforpowerrelationsbecauseofitsconnectionswiththesewiderpotentialitiesofmoderndiscourse,whichcanbeputtomanyotherusesintheexerciseofpower.Itcandosobecauseofitsexploita-tionof,ontheonehand,amodernpreoccupationwiththecategoryofdifferenceand,ontheother,withthelocationofthesedifferencesinbodies,constitutedpreciselyastheobjectsofsuchdescription.AfinelynuancedapplicationofFoucault’sanalytictechniquesistobefoundinEdwardSaid’sOrientalism,whichinvestigatesthewayinwhichthecolonisedEastwasfirstconstructedinWesternculturethroughthediscursiveprocessesofliterature,ethnographyandhistoryconcerningtheOrient–through,inaword,Orientalism.ThesepracticesdependedateachpointuponsettingupasystemofbinaryoppositionsbetweentheEastandtheWestcreatedbytheWest,‘outofwhoseunchallengedcentralityanOrientalworldemerged.’ThiscentralityarisesfromthepoweroftheWestrelativetotheEast.But,SaidinsistsinFoucauldianvein,Orientalismisnotexpressiveofsomenefarious‘Western’imperialistplottoholddownthe‘Orientalworld.’Itisratheradistributionofgeo-politicalawarenessintoaesthetic,scholarly,economic,sociological,historical,andphilologicaltexts...itis,ratherthanexpresses,acertainwillorintentiontounderstand,insomecasestocontrol,manipulate,eventoincorporate,whatisamanifestlydifferent(oralternativeandnovel)world.27ItisworthnoticingthatinthispassageSaidplaces‘Western’and‘Oriental’inscarequotestobringoutthatneitherhasanexistence133\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYoutsideoftheirconstruction,aconstructioninwhichWesternsubjectsarethemselvesconstitutedinoppositiontoEasternones,nothavingapriorexistenceassubjectsinaprivilegedpositionofpower.AnaturalwaytoexpressthisrelationbetweentheWestandtheEast,andindeedawaythatSaidhimselfauthorises,isintermsofGramsci’snotionofhegemonyreferredtoearlier.But,ascriticsofSaidhavepointedout,28itisfarfromclearthatFoucauldiandiscoursetheory,forwhich‘poweriseverywhere’,iscompatiblewithatheoryofhegemonyinwhichpowerisconcentratedinthehandsofadom-inantgroup.OnedoesnotneedtotakeaMarxistviewofthisgroupasadominantclassinordertoidentifyitsmembersasthosewhobenefitattheexpenseofothersfromcertaindiscursivepractices,andthustoseepowerasexercisedoppressively.ClearlythisishowSaidseesthepoweroftheWestasbeingexercisedintheimperialistobjec-tivesservedbyOrientalism.YetitisquestionablewhetherFoucauldiantheorycancapturetheideathatthereareexercisesofoppressivepowerwhichthereforeoughttoberesisted.Foucaultbelieves,inNietzscheanvein,thatwhereverthereispowerthereisresistance.Butresistanceitselfhasnomoralauthority,unlessitisthegrowthofautonomythatspringsfromresistingthepowerof‘thetechnologiesofeconomicproduction,socialregulationandcommunication’.29This,though,isresistanceonlytocertainmoderntechniquesofpower,nottoitspurposes.SaidhimselfcametoappreciatethesedeficienciesinemployingFoucauldiananalysisasapossiblepoliticaltool.HecommentsonFoucault’sunwillingnesstotakeseriouslyhisownideasaboutresistancetopower.Ifpoweroppressesandcontrolsandmanip-ulates,theneverythingthatresistsitisnotmorallyequaltopower,isnotneutrallyandsimplyaweaponagainstthatpower.30InCultureandImperialism31hediscusesthosemovementsofculturalresistancewhichhehadomittedfromOrientalism,andinparticularthedevelopmentofnationalidentitiestocounterimperialistcategories–atopictowhichweshallreturnshortly.Saiddoesnotadequatelyaddress,however,thequestionofwhatmakestheseresistantgesturespossibleifindividualsareconstitutedassubjectsbydiscursiveforma-tionsthatarticulaterelationsofpowerinwhichtheyaresubordinate.ThiswillatonceberecognisedasconfrontinguswiththesamestarkchoiceaboutthenatureofthesubjectthatAlthusserposited.ItisnoeasiertoresolveusingaFoucauldianaccount,andpersistentlygivesrisetoproblemsforthosewho,likethelaterSaid,bothwanttorecognise134\nMARXISMANDPOSTMODERNISMthediscursiveconstitutionofsubjectsandalsotheirroleinresistingtheoppressionthatthisdiscoursecanengender.POSTCOLONIALISMItis,perhaps,noexaggerationtosaythattheprincipalproblemarisingfrombringingtogethertheinfluencesofMarxandthoseofstruc-turalismisthatofshowinghowresistancetooppressionisevenpossible,giventhedominanceofthediscoursethroughwhichthepowerrela-tionsthatproduceoppressionaremaintained.Acrucialinfluencehereisthatoffeminism,fortheunequalandrestrictivetreatmentofwomencanonlyberecognisedasunjustandoppressiveifthesocialrolestowhichtheyaregivenaccess–rolesforwhichsuchunequalandrestrictivetreatmentappearsappropriate–areseenasconstructedinthemaintenanceofpowerrelations,ratherthannatural.Thisrequiresawayofthinkingaboutthoseroleswhichdrawsonaspectsofdis-coursethatdonotsimplyreflectmaledominance.Indifferentsocietieswiththeirdifferentculturestherewillbemoreorlessscopeforsuchresistantdiscourses.Similarly,then,thepoliticalproblemconfrontingracial,ethnicornationalgroupingsisthatofseeingtheirsituationinawaythatdoesnotsimplyreproducethemodesofcategorisationofthedominantdiscoursenorseeksolutionsonlyinthosemadeavailablebyit.ThustheoptionsofferedbyWesternliberaldemocracy–thedominantpoliticaldiscourseoftheday–willneedtobecarefullyscrutinisedinordertoassessthechancesofremovingoppressionfrompeopleswhohavenotbeenitsbeneficiaries.Thepriorquestionwillbe,however,‘Whataretheirresourcesforrecognisingtheirsituationandfindingsolutionstoit?’AnumberofIndianthinkershavebeenparticularlyconcernedwiththisquestion,andthatfortworeasons.First,BritishruleinIndiawasverysuccessfulincreatingarulingeliteabletoputWesternpoliticalideasintopractice.Second,however,thiselitewasrightlysuspiciousoftheapplicabilityofWesternideas,notleastbecauseofthetraumaticexperienceofPartition,inwhichborderswereredrawnatleastpartlybecauseofWesternconceptionsoftherelationbetweenculturaliden-tityandpoliticalorganisation–conceptionswhichtheMuslimleader,Jinnah,waswellabletoexploit.OnepointthatpostcolonialtheoristslikeParthaChatterjee,forinstance,areabletobringouteffectivelyisthatahegemonicdiscourseisnevertotal.Itco-existswithotherdis-courseswhichallowresistantpoliticalformstobecreated.ThusChatterjeearguesthatthenationalismofcolonialpeoplesdepended135\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYupontheirabilitytorefashiontheWesternnationformfromthatofapublic,economicallybasedidentityintoaprivate,spiritualone,inwhichdifferencefromthecoloniserwasmaintainedthroughanaes-theticallydistinctiveculture.Theshortcomingofthisstrategyis,hebelieves,thewayWesternideasofstatehoodthatareill-fittingtothiskindofculturalcommunityhavehadtobeadaptedtoit.32AnotherIndianthinkerassociatedwiththeevocativelynamedSubalternStudiesgroupofwhichChatterjeeisamember,GayatriSpivak,agreeswithhimthatWesternideasneedtobedrawnuponinresistingtheoppressionofex-colonialsubjects:‘thepoliticalclaimsthataremosturgentindecolonisedspacesaretacitlyrecognisedascodedwithinthelegacyofimperialism:nationhood,constitutionality,citizenship,democracy,evenculturalism’.33ButSpivakisanxioustodispeltheimpressionleftbyChatterjeethatthereisanauthenticvoiceofthesesubjects–theso-called‘subalterns’–whichmightinprinciplebearticulatedinoppositiontocolonialhegemonicdiscourses.Thesesubjectsexistasvictimsofoppressiononlythroughthewaytheyareconstitutedinsuchdiscourses.Theylackaconsciousnessoftheirsharedsituationandcanarticulateresistanceonlythroughamultiplicityofvoices–forexample,ofHindunationalism–innoneofwhichtheyspeakassubalterns,thatisasthesortofvictimstheyreallyare.Spivak’sresponsetothissituationistoadoptaMarxistpoliticsforpurelystrategicpurposes,whiledenyingthatMarxism,asaWesterndiscourse,cancapturetherealityofex-colonialexistence.Butthisstrategy,ofcourse,isnottoofferamethodofresistancetoWesterndiscourseandthekindofoppressivecategorisationsitentails,evenifitmayresultinsomealleviationofthesituation.34HomiBhabha,bycontrast,doesprovideanaccountofhowsuchresistanceispossiblewhichspringsfromaprofoundanalysisofwhatisinvolvedinculturalhegemony.Bhabha’saccountstartsofffromobservationsonthestrategiesofresistanceadoptedbycolonialsubjects,butitisevidentthathedoesnotintendittoapplyonlytosuchsituations.Hisobservationsareofsubjectresponsestothecivilisingmissionofcolonialismwhichisbutoneexampleofthewayinwhichpowerisexercised,notsimplybyrepressionbutbychangingthosesubjectedtopowersothattheywillconformwillinglytoitsrequire-ments.Yetthiscreatesaparadox,or,asBhabhaputsit,‘aprocessofsplittingastheconditionofsubjection’.35Ontheonehand,tobesubjectedtothepowerofthecoloniserthecolonisedmustberepre-sentedasotherthanthecoloniser,andmustgraspthatthisisherposition.Ontheotherhand,tointernalisethecoloniser’svaluesand136\nMARXISMANDPOSTMODERNISMthustoconformtohisnormsshemustbecomethesameasthecoloniser,andbeabletorepresentherselfso.Thislatteractofidenti-ficationisthusshotthroughwitharecognitionofcontinuingdifference.ThefigurethatBhabhaemploystocapturethissplitinthecolonial,orindeedanyothersubjectofculturalhegemonyisFrantzFanon’s‘doubling,dissemblingimage’ofBlackSkin,WhiteMasks–‘thewhiteman’sartificeinscribedontheblackman’sbody’.36Itisthissplittingwithinthesubjectwhich,Bhabhaargues,makesresistancepossible,forasheputsit:Resistanceisnotnecessarilyanoppositionalactofpoliticalintention,norisitthesimplenegationorexclusionofthe‘con-tent’ofanotherculture,asadifferenceonceperceived.Itistheeffectofanambivalenceproducedwithintherulesofrecognitionofdominatingdiscoursesastheyarticulatethesignsofculturaldifferenceandreimplicatethemwithinthedeferentialrelationsofcolonialpower.37Theformthatthisresistancecantakearisesfromthesortofper-formancesthatareinvolvedinidentifyingwiththecolonists.Theyareactsofmimicry,butactsperformedbyasubjectwhoseothernessmakeshimaninappropriatepersontoperformthem,sothattheymockandsubvertthatwhichtheymimic.Thisiswhatindigenouspeoples’appropriationofChristianitynotoriouslydoes,as,moresubtly,doesthecareerofacolonialsubjectlikeNaipaul’sMrBiswas–somuchmorethreateningtothecolonialauthorityexercisedthroughEuropeanvaluesthanistheorthodoxHindulifestyleofhiswife’srelations.38Theresultofmimicryofthissortis‘hybridisation,ratherthanthenoisycommandsofcolonialistauthorityorthesilentrepres-sionofnativetraditions’.39Butthisfeatureofculturalhegemonynecessarilysubvertsauthority.Foritisnotjustthatindependentlyidentifiabledominantformsbecomecontaminatedintheircolonialreception.Rather,becauseinclaimingauthoritytheydemandrecog-nition,thesubversivemimicrywhichconstitutessuchrecognitionisalreadyinscribedinthem.ThusBhabhadoesnotseehegemonyastheimpingingofonecultureuponanother,wheredifferentculturescanbepickedoutpriortotheirimpactinguponeachother.Instead,whatcountsasculturaldifferenceiswhatmanifestsitselfasresistancetoattemptstodominateothers.Itisnotsomethinglyingbehindandexplainingtheimperfectionsofmimicry.ItisawayofcategorisingthoseothersoverwhompowerisexercisedandbywhomitissubvertedthroughjusttheprocessthatBhabhaoutlines.137\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYBhabhaappliesthisaccountoftheprocessofsplittingtonation-formationaswellastocolonialism.Heretooculturaldominationmustbeachieved:‘Thescraps,patchesandragsofdailylifemustberepeatedlyturnedintothesignsofacoherentnationalculture.’Butthisis‘internallymarkedbythediscoursesofminorities,theheterogenoushistoriesofcontendingpeoples,antagonisticauthoritiesandtenselocationsofculturaldifference,’40sothatoppositionisnotdirectedatanexternalandapparentlyhomogeneousculturalhegemony.Yetthedominantstoryofthenationisconstantlyunderthreatfromitsrecipientsandrequirescontinualrepetition–aritualthatBhabhaseesascrucialtotheproductionandmaintenanceofnationalidentity.Itis,wemaysay,bysuchmeansthatnationalcultureisconstructed.WhatBhabhaiskeentoemphasise,however,isthatthereishybridityevenhere,and,moregenerally,heaimstochallengetheimageofhomogeneous,clearlyboundedcultureswhichisassumedbyAnglo-Americanpoliticalphilosopherslike,forexample,CharlesTaylor,whomBhabhasinglesoutforcriticismonthisscore.41Althoughspecificallydesignedtoshowhowresistancetoculturaldominationispossible,Bhabha’saccounthasattractedagreatdealofcriticism,mostofitanalogoustocriticismsofthepoststructuralistJacquesDerrida,whosedeconstructionofbinaryoppositionsbetweentheselfandtheother,andoftheconceptofaunifiedandstablesubject,hassomuchinfluencedBhabha.TheMarxistthinker,AijazAhmad,forexample,criticiseswhathetakestobeBhabha’s‘celebra-tionofculturalhybridity’asplayingdownthestraightforwardinequal-itiesofpowerthatareinvolvedincolonialistandotherculturalencounters.Thequestiontobeasked,saysAhmad,is‘intowhosecultureisonetobehybridisedandonwhoseterms?Thewilfulrelegationofthisquestiontoobscurity,’hecontinues,‘revealsneverthelessthattheunderlyinglogicofthiscelebratorymodeisthatofaglobalisedmarketplacewhichpretendsthatallconsumersareequallyresourcefulandinwhichallculturesareequallyavailableforconsumption,inanycombinationthattheconsumerdesires.’42Partofthiscriticismisjust:Bhabhadoesfailtorelatetheprocessesofhybridisationtothecon-cretecircumstancesofoppressionthatgenerateparticularmodesofresistance,andthisisbecausehisaccount,howeveritisexemplified,isaperfectlygeneral,historicallynon-specificone.ButAhmadmistakesBhabha’spurposeinattributingtohimacelebrationofhybridity.Hybridityisnotitselfastrategyofresistance.Itisaproductoftheprocesseswhichmakeresistancetoculturaldominationpossibleand,furthermore,itisafeatureofallculturalidentities,reflectiononwhich138\nMARXISMANDPOSTMODERNISMenablesonetoresisttheformsofculturaldominationwhichpresupposethehomogenisingconceptionofsuchidentities–thehomogenisingconceptionthatgivesrisetooppression.ThisisafarcryfromthosevulgarisedappealstohybriditywhichdoindeedfallfoulofAhmad’scriticismsand,farfromconstitutingaformofpoliticalresistance,colludeinthoseformsofoppressionthatresultfromextendingthescopeofcommodification,inthiscasetothecomponentsofcultureitself.POSTMODERNIDENTITIESWhat,wemayask,aretheimplicationsofpoststructuralistapproachestoculturalandnationalidentityforapoliticaltheoryofthesortthatcanhandleclaimstoculturalornationalrights?This,itmustbesaid,isnotaneasyquestiontoanswer,butwecanperhapsbestaddressitbyreflectingonwhatpoststructuralismand,morebroadly,postmodernismamounttoaslarge-scalephilosophicalenterprises.Poststructuralismaimstoundermineavarietyofdiscoursesthatseektodiscloseunderlyingstructuresthroughinvestigatingthesystemsofclassificationappliedtothem.Itdoessothroughexposingtheinsta-bilityandrelativitytothecircumstancesoftheirapplicationthatsuchclassificatorysystemsinfactpossess.Thustheindividuationofcultures,forexample,intermsofsystemsofdifferencesmaybecalledintoquestion,asitisbyHomiBhabha,throughrevealingtheparticularcir-cumstancesinwhichdifferencesareregisteredassuchandobservingthedestabilisingpresenceofalternativesintheformationofidentity.Theimplicationsofthislineofthoughtaremoreradicalthanthoseofasocialconstructionismwhichemphasisesonlythearbitrarybasesofsocialidentity.Forwhatpoststructuralismdoesistoraisedoubtsastowhethertheconstructionofsuchidentitiesdoesinfactcreatesocialgroupswhichhaveanyrealexistencebeyondtherepetitiveperformancesthroughwhichtheyarekeptinbeing.Postmodernismmaybeunderstoodasthephilosophyofpost-modernity–thecontemporaryhistoricalperiodinwhichthepro-gressive,liberatingmissionoftheEnlightenmenthasrunitscourse.Postmodernismischaracterisedbyitsmistrustof‘grandnarratives’thattellastoryaboutthenatureofhumanbeings,ofwhattheycanachieveandofhowtoachieveit,ofwhichbothliberalismandMarxismareinstances.Poststructuralismexemplifiespostmodernismjustbecauseitsdeconstructivecriticismserodetheclassificatorysystemsthatsuchgrandnarrativespresuppose.Itfollowsfromthissupposedcollapseof139\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYgrandnarrativesthatnoover-archingpoliticalvisionforhumaneman-cipationandwellbeingispossible:thedominantliberalpictureofaworldofsecularnation-stateswithfullculturalrightsturnsouttobeasgroundlessasadiscreditedMarxistinternationalism.Ineithercasethereasonisthesame–anover-optimisticviewofthecapacityofthehumansubjecttoshapeherlifefreelyandinaccordancewiththedictatesofreason.Itisjustthisconceptionofthesubjectasstanding,inprinciple,outsidethesocialpracticesanddiscoursesinwhichsheparticipatesthatpoststructuralismfollowsstructuralisminresisting.Butwhereasstructuralism,aswesawinthecaseofAlthusser,substitutesforsuchatranscendentalsubjectatotallysociallydeterminedone,poststructuralismundercutsthestatusofsocialstructurestodosuchdeterminingwork,leavingasubjectivitycharacterisableneitherintheuniversaltermsofEnlightenmentmetaphysicsnorthelocalandparticularonesofculturalembeddedness.Thefigurewhohas,perhaps,givenmostthoughttotheimplica-tionsofthisconceptionofsubjectivityforapoliticsofidentityistheBulgarianfrancophonefeministandpoststructuralist,JuliaKristeva.Kristevainitiallytrainedasapsychoanalyst:‘theethicsofpsychoanalysis’,sheremarks,‘impliesapolitics:itwouldinvolveacosmopolitanismofanewsortthat,cuttingacrossgovernments,economiesandmarkets,mightworkforamankindwhosesolidarityisfoundedonthecon-sciousnessofitsunconscious’.43Postmodernthinkingaboutidentity,likeHomiBhabha’s,hasbeengreatlyinfluencedbyFreud’saccountofthedevelopmentofthechild’sconceptionofhimselfasaseparateentity.InparticularithasbeeninfluencedbytheinterpretationplaceduponthisaccountbyJacquesLacan,forwhom‘theunconsciousisstructuredlikelanguage’,44ratherthanviewingit,likeFreudhimself,asabiologicalmechanism.WedonotneedtoexpoundFreud’saccounttobringoutsomeofthekeyfeaturesofLacan’sreadingofit.First,thesubjectlacksanyprioridentity:theidentityshegainshastobeestablishedbyaprocessofidentification.Second,theindividualgainsheridentityonlybycontrastwiththatoftheother(of,inthefirstinstance,theparent,ontheFreudianaccount).Inthedrawingofthiscontrast,furthermore,negativeemotionsofhostilityandjealousytowardstheotherareimplicated.Third,however,inHegelianvein,thedependenceoftheindividual’sidentityuponthiscontrast–thisalteritywithintheself,asitismetaphoricallyexpressed–impliesalackofself-sufficiency,stabilityandsecurityinidentity.Themaintenanceofidentityisthereforeaprocessperpetuallyfocuseduponuneasy140\nMARXISMANDPOSTMODERNISMtransactionswiththosewhoareotherthanoneself.Next,recognitionofidentityinvolvesidentificationwithimagesoftheself–inthefirstinstance,onLacan’saccount,withone’smirrorimage.Thisisboundupwithpositiveemotionsofanarcissisticcharacter.Lastly,thisself-identificationinvolvestakingupasubjectpositioninapre-existingsystemofrelationships,inthefirstinstancefamilyones,whichconsti-tutesanentryintothesymbolicorder.Foridentityisgainedonlythroughacquiringthelanguagewithinwhichitisconstituted.Kristevautilisesthisapparatustogiveanaccountoftheformationofourgroupidentitiesandtheattitudestothoseoutsidethegroupwhichisimplicatedinthem:Freudhasdemonstratedtowhatextentaconglomerationofmenandwomenintosetsisoppressiveanddeathbearing.‘Societyisfoundedonacommoncrime’hewroteinTotemandTaboo,andtheexclusionof‘others’whichbindstheidentityofaclan,asect,aparty,oranation,isequallythesourceofthepleasureofidentification(‘thisiswhatweare,thereforeitiswhatIam’)andofbarbaricpersecution(‘thatisforeigntome,thereforeIthrowitout,huntitdown,ormassacreit’).45WhatI‘throwout’intheidentificationwhichestablishesmyidentity–what,inKristeva’sterminology,Iabject–isthatwhichcharacterisesthoseIcountasstrangers.But–andthisiswherethepsychoanalyticturniscrucialtoKristeva’sthinking–whatIthrowoutingainingmyidentityinthesymbolicorderis,priortothat,apartofme,and,attheleveloftheunconscious,itremainsso.‘Theforeigner’,assheputsit,‘iswithinme,henceweareallforeigners.IfIamaforeigner,therearenoforeigners’.46Whataretheimplicationsofthisrealisation?Kristevainsiststhat‘wecannotsuppressthesymptomthattheforeignerprovokes’.47Andthismakescosmopolitanismoftheclassicalvarietyimpossible.Thereisnowayoftranscendingtheparticularmoralcodeswhichweacquireingainingouridentitiesanddistinguishingourselvesfromothers.Yetoncethemechanicsofthisarerealised,theneedtodesignsystemsthatallowustolivetogetherwithotherswhoareandmustremaindifferentwillberecognised.Changeinsocialrelationsispossiblepreciselybecausewearenotassubjectsfullydeterminedbyourplaceinthesymbolicorder–indiscourseandinrule-governedsocialbehaviour.Fortheabjectionnecessarytogaininganidentityinthatorderoccurswithintheself–sothatthesubjectcanchangeand,inits141\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYchanging,changesinthesymbolicorderareeffected,thoughpresentlyunpredictable.Kristeva’sworkconstitutesaninterestingattempttocombinetheintuitionsthatgiveriseontheonehandtocosmopolitanism–thatculturalandnationalidentityshouldnotmatterpolitically–andontheothertoconservatism–thatinevitablytheywill.Heraccountmaybeviewedasprovidingageneralschemafordescribingcollectiveidentitieswhichenablesustounderstandtheirpsychicdynamicsandthesortsofconflictsoraccommodationstheyprovoke.Arguablyitshouldnotbeseen,bycontrast,asseekingtoexplainnationalistmovements,forexample,intermsoftheirpsychologicalcausation.Thissaid,however,thepoliticalimplicationsofKristeva’saccountthreatentodissolveintoeitherapoliticallyunspecificutopianismoratroublingilliberalism.YetwhetherornotonewishestofollowKristeva’spsychoanalyticaccountofgroupidentities,thesedualstreamsinherpoliticalthoughtarethosealongwhich,arguably,anypostmodernisttheorymustbeled.OntheonehanditmustdoubttheavailabilitywithintheresourcesinheritedfromtheEnlightenmentforarrivingatageneralsetofpoliticalprescriptionsforaccommodatinggroupdifferences.Ontheotheritmustconcedethepoliticalsalienceofsuchdifferences.Forevenifthereisnoadequatesocialbasisforthemtheydohaveinescapablesocialconsequenceswhichneedtobeaccommodated.Howmighttheybe?Kristeva’sownapproachineffectrefashionsacharacteristicallyFrenchrepublicanismtoallowforgreaterculturaldiversity.Suchdiversityistobeappreciatedasrevealingsecretlyattractivepartsofourselves,andcanbeexpressedinaestheticproductionswhichaltertheimagesofnationalitywithwhichweareidentified.ButthisisspecificallyavisionforFranceanditisnotclearhowfarKristevawouldwishtogeneraliseittoothercases:indeed,withinapostmodernistframeworkitisnotclearthatsheshould.Noristhisobviouslyabadthing;48forwhatmayilluminatetheFrenchsituationbydrawingonideaswithintheFrenchtraditionmaysimplyhavenosensibleapplicationoutsideofit.ThedifficultyratheristhattheseideasgaintheirforcefromtheirplaceinanEnlightenmentworld-viewretainedinFrance.Apessimisticrejoinder49toKristevawouldbethatwiththecollapseofthisasauniversalworld-view,groupidentificationfallsbackupontheethnicnationalismsthatKristevasomuchdeprecates,andtowhichshe–andperhapspostmodernismgenerally–providesnocogentanswer.142\nMARXISMANDPOSTMODERNISMNOTES1.K.MarxandF.Engels,TheCommunistManifesto[1848](Harmondsworth:Penguin,1967),pp.78–80.2.Marx,Capital[1867–93](London:Dent,1930),p.630.3.K.MarxandF.Engels,TheGermanIdeology,inL.S.Feuer(ed.),MarxandEngels:BasicWritingsonPoliticsandPhilosophy(NewYork:Doubleday,1959),pp.254–5.4.SeeD.McLellan(ed.),Marx’sGrundrisse(London:Paladin,1973),p.142.5.MarxandEngels,CommunistManifesto,p.121.6.Ibid.p.102.7.QuotedinM.Guibernau,Nationalisms(Cambridge:Polity,1996),p.16.8.SeeG.W.F.Hegel,Hegel’sPhilosophyofMind,tr.WilliamWallace(Oxford:OUP,1971),p.279.9.QuotedinH.B.Davis,NationalismandSocialism(NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress,1967),p.61.10.TheusagederivesfromKautsky:seeH.B.Davis,TowardsaMarxistTheoryofNationalism(NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress,1978),p.6.11.SeeV.I.Lenin,‘Self-determination’inhisQuestionsofNationalPolicyandProletarianInternationalism(Moscow:Progress,1970).12.E.BalibarandI.Wallerstein,Race,Nation,Class(London:Verso,1991),p.82.13.Feuer,MarxandEngels,p.247.14.PrefacetoCritiqueofPoliticalEconomyinT.B.BottomoreandM.Rubel(eds),KarlMarx:SelectedWritings(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1963),p.68.15.ItisnotclearthatGramscidrewthisconclusioninhisunsystematicallypresentedbodyofthought:seeQ.HoareandG.NowellSmith(edsandtr.),SelectionsfromthePrisonNotebooks(London:LawrenceandWishart,1971).16.S.Hall,‘Gramsci’srelevanceforthestudyofraceandethnicity’,JournalofCommunicationInquiry20(1980),p.9.Gramsci’sapproachtonationalismisdiscussedbyEphraimNimni,MarxismandNationalism(London:Pluto,1991),ch.4.17.Althusser,ForMarx(London:NewLeftBooks,1977),p.233.18.Cp.R.Miliband,MarxismandPolitics(Oxford:OUP,1977),pp.54–5.19.QuotedinA.Callinicos,Althusser’sMarxism(London:Pluto,1976),p.67.20.E.Laclau,NewReflectionsontheRevolutionofourTimes(London:Verso,1990),p.210.21.Ibid.p.211.22.M.Foucault,Power/Knowledge(Brighton:Harvester,1980),p.97.23.Ibid.p.93.24.M.Foucault,TheHistoryofSexuality,vol.1(London:AllenLane,1979),pp.93–4.25.M.