【剑桥哲学指南】古代哲学

【剑桥哲学指南】古代哲学

ACompaniontoAncientPhilosophyACTA01120/03/2006,03:02PM\nBlackwellCompanionstoPhilosophyThisoutstandingstudentreferenceseriesoffersacomprehensiveandauthoritativesurveyofphilosophyasawhole.Writtenbytoday’sleadingphilosophers,eachvolumeprovideslucidandengagingcoverageofthekeyfigures,terms,topics,andproblemsofthefield.Takentogether,thevolumesprovidetheidealbasisforcourseuse,representinganunparalleledworkofrefer-enceforstudentsandspecialistsalike.Alreadypublishedintheseries:19.ACompaniontoEnvironmentalPhilosophyEditedbyDaleJamieson1.TheBlackwellCompaniontoPhilosophy,SecondEdition20.ACompaniontoAnalyticPhilosophyEditedbyNicholasBunninandEricTsui-JamesEditedbyA.P.MartinichandDavidSosa2.ACompaniontoEthics21.ACompaniontoGenethicsEditedbyPeterSingerEditedbyJustineBurleyandJohnHarris3.ACompaniontoAesthetics22.ACompaniontoPhilosophicalLogicEditedbyDavidCooperEditedbyDaleJacquette4.ACompaniontoEpistemology23.ACompaniontoEarlyModernPhilosophyEditedbyJonathanDancyandErnestSosaEditedbyStevenNadler5.ACompaniontoContemporaryPolitical24.ACompaniontoPhilosophyinthePhilosophyMiddleAgesEditedbyRobertE.GoodinandPhilipPettitEditedbyJorgeJ.E.GraciaandTimothyB.Noone6.ACompaniontoPhilosophyofMindEditedbySamuelGuttenplan25.ACompaniontoAfrican-AmericanPhilosophy7.ACompaniontoMetaphysicsEditedbyTommyL.LottandJohnP.PittmanEditedbyJaegwonKimandErnestSosa26.ACompaniontoAppliedEthics8.ACompaniontoPhilosophyofLawandEditedbyR.G.FreyandChristopherLegalTheoryHeathWellmanEditedbyDennisPatterson27.ACompaniontothePhilosophyof9.ACompaniontoPhilosophyofReligionEducationEditedbyPhilipL.QuinnandCharlesEditedbyRandallCurrenTaliaferro10.ACompaniontothePhilosophyof28.ACompaniontoAfricanPhilosophyLanguageEditedbyKwasiWireduEditedbyBobHaleandCrispinWright29.ACompaniontoHeidegger11.ACompaniontoWorldPhilosophiesEditedbyHubertL.DreyfusandEditedbyEliotDeutschandRonBontekoeMarkA.Wrathall12.ACompaniontoContinentalPhilosophy30.ACompaniontoRationalismEditedbySimonCritchleyandWilliamEditedbyAlanNelsonSchroeder31.ACompaniontoAncientPhilosophy13.ACompaniontoFeministPhilosophyEditedbyMaryLouiseGillandEditedbyAlisonM.JaggarandIrisMarionPierrePellegrinYoung32.ACompaniontoPragmatism14.ACompaniontoCognitiveScienceEditedbyJohnR.ShookandJosephMargolisEditedbyWilliamBechtelandGeorgeGraham33.ACompaniontoNietzsche15.ACompaniontoBioethicsEditedbyKeithAnsellPearsonEditedbyHelgaKuhseandPeterSinger34.ACompaniontoSocrates16.ACompaniontothePhilosophersEditedbySaraAhbel-RappeandRachanarEditedbyRobertL.ArringtonKamtekar17.ACompaniontoBusinessEthics35.ACompaniontoPhenomenologyandEditedbyRobertE.FrederickExistentialism18.ACompaniontothePhilosophyofScienceEditedbyHubertL.DreyfusandEditedbyW.H.Newton-SmithMarkA.WrathallACTA01220/03/2006,03:02PM\nBlackwellCompanionstoPhilosophyACompaniontoAncientPhilosophyEditedbyMaryLouiseGillandPierrePellegrinACTA01320/03/2006,03:02PM\n©2006byBlackwellPublishingLtdBLACKWELLPUBLISHING350MainStreet,Malden,MA02148-5020,USA9600GarsingtonRoad,OxfordOX42DQ,UK550SwanstonStreet,Carlton,Victoria3053,AustraliaTherightofMaryLouiseGillandPierrePellegrintobeidentifiedastheAuthorsoftheEditorialMaterialinthisWorkhasbeenassertedinaccordancewiththeUKCopyright,Designs,andPatentsAct1988.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recordingorotherwise,exceptaspermittedbytheUKCopyright,Designs,andPatentsAct1988,withoutthepriorpermissionofthepublisher.Firstpublished2006byBlackwellPublishingLtd12006LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataAcompaniontoancientphilosophy/editedbyMaryLouiseGillandPierrePellegrin.p.cm.—(Blackwellcompanionstophilosophy)Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindexes.ISBN-13:978-0-631-21061-0(hardcover:alk.paper)ISBN-10:0-631-21061-X(hardcover:alk.paper)1.Philosophy,Ancient.I.Gill,MaryLouise,1950–II.Pellegrin,Pierre,1944–III.Series.B111.C662005180—dc222005014100AcataloguerecordforthistitleisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.Setin10/12.5ptPhotinabyGraphicraftLimited,HongKongPrintedandboundinSingaporebyCOSPrintersPteLtdThepublisher’spolicyistousepermanentpaperfrommillsthatoperateasustainableforestrypolicy,andwhichhasbeenmanufacturedfrompulpprocessedusingacid-freeandelementarychlorine-freepractices.Furthermore,thepublisherensuresthatthetextpaperandcoverboardusedhavemetacceptableenvironmentalaccreditationstandards.ForfurtherinformationonBlackwellPublishing,visitourwebsite:www.blackwellpublishing.comivACTA01420/03/2006,03:02PM\nContentsNotesonContributorsviiiAcknowledgmentsxivAbbreviationsxvChronologyxviMapsxxviIntroductionxxixPartI:EarlyGreekPhilosophy1.TheBeginningsofScienceandPhilosophyinArchaicGreece3EdwardHussey2.AncientPhilosophyandtheDoxographicalTradition20JørgenMejer3.ParmenidesandAfter:UnityandPlurality34PatriciaCurd4.TheConceptoftheUniversalinSomeLaterPre-PlatonicCosmologists56AlexanderP.D.Mourelatos5.TheSophisticMovement77RachelBarneyPartII:Socrates,theSocratics,andPlato6.Socrates101DonaldR.Morrison7.MinorSocratics119FernandaDeclevaCaizzi8.ThePlatonicDialogue136ChristopherGill9.Plato’sEthics:EarlyandMiddleDialogues151TerryPennervACTA01520/03/2006,03:55PM\ncontents10.Plato’sPoliticalPhilosophy:TheRepublic,theStatesman,andtheLaws170MelissaLane11.Plato’sMetaphysicsandDialectic192NoburuNotomi12.Plato’sNaturalPhilosophyandMetaphysics212LucBrissonPartIII:Aristotle13.TheAristotelianWay235PierrePellegrin14.Aristotle’sLogicandTheoryofScience245WolfgangDetel15.Aristotle’sPhysicsandCosmology270IstvánBodnárandPierrePellegrin16.Aristotle’sBiologyandAristotle’sPhilosophy292JamesG.Lennox17.Aristotle’sPsychology316VictorCaston18.FirstPhilosophyinAristotle347MaryLouiseGill19.Aristotle’sEthics374MichaelPakaluk20.Aristotle’sPoliticalPhilosophy393DavidKeytPartIV:PhilosophyintheHellenisticAge21.PhilosophicSchoolsinHellenisticandRomanTimes415ThomasBénatouïl22.TheProblemofSources430RobertW.Sharples23.TheNewAcademyanditsRivals448CarlosLévy24.Pyrrhonism465JacquesBrunschwig25.Epicureanism486Pierre-MarieMorel26.StoicLogic505KaterinaIerodiakonouviACTA01620/03/2006,03:55PM\ncontents27.StoicEthics530RichardBett28.HellenisticCosmopolitanism549EricBrownPartV:MiddleandLatePlatonism29.MiddlePlatonism561MarcoZambon30.Plotinus577LucBrissonandJean-FrançoisPradeau31.WhatwasCommentaryinLateAntiquity?TheExampleoftheNeoplatonicCommentators597PhilippeHoffmannPartVI:Culture,Philosophy,andtheSciences32.GreekPhilosophyandReligion625GáborBetegh33.PhilosophyofLanguage640DeborahK.W.Modrak34.AncientMedicineanditsContributiontothePhilosophicalTradition664PierrePellegrin35.GreekMathematicstotheTimeofEuclid686IanMuellerIndexLocorum719GeneralIndex756viiACTA01720/03/2006,03:55PM\nNotesonContributorsRachelBarneyisCanadaResearchChairinClassicalPhilosophyattheUniversityofToronto,andDirectorofitsCollaborativePrograminAncientandMedievalPhilo-sophy.ShehaspublishedessaysonPlatoandHellenisticepistemologyandethics,andabookonPlato’sCratylus,NamesandNatureinPlato’sCratylus(Routledge,2001).HercurrentresearchisfocusedonPlato’sethics.ThomasBénatouïlisMaîtredeconférencesinPhilosophyattheUniversityofNancyII(France).Heistheauthorofananthologywithcommentary,LeScepticisme(Paris:Flammarion,1997),andofLaPratiquedustoïcisme(Paris:Vrin,2006),aworkontheconceptofuse(chresis)inHellenisticStoicism.GáborBeteghisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophyattheCentralEuropeanUniver-sity,Budapest(Hungary).HeistheauthorofTheDerveniPapyrus.Cosmology,TheologyandInterpretation(Cambridge,2004)andarticlesonancientcosmology,metaphysics,andtheology.RichardBettisProfessorofPhilosophyandClassicsatJohnsHopkinsUniversity.HeistheauthorofPyrrho,HisAntecedentsandHisLegacy(Oxford,2000),andoftransla-tionsofSextusEmpiricus’AgainsttheEthicists(withintroductionandcommentary:Oxford,1997)andAgainsttheLogicians(withintroduction,notesandothersupport-ingmaterials:Cambridge,2005).HehaspublishedextensivelyonGreekskepticism,includingcomparisonsbetweenancientandmodernapproachestoskepticism;hehasalsopublishedarticlesonotheraspectsofHellenisticphilosophy,aswellasonPlato,Socrates,theSophists,andNietzsche.IstvánBodnárisAssociateProfessorattheInstituteofPhilosophyofEötvösUniver-sity,Budapest(Hungary),andVisitingProfessorattheDepartmentofPhilosophyofCentralEuropeanUniversity,Budapest.HehaspublishedessaysonthePreso-cratics,Aristotle,andthePeripatetictradition.Recentlyheedited,withWilliamW.Fortenbaugh,acollectionofarticlesaboutEudemusofRhodes(NewBrunswick,NJ/London:TransactionBooks,2002).LucBrissonisResearcherattheNationalCenterforScientificResearch(Paris),andhaspublishedwidelyonbothPlatoandPlotinus,includingbibliographies,transla-tions,andcommentaries.HehasalsopublishednumerousworksonthehistoryofviiiACTA01820/03/2006,03:56PM\nnotesoncontributorsphilosophyandreligioninAntiquity.Heisco-editor(withJ.-F.Pradeau)ofanongoingFrenchtranslationofPlotinus’treatisesintheFlammarionseries(4volumeshavesofarbeenpublished,2001–5).EricBrown,AssociateProfessorofPhilosophyatWashingtonUniversity,istheauthorofStoicCosmopolitanism(CambridgeUniversityPress,2005)andseveralart-iclesonvarioustopicsinancientphilosophy.JacquesBrunschwigisProfessorEmeritusofAncientPhilosophyattheUniversityofParisI–Panthéon–Sorbonne.HeeditedandtranslatedintoFrenchAristotle’sTopics(vol.I,Budéseries1967;vol.IIcurrentlyinprogress).HismainpublicationsinEnglisharePapersinHellenisticPhilosophy(CambridgeUniversityPress,1994)and(co-editedwithG.E.R.Lloyd)GreekThought:AGuidetoClassicalKnowledge(HarvardUniversityPress,2000).HismainfieldsofinterestareAristotleandtheHellenisticschools.VictorCastonisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofMichigan.Hehaspub-lishedonthePresocratics,Aristotle,theStoics,andAugustine,onissuesconcerningthephilosophyofmind.HeispresentlyatworkonabookforCambridgeUniversityPressentitledTheProblemofIntentionalityinAncientPhilosophy.PatriciaCurdisProfessorofPhilosophyatPurdueUniversity.SheistheauthorofTheLegacyofParmenides:EleaticMonismandLaterPresocraticThought(Princeton,1998;revisededitionParmenidesPublishing,2004).HerrecentworkhasconcentratedonthePresocratics,includingAnaxagoras,Empedocles,Heraclitus,Parmenides,andGorgias.AtpresentsheiscompletingAnaxagorasofClazomenae:Fragments.TextandTranslationwithTestimonia,Notes,andEssays.FernandaDeclevaCaizziisProfessorofAncientPhilosophyattheUniversitàdegliStudiinMilan(Italy).SheistheauthorofAntisthenisFragmenta,AntiphontisTetralogiae,Pirrone:Testimonianze.Since1984shehasbeenamemberoftheeditorialCommitteeoftheCorpusdeiPapiriFilosoficiandcurrentlycoordinatestheresearchgroupinvolvedintheprogram.Shehasedited,andpublishedresearchon,manyphilosophicaltextsbyknownandunknownauthorspreservedonpapyrus.WolfgangDetelisProfessorofPhilosophy(Chairforancientphilosophyandphilo-sophyofscience)attheUniversityofFrankfurt/Main,Germany,andhastaughtatHamburg,Bielefeld,Reykjavik,Princeton,Rutgers,Pittsburgh,andColumbia/NewYork.HeistheauthorofbooksonPlato’stheoryoffalsestatementsandonPierreGassendi’sphysics.In1993,hepublishedanintroduction,Germantranslation,andcommentaryonAristotle’sPosteriorAnalytics(in2volumes).HislatestbookisonFoucault’sHistoryandSexualityvol.2(1998)(Englishtrans.:FoucaultandClassicalAntiquity,Cambridge,2004).Hehaspublishednumerousarticlesondifferenttopics,mainlyonancientphilosophy,onthehistoryandphilosophyofscience,andonmodernsemantics.ChristopherGillisProfessorofAncientThoughtattheUniversityofExeter.HehaswrittenPersonalityinGreekEpic,Tragedy,andPhilosophy:TheSelfinDialogue(1996)ixACTA01920/03/2006,03:56PM\nnotesoncontributorsandTheStructuredSelfinHellenisticandRomanThought(forthcoming)(bothwithOxfordUniversityPress).Hehaswrittenmanypapersonancientphilosophyandeditedsevenvolumesofnewessays,including(withM.M.McCabe),FormandArgumentinLatePlato(1996).Heisco-editorofthejournal,Phronesis.MaryLouiseGillisProfessorofPhilosophyandClassicsatBrownUniversity.SheistheauthorofAristotleonSubstance:TheParadoxofUnity(Princeton,1989),Plato:Parmenides,Introductionandco-translation(withP.Ryan)(Hackett,1996),andco-editor(withJ.G.Lennox)ofSelf-Motion:FromAristotletoNewton(Princeton,1994),and(withT.ScaltsasandD.Charles)ofUnity,Identity,andExplanationinAristotle’sMetaphysics(Oxford,1994).PhilippeHoffmannisDirectorofStudiesandChairofReligiousStudiesattheÉcolePratiquedesHautesÉtudes(Paris).HisresearchfocusesontheNeoplatoniccomment-ariesoflateAntiquity(themanuscripttraditionandthehistoryofdoctrine).HeistheauthorofstudiesonthegeneralprinciplesofexegesisandpedagogicalthoughtoftheNeoplatonists,ondoctrinalaspectsofSimplicius’commentariesontheCategoriesandDeCaelo,andhecurrentlydirectsresearchonreasonandfaithinNeoplatonism(Proclus,Simplicius).EdwardHusseyisaFellowofAllSoulsCollegeOxford.HispublicationsincludeThePresocratics(Duckworth,1972),AristotlePhysicsIII–IV(Oxford,1983)andessaysonmanyaspectsofearlyGreekphilosophyandofAristotle.KaterinaIerodiakonouisAssistantProfessorintheDepartmentofHumanitiesattheNationalTechnicalUniversityofAthens.Shehaseditedtwocollectionsofarticles:TopicsinStoicPhilosophy(Oxford,1999)andByzantinePhilosophyanditsAncientSources(Oxford,2002).Herrecentarticlesinclude:“Aristotle’sUseofExamplesinthePriorAnalytics,”Phronesis(2002),and“AncientThoughtExperiments:AFirstApproach,”AncientPhilosophy(2005).Sheiscurrentlywritingabookonancienttheoriesofcolorandcolor-perception.DavidKeythasformanyyearsbeenaprofessorofphilosophyattheUniversityofWashingtoninSeattle.WhileonleavefromthatposthehasalsotaughtatCornellUniversity,theUniversityofHongKong,PrincetonUniversity,andtheLosAngelesandIrvinecampusesoftheUniversityofCalifornia,andheldresearchappointmentsattheInstituteforResearchintheHumanitiesattheUniversityofWisconsin,theCenterforHellenicStudiesinWashington,DC,theInstituteforAdvancedStudyatPrinceton,andtheSocialPhilosophyandPolicyCenteratBowlingGreenStateUniversity.HeistheauthorofAristotlePoliticsBooksVandVI(ClarendonPress,1999)andco-editorwithFredD.Miller,Jr.ofACompaniontoAristotle’sPolitics(Blackwell,1991).MelissaLaneisUniversityLecturerinHistoryandaFellowofKing’sCollegeatCam-bridgeUniversity,whereshereceivedherPhDinphilosophy.HerbooksincludeMethodandPoliticsinPlato’sStatesman(Cambridge,1998)andPlato’sProgeny:HowSocratesandPlatoStillCaptivatetheModernMind(Duckworth,2001).SheisanAssociateEditorxACTA011020/03/2006,03:56PM\nnotesoncontributorsoftheCambridgeHistoryofGreekandRomanPoliticalThought(2000)aswellasacon-tributortotheCambridgeHistoryofTwentiethCenturyPoliticalThought(2003)andaSyndicofCambridgeUniversityPress.JamesG.LennoxisProfessorofHistoryandPhilosophyofScienceandDirector,CenterforPhilosophyofScienceattheUniversityofPittsburgh.HisresearchspecialtiesincludeAncientGreekphilosophy,scienceandmedicineandCharlesDarwinandDarwinism,withafocusonphilosophicalissuesrelatedtothelifesciences.HeisauthorofAristotle’sPhilosophyofBiology(Cambridge,2001)andAristotleonthePartsofAnimalsI–IV(Oxford,2001);andco-editorofPhilosophicalIssuesinAristotle’sBiology(Cambridge,1987);Self-MotionFromAristotletoNewton(Princeton,1994);andConcepts,Theories,andRationalityintheBiologicalSciences(PittsburghandKonstanz,1995).CarlosLévyisaspecialistinHellenisticandRomanphilosophy.HeistheauthorofCiceroAcademicus(Rome:1992)andLesphilosophieshellénistiques(Paris:1998).Hehaseditedmanycollectiveworksonthethoughtofthisperiod.In1993hecreatedtheCenterfortheStudyofHellenisticandRomanPhilosophyattheUniversityofParisXIIandheiscurrentlyProfessorattheUniversityofParisIV–Sorbonne.JørgenMejerhastaughtclassicsattheUniversityofCopenhagensincetheearly1970sandhasbeenaguestprofessoratvariousAmericanuniversitiesandatNankaiUniversity,China.HewasDirectoroftheDanishInstituteatAthens2001–3.HehaspublishedbooksonPresocraticphilosophyandhistoryofphilosophyinantiquity,andwrittenextensivelyonGreekandLatinliterature.HehasalsotranslatedGreektrag-ediesforTheRoyalDanishTheatreinCopenhagen.DeborahK.W.ModrakisaProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofRochester.Herpublicationsinclude:Aristotle.ThePowerofPerception(1987)andAristotle’sTheoryofLanguageandMeaning(2001).Pierre-MarieMorelisMaîtredeconférencesinPhilosophyattheUniversityofParisI–Panthéon–Sorbonne.HisspecialtiesincludeancientatomismandEpicureanismandthenaturalphilosophyandpsychologyofAristotle.HisbooksincludeDémocriteetlarecherchedescauses(Paris,1996),Atomeetnécessité:Démocrite,Épicure,Lucrèce(Paris,2000),atranslationwithnotesonAristotle’sParvanaturalia(Paris,2000),andageneralbook,Aristote.Unephilosophiedel’activité(Paris,2003).DonaldR.MorrisonisProfessorofPhilosophyandClassicalStudiesatRiceUniver-sity.HiscurrentresearchinterestsincludeSocrates,ancientpoliticalphilosophy,andlateancientconceptionsofphilosophicalmethod.RecentpublicationsonSocratesinclude:“TyrannieetroyautéselonleSocratedeXenophon,”Étudesphilosophiques(2004);“SomeCentralElementsofSocraticPoliticalTheory,”Polis(2001);and“OntheAllegedHistoricalReliabilityofPlato’sApology,”ArchivfürGeschichtederPhilosophie(2000).AlexanderP.D.Mourelatos,isProfessorofPhilosophyandClassicsatTheUni-versityofTexasatAustin,wherehefoundedandfor25yearsdirectedtheJointxiACTA011120/03/2006,03:56PM\nnotesoncontributorsClassics-PhilosophyGraduatePrograminAncientPhilosophy.HeistheauthorofTheRouteofParmenides(1970)andeditorofThePre-Socratics:ACollectionofCriticalEssays(PrincetonUniversityPress,1993).Articlesofhishaveappearedinjournalsandinessaycollectionsinthefieldsofclassics,philosophy,historyandphilosophyofscience,linguistics,andinmajorencyclopediasanddictionaries.IanMuellerisProfessorofPhilosophyEmeritusattheUniversityofChicago.HeistheauthorofPhilosophyofMathematicsandDeductiveStructureinEuclid’s“Elements”(MIT,1981),andthetranslator(withJosiahGould)ofthecommentaryonAristotle’sPriorAnalyticsi.8–22writtenbyAlexanderofAphrodisias(Cornell,1999),andofSimplicius’commentaryonBookIIofAristotle’sDeCaelo(Cornell,2004,2005).NoburuNotomiisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophy,KeioUniversity,Japan,havingreceivedhisMAinPhilosophyfromTokyoUniversityandhisPhDinClassicsfromCambridgeUniversity.HeistheauthorofTheUnityofPlato’sSophist:BetweentheSophistandthePhilosopher(Cambridge,1999;Japanesetranslation,NagoyaUniversityPress,2002).HeistheauthorofanumberofarticlesonPlato,andiscurrentlywork-ingontheSophistsandtheSocratics.MichaelPakalukisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophyatClarkUniversityinWorces-ter,Massachusetts.TheauthoroftheClarendonAristotlecommentaryonNicomacheanEthicsVIIIandIX(Oxford,1998),andofAristotle’sNicomacheanEthics:AnIntroduction(Cambridge,2005),hehaspublishednumerousarticlesinancientphilosophy,polit-icalphilosophy,andthehistoryofphilosophygenerally.HeiscurrentlyDirectoroftheBostonAreaColloquiuminAncientPhilosophy.PierrePellegrinisResearcherattheNationalCenterforScientificResearch(Paris),andhashadvisitingteachingpositionsintheUSandCanada,atPrinceton,Rutgers,andMontreal.HehaspublishedmainlyonAristotle’snaturalphilosophy(andinparticularAristotelianbiology),Aristotle’spolitics,historyofancientmedicineandancientSkepticism.HeistheauthorofLaClassificationdesanimauxchezAristote(1982,Englishtrans.:ClassificationofAnimals,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1986).HisworksalsoincludetranslationsofAristotle,Galen,andSextusEmpiricus.TerryPennerdidhisapprenticeshipasananalyticalphilosopherstudyingPlatoandAristotleatOxfordwithRyle,Owen,andAckrillandatPrinceton,wherehewasGregoryVlastos’sjuniorcolleague.HetaughtPhilosophyfor34years(and,lateron,Greek)attheUniversityofWisconsin-Madison.HismaininterestsareSocraticEthics,Platonicmetaphysics,Frege,andmodernanalyticalphilosophy.Inthewintertermof2005,hewasVisitingLeventisResearchProfessorofGreekattheUniversityofEdinburgh.Jean-FrançoisPradeauteachesthehistoryofancientphilosophyattheUniversityofNanterre(ParisX–Nanterre)andisamemberoftheInstitutUniversitairedeFrance.HisresearchandpublicationsmainlyconcernPlato’sphilosophyandthePlatonictradition.HeisthefounderandpresenteditorofÉtudesPlatoniciennes(Paris,LesBellesxiiACTA011220/03/2006,03:56PM\nnotesoncontributorsLettres)andauthorofastudyofPlotinus’philosophy:L’imitationduprincipe.Plotinetlaprocession(Paris:Vrin,2003).Heisco-editor(withL.Brisson)ofanongoingFrenchtranslationofPlotinus’treatisesintheFlammarionseries(4volumeshavesofarbeenpublished,2001–5).RobertW.SharplesisProfessorofClassicsatUniversityCollegeLondon.HeistheauthorofageneralbookonHellenisticphilosophy(Stoics,EpicureansandSceptics,London:Routledge,1996).HisresearchinterestsareespeciallyintheAristoteliantradition;hehaspublishedcommentariesonthephysicalandbiologicalfragmentsofTheophrastus,andseveralvolumesoftranslationsofworksbyAlexanderofAphrodisias,mostrecentlyoftheSupplementtotheBookontheSoul,basedonaneweditionoftheGreektextwhichiscurrentlybeingpreparedforpublication.HisothermajorcurrentprojectsareacollaborativeeditionofpartoftheProblemsvariouslyattributedtoAlexanderortoAristotle,andaneweditionofthefragmentsofStrato.MarcoZambonisResearcherattheHistoryDepartmentoftheUniversityofPadua(Italy);inadditiontoseveralarticlesandessaysonthePlatonicphilosophyoftheImperialage,hepublishedin2002avolumeentitledPorphyreetlemoyen-platonisme(Paris:Vrin).xiiiACTA011320/03/2006,03:56PM\nAcknowledgmentsThisprojecthasbeenlonginthemaking,andmanypeoplehavehelpedalongtheway.MichaelFredegaveussageadviceaboutthecontentsearlyonintheproject.AndreaFalconandDavidSedleycontributedtothetranslationofFernandaDeclevaCaizzi’spaperfromItalian.MarkPossanzaansweredqueriesaboutchronologyandthestudyofancientbooks.KurtRaaflaubandAlanBoegeholdgaveusadviceaboutmaps.WearegratefultoallthesepeopleandespeciallytoDavidYates,whocarefullycheckedtheChronologyandsavedusfrommanyerrors.Formoretechnicalhelp,wethankEleanorThumandCarolO’Malleyforvitalassist-anceinthefinalpreparationofthemanuscript.WealsothanktheBlackwelleditors,andparticularlyJeffDeanandDanielleDescoteaux,fortheiradviceandpatienceinseeingtheprojectthroughitsvariousstages.WeareverygratefultoMervynThomasforhisexpertworkinthehomestretch.Webothappreciatedhisefficientcopy-editing,hiskindness,andwit.Twopeople,AdamRachlisandPaulCoppock,deservespecialthanks.AdamRachliswasaResearchAssistantonthisprojectatBrownUniversityinthespringandsum-mer,2003.Inthatrolehereadandwrotedetailedcommentsondraftsofmanyofthepapers.Wehopethatourbookwillbeusefultoanumberofaudiences.Thebookaimstomakeacontributiontoscholarshipinancientphilosophy,butitalsoaimstoenablenon-specialistsandnewcomerstothefieldtolearnaboutthesubjectgenerallyortofindtheirwayintoareastheyhavenotpreviouslyexplored.Adamwasinmanywaysanidealreader–anupperlevelundergraduatePhilosophyconcentrator,notspecializ-inginancientphilosophybutwithakeeninterestinlearningaboutthesubject.Hewrotecommentsonthepapersfromthatperspective,andauthorsfoundthemveryusefulinrevisingtheirpapers.PaulCoppocktranslatedsevenofthepapersinthisvolumefromFrenchintoEnglish(chapters13,21,23,24,25,31,and34).Healsocontributedhiseditorialandphilosophicalexpertisethroughoutthefinaleditingstagesofthevolume.Heisresponsibleforthegeneralindex.Weareverygratefultothem.M.L.G.andP.P.xivACTA011420/03/2006,03:56PM\nAbbreviationsModernWorksandEditionsANRWHaase,W.(ed.).(1972–).AufstiegundNiedergangderrömischenWelt.Berlin:deGruyter.CAGCommentariainAristotelemGraeca.(1882–1909).(23vols.).Berlin:Reimer.DKDiels,H.(1951–2).DieFragmentederVorsokratiker.(3vols.).6thedn.,revisedbyW.Kranzandoftenreprinted.Berlin:Weidmann.(Originalworkpublished1903.)EKEdelstein,L.andKidd,I.G.(eds).(1988–99).Posidonius:TheFragments.(3vols.).2ndedn.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.KKühn,K.G.(ed.).(1821–33).Galen.Operaomnia.MedicorumGraecorumoperaquaeexstant.(20vols.)Leipzig:Cnobloch.Repr.Hildesheim:Olms,1964–5.KRSKirk,G.S.,Raven,J.E.,andSchofield,M.(1983).ThePresocraticPhiloso-phers.2ndedn.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.LSLong,A.A.andSedley,D.N.(1987).TheHellenisticPhilosophers.(2vols.).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.SVFvonArnim,J.(1903–24).StoicorumVeterumFragmenta.(3vols.).vol.4:indexesbyM.Adler.Leipzig:Teubner.AbbreviationsforAncientAuthorsandTextscanbefoundintheIndexLocorum.xvACTA011520/03/2006,03:56PM\nChronologyHistoryPhilosophySciences,Arts,Religion776–490BCE:Archaic776bce:FirstcelebrationofPeriodtheOlympicgames753bce:Traditionalc.750–725bce?:HomericfoundingofRomepoemsfl.c.700bce:HesiodEarlyormid7thcenturybce:Archilochus(poet)Midtolate7thcentury:Alcman(poet)b.630bce:Sappho(poet)594/3bce:Solon,chieffl.600–550bce:Thalesof585bce:eclipsepredictedarchoninAthensMiletusbyThalesd.547+bce:Anaximanderfl.544bce:PherecydesofofMiletusSyrosfl.546–525bce:AnaximenesofMiletus561/0–556/5;550/49;c.570–478bce:560–480bce:Hecataeusof540/39–528/7bce:3XenophanesofColophonMiletus(mademapoftheperiodsofPeisistratus’rulec.570–490bce:world;participatedininAthensPythagorasofSamosIonianRevolt499bce)(migratedtoCrotonc.530bce).c.524–459bce:fl.c.490bce:Heraclitusof525/4–456/5bce:Themistocles(statesman)EphesusAeschylus(tragicpoet)521–486bce:Dariusking*515–440sbce:518–446+bce:PindarofPersiaParmenidesofElea(poet)508/7bce:Cleisthenes’politicalreformsinAthensxviACTA011620/03/2006,03:56PM\nchronology499bce:IonianRevolt500–428bce:AnaxagorasEarly5thcenturybce:*495–429bce:Periclesc.492–432bce:HippasusofMetapontum(statesman)Empedocles(Pythagorean,5thcenturybce:Zenoofmathematician,musicEleatheory)5thcenturybce:Melissusof*496–406bce:SophoclesSamos(Eleatic;participated(tragicpoet)inSamiandefeatoverAthens441bce)490–323BCE:Classicalc.490–420bce:ProtagorasPeriod(sophist)490–479bce:PersianWarsc.485–380bce:Gorgias*485–420sbce:Herodotus490bce:BattleofMarathon(sophist)(historian)5thcenturybce:Hippias480s–406bce:Euripides(sophist)(tragicpoet)480bce:BattleofSalamisc.470–390bce:Philolaus465–425bce:Phidias478bce:DelianLeague(Pythagorean)active(sculptor)established(Athenianfl.440–430bce:DiogenesallianceagainstthePersians)ofApollonia*460–403bce:Critias469–399bce:Socratesc.469–399bce:(poet,associateofSocratesfl.late5thcenturybce:HippocratesofChiosandleaderoftheThirty)Antiphon(sophist)(mathematician)5thcenturybce:Leucippus460s–399+bce:Theodorus(atomist)ofCyrene(mathematician)c.460–370bce:c.460–370bce?:DemocritusofAbderaHippocratesofCos(atomist)(medicine)460/55–400bce:Thucydides(historian)451/0–404/3bce:c.450–380orearly360s459/8–*380bce:LysiasAlcibiadesbce:Euclides(Socratic/(orator)Megarian)*450–386bce:Aristophanes(comicpoet)2ndhalf5thcenturybce:OinipidesofChios(mathematician)443–429bce:Pericles*445–365bce:Antisthenes447–432bce:ConstructiongeneralofAthens(Socratic/Cynic)ofParthenon438bce:StatueofAthenaParthenosbyPhidias431–404bce:c.430–355bce:Aristippus436–338bce:IsocratesPeloponnesianWar(Socratic/Cyrenaic)(orator,teacher)429–347bce:Plato*430–355+bce:Xenophon(historian)xviiACTA011720/03/2006,03:56PM\nchronology420sbce?:TreatisecontainedinDerveniPapyrus(Orphic)411–410bce:RuleofFour412/03–324/21bce:*415–369bce:TheaetetusHundredinAthensDiogenesofSinope(the(mathematician)404–403bce:RuleofCynic)ThirtyTyrantsinAthens399bce:Trialandfl.c.400–350bce:391/0–*340bce:EudoxusexecutionofSocratesArchytus(Pythagorian)(mathematician,astronomer)400/380bce?:Anonymousc.397–322bce:AeschinesDissoiLogoi(orator)387/6bce:Foundationof384–322bce:DemosthenestheAcademy(orator)384–322bce:Aristotlec.384–322bce:DioclesofCarystus(medicine)372/70–288/86bce:*370–?300bce:Theophrastus(Peripatetic)Aristoxenus(music)367–357bce:DionysiusIIc.365–275bce:PyrrhotyrantofSyracuse(inexile357–344,retired344bce)359–336bce:PhilipIIking347–339/8bce:Speusippus344/3–292/1bce:ofMacedonheadofAcademyMenander(comicpoet)341–270bce:Epicurus338bce:DefeatofAthens339/8–314bce:Xenocratesfl.330bce:CallippusbyPhilipatChaeroneaheadofAcademy(mathematician,335bce:Foundationoftheastronomer)AthenianLyceumcalendarreformonbasisofCallippus’astronomicaltheory336–323bce:Alexander2ndhalf4thcenturybce:theGreat,kingofMacedonEudemusofRhodes(Peripatetic,studentofAristotle)2ndhalf4th–early3rdcenturybce:Stilpo(Megarian)4th–3rdcenturybce:DiodorusCronusandPhiloofMegara(Megarians)xviiiACTA011820/03/2006,03:56PM\nchronology331bce:Foundationof334/3–262/1bce:Zenoc.330–300bce:DerveniAlexandriaofCitium(founderofPapyrusStoicism;arrivalinAthensc.330–260bce?:313bce)Herophilus(medicine)in331/0–230/29bce:AlexandriaCleanthes(Stoic)c.331–278bce:MetrodorusofLampsacus(Epicurean)323–31BCE:Hellenisticc.325–235bce:Timonc.325–250bce:EuclidPeriod(studentofPyrrho)(mathematician)323bce:Alexander’sdeath322/1–288/86bce:followedbywarfareamongTheophrastusheadofhisgeneralsandtheirLyceumsuccessorsfl.c.320–300bce:Dicaearchus(Peripatetic)317–307bce:Demetriusof316/15–241/0bce:c.315–240bce?:Phaleron(studentofArcesilaus(Academic)Erasistratus(medicine)inTheophrastus)governs314/13–270/69bce:AlexandriaAthensPolemoheadoftheAcademy307/6or305/4bce:FoundationoftheEpicureanschool(theGarden)301bce:“Battleofthec.300bce:FoundationofEarly3rdcenturybce:kings”atIpsustheStoaFoundationoftheMuseumKingdomsofthesuccessors:andLibraryatAlexandriaAntigonidsinMacedoniaSeleucidsinSyriaandBabyloniaPtolemiesinEgypt288/86–270/68bce:StratoFirsthalf3rdcenturybce:headofLyceumAristarchusofSamos280/76–208/4bce:(astronomer)Chrysippus(Stoic)*287–212/11bce:Archimedes(mathematician)c.276bce:PhaenomenabyAratus270/69–268/64bce:Crates275/73–*194bce:headofAcademyEratosthenes(scholarand270/68–226/24bce:LycoheadofLibraryinheadofLyceumfor44yearsAlexandria)xixACTA011920/03/2006,03:56PM\nchronology264–241bce:FirstPunic268/64–241/0bce:WarArcesilausheadofAcademy247–183/2bce:HannibalMid3rdcenturybce:Aristo(Carthaginiangeneral)ofChios(Stoic)236–183bce:Scipio*230–140sbce:Diogenesoffl.c.205–184bce:PlautusAfricanus,polticianandSeleucia/Babylon(Stoic)(comicpoet)conquerorofSpain239–169bce:Ennius(comicpoet)218–201bce:SecondPunic214/13–130/29bce:fl.200bce:ApolloniusofWarCarneadestheElderofPerge(mathematician),Cyrene(Academic)authorofConics2ndcenturybce:Antipaterc.200/170bce:SuccessionsofTarsus(Stoic)bySotionofAlexandria185/80–110/9bce:c.200–118bce:PolybiusPanaetiusofRhodes(Stoic)(historian)2ndcenturybce:Critolaus185–*159bce:TerenceheadofLyceum(comicpoet)167/6–137/6bce:CarneadesheadofAcademy155bce:Carneades,DiogenesofBabylon,andCritolaus’embassyfromAthenstoRome(bringingphilosophytoRomeforthefirsttime)149–146bce:ThirdPunic147–127bce:RecordedWarobservationsofHipparchus146bce:Destructionof(astronomer)Carthage146bce:GreecebecomesaRomanProvince133bce:TiberiusGracchus,137/6–131/0bce:tribuneofthepeopleCarneadestheYoungerheadofAcademyc.135–51bce:Posidonius(Stoic)c.130–68bce:AntiochusofAscalon(Platonist)123and122bce:Gaius127/6–110/9bce:Gracchus,tribuneoftheClitomachusheadofpeopleAcademyxxACTA012020/03/2006,03:56PM\nchronologyLate2ndcenturybce:MetrodorusofStratonica(Academic)106–43bce:Cicero(orator,110/9–84/3bce:Philoofstatesman,andphilosopher)Larissalastheadof100–44bce:JuliusCaesarAcademy*110–40/35bce:Philodemus(Epicurean)*94–50sbce:Lucretius(poet,Epicurean)86bce:SullaconquersBefore88bce?:Antiochusc.86–35bce:SallustAthensofAscalon(Platonist)sets(historian)uphisownAcademyinc.84–54bce:CatullusAthens(poet)c.70–50bce:Andronicus70–19bce:Virgil(poet)ofRhodesheadofPeripateticschool63bce–14ce:Octavian1stcenturybce?:65–8bce:Horace(poet)(laterAugustus)Andronicus’publication*64bce–21+ce:StraboofAristotle’sworks(geographerandhistorian)1stcenturybce:Aenesidemus(Pyrrhonist)1stcenturybce?:Agrippa(Pyrrhonist)59bce–17ce:Livy(historian)48bce:FirstfireinlibraryofAlexandria31bce:BattleofActium:1stcenturybce:Arius1stcenturybce–early1stEgyptbecomesaRomanDidymus(doxographer)centuryce:VitruviusProvincefl.c.25bce:Eudorusof(architect)27bce:EndoftheRomanAlexandia(Platonist)Republic27BCE–476CEImperialc.20bce–45ce:Philoof*8/4bce:birthofJesusRomeAlexandria(Judaeus)27bce–14ce:Augustus(philosopher/theologian)emperor14–37ce:Tiberiusemperor4bce/1ce–65ce:Senecafl.14–37ce?:Celsus(Roman(poetandStoic)encyclopedist;medicine)d.36ce:Thrasyllus(editorofPlatoandDemocritus)xxiACTA012120/03/2006,03:56PM\nchronology41–54ce:Claudiusc.40/50–110+ce:Dio*35–90sce:QuintillianemperorChrysostom(oratorand(orator)Cynicphilosopher)c.45–125ce:PlutarchofChaeronea(Platonist,biographer,essayist)54–68ce:Neroemperor50/60–*135ce:Epictetusfl.62ce:Heronof69–79ce:Vespasian(Stoic)Alexandriaemperorc.50–100ce:Moderatus(mathematician),authorof70ce:TitustakesJerusalem(Platonist)Mechanica79ce:EruptionofMt.Late1stcenturyce?:Aëtius*56–118+ce:TacitusVesuvius(doxographer)(historian)79–81ce:Titusemperor81–96ce:Domitianemperorfl.c.100ce:Nicomachusof95ce:DomitianexpelsGerasa(mathematicianandphilosophersfromRome,neo-Pythagorean)includingEpictetus117–138ce:Hadrianfl.c.120ce:Hierocles(Stoic115/25–late180s/earlyemperorphilosopher),authorof190sce:Lucian(satirist)ElementsofEthics129–?199/216ce:Galen*125–170+ce:Apuleius(medicine)(authorandphilosopher)138–161ce:Antoninus2ndcenturyce:Numeniusfl.146–*170ce:PtolemyPiusemperor(Platonist)(mathematician,2ndcenturyce?:Alcinousastronomer)(Platonist)*150–211/16ce:Clementc.150–200ce:AtticusofAlexandria(Christian(Platonist)theologian)2ndcenturyce?:ChaldaeanOracleseditedorcomposedbyJulian(thesacredtextofmiddleandlatePlatonists)161–180ce:Marcus176ce:MarcusAureliusc.170–236ce:BishopAureliusemperorfoundsfourchairsofHippolytus(ChristianphilosophyinAthenstheologian)175/81ce:TrueDoctrinebyCelsus(anti-Christian)c.180ce:AtticNightsbyAulusGellius193–211ce:Septimiusfl.late2ndcenturyce:c.185–254ce:OrigenofSeverusemperorSextusEmpiricusAlexandria(Christian(Pyrrhonist)philosopherandexegete)198/209ce:AlexanderofAphrodisias(commentatorxxiiACTA012220/03/2006,03:56PM\nchronologyonAristotle)appointedpublicteacher,probablyinAthens222–235ce:AlexanderFirsthalf3rdcenturyce:SeverusemperorDiogenesLaertius,authorofLivesofPhilosophers3rdcenturyce:AmmoniusSaccas(PlatonistinAlexandria,teacherofPlotinus,Origen,andLonginus)205–270ce:Plotinus(inauguratesNeoplatonism)c.213–273ce:Longinus(rhetoricianandphilosopher)234–*305ce:Porphyryfl.250ce:Diophantus,(Neoplatonist)authorofArithmetics3rdcenturyce:Amelius(Platonist)c.245–325ce:Iamblichus(foundedaNeoplatonicschoolinSyriaatApamea)273ce:Longinusexecutedc.260–339ce:EusebiusofbytheRomansCaesarea(theologianandhistorian)284–305ce:Diocletianc.300ce:PorphyryemperorofEasternempirepublishesPlotinus’Enneads286–305ce:MaximianrulesWest306–337ce:Constantinec.317–388ce:Themistiusfl.320ce:PappusoftheGreatemperor(converts(commentatoronAristotle)AlexandriatoChristianity)(mathematician)313ce:EdictofMilan(tolerationofChristianity)fl.c.350ce:Calcidiusc.328–373ce:Athanasius(ChristiantranslatorandbishopofAlexandriacommentatoronPlato’s329–389ce:GregoryofTimaeus)Nazianz(theologian)xxiiiACTA012320/03/2006,03:56PM\nchronologyc.330–379ce:BasilofCaesarea(theologian)c.330–395ce:GregoryofNyssa(theologian)361–363ce:ReignofJulian(theApostate),restorationofpaganism379–395ce:Reignof354–430ce:Augustine,374–397ce:AmbroseTheodosiusauthorofConfessions(c.bishopofMilan391ce:Paganismoutlawed397–400ce)andCityofGod398–403ce:John(c.413–426ce)ChrysostombishopofConstantinople411ce:Alaric,kingoftheAfter400ce:Neoplatonicfl.early5thcenturyce:Visigoths,sacksRomeschoolsinAthensandStobaeus(anthologist)Alexandria415ce:Hypatia(mathematicianandphilosopher)murderedbyChristiansinAlexandriad.432ce(atagreatage):PlutarchofAthens(Neoplatonist)d.c.437ce:Syrianus(Neoplatonist)412–485ce:Proclus(Neoplatonist)455ce:Romesackedby*440–517+ce:AmmoniusGaiseric,kingofthe(Alexandria,teacherofVandalsDamascius,Philoponus,andSimplicius)5thcenturyce:HieroclesofAlexandria(Neoplatonist)476CE:Fallofthec.480–524ce:BoethiusWesternEmpire(commentatorandauthorRomulusAugustulusofConsolationofPhilosophy)deposedbyOdoacer,kingoftheHeruli493–526ce:Theodoricc.490–560ce:SimpliciusOstrogothickingofItaly(Neoplatonist)c.490–570sce:Philoponus(ChristianizedschoolinAlexandria)495/505–565+ce:Olympiodorus(Platonist)xxivACTA012420/03/2006,03:56PM\nchronology527–565ce:Justinian529ce:NeoplatonistsinemperorinConstantinopleAthens,including529ce:JustinianclosestheDamascius,Simplicius,andNeoplatonicschoolinPriscian,fleetoPersiaAthens(Ctesiphon)532ce:Simplicius’commentariesonAristotleprobablyallwrittenafterthisdate6thcenturyce:DavidandElias(Alexandria)2ndhalf6thcenturyce:AnonymousIntroductiontoPhilosophyofPlato570?–632ce:Muhammad,c.580–662ce:MaximusprophetofIslamtheConfessor(theologian)7thcenturyce:Arabc.640ce:DestructionofconquestofSyria,libraryatAlexandriaJerusalem,Egypt,andelsewherec.circa:aroundthis/thesedate(s)*dateapproximate?date(s)uncertainordisputed+sometimeafterdatelistedsdecadeof/sometimewithindateslistedfl.floruit:date(s)whenpersonwasactivexxvACTA012520/03/2006,03:56PM\nLYDIAerR.BlackSeadaneMMiletusCosIONIAPrieneEphesusBranchidaeColophonSmyrnaApolloniaClazomenaeLampsacusMityleneSamosTroyLESBOSCHIOSDELOSAegospotamiTHRACEAbderaCRETEPAROSSeaAegeanRhamnousCEOSAthensMELOSThebesMarathonMegaraArgosBOEOTIAMt.ESEsusHeliconCorinthuMt.ONNMycenaeSpartaELOPDelphiPParnassntOlympElisuMoOlympiaTarentumCrotonThuriiMetapontumRhegiumITALYEleaSyracuse)Mt.EtnabceLeontiniSICILYAcragasRome200km100mi0GreekWorld(6th–5thcenturiesMap1xxviACTA012620/03/2006,03:56PM\nBabylonR.SeleuceiaTigrisR.phratesuESELEUCIDKINGDOMAntiochAscalonTarsusSinopeCyprusNileR.PergeRhodesAlexandriaLampsacusPergamumByzantiumSamosbeR.ChiosCreteuLesbosPhaleron)DanAthensPTOLEMAICEGYPTbceOlympiaMACEDONIALarissaDelphiSpartaCyreneSyracuseKmRomeTheHellenisticPeriod(323–31Carthage0250500Map2xxviiACTA012720/03/2006,03:56PM\nCtesiphonBabylon.SeleuceiaRisrigT.RsetarhpSARACENSEuREDSEADamascusNyssaJerusalemAntiochApameaCaesarea.NazianzRileNBLACKSEAAlexandriaAphrodisiasByzantium/ConstantinoplebeR.uDanAthensCyreneGOTHSChaeroneaMEDITERRANEANSEAKilometersMilesSyracuseMt.VesuviusPompeiiRomeHerculaneumMilanCarthageTheLateRomanEmpireFRANKS00250150500300750450Map3xxviiiACTA012820/03/2006,03:56PM\nIntroductionOuraimaseditorsofACompaniontoAncientPhilosophyistoshowhowspecialiststodayreadthetextsoftheGreekandRomanphilosophers.Toindicatetherangeofworkinthisfield,wehavesolicitedcontributorsfromtheUnitedStatesandCanada,fromnumerousEuropeancountries(Denmark,England,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Italy)andfromJapan.Inadditiontoseniorscholars,wehavealsoinvitedanumberofyoungerspecialistsinthehistoryofancientphilosophy,whoaredestined,inthenearfuture,notonlytocontinuetheworkoftheirpredecessors,butalsotorevisetheirapproaches,methods,andresults.Wewanttodemonstrate,inageneralway,thatitisphilosophicallyimportanttodothehistoryofphilosophy,andespeciallythehistoryofancientphilosophy.Theneedtojustifythisenterpriseisnotaslong-standingasonemightthink,sincetheideathatitisphilosophicallyimportanttodothehistoryofphilosophyandeven,quitesimply,that“doingthehistoryofphiloso-phy”hasameaning,arenotveryoldclaimsbutdatebackatmosttotheendoftheeighteenthcentury.Evenifoneadmitstheimportanceofthehistoryofphilosophyinphilosophicalactivity,onemightaskmoreparticularly:Whyisaworklikeoursuse-ful,giventhatsincethesecondhalfofthenineteenthcenturyatleast,historiesofancientphilosophyhavebeenwrittenaccordingto“scientific”criteriathatarestillroughlyours?Inansweringtheparticularquestion,wewillmakesomeremarksaboutthemoregeneralquestion.AncientPhilosophyisdefinedasthegroupofphilosophicalworkswrittenintheGreekandRomanworldfromthebeginningofphilosophyinthesixthcenturybceintheGreekcolonyofMiletusonthecoastofAsiaMinortotheendofantiquity,some50yearsafterthefalloftheRomanEmpireintheWest.In529ceJustinian,theChristianruleroftheEasternEmpireinConstantinople,closedtheNeoplatonic(pagan)schoolinAthens,andthephilosophersfledtoCtesiphon(inmodernIraq).LateralivelyArabicphilosophicalandscientifictraditiondevelopedintheregion,whichhaddeeprootsinGreekandRomanthought.The1,200yearstowhichourvolumeisdevoted,fromthesixthcenturybcetothesixthcenturyce(seechronology)isaperiodfullofnoiseandpassion,butthephilosopherstookpartinoneandthesamedrama,adramathatmakessenseandthatlasteduntilChristianity,afterengulfingpoliticalpower,wasimposedastheonlypermissiblethought.ThelastfiresofancientthoughtweresetbyNeoplatonistsofthesixthcenturyce,byindividualslikeSimpliciusandPhiloponus,butwerethenquenched.Betweenthemomentofitsbirthandthemomentofitsdisappearance,however,ancientphilosophyhaditsowndynamicandlogic,whichthechaptersinthisvolumeexplore.xxixACTA012920/03/2006,03:56PM\nintroductionThevastmajorityofphilosophicaltextsfromantiquityhavebeenlost,manyofthemalreadyinantiquity(seeMejer,ancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltradi-tion).Ofimportantphilosophers,wearefortunatetohavethecompleteorrelativelycompleteworksinGreekofPlato,Aristotle(hisschooltreatisesbutnothispublishedworks),Epictetus,MarcusAurelius,SextusEmpiricus,andPlotinus;andinLatinofLucretius,Cicero,andSeneca.Weoweatremendousdebttothecommentarytradi-tionoflateantiquityforpreservingmuchofwhathascomedowntous,andespeciallytheworksofPlatoandAristotle(seeMejer’spaperonthepreservationoffragmentsofpre-Socraticphilosophy;seeHoffmann,whatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?theexampleoftheneoplatoniccommentators,onthecommentarytraditionmoregenerally).Differenthistoricalperiodshavehaddifferentconceptionsabouttherelationshipbetweentheirownphilosophicalpracticeandthatoftheirphilosophicalpredecessors.Aristotle,forexample,whowasperhapsthefirstphilosophertotakeseriouslythehistoryofphilosophy,famouslyrepresentedhispredecessorsinthefirstbookoftheMetaphysicsastakingimportantbutstumblingstepstowardhisowntheoryofthefourcauses.Thisapproachtothehistoryofphilosophy,whichissometimescalled“Whighistory”andwhichwewillcallthe“teleological”approach,takesastheculminationor“end”ofphilosophythecurrentand/orpreferredphilosophicaltheory,andinter-pretsearlierthinkersascontributinginonewayoranothertothedevelopmentofthattheory(seeHussey,thebeginningsofscienceandphilosophyinarchaicgreece,pp.7–8).HegeladoptedasimilarapproachinhisLecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophyintheearlynineteenthcentury.TheattitudecanbefoundeveninaphilosopherasmodernasHeidegger,whothoughtthatPlatoandAristotleopenedachapterinthehistoryofbeing(“theforgettingofbeing”)whichHeideggerhimselfintendedtoclose.Thehistoryofscienceisofteninterpretedinasimilarway.Earlierscientificachieve-mentsareunderstoodfromtheperspectiveofthecurrent“correct”theory.Newton’sLawsareoftenconsideredaspecialcaseofRelativityTheory(forbodiesmovingatslowspeeds).Suchanapproachtothehistoryofbothphilosophyandsciencerisksanachronism,becausetheearlierthinkerswerequiteprobablynotworkinginthesameconceptualframeworkastheirdescendants,usingsomevaguelyarticulatedcon-ceptionofamuchlatergoal,anddevelopingtheoriesinlightofthatgoal.Onthecontrary,theywereaskingquestionsthatseemedpressingatthetimeandinresponsetotheirownpredecessors.AsThomasKuhnpointsoutinthecaseofNewton,thelatertheoryhastoreinterprettheconceptsoftheearliertheorytomakeitaspecialcaseof1itsown.Thustheteleologicalapproachtendstodistorttheearliertheory.Italsotendstomarginalizefigureswhoseviews,fromalaterperspective,appeartobefalsestarts.Therehasalwaysbeenaninterestintheancientphilosophersasthesourceofviewsthatarecurrentlyinfashion.Inthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,forexample,Oxfordordinarylanguagephilosophersinthe1950sand1960sfoundthatAristotle,too,wasengagedintheirprojectofconceptualanalysis.MetaphysicianshavelookedtoAristotleforinsightintothenotionofessence.Philosophersinterestedinfunctionalism1.ThomasKuhn(1970).TheStructureofScienctificRevolutions.2ndedn.(ch.9).Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.xxxACTA013020/03/2006,03:56PM\nintroductioninthephilosophyofmindandthephilosophyofbiologytracevariousversionsofthetheorybacktoAristotle.Modernvirtueethicsowesitsinspirationtohim.Inturn,con-temporaryepistemologistslooktoSextusEmpiricus’accountofPyrrhonismforanearlyversionofskepticism.Thisisnotthehistoryofphilosophy,buttheuseofearlierviewsintheserviceofcontemporaryphilosophicalconcerns.Theancients,too,regularlymadephilosophicaluseoftheirpredecessorsinarguingfortheirownagenda,asourpreviousexampleofAristotleshows(andseeSharples,theproblemofsources,forexamplesfromtheHellenisticera).Thisproductiveuseofearlierphilosophysuggeststhatphilosophyandsciencehavequitedifferentrelationshipstotheirownearliertraditions.Agoodphysicistneedsnospecialknowledgeofthehistoryofhissciencemorethan20yearsold.AdoctorneednotreadHippocrates.Indeed,innotreadingHippocrates,hemaywellbecomeabetterdoctor,becausehehasmoretimetodevotetomasteringhisart(readingHippocratesisalotofwork).Thisobservationdoesnotruleoutthehistoryofthesciences,butitdoesdecouplethehistoryofthesciencesfromeffectivescientificpractice.Philosophyisdifferent.Tobesure,oneneednotknowthehistoricalbackgroundofconceptsatplayintheworksofcontemporaryphilosophersinordertounderstandtheirdiscourse,especiallywhentheymakenoreferencetothatbackground.Onecaninfactunder-standanyphilosopherthisway.Butthesituationisdifferentfromthatofthephysi-cianwhoisignorantofthehistoryofhisfield.Thephysicianignorantofhistorypracticeswithouttheoreticaldamagetohistheoreticalresearchinmedicine.Thisisnotthecaseforthephilosophicalreaderandevenlessforthephilosophical“professional.”Ourphilosophicalconceptshaveevolvedfromtheancientconcepts,andarethushistoricallyconstituted.FormanycenturiespeopleunderstoodDescartesasathinkerwithoutintellectualties.Butweundoubtedlyunderstandhimbettersincetheeffortsofthetwentiethcenturyhaverevealedhisdebttomedievalandpre-modernthought.TherevolutionaryconceptsofDescartesgaininphilosophicalrichnesswhenoneseesintheimageofwhatandinoppositiontowhattheywereconceivedandputtowork.Thesameistrueofourcontemporaryphilosophicalconcepts,whichhaveevolvedfromthoseoftheancients.Theknowledgeofthehistoricalrootsofconceptsandof2traditionsisfarfrombeingasimplematterofcuriosity.Insomehistoricalperiods,andsometimesevenconcurrentlywiththeteleologicalapproach,onecanfindanapparentlyoppositeattitude,thatthereisnothingnewunderthesun,becauseeverythingthinkablehasalreadybeenthoughtbytheGreatAncients.Inthehistoryofthoughtthisattitudeisquiteoftenlinkedwithsomekindoffundamentalism,whichurgesareturntotheoriginaldoctrineoftheFoundingFathersofphilosophy.Weseethissortofapproach,forexample,amongthePlatonistsofImperialRomeandlateAntiquity(onthistopic,seeZambon,middleplatonism,andHoffmann’schapter,citedabove,ontheNeoplatoniccommentators).Veryoften,despitetheprofessionoforthodoxy,thelaterworkdifferssubstantiallyfromitssource,sinceitinterpretsthesourceinlightofotherphilosophicalandculturalcurrentsof2.Foranexcellentdiscussionofthespecialrelationsphilosophyhastohistory,seeBernardWilliams,“PhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline,”TheRoyalInstituteofPhilosophyAnnualLecture2000,onlineat:http://royalinstitutephilosophy.org.xxxiACTA013120/03/2006,03:56PM\nintroductionitsowntime(suchasChristianity).PhilosophersintheMiddleandLatePlatonictraditionsalsothoughtthatPlatoandAristotle(andothers)sharedthesamedoctrine–theonetruedoctrine.Soalargepartofthephilososophicalprojectwastoreconcilepositionsthatappearedfromaliteralreadingofthetextstoconflictwithoneanother(forinstance,thecreationoftheworldinPlato’sTimaeusanditseternityinAristotle).Connectedwiththissecondattitudeistheideathatphilosophyhascertain“styles”ofthinkingthatcrossthebordersofhistoricalperiods.Fromthisperspective,whenColeridgeclaimsthateachofusisaPlatonistoranAristotelian,hemaysinbysimpli-ficationsincethereareperhapsmorethantwoparadigmsofthisgenre,butheisnonethelessprofoundlyright.SincetheendofantiquityuntilthemoderneraonecaneffectivelyreadthehistoryofphilosophyasasortofstrugglebetweenanapproachthatplacestruerealityinsomeIdealandanapproachthatattemptsasfaraspossibletocombinethoughtwithperception.Likewise,andthisisespeciallytrueforepistemo-logyandthephilosophyofscience,onenoticesanuninterruptedoscillationbetweenareductionistpositionthattendstomakeallsortsofknowledgesubdivisionsofasingleknowledgeandapositionthataffirmstheirreducibilityofdistinctdomainsofknowledge.Whenonespeaks,correctly,ofthe“rediscovery”ofAristotleinthethirteenthcentury,ofPlatointhefifteenthcentury,oftheSkepticsinthesixteenthcentury,ofEpicurusbyGassendiorofPlatonismbythephilosophicallogiciansintheearlytwentiethcentury,theissueisnot–ornotonly–therediscoveryoftextsthathadbeen,indifferentways,renderedinaccessibletophilosophers.Theissueissimplytheactiveandeffectiverediscoveryofphilosophicalpostureswhichonedoesnotfullyunderstandunlessoneunderstandstheoriginalversion.(Seefurther,Pellegrin,thearistotelianway.)AthirdattitudeturnsupsometimesintheHumanities,concernedastheyaretounderstandthehumanconditionandhumanconstructions.Thisistheviewthattherearecertainperennialquestionsaboutthehumancondition–questionsabouthumanhappiness,suffering,weakness,mortality.Ourhumannature,ouraspirations,andvulnerablilitieshaveremainedthesameacrossthemillenia,evenifourexternalcircumstanceshavechanged.Onthisviewweturntothegreatestoftheancients,whetherpoets,historians,orphilosophers,becausetheyansweredthesequestionsparticularlywellandhavemuchtoteachusforourownlives.Thesevariousapproachescertainlyhavevalueinsupportingcurrentphilosophicalpositionsoringeneratingnewones,butnoneisahistoricalapproachtotheancienttexts.Theyarenothistorical,preciselybecausetheyassumethattheancientauthorswereanswering(ortryingtoanswer)ourcurrentquestions.Sotheyareliabletodistorttheevidencetofitexpectations.Ofcourse,allinterpretersbringtothetexttheirownexpectations,shapedbytheirownexperienceandeducation.Wecannotavoidthis.Thedangerisafailuretorecognizewhatwearedoing.Ifwewanttounderstandtheideasofanancientauthor,andtointerpretthoseideashistorically,wehavetobecomeawareofourownperspectiveandtakecarenottobeundulyinfluencedbyit.AsHeraclitussaid:“Unlessoneexpectstheunexpected,onewillnotfindit”(DK22B18,part).Wemustbepreparedtobesurprised.Uptotheendofthenineteenthcentury,modernphilosophersrarelydetectedasignificanthistoricaldiscrepancybetweenancientwaysofthinkingandtheirown,and,consequently,theyconsideredGreekandRomanphilosophersastheirdirectxxxiiACTA013220/03/2006,03:56PM\nintroductioninterlocutors.Butwiththedevelopmentofarigorouslyhistoricalapproachtotheclassicaltexts(knowninGermanasWissenschaft),particularlyintheGermanhistor-icalschool(whichincludespeoplelikeF.Ast,I.Bekker,J.Bernays,H.Bonitz,C.A.Brandis,C.Prantl,L.Preller,H.Ritter,F.Susemihl,E.Zeller,andmanyothers),phi-losophybecameahistoricalobject.Thisisquitearadicalchangeinwesternphilo-sophyand,inaway,therealbeginningofthehistoryofphilosophyinthesenseweunderstandit.Fortherecannotbeanyhistoryofphilosophybeforeitsobjecthasbecomeahistoricalobject.Themostimmediatebenefitofsuchatransformationintheapproachtophilosophicaltextsistheenormousphilologicalandhistoricalworkaccomplishedbymodernscholars–continuing,tobesure,theeffortsoftheirforerunnersfromtheRenaissanceonwards–workthatmadethosetextsavailableinreliableeditionsthatwestillusetoday.Asexamples,wementionthemulti-volumeeditionoftheancientGreekcommentatorsonAristotleandothers,CommentariainAristotelemGraeca(citedasCAG),publishedinBerlinbetween1882and1909;HermanDiels’three-volumeeditionofthefragmentsofthepre-Socraticphilosophers,DieFragmentederVorsokratiker,publishedin1903,revisedbyWalterKranzin1951–2,whichremainsourprincipalsourceforearlyGreekphilosophy(citedasDK)(onDielsandthedoxographicaltradition,seeMejer’schapterinthisvolume).WealsoowetothisperiodtheeditionofPlato’sworksbyJohnBurnet,Platonisopera(5vols.,OxfordClassicalTexts,1900–7),whichisonlynowbeingrevised(byE.A.Dukeandothers,vol.1:1995).Inpartbecauseofthatmeticulousscholarlywork,whichincludedthecarefulstudyandeditingofclassicaltextsofmanykinds,historiansofancientphilosophyhavecompetedwithphilologistsinthestudyoftheworksofancientphilosophy.Philologistssometimesconsidertheirscholarlytoolssufficientfortheinterpretationofancientphilosophicaltextswithoutrecognizingthatancientphilosophicaltextsneedsomespecificinterpretativeprocedures.Treatingphilosophicaltextsasonaparwithoratoricalproseorepicverse–differingonlyinsubjectmatterandgenre–ontheassumptionthatallthetextswerewritteninthesamelanguagesduringthesameperiod,istomisswhatisexceptionalaboutphilosophicaltextsnomatterwhentheywerecomposed.Certainly,everyonewouldagreethatagoodhistorianofancientphilosophymustbeabletoreadthelanguagesinwhichthetextswerewritten.Fur-thermore,havingasoundbasisinphilologicaltechniquesisamostvaluableaidinthestudyoftheancientphilosophicaltexts.Butphilologyisonlypartofwhatthosewhostudyancientphilosophyneedtoknow.Theinterpretationofancientphilosophicaltextsrequiresphilosophicalexpertise,aswellasphilological.Justasphilosopherstodaymustundertaketomakesenseoftheargumentsoftheiropponentsbeforetheycanevaluateandcriticizethem,sothestudentofancientphilosophymustdothesame,thoughinthiscasethemaintaskistheinitialstepofmakingsense,ataskmademoredifficultbyourtemporaldistance.Butlikeanyphilosopherreadingtheworkofanotherphilosopher,ourtaskistounderstandwhatthephilosophicaltextistryingtoshowandhowitdemonstratesitsconclusions.Whenanargumentismissingorfragmentary,asisoftenthecasewiththeancientphilosopherswhoseworkshavecomedowntousinfragmentaryform,wemusttrytoreconstructwhattheargumentwas,giventheevidencewehave.Thisundertakingdemandsphilosophicaltools,includingthoseoflogicandconceptualxxxiiiACTA013320/03/2006,03:56PM\nintroductionanalysis.Thequestionstheancientswereaskingmayinsomecasesdifferconsiderablyfromthosethatphilosophersareaskingtoday,butuncoveringandclarifyingtheissuesrequiressoundphilosophicaljudgmentonourpart.The1950s,1960s,and1970swereexhilaratingtimesforthestudyofancientphilosophy.InthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcenturyphilosopherslikeGilbertRyle,LudwigWittgenstein,andMartinHeideggerhaddiscovered,especiallyinPlato,whattheytooktobetheseedsoftheirownphilosophicalpositions.Thedevelopmentofvariousanalyticaltools,especiallylogic,providednewmeansforinterpretingthean-cienttexts.Alegendarysix-weekNEHseminarinColoradoSpringsin1970,organizedbytheleadersinancientphilosophyintheEnglish-speakingworldatthetime–GregoryVlastos,G.E.L.Owen,andJohnAckrill–stimulatedtalentedyoungphilosopherstostudyandreevaluatetheancienttexts.Atthesametime,among“continental”scholars,themostremarkableeventinthefieldofancientphilosophywasAristotle’sreturntofavorintheAcademicworld,fromwhichhehadbeenostracizedforreligiousreasons.ForbeforeandaftertheSecondWorldWaranewinterestinAristotleoriginatedintheThomisticrevival,whichtookplacearoundJacquesMaritainandEtienneGilson.AmongthemostprominentfiguresofthistrendweremembersoftheBelgianschoolofLouvain,ledbyMgr.AugustinMansion.Thismovementproducedsomeimportantworks,suchasthetranslationofAristotle’sNicomacheanEthicswithcommentarybyR.A.GauthierandJ.Y.Jolif.ThemainwitnessofthereintroductionofAristotleinFrenchAcademiccirclesisprobablythebookbyPierreAubenque,LeProblèmedel’êtrechezAristote,publishedin1962–abookthatdisplaysastrongHeideggerianinfluence.Themidtwentiethcenturythusdemonstratedarenewedinterestinancientphilosophyinitsownright,buttheattractionwaswhatancientphilosophycouldcontributetomodernphilosophicaldebate.Thelate1970sand1980switnessedasignificantshiftinscholarlyinterest,whichmaybeconsidered,inaway,anafter-shockofthenineteenth-centuryhistoricalearthquakementionedabove.Thisshiftwasledbyagroupofyoungscholars,whoarenowleadersinthefield.JuliaAnnas,inheropeningeditorialinOxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy(1983),characterizedthetimeasanexcitingmomentinancientphilosophy,with“horizonsexpandingandinterestsshifting.”Sheencouragedcontributorstoventureintolessfamiliarterritory,especiallyinpost-Aristotelianphilosophy.MichaelFrede,inthemanifestointroducinghiscollectionofpapers,publishedin1987,spokeoftheenormousincreaseininterestinHellenisticphilosophyinthepasttenyears,andexhortedotherstodevotesimilarattentiontolateantiquity.Hecharacterizeddifferentapproachestothehistoryofphilosophy,andadvocatedtheexaminationofancientphilosophers,notasexemplarswhofitintothehistoryofphilosophybecausetheyansweredphilosophicalquestionsespeciallywellorpoorly(thatwouldbetoassumethereareperennialphilosophicalquestionsorthattoday’sphilosophicalframeworkis“correct”),butinsteadtostudythemwithinallthevarioushistoriesinwhichtheyoccur.Ourtaskasinterpreters,onthisview,istouncoverthephilosophers’questionsandtodiscoverorreconstructtheirreasonsforansweringthemastheydid.Althoughthemethodsofphilosophicalreconstructionarephilosophical,theoverallapproachisvigorouslyhistorical.Inasimilarspirit,scholarsofancientphilosophyinthe1980sbeganseriouslytoquestiontheuseofAristotleandotherhistoricalfigurestosupportcontemporaryxxxivACTA013420/03/2006,03:56PM\nintroductionphilosophicaltheories.MylesBurnyeat,inaninfluentialpaperpresentedinthemid1980s,whichwaswidelycirculatedthereafterandpublished(asadraft)someyearslater,“IsAristotle’sPhilosophyofMindStillCredible?”arguedstrenuouslyagainstfunctionalistinterpretationsofAristotle’spsychology,concludingthat“newfunction-alistmindsdonotfitintooldAristotelianbodies.”Thepaperhasstimulatedmuchthoughtfulresponse(onthisdebate,seeCaston,aristotle’spsychology).Whilequestionswerebeingraisedabouttherelevanceofancientphilosophytocontemporaryphilosophicalproblemsandabouttheappropriatenessofinterpretingthemasansweringourmodernquestions,extensivescholarlyworkwasbeingdoneinavarietyofareasofancientphilosophy,whichallowedtextstobereevaluatedphilosophicallyfromanumberofnewperspectives.ParticularlyimportantwastheworkonHellenisticphilosophyandthelaterstagesofancientphilosophy.Forinstance,the“rediscovery”ofthelibraryatHerculaneum(buriedtogetherwithPompeiibytheeruptionofMt.Vesuviusin79ce),whichcontainsmanyworksbythehithertoobscureEpicureanphilosopherPhilodemus,andthedevelopmentoftechniquesenablingthefragmentarypapyritobereadandeditedhaveallowedforacriticalreassessmentofEpicureanism(seeSharples’schapterinthisvolume,andMorel,epicureanism).Similarly,therecent“rediscovery”ofafragmentofEmpedoclesidentifiedintheearly1990sandpublishedin1999hasenabledscholarstoreassessthethoughtofthatpre-Socraticphilosopher(seeCurd,parmenidesandafter:unityandplurality,pp.36–42).RichardSorabji’smassivetranslationproject,TheAncientCommentatorsonAristotle,whichsawitsfirstpublicationinthelate1980s,hasmadethoseworksoflateantiquity(editedacenturyagoasCommentariainAristotelemGraeca,mentionedabove)moreaccessibletophilosophicalscholars.Inthelate1970sand1980s,scholarsinsignificantnumbersbegantoexplorearelativelyneglectedareaofAristotelianstudies,hisresearchinbiology(whichconstitutesone-quarterofAristotle’ssurvivingworks)andtherelationbetweenhisphilosophyofscienceinthePosteriorAnalyticsandhispracticeinthebiologicalworks(seeDetel,aristotle’slogicandphilosophyofscience,andLennox,aristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophy).Thisenormouslyproductivemovementalsogavescholarsanewperspectivefromwhichtoinvestigatehismetaphysics,psychology,andpoliticalphilosophy.Theaccesstonewinformationandattentiontoneglectedtextshasaffectedourunderstandingofmorefamiliartexts.Inaddition,ancientphilosophyhasprofitedfromtheapplicationofanumberofneworpreviouslyunheededmethodsofinterpretation.Manyhistoriansofancientphilosophyintheanalytictraditionhavecometorecognize(whatliteraryinterpretersappreciatedallalong)thatitisnotenoughtoanalyzeparticulararguments,especiallyinPlato,withoutseriousattentiontothenarrativeordramaticcontext,whichmaywellaffectthemeaning(seeC.Gill,theplatonicdialogue).SomeofthemostfruitfulrecentworkonPlatocombinescarefulanalysisoftheargumentswithattentiontothedialogueformandnuancesofthedrama.Furthermore,especiallyincontinentalEuropebutincreasinglyintheEnglish-speakingworldaswell,studentsofancientphilosophyarelookingoutsidetheirowndiscipline–especiallytothehistoryofancientscience,religion,politics,institutions,literature,law,andsoon–forinsightintotheancientphilosophicaltexts.ThetheoreticaltoolsusedbyhistoriansofphilosophyininterpretingthetextshavealsobeeninfluencedbyrecentdevelopmentsinsocialxxxvACTA013520/03/2006,03:56PM\nintroductionscienceandpsychology.Philosophyhascometoberecognizedasaculturalproduction,ifnotinthesamewayasotherdisciplines,atleastalongsidethem,thathasarisen,likeotherculturalproductions,fromacomplexofhistoricalfactors.ThisistheprofoundmeaningoftheveritablerevolutioninancientstudiesinitiatedbyJean-PierreVernantinthe1960s.Heregardedphilosophymainlyasaneffectofthatneworganizationofpowerwhichwascalledthenandisstillcalled“democracy.”Ourcollectiontakesaccountofthesevariousdevelopments.Forinstance,wehaveundertakentodisplaytheinterconnectionsbetweenancientphilosophyandotherdisciplinesanddomainsbydevotingseveralchapterstotherelationshipbetweenphilosophyandmathematics(Mueller,greekmathematicstothetimeofeuclid),medicine(Pellegrin,ancientmedicineanditscontributiontothephilosophicaltradition),andreligion(Betegh,greekphilosophyandreligion).Theaimofthiscollection,whichemphasizesanumberofdifferentapproaches,istopresentourmostcurrentunderstandingofancientphilosophy.Thisisthejustificationforthepresentcollection.Wehopethatourcollectionwillgivenotonlyanoverviewofthehistoryofancientphilosophyaspresentlyunderstoodanddebated,butwillalsostimulatereaderstoreflectonhowthestudyofancientphilosophymaybestproceedfromhere,combininginsightsfromdifferentapproaches.Notonlythat:Webelievethatthehistoryofancientphilosophy,properlyunderstoodhistoricallyinitsownculturalandintellectualcontext,hasmuchtocontributetoourpresentunderstandingofphilo-sophicalproblems.ThatisnotbecauseAncientPhilosophyisansweringtheverysamequestionsmodernphilosophersareasking.Onthecontrary,itisbecausethequestionsandanswerswefindinancientphilosophymaystimulateustothinkagainortoreconsiderawell-wornissuefromanewperspective.Thuswehopethatourreaderswillalsohavemuchtogainphilosophicallyfromthechaptersinthisvolume.M.L.G.andP.P.xxxviACTA013620/03/2006,03:56PM\nPartIEarlyGreekPhilosophyACTC01120/03/2006,03:57PM\nedwardhussey2ACTC01220/03/2006,03:57PM\nthebeginningsofscienceandphilosophy1TheBeginningsofScienceandPhilosophyinArchaicGreeceEDWARDHUSSEYHomerandHesiod:APre-scientificConceptionoftheWorldAncientGreekscienceandphilosophywereradicalinnovations,buttheydidnotemerge1fromavoid.Thischapterwillfirstlookatthewayinwhichtheworldwasconceivedandunderstood,around800bce,inthepoemsofHomerandHesiod.Thesepoemssooncametobetakenascanonical:inarchaicGreece,andrightdowntotheendofthefifthcentury,toknowandunderstandHomerandHesiodwastheacceptedtestofaneducatedperson.Thiscanonicalstatuswasnotcreatedorenforcedbypoliticaloreconomicpower.Apartfromtheirpoeticachievement,theconceptionoftheworldandofhumanlifethattheyprovidedwasonethatwasfoundconvincing,authoritative,andcomprehensivebysuccessivegenerations.Theirwayofrepresentingtheworld,andthegod-givenauthoritytheyclaimedfortheirstatements,constitutedtheestablishedview,againstwhichtheIonianproto-scientistsofthesixthcenturyweresharplyreacting,buttowhich(notsurprisingly)theywerealsoindebted.Therearenodiscontinuitiesinthiskindofhistory,withoutaccompanyingpartialcontinuities,whicharealsopartofthestory.Itmakessensetofocus,attheoutset,exclusivelyonHomerandHesiod,butthereadershouldrememberthattheywerenottheproductsofastaticorself-containedsociety.ArchaicGreecewas,onthecontrary,constantlyreceivingandreactingtoallkindsofstimulifromtheoldercivilizationsofthe“AncientNearEast”(touseaconvenient,thoughEurocentric,andnowalmostunintelligibleterm).TherearetwocharacteristicfeaturesoftheHomeric-Hesiodicworld-viewthatareofleadingsignificanceforastudyofthe“originsofscience.”Thesetwofeaturesareconnected,thoughoneofthemisveryobviousandoneratherlessso.Theobviousfeature,overwhelminglysotoamodernreader,isthecentralityofanthropomorphicgods(especiallytheOlympiangods)intheworld.Thelessobviousfeatureisthefinitudeandthevaguenessaboutthelimits(spatial,temporal,andofotherkinds)oftheworld.Thesecharacteristicfeaturesmustnowbeexamined.ThegodsofHomerandHesiod(manyofwhomweregodsofactualGreekreligiouscults)wereconceivedofanthropomorphically.Thoughtheywereimmortal,andhad1.IammuchindebtedtoHywelCliffordforhishelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraftofthischapter.3ACTC01320/03/2006,03:57PM\nedwardhusseysuperhumanpowers,theirnaturewasphysicallyandpsychologicallylikethatofhumanbeings.HencetheworldofHomerandHesiodis,initsessenceanditsdetails,afamiliarone,closelyrelatedtoordinaryhumanexperience.Thecentralityofthegodsintheworldissuchthatitcanalmostbesaidthatthegodsaretheworld.TheprincipalanddefiningconstituentsofthebodyoftheworldarethemselvesancientgodsinHesiod(Sky,Earth,Erebus,Tartarus,Sea:Theog.117–132).Withinthiscosmicframework,othergodsareactive,ofwhichtherulingdynastyisthatoftheOlympiangodsundertheleadershipofZeus.TheruleofZeusandtheOlympiansseemsnotguaranteedtobeinevitable,andintheorycouldbechallenged;butinpracticeZeus’unequalledcombinationofpowerandwisdommeansthatheisdefactokingoftheworld.