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish(London:AllenLane,1977),p.194.26.SeeD.T.Goldberg,RacistCulture(Oxford:Blackwell,1993),ch.3.27.E.Said,Orientalism(London:Routledge,1978),pp.8,12.143\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY28.ForexampleD.Potter,‘Orientalismanditsproblems’,inP.WilliamsandC.Chrisman(eds),ColonialDiscourseandPost-ColonialTheory(HemelHempstead:Harvester,1993).29.M.Foucault,‘WhatisEnlightenment?’inP.Rabinow(ed.),TheFoucaultReader(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1987),p.48.30.E.Said,TheWorld,theTextandtheCritic(London:Faber,1984),p.246.31.E.Said,CultureandImperialism(London:Vintage,1994).Seeesp.ch.3.32.SeeParthaChatterjee,TheNationanditsFragments(Princeton:PrincetonUP,1993),ch.1.33.G.Spivak,OutsidetheTeachingMachine(London:Routledge,1993),p.60.34.SeeG.Spivak,‘CantheSubalternspeak?’inWilliamsandChrisman,ColonialDiscourseandPost-ColonialTheory.35.H.Bhabha,TheLocationofCulture(London:Routledge,1994),p.111.36.Ibid.p.44.37.Ibid.p.110.38.IndeedBhabhacanbeviewedasinferringfromNaipaul’snovelsthepossibilityofmimicryasresistance,whileNaipaulthetheoristcouldonlyseeresistanceasmimickingtheWest.SeeR.Nixon,LondonCalling(NewYork:OUP,1992),ch.6.39.H.Bhabha,LocationofCulture,p.112.40.Ibid.pp.145,148.41.SeeH.Bhabha,‘Culturesin-between’,inS.HallandP.deGay(eds),QuestionsofCulturalIdentity(London:Sage,1996).42.A.Ahmad,‘Thepoliticsofliterarypost-coloniality’,inP.Mongia(ed.),ContemporaryPost-ColonialTheory(London:Arnold,1996),pp.286,290.43.J.Kristeva,StrangerstoOurselves(NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1991),p.192.44.J.Lacan,TheFourFundamentalConceptsofPsycho-analysis[1973](Har-mondsworth:Penguin,1979),p.20.45.J.Kristeva,NationswithoutNationalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1993),p.50.46.Kristeva,StrangerstoOurselves,pp.192,191.(PerhapsKristevaisaprimor-dialisthere:seech.1above.)47.Ibid.p.191.48.PaceAnthonySmithwhocomplainsthatpostmodernismrefusestoespousegeneraltheoreticalconclusions,inhisNationalismandModernism(London:Routledge,1998),pp.218–20.49.Cp.Z.Bauman,PostmodernEthics(Oxford:Blackwell,1993),ch.8.144\nPARTIIIqwIssues\nThispageintentionallyleftblank\n7CITIZENSHIP,IMMIGRATIONANDINDIGENOUSPEOPLESqwMEMBERSHIPOFTHESTATEWhoisentitledtocitizenshipofagivenstate?How,ifatall,doesaperson’sbeingoneofacertainpeople–inanyofthesenseswehavelookedat–affecttheirentitlement?Therearetwokindsofquestionhere.Oneisthelegalquestionofwhatformalconditionsforcitizen-shipagivenstateimposes,andthiswillvaryfromstatetostate.Theotheristhephilosophicalquestionofwhatsuchconditionsoughttobe,thatistosayofwhoismorally,ratherthanlegally,entitledtocitizenship.Primafacietherewouldseemtobejustonesortofanswertothephilosophicalquestion,bycomparisonwithwhichsomestates’formalconditionsmaybejustifiedandothers’unjustified.Closelyrelatedtothequestionofcitizenshipisaquestionaboutimmigration:whoshouldbeallowedtosettleinagivenstate?Fortherighttosettleisgenerallytakentoconfer,eventuallyforoneself,orforone’schildren,therighttobecomeacitizen,sincethemodernstateexpects,and,asweshallsee,forgoodreason,thattheoverwhelmingmajorityofitsinhabitantsshallbecitizens.Inwhatfollows,then,weshalloftenconsiderattitudestoimmigrationinordertoilluminateviewsabouttheproperconditionsforcitizenship.Inordertobegintoanswerthequestionofwhoisentitledtocitizenship,weneedtoconsiderwhatistheessentialpurposeofthe147\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYstate.Fortobeacitizenistobeamemberofthestate,sothatentitlementtocitizenshipisentitlementtostatemembership–thatis,tomembershipofapoliticalorganisationthatplaysaparticularroleinsociety.Itiscommonlyheld1thatthisrolecomprisestwofunctions–themaintenanceoforderinternallyandofsecurityexter-nally.Thisgivestheimpressionthatthebordersofastate,andhencethepopulationwhichistocompriseitsmembership,aretobefixedbydeterminingwhatmutuallyantagonisticpeoplesthereare,tobekeptapartfortheirownsafetybyincorporationintoseparatestates.Thoughbordersmaysometimesbefixedinaccordancewiththeseconsiderationsitisevidentthatthereisnoprincipledwayofdividingpeoplesupalongtheselinesanddistributingthemintostates,ifonlybecausemembershipofseparatestatesisatleastaspotentasourceofantagonismasanythingpriortoit.Theimpressiongivenbythetwo-functionaccountoftheroleofstatesis,indeed,ahighlymisleadingone.Thesymmetrythatitsuggestsbetweeninternalandexternalprotectionsofthecitizenisanillusion.Foritisthemaintenanceoforderwithinaterritorythroughlawenforcementthatisthestate’sconstitutiverole.Thesecuringofbor-dersisafunctionparasiticuponthisandnecessaryonlysothattherecanbeadistinctareawithinwhichabodyoflawscanbeenforced.Incursionsacrossborderswhichthreatenthelivesorpropertyofcitizenswould,intheordinarycourseofevents,simplybecriminalacts.Iftheyareonalargescaleandpoliticallyinspiredthenextraordinarymeasuresmustbetakentorepelthem,andinthisthesecurityfunctionofthestateisoperative.Butthisissimplytoenablethenormalprocessesoflawenforcementtoberesumed.Itfollowsthattheques-tionofwherethebordersofastateshouldbedrawndependsuponwhatpopulationsshouldbegovernedtogetherunderthesamebodyoflaws.Indeedthisissoevenwheremutualantagonismsaretakenintoaccountindrawingborders;forwhatthisimpliesisthattheantagonisticpartiescannotberestrainedfromdepredationsuponeachotherbyordinarylegalmeans.Moregenerally,thequestionofwhoshouldbegovernedtogetherunderthesamelawsneedstobedecidedbydeterminingwhowillvoluntarilyobeyandco-operateinenforcingthem.Thatistosay,bydeterminingwhowillacknowledgebytheiractionsapoliticalobligationtothesamestatebecauseitenforcesthelawacrosstheirterritory.Thequestionofwhoisentitledtocitizenshipofastatecan,then,beviewedfromtwoangles:whoshouldacknowledgepoliticalobligationstothestate?Andwhoshouldoccupyitsterritory?Theanswertothe148\nCITIZENSHIP,IMMIGRATIONANDINDIGENOUSPEOPLESsecondquestionmustnotcomeapartfromthattothefirst,sothatastatecannotreasonablyclaimterritorytowhichpeoplehavearightunlesstheyacknowledgeapoliticalobligationtothatstate.Ifitdoessoitwilllacklegitimacy,forastatelackslegitimacytotheextenttowhichitmustimposeitswilluponapeoplebyforce,ratherthanthroughdrawingupontheirsenseofpoliticalobligationtoit.Indeedthemodernstatediffersfromwhathavebeencalled‘systemsofmas-tery’2preciselyinthatitappealstosuchasenseofobligationandtherebymakespeoplemembersoftheirpoliticalorganisation–thatis,willingparticipants,whichiswhatcitizensare,ratherthanmeresubjects.WhatpreciselythepoliticalobligationsacknowledgedbythosewhoareproperlycitizensofastateamounttoisnotsomethingIshallconsiderhere,excepttosaythatItakeittoimplyacertainkindofloyaltytothestate.3Foritisnotjustacquiescenceinthelegalsystemthattherequisitesenseofobligationexpresses,butendorsementofitas,inacertainsense,one’sown.4Cosmopolitansmaybaulkatthislastremark.Forthem,mereoccupancyofanystatemaygenerateobligationstoitnodifferentfromthoseoneshouldacknowledgeifonelivedinanyother.Inthatcaseonewouldhavenoreasonforloyaltytoonestateratherthantoanother,andtheboundariesbetweenstates–iftheymustexistatall–mustexistonlyforpracticalreasonshavingtodowiththeefficientcarvingupofadministrativeareas.5Admissiontocitizenshipofastate,whetherthroughindigenousoccupationorimmigration,wouldbedeterminedonpurelyutilitariangrounds.Indeedcitizenshipproper,asthelocusofpoliticalrightsandobligations,wouldbeworldcitizenship,6andcitizenshipofstateswouldbeamerelylocalmanifestationofthis,asbeingthecitizenofacertaintownwithitsparticularbye-lawsisinrelationtostatecitizenship.Thedifficultyhereisthatitisnowhardtoseecitizenshipasaformofmembershipatall:worldcitizenshipisnotthis,inanysubstantivesense,sincethereisnowayforpeopletobenon-members;statecitizenshipissoonlyinthemostattenuatedandformalsenseofbeingassignedacertainadministrativedesignationwithparticularrulestofollow.Itmustnot,accordingtothecosmopolitantheory,gobeyondthis.Foranyspecialcommitmenttofellowmembersorprideinmembershipwouldunderminetherightsandobligationsofworldcitizenshipfromwhichitultimatelyderives.Andthatisawayofsayingthatthemotivationfordischargingobligationsandhonour-ingrightsdoesnotderivefrommembershipatall.Weshalllookatcosmopolitanismnofurther,whichisnottosaythatitmaynotbejustified.Averdictonthisdependsinpartonhowitscompetitors149\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYstanduptoscrutiny,forwhilecosmopolitanismmakesthecollectiveidentitiesthatindividualshave,beyondtheirmerehumanity,irrelevanttocitizenship,othertheoriesregardotheridentitiesasrelevant,orcanbepresentedassoregardingthem.POLITICALASSOCIATIONWhatsortofmembershipshouldcitizenshipbe?MichaelWalzerhasproposedausefulanalogybetweenmembershipofastateandmem-bershipofthreeothersortsofsocialentity:neighbourhoods,clubsandfamilies.7Itisconvenienttostartwithclubs,notleastbecausetheAmericancasewhichweshallbeusingasanexampleinthischaptercomesclosesttothismodelofthestate.Itwas,afterall,setup,justasaclubmightbe,byitsmembersestablishingaconstitution,‘inorder’,asthatconstitutionruns,‘toformamoreperfectunion,establishjustice,insuredomestictranquillity,provideforthecommondefence,promotethegeneralwelfare,andsecuretheblessingsoflibertytoourselvesandourposterity.’8Inthesetermsthepeopleoftheformercolonieswhoagreedtotheconstitutionenteredanassociation,verymuchasJohnLockeenvisagedthatpeoplewould‘joinanduniteintoacommunityfortheircomfortable,safe,andpeaceableliving,oneamongstanother,inasecureenjoymentoftheirproperties,andagreatersecurityagainstanythatarenotofit.’9Theoperativeprinciplehereis,ofcourse,theliberaloneoffreedomofassociation:peoplearefreetoassociatepoliticallywithwhomtheychooseinordertofurthertheirmutualintereststhroughmembershipofasharedstate.Theotherliberalprinciplewhichcomesintoplayhereisthatpeoplefallunderobligationsonlybyvirtueofcontractingthemvol-untarily.10Thusitistheirenteringintoassociationwithothersforthepurposeofestablishingandsupportingastatethatplacesthemunderapoliticalobligationtoobeyitslawsandgiveitloyalty.Theboundariesofthestatearefixed,therefore,aswerequire,bythescopeofthosewhoacknowledgethisobligation.Yetwhydoesthiscoincidewiththerangeofthosewhohavearighttooccupytheterritorythoseboundariesenclose?Locke’saccountensuresthatitdoes.Thereasonforthisliesinthefactthattheassociates’purposeincludesthe‘secureenjoymentoftheirproperties’andthattheterritoryboundedcomprisesjustthoseproperties.Peoplehavearighttolive,forreasonsweshalltouchonlater,wheretheyownproperty.Buttheyassociatetogethertoprotectthispropertyandtherebyincurpoliticalobligations,sothat150\nCITIZENSHIP,IMMIGRATIONANDINDIGENOUSPEOPLEStheanswerstothetwoquestionsintowhichthequestionofwhoshouldbeacitizendissolvescoincideaswerequire.OnthisLockeanaccountitisevidentthatpre-existingracial,ethnicorculturalidentitiesareseeminglyirrelevanttocitizenship.Allthatisneededisthewilltoengageinthesamepoliticalprojectasotherswiththesameinterests,ofwhichtheprotectionofcertainpropertiesistheparadigmcase.Itfollowsthatanyonewhoalsoundertakestobepartofthisprojectcaninprinciplebeadmittedtomembership,thoughwhethertheywillbeisatthediscretionoftheoriginalassociates.Allthatisrequiredisthatprospectivemembersshouldbesimilarlymotivatedtodischargetherequiredobligationsandhonourtherightsofothers.Butthismotivation,itisassumed,doesrequirethatthestate,conceivedastheproductofaparticularvoluntarypoliticalassociation,isworthsupporting.Itneedstobethoughtofasworthwhilenotjustindeliveringwhatthenewentrantswantbutinvirtueoftheprincipleswherebyitdoesso;andthiswillincludeitsdoingsopreciselythroughbeingafreeassociationandinotherrespectsrespectingandsafe-guardingindividualliberties.Attachmenttotheseprinciples,thoughtofpurelyasprinciplesofpoliticalorganisationandthus,intheoryatleast,cross-culturalintheirappeal,istakentoberequiredformembership.Oncemembershipisacquired,however,itbestowsanidentity,anationalidentity,accordingtoaliberalconstructionofnationality,asconsistinginacertainfixedinclinationofthewill.Forthestabilityandunityofthestaterequiresfixityintheassociationinwhichitoriginates.Thequestionthatneedstobeaskediswhetherthisidentityis,afterall,aculturalone.Forifitisthenthiskindofliberalviewofstatecitizenship,asgeneratingsharednationalitythroughasharedpoliticalassociation,maycollapseintoanotherkindofliberalnation-alism,namelythatwhichseesnationsasassociationssetuptopreserveacommonculture.Foraccordingtothisview,clearly,culturalqualifi-cationsonpotentialmemberswillbeimposed.DoesentrytotheUnitedStates,tobringthequestiondowntoaconcretecase,imposeculturalqualifications,contrarytoappearances,justbyvirtueofthefactthatitisacountrysetupalongLockeanlineswiththeliberalprincipleswhichthisimplies?AnanswerwillturnonwhetherweshouldregardtheseprinciplesascharacterisingaspeciesofReformationLiberalismwhichhasapotentiallyuniversalappeal,orwhethertheymarkoutsomemoreculturallylimitedversionofliberalism.ThosewhodraftedtheAmericanconstitutionwereinlittledoubtthattheyhaduniversalreasonontheir151\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYside:hadnottheDeclarationofIndependencedeclared,astruthsthatwereself-evident,theexistenceofrightsto‘Life,Liberty,andthepursuitofHappiness’andtotheinstitutionsofgovernment‘derivingtheirjustpowersfromtheconsentofthegoverned’?11Yetevenifthesetruthswereself-evident,noteveryonecouldappreciatethatfact.Thereligioustolerationimpliedbytherighttoliberty,forinstance,doesnotcommanduniversalassent.Thisimpliessomedisqualificationsforcitizenshiponculturalgrounds,butitscarcelymakestheAmericannationalidentityarisingfromcitizenshipaculturalone,sincenothingculturallyspecifictoAmericaisimplied.However,whetherornotsomeuniversalistdefenceoftheprinciplesenunciatedintheDeclarationofIndependencecanbeprovided,whatisfairlyclearisthatitwillnotextendtojustifyingtheparticulararrangementswherebythesearegivencontentintheconstitution.Butitistheconstitution,andnotsomeabstractsetofprinciples,whichdefinestherightsanddutiesofthecitizen.How,then,shouldassenttotheconstitutionbeconstrued:asmanifestingattachmenttoaparticularliberalcultureornot?Thereareatleasttwopossibleavenueswhichwouldleadtoanegativeanswer.Oneisthatsuchassentistheoutcomeofamodusvivendibetweenpeopleofdifferentculturalorethnicidentitieswhofindintheconsti-tutionasetofarrangementsthatenablesthemtopursuetheirvariousinterestsunderthesamestatewithaminimumoffriction.Religioustoleration,forexample,isacceptedforjustthisreason.Twopointsshouldbenoticedaboutthisanswer.First,althoughsuchprinciplesastolerationmaycommendthemselvestopeopleinawiderangeofcaseswheretheyneedtolivetogetherpeaceably,thattheyaresustainableinpracticedependsuponthebalanceofpoliticalforceswhichisinplayataparticulartimeandplace.Thus,iftheyviewedtheconstitutionasprovidingamodusvivendithentheso-called‘Know-Nothings’andrepublicansintheAmericaofthe1850swouldhavebeenquitejustifiedintheirpolicyofespousing‘nativism’andopposingimmigrationbytheCatholicIrish.12Forsuchimmigrantswouldpotentiallychangethatbalanceofforcesandcouldthreatenthemodusvivendi.Thesecondpointtonote,though,isthatsuchamodusvivendiisscarcelyabasisfornationalidentity,forthesenseofpoliticalobligationandloyaltyonwhichitrestsisatbestcontingentandtemporary.Nothingmorethanexpediencygroundstheunityofthestate,sothatthereisnothingtosecurethefixityofwillrequiredforsharednationalidentity.JohnRawls’so-called‘politicalliberalism’,whichwetoucheduponinChapter5,suggestsasecondavenuetotheconclusionthatAmerican152\nCITIZENSHIP,IMMIGRATIONANDINDIGENOUSPEOPLESidentity,construedasflowingfromLockeancitizenship,mightnotbeaculturalone.Rawlsrejectstheideathatliberalinstitutionsmightbefoundedonamodusvivendi,andsuggestsinsteadthattheyemergefromwhathetermsan‘overlappingconsensus’13betweenmembersofdif-ferentculturalgroups.Eachgrouphasitsowncomprehensiveviewofwhatisworthwhileinlifebuttheyagreeuponsuchprinciplesastolerationsincetheseprinciplesareimpliedbytheirdifferingoverallviews.Wecould,Rawls’theoryseemstosuggest,regardsuchacon-sensusasrepresentingamerelyfortuitousintersectionofdifferentculturalviewswhichitwouldbequitewrongtoascribetoanyculturalaffinity.Inthecaseinquestion,however,thisinterpretationwouldsurelybeperverse.Evenifabeliefintolerationcanbecoherentlycombinedintomanydifferentsystemsofvalue,thefactthatdifferentgroupsshareitinAmerica,forexample,isnocoincidence,buttheresultoftheirexposuretosimilarculturalinfluences.Inthesecircumstancesitisnotunreasonabletoregarditaspartofaculturewhichtheyshare,howevermanyotherelementsoftheirculturemaydiverge.14Iconclude,then,thatevenonaLockeanaccountofthebasisofAmericannationalidentity,thatidentityis,perhapsdespiteappearances,aculturalone.Theoverlappingconsensusaccountcouldservetogroundaviableconceptionofnationality,butaculturallybasedone,and,whatismore,onewhichwouldexcludethemembersofsomegroupsfromcitizenshiponculturalgrounds,sincetheircultureswouldnotprovidetheresourcesforthemtoviewasworthwhiletheprinciplesoftheassociationthattheysoughttoenter.15Walzerhimselfimplicitlyendorsessuchaconclusion.Forhebelievesthatapoliticalcommunityneedstopossessasharedconceptionofitselfwhichconstitutesitsnationalidentity.Itistoprotectthisculturalconceptionthatthecommunitymustbeallowedtherighttodeter-minewhoistoenterbybarringthosewhomightundermineit.TheAmericanself-conceptionisthatofanethnicallyandmorallyhetero-geneousliberalsociety,butthisisitselfafeatureofAmericanculture,sothatitisforthisreason,andnotforsomelessculture-specificone,thatrestrictingimmigrationtowhiteProtestantsinthe1920swouldhavebeenwrongaccordingtoWalzer.16Itis,however,quiteunclearthatapoliticalcommunityshouldbeaccordedtherighttorefusemembershiponthissortofground.Onewouldallowitonlyifonebelievedeitherthatthepointofapoliticalcommunitywastosustainacultureor,asWalzerseemstobelieve,thatthepursuitofacommonlifewhichastatefacilitatesrequiresasharedculture.Ifcultureistakentobewhatpeopleconceiveofascollectingthemselvestogetherinto153\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYagroupwithasharedidentity,neitherviewseemsconvincing.Whatprospectiveentrantstoastateareseekingisnotusuallyanidentity,butthebenefitswhichmembershipbringstothelivingofacommonlife.ItistheircapacityforthelatterwhichisrelevanttomembershipandthekindsofexclusionswhichWalzer’sclubmodelauthorisesgowellbeyondthis.THEFAMILYMODELSharplycontrastingwithWalzer’sclubmodelofstatemembershipisthatprovidedbythefamily.‘Themostnaturalstate’,wroteHerder,‘isonenation,anextendedfamilywithonenationalcharacter,’andhewentontocondemn‘thewildmixingofvariousracesandnationalitiesunderonesceptre.’17Citizenship,onthisaccount,shouldonlybeextendedtopeoplewhoaremembersofacertainrace,orofanethnicgrouporoneofanumberofcloselyrelatedethnicgroups.Itiscer-tainlynotbyvirtueoftheirvolunteeringforitthatcitizenshipisconferreduponthem,butinvirtueoftheirqualifyingasaresultofcertainbiologicaland,perhaps,alsoculturalfactsaboutthem–factswhicharetoallintentsandpurposesfixedandunchanging.Whyshouldthisbe?Fundamentallybecause,onthefamilymodel,itisthoughtthatthoseandonlythosewhosatisfythesequalificationswillbeabletodischargethepoliticalobligationsofcitizenship.Theboundariesofthestateshould,therefore,bedrawnaroundthem.Thereare,however,tworatherdifferentwaysinwhichthisconnectioncanbeexplainedandweshalllookateachinturn.Thefirstisplainlynaturalistic,maintainingthatthenationalloyaltieswhichunderpinpoliticalobligationarenaturalsentimentsjustas,itissupposed,loyaltiesinthefamilyare.Intheirsociobiologicalmanifes-tation18theseloyaltiesaretakentoarisefrom‘kinaltruism’,wherebyweprivilegethosetowhomwearegeneticallyrelated,orthosewithwhomweshareawayoflife,becausesuchbehaviourconducestothetransmissionofourgenes.Inthelattercase,ofcourse,itmaynotdosobecausethosewithwhomweshareawayoflifemaynotbesorelatedtous.Yetsinceinourevolutionaryhistorytheyarelikelytohavebeenso,suchbehaviourpersists.AndthiscanexplainnationalloyaltiesnaturalisticallyeveninanethnicallymixedcountryliketheUSA.Notthatsuchloyaltiesextendveryfarbeyondone’sownethnicgroup.Norcantheybeexpectedtoextendtorecentimmigrants,whowillnotnormallyshareone’swayoflifeandwhothusimperiltheestablishedbondsonwhichthestatedepends.154\nCITIZENSHIP,IMMIGRATIONANDINDIGENOUSPEOPLESThisisanupdatedversionofafairlyoldsetofbeliefs,whichwelookedatinChapter1.ItappealstoconservativesoftheNewRightasmuchasthatdidtothoseoftheOld.EveninacountryliketheUSAsuchbeliefshavehadconsiderableinfluence.DespitetheFourteenthandFifteenthAmendmentstotheconstitution(1865–6)whichbestowedcitizens’rightsirrespectiveof‘raceandcolour’19immigrationpoliciestargetedgroupsforexclusionorlimitationonracialorethnicgrounds.The1882ChineseExclusionAct,forexample,wasfollowedbyvariousActsbarringotherAsiansandprivilegingimmigrantsfromnorthernandwesternEurope.Sponsoringa1924Act,AlbertJohnsonexplainedthat‘theUnitedStatesisourland.Ifitwasnotthelandofourfathers,atleastitmaybe,anditshouldbethelandofourchildren.’20Histhoughtwasthatevenifthestatestartedasavoluntaryassociationofsettlersitscontinuancerequiredtheethnichomogeneitythatonlysevererestrictionsonnewimmi-grantscouldbring.SuchthoughtsareseldomfarfromthemindsofthoseonthepoliticalRight.How,though,doesthenaturalistpictureensurethatthescopeofmotivatedpoliticalobligationswillcoincidewithrightsofterritorialoccupation?Thisisnotaquestiontheaccountcaneasilyanswer.Ethologists21haveclaimedthat‘biological’nations,conceivedofasextendedkinshipgroupsofhumanorotheranimals,aremarkedoutbytheterritorytheydefend.Yetwhilethismakessomeconnectionbetweenterritoryandthenexusofobligationitisnottherightone.Fortheterritorythatisdefendedisnottherebytheterritorythatisrightfullyoccupied.Thepointisespeciallypertinentinviewofthefactthatethnicallydefinednationshaveaparticularpropensityfordrivingoutothersnotoftheirkind.Therightsthatareclaimedherearetoethnically‘pure’territoryasthebasisforcohesivestatehood.Thisis,perhaps,nolesscrediblethantheotherimplausiblepresumptionsonwhichthenaturalistpicturedepends.Whateveritsfailings,thecontinuedexistenceoftheUnitedStatesasasinglestablepolitygivesthelietothepicture.Differentracialorethnicgroupscanhavesharedpoliticalloyaltiesandthereisnoneedforcontrivedevolutionaryaccountstoexplainthis.Thereasonsforsupposingotherwisearealwayspolitical,neverconvincinglyscientific,notleastbecausetheeffectsofpeople’sracialbeliefscanneverbediscounted,infavourofsomesupposedlymorenaturaldispositions.Thesecondwaytotakethefamilymodelisquitedifferent.Itistoviewthefamilyasparadigmaticofcommunity.Accordingtothiscommunitarianaccount,itisnotthesupposednaturalnessofcertain155\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYsentimentsthatistakentoexplainthemotivationfordischargingpoliticalobligationstoastateboundedinacertainway,butthegiven-nessofone’smembershipofanation,analogoustothatofone’smembershipofthefamily.Inthefamilymymembershipis,accordingtothisstory,unchosenandinvoluntary,eitherthroughbirthorthroughsexualtiesthatarethemselvesunwilledandpassional.MyobligationswithinitstemfromrelationshipsinwhichIfindmyself,notfromonesIenterforareason;andIdischargetheseobligationsdisinterestedly,notbecauseIdiscernabenefitinundertakingthem.Theyareessentiallyobligationstoensurethecontentmentandwelfareofaparticularrangeofpeople,andassucharefairlyopen-endedandunspecific.Thisconceptionoffamilylifeshapesacertaincommunitarianviewofthenationthatisparticularlycongenialtoethnicnationalists.Asinthefamily,membershipisacquiredbybirthormarriage,orperhapsbyothermodesofassimilationwhichhavethesameeffectingeneratingunreflectiveloyalties.Theboundariesofthenationarefixedbytherangeofthosewhosharesuchloyalties.Imagesofthefamilylikethisareoftentakentobeaninescapablecomponentofnationalism,22yetthisistomissthespecificityoftheireffectsonparticularaccounts.DavidMiller’saccountofnationhood,forinstance,isfarremovedfromconservativeonesthatespousenatu-ralism,andMillerisatpainstodistinguishitfromthosethatlocatesharednationhoodinacommonethnicity.Yetheadopts23thefamilyasamodelofwhatasocialistnationalcommunitymightbelike,andhedoessopreciselytodefendthewelfarestatewhichisthought,ontheLeft,tobeimpliedbytheformalequalityofcitizenship.24Forthewelfarestateisthreatenedbyapolarisationbetweenhighlypaidprofessionalsandlow-paidworkersinducedbyglobalmarkets.‘Intheabsenceofnationalsolidarity,’commentsMiller,‘politicalleaderswillhaveneitherthemeansnortheincentivestocounteractthispolarisa-tion.’25Theoriginofthissolidarityliesintheconcernwhichmembersofanationsimplydohavefortheircompatriotsandnotforothers.For,andhereMillerquotesDavidHume,‘thegenerosityofmenisverylimited,and...itseldomextendsbeyondtheirfriendsandfamily,or,atmost,beyondtheirnativecountry.’26But‘nations...tendtothinkofthemselvesasextendedfamilies’,27sothatwejustdohavesuchconcerns,limitedinthenationalcase,asinthefamilialone.Withoutthem,theobligationsonwhichawelfarestatedependscouldnotrealisticallybeimposedbygovernment.Milleris,Ihavesaid,anxioustoavoidputtinganaturalisticglossonthesefacts.Heviewsthenation,alongsocialconstructionistlines,asa156\nCITIZENSHIP,IMMIGRATIONANDINDIGENOUSPEOPLEScertaintypeofgroupconstitutedbyitsmembersrecognisingeachotherascompatriotsandacknowledgingthemutualobligationswhichmembershipbrings.Thereisatension,though,betweenMiller’sstressontheallegedgivennessofnationalmembership,whichiswhatgen-eratesnationalloyalties,andhisviewthatthecommunalrelationshipsitinvolvesareworthwhileones,justlikerelationshipswithinthefamily.Foriftheyareworthwhilewhycanwenotenterintothemforthisreason,irrespectiveoffactsaboutourbirth?AswesawinChapter5,Millerrejectsthispossibilityasimplyingwhathedubsthe‘lifeboatmodel’ofnationalcommunity,inwhichIamsimplythrowntogetherwithothersandseethevalueofstickingtogethertomakeacollectiveresponse.Butthemutualobligationsofmembersofthenation,heclaims,arisenot‘fromthepresentfactoftheirco-operation’,butfromtheir‘historicalidentity’stemmingfromtherelationshipsinwhichtheyarebornandraised.28This,aswenoted,hasconservativeconsequences,forsinceco-operationspringsfromnationalidentityandnotviceversa,immigrationcancauseproblemsunless‘immigrantscometoshareinacommonnationalidentity’29–aprocesswhich,becauseheconstruesnationalidentityasakindofculturalidentity,Millerlikenstomarryingintoafamilyandacquiringitsculture.30Itis,furthermore,hardtoseehowthisaccountensuresacoincidencebetweenthosewhosharethesamepoliticalobligationsandtherightfuloccupantsofaterritory.Forifonefindsoneselflivingcheekbyjowlwiththosewhosimplydonotevinceasentimentofsolidaritytowardsone,itprovidesnoaccounteitherofwhytheyshouldevinceitorofwhy,iftheydonot,theiroccupationisnottherebyrightful.Iconcludethateventhiscommunitarianversionofthefamilymodelfailstoprovideasatisfactoryaccountoftherelationsbetweencollectiveidentityandcitizenship.RESIDENCEThefamilymodelofstatemembershipisadeeplyunattractiveone,eventhough,asweshouldnotforget,theprincipalmethodofadmis-siontocitizenshiponanyaccountisthroughbeingbornthechildofparentswhoarealreadycitizens.Thisfactalonedoesnothingtorecommendthefamilymodel.Fortobebornandbroughtupinafamilyalsoimpliesthecontinuityofinterestswithothersinit,perhapsincludingpropertyinterests,whichcreatesthepresumptionofone’swantingtobepartofthesamepoliticalassociationwiththem–tobe,thatis,amemberofthesameclub.Ithasalsonormallyimplieda157\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYcommonorcontiguousresidence,evenifthiscannowbelessoftenreliedupon.ItisthisfactofsharedoccupationofthesameareathatsuggestsWalzer’sneighbourhoodmodelofstatemembership.31Onthismodel,admissiontocitizenshipofastateshoulddependsimplyuponresidenceinitsterritoriesratherthanuponanyotherfactors,evenifresidenceitselfmayhavetobecontrolled.Butifitiscontrolled,thiswillneedtobearguedforinrelationtotheproblemsnewarrivalsmightcauseexistingresidents,andtheentryrequirementsimposedmustbeonlythoserelevanttothecandidates’qualificationsaspotentialresidents.Itisnotanecessaryfeatureoftheneighbourhoodmodelthatentryshouldbecompletelyunrestricted,thoughthisishowWalzerhimselfpresentsit,andthisfeatureprovides,infact,hisreasonforopposingitasapossiblemodelforcitizenshipofthestate.ForWalzerarguesthat‘neighbourhoodscanbeopenonlyifcountriesareatleastpotentiallyclosed’.32Hethinksthisbecause,aswenoticedearlierinthischapter,heholdsthatcommonliferequiresasharedcultureforwhichclosureofthecommunitymustbeensured.Thecommonlifeofaneigh-bourhoodpresupposes,then,asharedculture,butaculturewhosedistinctivenessandstabilityisensuredatadifferentlevel,namelyatthelevelofthestate.Thisargumentfortheunsatisfactorinessofaneighbourhoodmodeldepends,then,preciselyuponviewsabouttherelationshipbetweencultureandpoliticalcommunitywhichwecalledintoquestionearlier.Wequestionedthembecausetheyimpliedrestrictionsonentrythatimposedconditionsotherthanthoseoftheprospectiveentrants’qualificationsaspotentialresidents,whichIamarguing,aretheonlyonesthataneighbourhoodmodelcanproperlyrequire.Entrypoliciesofthissortare,itwillbeobserved,thosethathaveforthemostpartcharacterisedtheUnitedStates.Theyderive,Ishallsuggest,fromitsrepublicantraditionofcitizenship.For,aswenotedinChapter5,thebasisofrepublicancitizenshipisresidenceinthesameplace.Itiseasytoseehow,accordingtothisview,entitlementtocitizenshipoftherepublicextendstothosewhooccupyitsterritory.Forthosewhodependfortheirlivelihoodsuponalandandaplacehaveaprimafacieclaimtocontinuedoccupation,sothatthosewhoactuallyoccupyandworkinitwillnormallydosorightfullyandthereforebeentitledtocitizenship.Commonoccupationalsogivesrise,accordingtotherepublicantheory,toanawarenessofthecommongood,anditisthisawarenesswhichactuatescitizensintheperformance158\nCITIZENSHIP,IMMIGRATIONANDINDIGENOUSPEOPLESoftheirpoliticalobligations,sincethesearetheobligationsofmemberstoworktogetherforthecommongood,pre-eminentamongthembeingtheobligationtoobeyandenforcethelawsthatmakethispos-sible.Thosewhorightfullyoccupytheterritoryoftherepublicwillcoincidewiththosewhoacknowledgeapoliticalobligationtoit.Republicanismthusovercomesthehurdleatwhichethnicorculturalcommunitarianaccountsofentitlementtocitizenshipfalldown,anditdoessowithoutappealtotheinterestsofproprietorsuponwhichLockeanliberalismdepends.Forallitsoriginsinthelattertheory,itmaybethatAmericancitizenshipshouldbeviewedasaimingattheserepublicanideals.Ifthisisso,thensomefeaturesofAmericanimmigrationandcitizenshippolicystandinneedofreform.ForacenturyMexicanshavebeendrawnintotheeconomyofstateslikeCaliforniaandTexas,latterlyinthefaceofincreasinglystringentprecautionsbytheimmigrationauthoritiesandofobstaclesplacedinthewayofimmigrantsobtainingcitizenshiprights.Butfromarepublicanstandpoint,ifMexicansarerequired–asseemstobethecase–tosustaintheeconomyoftheregion,thensuchrestrictionsontheirentryareunjustified.Fromthebeginning,however,thecomplaintaboutMexicanimmigrantshasbeenthesame:that‘theirmostunfavourablecharacteristicistheirinclina-tiontoformcoloniesandliveinaclannishmanner’.33TheMexicansdonot,thatistosay,assimilate,retaininginparticulartheirSpanishlanguage,whichispredictedtoovertakeEnglishasthemajoritytongueinCalifornia.This,itissupposed,representsathreattotheverysenseofsharedcommunityonwhichrepublicancitizenshipdepends.Doesthatimply,forallitspretensionstothecontrary,thatrepublicanstatesmustinpracticeimposeculturaltestsuponprospec-tiveentrants?Idonotseethatitdoes.Thereisofcourseadangerintheethnicidentificationsofgroupsprovingsostrongandcomprehensiveastosubvertthepromiseofrepublicancommunity.Thusinthe1960samovementforChicanonationalismaroseamongMexicanAmericans,followingdisillusionmentattheirfailuretogaincivilrightsandanendtodiscrimination.34Inthiscase,asinmanyothers,ethnicidentificationwasareactiontoaninsufficientlyrepublicanresponsetotheirsituation.Thisisnottosaythatthereisnecessarilyarepublicanresponsesuffi-cienttoavertsuchdangersinallcircumstances.Itistosaythatthereis,sofar,nothinginherentlyinadequateinarepublicanapproachtocitizenship.Whatsuchanapproachmustnotdoistoimposeanybut159\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYthemostminimalculturaltestsuponotherwisesuitablecitizens.Ifitisdiscriminatoryinthiswaythenthisislikelytoproducejusttheeffectsthatsuchtestsareintendedtoavert,byheighteningasenseofethnicandculturalidentificationamongcitizens.What,though,ofvalues?Doesnotrepublicanismpresupposeasharedconceptionofwhatconstitutesthecommongood,whichmustnecessarilydrawonsubstantiveconceptionsthatnotallculturesshare?Thiswouldexposeittothesamedifficultyencounteredbythepolit-icalliberalismthatrootspoliticalvaluesinanoverlappingconsensus,namelythattheexclusionofthosewhoseculturesdonotincludesuchvaluesbecomesjustified.Thiswouldgivethelietothepretensionsofrepublicanismifitwereso.Again,however,Idonotthinkthatitis.Thevaluesthatshapethepoliciesoftherepublicare,ideally,onesthathavedevelopedfromexchangesbetweencitizenswhomayhaveverydifferentculturalbackgrounds.Theyaretheproductofsuchexchanges,potentiallyeffectingalterationsinthecitizens’priorculturalnorms,whichisaverydifferentthingfromtheirbeingthediscoveredintersectionofunchangingones.Thus,inprinciple,newmembersfromanyculturalbackgroundarewelcomeintherepublic,justsolongastheyarepreparedtoengageinthisprocessofexchangeanddecision-making.Ifitisobjectedthattorequiresuchpreparednessitselfmakesculturaldemandsthereare,Ithink,twopossibleresponses.Oneistostressthattherepublicisnotanassociationandnoformalrequirementisdemanded.35Whethernewmemberscanfulfiltheinformalrequirementisnotsomethingthatcanbedeterminedinadvance,foritcanneverbedeterminedinadvanceofthefactswhetherarepublicanpoliticscanbesuccessful.Thisleadstothesecondresponse.Onlyanover-rigidviewofculturewouldleadonetosupposethattherearepredictablelimitsonwhatispossibleforpeoplefromoneculturebywayofaccommodationtopeoplefromanother.Republicanpoliticsdependuponthefalsityofsuchaview.Republicancitizenshipgeneratesaformofnationalidentitywhichis,becauseofthepoliticalvaluesthattherepublicdevelopsandnurtures,notunfairlythoughtofasaculturalone,butonewhichIhaveargued,placesnoantecedentculturalrestrictionsuponmembership.Inmanywaysthisprovidesanattractivemodelforcitizenshipofstatesgenerally,andperhapsitisanidealthatweshouldworktowards.Butitisnot,forreasonswhichweshallcometoinamoment,clearthattheconditionsforrepublicancit-izenship,andthesharednationalityitcangenerate,alwaysexist,evenwhenpeoplerightfullyshareaterritory.160\nCITIZENSHIP,IMMIGRATIONANDINDIGENOUSPEOPLESINDIGENOUSRIGHTSRepublicanismpresupposesthataterritorycanbemarkedoutinsuchawaythatthereisacommongoodwhichallthoseoccupyingitcanaimtoachieve,andthisinturnpresupposesarangeofeconomicinter-dependencies.Furthermore,thoserelatedbytheseinterdependenciesmustbeabletoappreciatehoweachisinsomewayneededbyoth-ers.Theinterdependenciescannot,thatistosay,besimplyexploitative,howeverunequaltheymaybe.Iftheyareexploitative,orifnosuchinterdependenciesexist,thentherewillbenocommongoodtobepursuedbyall,onlyanumberofseparatesectionalgoods.Consider,forexample,thesituationoftheAmericancolonistsvisàvistheindige-nouspeoplesofAmerica.Whilerelationshipsofmutualdependencemightperhapshavedeveloped,basedontradebetweenhuntersandagriculturalists,thesettlers’landhungerresultedineitherseparationorexploitation.InthesecircumstancestherewasnopossibilityoftherepublicanidealbeingpursuedtogetherbynativeAmericansandEuropeansettlers.InsteadthenativeAmericanssufferedterribleinjus-ticeswhichwereonlycurtailed,tosomeextent,byFranklinRoosevelt’sIndianReorganisationActof1934.36Animportantquestiontobeaddressedishowsuchinjusticemightnowberectified.37Thisisnotthequestionwearetacklinghere.Rather,weask,whatsortofsharedcitizenshipispossibleinastatewherethissortofseparationofsocietiesexists,whetherasaprecautionbytheoppressedagainstfurtherexploitationandextinctionorforsomeotherreason?First,though,weneedtolookbrieflyattheradicalobjectionthatthedescendantsofthesettlershavenorighttooccupyAmericanterritoryatall,sothatitistheywholackentitlementtocitizenshipofanystatefoundedinit:onlytheindigenouspeopleshavethat.Theobjectiondependsupontheideathat‘theinhabitantsofanycountry,whoaredescendedandderiveatitletotheirestatesfromthosewhoaresubdued,andhadagovernmentforceduponthemagainsttheirfreeconsents,retainarighttothepossessionsoftheirancestors.’38ThisisJohnLocke,whodidnot,however,extendtheprincipletonativeAmericans.Indeed,asKymlickanotes,39itcouldnotinpracticebeappliedwithoutcreatingfurthergreatinjustices.Theprinciplepre-supposesthattherightsofindigenouspeoplesstemoriginallyfromthefactofresidenceandthisfactitselfcreatesapresumptionofrightfuloccupationevenwhenoccupationderivesfromunjustpossessioninthepast.Thesettlers,however,didnotregardtheirpossessionoflandinAmericaasunjustandLockeprovidedtherationaleforit.Itwas161\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYbased,hemaintained,40upontheirestablishingpropertyrightsbyenclosingandcultivatinglandpreviouslyleftwild,asithadbeenbythenativeAmericans.JohnWinthrop,theGovernorofNewEnglandintheearlyseventeenthcentury,hadanticipatedLocke:Thatwhichiscommontoallispropertonone.Thissavagepeoplerulethovermanylandswithouttitleorproperty;fortheyenclosenoground,neitherhavetheycattletomaintainit,butremovetheirdwellingsastheyhaveoccasion.41Theassumptionisthatpropertyissufficientforrightfuloccupation,andthatwherethesettlersestablishpropertyclaimstheytherebygainrightsofoccupationinthatterritorywhichwouldmakethemcitizensofitsstate.Locke’saccountrested,likeWinthrop’s,onaquitefalseviewoftheAmericanlandinwhichthenativeAmericansprocuredtheirlivelihoods.Itwasnot,ashetookittobe,aterranullius–ano-man’sland–butalandalreadydividedupbetweenindigenousgroupswiththeirownmodesofgovernance,includingrulesregulatingitsposses-sionanduse.42Thisfactwasrecognisedbyothers,whoacceptedthatoccupationofnativeAmericanlandscouldonlyproperlybeobtainedbytreaty.This,indeed,becamethepositionoftheBritishCrown,GeorgeIIIissuingaproclamationin1763whichforbadetakingpossessionofnativehuntinggroundsexceptthrougharrangementsnegotiatedbetweentheCrownand‘theseveralNationsorTribesofIndians’.43TheProclamationwasnot,however,tothetasteoftheset-tlers.Indeed,itprovedtobeoneoftheoccasionsoftheDeclarationofIndependence.IndependencewasfollowedbycampaignsagainstthenativeAmericanswhichwereorderedbyGeorgeWashington–asingularlyinauspiciousstarttotherepublic.AsJamesTullyhasobserved,44thesettlementofnativeAmericanlandwithoutdueprocesswasnotonlymateriallybutculturallyoppressive,sinceitprivilegedEuropeanconceptionsofpropertyoverquitedif-ferentcollectivistconceptionsinwhich‘thelanditselfisnotachattel’,asaspokesmanfortheFiveCivilisedTribesexplainedinopposingtheIndianAllotmentActof1881.45Treatyarrangements,bycontrast,evincerespectnotonlyforindigenousoccupants,butforthecustomsthroughwhichtheyholdthelandandorganisetheiraffairsgenerally.Tullyregardssucharrangementsasprovidingaconstitutionalmodelfortheplaceofaboriginalandotheranalogousgroupsof‘culturallydiversecitizens’.46Thismodelimplies,first,mutualrecognitionofsuchgroupsasequalandself-regulating;second,theirconsent,thoughthis162\nCITIZENSHIP,IMMIGRATIONANDINDIGENOUSPEOPLESisexercisedcommunallyratherthanindividually;and,third,thecon-tinuityoftheirwaysoflifeasareflectionofwhattheythemselveshavechosen.Adherencetothesethreeconstitutionalconventionsmakespossibleaformofmodusvivenditowhichthepartiesarepre-existingpoliticalformations,ratherthanindividuals,andinwhichthereisnoassumptionoftherightsofonetoimposetheirtermsofassociationoverothers.Tully’s‘contemporaryconstitutionalism’,ashecallsit,providesaninstructiveanswertoourquestionconcerningthekindofsharedcit-izenshipthatmightexistwhengroupsofcitizenscannotdiscernanoverallcommongoodtoaimfor,butnonethelessmust,bythefactoftheirsharedoccupationofaterritory,eitherlivesidebysidepeaceablyorbecomeembroiledininter-communalhostilityandviolence.Theavoidanceofconflictistheminimalreasonfortheircomingtogetherunderthesamestate.Itislessclear,however,thattheydocometogetherinthesamenation,thoughTullyhimselfbelievestheymayachievesuchasharedidentity.Thereasonforscepticismissurelythis:theirpoliticalobligationstothestatearenotdirect,butaremediatedbyloyaltytotheirgroup,whichisaconstituentpartofit.Tullymaywellberightthat‘mutualrecognitionoftheculturesofcitizensengen-dersallegianceandunity...nomatterhowdiverseorconfederalitis’,47bycontrastwithpoliciesofassimilationorintegration.Butitisanallegiancederivativeuponthestate’sroleinnurturingone’sgroup,towhichone’sprimaryloyaltyisdue.Itishardtoseethisderivativeallegianceasgeneratinganidentityoverandabovetheformalstatusofcitizen.Thispointisconnectedwithanotherthatconcernsthecharacterofthegroupsenteringintoarrangementsofcontemporaryconstitu-tionalism.ItiseasytoseehowculturalcommunitieslikethenativeAmericantribescanentertheminvirtueoftheircorporateandself-governingstructures.Itisfarlesseasytoseehowtheformofcitizenshipthatcharacterisescontemporaryconstitutionalismcanapplytogroupsnotsostructuredoreventocollectivitiesthatdonot,properlyspeaking,formgroupsatall,suchasthosethatTullycalls‘inter-culturalcitizens’48withhybridculturalidentities.Ofcourse,asTullywishestostress,thethreeconventionscanbeappliedinthestate’sdealingswiththemsoastoavoidculturaldiscriminationandsoforth.Butthisisfurtherthanheseemstorecognisefromtheirbeingplacedinrelationstothestateanalogoustothoseoftheindigenouspeopleswhoenteritthroughtreaty.Foritisnotclearthatthepoliticalallegianceofinter-culturalcitizensdependsuponpriorloyaltiesasdoindigenous163\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYpeoples’allegiances.Priorloyaltiessuchasthesearewhatmakeformsofautonomyforculturalcommunitiespossibleandoftendesirable.Itisquiteobscurehowself-governmentcouldbeofferedinanyformtothehybridculturalformationsthatmakeuptheculturaldiversityofmostcontemporarystates.Itisimportantnottoconfuseenjoyingsuchautonomywithbeingallocatedspecificrepresentationinthegovernmentofthestate.49Statesconstitutedthroughtreatyrelationsbetweenpre-existingpoliticalcommunitiesoftenhavetheformoffederations,thoughnotallfeder-ations(theUnitedStatesitselfisanexample)areconstitutedoutofsuchseparatecommunities;andfederationsareonewayinwhichgrouprepresentationcanbeeffectedundersuitableconditionsofterritorialcompactness.50Inothercircumstancesgrouprepresentationcanbeachievedthroughconsociationalsystemsinwhichterritoriallycommingledgroupsareallocatedspecificrepresentationingovernmentandevenrightsofvetoovermattersthatpeculiarlyaffectthem.51Allthese,andothers,arewaysofaffordingrepresentationtoethnicgroupsorculturalformations,sothatcitizenshipisconceivedofasmediatedbymembershipofthemandtheidentitiestheyprovide.ThisisamodelassociatedparticularlywiththeworkofIrisMarionYoung,52whichweshalllookatinmoredetailinthefollowingchapterwhendiscussingresponsestomulticulturalismmoregenerally.Yetitis,withthesortofexceptionswehavebeenlookingatinthissection,adeeplyproblematicmodelifwethinkofmodernidentitiesasfragmentedandhybridised.Foritseemstopresupposeadiscoverableandgeneralorderinthepriorityofidentitieswhichthislastthoughtundermines.Citizenshipmay,itmightturnout,simplybesuigeneris,anidentityneitherdependentuponothersnorgivingrisetothem;andhowitshouldbeallocatedmaybearnoprincipledrelationtootheridentities,pastorprospective.Thesemay,inparticularcases,needtobetakenaccountof,butforpragmaticreasons.Andforpragmaticreasonsciti-zenshipmayneedtobefoughtfor,ortobedisavowed.Buttheremaybelittlereasontothinkthatthequestionofentitlementtocitizenship,orwhatformssuchcitizenshipshouldtake,admitsofanygeneralanswer.NOTES1.ForexampleD.D.Raphael,ProblemsofPoliticalPhilosophy(London:Macmillan,1974),pp.32–4.2.J.Hampton,PoliticalPhilosophy(Boulder:Westview,1997),pp.121–2.3.PaceS.Caney,‘Individuals,nationsandobligations’,inS.Caney,D.George164\nCITIZENSHIP,IMMIGRATIONANDINDIGENOUSPEOPLESandP.Jones(eds),NationalRights,InternationalObligations(Boulder:Westview,1996),pp.119–21.4.Cp.Hampton,PoliticalPhilosophy,p.96.5.Cp.R.E.Goodin,‘Whatissospecialaboutourfellowcountrymen?’,Ethics98(1987–8),pp.663–86.6.Foradefenceofthisproposition,seeN.Dower,WorldEthics:TheNewAgenda(Edinburgh:EdinburghUP,1998).7.M.Walzer,‘Membership’,inhisSpheresofJustice(NewYork:Basic,1983);alsoinS.AvineriandA.de-Shalit(eds),CommunitarianismandIndividu-alism(Oxford:OUP,1992).8.‘ConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica’,reprintedinC.Chesterton,AHistoryoftheUnitedStates(London:Dent,1940),p.301.9.J.Locke,SecondTreatiseofCivilGovernment[1689–90],§95.10.SeeH.Beran,TheConsentTheoryofPoliticalObligation(Beckenham:CroomHelm,1987),esp.pp.50–3.11.QuotedinChesterton,HistoryoftheUnitedStates,p.297.12.SeeH.Brogan,TheLongmanHistoryoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica(London:Longman,1985),pp.312–13.SeealsoM.Walzer,WhatDoesitMeantobeanAmerican?(NewYork:Marsilio,1992),pp.31–3.13.J.Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1996),lectureIV.14.Tosupposeotherwisemaybeduetoafunctionalistviewofculture:seeChapter2above.15.ThisisDavidMiller’sconclusionin‘CitizenshipandPluralism’,PoliticalStudies43(1995),pp.432–50.16.SeeWalzer,SpheresofJustice,p.40.17.F.M.Barnard(ed.),J.G.HerderonSocialandPoliticalCulture(Cambridge:CUP,1969),p.324.18.SeeforexampleP.vandenBerghe,TheEthnicPhenomenon(Oxford:Elsevier,1981).19.QuotedinChesterton,HistoryoftheUnitedStates,pp.317–19.20.QuotedinBrogan,LongmanHistoryoftheUnitedStates,p.512.SeealsoR.Grillo,PluralismandthePoliticsofDifference(Oxford:OUP,1998),ch.7.21.ForexampleRobertArdrey,TheTerritorialImperative(London:Collins,1967),ch.6.22.SeeforexampleB.Parekh,‘Ethnocentricityofthenationalistdiscourse’,NationsandNationalismI(1995),pp.25–52.23.D.Miller,OnNationality(Oxford:OUP,1995).Seeesp.pp.49–58.In‘CitizenshipandPluralism’,however,headoptsadifferentpicture.24.ThelocusclassicusisT.H.Marshall,‘Citizenshipandsocialclass’,inR.E.GoodinandP.Pettit(eds),ContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy(Oxford:Blackwell,1997).25.D.Miller,‘Nationality:Somereplies’,JournalofAppliedPhilosophy14(1997),p.70.26.QuotedinMiller,OnNationality,p.58,fn.11.27.Ibid.p.121.28.Ibid.pp.41–2.29.Ibid.p.76.165\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY30.Miller,‘Nationality:Somereplies’,p.78.31.Walzerassumesthatneighbourhoodsareatypeofassociation,butheseemstobeusingthelatternotioninalessspecificsensethanwhenheviewsclubsassuch.Neighbourhoodscertainlylackthespecificpurposesofassociationsproper.32.Walzer,SpheresofJustice,p.38.33.SeeS.Bryan,‘MexicanImmigrantsintheUnitedStates’[1912],inW.MoquinandC.V.Doren(eds),ADocumentaryHistoryoftheMexicanAmerican(NewYork:Bantam,1971),p.337.34.Seeibid.pp.488–93.35.Except,usually,therenunciationofothercitizenships:seeHampton,PoliticalPhilosophy,pp.229–30.36.SeeBrogan,LongmanHistoryoftheUnitedStates,p.557.37.SeeJ.Waldron,‘Supersedinghistoricinjustice’,Ethics103(1992),pp.4–28.38.Locke,SecondTreatise,§192.39.W.Kymklicka,MulticulturalCitizenship(Oxford:OUP,1995),pp.219–21,note5.40.Locke,SecondTreatise,ch.5.41.QuotedinBrogan,LongmanHistoryoftheUnitedStates,p.60.42.Fordetaileddiscussion,seeJamesTully,‘AboriginalpropertyandWesterntheory:Recoveringamiddleground’,SocialPhilosophyandPolicy11(1994),pp.153–80.43.A.B.Keith(ed.),SelectedSpeechesandDocumentsonBritishColonialPolicy1763–1917,vol.1(London:OUP,1918),pp.3–11.44.SeeTully,‘Aboriginalproperty’andStrangeMultiplicity:ConstitutionalisminanAgeofDiversity(Cambridge:CUP,1995),ch.3.45.QuotedinBrogan,LongmanHistoryoftheUnitedStates,p.65.46.Tully,StrangeMultiplicity,p.183.47.Ibid.pp.197–8.48.Ibid.pp.53–6,176–8.49.Cp.Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship,pp.142–4.50.Foradiscussionofthisapproach,seeW.Kymlicka,‘Isfederationaviablealternativetosecession?’inP.Lehning(ed.),TheoriesofSecession(London:Routledge,1998).51.SeeArendLijphart,‘Self-determinationversuspre-determinationofethnicminoritiesinpowersharingsystems’,inW.Kymlicka(ed.),TheRightsofMinorityCultures(Oxford:OUP,1995).52.InthisconnectionseeparticularlyI.M.Young,‘Polityandgroupdiffer-ence:Acritiqueoftheidealofuniversalcitizenship’,Ethics99(1989),pp.250–74,and‘Defininggrouprepresentation’,Nomos39(1997),pp.349–76.166\n8MULTICULTURALISMqwCULTURALRIGHTSHowcanpeopleofdifferentcultureslivetogetherinthesamestate?Thisisthequestionthattheoristshaveinmindwhentheydebatethenatureofandprospectsformulticulturalism.Thereis,ofcourse,apre-sumptionthatthereisaproblemhere–apresumptionthatspringsfromtheideathatthe,insomesense,normalconditionofpeopleistoshareacultureiftheyshareastate.Thisideaishardtodefendifthesenseinquestionisthatofstatisticalnormality,forthemodernstate,asisfrequentlyobserved,1doesnotarisefromconditionsofculturalhomogeneity–itcreatesthem.Thesuppositionthatthingsareother-wiseislargelyduetothefunctionalisttheoryofculture,withitsGermanRomanticorigins,whichwecriticisedinChapter2.Andyet,itwillbeobjected,manifestlythereareproblemsofculturalco-existenceunderthesamepolity,arising,ontheonehand,fromtheneedforcitizenstobeabletocommunicatetogether,whichtheiruseofdif-ferentlanguagesmayhamper,and,ontheother,fromtheirneedtoliveunderthesamelaws,whichdifferentvaluesmaymakeithardtoaccommodate.Thattheremaybesuchproblemscanbeaccepted,andthesetwodimensionsofculture–languageandvalues–willbekeptinmindinwhatfollowsasfactorsthatmayneedtobeaddressedinthepoliticalarrangementsmadeforparticularcircumstances.Butnogeneralcon-clusionsabouttheproblematiccharacterofcombiningculturesinthe167\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYsamepolitycanbedrawn.Itis,weshouldnotice,withthecharacterofsucharrangementsthatweshallbeconcerned;thequestionforpoliticalphilosophersiswhatarethebestsortsofarrangementthatcanbemadeforaccommodatingculturaldiversity,whereby‘thebest’wemeanthosearrangementsthatcanbejustifiedintermsoftheprinciplesweapplytojudgingpoliticalarrangements–interms,thatistosay,oftheircapacitytoproducejustice,freedom,concordand,indeed,theoverallgoodofthoseconcerned.Notonly,then,mightweexpectittobecontroversialwhetheronesetofarrangementsisbetterablethananothertodelivercertaingoodsinconditionsofculturaldiversity,butalsowhetheronesortofgoodshouldtakeprecedenceoveranother.Onthelatterquestiondifferentphilosophicaltheorieswilldeliverdifferentanswerswhichaffectthearrangementsfordiversitytheysuggest.Itisnot,ofcourse,thetaskofthephilosophertoassessthepracticalconsequencesofthearrangementssuggestedforsomeactualpoliticalsituation,whichwilldependuponmanyempiricalfactors.Ethicallydesirablewaysofdealingwithdiversitymayfounderontherocksofantagonismandprejudice,whileapparentlyundesirableonesmay,thankstogoodwillandmutualaccommodation,prosper.Yetlessonscansometimesbedrawnfromactualsituationsaboutthetheorieswhichhavebeenappliedinthem.Wecanseesomescaleofpoliticalvaluesinoperation,andquestionwhether,ifthisisthewayitworksinpractice,wewishtocontinuetoendorseit,aswedidinmerereflection.Norisitenoughalwaystoprotestthatinmorepropitiouscircumstancesthepreviouslypreferredscalewouldbebest;andthisfortworeasons.First,politicalphilosophycannotbeutopian:itmusttakeaccount,ingeneralterms,oftheinterestsandpowerrelationswhichpoliticalarrangementsfoster.Second,politicaltheoriesmusteventuallyfindtheirtestinpractice:politicalvalueshavetobelivedwith,notcontemplatedonly.Itwould,however,berashtoconcludefromthebreak-upoftheSovietUnion,forexample,thatitspoliciesfordealingwiththecul-turallydiversepeoplesthatmadeitup,andthetheoriesonwhichthosepolicieswerebased,werefatallyflawed.Manyotherfactorswereinplay.Yetstill,Ishallsuggest,therearelessonstobelearntfromitifwecomparethesepolicieswiththosethatothertheoriesgenerateandconsidertheirupshots.Sovietpolicieswereshapedinresponsetothefactthatafterthe1917revolutiontheBolsheviksinheritedfromtheTsarsamulticulturalempirewithawidevarietyofwaysoflife,histories,languagesandreligions.2TheBolsheviksconceptualisedthis168\nMULTICULTURALISMdiversityinawaybroadlysimilartothatpropoundedbyKymlicka,distinguishingculturalgroupsintermsofsharedlanguageandhistory,ratherthanintermsofvalues,whichwerethoughtofasmoremutable.Indeed,culturaldistinctionswerediscernedamongthepeoplesofSovietCentralAsiapreciselytocountertheirownself-identificationsintermsofthesharedvaluesmanifestincommonIslamicbeliefsorsmall-scaletriballoyalties.3FortheseidentitieswerethoughttostandinthewayofaneventualcomingtogetherofSovietculturalgroupsinasharedclasssolidarity.Culturalgroupingsofthissortwerethoughtofasnationalities(thoughonlythelargeroneswiththeirowncompactterritoriesasnations4),andeachindividualwasassignedtooneofthem,sothatmembershipoftheSovietstatewasmediatedbyarecognisedculturalidentity.ThisisanimportantfeatureofSovietconstitutionalarrange-mentswhichdistinguishesthemfromthoseofmostliberaldemocracies.Whatrights,however,didnationalityconfer?Wecandistinguishfivetypesofputativeculturalrightthatarerelevanthere:toculturalexpression,toculturalprotection,toculturalcontrol,toculturalrep-resentationandtoculturalrecognition.Culturalexpressioninsuchmattersaslanguageuse–thoughnot,asmightbeexpectedfromtheconceptofcultureemployed,inethicalorreligiouspractice–was,broadlyspeaking,conceded–atleastintheearlydaysoftheSovietUnion.Sotoowasadegreeofculturalprotectionthroughtheprovi-sionofculturallyspecificeducationandstatefundingforaculture’sartisticactivities.Culturalprotectiondidnotingeneralextend,however,toexternalrestraintsonmembersofothercultures,5preventingthemfromendangeringthoseinaprecariousposition,likesomeofthetinylinguisticminorities:Russificationwasalwaysadangerwhichstateaction,inthedirectionoflabourforexample,tendedtocontributetoratherthantocounter.GroupsexercisedculturalcontrolintheSovietUniononlywithinthevarioussortsofautonomousregionsrecognisedasthehomelandsofnationalities–theUnionrepublicsandtheautonomousrepublics,andthelesseradministrativeunits–oblastsandokrugs–withinthem,exercisingdifferentpowersdependinguponthesizeandimportanceofthenationalitiestheyweresetupfor.6NotonlywerediasporanationalitiesliketheJewsleftwithoutcontroloftheirownculturaldevelopment,butthoselargenumbersofpeoplelivingoutsidetherecognisedterritoryoftheirnationalitylackedanyinfluenceoverit.Culturalcontroldidnotextendtotheimpositionofinternalrestrictionsonmembersofnationalitieswithintheirterritoriesasithadunderthe169\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYTsars.ThensomegroupshadbeengovernedunderlawsnotappliedelsewhereintheEmpire,underIslamiclawforinstance.Butpreciselybecausesuchrestrictionsarejustifiableonlyontheassumptionofagroup’sdistinctivevalues,theywerenotimposedundertheSovietsystem;indeedtheywereeliminated,7sothatSovietlawappliedequallytoallcitizens.Similarly,culturalrepresentationexistedonlyinaveryqualifiedform.PoliticalrepresentationintheSovietUnionanditsconstituentpartsdependeduponcitizenship,notuponnationality;thoughtheUnionwasafederationofrepublicseachformingaterritoryofoneormorenationalities.Culturalrepresentationimpliesculturalrecognition,thatistheexplicitspecificationofcertainculturalgroupingsasthosetobetakenaccountofinpoliticalarrangements.TheSovietsystemofpersonalnationalitywasaparticularlycomprehensiveexample.Itisimportanttonote,however,thattheotherthreetypesofrightdonotnecessarilyimplyculturalrecognition.Expressioncanbepermittedwithoutspecifyingwhatlanguage,say,isallowed,thoughforitsuseinpoliticalbusinessandthelikeitwouldneedtobespecified.Culturalprotectionmightintheorybeachievedthroughadhocmeasureswithoutformalrecognitionandculturalcontrolcouldbeexercisedbygroupssimplyasaresultofthestatenotinterferingratherthanbytheirbeingexplicitlyrecognisedandgrantedpowersovertheirmembers.TheSovietsystem,then,wasonewayinwhichculturaldiversityhasbeenaddressed,andwhichillustratessomeoftheissuesthatsuchpoliciesmustconfront.ClearlyMarxismhadaninfluenceontheSovietsystem,notleastintheprovisionalcharacterofculturalgroupingswithinitandinpoliciespermitting‘progressive’change,oftenequatedinpracticewithRussification.Equality,though,wasthedominantvalue,dictatingatleasttheoreticallythesameopportunitiesfordifferentcultures,includingraisingthelivingstandardsofeconomicallydisad-vantagedgroups,withoutwhichtheywouldlackopportunitiesforculturalfulfilment.Itisequallyclear,however,thatfactorshavinglittletodowithMarxismwereinplay,inparticularinthewaythatculturaldiversitywasconceptualisedasgroupdifferentiationintermsoffeaturesindependentofvalue.Intherestofthechapterweshallinvestigatedifferenttypesofpoliticalarrangementforhandlingculturaldiversity,comparingandcontrastingthemwiththeSovietexample.ASSIMILATIONANDINTEGRATIONInausefulclassificationofthewaysthatpolitieshavebeenstructuredtoaccommodateculturaldiversity,BhikhuParekhdistinguishesfive170\nMULTICULTURALISMmodels,whichhedubsproceduralist,assimilationist,bifurcationist,pluralistand‘millet’.8Weshalllookfirstatassimilationism–thedoc-trinethatastableandcohesivestaterequiresasharedculture,sothatallcultureswithinthestatemustassimilatetoit–andbifurcationism,or,asitisbetterknown,integrationism.Integrationismmaybeviewedasamodificationofassimilationism,requiringonlythatasharedpolit-icalcultureisrequired,sothatculturaldiversityinotherareasofliferemainspossible.Parekhviewsthesharedculturesrequiredinboththesemodelscruciallytoinvolvesharedvalues,thoughitisevidentthatinprincipleformsofthetwomodelscouldbedeviseddemandingonlyasharedlanguageandrelatedculturalpractices,orbothsharedlanguageandvalues.Inthecaseofvalues,forexample,theSovietUnionwasclearlyanassimilationistsystem,thoughthesharedculturedemanded–socialistculture–wasnotthoughtofasaspecificallynationalculture.9Inthecaseoflanguage,however,itequallyclearlywasnotassimilationist.TheSovietsystemwas,aswemayputit,valueassimilationistratherthanvalueintegrationist,becauseitfailedtodrawasharpdistinctionbetweenpoliticalandpersonalvalues,aimingforexampletoeliminatesuchpracticesasIslamicpolygamyinSovietCentralAsia,whichanintegrationistregimeought,arguably,totolerate.Assimilationismmayberegardedasthedenialoftwoputativeculturalrights–therightsofculturalexpressionandofculturalrecog-nition.Inrequiringconformitytosharednormswithinthestate,assimilationismmustdenytherightstoexpressinsocialpracticesaspectsofculturethatdeviatefromthesenorms.Inspecifying(orotherwiseindicating)acultureasthatofthestate,assimilationismmustdenyanyrighttotherecognitionofalternativecultures.Integrationismbasicallysharesthesecharacteristics,whilelimiting,ratherthandenying,rightsofculturalexpression.Itcould,forotherpurposes,permittherecognitionofspecificcultures,butnotasanaspectofthepoliticalarrangementsofthestate,towhichonlythesupposedlysharedpoliticalcultureisrelevant.Thedistinctionbetweenassimilationismandintegrationismis,however,adistinctionofdegreeonly,sincecompleteassimilationofallculturaldifferencetoacommonstandardcanneverbedemanded,sothatinthinkingaboutassimilationweneedtobeclearaboutjustwhataspectsofculturearetobeassimilatedandwhicharenot.Onlythenwillweknowwhatrightsareconceded,whetherexplicitlyorimplicitly,thoughonlyexplicitlyconcededandofficiallycountenancedrightscanbeviewedaspartofthepoliticalarrangementsofthestate.Assimilationismcanbearguedforfromavarietyofphilosophical171\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYpositions,dependingupontheparticularshapeittakes.Characteristicallythedemandforassimilationtoanationalculture,construedintermsofnationalvalues,wouldbeconservative,emphasisingthesupposedimpossibilityofaviablestatehoodintheabsenceofthesharedvalueswhichresultfromthelivingofacommonlifeovertime.Onthiskindofaccountthevaluesinquestionarelikelytobehighlyparticularised,involvingattachmenttothesepeopleandtothisplace,acommitmenttotheworkingoutofthishistoryanddestiny,andloveofjusttheseartisticandliteraryproductions.Indeed,conservatismisunlikelytodrawadistinctionbetweenthesharingofvaluesandofotherculturalcharacteristics,includinglinguisticones,regardingallaspartofanorganicunity.Itisequallytruethattheconservativeaccountleavesitunclearwhetheritisonlycommonculturethatisrequiredoralsoacommonethnicity(orevenrace).Whilemoregeneralisedvaluesmaybeadoptedorabandoned,itislessclearthatthemoreparticularisedvaluesandattachmentsofasupposedlynationalculturecanbesimilarlychosen,fortheywouldseemtodependuponasharedethnicidenti-ficationwhichcannotbehadfortheasking.Acommonlanguageculture,atleastintherichsensethatconservativenationalistsmaydemandit,alsodependsinpracticeuponasharedethnicity.Assimilation,then,thoughitcanintheoryremainmerelyaculturalrequirement,islikelyunderconservatismtobecomeanethniconeaswell.Amoregeneralreasonforassimilationismcanbederivedfromthecommunitarianthesisthatthepoliticalarrangementsofastatemustbejustifiedintermsofthemoralclaimsofacommunity,inparticulartheirclaimtohaveastatewhichaimstosecurethecommongoodthroughpoliciesthatreflectsharedvalues.ThesortofconservativenationalismwehavejustlookedatcaneasilygohandinhandwiththeculturalcommunitarianisminvestigatedinChapter5,which,aswesaw,isequallyhostiletodifference,sothat,shortofexcludingdiversity,itmustassimilateittoensurethefunctioningcommunitywhichjustifiesthestate.Neithertheorydoesmuchtomakeassimilationismcredible.Itisnotplausibletosupposethatculturalassimilationofthescopeimpliedbythemodel,inrelationtoeithervaluesorlanguage,isrequiredforawell-functioningstate.Norwoulditbereasonableforacommunityitselfculturallyhomogeneoustoclaimtherighttoastatewhichdemandedtheassimilationofminoritiesifastatewhichdidnotmakethisdemandcouldalsosecureitscommongood,asawell-functioningstateshoulddo.Itissimplynotevidentthatloyaltiestosuchastateneedtobegroundedonloyaltiestoaculturalcommunityofthekind172\nMULTICULTURALISMinquestion;northatvaluesascomprehensiveasthoseofsuchacom-munityneedtobesharedbycitizensforthemtorecognisewhatthestatedeliversastheircommongood.Thelastpointtellsequallyagainstthedemandforsharedsocialistvalueswhichreplaceallothers,madebythevalueassimilationismoftheSovietstate.Butevenifastatewithsharedvaluesweremorestableandcohesivethanonewithoutthem,this,andthesocialharmonythatgoeswithit,wouldhavebeenboughtatahighpriceintermsofindividualfreedom.Theseobjectionsmayleadonetoembraceintegrationism,mostprobablyintheshapeofrepublicanism.Herethecommunitarianargumentcanbemorecrediblydeployedinitsrepublicanform,fornowthecommunityinquestionisnotapre-existingculturalone,butratheracommunityitselfinherentlypolitical,shapedbysharedpoliticalactionandthecommonpoliticalvaluesthatsuchactivitybrings.Thenallthatisdemandedisareadinesstoparticipateinthepoliticalcommunityandtoadoptitsvalues–tointegrate,asthisnotioniscommonlyused,preciselytodistinguishtheprocessfromassimila-tion,aswenotedinChapter5.Forintegrationpermitstheretentionofdistinctiveanddiversevaluessolongastheseareconsistentwithsharedpoliticalones,andindeedthemaintenanceofculturalgroupboundariessolongasthesedonotmarkthesitesofcompetingpoliticalcommunities.Integrationismmayseemtooffer,then,theprospectofpoliticalstabilitycombinedwithconsiderableindividualliberty.Wehave,intheclosingpagesofChapter5andinthepreviouschapter,alreadydiscussedsomeofthedifficultiesthatstandinthewayofarepublicanidealwhichbestexpressesintegrationism.Identi-ficationintermsofmembershipofcultural,andmoreparticularlyethnicgroupscanblockthekindofconsensus-buildinguponwhichdependstheformationofsharedpoliticalvaluesunderrepublicanism.Suchidentificationisanunderstandablereactiontoasituationinwhichone’svaluesstandoutasminorityones,noteasilyassimilableevenatthepublicleveltothoseofthedominantculture.10Minoritygroupsarethenunabletoacknowledgethepoliticalvaluesofthestatewhichshapeitslawsandinstitutionsasinanysensetheirown,andcometoviewthemasanalienimposition,as,nodoubt,inmanycasestheyare.Integrationismrequiresparticularcircumstancestoconstituteaviableoptionfordealingwithdiversity:somekindsofdiversityarehardertoaccommodatewithinitthanothers,andthedifferencesbetweenWesternliberalismorsocialismandIslamhaveprovedparticularly173\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYintractable.IntheearlydaysoftheSovietUnionaMuslimsectionoftheCommunistPartywassetupunderSultan-Galiev,11whosegoalwasarepublicwithinthefederationwhichwoulduniteMuslimsunderaregimecombiningtheprogressivefeaturesofIslamwithCommunism.Sultan-GalievregardedthedominanceofRussianswithintheSovietstateasconstitutingacolonialistimpositionofWesternvaluesinessentialtoaCommunistrepublic.Sultan-GalievperishedinStalin’spurges,buthisprojectillustrateswhatisoftenforgotten,thatrepublicanismneednotbepredicateduponaWesternsystemofpoliticalvaluesandmay,indifferentforms,beasuitableresponsetosituationsofculturaldiversity,as,forexample,thatofMuslimpeopleswhoare,apartfromtheircommonIslamicfaith,culturallyquiteheterogeneous.PROCEDURALISMProceduralism12isaresponsetodiversitywhichabandonstheattempttoidentifycommonvaluesorothercommonculturalcharacteristicsasabasisforasharedpolity.Allthatitrequiresisthatcitizenssubmittotheauthorityofthestate,whichforitspart,interferesaslittleaspossiblewiththeirvaryingculturalpractices.Intermsoftheaxesofdefinitionemployedinthelastsectionwecancharacteriseprocedu-ralismas,ontheonehand,permittingculturalexpressionthroughpoliticalarrangementswhichembodysuchrights,while,ontheother,notconcedingrecognitiontoanyspecificculturalidentities.Whatproceduralismdoes,inotherwords,istopermitculturalexpressionwithoutspecifyingwhatculturesandpracticesaregrantedit.Itgrantsit,inHobbes’sphrase,simplyby‘thesilenceofthelaw’13onpointsthatmightbearonculturalexpression.ThecosmopolitansocietyoftheRomanEmpirewas,inmanyrespects,runonproceduralistlinesandenjoyedthekindoftolerationwhichthisimplies.14Proceduralismasherecharacterisedis,however,morerecentlyassociatedwithregimesofwhatwecharacterisedinChapter4asReformationLiberalism,andweshallexamineithereafteronlyinthisapplication.AninfluentialversionofthiskindofliberalismisduetoRobertNozick.Nozickdefends‘aminimalstate,limitedtothenarrowfunc-tionsofprotectionagainstforce,theft,fraud,enforcementofcontracts,andsoon.’15Withinsuchaminimalstatemanydifferentkindsofcommunitycanflourish,eachwithitsownsetofvaluesandotherculturalcharacteristics.Thus‘thoughtheframeworkislibertarianandlaissez-faire,individualcommunitieswithinitneednotbe’.16Peoplecan174\nMULTICULTURALISMenterthesecommunitiesifadmittedandleavethematwill,butthecommunitiesmayimposeinternalrestrictionswhichlimitthefreedomofmembersquamembers.Itisacorollaryofthiswayofmaximisingfreedomofculturalexpressionthatcommunitieshavetherightofcul-turalcontrol.Butagainthisisarightconcededsimplythroughthefactofnon-interferenceintheiraffairs,notthroughanyexplicitprovisionsspecifyingwhichcommunitiesmayhavecontrol.Individualfreedomisguaranteedwithinsuchasystemonlybytherightofexit,establishedbyvirtueofthestate’sdutytopreventcoercion.Accordingtothisconception,culturalcommunitiesareessentiallyvoluntaryassociations,andthecontrolaccordedthemis,ineffect,aconsequenceoftherightoffreeassociationconcededtocitizens.Whatisnotconceded,how-ever,inNozick’stheory,whichcontrastsitwithsomeotherformsofReformationLiberalism,isthatthestateitselfshouldbeanassociationwhichmembersmaycontrolatwill,usingittorealisewhatevervaluestheyshare,providedthattheydonotinfringetheindividualfreedomsofothers.Fortheminimalismofthestatepreciselyproscribesthiskindofdevelopment–aminimalismNozickbelievestobenecessarytopreventinfringementofliberty.AsimilartheoryhasbeendevelopedindetailbyChandranKukathas,whichisexplicitlyintendedtotacklethepolicyissuesposedbyactualcasesofculturaldiversitywithinthestateinawaythatNozick’sisnot.IndeedKukathasarguesthat‘liberalismisfundamen-tallyatheoryofmulticulturalism’,foritscommitmenttofreedomofassociationandtotolerationisaresponsetojustthisconditionofsociety.ItisaresponsewhichKukathascharacterisesas‘thepoliticsofindifference’,17forwhatiscrucialtoitisthatthestatetakesnointerestinpeople’sculturalidentitiesorinthevaluesandpracticesassociatedwiththem.Nor,hesuggests,isliberalism‘concerneddirectlytopro-motehumanflourishing:ithasnocollectiveprojects’.18TheliberalismKukathasiscommendingisnot,then,anEnlightenmentorRomanticLiberalism,bothofwhichaimatdevelopingindividualautonomyandthewell-chosenlivestowhichautonomysupposedlygivesrise.Kukathas’liberalismsimplytolerateswhatpeopledo,howeverhet-eronomousandunfulfilling.Fortoleration,heargues,isnottobejustifiedasadvancingautonomy.Rathertolerationistobeespousedbecauseitisanecessaryconditionformakingarationalassessmentofdifferentconceptionsofthegoodlife.ThisiswhyKukathascanmaintainthat‘toleration...isvaluablebecauseitistheconditionwhichgivesjudgementsworth’;19fortheirhavingworthdependsupontheappealtheymaketopublicreason,anappealthatcanbe175\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYmadeonlyifalltheoptionswithinthespaceofpublicreasonarekeptopeninthewaythattolerationallowsthemtobe.KukathasmountsapowerfuldefenceoftheproceduraliststanceasmanifestinReformationLiberalism.Butitisuncompromisinginitsconsequences.Itdoesnot,weshouldnotice,doanythingtoconcedearightofculturalprotection.Culturalassimilationis,asKukathasputsit,‘apartofthewayoftheworld’,20andsimplyaresultofthewaypeopleexercisetheirchoices.ThekindofstateKukathassupportsmaymakeassimilationhighlylikelyforeconomicallydisadvantagedorminoritygroups,butthatistheoutcomeofinequalitieswhichatrulytolerantstatecandonothingtoremove.Thefreedomsuchtolerationprotectsishereprivileged,aswemaythink,overjustice.YetthemoststrikingcaseofthisstemsfromKukathas’refusal–followingNozick–toproscribeculturalpracticesthatseemmanifestlytobeunjust,in,forexample,theirtreatmentofwomen.‘Evenincaseswherethereisclearevidenceofterriblepractices,’saysKukathas,‘thereisgoodreasonnottogiveestablishedauthoritytherighttointervene’,21forpersuasionismorallypreferableandmoreeffectivethanforce,anddoesnotdamagegrouplife.Manyfeminists,forexample,willnotbepersuadedbysuchconsiderations,especiallyiftheyareunconvincedthattherightofexitcanrealisticallybeexercisedbysubordinatemembersofanoppressiveanddogmaticculturalgroup.ThislastpointhintsatapossibleparadoxinKukathas’position.For,onemightask,whatisthepointofmakingtheoptionsforagoodlifeavailablethrougharegimeoftolerationunlessthosewhochoosebetweenthemareeducatedandinformedinawaythatenablesthemtomakearationalchoice?Buttoinsistonsuchanexposuretooptionswouldbetointerfere,intolerantly,withtheinstructionalpracticesofculturalgroups,andtherebytorestricttherangeofoptionsavailableforchoice,asKukathasaccepts.Hisargumentfortoleration,then,seemsself-defeating.Ontheonehandheregardsculturalgroupsasvoluntaryassociations;butontheotherhedeniesarighttotheconditionsformakingarationalchoiceofmembership.Withoutthesetherightofexitwhichsupposedlysafeguardsindividualfreedommaybepurelynominal,andcontinuedmembershipofaculturalgroupmaybeinpracticeinvoluntary.Andthisinvoluntarinessmaybeanaspectofthegroupthatstrikesitsmembersasafeatureofthegoodlife.Parekhbelievesthatproceduralismingeneralisincoherentforanotherreason,namelythatneitherthestate’smodeofgovernancenoritssystemoflawscanbeneutralinregardtothevaluesofthedifferentcultureswithinit.Asystemofrepresentation,forexample,176\nMULTICULTURALISMwillbebasedeitheronafranchiseofundifferentiatedindividualsorondelegationsfromgroups(perhapsculturalgroups).Itthusreflectsviewsaboutsocialorganisationthatmaybedisputedwithinthestate.Evenmoreobviously,laws,especiallythoserelatingtofamilylife,willnotbeneutral.