(ThedifficultiesZeusencountersinHomerinputtinghisplansintoeffectaremostlyduetotheneedtocarrytherestofhisfamilywithhimandtocircumventoppositionfromsomeofthemonsomeparticularmatters.)Humanbeings,evenwhenfavoredbythegods,aretransientandmarginalbeings,subjecttothewillofthegods.Thegodsare,therefore,centraltotheintelligibilityoftheworldinastraightforwardway:theyareinfactthesourceandtheexplanationofanyintelligibilityitmayhave,bothasawholeandastoparticularobjectsorevents.Tounderstandanythingistoknowwhichgodorgodsareresponsibleforit;andthatisusuallythemostthatcanbedone.Thegodsthemselvesarenottobeunderstoodintermsofanythingelse,thoughsomeofthemmaybepartlyintelligibleintermsofothergods.Theworldasawhole,then,maybeseenandpartlyunderstoodassomethingshapedbythechoicesofvariousgodsactinginanearlierstageoftheworld.Thechoicesofgodsmaybeunderstoodinsofarastheyhavemotivationsthatmakesenseinhumanterms.Hesiodoffersthemostambitiousattemptatproviding,systematically,anintelligibleworldalongtheselines.HisTheogonycontainsavastgenealogicalscheme,whichenablesonetodeterminetheexactkin-relationshipofanygodtoanyother.Theknowledgeofthegods’pedigreesandtheirinterrelationsisjustasimportantforunderstandingtheiractionsandwishesasthecorrespondingknowledgeabouthumankingsandprincesisinHomer’sepics.Hesiod’sTheogonyisinstructivebecauseitsoclearlyaimstobeanaccountoftheworldintermsofanthropomorphicgodsthatwasascompleteandcoherentasitsauthorcoulddevise.Thecharacteristiclimitationsofthiswayofthinkingappearallthemoreclearly.Thereisfirstofallthepointthattheworldisessentiallyfiniteinallrespects,becausethegodsarefinite.Spatially,itdoesnotextendfurtherthantheskyaboveandthemurkyregionofTartarusbelow,whiletheearthisencompassedbythecircularlyflowingOcean.Intime,itdoesnotgobackbeforetheappearanceofChaos,thefirstgod,ofwhomitisexpresslysaidthatit“cametobefirstofall”(Theog.116).Nothingissaidabouttheotherendoftime,butthestockepithetofthegods,“livingalways”(aieneontes),certainlyneednotimplyanunendingfuture.Thepowerandknowledgeofthegodsthemselves,thoughitissuperhuman,isalsofinite,beingintelligibleonlyafterthehumanpattern.Evenwithinthefiniteworld,therearethingsthatarebeyondthepowerofanygodstochangeortoprevent:notonlythegeneralnatureoftheworldandthegodsincludinghimself,butcertainmattersthatareimpersonally“fated4ACTC01420/03/2006,03:57PM\nthebeginningsofscienceandphilosophytobe,”whetherconditionallyorabsolutely(examplesinHesiod:Theog.463–465,475–476,891–894).Nordoanyofthegodsappeartoknowanythingaboutwhatmayliebeyondthespatialandtemporalboundariesmentioned.Inthissenseitmaybesaidthatthegodsthemselveshaveonlyalimitedunderstandingofthemselvesandtheirownsituation.Finitudeisnotinitselfahindrancetointelligibility;ratherthereverse.ButitisafeatureoftheHomeric-Hesiodicworldthatthoughitisfiniteitslimitsarenotonlyvaguelyexpressed,butareinthemselves,apparently,indefinite;inanycase,nottobepreciselyknown.Asaresult,eventhefinitudeoftheworldremainsindefinite,andconceivablyrevisable.Thispointisdifficulttoestablishwithcertainty,becausetheattentionofHesiodorHomeris,naturally,mostlyfocusedonthecenteroftheworld,theOlympiangods,andtheeventsinrecenthistoryinthecentralregion,inheavenandonearth.But,justbecausethegodsarefiniteandcentraltotheworld,thelimitsoftheworld,andanythingthatmightliebeyond,arebeyondthegods’powerstoaffect,andbeyondtheirknowledge.Tosaythis,forHomerandHesiod,isasgoodastosaythatanythingthatisbeyondthelimitsisunknowable,andcannotbeconsideredashavinganyrelevancetohumanlifeordivinebeings.Thisholdsnotonlyforthespatialandtemporallimits;thesameindefinitenessattachestothelimitsofthegods’power,tothelimitsofintelligibilityofthegodsthemselves,andtothatoftheworldasawhole.For,ashasbeensaid,thegodsareconceivedofas“super-humans,”whoarenottobeunderstoodotherwisethanbyana-logywithhumannatureasitisknownincommonexperience.Whilethismakesiteasytounderstand,inageneralway,manyaspectsoftheirnatureandtheiracts,itleavesitimpossibletostatewithanyprecisionhoworwhyanyonegodwillactinanyoneparticularcase.Andintelligibilityoftheworldasawholedependsdirectly,ashasbeensaid,onthatofthegods.Totakeacasedirectlyaffectingtheobservableregularorderoftheworld:atOdyssey12.377–388,theSun,angeredattheslaughterofhissacredcattlebyOdysseus’men,threatenstogodownintotheunderworldandshineamongthedead.ThisthreatisparriedbyZeuswithapromisetokillthoseresponsible.SoeventhecontinuanceoftheSuninhisregularcourse,onwhichsomuchdepends,isneverabsolutelyguaranteed.IngeneralitseemsthatthepreventionofcosmicanarchyisentirelydependentonthecontinuingbutfinitewatchfulnessandresourcefulnessofZeus;sothattherecanbenoabsoluteguarantee.Sofarascanbeseen,theHomeric-HesiodicaccountoftheworldwasthegenerallyacceptedoneinarchaicGreece.Thisisnottosaythatitwasregardedaswhollyunchallengeable,orwasleftwhollyunchallenged.AccordingtotheHomeric-Hesiodicworld-viewitself,anyhumanclaimtoknowthetruthaboutimportantmatterscon-cerningthegods,wasinprincipleopentochallenge.SoHomerandHesiodthemselveshadtoexplainhowitwasthattheyhadbetteraccesstothetruththanotherhumanbeings.Theirclaimwasthattheywere“inspired,”thattheirstoriesweretoldthembytheMuses,thegoddesseswhopresidedovermemoryandsong;hencethesourceoftheirknowledgewas,asithadtobe,thegodsthemselves.Butwhatsupportedtheclaimbyanyoneparticularpoettobesoinspired?Itcouldonlybethepublicsuccessofthat5ACTC01520/03/2006,03:57PM\nedwardhusseypoetinpoeticallyreproducingandenhancingtraditionalmaterials,inawaythatwasmanifestlypleasingandconvincingtomostlisteners.Atthispoint,then,therewasnecessarilyanappealtotraditionalbeliefsandstoriesaboutthegods.TheHomeric-Hesiodicreworkingofthesebeliefsandstoriesimposeditselfbecauseitwasfoundtobe,ultimately,themostsatisfying.Ifthisisright,itfollowsthatitwasopentoanyone(eventoacharacterwithintheHomericnarrativeitself)todoubtortochallengetheHomeric-Hesiodicaccountofthings,onanyoneparticularpoint,evenaveryimportantone.Thus,atOdyssey24.351–352,itappearsthatLaertes,inhisdespairatOdysseus’failuretoreturn,hasbeendoubtingwhethertheOlympiangodsarestilldispensingjusticeonOlympus.AndthereisevidenceformythsdiscrepantfromthoseofHomerandHesiodbeingassertedbyotherpoets,sometimesinwhatseemstobemoreorlessfreeallegory;forexample,Alcman’sstoryofPorosandTekmor(Alcmanfr.5Davies).Butwhatitwasnotpossibletodo,wastodoubtortochallengethesupportingsubstratumoftraditionalbelief:aboveall,thebeliefthatthebeingscentraltotheunderstandingoftheworldweretheanthropomorphicgodsoftraditionalGreekreli-gion.WhenthewholeHomeric-Hesiodicviewfinallycameundersystematicattack,thefirstseriouscriticofwhomweknow,XenophanesofColophon,centeredhispolemicpreciselyontheanthropomorphicgods.ItisclearthenthattheHomeric-Hesiodicviewoftheworldwasnotandcouldnotbea“free-standing”one,appealingtosomeintrinsicauthorityofitsown.Itwasdependentonthetacitsupportofthe“traditionalsubstratum”ofassumptions.Thusthisviewoftheworldwasclearly“pre-scientific.”Tosaythis,isnottodenythatitrepresentstheresultofagreatdealofintensereflectionontheproblemsofunderstandingtheworld.Moreover,someofthisreflectionisrecognizablyconcernedwithquestionsthataretypicallyphilosophical.Thus,Aristotle(Phys.IV.1,208b29–33)plausiblyinterpretsHesiod’sintroductionofChaosasthetemporallyfirstgod,asdrawnfromarecognitionthatsomeconceptofplaceisnecessaryandantecedenttoanyaccountofmaterialexistence.But,inspiteofsuchinterestingsuggestionsofproto-philosophicalreflection,ithastobesaidthattheHomeric-Hesiodicviewwaseveninacertainsense“anti-scientific”(and“anti-philosophical”).Thisismeantasfollows:itpositivelymadeimpossiblethedevelopmentofanyscientificthinkingabouttheworldasawhole,solongasit(orratherthe“substratum”ofsupportingbeliefs)retainedanyauthority.Itwasrecogni-tionofthisincompatibilitythatunderlaywhatPlatolatercalled“theancientquarrelbetweenphilosophyandpoetry”(Rep.X,607b5–c4;thepoets,HomerandHesiodaboveall,beingtheprincipalexponentsofthepre-scientificview).Whatconstitutesthedivisionbetween“scientific”and“pre-scientific”isnottheuseof“gods”inexplanationsoftheworld.Italldependsonthenatureofthegods.Aswillbeseen,theMilesiantheoristsalsopostulatedintelligent“gods;”butthesewerenotthetraditionalanthropomorphicones.ThegodsofHomerandHesiod,andgenerallythoseofthetraditionalGreekbelief,weretoohumanlycredible,toostraightforwardlysimilartocommonhumanexperi-ence,toserveaselementsofascientifictheory.Theyleavenoroomforanyefforttoriseabovevaguenessandambiguityinunderstanding,andtodevelopamoredetachedandprecisestyleofdescribingandunderstanding.Ashasbeenseen,thevery6ACTC01620/03/2006,03:57PM\nthebeginningsofscienceandphilosophynotionandlimitsofthe“world”havetobeleftindeterminate,andnotdeterminableeveninprinciple.Theythereforemakeascientificefforttounderstandtheworldimpossible,solongastheyaretakentobeindispensable.InnovationatMiletus:AristotleonThalesandHisNewStyleofCosmologyThereisalltoomuchwedonotknowabouthowpeoplewerethinkingintheGreekworldbetween800and600bce.Afewfragmentsofpoetsthrowonlyanuncertainandindirectlighthere.Whiletraditionalpoliticalstructureswerecrumblingandnewonesappearing,itseemsthatneverthelesstheHomeric-Hesiodicworld-view,andthetraditionalreligiousbeliefsandpracticesthatunderlayit,remaineddominant.After600bce,though,thepicturebecomesfuller,andotherformsofreligiousbeliefandpractice(particularlymystery-cultsandoccultbeliefs)comeintoview.Oneinnovationthatwassurelyofmorethanincidentalsignificancewastheintroduc-tionofGreekalphabeticwriting.Thismadeitpossible,foronething,tostabilizethetextsofHomerandotherpoetsin“canonical”versions.Itmadeitpossiblealsotoreducecustomarylawtoastandard,publiclyavailable,andrevisablewrittenform.Morethanthat,theeaseofalphabeticwriting,andthegrowthofliteracyamongtherichercitizens,meantthatanythinkinginvolvingmorethanthesimplestkindofargumentationcouldnow,forthefirsttime,beexactlyrecordedandpreservedbyanyoneliterate,forconsiderationbyanyoneelsewhowasliterateandinterested.Itwasnolongernecessarytowritemetricallyandtobedependentonsurvivinginenoughmemories.Themerepossibilityofcommittingone’sthoughtstowriting(nottomentionthesheerpleasureofdoingso)wasitselfanencouragementtoanykindofspeculationthatwentbeyondtheboundsofeverydayexperience.Anarchaeologicalpointisperhapsofinteresthere.VerylittleGreekwriting,apartfrominscriptionsandgraffiti,hasbeenmateriallypreservedfromthearchaicandclassicalcenturies.Outstandingamongthescantyfindsarecertainenigmatictextsdealingwithoccultreligiousmatters:thegoldplatesfoundinSouthernItaly,theOlbiabone-fragments,theDervenipapyrus.Aristotle,whosetestimonyisournaturalstarting-point,ascribestoThalesofMiletus(activec.600–550bce)thedistinctionofbeingthe“foundingfather”(archEgos)of“naturalscience,”orofakindof“philosophy”(Met.A.3,983a24–b27).Itisclearenoughwhat,inAristotle’sview,separatedThalesandhissuccessorsfromanythingwhateverthathadpreceded.ForAristotle,Thaleswasthefirstofthosewho“under-tookproperexaminationofthingsthatare”(eisepiskepsintOnontOnelthontas),who“philosophizedaboutreality”(philosophEsantesperitEsalEtheias),andwasthereforetryingtoconstructascience(epistEmE).AristotleisnotheresupposingthatThalesproducedanythinglikehis(Aristotle’s)ownidealofascienceofnature.Onthecontrary,heforthrightlypointsoutthedefects,asheseesthem,intheassumptionsandmethodsofalltheearliertheoriststhatherecog-nizesasforerunners.ButhiscentralpointinMetaphysicsAisthatthoughtheywerefumblingbeginners,theyhaveanincontestableclaimtoberecognizedaspredecessors,asatleastwould-bescientists,becauseofthekindofexplanationsthattheygave.7ACTC01720/03/2006,03:57PM\nedwardhusseyThalesapparentlysaidthateverythingcameoutof,andwasmadeof,water.Thisstatement,takenonitsown,couldwellbepartofacreationmythofthekindfamiliarfromsomeAncientNearEasterntexts.ButAristotleinterpretsit(nodoubtpartlyinthelightofthebetter-attestedtheorizingofThales’successors)astheprovisionofa“materialcause.”Thatis,heseesThalesasclaimingthateverythingthereis,itsnatureandbehavior,canandmustbeunderstoodexclusivelyintermsoftheproper-tiesofwater.Itisclearthatthissortofgeneralandabstractclaimisnotthekindofthingthatonemeetswith,eitherexpressedorlatent,inHomerorHesiod.Itischaracteristicofatheoreticalenterprise.Aristotleelsewhere(e.g.,Met.B.4,1000a9–19;Meteor.II.1,353a34–b5)contrastswithscientificexplanationstheexplanationsofthosehecalls“writersaboutgods”(theologoi),thosewhospeak“inmyths”(muthikOs),implyingthattheyareincomplete,unsatisfactoryandnotworthwastingtimeon.WhetherornotweaccepttheAristotelianaccount,itisimportantatleasttounderstandwhatitdoesandwhatitdoesnotimply.(Thepointsmadehereapplyalso,andmoreclearly,tothebetter-documentedsuccessorsofThales.)Aboveall,itdoesnotimplythatThaleswasscientificbecausehistheorywasa“materialist”theory,orbecauseitavoidedexplanationsintermsof“gods.”(HereI2bypassquestionsaboutwhatwasforAristotlea“material”cause;itisclearatleastthatAristotledoesnotmeantoattributeanywell-developedconceptof“matter”or“corporeality”toThales.)Aristotleelsewhere(Phys.III.4,203b3–15)impliesthatThales’“water”wasnotjustthewaterofordinaryeverydayexperience,asnowadaysconceived,butatheoreticallyloadedversionofthesame,whichwasaliveandintelli-gent,andcouldreasonablybeentitled“thedivine.”Aristotlehimselfdisapprovesofthissortofexplanation,andfindsitperhapsalmostasarchaicandbizarreasdomostmoderns.Butthatdoesnotdeterhimfromseeingitasbeing,atleastinintention,agenuinely“scientific”explanation.Thepoint,forAristotle,isthat,evenifThales’waterisa“god,”thisisaverydifferentkindofgodfromanyofHomerandHesiod’sgods.Itisanexceptionallywell-definedgod,ofwhichthepropertiesandpowerscouldinprinciplebestatedpreciselyinafinitelist.Becauseofthistheoreticalprecision,itcanwithoutabsurditybesuggestedascapableofgivingacompletetheoreticalexplanationoftheuniverse.TheTheoreticalEnterpriseUnfolds:APost-AristotelianInterpretationAristotle’saccountofthebeginningsofGreekscienceandphilosophyistheunavoid-ablestarting-pointforanyinvestigation.Thisissoforobviousreasons:Aristotleisbyfarthefullest,mostcoherent,mostexpert,andmostintelligentwitnesswehave.Hisconceptionofwhathappenedisnaturallyhardtochallenge;ithasbeenacceptedoftenenough,oftenwithoutbeingverypreciselyunderstood.ButourdependenceonAristotleisnotabsolute.Acertainamountofindependentevidencesurvives,particularlyintheshapeofbrieforlongerquotationsfromoriginal2.SeeBodnárandPellegrin,aristotle’sphysicsandcosmology,inthisvolume.8ACTC01820/03/2006,03:57PM\nthebeginningsofscienceandphilosophyworksofthesixthandfifthcenturies.ThisotherevidencecanoftensuggestwaysinwhichAristotle,likeanyotherhistorianofscienceandphilosophy,hasoversimplifiedanddistorted.InevitablyAristotle,likeeveryoneelse,sometimescannotfreehimselfsufficientlyfromhisowntemporalandphilosophicalstandpoint.Fromthediscussionofthe“flagship”caseofThales,above,itseemsthatthecoreofAristotle’sviewaboutthenatureofhisinnovationcanbeaccepted,evenifwedonotacceptAristotle’swholephilosophyofscienceandscientificexplanation.Wecanunderstandthatthenewcosmologywasnew,andwasproto-scientific,becauseitwasaself-consciouslytheoreticalenterprise.Againstthisview,itcanbearguedthatthenon-Aristotelianevidencedoesnotsupportsuchanunderstanding.(HereIdrawonFrede,2000.)Theargumentispartlylinguistic:beforePlato,theword“philosophy”anditsderivedverb(philosophia,philosophein)arerarelyattestedandhavenospecializedsense.Norarethereanyotherwordsthatareobviouslyusedtodesignatethenewapproachtocosmologyanditspractitionersassomethingseparateanddistinct.Inparalleltotheselinguisticpoints,itcanbepointedoutthatinthesurvivingremarksofthe“pre-Socraticphilosophers,”wefindthemcomparingthemselveswith,andattackingorpraising,notonlyothersofthesamenarrowgroupbutalsoawholerangeofpoetsandsages.Muchmustbeconcededtothesearguments.Itiscertainlyprobablethat,rightdowntotheendofthefifthcentury,therewasnoonewordorphraseinusetodenote,exclusively,thosewenowseparateoffas“pre-Socratics.”Itisalsohighlylikelythatboththeiradmirersandtheirdetractorsmadeuseofthegeneralterms“sage”(sophos:usuallyapproving)and“cleverperson”(sophistEs:ambiguousasbetweenapprovalanddisapproval).Thesetermscoveredamultitudeofactivities,buttheirimportwasapersonofrealorpretendedgeneralintelligence,appliedtoallsortsofmatters,whoseinsightsmightwellnotendorsetraditionalviews.ItisHerodotuswhoprovides,inhisportraitsofsuchmenasSolonandAmasisandhisvignettesofThalesandothers,theclearestviewofwhata“sage”wasexpectedtobe.Itwascharacteristicofthesagetopresenthimselfasconfidentlyinoppositiontothegeneralmassofreceivedopinion;andthisiscertainlytheattitudeandthetonewefind,togiveanoutstandinginstance,intheopeningofHeraclitus’book:Whilethislogosisalwaysmenalwaysprovetohavenounderstanding,bothbeforetheyhavehearditandwhenoncetheyhaveheardit.ForthoughallthingscomeaboutaccordingtothislogostheyarelikepeopleofnoexperiencewhentheyexperiencewordsanddeedssuchasIsetforth,dividingeachthingaccordingtonature(phusin)andpointingouthowitis.(HeraclitusDK22B1,part)Correspondingtotheinclusivityoftheseterms,itisalsohighlylikelythatatleasttheearliesttheoreticalcosmologistsdidnotseethemselvesexclusivelyassuch.Thalesevenwonaplaceamongthe“SevenSages,”anditishispracticalwisdom,aswellashis“prediction”ofasolareclipse,thatisillustratedbyHerodotus.XenophanesandHeraclitusminglemoral,political,andreligiousexhortation,andsocialcriticismwiththeircosmologies.Yet,evenwhenallthisisconceded,itbynomeansfollowsthatAristotlewaswrong,thattherewerenonewtheoreticalenterprisesornewmethodsincosmology,orthat9ACTC01920/03/2006,03:57PM\nedwardhusseytheywerenotseenassomethingnew.Hereonemusttakeaccountofacertainlinguisticconservatism,whichcanbeseeninotherinstancestoo.TheevidencesuggestsstronglythatGreekgeometryandarithmeticwerealreadydevelopingastheoreticalsciencesbeforetheendofthefifthcenturybce.Andyetthetermsalwaysusedtodenotethesetheoreticalactivitieswereonesthatdidnotdistinguishthematallfromthecor-respondingpracticalones:“geometry”(geOmetria)means“land-measurement,”i.e.land-surveying;andthewordsfornumbertheory(arithmEtikE,logismoi)mean“theart3ofcounting”and“reckonings.”Oneimportantmarkofsuchanenterpriseisthatitdealsprimarilyinwhatmay,looselyanduntechnically,becalled“abstract”entities.Moreprecisely,itsexplanatorytermsrefertoentitieswhicharetheoreticallypostulated,andwhich,thoughrelatedtotheobjectsofexperience,areatsomeremovefromthem.Mostimportantly,theyare“sanitized”toenablethemtobehandledwithprecisioningeneraltheoreticalreasonings.Theabstractnessofeventheearliesttheorists,theMilesians,canbeseeneveninthecaseofThales,ifweacceptonAristotle’stestimonythathis“water”wasnotjustthe“water”ofthemodernphysicist;butitappearsmoreclearlywithhissuccessorAnaximander.ForAnaximandertheultimatetheoreticalentitywas“theinfinite”(toapeiron):aself-confessedabstractentity,butonethatsustainsthesamecentralroleassignedbyThalesto“water.”Withlatertheoriesofthesamesortitisequallyclear,andbynomeansexclusivelyonAristotle’sevidence,thatevenwhen“water”or“air”or“fire”figureasultimatetheoreticalterms,themeaningofthesewordsisonlypartlytobeunderstoodfromourordinaryexperienceofthecorrespondingeverydaythings.Correspondingtothenewabstractnessoftheexplanationsisanewprecisionaboutwhatistobeexplained.WesawthatanimpenetrablevaguenesshangsoverallthelimitsofHesiod’sorHomer’sworld.Thereisnoplausibleway,withintheHomeric-Hesiodicworld-view,inwhicheventhegodscouldhavemorepreciseknowledgeabouttheselimitsandwhatmightormightnotliebeyondthem.Thisbeingso,itmaybemeaninglessanditiscertainlypointlesstoaskforsuchknowledge.Bycontrast,thenew-stylecosmologyhasquestionsoflimits,ortheirabsence,attheforefront;andthesubjectfortheoreticalinquiryisnotjusttheobservableworld-system(kosmos),buttheuniverse,allthatthereis(topan,toholon,taonta).TheMilesians,andmanyotherslaterinthesametradition,optedforwhatwasthentheeasiestsolution,aspatiallyandtemporallyinfiniteuniverse.Henceoneoftheircentraltheoreticaltaskswastoaccountfortheexistenceofoneormorefiniteworld-systems(kosmoi)withinthebasicallyuniformuniverse.(Inthisconnection,itisregrettablethatsolittleisknownabouttheearlydevelopmentofmathematicsasanexactscienceinGreece.Itishardtobelievethattheadventoftheoreticalcosmologyandthatoftheoreticalarithmeticandgeometrywerenotcausallyconnected.)Partofthepointofthisnewkindoftheoreticalentityisthatitlendsitselftounrestrictedgeneralreasonings.Thisraisesthequestionoftherelevanceoftheconceptsofreasonandrationalitytotheinnovationsofthesixthcentury.3.OnthedevelopmentofGreekmathematics,seeMueller,greekmathematicstothetimeofeuclid,inthisvolume.10ACTC011020/03/2006,03:57PM\nthebeginningsofscienceandphilosophyItwouldbeamistaketoassumethattheHomeric-Hesiodicworld-viewdidnotallowtheapplicationofreasonedargumenttolargequestionsaboutthenatureoftheworld.Apartfromtheintrinsicimplausibilityofsupposingthatbeforearound600bcepeopleweresomehow“notrational”(atleastonnon-practicalmatters),butthatthereaftertheybecameso,thereisactuallynoneedtosupposeanysuchthing.Whatweshouldsayis,rather,thattheHomeric-Hesiodicaccountoftheworldrepresentsafavorableexampleofwhathumanreasoncouldproduce,whenworkingundertherestrictiveconditionofnothavingyetdiscoveredthepossibilityofapurelytheoreticalenterprise.Theproblem(fromapost-Milesianpointofview)isthatifonestarts,notfromtheoreticalentitiesspeciallypostulated,butsimplyfromthingsonetakestobedirectlyandwhollygiveninexperience,then,howeverrationaloneis,thepossiblepowerandreachofone’sreasoningsisseverelylimited.First,noMilesian-stylereductionsarepossible:forexample,stones,animals,andwaterareallgiveninexperienceasdifferentthings,sononeofthemcanbetheoretically“reduced”toanythingelse.Allmuststandside-by-side,equallyprimary,inanycatalogofthecontentsoftheworld.Norwillcounter-factualreasoning,thatgreatweaponinthetheoreticalarmory,bepossible;foritwillhavenoArchimedeanpointfromwhichtoexertleverage.Toask,aboutsomefeatureoftheworld,“whatifXwerenotasitinfactis?”ismeaningless,ifXissomethingthatiswhollygivenbyexperiencealone.For,inthatcase,onecanhavenograspwhateverofwhatitmightmeanforXnottobeasitis.Inshort,whilethetheoreticalenterpriseisnottobeidentifiedwithrationalityperse,itischaracteristicofthetheoreticalapproachthatitisneededtoreleasethefullpowerofwhichreasonedargumentiscapable.Conversely,itischaracteristicofthepre-theoreticalapproachthatitisnecessarilyatthemercyofsomegenerallyacceptedassumptions.WemayseeHomerandHesiodastryingtomakethebestsensetheycouldoutofcertainuniversallyacceptedassumptionsoftheirtime:aboveall,thattheworldwasdominatedbyagroupofanthropomorphicgodswhowere,byandlarge,friendlytowardshumankindandgavetheminformation.(Thefactthattheseparticularassumptionshavefewadherentsnowadays,andareindeedwidelyconsideredabsurdandirrational,isnotrelevanttothepointbeingmadehere,thoughitmayhavecontributedtotheconfusionsabouttherelevanceof“rationality.”)Itisonlyapurelytheoreticalapproachthatcangivethenecessaryleveragetorevealgenerallyacceptedassumptionsaswhattheyare,namelymereassumptions.Forgenerallyacceptedassumptions,atheoreticalapproachsubstitutesasitspostulatesotherassumptions,whichareclaimedtobebothintrinsicallymoreacceptableandmoresuccessfulatgivingexplanationsoftheexperiencedworld.Aristotlerightlysawthegivingofcertaintypesofexplanationasanessentialpartofascience.Thenewstyleofcosmologywascharacterizedandalmostconstitutedbyanewstyleofexplanations.AsAristotlesuggests,pre-theoreticalexplanationsinthestyleofHomerandHesiodarealwaysessentiallyincomplete.Atbesttheypresentanoutlineofapossiblewayofunderstandingtheexplananduminoutline,withinacontextofgenerallyacceptedassumptions;theydonotandcannotshowthatitfollowsofnecessityfromthenatureofthings.Bycontrast,thenew-stylecosmologybaseditsclaimtoattentionpreciselyonitssupposedabilitytodeliveranaccountofthe11ACTC011120/03/2006,03:57PM\nedwardhusseyuniversethatnotonlyagreedwithexperiencebutalsofollowedofnecessityfromthestatedprinciples.Thusthepostulatesfromwhichthewholeenterprisestartedhadtobenotonlytruewithoutexception,butalsocapableinprincipleofdeliveringatheorycoveringthewholeoftheuniverseinacoherentandunifiedway.Anysuggestionofanythingintroducedadhoc,tomeetaparticulardifficulty,wouldbefataltotheirplausibility.Everythingabouttheuniversehadtobeseentoflowofnecessityfromwhatitessentiallywas.Aroundthistimethetermphusis,usuallytranslated“nature,”begantobecomecurrenttoindicatetheobjectofthenew-styletheorizing.AshasbeenshownbyHolwerda(1951),inarchaicandearlyclassicalGreekphusisservedasthenouncorrespondingtotheverbeinai“be”inmostsenses.Thesetheoreticaldemandsnaturallyleadtoaparticularstyleoftheorizing.Observablethingshavetobereducedtocombinationsofprimaryconstituents;andtheirpowersandinteractionshavetobesubsumedasspecialcasesundermoregeneraltruthsaboutthepowersandinteractionsoftheprimaryconstituents.Inparticular,apparentlyabnormalandparadoxicalphenomenamustbeshowntobenaturallyandconvincinglyexplicableinthetermsofthetheory.Insteadofthechaosofacceptedopinions,thenewaestheticoftheoreticalexplana-tionrequiresstructuralunityandthemaximumofsymmetryandessentialuniformitytobedisplayedintheuniverse.Theprinciplelaterformulatedasthe“PrincipleofSufficientReason”seemstobeimplicitinthisapproach,andtherearealreadysignsofitsconscioususeinAnaximander’sexplanationofwhytheearthremainsatrest(itissymmetricallyplacedwithregardtotherestofthekosmos).TheoreticalReflectionsontheLimitsandPresuppositionsofCosmology:TheOriginsofGreekPhilosophyLikeeveryotherrealrevolution,therevolutionincosmologywasirreversible.Thiswasnotbecausethenewtheoreticalapproachwasself-evidentlyorprovablytruerinitsresults,andstilllessbecauseofanyimpactonpracticallife(ithadnone),butbecauseitwasinitselfobviouslyandincontestablyanadvanceinthetechnologyofreasoning.Aswitheveryrevolution,therewerethosewhotriedtoignoreorresistit(“theypluckthefruitofwisdomwhenitisunripe”complainedPindar(fr.209Snell)aboutthenewstyleofcosmology);andthosewhofruitlesslyattemptedcompromisebetweentheoldwaysandthenew,suchasPherecydesofSyros(onwhomseeSchibli,1990).But,alsolikeeveryotherrealrevolution,therevolutionincosmologytendedinsomesensetodevouritsownchildren.Foritquicklybecameapparentthatthesharedprogramoftheoreticalinvestigationoftheuniversemightleadequallyintelligenttheoristsindifferentdirections.ThisawkwardfactisalreadyevidentwithintheMilesiangroup.Allweremonists,buteachchoseadifferentfundamentalconstituentandgavedifferentmechanismsfortheproductionofkosmoi.Anyonetheorist,therefore,waslikelytobeinconflictnotonlywithtraditionalideasbutwithallothertheoristsaswell.Howwasthenewparadiseoftheoretical12ACTC011220/03/2006,03:57PM\nthebeginningsofscienceandphilosophyreasoningtobesecuredfrominternaldisagreements?Andwhatuniversallyaccept-ablereasonscouldbefoundforpreferringonetheorytoanother?Oncethesequestionshadbeenraised,theytoocouldnotbeerasedfromthegeneralawareness.TheycanbeseenasthefoundingquestionsofGreekphilosophy.Thesup-portersofthetheoreticalapproachincosmologywereforcedhenceforwardtoapplythatsameapproachtohigher-orderquestions,aboutknowledge,aboutreasoningandreasonableness,abouttheepistemicstatusofthetheoreticalapproachitself.Thefirstpersonwhomourevidenceshowsunambiguouslytohavebeenconcernedwiththeseproblems,isXenophanesofColophon(activebeforeandaround500bce).ItisXenophanes,then,whohasthebestclaimtothetitleof“thefirstGreekphilosopher.”Xenophanesraisesthequestionofhumanknowledgedirectlyandexplicitly,andmakesthefundamentalpointthattruthisnotasufficientconditionforknowledge.Heconcludesthatonthecentralquestions(thegeneralnatureoftheuniverseasawhole,andthenatureofthegods)noknowledgeistobehad,forhumanbeingsatleast:“Andasforthecertaintruth,nomanhasknownoreverwillknowthat,concerningthegodsandalltheotherthingsIspeakof;forevenifoneshouldchancetosaywhatisfullycorrect,stillonedoesnotknow;itisopinionthatisconstructedaboutallthesematters”(DK21B34).ThenaturalsuppositionisthatforXenophanesknowledgeisgainedfromfirst-handexperienceonly.Yethehimselfwentbeyondthatlimit,asheindicatesintheselines.Andanotherremark(DK21B18)expressesoptimismaboutthepossibilityofhumanbeingsto“findoutsomethingbetter”withoutthehelpofthegods.Howbetter“opinion”shouldbeconstructedonthebasisoflimitedexperienceisindicateddirectly:“letthesethingsbetakenasopinionsthatresemblethetruth”(DK21B35).Indirectly,thepre-scriptiontobefollowedisindicatedbythereportsaboutXenophanes’ownontologicallyparsimoniouscosmology.Herehisguidingprincipleistoassumethatthepartsoftheuniverseinaccessibletodirecthumanexperienceareessentiallysimilartotheaccessibleparts.Nounobservedconstituentsorforcesarepostulated.Inofferingthiscosmology,Xenophanesseems,atfirstsight,tohavejettisonedoneoftheprincipalaimsofthetheoreticalenterprise:thatofgivingaconvincinglyunifiedoverallexplanationoftheuniverse.Xenophanes’universe,asrevealedbyhiscosmology,hardlyhasmuchunity.ButitturnsoutthatXenophaneshasasecondbranchtohistheorizing;theuniversethatisasubjectforempiricalcosmology,isnot4thewholeuniverse.Beyondandbehindit,thereisasupremegod.Thoughourknowledgeofthistheologyistantalizinglyincomplete(andAristotle,whohadreaditentire,foundit“unclear”atcertainvitalpoints),itseemsthatitwasbasedontheprinciplethatagod,oratleastasupremegod,mustbeineverypossiblerespectcompleteandperfect.Itmustthereforebeaunityinsomestrongsense,andmustalsoinsomesensecontaintherestoftheuniverse.Thedesiredoverallunityofexplanation,deniedbythecosmology,isthereforerestoredbythetheology.Theprin-cipleof“perfection”onwhichitwasbasedcanhardlyhavebeenseenassomethinggiveninhumanexperience;Xenophanesthereforemusthavetakenitassomethinglikeanaprioritruth.4.OnXenophanes’theology,seealsoBetegh,greekphilosophyandreligion,inthisvolume.13ACTC011320/03/2006,03:57PM\nedwardhusseyThisconclusionisborneouttosomeextentbytheevidence.First,Xenophanesmadebitterattacksonthetraditional,Homeric-Hesiodicreligiousopinions.Thesehelampoonedasshowingalltraditionalsupposed“gods”tobetheoreticallyunfittobeconsideredgods:theyweremorallyvicious,limitedbycontingentcircumstances,andwereconceivedofanthropomorphically,andaccordingtotheprevailinghumanphysicaltypeofeachsociety.Theimplicitappealistosomeunvaryingandabsolutestandardofdivinity,implying(atleast)moralandotherkindsofsuperhumanperfection,inoppositiontothevariousandconfusedconceptionsofimperfect,“human”godscur-rentinthetradition.Also,Xenophanes’positivestatementsshowtheresultsofthisappeal,andcontainsomestatementsdirectlyindicatingthestandardbeingappealedto.“Onegodisgreatestamonggodsandhumankind,notlikemortalseitherinbodilyformorinthought.”“Itisasawholethathesees,asawholethathethinks,asawholethathehears.”“Alwayshestaysstillinthesameplace,notstirringatall;norisitfittingforhimtomoveabouthitherandthither(DK21B23,B24,B26).ThemostobscurepartofXenophanes’theologyisthequestionofthisgod’srelationtotheobservableuniverse.ItisherethatAristotle(Met.A.5,986b21–25)complainsof“unclarity,”buttellsusatleastthatinsomesensethesupremegodisthewholeuniverse,ortheunityofthewholeuniverse.Themostnaturalwaytomakesenseofthismaybetotakethesupremegodascontainingtherestoftheuniverseinmuchthesamewaythatamindcontainsitscontents.Thatatleastwouldexplainhowthegod“withouteffort,swaysallthingsbythethoughtofhismind”(DK21B25).ItisstrikingthatXenophanes,thefirstrecognizablephilosopher,thusstandsatthebeginningoftwoGreekphilosophicaltraditionswhichareusuallythoughtofasnaturallyopposed,andfrequentlywere:theempiricisttraditionandthetraditionofapriorimetaphysics.Initsprocessofdevelopment,philosophygraduallyseparateditselffromthepurelycosmologicalenterpriseandthemorespecializedareasofstudy(astronomy,mathematics,medicine,biology)thathaddevelopedtheirowntheoreticalimpetuspartlyininteractionwithcosmology.Butforbothofthetwogreatphilosophersofthepre-Socraticperiod,HeraclitusofEphesus(activec.490bce)andParmenidesofElea5(activec.470bce;notdiscussedinthischapter),cosmologywasstillanintegralpartoftheirenterprise.Inhistheoryoftheobservablekosmos,HeraclitusmaintainedaXenophaneanempiricism,andasimilarontologicalparsimony,notpostulatinganyunobservedbutinprincipleobservableentities(orforcesormechanisms).Theobservedandobservableforcesatworkarethereforejustthehotandthecold,thewetandthedry,engagedasforcesinunendingstruggleamongthemselves,andembodyingthemselvesinfire,water,andothermanifestconstituentsofthekosmos.Butthiscosmicstruggle,warlikeandyetalsolawlikeinitsregularchanges,isforHeraclitusonlyoneparticularexampleofanabstractschematism(“unity-in-opposites”)whichhefoundinallaspectsofpre-theoreticalhumanexperience,andpostulatedasfundamentalinalltheunderlyingstructuresoftheuniverse:5.OnParmenides,seeCurd,parmenidesandafter,inthisvolume.14ACTC011420/03/2006,03:57PM\nthebeginningsofscienceandphilosophyAroad:uphilldownhilloneandthesame.(DK22B59)Sea:waterpurestandmostimpure,forfishesdrinkableandlife-saving,forpeopleundrinkableanddeadly.(DK22B61)Onthosewhostepintothesamerivers,otherandotherwatersflow.(DK22B12)FromtheseparticularexamplesHeraclitusproceededtoafirstattempttoconceptualizethenotionof“structure”(harmoniE),andtheassertionthat“latentstructureismasterofvisible”(DK22B54).Sotheunderstandingoftheuniverserequirestheuncoveringofnon-obvious“structures”whicharedeterminativeofeverythingelse.Thisisathoughtthatwouldseemtohavebeenimplicitinthetheoreticalenterpriseallalong;informulatingitexplicitly,Heraclituscomestostandatthebeginningsofthephilosophyofscience.RatherlesseasytodecipherisanotherkeyconceptofHeraclitus,“thelogos”(or“thislogos”),theintroductionofwhichhasalreadybeencited.Noevenapproximateequivalentof“logos”,asusedbyHeraclitus,existsinEnglish(orinanyothermodernlanguage,sofarasIknow).ThemanyusesofthiswordinordinaryGreek(“word”,“story”,“account”,“reckoning”,“selection”,“proportion”,“reasoning”arethemostusual)aresystematicallyexploitedandtheoreticallyunitedbyHeraclitus.Thedetails,andtheupshot,arecontroversial;itisatleastarguablethatherewehave,amongotherthings,thebeginningsofphilosophicalengagementwiththeconceptofreason.“Thoughthelogosispublic,themanylivetheirlivesasthoughtheyhadaprivatesourceofunderstanding”(DK22B2).Butthelogosiscertainlynotonlythesharedreasonthatenableshumanbeingstounderstandtheuniverse.Heraclitusseesitalsoasthereasonthatcontrolsthatsameuniverse,ontheprinciplethatwhatreasoncangraspmustalsobeproducedbyreason.Thisactivereasonistraceableinthepatternsof“unity-in-opposites”embeddedintheobservableuniverse:“Whenonelistensnottomebuttothelogositiswisetoagree(homologein)thatallthingsareone”(DK22B50).Howthedirectionoftheuniversebythelogosistobeconceivedof,isperhapstheobscurestquestionininterpretingHeraclitus;butitseemsthatlikeXenophaneshepostulatedasupremeandunifyingdeity,whosemindservedasthecarrierofthecosmiclogos.XenophanesandHeraclituscanbeseenasseeking,throughphilosophicalreflec-tion,tolocatethecauseandthecureofthetroublesbesettingthenewtheoreticalcosmology.Aratherdifferentreaction,perhaps,wasthatofPythagorasofSamos(activebeforeandaround500bce),anotherpersonageofthisperiod,andonementionedwithsomecontemptbybothXenophanesandHeraclitus.Pythagoras,sofarasonecanpenetratethefogoflegendthatsurroundshislife,presentedhimselftohiscontemporariesprimarilyasamagician,awonder-worker,amystagogueofcharismaticpersonality.Butheclearlyalsolaidsomeclaimtotheall-roundknowledgeandtherevealinginsightsofthe“sage.”Itseemsfairlycertainthatthe“Pythagoreanwayoflife”heimposeduponhisfollowersincludedthestudyofmathematicsandofmusicandastronomy,seenasexhibitingmathematicalstructures.Atleastthiswasacentralpointintheintellectualactivityofmanywhosawthemselvesas“Pythagoreans”inthefifthcentury.A“Pythagorean”programof“reducingeverythingtonumbers”wascurrentthen;andmaypossiblygobackto15ACTC011520/03/2006,03:57PM\nedwardhusseyPythagorashimself.Ifso,itisyetanotherexampleoftheemergenceinthisperiodofthoughtsthatweretohavealongsubsequenthistoryinthepracticeandphilosophyofscience.QuestionsandDisputesThepreviouspartofthischapterhasoutlinedaninterpretationofcertaintextsfromthearchaicandclassicalperiodsofancientGreece.Itwillalreadybeobviousthattheevidenceformanypointsisfragmentaryandmiscellaneous;andthat,eventhoughsomecompletetextssurvive(notablythepoemsofHomerandHesiod),thesetextsnevertellusunambiguouslyandfullyallthatwewanttoknow.Interpretationsonsuchmattersarealwaysopentodispute.Itisalsoclearthatanyinterpretermustnecessarily,knowinglyornot,takeuppositionsonsomefundamentalmattersofmethodandapproach.Itcannotbesaidthatthereisagreatdealofagreementonanyofthesemattersinrecentscholarship;noristhatafacttoberegretted.InthisfinalsectionIofferabriefsurveyofsomeofthemorefundamentaldisputes,inthelightofsomerecentscholarlyworks.Onequestionthatcausestroubleisthatof“teleology”intheunderstandingofthehistoryofscienceandphilosophy.InthischapterIhavebeenprofessedlyconcernedwiththe“beginningsofscienceandphilosophy,”andhavethereforebeentakingasastarting-pointandaguidesomemodernnotionsofwhatconstitutes“science”and“philosophy”respectively.Suchaprocedureisexposedtoobviousdangers:onemustconstantlybeawareoftheallthewaysinwhichthearchaicGreek“beginnings”weresignificantlyunlikemodernscienceandphilosophy,aswellasallthewaysinwhichtheyweresignificantlylikethem.Butthatisjustonewayofformulatingallthecentralquestionsaboutthesubject-matter.Somewould,perhaps,rejectanysuchprocedureattheoutset,asirredeemably“teleological.”Inthiscontexttheword“teleology”isoftenusedasaconvenienttermofabuse,andlikemanysuchtermsitservestocoveramultitudeofdifferentthings,whichneedtobedistinguished.“Teleology”,inthebroadestsenseofstudyingtheancientworldinthelightofamodernunderstandingofthings,maybenotwhollydesirable(becauseofthedangersalreadymentioned),butisinanycasecompletelyinevitable.Itisabsurdtosupposethattheancienttextsalonecouldgenerateforusapurely“ancient”wayofunder-standingthem.Moreproperly“teleology”impliestheunderstandingofhistoricaldevelopmentsbyseeingthemasmovingtowardssome,supposedlysomehowpre-ordained,goal.Herewemustdistinguishdifferentsuppositionsaboutthegoalinvolved.Scienceandphilosophyareoftheirverynaturedirectedtowardsgoals:thebetterknowingandunderstandingofhumanexperience,andoftheworldasgiveninexperience.Henceifanyprogresstowardsthesegoalsisinfactpossible,andifhumanmindscollectivelyarecapableoflearningfromtheresultsofrepeatedtrialanderror,thentherewillbeakindof“teleology”inherentinthehistoryofscienceandphilosophy,withoutwhichnosortofunderstandingofitispossible.Buttosaythisisnottosaythatsuchprogressisalwayspossible,stilllessthatprogresswillalwaysbemade.16ACTC011620/03/2006,03:57PM\nthebeginningsofscienceandphilosophyAboveall,tosaythisisnotatalltodiscounttheimportance,bothhistoricalandphilosophical,ofwhatappearfromamodernpointofviewas“dead-ends”and“failures.”Totakeastrikingexamplefromthisperiod:inthedevelopmentofarchaicGreektheorizing,the“cosmo-theology”oftheMilesians,describedabove,issucha“dead-end,”anevolutionarycuriosityhavingnolivingdescendants.Yetitwas,ofcourse,ofthegreatestpossibleimportanceinthedevelopmentofbothscienceandphilosophy.Evenifitisadmittedthatwemayreasonablylookfor“thebeginningsofscienceandphilosophy”inthearchaicperiodofancientGreece,thereisstillroomfordisputesaboutthenatureofthedevelopmentsinthatperiod.Forastart,thevalueofAristotle’sevidencemaybequestioned.TheattemptbyCherniss(1964)ataroot-and-branchdestructionofAristotle’scredibilityasawitness,nolongercommandsmuchassent.YetonemaystillreasonablysuspectthatAristotledoesnotalwaysavoid,orevennotice,thedangersinherentinhiswayofseeingthings.AnditwouldcertainlybewhollyunjustifiedtoassumethatAristotlealwaystellsusallthatwewishtoknowabouttheearliertheorists.Inanyparticularcase,thequestionisacomplexone,andthereisnoroomforsweepinggeneralizations.(Foranexampleofmoderateandwell-basedskepticismaboutAristotle’sevidenceononeimportantpoint,andhowitmightbeanswered,seepage9.)Therearealwaysthosewhoemphasizecontinuityinhumanhistory,attheexpenseofdiscontinuity;andconverselythosewhoemphasizediscontinuityattheexpenseofcontinuity.Itisbettertoadmitatoncethatinanylineofdevelopmenttherearealwaysbothcontinuitiesanddiscontinuitiestobefound.Thatdoesnothelpustoansweranyspecificquestions:forexample,wasHesiodalready“scientific?”weretheMilesiansstill“pre-scientific?”Reasonsforsaying“no”tobothquestionshavebeengivenabove.Theydependessentiallyonaparticularviewaboutwhichaspectsofscience(asatpresentunderstood)areessentialandwhicharenot.Ingeneral,anyparticularunderstandingof“earlyGreekscienceandphilosophy”inevitablyinvolvessomegeneralconceptionofscienceandofphilosophy.Itishardlysurprising,giventhecontestabilityofanysuchconceptions,thatmanydifferentkindsofanswertothesetwoquestionsaretobefoundinrecentscholarship.Therearethosewhoseektoshowthat,forexample,thecosmologyofHesiodisofessentiallythesamekindasthatoftheearliest“pre-Socratics.”Thestrongculturalinfluenceofthe“AncientNearEast”onarchaicGreeceisofteninvokedinthiscon-nection.OnenotablerepresentativeofthisviewisMartinWest,whosebookEarlyGreekphilosophyandtheOrient(West,1971)goesfurtherthanmostinclaimingtheessentialdependenceofearlyGreekscienceandphilosophyonthe“AncientNearEast;”whileclaimsalongthesamelinesaremade,forexample,byBurkert(1999)andHölscher(1968).IfoneacceptsthatthereisindeedaqualitativedifferencebetweentheHomeric-HesiodicworldviewandthatoftheMilesiancosmologists,thereisstillscopefordis-agreementabouttheultimatenatureofthisdifference.Themostfavoredview,untilrecently,wasthatHesiod’sandsimilarcosmologieswerenot“rational”but“mythical;”whereasthenewtheoreticalenterprisewas“rational”(see,forexample,Barnes,1979;Kirk,Raven,andSchofield,1983;Vernant,1983).Thisviewhaslostpopularityrecently,perhapsbecauseitisnowgenerallyperceivedthat,atbest,withoutfurther17ACTC011720/03/2006,03:57PM\nedwardhusseyexplanationofwhatismeantby“rationality,”itmerelyrephrasestheproblemratherthangivinganyinsightintoit.Asarguedabove,thereisnoobvioussenseinwhichHesiod’scosmogonywasnottheresultofrationalthought;yetthereissomethingimportantthatishalf-concealedinthisview,andneedstobebroughtout.Anothertypeofviewplacestheemphasisonchangingconceptionsof“truth;”buthereitisdoubtfulwhetherwecanmakesenseofaconceptionoftruththatisasflexibleasseemstoberequired.(SeeDetienne,1996;andWilliams,2002.)Asarguedabove,thereiscertainlyamostimportantdifferencebetweenthesourcesofauthoritativetruth,asconceivedofbytheHomeric-Hesiodicviewandbythesixth-centurytheorists.Butwhetherthiswasthecauseortheconsequenceofthedifferentconceptionsofreality,isanotherquestion.Therearealsoquestions,hardlytouchedoninthischapter,aboutthecircumstances(political,economic,social,andcultural)inwhichGreekscienceandphilosophybegan,andwhichmayhavehelpedorhinderedtheirdevelopment.Somehavepointedtopoliticalchanges:thedecayofthetraditionalpoliticalauthorityofkingsandprinces,andthedevelopmentofnewpoliticalstructureswithmorewidespreadparticipationofcitizensinthepoliticalprocess.(Onallthis,seeLloyd,1987;Vernant,1983.)HereIhavesuggested,followingmanyothers,thatthespreadofanalphabeticscriptandhenceofadegreeofliteracyinGreecemaywellhavebeenimportant,atleastasacatalyst.(Forotherviewsonthisquestion,see,forexample,Lloyd,1979;Osborne,1997.)BibliographyPresocratics:TextsandTranslationsDiels,H.(1951–2).(CitedasDK).DieFragmentederVorsokratiker(3vols.,6thedn.,revisedbyW.Kranzandoftenreprinted).Berlin:Weidmann.(Originalworkpublished1903.)Kirk,G.S.,Raven,J.E.andSchofield,M.(1983).ThePresocraticPhilosophers(2ndedn.).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.McKirahan,R.D.,Jr.(1994).PhilosophybeforeSocrates:AnIntroductionwithTextsandCom-mentary.Indianapolis:Hackett.WorksCitedBarnes,J.(1979).ThePresocraticPhilosophers.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul.Burkert,W.(1999).“TheLogicofCosmogony.”InR.Buxton(ed.),FromMythtoReason?StudiesintheDevelopmentofGreekThought(pp.87–106).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Cherniss,H.(1964).Aristotle’sCriticismofPresocraticPhilosophy.NewYork:OctagonBooksInc.Davies,M.(1991).PoetarumMelicorumGraecorumFragmenta.vol1.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Detienne,M.(1996).TheMastersofTruthinArchaicGreece.NewYork:ZoneBooks.Frede,M.(2000).“ThePhilosopher.”InJ.BrunschwigandG.E.R.Lloyd(eds.),TheGreekPursuitofKnowledge(pp.1–17).Cambridge,Mass.andLondon:BelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress.Hölscher,U.(1968).AnfänglichesFragen.Göttingen:VandenhoeckandRuprecht.Holwerda,D.(1951).CommentatiodevocisquaeestFUSISviatqueusupraesertiminGraecitateAristoteleanteriore.Groningen:J.B.Walters.18ACTC011820/03/2006,03:57PM\nthebeginningsofscienceandphilosophyKirk,G.S.,Raven,J.E.andSchofield,M.(1983).ThePresocraticPhilosophers(2ndedn.).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Lloyd,G.E.R.(1979).Magic,ReasonandExperience:StudiesintheOriginsandDevelopmentofGreekScience.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(1987).TheRevolutionsofWisdom:StudiesintheClaimsandPracticesofAncientGreekScience.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Osborne,R.(1997).“ThePolisanditsCulture.”InC.C.W.Taylor(ed.).RoutledgeHistoryofPhilosophy.vol.1:FromtheBeginningtoPlato(pp.9–46).LondonandNewYork:Routledge.Schibli,H.S.(1990).PherekydesofSyros.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Snell,B.(1964).Pindarus.Lipsiae[Leipzig]:B.G.Teubner.Vernant,J.-P.(1983).MythandThoughtAmongtheGreeks.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul.West,M.L.(1971).EarlyGreekPhilosophyandtheOrient.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Williams,B.(2002).TruthandTruthfulness:AnEssayinGenealogy.PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress.FurtherReadingsFrede,M.(1996).“Introduction.”InM.FredeandG.Striker(eds.),RationalityinGreekThought(pp.1–28).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Hussey,E.(1990).“TheBeginningsofEpistemology.”InS.Everson(ed.),Epistemology(pp.11–38).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(1995).“IonianInquiries.”InA.Powell(ed.),TheGreekWorld(pp.530–49).LondonandNewYork:Routledge.——.(2000).“Heraclitus.”InA.A.Long(ed.),TheCambridgeCompaniontoEarlyGreekPhilosophy(pp.88–112).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Jordan,W.(1990).AncientConceptsofPhilosophy.London:Routledge.Kahn,C.H.(1979).TheArtandThoughtofHeraclitus.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Lloyd,G.E.R.(1966).PolarityandAnalogy:TwoTypesofArgumentationinearlyGreekThought.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(1990).DemystifyingMentalities.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(1991).MethodsandProblemsinGreekScience.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Vlastos,G.(1995).StudiesinGreekPhilosophy.(vol.1):ThePresocratics(ed.D.W.Graham).Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.West,M.L.(1966).HesiodTheogony.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.19ACTC011920/03/2006,03:57PM\njørgenmejer2AncientPhilosophyandtheDoxographicalTraditionJØRGENMEJERItisanunfortunatefactthatbyfarmostofthetextswrittenbyancientphilosophershavebeenlost.WeareluckytohavethemoreorlesscompleteworksofimportantphilosopherslikePlato,Aristotle,Epictetus(asreportedbyArrian),SextusEmpiricus,Plotinus,Lucretius,CiceroandSeneca;wehavemanylatecommentatorsonPlatoandAristotle,andwehavesomeimportanttextsbyEpicurus,preservedinDiogenesLaertius(cf.below).Inadditiontothesetextstransmittedthroughmedievalmanu-scripts,afewphilosophicaltextshavebeenpreservedonpapyrus:alongsectionfromEmpedocles’poem,acoupleofsectionsfromtheSophistAntiphon’sOnTruth,longerandshorterpassagesintheHerculaneanpapyrifromEpicurus’OnNatureandfromPhilodemus’treatises,andthesecondcenturyceStoicHierocles’ElementsofEthics(Sider,2005).Butmostofthephilosophicaltextswrittenbythepre-Socratic,theSocraticandtheHellenisticphilosophershavenotsurvivedeventhoughmanypassageswerequotedbyotherancientauthors.Thisisnotsurprising.Infact,mostancienttextsdisappearedbeforetheendofantiquity,andthestudyofphilosophicaltextshadanevensmallerpublicinGreco-RomanantiquitythanhasbeenthecasesincetheRenaissance.ItdemandedapublicinterestlikethedramatictraditioninAthens,oradedicatedgroupofpeoplelikethemembersofanestablishedphilosophicalschooltosecurethetransmissionandsurvivaloftexts.ThesituationaswefinditfirstdescribedinPlato’sdialoguesdidnotchangesignificantlyinGreekandRomanantiquity:philosophywaspracticedingymnasia,stoas,andotherpublicplaces,orinprivatehomes,notininstitutionsofteachingorlearning.ThePlatonicAcademy,theAristotelianPeripatosandEpicurus’Gardenweretheonlyinstitutionsthatprovidedspaceforcontinuousphilosophicalactivityandforcollectionsofphilosophicaltexts,andeventheselocationswerenotabletosurvive1Sulla’sattackonAthensin86bce.ThefamousVillaofthePapyriinHerculaneumfromshortlyafterthatdatewasanEpicureanestablishment,andthelibraryfoundtherewasbeyonddoubtthelibraryoftheEpicureanscholarPhilodemus,butapartfromEpicureanphilosophicaltextsithassofarnotprovidedotheroriginalworksbyphilo-sophers(Gigante,1995).Ingeneral,thestudyoftextsdoesnotseemtohaveplayedasignificantroleinphilosophicalactivity,atleastdowntotheRomanEmpire.1.SeeBénatouïl,philosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimes.20ACTC022020/03/2006,03:57PM\nancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltraditionTherearenumeroustestimoniesthatphilosophicaltextsbecameverydifficulttogetholdofandevendisappearedbeforetheendofantiquity.Infact,inthesecondcenturybcetheAthenianscholarApollodorus“happenedtofind”(D.L.2.2)acopyofthepre-SocraticphilosopherAnaximander’soneandonlybook–whichisotherwiselostexceptforonepossiblesentence.ThePlatonicdialogueswerenotreadilyavailableonehundredyearsafterhisdeath(D.L.3.66),andthoughsomeoftheAristoteliantreatiseswereknownduringtheHellenisticperiod,themainbodyofhisworksonlybecameavailabletothepublicaftertheeditorialworkdonebyAndronicusandothersinthefirstcenturybce(Barnes,1997;Gottschalk,1987;Moraux,1973)whenthescholarlytraditionofcommentinguponhisworksbegan.Acommentaryinantiquitywasusuallyaseparatevolumeandthecommentariesfollowedtheorderofthestatementsoftheoriginalwork,citingafewwordstoindicatefromwherethecommenttookoff,theso-calledlemma.Henceacommentarypresupposesthepresenceofthebookwithwhichitdeals.Evenifitwaspossibletofindacopyofaphilosophicaltext,itwasdifficulttobecertainwhatwasagenuinework,tofindagoodcopyofagenuineworkbyanearlierphilosopher,andtogetholdofthecompleteœuvreofanauthor.HencetheworkofAndronicuswhohadtoputtogethervariousAristoteliantreatisesanddeterminetheauthorshipofsomeofthetexts;hencetheworkofThrasyllusontheworksofPlatoandofDemocritusinthefirsthalfofthefirstcenturyce–theCorpusPlatonicumasithasbeentransmittedtousinthemedievalmanuscripts(andasitisstillprintedintheOxfordClassicalLibrary)goesbacktoThrasyllus(Tarrant,1993).ItisnocoincidencethatmanyquotationsfromDemocrituscomefromauthorslivingbetween50and250ce,andthatthetraditionofmakingcommentariesonthetextsofPlatoandAristotlegainedgroundinthesameperiod.InthemiddleofthefourthcenturyceEmperorJuliancomplainsthatmostoftheEpicureanandSkeptictextshaddisappeared(Julianfr.Ep.89,p.141Bidez),andthecommentatorSimpliciusinthesixthcenturycespecificallystatesthathewillquotefromParmenides’poemandotherpre-Socratictextsbecausetheywerehardtofind(e.g.,InPhys.39.20–21or144.28Diels).ThefactthatphilologicalquestionsplaysuchasignificantroleinthelatePlatoniccom-mentatorsprovesthatitwasalwayshardtostudyphilosophicaltexts,notonlybecauseofthescarcityoftexts,butalsobecauseitwas,thenasnow,difficulttoreadtextsthatwerehundredsofyearsold.ItisonlywhenwereachtheNeoplatonicschoolinthethirdcenturyce,thatwefinddirectevidencefortheuseofphilosophicaltextsinthedailyroutineofaphilosophicalschool,anditisnocoincidencethatwehavenotonlyasubstantialbody2oftextsbyPlatoandAristotle,butalsonumerouscommentariesonthesetexts.Avividaccountofthereadingofphilosophicaltextsina“class,”accompaniedbywrittenororalcommentaries,wasgivenbyPlotinus’studentPorphyryinhisLifeofPlotinusasfollows:Inthemeetingsoftheschoolhe[Plotinus]usedtohavethecommentariesread,perhapsofSeverus,perhapsofCroniusorNumenius,orGaiusorAtticus,andamongthe2.Onthecompositionandproductionofthesecommentaries,seeHoffmann,whatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?21ACTC022120/03/2006,03:57PM\njørgenmejerPeripateticsofAspasius,Alexander,Adrastus,andothersthatwereavailable.Buthedidnotjustspeakstraightoutofthesebooksbuttookadistinctivepersonallineinhisconsideration,andbroughtthemindofAmmoniustobearontheinvestigationathand.Hequicklyabsorbedwhatwasread,andwouldgivethesenseofsomeprofoundsubjectofstudyinafewwordsandpasson.WhenLonginus’workOnPrinciplesandhisLoverofAntiquitywerereadtohim,hesaid,“Longinusisascholar,butcertainlynotaphilosopher”...TherhetoricianDiophanesreadadefenseofAlcibiadesinPlato’sSymposiuminwhichheassertedthatapupilforthesakeofadvancinginthestudyofvirtueshouldsubmithimselftocarnalintercoursewithhismasterifthemasterdesiredit.Plotinusrepeatedlystarteduptoleavethemeeting,butrestrainedhimself,andaftertheendofthelecturegaveme,Porphyry,thetaskofwritingarefutation.Diophanesrefusedtolendmehismanuscript,andIdependedinwritingmyrefutationonmymemoryofhisarguments.WhenIreaditbeforetheassembledhearers...