‘Theunityofapoliticalcommunity,’heconcludes,‘cannotrestonproceduralfoundationsalone.’22Kukathas’responsetothiswouldbetodenythatthestateisacommunityatall.Itis,hesuggests,‘anassociationofassociations...apoliticalsettlementwhichencompassesthesediverseassociations.’23Kukathaswouldnotdenythatamodeofgovernanceandlawsmustbeagreed,buthewouldarguethattheyrepresentsimplyanagreementonthenormsofcivillifehammeredoutbetweencitizens,notasetofpublicvaluesthatisthebasisforsocialunity.24Walzer,inadirectreplytoKukathas,doesnotbelievethatthisrepresentsanenduringpossibility:‘everysettle-ment’,hesuggests,‘isonitswaytobecomingawayoflife...atleastacommonpoliticallife.Theresult...isthateverydomesticsocietydevelops’–paceKukathas–‘a“commonmoralstandpoint”’.25EvenifWalzerisright,however,theattitudeoftolerationthatKukathascommendsmaystillbeoneworthcultivatingpolitically,alliedasitistoaproperscepticismaboutone’sownvalues.ItwasthisthatwassignallylackingintheSovietUnion,astateinwhich,inprinciplethoughobviouslynotinpractice,theregimeoftolerationcommendedbyKukathascouldhavebeenappliedalongsidetherecognitionoflanguagegroups.Failuretoexercisesuchtoleration,especiallyinrespectofMuslimpeoples,hamperedthedevelopmentofapoliticalsettle-ment,letaloneapoliticalcommunity,intheseareas,andcontributeddirectlytotheeventualsecessionsandcivilwarswhichmarkedtheSovietUnion’sdissolution.PLURALISMTheproceduralistmodelembodieswhatCharlesTaylorcalls‘thepoliticsofequaldignity’,bywhich‘whatisestablishedismeanttobeuniversallythesame,anidenticalbasketofrightsandimmunities.’26AgainstthisTaylorpits‘thepoliticsofdifference’whicharisesfrompeople’sdemandstoberecognisedasdistinctivebyvirtueof,forexample,theirculturalidentities.Itisjustsuchdistinctivenessthatproceduralismisblindtoand,aswehaveseen,caninpracticethreatenthroughprivilegingthedominantculture.Whetherasareactiontothis,orforotherreasonshavingtodowiththestrengthofculturalorethnicidentification,thedemandforculturalrecognitionhasbecome177\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYaprevalentfeatureofmulticulturalsocieties.Nowitisanalmostinevitableconcomitantofthisdemandforculturalrecognitionthatculturalprotectionwillbesought,protectionwhich,aswehavenoticed,proceduralismcandonothingtoprovide.Tofailtoprovideprotectionwillbeviewedaswithholdinganyacknowledgementoftheimportanceofthecultureforitsmembers,andthusnotgrantingitrecognition,ordoingsoonlynominally.Butsuchprotectionwill,asTaylormakesclear,requiredifferentialtreatmentofcitizens–differentbasketsofrightsandimmunitiestailoredtotheneedsofdifferentgroups–andthusabreachintheprincipleofuniversality(orindifference,aswehaveseenKukathaspunninglyexpressit)whichcharacterisesproceduralism.Thepoliticsofdifferenceprovidesapluralistmodelfordealingwithdiversity.27Itgrants,ifnotcomprehensivelyasintheSovietUnion,thenatleasttocertainspecificgroupsforwhichparticularpoliticalarrangementsaretobemade,therightofculturalrecognition.But,alongtheotheraxisweareemployingtocharacterisethesemodels,itdoesnot,asweshallshortlysee,grantunlimitedrightsofculturalexpression,asproceduralismaimstodo.Perhapsthemostgeneralreasonwhyrecognitiondoesnot,unexpectedly,goalongwithuntrammelledfreedomofculturalexpressionisbecauseunderplural-ismgroupsarerecognisedfortheirvaluetotheirmembers,sothatinsofarastheirpracticeshaveanegativevaluetheyforfeittheirclaimtofreeexpression.Thekindofliberalismwhichfavourspluralismis,Taylormakesclear,‘notapossiblemeetinggroundforallcultures,butisthepoliticalexpressionofonerangeofcultures,andquiteincompatiblewithotherranges...Thehospitablevariant,Iespouse,’hecontinues,‘hastodrawtheline.’28ThusmanyofthepracticeswhichaproceduralistliberallikeKukathasispreparedtocondonearepro-scribedbyapluralistliberallikeTaylor.Culturalrecognitionwithinhiskindofliberalstatecomesataprice.ThemostworkedouttreatmentofthistypeofpluralistliberalismisWillKymlicka’s,whichwehavealreadytoucheduponwhendis-cussingEnlightenmentLiberalisminChapter4.Kymlicka,itwillberecalled,adherestotheEnlightenmentviewthatitistheexerciseofindividualautonomythat,pre-eminently,thepoliticalarrangementsofastateshouldoptimise.Thevalueofculturalmembershipstemsfromthesupposedfactthatitisrequiredforsuchautonomy,sinceaperson’scultureprovidesthecontextoftheirchoices.ItisforthisreasonthatcultureisforKymlickaessentiallylanguageculture,sinceaperson’s–oragroup’s–valuesaretheconsequenceof,notthe178\nMULTICULTURALISMconditionfor,choice.Scopeforautonomywoulditselfbereducedifculturalmembershipcommittedpeopletosomeunchangingvalues.Recognitionofculturesisanacknowledgementofthevalueofculturalmembershipforindividualautonomy,andculturalprotectionneedstobeextendedtothreatenedgroupsinordertoequalisetheopportu-nitiesforanautonomouslifeamongstcitizens.Similarly,althoughKymlickaiswillingtolimitculturalexpressiononlyreluctantlyandwithconsiderablequalification,29nonethelessitiswhenagroup’spracticesinvolveinternalrestrictionsorotherthreatstotheautonomyofitsmembersthatheispreparedtolimittheirrightsofculturalexpression.SinceKymlickaexcludesvaluesfromtheconstitutivefeaturesofaculture,themoreliberalpracticesthatresultfromsuchlimitationsdonotchangethegroup’sculture,onlyitscharacter–aconclusionremarkablysimilartothatreachedbySoviettheoristsabouttheirdifferentlymotivatedinterferenceinculturalpractices.Kymlickadrawsasharpdistinctionbetweentwosortsofgrouptobeencounteredinamulticulturalsociety:ontheoneside,indigenouspeoplesand,ontheother,immigrantgroups.30IndigenouspeoplesenjoywhatKymlickareferstoassocietalcultures,whichprovideforacompletewayoflifeacrossbothpublicandprivatespheres.Theseheviewsasnations,inline,aswehaveseen,withSovietpractice.Multiculturalsocietiescomprisingsuchgroupsare,then,multinational.Immigrantgroups,bycontrast,contributetomakingupwhathecallspolyethnicstates.Theirculturesarepractisedonlyintheprivatesphereandtheirliveslivedout,fortherest,inthesharedpubliconeintowhichtheyareintegrated.Kymlickaregardsindigenousnationalminoritiesandimmigrantgroupsashavingdifferentanddifferentlygroundedrights.Nationalminoritiesareentitledtowhateverisrequiredforthemtocontinuetoexist,asprovidingaviableoptionwhichtheirmembersmaychoosefortheirpreferredwayoflife.Itisinthiswaythattheirmembers’autonomyismaximised,andthismayrequireself-government.Immigrantgroups,however,arenotsimilarlyentitledsincetheirmembersaretakentohavealreadyexercisedtheirautono-myinchoosingtoliveinanalienlandandtherebytohaveacceptedtherequirementsofadifferentwayoflife.Their‘polyethnicrights’are‘intendedtohelpethnicgroupsandreligiousminoritiesexpresstheirculturalparticularityandpride’,whileatthesametime‘topro-moteintegrationintothelargersociety’.31Againthelevelofculturalprotectionprovidedisaimedatmaximisingtheirmembers’autonomy.Thisdemarcationofculturalrightsishighlyquestionable.DiasporapeoplesliketheJewsdonotfalleasilyoneithersideofKymlicka’s179\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYdistinction,and,importantly,theylackthecompactterritorieswhichKymlickaseesascharacteristicofnationalminorities–perhapsevenessentialtotheirhavingsocietalcultures.CertainlytheJewswereperceivedasposingaproblemintheSovietUnion,32preciselybecausetheylackedaterritoryandacommoneconomiclife.Anattemptwasmadetochangethisbysettingupanautonomousrepublicforthem–Biro-Bidjan–butthisfailedorwasabandoned.Nonetheless,theywererecognisedasanationalityandYiddishwasprotected,atleastsporadically,astheirnationallanguage.Yettheiranomalouspositionvisàvismostrecognisednationalities,thereligiousaspectsoftheircultureandtheirsolidaritywithfellowJewselsewhere,tendinginthelimittoZionism,ledtorepeatedattemptsatassimilationontheonehandortoanti-Semitismontheother.ItisquiteunclearthatanostensiblyliberaltheorylikeKymlicka’swouldhavefaredanybetter.Fordespitehisavowedcommitmenttoautonomy,itisnot,inthefinalanalysis,whatpeoplewant,whattheythemselvesactuallyvalue,thatdetermineswhatrightsheallowsthem.Itisratherthenatureoftheculturetheyhave.AccordingtoKymlicka,aswehaveseen,‘nationalminoritieshavesocietalcultures,andimmigrantgroupsdonot.’33ItisthevaluethatKymlickadescriesinasocietalculture–thatofprovidingarichandsecurecontextofchoice–whichsupposedlyentitlescertainindigenouspeoplestorightsdeniedtoimmigrantgroups.SimilarjudgementsweremadebySoviettheoristsabouttheUnion’sdiverseculturalgroups.Inbothcasestheyarebased,Iargue,onanuntenablefunctionalismwhichparcelscultureoutamongstsystemicallyboundedgroupsinanunrealisticand,initseffects,illiberalway.ThesefeaturesofKymlicka’spluralism–thecontextualviewofcultureandthedichotomisingofmultinationalityandpolyethnicity–maybedetachedfromitsfundamentalgroundinginthevalueofautonomy.Thisvaluehasbeenappealedtobyothertheorists,forexampleJosephRaz,whomwecategorisedinChapter4asaRomanticLiberalincontrasttoKymlicka’sEnlightenmentvariety.Razbelievesthatthereisaliberalcaseforwhathecalls‘theaffirma-tionofmulticulturalism’,because‘itemphasisestheroleofculturesasapreconditionfor,andafactorwhichgivesshapeandcontentto,individualfreedom.’34Itdoesthisbecausefreedomcanbeexercisedonlyagainstabackgroundofruleswhichgiveone’schoicesmeaning,andtheserulesarewhatcultureprovides.SofarthisissimilartoKymlicka’scontextualistaccount.ButRazseesapositivevalueinapluralityofcultures,andthisplaysnoessentialpartinKymlicka’saccount.Thus,farfromwishingfortheintegrationofimmigrant180\nMULTICULTURALISMgroups,thecultureswhosediversityRazaffirmsarethoseof‘differentcommunities’which‘sharethesamepublicplacesandcommonser-vices,and...mixinworkplacesandinleisurefacilities.’35Theplu-ralitywhichsuchasocietyoffersisvaluablebecauseitconducestoautonomyinprovidingpeoplewithavarietyofpossiblewaysoflife,eachvaluableinitsownway.ItwillbeapparentfromthisdescriptionthatRaz’sconceptionofcultures,unlikeKymlicka’s,involvescharacterisingthemintermsofthevalueswhichtheyespouseaswellasoftheirothercomponents.Foritispreciselybecausedifferentculturespromotedifferentvaluesthatapluralityoftheminasocietyamplifiesthescopeforautonomy.LikeKymlicka,however,Razimposesrestrictionsoncultureswheretheyengageinpracticeswhichthreatentheautonomyoftheirmembers;inthisconnectionhementions‘slavecultures,raciallydis-criminatorycultures,andhomophobiccultures’36asbeyondthepale,andrequiringreformorevenrepression.This,though,requirescaution,forevenoppressiveculturesoffertheirmembersmuchthatanewonemaybeunabletoreplace.SuchscruplesechoKymlicka’s.ButtheviewofcultureRazshareswithhim,whichstressestheimportanceofculturalgroupmembershipforpersonalautonomy,surelysitsillwithRaz’spluralism.Forifmeaningfulchoicerequiresaframeworkofvaluesprovidedbyone’sownculturethenitishardtoseehowchoosingbetweencultures,whichpluralismfacilitates,canbeamean-ingfulpossibility.Ofcourse,thosewhodispensewithKymlicka’sandRaz’spersistentassumption37thatculturescomeparcelledupinseparategroupswillnothaveaparticularproblemwithsuchcross-culturalchoices.Butthisshouldnotleadonetothinkthatpeoplecanpickjustanyculturalvaluesinanycircumstances.Solidarity,forexample,canflourishonlyagainstacertainsocio-economicbackground,self-helpagainstanother,andfactsofthissort,well-understoodbyMarxists,raisedoubtsaboutthescopeforvaluepluralismwhichRaztakesforgranted.Culturesarenotconsumergoods.ThegoodsocietywhichRazdepictsis,indeed,inmarkedcontrasttothesocialconditionsthatprevailedintheoldSovietUnion,wheretheabsenceofadequateculturalchoicedidhamperthedevelopmentofpersonalautonomy.However,SovietfailuretoprovideforsuchchoicewasnotanalogoustoitsfailuretoprovidethesamevarietyofconsumergoodsaswereavailableintheWest.Yet,asinplannedeconomiesliketheSovietUnionplannersdecidewhatshallappearinshops,soRazdoesnotflinchfromtheconclusionthatinliberalsocietiesthestateshoulddeterminewhat181\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYculturaloptionsthereshouldbebyexercisingitspowertosuppressrepugnantones.Whateveronethinksoftheethicsofthissuggestion,itimpliesanevengreateroptimismaboutthepoweroflegislatorstoexerciseculturalcontrolthanthatoftheSovietplanners.CULTURALSEPARATIONThefinalmodelformulticulturalsocietyweshallconsideriswhatParekhreferstoasthe‘millet’model,afterthemilletsystemwhichprevailedintheOttomanEmpire.Inthissystemthevariousreligiouscommunities–Muslims,JewsandChristiangroups–were,forcertainpurposes,self-governingandcouldimposeinternalrestrictionsupontheirmembers.38Parekhgeneralisesthistoanysysteminwhich‘individualsareaboveallculturalbeingsandembeddedinspecificcommunities...thestatehasnomoralstatus,anditssoleraisond’êtreistoupholdandnurtureitsconstituentculturalcommunities.’39Thismaywellbearomanticisationofthehistoricalmillets,whichlumpedpeoplestogether–BulgarianswithGreeksandsoon–foradminis-trativeconvenienceratheronprinciplesofthesortthatParekhadumbrates.Neverthelesshismodelisausefulidealisation,enablingustofocusonamethodofdealingwithmulticulturalismquitedifferentfromtheothers.Itisamethodwhichprioritisesculturalidentitybymakingitthedeterminantofthejurisdictionunderwhichpeoplefall,quiteindependentlyoftheareasinwhichtheyhappentolive.Itdifferssharply,then,fromtheSovietsysteminwhichnationalitieswererecognised,butthejurisdictionofthenationalregionswaster-ritorialnotpersonal.40Foritmakesnopresumptionthatthenormalstateofthingsisthatculturalgroupsarelivinginseparateareas,ratherthanminglingpromiscuously,asinmanypartsoftheworldtheyalwayshave.Themilletmodel,broadlyconceived,maybethoughtofasawayofmaximisingculturalexpressionthroughgrantingculturalrecogni-tion,whichitdoesinafairlycomprehensivefashion.Themechanismwhichlinksculturalrecognitiontoexpressionistheculturalcontrolputintothehandsofthegrouprecognised,therebyremovingitfromthepossibleambitofstateaction.Thepointofrecognition,then,isnotjusttoconcederightstoindividualsbyvirtueoftheirspecificculturalidentities,buttogiveculturalgroupsacorporateexistencewhichenablesthemtoactonbehalfoftheircultures.Insofarasarightofculturalprotectionisconcededitis,essentially,throughgrantingthegroupsthemselvespowerstoprotecttheircultures,ratherthan182\nMULTICULTURALISMthroughusingthepowersofthecentralstate.Inadditiontointernalrestrictionsonmembers,whichmaybeextensivetothepointofdenyingarightofexit,certainexternalrestraintsonnon-membersmaybeallowed.Butowingtothefactthatthevariousgroupsliveintermingledinamillet-modelsociety,therewouldbemuchlessscopefortheserestraintsthaniftherewereterritorialseparation.Systemsconformingtothemilletmodelarewhatmanyculturalminoritiesarecallingfor,inparticularMuslimminoritiesinEuropeanstateswhopointoutthatmodifiedversionsofitoperatedinBritishIndiaandFrenchNorthAfrica41–as,indeed,theydidinCentralAsiaunderRussianrulepriortothe1917revolution.Themotiveforthesecallsisaconvictionthatthevaluesofdifferentculturalgroupsareincompatible,andthatthisincompatibilitycannotbehandledbyrelegatingculturallyspecificpracticestotheprivaterealm,asininte-grationism.Nor,itisargued,canliberalregimescopewithitanybetter,partlybecausetheytooinvolveasharedbodyoflaws,partlybecausetheyleadinpracticetoassimilation,eitherthroughtheadvantagethatthedominantWesternculturehasinculturalcompetitionorthroughitsprivilegingofautonomyoverotherpoliticalvalues.Separation,itisconcluded,inthewayprovidedforinthemilletmodel,istheappro-priateresponsetoculturaldiversitythatinvolvesincompatiblevalues,asweshouldallowthatsomediversitydoes.Underlyingsuchcallsfortheintroductionofthemilletmodelisaculturalcommunitarianismadapted,asthemorecommonculturalnationalistcommunitarianismisnot,tothefactsofculturalintermin-glingoftenbroughtaboutbypopulationmovements,forcedorunforced.Thiskindofcommunitarianismseesidentitiesasconstitutedinthefirstinstancethroughmembershipofculturalcommunities,andseekspoliticalarrangementswhichwillmaintainthesecommunitiesinthewaythatinothercircumstancesnation-statesmightdo.Itseekswhat,inaslightlybroadercontext,IrisMarionYoungdubs‘sepa-ratism’42–atermwhichneatlycapturestheaffinitybetweenthisstrategyandthatofnationalsecessionwhichweshallconsiderinthenextchapter.Youngbelievesthatseparatismasareactiontoassimilationandtoliberalindividualismhasmanypositivefeatures–promotingculturalautonomy,andchallengingboththeculturaldominationandtheprocessesofsocialexclusionwhichsocialcategorisationbyadominantgroupentails.YetYoungalsothinksthatseparatistsembraceanessentialistconceptionofculturalgroupswhichfailstoappreciatethat‘asocialgroupexistsandisdefinedasaspecificgrouponlyinsocialandinteractiverelationtoothers,’sothat‘groupidentityisnot183\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYasetofobjectivefacts,buttheproductofexperiencedmeanings.’43Thisleads,shemaintains,totendenciesbothtosimplifyandpurifygroupidentitiesandtoinsulateandfreezethem–tendencieswhichignorethecomplexinteractionandinterdependenceofthegroupsinquestion.Thereisagooddealofjusticeinthesecriticisms,butitislessclearthatYoung’sproposedpoliticalviamediabetweenassimilationandseparationentirelyescapesthem.Sheholdsthat,ontheonehand,dif-ferentculturalgroupsshouldrecognisethattheyparticipateinthesamesocietyandacceptthesamepolity,but,ontheother,thattheyhavedifferentiatedplacesinit,sincetheirmembersparticipatebyvirtueoftheirculturalidentitieswhichthepolityrecognisesasdistinct.Thisimpliesculturalrepresentation.ButitalsoimplieswhatYoungcalls‘group-conscious’policiesratherthanonesthatareneutralinthesenseofbeingblindtogroupdifference,thoughtheremustalso,shethinks,beasafetynetofcivilrightsapplicabletoall.44Suchpoliticalarrangementsclearlyhaveaffinitieswiththemilletmodelaswehavedescribedit,andtheytooaimtomaximiseculturalexpressionthroughculturalrecognition.Theycontrastwiththemilletmodel,perhaps,onlyinallowingagreaterroletothestate,throughmechanismsofculturalrepresentation,andasmalleronetoculturalgroupsaspoliti-callycorporatebodiesexercisingculturalcontrolovertheirmembers.Thisdoesnotamount,however,toacceptanceoftheideathatthestatecanpursuesomecommongood,whichYoungregardsas‘mythical’.45Young’santi-separatismextendstoathoroughgoingoppositiontonationalismasrepresenting‘whitemalebourgeoisunityanduniver-sality.’46DavidMiller,aswehaveseeninChapter5,takesissuewithYoung’s‘radicalmulticulturalism’,whichholdsthattheidealstateisnotthenation-statebutone‘composedofapluralityofnationsorculturalgroups’47organisedaswehavejustseen.Thispositionrelies,Millerargues,‘uponafalsecontrastbetweentheallegedlyauthenticgroupidentitiesthatamulticulturalpoliticsissupposedtoexpress,andanartificiallyimposedcommonnationality’,48whereasinfactnationalidentitiesarenolessgoodorgenuinethanothergroupidentities.Miller’scriticismis,however,unfairtoYoung,whoopposesthisideaofauthenticityasappliedtoanyculturalidentity.Rathershethinksthatgroupidentitiesemergefromtheirmembers’‘subjectiveaffirma-tionofaffinitywiththatgroup’.49ThedifferencebetweenYoungandMiller,then,turnsuponwhethersheisrightinfoundingthepoliticalarrangementsofasocietyonthosegroupidentitiesthatpeoplearecurrentlymostcomfortablewith;orwhetherheisrightinfounding184\nMULTICULTURALISMthemuponthosethat,inhisview,peopleshouldadopttoformapolit-icalcommunity.Millerarguesthatnationalidentitiesbettersatisfythelattercondition.But,aswehaveseen,Youngdeniesthattherereallyisanycommonalitythatsuchidentitiesexpress.Itisfragmentationwithinthestate,preventingeffectivecitizenship,thatworriesMillerinregardtoYoung’s‘politicsofdifference’,andwhichconcernsParekhinregardtomilletmodelsgenerally.50Itisthedevelopmentofgroupidentitiesfirmlyfixedovertimethatposesthegreatestthreathere51–adevelopmenttowhichmilletmodelsarguablycontribute.Despiteherprotestationsinfavourof‘theimportanceofafluidandrelationalconceptionofgroupdifference,whichunderstandsgroupsasoverlapping,criss-crossing,andwithundecidableborders’,52itisunclearwhetherinpracticeYoung’spoliticscanescapethesedangers.Itmaynotbe,asshearguesinthepassagefromwhichthisquotationisdrawn,becauseofsomeessentialistseparatisminherentinthemthatSoviet-stylepersonalnationalitiesgeneratedidentificationsthathaveledtoappallingethnicviolenceandinjusticeinrecentyears.Itmaysimplybe,asRogersBrubakermaintains,53thatitistheinstitutionalisedrecognitionofsuchself-understandings–self-under-standingsthatmanywouldnothavehadwithoutsuchrecognition–whichhasthesedestructiveconsequencesanyway.Forsuchpoliticallyinstitutionalisedself-understandingsleadnaturallyenoughtoethnicseparationandexclusion.IfthisissothenthejusticeforminoritieswhichYoung’spoliticsofdifferenceisdesignedtoachieveissurelyboughtattoohighapriceintermsofthelossofsocialstabilityandconsenttothestate.Andthismaybethefinaljudgementonthemilletmodelgenerally.Why,though,shouldweexpectageneraljudgementonhowpeopleofdifferentculturescanlivetogetherinthesamestateanyway?Thefactthatdifferentpoliticaltheoriesgeneratedifferentgeneralanswersmaysimplyreflecttheirownlimitations.Someofthesearedue,Ihavehinted,totheparticularhistoricalcircumstancesinwhichtheyhavearisen.Aptfordealingwithsomekindsofdiversity,theyproveunfitfortacklingothers.Soananswertothequestionwestartedthischapterwithmaybethatwemustlookindetailatthekindsofculturaldiversitythatareinquestion,theextentandnatureoftheculturalaffinitiesanddifferencestheymanifest,andthetraditionswithinculturesforcopingwithvariouskindsofdivergencebetweenthem.Noneofthisoffersanyguaranteeofasolutionacceptableonallsideswithoutconsiderablecompromise.Butassuredlythechancesoffindinganaccommodationinanygivencircumstanceswillbehamperedby185\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYignoringthesecomplexitiesandfallingbackintotheover-simplificationaboutculturalgroupsagainstwhichwehaverepeatedlyinveighed.NOTES1.Themuch-citedexampleisthecreationofFrenchculturedescrbedinE.Weber,PeasantsintoFrenchmen(London:Chatto,1977).2.TheclassicaccountisbyHélèneCarrèred’Encausse,TheGreatChallenge:NationalitiesandtheBolshevikState1917–1930(NewYork:HolmesandMeier,1992).3.SeeG.Smith(ed.),TheNationalitiesQuestionintheSovietUnion(London:Longman,1990),Part4.4.InaccordancewithStalin’s‘Marxismandthenationalquestion’inD.Lane(ed.),PoliticsandSocietyintheUSSR(London:WeidenfeldandNicholson,1972),pp.471–8.5.ThatistowhatKymlickacalls‘externalprotection’:MulticulturalCitizenship(Oxford:OUP,1995),pp.35–44.6.Foradetailed,ifpolemical,account,seeWalkerConnor,TheNationalQuestioninMarxistLeninistTheoryandStrategy(Princeton:PrincetonUP,1984),pp.302–22.7.Seed’Encausse,GreatChallenge,pp.161–72.8.B.Parekh,‘Balancingunityanddiversityinmulticulturalsocieties’,inD.AvnonandA.de-Shalit(eds),LiberalismanditsPractice(London:Routledge,1999).TheensuingcharacterisationofthesemodelsfollowsParekhunlessotherwisestated.Theirdelineationintermsofthegrantingordenialofculturalrightsofexpressionandrecognitionis,however,minenothis.9.Ontheimportanceofthis,seeRogersBrubaker,NationalismReframed(Cambridge:CUP,1996),pp.26–9.10.Cp.M.Walzer,OnToleration(NewHaven:YaleUP,1997),p.84.11.SeeH.B.Davis,TowardaMarxistTheoryofNationalism(NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress,1978),pp.95–9.12.FollowingParekh,thistermisusedinarathermoregeneralsensethanwhenitis,ascommonly,associatedwiththeEnlightenmentLiberalismofJohnRawls.13.T.Hobbes,Leviathan[1651],ch.21.ChandranKukathasmakesthecon-nectioninhis‘Liberalismandmulticulturalism’,PoliticalTheory26(1998),pp.686–99.14.AsWalzernotesinOnToleration,pp.14–19(thoughhebracketsthiswiththetolerationofferedunderthe‘millet’model).15.R.Nozick,Anarchy,StateandUtopia(Oxford:Blackwell,1974),p.ix.16.Ibid.p.320.17.C.Kukathas,‘Liberalism,multiculturalism,oppression’,inA.Vincent(ed.),PoliticalTheory:TraditionandDiversity(Cambridge:CUP,1997),pp.134–5.18.Kukathas,‘Liberalismandmulticulturalism’,p.691.186\nMULTICULTURALISM19.C.Kukathas,‘Culturaltoleration’,inI.ShapiroandW.Kymlicka(eds),EthnicityandGroupRights(NewYork:NewYorkUP,1997),p.79.20.Kukathas,‘Liberalism,multiculturalism,oppression’,p.137.21.Kukathas,‘Culturaltoleration’,p.89.22.Parekh,‘Balancingunityanddiversity’,pp.113–14.23.Kukathas,‘Culturaltoleration’,p.94.24.Kukathasdeniesthisisonlyamodusvivendi,bywhichhemeansanagree-mentwhichreflectsonlythebalanceofpowerbetweentheparties:ibid.p.84.25.M.Walzer,‘ResponsetoKukathas’,inShapiroandKymlicka,EthnicityandGroupRights,p.108.26.C.Taylor,Multiculturalism(Princeton:PrincetonUP,1994),p.38.27.Parekhextendspluralismbeyondtherecognitionandsupportofculturalminoritiestotheincorporationoftheir‘valuesandaspirations’inthecommunity’spoliticalculture:see‘BalancingUnityandDiversity’,p.111.Thisseemstomeanadditionalandinessentialelement.28.Taylor,Multiculturalism,p.62.29.W.Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship(Oxford:OUP,1995),ch.8.30.Ibid.ch.2.31.Ibid.p.31.32.SeeDavis,TowardaMarxistTheory,pp.128–34;d’Encausse,GreatChallenge,pp.148–51;Smith,NationalitiesQuestion,ch.21.33.Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship,p.107.34.J.Raz,‘Multiculturalism:Aliberalperspective’,inhisEthicsinthePublicDomain(Oxford:OUP,1994),pp.158,163.35.Ibid.p.159.36.Ibid.p.169.37.RazismoreequivocalonthispointthanKymlicka,regardingamulti-culturalsocietyascapableofdevelopingacommonculture;ibid.p.176.38.Foradiscussion,seeR.Grillo,PluralismandthePoliticsofDifference(Oxford:OUP,1998),ch.4.39.Parekh,‘Balancingunityanddiversity’,p.111.40.SeeBrubaker,NationalismReframed,ch.2.41.SeeGrillo,Pluralism,pp.203–7.42.I.M.Young,‘Togetherindifference:Transformingthelogicofgrouppoliticalconflict’,inW.Kymlicka(ed.),TheRightsofMinorityCultures(Oxford:OUP,1995),p.163.Younghasawiderrangeofculturaldiffer-encesinmindthanweareconsideringhere,includingthatbetweene.g.homosexualsandheterosexuals.43.Ibid.p.161.44.I.M.Young,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton:PrincetonUP,1990),ch.6.45.Ibid.p.138.46.Ibid.p.119.47.Ibid.p.180.48.D.Miller,OnNationality(Oxford:OUP,1995),p.133.187\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY49.Young,JusticeandPoliticsofDifference,p.172.50.Cp.Parekh,‘Balancingunityanddiversity’,p.121.51.Cp.AnnePhillips,DemocracyandDifference(Cambridge:Polity,1993),ch.5.52.Young,‘Togetherindifference’,p.168.53.Brubaker,NationalismReframed,pp.48–51.Cp.Y.Slezkne,‘TheUSSRasacommunalapartment,orHowasocialiststatepromotedethnicpartic-ularism’,inG.EleyandR.G.Suny(eds),BecomingNational(NewYork:OUP,1996).188\n9SELF-DETERMINATIONANDSECESSIONqwTHERIGHTOFSELF-DETERMINATION‘Allpeoples’,declaretheUnitedNationsCovenantsonHumanRights,‘havetherightofself-determination.’1Itshouldbynowbeevident,however,thatitisnotatallobviouswhoistocountasapeople.Doesinternationallawthrowlightonthisquestioninawaythatcanresolvetheconflictswhichclaimstoself-determinationcommonlyproduce?Canit,forexample,resolvethequestionofhowtheinhabitantsofIrelandaretoexercisetheirrightofself-determinationinawaythatsettleswhethertheSixCountiesofUlstershouldbecomepartoftheIrishRepublicorremainintheUnitedKingdom?OnesidemayclaimthatthepeoplewhopossessthisrightarethepeopleofIrelandasawhole,avoteamongwhomwouldprobablyrevealamajorityinfavourofreunifyingtheNorthintotherestofIreland.Theothersideclaims,however,thatthepeoplewiththerightarethepeopleofNorthernIrelandalone,amongwhomamajorityagainstreunificationwouldbefound.How,then,arethepeoplesmentionedintheUnitedNationsArticletobeidentifiedandwhatdoestherightitaccordstothemamountto?Ananswertotheformerquestionistosomedegreedependentonananswertothelatter.Forwhatpeoplesaretoberecognisedininter-nationallawwilldependuponhowthepoliticalrightofself-determi-nationistobeunderstood,andthisinitsturnwilldependuponwhat189\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYsortofwrongistakentobeaviolationofit.Whatisitnottobeself-determiningandwhatiswrongwithit?Itis,ofcourse,toliveunderaformofgovernmentdeterminedbyothers,nottobeself-governing,andthatistolackacertainkindoffreedom.Theparadigmcaseofthisistobegovernedasacolonyorwithinsomeotherimperialorder,anditistherightsofpeoplenottobesogovernedthattheUnitedNationsCovenantswere,interalia,drawnuptodefend.Itisthefreedomofapeoplethatisbeingprotectedhere,notdirectlythatofindividuals.Fortherightofself-determinationentitlespeopletodecideontheformofgovernmenttheywish,andthatmaynotbealiberalonewhichguaranteesindividualfreedomsnoryetademocraticoneinwhichindividualsarefreetoparticipateinthepoliticalprocess.2Thefreedomtherightgivespeopleisthecollectivefreedomtodeterminetheirownaffairs,ratherthanhavingthemdeterminedthroughinstitutionstheycannotrecogniseasgivingthemtheirowngovernment.Whatiswrong,though,withlackingthisfreedom?Itis,afterall,apointwidelymadeaboutmanyformercoloniesthattheywerebetteroffbeforeself-government.Perhapsoccasionallythisistrue.Whathasself-determinationbroughttothesepeoples?Thisisnotaneasyques-tiontoanswer.Butatleasttwoapproachesmaybeexplored.Thefirstmovesawayfromemphasisingfreedomaswhatself-determinationbringstofocusingonjustice.Itis,itmaybeclaimed,unjustthatsomepeopleshouldberuledbyothers,andtherebybedeniedopportunitiestocontroltheirownaffairsthattheothersenjoy.Thisis,otherthingsbeingequal,discriminatoryandunfair.Anargumentofthissortseemstolurkbeneaththesurfacewhenthe‘equalrightsandself-determinationofpeoples’arebracketedtogether,asintheUnitedNationsCharter.3Hereself-determinationseemstobejustifiedasarightofpeoplesbecausepeoplesaretobeaccordedequalrightsandsomearealreadyself-determining.Thedifficultyhere,ofcourse,isthatitisnotclearwhatcollectivitiesaretobetreatedasequalinthisregard.Thesamedifficultyarisesifweadoptasecondapproachtojusti-fyingtherightofself-determination,namelybytryingtoexplainwhythefreedomitsafeguardsisvaluable.Todothiswewouldseemtoneedtoidentifythetypeofcollectivityforwhichsuchafreedomisvaluable.Andthisissowhetherornotitsvalueisexplainedintermsofthefreedomitgivesindividualmembers,orwhetheritistobeexplainedindependentlyofindividualfreedomorotherindividualgoods,butintermsofwhatisgoodforacollectivityofsuchakindasawhole.Nonetheless,tothinkintheformer,individual-centredway190\nSELF-DETERMINATIONANDSECESSIONislikelytoproduceadifferentanswerfromthinkinginthelatter,collectivity-centredone.Forifweconsiderwhatindividualslackwhoarenotmembersofacollectivitywhichispoliticallyself-determining,wewillthinkintermsofadeficiencyinthewaytheyarerelatedtotheirgovernment,awaywhichdeniesthemappropriatecontrolofthewaytheyaregoverned.Thereforeeveniftheyaregovernedwellthiscannotbetheresultoftheirpoliticalagency,andiftheyaregovernedbadlynopoliticalactoftheirscanchangethings.Tothinkinthesetermsistothinkofapeopleasconsistingofthosewhoaregovernedtogetherasapoliticalunit,as,forexample,acolonyis.Itisapoliticalunitofthissortwhichhasarightofself-determinationunderinternationallawifself-determinationisthoughtofasmakinggoodforitsindividualmemberswhattheylackundercolonialandsimilarregimes.How,bywayofillustration,mightthislegalconceptionofapeoplebeappliedtotheNorthernIrelandquestion?Irelandwasnever,properlyspeaking,aBritishcolony.IndeeditwasincorporatedintotheUnitedKingdombytheActofUnion(1801).Butthatincor-porationwasnotrecognisedbymanyIrishpeople,onthegroundsthattheIrishparliamentlackedthepowertodissolveitself.Bethatasitmay,incorporationintotheUKdidnotresultintheIrishpeopleenjoyingself-determinationsincetheywereevidentlytreatedasasubjectpeopleand,indeed,thepointofincorporationwastodenythemtheself-governmentwhichmighthaverectifiedthissituation.ThecaseofAlgeria’sincorporationintometropolitanFranceisananalogousone,notpreventingtheUnitedNationsfromrecognisingtheAlgerianpeople’srightofself-determination.4Irelandasawhole,then,mightbetakentobetheterritorywhosepeoplehadarightofself-determination,arightwhichtheyarguablyexercisedinthe1918Westminsterelectionbyreturningoverthree-quartersoftheirMembersofParliamentcommittedtoIrishindependence.5ShouldweconcludethatthepartitionofIrelandviolatedtheIrishpeople’srightofself-determination?Thereare,itistrue,generalprinciplesofinternationallawaccordingstatestherightofterritorialintegrity,andthishasbeenextendedbyUNdeclarationstooutlawingthedismembermentofcoloniesintheprocessofdecolonisation.6PerhapsthismayprovidesomeargumentagainsttheIrishpartition.Butitisevidentlynotonethatderivessolelyfromtherightofapeopletoself-determination,anditishardtoseehowthisrightcangenerateanargumentagainstpartition.Itisonethingtosaythatthepeopleswhohavearightofself-determinationarethosepoliticalunitssubjectedtoformsofgovernmentoverwhichtheirmembershaveno191\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYcontrol.Itisquiteanothertosaythattheirrightofself-determinationcannotbeexercisedinawaythatdividestheseantecedentpoliticalunits.Fortheunityofapeople,onthisconception,consistssimplyinthefactthatitsmembershavebeengovernedtogether.Theyneednotevenhaveconstitutedapoliticalassociation,sinceundercolonialismnosuchassociationmayhavebeenpossible.Thepointtobemade,therefore,isthatacknowledgingtherightofpeoplestoself-determination,asusuallyunderstoodininternationallaw,7doesnothingtoindicatehowthisrightistobeexercised,whetherbyasubjectpeopleasawhole,orinawaythatmayleadtopartition,asarguablyhappenedinIreland.Thisfollowsdirectlyfromthefactthatthejustificationoftherightisintermsofitsmakingpossibletheexerciseofacertainindividualfreedom.Butnothingcanbededucedfromthefactthatanindividualhasthatfreedomabouttheidentityofthoseotherstogetherwithwhomshewillexerciseit.Whileitisclearwho,currentlydeniedit,hastheright,itisquiteindeterminatewhatthescopeofthosewhoexerciseittogethershouldbe.Furtherprin-ciplesneedtobeappealedtoinordertoremovethisindeterminacy.Apurelypragmaticprinciplewouldbethatthewaytherightofself-determinationisexercisedshouldnotreproducetheconditionsofpoliticaldominationwhichtheexerciseoftherightisintendedtoremove.ThatostensiblywasareasonforthepartitionofIreland,thoughevidentlyinescapingthethreatofIrishCatholicdominationUlsterProtestantsexposedtheirCatholicneighbourstoasimilarthreatinstead.Itishardtoseethatthepragmaticprinciplecanalwaysbeappliedinawaythatavoidssuchresults.Thereareotherprincipleswhichmightbeinvokedtoovercometheindeterminacyofself-determination.Onemight,asnotedabove,appealtotheprincipleofrespectforterritorialintegrityanddefendthisprincipleonthegroundsthatitpromotesorderandstability.But,aswehaveobserved,suchaprinciplehasnothingtodowiththereasonforacknowledgingtherightofself-determinationitself.Another,whichdoes,justifiestherightasimpliedbyindividualrightsofpersonalautonomy.Thenthepoliticalrightofself-determinationshouldbeexercisedinawaythatmaximisestheindividual’schancesoffindinghimselfinthestateofhischoice.8Weshallreturntothispositionlater.Herewemustnotethatthereisnogeneralassumptionofitininternationallaw,whateveritsmoralforcemaybe.Fortherightofself-determinationunderinter-nationallawdoesnotconsistinarighttodeterminetheboundariesofone’sstate,butrathernottobeoppressedasamemberofasubject192\nSELF-DETERMINATIONANDSECESSIONpeoplewithintheboundariesofthepoliticalunitinwhichonefindsoneself.Afurthertypeofprinciplewhichaimstospecifyhowtherightofself-determinationistobeexercisedagainstartsofffromaparticularjustificationofthatright,namelythatthefreedomtherightsafeguardsisvaluablebecauseitisagoodforthekindofcollectivityofwhichthosewiththerightaremembers.Thisistoadoptthecollectivity-centredapproachtojustifyingtherightwementionedabove,bycontrastwiththeindividual-centredonewhichwehavesofarbeenexamining.Whatkindofcollectivitymightapeoplebesuchthatitisvaluableforittobeself-determining?Theanswergenerallygivenhereisthatitisanation,sothattherightofpeoplestoself-determinationisarightthatnationshave,aright,thatis,ofnationalself-determination.Weshallgoontoscrutinisethissupposedlynationalrightimmediately.Butwemustnoteagainthatinternationallawdoesnotrecogniseituncontroversially,perhapsinpartbecauseitisunclearwhatanationisandthusuncleartowhomanationalrightshouldbeallowed.WasthereinIrelandbutonenation,or,assomewhosoughttoamendthe1912HomeRuleBillcontended,9two?Thisconsiderationintroduces,itmustbestressed,aquitedifferentbasisonwhichtojudgehowrightsofself-determinationaretobeapplied,andonewithmuchmoreradicalconsequencesthantherightsconcededininternationallaw.SECESSIONTherightofself-determinationallowedininternationallawisnotequivalenttoarightofsecession,thoughmanyphilosophersseemtoassumethatitis.10Arightofsecessionwouldbearightforabodyofpeopletobreakawayfromtheirexistingstateandformanewoneintheirpartoftheold.Theparadigmaticdecolonisationcasesofself-determinationdonothavethisstructureoftheformationofnewpoliticalunits.Eventhosethatseemto,likeIreland,are,itissupposed,caseswhere,despiteformalincorporation,apartofthestateisinfacttreatedasaseparatepoliticalunit.Unionists,ofcourse,disputedsuchadescription,regardingtheinaugurationoftheIrishFreeStateasaseces-sionfromtheUnitedKingdom,inwhichNorthernIrelandremainedbecausethemajorityofitsinhabitantsweresupposedlyofBritishratherthanIrishnationality.Specificallynationalself-determinationmust,however,entailarightofsecession.11Foritentailsthatanationcandeterminethewayinwhichitisgovernedand,whileitsdecision193\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYmaybetoremaininthestateascurrentlyconstituted,itmayequallybetooptoutofit.Self-determinationingeneralcannotbeconstrainedwithintheboundsprescribedbythosewhohaveinthepastdeniedit,fortoallowonlyregionalautonomyorthelikeisnottopermituntrammelledself-determination.Whilethosewhogainautonomymaybebetterabletodeterminethewaytheyaregovernedthanbefore–indeed,itmaybethebestwayforthemtobegoverned–stillitisnotnecessarilythewaytheychoosetobe,andthustheylackself-determination.Yettheconceptofnationalself-determinationisnotthatofasubjectpeoplewithinastatehavingarighttosecedefromit.Itistheideathatthosewhoconstituteanationhavearighttosecedefromastateinvolvingothernations,whetherornottheyareincircumstancesofsubjection.HereitisusefultodrawadistinctionbetweenwhatIshallcallgovernmentalsecession,ontheonehand,andnationalsecessionontheother.Governmentalsecession,Ishallstipulate,occurswhenpeoplefindthemselvesincertaincircumstancesthatgivethemareasonforwantingtobegovernedseparatelyfromthosealongwithwhomtheyarecurrentlygoverned.Nationalsecession,bycontrast,occursirrespectiveofpeople’scircumstances,butbecausethekindofcollec-tivitytheyare,specificallybeinganation,istakentogivethemareasonforhavingagovernmentseparatefromthatofothernations.Bearingthisdistinctioninmind,whatrightsofsecessioncanweidentify?Hereweareraisingprimarilythequestionofwhatmoralrightsthereare.Theremaybelegalrightsinavarietyofcases.Onewehavealreadyencounteredinnoticingthatformalsecessionmaysometimesbethelegalrightofasubjectpeople.Another,clearly,willbethelegalrightofthemembersofafederationwhoseconstitutionpermitssecession,asintheformerSovietUnion.Whiletheformersortofrightwillbejustifiableonmoralgrounds,thelatterislikelytoarisequitehaphaz-ardly,withoutanymoraldistinctionbetweenthecaseswhereitispossessedandthosewhereitisnot.Theinterestingquestioniswhat,quitegenerally,mightgroundamoralrightofsecession.ItishelpfulheretofollowAlanBuchanan12indrawingadistinctionbetweenconcedingamoralrighttosecedeindependentlyofconsid-eringwhatasystemofinternationalinstitutionalmoralitywouldbelike,andconcedingoneasapartofsuchasystem.Byinstitutionalmoralitywearetounderstandasystemwhichprovidesamoralunderpinningforlegalrights.Informulatingitwehavetoaskwhatsortofaninter-nationalorderwouldresultfromconcedinglegalrightsofsecessionin194\nSELF-DETERMINATIONANDSECESSIONcertainkindsofinstance,notjustwhatmoralrightswouldseemtobeimpliedbygeneralprinciplesofethics.IshallalsofollowBuchananinsupposingthattheappropriatequestiontoraiseinaskingwhatmightgroundarightofsecessionisaquestionofinstitutionalmorality.Thisdoesnotimply,however,thatweshouldconsideronlysuchfactorsastheeffectsofconcedingcertainkindsofrightupontheworldorderthatprevailswithintheexistingstatesystem.13Weneedalsototakeaccountoftheeffectsofgrantingorwithholdingarightonthepeoplesofthosestatesandtoaskwhetherinthelightofthesetheexistingsystemisdefensible.BuchananhimselfispreparedtoconcederightsonlyofwhatIhavetermedgovernmentalsecession,andnotalwaysthose.Suchsecessionsmaybesoughtforavarietyofreasons,includingforeconomicorpoliticaladvantage.ThatisthechargelevelledbyIrishNationalistsagainstUlsterUnionistswhomtheyviewassecedingfromanIrishstateinordertopreservetheirpositionofdominance,albeitinasmallerterritory.Bycontrastwithsuchcases,whereseparategovernmentissupposedlysoughttoobtainadvantages,arethosewhereitissoughttoremedydisadvantagesarisingfromincorporationinasinglestate.ItisamongthelattercasesthatBuchanandiscernsthreesituationswhereundercertainstrictconditionsarighttosecedemaybeallowed.14Thefirstiswhereagroup–ofwhateversort–hasfounditselfthevictimofunjustexpropriationofitsterritory.ThiswaspartofthecaseforIrishindependencefromtheUnitedKingdomanditisacaseasstrongintheNorth,whichdidnotgainindependence,asintheSouth,whichdid.Itis,however,notsuchastraightforwardkindofcaseasitmayatfirstappear.Togainjurisdictionoverterritorypreviouslyunderanother’sjurisdictionisnotthesamethingastoseizeanother’sproperty;andwhiletheformermay,asintheIrishcase,goalongwiththelatter,itneednotdoso.Unjustlossofjurisdictionoverone’sterritoryisnodoubtawrongforwhichsecessionmaysometimesbeafittingremedy,butinexplainingwhyitiswewouldneedtosaywhatkindofgrouphasarighttojurisdictionoveraterritory.Ifweinvokesuchconsiderationswearenolongerdealingsimplywithgovernmentalsecession.Indeed,ifthekindofgroupaccordedarighttojurisdictionisanationalgroupthenwearedealingwithacasefornationalsecession.NosuchdifficultiesareattendantuponBuchanan’sothertwocasesofaremedialrightofsecession.Inonetherightofsecessionisderivedfromarighttoself-defenceagainstgrossviolationsofhumanrights,195\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYmostseriouslythosethatthreatenhumanlife.Evidentlythosewhofindthemselvesinsuchcircumstanceswilloftendosobyvirtueofbeingmembersofaracial,ethnicorculturalgroupwhichisbeingpersecuted.Itis,however,simplyasacollectionofindividualsinthesecircumstancesthattheyhavetheright,notbyvirtueofthekindofgrouptheybelongto.Thusthefactthattheirsecessionmayinthesecircumstancesinvolvetheredrawingofbordersinawaythatgivesthemastatewhichfollowsthecontoursoftheirethnicgroup,say,isentirelyfortuitous.Theyhavenoargumentforastateasanethnicgroup,onlyaspeoplewhoserightsareviolatedandwhoneedaseparatestatefortheirownprotection.Doubtlessthelattersortofargumentfromself-defenceisoftenemployedwhenwhatiswantedisreally,say,anethnicallybasedstate,andforthisreasonclaimsofrightsviolationsand,moreparticularly,claimsthatthereisathreatofthemneedtobecarefullyscrutinised.Thereis,forexample,littleapparentsubstanceinUnionists’claimsthattheirrightswouldbeseriouslyviolatedwithinaunitedIreland.SimilarconsiderationsasthoseadducedaboveoftenapplytothelastcaseinwhichBuchananallowsaremedialrightofsecession,15namelywhereasectionofastate’spopulationissubjectedtounequaltreat-mentthatiseconomicallyexploitative,or,asBuchanantermsit,todiscriminatoryredistribution.Onemightwonder,however,whyonlyeconomicunfairnessiscitedbyBuchananassometimesjustifyingsecession.Forunequaltreatmentofothersorts,inparticularwithrespecttopeople’sculture,mightseemtogenerateananalogousargument.Buchanandoesconsiderthecaseforsecessiontopreserveaculturebutheisextremelycautiousaboutconcedingit,arguingthatotherremediesmaybeavailableandthatforastatetohavetoyieldterritorytoculturalsecessionistswouldbe‘arecipeforintolerablyexcessiveinternationalinstability.’16Thedifficultyhereisthatifpeople’scul-turalpracticesarebeingjeopardisedasaresultofpreferentialtreatmentforadifferentlanguageorcustoms,thenotherremediesmaywellbeunavailablewithinasystemthatallowsextensivestatesovereigntyoversuchmatters.Whatwemayneedtocontemplatehereifsecessionseemsanunattractiveoption–aswellitmight–arechangestotheinternationalorderwiththeaimofguaranteeingcertainculturalprotections.Intheabsenceofsuchinternationalguarantees,however,secessiononculturalgroundsmaysometimesbejustified,evenifwewouldnotwishtoconcedeanygeneralrighttoitininstitutionalmorality.Forsometimespeoplearemorallyjustifiedindoingthingstheyhavenorighttodo.196\nSELF-DETERMINATIONANDSECESSIONCULTURALSEPARATISMThecaseofculturalsecessionwehavebrieflytouchedonis,liketheothersjustconsidered,acaseofgovernmentalsecession,notacaseofagrouphavinggroundsforseparatestatehoodderivingfromtheirbeingagroupofacertainkind,inthiscaseaculturalgroup.Indeedtheymaynotevenconstituteanythingrecognisableassuchagroupifthekindofseriousunequaltreatmenttheyaresubjectedtostemsmerelyfromtheimpositionofasingledominantculturalnormandthesuppressionofanydifferences,irrespectiveofwhetherthesemarkpeopleoutasmembersofotherculturesorjustasnon-conformists.Peoplecansecedesimplytopermitculturalvariety,forexampleinmattersofreligion.Thiswouldevidentlybeaquitedifferentkindofcasefromthatwhichwemustnowinvestigate,wherearighttoseparatestatehoodisclaimedforagroupinvirtueofthekindofgroupitis,irrespectiveofthecircumstancesinwhichitfindsitself.Ofmostsignificanceherewillbethoseinstancesinwhichitisassupposedlyformingaseparatenationthatagroupclaimsaseparatestate,onetypeofgroundforwhichwouldbethatithasaseparateculturewhichisbothwhatmakesitanationandwhatjustifiesitsrighttoseparatestatehood.Itwasnationalidentitysoconceivedthatshapedtheprincipleofnationalself-determination,whichwasinvokedtojustifythenumerousorganisedsecessionsthatfollowedtheFirstWorldWar.Oneofthearchitectsofthatsettlement,WoodrowWilson,famouslywrotethatthe‘warhaditsrootsinthedisregardoftherightsofsmallnationsandofnationalitieswhichlackedtheunionandtheforcetomakegoodtheirclaimtodeterminetheirownallegiancesandtheirownformsofpoliticallife.’17Hisrecipeforpreventingfuturewarsturnedonthenotionthatculturallydefinednationshadtherighttoseparatestates.18ItwasinthisatmospherethatpartitionoccurredinIreland,repre-senting,asitdid,acceptanceoftheviewthattherewereinculturaltermstwonationsthere,ratherthanone.Notthatitshouldbethoughtthateveninculturaltermsthisdivisionwasgenerallyaccepted–verymanyIrishNationalists,aswesawinChapter3,heldtheviewthatProtestantismcouldbeaccommodatedwithinacommonIrishculture.Supposing,however,suchdemarcationquestionswereresolvable,howmightseparateculturalnationalitygeneratearightofnationalsecession?Thereare,aswealsonoticedinthatearlierchapter,manywaysinwhichculturalorethnicnationalismmightmountclaimstoseparate197\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYstatehood.Wecanonlylookatafewofthesehere,andwillconfineourselves,inthissection,toinvoluntaristarguments–thatistosaytothoseargumentsthatrelyonaconceptionofthenationasconstitutedindependentlyofitsmembers’desirestoassociatetogetherinit.Thegeneralformoftheargumentwillbethat,otherthingsbeingequal,itisdesirablethatseparateculturesshouldfallunderseparategovern-ments.Aformofgovernmentwhichcanresultinaculturebeingirreparablydamagedis,itisconcluded,illegitimateandmaythereforerightfullyberepudiatedthroughsecession.Itis,weshouldnotice,legitimacynotfreedomorjustice,whichisherethoughtofaswhatisgainedbyanactofsecession;andthereasonforthisisthatagovern-mentwhichdoesnotshowrecognitionandrespectforone’scultureisheldtohavenogoodclaimonone’sobedience.Whereculturalnationalismdiffersfromliberalisminmostofitsformsisthatitdeniesthatsuchrecognitionandrespectcanbeadequatelydemonstratedwithinasystemofindividualculturalrights.Itdeniesthepublic/privatedistinctiononwhichsuchaliberalsystemisbasedandinsiststhatcultureisnecessarilymanifestinthepublicrealmregulatedbygovernment.Actsofgovernmentthushaveatendency,hiddenorovert,tofosteracultureortodamageit.Ifthelatteristhecase,thentheculturedamagedisnotbeingaccordedsuitablerespectwithintheexistingstructures,sothesemayneedtobechanged.Thisgeneralargumentforarightofculturalsecessioncanbefleshedoutinmanyways.Themostobviousissimplytoassertthattherearemanycasesinwhichpeople’sculturesaresodissimilarthattheycannotbegovernedtogether.ThisisthecaseoftenmadeforthepartitionofIreland,andonerepeatedbyJinnahinhisargumentforpartitioninIndia.19Atitssimplestthisargumentidentifiespeopleculturallyintermsofsuchfactorsasreligionor,moregenerally,values.Thesearetakentobeexclusive,sothattheygeneratesystemicallyboundedgroups.Suchattachmentsorvaluesarenot,however,necessar-ilyconflictualinthesensethattheymakesocialharmonyimpossible.20Rathertheysupposedlyrenderimpossibleagovernmentwhichdoesnotfavouronesetovertheother.InaperhapsparanoidmanifestationofthissortofviewinNorthernIreland,itistheChurchofRomewhichisallegedtohaveambitionstocontrolthegovernmentofIrelandinordertoeliminateProtestantism.Protestantculture,itisconcluded,requiresaseparategovernmenttoprotectit.21Therearemanydifficultieswiththiskindofargument,whichisessentiallyaconservativeone.Itis,aswesawinChapter2,quiteunclearthatculturalgroupsofthekindrequiredtogenerateasystem198\nSELF-DETERMINATIONANDSECESSIONofseparatestatescan,realistically,beidentified.Whatwemorecom-monlyhaveareinfactethnicgroups,whoseculturaldifferencesaremarkersofethnicboundaries.22Inthatcasetheproblemsofsharedgovernmentareonlyapparentlylocatedinthedifficultiesofgoverningtogethermembersofdifferentcultures.Inrealitytheyhavetodowiththeproblemsofgoverningintheinterestsofgroupswhosemembersdonotperceivesomecommoninterest.Suchconsiderationsgeneratenoobviousrightstoseparatestatehoodasagainstindicatingitspossiblepragmaticadvisability.Twofurthersortsofargumentforarightofculturalsecessionmaybediscerned.Thefirstattachesanintrinsicvaluetoaculture,conceivedasanintegratedsystemofpracticeswithinwhichmaybelivedalifethatisrich,harmoniousanduntroubledbydoubtanddifficulty.23Suchacultureissupposedlyentitledtotheprotectionofstatehood,withoutwhichitcouldfallpreytoalieninfluencesthatthreatenitsunityandcomplexity.Itis,onthisview,thedutyofgovernmenttofostersuchaculture,andgovernmentgainsitslegitimacypreciselyfromfulfillingthisduty,forgovernmenttherebydemonstratesthatitvalueswhatthemembersoftheculturevalueandearnsarighttotheirobedienceindoingso.Superficiallyattractiveasthispictureis,itisagainaprofoundlyconservativeone,andonedominatedbythefunctionalistmodelofcultureexaminedandrejectedearlier.Certainlyitisaninfluentialpicture,gaininggroundcomparativelyrecentlyamongtheProtestantpopulationofNorthernIrelandwhoconceptualisetheirthrift,chapel-goingandmarchingbandsintermsofit.Yetwhyshouldacultureofthissortenjoytheprotectionofseparatestatehood?Itmight,tostartwith,notstrikenon-membersasconstitutingacultureofanyespecialvalueanyway,with,perhaps,vicesthatoutweighitsvirtues.Andiftheanxietyisthatwithoutaseparatestateitwoulddisappearthenwhywouldthisbe?Mightitnotbebecauseitsmembersthemselvescamefreelytoparticipateinabroaderculture,ratherthanbecausetheyweresomehowforcedtoabandontheiroldnarrowone?Itisquiteunclearthatthereisanyrighttopoliticalinstitutionsthattendtopreventthisoutcome.Thesecondsortofargumentviewsacultureasofinstrumentalvalueintermsofthebenefitsitbringstomembers.‘Inthelastanalysis,’writesStuartHampshire,attributingsuchaviewtoIsaiahBerlin,‘asanenationalismistobejustifiedbyautilitarianargument–thatmostmenandwomenarehappyonlywhentheirwayoflifeprolongscustomsandhabitswhicharefamiliartothem.’24AvishaiMargalitandJosephRazhavedevelopedthisline,25arguingthatindividual199\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYwellbeingdependsuponparticipationinaculturewhichenshrinesthesharedexpectations,traditionsandconventionsofsuchalife.Itisamatteroffact,theybelieve,thatpeopleareorganisedintogroupswithsuch‘pervasivecultures’,intowhattheycall,aswenoticedinChapter2,‘encompassinggroups’.Whereanencompassinggroupformsamajorityinaterritorythenithastherighttodeterminewhethertheterritoryshallbeaseparatestateinordertosafeguarditsculture–aculturewhichcruciallyshapesitsmembers’identities.Agovernmentwhichdeniedthatrightwouldbeillegitimate,itmightbecontinued,because,inordertogainuncoercedobedience,itneedstogovernpeopleassubjectswithculturallyconstitutedidentitiesabletorecognisethegovernment’slawsastheirown.Onceagain,however,themodelofculturethatisoperativehereisopentocriticism.InparticularitisquiteunclearthatthecultureswhichareofspecialbenefittopeopleorwhichdoshapetheiridentitiesarethesortsofculturethatMargalitandRazappealtoindefendingarightofculturalsecession,mostespeciallysupposedlynationalculture.Theculturesthatshapetheiridentitiesinthesenseofmakingthemwhattheyaremaynotbegroupculturesatall,ornottheculturesoftherestrictedgroupstheytakethemtobe.ThusoutsidersconstantlyobservehowmuchProtestantsandCatholicsthroughoutIrelandhaveincommonculturally.Perhapsitisthesecommonfeatureswhicharemostimportanttothemandwhichmightmakepossiblesharedgovernment.Ifitisrespondedthatthisisnotwhatbothsideswant,thenwepasstoaquitedifferentsetofargumentsforarightofnationalsecession.FREEDOMOFASSOCIATIONThiscontrastingtypeofargumentfortherighttosecessionidentifiesthekindofcollectivitywhichhassucharightasagroupconstitutedbyitsmembers’shareddesiretobegovernedtogetherandseparatelyfromothers.Theapproachdrawsonaliberaltheoryoftherighttofreedomofassociation,includingpoliticalassociation.AsJohnStuartMillfamouslyexpressedit,‘onehardlyknowswhatanydivisionofthehumanracewouldbefreetodoifnottodeterminewithwhichofthevariouscollectivebodiesofhumanbeingstheywouldchoosetoassociatethemselves.’26Thetheorymay,asinMill’scase,belinkedtoanidentificationofthecollectivitythathasthisrightasanation,andweshalllookatthispositioninamoment.Yetitneednotbeso,andinitsmostinfluentialrecentformulationbyHarryBeranitisnotsolinked.27Beranderivestherightsimplyfromthefreedomof200\nSELF-DETERMINATIONANDSECESSIONindividualstodeterminetheirownrelationships,sothatitmustbeexercisedinamannerthatdoesnotrestrictthatfreedomforothers.ItisinthiswaythatBeranaimstoresolvetheproblemforvoluntaristicaccountsofself-determination,namelyofhowtheareaischosenwithinwhichaplebisciteshouldbeheldtodeterminewhetheritsinhabitantsdesirestatehood.Beran’sanswerisbasicallythatwould-beseparatistsmayspecifytheareaoftheplebisciteforsecession,while,ifitissuccessful,anyportionofthisareamayvoteonwhetheritshouldremainpartoftheresultingsecessioniststateandsoonrecursively,subjecttominimalrequirementsofviability.IfsuchaprocedurehadbeenadoptedinthepartitionofIrelanditwouldhaveproducedadifferentresolutionfromthatwhichwenowsee.TheSinnFeinnegotiatorswhosignedtheAnglo-IrishTreatyof1921didsointheexpectationthattheBoundaryCommissionforwhichtheTreatyprovidedwouldallownationalistsintheSixCountiesoftheNorthtovoteforincorporationintotheIrishFreeState.Theyweredisappointed,withtheresultthatFermanagh,TyroneandthecityofDerry,whichwouldhavesovoted,remainedinastatefromwhichtheyweredeniedademocraticexit.28Hadsuchasettle-mentbeenforthcomingitwouldhavebeenharderthanitnowisfornorthernNationaliststodenythelegitimacyoftheNorthernIrishstate.Fortheliberaltheoryofself-determinationnaturallygoestogetherwiththeconsenttheoryofpoliticalobligationwhich,initssimplestform,allowsthatthosewhodonotconsenttoacertainstateandlacktheopportunitytosecedehavenoobligationstoitandhencecannotregarditaslegitimate.Ifitisrepliedthatpoliticalobligationstothestatedependuponhorizontalrelationshipsofmutualobligationbetweenitsmembers,fromwhichtheycannotsimplyescapebyseces-sion,thenitcanberespondedthatwhilethismaybetruewherethereisaworkingpoliticalassociationitwillnotbesowhenthosewhoseeksecessionarenottreatedaspoliticalassociatesbutratherasaminoritypermanentlyexcludedfromeffectivepoliticalactivity,asNorthernIrishCatholicshavebeentreated.Thedifficultywiththissortofresponseisthatitthreatenstoreducethescopeoftherightofsecession,whichBeranconcedesverygen-erally,tocasesinwhichsecessionistsfindthemselvesinpoliticallydisadvantageouscircumstances.29Toescapethiskindofdifficultythestraightforwardliberalargumentforarighttosecessioncanbelinkedtoaliberaltheoryofnationality.Thenitcanbemaintainedthatitisbecausepeopleformanationthattheyhavearighttosecedeandthattheirforminganationis,inthesortofwaydiscussedinChapter3,201\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYdependentupontheirwantingtoassociatetogether.Thentheirrighttostatehoodtranscendstheircircumstances,forthehorizontalrelation-shipswhichgiverisetoobligationstothatstateare,supposedly,thoseofsharednationality.Astate’slegitimacydepends,broadlyspeaking,uponitscorrespondencetoanassociationoffellownationals.30Suchanassociationcanbeviewedindifferentways,eitherasbyitselfconstitutingpeopleintoanation,orasformedbythembecauseofcertaincommoncharacteristicswhicharealsonecessaryforsharednationhood.Inthefirstkindofaccountthereasonsfortheassociationthatconstitutespeopleintoanationarebasicallyirrelevant,31thoughthereasonsarelikelytobethattheyhavecommoninterestswhichwouldbefurtheredbymembershipofthestate.Yetwhilealiberaldefenceofarighttosecessionfromtheprincipleoffreeassociationmayseembeguilingintheabstract,surelyitismuchlesssoincaseswheretheassociationpatentlyexiststofurthercommoninterests,especiallyifthisisattheexpenseofothers.Isuggestthatwewouldtendtothinkofsuchanassociationashavingarightofsecessiononlyifthereweresomegoodreasonforittohavepoliticalinstitutionswhichfurthereditsinterests.Thisversionoftheliberalaccountfailstodemonstratewhatsuchareasonmightbe.Itthenbecomespartic-ularlyvulnerabletocriticismsoftheMarxistvariety,forexamplethatUlsterUnionistclaimsofadistinctnationalityfromtherestoftheIrishpopulationareasham,disguisingwhatwere,untilrecently,thesharplycontrastinginterestsoftheheavilycapitalisedNorthbycom-parisonwiththoseoftheruralSouth.32Itseemsthatanyplausiblejustificationfornationalsecessionwillhavetodrawonmoreresourcesthanthosethatabareliberalvoluntarismcanprovide.Thesecondkindofaccountaimstoprovidethesereasons,andtodoso,inparticular,byregardingthenationasaculturalassociation,inwhichpeoplewishtojointogetherpoliticallybecausetheyhaveacommonculture.ThismaywellhavebeentheconceptionthatMillhadinmind,andrecentlyithasbeencanvassedbyYaelTamir.33OneofitsadvantagesisthatitsuggestsasolutiontotheproblemnotedinChapter2ofhowculturesmightbedelimitedinawaythatpicksoutculturalgroupsandcanthusinterpretculturalidentitiesasthemembershipofsuchgroups.Thisisnecessaryifnationalityistobethoughtofasaformofculturalidentity,sincenationalityneedstobeacharacteristicwhichclassifiespeopleintosystemicallyboundedgroups.Accordingtotheculturalassociationistviewofnations,thisrequirementcanbemetbyidentifyinganationalcultureasthatcollec-tionofcharacteristicswhichpeopletakethemselvestoshareandonthe202\nSELF-DETERMINATIONANDSECESSIONbasisofwhichtheywishtoassociatepolitically.Theyaretheculturalcharacteristicswhichform,sotospeak,thefocusoftheassociation.Inpractice,however,itisquiteunclearthatasuitablesetofculturalcharacteristicsidentifiedbyallitsmembersasmarkingouttheculturalassociationcanbediscovered.Itismorelikely,aswenoticedinChapter1,thatwhateverculturalcharacteristicscomemostreadilytohandareseizeduponasthosethatmarkoutwhatis,infact,anethnicratherthanaculturalgroup.InthecaseofUlsterUnionists,forinstance,theculturearoundwhichtheyassociateisfluid,capableofpreservingthesamecontoursforthegroupevenwhenitsculturalcontentisidentifieddifferentlyorchanges,with,forexample,afalling-offofreligiousobservanceandanincreasedemphasisonOrangeparades.34Wherethissortofphenomenonoccurs,thecaseforarightofsecessionforanationconceivedofasaculturalassociationisgreatlyweakened.Forthiscaseisstrongerthanthatofthepurelyassociativeoneonlytotheextentthatitactuallyidentifiesaworthymotivefortheassociation.Yettheuseofculturesimplytomarkoutanethnicgroupisinherentlyexclusionary;sowhydoesfocusinguponacommonculturefurnishaworthymotiveforassociationinsuchacase?Whatwouldneedtobedemonstratedwouldbethattheexclu-sionsinvolvedmightservesomecommongood.Thebeliefthattheydoseemsgenerallytobebasedupontheassumptionthatculturalcohesionisneededforpeopletoformaneffectivecommunitywhosemembershavehorizontalrelationshipswhichcangeneratethepoliticalobligationsneededforsharedstatehood.Yetthisjusttakesusbacktothesortofconservativeargumentlookedatearlier.Throughoutthissectionwehavetreatedthewishtoassociateandthefactofassociationascoincident.Yettheyarenot:peoplemaywishtoassociateandyetfindtheyfailtodoso,fail,wemaysay,tobuildacommunityoutoftheirwishforone,whetherornottheyrealisetheirfailure.Conversely,peoplecanactuallyhavethekindofcommunalrelationswhichgeneratepoliticalobligationsbutfailtograspthebasisforthemandforminsteadanassociationthatfocusesuponfactorswhichareirrelevanttothefactsoftheircommunity,asnarrowlyfocussedculturalassociationsmaybe.Itwouldseemutterlyperversetoprivilegepeople’swishes,based,asinthesecases,onquitemistakenbeliefs,overthefactsoftheirassociation.Yetliberalprinciplesaccordrightsinordertofurtherpeople’sopportunitiestodowhattheywant,howevermisguided.Onemightreasonwiththem,butinthelastresorttheliberalmustabidebytheirdecisions.Theeffectsontheinterna-tionalorderofdoingsomay,however,bedisastrous,andinstitutional203\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYmoralitymusttakeaccountofthis.Itmust,thatistosay,declinetoprivilegepeople’swishesoverthefactsconcerningadesirableworldorder.Iconcludethatnocogentargumentscanbemusteredforarightofnationalself-determinationandpossiblesecessionfromliberalprinciplesoffreedomofassociation.THENATIONALCOMMUNITYIfnationsarecommunities,albeit‘imagined’ones,thenthebestargumentfornationalself-determinationmaybethatcommunitieshavetherighttoadministertheirownaffairs.Becausecommunitiesaregroupslivingacommonlifewhosemembers’sharedpurposeispursuitofthecommongood,itmightbeargued,theyhavearighttoinstitutionsinwhichtheyandtheyalonecanparticipateinordertorealisethisgood,fornootherinstitutionsaresolikelytoachieveitasthese.Heretheideaofcommunitythatisoperativeingroundingtherightcanbedivorcedfromanyconceptionofcommonculture,thoughtherewillhavetobewhatevercommonalityofcultureisneededforasharedpurposetobepursued.Thisconcessiongoesnowhere,however,towardsacceptingthemistakenassumptionthatacommonculture,independentlyunderstood,somehowgeneratesacommunity.35Evidentlyitdoesnot,astherightmaterialbasisforcommunalrelationsmaybelacking.Furthermoreitis,asIindicatedamomentago,quitepossibleforpeopletobemistakenabouttheexistenceoftheircommunitybecausetheywronglybelievethatcommunalrelationsarepresentwhentheyarenot,oraboutitsnaturebecausethepurposestheysetthemselvesreflectivelyarenarrowerthanthosetheirlivesamongothersmakemanifest.Supposeforthemoment,then,thatwegrantthecommunitariandefenceofnationalself-determination:howmightwecountcommu-nitiesforthepurposesofdiscerningwhichgroupsofpeoplehavetherighttoself-determination?Howmanysuchcommunitiesarethere,totakeaconcreteexample,intheNorthofIreland?Ithasbecomecommonplacetospeakoftherebeingtwocommunities:ProtestantsandCatholics,orLoyalistsandNationalists,thoughtofashaving,inKearney’swords,‘opposingnationalandculturalidentities...togetherwithconflictingaspirations.’36Butanotheransweristhatthereisjustone,bothProtestantsandCatholicsthoughtofascombiningintoasinglecommunity,andthat,perhaps,notdistinctfromthecommunitycomposedofallthoselivingintheislandofIreland.Thedifferentanswersarebothtobefoundinthe1998GoodFridayAgreementon204\nSELF-DETERMINATIONANDSECESSIONtheconstitutionalfutureofIreland,37incompatibleastheywouldseemtobe,thetextoftheAgreementconstantlyvacillatingbetweenthem.NodoubtthisrepresentsadiplomaticnecessitygivendisagreementbetweenthepartiestotheAgreementabouthowtocounttherele-vantcommunities,adisagreementrootedinphilosophicaldifferencesastowhatmakespeopleacommunity,ofthesortthatweexaminedinChapter5.Whatkindsofcriterionforcommunalidentitymightbeoffered?Thefirstcriterion,whichpicksuponeofthestrainsincivicnation-alism,isthattherelevantcommunitiesarethosegroupsalreadyorganisedpoliticallyfortheircommongood.Politicalcommunitieshaverightsofself-determination,runsoneversionofthisapproach,becausetheirpoliticalorganisation,perhapsinoppositiontooppression,showsthattheyreallycanworktogetherasacommunityforasharedpurpose.38HowmightthisbeappliedtoIreland?Noteasily,wemustconclude,forthoughpriortopartitiontherearguablywasasinglepoliticalcommunity,neverthelessitfailedtoincorporateUlsterProtestantsintoitsranksinitsdriveforindependence.Itwould,however,bewrongtoconcludefromthebarefactthatthereisaNorthernIrishstatethatthisrepresentsasinglepoliticalcommunityeither.Forthemereexistenceofastatedoesnothingtoshowthatitscitizensmakeupasinglecom-munity,preparedtoactforasharedpoliticalpurpose.Indeed,NorthernCatholicsarenotforthemostpartpreparedtoactinconcertwithProtestantswithintheexclusiveconfinesofaNorthernIrishstate.Asecondapproachidentifieswhatarethoughtofashistoriccom-munities,thatistosaygroupswhosecommunalinterdependenciescanberecognisedashavingpersistedovertimeandarerecognisedassuchbytheirparticipants.39BythiscriterionNorthernIrelandcannotsensiblybecountedasacommunity,sinceitlacksahistoryexceptasapartofIrelandasawhole.ThewholeofIrelandhasamoreplausibleclaimtobeingasinglecommunityonthiscriterion,butcanacommonhistoryreallyevinceacommonpurpose?Itishardtoseewhyitshould,andonemaysuspectthatonlyacovertidealismmightleadonetoassumeit.IftherehasbeenasharedpurposeinIrelanddespitethemanifestconflicts,thenthismusthavemoretodo,onemightsuggest,withgeographythanwithhistory.Forgeographyfurnishesathirdcriterionofcommunity,intermsofwhichpeoplewholeadeconomicallyinterdependentlives,reliantontheresourcesofthesameplace,countasasinglecommunitybecausetheymustwilly-nillyshareacommonpurposeinlivingtheretogetheraswellaspossible.This,whichis,aswehaveseen,therepublicanconceptionof205\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYcommunity,canonlybeappliedtoIrelandasawholeonthemostoptimisticassumptions,givenitshistoryofconflictandexploitation.PerhapstherehasattimesbeensuchanIrishcommunity,andrepub-licansarekeentostresssuchepisodesofcommonality.ButtherecordforthecountryasawholeisnotmuchmoreencouragingthanthatfortheNorthalone,wheresharedhabitationhasproducedatbestuneasylocalaccommodations.Yetitwouldbewrongtorecoilfromthiscriteriontoafourth,ethnicone,settlingforacountoftwocom-munities.Forthiscriterionwhichidentifiespeopleasacommunityonlywhentheyenjoythefullrangeofrelationshipsmadepossiblebysharedsocialnormscanbesustainedonlybyimposingtoostringentatestofwhatistocountasacommonlife.ThusitjustisnotthecasethatthelivesofProtestantsandofCatholicsareseparableinawaythatmakesitplausibletospeakoftwocommunities:toomuchofthelivesofeachgroupintersectswithanddependsuponthelivesoftheother.PerhapstheanswertothequestionofhowmanycommunitiesthereareinNorthernIrelandissimply‘none’.Thereisamuchmoregeneralpointtobemadehere.Itisthatthereisnoclearanduncontentiouswaytodelimitthecommunitiesthatmightbecandidatesforarightofnationalself-determination.Nosinglecriterionmaybeagreeduponandevenwhenasinglecriterionisofferedtherecanbedisagreementonhowitshouldbeappliedandthereforeonwhatcommunitiesoughttobeidentified.Nationscannotbemerelyimaginedcommunities,inthesensethatmaterialfactsabouttheactualrelationshipswithinthemandtheobjectivesthattheyevincearequiteirrelevanttojudgementsaboutwhethertheyexistascommunitiesoronlyasnationalisticpipe-dreams.Materialfactsarerelevant.Itisjustthattheyyieldnowayofidentifyingasystemofnationalcommunities.Perhapstheymighthavedone,butrealityistooresistant.Themixturesofconflictandcohesion,thevarietiesandlevelsofsocialorganisation,thecomplexinteractionsbetweenpeople’srealrelationshipsandtheirperceptionsofthem–allthisandmorerendersitquiteimplausibletosupposethatasystemofnationalcom-munitiescouldbeidentifiedcorrespondingtosomepossiblesystemoflegitimatestates.Yetbecausestatesdoformasystem,andnationalself-determinationpositsarighttothemforcollectivitiesofacertainkind,nothinglessthansuchasystematicidentificationofnationswouldbeadequateiftherightistobeallowed.Myconclusionisthatthereisnowayofmakingoutsucharight.Theideathatthereisonemaybenomorethananaspectoftheideologywhichseekstolegitimiseparticularstatestructures.Butinthespecific206\nSELF-DETERMINATIONANDSECESSIONcircumstancesofindividualstatesthewaytheideologyisappliedmaybequitedifferent,nowdrawingoninvoluntaristculturalconsiderations,nowoncivicassociationistones,nowonsomestoryofanationalcommunityandsoforth.Oncegeneratedtolegitimiseestablishedstates,thesedifferentargumentsfornationalself-determinationcanbeappropriatedbynon-stategroupsandusedtofurtherclaimsforseces-sion.Howshouldwereacttothem?Allwecansafelysay,itseemstome,isthatwemustviewthempragmatically,withouttheassuranceofbeingabletorelyupongeneralprinciplesofjusticewhichwillallowlikecasestobetreatedsimilarly.Forevenwhentwogroupsputupthesamekindofcaseforsecessionthecircumstancesthatsurroundtheirsituationsmaybedifferent.Onegroupmaybesufficientlypowerfulanddeterminedtocreateintolerableconflictiftheirclaimisrejected.Anothermaynot,andthedamagetheirsecessionmightdotootherswouldoutweighthelimiteddisruptiontheymightcause.Onegroupmay,independentlyofthesecessionistcaseitmounts,betheactualorpotentialvictimofoppression;anothermaybycontrastseektooppress,andsoon.Thekindsofcasemountedcandiffertoointheirmoralcomplexions,evenifnonearedecisive.Some,oftenregrettablythemostpotentingainingpopularsupport,aretheleastmeritorious.Wherepossible,politicalarrangementsshouldbemadethatavoidgivingencourage-menttosuchsortsofseparatism,forexampleethnicones,andaboveallsuchsituationsneedtobeviewedintermsoftheirimpactupontheordinarypeoplewhoareinvolved.Pragmatismisnottheprerogativeonlyofstatesmenconcernedwiththestabilityofthestatesystem.Itisalsothecommonprudenceoftheirsubjects,strugglingtoleadtheirlivesasbesttheycanandtoseetheirsituationclearly,mistrustfulofthediscoursesofpowerintermsofwhichthegrandersortsofclaimarecouched.NOTES1.UNCovenantsonHumanRights,HumanRightsinInternationalLaw(Strasbourg:CouncilofEurope,1985),pp.15,27.2.Cp.D.George,‘Theethicsofnationalself-determination’,inP.GilbertandP.Gregory(eds),Nations,CulturesandMarkets(Aldershot:Avebury,1994),pp.68–9.3.CharteroftheUnitedNations(NewYork:UnitedNations,1989),p.3.4.SeeH.Wilson,InternationalLawandtheUseofForcebyNationalLiberationMovements(Oxford:OUP,1988),pp.65–70.207\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY5.SeeN.Mansergh,TheUnresolvedQuestion(NewHaven:YaleUP,1991),pp.116–18.6.SeeJ.McGarryandB.O’Leary,ExplainingNorthernIreland(Oxford:Blackwell,1995),p.41.7.SeeA.Cassese,‘Theself-determinationofpeoples’inL.Henkin(ed.),TheInternationalBillofRights(NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1981).8.SeeH.Beran,‘Whoshouldbeentitledtovoteinself-determinationref-erenda?’,inM.WarnerandR.Crisp(eds),Terrorism,ProtestandPower(Aldershot:EdwardElgar,1990).9.SeeMansergh,UnresolvedQuestion,pp.52–3.10.ForexampleDavidCopp,‘Democracyandcommunalself-determination’,inR.McKimandJ.McMahan(eds),TheMoralityofNationalism(NewYork:OUP,1997),p.281.11.PaceA.Buchanan,‘Secessionandnationalism’,inR.E.GoodinandP.Pettit(eds),ACompaniontoContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy(Oxford:Blackwell,1993),pp.586–9.12.A.Buchanan,‘Theinternationalinstitutionaldimensionofsecession’,inP.Lehning(ed.),TheoriesofSecession(London:Routledge,1998),pp.227–9.DavidMillerdisputesBuchanan’sapproach,arguingthatweneedatheoryofsecessiontoguideourthinkingaboutcases,notjusttoallowustoformulateaninternationallegalsystem.Butifthisisacomprehen-siveandcoherenttheory,thenitishardtoseewhythetwosetsofcon-siderationsshouldcomeapart,sinceinthinkingaboutparticularcasesofsecessionwewouldneedtoconsidertheconsequencesofothersdoinglikewise.Ofcoursetheremaybenosuchtheorytobehad,inwhichcaseitisnotclearthatwecouldspeakofrightsatall,asagainstjustificationsinparticularcases.SeeD.Miller,‘Secessionandtheprincipleofnationality’,inM.Moore(ed.),NationalSelf-DeterminationandSecession(Oxford:OUP,1998),esp.pp.63–5.13.PaceBuchanan,whoadvocateswhathecalls‘minimalrealism’–restrict-ingproposalstothosewith‘asignificantprospectofbeingadoptedintheforeseeablefuture’.SeeBuchanan,‘Theinternationalinstitutionaldimensionofsecession’,p.237.Cp.KaiNielson,‘Liberalnationalismandsecession’,inMoore,NationalSelf-DeterminationandSecession,pp.128–32.14.A.Buchanan,Secession(Boulder:Westview,1991),pp.27–81.15.ThisisBuchanan’spositionin‘Self-determination,secession,andtheruleoflaw’,inMcKimandMcMahan,MoralityofNationalism.In‘Theinter-nationalinstitutionaldimensionofsecession’,however,heomitsthisthirdright,while,asweshallsee,inSecessionitselfheadditionallyappearstoallowsomecasesofculturalprotectionasgeneratingarightofsecession.ItisnotclearwhetherthisrepresentsaprogressivetighteningofBuchanan’sview.16.Buchanan,Secession,p.60.17.W.Wilson,‘Self-determinationasthebasisforpeace’,inA.Zimmern(ed.),ModernPoliticalDoctrines(London:OUP,1939),p.223.208\nSELF-DETERMINATIONANDSECESSION18.SeeE.Hobsbawm,NationsandNationalismsince1780(Cambridge:CUP,1990),pp.130–6.19.SeeN.Mansergh,TheCommonwealthExperience(London:WeidenfeldandNicholson,1969),pp.305–6.20.AsIwronglysuggestinThePhilosophyofNationalism(Boulder:Westview,1998),p.147.21.SeeJ.D.Cash,Identity,IdeologyandConflict(Cambridge:CUP,1996),ch.4.22.ForthisinterpretationoftheNorthernIrelandconflict,seeMcGarryandO’Leary,ExplainingNorthernIreland,chs5and6.23.ForthiskindofaccountseeD.Bell,CommunitarianismanditsCritics(Oxford:OUP,1993),ch.4.24.S.Hampshire,‘Nationalism’,inE.andA.Margalit(eds),IsaiahBerlin:ACelebration(London:HogarthPress,1991),p.128.25.A.MargalitandJ.Raz,‘Nationalself-determination’,inW.Kymlicka(ed.),TheRightsofMinorityCultures(Oxford:OUP,1995).26.J.S.Mill,ConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment[1861],ch.16.27.See,forexample,H.Beran,‘Ademocratictheoryofpoliticalself-deter-minationforanewworldorder’,inLehning,TheoriesofSecession.28.SeeMansergh,UnresolvedQuestion,ch.10.29.TheresponsewouldnothaveauthorisedthesecessionofUlsterif,asisplausible,theProtestantpeoplehadobligationstotheirCatholicfellow-countrymen,whohadbeenreadytotreatthemaspoliticalassociates.30.Complicationshavetobeintroducedforcaseswhereanationoptstostayinamulticulturalstate,whichistherebylegitimised.31.Solongastheydonotdependupontheirtemporarycircumstances,butonwhatmakesthemacertainkindofgroup.32.SeeMcGarryandO’Leary,ExplainingNorthernIreland,ch.2.33.Y.Tamir,LiberalNationalism(Princeton:PrincetonUP,1993).34.SeeMcGarryandO’Leary,ExplainingNorthernIreland,pp.355–8.35.Anassumptionbetrayedintheconstantslidefromtalkofcommoncul-turetotalkofsharedcommunityinauthorslikeTamir:seeTamir,LiberalNationalism,esp.ch.2.36.R.Kearney,PostnationalistIreland(London:Routledge,1997),p.71.37.Concludedon10April1998throughmulti-partynegotiationsinBelfastandratifiedbyreferendumsinbothpartsofIreland.38.Cp.M.Walzer,JustandUnjustWars(NewYork:Basic,1992),ch.6.39.Cp.Bell,Communitarianism,ch.4.209\nCONCLUSIONqwThepost-ColdWarworldisaplaceofviolentethnicconflictandcontestednationalboundaries.Whatpeoplesthereareandhowtheyshouldberecognisedpoliticallyarequestionsofimmediatepoliticalconcern.Buttheyarequestionswhoseanswerswillreflect,evenwhentheyarenotexplicitlyinformedby,philosophicalviewsaboutcollectiveidentitiesandtheirethicalimplicationsforpoliticalorganisation.Theaimofthisbookhasbeentoexposesomeoftheseviewsandtoexem-plifyhowtheyarerelevanttocontemporarypoliticalissues.Ithasnot,however,advancedasystematictheoryfromwhich,togetherwiththefactsabouttheidentitiesinvolved,solutionstotheseproblemscanbereadoff.Indeedithasexpressedscepticismatthepossibilityofsuchatheory.Onereasonforthisstems,asIhaveattemptedtoillustrate,fromtheculturalspecificityoftheleadingtheories.Thevariousversionsofliberalismandcommunitarianism,forexample,aroseinparticularhistoricalcircumstancesandmaynotbetransferrabletocontemporaryonesforatleasttwokindsofreason.First,thoughtheymaycommandcredenceamongthoseintheWestwhosehistoriescontributedtotheirformation,thereisnoreasontothinkthattheywillbeviewedasanythingotherthanalienimpositionsbythosewithdifferenthistoriesandtraditions.Yetitispreciselytocounteralienimpositionsthatpoliticalrecognitionofdistinctcollectiveidentitiesissought.Second,thereisnoreasontothinkthatthekindsofcollectiveidentitytowhichtheclassicaltheoriesarerelevantarethosethatnowprevail,andthusnogroundsforconfidencethattheclaimsofcontemporarycollectiveidentitiescanbeadequatelyaddressedbythem.Somuchforscepticism.Thissecondpointis,however,relatedto210\nCONCLUSIONoneofthebook’spolemicalthemes.ItisthatthedominantAnglo-Americanapproaches,bothliberalandcommunitarian,arepervadedbyagroundlessandmystificatoryfunctionalismaboutculture.Functionalismcontributestotheideathatthepossessionofcollectiveidentitiesbasedonmembershipofculturalgroupsisarecurrentfeatureofhumanlife,afeature,indeed,necessarytoameaningfulmoralexis-tenceand,forthatreason,tobesafeguarded.Whatchanges,accordingtothispicture,isonlythesortofgroupofwhichculturalidentityconnotesmembership,fromtheprimitivetribetothemodernnation.Althoughkinshiptiesinthelatterarelesscloseandlessovertlycon-stitutiveofmembershipthanintheformer,acommonethnicityisstillanaturalcorollaryofculturalidentityaccordingtothisview.Thus,whiletheracistexcessesofethnicidentificationmaybecondemned,itisitselfseenasatworstamorallyneutralcharacteristicofgroupsclaimingpoliticalrecognition.Itis,perhaps,tobetemperedbythewideningofallegianceprescribedbyaprogressivemodernism,butnotitselftoberegardedasaphenomenonthatpoliticsshould,orevencould,opposeasanobstacletopeaceandajustpoliticalorder.1Thefacts,wearesuggesting,andthemoraljudgementsconsequentuponthemarequitedifferent.Themistakeis,inFredrikBarth’swords,topostulate‘aworldofseparatepeoples,eachwiththeirowncultureandeachorganisedinasocietywhichcanlegitimatelybeisolatedfordescriptionasanislandtoitself’.2Yet,aswehaveseen,theseparatenessofpeopleistoalargeextentanartefactofprocessesofcategorisationandgroupidentificationinwhichculturalmarkersareselectedtoestablishandmaintaintheboundariesofethnicityandnationality.Thereare,tobesure,othercriteriaofcollectiveidentity,forexampleterritorialcriteria.Yettheseincreasinglytakesecondplacetoethnicorethno-nationalcriteriaasterritoryisseenasthattowhichnon-territoriallyindividuatedgroupslayclaim,ratherthanthatwhosecommonoccupationformsagroup.Whereas,Ihaveargued,themoralclaimsofterritorialgroupstopoliticalrecognitioncanbestrong,eth-nicityinitselfnotonlyhasnomoralstanding,itsnecessaryexclusivityismorallyrepugnant,asourceofconflictandabartoco-operationinfacinguptoacommonfate.Thereasontoentertaintheclaimsofethnicgroupsliesnotintheirbasisinethnicityorcommonculturebutinthefactthatthesearetheidentificationsthatpeoplemakeofthemselvesandsometimesforgoodreason.Tocategorisethemdifferentlyisofitselfoppressive.Yetrecognitionshouldbegiventoethnicorethno-nationalgroupsinpoliticalarrangementsonlywiththegreatestcaution,andinthe211\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYlightbothoftheparticularcircumstancesthegroupinvolvedisinandoftheresultsofrecognisingit.Therecognitionofthesecessionofethno-nationalgroupsintheBalkans,forinstance,illustratesthedangerofdoingotherwise.Thesesecessionsunleasheddisorderandviolencewhoseunconsideredconsequencescontinuetoramify.NorisitobviousthatinternationalrecognitionofSloveniaandCroatia,whichprecip-itatedthebreak-upofYugoslavia,tookadequateaccountoftheirsituationormotivesforsecession.Theywere,tobesure,menacedbytherumblingsofaresurgentSerbiannationalism.ButtheywerealsothemosteconomicallyadvancedpartsofYugoslaviawithmuchtogainfromindependence,notvictimsofexclusionandoppression.Ananalogousethnicgroupthatwas,bycontrast,avictimofsuchtreat-mentwouldhavehadfromthesecircumstances,Ihaveargued,agoodcaseforgovernmentalsecession.Butnothingcanbeinferredfromthisaboutexactlywhatpoliticalarrangementsshouldbemadeforsimilarkindsofgroupinothersituations.Theethnicself-identificationofanexcludedandoppressedpeopleisunderstandableandmayevenbenecessaryfortheiremancipation.Yetitstillproducesapotentiallydangerousformofcollectivity.Nottheleastoftheobjectivesoflib-eratingitshouldthereforebetheremovalofthosecircumstancesthatgiveitthisforminthefirstplace.Moregenerally,politicalarrangementsshouldseektominimisethescopeforsuchidentificationsandthemotivationforthem.Republicanism,withitsterritorialmodeofidentification,aimstodojustthis.Inthepresentdayitcomesupagainsttheethnicself-identificationsofmarginalisedgroupswithinestablishedstatesthathaveaspirationstoarepublicanpolitics.Perhaps,IsuggestedpessimisticallyinChapter5,republicanism,forallitsvirtues,cannotsurvivethesepost-Enlightenmentdevelopments.Ifitistodoso,however,itcanonlybethroughthebreak-upofexistingunitarynation-statesintofederationsofsmallerunitswherepreviouslymarginalisedgroupsbecomethedominantonesandcanenjoytheprotectionaffordedbyregionalautonomy.3Theseprinciples,thoughnot,lamentably,theirpractice,intheoldSovietsystemdescribedinChapter8havemuchtocommendthem,assumingtheyaredetachedfromtheattributionofpersonalnationality.Eventhen,though,therearemanifestdangers,mostobviouslyofreproducingatamorelocalleveltheexclusionandoppressionthatdevolutionseekstomitigate.Thecharacterofthegroupis,Ihavesuggested,relevanthere.Anoppressedpeoplemovedbyadesireforjusticehasamoralbasisforitsclaimsthatagroupmerelyfrustratedinitsself-aggrandisementevidentlydoesnot,pragmatically212\nCONCLUSIONimperativetoplacateitasitmaybe.Evenmorelocalordiffuseformsofempowermentthanregionalautonomymaybenecessarytodealwithterritoriallydispersedminorities.Heretoo,though,theAustro-Marxistnostrumofethnicgrouprepresentation,4recentlyrevivedbyIrisMarionYoung,shouldberesisted.Eventhesesketchysuggestionsmaycauseapprehensionsamongthosewhosharetheauthor’sconcernforapoliticsaimedprincipallyatemancipationandcollectivecontrolofcommonlife.Thefirstisthattheethicalcontentsofthejudgementsaboutthepoliticalarrangementsrequiredtoachievetheseendsarethemselvesineluctablyculture-specific,andthusfallpreytothescepticaldoubtswestartedwith.Tosomeextentthisistrueandwecannot,ofcourse,escapeourowncul-turaltraditionstooccupysomeArchimedeanpointofjudgmentaluniversality.Butitistrueonlytoanextent.Thereareobjectivetestsofwhetherpeoplearevictimsofdiscriminationandoppression.Itrequiresnospecificconceptionsofjusticeorfreedomtodiscerntheirunnecessarysufferingandlackofcapacitytorectifyit.Itisbecauserepublicanismisinitiallyfoundeduponsuchobjectivemeasuresofjusticeandfreedom,whichareonlylaterrefinedintomorespecificcommunalconceptions,thatarepublicanpoliticsescapesthefullforceoftheobjectionagainstculturalimperialism,asSultan-Galiev’sdoomedMuslimrepublicillustrates.Itis,furthermore,bysuchobjectivemea-suresthatthecharacterofparticularethnicgroupsistobejudged.Fornoculturalarroganceisinvolvedinjudgingharshlythosewhoarebythesemeasuresoppressiveandunjust.Asecondapprehensionconcernsthelackofprotectionforculturesapparentlyimpliedbyarefusaltorecognisetherightsofculturallyidentifiedethnicgroups.Whatismore,thisbook’sattackonfunction-alismmaybeinterpretedasdownplayingtheimportanceofculturealtogether,anditspreparednesstojudgeoftherelativevaluesofculturesasevincinginadequaterespectforculturaldistinctiveness.Thesewouldbegravechargesindeed.Theoutlineofananswermuststartfromtwopremises:first,thatpeopleshouldhavecollectivecontrolovertheirownculture;second,thatsuchcontroldoesnotnormallyrequirepoliticalinstitutions,thoughcontrolofpoliticalinstitutionsmaybeneededtoremoveobstaclestocollectiveculturalcontrol.Ofcoursecultureisofvitalimportancetopeople’sgrasponrealityandcapacitytodealwithittogether.Whatthreatensit,though,islossofcollectivecontroloveritsexpressionandevolution.Culturalprotectionshouldservetoestablishtheconditionsforsuchcontrol.Butitspoliticisationthreatensbothtoplacecultureundersectionalcontrolandtopressit213\nPEOPLES,CULTURESANDNATIONSINPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYintoserviceforthemaintenanceofpower,ratherthanfortheillumi-nationoflife.Peoplecancontroltheirownculturewithoutformingaboundedculturalgroup:theysimplyparticipateinitandcontributetoitfreelyandonanequalfooting.Thisis,onemightsay,thenormfromwhichculturallyidentifiedgroupswiththeirpoliticalagendasareadeviation,adeviationwhich,farfromnecessarilyprotectingwhatisvaluableincultures,maywellfreezeanddebilitatethem.Whatisofdistinctivevalueinculturesisnotwhatisthusfrozeninprocessesofboundary-markingandstereotyping,butwhatpeoplehavedevelopedastheirownviewpointontheworld.Thatthisshouldnotbeinterferedwithbyothersthroughimperialisingculturalcontactsneedsnodefencefromfunctionalismorculturalrelativism.Norcansuchtheoreticalstancesprovideanysatisfactorygeneralformulaforensuringthatwhatpeopleshouldgethereiswhattheydoget,notleastbecausetheycannotdeterminehowlocalthelevelisatwhichpeopleshouldretainwhatisdistinctiveaboutthemselvesculturally.Theconclusionofthisbookmight,ontheonehand,bereadaspostmodernist,seekingtodeconstructthecollectiveidentitiesuponwhichthegrandnarrativesofWesternpoliticalphilosophyerecttheirjustificationsforthepoliticalstatusquo,andtosubstituteamorecomplexpictureofhumaninterrelationsforwhichnosinglepatternofpoliticalorganisationisadequate.Eachsituationmustbecopedwithbythoseinvolvedwithoutsuchpreconceptions,thoughthisisnottosaywithoutsomeconceptionofwhatisjustandliberatory.Ontheotherhand,however,thebookresistsapessimisticrelativismaboutthesenotions,suggestingthattheycanbefoundedonobjectivefactsabouthumanneedsandsocialharmony,therecognitionofwhichcangroundresistancetounjustandunfreepoliticalorders.Itis,therefore,people,notpeoples,whoareintheendtheobjectsofphilosophicalinterestandpoliticalconcern.Thattheyidentifythemselvesaspeoplesinthewaytheydoisnotaninescapableconsequenceoftheirhumanity,butitcanreflecttheirdifferingsearchesforfreedomandjustice–some,aswehaveseen,morelikelytosucceedthanothers.NOTES1.ThisthesisgoesfurtherthanJeremyWaldron,‘Minorityculturesandthecosmopolitanalternative’,inW.Kymlicka(ed.),TheRightsofMinorityCultures(Oxford:OUP,1995).ForWaldronregardstheparcellingupofthesocialworldintodistinctgroupculturesassimplyfactuallymistaken,whileIregardtheviewthattheyaresoparcelledupasdangerousprecisely214\nCONCLUSIONbecausepeopleincreasinglydosoidentifythemselves–fornogoodreasonbutwithdisastrouspoliticalconsequences.2.F.Barth,‘Ethnicgroupsandboundaries’,inhisProcessandForminSocialLife(London:Routledge,1981),p.200.RogersBrubakertermsthismistake‘groupism’inhis‘Mythsandmisconceptionsinthestudyofnationalism’,inJ.A.Hall(ed.),TheStateoftheNation(Cambridge:CUP,1998),esp.pp.292–8.3.Thereisnospacetodefendthesuggestionhere.ButforapessimisticassessmentofitseeW.Kymlicka,‘Isfederalismaviablealternativetosecession?’inP.Lehning(ed.),TheoriesofSecession(London:Routledge,1998).4.SeeB.JenkinsandG.Minnerup,CitizensandComrades(London:PlutoPress,1984),pp.26–7.215\nINDEXqwAchebe,Chinua,14–15assimilation,109–13,170–4ActofUnion(1801),191associationaestheticproductions,42freedomof,200–4‘affairedufoulardeislamique’,110–11political,150–4Africa/Africans,9,15,19Audard,Catherine,121nAfro-Cubanmusic,51Aurelius,Marcus,79–80,99nAhmad,Aijaz,138–9AustralianAboriginals,50Alcoff,L.M.,30nauthenticity,historyand,48–51Algeria,191autonomy,91–8,164,178–9Alter,P.,76ndefinitionof,91Althusser,Louis,129–30,131,132tolerationand,175altruism,kin,154aversiveracism,15AmericaseeUnitedStatesancientGreece,101Balibar,Etienne,73,109Anderson,Benedict,64,65–6,67Balkans,212Anglo-IrishBarber,Benjamin,121nnationand,67Barth,Fredrik,22,211seealsoIreland;UlsterBauman,Z.,144nAnglo-IrishTreaty(1921),201Beitz,Charles,82anti-dominativeethnicgroups,29Benn,Stanley,97‘anti-productivism’,47Beran,Harry,200,201Appiah,KwameAnthony,19Berlin,Isaiah,97,199archaeology,131Bhabha,Homi,136–8Archard,D.,121nbifurcationism,integrationismas,171Ardrey,Robert,165nbiologicalcategories,11Aristotle,101–3,104–5biologicalorganisms,36Arminius,84‘black’,ascategory,18Arnold,Matthew,34,42,43‘BlackAtlantic’identity,47216\nINDEXblackconsciousness,19ethnicgroupsand,23blackness,18–19politicalrecognitionand,28‘bondofjustice’,106commongoals,65BoundaryCommission,Anglo-Irishcommongood,republicanismand,160Treaty,201‘commongood’thesis,102Bourdieu,Pierre,45commoninterestsBrazil,racialcategorisationin,20politicalrecognitionand,28Brennan,Timothy,51statemembershipand,202Britishrule,inIreland,69‘commonsenseofright’,106Brubaker,Rogers,185,186n,215nCommunistManifesto(Marx&Engels),Buchanan,Alan,194–6,208n123,125Burke,Edmund,85CommunistParty,Muslimsectionof,BushNegroart,50174Butler,Judith,81communitarianism,101–20cultural,113–17Calhoun,C.,55ncommunities,72,101–5,116Caney,S.,164ninNorthernIreland,204capitalism/capitalists,123–7confessionalcriterion,115global,125conflicttheory,38–41post-ColdWar,80Connor,Walker,186nCatholics,192Conrad,Joseph,9,14,17,24,29TheCelts(Delaney),55nconservatism,82–6Césaire,Aimé,19nationalismand,172Chamberlain,M.E.,30nConstant,Benjamin,121ncharacter,formationof,47constitution,ofUS,150–2Chatterjee,Partha,135–6constitutionalism,contemporary,163Chicanonationalism,159construction,ofsocialgroups,38ChineseExclusionAct(1882)US,155contemporaryconstitutionalism,163Christianity,114Copp,David,208nChrysippus,99nCornishlanguage,43Cicero,105–6,113cosmopolitanism,79–82,141,142citizenship,57,58,147–64Cox,O.C.,30ninter-cultural,163Croatianlanguage,40republicantraditionof,158Cuba,51world,149culturalassimilation,176TheCityofGod(StAugustine),113–16culturalcommunitarianism,113–17,city,allegianceto,117172civicnationalism,69–70culturalhybridity,138civicnationhood,67–70culturalidentity,32–54civilisation,35culturalnationalism,67,69,117–20‘claimofcommunity’thesis,104culturalrelativism,46Clermont-Tonnerre,108culturalrights,167–70clubs,150culturalseparation,182–6,197–200Cohen,A.P.,31n,55nculturaltransformation,111Cohen,J.,98nculture,32–5colonies,revoltin,126definitionof,33–4colonisation,15ethnicgroupsand,23colonists,American,161groupconstructionism,39commonculturepoliticalrecognitionand,28217\nINDEXself-written,51ethnicnationalism,71–4,142,211–12ethnicnationhood,71–4D’Encausse,HélèneCarrère,186nethnicity,21–3,211Dark,PhilipJ.C.,50fictive,73Davis,H.B.,143nEvans-Pritchard,E.E.,54nDeRepublica(Cicero),105–6,113DeclarationofIndependence,USA,152,fabrication,nationsas,66162falseconsciousness,128Delaney,F.,55nfamilymodel,154–7Derrida,Jacques,138Fanon,Frantz,137dialects,40fatalism,47dialogiccommunity,81–2,113feminism,135diaspora,179–80Festenstein,Matthew,55n,99nidentities,52Fichte,JohannGottlieb,85,117difference,politicsof,2,177–8fictiveethnicity,73discrimination,ethnicidentificationand,FifteenthAmendment,155159FiveCivilisedTribes,162discriminatoryredistribution,196Foucault,Michel,17,131–5dominativeracism,15,28–9FourteenthAmendment,155Dower,N.,165nFranceDruidism,49Algeriaand,191Durkheim,Emile,36–7Muslimheadscarvesand,110–11fraternity,65Eagleton,Terry,15,67freedom,3,89easternnationalisms,67ofassociation,200–4economiesindividual,180planned,181FrenchRevolution,59,108unfairness,196Freud,Sigmund,140–1education,2,111Friedrich,CarlJ.,121nEisteddfodau,49Friel,Brian,62‘embeddedindividual’thesis,102functionalism,35–8,167,211EnglandandIrishsuppression,57Gaelic,64sixteenth-century,59ethnicism,68,70Enlightenment,82,142,178tradition,73liberalism,90–4Galiev,Sultan,174,213taxonomiesof,17Geertz,C.,24thinkers,80Gellner,Ernest,58–9,66epiphenomenon,ideologyas,128Gemeinschaft,72,116Ervine,John,64genealogy,131‘ethicalcommunitarian’thesis,103–4generalwill,108ethnicconceptions,ofnationhood,67geneticdifferences,11ethnicgroups,213geographicallocation,10anti-dominative,29GeorgeIII,162non-reactive,27Gesellschaft,72,116politicalrecognitionand,27–9Gibson,G.D.,55nreactive,28Gilbert,P.,75nethnicidentification,159Gilroy,Paul,19,47ethnicmixing,119–20globalcapitalism,125218\nINDEXgoals,common,65cultural,32–54Goldberg,David,17diaspora,52Goldsmith,Oliver,83group,140–2GoodFridayAgreement(1998),204–5national,57–74,151governmentalsecession,194postmodern,139–42Gramsci,Antonio,128,134,143nsymbolicorderand,141Gray,John,95IdeologicalStateApparatus,130,132Greece,ancient,101ideology,127–31Greenfeld,Liah,59racialcategorisationand,12‘group-conscious’policies,184‘imaginedcommunity’,nationas,64groupconstruction,culturein,39immigrantgroups,179groupcultures,33,97immigration,118,147–64groupidentities,17–21,140–2India,partitionand,135–6,198EnlightenmentLiberalismand,93IndianAllotmentAct(1881),162Guibernau,M.,143nIndianReorganisationAct(1934),161indigenousmusic,51Habermas,Jürgen,81–2,113indigenouspeoples,147–64,179habitus,45,47indigenousrights,161–4Hall,Stuart,52,129instrumentalvalueofculture,199Hampshire,Stuart,199instrumentalism,23–6Hastings,Adrian,75nintegration,84,111,170–4Heaney,Seamus,75ntheory,35–8HeartofDarkness(Conrad),9,15inter-culturalcitizens,163Hegel,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich,58,interpellation,13075n,125intrinsicvalue,ofculture,199hegemony,129,134,135,137involuntaristarguments,198white,16Ireland,57–74Herder,JohannGottfriedvon,35,97,self-determinationand,189–207117,154IrishFreeState,193Hewitt,John,61,63,75nHispanics,22Jacobs,J.M.,55ascategory,17Jenkins,R.,23,25inUSA,17–18Jennings,Jeremy,121nhistoriccommunities,205Jews,108,179–80history,authenticityand,48–51Jinnah(Muslimleader),135,198Hobbes,Thomas,174Johnson,Albert,155Hobsbawm,E.,49,59Johnson,Dr,109Holland,revoltin,87jurisdiction,unjustlossof,195HomeRuleBill(1912),193justice,3,90,113–14AHouseforMrBiswas(Naipaul),32,41,bondof,10650humanrights,189Kant,Immanuel,80,81,91,92violationsof,195–6Kautsky,Karl,143nHume,David,156kinaltruism,154Hutchinson,John,69,70‘Know-Nothings’,152hybridity,51–4,138Kohn,Hans,76nKristeva,Julia,140–2identitiesKukathas,Chandran,99n,175–6,177,‘BlackAtlantic’,47178219\nINDEXKymlicka,Will,34,37–8,54n,55n,94,Milton,John,87112,161,166n,178–81,214n,‘minimalrealism’,208n215nminoritycultures,88minorityrights,37Lacan,Jacques,140Mobutu,General,50Laclau,Ernesto,130modernism,23land,righttoown,61,161–2primordialismand,24language,41–4,111moralrights,194culturalgroupingsas,169moralstandards,45cultureand,178–9morality,96Spanish,159Morgan,D.P.,64Lea,D.R.,75nmulatto,ascategory,17Lee,D.,54nMulhall,S.,121nlegalrights,194–5multiculturalism,167–86Lenin,VladimirIlyich,126musicLévi-Strauss,Claude,33,35Afro-Cuban,51liberalism,175–6carnivalistic,47enlightenment,90–4Muslimsreformation,86–90inCommunistParty,174lifeboatmodel,119,157headscarves,France,110–11Lincoln,Abraham,92asminorities,183linguisticcategories,10mutualconcern,65andself-government,44myth,49Linklater,A.,98nLivingstone,Dr,15Naipaul,V.S.,32,41,50,144nLocke,John,61,150–1,161–2Nairn,Tom,75nLockwood,David,54nnames,ethnicgroupsand,22Loomba,Ania,30nnationalcommunity,63–7,204–7Luhmann,Niklas,54nnationalconsciousness,59nationalidentity,57–74,151MacIntyre,Alisdair,121nnationalsecession,194Malik,Kenan,16nationalism,59,83Mansergh,N.,109nChicano,159Margalit,Avishai,37,199–200cultural,117–20Marshall,T.H.,165nFrenchrepublican,107Marx/Marxism,16,40,81,123,202nationality,57–74critique,123–7American,92–3postmodernismand,123–42culturalgroupingsas,169Mazzini,125Marxismand,125Meinecke,Friedrich,76naspoliticalidentity,108‘mélange’,52,53nationhoodmembership,ofstate,147–50civic,67–70Mexicans,159ethnic,71–4Miles,Robert,12,128familymodeland,156Mill,JohnStuart,200,202inIreland,68Miller,David,84,118–20,156–7,165n,nations184,208ndefinitionof,64milletmodel,182–4placeand,60–3Mills,Charles,16primordialismabout,57220\nINDEXandstate,57–60politicalnations,andnationhood,67nativeAmericans,161–2politicalphilosophy,1–3,168nativism,152politicalrecognition,ethnicgroupsand,naturalwill,11627–9negativeliberty,88politics,ofdifference,2,177–8négritude,19,47Politics(Aristotle),101–2neighbourhoods,158,166npolyethnicrights,179neutrality,92Poole,Ross,76nandlawsystem,176–7post-cold-warworld,210Newby,H.,54npostcolonialism,135–9Nielson,K.,76npostmodernidentities,139–42Nietzsche,Friedrich,132–3postmodernism,Marxismand,123–42Nixon,R.,144npoststructuralism,131–5,139‘non-neutrality’thesis,104Potter,D.,144nnon-reactivegroups,politicalrecognitionPowell,Enoch,84and,27–8power,30,130,132NowellSmith,G.,143nprimordialism,23–6Nozick,Robert,174–5‘prioritisation’thesis,104Nussbaum,Martha,80proceduralism,174–7property,150–1O’Connor,F.,74nProtestants,61,192,198O’Neill,J.,122npsychoanalysis,140organicism,85–6public/privatedistinction,89–90,108–9orientalism,133–4Quinton,Anthony,83,85–6,99nPan-Africanism,19Parekh,Bhikhu,53,165n,170–1,176,race,9–17,84182,185,186n,187nsocialconstructionof,12–14Parsons,Talcott,54nracialcategorisation,9–12,133partition,Indiaand,135–6asideology,12peoples,definitionof,2,10differentiationand,13perennialism,31nracism,14–17,109,126Phillips,Anne,188nethnicnationhoodand,71place,nationand,60–3Raphael,D.D.,164nplannedeconomies,181rationalistcosmopolitanism,80ThePlayboyoftheWesternWorld(Synge),Rawls,John,91,92,93,152–3,186n64Raz,Joseph,96,180–1,187n,199–200pluralism,177–82reactiveethnicgroups,28definitionof,96–7realism,83polis,101–3,104,105ReformationLiberalism,86–90,94,151,Polishindependence,125174politicalassociation,150–4religioustoleration,152politicalcircumstances,nationalRenan,Ernest,69consciousnessand,59RepressiveStateApparatus,130politicalcommunity,105republicanism,105–9,173,212politicaldemands,45commongood,160politicalidentity,nationalityas,108traditionofcitizenship,158politicalliberalism,93,152–3residence,157–60politicalnationalisms,70Rex,J.,30n221\nINDEXRicoeur,Paul,55nSpinner,Jeff,99n–100nrightsSpivak,Gayatri,136commonsenseof,106stability,social,92cultural,167–70Stalin,Joseph,174,186nindigenous,161–4Stanley,H.M.,15Rochester,Earlof,86statesRomanpeople,114membership,147–50Romanrepublic,123nationand,57–60,68Romanworld,79roleof,148romanticliberalism,95–8stereotypes,9Roosevelt,Franklin,161Stoicphilosophy,79–80,86Rousseau,Jean-Jacques,107SubalternStudies,136Runciman,W.G.,54nsubjection,132Rushdie,Salman,52Swift,A.,121nRussell,George(AE),64,73syncretism,52Russification,169,170Synge,J.M.,64,66,67,68,70Sabine,G.H.,99nTacitus,84,99nSaid,Edward,133–4Tamir,Yael,34,39,96,202StAugustine,113–16Taylor,Charles,121n,138,177–8Sandel,Michael,100n,121nterritory,61Sarup,M.,12Thom,Martin,116Scruton,Roger,84toleration,88,89secession,193–6autonomyand,175self-determination,rightof,189–93religious,152self-government,linguisticgroupsand,Tönnies,Ferdinand,72,11644TotemandTaboo(Freud),141‘self-writtenculture’,51Translations(Friel),62separatism,183tribe,allegianceto,117Serbianlanguage,40Trinidad,41‘sharedconception’thesis,102truth,historicalnarrationand,49‘silenceofthelaw’,174Tully,James,63,162–3,166nsituationalism,23,25skincolour,11Ulster,189,192Smiles,Samuel,32,47UlsterProtestants,61Smith,Anthony,31n,70,72,144nUlsterUnionists,193socialcategorisation,racialdescriptionUnitedNationsCovenantsonHumanand,10Rights,189,190socialconstructionism,38UnitedStates,109,147–64raceand,12–14Americannationality,92–3socialrelationships,changesin,141AmericanRevolution,59socialunity,92ChineseExclusionAct(1882),155solidarity,181constitutionof,150–2Somers,M.R.,55nSouthAmerica,racialcategorisationin,valueassimilation,inSovietsystem,20171SovietUnion,break-upof,168–71‘valueofmembership’thesis,103Spanishlanguage,159values,45–8Spencer,Herbert,36,54nvandenBerghe,P.,31n,165n222\nINDEXViroli,Maurizio,116westernnationalisms,67‘wholewayoflife’,cultureas,33Waldron,Jeremy,122n,214,214nWilliams,Eric,41Wallerstein,Immanuel,126Wilson,Woodrow,197Walzer,Michael,112,121n,150,153–4,Winthrop,John,162158,165n,166n,177worldcitizenship,149Washington,George,162Wearin’o’theGreen(song),57,59,60Yeats,WilliamButler,65,68,70Weber,E.,186nYoung,IrisMarion,118,164,166n,Weber,Max,21,58183–5,213‘websofsignificance’,41–2Yugoslavia,40,212Welshlanguage,42–3Westernimperialism,16Zionism,180223