(PorphyryPlot.14–15Armstrong)Towardstheendofantiquity,theperiodinwhichmostofourcommentariesonAristoteliantextswerewritten,theteachingofphilosophyhadbecomeaverysystematicenterpriseinwhichtextsandcommentariesplayedacentralrole,includingthestudyofphilosophicalpredecessorswhoseviewshadbearingonthetextsofPlatoandAristotle.AlreadySenecahadcomplainedthatphilosophyhadbecomephilology(Ep.108.23ff.),andintheNeoplatonicschoolafterPlotinustherewasamoreorlessfixedcurriculumoftextstobestudiedandexplainedaccordingtoaprescribedmethod.ThereadingofAristoteliantextsprecededthereadingofaselectionofPlatonicdialogues,andineachcasethecurriculumbeganwithaseriesoftopicsthatwealsofindinmoderncoursesonPlatoandAristotle.Thus,whenreadingPlato,thelecturerwouldbeginhisteachingbydiscussingthefollowingtopics(cf.,Anon.ProlegomenainPhilosophiamPlatonis;cf.,Sorabji,1990):1.ThenatureofPlatonicphilosophy;Platocomparedtootherphilosophicalschools2.WhyhasPlato,butnotPythagorasandSocrates,writtenphilosophicalbooks?3.WhydidPlatowritedialogues?4.Themainelementsofadialogue,inparticularthedramaticsetting,thestyle,andthearguments.5.Thetitleofthedialogues.6.Howarethephilosophicaltopicsofthedialoguestobedistinguishedfromoneanother?7.Thestyleofpresentation.8.Howmanyrulesaretherefordeterminingthepurposeofthedialogue?9.Theorderofthedialogues.10.Plato’swayofteachingphilosophy.Whilethisapproachmayseemnaturaltous,thereislittleevidencethatthisoranyothersystematicapproachwascommonbeforetheNeoplatonicschool.Asimilar,systematicapproachwasgiveninconnectionwiththestudyofAristotle’sCategories.ButthefactthatphilosophynowhadbecomemainlythestudyoftextsbyAristotleandPlatoisthereasonwhysomanyofthefragmentsofthepre-SocraticphilosopherscomefromthecommentariesoftheNeoplatoniccommentators,especiallySimplicius:22ACTC022220/03/2006,03:57PM\nancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltraditioninordertounderstandtheAristoteliantextitwasnecessarytoknowthemanynamesandviewsofpreviousphilosopherstowhomAristotlerefers.Themodernconceptof“historyofphilosophy”didnotexistintheGreco-Romanantiquity.Philosophersturnedtotheirpredecessorsinordertothrowlightontheproblemstheythemselvesweredealingwithorinordertorejectcompetingviews,notbecausetheywereinterestedinthehistoricaldevelopmentofhumanthinking.Itisimportanttokeepthisinmindbecausethereasonforquotingaphilosophicaltextisalmostalwaystofindconfirmationortoexpresscriticism.Thus,themodernscholarisobligedalwaystotakethecontextintoconsiderationbeforeevaluatingthesignificanceofaquotationor“fragment,”themoresosincetheconcept“fragment”isnowhereclearlydefinedinmodernscholarship.Manyso-calledfragmentsappearindifferentsourceswithdifferentvariations,anditisoftendifficulttodeterminewhetherareferencetoanearlierphilosopherisadirectquotation(fragment),aparaphrase,oranindividualinterpretationofatext.Noancienttextpretendstoofferanaccountofthedevelopmentofphilosophyasasequenceofconceptualthinking.ItmayhavebeenSophistslikeGorgiasandHippiaswhobegantocollectexcerptsfromphilosophicalandothertextsinthefifthcenturybce,butthisisnotthebeginningofhistoryofphilosophy.Itis,however,oneimportantcharacteristicofearlyGreekphilosophythatphilosophersseemtohavebeenawareoftheirpredecessorsandcontemporaries(seee.g.,DK31B1andB112Empedocles,DK47B1Archytas,orDK64B1DiogenesofApollonia),butarealinterestinthephilo-sophyofthepastwasatfirstcloselyconnectedwithAristotle’sviewofphilosophyandtheacquisitionofknowledge.Platomayhaveknownmanyofthepre-Socratics,butsincerealityforhimwastheworldofFormsandthisrealitycametothephilosopherasadirectexperience,as,forexample,describedintheSymposium,historyassuchwasnevercentraltohisphilosophicalproject.ForAristotle,therealityoftheworldasdescribedbyearlierphilosopherswastoostrongtobeneglectedevenifhispredecessorsonlyhaddiscoveredpartofthetruth:“Letusrememberthatweshouldnotdisregardtheexperienceoftheages;inthemultitudeofyearsthesethings,iftheyweregood,wouldcertainlynothavebeenunknown;foralmosteverythinghasbeenfoundout,althoughsometimestheyarenotputtogether;inothercasesmendonotusetheknowledgewhichtheyhave(Arist.Pol.II.5,1264a1–4,cf.alsoMet.a.1,993a31–b19andM.1,1076a12–16).Aristotlealwaysstressedthesignificanceofthebeginning(archEmeaningbothbegin-ningandprinciple)ofthoughtsandthingsandhencehealwaystriedtoleaduptohisownviewsbyreviewingthoseofhispredecessors.Thiswaspartofthedialecticalprocess,cf.Top.II.2andII.14.Needlesstosay,hewasneverwritinghistoryofphilo-sophyassuch,butalwaysreviewedthepastinthelightofhisownphilosophicalproblemsandsolutions.SomeofthemostinfluentialpassagesofthiskindareinthefirstbookoftheMetaphysicsandintheearlybooksofhisPhysics.Inadditiontothenumerouspassagesthatdealwithearlierandcontemporaryphilosophyinhispreservedworks,healsowroteafairnumberof(nowlost)booksonindividualpre-Socratics.Hisworkwasinparticularcarriedonbyhispupilandsuccessor,Theophrastus,andasignificantpartoftheso-calleddoxographicaltraditionmusthavebeenderivedultimatelyfromtheirbookseventhoughtherewerealsootherkindsofworksonphilosophicalideas,inparticularofHellenisticphilosophy(seebelow).Therecanbe23ACTC022320/03/2006,03:57PM\njørgenmejerlittledoubtthatitwasfarmorecommonforintellectualstohavelearntaboutearlierphilosophyfromsuchreportsthanfromreadingtheoriginalphilosophicalworksthemselves,exceptforthePlatonicdialogueswhichwereknownthroughoutantiquity,andforthoseAristoteliantextswhichwerestudiedbymembersofthePeripatosandespeciallythePlatonicAcademyintheRomanEmpire.Itis,however,wrongtothinkofdoxographicalworksasconstitutingaliterarygenreinclassicalantiquity.Doxographyisanineteenth-centuryterm,madefamousbyHermannDiels’DoxographiGraeci(Berlin,1879),inwhichhecollectedanumberoftextsthatallreporttheviewsofGreekphilosophersfromThalestothemidfirstcenturybce.InthelongLatinprefacetothiscollectionDielsdiscussedthecharacter-isticsofthesetexts,whichexhibitsomanysimilaritiesthattheycanbeconsideredwithsomejustificationasbelongingtoaparticulartradition.Diels’establishmentofthisso-calleddoxographicaltraditionhasdominatedthediscussionofthesourcesforearlyGreekphilosophyformorethan100years,buthasrecentlycomeunderdecisivecriticism(seeMansfeldandRunia,1996).Itisimportanttonoticethattheterm“doxography”ismodern,createdasananalogytothetermlogographos(=speech-writerforlitigantsincourts,writerofprose),andbasedonthetitleofanumberofHellenisticbookscalledOntheOpinionsof...(Greekdoxa,dogma;othertermsareused,andinparticulartheLatinwordplacitahasbeenusedtodesignatethesetexts).ThetwotextsthatconstitutethemainspecimensofdoxographyarePseudo-Plutarch’sEpitomeoftheOpinionsofthePhilosophers(oftencalledPlacitaPhilosophorum)fromthesecondcenturyce,alsocopiedoutbyEusebiusinhisPraeparatioEvangelicaBooks14–15inthefourthcenturyandtranslatedintoArabicshortlybefore900ce,andtheverysimilaranonymousexcerptsinStobaeus’Anthology(1.1–46;4.36–37;and4.50a30).ThetextsofthesetwosourceswereprintedinparallelcolumnsbyDiels(DoxographiGraeci,pp.273–444;foranexample,seeTable2.1);theyconsistofentries,orquestions,onphilosophicalandothermatters,accordingtoPs.-Plutarcharrangedinfivebooksdealingwithcosmologyand(meta)physics(I),theheavenlybodies(II),meteorology(III),psychologyandperception(IV),andhumanphysiologyandembryonics(V).Undereachentryarelistedtheviewsofanumberofphiloso-phers,fromthepre-Socraticstothefirstcenturybce(andeveninafewcaseslater),viewsthatpurporttogiveanswerstotopicslike:Onthevoid,Ontime,Howdidtheworldoriginate?Whatisthenatureoftheheavenlybodies?Aresenseimpressionstrue?Howdoesconceptiontakeplace?Theselectionofphilosophersisfarfromsys-tematic,andtheirviewsarepresentedassimplestatementsoffact,withoutanycon-textorarguments.Thedifferentviewsareorganizedinsuchawaythatsimilarviewsareputtogether,withoutregardforthechronologicalsequence,andthencontrastedwithadifferentview.Asanexample,inTable2.1wetaketwochaptersontimeaspresentedinDielsp.318,labeledAëtius1.21–22.Infact,Diels’presentationisdeceptiveunlessthereadertakeshiscriticalapparatusintoconsideration,forthechapterheadingsarenotinStobaeus,andthethreesec-tionsonPlato(21.2;22.1and9)arenotlistedherebyStobaeusbutinalaterchapter(1.8.45),and22.7–8followthesectiononEratosthenes.Furthermore,StobaeushasanextrasectionontheStoicChrysippusfollowingXenocrates,obviouslytakenfromalaterchapteronChrysippus(1.8.42).24ACTC022420/03/2006,03:57PM\nancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltraditionTable2.1SamplefromDoxographiGraeciPs.-PlutarchEpitome1.21StobaeusEcl.1.8.40bOnTimeOnTimePythagorassaysthattimeisthe1Pythagorassaysthatitisthesphereofthesphereofthesurrounding.surrounding.Plato,thatitisamovingimageor2Platothatitisamovingimageorthethedistanceofthemovementofdistanceofthemovementoftheworld.theworld.Eratosthenes,thatitisthe3Eratosthenesthatitisthepathofthesun.pathofthesun.Ps.-PlutarchEpitome1.22StobaeusEcl.1.8.40bOntheNatureofTimeOntheNatureofTimePlatosaysthatthemovementof1[Plato]saysthatthemovementofthetheuniverseisthenatureoftime.universeisthenatureoftime.2Xenocratessaysthatthenatureoftimeiswhatmeasuresthingscreated,andeternalmovement.3HestiaeusfromPerinthus,thephysicist,saysthatitisthemovementofthestarsrelativetooneanother.4Stratosaysthatitisthesizeofthethingsinmovementandatrest.5Epicurussaysthatitisanattribute[ofattributes],i.e.anattendantcircumstanceofmovements.6AntiphonandCritolaussaythattimeisathoughtorameasure,notasubstance.MostoftheStoicssaythatitis7TheStoicssaythattimeismovementinmovementinitself.itself.Mostpeoplesaythattimeis8Mostpeoplesaythattimeisungenerated.ungenerated.Platosaysthatitisgeneratedin9[Plato]saysthatitisgeneratedinthinking.thinking.Thesetwochaptersdemonstratesomeoftheproblemsthatmakeitdifficulttoreconstructacommonsource,andtherecentanalysisinMansfeldandRunia(1996,226–8),suggestsadifferentarrangementoftheoriginaltextthanthatgivenbyDiels.WhilethereisgoodreasontoassumethatPs.-Plutarchhaspreservedthestructureofthelostsources,itisnotalwayscertainthatalltheviewspresentedbyStobaeusbelongtotheoriginaltext,anditisobviousthatitisfarmoreimportanttostudythelaterdoxographicaltextsastransmittedthanDielsdid.Theymayhavehaddifferentpurposesinshapingtheirpresentationsthanthesourceswhichtheyused,andthis25ACTC022520/03/2006,03:57PM\njørgenmejermayaffectthereliabilityoftheirreports.Whatmatters,obviously,isthevarietyofopinions,nottheconnectionbetweennotionsnortheargumentationofindividualphilosophersassuch:theorderfollowsneitherchronologynorconnectionstophilo-sophicalschools,andthepresenceorabsenceofanyindividualphilosopherisnoindicationofthesignificanceoftheinformation.IfwefollowPs.-Plutarch,Epit.1.22beginswithtwoopposingviews(Platovs.theStoics)whilesections2–4givetheviewsofphilosopherswhogavetimeaplaceinthephysicalworld,5and6theviewsofthosewhoseemtodenytherealityoftime.Sections8–9dealwithaseparateissue,viz.whetherornottimeisgenerated.BothPs.-Plutarch’sandStobaeus’accountsmust,despitevariations,havebeenbasedonthesamesource,whoaccordingtoDielsandmostotherscholarswasanotherwiseunknownwriterofadoxographicalworkbythenameofAëtius,tobedatedc.100ce.Thiswork,initsturn,seemstobebasedonsimilarworksfromthefirstcenturybceandeventheearlierHellenisticperiodsincetheearliesttraceofitisfoundinChrysippusinthethirdcenturybce.OneormoreoftheseworkswereextremelypopularbothintheHellenisticperiodandintheRomanEmpire,andwecanrecognizetheirinfluencein,forexample,Cicero,Varro,Athenagoras,Soranus,andtheHistoriaPhilosopha,whichisfalselyattributedtoGalen,butinfactdatesfromlateantiquity.Butitisobviousfromtheexamplegivenabovethattherearemajorvariationsinthedoxographicaltexts:ItisimportantthatthemodernscholarlooknotonlyatwhatisclaimedtobethereconstructedtextofAëtiusbutalsoatthetransmittedtextofthenumerousdoxographicalsourcesfromthesecondtothesixthcenturiesce(seefurtherMansfeldandRunia,1996).Adifferentkindofdoxographyisfoundin(primarily)thechurchfatherHippolytus,DiogenesLaertius,andPs.-Plutarch’sStromateis(=Patchwork,Miscellanies),(seeMansfeld,1992,andMejer,1992).Thesedoxographiesdifferfromthefirstkindinthattheypresenttheviewsofeachphilosopherinaseparatechapter,buttheyaresimilartoitinthattheyreportonthesamefiveareas,ofteninthesameorderandwiththesamewording.AsanexamplewemaytakeDiogenesLaertius’summaryofDemocritus’philosophy(D.L.9.44–45):Democritus’opinionsareasfollows:(44)Theprinciplesofeverythingareatomsandvoid,andeverythingelseiscon-ventional.Thereareinfinitelymanyworldswhichcomeintobeingandpassaway.Theatomsareinfiniteinsizeandnumber,andtheyarecarriedaboutinthewholeinaswirl,andinthatwaytheygenerateallthecompounds,fire,water,air,earth.Forthesethingstooarecomplexesofatoms,whichareincapableofbeingaffectedandchangelessbecauseoftheirsolidity.Thesunandthemoonarecompoundedofsmooth,roundbodiesofthatkind,asisthesoul,whichisthesameasthemind.Weseethroughtheimpactofimages.(45)Everythingcomestobebynecessity,theswirl,whichhecallsnecessity,beingthecauseofthecomingtobeofeverything.Thegoalinlifeistobeinagoodstateofmind(euthumia),butthisstateisnot,assomeerroneouslyhaveinterpretedit,thesameaspleasure,butthestateinwhichthesoulisquietandwellbalanced,undisturbedbyanyfearorsuperstitionoranyotheremotion.Democrituscallsthisstateofmind“well-being”(euestO)andusesmanyotherterms.Conventionsareartificial;inrealityonlyatomsandthevoidexist.–ThesearetheopinionsofDemocritus.(Taylor,1999,withsomechanges)26ACTC022620/03/2006,03:57PM\nancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltraditionIn§44theinformationfollowstheorderofthepresentationinPs.-Plutarch’sEpitome,andonceagain,therearenoargumentsorreasonsoffered.Thisreportdoesnot,likesomanyotherdoxographicalsources,addtowhatweknowfromothersources,mainlyAristotleandTheophrastus,thoughinsomeinstancesitispossibletodrawconclusionsthatwecouldnotobtainfromothersources.Thus,thecosmologicalinformationaboutAnaximanderinHippolytus’Refutatio1.6.1–7(=DK12A11)isimportant,andtheotherwisequestionableinterpretationofHeraclitus’cosmologyinD.L.9.7–11isindicativeofsomedefinitestructureofHeraclitus’book,whichmusthavebeenmorethanjustacollectionofsayings(cf.D.L.9.5).ThesecondparagraphoftheDemocriteandoxographyis,however,uniqueanddeservesfurtherscrutiny.Itconfirmstheimportantprinciplestatedinthebeginningof§44thatonlyatomsandvoidarereal,thusdenyingthepossibilityofprimaryandsecondaryqualities,adistinctionwhichissometimesattributedtoDemocritus,anditprovesthattheremusthavebeenadiscussionofDemocritus’ethics,asubjectwhichisotherwiseneglectedintheancientsources,thoughThrasyllusplacedDemocritus’ethicalworksfirstinhiscatalogofhiswritings(cf.D.L.9.46).Itisalsonoteworthythatareferencetoethicscanbecombinedwiththeusualfiveareasofdoxographicalreports,thusdemonstratingthattheindividualdoxographercanaddtoorsubtractfromwhathefoundinhissources.Whilesomeofthesedoxographicalreportsthuscontainimportantinformation,othersdemonstratethattheknowledgeaboutearlierGreekphilosophyinlateantiquitycanbeconfusedandmisleading.Itisimportanttonoticethatbothkindsofdoxographybasicallyabstainfromcriticizingordiscussingtheviewspresented,asisalsoclearfromsomeremarksquotedbySt.AugustineinhisprefacetoDehaeresibus(Patr.Lat.vol.42,p.23):AcertainCelsus[otherwiseunknown]haspresentedtheviewsofallphilosopherswhofoundedphilosophicalschoolsdowntohisownperiod...insixratherlargevolumes.Hedidnotrefuteanyofthem,hejustexplainedwhattheythought,withsuchbrevitythatbothstyleandcontentgaveroom,notforpraisingandcriticizing,norforconfirmingordefending,butonlyforexplainingandpresentingtheirideas.ForCelsusmentionedmorethanonehundredphilosophers,notallofwhomevenfoundedtheirownschools,sincehewasoftheopinionthatheoughtnottoneglectthosephilosopherswhofollowedtheirteacherswithoutdissent.QuotationsfromAristotle’sstudentTheophrastusintheAristoteliancommentatorSimpliciusinthesixthcenturycedemonstratethatthesectionsontheGreekphilo-sophersfromThalestoPlatointhedoxographicalsourcesmustultimatelygobacktoTheophrastuswhobothinindependenttreatises(onDemocritus,Anaxagoras,etc.)andinhisphilosophicalworksdiscussedhispredecessors.ItisnotcertainthatallthisinformationisderivedfromhisPeriphusikOndoxOn(=PhysicalOpinions,asthelikelymeaningis),thoughthishasoftenbeenassumed,sinceTheophrastuslikeAristotleusedtodiscussthehistoricaldevelopmentofideasasapreliminarysteptohisownphilosophy:manyofthefragmentswhichDielsattributedtohisPeriphusikOndoxOninfactcomefromTheophrastus’Physics.WecannotbesurefromwhichbookthefragmentofhisDeSensibuscomes(Balthussen,2000),butitseemslikelythatthis27ACTC022720/03/2006,03:57PM\njørgenmejerfragmentinanycasegivesafairimpressionofthewayTheophrastuspresentedtheviewsofhispredecessors.ItisnotknownwhochangedtheAristotelian-Theophrasteanwayofdiscussingtheirpredecessorsaccordingtotheaffiliationoftheirviewsintothelessproblem-orientedsystemwefindintheso-calleddoxographers.Itisimportanttonoticethateachdoxographerseemstohavechangedandaddedtohisimmediatepredecessor,butthefactthatseveralsourcesattributethesameviewtoaparticularphilosopherdoesnotbyitselfincreasethelikelihoodthatitreflectstheoriginalideasofthatphilosopher.Allitmeansisthatthiswasastandarditemwithinthedoxographicaltradition.ThoughdoxographyinastrictsenseoriginallyappliedonlytothosesourcesthatwerethoughttoderivefromTheophrastus,ithaslatercometobeusedaboutanyancientsourcewhichreportstheviewsofearlierphilosophers.Ithasevenbeensuggested(Giusta,1964–8)that,correspondingtothedoxographiesonphysicsandmetaphysics,theremusthavebeenanotherdoxographicaltraditiondealingwithethics.Thereseems,however,tobegeneralagreementthatsuchaparalleltraditioncannotbeproventohaveexisted.Thesimilaritybetweenvarioustexts,e.g.inCiceroandSeneca,isnogreaterthancanbeexplainedasaresultofacommonwayofdealingwithparticularethicalproblems.Thereisanothertypeofphilosophicalhistoriographywhichmaybecalleddoxographical,viz.aseriesofworkscalledPerihaireseOn(=OnSects),writteninthesecondandfirstcenturiesbce.Theseworksarealllostandonlyknownfromrefer-encesandquotationsin,especially,DiogenesLaertius;onlyonesubstantialexcerptonPeripateticandStoicethics,fromAriusDidymuspreservedbyStobaeus,canpossiblybeattributedtothistypeofwork(Ecl.2.7=2.37,14–152,25Wachsmuth;theiden-tityofAriusDidymus,commonlyassumedtobeAugustus’Stoiccourtphilosopher,isuncertain,cf.Göransson,1995).EusebiusandStobaeusalsopreservesectionsonthephysicaltheoriesofthesetwoschoolswhichmaycomefromthesamework;sincewecancomparethePeripateticmaterialwithAristotle’sownworks,itisoflessim-portancethanthesectionsontheStoicswhosewritingsarealllost(cf.Pomeroy,1999).Itappearsthatthistypeofdoxographydealtwithonlythepost-Socraticschoolsofphilosophy,andmainlywithethics,andthattheyofferedsystematicaccountsofthephilosophicaldoctrines,sothattheviewsofeachschoolonaparticularphilosophicaltopicwerepresentedinseparatesections.Inlateantiquity,forinstance,inthechurchfathers,therecanbelittledoubtthatdoxographicalworksofonetypeoranotherwerethesourcesconsultedbymoststudentsofphilosophy.Fewoftheoriginalworksbypre-SocraticandHellenisticphilosopherswereavailableoutsideAlexandriaandothercentersofscholarship.Hencethestudyofdoxographyandofthetransmissionofphilosophicaltextsinantiquityisimportantforaproperevaluationofthesignificanceoflatetestimoniesandoftheirinterpretationsvis-à-vistheoriginalstatementsbyphilosopherswhoarenowlost.BiographyTheancientGreeksandRomanswerejustasfascinatedbythelivesofphilosophersandotherfamousmenasthemodernworldis,thoughitisobviousthattheywere28ACTC022820/03/2006,03:57PM\nancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltraditionmoreinterestedinthepersonalitiesthaninthesocialandeducationalaspectsofbiography.Thus,weknownexttonothingabouttheearlydevelopmentandthephilo-sophicalstudiesofyoungphilosophers.Infact,itisimportanttounderstandthatitwasalwaysdifficulttofindinformationaboutmenofthepastbecausethedocumentaryevidencewasvirtuallynonexistent:thebiographerhadtocullwhateverevidencehecouldfromthewritingsoftheindividualpersonality,somethingwhichwasdifficultinthecaseofbothancientdramatistsandphilosophers,thedramatistsbecausetheydonotspeakinpropriapersona–thephilosophersbecausetheyconcentrateonargu-mentanddonotdescribetheirownlives.Evenwhenphilosophersseemtohavespokenaboutthemselves,itisoftenhardtoconnectthisinformationwiththeirexternallife.WhenwearetoldthatDemocritusinabookstatedthathewroteit730yearsafterthefallofTroy,wearecompletelyatalossastowhichdateheassignedtothisevent(D.L.9.41),andthustheinformationdoesnothelpusdateDemocritus.Thislackofinformationdidnotpreventancientwritersfromproducingalargenumberofbiographiesofphilosophers,butitisimportanttorealizethattheynecessarilyhadtorelyonveryscatteredevidence.Themainelementinancientbiographywasanecdotesandcharacteristicsayings(gnomicstatements,apophthegmata),butunlesstheauthorhadapersonalrelationshipwithhissubject,thereislittlechancethattheinformationprovidediscorrectinahistoricalsense.Thiscan,forinstance,begatheredfromthefactthatthesameanecdotecanbetoldaboutmorethanonephilosopher:theanecdotessaymoreaboutwhichcharacteristicstheancientsattributedtoaphilosopherthanabouttheactuallifeofthatindividual.Oneofthebasicproblemsinbiographyisofcoursetodeterminethelifespanofthesubjectinquestion.Sincetheancientshadnoabsolutechronology,itwasnecessarytoestablishdatesbymeansofsynchronismswithknowneventslikeOlympiadsorwithnamesofofficeholders;thustheAtheniansdatedyearsbyreferringtooneoftheninearchons.Sometimesawell-knowneventtookplaceduringaphilosopher’slife,e.g.thefoundationoftheAtheniancolonyThuriiin444bcewithwhichProtagoraswasassociatedsincehewassaidtohavewrittenthelawsforthatcity.Consequently,hewasassumedtohavebeenattheheightofhiscareeratthatdate,anditwassaidtobehisacme(Gr.)orfloruit(Lat.),usuallyidentifiedwithhisfortiethyearofage.Thefortiethyearwasalsousedtofixthedateoftwophilosopherswhenoneofthemwassupposedtobethestudentoftheother.DemocritushadsaidsomethingaboutbeingyoungwhenAnaxagoraswasold,andastheirrelationshipwassupposedtobethatofteacher/student,Democritus’birthwasdatedto460bc,whichwasAnaxagoras’floruit.Itisveryunlikelythatthisintervalof40yearsreflectsanyactualdifferenceinagebetweenthetwophilosophers,nottomentionthefactthatwecannotbesurethatDemocrituseverstudiedwithAnaxagoras.ButtheHellenisticbiographershadatendencytolinkphilosophersinsuccessionssothatanyrelationshipbetweentwophilosopherswouldbeinterpretedasthatofteachertostudent.Insomecasesitwasknownhowoldaphilosopherwaswhenhedied–forexample,Socrateswas70yearsoldwhenhewasexecutedinOlympiad95.1(=399bce),hencehemusthavebeenbornOl.77.4(=469bce).Contrarytomodernpractice,itisinfactofgreatinteresttocontemplatethosepiecesofinformationthatdonotfitinwiththeusualdatingsystems.Thus,whenwearetoldbyThrasyllusthatDemocrituswasbornoneyearbeforeSocrates(i.e.,470bce),thisdeservestobetakenintoseriousconsideration29ACTC022920/03/2006,03:57PM\njørgenmejersinceitishardtoseewhyThrasyllusshouldhavecontradictedtheusualdateunlesshehadgoodreasonstodoso.ThefirstbiographiesofphilosophersseemtohavebeenwrittenbyPlato’sstudentsshortlyafterhisdeath,butphilosophicalbiographieswerepopularthroughouttheHellenisticperiod.Around200bceSotionfromAlexandriawroteabookcalledSuccessionsofPhilosophers,inwhichhemadeonephilosophersucceedanotherasheadofaparticularphilosophicalschoolandsimilarlyconnectedvariousschoolswithoneanother.Thissystemof“successions”weregenerallyfollowedbyalllaterwriters;thetwomainsuccessionswerea)theIoniclinefromThalesviaArchelausandSocrates,PlatoandAristotletoClitomachusasheadoftheAcademyandChrysippusasheadoftheStoa,andb)anItaliclinefromPythagorasoverDemocritustotheEpicureanandSkepticschools.SometimesaseparatelineofEleaticswasadded.TherecanbelittledoubtthatthiswayoforganizingthehistoryofphilosophywasmodeledontheHellenisticschoolsandthatthenotionthatphilosopherswereorganizedinschoolspriortoPlato’sAcademyisanachronistic.Allofthesehistoricalworkshavebeenlost,butneitherfromthebitsandpiecesquotedbyDiogenesLaertiusandothersourcesnorfromthetwopartlypreservedbooksoftheEpicureanPhilodemus’SurveyofPhilosophers(SuntaxistOnphilosophOn)ontheAcademyandtheStoa(Dorandi1991,1993)fromthemiddleofthefirstcenturybce,doesitappearthattheyweremuchconcernedwiththephilosophicalcontributionsofthevariousschoolscovered:theemphasiswasonthelifeoftheindividualphilosopherandoftheinstitutiontowhichhebelonged,andphilosophicaltopicsseemmostlytohavebeenintroducedwhentheinnovations(“inventions”)ofaphilosopherwerelisted.ThemostimportantspecimenofhistoriographyofphilosophyfromantiquityfollowsthestructureoftheSuccessions,viz.DiogenesLaertius’CompendiumoftheLivesandOpinionsofPhilosophers.Theauthorisnototherwiseknownandhisworkcanonlybedatedfromacombinationofthelatestpersonalitieshementions,andthefactthathewasnotyetinfluencedbyNeoplatonism,i.e.,itmusthavebeenwrittenaround200ce.Hisworkisdividedintotenbooks:introductionandvariouswisemen(includingThales)(1);TheIonianTradition(Books2–7):Ionianphysicists,SocratesandtheminorSocratics(2),Plato(3),theAcademydowntoClitomachus(4),AristotleandthePeripateticsdowntoLyco(5),AntisthenesandtheCynics(6),ZenoofCitiumandtheStoics–possiblydowntothefirstcenturyce;theendofBook7islost(7);theItalicTradition(Books8–10):Pythagorasandhisearlysuccessors,andEmpedocles(8),Heraclitus,theEleatics,theAtomists,Protagoras,DiogenesofApollonia,andPyrrho(9),andfinallyEpicurus(10).Diogenes’bookisbasicallyacompilationofexcerptsfromalargenumberofsourcesandoftenprovidesuswiththemainevidencefortheHellenistictradition.Thequalitiesandthestructureareveryuneven:somelivesarenothingbutanecdotesandaphorismwhileothersareprimarilydoxographies.SomeLiveshaveimportantsectionsonphilo-sophy(e.g.,theLivesofZenoinBook7andPyrrhoinBook9)whileothersareofnohelpinreconstructingthephilosophyofathinker(e.g.,PlatoinBook3andAristotleinBook5;inbothcases,however,theyexemplifyhowlatergenerationsinterpretedtheirpredecessors).Forthepre-Socratics,Diogeneshasusedadoxographicalsourceofthetypedescribedabove,pp.24–8.However,inBook10DiogeneshaschosentoquotefourlongtextsbyEpicurushimselfthatconstitutethemostimportantevidence30ACTC023020/03/2006,03:57PM\nancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltraditionforEpicurus’philosophypriortothefirstcenturybce(viz.,CiceroandthepapyrifromHerculaneum).DiogenesendshisbookwithEpicurus’40“PrincipalDoctrines”becauseheconsidersthemaculminationofphilosophicalwisdom.MostofDiogenes’biographiesincludedanumberofitemslikebirth,parents,name,appearance,relationstootherphilosophers,travels,lifestyle,andmannerofdeath;manyLivesalsocontainbibliographiesandsomepiecesofdocumentaryevidence.Thereisnofixedorderinwhichtheseitemsarepresented,someLivesaremuchmorecomprehensivethanothers,butinmostcasesthecomprehensivenessofaLifedependsonthenumberofanecdotesavailable.Thefactualinformationmustalwaysbeviewedwithskepticismandtherearemanyobviousmistakes.ThoughitisclearthatDiogenesisnophilosopher,hehaspreservedmuchofphilosophicalinterest.MostoftheotherphilosophicalLivesfromlateantiquityarewritteninthecontextofthePlatonicphilosophy:ApuleiuswroteabookonPlatoandhisphilosophyinthesecondcenturyce,andahundredyearslaterbothPorphyryandIamblichuswrotebiographiesofPythagoras,buttheyareallthreemoreofvalueasasourcetothetimesoftheirauthorsthanasasourcetothesubjectoftheirbiographies.Porphyry’slifeofPythagoraswaspartofhisHistoriaPhilosopha,onthehistoryofphilosophyinfourbooksuptoandculminatinginPlato.MoreimportantisthefactthatwehavebiographiesofsomeNeoplatonicphilosopherswrittenbytheirstudents:PorphyrynotonlycollectedandeditedPlotinus’writingsattheendofthethirdcenturyce,healsowroteavividdescriptionofPlotinus’lifeasheknewitfromhisowntimewiththe3NeoplatonicphilosopherinRome.TwohundredyearslaterMarinuswrotealifeofProcluswhowasheadoftheAcademyinAthensinthefifthcenturyce,andearlyinthesixthcenturyDamasciuswroteaHistoriaPhilosopha(previouslycalledLifeofIsidorus),whichcoversthelastcoupleofgenerationsofPlatonicphilosophersinAthens.SincewehavesomanywritingsbytheNeoplatonicphilosophersthemselves,thesignificanceofthesebiographiesisnotwhattheyhavetotellusaboutthethoughtsoftheseNeoplatonists,buttheirdescriptionofthephilosophicalactivitiesinAthens.TakentogetherwiththenumerouscommentariesonworksofPlatoandAristotle,theyofferimportantinformationabouttheinstitutionalaspectsofdoingphilosophyin4lateantiquity,andmuchremainstobedoneinthisarea.ItisnocoincidencethatSimpliciusandmanyothersinthisperiodwerecapableofcomposingcommentariesthatarestillimportantbothforourunderstandingofthetextstheycommentonandforourknowledgeofGreekphilosophy.BibliographyWorksCitedBalthussen,H.(2000).TheophrastusAgainstthePresocraticsandPlato.PeripateticDialecticintheDesensibus.Leiden:Brill.Barnes,J.(1997).“RomanAristotle.”InJ.BarnesandM.Griffin(eds.),PhilosophiaTogata2.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.3.OnPorphyry’sbiography,seefurtherBrissonandPradeau,plotinus.4.Onthistopic,seeHoffmannwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?31ACTC023120/03/2006,03:57PM\njørgenmejerBidez,J.(ed.).(1924).L’empereurJulienOeuvrescomplètesI.2Lettresetfragments.Paris:LesBellesLettres.Diels,H.(1879).DoxographiGraeci.Berlin:G.Reimer.Dorandi,T.(1991).Filodemo.Storiadeifilosofi[.]Platoneel’Academia(PHerc.164e1021).Naples:Bibliopolis.——.(1993).Filodemo.Storiadeifilosofi:LastoadaZenoneaPanezio(PHerc.1018).Leiden:Brill.Gigante,M.(1995).PhilodemusinItaly.TheBooksfromHerculaneum.AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress.Giusta,M.(1964–8).Idossografidietica1–2.Torino:UniversitadiTorino.Göransson,T.(1995).Albinus,Alcinous,AriusDidymus.Gothenburg:UniversityofGotherburgPress.Gottschalk,H.B.(1987).“AristotelianPhilosophyintheRomanWorldFromtheTimeofCicerototheEndoftheSecondCenturyAD.”ANRWII36.2,1079–174.Mansfeld,J.(1992).“PhysikaidoxaiandProblemataPhysikafromAristotletoAetius.”InW.W.FortenbaughandD.Gutas(eds.),Theophrastus,hisPsychological,DoxographicalandScientificWritings(pp.63–111).NewBrunswick:Transaction.MansfeldJ.andRunia,D.T.(1996).Aëtiana.TheMethodandIntellectualContextofaDoxographer(vol.1):TheSources.Leiden:Brill.Mejer,J.(1992).“DiogenesLaertiusandtheTransmissionofGreekPhilosophy.”ANRWII36.5,3556–602.Moraux,P.(1973).DerAristotelismusbeidenGriechen.VonAndronikosbisAlexandervonAphrodisias(vol.1):DieRenaissancede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hatParmenides’criticismsofhispredecessorsrestontheprinciplethatwhatcanbegenuinelyknownmustbeaunityofaparticularsort,whichIcallapredicationalunity.Onthisview,anythingthatgenuinelyis(thattrulycanbesaidtobe),andsocanbeknown,mustbeofasingle,whollyunifiedkind.Parmenidesdrewconclusionsfromthisthatlaterphilosopherstookveryseriously.Oneconsequenceisthatwhatisgenuinelyrealcannotcometobe,passaway,oralter,thusposingtheproblemsofchangeandknowledge:Howcanweaccountfortheappearanceofchangethatweseeintheworldaroundus?Andhowcanwehaveknowledgeofsuchachangingworld?AnadvantageofviewingParmenidesinthiswayisthatitmakessenseofthecosmologicaltheorizingofpost-ParmenideanfiguressuchasAnaxagoras,Empedocles,andDemocritus.Allthesephilosopherswere(intheirdifferentways)pluralists,holdingthatthereisanumer-icalpluralityofmetaphysicallybasicentities;andyet,Ishallargue,allwereworkingintheParmenideantraditionbecausetheyallacceptedParmenides’criteriaforwhatisgenuinelyreal.1.Referencestothepre-SocraticsaremadeusingthestandardnumberingsystemofDielsandKranz(citedasDK),1951–2.Unlessotherwiseindicated,translationsaremyown.ManythankstoMaryLouiseGillandtoMartinCurdforhelpfulsuggestionsandcomments.2.Stokes(1971)providesacomprehensivetreatmentofunityandpluralityinearlyGreekthoughtinEnglish.34ACTC033420/03/2006,03:58PM\nparmenidesandafter:unityandpluralityBeforeParmenidesAristotledescribesmanyoftheearlyGreekthinkersasphusiologoi,becausetheysoughttogiveanaccountofnature(orphusis).AlthoughAristotlehasbeenaccusedofmisunderstandingandoversimplifyingthethoughtofthepre-Socratics,hisaccounthasmuchtorecommendit.Asfaraswecantellfromtheveryskimpyevidence(muchofwhichcomesfromAristotlehimselfandtheAristoteliantradition),theearliestphilosophers,theMilesians,soughttoexplainthesensibleworldintermsofwhatmightbecalledageneratingsubstance,asinglebasicstuffthatundergoesaseriesoftransformationsandgeneratesthesensibleworldasweperceiveit:forThalesthiswasmostprobablywater,forAnaximanderitissomecharacterlessstuffcalledtheapeiron(theindefinite),forAnaximenes,itisair(Graham,1997).(FormoderndisputesaboutthebestwaytounderstandtheMilesiansseeAlgra,1999;Barnes,1979b;andinthisvolumeHussey,thebeginningsofscienceandphilosophyinarchaicgreece,esp.pp.7–12.)BecauseourevidencefortheMilesiansissomeager,itisdifficulttodrawanyfirmconclusionabouttheirviewsortheirreasoning.ForHeraclituswehavemoreevidence,anditrevealshimarguingnotonlyabouttherealconstitutionoftheworld,butalsoaboutthecharacterofourknowledgeofthatworld.Althoughthesurvivingfragmentspresentformidableinterpretivechallenges,itisclearthatHeraclitusregardswhathecallsthelogos(whichcanbetranslatedas“account”)asthesinglegoverningprincipleoftheuniverseandtheproperobjectofgenuineknowledge(DK22B1andB2).InB1,afterindicatingthattheaccount(logos)thathegives“holdsforever,”Heraclitussaysthathewilldistinguish“eachthinginaccordancewithitsnature(phusis),sayinghowitis.”Itisunderstandingthelogosthatallowshimtodothis.AtB50hespecificallylinksthelogoswithaspecialkindofunity:“Listeningnottomebuttothelogos,itiswisetoagreethatallthingsareone.”Howallthingsareoneissuggested(butnotspelledout)insomeofthefragments.Inthecaseofcertainopposites,Heraclitusclaimsthattheyarereallyoneandthesame(adoctrinethathasreceivedmuchattentioninHeraclitusstudies).Dayandnight(B57),theroadupanddown(B60),andthehealthinessandnoxiousnessofseawater(B61)arebutparticularlyvividandparadoxicalmanifesta-tionsofthisunityofopposites.Yetthereisamorebasicunityunderlyingthatoftheopposites,namelytheinterconnectednessandsusceptibilitytoasingleexplanationofallthatthereis,anditisthisthatthelogosexplains(MacKenzie,1988).Thisunityisexemplifiedprimarilybyfire,apartofthenaturalworldand,forHeraclitus,animport-antsymbolofthelogos.AtB30Heraclitussays:“thiscosmos,thesameforall,nogodormanmade,butitalwayswasandisandwillbe,fireeverliving,kindlinginmeasuresandgoingoutinmeasures.”Heraclitusisnotclaimingthattheworldisliterallymadeoutoffire(inthesenseofanAristotelianmaterialfirstprinciple)but,throughthereferencetomeasure,thatitisasystemofperpetualbutorderedchange.Justlikefire,thecosmosisalwayschangingitsappearanceyetremainsoneandthesameinitsnature;indeeditistemptingtoseeHeraclitusassayingthattherealconstitutionornatureofathingjustistheorderedseriesofchangesthatitundergoes(Graham,1997;MacKenzie,1988).Realknowledgeisthegraspingofthispointandthusunderstandingtheunderlyingunityofallthatthereis(Curd,1991;Lesher,1983;MacKenzie,1988).35ACTC033520/03/2006,03:58PM\npatriciacurdInHeraclituswehaveclaimsaboutbothknowledgeanditsobject:toknowistograsptherealnatureofathing,andthatnaturemustitselfbeunifiedinacertainway.Althoughthecontentofthelogoscanbegraspedbythehumanmind(B2),mostpeoplefailtohearorunderstandit(evenafterHeraclitushimselfhastoldhisstory;B2,B1,B17,B34).InB40,Heraclituscondemnscertainofpredecessorsforhavingmuchlearning(polumathiE)butnounderstandingorcomprehension(noos).B41spellsoutinwhatthatunderstandingconsists:“thewiseisonething:toknowtheplanbywhichallthingsaresteered.”ThepolymathsofB40havecollectedmuchinformation,butthereisnounifyingunderstandingofthenatureofthingsthatbringsallthebitsandpiecestogetherintoacomprehensivegraspingofthesinglesystemthatisthecosmos.Wisdomconsistsinknowingthatwhichgovernsandcontrolstheworkingsofthewhole,andthatisthelogos.Trulytoknowthelogoswouldbetoknowitscontent,knowingnotonlythegrandschemeofchangesthatconstitutesthecosmosbutalsotoknowtherealnatureofeachthingandtobeabletosayhowitis(asB1putsit).Itisonlythroughthelatterthatwecanknowtheformer:anunderstandingofthecosmosisgroundedintheknowledgeofthenatureofeachthing.Thelogositselfistheunifyingprinciplethatguidesandsteersallthings,asingleaccountofhowthingsare,andtheobjectofgenuineknowledge.ParmenidesThesurvivingfragmentsofParmenides’writingsarecontainedinapoemthat3hastwomainsections:theAlEtheia(“Truth”)andtheDoxa(“Opinion”).Parmenides’argumentbeginswithanintroduction(DK28B1,“theProem”)tellingofajourneybyayoungman(thekouros)toanunnamedgoddesswhobothrevealsanimportanttruthandteachesthatthetruthmustbeacceptedonlyafterherargumentshavebeenevaluated,andnotbecauseitcomesfromagoddess.Meetingthekouros,thegoddesstellshimthatitisrightthathelearn“allthings”(panta),“boththeunshakingheartofwell-persuasivetruthandthebeliefsofmortals,inwhichthereisnotruetrust”(DK428B1.28–30).Thetaskoflearningallthingscannotbeachievedthroughlearningbyroteandthenrejectingwhateverisnotontheapprovedlist.Giventhegoddess’sfrequentdemandsthatthekourostakecontrolofhisnoosorthought(Lesher,1984),tolearn“allthings”wouldseemtobetolearntojudgecorrectlyaboutthingsthatpresentthemselvesasbeingthecase,orconcerningclaimsaboutwhatisthecasemadebyothers.ThisisreinforcedbythewordsatB7.5–6wherethekourosisexhortedtojudge3.TheDoxadescribesacosmologicaltheorysimilarinmanyrespectstothetheoriesthatParmenidescriticizesintheAlEtheia.EvenancientcommentatorswereunsurewhatParmenides’intentionswereintheDoxa.Parmenidesmighthavemeantitasagenuinecosmology,asanillustrationofthesortsoferrorsmortalsmake,orasatestforthesortsofmistakeshehaddiagnosedintheAlEtheiaasakindoftrainingtool.(ForarangeofaccountsoftheDoxa,seeCurd(2004),Long(1963),Mourelatos(1971),andNehamas(2002).)TheargumentsIgiveherearebasedonthoseoftheAlEtheia,anddonotdependonaninterpretationoftheDoxa.4.Readingeupeitheos(well-persuasive)ratherthaneukukleos(well-rounded)inB1.29.36ACTC033620/03/2006,03:58PM\nparmenidesandafter:unityandplurality(krinai)bylogos,atB8.15wherethetestisajudgmentordecision(krisis),andatB8.62,wherethegoddesstellsthekourosthatshegivestheaccountofmortalthoughtintheDoxasothat“nomortalthoughtwilleverdrivepastyou”(Lesher,1984).Asignthatthegoddessintendstoteachthekouros(andParmenides’readersandhearers)tojudgecorrectlycomesinB2–3whenshebeginsherlesson:Comenow,andIwilltellyou,andyou,hearing,preservethestory,theonlyroutesofinquirythereareforthinking;theonethatitis(estin)andthatitcannotnotbeisthepathofPersuasion(foritattendsontruth)theother,thatitisnot(oukestin)andthatitisrightthatitnotbe,thisIpointouttoyouisapathwhollyinscrutableforyoucouldnotknowwhatisnot(foritisnottobeaccomplished)norcouldyoupointitout...(DK28B2)...forthesamethingisforthinkingandforbeing.(DK28B3)Althoughthefragmentsdonotexplicitlystatetheobjectoftheinquiry(thereisnosubjectprovidedfortheverbsinlines3and5),thecontentoftheAlEtheiaandtheDoxapointtoitasbeingthefundamentalnatureofthings–theultimateentityorentitiesinanaccountofwhatthereis.Whenthegoddesspromisesthatthekouroswilllearnallthings,sheissayingthatshewillteachamethodofinquirythatwillresultintruthaboutthewaythingsreallyare.Parmenidescriticizeshispredecessorsbecausetheyhavetakenthewrongrouteintheirattemptstoexplaintheworld.FromParmenides’pointofview,theywereunsuccessfulbecausetheyacceptedasbasiccertainentitiesthatwerenotgenuinelyrealinsofarastheyadmittedchangeorincorporatedopposites,andsoembracedbothwhat-isandwhat-is-not.Totakewhat-is-notasthestartingpointistosetoutonaroutethatcanneverbecompleted.AsB2.7–8says,toknoworpointoutwhat-is-not“isnottobeaccomplished.”Suchanendeavorisdoomedtofailbecausewhat-is-notisinherentlyvague(Mourelatos,1976,1979);itcannotbegraspedorunderstood.InB6andB7Parmenidescastigatesthosewhorelyonsenseexperi-enceasasourceofunderstandingandthusconflatewhat-isandwhat-is-not.Manyphilosophersreadthebare“is”inB2andtheotherParmenideanfragmentsasprimarilyexistential,andregardParmenides’argumentsasdealingwithwhatcanexistasasubjectofinquiryordiscourse,andsoasaboutanythingthatcanbespokenofandthought.Thus,hissubjectcouldbegrasshoppersorunicorns,aswellasthebasicentitieslikeairortheapeironofearlierphilosophicaltheories(Barnes,1979b;Coxon,1986;Furth,1974;Gallop,1979,1984;McKirahan,1994;Owen,1960).Despiteitspopularity,therearedifficultiesinreconcilingtheexistentialinterpretationwiththewordingandcontextofParmenides’arguments.Forexample,thetargetofthegoddess’sscornseemstobelessthosewhotrytothinkaboutwhatdoesnotexist,thanthosewhoconflatewhat-isandwhat-is-notintheirinquiriesandsubsequentexplanationsofwhatisfundamental.InB1.31–32,thekourosiswarnedagainstmortalbeliefs,notbecausetheytrytostudyortalkaboutwhatdoesnotexist,butbecausetheyconflatethingsthatmerelyseemtobewiththosethatreallyare.(Forfurtherargumentsagainsttheexistentialinterpretation,seeCurd,2004;Kahn,1978,1988,2002;andMourelatos,1979.)37ACTC033720/03/2006,03:58PM\npatriciacurdAnalternateaccountofthebare“is,”andtheoneIadoptinthischapter,interpretsitnotasexistential,butaspredicativeinaparticularlystrongandfundamentalsense.Onthisview,thesubjectofParmenides’inquiryistheproperwaytogiveanaccountofthenatureorrealityofthings.Parmenidesisconcernedwiththecharacterofentitiesthatcanprovidethissortofultimateexplanation(Curd,2004;Mourelatos,1971,1989).What-is,inthissense,iswhatismetaphysicallybasic,thestartingpointinanexplanation.Thus,tobe,forParmenides,istobethenatureor,aswewouldsay,theessenceofsomething:tobeF,istobewhatbeingFis,orwhatitistobeF.Onlysuchentitiesaretheappropriatebasisforexplanation.Whenwegiveanexplanation,sayingthatthusandsoistheultimatenatureofX,orthatXisreallyY,weareusing5Parmenides’“is”ofultimateexplanation.Suchasubjectistheobjectoflegitimateknowledgeorunderstanding(wehaveseenthislinkbetweenknowledgeandthenatureofthingsintheworkofHeraclitus).ThisiswhyParmenidesstressesthecon-nectionbetweenwhat-isandgenuinethoughtorunderstanding(seeB3andB8.34–38).Tobesure,thereisanexistentialaspecttosuchaclaim,foranythingthatisagenuinenatureoressencemustexist,buttheclaimofexistenceisnotprimary:itfollowsfromthetruththatsomethingindeedisanatureoressence.Thus,Parmenides’subjectisnotjustanythingthatcanbeasubjectofdiscourse;ratherheisconcernedwithwhatcanserveasthelegitimateobjectofinquiryintothewaythingsreallyare.Parmenidesgivesthepositiveargumentsaboutthenatureofwhat-isinthelongfragmentB8.Heopenshisaccountthisway:...asinglestorystillremainsoftheroutethatitis;andonthisroutethereareverymanysigns,thatwhat-isisungenerableandimperishable,awholeofasinglekind,andunshakingandcomplete;norwasitnorwillitbe,sinceitisnowalltogetherone,cohesive.(DK28B8.1–6,readingoulonmounogenesandteleioninB8.4)TheseopeninglinesofB8giveformalrequirementsforametaphysicallybasicentity;theytellus,notwhatwhat-isis,buthowwhat-isiswhatitis.Reading“ungenerableandimperishable,”and“unshakingandcomplete”asadverbialclaimsaboutthewaythatabasicentityholds(oris)itsessentialnature,weseethatParmenidesclaimsthatgenuinelytobe,tobeF,say,istobesoungenerablyandimperishably,asawholeofasinglekind,unalterablyandcompletelyF.Onlywhatisinsuchastrongwayisapossiblenatureandsoanobjectofthoughtandunderstanding,becauseonlysuchanentitycanbegraspedasawholebynoos,thecapacityofthoughtinus.Parmenidesdoesnottellushowmanyentitiesofdifferingkindscansatisfythoserequirements,nordoesheidentifythosethatdo.Rather,hegivesusthecriteriaandtellsushowtogoaboutlookingforthesenatures.Theserequirementscanbediscoveredbyapplyingthe“decision”(krisis)statedinB8.15–16:5.Forafused“is”involvingbothpredicativeandexistentialaspects,seeFurth(1974),althoughFurthstressestheexistentialcomponent.Mourelatos(1971)discussesalternativeinterpretationsofthesubjectless“is”ofB2anddefendsanotionof“speculativepredication.”Forfullerdiscussionoftheclaim“XisreallyY”seeMourelatos(1989)andCurd(2004).38ACTC033820/03/2006,03:58PM\nparmenidesandafter:unityandpluralityAndthedecision(krisis)concerningthesethingsisinthis:isorisnot;andithasbeendecided,justasisnecessary,toleavetheoneunthinkableandunnamed(foritisnotatruepath),theothertobeandtobegenuine.TheargumentsofB2andB3andtheopeninglinesofB6spelloutthebasisofthekrisis:“Itisrightthatwhatisforsayingandthinkingbe;foritcanbe,butnothing(mEden)cannot;thisIbidyouponder.”(Foradiscussionofthiscontroversialtext,seeCordero,1979,1987;andCoxon,1986.)Thereisnowayforthoughtordiscoursetofastenonwhat-is-not;itsvaguenessfrustratesanyattempttoknoworsaywhatitis.AppliedrepeatedlyinB8,thedecisionbetweenisandisnotshowsthatifbeingacertainwayopenswhat-istowhat-is-not,thenwhat-iscannotbethatway.Anyattributethatentailstherealityofwhat-is-not(ordependsonitsreality)isdeniedtowhat-is.TheargumentsinB8unfoldtheconsequencesoftheclaimthatonlywhat-iscanbe,andtheyrevealthatParmenidesiscommittedtosomesortofmonism.Takentogether,theclusterofsignsalongtherouteofinquiry(B8.1–6,above)pointtoanobjectofthatinquirythatisunified,anindivisiblewholeofasinglekind.So,what-ismustbeone.PlatoandlaterthinkersdescribeParmenides’positionassomethinglike“theallisone”(theSophist)orreporthimasholdingaviewabout“theOne”(theParmenides).UnityisacrucialnotionforParmenides,butinwhatsenseisheamonist?ManyhistoriesofGreekphilosophyportrayParmenidesasanumericalmonistcom-mittedtotheexistenceofonlyonethingthatisgenuinelyreal(Guthrie,1965;KRS,1983;McKirahan,1994),butthisviewhasbeenchallenged(Barnes,1979a;Curd,2004;Jones,1973;Mourelatos,1971;Solmsen,1969).OneearlyhintthatParmenideswasnotanumericalmonistcanbefoundinBookIofAristotle’sMetaphysics,whereAristotlecontrastsParmenidesandMelissus.RecognizingcertainaffinitiesamongtheEleatics,“thosewhospokeoftheuniverseashavingasinglenature,”healsonotesdifferences:“Parmenidesseemstofastenonwhatisoneinaccount(logos),Melissuson6thatwhichisoneinmatter”(Met.A.5,986b10–11,b19–20).AlthoughAristotleseemstothinkthatnumericalmonism(ofthetypeadvocatedbyMelissus)isacon-sequenceofParmenides’arguments,heseesthatParmenidesisprimarilyconcernedwiththeunityofthenatureoressenceofathing.OnceweabandonthenotionthatParmenides’primaryconcerniswithwhatcanexist(andsogiveupthinkingthatthedenialofwhat-is-notistobeequatedwithafundamentalrejectionofwhatdoesnotexist),itislessobviousthatweareforcedtounderstandParmenidesasassertingthat7onlyonethingexists.Whateverisgenuinelyrealisone,butthatdoesnotentailthattherecanbeonlyonegenuinelyrealthing.Intheremainderofthissection,IexamineParmenides’claimsaboutwhat-isandhismonism,andthen,inthefollowingsections,Iexploretheimportanceofhisviewsaboutknowledgeandunityforlaterpre-Socraticthinkers.6.InMet.D.6Aristotleexploresthevarioussensesof“one,”andsaysthatthingsareoneinlogoswhenstatementsoftheiressencesareindivisible(1016a32–5).7.Nevertheless,itispossibletoacceptboththeexistentialinterpretationanddenythatParmenidesisanumericalmonist,asinBarnes(1979a).39ACTC033920/03/2006,03:58PM\npatriciacurdInconsideringParmenides’argumentsaboutwhat-is,itiscrucialtorememberthat,forhim,anygenuineorlegitimatepredicationoftheform“XisY”isthedescriptionofaknowableessence(Y),revealingtheverynatureofX.Itisthisunderstandingofpredicationthataccountsforthepeculiarlystrongrequirementsthatheplacesonwhat-is.Thegoddessbeginsheraccountofwhat-isbydenyingthatitcancometobeorpassaway.Suchchanges,equivalenttobirthanddeath,requirethatwhat-iscomefromorbecomewhat-is-not,andthatitimpossible.Thisprohibitionagainstsubstantialchangeisthenexpandedintoageneralargumentagainstanykindofchangeforwhat-is.Thenatureofathingthatis(abasicentity)isstable,subjecttonoalterationormodification.Thus,oncewegraspit,wecanholditwithconfidence,forthatnaturecanneithergrow,alter,norpassaway.Whatevergenuinelyiswillbealwaysjustwhatitis.Afterdenyingtherealityofcoming-to-be,passing-away,andalteration,theargu-mentstakeuptheclaimthatwhat-isisallalikeandhenceindivisible.AtB8.4welearnedthatwhat-isisa“wholeofasinglekind:”oulonmounogenes.Thecharacterornatureofwhat-isisuniformallthewaythroughaswemightsay.Becauseitisthesameallthewaythrough,what-isisnotdivisible:anythingthatisgenuinelyrealmustbeallandonlyjusttheonethingthatitis.Theonlywaytomarkadivisioninanentity,E,wouldbetofindsomedifferenceinE.ButanypredicatethatEholds,itholdsessentially;sotosupposethatEhaddifferenceswouldbetosupposethatitisessen-tiallyfandessentiallyg,andthushadtwodifferentnatures.Thus,toknowEorgraspitwiththeunderstandingwouldentailthatwewouldhavetoknowtwothings.ButifEwereessentiallybothfandg(andwhatitistobefisdifferentfromwhatitistobeg),thenEwouldthenturnouttobeessentiallynot-f(insofarasitisg)andessentially8not-g(insofarasitisf).Becauseitisimpossibleforwhat-is-nottobe,what-iscannotbedivisible.Theargumentagainstthedivisibilityofwhat-isisnotanargumentfornumericalmonism,butratheranexplorationoftheclaimthateachthingthatiscanhaveonlyoneessenceornature.Parmenides’viewoftheconnectionbetweentheimmunitytochangeofwhat-isanditsunifiednaturecanbeseeninthesignsattheopeningofB8.Lines4to6assertthatwhat-isis“awholeofasinglekind,andunshakingandcomplete;norwasitnorwillitbe,sinceitisnowalltogetherone,cohesive.”Intheseclaimstheunityofwhat-isanditsstabilityarelinkedbynecessity:becausewhat-iscannotchange,itmustbeone,andbecauseitisawholeofasinglekind,itcannotchange.ThecontinuationoftheargumentatlinesB8.26–31presentsanimageofwhat-isasheldchangeless,firm,andstable“withingreatbonds”bytheforceof“mightyNecessity;”thuswhat-is“liesbyitself”andissteadfast.Ifwethinkofthisastherealityofathing,wecanseethatsuchathinglacksnothing–itiscompletedandperfected,aslinesB8.32–33and42–49assert.Nothingcanbetakenawayandnothingneeds8.IfbeingfiswhatitistobeE(i.e.Eisf),thentherecannotbeanyotheressencedifferentfromfthatisalsowhatitistobeE.For,tograsptheessencegwouldbetograspathingthatisdifferentfromthethingwhoseessenceornatureisf.TheapparentpeculiarityoftheargumentdependsonthenatureofParmenideanpredicationandthestrongdistinctionbetweenisandisnot.40ACTC034020/03/2006,03:58PM\nparmenidesandafter:unityandpluralitytobeadded:“foritisnotinneed;forifitwere,itwouldlackeverything.”Becausewhat-is,asanessenceornature,iswholeandperfect,itcanbegraspeddirectlyandcompletelywiththeunderstanding.Suchathingisthenaturalhomeofthinking,thenaturaltargetfornoos,thepowerofunderstandingforParmenides:Andthesamethingisforthinkingandwhereforethereisthought;fornotwithoutwhat-is,inwhichitisexpressed,willyoufindthinking;fornothingeitherisorwillbeexceptwhat-is,sincefateshackledjustthistobewholeandunchanging.(DK28B8.34–38)Acontrollednoos,takingthepathofwhat-is,engagesininquirythatends(bothcompletesitsjourneyandperfectsitself)inwhat-is.Theinternalunityandstabilityofwhat-ismakesthispossible.Aninquirythatmisunderstandsitsappropriateobjectandfastensonthewrongkindofentity(onethatseemsgenuinebutisnot)canneverbecompleted,foranoosthatattemptstograspwhat-is-notwillbecaughtinaloopofnegationsthatleaditnowhere.Thisputativeobjectofthoughtistoovaguetobegrasped,andsoonetravelingthatpathofinquirycannevercompletethejourney.(ThinkoftryingtounderstandorintellectuallygraspAnaximander’sapeiron.)Incon-trast,theunified,bounded,completed,homogenousnatureofagenuinelybasicentityisthegoalofcontrolledthought.Testingashegoes,judgingbylogos,asinstructedinB7,andinsharpcontrasttotheuncriticalhordesofB6whorelyonexperienceratherthanthinking,atravelerontherouteofwhat-iscouldreachthe“unshakingheartofwell-persuasivetruth”abouthowthingsare.Thetestshavebothanegativeandpositiveroletoplay.Negatively,theycanbeusedtoruleoutcertainaccountsofhowthingsare,andsoprotecttheinquirerfromfallingintotheerrorofbeginningwiththewrongsortofentity.Positively,theteststelluswhatisacceptableasabasicentityinatheorythatexplainstheworldasweperceiveit.Suchanentitycouldbeabuildingblockinanexplanationoftheworldthathumanbeingsperceive,butitwillnotitselfbesubjecttochange.OnlywhatissostronglyunifiedthatitmeetstherequirementsofParmenides’argumentscanbesuchagenuineentity.Whatandhowmanythebasicentitiesare,andhowtheygiverisetotheperceptibleworldandtheappearanceofchange,isleftopenbyParmenides–theremaybeoneormany.Thus,thewayisleftopenforapluralismthatisconsistentwiththemonisticrequirementsofParmenideanmetaphysics.TherearehintsofsuchaviewinthestorytoldbytheDoxa;ifwetakethatstoryasasuggestionofhowtoprovidearationalcosmology,thenmixtureandseparationwouldbeacceptablemechanisms,allowingapluralityofbasicingredientstomaintaintheircharacterthroughouttheprocessesthatproducethephenomenalworld(seenote3).ThethreemajorphilosophicaltheoriesafterParmenidesandbeforePlatowerethoseofAnaxagoras,Empedocles,andtheAtomists,LeucippusandDemocritus(Ifollowthetradition,goingbackatleasttoAristotle,thatLeucippusandDemocritusheldthesameversionofatomism).Thethreetheoriesdifferinimportantways,buttheyallshareoneimportantfeature:allthreeadopt“Eleaticpluralism”(Wardy(1988),whoconcentratesonatomism).ThesurvivingfragmentsindicatethatthisconsistencywithParmenideancriteriaisnotaccidental.Inallthree,therearepassagesthatdeny41ACTC034120/03/2006,03:58PM\npatriciacurdgenuinecoming-to-beandpassing-away,thataffirmtheinternalconsistencyandhenceinternalunityofthebasicentitiesofthetheories,andthatgroundknowledgeinthoseentities.Similarly,inallthree,thenumericalpluralityofthebasicentitiesissimplyassumedorasserted,andmechanismsstrikinglylikethemixtureandseparationoftheDoxaappear.Nonefelttheneedtorefutenumericalmonismorargueforapluralityofbasicentities,whileallseemawareoftherequirementsofpredicationalmonism.9InowturntoaconsiderationofthesethreeEleaticPluralists.EmpedoclesInhisaccountofthenatureofthings,EmpedoclesfollowsParmenidesinemphasizingtheunrealityofcoming-to-beandpassing-away:Foritisimpossiblethatthereshouldbecoming-to-befromwhat-is-not,10andthatwhat-isshouldbedestroyedisnottobefulfilledandisunheardof;11forwhereveronemaysetit,thereistruthitwillalwaysbe.(Empedocles,DK31B12)Empedoclespostulatessixfundamentalentitiesasthebasisofhistheory:fourroots12(earth,water,air,andfire)andtwoforces,LoveandStrife.Theroots,throughthemotivesforcesofLoveandStrife(Loveisapowerthatpullsapartlikesandbringstogetherunlikes;Strifebreaksupmixturesofunlikesandpullstogetherlikes),arethesourceofthecosmoswithitsheavenlybodies,theearth,andthelivingbeings–plants,animals,humanbeings–thatinhabitit.ThealternatingascendanciesofLoveandStrifeproduceandbreakupthecosmosasweperceiveit.WhenLoveabsolutelydominates,thereisamotionlessSphere,inwhichtherootsaresothoroughlymixedthatnonecanbediscerned.StrifethengathersforceandbreaksuptheSphere;underitsgrowingpower,thereisincreasingseparationuntiltherootsareutterlysegregatedfromoneanother.Lovethenincreasesherpowerandmixturesofunlikesbegintoform.Althoughthedetailsofthecosmiccyclesarecontroversial,itisclearfromB17,B21,andB26thattheonlygenuinelyrealentitiesaretheroots,andLoveandStrife.B26makesthepointclearly:9.OnlaterPresocraticthinkers,seealsoMourelatos,theconceptoftheuniversalinsomelaterpre-platoniccosmologists,inthisvolume.10.CompareParmenidesDK28B2.7“itisnottobefulfilled”thatonecouldknowwhat-is-not,andB8.21,wheredestructionis“unheardof.”11.Therearedifficultiesinthetextofline1.IfollowWright(1981)(fragment9inhernumbering),andInwood(1992)(fragment18inhisordering)(e0kga\rtou=mh\e0o/ntov),ratherthanDiels’sversionasgiveninDK(e1ktega\rou0da/m0e0o/ntov).AsWrightnotes(p.173),thisgivesabetterparallelwithParmenideanusage.12.Here,IconcentrateonphysicsandmetaphysicsinEmpedocles.Theseareintimatelyconnectedwithhisviewsaboutthebestwayforhumanbeingstolive.OnthereligiousaspectsofEmpedocles’poem,seeBetegh,greekphilosophyandreligion,inthisvolume.42ACTC034220/03/2006,03:58PM\nparmenidesandafter:unityandpluralityFortheseverythingsare,andrunningthrougheachotherthey13becomehumansandthekindsofotherbeasts.(DK31B26.3–4)Here,throughtheuseofformsoftheverbs“tobe”and“tobecome,”thereisacleardistinctionbetweenthethingsthatarereal(theroots),andthetemporaryphenomenathatresultfromthemixing(runningthroughoneanother)oftheroots.EmpedoclesshowshowthisispossibleinB23:Justaswhenpaintersadornvotiveofferings–menwelltaughtbycunningintheircraft–whowhentheytakethemanycoloredpaintsintheirhands,mixinginharmonymoreofthesebutlessofthose,outofthemmakeshapesresemblingallthings,craftingtreesandmenandwomenandbeastsandbirdsandwater-nourishedfishandlong-livedgodsbestinhonors.Sointhiswaydonotletdeceptionovercomeyourmind[tothink]thereisanyothersourceformortalthings,asmanyasareseen,countless,perishable,butknowthesethingsclearly,havingheardthestoryfromagod.(DK31B23)Certainfragments(B96andB98)actuallygiverecipesfortheproportionsanddegreesofmixturethatwillproducebone,flesh,andblood.Otherfragmentsindicatetherolesofdifferentrootsinaccountingforphenomenalproperties:forinstance,increatureswithhardshellsorhorns,Empedoclesattributestheirhardnesstotheearththatmakes14upthesurfacesoftheseanimals.InhiscommentaryonAristotle’sDeAnima(Simpl.InDeAn.68.10–13,partofthecontextforfragment96),Simpliciussuggeststhatfirepredominatesintherecipeforbone“becauseoftheirdrynessandpalecolor;”presumably,theheatandbrightnessoffireisresponsibleforboththeseproperties.Onecouldpresumablyknowthisbothbyperceptionofthe(relatively)purerstatesoftheroots,andbyanalysisofotherperceptions,soworkingtotheexplanation.Thus,knowledgeoftherootsandtheforcescanleadtoaprincipledunderstandingofthephenomenalworld.AsmetaphysicallybasicentitiesthatconformtotheEleaticmodel,therootsandLoveandStrifeareeachunifiedessencesornatures,andeachisknowable.Inapas-sageatB17.27–35,Empedoclesemphasizesthattherootsconstitutewhatisreal,stressingthateachhasitsownnature.Wecancometounderstandthecontentsand13.Theline“Fortheseverythingsare,andrunningthrougheachother...”occursthreetimesintheextantfragments:hereinB26,andalsoatB17.34andatB21.13–14.Ineachcasewearegivenanexampleoftheresultofrunningthroughoneanotheroftheroots.14.ThisclaimoccursinensemblebfromthereconstructionoftheexcitingnewfragmentsofEmpedoclesthatwerediscoveredonapapyrusinthelibraryattheUniversityofStrasbourg.ThetextsandtheremarkablestorybehindtherediscoveryandreconstructionofthefragmentscanbefoundinMartinandPrimavesi(1999).OtherdiscussionsoftheStrasbourgmaterial,whichisstillbeingevaluated,canbefoundinCurd(2001),Laks(2002),andOsborne(2000).43ACTC034320/03/2006,03:58PM\npatriciacurdprocessesofthesensibleworldthroughknowledgeofthesebasicthings.ForEmpedoclesthisknowledgehasgreatimportance,foritisunderstanding,notjustoftheprocessesoftheworld,butalsoofthebestwaytolive(Kingsley,2002).Greatcaremustbetakentounderstandthingsproperly;thehearerofEmpedocles’poemisexhortedinB3to“consider,byeveryart,thewayeachthingisclear,”spurningnoneofthesenses,to“thinkinthewayeachisclear;”thisclarityispossiblebecause,asB110says,“allhavethoughtandashareofmind.”TheclaiminB110mayrefertoallthingsortoallhumanbeings(thecontextsinwhichthefragmentisfoundsuggesttheformer).Ineithercase,thesuggestionisthathumaninquirycanbeconductedwellorbadly(seeWright,1981,pp.236,259–61).Senseperceptioncanbeameanstoknowledgeoftherootsandtheforces,butperceptionaloneisapparentlyinsufficient.Theremustbethoughtgroundedinperceptiontoreachthetruthaboutthecharactersoftheroots.EmpedoclesagreeswithParmenidesthatonecancontrolone’sthoughtandthusincreaseone’swisdom.Becausethereisasettlednatureforeachoftheroots,wecanineachcaseextrapolatefromperceptualevidencetothosecharacters.B21referstophenomenalsun,rain,air(indirectly),andearthas“witnesses”tothechar-acteroftheroots(SimpliciusquotesB21twiceasevidenceforthis).Itakeitthattheperceivedoccurrencesarenotpureinstancesoftheroots(whichwouldoccuronlyincompleteseparationunderStrife),buttheclosesttothatpurestateavailabletohumanexperience.AlthoughEmpedocles’theoryembracesapluralityofbasicentities;itiscompatiblewithParmenides’requirementsforanacceptableandrationalcos-mologyinsofaraseachofitsconstituentsisaknowable,unified,metaphysicallybasicentity.AnaxagorasAswithEmpedocles,Anaxagoras’commitmenttotheParmenideanframework(Curd,forthcoming;Furley,1989,1992,2002)isclearlyrevealedbyhisemphaticdenialthatcoming-to-beandpassing-awayaregenuinelyreal:TheGreeksdonotthinkcorrectlyaboutcoming-to-beandperishing;fornothingcomestobeorperishes.Buttheyaremixedtogetherandseparatedfromthethingsthatare.Andthustheywouldrightlycallcoming-to-bebeingmixedandperishingbeingseparated.(DK59B17)Thechangingthingsoftheworldofexperienceareconceivedastemporary,localmixturesoftheenduringandpermanentthingsthatare,thebasicingredients.Anaxagorasbeginswithanall-pervasivecosmicmixfromwhichthecosmosevolved,asitissetrotatingbyMind(orNous).Throughtheforceoftherotation,ingredientsemergefromtheoriginalmixture,andtheyaremixedandseparatedagainandagain.ItisthesemixturesandseparationsthatAnaxagorascallscoming-to-beandpassing-away,anditisthesethatresultintheworldasweperceiveit.TheingredientsintheoriginalmixarecharacterizedinDK59B1:“allthingsweretogether,unlimitedinextent(plEthos)andinsmallness,forthesmall,too,wasun-limited.”Althoughtherehavebeensuggestionsthattheingredientsarerestrictedto44ACTC034420/03/2006,03:58PM\nparmenidesandafter:unityandpluralitytheopposites(Schofield,1980;Tannery,1930;Vlastos,1950),manypassages(e.g.,B10,B1,B2,andB4a)indicatethattheoriginalmixincludesmorethantheopposites(Graham,1994).TheunlimitedextentandnumberofkindsoforiginalingredientsshowAnaxagoras’strategyfordealingwiththeEleaticprohibitiononcoming-to-beforwhatisgenuinelyreal.Heagrees(inB17)thatsomeobjectscancometobe(bymixtureandseparation),butthesearenotgenuinelyrealsincetheydependfortheirexistenceonthebasic(unchanging)entitiesofwhichtheyarecomposed.Thisisobviouslytrueforwhatwewouldcallartifacts,itemsproducedbyhumanagency.AnaxagorasacknowledgesthisinB4a,wherehespeaksoftheworksmadebyhumanbeings;butAnaxagorasalsoregardsplantsandanimalsascomplicated“naturalartifacts”thatresultfromthecompoundingofingredientsunderthe“direction”ofaseed,ratherthanviewingseedssimplyasmicroscopicversionsofplantsandanimalsthatgrowbyexpansion(Furley,1989).Everythingwastogetherintheoriginalmix(B1);theoriginalstateisacompletelyblendedcosmicsoup.Moreover,Anaxagorassaysthat“everythingisineverything”(B11,B12),sothereisasenseinwhichtheoriginalwell-mixedstateofallthingstogetherismaintainedatallplacesandtimes(B6:“justasinthebeginningsotoonowallthingsaretogether”).Evenaftertherotationofthemixresultsintheformationofstars,planets,andanimals,theseparationoutofthingsisonlyrelative.Anaxagorasclaimsthateverythingremainsineverything,althoughsomethingsarelargerorsmallerindifferentareas.Thismeansthatthedensitiesoftheingredientsmaydifferinsuchawaythatwhatlookslikeadiscreteentitymayappear,butthisisonlyatemporaryemergencefromthebackgroundmixture.Justasintheoriginalmix,thedensitiesofairandaetheraresooverwhelmingthatairandaetherappeartocoverandpervadeallthings(Furth,1991;Inwood,1986).Ifwesupposethattherearepureorunmixedstuffs,thentheremusthavebeen(atleastlocally)acompleteseparationfromtheoriginalstateofallthingstogether.Thatmeansthatthethingsintheoriginalmixcouldhavereachedthestateofbeing“smallest”(nomatterhowweinterpret“large”and“small”here).Forsupposewestartwithamixthat,unlikeAnaxagoras’own(whichhasanindefinite(apeiron)numberofingredients),containsonlythreeingredients,xyz.Wethenextractalloftheyandtheztoendupwithapurestateconsistingsolelyofx.Ifsuchacompleteseparationwerepossible,thatwouldimplythattherewasaleastamount(plEthos)ofyandofz,suchthat,onceitisremovedfromourhypotheticalmixture,nomoreyorzwouldremain.Thus,completeseparationimpliesthatthereisaleastorsmallest;butAnaxagorasdeniesthattherecanbeasmallest(aswellasalargest):Norofthesmallisthereasmallest,butonlyasmaller(for[gar]itisnotpossiblefor15what-isnottobe)–butalsoofthelargethereisalwaysalarger.Anditisequaltothe15.Thereisaproblemwiththemanuscripttextatthispoint,sinceitmakesnorealsense,eitheronitsownoraspartoftheclaimsofB3.Onesuggestion(Sider,1981)istogareonoukestitomEi[mE]oukeinai,translatedas,“Forthatwhichiscannotbecutawaytonothing.”Schofield(1980),whosetextIfollowhere,rejectsboththeMSSreadingandthesuggestionadoptedbySider,arguingthatthesimplestemendationisthefollowing:togareonoukesti[to]mEoukeinai.Hetranslates:forwhatiscannotnotbe(i.e.,itisnotpossiblethatwhat-isnotbe).45ACTC034520/03/2006,03:58PM\npatriciacurdsmallinextent(plEthos),butinrelationtoitselfeachisbothlargeandsmall.(Anaxagorasfr.3,textfollowingSchofield,1980)Despiteitsobscurity,onethinginthispassageisplain.Thedenialofasmallestislinkedtotheassertionthatwhat-iscannotnotbe.ThisisagoodParmenideanclaim,andAnaxagorasthinksthatitentailsthedenialofasmallest.Ifweunderstandsmallandlargeasdegreesofmanifestationofaningredientorthing,thenAnaxagorasisassertingthatevenwhenastufforqualityisnotapparent,itmuststillbepresent,justasintheoriginalstate.TheexplanatoryclauseinB3(introducedbygar)suggeststhatAnaxagorassupposesthatifanobjectweregenuinelytoloseaquality(byalteration,forinstance),thenthatqualitywouldceasetobe.Buttherecanbenopassing-away;sotheremustbesomewayofexplainingtheapparentdisappearanceofthequality.Anaxagorasdoesthisbyplacingnolowerlimitonsmallness.Ratherthanceasingtobe,thequalitybecomessmaller(inthesenseoflessmanifest),perhapsbybeingswampedbythelargerextent(greatermanifestation)ofsomeotherproperty.Thusinthecaseofillness,pallormayswamptheruddinessofanormalhealthycomplexion,butthatruddinesshasnotceasedtobeinthemixture,buthasonlybecomesmallerincomparisonwiththegreaterextentofthepallor.Thus,theeverythingineverythingclaimcanbemaintainedevenas,speakingloosely,whatwemightcallcoming-to-be,passing-away,andaltera-tiontakeplace.Generation(asapprovedinB17)andalterationorgrowth(bymixtureandseparation)willcontinue.AnaxagorasrespectsParmenides’principlethatgenuinechange,generation,anddestruction(thatis,alteration,generation,anddestructionofwhatisgenuinelyreal)isimpossible,whileembracinganindefinitepluralityofbasicentities.ThedenialoftherealityofchangealonedoesnotmaketheAnaxagoreansystemconsistentwithParmenideanrequirements.Aswehaveseen,Parmenidesrejectschangeaspartofhisanalysisofwhatitmeansforsomethingtobereal,orgenuinelytobe,butthatanalysisalsorequiresthateachthingthatismustbeaunityandmustbeknowable.Anaxagoras’positionseemstobethatalthoughhumanbeingsprobablywillnotbeabletofathomallthattherewasintheoriginalmixandsowhatthereisineachperceptibleobject(foreverythingisineverythingandremainsso),theymaynonethelesshavereal(althoughlimited)knowledge.B21claimsthatweareunabletojudgethetruthbecauseofthefeeblenessofthesenses;butB21asuggeststhatthesensescanbeacluetowhatisreal:“phenomenaareaglimpseoftheunseen.”MoreoverthereisevidencethatAnaxagorasthoughtthattheingredientsareinprincipleknowable.ForafterquotingourB7,Simpliciusadds“Thathesupposedthem(theingredients)tobelimitedinform,hemakesclearbysayingthatmind(Nous)knowsthemall,”andthereareclaimsinB12thatsupporthisattributionofcompleteknowledgetocosmicNous.ThequestionoftheEleaticknowabilityoftheAnaxagoreanbasicingredientsisconnectedtotheissueofthenatureoftheircharacters,butwehaveonlyindirectdiscussionofthis.InB12AnaxagorasclaimsthatNousnotonlyinitiatestherotationthatultimatelyresultsinthephysicalworldasweperceiveit,italsorulesandcontrolsallthings,“maintainscompleteunderstanding(gnOmE)...andwieldsthegreatest46ACTC034620/03/2006,03:58PM\nparmenidesandafter:unityandpluralitypower.”B12alsosaysthat“Nousknew(egnO)allthings,thethingsmixingtogetherandseparatingoutandbreakingup,andasmanyasweregoingtobeandasmanywereandarenotnowandasmanyasarenow,andasmanyaswillbe”(DK59B12).InorderforNoustoperformthesetasksofinitiating,controlling,andrulingtherota-tion,itmustknoworunderstandallthings(justasAnaxagorassays),andthisispossibleonlyifthosethings(thechrEmata)eachhaveagenuineorsettledcharacterthatNousknowsandunderstands.(DifferentviewsofNousandthenatureofitscosmicunderstandingcanbefoundinLaks(1993)andLesher(1995).)IfeachingredientissomethingthatNouscanindeedknow,eachisseparableandpureinanalysis,eventhoughitcanneverbesoinactuality.ThisseemstobewhatSimpliciusmeantinsayingthatAnaxagorasthoughttheingredients“limitedinform.”Assuch,eachwillhavetherequisiteParmenideancharacterforservingasabasicentity,thusguaranteeingthatAnaxagoras’theoryisarationalcosmology,consistentwithEleaticpluralism.AtomismAtomismfollowsthepatternwehaveseeninbothAnaxagorasandEmpedocles:aplurality(hereaninfinitenumber)ofbasicentitiesthatneithercometobenorpassaway,andwhichmixandseparatetoaccountforthephenomenaofthesensibleworld.ThatatomsaregenuinelyrealintheappropriateParmenideansenseisindicatedbytheirbeingcalled“whatis”or“being.”OneofthecleareststatementsofatomicprinciplesiscontainedinafragmentofAristotle’sOnDemocritus,quotedbySimpliciusinhiscommentaryonAristotle’sDeCaelo(DK68A37);thereAristotlediscussesthenatureandcharacteristicsofatoms,contraststhemwiththevoid,andexplainstheapparentcoming-to-beandpassing-awayofsensiblesthroughtheactionofatomsandvoid.Thebasiccomponentsofthetheoryareatoms,infiniteinnumber,indivisible,allmadeofthesamestuff,havingdifferingshapes,sizes,and(perhaps)weights,buthavingnoothercharacteristics,16calledthefullorwhat-is;andvoid,calledtheemptyorwhat-is-not.Eachatomisinternallyunified,beingasimplemassofatomicstuff,andinbeingwhatitis,everyatomislikeeveryother:atomsbelongtoasinglekindandeachisitselfaParmenideanunity.Thesetwotypesofthings,atomsandvoid,aretheonlythingsthatarerealandbasic;anythingelseissimplyacollectionofatomsandvoid:“Byconventionsweet,andbyconventionbitter,byconventionhot,byconventioncold,byconventioncolor:16.Althoughsomesurvivingfragmentsasserttherealityofatomsandvoid(DK68B125),nonediscusstheirnaturesindetail.WemustrelyontestimonyfromAristotleandlaterwriters,andAristotle’sownseparatetreatmentofDemocritusislargelylost(asarethoseofotherancientwriterstowhombooksonDemocritusareattributed).Atomicindivisibilityisavexedquestion;moderncommentatorsdisagreeaboutwhetheratomsaretheoreticallyaswellasphysicallyindivisible.ThereisalsonoconsensusaboutwhetherDemocriteanatomshaveweight.(SeeBodnár,2001;Makin,1989;O’Brien,1981;andTaylor,1999a,1999b.)47ACTC034720/03/2006,03:58PM\npatriciacurdinrealityatomsandvoid”(DK68B9=B125).Galen,oneofthesourcesforthisfrag-ment,explainsthatsuchthingsascolor,sweetness,andsoonarewhatwewouldcallsecondaryqualities:whenDemocritussayssomethingis“byconvention,”hemeans(accordingtoGalen),whatisrelativetous,and“notwhatisinthenatureofthethingsthemselves”(DK68A49).Butnotonlyarecolorsandflavorslikethis,soaretheordinaryphysicalobjectsthatweperceive,andindeedourcosmositself(aswellasotheruniversesthatcanformintheinfinitevoid).Thesehavenoindependentrealitythemselves,butaretheresultofthearrangementsandrearrangementsofatomsandvoidthatoccurasatomsmoveandintermingle.Atomsareinmotion,andwhentheycollide(orcomeveryclosetooneanother)someofthemintermingleandthesecollec-tionsorcloudsofatoms,whenlargeenough,constitutetheperceptibleobjectsofourworld.Theirperceptiblecharacters(thethingsthatare“byconvention”)aredeterminedbythecharactersoftheatomsandbytheamountandarrangementofvoidinthemixtures.(Theophrastus’DeSensibusisoursourcefortheseclaims;seeDK68A135.62,65–67.)Theatomists’pictureiscomplicatedbytheirinsistenceontherealityofvoid.Voidmustbejustasreal(andjustasknowable)asatomsinorderforthetheorytosucceed;butthereisgoodancientevidencethattheatomistscalledthevoid“not-being”or“what-is-not.”TotheEleaticearthissoundsheretical.Howcanwhat-is-notbe,muchlessbeafundamentalandknowablepartofatheorythatexplainswhatthereis?ThisaspectofatomismapparentlyconflictswithParmenides’assertion:“fornevershallthisbeforcedthrough:thatthingsthatarenotare”(DK28B7.1).Sothequestionis,howcananatomistsaythatvoidbothiswhat-is-notandthatitis“inreality”?Isuggestthattheatomistsregardvoidasakindofthingthatis(i.e.,asmeetingParmenideanrequirementsthatithaveagenuineandunchangingnature),thusexplainingwhytheysaythatwhat-isisnomorethanwhat-is-not.(AdifferentviewoftherelationbetweentheatomistviewofvoidandParmenideanrequirements,thattheatomistssimplydenythatwhat-is-notcannotbe,canbefoundinTaylor,1999a.)ApassageinPlutarchgivesacluetothenatureofvoid.InhisAgainstColotes,PlutarchquotesB156,sayingColoteshasbeenmisledbythestatementofDemocritus:“inwhichhe[Democritus]declaresthatthing(den)isnomorethannothing(mEden),callingbodythingandvoidnothing,sinceittoohasanature(phusis)andexistence(hupostasis)ofitsown.”Plutarch’sattributiontovoidofanatureandexistencesupportswhatisalreadyevidentfromDK68B9/125,namelythatvoidis“inreality,”andisagenuinebeing.Theproblemistodeterminewhatthatessenceornatureis,andwhytheatomistschosetocallit“nothing”or“whatisnot.”OneobviousreasonforthisappearsinPlutarch’scomment.Atomsarebodies:theyarehard,impenetrable,takeupspace,andsoon.Althoughvoidhasnobodilycharacteristics,itnonethelessplaysanindispensableroleinthetheory.Iftherewerenovoid,therecouldnotbeapluralityofatoms,forvoidiswhatseparatesatomsfromoneanother;moreover,voidhasafurtherroletoplayinexplainingboththecharactersandthemovementsofcomplexmacroscopicbodies.WeknowfromTheophrastusthattheatomistsappealedtothearrangementofatomsandvoidinmetalssuchasironandleadtoexplaintheirheavinessorlightness,andtheirhardnessorsoftness.Thereis48ACTC034820/03/2006,03:58PM\nparmenidesandafter:unityandpluralityalsoevidencethatDemocritusthoughtthatmacroscopicbodies(collectionsofatoms)tendtomoveordriftinadirectionthatcontainsmorevoid(sincethoseregionswillofferlessresistance).Thus,althoughvoiddoesnotcausethemotionofatoms,ithelpstoexplainitatthelevelofcompoundbodies(Berryman,2002;Sedley,1982).Sovoidhasanatureasanatomicseparatorandisanecessarypartoftheatomictheory;thisaccountsforitsreality.Nevertheless,voidisnotabody,andsoitmightreasonablybecalledwhat-is-not.Atomsarenotperceptible.Democritusrecognizesthedifficultyincomingtoknowatomsandvoid,sayingthatweareseparatedfromreality(DK68B6)andthat“truthisinthedepths”(B117),butheisneverthelesscommittedtotheknowabilityofbothatomsandvoid.Allknowledgeofatomsandvoidmustbegroundedinreason-ingratherthanperception.SextusEmpiricusacknowledgesthatthereare,forDemocritus,“twokindsofknowing,onethroughthesensesandtheotherthroughtheunderstanding;theonethroughtheunderstandinghecallsgenuine,witnessingtoitstrustworthinessindecidingtruth;theonethroughthesenseshenamesbastard,denyingitsteadfastnessinthediscernmentofwhatistrue”(contextofDK68B11).Sextuscontinues,andquotesDemocritus:Hesaysinthesewords,“therearetwoformsofknowing:onegenuine,theotherbastard.Tothebastardbelongallthese:sight,hearing,smell,taste,touch.Theother,thegenuine,hasbeenseparatedfromthis.”Then,preferringthegenuinetothebastard,hecontinues,saying,“Wheneverthebastardisnolongerabletoseemorefinelynorhearnorsmellnortastenorperceivebytouch,butsomethingfiner”(DK68B11)Senseperceptionisanillegitimateformofknowingbecauseitdoesnotconnectwithwhatisreal(atomsandvoid)butonlywhatisapparent(thetemporarycollectionsofatomsandvoidthatare“byconvention”andthatwecallphysicalobjectsandtheirproperties).Togetbeyondthoseobjectstowhatisrealwemustexaminesmallerandsmallerthings–allthewaydowntotheatomsthemselves.Buttheycannotbeperceiveddirectlyandsowemustextrapolate,useourunderstanding(whichindeedconnectswiththegenuine–whatisinreality)toachievenon-sensoryknowledgeofatomsandvoid.Justhowthisprocessworks,Democrituseitherdidnotsayortheevidencehasnotsurvived(Sextus’quotationbreaksoffatacrucialpoint),butitseemstoinvolvebeginningwithperceptionandthenmovingtounderstanding(Lee,forthcoming).EleaticismafterParmenides:MelissusThepost-ParmenideantheoriesexaminedsofarshareaconfidencethattheunityrequiredbyParmenideanargumentsisconsistentwithanumericalpluralityofentities,eachofwhichindividuallysatisfiestherequirementsforwhat-isgiveninParmenidesB8.IhavesuggestedthatParmenideshimselfleavesopenthequestionofhowmanyentitiesthereare(ormightbe)thatsatisfyhisrequirements.Melissus,exploringimplicationsofcertainaspectsoftheEleaticposition,andrejectingParmenides’requirementthatwhat-isbelimited,advocatesnumericalmonism.Thus,onmyview,49ACTC034920/03/2006,03:58PM\npatriciacurdMelissusisaninnovator,notamereimitatorofParmenides,asheisoftenrepresented.17(Barnes(1979a,1979b)isanoutspokenadvocateofMelissus’originality.)Beginningwiththeclaimthatnothingcancomefromnothing,Melissusarguesthatwhat-isnevercametobe,but“itisandalwayswasandalwayswillbe”;moreover,assuchithasnobeginning,andnoend,andisunlimited.Melissustriestoderivetheunlimitedcharacterofwhat-isfromitslackofcoming-to-be:“justasitalwaysis,inthiswaytooitisnecessarythatitisalwaysunlimitedinmagnitude(DK30B3);nothinghavingbothbeginningandendiseithereternalorunlimited”(B4).Becausewhat-ismustbeunlimited,itmustbeone:“foriftheyweretwo,theycouldnotbeunlimited,butwouldhavelimitsagainsteachother”(B6).Thus,MelissusconcludesinB7,“itiseternalandunlimited,andoneandallalike.”HerethenindeedistheOne(ashewillcallitinB8);post-Parmenideanpluralismisrejected.Melissus’crucialmoveistherequirementthatwhat-isbeunlimited.Parmenideshadarguedthatwhat-isneithercomestobenorpassesaway;yethehadalsodeclaredthatwhat-isislimited,“changelessinthelimitsofgreatbonds”(DK28B8.26),“mightyNecessityholdsinthelimitsofabond”(DK28B8.30–31).ThedifferencemaybethatParmenides,morethanMelissus,emphasizestheepistemologicalaspectsofwhat-is:thelimitednatureofwhat-ismakesitcompleteandperfect,andthusentirelythinkableandknowable;indeedifitwereunlimiteditcouldnotbegraspedbyunderstanding.Melissus,perhapsrespondingtothephysicaltheoriesofAnaxagoras,Empedocles,andtheAtomists,arguesthatsomethingthathasnobeginningandnoendmustlackalllimits,notonlytemporalbutalsospatial.Oncethatmoveismade,hethinksthatuniquenessfollows.(Foraclearanalysisanddiscussionoftheargument,seeSedley,1999.)MelissusmarshalsotherargumentsagainstthemechanismsinvokedbyEleaticpluralismandagainstthereliabilityofperception(orevenitsusefulnessasaglimpseoftheunseen).InB7hearguesthatrearrangementisimpossible(thusattackingmixtureandseparationasanacceptablemethodofexplainingapparentchange),andrejectsbothvoidandmotion(thusattackingthefoundationsofatomism).InB8hetakesonsenseperception.Thepluralistscanonlyarguethatperceptionisaguidetowhatisgenuinelyrealifthereissomeconnectionbetweenwhatisrealandwhatappearstothesenses–only,thatis,ifthereisaphysicalprojectionofbasicentitiesintothesensibleworld.Thus,forexample,Empedoclesassertsthat“mortalthings”(i.e.,thetemporarymixturesoftherootsthatconstitutesensibleobjects)havethecharacterstheydobecauseoftheunderlyingnaturesoftherootsthatconstitutethem,andtheAtomistssaythatqualitiesofperceptibleobjectsaredeterminedbytheshapesandsizesoftheatomsthatconstitutethem.Melissusarguesagainstthiskindof17.Becauseoflimitationsofspace,IomitadiscussionofZeno.HeisbestknownfortheparadoxesofmotionthathavecomedowntousfromAristotle’sdiscussionsofthem.Theliteratureontheseparadoxes,inboththeirancientandmoderninterpretations,isvast.Fortexts,seeLee(1936);clearintroductorydiscussionscanbefoundinMcKirahan(1994)and(1999);andinthisvolume,seeBodnárandPellegrin,aristotle’sphysicsandcosmology.Zeno’sparadoxesofmotioncanbereadasconcernedwithplurality(fortheydealwithaplural-ityofplacesandtimes)andthegeneralparadoxesofplurality(asgiveninPlato’sParmenides=DK29A11,andintheparadoxofthemilletseed,DK29A29)canbereadassupportingthepredicationalmonismthatIhaveattributedtoParmenides(seeCurd,1993,1998).50ACTC035020/03/2006,03:58PM\nparmenidesandafter:unityandpluralityrationalcosmologybyofferingadestructivedilemma.Ifsenseperceptionisreliable,andshows(asitseemsto)thatthingscometobeandpassawayandalter,thentheunderlyingentitiesmustalsocometobe,passawayandalter;butthatisimpossible.Thus,ifsenseperceptionisreliable,thennoaccountoftheperceivedworldthatbeginswithunderlyingentitiesispossible.Ifsenseperceptionisnotreliable,wecannotuseitsevidenceintheconstructionortestingoftheories.Conclusion:rationalcosmologyisahopelessproject.IfMelissusisright,thennumericalmonismisinconsistentwithinquiryintonature(justasAristotleclaimsinthePhysics).AftermathAswehaveseen,forParmenidesandmostofthethinkerswhocameafterhim,therealquestionaboutunityandpluralityisnothowmanybeingstherearebutthenatureofthebeingsthatthereare.Theconcernwiththeunityofwhatismetaphysi-callyandepistemologicallybasiccontinuesintolaterGreekthought,butanimportantshiftoccursinPlato’slatedialoguesandinAristotle.WhilePlatoappearsintheearlyandmiddledialoguestoacceptParmenides’claims,hiscriticalexaminationofthemintheParmenidesleadstoarejectionofhisassumptionthatthereisonlyonekindofpredication.AristotlefollowsPlatointhis,andarguesthat“beingissaidinmany18ways”(Met.G.2;Z.1).Plato’sformsintheperiodofthePhaedo,Symposium,andRepublic,areParmenideanentities;oneneedlooknofurtherthantheaccountoftheBeautifulitselfintheSympo-siumtofindlinguisticechoesandmetaphysicalparallels(seeNehamas,1979;Solmsen,1982;therearealsoParmenideanechoesintheargumentsofBookVoftheRepublic).ButintheParmenidesPlatotakesupthequestionofthecoherenceoftheveryideaofaunifiedParmenideanentity.UsingthecharactersZenoandParmenides,hequestionswhetherapluralityofEleaticones,suchasarerequiredforhistheoryandfortheEleaticpluralismsthatwehaveexaminedhere,ispossible.InPartIofthedialogue,hearguesthattherequirementthataformbeapredicationalunityunderminestheparticipationrelationbetweenformsandparticulars.InPartII,examiningtheinternalunifiedstructureofaselectedform(theOne),PlatoshowsthattheEleaticconceptionsofunityandbeingaretoostrongtoallowtheattributionofsuchattributesassamenessanddifferencetoforms(seeGill’sintroductioninGillandRyan,1996).HebeginsthetaskofrethinkingtherelationsamongformsthatculminatesintheargumentsoftheSophist,withitsclaim(putinthemouthofaStrangerfromElea)thatthereisawaythatwhat-isisnotandthatwhat-is-notis.Hebeginstoarguethatnotallusesof“tobe”aretheattributionofanessenceornature(inthePhaedohehadarguedthatonlyFormscanbesaidtobewhattheyare,otherthingsmerelyhavetheir19attributesthroughparticipationintheform).Aristotle,too,rejectsParmenides’insistencethatanythingthatgenuinelyismustbeanessenceoranature.Nevertheless,eveninAristotlewecanseetracesofParmenides’views,forAristotleagreeswithParmenidesthatwhatabsolutelyisnotcannotbe(Phys.I),andheismuchconcerned18.Onthistopic,seeM.L.Gill,firstphilosophyinaristotle,inthisvolume.19.SeeNotomi,plato’smetaphysicsanddialectic,inthisvolume.51ACTC035120/03/2006,03:58PM\npatriciacurdtoshowthatastatementordefinitionofanessencemustbeaunityofaparticularlystrongsort,andtodemonstratehowsucharequirementcanbemet(Met.Z.10–12).BibliographyWorksCitedAlgra,K.(1999).“TheBeginningsofCosmology.”InA.A.Long(ed.),TheCambridgeCompaniontoEarlyGreekPhilosophy(pp.45–65).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Barnes,J.(1979a).“ParmenidesandtheEleaticOne.”ArchivfürGeschichtederPhilosophie,61,1–21.——.(1979b).ThePresocraticPhilosophers.(2vols.).London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul.Berryman,S.(2002).“DemocritusandtheExplanatoryPoweroftheVoid.”InV.CastonandD.Graham(eds.),PresocraticPhilosophy(FestschriftforA.P.D.Mourelatos)(pp.183–91).Aldershot:Ashgate.Bodnár,I.(2001).“AtomicIndependenceandDivisibilty.”InA.Preus(ed.),BeforePlato(pp.123–47).Albany,NY:SUNYPress.Caston,V.andGraham,D.(eds.).(2002).PresocraticPhilosophy(FestschriftforA.P.D.Mourelatos).Aldershot:Ashgate.Cordero,N.-L.(1979).“LesdeuxcheminsdeParménidedanslesfragments6et7.”Phronesis,24,1–32.——.(1987).“L’histoireduTextedeParménide.”InP.Aubenque(ed.),ÉtudessurParménide(vol.2,pp.3–24).Paris:Vrin.Coxon,A.H.(1986).TheFragmentsofParmenides.Assen:VanGorcum.Curd,P.(1991).“KnowledgeandUnityinHeraclitus.”TheMonist,74,531–49.——.(1993).“EleaticMonisminZenoandMelissus.”AncientPhilosophy,13,1–22.——.(2001).“ANewEmpedocles?TheImplicationsoftheStrasbourgFragmentsforPresocraticPhilosophy.”InProceedingsoftheBostonAreaColloquiuminAncientPhilosophy,17,27–49.——.(2004).TheLegacyofParmenides:EleaticMonismandLaterPresocraticThought.Revisedpaperbackedition;LasVegas:ParmenidesPublishing.(1stedn.,Princeton:PrincetonUniver-sityPress,1998.).——.(forthcoming).AnaxagorasofClazomenae.ATextandTranslationwithIntroductionandCommentary.Diels,H.(1951–2).(CitedasDK).DieFragmentederVorsokratiker.(3vols.).6thedn.revisedbyW.Kranzandoftenreprinted.Berlin:Weidmann.(Originalworkpublished1903).Furley,D.J.(1989).“AnaxagorasinResponsetoParmenides.”InD.J.Furley,CosmicProblems(pp.47–65).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(1992).“FromAnaxagorastoSocrates.”InK.Boudouris(ed.),ThePhilosophyofSocrates(Vol.2):Elenchus,Ethics,andTruth(pp.74–80).Athens:InternationalCenterforGreekPhilo-sophyandCulture.——.(2002).“Anaxagoras,Plato,andtheNamingofParts.”InV.CastonandD.Graham,(eds.),PresocraticPhilosophy(FestschriftforA.P.D.Mourelatos)(pp.119–26).Aldershot:Ashgate.Furth,M.(1974).“ElementsofEleaticOntology.”InA.P.D.Mourelatos(ed.),ThePre-Socratics(pp.241–70).GardenCity,NJ:Anchor.——.(1991).“‘APhilosophicalHero?’AnaxagorasandtheEleatics.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,9,95–129.Gallop,D.(1979).“‘IsOrIsNot’?”TheMonist,62,61–80.——.(1984).ParmenidesofElea:Fragments.Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress.52ACTC035220/03/2006,03:58PM\nparmenidesandafter:unityandpluralityGill,M.L.andRyan,P.(1996).Plato:Parmenides.Indianapolis:Hackett.Graham,D.W.(1994).“ThePostulatesofAnaxagoras.”Apeiron,27,77–121.——.(1997).“Heraclitus’CriticismofIonianPhilosophy.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,15,1–50.Guthrie,W.K.C.(1965).AHistoryofGreekPhilosophy.(vol.2):ThePresocraticTraditionfromParmenidestoDemocritus.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Inwood,B.(1986).“AnaxagorasandInfiniteDivisibility.”IllinoisClassicalStudies,11,17–33.——.(1992).ThePoemofEmpedocles:ATextandTranslationwithanIntroduction.Toronto:TheUniversityofTorontoPress.(Revisededn.2001.)Jones,B.(1973).“Parmenides’‘WayofTruth’.”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy,11,287–98.Kahn,C.H.(1978).“WhyExistencedoesnotEmergeasaDistinctConceptinGreekPhilo-sophy.”ArchivfürGeschichtederPhilosophie,58,323–34.——.(1988).“BeinginParmenidesandPlato.”LaParoladelPassato,43,237–61.——.(2002).“ParmenidesandPlato.”InV.CastonandD.Graham(eds.),PresocraticPhilo-sophy(FestschriftforA.P.D.Mourelatos)(pp.81–93).Aldershot:Ashgate.Kingsley,P.(2002).“EmpedoclesfortheNewMillennium.”AncientPhilosophy,22,333–413.Kirk,G.S.,Raven,J.E.,andSchofield,M.(eds.).(1983).(CitedasKRS).ThePresocraticPhilo-sophers.2ndedn.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Laks,A.(1993).“Mind’sCrisis:OnAnaxagoras’NOUS.”TheSouthernJournalofPhilosophy,31(Suppl.Vol.),19–38.——.(2002).“ReadingtheReadings:OntheFirstPersonPluralsintheStrasbourgEmpedocles.”InV.CastonandD.Graham(eds.),PresocraticPhilosophy(FestschriftforA.P.D.Mourelatos)(pp.127–37).Aldershot:Ashgate.Lee,H.D.P.(1936).ZenoofElea.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Lee,M.(forthcoming).Epistemolog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resocratics.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.55ACTC035520/03/2006,03:58PM\nalexanderp.d.mourelatos4TheConceptoftheUniversalinSomeLaterPre-PlatonicCosmologistsALEXANDERP.D.MOURELATOSThehistoryproperoftheconceptoftheuniversalhasanobviousandfamiliarstart:thephilosophiesofPlatoandofAristotle.Bothoftheseclassicalphilosophersrecognized–indeedtheymadeitthecentralpartoftheirmetaphysicalteaching–thatwegrasprealityintwosignificantlydifferentmodes:intermsofconcreteindividualsorparticulars(e.g.,Socrates,theParthenon,Miltiades’sword,thejury’sverdictinSocrates’trial);andintermsoftypesorkinds(e.g.,manoranimal,templeorbuilding,swordor1weapon,justice,wisdom).Thetermusedbybothphilosopherswithreferencetothesecondofthetwomodesis,ofcourse,eidosoridea,“form,”“kind”;andAristotlealsoemploystheancestortothemodernterm“universal,”viz.,to/takatholou(incontrasttoto/takath’hekaston),aswellasthetermtokoinon,“thecommon,”andothertermsas2well.Withinandbeyondclassicalancientphilosophy,anddowntothepresentday,theconceptoftheuniversalundergoesmanytransformations;andtheso-called“prob-lemofuniversals,”i.e.,thelong-standingdebatebetweenrealistsandnominalists,playsamajorroleinthesetransformations.Accordingly,modernscholarswhowriteonPlatoorAristotlehaveoftenquestionedwhethereitherPlato’sorAristotle’s“forms”mayqualifyas“universals”underoneoranotherofvariouslyrestrictivedefinitionsof3theconceptoftheuniversal.Inthischapter,Iseektorelyonareasonablyminimalistspecificationofthecontentoftheclaimthatthetwoclassicalphilosophershavegraspedtheconcept.Bythequalification“minimalist”Isignalmyintentiontoassumealow-level,intuitivelyaccessible,conceptionoftheuniversal;andbythequalification“reasonably,”myconcernthatthespecificationshouldnotbesobroadastoallowanyactofattendingtothedistinctionbetweenreferringexpressionsandpredicates(com-monnouns,adjectives,verbs)tocountasrecognitionoftheuniversal.1.Thereisanexcellentconciseaccountofthedevelopmentoftheconcept,andofrelatedmetaphysicaldebates,beginningwithPlatoandAristotle,inthemostrecentlexiconforancientphilosophy,BächliandGraeser(2000,s.v.“Allgemeines,”pp.18–24).2.ThelocusclassicusfortheintroductionofthedistinctionbetweenuniversalsandparticularsinAristotleisInt.7,17a38–b1.3.Foracomprehensiverecentcomparisonofhowtheconceptoftheuniversalisintroducedandhowitfunctionsinthetwophilosophies,respectively,ofAristotleandofPlato,seeSegalerba(2003,esp.pp.67–70,82–3);cf.Segalerba(2001,pp.95–106,223–7).56ACTC045620/03/2006,03:58PM\ntheconceptoftheuniversalButbeforeIattemptsuchaspecification,letmeconfirmwhatmaybeperceivedasimpliedinthetitleofthischapter:myaccountisnotoneaboutthehistoryproperoftheconceptbutaboutitspre-history.D.M.Armstrong’selegantmodernphilosophicalintroductiontooursubjectopenswiththisremark:“Thetopicofuniversalsisaveryoldone.ItgoesbacktoPlatoatleast,perhapstoSocrates,perhapstoevenearliertimes”(1989,p.1).Myinterestispreciselyinthose“earliertimes.”Iseektoidentifyandtodiscusscontributionstothegraspoftheuniversalthatweremadebytheearliest4philosophersintheWesterntradition,thepre-Socratics.Socrateshimself,nodoubt,mademajorcontributionstothedevelopmentoftheconcept;thatisAristotle’sexplicittestimony(Met.A.6,987b1–4;M.4,1078b17–19andb27–31;M.9,1086b1–5),andthatiswhatPlato,inhisportraitofSocrates,wouldhaveusbelieve.ButtheSocraticproblemisascholarlyissueIneedtoskirt.Forourpurposeshere,Plato(includingPlato’sSocrates)willserveastheterminusantequem.Still,beforeproceeding,somethoughtisinorderconcerningthelevelofunder-standingofthedistinctionbetweenparticularsanduniversalswemayassumefortheSocratic-SophisticcirclesofthefifthcenturythatformthecontextandbackgroundofmanyofPlato’searlyandmiddledialogues.Forithasbeenwidelysupposedbymodernscholarsthatinthisgroupofdialogues,fifth-centurycharactersotherthanSocrates(hisinterlocutors),arepresentedasineptinhandlingtheconceptoftheuniversal.Theallegedineptnessisthatofconfusing–atleastinitiallyintheconversation–universalsandparticulars.ButAlexanderNehamas(1975,1999)hasshownthatthisinterpretivediagnosishaslittlesupportintherelevanttexts(1999,pp.159–76).Typicallytheinitialerrorisratheroneofofferingtoonarrowacharacterizationoftheuniversalatissue,nottheerrorofcitingmerelyaninstanceorexample.MoresignificantisthefactthatSocratesoftenasks,“IstheresuchathingastheF(e.g.,‘thepious/piety,’or‘thebeautiful/beauty’)?”or“DowesaythattheFissomething?”andhisinterlocutorsunhesitatinglyanswer,“Yes,thereis,”or“Yes,itis.”PlatoandPlato’sSocratesseemtoregarditaprerequisite–indeedonetheytypicallyassumeashavingbeenfulfilledbeforetheconversationstarts–thatthetwosidesindialoguehaveanunderstandingofthedifferencebetween“Whichthingis/thingsareF”and“WhatitistobeF.”Itisnotun-reasonabletoimagine,therefore,thatissuesconcerningeitherthedistinctionbetweenauniversalanditsinstancesorthedistinctionbetweenuniversalsofdifferentscope(onesatdifferentlevelsofgenerality,genus-speciesdistinctions)wouldhavebeenbroachedinthecourseofSophisticinstructionandSophisticdebates.StronglysuggestiveevidenceofthisisinthereportsconcerningProdicus’practiceofonomatOnorthotEs,“correctuseofwords,”whichentailedboththeformulationofdefinitionsandthecanvassingofissuesofsamenessanddifferencebetweenabstractconcepts(typicallyexpressed5byinfinitives,articulateadjectives,ornouns;seeDK84A9,A11,A13–A19).Also4.Asithasoftenbeenpointedout,morethanhalfofthe“pre-Socratics”arecontemporariesornear-contemporariesofSocrates.Thetermisbestunderstoodasreferringtofifth-centuryphilosopherswhowerenotinfluencedbySocrates.5.Referencestofragmentsfromtheworksofthepre-Socraticsortotestimonia(reports)concerningtheirdoctrines,is,asusual,bythechapternumberandsection(“A”fortestimonia,“B”forfragments)intheeditionbyHermannDiels(revisedbyWaltherKranz),referredtoas“DK”:seeWorksCited,below.57ACTC045720/03/2006,03:58PM\nalexanderp.d.mourelatosrelevantandsuggestiveistheevidenceimpliedinPlato’stestimonythatGorgiaswouldadmitonlyspecialkindsofaretE,“excellence,”butnosingleencompassingtype(Meno71b–73c).Anditisworthnotingthatthethemeofsameness/differenceinvolvingabstractconceptsisconspicuousintheSophistictreatiseDissoilogoi(DK90).Theinternaldatingofthistreatise,however,placesitscompositionsometimeaftertheendofthePeloponnesianwar(DK90.1.8);so,theDissoilogoiisrathertoolatetoqualifyaspre-Platonic.(Foradiscussionofthisinterestingtext,seeinthisvolumeBarney,thesophisticmovement,pp.87–90.)Butwhataboutthemainlineofthepre-Socratics,thecosmologistsornaturalphilosophersofthetradition(Aristotle’sphusiologoi)?Whatthematicallysignificantusesoftheconceptoftheuniversalarefoundintheirsayingsanddoctrines?Whatevidenceofantecedents,anticipations,orpre-formationsoftheconceptmightbefoundinwhatweknowofthephilosophicalwritingsandprojectsofthesephilosophicalpioneers?Thequestionhasbeenraisedbefore.Aristotle,asonemaywellexpect,wasfirsttoraiseit.Theanswersheofferedhavebeencitedbymodernscholarsandhistoriansofphilosophy,whohavealsomadeadditionalindependentproposals.Theresultsofmyowninvestigationdifferinsomesignificantrespectsfromtheanswerstraditionallyoffered.Inalargerstudyitwouldbeofinteresttotracethefullpre-historyoftheuniversal,fromtheearlyIoniansdowntothepluralistcosmologiesofthelatefifthcentury–andIhopeandaimtoundertakesuchabroaderstudyinthefuture.Inthischapter,however,Ishallconcentrateoncontributionsmadebythelaterpre-Socratics.Itrustthislimitedscopeisreasonable,inasmuchasthisisalsothescopeofthetraditionalanswers.CriteriaUsedfortheConceptoftheUniversalLetmenowofferwhatwaspromisedatthestart,a“reasonablyminimalist”specificationoftheconceptoftheuniversal.UsingthephilosophiesofPlatoandofAristotleasourbenchmark,wecansafelyclaimthattheconceptisrecognizablypresentinthethinkingofthetwoclassicalphilosophersonthebasisofthreecriteria.Thecriteriaarenotdisjunctive;allthreemustbemetifwearetoclaimthattheconcepthasbeengraspedbyaparticularphilosopherorinacertainperiod.Igivethecriteriafirstinabaldstatement,andthenIappendneededexplicationsandcomments.Inboththetwoclassicalphilosopherswefind:1.thetype–tokendistinctioninthematicallysignificantcontexts;2.uses,inthematicallysignificantcontexts,ofadistinctionbetweentwotypes,atype1(subordinate)andatype2(superordinate);and3.someawareness,explicitorimplicit,ofthedistinctionbetweena.thetype–tokenrelation,orthetype1–type2relation,andb.themereologicalrelationthatconnectsthewholeofanymass-entity(partitiveentity)withthecomponentpartsorportionsofthatwhole.Thefirstandmostfamousformulationofthefirstcriterionis,ofcourse,inAristotle’sdistinctionbetweenhenarithmOiandheneidei/logOi/genei,“oneinnumber/numerically58ACTC045820/03/2006,03:58PM\ntheconceptoftheuniversalone”vs.“oneinform/definition/genus/species.”InPlatothishelpfulterminologyhasnotyetbeenestablished,thoughitisoftenimpliedincontext.Ishallneedtodwellsomeonthefirstcriterion,notonlysoastojustifymyseeminglyanachronisticpre-ferenceforC.S.Peirce’snowfamiliarterminologyof“type”vs.“token”(seeArmstrong,1989,pp.1–2;cf.Audi,1995,s.v.)butalsobecauseultimatelythiscriterionwillemergeasespeciallyaptforthepurposeofassayingcontributionstotheconceptoftheuniversalbyfifth-centurycosmologists.Threetextsmeritourattention:first,thepassageinPeircewhichintroducestheterminologyandexplainsitsrationale;andthen–mostinterestingly–twoancienttextsinwhichPeirce’sdistinctionispre-figured.HereisthekeypassageinthePeircecorpus:AcommonmodeofestimatingtheamountofmatterinaMS.orprintedbookistocountthenumberofwords.Therewillordinarilybeabouttwenty“the”sonapage,andofcoursetheycountastwentywords.Inanothersenseoftheword“word,”however,thereisbutoneword“the”intheEnglishlanguage;anditisimpossiblethatthiswordshouldlievisiblyonapageorbeheardinanyvoice....SuchadefinitelysignificantForm,IproposetotermaType.ASingleevent,whichhappensonceandwhoseidentityislimitedtothatonehappening,oraSingleobjectorthingwhichisinsomesingleplaceatanyone6instantoftime,...IwillventuretocallaToken.ArmstrongnotesthatPeirce’sdistinctionisone“thatpracticallyallcontemporaryphilosophersaccept”(1989,p.1).Thisisostensiblybecauseofits“minimalist”char-acter,whichpermitscaptureoftheessentialsofthedistinctionbetweenuniversalsandparticularswiththelightestburdenofmetaphysicalinterpretationorquestion-begging.OftenthedistinctionisillustratednotwithPeirce’sexampleofindividualwordsbutwiththatofindividualletters.Amazingly,inthisversionthedistinctionhadalreadybeenformulatedinantiquity.ForitoccursunmistakablyinGalen:Whenanutterancesignifiesasinglething(tEsmenphOnEshensEmainousEs),necessarilythetypeofthethingatissueisone.Nonetheless,agivenlettercanbemanyinnumber(arithmOipolla),asinthecaseoftheletteralpha.Andforthisreasonwhenwesaythattherearesevenvowelsinourlanguage,andtwenty-fourelementsofthealphabetinall,clearlyweareconsideringthecommonformunderlyingthemall(tokoinonhapantOneidos),andnottheparticularsofthem(takatameros)writtenonpapyrus,wood,parchment,andstone....[W]henwesaythattheynumbertwenty-fourinall,wecan-vass(procheirizomenoi)nottheparticularsbutratherjustthetypes(outakatameros...tad’eidEmonon),towhich,inmyview,weattachthenames.(Meth.med.2.7–8=X,131–7132Kühn)6.Peirce(1931–60,vol.4,pp.423–4[=section537]).IthankmycolleagueFredKronzforpointingmetothispassage.Laterinhiscareer,Peircechangedhisterminology,callingtypea“famisign”andtokenan“actisign.”Buteventually(in1908),heconcededthatthe“formernamesarebetterthantheonesInowuse”(Peirce,1998,vol.2,p.488).7.Cf.Hankinson(1991,pp.66,213–14).IhavemodifiedHankinson’stranslation.Heveryperceptivelygivesthetranslation“tokens”fortakatameros;butthismightwellseemtendentiousinthecontextofmyownargument.59ACTC045920/03/2006,03:59PM\nalexanderp.d.mourelatosThefullcontextinGalen’streatiseshowsthatuseofthealphabetexampleismotivatedbyGalen’sacceptanceoftheAristoteliandoctrineofuniversalsasinherentinthings,universaliainrebus.Nonetheless,aswithPeirce’suseoftheexampleofwords,Galen’salphabetexampleseekstomaketheconceptaccessibleandintuitive,metaphysical8baggagebeingkepttoaminimum.Evenmoreremarkable–andperhapssufficientforabatinganylingeringconcernthatmyuseofthetype–tokenterminologymaybeanachronistic–isthefactthatGalen’suseofthealphabetexamplehasitsprecedentinAristotle.InMetaphysicsMAristotleusesthisveryexampleinordertodistancehimselffromthePlatonictenetthatthedistinctionbetweenuniversalsandparticularsrequiresaseparatelyexistingForm,atranscendent“theFitself.”Therelevanttextisintricatelydialectical,buttherationaleintheuseofthealphabetexamplecomesthroughclearlyenough:[T]hereisnothingtostoptherebeingmanyalphasandbetas,aswiththeelements(stoicheiOn)ofspeech(tEsphOnEs),withouttherealsobeingoverandabovethemany(paratapolla)acertain“alphaitself”and“betaitself”(autoalphakaiautobEta).(Met.M.10,91087a7–10)ItistellingthattheNeoplatonistcommentatorSyrianus,inhisdiscussionofthis10passage,resistsAristotle’sdeflationaryexploitationofthealphabetexample.AnditislikewisetellingthatamoderncommentatoradoptsPeirce’sterminologyoftypesandtokensinparaphrasingthesametextofAristotle’s:Therecanbemanyelementsorlettersofthesamekind,e.g.,manyAs,withoutthisimplyingeitherthatthereisaFormofAoramysteriousuniversalA.Tokenscanbetokensofthesametypewithoutthisleadingtothemanufactureofanexaltedstatusfor11thetypeoverandaboveitstokensandseparateandindependentofthem.ThefactthatPlatonistsmayfindthetype–tokendistinctionunacceptablydeflationaryisnotsurprising.Theimportantfactinthepresentcontextisthat,nomatterhowPlatoandhisfollowerswouldhaveultimatelyconceptualizedthedistinctionbetween8.“Anditissoevident,anditsonaturallybelongstoeverything,beitmanorbeast,torecognize...theunitaryform(hOseidoshen),thatevendonkeys,...thestupidestcreaturesofall,managetodistinguishbetweenthingswhichareoneinformandthosewhichareonenumerically”:Meth.med.2.7=X,133Kühn;trans.fromHankinson(1991,p.67).9.Mytranslation,drawingonAnnas(1976,p.115).IamgratefultoDr.Segalerbaforcallingmyattentiontothisimportantpassage.10.ItranslatefromSyrianus,InMet.pp.163–164:“He[Aristotle]claimsthatjustastheelements(stoicheia)ofspeech(phonEs)makeforinfinitelymanyutterances,eventhoughtheyarenotseparatefromutterances(tOnphOnOn),inlikefashiontheprinciplesofthingsareinseparablefromindividuals....[But]wewouldnotbeabletoproduceaninfinitenumberofutterancesoutofthetwenty-fourspecificelementsofthealphabetifwedidnothavewithinourselvesboththeform(eidos)ofeachandalsothepatternsforcombiningthemall(logoussyntheseOs).”IthankDr.GeraldBechtleforcallingmyattentiontothispassage.11.Annas(1976,p.190).And,withoutusingPeirce’sterminology,but,ineffect,applyingthesamedistinctiontothepassagefromMet.M.10:Segalerba(2001,pp.210–12).60ACTC046020/03/2006,03:59PM\ntheconceptoftheuniversaltheF-itselfandF-things,thatdistinctioninvolvesataminimumthedistinctionbetweentheF-typeandF-tokens.Turningnowtoboththefirstandthesecondofthethreecriteriafortheuniversallistedabove,letmeexplainthequalification“thematicallysignificant.”Icalladis-tinction“thematicallysignificant”notonlyif,inthecontextatissue,thedistinctionitselfbecomesatopicofdiscussion,butalsoifmajorphilosophicalclaimsarebeingputforwardbyvirtueofdeployingthedistinction.Examplesofthematicallysignificantusesofeitherthetype–tokenorthetype1–type2distinctioninPlatoandAristotlearefartoonumeroustolist.ItmaysufficejusttoalludeheretotwofamouspassagesinPlatonicdialogues.InPhaedo74a–cSocratespromptsSimmias’agreementthatweoughttodistinguishbetween“theequal”asitappliesconcretelytosticksorstonesandautotoison,“theequalitself,”orautohoestinison,“whatitistobeequal,”orisotEs,“equality.”InMeno71d–eSocratescallsonhisinterlocutortospecifytheencom-passingtypereferredtoasaretE,“virtue,humanexcellence”(type2);butMeno(adheringtotheteachingsofGorgias)respondsbycitingpluralsubordinateorspecialtypes,suchas“virtueforaman,”“virtueforawoman,”“virtueforaslave,”etc.(type1).Brieflyafterthisexchange,SocratesdistinguishesbetweenschEma,“shape”(type2)andschEmati,“ashape,”e.g.,strongulon,“curvilinear,”oreuthu,“rectilinear”(type1).Thethirdcriterionmayseematfirstblushtootechnicaltoqualifyaspartofa“minimalist”specification;andyetitisabsolutelyessentialandelementary.For,with-outit,thetype–tokendistinction(andthusthedistinctionbetweenauniversalanditsparticulars)mightbeconfusedwiththedistinctionbetweenapartitivewholeanditsparts.Thoughthereisacertainone–manyrelationbetween,say,scoopfuls,orevenstretches,ofwaterinalakeandthelakewatertakenasawhole,thatrelationis“mereological,”itisnotonebetweeneitheratokenandatypeorbetweenasubordinatetype1andasuperordinatetype2.Athinkerwhograspsthemereologicalrelationmaynotnecessarilybeenroutetograspingtheuniversal.PlatotookpainstodistinguishtherelationthatholdsbetweenaPlatonicFormanditsinstancesfromtheonethatholdsbetweenamass-entityanditsportions.Theso-called“Sail”(istion)argument(perhapsbettertranslatedthe“Awningargument”)atParmenides131b–cisdirectly12aimedatanassimilationoftheuniversaltoamass-entity.SomeConceptualBarrierstoEarlyGraspoftheUniversalOneofthereasonswhythepre-historyoftheuniversalisanengagingtopicisthattherearecertainthematicbarriersthatmayhaveservedtoblockortodelayrecognition12.Thetext,intranslationasinAllen(1983,p.8),slightlyrevised:[ParmenidestoSocrates]“Youmakeoneandthesamethingbeinmanydifferentplacesatonce,asifyou’dspreadanawning(istion)overanumberofmenandthenclaimedthatonethingasawholewasovermany....Butwouldthewholeawningbeovereachman,orpartofitoveroneandpartoveranother?–[Socr.]Partofit.–[Parm.]Therefore,Socrates,theForms(eidE)aredivisible,andthingsthathaveashareofthemhaveashareofpartsofthem;wholewouldnolongerbeineach,butpartofeachineach.”61ACTC046120/03/2006,03:59PM\nalexanderp.d.mourelatosorsignificantdeploymentoftheconcept.Incosmologiesthatadvocatesomeversionofmaterialmonism,theconceptoftheuniversalinevitablylacksprominence,orindeedrelevance.Wetoday,asstudentsofAnaximander,mightdistinguishbetween(a)hisapeironasamassiveindividualand(b)suchpropertiesasareattributedtoitinoursources,viz.,“eternal,”“unaging,”“deathless,”“indestructible,”“encompassing.”Thatis,wearefreetoenvisagethesepropertiesasinprincipleorpotentiallydetach-able,applicablealsotoindividualsotherthantheapeiron.ButthatispreciselywhatAnaximander’smonismprecludes.Thesepropertiesarepossesseduniquelyandexclusivelybytheapeiron.Forhim,thecosmicindividualanditspropertiesformaninseparablewhole.Thecosmologygivesusnoencouragementorstimulustodetachtheproperties,tobegintoviewthemasuniversals.WhatissaidhereaboutAnaximander’sapeironappliescorrespondinglytothecosmicairofAnaximenes,whichislikewisethesubjectofsuchattributesas“infinite,”and“divine”(DK13A5,A6,A9,A10).Butitalsoapplieswithreferencetothevariousstatesofrarefaction-condensationofcosmicair.For,howevernaturalitmightbeforustoviewlikestatesofrarefaction(orofcondensation)indifferentregionsoratdifferenttimesasdistincttokensofthesametype,forAnaximenesthesemanifesta-tionsindifferentregionsordifferenttimesareintegralpartsofaglobalindividual.Pursuingthislineofthought,onemightsupposethattheoneGodofXenophanes,theunitarywhat-isofParmenides,andtheOneofMelissusshouldalsobejudgedbarrenasconceptualsoilfortheuniversal.Thereare,however,somenoteworthycomplexitiesinthesecases,anddiscussionofthesemustbedeferredtoanotheroccasion.Interestingly,pluralismmayalsobeinhospitabletotheconceptoftheuniversal.AsW.A.Heidelpointedoutacenturyago(1906),athought-structurethatholdsswayinphilosophicalandscientificthoughtbeforePlatoisthatofcomposition/re-compositionofpartitiveentities,ormass-entities,ofstuffs.The“opposites”inAnaximanderandinAlcmaeon,theinterminglingearthandwaterofXenophanes,theoppositemorphaiinParmenides’“Doxa,”thefourelementsofEmpedocles,theinfinitechrEmataofAnaxagoras’cosmology,and(inparalleltothesemoreproperlyphilosophicalcon-texts)thedunamies,“powers,”ofthemedicaltreatises–alltheseentitiesrepresentahybridcategoryofthing-stuff-power-quality(Mourelatos,1973,pp.17–30).Eventhefourthatbecamethecanonical“contraries”inAristotle’sscheme–thehot,thecold,thedry,themoist–areconceptualizedbymanyofthepre-Socraticsnotasqualitiesorpropertiesbutas“the-hot-burning-stuff”or“the-dry-desiccating-stuff,”fullyonaparontologicallywiththosestuffsthatbearfamiliarmass-noundesignations,suchasair,soil,bone,orsap.Accordingly,thehotintheovenandthehotinthekilnarenottwotokensofthetypehotbutrathertwoportionsofasinglemass-entitythathavebeenparceledouttodifferentregions.Thereisgoodreasontobelievethatthisdominantlymereologicalthoughtstructureisahold-overfromacharacteristicallypre-philosophicalconceptualscheme(Mourelatos,1973,pp.21–2).Forthereasonsthathavealreadybeensuggestedabove(whenIspecifiedcriteriawithrespecttoPlato’sandAristotle’sgraspoftheuniversal),thehybridcategorythatisatissueheremayhaveservedmoreasablockordeviationandlessasaproperstageinthedevelop-mentoftheuniversal.Interferencefromthishybridcategorymayalsorendermootthecontributiontoouraccountthatcouldhavebeenmadebytwonoteworthyconceptualdevicesthatare62ACTC046220/03/2006,03:59PM\ntheconceptoftheuniversalwell-attestedinpre-Socraticthought:theprincipleLiketoLike;andtheso-calledSynonymyPrincipleofCausation,whichstipulatesthatthepresenceofacertainpropertyFinaneffectmustbetracedtothepresenceofFinthecause(Barnes,1979,vol.1,pp.88,119).Clearly,theLiketoLikeprinciplecanbeappliedtoentitiesofthehybridcategory–andthis,almostcertainly,istheoriginalversionoftheprinciple.Soapplied,ifthe-hot-burning-stuffconsortswithitslike,theassimilationmaybeunderstoodinconcrete,physical,andmereologicaltermsasattractionoragglutina-tionbetweendifferentportionsofthesamestuff.AsfortheSynonymyPrinciple,therearefamouslyspecialversionsofitinPlatoandinAristotlethatpointstraighttoformasanabstractentityandauniversal:thePlatonicformula,F-thingsareFbecauseoftheformF-ness;theAristotelianmetaphysicalslogan,anthrOposanthrOpongennAi,“ahumanbeingbegetsahumanbeing.”Applied,however,toentitiesofthehybridcategory,theSynonymyPrincipleenvisagesamerephysicaltransfer(imparting,invading,encroachment,spillage,contamination)fromcausetoeffect:whenthehotbrickisputinthewater,the-hotspillsoutofthebrickandheats(invades)thewater.ThecommunityoftheF-characterisnotoneinvolvingdifferenttokensofthesametypebutratheroneofredistributionofportionsofthesameindividual.Anotherfactorthatmaybluntawarenessofthetype–tokenrelationisattentiontocyclicallyrecurringphenomena.Amodernstudentofphilosophywouldnotrequiremuchpromptingtorealizethatsuchrecurringeventsasnightfall,dusk,daybreak,dawn,newmoon,or–forthatmatterandmorebroadly–eachofthefourseasons,areallproperlytypes,andthatundereachtypetherearedistincttokensdistributedovermoreorlessregularintervalsintime.Butearlystudentsofthecosmos,whowereindeedpre-occupiedwithsuchrecurrences,arelikelytohaveperceivedinthemsuccessivereappearancesorreturnsofthesametokenindividuals.Winterandsummerwouldhavebeenconceivedasindividualsofthathybridcategory:theyperiodicallymaketheiradvent,andthenrecede–eventoday,wespeakofthecomingofdawn,orthecomingofwinter.Othercyclicallyrecurringeventswouldhavebeenperceivedastemporalpartsofsuchconspicuousindividualsasthesunorthemoon,nomoredetachablefromeitherluminarythanthetraitsandbehaviorofAchillesaredetach-ablefromthepersonofthatuniqueindividualinHomer.ThosemodernscholarswhohavelookedforanticipationsofthePlatonicconceptofFormindependentlyofAristotle’ssuggestionsonthetopichavefocusedtheir13investigationsonthathybridcategoryofthing-stuff-power-quality,thecategoryIhavespecificallysetoutsidethescopeofthepresentaccount.Thisfocusinscholar-shipisunderstandable,inviewoftheextensiveoverlap,bothlexicalandsyntactic,betweentheearlymereologicalschemeandthatofPlato’stheory.Inbothschemeswehavesubstantivesformedfromthearticulateneuter(tothermon,“thehot”/tohosion,“thepious”);inbothwehavethelanguageof“sharing,”“partaking,”“participating,”“communion”(metechein,koinOnein),aswellaslanguagefortheconverserelationof“inherence”or“presencein”(pareinaioreneinaiwithdative);andinbothschemesthe“sharing,”etc.,admitofdegrees(“more”and“less”).Butithasgenerallybeenrecognizedthatthemereologicalmodelcanbeapplied,atbest,onlytoalimitedrange13.See,e.g.,Furley(1976,pp.81–2);Furley(1987,pp.69–70,171–3);Meinwald(1992,p.375);Moline(1981,pp.84–97).63ACTC046320/03/2006,03:59PM\nalexanderp.d.mourelatos14ofPlatonicForms.ItobviouslyfailsinthecaseofarithmeticalandgeometricForms–structureForms,generally–alsointhecaseofbiologicalForms,andinothercases.Giventhatthefocusofthepresentaccountisontheuniversalasanabstracttype(theparadigmbeingthetype–tokenandthetype1–type2distinctions)“anticipations”thatdrawonthemereologicalschemearesimplyoffourtopic.Empedocles:FormulaeforCompounds;BiologicalForms;Type-IdentitiesAcrossCyclesAristotlerecognizesthreepre-Socraticantecedentsforhisconceptoftokatholou,“the15universal”:numbersandproportionsinPythagoreanism;theformulaeofcom-16positionforcompoundsinEmpedocles;andDemocritus’attentiontoissuesof“form”17and“essence.”Aristotleischaracteristicallycharyinallthreecases,whichmaytosomeextentbejustifiedbyhisnarrowfocuson“definingessence.”We,however,canbemoregenerous.IshalltakeupEmpedoclesfirst.WefindintheEmpedoclesfragmentsarithmeticalformulaenotonlyforbone(DK31B96),whichistheonlycasecitedbyAristotle,butalsofor“theforms(eidea)ofothertissue(allEssarkos)”(B98).Bloodrequiresexactlyequalpartsofthefourelements(isEmalista,B98.1),whereasothertissuesandbodyfluidsinvolvespecificvariationsfromthenormofequality:slightlymoreofearth,orslightlymoreoftheotherthree(B98.4).Thenumericalformulaforboneenvisagestransparentlyauniversal,asAristotlenoted.Moreover,theprincipleofvariationofpro-portionallowsEmpedoclestoconstructanentiredomainoftypesofbiologicaltissue.ThetermeidosanditscognateideaareprominentinyetanothercontextinEmpedocles.Theplurals(eidE,eidea,ideai)areemployedalongwiththepluralofethnos,“tribe,kind”(ethnea)inreferencetokindsoflivingbeings,includinggods(whofor18EmpedoclesaredolichaiOnes,“long-lived,”butnotimmortal).Emphasizingthe14.See,e.g.,Brentlinger(1972).IamnotconvincedbytheargumentinMoline(1981,pp.143–55),thatthemereologicalmodelpersistsintoPlato’smiddleandlateperiods.15.Met.M.4,1078b17–23:Socrateswasfirsttoseekkatholouhorizesthai,“universaldefini-tions”;Democritus“touchedonit”(seebelow);thePythagoreans,asked“whatisopportunity(kairos)orthejustormarriage”andreducedthesetonumbers(eistousarithmousanEpton).Cf.Met.A.5,985b23–31,987a13–22.Foranexplanationofsuchreductionsofabstractentitiestonumbers,seeMcKirahan(1994,pp.91–111).16.Phys.II.2,194a20–21:“EmpedoclesandDemocritustouchedinsmallpartonform(eidous)andessence(toutiEneinai).”Cf.PAI.1,642a17–24:Empedocles“drivenbytruthitselfiscompelledtosaythatconstitutivenature(phusis)istheratio,aswhenheexplainswhatboneis”;Met.A.10,993a17–18:“evenEmpedoclessaysthatboneiswhatitisbyvirtueofaratio,whichistheessenceandreality(totiEneinaikaihEousia).”17.SeePhys.textinprecedingnote.Cf.Met.M.4,1078b17–21:“Democritusjusttouchedonitslightly(thekatholou),androughly(pOs)definedthehotandthecold.”AlsoPAI.1,642a17–24:“DemocrituswasthefirsttotouchontotiEneinai,‘essence,’andontohorisasthaitEnousian,‘workingoutdefinitionsoftherealityatissue.’”18.InadditiontothecitationsfromDK31B98(aboveinthetext),pluralformseidE/eideaalsoappearinB22.7,B23.5,B71.3,B73.2,B115.7,andB125.1.64ACTC046420/03/2006,03:59PM\ntheconceptoftheuniversalimmensevarietyoftheseformsandkinds,Empedoclesdescribestheirevolutionaryadventinthesewords:“countlesstribes(ethneamuria)ofmortalbeingspouredforth,structuredinallsortsofforms(pantoiaisideesinarErota),amarveltobehold(thaumaidesthai)”(DK31B35.16–17;cf.B35.7).Notlimitinghimselftothisglobalcharacterization,hefrequentlysortsoutthe“mortalbeings”intosub-genera:“humanbeings”(furthersubdividedinto“men”and“women”),19“beasts,”“birds,”“fish,”“trees,”“shrubs.”Ofcourse,thefactthatwehaveinEmpedoclesclassificatoryusesofeidosandrelatedtermsdoesnotbyitselfsatisfythedemandforthematicsignificanceIhavestipulated.If,however,wefollowthemajorityofinterpretersinassumingthatinEmpedocles’cosmologywehaveacosmiccycle,thedistinctphasesofwhichareindefinitelyoreternallyrepeated,thentheissueofeideaandethneabecomesphilosophicallymomentous.Wesawearlierhowcyclicalphenomenamayservetoblockawarenessoftypesbyallowingthatdifferenttokensofthesametypeshouldbeconceptualizedasrecurringadventsofthesametoken(e.g.,lastyear’sandthisyear’ssummer).InEmpedocles’scheme,thereisnopossibilityofsuchblockage.For,withthepossibleexceptionoftransmigratingdaimones,thevastmajorityofindividuals(thetokenscorrespondingtothetypes)donotsurvivethroughthephaseofmaximumLove(thesphairos),andprobablyalsonotthroughthatofmaximumStrife.Whatrecursareunmistakablytypes.TheoreticallyscrutinizinganytwocompletecyclesMandN,outoftheentiretyofelapsedcycles,anyhearerorreaderofEmpedocles’verseswouldhavebeenprompted–astodayanyreaderislikewiseprompted–towonder,“AretheeideaofcycleMthesameasthoseinthecorrespondingphaseofcycleN?”Evenwithinonegivencycle,thequestionarises,“AretheeideathataretemporallyseparatedeitherbytheperiodoftotalLoveorbytheperiodoftotalStrifethesameordifferent?”Philolaus:Genus,Species,andtheRelationtoParticularsWithrespecttomysecondofthethreeantecedentsacknowledgedbyAristotle,itisimportanttostressthatAristotlespeaksof“Pythagoreans,”orevenof“oneswhocallthemselvesPythagoreans,”notofPythagoras.ItiscertainlynotclearwhetherthereferenceistoPythagoreansoftheearlyfifthorthelatefifthcentury,or,forthatmatter,ofthefourthcentury.Indeed,themostpenetratingandcriticallybalancedaccountofthesubjectofPythagorasandPythagoreanisminmodernscholarship,WalterBurkert’smagisterialbookof1962(originalGermanedition),wouldleadonetosurmisethatPythagoras’contributiontothedevelopmentoftheconceptoftheuniversalwouldhavebeen,atmost,aproclamationofmysticalfaithinuniversalaffinity.Eventhemuch-discusseddiscoveryofthearithmeticalratiosforthemusicalconcordswasprobablynot,accordingtoBurkert(1972,esp.chs.5and6),onemadeexclusivelybyPythagoras’successors–letalonebythefounderoftheschool.Ifwelimitourpurviewtothislaterperiod,wemayappreciatewithsomeconfidencethecontributionsmadebyPhilolausofCroton,certainimportantfragmentsofwhosewritingsarenowsecurelyacknowledgedasauthentic.Itisespeciallysignificant19.Seethesefragments(allinDK31B):9,20,21,23,26,76,77–80,117,127,and130.65ACTC046520/03/2006,03:59PM\nalexanderp.d.mourelatosthatPhilolausnameshiscosmologicalprinciplesnotapeironandperasbut(usingtheplural)apeiraandperainonta,“unlimitedandlimitedthings”(DK44B1,B2,B6),thusopenlyproclaiminghispurposetoclassifytaeontapanta,“allexistingthings,”underthesetwobroadtypes(seeHuffman,1993,pp.37–53,93,101).Aconceptuallymorearticulatetypology,togetherwithsomenotablysophisticateddistinctions,isimpliedinacontextofnarrowerscope,thedomainofnumbers.Theviewpoint,nonetheless,isequallyabstractasinPhilolaus’statementofcosmologicalprinciples,andtheimpliedmetaphysicalbearingisnolessfundamental:Number,indeed,hastwoproperkinds(idiaeidE),oddandeven,andathirdfrombothmixedtogether,theeven-odd.Ofeachofthetwokindstherearemanyforms(morphai),ofwhich[scil.,theforms]eachthing,inandofitself,providesasign(hekastonautosEmainei).20(DK44B5)Weneednotbeside-trackedbythevexedquestionofthenatureandscopeofthe21derivative“third”type,the“even-odd”;foritisclearfromthesecondsentencethatthefocusisonthetwokindsthatwerejustdenominated“proper”or“intrinsic”(idia).Soread,thefragmentoffersastatementofmajorimportance,ashasrightlybeenemphasizedbyCarlHuffman:Philolausherespeaksnotonlyofarelationbetweennumbersasindividualspeciesandtheirtwogenera,evenandodd,butalsoof“therelationbetweennumbersandthings”(1993,p.178).Intheterminologyusedinthepresentchapter,Philolaustakesnotebothofatype1–type2relationandalsooftherelationbetweenindividualtokensandtheirappropriatetype.Heiscontrastingthemediatedrelationthatobtainsbetween,say,fourpebblesandthetypepickedoutbytheexpression“even”withthemoreimmediaterelationofsignificationthatholdsbetweenthetetradofpebblesandthetypepickedoutby“four.”Inthelattercase,thephysicaltetrad“inandofitself”(hekastonauto)isatokenofthetype–indeed,“betokens”wouldbeanexcellentalternativetranslationforsEmainei.Bycontrast,intheformercase,therelationoftheparticulartotheeidosreferredtoas“even”ismediatedbythemorphEreferredtoas“four.”Soexplicated,PhilolausB5gainsevenmoreinsignificance.ItsphrasingshowsPhilolausgropingforametaphorthatmayconveytherelationbetweenaparticularandauniversal.Unmistakablyitisinthistext,notinPlato,thatwehavethefirstrecordedattemptinthehistoryofmetaphysicsatcoiningatermforthisrelation.Philolausoptsnotfor“participatesin”or“sharesin”or“imitates”or“exemplifies”butratherforsEmainei,“providesasignof,”“betokens”–remarkably,anexpressionthat20.Exceptforslightvariationinthetranslationofthefinalthreewords,textandtransla-tionisasinHuffman(1993,p.178;seealsopp.184–93).IagreewithHuffmanthatthereadingau0tauto/(Doricreflexivepronoun)oftheMSSneedstobeemendedtosimplyau0to/.Huffmanhaspointedouttome,however(inprivatecorrespondence),thatau0tauto/couldberetained,providedweinsertdi(a/)toreaddi0au0tauto/,andthismighthelpexplaintheoriginofthenonsensicaldhmai/nei(emendedbyHuffmanandothereditorsintoshmai/nei).21.ThesolutioninHuffman(1993,p.190),isplausibleenough:“[T]heeven-oddisaderivedclassofnumberswhosefirstmemberis,astheancienttraditionindicates,theone,butwhichalsoincludes...evenandoddnumberscombinedinratios(e.g.,2:1,4:3,and3:2).”66ACTC046620/03/2006,03:59PM\ntheconceptoftheuniversalisaclosesemanticcongenerofthemodernterm“instantiates.”OneisnaturallyledtowonderhowdifferentlythehistoryproperoftheuniversalmayhaveunfoldedhaditstartedwithphilosophicalreflectionontherelationconveyedbyPhilolaus’sEmaineinratherthanwiththeothermetaphorscitedabove–theonesintroducedandfavoredbyPlato.Democritus:AnInfinityofAtomicTypes,AtomicTokensIturnnowtothethirdcaseofanticipationAristotlerecognizes.Thephilosophyof2223DemocrituswasthesubjectofalosttreatisebyAristotle;anditisclearfromthepreservedtreatisesoftheAristoteliancorpusthatAristotleviewedDemocritusasamajorphilosophicalrival.Aristotle’sowntestimonybelieshisgrudgingcommentsonthetopicoftheuniversal(“Democritusjusttouchedonitslightly...roughlydefinedthehotandthecold”:seeaboven.15).ForitisAristotlehimselfwhotellsusthatDemocriteanatomsare“infiniteinmultitude...andhaveallsortsofforms(pantoiasmorphas)andallsortsofshapes(schEmatapantoia)anddifferencesinsize”(Arist.fr.208Rose,cf.DK68A37).AnditisAristotlewho,inotherpassages,leavesnodoubtthat“allsorts”mustbegiventhestrongestpossiblereading,inotherwords,thatDemocritusenvisagedinfinityinboththerelevantrespects:Theindivisiblebodiesareinfinitebothinmultitudeandintheshapes.(GCI.1,314a22,cf.DK67A9)Since[ordinary]bodiesdifferinshape,andtheshapesareinfinite,thenthesimplebodiesaswellareinfinite.(Cael.III.4,303a11;cf.DK67A15)Especiallystrikingistheinferencefromtheinfinityoftypesofshapetotheinfinityofatoms:therangeofshapesisintrinsicallyinfinite;theremustbeatleastonespecimenforeachtype(Democrituswasnobelieverinpurelyidealpossibilities);thereforethenumberofatomsbearingshapemustbeinfinite.Theinferenceherecouldnothavebeendrawnwithoutafirmgraspofthetype–tokendistinction.ThedegreeofinsightintothatdistinctionthesereportsassigntoDemocrituscomparesfavorablywithwhat24maybeassignednotonlytocorrespondingpassagesinEpicurusandLucretiusbutalsotothemanysimilarcontextsinPlatoandinAristotle.22.Itis,byandlarge,notpossibletodistinguishbetweenthecontributionstotheoriginalphilosophyofAtomismmadebythefounderofthetheory,Leucippus,andthosemadebyhissuccessorDemocritus:seeMcKirahan(1994,p.304);Taylor(1999,pp.157–8).Iadheretothewidelyadoptedpracticeofusingthename“Democritus”insynecdocheforthesayingsanddoctrinesofbothLeucippusandDemocritus.23.Perhapstwotreatises,“OnDemocritus”and“ProblemsfromDemocritus.”SeeDK68A34.24.Cf.Epic.Hdt.42–3;Lucr.2.478–531.TheEpicureans’doctrineofminimalpartsdictatedadjustingDemocriteandoctrine:thetokenatomsareinfinite;butthetypesofatomicshapearefinite,thoughvastlynumerous,aperilEpta,“unencompassable.”SeeMorel,epicureanism,inthisvolume.67ACTC046720/03/2006,03:59PM\nalexanderp.d.mourelatosMoreover,itislikelythatDemocrituswentfurther:hepositedaninfinityoftokenatomsforeachoftheinfinitetypesofshape.ThisisimpliedbytestimonythatpresentstheearlyAtomistsashavingrecoursetoaversionofthePrincipleofSufficientReason,theso-calledargumentfromoumallon,“nomorethisthanthat”:They[LeucippusandDemocritus]saythatthemultitudeofshapesintheatomsisinfinitesincethereisnomorereason(diatomEdenmallon)that[agivenatom]shouldhavethisshaperatherthananother(toioutonEtoioutoneinai).(Simpl.InPhys.28.15ff.=DK68A38)AsintheDeCaelotextcitedearlier,theinferencedoesnotgobeyondestablishingtheinfinityoftypesofshape.Butiftheoumallonargumentworkstoproducethisinference,itshouldalsoworktoestablishthatthenumberoftokenatomsforanyone25oftheinfinityoftypesofatomicshapeisinfinite.Furthermore,relyingonthesameargument,itmaywellseemreasonabletostrengthenAristotle’s“allsortsofsizes”into“aninfinityofatomicsizes,”andthenproceedtothecorollary,thatwithrespectalso26toanyonesize-typethereisaninfinitesupplyoftokenatoms.Inanyevent,justasthereisaninfinityoftypeswithrespecttoatleastoneofthetwopropertiespossessedbytheatomsintrinsically(shape,size),thereisacorrespondingimmensemultitude(perhapsinfinity)oftypesforwhatmightbecalledextrinsicorrelationalproperties,thoseacquiredbyatomsaftercollisionandrebound,orinthecourseofaggregationintocompounds:motion(includingthedifferentiaeofspeedanddirection);taxis,“array,order,position”(thedifferencebetweenANandNA);andthesis,“posture,tilt,orienta-27tion”(thedifferencebetweenNandZ).Finally,atthewidestcompass,intheinfinite25.TheinferenceisindeeddrawnbytheEpicureansforeachofthetypesofshape–inthisrespectprobablyinadherencetoDemocriteandoctrine–eventhoughthenumberofatomicshapesisfinite:seeprecedingnote.26.Theevidenceis,admittedly,ambiguous.SeeTaylor(1999,pp.173–5).ButtheemphasisplacedbytheEpicureansonlimitingthevarietyofatomicsizesdoesperhapsindicatethatDemocritus,bycontrast,hadenvisagedsuchaninfinity.Itissometimesassumed–andIhavesobeeninclinedtoassumemyself–thatanyinfinitevariationofsizewouldhavetoobtainbetweenalowerandanupperbound(smallestandlargestatomicsize).Thepositingofanysuchboundswouldbeunfortunate;foritwouldsignificantlyqualifyDemocritus’adherencetotheoumallonprinciple.ButasVictorCastonandotherspointedouttome(inadiscussionofMourelatos,2005),theunqualifiedinfinityoftheDemocriteanuniversecouldperhapsallowforfiniteatomicsizesthatrecedeorproceedadinfinitumtosmaller-and-smallerandtolarger-and-larger,respectively.TheLiketoLikeprinciplewouldguaranteethatkosmoi,“worlds”(whichinallancientatomistcosmologiesarelarge-scaleregionalclusteringsofatomiccompounds)wouldinvolveonlycompatibleatomicsizes–onesthatfallwithinarangeappropriateforthedimensionsofthekosmosatissue.Tobesure,ifatomsaretobethoughtofasindivisiblemagnitudesinastrongsense(metaphysicallyormathematically,notjustphysically),thentherewouldhavetobealowerboundatomicsize.ButIstronglydoubtthatDemocrituswouldhaveentertainedthecontradictoryconceptofideai,“shapes,”thatareindivisible.27.AristotleMet.A.4,985b4–21;DK67A6.IdeliberatelyselecttheAristoteliantermsovertheDemocriteandiathigEandtropEwhichrefer,Ibelieve,tothedispositionsthatcorrespond,respectively,tothetwooccurrentandacquiredpropertiesoftaxisandthesis.SeeMourelatos(2005,pp.56–8).68ACTC046820/03/2006,03:59PM\ntheconceptoftheuniversalexpanseofthevoidthereisaninfinityofkosmoi,“worldstructures”(DK67A1,A21,68A1[44]).Democritusmaywellappearintoxicatedbythethemeofinfinity,obsessedwithit.Intheoverallramifiedscheme,wehavefivesuperordinatetypes(thefivedistinctintrinsicorextrinsicpropertiesofatomscitedabove:shape,size,motion,array,posture);foratleastthefirstofthesethereisaninfinityofsubordinatetypesofthatproperty;andforeachofthesubordinatetypes(betheyinfiniteorfinite)thereisaninfinityoftokenatoms.Oneofourancientsourcescomments,withevidentirritation,that“itisaconsequenceoftheir[Leucippus’andDemocritus’]theoriesthatthereis28somethingmoreinfinitethantheinfinite.”Whatdrivesthisexuberantproliferationofentities–hereisthecrucialpointforthepresentaccount–arethetwodistinctions:type–tokenandtype1–type2.GiventheimportantworkthesedistinctionsaccomplishwithinDemocritus’system,itwouldnothaverequiredtoodifficultanactofabstractionforhimtofocusontheinfinitedomainofanyoneofthefivesuper-ordinatetypescitedhere.Certainlyinthecaseofatomicshape,wehaveevidencethathedidapproachthesubjectabstractlyandtypologically.Forhespokenotonlygloballyofaninfinityofshapes;hetooknotealsoofsuchsub-generaas“convex,”“concave,”“lop-sided,”“curviform,”“spherical,”29“angular,”“polygonal,”“hook-like”;andhewrotetreatisestitledPeridiapherontOnrhysmOn,“OnDifferentShapes,”andPeriameipsirhysmiOn,“OnChangesofShape”(DK68A33),aswellasseveraltreatisesontopicsofgeometry(DK68A33).CommentsbyDemocritusontheUniversalMyargumentsofarhasbeenthattheusesofthetype–tokenandtype1–type2dis-tinctionsbyDemocritushaveenoughthematicsignificancetojustifytheclaimthatthisphilosopherhasawell-articulatedgraspoftheconceptoftheuniversal.ButIbelieveanevenstrongercasecanbemade:thereisgoodevidencethatDemocritusnotonlymadeuseoftheconceptoftheuniversalbutthathe“thematized”it,thathemadetheconceptitselfatopicforexplanationandcomment.Theevidenceisintwoseldomdiscussedfragments.Inaseparatestudy,Ihaveanalyzedthetwoostensiblequotationsinthesetwofragments,togetherwiththecontextsinthesourceinwhichthequotationshavebeenpreserved(2003).HereImustlimitmyselftoaprécisoftheinterpretiveissuesinvolvedandtoreportingofmyconclusions.Fordetailsofthesupportingevidenceandinterpretiveargument,Ireferthereadertothisotherstudy.ThefirstofthesefragmentsisB124.ThepartinwhichDemocritusisquotedreads:Democritus,inasmuchashesays,“onewillbe[estai,singular]menand[they]all[willbe]man”(anthrOpoiheisestaikaianthrOpospantes).Hippocrates,however,says....28.JohnPhiloponusInGC12.4–5(commentingonArist.GCI.1,314a15).Cf.Taylor(1999,p.73).29.SeeDK68A37,A101–102,A132,A135.Cf.Stückelberger(1979,pp.319–20).69ACTC046920/03/2006,03:59PM\nalexanderp.d.mourelatosThesourceispseudo-GalenMedicalDefinitions(439=XIX,449–450Kühn),andthethemeintheparagraphinwhichthequotationoccursishistoryoftheembryologicaldoctrineofpangenesis,thedoctrinethatseedisdrawnfromthewholeofthebodyofthefatheror(wholeofthebodyofeach)oftheparents.Aswouldonlyseemreason-ableforastart,embryologicalreadingsofthequotedsentencehavebeentried;buttheyappearforced.Moreover,otherpassagesofMedicalDefinitionsshowpseudo-Galenquotingfromphilosophersorusingtheirterminologymoreforthepurposeofdisplay-ingerudition,exploitingthequotedsayingsortermsonthebasisofutterlytenuousandmerelyverbalconnectionswiththemedicalsubjectatissue.Wearenotcom-pelled,therefore,toassumethattheoriginalcontext,inDemocritus’ownwork,wasembryological.Myproposalisthattheoriginalcontextwasmetaphysical.Letmefirstbrieflyresolvesyntacticalissues.Thefutureformestaidoesnotenvisageembryologicaldevelopment;itisafuturumconsequentiae(cf.“Givenwhatwassaid,thiswillbethecase....”).Moreover,thefactthatestaiisgrammaticallysingularneednotdictatetaking“one”asthesubjectofthesentence.Foritisquitepossibleandplausiblethatthecopulalogicallyrepresentsanidentityrelation:“men=one;i.e.,menwillbeidenticalwithsingle(man).”Inthatcase,thegrammaticalsubjectisanthrOpoi,“men,”30andthisconstrualis–afterall–themorenaturalone,giventhewordorder.MymetaphysicalreadingofB124can,accordingly,beconveyedinthisparaphrase:Ifoneadoptsthesynopticview,themanymenwillbe(maybeviewedas)asingleman–thetypeMan.Nonetheless,themanymen,severally,takenasseparateindividuals(tokens),willcountas(orsimplyare)aman.Ifthisinterpretationiscorrect,Democritusdidnotonlyconformtothethirdofthecriterialistedabove(p.58),hestatedthatcriterion.Ineffect,heintuitivelyanticipatesPlato’sistionargumentintheParmenides:the“one”thatiscollectedinauniversalisnota“oneovermany”inthewayanawningextendsovermanyspectators(seeabove,p.61).DiscernibleintheDemocriteansayingaretwopoints:(a)Aswelookfortheuniversal,thepluralindividualhumanbeingswillcometobeviewedasone,thetypeMan.(b)This,however,doesnotmeanthatManisapartitiveentity,onethatcanbedistributedmereologically;rather,eachandeveryhumanbeingisinhimselforherselfsufficientlyandexhaustively“aman.”Butwhy,onemaywonder,shouldDemocritushavebeenconcernedtomakethispoint?Icanthinkoftwogoodreasons:oneisthathesoughttodifferentiatehisontologysharplyfromthatofsuchrivalsasEmpedocles,Anaxagoras,orDiogenesofApollonia,inallofwhosetheoriesthefundamentalrealities,belongingastheydotowhatIearliercalledthe“hybrid”category,areindeedpartitive.Moreover,bydrawingattentiontothedualuse(bothforthetypeandfortokens)ofthefamiliarexpressionanthrOpos,hecouldprovideanintelligibleanalogueforhisowntechnicaldualuseofthetermidea,“shape.”Forheusesthelatterinreferringbothtothetype–thepropertyofshapeallatomsinherentlypossess–andalsotothetokens,whichhedistributivelycallsnotonlyatomoioratomabutalsosimplyideai.30.Cf.Kahn(1973,p.427):“Thereseemstobenodoubtthatthestatisticallyfavoredorder,bothinHomerandinclassicprose,is...N[subject]f[predicate]is.”70ACTC047020/03/2006,03:59PM\ntheconceptoftheuniversalTheotherDemocriteansayingthatshows,Ibelieve,ourphilosopherattendingtotheconceptoftheuniversalisinB165,whichinDKisprintedasafragmentintwoparts,joinedbyadash.Inthesourcetext,inSextusEmpiricus,thetwopartsareseparatedbytwointerveningsentencesofSextus’owncomments.ItisnotevencertainthatthefirstpartisaquotationratherthanasummarizingremarkbySextus;noristheremuchsupportinthefullcontextforDiels’conjecturethatthetwopartsoriginallyconstitutedasinglestatement.So,myinterest,likethatofotherscholarswhohavediscussedthisfragment,isonlyinthesecondpart:anthrOposestihopantesidmen.Maniswhatweallknow.(DK68B165)Perhaps–sogoesthetraditionalinterpretation–thiswasareductiveremark,some-thingofthisforce:itistheoreticalentities,atomsandthevoid,thatchallengeourreflec-tion;noneedtoconcernourselveswithacommonplacetopic,thenatureofman.ButsuchaninterpretationwouldrundirectlyagainsttheevidencethatDemocrituswroteanentiretreatiseonTheNatureofMan(DK68B5d);anditalsogoesagainstDemocritus’professedavidandglobalyearningforfindingaitiologiai,“explanations”(DK68B118).Myproposalisthatthesayingcombinesepistemologicalandmetaphysicalimport.ItintroducesandexplainstheuniversalimpliedinManbypointingoutadisparitybetweenourknowledgeofuniversalsandourknowledgeofparticulars.Thereisnowaythatallhumanbeings,certainlynotacrossalltheages,butnoteven(assumingancientmodesoftransport)oversomelimitedstretchoftime,shouldknowonesingleindividual–say,Democritus,orLeucippus,orProtagoras,orthepresentkingofPersia.Andyetweallknowwhatitistobehuman,weknowtheuniversalanthrOpos.ItisnotatalldifficulttoimaginewhatcircumstancesmighthavepromptedDemocritustomakethiscomment.Otherfragmentsshowhimcontrastingtheclarityandsecuritywithwhichweknowgeneralandfundamentaltruthsaboutatomsandthevoidagainsttheobscurityofknowledgeofhekasta,“thingsinparticular”:Evenso(kaitoi),itwillbecomeevidentthatitisnotpossibletoknowwhateachparticularthingis(hoionhekaston)inreality(eteEi).(DK68B8)Surely,ontheonehand(men),ithasbeenshowninmanywaysthat,intermsofreality(eteEi),wedonotgraspwhateachparticularthingisorisnot(hoionhekastonestinEoukestin),....(DK68B10)Buttheexampleof“man”inB165mayalsohaveservedthesamepurposetheexampleofthealphabethadservedinGalen(seeabove,pp.59–60).Ifacritichadobjectedthatconcreteparticularsaremoreeasilyknowablethantypes,B165wouldhaveprovidedaneffectiverejoinder.DemocritusandAristotle:OriginsoftheType–TokenDistinctionEmergingfromtheprecedingtwosectionsisahistoricaldiagnosisthatisabsentinstandardaccountsofthepre-Socratics.ItwouldappearthatinDemocrituswehavean71ACTC047120/03/2006,03:59PM\nalexanderp.d.mourelatosanticipationoftheAristoteliansolutiontothemetaphysicalproblemofthestatusof31universals:universaliainrebus.Butifthisisright,thenAristotle’suseofthealphabetexampleinMet.M.10(citedabove,p.60)gainsenormouslyinsignificance.ForitisalsoinAristotle,atMet.A.4,985b4–21,thatwefindthesuggestionthatDemocritushadusedthealphabetexampleinordertoillustratethebasicdifferencesinthefunda-mentalpropertiesoftheatoms–schEma,“shape,”taxis,“array,order,”andthesis,“posture,tilt.”SincetheGreekwordforletter,stoicheion,istheonethatisultimatelyadopted(clearlybyPlato’stime)asthetermformetaphysicalelements,andDemocrituspre-eminentlyandfamouslyhasametaphysicsofelements,thereisnoreasontodoubtthattheexampleAristotleusedcamefromDemocritushimself.Andoncethisconnectionismade,itisdifficulttoresistthefurtherinferencethatDemocritus’choiceofthealphabetexamplemadeitpossibleforhimalsotoillustratethedistinctionwhich,asIarguedabove(pp.67–9),isabsolutelyessentialforformu-latingthedoctrineofdualpluralitiesandinfinities:thedistinctionbetweentypesandtokens.Justastheletteralphacanrefereithertoatokenortoatype,sotoo“cube”canrefereithertoaparticularatomortoatypeofatomicshape.And,morebroadly,ideaimaybeeithertypesofatomicshapeoratomsviewedindividually,tokenatoms(seeabove,p.70).OnemaywonderwhetherthereisahistoricalchainthatbindsGalen’suseofthetype–tokendistinctionwithitscounterpartinPeirce.Inthecaseoftheancients,atanyrate,thereisgoodreasontosupposethatwedohavesuchachain.ItslaterlinksshowupinGalenandSyrianus;itcertainlyrunsthroughAristotle;anditsstartandmooringisinDemocritus.DemocritusandPlatoThedomainofinfinitelyvarioustypesofshapepositedbyDemocrituscouldwellbeenvisagedasanenormousupsidedowntypologicaltree,withprodigiousbranchingsandsub-branchings–ineffect,ahierarchicalinventoryofallpossibleshapes,theentiretyoftheconceptualmatrixofshape.Naturally,oneisdrawntoacomparisonwiththePlatonicuniverseofideai,“forms.”ThatuniverseisvastlygreaterincompassthanDemocritus’inventoryofthetotalityofideai,“shapes.”Nonetheless,thespecialregionofPlato’sidealuniversewhichisallocatedtoshapehasexactlythesamecontentandlogicalstructureasDemocritus’hierarchicalinventory.Plato’sgrandmetaphorintheSophistofabattlebetween“theGodsandtheGiants”(theidealistfriendsoftheFormsandthematerialists,246a–c),hasgivenrisetosimplistic,almosthackneyed,contrastingofDemocritusandPlatoinhistoriesofphilosophy.Andyet,asissuggestedbytheremarkablefactthatthetermideaplaysakeyroleinthesystemofbothphilosophers,therearealsostrikingaffinities,bothon31.Thealternative,thathemighthaveintuitivelyassumedsomeversionofnominalism,isquiteunlikely.FortherewouldhavebeenlittlepointinDemocritus’insistenceontheactualinfinityofshape-typesifallhepositedaspresentinrealityweregrossresemblancesbetweenatom-tokens.72ACTC047220/03/2006,03:59PM\ntheconceptoftheuniversalthethemeoftheimportanceofformasstructureorshape(Mourelatos,1984)and–asthepresentstudyhassoughttodemonstrate–intheirrespectiveapproachestothe32conceptoftheuniversal.Tobesure,therearealsoradicalandstarkdifferences.WhatforPlatoisauniverseofidealpossibilities(e.g.,allthepossibleshapes)isforDemocritusanactualuniverseofrealizedatomicshapes.ForitwouldberemissofusnottonoticethattheexuberantapplicationoftheoumallonargumenthastheeffectofmakingDemocritusanadherentnotonlytothePrincipleofSufficientReasonbutalsotoLovejoy’saptlynamedPrincipleofPlenitude(1936,p.52,andgenerallych.2).Otheradherentstothissecondprinciplewouldfinditsufficienttopositthatallpossibilitiesshouldberealizedeventually,ininfinitetime.Democritus,bycontrast,wouldhavetoinsistthatallpossibilitiesarerealizedateverymoment–ifthewholeofthespatiallyinfiniteuniverseistakenintoconsideration.Anyofthetypesofatomicshapeswhichatsomeparticulartimearerepresentedbynotokensatallinsomeparticularkosmos,“worldstructure”(e.g.,ourworld,hereandnow)aresorepresentedatthatsametimeinotherkosmoi–elsewhere33intheinfiniteexpanseofthevoid.SinceDemocritusnotonlyoutlivedSocratesbutmayhavestillbeenactivephilo-sophicallyintothefirsttenortwentyyearsofPlato’sphilosophicalcareer,thetrenchantsayinginB165(“Maniswhatweallknow”)mayhavealsoservedasavehicleforconveyingthedifferenceDemocritushimselfperceivedbetweenhisconceptoftype–and,morepointedly,ofidea,“shape,”asatype–andthemoreexaltedconceptofthePlatonicideaasasublimeexemplar.Thecrucialpointinthepresentaccountisthat,sofarasthelogicoftheconceptoftheuniversalisconcerned,PlatowouldnothavehadtoteachDemocritusmuch–certainlynotwhathepresentsSocratesasexplainingtoMenoaboutthelogicof34shape.32.Foraffinitiesontopicsotherthantheonestakenupinthepresentstudy,seePaneris(1984,esp.pp.80–1);alsoNikolaou(1998,esp.pp.140–52).33.SeeTaylor(1999,pp.94,96,197).Forthedistinctionbetweenkosmosanduniverse(topan),seeFurley(1987,p.136).34.AnearlyversionofthischapterwaspresentedinNovember2000inModernGreektotheAcademyofAthens,andlaterasalectureattheUniversityofCrete(Rethimno),andattheUniversityofPatras.TheGreektextwaspublishedin2002intheProceedingsoftheAcademyofAthens:Mourelatos(2000).Englishversionsearlierthanthepresentonewerereadat:theUniversityofAarhus,Denmark;theUniversityofEdinburgh;theTwenty-FourthAnnualAncientPhilosophyWorkshop,FloridaStateUniversity;TexasA&MUniversity;CentralEuropeanUniversity,Hungary;theUniversityofUtrecht;theCenterforHellenicStudies,Wash-ington,DC;andMarquetteUniversity.IamdeeplygratefultoDr.JohannaSeibtofAarhusUniversityforhereleganttranslationofthepenultimateEnglishversion,underthetitle“VorplatonischeZugängezumUniversalienbegriff,”whichmadeitpossibleformealsotopresenttheworkinOctober2003attheUniversityofBern,Switzerland,andattheFreieUniversitätBerlin.–Isincerelythankthesponsorsoftheeventslistedabove,andIamindebtedtotherespectiveaudiencesforcommentsandsuggestionsthathaveresultedinsignificantimprove-mentsinthetextpublishedhere.IwishtoacknowledgeinparticularsuggestionsbyDr.GianluigiSegalerbaandDr.GeraldBechtle,bothoftheUniversityofBern.73ACTC047320/03/2006,03:59PM\nalexanderp.d.mourelatosBibliographyWorksCitedAllen,R.E.(1983).Plato’sParmenides:TranslationandAnalysis.Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress.Annas,J.(1976).Aristotle’sMetaphysics:BooksMandN.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Armstrong,D.M.(1989).Universals:AnOpinionatedIntroduction.Boulder/London:WestviewPress.Audi,R.(ed.).(1995).TheCambridgeDictionaryofPhilosophy.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Bächli,A.andGraeser,A.(2000).GrundbegriffederantikenPhilosophie:einLexikon.Stuttgart:PhilippReclam.Barnes,J.(1979).ThePresocraticPhilosophers.(2vols.).London:Routledge&KeganPaul.Brentlinger,J.(1972).“IncompletePredicatesandtheTwo-WorldTheoryofthePhaedo.”Phronesis,17,61–79.Burkert,W.(1972).LoreandScienceinAncientPythagoreanism(trans.E.L.Minar,Jr.).Cam-bridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.Originalwork(1962)WeisheitundWissenschaft:StudienzuPythagoras,PhilolaosundPlaton.Nürnberg:VerlagHansCarl.Diels,H.(1951–2).(CitedasDK).DieFragmentederVorsokratiker.(3vols.).6thedn.RevisedbyW.Kranz,withseveralsubsequentreprintings.Berlin:Weidmann.Originalwork,byDielsalone,published1903.Furley,D.J.(1976).“AnaxagorasinResponsetoParmenides.”InR.A.ShinerandJ.King-Farlow(eds.),NewEssaysonPlatoandthePre-Socratics[=CanadianJournalofPhilosophy,suppl.vol.2](pp.61–85).Guelph,Ontario:CanadianAssociationforPublishinginPhilosophy.——.(1987).TheGreekCosmologists:TheFormationoftheAtomicTheoryandItsEarliestCritics.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Galen.ClaudiiGaleniOperaomnia.MedicorumGraecorumoperaquaeextant,C.G.Kühn(ed.)(20vols.).Leipzig1821–33.Repr.Hildesheim:Olms,1964–5–Demethodomedendiinvol.X(1825),repr.1965;pseudo-GalenDefinitionesmedicaeinvol.XIX(1830),repr.1965.Hankinson,R.J.(1991).Galen,OntheTherapeuticMethod,BooksIandII:TranslatedwithanIntroductionandCommentary.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Heidel,W.A.(1906).“QualitativeChangeinPre-SocraticPhilosophy.”ArchivfürGeschichtederPhilosophie,19,333–79.Repr.withtheoriginalpaginationinW.A.Heidel,SelectedPapers,ed.LeonardoTarán.NewYork/London:Garland,1980.Inabridgedversionrepr.inMourelatos(1974),pp.86–95.Huffman,C.(1993).PhilolausofCroton,PythagoreanandPresocratic:ACommentaryontheFragmentsandTestimoniawithInterpretiveEssays.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Kahn,C.H.(1973).TheVerb‘be’inAncientGreek.FoundationsofLanguage,suppl.series,16.Dordrecht:D.Reidel.Repr.withanewintroductoryessay,Indianapolis:Hackett,2003.Kraut,R.(ed.).(1992).TheCambridgeCompaniontoPlato.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Lovejoy,A.O.(1936).TheGreatChainofBeing.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.(Repr.1964).McKirahan,R.D.,Jr.(1994).PhilosophybeforeSocrates:AnIntroductionwithTextsandCommentary.Indianapolis:Hackett.Meinwald,C.C.(1992).“Good-byetotheThirdMan.”InR.Kraut(ed.),TheCambridgeCompaniontoPlato(pp.365–96).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Moline,J.(1981).Plato’sTheoryofUnderstanding.Madison,Wisc.:UniversityofWisconsinPress.Mourelatos,A.P.D.(1973).“Heraclitus,Parmenides,andtheNaïveMetaphysicsofThings.”InE.N.Lee,A.P.D.Mourelatos,andR.M.Rorty(eds.),ExegesisandArgument:StudiesinGreek74ACTC047420/03/2006,03:59PM\ntheconceptoftheuniversalPhilosophyPresentedtoGregoryVlastos.[=Phronesis,suppl.vol.1](pp.16–48).Assen:RoyalvanGorcum/NewYork:HumanitiesPress.——.(ed.).(1974).ThePre-Socratics:ACollectionofCriticalEssays.GardenCity,NY:AnchorPress/Doubleday.Repr.withnewintroduction,Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1993.——.(1984).“Dhimókritos:filósofostismorfís”[Democritus:PhilosopherofForm].InProceed-ingsoftheFirstInternationalCongressonDemocritus.(2vols.)(vol.1:pp.109–19,Englishsummary,pp.118–19).Xanthi:InternationalDemocriteanFoundation.——.(2000).“Iaparkhyéstisfilosofikyíséniastoukatholou”[BeginningsofthePhilosophicalConceptoftheUniversal].PraktikátisAkadhimíasAthinón[ProceedingsoftheAcademyofAthens],75,509–25[issuedin2002;Englishsummary,p.526].——.(2003).“DemocritusontheDistinctionbetweenUniversalsandParticulars.”InA.BächliandK.Peter(eds.),Monism(FestschriftforAndreasGraeser)(pp.43–56).PhilosophischeAnalyse,9.Frankfurt:OntosVerlag.——.(2005).“IntrinsicandRelationalPropertiesintheDemocriteanOntology.”InR.Salles(ed.),Metaphysics,SoulandEthics:ThemesfromtheWorkofRichardSorabji(pp.39–63).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Nehamas,A.(1975).“ConfusingUniversalsandParticularsinPlato’sEarlyDialogues.”ReviewofMetaphysics,29,287–306[quotedherefromitsreprintingasch.8inNehamas(1999),pp.159–75].——.(1999).VirtuesofAuthenticity:EssaysonPlatoandSocrates.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.Nikolaou,S.-M.(1998).DieAtomlehreDemokritsundPlatonsTimaios:einevergleichendeUntersuchung.BeiträgezurAltertumskunde,112.Stuttgart:Teubner.Paneris,I.P.(1984).IkosmologhyíatouPlátonaseschyésimetinatomikyítheoríatouDhimókritou[Plato’sCosmologyinRelationtotheAtomicTheoryofDemocritus].Xanthi:InternationalDemocriteanFoundation.Peirce,C.S.(1931–60).CollectedPapers.EditedbyC.HartshorneandP.Weiss(8vols.in5).Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.——.(1998).TheEssentialPeirce.EditedbythePeirceProject(2vols.).Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress.Prauss,G.(1966).PlatonundderlogischeEleatismus.Berlin:deGruyter.Segalerba,G.(2001).NotesuOusia:volumeprimo.Florence:EdizioniETS.——.(2003).“NumerischeEinheitalsontologischesKriterium:zurUnterscheidungderEntitätenbeiAristoteles.”WienerJahrbuchfürPhilosophie,35,59–96.Stückelberger,A.(1979).AntikeAtomphysik.Munich:Heimeran.Syrianus.SyrianiinMetaphysicaCommentaria.G.Kroll(ed.)(1902).CAG,6.Berlin:Reimer.Taylor,C.C.W.(1999).TheAtomists,LeucippusandDemocritus:Fragments,aTextandTranslationwithaCommentary.Phoenixsuppl.vol.36(=PhoenixPresocratics,5).Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress.FurtherReadingClear,concise,andphilosophicallyengagedgeneralintroductiontothetopicofuniversals:Armstrong(1989).Excellentsurveyofallofpre-Socraticphilosophy:McKirahan(1994).Accountsofpre-Aristotelianandpre-Platonicconceptionsofqualityandofchange(cf.“hybridcategory,”above):Heidel(1906);Mourelatos(1973).Animportantalternativeaccountofthepre-Aristotelianbackground:Mann,W.-R.(2000).TheDiscoveryofThings:Aristotle’sCategoriesandTheirContext.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.75ACTC047520/03/2006,03:59PM\nalexanderp.d.mourelatosTheconceptoftheuniversalinPlato’sSocraticdialogues:Nehamas(1975,1999).Fullergeneralstudiesofthethreepre-Socraticsdiscussedabove:•PhilolausandthePythagoreans:Huffman(1993).•Empedocles:Inwood,B.(1992).ThePoemofEmpedocles:ATextandTranslationwithanIntro-duction.Phoenixsuppl.vol.29(=PhoenixPresocratics,3).Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress.Revisededition2001.•Democritus:Taylor(1999).DetailsonthetextualevidencefortheinterpretationofDemocritusofferedhere:Mourelatos(2003).76ACTC047620/03/2006,03:59PM\nthesophisticmovement5TheSophisticMovementRACHELBARNEYIntroduction“Iknowfewcharactersinhistorywhohavebeensohardlydealtwithastheseso-calledSophists”,saysanindignantGeorgeGroteinhismonumentalHistoryofGreece(Grote,1872,p.43).Thesophistshereferstoareaninfluentialgroupofteachers,intellectuals,andauthorsoffifth-century(bce)Greece;the“so-called”registersaprotestagainstwhatGrotearguesisanunfairlypejorativelabel.Thoughassociatedwiththewordsforwisdom(sophia)andwiseman(sophos),andoriginallymeaningsimplyanexpertorteacher,sophistEshadbeguntotakeonconnotationsofintellec-tualdeviousnessalreadyinthefifthcentury–atrendpowerfullyreinforcedbyPlato’slargelyunsympatheticportrayal(cf.Guthrie,1969,pp.27–34).Forourpurposes,“thesophists”willsimplypickoutagroupoffifth-centuryteachersandthinkerswhoweresolabeledinantiquity,andwhosepracticesandideasseemtooverlapinimportantways;theyincludeProtagoras,Gorgias,Hippias,Prodicus,andAntiphon,1and,insomerespects,Socrates.Sinceourconcerniswiththeirideas,thegroupwillalsoincludetheunidentifiableauthorsofsomekindredanonymoustexts(theDissoiLogoi,theAnonymusIamblichi);andlightcanalsobeshedonsophisticideasbypassagesinothercontemporaryauthorssuchasDemocritus,EuripidesandThucydides.Infact,theremaybelittlepointintryingtoseparateoffsophisticideasfromthebroaderintellectualcurrentsoftheirera–the“Fifth-CenturyEnlightenment”,asithassuggestivelybeencalled.Perhapsthatisthehallmarkofasuccessfulintellectualmovement.1.BesidesSocrates,ofwhommorelater,themostquestionablenamehereisGorgias,whowasfirstandforemostarhEtorikos,arhetoricianorteacherofpublicspeaking.Ihereassumethat“rhetorician”and“sophist”areoverlappingcategories(cf.Plato,Grg.465c,520a–b).Bothprofessedpublicspeaking:thedifferencewouldperhapsbethatasophisttaughtrhetoricalskillsnotsimplyassuch,butinthecontextoftheorizingaboutlanguage,ethics,andpolitics.ThedivisionoflabormightbeepitomizedbythefactthatGorgiasservedasanambassadortoAthensfromhishomecityofLeontini(DK82A4),whileProtagorasdraftedlawsforthecolonyofThurii(DK80A1).Ontheotherhand,itwouldbewrongtoassumethatGorgiasasarhetoricianlackedtheoreticalinterests,inlightofhisOnNotBeing(discussedbelow).ThestrongestargumentforexcludingGorgiasisthatinPlato’sMeno,heissaidnottoundertaketomakemenvirtuous,astandardfeatureofsophisticteaching,andtoscoffatthosewhodo(95c;butcf.DK82A8b).77ACTC057720/03/2006,03:59PM\nrachelbarneyThatthesophistshavebeendeprivedoftheirdueisatruismoddlyundisturbedbyscholarlyprogressandthepassageoftime:itcanbefoundinHegel’sLecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy(1840)andinGeorgeKerferd’sTheSophisticMovement(1981a),whichbeginsbyaskingwhythesignificanceofthesophists“hasbeensounderrateduptonow”(p.3).Thereasonisperhapsthateverydefenderofthesophistshassoughttorehabilitatesomethingdifferent.ForGrote,theyareaboveallprofessionalteachers,addingprogressiveinsightstothemainstreammoralityoftheday.Nietzsche,denounc-ingGrote’sreadingasawhitewash,presentsthemassubversivemoralcriticsafterhisownheart:“theypostulatethefirsttruththata‘morality-in-itself’,a‘good-in-itself’donotexist,thatitisaswindletotalkof‘truth’inthisfield”(Nietzsche,1968,p.233).Ifthereisanyconsensustobefoundamongtheirdefenders(andtheirenemiesaswell),itistheconstantlymutatingviewthatthesophistsareourcontemporaries–whetherthatmakesthemEnlightenmentrationalists,eminentVictorians,cynicalfindesiècle2perspectivists,analyticmoralphilosophers,or,mostrecentlyofall,postmodernists.ThisRorschachqualityisunlikelyevertodisappear,fortherearespecialbarrierstoanauthenticallyhistoricalgraspofthesophisticmovement.OneistheloomingshadowofPlato.Platodepictssophistsmemorablyinanumberofdialogues,includingtheProtagoras,Gorgias,HippiasMajorandMinor,RepublicandEuthydemus,andhedevotestheSophisttodefiningthebeast.Butallofthistestimonyisproblematic–notonlybecauseofPlato’snotorioushostilitytothesophists,whichhassometimesbeenoverstatedbyscholars(cf.Grote,1872and1865;andIrwin,1995),butbecausehisevidenceisinconsistent.Forinstance,thesophistsoftheSophistandEuthydemusarespecialistsinquestion-and-answerrefutation,thoseoftheProtagorasinlongspeeches.Moreover,thedialogueform,withitsrelianceonindividualcharacters,makestheextrapolationofgeneralclaimsproblematicinanycase:ifHippiasisconsistentlyrepresentedbyPlatoasanitwit,doesthattellussomethingaboutthesophisticmove-ment,orjustaboutHippias?IsCalliclesintheGorgiasacanonicalrepresentativeofsophisticthought,asNietzscheclearlyassumed;orishejustaferal(andquitepossiblyfictional)politicianwhohappenstobefriendswithGorgias?Ourotherevidenceforsophisticthoughtisscatteredanduneven.Afewbriefbutcompletesophistictextshavesurvived–thoughalasnothingbyProtagoras,theseniorandmostcelebratedmemberoftheprofession–includingseveralbyGorgias.Sohaveanumberofinformative“fragments”:thetermisstandardlyusedforanyreliable-lookingquotationfoundinalaterauthor,butwealsohavesomeactualscrapsofpapyruscontainingsubstantialpassagesfromAntiphon’sbookOnTruth.However,muchofthisdirectevidenceisobscureorhardtointerpret;andtakenasawhole,ourevidenceraisestwocentralpuzzles.OneiswhatIwillcalltheproblemoftheory:towhatextentwerethesophistsengagedinofferingwhatwouldlaterbetermeddogmata,i.e.,doctrinesortheories?Scholarshaveoftenspokenof“sophisticethics”,takingthesophiststohaveofferedoverlappingifnotidenticalpositionsonquestionssuchasrelativism,thenatureofjusticeandwhethervirtuecanbetaught.Butthe2.ThefirstthreearesomewhatcaricaturedreferencestothereadingsofHegel,Grote,andNietzscherespectively.Forthesophistsas(againtooversimplify)analyticmoralphilosophers,seeBarnes(1982);forpostmodernists,Fish(1989)andJarratt(1991).78ACTC057820/03/2006,03:59PM\nthesophisticmovementattributionofdogmatatothesophistscanbeaslipperybusiness.Forinstance,whenThrasymachusinPlato’sRepublicclaimsthat“Justiceistheadvantageofthestronger”(339a),ishegivingarevisionistdefinitionofjustice,ormerelydebunkingjusticeascommonlyunderstood?Andinanycase,doeshemeanwhathesays?PressedbySocrates,heresponds,“Whatdifferencedoesitmaketoyou,whetherIbelieveitor3not?Aren’tyourefutingmyaccount?”(Rep.I,349a).Thesophist’sclaimsare,itseems,offerednottoexpressconviction,butforthesakeofprofessionaldisplay–andformoney(337d).Ofoursurvivingtexts,Gorgias’OnNotBeingpresentsadeadpansystematicargumentthatnothingexists;theanonymousDissoiLogoiarguesonbothsidesofvarioustopics.Onewayoranother,astartlinglyhighproportionofsophistictextseludeconfidentinterpretationasdogmata:Iwillconsiderlateronwhatwemightmakeofthisfact.Asecondpuzzleraisedbyourevidenceisthequestionofunity.Didthesophistsreallyshareacommonintellectualproject,withdistinctiveprojectsandpositions?Thesharedlabel“sophist”isnoguaranteeofacommonnature.RecentscholarshiphaslargelyfollowedGroteininsistingonthediversityofsophisticthought;andRichardBetthasarguedthatthecommonalityrevealedbyourtextsisreallyjustoneofattitude:“WhatunitestheSophistsintheareaofethics,Isuggest,isnotsomuchanyparticularviewstheyhold...butratheracertaintypeofattitudeorapproach....Thisattitudeorapproachwemightcall‘naturalistic’,orperhaps,moreambitiously,‘socialscientific’”(2002,pp.254–5;cf.Guthrie’s“empiricism,”1969,pp.8–9,47).Thesophistswerecollectivelyinterestedinthehumanandsocialrealm;theirideasweresupportedbyobservationofthephenomenaandbyrationalargument,ratherthantradition,inspirationorauthority;butincontentthoseideaswereenormouslydiverse.Iwilltrytomakethecasefortwosomewhatstrongerkindsofunity.First,sophisticthoughtismarkednotmerelybyacommonintellectualapproachbutbyasharedagendaorsetofproblems.Whetherthetopicisjustice,religion,orgrammar,thesophistsareconcernedtodisentanglethecontributionofthesubjectiveandthesociallyconstructedfromthenaturalorobjective,andtoworkouttheimplicationsofthatanalysis.Atthesametime–andthisisthesecondpoint–thissharedprojectdoesnotentailshareddogmata;ifanything,sophisticphilosophizingtendstomeanphilosophiz-inginacritical,self-undermining,orotherwiselessthandogmaticway.Afterabriefsketchofsophisticinterestsandmethods,Iwilldiscussthreecentralandoverlappingthemes:thedistinctionbetweennatureandconvention,particularlyasappliedtojustice;variability,relativity,andqualifiedtruthinethics;andtherelationoflanguagetoreality.Thiswillnotadduptoacomprehensiveoverviewofsophisticthought,andreadersarereferredtothelongertreatmentsofKerferd(1981a,b)andGuthrie(1969)forfullerandmorehistoricallydetailedaccounts.Readersarealsowarnedthatfewifanygeneralclaimsaboutthesophists,orreadingsofparticularsophistictexts,areuncontroversial,andIcannotheredocumentallthepointsatwhichscholarlyopiniondiffers.Myaimismerelytobringouttherangeandlivelinessofsophisticdebate,andthecomplexitiesofsomestill-underappreciatedtexts.3.QuotationsfromPlatoarefromtheversionsbyvarioustranslatorsinCooper(1997),oftenwithsomerevisions.79ACTC057920/03/2006,03:59PM\nrachelbarneySophisticThought:ScopeandMethodsAstandarddefinitionofasophist,bothinantiquityandamongmodernscholars,isasaprofessionalteacherofvirtueorexcellence(aretE)(cf.Plato,Ap.19d–20c);butjustwhatthisinvolvesisnotsoobvious.InPlato’sProtagoras,Protagorasclaimstoteach“goodjudgment”andthesuccessfulmanagementofbothdomesticandpublicaffairs(318e–319a).Meno,apparentlyfollowingGorgias,saysinPlato’sMenothataman’svirtueistomanagepublicaffairssoastobenefithisfriendsandharmhisenemies(71e);or,insum,“toruleoverpeople”(73c–d).AndMenoinsiststhatthevirtueofawomanisdifferent,asisthatofaboyorslave.SoaretEevidentlyconsistsintheskillsandaptitudesthatenablesomeonetofulfillhisorhersocialrole.This“functional”conceptionofvirtueisadeeplytraditionalone:thearetEoftheHomericwarriorcon-sistedintraitssuchasstrength,courage,andintelligence,whichmadeamanexcelindeliberationsandonthebattlefield.InthelaterworldofdemocraticAthens,wheretheprimaryarenaofcompetitionforambitiousgentlemenisnotwarbutpolitics,aretEfunctionallyunderstoodcomestoconsistaboveallintheartofpublicspeaking.Foritistheabilitytopersuadeone’sfellowcitizens,gatheredenmasseintheAssemblyorcourts,thatenablesamantosuccessfullywieldpoliticalpower.Butthisisonlyonestrandofthecomplexmoraltraditionwhichthesophistsinherit.EveninHomer’sworld,self-restraint,reverence,andanacceptanceofone’slimita-tionsareimportantnormsofcharacter;andHesiod’sWorksandDays,theotherpillarofearlyGreekmoralthought,centersonthevirtueofjustice,understoodintermsofhonesty,fairdealing,andrefrainingfromwhatbelongstoothers.Muchofthelivelinessoffifth-andfourth-centurymoralthoughtcomesfromtheattemptsofvariousGreekthinkerstoreconcileornegotiatebetweenthefunctionalandtheHesiodicconceptionsofvirtue(cf.Adkins,1960).Theelitepoliticalskillstaughtbythesophistsgenerallysoundmuchmoreliketheformer;butwhethertheclaimsoftheHesiodicvirtuescouldbedeniedorreinterpretedwasaquestiontheycouldnotaffordtoignore.Theotheringredientsofasophisticeducationwerevariable.Traditionally,thesophistshavebeenseenasspecialistsinethicsandpolitics,contrastedwiththe“pre-Socratic”philosopherswhoinvestigatedthenatureandoriginsofthecosmos.Buttheevidenceagainstthisstereotypedcontrastisstrong.SophistslikeAntiphonandHippiashadviewsonmathematicsandnaturalscience,while“pre-Socratics”likeDemocrituswroteworksofethicsandliterarycriticism(cf.Kerferd,1981a,pp.38–41).Plato’sProtagorassnipesatcompetitorslikeHippiasfordraggingyoungmen“intosubjectsthelikesofwhichtheyhaveescapedfromatschool,”includingarithmetic,astronomy,geometry,andmusic(Prt.318e).Sosophisticinterestswerebroad,andcurriculumdesignamatterofdebate.Diversitywasalsocharacteristicofsophisticintellectualpractices,andbreadthitselfwashighlyvalued.Hippiaswasafamouspolymath(Plato,Hp.Ma.285b–286b,Hp.Mi.368b–d),andGorgiasboastedofbeingabletoansweranyquestionimpromptu(Plato,Grg.447d–448a).Plato’sdialoguespresentvividdepictionsofthesophistsastravelingpolymathsandpundits,earningtheirkeepnotonlywithprivatelessonsbutthroughpublicdisplaysofmemorizationandmoralisticoratory,brilliantflightsofliteraryinterpretation,andcombativerefutationsathouseparties.80ACTC058020/03/2006,03:59PM\nthesophisticmovementThreetermsrecurinoursourcesinrelationtosophisticdiscourse:eristic,makrologia,4andantilogikE.Eristic(fromerizein,“strive”or“quarrel”)isapejorativetermforwhatwemightmoreneutrallycallsophisticrefutation.ItspracticeisdepictedinPlato’sEuthydemus,andiscentraltohisdefinitionoftheprofessionintheSophist(268b–d);itisalsoanalyzedbyAristotleinhisSophisticalRefutations.Itisasortofintellectualmartialartfortwoplayers,whotakeonwell-definedrolesofquestionerandrespondent.Therespondentaffirmssomethesis;thequestionerattemptstoleadhimintoaffirmingitscontradictory.Fallaciousinferences(oratanyratewhatwe,andAristotle,wouldregardassuch)runrampant,andthequestionersometimesusestacticstowhichtherespondentobjects(Euthd.295bff.,Prt.331c–e,334e–335a)–eristicseemstohavebeenoneofthosegamesinwhichwranglingabouttherulesispartofthefun.ForPlato,theorientationoferistictovictoryatallcosts,ratherthanthetruth,ismorallyrepellent,andrepresentsadeepdivisionbetweenSocratesandthesophists:butasapracticeofquestion-and-answerrefutationthroughcontradiction,eristicisformallyindistinguishablefromtheelenchus,Socrates’standardmodeofargumentinPlato’searlydialogues.AccordingtoDiogenesLaertius,Protagoraswasthefirsttointroduce“Socratic-style”argument(DK80A1);andPlato’sProtagorasshowsProtagoraspro-ducinganelegantelenchusoftheyoungerSocrates(339b–e).SoSocrates’elenchuswaslikelyanadaptationofsophistic,andperhapsspecificallyProtagoreanpractice.Tomodernreaders,ancientreferencestoSocratesasasophistseembizarre,givenPlato’sinsistenceonhisdistinctivemoralmission,hiscommitmenttothetruth,andhis5refusaltoteachformoney.ButlikeProtagorasandtheothers,Socratesoccupiedhimselfbydiscoursingonvirtueandpractisingtheartofrefutation;hisdistinctivefeaturesmightwellhavebeenlessvisibletohisfellowcitizens.Theextenttowhichthesophistsmight,likeSocrates,haveusedtheirtechniquesofrefutationforseriousphilosophicalpurposesisnowimpossibletogauge.Makrologia,whichsimplymeansspeakingatlength,issaidbySocratesintheProtagorastobedistinctiveofProtagorasandbeyondhisowncapacities(334d–336b).InfacttheProtagorasitselfshowsSocratesmakingalongspeechonSimonides,butcertainlytheset-piecespeechisacharacteristicsophisticmode.ExampleswhichhavesurvivedwouldincludeProdicus’ChoiceofHeracles(DK84B2),Protagoras’“GreatSpeech”intheProtagoras,andGorgias’Helen,DefenseofPalamedes,OnNotBeingandFuneralOration.Gorgias’textsareusuallyclassedasrhetoricalepideixeisordisplaypieces;whetherandhowweshoulddistinguishbetweensophisticmakrologiaandrhetoricalepideixisisunclear.Thethirdgenre,antilogikE,“opposedargument,”isonewithdeeprootsinGreekculture.AntitheticalargumentscanbefoundintheIliadandinGreektragedy;theywereofcoursestandardintheAssemblyandlawcourts,andaresatirizedbyAristophanes–mostnotablyinhisClouds,inthecombatoftheJustandtheUnjustSpeech.Asasophisticspeciality,antilogikEisparticularlyassociatedwithProtagoras,4.Themeaningsofthesetermsareallcontested;IcarveupthesophisticgenressomewhatdifferentlyfromeitherKerferd(1981a,pp.59–67)orNehamas(1990).5.Socratesisofcoursedepictedassophist(andphusikos)parexcellenceinAristophanes’Clouds(seeMorrison,socrates,inthisvolume);cf.theoratorAeschines(InTim.173)andKerferd(1981a,pp.55–7).81ACTC058120/03/2006,03:59PM\nrachelbarneywhowassaidtohavewrittenbooksofAntilogiai(DK80A1)andtohavebeenthefirsttoclaimthatoneveryquestiontherearetwoargumentsopposedtoeachother(DK80B6;cf.Sph.232d–e).TheDissoiLogoi(“DoubleArguments”)putsintopracticethisProtagoreanprinciple;sodotheTetralogiesofAntiphon,whicharguebothsidesofthreehypotheticallegalcases.Aswitheristic,muchremainstobeunderstoodabouthow“antilogic”issupposedtofunction:inparticular,whetheritshouldbeseenaspurelyagymnasticexerciseorsomethingmore,andwhetheritdependsonparticularviewsaboutthenatureoftruth.AfurtherquestioniswhetherweshouldviewantilogikEasagenreinitselforassomethingwhichmighttakeanumberofforms.Eristicrefuta-tionperformedonbothsidesofaquestionwouldpresumablycountasantilogikE;soperhapsshouldepideixeissuchasGorgias’HelenandOnNotBeing,defensesofthepatentlyindefensibleforwhichtheobviousothersideofthecasecanbeleftunspoken.Thesedifferentsophisticpracticeshavesomecommonfeatures.Allareverbalinnature,andinvolveproseratherthanverse;most(andmostobviouslyeristic)seemtohavebeenoriginallyandprimarilyoralratherthanwrittengenres.Allareexplicitlyorimplicitlyagonisticorcompetitive.ScholarssinceBurckhardtandNietzschehavenotedthepervasivelyagonisticstyleofancientGreekculture:thesophistsbelongedtoaworldinwhichintellectuals,poets,andpoliticianswereasmuchcompetitivepublicperformersastheOlympicathletes(cf.Guthrie,1969,pp.41–4).Finally,andinpartasaresultofthisagonisticstance,thecharacteristicsophisticgenresallhaveanuneasyrelationtotruthandbelief.AntilogikEanderisticarebothindifferenttothecontentofthethesisunderdiscussion.Longspeechescanexpressconviction,ofcourse,buttherecognitionofmakrologiaorepideixisasamodeofcompetitivedisplayshouldwarnusagainstanyassumptionthatsophisticspeecheswilldoso.Thisisoneofthereasonsitwillbeeasiertoextractthemesandargumentsthandogmatafromsophistictexts.Justice,Nature,andConventionOurmostimportantsurvivingtextforunderstandingsophisticmoralthoughtisprobablyAntiphon’sOnTruth.Threesubstantialpapyrusfragmentshavecomedowntous,eachmakinganimportantargument;theirorder,unfortunately,cannotbe6known.Onebrieffragmentclaimsthatethnocentricbiasmisleadsus:“[thelawsofnearbycommunities]weknowandrespect,butthoseofcommunitiesfarawayweneitherknownorrespect.Inthiswehavebecomebarbaroustoeachother,whenbynature(phusis)weareallatbirthinallrespectsequallyadaptedtobeingeitherbarbariansorGreeks”(F44(b),II.1–15).Greekandbarbarian(i.e.,literally,non-Greekspeaker,6.SeePendrick(2002,pp.315–18).Antiphon’sfragmentsarecitedbyPendrick’snumeration.TranslationsarebasedonbothPendrickandGagarinandWoodruff(1995),withrevisions;translationsofothersophistictextsarefromthelatter,withrevisions,unlessotherwisenoted.TherehasbeenmuchscholarlydebateoverhowmanyAntiphonstherewere,andinparticularwhetherthesophistwhowroteOnTruthistobeidentifiedwiththeoligarchicAthenianpoliticianAntiphonofRhamnus:seePendrick(2002,pp.1–26).82ACTC058220/03/2006,03:59PM\nthesophisticmovementthoughthetermisoftenpejorative)shareauniversalnature:“Forweallbreathetheairthroughourmouthandnostrils,andwelaughwhenwearepleasedandweepwhenwearepained”(II.27–III.3).Notetheapparentlyself-underminingformoftheargument:theaccusationthat“wehavebecomebarbarous”reliesonthepejorativeconnotationsof“barbarian”whichtheargumentitselfundermines.Presumablythepointistostartleusintoreflectiononhow,ifatall,theterm“barbarian”shouldbeused.ThiscontrastbetweenthegivenandtheartificialreceivesfullerdevelopmentinthelongestfragmentofOnTruth(F44(a)),whichappliesittojustice.Thepassagebeginswithanaffirmationofconventionalismaboutjustice(notitselfanuncommonorthreateningview,cf.SocratesinXenophonMem.4.4.12).“Thusjustice(dikaiosunE)isnotviolatingtherules(nomima)ofthecityinwhichoneisacitizen”(F44(a),I.5–11).Theupshotimmediatelyfollows:“Thusapersonwouldbestusejusticetohisownadvantageifheconsideredthelaws(nomoi)importantwhenwitnessesarepresent,buttheconsequencesofnature(phusis)importantintheabsenceofwitnesses”(I.12–23).For,Antiphonexplains,legalrequirementsaremerelyamatterofagreement,andviolationsofthemmaygounpunished;“buttherequirementsofnaturearenecessary”(I.25–27),andactionsagainstthemareself-defeating.Andthetwoarenotjustdistinctbutopposed:“mostthingsthatarejustaccordingtolawareinimicaltonature”(II.26–30).Thethingsadvantageoustonatureturnouttoincludelifeitselfandpleasure;thenatural,equatedasinF44(b)withthephysiologicallyandpsycho-logicallygiven,pointsustowardsasimplehedonism.Theconceptionofhumannaturehereassumedcanplausiblybefilledoutfromsomekindredsources,includingCallicles,Thrasymachus,andGlauconinPlato,and7certainspeechesinThucydides.Humannatureisegoisticandpleonectic:webynaturestrivetohavemore(pleonechein)ofthegood,understoodaswealthandpowerandthepleasurestheycanprovide.Naturalhumanbehavioristhusredintoothandclaw;butsinceunbridledpleonexiawoulddomostofusmoreharmthangood,eachcommunityhasadoptednomoi,lawsandmoralconventions,torestrainandpunishit.(Nomosmeansboth“law”andsocialandmoral“convention”;indeed,aswewillsee,insometextsitextendsmorewidely,tothewholerealmofhumansubjectivity.)Thissocialcontractisconstruedinvariousways:asaself-interestedcompactbyallparties(Glaucon),aconspiracyofthemanyagainstthenaturallydominantfew(Callicles),andaself-servingimpositionbytheregimeinpower(Thrasymachus).Inanycasetheupshotisoftenan“immoralist”stance:thedemandsofnomosandconventionaljusticearesomethingtobeseenthrough,andanyonewhocanviolatethemwithimpunityhasnoreasonnotto.AstheUnjustSpeechsaysinAristophanes’Clouds:“Keepingcompanywithme,use[your]nature,leap,laugh,considernothingshame-ful!”(1077–1078).However,Antiphon’sdiscussionofjusticedoesnotendhere;andinF44(c),hearguesagainsttheconventionalistunderstandingofjusticesofarassumed.Suppose,Antiphonsays,thatIamcalledasawitnessinalegaldispute;accordingtoconven-tion,formetogivetruetestimonyisjust.ButsupposethatbytestifyingtrulyIwill7.Plato,Grg.483a–484c,Rep.I,338c–348dandII,357b–362c,ThucydidesI.75–77,V.84–114.83ACTC058320/03/2006,03:59PM\nrachelbarneyharmsomeonewhohasnotharmedme.Conventionaljusticealsoincludesthenotionthatformetoharmsomeonewhohasneverdonemeharmisunjust,whichresultsinacontradiction:thesetwothings“cannotbothbejust”(II.17–21).Thisisaclassicelenchus,and,aswhenusedbySocrates,iteffectivelyrefutesaclaimtoauthority:theconventionalunderstandingofjusticecannotberight.Thisapparentinconsistency8betweenthetwofragmentsispuzzling,andperhapsweshouldsimplyreadAntiphon’sdiscussionofjusticeasanexerciseinantilogikE;butitseemsmoreplausibletoreadbothfragmentsasobjectionstoconventionalism.InthatcasethepointofF44(a)toomustbe,implicitly,thatconventionaljusticedoesnotdeservethenameofjusticeatall–perhapsbecauseitisessentialtotheconceptofjusticethatitisworthpursuing.Onthisreading,allthreeargumentshavesomeresemblancetoanotherimportantfragmentofAntiphon(alsofromOnTruth),reportedbyAristotleinhisPhysics.Thisisabizarrescientificthought-experiment:“ifoneweretoburyabedandtheputrefactionweretogetthepowertosendupashoot,itwouldnotbeabedbutwood,sincetheone–thearrangementinaccordancewithconvention(katanomon)andtheartisticform–existsaccidentally,whereastheessenceisthatwhichpersists,continuouslyundergoingthesemodifications”(Phys.II.1,193a12–17=F15(b),Pendricktrans.).TheGreekword“nature”(phusis)iscloselyconnectedtotheverb“grow”(phuO):thesophistsandpre-Socraticnaturalscientistsshareadeepassumption,rootedintheGreeklanguageitself,thatthenatureofsomethingisrevealedinitsoriginsandgenerativepowers.Thatnatureconsists,Antiphonclaims,notinthesuperficialidentityestablishedbyhumanagencyandrepresentedinthenamesweuseforthings,butintheunderlying9materialonwhichweact.Asthisoddargumentbringsout,thenature/conventiondichotomyhasitsoriginsinthesearchofpre-Socraticnaturalscientistsforthebasic10principlesofthecosmos.Inparticular,itpressesonacontrastwhichpervadespre-SocraticthoughtfromParmenidesonward,betweenamisleading,mind-dependentrealmofappearanceandenduring,underlyingrealities.Soitisperhapsnosurprisethatthecontrastbetweennatureandconventioncomestobeappliedinawiderangeofcontexts.Democritus,forinstance,issaidtohavearguedthatnamesareamatterofconventionratherthannature(DK68B26:cf.thesectionon“Namesandthings”below);andhisatomismwassummedupinthesloganthatperceptualqualitiesaremerelybyconvention(nomOi:i.e.,presumably,subjective11ormind-dependent),whileonlyatomsandthevoidarereal(DK68B9,B125etc.).Buttheprincipalarenaofthecontrastwasinethicsandpolitics.Indeed,theappealtonatureasasourceforethicalnormsisundoubtedlythesophisticmovement’smostpowerfullegacytophilosophy.Thatappealtookvariousforms.ForAntiphon,“nature”seemstomeanhumannature,representedbyourcommonphysiology.IntheGorgias8.Cf.Furley(1981);Pendrickisagnostic(2002,pp.368–9),andBettrelegatesF44(c)toafootnote(2002,p.250n.28).9.Cf.Morrison(1963,pp.40–6).10.Indeed,inhisattackonirreligioninBookXoftheLaws,Platotreatsatheism,thenomos/phusisdistinctionasappliedtovalues,andpre-Socratic-stylenaturalisticexplanationsoftheoriginsofthecosmosasasingle,threateningintellectualposition(885c–907d).11.Quotationsfrom“pre-Socratic”philosophersarebyRichardMcKirahaninCurd(1996),withrevisions.84ACTC058420/03/2006,03:59PM\nthesophisticmovementCalliclesdrawsonanimalbehaviorandtheaggressionofstatestoarguethatthereisa“naturaljustice”accordingtowhichthestrongshouldhavemorethantheweak(Grg.483a–484c;cf.Aristophanes,Clouds1427–1429).Socrates’responseisnottorejecttheappealtonaturebuttoredefineit:whatreallycharacterizesthenaturalworld,andinvitesouremulation,is“partnershipandfriendship,orderliness,self-control,andjustice,”particularlyasdisplayedintheorderlymotionsoftheheavenlybodies(Grg.508a,cf.Ti.47a–e).SoCallicleserrsnotbecausethereisanythinginvalidaboutderivingethicalnormsfromtheobservationofnature(asDavidHumewouldlaterargue),butbecausehehasgotnaturewrong;andlaterphilosopherssuchastheStoicsandEpicureansalsofindfuelfortheirconceptionsofthegoodincompetingappealstotheobservationofnature.Thequestionraisedbytheseanalysesishowthediagnosisofsomethingascon-ventionalshouldaffectourattitudetoit.WhenDemocritussaysthatcolorisamatterofconvention,hisagendaseemstobeeliminativist:nosuchthingreallyexists,andcolor-phenomenacanbereducedtotheinteractionsofcolorlessatomsandvoid.Attheotherendofthespectrum,thatlanguageisconventionalhardlyseemstomakeitunrealorinvalid.Aninterestingcasestudyisprovidedbytwosurvivingsophistictexts12ontheoriginsofreligion.AccordingtoafragmentoftheplaySisyphus,beliefinthe13godsoriginatedasacleverdevicetoreinforcethesocialorder.Atfirst,humanlife,likethatofanimals,wasruledbyforce;thenmenenactedlawsandpunishments,establishingjustice“asatyrant(tyrannos)”(DK88B25.6).Butthiscouldnotpreventwrongdoinginsecret:so“someshrewd,intelligentmaninventedfearofthegodsformortals,sothatthewickedwouldhavesomethingtofeareveniftheirdeedsorwordsorthoughtsweresecret”(B25.12–15).Bycontrast,afragmentofProdicusassertsadifferentrelationbetweenworshipandsocialutility:“Thesunandthemoonandriversandspringsandingeneralallthingsthatbenefitourliveswererecognizedas(enomisan)godsbytheancientsbecauseoftheirbenefits....forthisreasonbreadwasworshippedas(nomisthEnai)Demeter,wineasDionysus,waterasPoseidon,fireas14Hephaestus,andsoonwitheverythingofservicetous”(DK84B5).Itiseasytoseefromthesetextsbothwhysomesophistscametobeaccusedofatheism(asdidthepre-Socraticnaturalscientists,cf.Aristophanes,Clouds365ff.and15Plato,Ap.18b–d),andwhysomeatleastmighthavedisputedthecharge.Prodicus12.Sophisticanalysisofconventionsoftentakestheformofstorytellingabouttheoriginsofsociety,followingthetraditionalGreekgenreof“anthropology”:seeCole(1990),andstill,LovejoyandBoas(1935).13.TheSisyphusfragmentisattributedtobothCritiasandEuripides:seeBett(2002,p.251n.30).14.Cf.alsoPhilodemusdePietate,whichaddsasecondstageinwhichhumaninventorsofbeneficialartsweredeified(DK84B5=Philod.DePiet.PHerc.1428col.3.12–13Henrichs).15.Protagoras,interestingly,wasevidentlyathoroughgoingagnostic:“Concerningthegods,Iamnotinapositiontoknoweitherthattheyexistorthattheydonot,norcanIknowwhattheylooklike,formanythingspreventourknowing–thesubjectisobscureandhumanlifeisshort”(DK80B4).Justhowthisrelatestohisthesisthat“Manisthemeasureofallthings,”andhowifatallitshouldinformourreadingofthemythinthe“GreatSpeech,”aredifficultquestions.85ACTC058520/03/2006,03:59PM\nrachelbarneycouldarguethathisexplanationpresentsalegitimatebasisforanenlightenedworship,freedfromprimitiveanthropomorphism.Ontheotherhand,thismightbeseenbytraditionalistsaslittlebetterthanatheism;andProdicus’accountcouldalsobereadas,liketheSisyphus,explaininghowmencametoworshipnon-existentbeings.AsfortheSisyphus,itsimportisparadoxical,foritpointsoutthesocialutilityofreligioninawaywhichmustnullifytheholdofreligiononitsaudience.Sotherevelationthatsomethingisamatterofconventioncansupportawiderangeofresponses.Returningtothecentralcaseofjustice,Antiphon’sdiagnosisofjusticecontrastswiththatofananonymousbutalmostcertainlycontemporarytext,theAnonymusIamblichi.TheAnon.Iamb.arguesthathumanbeingsarebynaturelessthanself-sufficient,andwecannotlivetogetherwithoutlaw:“becauseofalltheseconstraintslawandjusticearemadeking(tontenomonkaitodikaionembasileuein)amonghumanbeings,andwillneverbedisplaced;fortheirstrengthisingrainedbynature(phusei)”(6.1).So,paradoxically,nothingismorenaturaltousthanthemoralconventionswhichmakepossiblecivilsociety.Asimilarresponseisexpressed,asI16readit,inthe“GreatSpeech”ofProtagorasintheProtagoras(320c–328d).The“GreatSpeech”depictsinmythictermstheclaim,presentedasthekeyassumptionbehindAthenianparticipatorydemocracy,thatallhumanbeingsinsocietypossesssomemeasureofjustice.Atfirst,aspertheSisyphus,humanlifewaslawless:humans“wrongedeachother,becausetheydidnotpossessthecraftofpolitics(politikEtechnE)”(322b7–8),andsowereunabletoformsustainablesocieties.SoZeusandHermesbestowedjusticeandshameuponmankind.Thisnotionthatthevirtuesarecrafts,technai,orsomethinglikethem,maybeanimportantsophisticcontributiontomoralthought,thoughitisusuallyassociatedwithPlato’sSocrates.Protagoras’pointhere,however,isthatwhilethevirtuesarecraft-like,theyareunlikethespecializedcraftsinbeingopentoachievementbyall;indeedtheyarecontinuallytaughtbyallofustoeachother.Themythicgenredoesnotallowforexplicituseofthecontrastbetweennatureandconvention;andProtagoras’emphasisontheoriginalferalconditionofhumanity,andontheimportanceofsocialconditioning,canbereadasimplyingthatjusticeisconventional.Ontheotherhand,tosaythatjusticeisadivinegift,univer-sallyshared,soundslikethemythicwayofsayingthatitisapartofhumannature.Inthatcase,Protagoras’positionisthesameasthatoftheAnon.Iamb.,andrestatesthatofHesiodintheWorksandDays:“ThiswasthenomosZeusestablishedforhumanbeings:forfishandbeastsandflyingbirdsheallowedthatonemayeatanother,since16.Howclosethe“GreatSpeech”comestoanaccuraterepresentationofProtagoras’viewsisimpossibletosay;anditisphilosophicallyincompatiblewiththerelativismattributedtoProtagorasinPlato’sTheaetetus.Still,bothcanbeseenasdevelopmentsofapositionwhich,bytriangulation,wemightsuspecttohavebeenthatofthehistoricalProtagoras,viz.asimpleendorsementofallexistingmoralconventions.(AsKahndrilynotes,thisis“anextraordinarilyconvenientviewforamoralphilosopherwhoearnshislivingbytravellingonalecturecircuitfromonecitytoanother”(1981,p.106).)TheProtagorasgroundsthatendorsementofnomosinfunctionalistanthropology:allsocietiesarejustbecausewithoutjustice(assumedtobearealandindependentlyspecifiablevirtue,along“Hesiodic”lines)theycouldnotsurvive.TheTheaetetustakesthealternativerouteofrelativism:allcommunities’nomoicountasjustbecausetheydeterminewhatjusticeis.86ACTC058620/03/2006,03:59PM\nthesophisticmovementthereisnojusticeamongthem;buttohumanbeingshegavejustice,whichturnsouttobemuchbetter”(276–280,GagarinandWoodruff,1995,trans.).Thisdebateaboutjusticesuggestsageneraldivisionofsophisticthinkersintotwowings:callthemsubversivesandreaffirmers.Forthesubversives(Antiphon,theSisyphus,Callicles),ournormsandinstitutionsconflictwithourpleonectichumannature,andsocannotwithstandtransparency.Forthereaffirmer,conventionsarelegitimatelyauthoritativeandevennaturaltous.Somesophistictextsfallintoanambiguousmiddleground:wemightcountProdicusonreligionasneitherareaffirmernorasubversivebutareinterpreteroftradition.Tocompletethetaxonomy,afourthstancewouldbeoneofselectivereformorcritique:someconventionsconformtonaturebetterthanothers,andthosewhichdonotshouldbecorrected(cf.Protagoras17onlanguageinthesectionon“Namesandthings”).Amongotherenduringissues,thissophisticdebateraisesapuzzleaboutwhereauthentichumannatureistobeobserved.Look,saysthesubversive,tobehaviorfreedfromconstraint:studyanimals,tyrantsorempires,orimagineanagentendowedwithsuperpowers(Anon.Iamb.6.2–4;PlatoRep.II,359c–360d),andyouwillseeusaswereallyare.Thereaffirmerturnsinsteadtowhatisdistinctiveabouthumanbeings.ForAristotle,thereaffirmerparexcellence,thatwillturnouttoberationalityitself(cf.the“functionargument”ofENI.7);fortherhetoricianIsocrates,itisthediscursivecapacitywhichmakespersuasionandwithitcivilsocietypossible(Antidosis253–257);forProtagoras,itseemstobesociabilityandtheruleoflawitself.Relativity,Variability,andQualifiedTruthThesophistshaveoftenbeencollectivelylabeled“relativists”;buttheevidenceforthisissurprisinglythin(cf.Bett,1989).TheprincipaltextisthetheoryattributedtoProtagorasinPlato’sTheaetetus;buttheinterpretationofthisisenormouslycon-troversial,andhowmuchofitisauthenticallyProtagoreancannotbeknown.Wecanbefairlysurethatitsstarting-point,thefamous“MeasureThesis,”isaquotationfromProtagoras:“Ahumanbeingisthemeasureofallthings,ofthosethingsthatare,that18theyare,andofthosethingsthatarenot,thattheyarenot”(DK80B1).Thisis17.Manyscholarshaveseenagenerationalprogressioninsophisticthoughttowardsincreasingradicalism,fromreaffirmerslikeProtagorastosubversiveslikeAntiphonandCritias;theevidenceforthisseemstomeinconclusive.Cf.Kahn(1981,pp.106–8)andWallace(1998,pp.214–22).18.Ithasbeenmuchdebatedhowwearetounderstandsuchearlyphilosophicalusesoftheverb“tobe”(einai:notethatthereisnodistinctGreekverbfor“exist”),intermsofmoderndistinctionsbetweenexistential,predicative,andotheruses.DoesProtagorasmeanthatweareeachthemeasureofwhethereachthingexists,orofhoweachthing“is”,i.e.,whatpropertiesshouldbepredicatedofit?Theshortanswer,Itakeit,isboth.Thestandard(andperfectlyreasonable)Greektendencyistoviewexistentialusesof“tobe”asshortforpredicativeones:tosaythatsomethingexistsimpliesthatwecanpredicatesomepropertiesofit,andtopredicatepropertiesofsomethingistoimplyorpresupposesomesortofexistentialclaimaboutit.Cf.DK80B4,DissoiLogoi5.15,theHippocraticOntheArt(2),andKerferd(1981a,pp.94–5).87ACTC058720/03/2006,03:59PM\nrachelbarneyglossedbyPlatoasavalidationofconflictingperceptions:ifthewindseemscoldtomeandwarmtoyou,itiscoldformeandwarmforyou.Ouropinionsor“appearances”arealltrue–forourselves(Tht.152a–c).Butdoesthatmeanthatthewinditselfisreallybothwarmandcold(sothattheworldis,asHeraclitusargued,acontradictoryplace);orthatitisneither;orperhapseventhatthereisno“winditself”atall?(These19areonlyafewofourinterpretiveoptions.)Moreover,ratherlateinPlato’sdiscussionthethesisiscomplicatedbytwoimportantaddenda.First,thoughallopinionsareequallytrue,somearestillbetterthanothers,bybeingmoresubjectivelysatisfyingandfunctionalforthosewhoholdthem.Sothereisstillarolefortheexpertorwiseman,suchasProtagorashimself,namelyreplacingdysfunctionalopinionswithbetterones(Tht.166a–167d).(SoProtagorasherewouldbelongtothe“reformer”campinthetypologyabove.)Second,onethicalmattersatleast,Protagoras’validationofopinionextendstocommunitiesaswellasindividuals:“Whateverinanycityisregardedasjustandadmirableisjustandadmirable,inthatcityandforsolongasthatconventionmaintainsitself”(Tht.167c,cf.168b,177dff.).OnecanimaginethehistoricalProtagorastakingthisendorsementofnomosashisstartingpointanddevelopinganepistemologytosuit;butitishardtoseehowbothcitiesandindividualscanbeethicallyinfallible,andharderstilltoreconcileallthiswiththepoliticsofthe“GreatSpeech”(cf.n.16).TheonlyothersophistictextwhichdiscussesrelativityatlengthistheDissoiLogoi.Thisanonymous,undatableandenigmaticworkisoftendismissedasphilosophically20crudeandconfused:thisis,Ithink,aseriousunderestimation.TheDLisararesurvivingexerciseinProtagoreanantilogikE,“opposedargument,”arguingsuccessivelyonbothsidesoffiveparalleltheses(andthen,inaconcludingsectionIwillnotdiscuss,unravelingintomiscellaneousreflectionsonavarietyoftopics).Itarguesthatthegoodandthebadarethesameandthattheyaredifferent;andlikewisewiththefineandtheshameful,thejustandtheunjust,thetrueandthefalse,andwhetherthemadandthewisesaythesamethingsordifferentones.Thetextbegins:“Concerningthegoodandbad,contrastingargumentsareputforwardinGreecebyintellectuals(tOn21philosophoutOn)”(DL1.1);thereisnoreasontoattributeeithersideofanyoftheargumentstotheauthorinpropriapersona.Culturalrelativityentersthepictureinsupportoftheclaimthatthefine(kalon)andshameful(aischron)arethesame:“TheSpartansthinkitfineforgirlstodoathleticsandgoaroundwithbarearmsandwithouttunics,butIoniansthinkitshameful....TheMassagetaicutuptheirparentsandeatthem,andtheythinkthefinesttombistobeburiedinsideone’schildren,butinGreeceifsomeonedidthesethings,hewouldbedrivenoutofGreece”(DL2.9–14).Andthesamegoesforpre-maritalsex,tattoos,19.Forexplanationoftheissueshere,cf.Woodruff(1999,pp.302–4),Gibert(2003,pp.39–44),Kerferd(1981a,pp.85–93),andBarnes(1982,pp.541–53).20.SeeRobinson(1979,2001).GratuitousabuseoftheauthorgoesbacktoDiels’“talentlose”(1951–2,vol.2,p.405);cf.Burnyeat“feeble”(1998,p.106)andBarnes“themoreinterestinginthatitreflectsafeeblelayman’sapprehensionofthings”(1982,p.517).21.TranslationsfromtheDLarebasedonRobinson(1979)andGagarinandWoodruff(1995)withrevisions.88ACTC058820/03/2006,03:59PM\nthesophisticmovementincest,scalping,andmoisteningflourwithone’sfeet.Thissurveyofdiversityfollowsaseriesofargumentsappealingto“relativity”ofotherkinds:“tohaveintercoursewithone’shusbandinprivateisfine...butoutsideisshameful,wheresomeonewillseethem...toadornoneselfandputonmakeupandweargoldjewelryisshamefulforamanbutfineforawoman,”andsoon(DL2.5–6).TheDL’sargumentsforthe“Same”positionontheotherthesesalsoinvokerelativityorcontextualvariation.Deathisbadforthosewhodiebutgoodforthegravediggers;andtherearesituationsinwhichtheuseofforceorfraudmaybejust.ThustheDL’srelativityargumentsarejustasubsetofargumentsfromvariability(cf.Bett,2002,pp.238–44).Apreoccupationwithethicalvariabilityrecursinothersophistictexts:BettcitesProtagorasinPlato’sProtagoras(somethingsaregoodforhumansandothersforhorses,334a–c)andMeno’senumerationofdifferentvirtuesinhisMeno(71e–72a).Wemightalsonotethepositionoftheunnamed“loversofsightsandsounds”againstwhomSocratesarguesinRepublicV.TheydenytheunityofeachForm,refusingtoallow“thatthefineitselfisoneorthatthejustisoneoranyoftherest”(479a,cf.475e–476a),butagreethatanyparticularfinethingisalsoshameful,andanythingjustalsounjust(479a).Insum,ourevidencesuggeststhatanumberofsophistsheldwhatwemightcallthevariabilitythesis:whateverisgoodinsomequalifiedwayisalsobadinsomeotherway,andsoonforsomecentralrangeofcontrarypredicates.TheDL’sargumentsforthe“Same”position,withtheirwearisomeenumerationofopposedpredications,looklikeargumentsbyinductionforthevariabilitythesis.Butthatthesisdoesnothingtosupportthe“Same”positionwithouttwofurtherassump-tions.Oneisthatwecanlegitimatelyinferanunqualifiedthesisfromaqualifiedone:ifdeathisgoodforthegravediggersorshamefultothePersians,thendeathisgoodorshamefultoutcourt.(Thiswouldfollowfromthereasonable-soundingassumptionthat,asSocratesputsitinPlato’sCratylus(385c),atruestatementoraccountmustbecomposedoftrueparts.)Theotherassumptionisthatthemeaningofaconceptisitsextension:if“fine”and“shameful”denotethesamesetofthings,thefineandtheshamefularethesamething.The“Different”argumentsthenproceedbyreductio,relyingonthefurtherassumptionthattermswhichare“thesame”canbesubstitutedforeachother:forinstance,iftheproponentsofthe“Same”thesisclaimtohavedoneanythingfine,theymustagreethatitwasalsoshameful(DL2.21).Theeffectistoshowthattheassumptionsrelieduponbythe“Same”arguments,takentogetherwiththevariabilitythesis,leadtoabsurdresults.Andthisparadoxicaldialecticcould,incid-entally,beputintermsofourfamiliarcontrast.TheDissoiLogoishowsthatbynomos–includingallourhabitualevaluationsofparticularthingsasgoodandbad–thegoodandbadturnouttobethesamething;butsurelybyphusistheyaredifferent?Theauthor’ssolutiontothispuzzleemergesonlyrathershylyattheendoftheopposedarguments–itisratherasiftheostensionofpuzzlesisassumedtobemoreinterestingthantheirsolution.Inthecourseofarguingthatthemadandthewisedonotsaythesamethings,theauthornotesthatproponentsofthe“Same”thesiswilladmit“thatthetwogroupssaythesamethings,onlythewisesaythemattherightmomentandthemadatmomentswhenitisnotproper”(DL5.9).Butthisqualifica-tion,henotes,makesallthedifference:“theyseemtometohaveaddedthesmallphrases‘whenitisproper’and‘whenitisnotproper’,withtheresultthatitisno89ACTC058920/03/2006,03:59PM\nrachelbarneylongerthesamething”(DL5.10).Inotherwords,wherethe“Same”argumentswentwrongwasinfallaciouslyassumingqualification-droppingtopreservetruth(adiagnosisrepeatedbyAristotle,SE5,166b37–167a21).Thelegitimacyofqualification-droppingmaylooklikeaminorquestionoflogicalprocedure;infact,itisboundupwithsomeofthedeepestandmosturgentlydebatedphilosophicalpuzzlesoftheage–onesoftendiscussedbyscholarsunderotherhead-ings,suchasthe“unityofopposites”and“conflictingappearances.”Thesepuzzlescanallbeseenasoffspringofthevariabilitythesis,combinedwithadilemmaaboutqualification.Ifsomexisbothgoodandbad–orhotandcold,orlargeandsmall,orexistentandnon-existent–indifferentqualifiedways,whatarewetosayofxassuch?Doesitfollowthatxisalsogoodsimpliciterandbadsimpliciter,orneither?Toallowqualification-droppingacrosstheboardleadsimmediatelytocontradictions,absurd-ities,andaworldofindeterminacyinwhichnothingisbynatureanymoregoodthanbad.Butprohibitingallsuchinferencesleads,paradoxically,tomuchthesameresult,foritentailsthatforthesamerangeofcasesxassuchisonceagainnomoretheonethingthantheother.TheDLleavesthatproblemstanding,andwithitthequestionofhowmeaningrelatestodenotation.Ifeverythingfineisalsoshamefulinsomeway,inwhatsenseare”fine”and“shameful”oppositesthatexcludeeachother?Foranyoppositiontobeleft,itseemstheremustbesomethingmoreto“thefine”thanthesetofparticularfinethings:butwhat?Thisis,strikingly,oneofthecentralproblemsthatPlato’stheoryofFormsisengineeredtosolve.Platoacceptsthevariabilitythesis;buthedenies,inspectacularfashion,theassumptionthattheirdenotationofsensibleparticularindi-vidualsiswhatgivesourwordstheirmeanings.Thenamesofthingsreferinthefirstinstancenottotheparticularthingsaroundus,whichareindeedsusceptibleonlyofqualifiedtruth,buttoessencesornatures–theForms–whichare“separate”fromthem,andunmixedwiththeiropposites,andwhichcanthereforeserveassubjectsofunqualifiedtruthandknowledge(Plato,Phd.74a–75a,Hp.Ma.288d–292e,Symp.211a–212a,Rep.V,479a–e,Prm.129a–130a).SotheproblemsoverwhichtheDLpuzzlesarealsothosethatmotivatePlato.AndtheDLshowsthatforthesophists,asforPlato,argumentsaboutethicsaresimultaneouslyvehiclesforexploringimportantproblemsaboutlanguageandreality–problemsaboutwhatwemightcallthegapbetweennamesandthings.InthenextsectionIturntotextsthatconfrontthisgapdirectly.NamesandThingsManytextstestifytosophisticfascinationwiththeworkingsoflanguage:theyrangefromdiscussionsofrhetoricandliterarycriticismtowhatwouldnowadayscountaslinguistics,grammar,andthephilosophyoflanguage.InPlato’sProtagoras,Protagorasdeclaresthat“thegreatestpartofeducation”istobeabletoanalyzeandevaluatethewordsofthepoets(339a).ProtagorasgoesontosubjectSocratestoanelenchusbygettinghimtoendorseanodeofSimonides,whichisthenshowntocontainacon-tradiction(339b–e).Asamodeofeducation,suchsparringwouldhaveinvolvedatoncealessonintheartoferistic,thehoningofliteraryandcriticalskills,andreflection90ACTC059020/03/2006,03:59PM\nthesophisticmovementonaseriousethicalquestion(here,therelationof“becominggood”to“beinggood”)aboutwhichthepoetmighthavesomethingvaluabletosay.ProtagorasevidentlyadoptedasimilarlycriticalstancetowardstheGreeklanguageitself,claimingthatthewords“wrath”and“helmet”(bothgrammaticallyfeminine)22aremasculine(DK80A28;cf.theparodybyAristophanesatClouds659–691).WehavenoevidencethatProtagoraswasaseriouscampaignerforlinguisticreform,butheclearlycounts,onthisfrontatleast,asa“reformer”intermsofthetypologysuggestedabove,holdingconventionsupforcorrectioninthelightofnature.Othersophistictextsshowasimilarmixofanalysisandprescription.ProdicusisportrayedbyPlatoasaspecialistinthe“correctnessofnames,”andinparticularthedrawingoffinedistinctionsbetweenwordsofsimilarmeaning(Prt.337a–b,358a–b,Chrm.163d,Cra.384b,La.197d,Meno75e,cf.Classen,1981,pp.230–8).Plato’sattitudeseemstobeoneofhalf-respectfulamusement:Prodicusiswrongtothinkthatanywisdomistobegainedbysuchexercisesinlexicography,butitisthejobofthephilosophertodistinguishmeaningscorrectly,throughdialectic.LikeeristicandantilogikE,Prodicanlinguisticanalysisisasimulacrumof,andperhapsaprolegomenonto,realphilo-sophicalmethod.Plato’sCratylusdiscussesthe“correctnessofnames”ratherdifferently,intermsofthedichotomyofnatureandconvention.Namesbearthetwinhallmarksofsocialconstruction,sincetheyvaryfromplacetoplaceandaresubjecttochangeatwill(cf.DemocritusDK68B26).Atthesametime,theirfunctioningsomehowoutrunsconvention:differentlanguagescansaythesamething,andthetruthorfalsityofwhatwesaydependsnotonlyonourconventionsbutonhowthingsare.ForPlato,anaturalcorrectnessofnameswouldmeanthatnamescouldbejudgedaccordingtowhethertheycorrespondtothenaturesofthethingstheyname(Cra.391d–427d)–anotherversionofa“reformist”stancetowardslanguage.Thisideaof“naturalcorrectness,”whichtheCratylusspellsoutintermsofetymologyandphonetic“like-ness,”isveryalientomodernthoughtaboutlanguage;itbecomesmoreintelligibleifwereflectthatforPlato,andforthesophistsaswell,concernsaboutlanguagewerealsodrivenbyhighethicalandpoliticalstakes.Thucydidesfamouslydiscussesthewaysinwhichmoralterminologycomestobeabusedandcorruptedintimesofcivilwar(Thuc.III.82–83),andPlato’searlydialoguestestifytothesharplydifferentwaysinwhichtermslike“virtue”and“justice”mightbeapplied.Itisnotsoeasytodeterminewherelinguisticconventionsendandethicalandpoliticalonesbegin.TheCratylusalsotestifiestointensecontemporarypuzzlementovertruthand23reference.Ourevidenceonthistopicisratherconfusing,muchofitconsistingof24paradoxicalslogansandunattributedarguments.Themostnotoriouspairofslogans25asserttheimpossibilityofcontradictionandfalsestatement.Justwhoislikelyto22.Cf.alsothecriticismofHomeratDK80A2.Protagoras’analysesofgender(DK80A27),thetensesofverbs(DK80A1)andmodesofspeech(DK80A1)werepresumablyusedtoprovideammunitionforsuchcriticismsofthepoets.23.OnthetreatmentoflanguageintheCratylus,seealsoModrak’sphilosophyoflanguageinthisvolume.24.SeeGuthrie(1969,pp.204–19),Classen(1981),andDenyer(1991)fordiscussion.25.Plato,Euthd.283e–286d,Cra.429c–430a;cf.D.L.10.53,Isoc.Helen1;Kerferd(1981a,pp.88–90),andGuthrie(1969,pp.218–19).91ACTC059120/03/2006,03:59PM\nrachelbarneyhaveassertedeitherisuncertain(theSocraticAntisthenesisaleadingcandidate),andasophisticoriginwouldbepuzzlinggiventhatbothantilogikEanderisticseemtorequirecontradiction.Still,theparadoxesmighthavebeengeneratedbytwosophisticideas.Oneisthe“Measure”thesis.Ifthewindcanbeatoncewarmforyouandcoldforme,thenourdescriptionsofitdonotexcludeeachotherafterall;sothereisalotlesscontradictionaboutthanwemightthink–perhaps,ifProtagorascangiveanintelligiblerelativizationofallourclaims,noneatall.Theothersourceoftheparadoxesisasetofpuzzlesabouttruthandreference.Parmenideshadalreadyarguedthatonecannotsayorthinkwhatisnot:foritisnottheretobepickedoutbylanguage(DK28B2,B6,B7).Atruestatementsays“whatis”;afalseone“whatisnot.”But“whatisnot”isnothing,sospeechwhichsays“whatisnot”saysnothingatall(Plato,Cra.429c–430a).(Or,inslightlydifferentterms:tobemeaningfulastatementmustbe“of”or“about”something.Butafalsehoodwouldhavetosaysomethingotherthanthatthing,andsowouldreallybe“of”somethingelse;andfortwostatementstocontradicteachother,bysayingdifferentthingsaboutthesamething,isimpossible(Plato,Euthd.283e–284a,285d–286b).)Platostruggleswiththesepuzzlesinseveraldialogues;hiseventualsolutionintheSophistdependsonalongandcomplexexcursusintothemetaphysicsofwhatisandisnot.Icannotdiscusshissolutionfully,butitscentralstrategicmoveis,roughly,todistinguishbetweenreferenceandassertion:falsestatementsays“whatis,butnotasitis”(Sph.262e–263d).Ourmostimportantsophistictextonlanguage,Gorgias’OnNotBeing,arguesforthestillmoreunnervingthesisthatwecannotcommunicatewhatistrue.Infact,thisenigmatictourdeforcearguesforthreestartlingconclusions.First,nothing“is”orexists;second,evenifsomethingdidexist,wecouldnotthinkorcomprehendit;and26third,evenifwecouldthinkit,wecouldnotcommunicateit.Interpretershavelongdebatedinwhatspirittheseargumentsshouldberead(cf.Caston,2002,pp.205–8).TheONBiscertainlyanexerciseinrhetoricaltechnique:itis,afterall,hardtothinkofamoreconvincingtestcasefortheabilityto“maketheweakerargumentthestronger.”Butitisalsoplausiblyaparody,atonceplayfulandseriouslycritical,ofcontemporaryphilosophy,andParmenidesinparticular.ThefirstpartoftheargumentlookslikeareductioofParmenides’proofthatonlyBeingexists;andasKerferdnotes,theargumenttakenasawholeamountsto“pullingapartandseparatingthreethingswhichParmenideshadidentified,”namelybeing,thought,andspeech(1981a,p.99;cf.DK28B2,B3,B6,B8.34–36).TheoddlyrecessivestructureoftheONBmeansthatitcanalsobetakenascollect-ivelyarguing,throughaseriesoffall-backpositions,foritsfinalconclusion:eveniftherewerethings(whichtherearen’t),andeveniftheycouldbeknown(whichthey27can’t),wecouldnotcommunicatethem.Andtheselatterstagesoftheargumenthavethelookofanon-parodicphilosophicalagenda.InthesecondpartoftheONB,26.TwoquitedifferentversionsoftheONB,neitherofwhichcanbetakenasGorgias’ipsissimaverba,havecomedowntous(S.E.M7.65–87and[Aristotle],DeMelisso,Xenophane,Gorgia(79a11–80b21).Iwillbefreeinextractingandamalgamatingwhatseemtomethemainpoints.27.ThisrecessivestrategyalsostructuresGorgias’DefenseofPalamedes(DK82B11(a)).92ACTC059220/03/2006,03:59PM\nthesophisticmovementGorgiasarguesforachasmbetweenobjectsandourthoughtsaboutthem.“Forifthingsthatarethoughtof,saysGorgias,arenotthingsthatare,thenwhatisisnot28thoughtof”(S.E.M7.77).Andindeedthingsthatarethoughtofarenotthingsthatare.Afterall,“ifsomeonethinksofapersonflyingorchariotsracinginthesea,itisnotthecasethatforthwithapersonisflyingorchariotsracinginthesea”(S.E.M7.79).Ofcourse,thefactthatasea-chariotisnotboththoughtofandexistenthardlyprovesthatnothingcanbeboth;butitdoesshowthatintentionalentitiessuchasmentalrepresentationsconstituteanorderofbeingquitedistinctfromordinary“thingsthatare,”includinganywhichwemightclaimtobethinkingof.ItisunclearwhetherGorgiastakeshimselftohaveestablishedonlythisreasonableclaim,oralsotheoutrageousonethatnothingcanbebothexistentandanobjecttowhichthoughtrefers:perhapsweshouldreadthetextassystematicallyambiguous,betweenastrongthesiswhichoffendscommonsenseandaweakeronewhichcontrovertsonlyParmenideanphilosophers.(ThefirstpartoftheONBcouldperhapsalsobereadthisway,asdenyingexistenceeithertotheeverydaythingsofcommonsenseoronlytoParmenideanBeing.)Thethirdpartoftheargument,ontheimpossibilityofcommunication,largelyfollowsthemodelofthesecond.Another“categorialgulf”(Mourelatos,1987,p.139)separatesspeech(logos)fromtheobjectswemighthopetosignify:“itisnotthecasethatwecommunicatethingsthataretoourneighbours,butlogos,whichisdifferentfromtheobjects”(S.E.M7.84).Justassighthasthevisibleasitsobject,andnottheaudible,sotoowhenaspeakerspeaks,whathesaysislogosratherthanacolourorathingorathought.Moreover,itisimpossibleforthesamethoughttoexistintwopeople;andthereisnoreasoneventoexpecttheirthoughts29tobequalitativelysimilar.Whateverwemakeofhisintentions,theseargumentsdisplayGorgiasatworkonrealandintractablephilosophicalpuzzles:howisitpossibletorefertonon-existentobjects?Ifathoughtisadifferentkindofthingfromanobjectinworld,howcanitcommunicatethatobject?AreadingofhisconclusionsasbothradicalandseriouslyintendedgainssomeconfirmationfromGorgias’EncomiumofHelen(DK82B11).Inthisepideicticspeech,GorgiasarguesthatHelen’sdecisiontogowithParistoTroymusthavebeencausedbyoneoffourfactors:fateanddivinewill,force,persuasivespeech(logos),orlove.Whicheveritis,heargues,sheisnottoblame;foreachofthesecausesreallycountsasakindofforce,renderingheractioninvoluntary.Thegeneral30intentofGorgias’workisonceagainopaque;buttheagendaoftheHelendoesseemtocomeclearinitsextendedpraiseoflogos,describedasa“mightymaster”(DK82B11.8)whichworksonthesoulasdrugsdoonthebody(14).Thepoweroflogos28.TranslationsfromtheONBarefromRichardMcKirahaninCurd(1996),withrevisions.29.Cf.alsothecrypticAntiphonDK87B1.30.TheHelenisoftenreadasa“paradigmcase”argumentthatnooneisresponsibleforanyaction.ButatthecloseoftheHelenGorgiasreferstoitasa“playthingformyself”(DK82B11.21),effectivelycallingintoquestionanyreadingofitasethicaldogma.Thisself-underminingshould,Ithink,bereadasateaseandachallenge:WemustdecideforourselveswhethertheHelenshouldcountasseriousmoralphilosophy,andwhatitprovesifso.93ACTC059320/03/2006,03:59PM\nrachelbarneyderivesfromitsswayoverfalliblehumanopinion(doxa):“Forifallmenonallsubjectshadmemoryofthepast,[understanding]ofthepresent,andforesightintothefuture,speechwouldnotbethesameinthesameway...butasitis...mostmenonmost31subjectsmakeopinionanadvisertotheirminds”(11).AsMourelatoshasargued,theargumentsoftheHelenandtheONBonlanguagearecomplementary(1987).TheONBshowswhatlanguagecannotbe:eitherameansofcommunicatingtheobjectivenaturesofthingsorofrepresentingourideasofthem.TheHelenexpoundsthealternativewhichremains,namelythatlanguageissimplyatoolformanipulatingbehavior.ItisdifficulttoascribeafullandcoherentmetaphysicsandepistemologytoGorgias–or,allthemoreobviously,tothesophistsasagroup.Scholarshavesometimesspokeninageneralwayofthesophistsascollectively“empiricists,”“skeptics,”and“relativists”withoutadequatelynotingthatthesearedistincttheorieswithlittleifanythingincommon(e.g.,Guthrie,1969,pp.9–11,49–51).Sophisticthoughtonrealityandourepistemicaccesstoitonlyformsagenuineunitytotheextentthatitisseenasfundamentallynegativeandcritical,exploringvariousstrategiesfordenyingthepretensionstoknowledgeofaParmenides,Empedocles,or,proleptically,Plato.Fromthatangle,GorgiasandProtagorascanplausiblybeseenasformingaunitedfrontofdeflationaryanti-realism:againstmetaphysicianslikeParmenides,theyarguethatthereisnopointinspeculatingabout,orevenanyintelligiblewayofthinkingandtalkingabout,aBeingwhichtranscendsourexperience.Thereisnorealitybeyondappearance,andnohopeforanyknowledgewhichwouldbedifferentinkindfromourfallibleopinions.Ifthisisafairreading,thensophisticdiscussionoflanguageandthoughtrevolvesevenmorecloselyaroundthequestionwesawraisedbytheirethicalinquiries:howfarourcustomarywaysofthinkingandtalkingaregroundedinanythingbeyondthemselves.ConclusionsAtthestartInotedtwoquestionswefaceininterpretingthesophists:didtheyexpoundphilosophicaldogmata,andweretheyengagedinacommonprojectatall?Unsurprisingly,thetextswehaveexaminedprovidenosnappyanswers.Ontheques-tionofunity,wehaveencounteredafewsharedpositions,butmuchmorecommongroundinthesophists’conceptualframeworkandmodesofargument.Thesophisticmovementhaswhatwemightcalldialecticalunity:theunityofadebateortradition,withboththecommonalityandthediversity,indeedconflict,itimplies.Morecon-troversially,Ihavearguedthatwecanseemuchifnotallofsophisticthoughtasdrivenbyasingle(albeitbroad)philosophicalagenda.Thedecompositionofinstitu-tionsandvaluesintonaturalandconventional;thefascinationwithvariabilityand31.Cf.anotherimportant,butpuzzlingdictumattributedtoGorgias:“Being(toeinai)isobscurewhenitdoesnotencounteropinion(toudokein);opinionisweakwhenitdoesnotencounterbeing”(DK82B26).94ACTC059420/03/2006,03:59PM\nthesophisticmovementqualifiedtruthinethics;thesubversionofeasyassumptionsaboutmeaningandcommunication:allmakemanifestapreoccupationwithmeasuringthegapbetweenourwordsandtherealities–ifany–towhichtheymayormaynotconform.Thisprojecthadaprofoundinfluenceonlaterthought,anditishardtoseeanygroundsfordenyingthesophistsaplaceinbookson“pre-SocraticPhilosophy.”Ontheotherhand,muchsophisticargumentisnotlikephilosophicalargumentasweusuallyunderstandit–thatis,Itakeit,asinvolvingthebestargumentsonecanmusterforconclusionsinwhichonebelieves.Thesophistsaremoreinterestedinfallaciesandpuzzlesthaninproofsandsolutions,morecomfortablewithparadoxandsatirethanwithdogmaticassertion.Thismayinpartexpressasubversiverelationtotheirphilosophicalrivals,asinthecaseoftheOnNotBeingandParmenides.Soargu-ablythesophistsarelesstheancestorsofphilosophyingeneralthanofsubsequentattemptstocureordebunkit;anditisnoaccidentthatdeflationarymovementssuchasancientskepticism,modernpragmatism,andpostmodernismhavelookedbackto32themforinspiration.Yet,paradoxically,thesophists’methodologicalslipperinesscanalsobeseenasacrucialfirststeptowardslaterphilosophicalnormsofobjectiverationality.Pre-SocraticssuchasParmenidesandEmpedoclescombineappealstothereader’srationalitywithclaimstosupernaturalauthority(DK28B1,B7;DK31B23,B110,B112),buttheargumentsofatextliketheDissoiLogoiorAntiphon’sOnTrutharedetachedfromanyauthorityatall;insophisticwritings,theauthorialfirstpersoniseitherabsentorisastrikinglyunhelpfulandunreliablenarrator.IfwecouldaskGorgias,“Butdoyoureallymeanthatnothingexists?”hemightwellshrughisshouldersandanswer,deadpan,“Canyourefuteme?”Sophistictextsarechallenges,invitingustojudgetheirargumentsforourselves.Thisshouldsoundfamiliar;forthesamecanbesaidofPlato,whoisnotoriouslyabsentfromhisworksandwhoseSocratesemphasizesthatlogoimustbejudgedontheirownmerits.AndtheothercommonalitiesbetweenthesophistsandPlatoarestriking.SocraticelenchusisformallyindistinguishablefromProtagoreaneristic;andanumberofPlato’sdialoguesare,inwholeorpart,exercisesinantilogikE,includingtheMeno,Protagoras,Phaedrus,Cratylus,arguablytheParmenidesandratherlopsidedlytheRepublic(onwhichcf.thedisquietingDK80B5:accordingtosomeancienthis-toriansofphilosophy,theRepublicwaslargelyarip-offofProtagoreanarguments).Onquestionslikethecorrectnessofnames(theCratylus)andthenormativestandingofjustice(Gorgias,Republic),Platocanbeseenasconcernedwiththeanalysisofnatureandconvention,andasfittingintoa“reformer-reaffirmer”niche.Aboveall,wecanseethetheoryofFormsasPlato’ssolutiontosophisticpuzzlesaboutvariabilityandqualifiedtruth.Giventhestateofourevidence,thesophistsarelikelytocontinuetoresistconfidentinterpretation;butwemaycometounderstandthembetterifwecanlearntoreadPlatoasthefloweringofthesophistictraditionratherthan–oraswellas–itsnemesis.32.TheDissoiLogoihascomedowntousattachedtoMSSofSextusEmpiricus,presumablybecauseAntilogikEwasseenastheancestorofskeptical“equipollentargument.”Forpragmatism,cf.Mailloux(1995,pp.8–14),forpostmodernism,Fish(1989)andJarratt(1991).95ACTC059520/03/2006,03:59PM\nrachelbarneyBibliographyWorksCitedAdkins,A.W.H.(1960).MeritandResponsibility.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Barnes,J.(1982).ThePresocraticPhilosophers.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul.Bett,R.(1989).“TheSophistsandRelativism.”Phronesis,34,139–69.——.(2002).“IsThereaSophisticEthics?”AncientPhilosophy,22,235–62.Burnyeat,M.F.(1998).“DissoiLogoi.”InE.Craig(ed.),TheRoutledgeEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(vol3,pp.106–7).London:Routledge.Caston,V.(2002).“GorgiasonThoughtanditsObjects.”InV.CastonandD.W.Graham(eds.),PresocraticPhilosophy.(FestschriftforA.P.D.Mourelatos)(pp.205–32).Aldershot:Ashgate.Classen,C.J.(1981).“TheStudyofLanguageamongstSocrates’Contemporaries.”InG.B.Kerferd(ed.),TheSophistsandtheirLegacy(pp.215–47).Wiesbaden:Steiner.(Originalworkpublished1959.)Cole,T.(1990).DemocritusandtheSourcesofGreekAnthropology.Atlanta:ScholarsPress.(Originalworkpublished1967.)Cooper,J.M.(ed.)andHutchinson,D.S.(assoc.ed.).(1997).Plato:CompleteWorks.Indianapolis:Hackett.Curd,P.(ed.).(1996).APresocraticsReader.(TranslationsbyR.McKirahan.)Indianapolis:Hackett.Denyer,N.(1991).Language,ThoughtandFalsehoodinAncientGreekPhilosophy.London:Routledge.Diels,H.(1951–2).(CitedasDK).DieFragmentederVorsokratiker.(3vols.).6thedn.revisedbyW.Kranzandoftenreprinted.Berlin:Weidmann.(Originalworkpublished1903.)Fish,S.(1989).“Rhetoric.”InS.Fish,DoingWhatComesNaturally(pp.471–502).Durham,NC:DukeUniversityPress.Furley,D.J.(1981).“Antiphon’sCaseagainstJustice.”InG.B.Kerferd(ed.),TheSophistsandtheirLegacy(pp.81–91).Wiesbaden:Steiner.Gagarin,M.andWoodruff,P.(eds.).(1995).EarlyGreekPoliticalThoughtfromHomertotheSophists.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Gibert,J.(2003).“TheSophists.”InC.Shields(ed.),TheBlackwellGuidetoAncientPhilosophy(pp.27–50).Oxford:Blackwell.Grote,G.(1865).PlatoandtheOtherCompanionsofSokrates.(3vols.).London:JohnMurray.——.(1872).AHistoryofGreece.(10vols.,vol.7).4thedn.London:Murray.Guthrie,W.K.C.(1969).AHistoryofGreekPhilosophy(vol.3):TheFifth-CenturyEnlightenment.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Hegel,G.W.F.(1995).LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy(trans.E.S.Haldane).Lincoln:UniversityofNebraskaPress.(Originalworkpublished1840.)Irwin,T.H.(1995).“Plato’sObjectionstotheSophists.”InC.A.Powell(ed.),TheGreekWorld(pp.568–87).London:Routledge.Jarratt,S.(1991).RereadingtheSophists.Carbondale:SouthernIllinoisUniversityPress.Kahn,C.(1981).“TheOriginsofSocialContractTheoryintheFifthCenturyb.c.”InG.B.Kerferd(ed.),TheSophistsandtheirLegacy(pp.92–108).Wiesbaden:Steiner.Kerferd,G.B.(1981a).TheSophisticMovement.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Kerferd,G.B.(ed.).(1981b).TheSophistsandtheirLegacy.Wiesbaden:Steiner.Long,A.A.(ed.).(1999).TheCambridgeCompaniontoEarlyGreekPhilosophy.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Lovejoy,A.O.andBoas,G.(1935).PrimitivismandRelatedIdeasinGreekAntiquity.Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.96ACTC059620/03/2006,03:59PM\nthesophisticmovementMailloux,S.(ed.).(1995).Rhetoric,Sophistry,Pragmatism.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Morrison,J.S.(1963).“TheTruthofAntiphon.”Phronesis,8,35–49.Mourelatos,A.P.D.(1987).“GorgiasontheFunctionofLanguage.”PhilosophicalTopics,15,135–70.Nehamas,A.(1990).“Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic:Plato’sDemarcationofPhilosophyfromSophistry.”HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterly,7,3–16.Nietzsche,F.(1968).TheWilltoPower(trans.W.Kaufman).NewYork:RandomHouse.(Originalworkpublished1901.)Pendrick,G.(ed.).(2002).AntiphontheSophist:TheFragments.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Preus,A.(ed.).(2001).BeforePlato:EssaysinAncientGreekPhilosophyVI.Albany,NY:SUNYPress.Robinson,T.M.(ed.).(1979).ContrastingArguments:AnEditionoftheDissoiLogoi.NewYork:ArnoPress.——.(2001).“TheDissoiLogoiandearlyGreekScepticism.”InA.Preus(ed.),BeforePlato:EssaysinAncientGreekPhilosophyVI(pp.187–197).Albany,NY:SUNYPress.Wallace,R.W.(1998).“TheSophistsinAthens.”InD.BoedekerandK.Raaflaub(eds.),Demo-cracy,Empire,andtheArtsinFifth-CenturyAthens(pp.203–22).Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.Woodruff,P.(1999).“RhetoricandRelativism:ProtagorasandGorgias.”InA.A.Long(ed.),TheCambridgeCompaniontoEarlyGreekPhilosophy(pp.290–310).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.FurtherReadingsDetienne,M.(1996).TheMastersofTruthinArchaicGreece(trans.J.Lloyd,)NewYork:ZoneBooks.(Originalworkpublished1967.)Dover,K.(1974).GreekPopularMoralityintheTimeofPlatoandAristotle.Oxford:Blackwell.Lee,M.(2000).“TheSecretDoctrine:Plato’sDefenceofProtagorasintheTheaetetus.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,19,47–86.Pfeiffer,R.(1968).HistoryofClassicalScholarship:FromtheBeginningstotheEndoftheHellenisticAge.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Schiappa,E.(1991).ProtagorasandLogos.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Striker,G.(1996).“MethodsofSophistry.”InG.Striker,EssaysonHellenisticEpistemologyandEthics(pp.3–21).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.97ACTC059720/03/2006,03:59PM\nACTC059820/03/2006,03:59PM\nPartIISocrates,theSocratics,andPlatoACTC069920/03/2006,04:00PM\ndonaldr.morrison100ACTC0610020/03/2006,04:00PM\nsocrates6SocratesDONALDR.MORRISONSocratesisthemythicfatherandpatronsaintofphilosophy.Oneanswertothequestion,“Whatisphilosophy?”is:PhilosophyiswhatSocratesdidandwhathestarted.Socratesremainsmythicbecausehehimselfwrotenothing.OurearliestimagesofSocratescomefromancient,complexliteraryworkswhoseaimandvaluesarenoteasytoassess,andtheypartlydivergeanddisagree.Socrateshadthegreatgoodfortunethatoneofhisfollowers,Plato,wasoneofthegreatestgeniusesandmostbrilliantwritersofalltime.Thecharacter“Socrates”inPlato’sdialoguesisoneofthemostfascinatinginworldliterature.YetitishardtoknowinthisportraitwherethehistoricalSocratesleavesoffandPlatobegins.LifeandCharacterAfewfactsareclear.Socrateswasbornabout469bceinAthens.Hebelongedtothemiddleclass:heissaidtohavebeenthesonofastonemason,andhemayhimselfhavepracticedthatcraft.SocrateslivedinAthensuntilhewassentencedtodeathbyanAthenianjuryandwasexecutedbyhemlockpoisoningin399bce.Socrates’courageandendurancewhileservingasaninfantrymaninthePeloponnesianWarbecamelegendary(Plato,Ap.28e;Symp.219e–221b).Socratestwiceriskeddangerbyopposingauthorities,oncein406whenhetriedtopreventanunconstitutionaltrial(Ap.32b–c;Xen.Hell.1.7.14–15;Mem.1.1.18;4.4.2),andlaterunderthejuntaoftheThirtyTyrants,whenherefusedtoco-operateinthearrestofLeonofSalamis(Ap.32d;Xen.Mem.4.4.3).ThesestoriesofSocrates’unusualphysicalandmoralcourageshowhimasapersonofextraordinaryintegrity.Ifhebelievedsomethingtoberight,hewoulddoit;andifhebelievedittobewrong,hewouldrefuse,regardlessofsocialpressureorphysicaldanger.Socrates’consistencyofthoughtandactioniscentraltohisgreatness.SocratessaysinPlato’sApologythathehashada“divinesign”sincechildhood,avoicethatwarnshimwhenheisabouttodosomethingheshouldnot.InXenophon,thevoicenotonlywarnsSocratesawayfromactions,butalsogivespositiveadvice(Mem.4.3.12,4.8.1;Ap.12).Socrates’divinesignor“daimonion”createsamagnificentparadox.SocratestherationalistphilosophergoesaboutAthensaskingpeopletoaccountfortheirlivesandactions.Irrefutablereasonandargumentarethestandardforknowledge,onealmostimpossibletomeet.AccordingtoPlato’sportrait,Socratescannotmeetiteither.Heiswiseonlyinknowinghisownignorance.Thisputsboth101ACTC0610120/03/2006,04:00PM\ndonaldr.morrisonSocratesandtheAtheniansinadeephole.ButSocrates–uniquely–hasadivinevoice,a“littlebird”thatwhispersintohisearandgiveshiminfallibleadvice.Theparadoxisinescapable:aphilosophercommittedtopublicreason,whohasaprivatepipelinetothetruth.Socratesspentmuchofhisadultlifeconversingwithothersaboutsuchquestionsas“Whatisjustice?”and“Whatislaw?”Hediscussedthesemattersdailywithaclosecircleoffriendsandadmirers,butalsowithwhoeverhappenedby,andwithfamousmenlikePericlesandGorgias.Socrates’philosophicalrefutationsoftheprominentandthepowerfulannoyedmany,andhisquestioningoftraditionalAthenianvaluesandreligiousbeliefsoffendedconservatives.Certainlyforthesereasons,alongwithothers,Socrateswasbroughttotrialin399bceandsentencedtodeathbyhemlockpoisoning.ThemostimportantancientevidenceregardingSocratescomesfromfoursources:Aristophanes’Clouds,theSocraticwritingsofPlato,theSocraticwritingsofXenophon,andsomescatteredremarksinAristotle.Thesourcespaintratherdifferentportraits.“TheproblemofthehistoricalSocrates”isthedifficultandperhapsinsolubleproblemofsiftinganddistillingthesesourcesintoahistoricallyaccuratepictureofSocrates.Noconsensusexiststodayonhow,orwhether,thisproblemcanbesolved(Patzer,1987).OnetraditionalviewisthatXenophon’saccountistrustworthy,whereasPlato’sisnot.Thisviewhashardlyanyadherentstoday.ManyscholarsbelievethatareasonablyfaithfulportraitofthehistoricalSocratesandhisphilosophicalviewscanbefoundincertainearlyworksofPlato.Onthisview,Platofirstbeganwritingremembrancesofhisbelovedmaster,butashematuredhebegantoputhisownphilosophicalviewsintothemouthofSocrates.Thedialoguesregardedas“Socratic”ratherthan“maturePlatonic”typicallyinclude:Apology,Charmides,Crito,Euthydemus,Euthyphro,Gorgias,HippiasMajor,HippiasMinor,Ion,Laches,Lysis,Menexenus,Protagoras,Republic(BookI).ThemostprominentdefenderofthisapproachwasGregoryVlastos(1991).ManyscholarsbelievethatifanythinginPlatoismeanttogiveafaithfulpictureofthehistoricalSocrates,itisSocrates’dramaticdefenseofhimselfandhiswayoflifeinPlato’sApology(Döring,1998;Vlastos,1971,Introduction;cf.Morrison,2000).ManyotherscholarsholdtheskepticalviewthattheproblemofthehistoricalSocratesisinsoluble.Certainfactsabouthislifeandfeaturesofhischaracterarecon-sistentlyenoughportrayedthatwecanbereasonablysureaboutthem.Butallofoursourceswere,inlargepart,usingSocratesforendsoftheirown(Kahn,1996).TodisentanglefromtheirwritingswhatoriginatedwiththehistoricalSocratesandwhatdidnotmaybeahopelesstask.Butourinabilitytosolvethehistoricalproblemneednotbedisheartening.ForthereremainsthepossibilityofgivinguponthenoumenonSocrates–Socratesasheactuallyhistoricallywas–whileretainingavividinterestinthephenomenonSocrates–thatis,Socratesasheismanifestedthroughhisinfluenceonhisfollowers,andmoregenerallyontheculturearoundhim.ThinkofeachoftheSocraticsasafacetthroughwhichSocratesmaybeviewed.Theviewthrougheachfacetisdifferent.Theviewsareofthesameobject,yettheyarenotreducibletoanysimpleunity.Socrates-as-seen-through-the-many-facets-of-the-Socratic-movement–thatisaSocratesthatisavailabletous,andonethatisendlesslyfascinating(VanderWaerdt,1994).102ACTC0610220/03/2006,04:00PM\nsocratesSomeaspectsofthephenomenonSocratesarecoveredelsewhereinthisvolume.TheSocraticsotherthanPlatoandXenophonhaveachaptertothemselves(minorsocratics).Somescholarsdistinguisha“Socraticperiod”withinPlato’sdialogues.Onthisview,thecharacter“Socrates”incertaindialogueswrittenearlyinPlato’scareerhasacoherentphilosophicaloutlookdifferentfromtheoutlookof“Socrates”india-loguesliketheRepublic.Theearlierdialoguespresent“Socratic”views,incontrasttothe“maturePlatonic”viewsoftheRepublicandlaterdialogues.Thedifferencebetweenthe“Socratic”and“Platonic”viewsonethicsandmoralpsychologyiscoveredinplato’sethics:earlyandmiddledialogues.Ontheotherhand,allPlatonicwritingsinwhichthecharacter“Socrates”appearspresentanimageofSocrates.Thusthesubjectmattersofthesophisticmovement,theplatonicdialogue,plato’smeta-physics,andplato’spoliticalphilosophyalloverlapwiththischapter.SocratesinAristophanes’CloudsOuronlyportraitofSocratesfromhisownlifetimeisfoundinAristophanes’comicplayClouds,producedin423whenSocrateswasabout50yearsold.SocratesinCloudsisheadofaschool,the“Thinkery.”Heandhisstudentsarepale,unwashed,andpoor.Theyspendalltheirtimethinking,andcarenotforfoodorwineorexercise.Aprincipalactivityoftheschoolisscientificresearchintosuchsubjectsasastronomy,meteorology,naturalhistory,geometry,andgrammar.Butwhatdrivestheplotisthedesireofachronicdebtor,Strepsiades,tolearnanothersubject:forensicrhetoric,ortheartofmakinganunjustcauseappearjust.WhenStrepsiadesflunksoutofSocrates’Thinkery,hesendshissonPheidippidesinstead,whomastersthisartandreturnshometopunishhisfatherwithabeating.Socratesinvestigatesheavenandearth.Heteachesnaturalphilosophy,ontopicsrangingfromthephysiologyofthegnat(Nub.156–165)tothecoursesandrevolutionsofthemoon(171–172).Aristophanes’SocratesrejectsthetraditionalgodsofGreece,substitutingtheClouds,orotherpersonificationsofnaturesuchasBreathandAirandChaos.Socratesexplainsnaturalphenomenabymaterialnecessityratherthanbydivineintervention:thunderiscausedbythecollisionofwater-filledclouds,insteadofZeus.Infact,thenaturalphilosophyofAristophanes’SocratescloselyresemblesthatofDiogenesofApollonia,a“materialist”philosopherwhohadprobablyvisitedAthens(seeVanderWaerdt1994,ch.2).Aristophanes’portraitofSocratesasanaturalphilosophercontrastssharplywithourothersources.Xenophon’sSocratesclaimsthatknowledgeofheavenlyphenomenaisimpossible,andthatthosewhotrytoacquireitaremad.Xenophon’sSocrates,likePlato’s,devoteshimselftohumanaffairs.Whatisjustice?Whatislaw?Whatismostvaluableinhumanlife?HowcanSocratesandthosehespeakswithlearntoleadgoodlivesanddotherightthing?InanautobiographicalinterludeinPlato’sPhaedo,Socratestellsastorythatmightreconciletheseportraits(Phd.96aff.)Socratessaysthatinhisyouthhewasmarvelouslyeagerfornaturalphilosophy.Buthegrewdissatisfiedwhenhecouldnotfindthesortofanswerthatwouldsatisfyhim,soheabandonednaturalphilosophy.Aristophanes’earlyportraitofSocratesasanaturalphilosophermaybecorrect(thoughexaggeratedforcomiceffect),andconsistentwiththelateraccountsofPlatoandXenophon,which103ACTC0610320/03/2006,04:00PM\ndonaldr.morrisonreflectalaterphaseinSocrates’life.EvenifSocratesdidgothroughthisearlierphase,Socrates’importanceinthehistoryofthoughtisnotduetothephysicaldoctrinesattributedtohimintheClouds.ThecenterpieceoftheCloudsisadebatebetweenpersonificationsoftwomodesofreasoning:JustandUnjustArgument.ThisdebateiswonbyUnjustArgument,whocleverlyadvocatestheuseofspeechtofurthercrassself-interestattheexpenseoftraditionalmorality.Theartofpersuasion,includingtheabilitytomaketheweakerargumentappearthestronger,wastaughtduringthesecondhalfofthefifthcenturyby“sophists”likeProtagorasandGorgias,whochargedheftyfees.AninfluentialinterpretationofthecharacterSocratesintheCloudsisthatitdoesnotreallyportraySocrateshimself,butratheratypicalmemberoftheGreekEnlightenment,asophist(seeBarney,thesophisticmovement).Yetwemustbecareful.StrepsiadessaysthatSocrateschargesfees;butintheplaywedonotseeSocrateschargingfees,andSocrates–unlike,forexample,Protagoras–isutterlypoor.SocratesdoesnothimselfteachUnjustArgument,andheleavesthestagewhenUnjustArgumentappears.Thepointisasubtleone,andnotallscholarswillagree,butAristophanesmaybesayingthatonecanlearnhowtoturncleverargumenttoimmoralpurposesfromSocrates’associates,butnotfromSocrateshimself.Plato’sApologyofSocratesThechargethatAristophanesunfairlypresentsSocratesasasophistbeginswithPlato.InPlato’sApologySocratescreditsAristophaneswithmaligninfluence:Therehavebeenmanywhohaveaccusedmeformanyyearsnow,andnoneoftheiraccusationsaretrue....[They]persuadedyouandaccusedmequitefalsely,sayingthatthereisamancalledSocrates,awiseman,astudentofallthingsintheskyandbelowtheearth,whomakestheworseargumentappearthestronger....Whatismostabsurdinallthisisthatonecannotevenknowormentiontheirnamesunlessoneofthemisawriterofcomedies.(Ap.18b–c)TheApologyofSocratespresentsSocrates’defensespeechathistrial.HowaccurateanimageisitofthespeechSocratesactuallygave?Wecannotknow.WhatisclearisthatPlato’sApologyofSocratesisoneofthegreatestspeechesinhistory.Themostvivid,inspiring,andpsychologicallyconvincingimagewehaveofSocratescomesfromthisspeech.SocratesdefendshimselfagainstthethreeAristophanicchargesbyarguingthatheisnotwise,butignorant;thathedoesnotstudyphysics,butratherethicsandpolitics;andthathissoleconcernisnottowintheargument,buttodiscoverthetruth.ThesethreetraitshelpmakeSocratesthefounderofphilosophy.Thecommitmenttotruthratherthanpersuasioniswhatdistinguishes(true)philosophyfrom(false)rhetoric.PlatohasSocrateshammerthispointhomeatlengthintheGorgias.The“pre-Socraticphilosophers,”suchasAnaxagorasandXenophanes,didinquireinto“thingsintheskyandbelowtheearth”:theywereprimarilycosmologistsandphysicists.Socratesre-directedinquiryfromtheworldofnaturetotheaffairsofhumanbeings.104ACTC0610420/03/2006,04:00PM\nsocrates“Philo-sophia”means“loveofwisdom”.Onecanlovewisdom–andstriveforitwithlove-struckobsessiveness–withoutoneselfbeingwise.“Pre-Socratic”philosopherslikeParmenidesandHeraclitusclaimedtobealreadywise.Socrates,bycontrast,insistedboththatwisdomisthemostimportantthingtohave,andthathehimselfdidnothaveit.Devotinghislifetothesearchforthewisdomthathelacked,Socrateswas“philo-sophos”inaspecialsense.Socratesexplainshislife’smissionwithastory(Ap.21–22).HislifelongfriendChaerephonwenttotheDelphicOracleandaskedifanyonewaswiserthanSocrates.Theoraclerepliedthatnooneis.Socratestookthisasariddle:Socratesknewthathewasnotwise,yettheoracledoesnotlie.Totesttheriddle,Socrateswenttothosewithareputationforgreatwisdom–poets,politicians,andsuch–andquestionedthemtoseeiftheywerereallywise.Uponexamination,nooneturnedouttohavethewisdomthatheclaimedorpeoplethoughthehad.WhenSocratesapproachedordinarycraftsmen,hediscoveredthattheseartisanswereindeedwiseintheirparticularcrafts,forexample,carpentryandshoemaking.Butoutofprideintheircraft,thesepeoplealsothoughtthattheywerewiseinthemostimportantmatters–ethicsandpolitics.Butthecraftsmencouldnobetterexplainanddefendtheirviewsonthesetopicsthanthepoliticiansandthepoets.Socratesconcludedaboutallthesepeople:“Iamwiserthanthisman;itislikelythatneitherofusknowsanythingworthwhile,buthethinksheknowssomethingwhenhedoesnot,whereaswhenIdonotknow,neitherdoIthinkIknow;soIamlikelytobewiserthanheistothissmallextent,thatIdonotthinkIknowwhatIdonotknow”(Ap.21d).Onemightthinkthatafterprovingtheoraclerightinthisway,Socrateswouldstop.ButSocratesinterpretsthetestingoftheoracleasalifelongmission:“SoevennowIcontinuethisinvestigationasthegodbademe–andIgoaroundseekingoutanyone,citizenorstranger,whomIthinkwise.ThenifIdonotthinkheis,Icometotheassistanceofthegodandshowhimthatheisnotwise”(Ap.23b).WhydoesSocrateskeepon,yearafteryear,exposingasfalsepeople’spretensionstowisdom?Accordingtosomescholars,theoraclefromDelphiisapivotaleventinSocrates’life.TheactivitywethinkofascharacteristicofSocrates–examiningothersandexposingtheirpretensionstowisdom–beganasaresponsetotheoracle,andSocrates’reasonforcontinuingthisactivityisfundamentallyareligiousreason:hehasbeencommandedtodosobyApollo.OtherscholarsbelievethatSocratesbehavedinthiswaylongbeforeChaerephonvisitedDelphi(ifindeedChaerephondidvisitDelphi,andPlatodidnotsimplyinventthisstoryashedidsomanyothersinthedialogues).Onthisview,Socrates’talkof“amissionfromApollo”providesthecoverofareligioussanctionforanactivitythatSocrateshadadeeper,andmorefundamentallyphilosophical,reasontopursue.Thisreasonisbenevolence:adesiretobenefithisfellowAthenians.Socrates’inquirieshaveconvincedhimthatpeoplegenerallyleadthoughtlesslives,actingonthebasisofunexaminedvaluestheycannotjustify.Everyone–notjustpoliticiansandpoets,butalsoordinarypeople–needsthemedicinethatphilosophyprovides.Socratessays,“Anunexaminedlifeisnotworthliving”(Ap.38a).Socrates’powerfulcritiquerisksnihilism.Ifnoone’sopinionsaboutvaluecanbejustified,whoistosaywhatisrightorwrong?IfIfindthatIhavenogoodreasontodoonethingratherthananother,perhapsIcandowhateverIwant!105ACTC0610520/03/2006,04:00PM\ndonaldr.morrisonThisbringsustotheofficialchargesagainstwhichSocratesdefendedhimselfathistrial.Socrates’officialaccuserwasMeletus,backedbyAnytusandLycon.Thechargeswere(1)thatSocratesisguiltyofcorruptingtheyoungand(2)ofnotbelievinginthe1godsofthecity,butinothernewdivinities.ThedefenseSocratesgivesintheApologyagainstthesechargesissurprisinglyweak.WhatSocratesdoesistoshowthatMeletusisthoughtlessandnotacredibleaccuser,whileavoidingthesubstanceofthecharges.SocratesrespondstothereligiouschargebygettingMeletustorestate“notbelievinginthegodsofthecity”asachargethatSocratesisanatheist,thathebelievesinnogods.Socratesthenpointsoutthathecannotbothbeanatheistandbelieveinothernewdivinities!Thisdoesnotaddressthesubstanceofthecharge.Meletuswasfoolishtorevisethechargetoatheism.PlatoelsewherehasSocratesstronglycriticizethetraditionalHomericstoriesaboutthegods(Republic).Socrates’criticismoftraditionalGreekreligionissimpleandbrilliant.Thegodsaregood;itwouldbeimpioustosuggestotherwise.Butthetraditionalstoriesshowthegodsmisbehavinginallthewaysthathumansbehave:forexample,Zeustellsliesandrapeswomenandkillshisfather.Sothesestoriesmustbeuntrue.Socrates’critiqueofGreekreligionhadadramaticimpactonWesternculture.Itgaverisetophilosophicaltheology,the“godorgodsofthephilosophers”asopposedtothemythorthestory.ThetaskofSocraticphilosophicaltheologycanbestatedthus:assumingthatdivinityexists,andisgood,and(beingmorepowerfulthanmortals)istheirultimatecause,whatmustdivinitybelike?Plato,Aristotle,theStoics,andtheChristianfathersallconstructedtheirtheologiesonthisbasis.TherevolutionaryimplicationsofSocrates’arguments,however,makethemprofoundlythreateningtotraditionalGreekreligion.IfSocratesteachestheyoungtobelievethatwhatHomerandHesiodteachaboutthegodsisfalse,areasonableAtheniancitizenmightwellregardthisas“corruptingtheyoung.”TwootherissuesraisedbyMeletus’impietychargeshouldbementioned.“Introduc-ingnewdivinities”presumablyalludestoSocrates’personaldaimonion.This“divinity”isoddandmysterious,butintroducingnewdivinitieswasnotsounusualinAthens.Forexample,foreignersintheharbortownbroughttheirdivinitieswiththem(seeParker,1996).Moreimportantly,Greekreligion–likeJudaismandunlikeChristianity–wasprimarilyamatterofpracticeandnotbelief.Theentirecommunityhadaninterestinseeingtoitthateverycitizencarriedouttheproperritesandsacrifices,anddidnothingoffensivetothegods.Asingleperson’soffensemightleadanangrygodtobringdownaplagueormilitarydefeatuponthewholecity.Plato’sSocratescastsdoubtonAthenianreligiousbelief,butPlatonevershowshimneglectinghiseverydayreligiousduty.Xenophongoesfurther,andexplicitlyanswerstheimpietychargewiththeargumentthatSocrateswasopenlyfaithfulintheperformanceofhisreligiousduty(Mem.1.1.11,1.2.1–2;cf.4.3.16).SocratesrespondstothecorruptionchargeintheApologybyarguingthatbadpeopleharmthosewhoareclosetothem.SinceSocrates,likeallmen,wouldratherbebenefitedthanharmedbyhisassociates,hewouldneverintentionallyworsenhis1.Fordiscussionofthechargeofimpiety,seeBetegh,greekphilosophyandreligion,inthisvolume.106ACTC0610620/03/2006,04:00PM\nsocratesyoungcompanions’character.SoeitherSocratesdoesnotcorrupttheyoung,andisinnocentofthecharge,orhedoessounintentionally,anddeservesinstructionandadviceratherthanpunishment(Ap.25b–26a).Thisisapoorargument.ItsmostimportantflawisthatSocrateshaspersistedinhiswayoflifeformanyyearsinthefaceofcriticism.IfSocratesdoescorrupttheyoung,thereiseveryreasontothinkthatheisincorrigible.DidSocratescorrupttheyoung?Or(whatisadifferentquestion)wasitreasonableforatypicalAthenianjurortobelievethatSocratescorruptedtheyoung?Thesearenoteasyquestionstoanswer.ProminentintheAthenians’mindswerethecasesofCritiasandAlcibiades,twoassociatesofSocrateswhobecamenotoriousforevildeeds–andinAlcibiades’case,forimpiety(Mem.1.2.12–34;Plato,Alc.I;cf.Thuc.V–VIII;Plut.Alc.).Buttheissuegoesbeyondparticularindividuals,orevenparticularbeliefs.Socrates’witheringcritiqueofhisinterlocutors’statementsunderminesmorethanjustHomericreligion.Hiscritiqueofmereopinionthreatensallexistingvalues.Themerefactthatmostpeoplebelievesomething,orourancestorsbelievedit,doesnotgiveusreasontothinkthatthebeliefistrue.BehindtheofficialchargethatSocrates“corruptedtheyouth”issurelythecorrectperceptionthatSocratesunderminedtraditionalvalues.Evenso,Socrateswasnonihilist.Socrateshadstronganddistinctiveviewsabouthowtoactandwhatisvaluableinlife.AfterclaimingthathismissionfromApolloisablessingtothecity,Socratescontinues,“ForIgoarounddoingnothingbutpersuad-ingbothyoungandoldamongyounottocareforyourbodyoryourwealthinpreferencetoorasstronglyasforthebestpossiblestateofthesoul”(30a).Socratesheldthatwhatmattersmostinlifeisnot(whatmostpeopleinhissocietythoughtitis)wealth,orfame,orpower,orevenbodilyhealth.Whatmattersmostistheexcellenceofone’ssoul,orvirtue.Thispointofviewisfamiliarenoughtoustoday,butitwasabsolutelynewandrevolutionaryinthefifthcenturybce.SocratesexpressesotherstrongmoralviewsintheApology.Immediatelybeforemakinghisfamousremarkabouttheunexaminedlife,Socratessays:“itisthegreatestgoodforamantodiscussvirtueeverydayandthoseotherthingsaboutwhichyouhearmeconversingandtestingmyselfandothers”(Ap.38a).Thisisastrongstatement.ThebenefitSocratesclaimedearlierforhisphilosophicalactivityisthatitpuncturescomplacency:itisbettertobeawareofone’sownignorancethantothinkoneknowswhatonedoesnot.ButonepowerfulencounterwithSocrates,takentoheart,maysufficetoaccomplishthat.HereSocratesinsiststhatphilosophy,asawayoflife,issuperiortobricklayingorgeneralshipormanagingashipyard.InthispassageSocratesisnonihilistorskeptic.Heseemstoknow,orbelievewithconfidence,thatthemostvaluablethingforahumanbeingisvirtue,andphilosophyisthebestactivity.Socrates’distinctivemoralviewsarefurtherrevealedintheCrito.ThisdialoguetakesplacewhileSocratesisinprison.CritoandhisfriendshavearrangedtobribethejailersandtransportSocratesintoexile.CritoarguesthatSocratesowesittohimself,hisfriends,andhisfamilytoescape.SocratesarguesthathehasadutytoAthenstoremaininjailandaccepthispunishment,eventhoughthesentenceisunjust.SocratesbeginshisargumentbyremindingCritoofcertainmoralprinciplesheandCritoshare.Amongtheseare:Thesoulismoreimportantthanthebody.Lifeisnotworthlivingwitharuinedorunhealthybodyorsoul.Unjustactionharmsthe107ACTC0610720/03/2006,04:00PM\ndonaldr.morrisonsoul,andjustactionhelpsit(Cri.47e–48a,cf.Grg.469c–522c).Onemustneverdowrongwillingly(49a)oreveninjureanotherwillingly(49c).Thisprohibitionisabsolute:evenifoneisoneselfwrongedorinjured,itisnotrighttoinflictaninjuryinreturn(49c).Socratesiswellawarethattheseprinciplescontradicttraditionalvalues.Thetradi-tionalGreekconceptionofavirtuouspersonisonewho“helpshisfriendsandharmshisenemies.”Socratesheld,andinfluencedhisfollowerstohold,moralbeliefscon-trarytotraditionalvalues.IfSocratesisrightaboutmorality,hedoesnotcorrupthisfollowers,butsavesthem.IftraditionalGreekmoralityisright,ontheotherhand,Socratescorruptstheyoung.Thisshowsthatthereisnoshortcutanswertothequestion,“DoesSocratescorrupttheyoung?”TheonlywaytoknowwhetherSocratescorruptstheyoungornotisthroughmoralknowledgeitself.ToknowwhetherornotSocratesisguiltyofthechargesathistrial,onemustknowwhatgoodnessisandwhatbadnessis,whichactionsarerightandwhichoneswrong.SocratesmakesplainintheCritothathethinksmostjurorswerenotcompetenttojudgehisguilt.Bythestandardwehavejustlaidout,Socratesissurelycorrectinhiscondemnation.Theproblemisthat,byhisownadmission,Socratesalsolacksmoralknowledge.Thisentailsthathealsoisnotinapositiontoknowwhetherornothecorruptstheyoung!Socrates’confidenceinhisowninnocenceisunjustified.HowSocrates’avowalofignoranceiscompatiblewithconfidenceinhisowninnocenceisaparadox.PerhapsthereasonwhySocratesintheApologydoesnotgiveasubstantiverefutationofthecorruptionchargeisthathecannot.LateinhisspeechSocratesattemptstoescapethecorruptionchargeonatechnicalitythathasbecomerenowned.Socratesinsiststhathehasneverbeenanyone’steacher(33a).Thereasonhegivesisthat,unliketheprofessionalsophists,hedoesnotchargeafeeforhisconversation.“AndIcannotjustlybeheldresponsibleforthegoodorbadconductofthesepeople,asIneverpromisedtoteachthemanythingandhavenotdoneso”(33b).ThenobleimageofimpoverishedSocrateshasmadeitharderforphilosopherstojustifyadecentlivingeversince!Socrates’refusaltochargeafeedidhavetheimportanteffectofkeepinghimfreetochoosehisowncompany.Theprofessionalsophists,likeuniversityteacherstoday,wereobligedtoconversewithwhoeverpaidtheirfees.ButitisnotreallyplausibleforSocratestoimplythatunlesshechargedhisfollowersafeeheisnotresponsibleforhisinfluenceuponthem.SocraticMethodAccordingtoPlato’sApology,thepurposeandvalueofSocraticrefutationisnegativeandexistential:theinterlocutor’sclaimtowisdomisexposedasfalse.PlatonicdialoguesoftenshowSocratesengagedinthissortofrefutation.Hewillaskageneral,“Whatiscourage?”(Laches)orapolitician,“Whatisjustice?”(Republic),oraself-describedreligiousexpert,“Whatispiety?”(Euthyphro).Plato’sSocratesisalmostnevershowndiscussingimmediatelyrelevantpracticalquestions,suchaswhetherthisstatueisbeautifulorwhetherthisman’sleavingthebattlefieldwascowardly.Confrontedwith108ACTC0610820/03/2006,04:00PM\nsocratesquestionsofthissort,Plato’sSocrateswillmaketheissueabstractagain:Wecannotjudgewhetherthisstatueisbeautifulunlessweknowwhatbeautyis.Imyselfdonotknowwhatbeautyis.Sotellme,whatdoyousaybeautyis?Aftertheinterlocutoroffersadefinition,Socrateswillaskaseriesoffurtherques-tions,whichrevealthatthedefinitionisinadequate.Typically,eitherSocratesortheinterlocutorwillsuggestareviseddefinition,andSocratesproceedsthroughaseriesofquestionstoshowthatthisdefinitionwillnotdo,either.SocraticrefutationisoftenreferredtobyitsGreekname,elenchus.Socratesregardstheelenchusasatouchstoneforwisdomorknowledge.Ifyouareareligiousexpert,youcanexplainwhatpietyis,anddefendyourdefinitionagainstobjections.Tobepoliticallywise,youmustunderstandjustice,andthusbeabletodefineitanddefendyourdefinition.Socratesseemstothinkthatexpertsinordinarycraftssatisfythisrequirement.ButwemaydoubtthatatypicalAtheniancarpentercouldsuccessfullydefendadefinitionof“bed”againstSocraticattack!Socratesdoesnotdistinguishtechnicalverbalskill–eitherlogicalargumentorrhetoricalpersuasion–fromsubstantiveknowledgeofasubjectmatter.Socrates’interlocutorssometimesfeeltheyhavebeenrefuted,notbecausetheylackexpertiseinthesubject,butbyverbaltrickery.Socrateswoulddenythedistinction.PlatoshowsvividlyinhisdialogueshowbeingrefutedbySocratescouldbedeeplyannoying.Socratesimpliesthatonefactorinhistrialandconvictionwaswidespreadbuilt-upannoyanceatthewaySocratespuncturedpretensionstowisdom.ButthereisanotherreasonwhySocraticrefutationcould“getunderyourskin.”OneruleofSocraticdiscussionwassincerity:participantsinthediscussionshouldsayorassentonlytowhattheyreallybelieve.SinceSocratesconversesaboutthemostimportantissuesinhumanlife,whenherefutesaperson,heshowsthattheperson’sbasicbeliefsaboutgoodandbadandhowtoliveareunfounded.Thisexperiencecanbeshattering.ThiseffectofSocraticrefutationisespeciallyimportant,becauseSocratesdidnotmerelyconversewiththeprominentandpowerful.Socratesspenttimeinthemarket-place,willingtoconversewithwhoeverhappenedby.Evenifyouareamodestpersonanddonotclaimwisdom,aconversationwithSocratescanrevealthatyouropinionsaboutgoodandbadandhowtolivehavenobasis.InconversationwithSocrates,yourbasicvalues,yourwholewayoflife,yourveryself,areontrial.ThisaspectofSocraticrefutationishighlightedbyNiciasintheLaches:[W]hoevercomesintoclosecontactwithSocratesandassociateswithhiminconver-sationmustnecessarily,evenifhebeganbyconversingaboutsomethingquitedifferentinthefirstplace,keeponbeingledaboutbytheman’sargumentsuntilhesubmitstoansweringquestionsabouthimselfconcerningbothhispresentmanneroflifeandthelifehehaslivedhitherto.(Laches187e)YettheprocessbywhichSocratesrefuteshisinterlocutorhasvaluethatgoesbeyondthemerelynegativeandexistential.IfallwelearnedfromthedialoguesbearingtheirnameswerethatLaches,Lysis,Hippias,andMenolackwisdom,thesedialogueswouldnothavesurvivedtheages.Butthesedialoguesdomore.EvenwhenhisconversationpartnerisanunpromisingdoltlikeEuthyphro,Socratessteerstheconversationin109ACTC0610920/03/2006,04:00PM\ndonaldr.morrisonsuchawayastomakeitarichandprofoundphilosophicalexplorationofitstopic(seeC.Gill,theplatonicdialogue).Socratessteerstheconversationbysearchingfora“definition.”Socratesaskshisconversationpartnertogiveadefinition,to“saywhatcourageis”or“whatjusticeis.”WhatSocrateswantsisnot(whatwewouldcall)adictionarydefinition,tellinghowthewordistypicallyused,but(whatphilosophershavecometocall)a“realdefinition,”anaccountdisplayingtheessentialnatureof,forexample,courageorjustice.Infactourconcept“essence”goesbackhistoricallytoSocrates’questfordefinitions:“theessenceofF”iswhateverisgivenbyacorrectanswertotheSocraticquestion,“WhatisF?”ForanyattributeF,Socrateswantstoknowthe“onething”commontoallFthings2thatmakesthemF.Thisdefinitionmustbegeneral.Socrates’interlocutorsoftenerrbygivingexamplesinplaceofageneralaccount.“Justice”isnotanacceptabledefini-tionof“virtue,”becausethereareothervirtuesbesidesjustice,e.g.,temperanceandcourage.Thesuccessfuldefinitionisneithertoowidenortoonarrow.ThedefinitionmustbetrueofeverythingthatisF,butnotholdtrueofanythingthatthatisnotF.Inaddition,thedefinitionmustexplainwhyFthingsareF.InmanyPlatonicdialogues,Socrates’attemptstoarriveatadefinitionfail.ButintheMeno–whereSocratestriesandfailstodefine“virtue”–Socratesgivesamodeldefinitionusingthisexample:“shape”is“thelimitofasolid”(Meno76).AndintheRepublicSocratesdefinescivicjusticeas“eachonedoingitsownjobwell”(Rep.IV,443d–444a).Afterelicitingadefinition,Socratescontinuestoquiz,obtainingfromhisinter-locutoranswerstoastringofquestionsconcerningthedefinitionandrelatedissues.EventuallySocratesisabletoshowthatoneoftheresponsescontradictstheoriginalthesis.Theinterlocutorisrefuted.Theenduringvalueofthesediscussionsismostlyduetothebrillianceanddepthoftheirideasandarguments.Socratesdoesnotaimsimplyforaquickandeasyrefutation.Hesteersthediscussionthroughprofoundterritoryalongtheway.ButSocratesoftenclaimstohaveaccomplishedmorethan“aninterestingexplora-tion.”Heclaimstherefutationshowsthattheinitialdefinitionisfalse.Asamatteroflogic,thisclaimismistaken.IfthethesesD,A,B,andCareinconsistent,atleastoneofthemmustbefalse,buttheinconsistencyalonedoesnottelluswhetherthefalsehoodlieswiththeoriginaldefinitionD,orwithonetheotherclaimsA,B,orC.HowSocratescanclaimtohaveprovedthattheinitialdefinitionisfalse,whenallhehasshownisthattheinterlocutor’sbeliefsareinternallyinconsistent,isanotorious“problemoftheelenchus”whichmanyscholarshavetriedtosolve.WehaveseenthatSocratesisnotaskeptic.Heandhiscompanionsshareasetofmoralprinciplessharplyatoddswiththeirsociety.Anotherproblemoftheelenchusishowandwhetherthisnegativeprocedurecanproduceconstructiveresults.IsSocrates’confidenceinhisownmoralprinciplessomehowjustifiedthroughtheelenchus?Socrates’famouscomparisonofhisactivitywiththatofamidwifesuggestsaway:2.AristotletestifiesthatasearchforgeneraldefinitionswascharacteristicofSocrates(Met.M.4,1078b).AristotleherealsoconfirmsthatonemethodSocratesusedinhissearchfordefinitionswasgeneralizingfromexamples,amethodAristotlecalls“induction.”Xenophon’sdepictionofSocrates’searchfordefinitionsagreeswithPlatoandAristotleonboththesepoints(Mem.1.1.16,4.3–6).110ACTC0611020/03/2006,04:00PM\nsocratesNowmyactivityisjustlike[midwives’]inmostrespects.ThedifferenceisthatIattendmenandnotwomen,andthatIwatchoverthelaboroftheirsouls,notoftheirbodies.Andthemostimportantthingaboutmyartistheabilitytoapplyallpossibleteststotheoffspring,todeterminewhethertheyoungmindisbeingdeliveredofaphantom,thatis,anerror,orafertiletruth.ForonethingwhichIhaveincommonwithordinarymid-wivesisthatImyselfambarrenofwisdom.(Tht.150b–c)Socratesheresuggeststhatattemptsatrefutationareatestfortruthaswellasfalsity.IfaphilosophicalthesiswithstandsSocraticexamination,ithasbeenshowntobea“fertiletruth.”NoticeachangedperspectivefromtheApology:whatisbeingtestedhereisnolongerapersonorhisclaimtowisdom,butaphilosophicalthesisoridea.IfthedistinctivemoralprinciplesthatSocratesandhisassociatessharehavewith-stoodmanyattemptstorefutethem,perhapsovermanyyears,thenbytheTheaetetusstandardtheyhavebeenshowntobetrue.Although(accordingtothemidwifemetaphor)Socrateswasnotthesourceoftheseideas,astheirexaminerheisoptimallyplacedtojudgetheirtruth.Iftheelenchusisatestfortruth,perhapsitcanproduceknowledgeafterall,andSocratesisnotasignorantashepretends.MoralPsychologyOnepowerfulandwidespreadinterpretationoftheethicsandmoralpsychologyofthePlatonicSocratesholdsthatSocratesisapsychologicalegoist:hebelievesthattheultimateendofallouractionsisourowngood.Thismakeshimalsoanintellectualist:everyonealwaysdoeswhatseems(tohim)best(forhimself).Socrates’intellectualismleadshimtodenyweaknessofwill:nooneever“doeswrongwillingly”(Prt.345e).Virtueistheartoflivingagoodlife,i.e.,promotingandsecuringone’sowngood.Sincenooneactsagainsthisbetterjudgment,theabilitytoreliablyrecognizewhatisgoodandwhatisbadsufficestobeabletochoosethegoodandrejectthebad.Calltheabilitytoreliablyrecognizegoodandbad“knowledgeofgoodandbad.”SocraticintellectualismabouthumanactionthusleadstoSocraticintellectualismaboutvirtue.Virtueisknowledge.Whatkindofknowledge?Notcarpentryormathematics,3butexpertiseconcerningwhatisgoodorbad.ButthisinterpretationofPlato’sSocratesfacesdifficulties.TheevidenceforSocraticpsychologicalegoismisthin.(InfactthemostexplicitexpressionofSocraticegoismisfoundnotinPlato,butinXenophon:Mem.3.9.4.)Thepassagesmostoftencited(Euthd.278e,Meno77–78,Grg.468,486,507)supportaweakerdoctrine,UniversalSelf-Interest.Socratesholdstheplausiblethesisthateveryonedesires,andintenselydesires,hisownwell-being.Socratesassumesthatvirtuallyeveryoneisawareofhavingthisdesire.Thismakesegoisticmotivesanaturalstartingpointforethicaldiscussion.Someinterlocutors,likeCalliclesinPlato’sGorgias,havenonon-egoisticdesires.Withthem,discussionmustproceedfromnarrowlyegoisticassumptions.Butmanypeoplecare,ultimatelyandintrinsically,aboutgoodsbeyondthemselves:their3.ForanexcellentpresentationofthisapproachtoSocrates,seePenner,plato’sethics:earlyandmiddledialogues,inthisvolume.111ACTC0611120/03/2006,04:00PM\ndonaldr.morrisonfriends,theirfamilies,thecity.Withthesepeople,Socrates’philosophicalinquiriescanbuildonabroaderbase.ThroughoutPlato’sdialogues(andnotjusttheso-called“Socratic”ones)SocratesassumesUniversalSelf-Interest.Socratesalsoholdsthatallrationaldesireisforthegood,but“thegood”canbefilledoutindifferentways.Somerationaldesiresareforone’sowngood.Otherrationaldesiresareforthegoodofone’scity,orforthegoodnessofthecosmos(theDemiurgeinPlato’sTimaeus).Differentpeoplewillhavedifferentshapesandrangesofdesiresforthegood.ButSocrates(throughoutPlato)doesseemtothinkthatallrationaldesireisforthegood.DrawinguponPlato’sProtagoras,Aristotlereports:“Itwouldbestrange–soSocratesthought–ifwhenknowledgewasinamansomethingelsecouldmasteritanddragitaboutlikeaslave.ForSocrateswasentirelyopposedtotheviewinquestion,holdingthatthereisnosuchthingasweaknessofwill”(ENVII.2,1145b23–26).ThethesisthatknowledgeissuchapowerfulstatethatitcannotbeovercomebypassionsisnotdistinctlySocratic.WhenSocratessuggestsit,Protagorasreadilyagrees(352b–d).TheknowledgethatSocratesthinkscannotbeovercomebypassionisnotjustanysortofknowledge(liketheknowledgethattodayisTuesday),butknowledgeofgoodandbad.Anothernameforthisknowledgeispracticalwisdom.SocratesintheRepublicalsogivespracticalwisdomthisstrength.EvenAristotleagreesthatapersonwhohaspracticalwisdomisnotsubjecttoweaknessofwill(ENVII,X).Thereasonthattheknowledgewhichiswisdomcannotbeovercomebythepassionsisthatwisdomissovery,verystrong.Anordinaryperson’sbeliefsdonothavethatstrength.So,asAristotlerecognized(VII.2,1145b31–1146a9),thetwoclaims“Nowisemandoeswrongwillingly”,and“Noonedoeswrongwillingly”arephilosophicallyverydifferent.Moreover,theevidenceforattributing“noonedoeswrongwillingly”toSocratescomesfromaverydifferentcontextintheProtagoras.SocratesmakesthisclaimaspartofaconvolutedinterpretationofapoembySimonides:“ForIamprettymuchofthisopinion,thatnointelligentmanbelievesthatanyonedoeswrongfreelyoractsshame-fullyandbadlyofhisownfreewill,buttheywellknowthatallwhodoshamefulandbadthingsdosootherthanfreely”(Prt.345d–e).Socratesdoesnotheresaythatnooneactsagainsthisbetterjudgment,ordoeswhathebelievestobewrong.Whathesaysisthatnoonedoeswrongfreelyorwillingly(hekOn).Apersonwhodoessome-thingunwillinglydoesitbecauseofsomeconstraint.Youremaininjailbecausethecelldoorislocked.Youhandyourwallettoathiefbecauseofhisgun.Thisconstraintcanbeeitherexternalorinternal.Arecoveringalcoholictakesadrink,relapsingagainsthiswill,becauseofthepowerofhisaddiction.Lookingatanearlierphilosopherthroughthelensofhisownphilosophicalviews,AristotlemisinterpretsSocrates’remarksintheProtagoras.Socratesdoesnotmeantosaythatnoonedoeswhathebelievestobewrongoractsagainsthisbetterjudgment,butratherthatwhenapersondoesthat,heactsunwillingly.EducationandPoliticsTheSocraticprinciplethatvirtueisknowledgeneednotimplythatalleducationisnarrowlycognitive,orthattheonlymeansofmoralimprovementisphilosophical112ACTC0611220/03/2006,04:00PM\nsocratesdialectic.Fordialectictobeuseful,certaincharactertraitsmustalreadybeinplace:patience,humility,andastrongdesiretolearn.InbothPlatoandXenophon,Socratesappealstoemotionsaswellasreason;aboveall,Socratesmakesuseofshame.Socratesbelievesthatthecharactersofsomeimmoralandunjustpeoplecanbeimprovedbypunishmentssuchflogging,prison,andfines(Grg.472–480).ThebeneficialeffectsoftheLawsofAthensuponthecharacterofitscitizensareacknowledgedbySocratesintheCrito.IntheApologySocratesdeniesthathepracticespolitics(onthegroundsthathewouldsurelyfail)(Ap.31),whileintheGorgiasheclaimsthatheistheonlyAthenianwhotrulypracticespolitics(Grg.521d).Theseapparentlycontradictorystatementsarereconcilable.Socratesdeniesthatheisabletobenefitthecity“inthepublicspace”oftheAssemblyorcitygovernment,yetclaimstobeabletobenefitthecityprivately,bymakingcertainofitsmembersbetterone-on-onebydialectic.LesseasilyreconcilableareSocrates’loveofAthensandhiscontemptforAtheniandemocracy.SocratesbelievesthattheLawsofAthensareworthyofrespectandbeneficial,andthatonlyinAthenscanphilosophyflourish.YethealsobelievesthatnoneoftheAthenianpoliticalactors“trulypracticepolitics,”andthatputtingpoliticalpowerinthehandsofthemanyislikepracticingmedicinebymajorityvote.IronyPlato’sSocratesisnotalwayshonest.Heclaimsabarrenignorancethathismoralself-confidencebelies.Socratesinsincerelyflattershisinterlocutorsbyattributingtothemawisdomhedoesnotforamomentbelievein.InAristophanesandPlato,eirOneiaanditscognatesmean“dissimulation,deception.”Thisisadifferentnotionfromourconceptofirony,althoughitisrelated.Ironicalspeechdoesnotintendtodeceivethehearer,buttosuccessfullycommunicateamessagethatisdifferentfromtheliteralmeaningofwhatissaid.Quintilian’sdefinitionofironyfitsourconceptwell:speech“inwhichsomethingcontrarytowhatissaidistobeunderstood”(Inst.orat.9.2.44).IntheSymposiumAlcibiadessaysthat,whenitcomestoSocrates,appearancesaremisleading.Socratesclaimstobecompletelyignorantandknownothing,whileinsideheiscompletelydifferent.“Hiswholelifeisspentdissembling(eirOneuomenos)andtoyingwithhisfellowmen”(Symp.216e).ThrasymachusintheRepublicchargesthatSocratesisdeceitfulinpretendingnottohaveananswerforthequestionsheasks:“Heracles!ThisisSocrates’habitualdeception(eirOneia)”(Rep.I,337a).IntheGorgias,SocratessaystoCallicles,“Owonderfulone,teachmemoregently,sothatIdon’tgiveupattendingtoyou.”Calliclesreplies:“Youaremockingme(eirOneue)Socrates”(Grg.489d–e).Thesechargesarefair.ButSocrates’disingenuousnessandmockerymayinvolvemorethansimpledishonesty.IfSocratesintendsCalliclestorecognizethemockery,thenSocrates’remarkisnotdeceptive,butironical.Socrateswasthefirstgreatphilosopher,andalsothefirstgreatironistinhistory.Hisironyhasbeencelebrated,scorned,andpuzzledoverfromhistimetoours(Kierkegaard,1989;Nehamas,1998,pt.1;Vlastos,1991,ch.1).WhenSocratespraisesEuthyphro,heengagesineirOneia,butnotirony.Hiswordsaredeceptiveandmocking,butthey113ACTC0611320/03/2006,04:00PM\ndonaldr.morrisonarenotintended“tocommunicatesomethingotherthanwhatissaid,”becauseSocratesrealizesthatEuthyphroistoostolidtocatchon.TheexamplefromtheGorgiasismorecomplicated.CalliclesaccusesSocratesofeirOneia,ofintendingtodeceivewithhispraise.Bythisaccusation,CalliclesmeanstosignalthattheeirOneiahasfailed:he,Callicles,hasseenthroughthedeception.ButwhatifCalliclesiswrong?WhatifSocratesdidnotintendtodeceiveCallicles,but–awareofCallicles’sharpness–expectedhimtoseethroughthedeceptionandrealizethatSocratesthinkslittleofhim?Inthatcase,Socrates’remarkisaninsultingirony.ThesituationinPlato’sdialoguesisevenmorecomplicated.Thereisanothercharacterwhoseintentionsmatter:theauthor(seeNehamas1998,andinthisvolumethechapterbyC.Gill).WhenPlatohasSocratespraiseEuthyphro,heexpectsthereaderto“get”theinsincerityofthepraise.SoalthoughSocratesdeceivesEuthyphro,Platoenlightensthereader,throughtheuseofirony.Literallydeceptivespeech–sayingsomethingotherthanwhatyoumeanorbelieve–hasanenormousvarietyofuses,manyofthemrelevanttoSocrates(Nehamas,1998;Vlastos,1991).Ihavediscussedsomeoftheseuses.Hereisonemore:SupposeoneofSocrates’closecompanionswaspresentwhileSocrateswastalkingwithEuthyphro.ThenwhenSocratespraisesEuthyphro,hewillexpectthatEuthyphrowillbedeceived,buthisfriendwillrecognizetheironyandunderstanditasanexpressionofcontempt.Ironicalspeechcanthusbeusedtoseparateout“insiders”whogetthejokefrom“outsiders”whodonot.ThedistinctionbetweeninsidersandoutsiderswascrucialtoSocrates,whosawhimselfandhiscompanionsasunitedbyacommitmenttoawayoflifeandasetofvaluesdramaticallydifferentfromthoseoftherestofsociety.Whendiscussinginpublic,Socratesmayoftenhavespokenwiththisdoubleintention,deliberatelymisleadingoutsiderswhileironicallycommunicatinghisrealthoughtstohisfriends.XenophonThedistinctionbetweeninsidersandoutsidershelpstoexplainacharacteristicdiffer-encebetweenPlato’sSocratesandXenophon’s.Plato’sSocratesappearsmoresavageandironical,andXenophon’sSocratesmorekindlyandstraightforward,becausePlatomainlyshowsSocratesinconversationwithprofessionalsophistsandother“outsiders,”whileXenophonmainlyshowshiminconversationwithhisfriends.ButwhenXenophon’sSocratesconverseswithsophistsandtyrants,hecandisplayasimilarirony(Mem.1.2.30–34,4.4.5;Morrison,1987).XenophonwrotefourSocraticworks:ApologyofSocratestotheJury,Memorabilia,Oeconomicus,andSymposium.HewrotethreeotherworksofpoliticalphilosophyinwhichSocratesdoesnotappear:Hiero,Agesilaus,andCyropaedia.TheseotherworksareimportantforunderstandingXenophon’scontributiontotheSocraticmovement,butdonotcontributedirectlytohisimageofSocrates.UnlikePlato’sApology,Xenophon’sApologydoesnotpretendtopresentSocrates’entirespeech.Xenophonfocusesinsteadonasinglequestion:whydidSocratesspeaksoarrogantlyasalmosttoensureconviction?Plato’simpliedanswertothisquestionisthatonlythuscouldSocratesbetruetohimself.Socratesunderstoodthathewaswise114ACTC0611420/03/2006,04:00PM\nsocrates(withahumanwisdom,throughawarenessofhisownignorance),inawaythatmostAtheniansarenot,andthathisphilosophicalmissionmakeshimAthens’greatestbenefactor.Ifmakingthesefactsclearappearsarrogant,sobeit.Xenophonthinks,plausibly,thatthisexplanationisinsufficient.Socratescouldhavepresentedthesamebasicdefenseinamuchmoreconciliatorymanner.Xenophonissurelyrightaboutthis,althoughhisexplanationofSocrates’arrogantpresentationislessnoblethanPlato’s.XenophonclaimsthatthereasonSocratesspeakssoarrogantlyisthathepreferreddeathtotheinfirmitiesofoldage.TheMemorabiliaorRecollectionsofSocratesisXenophon’sown“apology,”ordefenseofSocrates.MostofthebookisdevotedtodefendingSocratesagainstthechargeofcorruptingtheyouth:“Inmyopinion[Socrates]actuallybenefitedhisassociates,partlybypracticalexampleandpartlybyconversation.IshallrecordasmanyinstancesasIcanrecall”(Mem.1.3.1).ThusXenophondirectlyconfrontsthecorruptionchargethatPlato’sApologyevades.Socratesbenefitedhisyoungassociatesbyargumentandadvice;butaboveall,byhisexample(Mem.1.2.2–3).Socrates“madehisassociatesdesirevirtueandgavethemhopethatiftheytookcareforthemselves,theywouldbecomegood.Andthoughheneverprofessedtobeateacher,hemadehisassociateshopebyimitatinghimtobecomeso,sincehehimselfwasmanifestlyofthissort”(Mem.1.2.2–3).Xenophon’sSocratesisavuncular.Hegiveshisyoungassociatespracticaladvice.Hisphilosophicalconversationsareoften(thoughnotalways)moreconcretethanPlato’s,andleadtopositiveconclusions.Consonantwithhisapologeticpurpose,Xenophonde-emphasizeswhatiscontroversialaboutSocrates.Considerthetradi-tionalGreekmaxim:“Helpyourfriendsandharmyourenemies.”PlatointheCritohasSocratesdenythis,insistingthatyoushouldnotharmanyone,notevenyourenemies.Bycontrast,Xenophon’sSocratesdoesadvocatehelpingfriendsandharmingenemies(Mem.2.3.14;2.6.35;3.1.6;4.2.14–16).ButhisSocratestransformsthemeaningofthistraditionalmaximthrougharadicalnewunderstandingoffriendship.Socratesarguesthatbadmencannotbefriendstoanyone(Mem.2.6.1–7,14–16).Onhisviewoffriendship,goodmenarenaturallyfriendswitheachother,andenemiesofthebad.Sincetrulybadpeoplecannotbeimproved,goodpeoplecannoteitherbenefitorharmthem.Socratesisamasteroferotics.InPlato’sSymposium,Socratessaysthateroticsistheonethingheknows(177d,cf.Lysis211eandTheages128b).InXenophon’sSymposium,Socratessaysthatheprideshimselfonbeinga“procurer,”wherethatwordhassexualconnotation.(Symp.4.57).Socratesdoesnotemployhiseroticpowerforthepurposesofphysicalseduction.InPlato,AlcibiadesbemoansSocrates’sexualcontinenceinthefaceofAlcibiades’desire(Symp.219b–d).WhenSocratesandhiscompanionsvisitaprostituteinXenophon’sMemorabilia,shefallsinlovewithhimwhileheremains4immunetohercharms(Mem.3.11).Socrates’seductionisaimedatthesoulsofhisyoungadmirers.ThemostbrilliantandvividimageofSocraticspiritualseductionisAlcibiades’speechinPlato’sSymposium.ButthemostdetailedandinformativeaccountofSocrates’selectionandintellectualseductionofagiftedyoungmanisthestoryof4.SocraticerosisalsoamajorthemeinAeschines.SeeKahn(1994)andDeclevaCaizzi,minorsocratics,inthisvolume.115ACTC0611520/03/2006,04:00PM\ndonaldr.morrisonEuthydemusinXenophon’sMemorabilia(4.2).ThisaccountshowsthatSocrateswasverychoosy.TobeadmittedasoneofSocrates’closeassociates,ayoungmanneededtobeintelligent,desirousofallformsoflearning,persistentinthefaceofshameanddiscouragement,andinclinedtowardvirtue.Socrates’religiousoutlookissomewhatdifferentinXenophon’streatmentthanPlato’s.XenophondefendsagainsttheimpietychargebystressingSocrates’faithfulobservanceofreligiousritualsandsacrifices(Mem.1.1.2).Xenophon’sSocratesbelievesindivination:theabilityofominousbirdsorsheepentrails,properlyinterpreted,toforetellthefuture.OnemightthinkthatthismakesXenophon’sSocratesmorecon-ventionalandlessphilosophicalthanPlato’s.Butthiswouldbewrong:Xenophon’sSocratesgivesaphilosophicalargumentinfavorofdivination.InbothPlatoandXenophon,Socratesholdstheanti-Homericviewthatthegodsaregood.WhereasinPlatoSocratesmerelyassumesthatthegodsexistandaregood,Xenophon’sSocratesgivesaphilosophicalargumentfortheexistenceofbenevolentandbeneficentdeities.Thisiswhathasbecomeknownasan“argumentfromdesign”:theworldaroundusrevealssomuchmarvelouslyfunctionaldesignthatitmusthavebeenproducedbyintelligentandpowerfulbeneficentdesigners(Mem.1.4.2–8).Xenophon’sSocratestakesanotherstepbeyondPlato’swhenhearguesthatthegodsarenotonlygood,butalsoomniscient(Mem.1.2.19).Itstandstoreasonthatall-knowingandbenevolentgodswillassisthumanbeings,withtheirlimitedintelligence,bysendingthemsigns.ConclusionSocrates,thefounderofphilosophy,isaparadox,amystery,andaninspiration.Heisahistoricalfigure,andamyth.Heisprofoundlyrational,andprofoundlydevout.Heraisesthestandardsforethicalandpracticalknowledgesohighthatnoonecanmeetthem;butatcrucialmomentsheisrelievedofthisinconveniencebytheprivaterevelationofaninfallibledivinity.Socrates’mostoutstandingpersonalcharacteristicswereadevotiontorationalinquiryaboutvalues,andanunflinchingconsistencyofthoughtandaction.TogetherthesetraitsleadtocondemnationandexecutionatthehandsofhisnativecityAthens.Whatisphilosophy?Whatisaphilosophicallife?Whatarethetiesofloyaltythatbind,andthedivergencesofoutlookandpurposethatdivide,thePhilosopherandtheCity,therealmofethicsandtheworldofpolitics?Forthoseinterestedinsuchquestions,throughouthistoryandtoday,theancientimagesofSocratesprovideaninexhaustiblesourceofinspiration.BibliographySourcesAristophanesDover,K.J.(ed.).(1968).Aristophanes:Clouds.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Sommerstein,A.(trans.)(1981).Aristophanes:TheAcharnians;TheClouds;Lysistrata.Harmondsworth:Penguin.116ACTC0611620/03/2006,04:00PM\nsocratesPlatoTheworksofPlatoarecitedbyStephanusnumbers,indicatingpageandsectiononthatpageoftheeditionofPlato’sworksbyHenriEstienne(Paris,1578).ModerneditionsoftheGreektextandtranslationscommonlyusethesestandardnumbersinthemarginsofthetext.GreektextofPlato:Burnet,J.(ed.).(1900–7).Platonisopera.(5vols.).Oxford:ClarendonPress.TheOxfordClassicalTextiscurrentlybeingrevised:Duke,E.A.,Hicken,W.F.,Nicoll,W.S.M.,Robinson,D.B.,andStrachan,J.C.G.(eds.).(1995).Platonisopera.(vol.1):Euthyphro,Apology,Crito,Phaedo,Cratylus,Theaetetus,Sophist,Politicus.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Euthyphro,Apology,Crito:Burnet,J.(1924).Plato’s“Euthyphro”,“ApologyofSocrates”,and“Crito”.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.ConcordanceofPlato:Ast,D.F.(1835–8).LexiconPlatonicum;sive,VocumPlatonicarumindex.(3vols.).Leipzig:Weidman.Repr.NewYork:BurtFranklin,1969.TranslationofPlato:Cooper,J.M.(ed.).(1997).Plato:CompleteWorks.(D.S.Hutchinson,assoc.ed.).Indianapolis:Hackett.XenophonBandini,M.(ed.)andL.-A.Dorion(trans.).(2000).Xénophon:Mémorables.(vol.1).Paris:LesBellesLettres.Marchant,E.C.andTodd,O.J.(eds.).(1979).Xenophon(vol.4):Memorabilia,Oeconomicus,Symposium,Apology.LoebClassicalLibrary.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress/London:Heinemann.Tredennick,H.andWaterfield,R.(trans.).(1990).Xenophon:ConversationsofSocrates.London:Penguin.WorksCitedDöring,K.(1998).GrundrissderGeschichtederPhilosophie.(vol.2/1):Sokrates,dieSokratikerunddievonihnenbegründetenTraditionen.Basel:Schwabe.Kahn,C.(1994).“AeschinesonSocraticEros.”InP.VanderWaerdt(ed.)TheSocraticMovement(pp.87–106).Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.——.(1996).PlatoandtheSocraticDialogue.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Kierkegaard,S.(1989).TheConceptofIronywithConstantReferencetoSocrates.(trans.H.HongandE.Hong).Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Morrison,D.(1987).“OnProfessorVlastos’Xenophon.”AncientPhilosophy,7,9–22.——.(2000).“OntheAllegedHistoricalReliabilityofPlato’sApology.”ArchivfürGeschichtederPhilosophie,82,235–65.Nehamas,A.(1998).TheArtofLiving:SocraticReflectionsfromPlatotoFoucault.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Parker,R.(1996).AthenianReligion:AHistory.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Patzer,A.(1987).DerHistorischeSokrates.Darmstadt:WissenschaftlicheBuchgesellshaft.VanderWaerdt,P.(ed.).(1994).TheSocraticMovement.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.Vlastos,G.(ed.).(1971).ThePhilosophyofSocrates.NewYork:Doubleday.——.(1991).Socrates:IronistandMoralPhilosopher.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress/Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.117ACTC0611720/03/2006,04:00PM\ndonaldr.morrisonFurtherReadingBenson,H.H.(ed.).(1992).EssaysonthePhilosophyofSocrates.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Brickhouse,T.andSmith,N.(2000).ThePhilosophyofSocrates.Boulder:Westview.Edmunds,L.(1985).“Aristophanes’Socrates.”ProceedingsoftheBostonAreaColloquiuminAncientPhilosophy,1,209–30.Field,G.C.(1930).PlatoandhisContemporaries:AStudyinFourth-centuryLifeandThought.London:Methuen.Gomez-Lobo,A.(1994).FoundationsofSocraticEthics.Indianapolis:Hackett.Grote,George.(1865).PlatoandtheOtherCompanionsofSocrates.(3vols.).London:Murray.Guthrie,W.K.C.(1971).ThePhilosophyofSocrates.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Hadot,P.(1995).PhilosophyasaWayofLife:SpiritualExercisesfromSocratestoFoucault.Oxford:Blackwell.Irwin,T.(1995).Plato’sEthics.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.McPherran,M.(1996).TheReligionofSocrates.UniversityPark:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress.Nussbaum,M.C.(1980).“AristophanesandSocratesonLearningPracticalWisdom.”YaleClassicalStudies,26,43–97.Prior,W.(ed.).(1996).Socrates:CriticalExaminations.(4vols.).London:Routledge.Slings,S.R.(1994).Plato’sApologyofSocrates.ALiteraryandPhilosophicalStudywithRunningCommentary.EditedandcompletedfromthepapersofthelateÉ.deStrycker,S.J.Leiden:Brill.Strauss,L.(1989).“TheProblemofSocrates:FiveLectures.”InT.Pangle(ed.).TheRebirthofClassicalPoliticalRationalism(pp.103–83).Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Vlastos,G.(ed.).(1971).ThePhilosophyofSocrates.GardenCity,NY:Anchor.——.(1994).SocraticStudies.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.deVogel,C.J.(1963).“WhowasSocrates?”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy,1,143–61.Zeller,E.(1885).SocratesandtheSocraticSchools.(trans.O.J.Reichel.).NewYork:Russell&Russell.118ACTC0611820/03/2006,04:00PM\nminorsocratics7MinorSocraticsFERNANDADECLEVACAIZZIIntroductionAlthougheveryonewantedtobecalledaSocratic,andthoughtthattheywere,thefollowersofSocratesactuallygaverisetodiverseandconflictingtraditions(Cicero,DeOr.3.16.61;AristoclesofMessene,ap.Eus.Praep.Evang.11.3.4).Thevagariesoftextualtransmissionandtheculturalpreferencesoflateantiquitycombinedtopre-servetheentireCorpusPlatonicum,butnotsofortheotherfigures,majororminor,oftheSocraticcircle–notevenforAntisthenes,whoseoutputwasvaried,impressiveinquantity,andimportantenoughtoearnthepraiseoftheancients,whoreadandvaluedhisworksformanycenturies.Thissituation,whoserepercussionsonthedevelopmentofphilosophicalthoughtinmoderntimesarewellknown,hasfavoredtheseparationofPlatofromtheotherSocratics.ThisseparationisnotmerelyduetotheenormousdifferencebetweentheamountweknowaboutPlatoandabouttheothers;itisoftenaccompaniedbymorepartisanphilosophicaljustificationsandvaluejudgments.Socrates,Plato,andtheSocraticsarethreepawnsinacomplexgame,agamethathasneverceasedtochallengeandtofascinateallthosewhohaveworkedinthefieldofphilosophy.Onthetable,onemightsay,aretwolargeinterconnectedproblems.Ontheonehand,thereistheenigmaticandelusivefigureofSocrates,who,althoughhewrotenothing,gavehisnametoagenreofliterature,thelogosSokratikos,agenrepracticedbymanyauthorswhoinvariouswaysinvokedhim.Ontheotherhand,thereistheinterpretationofPlato’sphilosophyandofitsrelationshiptoSocrates’thought,onwhichourpositiveornegativevaluationoftheotherSocraticsdependsinmanycases.Themodernlabels‘MinorSocratics’,‘Socraticiminori’and‘Demi-Socratiques’thattodayareretainedmostlyforreasonsofconvenience,owetheirsuccesstotheseminalhistoryofGreekphilosophybyEduardZeller,DiePhilosophiederGriechen(1844–6,citedfromfifthedition1922).ThegreatGermanscholaropenedthesecondpartofhisworkwithasectionentitled“SokratesunddieunvollkommenenSokratiker”(“SocratesandtheincompleteSocratics”).HerewefindthethesisthattheSocraticswho,besidesPlato,foundedphilosophicalschools–Euclides(withPhaedo),AntisthenesandAristippus–allinvokedSocrates.Theydidso,however,inaone-sidedway,reflectingthespiritoftheirmaster’sdoctrineonlyincompletely.SomekepttothegeneralcontentoftheSocraticprinciple,theabstractideaoftheGood.OthersstartedoutfromaeudaemonisticconstrualofthisideaandmadetheGoodintosomethingrelative.119ACTC0711920/03/2006,04:00PM\nfernandadeclevacaizziWithinthefirstgroup,thetheoreticalperspectivewasfundamentalforEuclides,thepracticalperspectiveforAntisthenes.ThustheSocraticsweredividedintothreeschools:theMegarian,theAntistheneanandCynic,andfinallytheCyrenaic.Eachoneoftheseschools,whiledevelopingasingleaspectofSocrates’thought,alsoreconnectedtoearlierdoctrinalpositions.TheMegariansandtheCynicslinkedthemselvestotheEleatictraditionandtothesophisticmovementasrepresentedbyGorgias,theCyrenaicstoProtagoreanskepticismandtoitsHeracliteanfoundations(Zeller,1922,2.1,p.244).Zeller’shistoricalconstructionandtheauthorityofhisworkcontributednotonlytotheestablishmentofthelabel“MinorSocratics,”butalsototheinfluenceofthephilo-sophicaljudgmentthatjustifiedit,thattheSocraticsshouldbeconsidered“minor”relativetoPlatobecause“PlatoaloneachievedadeeperunderstandingofSocrates’philosophyandbroughtittoperfectionineveryaspect”(p.388),whiletheirphilo-sophicaldoctrinesrevealedacontaminationofSocraticbypre-Socraticthought.In1865GeorgeGrotepublishedPlatoandtheOtherCompanionsofSokrates(citedbelowfromthesecondedition,London1885),inwhichheextolled–notwithoutpolemicaldigsatZeller–thecriticalopennessandfocusondialecticalrefutationcharacteristicofSocratesandinheritedbyalltheSocratics,Platoincluded.“He[Sokrates]wasthegenerator,indirectlyandthroughothers,ofanewandabundantcropofcompositions–the‘Sokraticdialogues’:composedbymanydifferentauthors,amongwhomPlatostandsoutasunquestionablecoryphaeus,yetamidstothernameswelldeservingrespectfulmentionasseconds,companions,oropponents”(vol.1,p.vi).AsinthecaseofZeller’ssection,eventhetitlethatGrotechoseforhisbookrevealshiswayofconceivingtherelationshipamongSocrates,Plato,andthe“Socratics.”Ofcourse,theexegeticallineproposedbyZeller,andlargelyacceptedafterhim,isnotwithoutsupportintheancientsources.Itispreciselythenatureandthereliabilityofthesesourcesthatneedtobeassessedwithparticularcare,inthelightoftheenormousprogressachieved,afterthepublicationofPhilosophiederGriechen,bystudiesofancientphilosophicalhistoriography,studiesthathavereceivedimpetusandinspira-tionfromHermannDiels’magisterialDoxographiGraeci(1879)(seeCalderandMansfeld,1999).TheFollowersofSocratesSpeakingof“so-calledSocratics,”DiogenesLaertius(2.47)makesitclearthatthelabel“Socratics”hadalreadyassumedapeculiarcharacter,onethatdifferentiateditfromotherlabelsalsoderivedfromafoundingmaster(apotoudidaskalou),suchas“Epicureans”(forthenamesofthephilosophicalschoolsseee.g.D.L.1.17).Foranumberofreasonsthelabel“Socratics”couldnotbeeasilyadaptedtotheschemaofscholasticanddoctrinal“successions”(diadochai)propagatedfromtheHellenisticageonwards.Thiswasduetotheprofounddivergencesbetweenthosethatcalledthemselves,orwerecalled,Socratics.Accordingtotheancients(asidefromafewhostilesources),SocrateshadnottaughtinthemanneroftheSophists,norhadhefoundedanauthenticschool.Atallevents,correctlyorincorrectly,thenotionof“schools”firstenteredgeneraldiscourseonlyinreferencetohisfollowers.(Ontheschoolsinthelatertradition,seeBénatouïl,philosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimes,inthisvolume.)120ACTC0712020/03/2006,04:00PM\nminorsocraticsSocrates’entourageconstitutedarathervariegatedgroup.Someofthemassociatedwithhimonlyoccasionallyorirregularly;othersweredistinguishedbytheirassiduity,andstillothersbyassiduitycombinedwithahighlevelofphilosophicalability.Weknowthatseveralofthemmadethepracticeofphilosophywhatwewouldtodaycalltheir“profession.”However,wemustnotforgetthatwhatwecallphilosophy,withitsfamiliarlistoffiguresstartingwithThales,istheproductofthereflectionandactivityoftheheirsofSocrates,notablyPlatoandhisdiscipleAristotle.Inotherwords,thosewhoformedSocrates’audience,afewofwhomalsobecamefaithfulcompanions,werenotmotivatedbythedesiretobecome“philosophers,”butratherbytheconvictionthatSocrateshadsomethingofimportancetoofferthemfortheirownlife.Ancientphilosophicalhistoriography,suchasthemanualthathascomedowntousunderthenameofGalen(Hist.philos.3),felttheneedtojustifytheselectionitmadewithinthismultiplicityoffigures.Inthispseudo-Galenicworkwereadthat,ofthenumerousSocratics,onlythosethatleftasuccessionneedbementioned:thatis(apartfromPlato)AntisthenesandtheCynics,AristippusandtheCyrenaics,EuclidesandtheMegarians.Asinantiquity,westillfindinmodernhistoriesofphilosophy,along-sideamajorchapteronPlato,asectiondedicatedtoAntisthenes,Aristippus,Euclidesandtheirsuccessors,withbriefmentionsofotherfiguresassociatedwithSocratesbytheancienttradition.Thishistoriographicchoiceprivilegesdoctrinalcontinuityandthecapacityfortransmittingrelativelystablephilosophicalthought.Inantiquity,itemergedoutofaseriesoffactorsthatweshouldkeepinmindtoavoidviewingthepost-Socraticperiod(andthereforeSocrateshimself)withinadequatetoolsandanachronisticcategoriesofanalysis.IntheearlyHellenisticage,twofundamentalfactorsreachedmaturity.Firstofall,theAristotelianideathatphilosophyconstitutesadiscretedisciplinegainedaccept-ance,withtheparallelpractice,encouragedbyAristotlehimself,ofdoxography–(i.e.,thecollectionofphilosophicalopinions).TheworkofTheophrastusonthephilo-sophersofnatureistheearliestexampleofthiskindofliterature.Second,severalschoolsoftheHellenisticage,instrongcompetitionwithoneanother,endeavoredtoenhancetheirownauthorityandthatoftheirleadersbyestablishingaprestigiouspedigree–arolewhichfelltononeotherthanSocrates.TheStoics,forinstance,contendedwiththeAcademicsfortheSocraticheritage,tyingthemselvestooneormorerepresentativesofwhatwouldbecomethesequenceAntisthenes–DiogenesofSinope–CratesofThebes–ZenoofCitium.EpicureanpolemicsagainstSocratesallbutconfirmthatSocrateswasstillaverysignificantpresenceintheHellenisticage(cf.Long,1996,andAlesse,2000).Hencerivalryamongtheschoolsandcontinuityovertimewereimportantingredientsinthenascentphilosophicalhistoriography.Thelatteringredientgaverisetothecreation,whereverevenremotelyplausible,ofanetworkofmaster–disciplerelation-ships.InthecaseoftheSocraticsthethemeofrivalrythuswonamplecoverageinthebiographicalandanecdotaltradition,anddoctrinaldisagreement(diaphonia),lateraflagshipintheSkepticalcritiqueofdogmaticphilosophies,provedusefultoaneruditehistoricaltraditioninterestedmainlyinestablishingclassifications,oppositions,andrelationsamongtheschools.Socrates’popularityduringtheentirecenturyfollowinghisdeathhadattractedattentiontothe“Socratics,”whowerethenaturallinkbetweenSocratesandthe121ACTC0712120/03/2006,04:01PM\nfernandadeclevacaizziHellenisticschools,totheirroleinrelationtotheirmaster,andtotheirinterrelation-ships.Inthelaterfourthandthethirdcenturiesbcethereappeared,besidesmonographsonSocratessuchasthatofDemetriusofPhaleron,atleasttwoworksentitledOntheSocratics:onebythePeripateticPhaeniasofEresus(frr.30–31Wehrli),acontemporaryofTheophrastus,andonebyIdomeneusofLampsacus(cf.D.L.2.20).Weknowverylittleabouteitheroftheseworks.However,itislikelythat,togetherwithothersthatarealsolosttous,theywereusedbySotionofAlexandriaaroundtheendofthethirdcenturybcewhencomposingamulti-volumebiographicalwork,SuccessionsofthePhilosophers.AdistantheirtothisistheLivesofthePhilosophersbyDiogenesLaertius,anditistothisworkthatwemustnowturntobegintogetanideaoftheancient1traditionabouttheSocratics.Attheendofthe“LifeofSocrates,”Diogenes(2.47)offersalistoffigureswhofallintotwogroups:Plato,Xenophon,andAntisthenes(jointly“thegreatestoftheso-calledSocratics”);andAeschines,Phaedo,Euclides,Aristippus(jointly“themostillustriousofthetraditionalten”).The“LifeofPlato”takesupBook3,followedbythoseoftheAcademicsinBook4andthoseofAristotleandthePeripateticsinBook5.AntisthenesandtheCynicsarefoundinBook6,whichisfollowedbytheStoicsinBook7.InBook2,the“LifeofSocrates”isfollowedbytheLivesofXenophon,Aeschines,AristippusandtheCyrenaics,EuclidesandtheMegarians,andStilpo.Verybriefchap-tersarededicatedalsotoPhaedo(beforetheoneonEuclides),Crito,Simon,Glaucon,Simmias,andCebes.DiogenesLaertiussought,asmuchaspossible,tomaintainanorderinhisLivesthatrespectedthestructureofthesuccessions.Itisalsoveryimportanttonotethatwhatlooselyunitesallthefirst-generationSocraticsselectedbyDiogenesLaertiusisnotsomuchthattheyhadknownSocratespersonallyandhadspenttimewithhim(ifthishadbeenthecriterion,wewouldalsoexpectothernameswellknowntoreadersofPlatoandXenophon),butratherthattheancienttraditionattributestoallofthemthecompositionofdialogues,whosetitlesarealwaysmentioned,inafewcasesintheformofapropercatalog.Inconfirmationofthegreatimportanceofthisfact,sufficeittoaddthatfromtheinformationscatteredthroughoutDiogenes’bio-graphiesemergethetracesofacenturies-longeruditediscussionoftheauthenticityofsuchworks.Inthisdiscussion,PanaetiusofRhodes(circamidsecondcenturybce)undoubtedlyplayedasignificantrole.Inthelightofthisobservation,onebetterunderstandsthefact,surprisingtous,thatinD.L.2.47Xenophonappearsbetweentwoprofessional“philosophers”:PlatoandAntisthenes.ALiteraryGenreInthelightofthesefacts,thefollowinghypothesisappearsquiteplausible.Whentheancientsbegantospeakof“Socratics,”theywerereferringprimarilytoauthorswhohadsomethingtodowithSocrates.Onlylaterdoesthelabelindicatephilosophersinthestrictsense.Itthenbecameproblematicforancienthistoriography,primarily,as1.OnthevalueofDiogenesLaertiusasasource,seeMejer,ancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltradition,inthisvolume.122ACTC0712220/03/2006,04:01PM\nminorsocraticswehaveseen,becauseofthedoctrinaldifferencesseparatingthosewhogotdubbedSocratics.Theoldestoccurrencesoftheadjective“Socratic”appearinAristotle.HeusesittwicetoindicateSocrates’theoriesoraspectsofhismethod(EEVIII.1,1246b34;Rh.II.20,1393b4),twiceinapplicationtologoi(Rh.III.16,1417a21;Poet.1,1447b11),andoncewithdialogoi(fr.61Rose=15Gigon,fromthedepoetis).Aristotlealsoinformsusthatthefirsttowrite“Socraticdialogues”wasAlexamenusofTeos,ofwhomunfortunatelyweknownothing;that,unlikemathematicallogoi,Socraticlogoihaveamoralcharacter;andthatversemimesbySophronofSyracuseandSocraticdialoguesinprosearebothpartofasinglegenre,thegenrewhichthroughlanguagealoneimitatescharacter(ethos),thethingsthathappentopeople(pathe),andtheiractions(praxeis).ItisnowonderthatancientscholarsofrhetoricdevotedmuchattentiontothestylisticcharacteristicsoftheSocraticdialogueasaliterarygenre.Naturally,however,whatinterestsmodernscholarsofphilosophymostaboutthistypeofliteratureisthequestionofitscontent’spurposeandhistoricity(anissuethatexercisedtheancientstoo).GrantingthatthemimeticcharacteroftheSocraticdialoguesfocusedprimarilyonSocrates,whatwastheaimofthosewhocomposedthem?Where,ifatall,canonedrawthelinebetweenthe“philosophy”ofSocratesandthatoftheauthorofthework?Andfurthermore,returningtoAristotle’sstate-ment,whatdoesitmean,inthecaseofthelogoiSokratikoi,toimitateethos,pathe,andpraxeis?DoesitmeantoreproducewhatSocratesdidandsaid,orrathertoreproducehismethod,or,evenmorevaguely,tostayinthesamethematicareainwhichSocraticconversationhadoperated?Wheredoestheliteraryworkendandthephilo-sophicalworkbegin?Wheredowelookforthethoughtofthedialogue’sauthor,assumingthathereallydoesintendtoexpoundit?CanadialoguebecalledSocraticevenwithouthavingSocratesasitsmaincharacter?TheanswerstotheseandtootherquestionsfamiliartoscholarsofPlato’sdialoguesencounterthedifficultycausedbythefactthat,apartfromPlatoandtheratherspecialcaseofXenophon(seeDöring,1998,pp.182–200,andinthisvolumeMorrison,socrates),nootherintactexamplesofSocraticdialogueshavecomedowntous.Thelackoftermsofcomparisonhasitsnegativeeffects,unfortunately,evenwhenoneconcentratesonPlatoalone.Forreasonsofspace,IwillpassoverthestimulusthatthedebateaboutSocratesandhiscondemnation(forexample,thecirculationofPolycrates’AccusationagainstSocratesin393bce)broughttothecompositionofworksbytheSocratics.Themostattentivemoderninterpretersofthisbodyofliterature,whichmusthavebeenveryvastandspreadoveratleasthalfacentury,rightlyemphasizetheimportanceofintertextu-alityandthepartplayedbyemulationandinternalcompetition.Allsuchelements,whileinvitingustopayattentiontothecomplexmotivationsthatunderlietheoriginofaliterarycomposition,alsoseemboundtodistanceusfromthehistoricalSocrates;fortheywarnusnottoviewtheseworksaschroniclesortousethemasauthentichistoricalsources(Blank,1985,p.24).Thatsaid,wemustnotforgetthat,inthecaseofthelogoiSokratikoi,competitionbetweenworksofthesamegenre(nottomentionpolemicsagainstadversariesoutsidetheSocraticcircle)assumedacharacterthatwasratherdifferentfromthatofacontestbetweenmenofletters.Thesubject-matterofthisliterature–thefigureofSocrates,andthesignificanceofhislifeanddeath123ACTC0712320/03/2006,04:01PM\nfernandadeclevacaizzi–concernedthe“mostimportantthings”:humannature,thefoundationsandpurposesofaction,goodandbad,andhappinessandunhappiness.BydecidingtowriteaboutSocrates(whohimselfhadchosennottowrite),theSocraticstookthefieldonGreekpaideia’sveryownterritory,inordertosavefromoblivionnotsomuchthemselvesasthemanwhowastheirinspiration,alongwithhismessage.Oneofthemoresignificantresultsofthisdecision,albeitonenotalwaysgivendueconsiderationbymodernscholars,wastheconstructionofanimageofSocratesandthephilosophicallifecapableofevoking,andatthesametimere-interpretingorquestioning,thegreateducationalmodelsandthemoralvaluestrans-mittedbytheliterarytradition.HenceasignificantpartofSocrates’heritage–theheritagebyembracingwhichonecould,intheeyesoftheancients,legitimatelycalloneself“Socratic”–lay,morethaninlivingaphilosopher’slife,inconveyingbywayofthewrittenwordthepathtowhateveritwasthatonlysuchalifeseemedabletoprovide,usingasamodelthefigureofSocrates,thevirtuousandhappymanparexcellence(seeClay,1994,p.23).Atthesametime,thischoicepermittedtheSocraticstopresentthemselvesaseducators,andtocompetewithotherfigures(suchasIsocrates)who,inthefirsthalfofthefourthcenturybce,aspiredtothesamerole.ThefigureofAntisthenesappearsparticularlysignificantfromthisviewpoint.Whatweknowofhim,whichisverylittlecomparedwithhisliteraryoutputandtherolehemusthaveplayedinAthensinthefirsthalfofthefourthcenturybce,allowsusneverthelesstograsphispreciseintention.Thiswastore-read,fromtheSocraticviewpoint,theGreekculturaltradition,asrepresentedbyHomer,themythologicalheritage(Heracles),andthehistoryoffar-offepochsandplaces(CyrustheGreat).Antisthenes’exegetical,philosophicalandeducationalactivitywasculturallyeffective.AsignificantexampleofthisisofferedbythesimilaritybetweentheimageofOdysseustransformedintoabeggarbyAthenauponhisreturntoIthaca(Od.18.429–438)andthetypeofCynicphilosopherfoundintheGreco-Romanworlduntillateantiquity.TherearemanyindicationsmakingitplausiblethatOdysseusbecameamodelfortheCynictraditionbecauseofAntisthenes’interpretation,whichinturnwascloselyconnectedwithhispersonalimageofSocrates.ButnotallofthemanyreinterpretationsofthepoeticheritageconductedunderSocrates’bannerofwhichwehavetracesgobacktoAntisthenes,evenifheworkedwithparticularauthorityinthisarea.Letmementiononlyoneexample:thethemeofnakedness.Thistheme,well-knowntoreadersofthefinalmythofPlato’sGorgias(523aff.),appearsinanelegantremarkattributedtoAristippus(ap.D.L.2.73:“Tothepersonwhoaskedhimthedifferencebetweenthewiseandtheunwise,hesaid:‘sendbothofthemnakedamongstrangersandyouwillknow’”).TheresponsealludestothemesfromtheOdyssey,primarilyfromtheaccountofthearrivaloftheshipwreckedOdysseusontheislandofthePhaeacians(Od.6.127ff.).Nakedness(whichintheIliadisassociatedratherwithshameandhumiliation)inthecaseofOdysseusisawayofallowingtheherotodemonstratehisrealnature,andallowingthePhaeacianstodemonstratetheirvirtueofhospitality.Thecontrastbetweenappearanceandreality,exteriorandinterior,physicalandpsychicbeauty(recall,too,thefamousdescriptioninthethirdbookoftheIliadofOdysseusasambassadortoTroywithMenelaus,especially3.216–224),areallmotifsthattakeusbacktoSocrates,andfromSocratestheycanbetracedbacktotheHomericpoems.124ACTC0712420/03/2006,04:01PM\nminorsocraticsMoregenerally,reflectiononwisdom/ignorance,virtue/vice(withthenecessaryconnectionbetweenvirtueandhappiness),soul/bodyandfreedom/slaveryconstitutesthecommonSocraticlegacy(the“mostimportantthings”).Hisheirselaboratedindifferentwaysonthislegacyintheirownwritings,butalwaysinrelation–positiveornegative–totheprecedingtradition.TheybelievedfirmlythattheywerethusadheringtoSocrates’messageandfaithfullyperpetuatinghisimage.Theybelievedthatlinkinghimtoillustriousprecursorsandtomodelswellknowntotheirreadersguaranteedtheirwritingbothforceandpersuasiveimpact.Inthisway,thephilo-sophercondemnedbytheAthenianswastransformedintoafigurepowerfulenoughtobecomparedtothegreatheroesoftheGreektraditionandtoemergevictorious.Hewasatanyratedestined,likethem,toremainaliveinthecenturiestocome.VirtueandHappinessTheircontemporaryandrivalIsocratesalsoconfirmsthecentralityofthethemeof“virtueandhappiness”intheSocratictradition.InhisAgainsttheSophists(ca.390bce;seealsotheHelen,ca.385bce),Isocratesarguesagainstthosewhoconcernthemselveswitheducationandpromisemorethantheycandeliver.Again,takinguptheepithetthatinAristophanes’Clouds(e.g.,Nub.102;alazonas)hadbeenusedforSocratesandhiscompanions,Isocratesalsospeaksofalazoneuesthai,“bragging,”andattacksthosewhospendtheirtimeindisputes(hoiperitaseridasdiatribontes,cf.Sph.10),whomakeashowofseekingthetruthandinsteadliefromtheoutset(Sph.3–4):Theyhavegonesofarintheirlackofscruplethattheyseektopersuadetheyouththat,shouldtheychoosetofollowthem,theywilllearnwhatmustbedoneinlifeandthroughthisknowledgetheywillbecomehappy.Andpresentingthemselvesasteachersanddispensersofgoodssoprecious,theyarenotashamedofaskinginexchangethreeorfourminas.Butiftheyweretoselloneoftheothergoodsatapricesomuchlessthanitsvalue,theywouldnotdenytheirfolly.Instead,byvaluingallvirtueandhappinesssolittle,theyexpecttobecometheteachersofothersasiftheyhadamind.Furthermore,theyclaimtohavenoneedofmoney,callingwealthfilthylucreandgoldworthnothing,andtheyholdtheirhandsoutforatriflinggainandpromisetomaketheirdisciplesallbutimmortal.(Norlin’stranslation,slightlymodified)LaterIsocratesagainemphasizesthatthesepeopleclaimtoteachwisdomandhappiness(Sph.7)withoutbeingabletoprovidegenuinelyusefulrulesofbehavioreitherforthepresentorforthefuture.Admittedly,amongthosethatIsocratescalls“sophists”therearediverseindividualsandgroups,whoarealsomutualrivals.Still,theconnectionmadebetweenknowledge,virtue,andhappiness,andthemotifofone’srelationshipstoexternalgoods(essentially,inthiscontext,wealth)allowustoidentifytheSocratics,andaboveallAntisthenes,astheprincipaltargetofthispassage.Grantedthatthemoraluseofpoverty,whichwewillfindlateroninZenotheStoic(cf.DeclevaCaizzi,1993),datesbacktoSocrates,itwascertainlyAntistheneswhomadeitcentral.Fromonewhospeaksofvirtue,knowledge,good,andhappiness,inshort,ofhowtolive(remembertootheSocratesofPlato’sGorgias),oneexpectsbehaviorconsistent125ACTC0712520/03/2006,04:01PM\nfernandadeclevacaizziwiththemainthrustofhisteaching.Everycontradiction,whetherrealorinvented,providesawelcomeargumentforadversaries.Thethemeofconsistency(akolouthia),whichwillbecomeatoposofHellenisticbiography,hasancientorigins,asthepassageinIsocratesattests.Theconfrontationbetweenthe“sophist”AntiphonandSocratesinXenophon(Mem.1.6)exhibitsthisthemeinthedebateoverthemeaningofhappiness.AnecdotesabouttheSocratics,plentifullytransmittedbythebiographicaltradition,confirmthatintheeyesoftheancientsanyclaimanttothelegacyofSocrates(whoseownconsistencybetweenthoughtandactionlentmuchpersuasiveimpacttoargumentsleadingtoconclusionsradicallyopposedtothereceivedwisdom)was,andwasfelttobe,expectedtoprovidebyhisownconductlivingproofofthetruthofhisconvictions–thatis,ofhisconceptionofhappiness,good,andvirtue.InreviewingbrieflywhatweknowaboutthethreeSocraticstheancientsconsideredtobefoundersof“schools,”wewillreturntotheseimportantthemes.AntisthenesAntisthenes(ca.445–365bce),sonofanAtheniancitizenandafemaleslave,isdescribedbytheancientsasutterlyloyaltoSocrates,arivalofPlatoandasourceofphilosophicalinspirationfortheStoics.Aprolificandrefinedwriter,hewasmuchappreciatedfortheliteraryqualityofhisstyle,whichtheancientsattributedtotherhetoricalteachingofGorgias.However,thehistoricalthesiswhichseparatestwophasesofhisformation,namelyasophisticalandaSocraticone,andsomakeshimanincompleteSocratic,asortofsophist“converted”toSocraticphilosophy,isalateconstructionandcannotbeacceptedwithoutreservation.Isocrates’polemictestifiestoAntisthenes’activityinAthensinthetwodecadesfollowingthecondemnationofSocrates.Thecatalogofhisworkscontainsabout60titles,orderedaccordingtosubject,intenvolumes.Thetitlesinthefirstvolumerevealhisinterestinrhetoric.ThedeclamationsAjaxandOdysseus,hisonlywritingstocomedowntousintact,arefoundalongsidepolemicalworksagainstIsocratesandLysias.Thesixthandseventhvolumescontainedhislinguisticandlogicalwritings,inwhichhearguedmostlyagainstPlatoregardingthemethodofacquiringandtransmittingknowledge:Truth,SathonorOnContradiction,OnEducationorOnNames,OntheUseofNames,OnQuestionandAnswer,andOnOpinionandKnowledge.Intheseworks,Antisthenesidentifiedlinguisticanalysisasthetoolforbringingintofocusthenetworkofpredicationsthatarepropertoasubjectandeliminatingthenon-properones,soastoarriveatthetypeofpredica-tionthathecalled“theproperaccount(logosoikeios),oneforeachthing”(Arist.Met.D.29,1024b26ff.=SSRVA152=47ACaizzi).Fromthiswasinferredtheimpossibilityofcontradiction,anotherthesisattributedtoAntisthenes(D.L.9.53=SSRVA154=48Caizzi).The“properaccount”mustbeidentified,inallprobability,withthe“logosthatshowswhatathingwasoris”(D.L.6.3=SSRVA151=45Caizzi).ForAntisthenesthisaccountreplacedtheunattainabledefinitionofthething’sessence(tiesti)whichhisrivalPlatohadsought.HemayhavebelievedthatthePlatonictheoryofForms,whichpostulatedasaconditionforknowledgearealitythathumanscannotapprehend(atleastinthisearthlylife),carriedwithittheriskofskepticism(“Iseeahorse,nothorseness,”SSRVA149=50Caizzi).AristotleinformsusthatAntisthenesdenied126ACTC0712620/03/2006,04:01PM\nminorsocraticsthatthetiesticanbedefined,inasmuchasthedefinitionisonlya“longaccount,”butallowedthatthequality(poion)canbestatedandtaught(Met.H.3,1043b4ff.=SSRVA150=44ACaizzi).Fromthis,andfromotherevidencewhichishardtointerpret,onecanhypothesizethatAntisthenes’preciseaimwastoseekthequalitiesappropri-atetoaspecificsubject(mainly,itseemslikely,ofamoralnature)andthathesug-gestedrecoursetothecognitivetoolofanalogy(whichEuclides,ontheotherhand,criticized:seebelow).Inthecaseofmoralconcepts(suchascourage,freedom,slavery,injustice,andimpiety),theanalysisofnames(“thebeginningofeducationistheinves-tigationofnames”,Epict.Diss.1.17.10–12=SSRVA160=38Caizzi)includedthetestingoftheiruse,withaclarificationofcontradictionsandofabuses(onethinksofthecelebratedpagebyThucydidesIII.82,onthedistortionofthemeaningsofwordscausedbywar).Insodoing,onewouldarrivefinallyatthename’sunambiguouscontent,withacleardistinctionbetweenpositiveandnegative,goodandbad,truthanderror.Thisfaithinlanguageasacognitiveandpedagogicalinstrumentis2probablycriticizedinPlato’sCratylus.Aratherdisorderedlist(D.L.6.10–11)reportsafewoftheprincipalthesesheldbyAntisthenes(manylatertakenupbytheStoics):virtuecanbetaught;nobilitybelongstononeotherthanthevirtuous;virtueissufficientforhappiness;virtueneedsnothingelseexceptthestrengthofaSocrates;virtueisamatterofdeedsanddoesnotneedastoreofwordsandlearning;virtueisthesameformenandwomen;virtueisaweaponthatcannotbetakenaway;wisdom(phronEsis)isanindestructiblewall;wallsofdefensemustbeconstructedwithourownincontrovertiblearguments;disrepute(adoxia)isagoodthing,asisexertionorstrain(ponos);thewisemanisself-sufficientbecauseothers’goodsbelongtohim.ThereferencestophronEsis,toincontrovertiblearguments,andtothefactthatvirtuecannotbelost,andtheantithesisbetweenthepersonwhoknowsandthepersonwhodoesnot,confirmthatforAntisthenestoovirtueisidentifiedwithknowledge(cf.theworkofAntisthenesalreadycited,OnOpinionandKnowledge).Inallprobabilitythesedoxaiwereobtainedfromthesecondandthirdvolumesofthecatalog(whichgroupedtogetherworksthatdealtwiththemesofethicsandpolitics),andfromthefourthandfifthvolumes(Cyrus,TheGreaterHeraclesorOnStrength;CyrusorOnKingship).Inthesamephilosophicalcontext(andnotasaproductofaseparate“sophistic”phase)mustbeincludedhisnumerousworksofHomericexegesis(volumeseightandnine).CharactersandepisodesoftheIliadandtheOdyssey,readinthelightofSocraticprinciples,providedmeansofconfirmationthatwerepedagogicallyeffectivebecausetheylinkedtheseprinciplestotheverysourceoftheculturaltradition.SoSocrates’morality,farfromhavingthesubversivecharacterthathadledtohiscondemnationin399,turnedouttobe,onthecontrary,thegenuineheirtothevaluespresentinthetraditionbutdistortedbyvulgarthinkingincapableofgraspingthesignificanceofthetexts.AntisthenesfoundinOdysseusthemythicalantecedentofSocrates,interpretinghimasaparadigmofthecapacityforenduranceandself-control(“haveendurance,myheart:youhavesufferedworsepain,”Od.20.18,wastobecomeasortofmottoof2.SeeModrak,philosophyoflanguage,inthisvolume.127ACTC0712720/03/2006,04:01PM\nfernandadeclevacaizziCynic-AntistheneanSocraticism)inpursuitoftruegoodness.OfcourseHomerdidnotrelateOdysseus’attitudeexplicitlytotheachievementofhappiness.However,oncloserinspection,Odysseus’sufferingsaimattherecoveryofhissocialroleandallthosegoodsthat,forthearchaicculture,constitutedthehappinessoftheindividual.Thehero’ssituationisre-interpretedasthestruggleofanindividualtoovercometheadversitiesoffate,asanaffirmationofworthandofinteriorstrengththroughrenunciation,albeittemporary,ofhisownrank.ReadinthelightoftheSocraticmessage,thestoryofOdysseusbecomesanopportunityforamoregeneralreflection:notonlyarereputation,honors,andrichesoflittleimportance,butinfactadversecircumstancesandaninferiorsocialrolefacilitatetheemergenceoftheperson’struequalities.ItisnoaccidentthatAntisthenesheldadoxia(disrepute),aswellasponos(exertionorstrain),tobeagoodthing.Thisisnotbecausetheyaregoodsinandofthemselves,butbecausetheyfacilitatetheachievementofthetruegoodnessforwhicheveryonestrives.Materialandphysicalgoodshindertherecognitionofthegood,makingtheachievementofvirtuedifficult.Thatiswhyitisnecessarytopracticeself-control(enkrateia),whichrequiresthestrengthwhich,accordingtoAntisthenes,Socrateshadmanifestedinthehighestdegree.InthefictitiousspeechesofOdysseusandAjaxcompetingforthearmsofAchilles(theonlysurvivingwritingsbyAntisthenes),asinotherfragmentsofHomericexegesis(SSRVA185–197=51–62Caizzi),AntisthenessideswithOdysseus,emphasizingthehero’sadaptabilitytocircumstances.Thisbecomesthemarkoftheindividual’sfreedomfromtherestrictionsimposedbyconventions,fromemptyopinions,andfromappearances.Antisthenes’Odysseusisaconquerorwhochallengesevents,interven-inginthemactivelyanddominatingthemthankstohisintelligenceandcapacityforself-control.InhimwefindcertainaspectsoftheCynicphilosopher,withthecharacteristictraitthatthecomicpoetshadalreadynoticedinSocrates(forexample,Ar.Nub.362–363;Ameipsias,ap.D.L.2.28=fr.9KasselandAustin):thecontrastbetweenexteriorandinterior,betweenahumbleappearanceandinternalstrength.Thisstrengthisexpressedinbehaviorandlanguagecalculatedtoassertthepersonalityofthephilosopher,toattracttheattentionofandprovokereactionsfromthosearoundhimand,wecouldsay,tocreateaneffectiveimage.AlongsidehisworksofHomericexegesis,Antisthenes’writingsonHeraclesandonCyrustheGreatwereofgreatimportance.LikeOdysseus,thePersianCyruswasalsodepictedastheparadigmofthe“trueking”becauseofallhehadmanagedtoendureandtodo.Inthiswaythephilosopher,thepersonwhobehaveslikeOdysseusforthesakeofvirtue–thatis,inordertoattainthegood,whichcoincideswiththefulfillmentofhumannatureandhumancapacities–istheonlyonetoearnthetitleoftrueking.Inhissoulresideallthegoodthingsthatbelongtoaking:riches,honor,power.Theydependonlyonhim,andsonoonecantakethemaway.Inthissense,thepersonwhopossessesvirtueishappy,andvirtuesufficesforhappiness.Inthissense,again,onlythe“philosopher”isaking.Thisthought(whichfindsalargefollowingintheStoictradition:seeBett,stoicethics,inthisvolume)seemsinAntisthenestoleaveverylittleroomforexternalgoods,whichappearlessasindifferentfactors,capableofbeingtransformedineitherapositiveornegativewaydependingonhowtheyareused,thanasmorallynegativeobstaclesonthepathtovirtue,andasalienonceapersonhasachievedvirtue.ThispositionisconsistentwiththeSocratictenetthatidentifies128ACTC0712820/03/2006,04:01PM\nminorsocraticsvirtueandhappiness,butthenotionofthesageitpresupposesemphasizesdetachmentfromthetraditionalgoods,ratherthanachange,guidedbyreason,inthewayoneusesthem.ThethemeofadoxiaandponoswasalsoconfrontedinoneofAntisthenes’mostfamousworks,theHeracles.LikeOdysseus,Heraclesofferedamodelofanexceptionalpersonality,butunlikeOdysseushewas,asthesonofZeusandamortal,ademigod.Inthemoralizingversionofthemyth,heisadriftfromsociety,wanderingfromplacetoplacetoperformarduouslabors.IfinthecaseofOdysseusthedominantthemeisthecontrastbetweenappearanceandreality,inHeracles’caseitisrathertheco-existenceofthehumanandthedivineandthemanifestationofthedivinenatureintheactionsofthehumancomponent.Inthissense,theactionsofHeraclesexpressthestruggleofthesuperioragainsttheinferior:theycanbeseenasanticipatingthehierarchicaldistinctionbetweensoulandbodyattributedtoSocrates.InAntisthenes,however,thisthemeappearsinanaturalisticsettingfarremovedfromPlatonicmetaphysicaldualism.Thecontrastbetween“earthly”and“celestial”elementsseemstobeappliedtoHeraclesinafragmentwhichisdifficulttointerpretbecauseitispreservedonlyintheSyriactranslationofThemistius(SSRVA96=27Caizzi).Thesenseofthepassageseemstobethattheoutwardmanifestationofone’sowninteriorforcescoincideswiththerealizationoftruehumannature,withoutanyneedforatranscendentorder.Theabove-mentionedpolemicagainstPlatoontheexistenceofForms(“Iseeahorse,nothorseness”)islinkedtotheprobablerejectionbyAntisthenesofanother-worldlydimensionradicallyseparatedfromthesensibleworld:thedivinecoincideswithnature,anditisnaturethat,throughphronEsis,guidespeopletowardthegood.Thepolemicagainstpleasure,expressedinthecelebrateddictum“Iwouldrathergomadthanfeelpleasure”(SSRVA122=108Caizzi),isprominentinAntisthenes.Yieldingtopleasuresimpliesanobscuringofreasonandexcludesthevirtuouslife;soonemusttrainoneselftorenouncethem.HowmuchimportanceAntisthenesattributedtoreasoncanbeinferredfromD.L.6.13(SSRVA134=63Caizzi),whereindestructibleargumentsarecomparedtothewallsofthecity,orfromthereport(Plut.St.rep.1039E=SSRVA105=67Caizzi)thatChrysippusadmiredthestatementofAntisthenesthatonemustpossesseitheranintellectorarope(tohangoneself).However,theanti-hedonisticcomponentofAntisthenes’thoughtshouldnotbeexaggerated.Hispolemicdidnotrailagainsteverytypeofpleasure,butratheradvoc-atedthesubstitutionofatruepleasureforafalseone.XenophonattributesasimilarnotiontobothSocrates(Mem.1.6)andAntisthenes(ap.Xen.Symp.4.34–45).InStobaeus(Anth.4.39.18=SSRIC313)weread:“Tothosewhoaskedhimwhathappinessis,Socratesanswered:‘apleasurewhichoneshouldnotregret’.”ThefactthatAthenaeus(12.513A=SSRVA127=110Caizzi)explicitlyattributesthesameconcepttoAntisthenesshowsthat,inallprobability,thesourceoftheSocraticsentencewasaworkbythelatter.Inthefollowingsentencewecanalsofindapositiveappreci-ationofcertainpleasures(Stob.Anth.3.29.65=SSRVA126=113Caizzi):“Onemustseekoutpleasuresthatfollowexertion,notthosethatprecedeit.”Comparealso(Stob.Anth.3.1.28=SSRVA125=93Caizzi):“Neitherabanquetwithoutharmonynorwealthwithoutvirtuebringspleasure.”Thesetextsareawarningagainstthetempta-tiontoexaggeratethecontrastsbetweenSocrates’variousdisciplesandinparticular129ACTC0712920/03/2006,04:01PM\nfernandadeclevacaizzibetweenAntisthenesandAristippus,whowasconsideredapleasure-theoristbytheancienttradition.AristippusAristippusofCyrenewasattractedtoAthensbythefameofSocrates.HewasthefirstSocratictoearnalivingbychargingforhisteaching.NumerousanecdotesrefertohissojournatthecourtofDionysiusinSyracuse,linkinghimtoPlatoaswellastoDiogenesofSinope.Becausehebecameinantiquitytherepresentativeparexcellenceofalifedevotedtopleasure,hisbiographyisfullofstoriesandjokesbasedonthischaracteristic.Nevertheless,ifthefictionalencrustationsarestrippedawaytorevealthehistoricalcorebeneath,a“Socratic”figureemergeswhoisnotsoheterodoxwithrespecttothemasterashemightseem.UnlikethecaseofAntisthenes,informationonAristippus’writingsofferedbyDiogenesLaertiusrevealsanuncertaintradition(avolumethatcontained25dialogues,sixbooksofdiatribes,12titlesidentifiedbySotionandPanaetius).Intheunanimousopinionofscholars,theimportantdoctrinalcontributionsattributedtotheCyrenaics(reportedinD.L.2.86ff.;S.E.M7.191ff.)derivefromhisgrandson,AristippustheYounger,sonofhisdaughteranddiscipleArete.OfAristippus,wearetold(D.L.2.66–67)that:Hewasabletoadapthimselftoplaces,times,andpersonsandplayedhisroleappropriatelyineverycircumstance.Thatiswhyhe,morethanothers,enjoyedthefavorofDionysius,inthathealwaysmanagedtomakeeverysituationacceptable.Heenjoyedthepleasureofwhatwaspresent,butdeclinedtomakeanefforttoenjoywhatwasnotpresent....OnceDionysiusgavehimhischoiceofoneofthreecourtesans.Hecarriedoffallthree,saying:“Parispaiddearlyforgivingthepreferencetooneoutofthree.”Butwhenhehadbroughtthemasfarastheporch,heletthemgo.Tosuchextremesdidhegobothinchoosingandindisdaining.Hencethesaying[...]:“Youaloneareendowedwiththegifttoflauntinrobesorgoinrags.”(Hicks’stranslation,slightlymodified)ThereferencetoOdysseus,andtothethemesmentionedabove,emergesclearlyfrom[Plut.]DevitaetpoesiHomeri2.150(SSRIVA55=30Mannebach):AndasOdysseussometimesworeafurryandsoftcloakandsometimesragsandknapsacks,sometimesherestednearCalypsoandsometimessufferedthevexationsofIrusandMelanthius,soAristippusassumingsuchanimageoflifeenduredpovertyandtoilwithastrengthofspirit,andgaveintopleasurewithoutrestraint.Interestinglyenough,theseareallthemesthatappearinafragmentofEpictetusonSocrates(ap.Stob.Anth.4.33.28):WhenArchelaussentforSocrateswiththeintentionofmakinghimrich,Socratesorderedthathebetold:“InAthensfourquartersofflourcanbeboughtforoneobolandwaterflowsfromthespringsforfree.SoifwhatIhaveisnotenoughforme,Iwillbeenoughforit,andsointhiswayitwillbeenoughforme.AnddoyounotseethatPoluswasaccustomedtoplaythepartsofOedipusatColonus,theoutcastandthebeggar,and130ACTC0713020/03/2006,04:01PM\nminorsocraticsofOedipustheKingequallywell?AndthenshallthemanofnoblenaturebeinferiortoPolusandnotplaywellanypartassignedtohimbythedaimon?AndwillhenotfollowtheexampleofOdysseuswhoeveninragsdidnothavelesserdignitythanintherichandpurplecloak?”(Od.18.67;19.225).(Oldfather’stranslation,slightlymodified)Wecannotcertainlyidentifytheworkfromwhichthisisquoted,butitconfirmsthemoraluseofthefigureofOdysseusintheancientSocratictraditionanditsimportanceintheSocratics’creationoftheimageofSocrates.InAristippus,itseemscentralthatthephilosophermanifestshissuperioritythroughhiscontroloftheexternalworld,withregardtowhichhekeepshisownfreedomto“choose”orto“reject.”ThismotifappearsalsoinAntisthenes,butinAristippusthebitterattackonpleasureasanobstacletovirtueisabsent.Onthecontrary,Aristippusmaintained,perhapsnotwithoutreason,thattheradicalrejectionofpleasurelimitstrueliberty(seealsoXen.Mem.2.1.17andSSRIVA19):toexperiencepleasurewithoutbecomingenslavedtoitisjustasmuchamanifestationofvirtueastheacceptanceofthemostdrasticdenials.Twocenturieslater,Horace(Ep.1.17.23ff.=SSRIVA45=32AMannebach)wouldsketchafineportraitofAristippus,contrastinghimwiththeCynicummordacem:Everyaspect,everyconditionandeverythingsuitedAristippus.Hecouldsuithimselftoanysituation,thoughgiventhechoicehewouldalwayschoosethebetter.Ontheotherhand,IwonderifthemanclothedintheragsthatCynicsalwayswearwouldbeabletodealwithabettercircumstance.Aristippuswouldnotrequireapurplerobe;hewouldmakehiselegantwaythroughthecrowdedstreetswearingwhatevertherehappenedtobeathand,andwouldplayoneortheotherrolewithoutevercuttingapoorfigure.TheothermanwouldlookatanicecloakmadeoutofbeautifulclothfromMiletusasifhethoughtitwasmuchworsethanadogorasnake.Youwouldhavetogivehimbackhisbeggar’sragsorhewoulddieofthecold.So,givehimbackhisragsandleavehimalone3toleadhisfoolishlife.(Trans.byFerry)ReadersofPlatowillthinkofAlcibiades’encomiumofSocratesintheSymposium(220a;cf.214a):Whenwewerecutofffromoursupplies,asoftenhappensinthefield,nooneelsestooduptohungeraswellashedid.Andyethewastheonemanwhocouldreallyenjoyafeast;andthoughhedidn’tmuchwanttodrink,whenhehadto,hecoulddrinkthebestofusunderthetable.Still,andmostamazingly,nooneeversawhimdrunk(aswe’llstraightawayputtotest).(Trans.byNehamasandWoodruff)WecanaddthatSocrates’sociabilityasdescribedbyPlatointhedialogue,thewayinwhichhedoesnotwithdrawfromhisenvironmentyetremainsindefinablydetached3.SeealsoSen.Ep.5.6.ArguingagainsttheostentatiousdifferencebetweenthephilosopherandtheruggednessoftheCynicwayoflife,Senecawrites:“Heisagreatmanwhousesearthenwaredishesasiftheyweresilver;butheisequallygreatwhousessilverasifitwereearthenware.Itisasignofanunstablemindnottobeabletoendureriches”(trans.byGummere).131ACTC0713120/03/2006,04:01PM\nfernandadeclevacaizzifromothers,iscertainlyclosertotheimageofAristippusthantothemoreruggedoneofAntisthenes.SomescholarshavenotedthatXenophon,althoughhostiletoAristippus,reliesnotonSocratesbutonanexpositionofProdicus’writtentextinordertorefutehim(Mem.2.1.21ff.).InthatconversationAristippusdefendedhisidealoffreedom,presentedasthatwhichmorethananyotherthingleadstohappiness(2.1.11).Inthenameofthisfreedomherejectedthe“city”andproclaimedhimself“astrangereverywhere”(2.1.13).InXenophonthischoiceappearstiedtothethemeofpoliticalpowerandmanifestsitselfasaformofegoism.However,theremarkassumesamoreprofoundmeaningif,yetagain,onekeepsinmindtheliterarythemeofthebeggarhero,wanderingandstateless,anditsphilosophicalinterpretation(comparetheremarkonnakednesscitedabove,D.L.2.73).Aristippus’aim,toliveaneasyandpleasantlife(Xen.Mem.2.1.9–10:rhastatekaihedistabioteuein),recallstheancientmodelofthegods’happinessintheHomericworld,andhisviewofthemeanstothatenddoesnotpresupposethepossessionofmanyexternalgoods,northeexclusiveenjoymentofphysicalpleasures.Foreverythingexternaltobetransformedintoagood,whatisneededisinternalstrength,wisdom,andthefreedomandindependencethatpreventenslavementtoanythingexternal.ThusevenAristippusis,inhisway,adevoteeofenkrateia.Atallevents,evenforhim,asatrueSocratic,itisphronEsis(wisdom),thatallowsapersontoredirectthewholelifetowardthegood(cf.alsohisattackonuselesssciences,suchasmathematics,fornothavingthegoodastheirobject,SSRIVA170,171).EuclidesInthecaseofEuclidesofMegara,thethirdoftheMinorSocraticswhoaccordingtotheancientscreatedaschool,thebiographicalandanecdotaltraditionissingularlyimpoverished.ThebriefchapterbyDiogenesLaertius(2.106–113)mentionsnumer-ousfigures,alongwithvariedkindsofinformation:EubulidesofMiletus,AlexinusofElis,EuphantusofOlynthus,ApolloniusCronus,DiodorusCronus,Ichthyas,andClinomachusofThurii.Alltheseareconnected,directlyorindirectly,toEuclides.ThelastonenamedinthisgroupisStilpoofMegara,whoseLifeismuchricherininforma-tionandtakesupallofsections113–120.TheplaceofthelifeofStilpointhistraditionisjustifiedbypersonalrelationsamongphilosophers,relationswhosevariabilitybyitselfindicatestheirfictionalcharacter.Forinstance,inCic.Acad.II.(Lucullus)42.129(SSRIIA31=26ADöring)EuclidesisinsertedintoasuccessionthatstartsfromXenophanesandincludesParmenidesandZenoofElea.Thesamesuccession,butwith,significantly,StilpoofMegarainplaceofEuclides,isrepeatedbyAristocles,OnPhilosophy(fr.27Döring).InD.L.2.106(SSRIIA30=fr.31Döring)wereadthatEuclides“appliedhimselftothewritingsofParmenides”(kaitaParmenideiametecheirizeto).Theso-calledMegarianschoolwasneveragenuineinstitutionnordiditconsistinaunifiedphilosophicalposition.Alongsidethelabel“Megarians,”wefindalso“Dialecticians”and“Eristics.”Itisdifficulttosaywhetherthesetermsareusedtocharacterizedistinctgroups.BesidesEuclides’andStilpo’scommonoriginfromMegara,theaimoftracingthetraditionofPyrrhonistSkepticismbacktoSocratesprobablyalso132ACTC0713220/03/2006,04:01PM\nminorsocraticsplayedadeterminingroleintheHellenisticconstructionoftheMegariansuccessionand“school”(cf.D.L.9.61).InlightofthesedataandofwhatweknowoftheorientationsofHellenistichistoriography,theevaluationofpossiblyEleaticthemesoughttofollowinvestigationofEuclides’primaryculturalrelationshipwithSocrates,notbeapointofdepartureforthereconstructionofEuclides’philosophyinitsentirety.DiogenesLaertius(2.108)reportsthetitlesofsixdialogues,fromwhichitappearsthatEuclidesengagedfullyinthewritingofSocraticliterature:Lamprias,Aeschines,Phoenix,Crito,Alcibiades,Eroticus.ThreeofthesetitlesdealwithcharactersintheSocraticcircle.EventheEroticusrecallsaSocraticthemewhich,aswellasinPlato,waspresentintheAlcibiadesofAeschines(SSRVIA53=12Dittmar)andprobablyalsointheHeraclesbyAntisthenes(SSRVA92=24Caizzi).WecansaynothingforcertainaboutLampriasandPhoenix.Theonlyverbatimfragmentwepossess(reportedbyStob.Anth.3.6.63=SSRIIA11=19Döring),contrastingsleepanddeath(cf.Hom.Il.14.231;Hes.Theog.212;756–759)whicharerepresentedastwodaemons,ismostprobablytakenfromoneoftheseworks,butitisimpossibletoreconstructitscontext.Oneofthefewinterestinganecdotes,reportedbythePlatonistphilosopherTaurus(ap.Gell.NA7.10.1–4=SSRIIA2=1Döring),tellshow,inordertolistentoSocratesevenaftertheAthenianshadforbiddentheMegariansentranceintothecity,EuclideswouldarriveinAthensatsunset,dressedasawoman,leavingagainatdawn,stilldisguised,andtravelingonfootbetweenthetwocities.Therecoursetodisguise(likeOdysseusonhisarrivalatIthaca)certainlyindicatesindifferencetowardappearances.PlatomentionsEuclidesaspresentatSocrates’deathalongwiththeotherSocratics(Phd.59b–c).Furthermore,inthesurvivingversionoftheprefacetotheTheaetetus,heisthepersonmaderesponsibleforcomposingthewrittenversionoftheconversation4thattookplacemanyyearsearlierbetweenSocratesandtheyoungTheaetetus.Finally,takingintoaccountthatPlatoandotherstookrefugeinMegaraafterSocrates’death(Hermodorusap.D.L.2.106),andtheabsenceofanecdotesalludingtopolemicsbetweenEuclidesandPlato,itappearsplausiblethattheirrelationswerefriendly.Itismuchmoredifficulttodeterminehowfartheyagreedordisagreedphilosophically,andwhether–andifso,towhatextent–Plato’sdialoguescontainallusionstoEuclides.Modernattemptstoidentifysuchreferences(forinstancebehindthe“friendsoftheForms”inPlato’sSophist)havenotledtosecureresults.NomentionofdiscussionbetweenEuclidesandAntistheneshasreachedus.Regardinghisthought,theprincipaltestimonyisinDiogenesLaertius(2.106=SSRIIA30=24Döring):“Heheldthegoodtobeone(hentoagathon),calledbymanynames:sometimeswisdom,sometimesgod,sometimesintelligence,andsoon.Allthatiscontradictorytothegoodheusedtoreject,maintainingthatithasnoexistence.”TothiswemayaddD.L.2.161(SSRIIA32=25Döring),fromwhichwelearnthat,fortheMegarians,virtueisonething,calledbymanynames.Cicero(Acad.II.[Lucullus]42.129,citedabove)writesthattheMegarianssaid“thesolegoodisthatwhichis4.FromtheTheaetetusoneinfersthatEuclideswasstillalivein369,yetheisnotcitedbyDiodorusasbeingamongthosewhowerealivein366.Hisdateofbirthcanbenolaterthan450.133ACTC0713320/03/2006,04:01PM\nfernandadeclevacaizzialwaysoneandalikeandthesame.TheseauthorsalsotookmuchfromPlato”(trans.Rackham).Euclides’conceptsandterminology,butaboveallhisinsertionintotheEleaticsuccessionbyancientdoxography,underliethedominantinterpretationofhisphilo-sophyastheproductofcontaminationbetweenEleaticandSocraticthought,withgreateremphasisplacedsometimesontheformercomponent,sometimesonthelatter.ThemostdeterminedreactionagainstthisexegeticallinecamefromKurtvonFritz(1931),followedmorerecentlybyKlausDöring(1972and1998)andGabrieleGiannantoni(1990).VonFritzhasshownthattheemphasisisnotonbeingbutratheronthegood,andthattheideathatwhatisoppositetothegoodisnon-existentderivesfromtherecognitionofthegood’sunityandidentityinallitsmanifestations.EveninthescanttestimonyonEuclideswecanglimpsethethemeswetendtoconsidertypicallySocratic:whatreallymattersisthemoralgood;thepersonwhoknowsthegoodwilldoit;thepersonwhodoessomethingbadactsinthemistakenbeliefthatitisgood.Alongthesamelines,Giannantoni(SSR1990vol.4,n.5,pp.51–60)hasobservedthatthethesisofEuclidesistheoneheldbytheSocratesofPlato’sProtagorasandoperativeinPlato’s“Socratic”dialogues,thatthevirtuesformaunity,understoodasepistEmEofwhatisgoodandbad.ThatEuclidesattackedproofsnotfromtheirpremisesbutfromtheirconclusion(D.L.2.107=SSRIIA34=29Döring)maybelikenedtotheSocraticmethodofrefutation.Apparently,healsocriticizedargumentfromanalogy,maintainingthatitmustbedrawneitherfromsimilarorfromdissimilarelements:iffromsimilarelements,oneshouldconcernoneselfwiththethingsthemselvesratherthanwiththosewhicharesimilartothem;iffromdissimilarelements,thecomparisonfails.TimonofPhlius(D.L.2.107=PPFfr.28),whoattacksalltheSocratics,callingthemchatterers,speaksofthe“wrangling(eridantEs)Euclides,whoinfusedtheMegarianswithafrenziedloveofstrife(erismou).”ThisjudgmentmakesEuclidesresponsibleforanargumentativemethodthatothersourcesattributetohiscompatriotStilpo(cf.D.L.2.113,119).However,thedialecticalmethoddevelopedandrefinedbySocratesandhisfollowerswasconsiderederistic,andwaspopularlyconfusedwiththepracticesofpersonswhohadnothingtodowithSocrates,asisclearfromthepolemicbyIsocratescitedabove.AndthecarewithwhichPlatosetsoutintheEuthydemustoshowhowSocraticdialecticdiffersfromEleaticorProtagoreaneristicpointsinthesamedirection.Onemustnotforgetthatthequalification“eristic”referstotheintentionofthepersonpropoundingtheargument,nottotheargumentitself.Thelogoscanpre-senteitherafallacyoraseriouslinguisticaporia.AnanecdotereportedinD.L.2.30,whereSocratesdeploresEuclides’commitmenttoeristiclogoi,verylikelyreflects,asdootheranecdotesofthekind,polemicsinternaltotheSocraticcircle.Itiscertain,however,thatthephilosophers’traditionassociatedwiththe“Megarianschool”concentratedtheireffortsinthelogical-linguisticarea.AndbyemployingcelebratedparadoxessuchastheVeiledManandtheLiar,theycastlightonproblemsandaporiai5thatstillconstituteachallengeforphilosophy.5.ForthetreatmentofthesepuzzlesbytheStoics,seeIerodiakonou,stoiclogic,inthisvolume.134ACTC0713420/03/2006,04:01PM\nminorsocraticsBibliographyPrincipalEditionsofFragmen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traltotheprojectofphilosophy.Second,I136ACTC0813620/03/2006,04:01PM\ntheplatonicdialogueconsiderhowmodernscholarshiponthedialogueformisinterconnectedwiththedivisionofPlatonicworksintochronologicallydistinctgroupsandwiththequestionhowfarandinwhatsensePlato’sthoughtdevelops–twohighlycontroversialtopics.Third,Ioffermoreextendedtreatmentofoneofthethreestylesofreadingoutlinedhere(the“maieutic”approach),whichIcombinewithanattempttodefinePlato’sthinkingondialecticandtocharacterizePlato’soverallphilosophicaloutlook.StylesofReadingandConceptionsofPhilosophyThefirststyleofreadingissowidespreadandunself-consciousthatitmayescapenoticeasadistinctmodeofinterpretationatall(thoughitisone).Thisapproach,whilerecognizingthatthedialoguesconstituteadistinctiveliteraryform,treatsthemas,ineffect,awhollyexplicitvehicleofSocratic-Platonicphilosophy.Theassumptionisthatthemainspeaker,whoineachcasedominatesthediscussion(Socratesinmostofthedialogues,variousfiguresinthelatedialogues)isthemouthpieceofthephilo-sophicalproject.Thefocusofthisprojectisvariouslyinterpretedbythosewhoreadthedialoguesinthisway.Formostinterpreters,ancientandmodern,themaincon-cernisideasortheories,oftenunderstoodasteachingsordoctrines.Theseideasaresometimestakentoformaconnectedsystemofdoctrines,whichareexplicatedinacertainsub-groupofdialoguesorinthedialoguesasawhole.VersionsofthisreadingcanbefoundinAristotleandintheschoolofPlatoinitsvariousphasesfromthelate1fourthcenturybceuntiltheendofantiquity.ThiswayofreadinghasalsobeencommonamongmodernPlatonicscholars;“unitarianism”(readingallthedialoguesasexpressingasinglesetofideas)hasbeenadoptednotablybyPaulShorey(1904)andHaroldCherniss(1936)andiswidelyassumedinmuchrecentFrenchscholar-ship,forinstancebyLucBrisson(1998)andJean-FrançoisPradeau(2002).Asecondfocusforthiswayofreadinghasbeenonmethodsofargumentandonqualityofargumentation.ThisconcernalsogoesbacktoAristotle(seefurtherVlastos,1991,pp.91–8)andlaterthinkersinthePlatonictradition.ThePlatonicdialoguesweresometimescategorizedinantiquitybyreferencetothekindofargumentativemethodbeingapplied(D.L.3.49–62;Tarrant,1993).Inmoderntimes,thishasbeenthecentralconcernofthe“analytic”schoolofinterpretation,originallyAnglo-Americanbutnowmorewidespread.Apowerfulinfluenceonthisgroupwasthepreoccupationwithphilosophicalmethod,especiallylogicalandconceptualanalysis,amongearlytwentieth-centurythinkerssuchasFrege,Russell,andWittgenstein.Forleadingfiguresofthisgroup,especiallyG.E.L.OwenandGregoryVlastos,modernmethodsofanalysisservedasamodelofwhatcountedas“philosophy”andalsopro-videdstandardsbywhichPlatoandotherancientthinkerswerejudged.ThetypicalformofinterpretativediscussionisananalysisofaspecificstretchofargumentinasinglePlatonicdialogue,takeneitherasdisplayingargumentativemethodorasattemptingtoestablishorundermineadeterminateclaim.Onecentralconcernforthis1.SeeKahn,1996,pp.79–87,onAristotle;Sedley,1996,onPlatonicapproaches;andHoffmann,whatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?,inthisvolumeonNeoplatoniccommentary.137ACTC0813720/03/2006,04:01PM\nchristophergillapproachhasbeenthemethodologyandoutcomeofSocraticelenchus(thesystematic,inferentialcross-examinationofinterlocutorsbySocratesintheearlyPlatonicdialogues,leadingtotheexposureofinconsistencyintheirbelief-sets(Vlastos,1994).Anotherhasbeenthequestionofthecogencyofthecritiqueofthe(Platonic)theoryofFormsinthefirstpartoftheParmenidesandalsowhetherPlatothoughtthiscritiquecouldbeanswered(Owen,1953,1985;Vlastos,1954).Theinverseofthiswayofreadingthedialogues(thatis,asexplicitvehiclesofPlatonicphilosophy)isthe“esoteric”approach.ThekeymarkofthisapproachisthebeliefthatPlato’smostprofoundandsystematicdoctrineswerenotfoundinthedia-loguesbutweretaughtthroughoralinstructiontoadvancedstudentsinPlato’sschool,theAcademy.Theunwrittendoctrinescenteredontwomathematico-onticprinciples,theOneandtheUndividedMany;thesystemofideasbasedontheseprinciplesisheldtounderpinPlatonicphilosophyasawhole,including(whatwecall)metaphysics,epistemology,andethics,categoricaldistinctionsnotdrawnbyPlato.ThisviewdrawsonevidenceinAristotleandthelaterancientPlatonictraditionforPlato’sunwrittendoctrines.Forthisinterpretation,thewrittendialoguesareintendedonlyasprelimin-ary(or“propaideutic”)tosystematicoralinstruction.ThedialoguesofferprovisionalindicationsofthekindofdoctrinesandphilosophicalsystemtaughtcomprehensivelyintheAcademy.Theprovisionalcharacterofthedialoguesissignalledbyexplicitindicationsofdoctrinalincompleteness(e.g.,Rep.VI,504a–506a;Plt.284d;Ti.48b–c,53d),aswellasbeingillustratedbycontrastwithreportsofthemoresystematicoraldoctrines.ThedominantroleinthePlatonicdialoguesofSocratesandothermainspeakers(suchastheEleaticStranger),bycontrastwiththeinterlocutor,issometimestakenasexemplifyingthefundamentallydidacticanddogmaticcharacterofPlatonicphilosophizing.Thisapproach,broachedintheearlynineteenthcentury,wasdevelopedsystematicallybyKonradGaiserandHans-JoachimKrämer;currentleadingexponentsareThomasSzlezák(e.g.,1985,1999)andGiovanniReale(e.g.,1997).ThethirdinterpretativeresponseisonethatattachesthehighestimportancetothefactthatPlatowroteindialoguesandtothespecificcharacterandformofthosedialogues.Forthisview,thedialoguesareneitherafullexplicationofphilosophicaldoctrinesormethodnoradeliberatelyincompleteandpreliminaryversionofasystemoforalinstruction.Thekeythoughtis,rather,thatthedialoguesarewritteninsuchawayastostimulatethereadertothinkforhimselforherselfabouttheideasdiscussed.Thedialoguespresentgenuine(andnotsimply“propaideutic”)philosophizingbuttheyarenotsupposedtobeofferingfullyworked-out,authoritativeconclusions.Itisforthereadertotaketheargumentfurther,eitherbyresponsiveinterpretationorbyindependentphilosophicalenquiry.Thisapproachdrawsonseveralsalientfeaturesofthedialoguesthemselves,takenasofferingamodelforphilosophicalactivityoraguidetointerpretation.TheseincludethepresentationbySocratesofhischaracter-2isticformofdialogueasamethodof“sharedsearch”(suzEtEsis)andonewhichis,inprinciple,incompleteandongoing,asisindicatedbytheunresolved,“aporetic”conclusionsofmanydialogues.TheyalsoincludeSocrates’characterizationofhis2.Seee.g.Chrm.166c–d;Grg.505e–506a;Prt.348c5–e1;Sph.218b–d;Phlb.19a–c;Plt.258b–c,285c–d;Tht.150a–151e.138ACTC0813820/03/2006,04:01PM\ntheplatonicdialoguedialecticalmethodintheTheaetetusas“maieutic”(midwifely),designedtobringtobirththeideasoftheothersratherthansupplyingthemwithfullydevelopedideasofhisown(Tht.149–151).OthertextsoftencitedinsupportofthisreadingarethecriticismsmadeofwritingasamediumforphilosophicalcommunicationinthePhaedrus(275–278)andtheSeventhLetter(340–344;cf.Gill,1992).Writingistheresaidtogivereadersafalseimpressionofhavingknowledgewhichtheyhavenotacquiredforthemselvesbyactivedialecticalenquiry.ThePlatonicdialogueisthoughttobedesignedtousewritingasacatalysttoindependentenquiryinawaythatcounteractsthenormaldrawbacksofthemedium–anideathatgoesbacktoSchleiermacherintheearlynineteenthcentury(Szlezák,1997).Thiswayofreadingdialoguescanalsobefoundinantiquity.DavidSedley(1996,pp.98–103)hasshownhowaPlatonistcommentatorofthelatefirstcenturybcesawtheTheaetetusnotjustastheoriginoftheideaofphilosophyasamaieuticprocessbutalsoasadialoguewhichwaswritteninamaieutic(midwifely)way,stimulatingreaderstodrawtheirownconclusions.Inmoderntimes,therehavebeenmanyformsofthisstyleofreading,somebyscholarswhoholdversionsofthescholarlyapproachesalreadyoutlined(forinstance,analyticoresoteric).Ofthethreewaysofreadingthedialoguessurveyedhere,IthinkthatthethirdistheonethatisbeingpursuedmostvigorouslyincurrentPlatoscholarship.IthasalsogivenrisetosomeofthemostpenetratingstudiesofspecificPlatonicdialoguesandofphilosophicallysuggestivefeaturesoftheirform.Withinthislineofinterpretation,amajorpointofdistinctionisbetweenthosewhothinkthatPlatoasauthorhasaclearanddeterminateviewabouttheintendedconclusionofthereader’sreflectionandthosewhostress,rather,theopennessoftheoutcome.ThosewhotakethefirstlineincludefollowersofLeoStrauss.“Straussians”believethatthemeaningofPlatonicdialoguesdoesnotlieontheirsurface,andthatsustainedinterpretativeattentionisrequiredtodecodethatmeaning,basedontheassumptionthateachdetailofargumentordramaticpresentationsubservesanoverallpurpose(aviewprefiguredbyProclus,p.136above).InmostStraussianaccounts(e.g.,Strauss,1964;Bloom,1968),thisiscombinedwiththeassumptionthatthissustainedindependentinterpretation,ifcorrectlycarriedout,willleadtocertain,verydefinite,conclusions.AreadingoftheRepublic,forinstance,shouldleadtothecon-clusionthatphilosophersshouldnotengageinpoliticsinconventionalsocietiesandthatprogrammesofsocialreform,ofthekindundertakeninmanyWesterncountriesinmoderntimes,arefundamentallymisguided(cf.Ferrari,1997;also,morecritically,Burnyeat,1985).Forotherscholars,writingfromavarietyofstandpoints,theintendedoutcomeofinterpretationorreflectionistakentobelesspredetermined.Thisviewissharedbysomewhoseapproachis,broadly,literary-philosophical.Thesescholarsfocuson,forinstance,theimplicationsofthestudiedanonymityofthePlatonicdialogueformandofPlato’slife-longpresentationofphilosophyasinseparablefromshareddialectical3enquiry.Versionsofthisviewarealsosometimesadoptedbyesotericoranalyticscholars.RafaelFerber(1991),forinstance,adoptstheesotericapproachinarelatively3.See,e.g.,Gonzalez,1995;Griswold,1988,2002;Press,1993,2000;Stokes,1986.139ACTC0813920/03/2006,04:01PM\nchristophergillnon-dogmaticform,andmaintainsthatbothPlato’swrittenteachingsandtheideasinthedialogueswerepresentedbyPlatoonlyasaprovisionalattempttoformulateknowledgeoftruthandnotasanauthoritativesystem(cf.Gill,1993).Analogously,MichaelFrede(1996),writingfromananalyticstandpoint,arguesthatPlato’scon-tinuinguseofthedialogueformthroughouthiswritingcareersignifiesadisavowalofphilosophicalauthority.EveninadialoguesuchastheSophist,thecentralpartofwhichreachesdeterminate,andconceptuallypowerful,conclusions(aboutthenatureoffalsestatement),Platosignalsthelimitationsofwhatthedialogueachieves.Platodoessoespeciallybyalludingtoafurtherdialogue,thePhilosopher,whichwillofferamorepositiveanddefinitiveaccountofphilosophicalknowledgethantheSophist–butwhichisneverwritten.Theimplicationisthatitisuptous,asresponsivereaders,toworkoutforourselveswhatthePhilosophershouldhavecontained(cf.Sayre,1992).Althoughmodernpioneersoftheanalyticapproach,suchasOwenandVlastos,werenotinclinedtoseethedialogueformasbeingofspecialphilosophicalimportance,morerecentanalyticscholarshavebeenmoredisposedtothinkthatitisandthatanalyticreadingscanbeadvancedinthisway.GillandMcCabe(1996),acollectionmostlybyanalyticscholars,iscenteredontheaimofexaminingtherelevanceofthedialogueformforthekeyconceptualissuesofthelatedialogues–agroupofdialogueswhichreceivedspeciallycloseattentionfromanalyticscholars.Theideathatitisveryimportanttoreachanindependentunderstandingofconceptualproblemsraisedbythedialogueshas,infact,beenfundamentalfortheanalyticapproach;anditisnowmorewidelyrecognizedthatstudyofthedistinctivefeaturesofthedialoguescanformanintegralpartofthatprocess.TheDialogueFormandPeriodizationAsisindicatedintheprecedingsurveyofapproaches,theviewtakenoftheroleofthedialogueforminPlatoiscloselyboundupwiththelargerinterpretationofPlato’sphilosophicalaimsandmethods.IexplorethisconnectionfurtherbyshowinghowthequestionofthedialogueformislinkedwithoneofthekeyissuesofcurrentPlatonicscholarship:thatofperiodization,andthequestionwhetherandinwhatsensePlatonicphilosophydevelops.Subsequently,Iofferanddefendmyownviewonthatissuebyexploringfurtherthethirdapproachjustoutlined,theinterpretationofPlatonicdialoguesasmaieutic.AcommonwayofsubdividingthePlatonicdialogues,atleastinmoderntimes,isintoearly,middle,andlate;thissubdivisionisalsolinkedwithcertainwidelyheldviewsofthefunctionofthedialogueformintherelevantperiod.Themainaimoftheearlydialogues(like“Socraticdialogues”byotherancientauthorssuchasAeschinesandXenophon)istakentobetoperpetuatethecharacter,themes,andmodeofargumentofthehistoricalSocrates.The“Socraticdialogue”is,insomesense,adramaticgenre,thoughwedonotknowifthesedialogueswerewrittenforperformance,recitation,orprivatereading.ThedramaoftheearlyPlatonicdialoguescentersespeciallyontherecreationofSocrates’trial-speechandhisresponsetoimprisonmentbeforeexecution(Apology,Crito).ItalsocentersonSocrates’charac-teristicmethodofdialectic(elenchus)eitherwithrelativelynaïveinterlocutors(e.g.,140ACTC0814020/03/2006,04:01PM\ntheplatonicdialogueEuthyphro,Laches)oringladiatorialcontestswithmoreintellectuallysophisticatedfigures(Protagoras,Gorgias).TherepresentationofthefigureofSocratesandhisinteractionwithothersiselaboratedinthemiddledialogues,whichdramatizehistough-mindedresponsetotheprospectofdeath(Phaedo),tosexualdesireandalcohol(Symposium),ortothedialecticalchallengeofanimmoralist(Republic,BookI).Atthesametime,thesedialoguesareoftenseenasvehiclesbywhichPlatoputsforwardinamoreconstructiveandexplicitwayideas(forinstanceaboutFormsortheimmortalityofthesoul)whichgobeyondthethinkingofthehistoricalSocrates,eveniftheyhavetheirrootsinSocraticenquiries.Inthelatedialogues,Platoissometimesseenasretainingthedialogueformonlyasaconventioninworkswhichhavebecomevirtualmonologues(Laws)or,indeed,actualmonologues(Timaeus-Critias).Amorepositiveviewofthefunctionofthelatedialogues,heldparticularlybyanalyticscholars,isthattheyareusedtodemonstratePlato’sintellectualindependence,bothfromSocratesandfromhisownearlierideas.IntheTheaetetusandPhilebus,PlatodramatizesagaintheSocraticmethodofdialecticalcross-examination,butwithcertainmethodologicalandconceptualmodifications(Burnyeat,1977;D.Frede,1996b).IntheParmenides,Sophist,Statesman,wefindexplicitorimpliedcriticismofthemiddle-periodtheoryof4Formsandrelatedtheories,combinedwiththeexplorationofnewformsofdialecticalenquiry(notably,definitionofrealkindsby“division”);thefunctionofthedialogueforminthelateworksistakentodisplaythesediverseformsofintellectualindependenceandcreativity.ViewsofthistypearerelativelycommoninmodernPlatonicscholarship.IdeasaboutperiodizationarealsooftenassociatedwithaccountsofthedevelopmentofPlato’sphilosophyduringhiswriting-career.Tosomeextent,thisconcerngoesbacktoantiquity.AristotleidentifiescertainideasasSocratic(forinstance,thedenialofakrasiaorweaknessofwillintheProtagoras),whiletreatingthetheoryofFormsintheRepublicasPlatonic(Vlastos,1991,pp.91–8).However,thiswayofreadingthedialoguesisbynomeansuniversalinantiquity.LaterPlatonistsandtheStoics,whoseethicalideasarestronglyinfluencedbyPlatonicthought,donotseemtodrawacleardistinctionbetweenSocraticandPlatonicversionsoftheideathatvirtueisfundamentaltohappiness(Annas,1999,ch.2).UnitarianismwasanassumptionofmuchancientcommentaryinthelaterPlatonicschool;hence,whencommentingontheTheaetetus,PlatoniststriedtofindconsistencybetweentheepistemologicalideasoftheTheaetetus,Meno,andRepublic(Sedley,1996).TheylookedforconsistencybetweendialoguesseeninmodernscholarshipasbelongingtodifferentphasesofPlato’sthought.TheattempttotrackthestagesofthedevelopmentofPlato’sthoughtonkeyissueshasbeenacentralpreoccupationofEnglish-languagescholarship,especiallyintheanalyticapproach.Arelatedaimhasbeentocorrelatethiswithachronologicalorderingofthedialogues,especiallythroughthestudyofstyle-markerswhichareindependentofchangesincontent(thatis,stylometry;cf.Brandwood,1992).Vlastos,4.Explicitcriticism,Prm.129a–135c;impliedcriticism,e.g.Sph.246b–249d;onthequestionwhethertherearechangesinPlato’slaterpoliticaltheory,seeGill,1995,301–4;Rowe,2000;andinthisvolumeLane,plato’spoliticalphilosophy.141ACTC0814120/03/2006,04:01PM\nchristophergillforinstance,setoutaninfluentialfour-stageframeworkforsubdividingthedialogues(elenctic,transitional,middle,late).ThisframeworkwasdesignedtoidentifyaphaseinwhichPlato’saimwastodramatizeSocraticmethodandideas(theelencticdialogues)andthentocharthisprogressiveemancipationfromSocraticmethodandideas(Vlastos,1991,ch.2).Owenfocused,rather,ontheideathatthelatedialoguesweredominatedbyPlato’scritiqueandrejectionofhisearlier(middle-period)theoryofFormsanddualisticepistemology.Hearguedatonepoint(Owen,1953)thattheapparentlydualistTimaeusshouldbere-datedasmiddletoensurethatthelateperiod(inauguratedbythecritiqueofthetheoryofFormsinthefirstpartoftheParmenides)wasseenasconsistentlycriticalofidealistmetaphysicsandepistemology.Thatmovehasnotbeengenerallyfollowed.Amorecommonresponseamonglateranalyticinterpreters(suchasSayre,1983;McCabe,1994;andD.Frede,1996b)hasbeentoreadthelatedialoguesas,byimplication,rethinkingPlatonicphilosophyinawaythatreplacesmiddle-perioddualismwithmoreunifiedconceptualframeworksforunderstandingepistemology,thecosmos,ormetaphysicalcategories.ThisprojectoftryingtotrackPlatonicdevelopmentanditschronologyhasrecentlybeensubjectedtostrongcriticismfromwithinEnglish-languagescholarship.JohnCooper,intheintroductiontotheHackettcollectedtranslationofPlato(1997,pp.viii–xviii),hashighlightedtheweakevidentialsupportformanyoftheassumptionsusedtoconstructachronologyofthedialogues;theHackettcollectionisorderedonthebasisofThrasyllus’(firstcenturybce)arrangement.CharlesKahn(1996),writingfromabroadlyunitarianstandpoint,hascriticizedbothaspectsoftheanalyticperiodizationofthePlatonicworks:thedistinctionbetweenSocraticandPlatonicworksandthatbetweenmiddle-periodandcriticalPlatonicworks.OneofthemostcogentfeaturesofhiscritiquehasbeendirectedattheideathatstylometrycanbeusedtoconstructaPlatonicchronologybywhichtomapphilosophicaldevelopmentonalinear,dialogue-by-dialoguebasis.Heargues,persuasively,thattheonlysolidout-comeofPlatonicstylometry,oneachievedaboutacenturyago,wastoestablishthreebroadstylisticgroups–whichmaybechronologicallydistinct.Theseare:group3(latedialogues)–Laws,Philebus,Sophist,Statesman,Timaeus-Critias;group2(middle),Phaedrus,Parmenides,Republic,Theaetetus;group1(early)allotherdialogues.Hearguesthatstylometryprovidesnomeansforidentifyingaprecisechronologicalsequencewithineachgroup(Kahn,1996,pp.42–8,cf.2002),aclaimreinforcedonstylometricgroundsbyPaulKeyser(1991).Kahn’sarguments,ifaccepted,haveradicalimplica-tionsforthefuturestudyofPlatonicdevelopment,bearing,inparticular,onthelimitsofwhatweknowaboutthisdevelopment.Howdotheserecentdebatesonchronologyanddevelopmentrelatetothequestionoftheinterpretationofthedialogueform?Theydoso,inpart,because,asindicatedearlier,theunderstandingofthefunctionofthedialogueformhas,typically,restedonaspecificpictureofPlatonicdevelopment,withcertainassumptionsaboutwhichdialoguesshouldgoineachgroup.Forinstance,theSymposiumandPhaedoarewidelyseenasmiddle-period,“Platonic,”works,but,asKahnunderlines(1996,p.46),theybelonginstylometricgroup1,althoughtheirspecificchronologicalpositioninthatgroupcannotbedeterminedbystylometricmeans.Kahnhimselfoffersanewconcepttocharacterizethefunctionofmostofthegroup1dialogues,seeingtheirdiscussionsas“proleptic”(anticipatory)ofthemetaphysicalframeworkwhichispresentedinfull142ACTC0814220/03/2006,04:01PM\ntheplatonicdialogueandexplicitformintheRepublic.Ineffect,KahnseekstorevisetheSocrates–Platodivide,presentingmostofthedialoguesseenbyVlastosasrepresentationsofSocraticelenchusaspartialandindirectstatementsofPlatonictheory.Kahn’smovehasbeencriticizedfromananalyticstandpointbyM.M.McCabe(2002),whosuggeststhat,whendifferentPlatonicdialoguesseemtohavecomparablecontent,theyarebetterunderstoodas“metaleptic,”comingafterandcriticizingpreviousideasandthusencouragingreaderstothinkouttheissuesforthemselves.Amoregeneralpointisthatthemoreweseethedialogueformasusedinanartfulorindirectway,thelessstraightforwardisthetaskofinterpretingPlato’sthought,ortrackinghisdevelopment,fromthedialogues.ThisideaisalsoimplicitinesotericorStraussianinterpretations,whichlaylittlestressondevelopment;butrecentdebatehasalsobroughtouttheimportanceofthispointforthosewhoreadthedialoguesratherasexplicitvehicles,thatis,doctrinaloranalyticreaders.AMaieuticResponsetotheQuestionofPeriodizationInowofferafullerresponsetotheissueofperiodization,drawingouttheimplicationsfortheinterpretationofthedialogueform(cf.Gill1996and2002b).Idosofromthethirdinterpretativestandpointoutlinedearlier(p.138),inwhichthedialoguesarereadasmaieutic,designedtopromoteindependentphilosophicalreflectioninthereader.Indoingso,IrefertofourrelatedprincipleswhichIhaveofferedelsewhere(1996,p.285)asabasisforanalyzingPlatonicthinkingaboutdialecticandthesearchforknowledgeandthusforilluminatingthewrittendialogueswhichcenterontherepre-sentationofdialectic.1.Objectiveknowledgeofthemostimportantkind(abouttheessentialprinciplesofreality)canonlybeachievedinandthroughparticipationindialectic,thatis,philosophicaldialogueconductedthroughsystematic,one-to-onequestionandanswer.2.Dialecticcanonlyachievethisgoaliftheparticipants(a)bringtodialectictheappropriatequalitiesofcharacterandintellect,and(b)engageeffectivelyinthemodeofdialecticthatisappropriatelyrelatedtothesubjectunderdiscussion.3.Theproperunderstandingofanygivenphilosophicalproblemdependsonsituatingthisproblemcorrectlyinrelationto(a)thefundamentalprinciplesofreality,and(b)thefundamentalprinciplesofdialecticalmethod.4.Eachdialecticalencounterhasitsownintegrityandsignificanceandconstitutesacontextinwhichsubstantialprogresscanbemadetowardsunderstandingthefundamentalprinciplesofrealityandphilosophicalmethod.IwanttosuggestthattheseprinciplescanhelpustoexplaincertainrecurrentfeaturesofthedialogueformandthattheyprovideabasisforanalyzingthephilosophicaloutlookthatunderliesPlatonicdeploymentofdialectic.Theyenableus,first,todefineadifferentkindof“unitarianism”fromthatdiscussedearlier,namelyaunitarianismofphilosophicaloutlookratherthanthecontentoftheideasthroughoutthedialogues.Second,theyhelpustoseethephilosophicalsignificanceofPlato’spracticeofpresenting143ACTC0814320/03/2006,04:01PM\nchristophergilleachdialogueasadistinctdialecticalencounter.Third,theyprovideabasisforaperiodizationofPlato’sworksbasedonvariationsintypeofdialogue–inparticularintheextenttowhichthedialecticrespondstodifferentoropposingviews.Iconcludebycharacterizingthephilosophicaloutlookthatis,inmyview,impliedinthesedialecticalprinciplesandinPlato’suseofthedialogueform.Assuggestedearlier(p.140),itisoftensupposedthatthedialogueformisusedquitedifferentlyindifferentphasesofPlato’swritingcareerandthattheroleofthedialogueformmaybemoreimportantatsomeperiodsthanatothers.However,wecanalsoseecertainimportanttypesofcontinuityinthisrespect.Oneisthat,asindicatedinprinciple1above,philosophy,whetherrepresentedordescribedinthedialogues,isalwaysconceivedastakingtheformofdialectic,thatis,one-to-onequestion-and-answerusingaspecificmethodtocarryoutanagreedenquiry.Theformofdialecticvaries:itmaybeelenchus,hypothesis,collectionanddivisionorsomeversionofdialecticthatismoretechnical(Parmenides)ormoreinformal(Republic,Laws)(cf.Berti,2002;Robinson,1962;Sayre,1969).Otherstylesofdiscourse,suchasmyth,maybeincorporatedintotheoveralldialecticalproject(Morgan,2000);the(incomplete)Timaeus-Critias-Hermocratestrilogyseemstohavebeenconceivedasthreecorrelatedtypesofphilosophicalmyth.Hence,thecontinuingpresentationofthemodeofdis-cussionas“sharedsearch”(suzEtEsis)remainsintelligibleandjustifiable.Theideathatsearchmustbe“shared”isunderlinedinvariousways,assuggestedinprinciple2above.Insomecases,theincapacityorunwillingnessoftheinterlocutortoengageintherelevanttypeofdialecticalenquiryleadstowell-markedbreakdownindiscussionortoaporia(unresolveddifficulty).Thefactthatthisis,forbothpartnersindiscussion,agenuine“search”ismarkedthroughoutthedialogues,thoughindifferentways.Evenincaseswherethediscussiondoesnotterminateinaporia,thelimitsoftheknowledgeachievedbythemainspeakerissometimesunderlined,bycontrastwiththekindofcomprehensiveunderstandingsoughtthroughdialectic(principle3above).Forinstance,intheRepublic,Socratesemphasizesthatheonlyhas(fallible)“opinions”aboutwhatconstitutescompleteknowledgeoftheGood(VI,506b–507a).InthePhilebus,Socratesunderlinesthefactthatthedialecticalmethodsheemploysfallshortofafullycomprehensiveandsystematic,“god-given”typeofdialectic(Phlb.14b–20a,5esp.16c–17a).Hence,the“sharedsearch”presentedthroughoutthedialoguesisacontinuingonewhichthereaderisinvited,explicitlyorimplicitly,tocontinue.Thus,whatisoftenseenasthedistinctivelySocraticphilosophicalstandpoint,ofcontinuingquestthroughdialecticforknowledgenotyetattained,ispervasivethroughoutthewholePlatoniccorpus.TheseconsiderationshelptoexplainPlato’sretentionofthedialogueform,namelyasamodeofrepresentingdialecticalsharedsearch.Theycanalsoservetoexplainwhyeachdialogueismarkedasanindependentdialecticalencounter,withitsownfreshcastofcharacters(apartfromSocrates),context,subject-matterand(sometimes)modeofdialectic.Thismodeofpresentationisnotcharacteristicoftheonlyothercompletesurvivingexamplesof“Socraticdialogues”,thoseofXenophon(Memorabilia),5.Cf.D.Frede(1996a),pp.226–39,esp.232–3;seealsop.140above(M.FredeonallusionstothePhilosopherintheSophist).144ACTC0814420/03/2006,04:01PM\ntheplatonicdialogueinwhicheachepisodeissimplypartofacontinuingnarrative;thus,thismodeseemstoreflectadistinctivelyPlatonicconceptionoftheform.AlthoughthereareinternalreferenceswithinthetrilogyTheaetetus-Sophist-StatesmanandtheprojectedtrilogyTimaeus-Critias-[Hermocrates],therearenootherexplicitreferencesacrossdialogues.Evenapparentreferences,suchasthatinthePhaedototheMenoorintheTimaeustotheRepublic,arebesttakenasallusiontoother(fictional)discussionsratherthan6cross-referencestoPlatonictexts.Thisformalfeatureistooconsistentlymaintainedtobemerelyaccidental.Partofthepointseemstobetounderline(assuggestedinprinciple4above)thatanygivendialecticalencounterprovidesacontextinwhichthe“sharedsearch”forknowledgeofrealitycanbecarriedforward.Thestudiousabsenceofcross-referencingwithinthedialogues,despitePlato’sownawarenessofhisdevelopingcorpusofworks,seemstoreflectthepointsignaledinthePhaedrusandSeventhLetter(p.139above).Thisisthatphilosophymustbeanactive,independentprocessofsharedenquiry,conductedthroughstrenuousengagementinacertainformofdialectic.Itcannotrelyonconclusionsreachedbyothersinanothercontext,orindeedonconclusionsreachedbythemainspeakerinanotherdialecticalencounter,thoughhemaydrawinageneralizedwayonideasdevelopedelsewhere.Thus,althoughthePlatonicworksholdupasanidealakindofcompleteandsystematicknowledge(principle3above),thedialoguesthemselvesdonotpurporttoarticulatethatsystem,butpresentthemselvesaslocalized,separate,aspirationstosuchknowledge.Inthiswaytoo,theynegateanyimpressionofbeingauthoritativeandthusofmakingitunnecessaryforthereadertoundertakesuchindependentenquiriesforherself.Italsofollows,Ithink,thatinterpretationofthedialoguesshouldfocus,inthefirstinstanceatleast,onrespondingtothedistinctivecharacterandsignificanceoftheargumentinanyonedialogue,ratherthantryingtoexplainthatargumentbyreferencetootherdialoguesorbyasystemofthoughtsupposedlyembodiedin(orbehind)thewholesetofdialogues.Correspondingly,certainrecentstudies,includingthosefromananalyticstandpoint,havefocusedondrawingouttheinternallogicandsignificanceofasingledialogue(e.g.,Burnyeat,1990;Notomi,1999).Indeed,aseriesofsuchstudiesisinpreparationforpublicationbyCambridgeUniversityPress,withM.M.McCabeasGeneralEditor.Sofar,Ihavestressedaspectsofthedialogueform,whichseemtobelinkedwithimportantfeaturesofPlatonicthoughtaboutdialectic,whichrunthroughoutthewholecorpus.ButIthinkthatthe“maieutic”readingofthedialoguescanalsoleadustoformafreshviewoftheperiodizationofthedialogues,andonethatiscompatiblewiththree-groupdivisionwhich(asKahnhasargued,p.142above)istheonlysecureoutcomeofstylometricresearch.Thebasisforthisperiodizationis“dialogue”inaratherbroadersensethanthatofdialecticalmethod,namelythekindofdialoguethattakesaccountofpositionsandapproachesdifferentfrom,oropposedto,one’sown.Theelencticdialoguesofstylometricgroup1(oftenregardedasthecore“Socratic”dialogues)purporttoshowSocratesengagingverycloselywiththeideasofhisinter-locutors.However,theargumentissohighlydirectedbySocratesandsouniformlynegativeoraporeticinitsoutcomethatitisopentoquestionhowfarsuchelenchus6.SeePhd.72e–73a;Meno81a–86b;Ti.81e–86b;alsoTht.183e;Sph.217c;cf.Gill,2002b.145ACTC0814520/03/2006,04:01PM\nchristophergillreallyengageswiththepositionsoftherespondents(asstressedbyBeversluis(2000);onwhichseeGill(2001)).Thereisamarkeddifferenceinthisrespectinthedialoguesofstylometricgroup2:Parmenides,Phaedrus,Republic,Theaetetus.IntheParmenides,themainquestioner(Parmenides)bothcriticizesthetheoryofFormswhichispresentedpositivelyinotherPlatonicdialoguesandalsodeployswhatseemstobearadicallynewversionofdialect-icalargument.InthePhaedrus,insharpcontrasttothewhollynegativetreatmentofrhetoricintheGorgias,Socratestwiceadoptsthemodeofrhetoricasavehicleforideasaboutloveandalsooffersanaccountofwhatwouldconstitutearational,systematicformofrhetoric.TheTheaetetus,whiledeployingelenchusagain,doessoinaverydifferent,“maieutic”manner(cf.Burnyeat,1977).ThisprocessinvolvesanarticulationofaversionofProtagoreansubjectivism(combinedwithHeracliteanflux-doctrine)thatissofullydevelopedthatreadershavesometimesmistakenitforPlatonicdoctrineratherthanseeingitasdesigned,ultimately,fordialecticalrefutation(Burnyeat,1990,pp.10–19;Fine,1996).TheRepublicdramatizesthiscontrastinstylesofdialogue.BookIshowsSocratesrefutingtheimmoralistthroughelenchus–thoughleavinghimquiteunconvinced;BooksII–Xshowhimconstructingacomplexargument,com-biningethics,epistemology,psychology,andpoliticsinaquitenewwaythatseekstomeetandanswertheimmoralist’ssubstantiveclaims.Inthedialoguesofstylometricgroup3,thefocusmainlyfallsontheevolutionofnewfigures(theEleaticandAthenianStrangers,TimaeusandCritias)whosemodesofdiscourseandwhoseconceptualprojectsdivergeinsignificantwaysbothfromeachotherandfromthoseofthedialoguesofgroups1and2.Thesediscussionssometimesincludeamoreexplicitlycollaborativeformofdialectic,seekingcommongroundbetweenopposedpositions,notablyinthePhilebus.Thismightincludestandingbackfrompositionspreviouslyadoptedinthedialogues,asinthecriticalcommentson“thefriendsoftheForms”intheSophist,246a–249d.Butevenwhenthereisnotexplicitengagementwithopposed(orformerlyopposed)positions,thereis,asintheTimaeus-CritiasorLaws,areadinesstoembraceareassuchascosmologyordetailedconstitutionaltheoryformerlyeschewedbySocratic-Platonicdialectic.Thisprogressivemovetowardseverfullerdialoguewithdifferentpositionsandmethodsalsosupportsthemaieuticreadingofthedialoguesbecauseitembodiesanexemplarywillingnesstoexplorenewanddivergentcon-ceptualframeworksandtoevolveproceduresfordeterminingwhatisvalidinthoseframeworksaswellasinone’sownpreviousstandpoint.IconcludebyconsideringwhatkindofphilosophicaloutlookisimpliedintheversionofthemaieuticreadingofPlatooutlinedhereandinthefourprinciplesofPlatonicthoughtaboutdialecticofferedearlier.Typically,Platoisseenasauthorofoneoftheclassicobjectivisttheoriesinthehistoryofphilosophy,thatofthetheoryofForms,withacorrelatedtheoryofknowledgeandassociatedidealistimplicationsforthestudyofpsychology,politics,andthecosmos.However,somemodernphilo-sopherswhohaveshowninterestintheformofPlatonicdialecticinthedialogueshaveseentheretheexpressionofaratherdifferentoutlook.DonaldDavidson,forinstance,seesinthemethodofelenchus,bothintheearlydialoguesandthePhilebus,amethodofseekingtruththroughagreementbetweenparticipantsthatimpliesanintersubjectiveconceptionofknowledge,thusanticipatingDavidson’sownposition.Hans-GeorgGadamerfindsinthe“sharedsearch”ofSocraticdialectic,includingthat146ACTC0814620/03/2006,04:01PM\ntheplatonicdialogueintheRepublic,aprefiguringofhis(“hermeneutic”)viewthattrutharisesoutofthedialecticalsharingof“interpretations,”eachoneframedfromaninevitablylocalized7perspective.TheformulationsoftheprinciplesofdialecticofferedearlieraredesignedtoexpresswhatIhavecalledan“objective-participant”or“inter-objective”standpoint(1996,pp.284–6).Inthisstandpoint,objectiveknowledgeoftruthistakenasthegoalandultimateoutcomeofdialectic.Butthisiscoupledwiththerecognitionthattheonlyeffectivemeansofmovingtowardssuchknowledgeisthroughengagementinevermoresearchingandprofoundformsofdialecticalenquiry.Thedialoguescanbeseenbothasrepresentingthisprocessandasaimingtopromotesuchengagementamongitsreaders.Oftheverydiverseandcontrastingwaysinwhichthedialogueformiscurrentlyunderstood,thisseemstometobethemostpromising.BibliographyWorksCitedAnnas,J.(1999).PlatonicEthics:OldandNew.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.——.andRowe,C.(eds.).(2002).PerspectivesonPlato:ModernandAncient.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.Berti,E.(2002).“Sipuòparlarediun’evoluzionedelladialetticaplatonica?”Plato2(InternetJournaloftheInternationalPlatoSociety:http://www.nd.edu/~plato).Beversluis,J.(2000).Cross-examiningSocrates:ADefenseoftheInterlocutorsinPlato’sEarlyDialogues.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Bloom,A.(trans.).(1968).TheRepublicofPlato(withnotesandaninterpretiveessay).NewYork:BasicBooks.Brisson,L.(1998).LeMêmeetl’autredanslastructureontologiqueduTiméedePlaton:uncommentairesystématiqueduTiméedePlaton(3rdedn.).SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.Brandwood,L.(1992).“StylometryandChronology.”InR.Kraut(ed.),TheCambridgeCompaniontoPlato(pp.1–50).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Burnyeat,M.(1977).“SocraticMidwifery,PlatonicInspiration.”BulletinoftheInstituteofClassicalStudies,24,7–16.——.(1985).“SphinxWithoutaSecret.”NewYorkReviewofBooks,32(May30),30–6.——.(1990).TheTheaetetusofPlato,translatedbyM.J.Levett,revisedandwithanintroduc-tionbyM.Burnyeat.Indianapolis:Hackett.Cherniss,H.(1936).“ThePhilosophicalEconomyoftheTheoryofIdeas.”AmericanJournalofPhilology,57,445–56.Cooper,J.(ed.).(1997).Plato:CompleteWorks.Indianapolis:Hackett.Cousin,V.(ed.).(1864).Procliphilosophioperainedita(2ndedn.).Paris.Davidson,D.(1985).“Plato’sPhilosopher.”LondonReviewofBooks,1Aug.1985.ReprintedinT.IrwinandM.C.Nussbaum(eds.),(1993)Virtue,LoveandForm:EssaysinMemoryofGregoryVlastos=Apeiron,26(3–4)(pp.179–94).Edmonton,Alberta:AcademicPrintingandPublishing.Ferber,R.(1991).DieUnwissenheitdesPhilosophenoderWarumhatPlatondie“ungeschriebeneLehre”nichtgeschrieben?SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.7.SeeDavidson,1985,1993;alsoScaltsas,1989;Gadamer,1980,and1986,ch.3;cf.Renaud,1999;andGill,2002a.147ACTC0814720/03/2006,04:01PM\nchristophergillFerrari,G.R.F.(1997).“Strauss’sPlato.”Arion,5(2),36–65.Fine,G.(1996).“ConflictingAppearances:Theaetetus153d–154b.”InC.GillandM.M.McCabe(eds.),FormandArgumentinLatePlato(pp.105–33)Oxford:ClarendonPress.Frede,D.(1996a).“TheHedonist’sConversion:TheRoleofSocratesinthePhilebus.”InC.GillandM.M.McCabe(eds.),FormandArgumentinLatePlato(pp.213–48).Oxford:ClarendonPress.——.(1996b).“ThePhilosophicalEconomyofPlato’sPsychology:RationalityandCommonConceptsinPlato’sTimaeus.”InM.FredeandG.Striker(eds.),RationalityinGreekThought(pp.29–58).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Frede,M.(1996).“TheLiteraryFormoftheSophist.”InC.GillandM.M.McCabe(eds.),FormandArgumentinLatePlato(pp.135–51).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Gadamer,H.-G.(1980).DialogueandDialectic:EightHermeneuticalStudiesonPlato.(trans.P.C.Smith).NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.(Originalworkpublishedasseparateessaysbetween1934and1974.)——.(1986).TheIdeaofGoodinPlatonic-AristotelianPhilosophy.(trans.P.C.Smith).NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.(Originalworkpublished1978.)Gill,C.(1992).“DogmaticDialogueinPhaedrus276–7?”InL.Rossetti(ed.),Understandingthe“Phaedrus.”ProceedingsoftheSecondSymposiumPlatonicum(pp.156–72).SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.——.(1993).“PlatonicDialecticandtheTruth-StatusoftheUnwrittenDoctrines.”Methexis,6,55–72.——.(1995).“RethinkingConstitutionalisminPoliticus291–303.”InC.Rowe(ed.),ReadingtheStatesman.ProceedingsoftheThirdSymposiumPlatonicum(pp.292–305).SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.——.(1996).“Afterword:DialecticandtheDialogueForminlatePlato.”InC.GillandM.M.McCabe(eds.),FormandArgumentinLatePlato(pp.283–311).Oxford:ClarendonPress.——.(2001).“SpeakingupforPlato’sInterlocutors.ADiscussionofJ.Beversluis,Cross-examiningSocrates.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,20,297–321.——.(2002a).“CriticalResponsetotheHermeneuticApproachfromanAnalyticPerspective”.InG.RealeandS.Scolnicov(eds.),NewImagesofPlato:TheIdeaofGood(pp.211–22).SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.——.(2002b).“DialecticandtheDialogueForm.”InJ.AnnasandC.Rowe(eds.),PerspectivesonPlato:ModernandAncient(pp.145–71).Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.——.andMcCabe,M.M.(eds.).(1996).FormandArgumentinLatePlato.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Gonzalez,F.(ed.).(1995).TheThirdWay:NewDirectionsinPlatonicScholarship.Lanham,Md.:Rowman&Littlefield.Griswold,C.(ed.).(1988).PlatonicWritings,PlatonicReadings.NewYork:Routledge.(2ndedi-tion,UniversityPark,Pennsylvania:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2002.)Kahn,C.H.(1996).PlatoandtheSocraticDialogue:ThePhilosophicalUseofaLiteraryForm.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(2002).“OnPlatonicChronology.”InJ.AnnasandC.Rowe(eds.).PerspectivesonPlato:ModernandAncient(pp.93–127).Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.Keyser,P.(1991).ReviewofG.Ledger,RecountingPlato.BrynMawrClassicalReview,2(7),404–27.Morgan,K.(2000).MythandPhilosophers:FromthePresocraticstoPlato.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.McCabe,M.M.(1994).Plato’sIndividuals.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.——.(2002).“DevelopingtheGood:ProlepsisorCritiqueintheEuthydemus?”Plato2(InternetJournaloftheInternationalPlatoSociety:http://www.nd.edu/~plato).148ACTC0814820/03/2006,04:01PM\ntheplatonicdialogueNotomi,N.(1999).TheUnityofPlato’sSophist:BetweentheSophistandthePhilosopher.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Owen,G.E.L.(1953).“ThePlaceoftheTimaeusinPlato’sDialogues.”ClassicalQuarterly,NS3,79–95.——.(1985).Logic,ScienceandDialectic:CollectedPapersinGreekPhilosophy.(M.C.Nussbaum,ed.).London:Duckworth.Pradeau,J.-F.(2002).PlatoandtheCity:ANewIntroductiontoPlato’sPoliticalThought(trans.J.Lloyd).Exeter:UniversityofExeterPress.(Originalworkpublished1997.)Press,G.(ed.).(1993).Plato’sDialogues:NewStudiesandInterpretations.Lanham,Md.:Rowman&Littlefield.——.(2000).WhoSpeaksforPlato?StudiesinPlatonicAnonymity.Lanham,Md.:Rowman&Littlefield.Reale,G.(1997).TowardsaNewInterpretationofPlato(trans.J.CatanandR.Davies).Washing-ton,DC:CatholicUniversityofAmericaPress.(Originalworkpublished1984;translationbasedon10thedn.)Renaud,F.(1999).DieResokratierungPlatons:DiePlatonischeHermeneutikHans-GeorgGadamers.SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.Robinson,R.(1962).Plato’sEarlierDialectic.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Rowe,C.(2000).“ThePoliticusandotherDialogues.”InC.RoweandM.Schofield(eds.),CambridgeHistoryofGreekandRomanPoliticalThought(pp.233–57).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Sayre,K.(1969).Plato’sAnalyticMethod.Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress.——.(1983).Plato’sLateOntology:ARiddleResolved.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.——.(1992).“AMaieuticViewofFiveLateDialogues.”InJ.C.KlaggeandN.D.Smith(eds.),MethodsofInterpretingPlatoandhisDialogues.(=OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophysuppl.vol.)(pp.221–43).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Scaltsas,T.(1989).“SocraticMoralRealism:AnAlternativeJustification.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,7,129–50.Sedley,D.(1996).“ThreePlatonistInterpretationsoftheTheaetetus’.InC.GillandM.M.McCabe(eds.),FormandArgumentinLatePlato(pp.79–103).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Shorey,P.(1904).TheUnityofPlato’sThought.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Stokes,M.(1986).Plato’sSocraticConversations:DramaandDialecticinThreeDialogues.Baltimore:John’sHopkinsUniversityPress.Strauss,L.(1964).TheCityandMan.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Szlezák,T.A.(1985).PlatonunddieSchriftlichkeitderPhilosophie:InterpretationenzudenfrühenundmittlerenDialogen.Berlin:deGruyter.——.(1997).“Schleiermachers‘Einleitung’zurPlaton-Übersetzungvon1804.”AntikeundAbendland,3,46–62.——.(1999).ReadingPlato(trans.G.Zanker).London:Routledge.(Originalworkpublished1993.)Tarrant,H.(1993).ThrasyllanPlatonism.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.Vlastos,G.(1954).“TheThirdManintheParmenides.”PhilosophicalReview,63,319–49.——.(1991).Socrates:IronistandMoralPhilosopher.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(1994).SocraticStudies.(M.Burnyeat,ed.).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.FurtherReadingBlondell,R.(2000).ThePlayofCharacterinPlato’sDialogues.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.149ACTC0814920/03/2006,04:01PM\nchristophergillCoventry,L.(1990).“TheRoleoftheInterlocutorinPlato’sDialogues:TheoryandPractice.”InC.Pelling(ed.),CharacterizationandIndividualityinGreekLiterature(pp.174–96).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Derrida,J.“Plato’sPharmacy.”InB.Johnson(trans.).Dissemination,WithIntroductionandAddi-tionalNotes(pp.61–171).Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Findlay,J.N.(1974).TheWrittenandUnwrittenDoctrines.NewYork:HumanitiesPress.Gaiser,K.(1980).“Plato’sEnigmaticLectureontheGood.”Phronesis,25,5–37.Haslam,M.(1972).“Plato,Sophron,andtheDramaticDialogue.”BulletinoftheInstituteofClassicalStudies,19,17–38.Kahn,C.H.(1983).“DramaandDialecticinPlato’sGorgias.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilo-sophy,1,75–121.Klagge,J.C.andSmith,N.D.(eds.).(1992).MethodsofInterpretingPlatoandhisDialogues.(=OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophysuppl.vol.).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Nightingale,A.(1995).GenresinDialogue:PlatoandtheConstructofPhilosophy.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Rutherford,R.B.(1995).TheArtofPlato:TenEssaysinPlatonicInterpretation.London:Duckworth.Schmid,T.(1998).Plato’sCharmidesandtheSocraticIdealofRationality.Albany,NY:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Sedley,D.(1995).“TheDramatisPersonaeofPlato’sPhaedo.”InT.Smiley(ed.),PhilosophicalDialogues:Plato,Hume,Wittgenstein(pp.3–26)(=ProceedingsoftheBritishAcademy85).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Tigerstedt,E.N.(1977).InterpretingPlato.Uppsala:AlmquistandWiksellInternational.Weingartner,R.H.(1973).TheUnityofthePlatonicDialogue.Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill.150ACTC0815020/03/2006,04:01PM\nplato’sethics:earlyandmiddledialogues9Plato’sEthics:EarlyandMiddleDialoguesTERRYPENNERSocratesandPlato:ConflictingPsychologiesofActionThereisaconsiderablechangeoftoneandmethodbetweenwhatwefindinmostofPlato’searlydialoguesandwhatwefindinthatgreatethicalmasterpieceofPlato’s1middleperiod,theRepublic.Thusinatypicalearlydialogue,wefindSocratesexamin-ingandrefutinganswersofotherstoethicalquestionsofthesort:“Whatiscourage?”2(“Whatistemperance?”“Whatispiety?”)and“Isvirtueteachable–andifsohow?”andsuggesting(surelywithironicexaggeration),thathehimselfisquiteasignorantaboutthecorrectanswerstohisquestionsashisinitiallyconfidentinterlocutorsturnouttobebytheendofthedialogue.ThisisnottodenythatwefindSocratesthereclearlyenoughcommittedtobeliefsofhisown–suchas“Virtueisknowledge,”“Nooneerrswillingly,”and“Alldesireisforthegood.”Thepointismerelythatbytheendofmostearlydialogues,Socrateshasapparentlyshownalltheanswersanyonehasofferedtohismainquestionstobefailures.Theresultsofthesedialoguesareall,inform,negative.IntheRepublic,bycontrast,atleastfromBookIIonwards,wefindthecharacterSocratesoffering(andsustaining)apositiveanswertothequestion“Whatisjustice?”–doingso,moreover,bymeansofanextraordinaryandquiteunprecedenteddevice:3examiningwhatjusticewouldbeinacertainidealcityconstructedinthought.But1.ForthedatingofPlato’sdialogues,seeC.Gill,theplatonicdialogue,inthisvolume.2.Otherquestions:Whatislove(orfriendship)?Isvirtueascienceorexpertise?Whatisrhetoric–thatis,whatistheartofpersuasion,andisitanexpertiseorscience?Orisitwhatmodernswouldcallapseudo-science(n.5below)?Whatisliterarycriticism,andisitanexpertiseorsciencethatcanbehadindependentlyofthetruthaboutthesubject-mattertheliteraturedealswith?Orisitapseudo-sciencetoo?IsAchillesthebetterperson,orOdysseus?Andisthepersongoodinsomeareatheonewhoerrswillinglyinthatarea,ortheonewhoerrsunwillingly?Ifyoungpeopleshoulddevotethemselvestothepursuitofhumangoodnessandthereforeknowledgeorexpertise,whatistherelevantknowledgeorexpertise?IsSocratesanatheistandcorruptoroftheyoung?AndwouldSocratesbeactingwellandjustlyintryingtoescape?3.Extraordinarybecauseoftheparticularwayinwhichjusticeintheindividualismodeledonjusticeinanidealstate:seethesectionsbelowonpsychologicalwell-adjustmentintheRepublic.151ACTC0915120/03/2006,04:02PM\nterrypennernotonlyisthe“Whatisit?”questiongivenapositiveanswer.TheRepublicalsooffers–asitscentralargumentindeed–anextendedargumentforapositiveanswertothequestion“Doesthejustlifemakeushappierthanthecompletelyunjustlife?”AssociatedwiththischangeoftoneandmethodintheRepublicis(a)acertainwideningofPlato’sinterestsbeyondtheareaofindividualethics,togetherwith(b)certaindevelopments–andeven(c)reversals–indoctrine.Thus,(a)Rep.II–Xshowsaninterestindetailsofpoliticalorganizationthatisentirelyabsentfromtheearlydialogues.Again,(b)inadevelopmentoftheearlyperiodinsistenceontheobjectivityofthesciences,thePlatoofRep.II–Xengagesinsomeelaboratetheorizingaboutthemetaphysicsandepistemologyoftheunchangingobjectsofthesciences–theabstractobjectshecalls“Forms,”whichhecontrastssharplywiththeever-changingphenomenaoftheperceptibleworld.Thiscontrastbetweenchangingperceptiblesandunchangingabstractobjects(intelligibles)–whichPlatoalsospeaksofasacontrastbetweenbecomingandbeing–isquiteabsentfromtheearlydialogues(exceptforthePhaedo,theCratylus,andtheSymposium).And(c)Rep.II–Xunveilsawholenewpsychologyofdesireandvoluntaryactionthatactuallycontradictstheviewsespousedintheearlydialogues(withtheexceptionofthePhaedoandpartsoftheGorgias).Wheretheearlydialoguesmostlyinsistthatalldesireisforthegood,atRep.IV,437d–438awearetoldthatthirstisdesirejustfordrink–notforhotdrinkorcolddrink,ormuchdrinkoralittledrink,and,aboveall,notforgooddrink.Wearenottoallowanobjectortotellusthatthirstisforgooddrink(drinkthatisgood)onthegrounds(theobjectorsays)thatalldesireisforthegood.Whotheobjectoriswillbealltooobvioustoanyonefamiliarwiththeearlydialogues.ItistheviewofthecharacterSocratesinmostoftheearlydialoguesthatalldesireisforthe4good.ThusPlatointheRepublicispreciselyrejectingtheviewofmostoftheearlydialogues.Thesechangesnotwithstanding,thereisalsoremarkablecontinuitybetweentheethicalviewsoftheearlydialoguesandthoseoftheRepublic.QuestionsofhumangoodnessandthegoodforhumansremainverymuchamatterofobjectiveknowledgeorsciencethroughoutPlato’sdialogues,whetherthisshowsup(asintheearlydialogues)viatheanalogyofhumangoodnesstovariousformsofexpertise,or(asintheRepublic)viathereferencetoForms.Ineitherversion,theemphasisisonscience–asopposed,say,totradition,religiousornot.Thustheethicsimplicitinthetheologyofthetraditionalmythsisroundlycriticized(Rep.II–III)–orevenridiculed(Euthyphro).Atthesametime,thesophisticenlightenment(withwhichAristophanes’CloudshadidentifiedSocrates)isalsocriticized.Thusrhetoric,aspracticedbythepoliticiansandoratorsoftheday,andoftenrepresentedinthe“newlearning”ofthelatefifthcenturyasawaytoachievesuccessinpersonalandpoliticallife,isarguedthroughouttobe4.Thatis,alldesirethatleadstoaction.Onemayfeeladesirefordrinkthatonedoesnotacton;butwhensuchadesireleadstoaction,itisarguablyonlybecausethedrinkinquestionisseenas(partof)thegoodintheparticularsituationconfrontingtheagent(Lys.220d8–e2,221c5–d2,Grg.467e–468e).Intheviewwefindinmostoftheearlydialogues,evenwhenthirsty,oneactsonthedesireforgood,notthedesirefordrink.152ACTC0915220/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’sethics:earlyandmiddledialogues5atbest(whatwewouldcall)apseudo-science.Finally,theideathatthereissomeunderstandingtobegainedfromtheworksofthegreatepicandtragicpoetsofthedayistreatedwiththesamedisdainthroughout.Evenso,thechangesnotedabovebetweenmostearlydialoguesandRep.II–X6deservesomeexplanation.Somecommentators,followingAristotleonthehistoricalSocrates,suggestthatthesechangesanddevelopmentsarebestexplainedbysuppos-ingthatmostearlydialoguesgiveusaPlatostillundertheveryconsiderableinfluenceofthemethodsanddoctrinesofthehistoricalSocrates,whileRep.II–XgivesusaPlatowhocarriesforwardinanewwaymanyofthesameethicalconcernsthatanimatedSocrates,butwhoalsohaspreoccupationsthataredistinctivelyhisown.OnethingAristotletellsusisdistinctiveoftheviewsofthehistoricalSocratesistheviewthatvirtueisknowledge.ThisiscertainlythesuggestionoftheApology,eventhoughtheApologyalsohasitthatSocratesisthewisestpersonthereis,andthathiswisdomconsistsinhisacknowledgingthathehimselfhasnoknowledge.Thusthevirtuewhichisknowledgeissomethingatwhichwecanatbestaim.(Akindofidealobject,astheFormswilllaterbe.)Theknowledgeinquestion(thatnoonehas)appearstobetheknowledgeofthegoodandthebad–ofvirtueandvice.(Asforothersortsofknowledge,Socrateshasnoproblemwiththeideathatcobblers,carpenters,anddoctors7haveknowledgeoftheirownparticularsubject-matters.)WhattheApologytellsusisthatthebestchanceofmakingchildren,orothers,goodpeopleliesinmakingsuretheyareexamined–andrefuted–everydayintheiropinionsaboutvirtue(humangoodness).“Theunexaminedlife,”ashefamouslyputsit,“isnotworthliving”(Ap.38a5–6).5.TheboastoftherhetoricianGorgiasisthat,withoutanygrasponthescienceofmedicine,hecanpersuadepatientstoundergosurgerywherehisbrother,thedoctor,fails(Grg.456a–c).Moregenerally,bywhatSocratescallsa“knackofflattery”(463b),Gorgiasprofessestogainclientsasupposedgoodtheythinktheywant;butGorgiasfeelsfreetoexpresscompleteindifferencetothesciencerelevanttothegoodinquestion.Thisover-extendsrhetoricinthefollowingway(derivedfromGrg.466a–468e):Withoutthatknowledgewhichasciencehasofthemeans–endstructureswithinitsarea,rhetoricisindangerofsecuringforitsclientswhattheythinkisameanstotheirendinthatarea–whenitisn’t.(Thisappliesalsotothescienceofthegoodandthebad,wherepresumablymeans-endstructuresareprettycomplex.)Toprofessindifferencetoknowledgeofmeans-endstructuresrelevanttotheclients’desiresispreciselytocourtdisaster.Tosecureanapparentlywantedmeansthat,throughignorance,leadstonoendtheclientwants–thatisnoexemplificationofascienceofgettingpeoplewhattheywant.Rhetoric–withoutscience–gainsonenorealgood.SeePenner(1988,1991).Atruerhetoric,withthescienceoftherealgood,wouldbeanothermatter:cf.Grg.517a,Phdr.261c–262c.6.Halliwell(1994),Irwin(1977,1995),Penner(2002:contraKahn(1996)),Santas(1979),Vlastos(1991).7.Atanyrate,heiscontent,forpurposesoftheanalogywithvirtuethathewishestosetup,totreatthesesciencesaswellenoughinstantiatedinactualcarpenters,doctors,etc.Theuseoftheideathatthesesciencesareautonomous,andrequirenoknowledgeofthe(human)good,ifintendedinnomorethananexpositoryway–tointroducetheideaofvirtueasascience–wouldnotthereforeclashwiththeclaimintheRepublicthatthereisnoknowledgeofanysciencewithoutknowledgeoftheFormoftheGood.153ACTC0915320/03/2006,04:02PM\nterrypennerVirtue,itappears,isentirelyanintellectualmatter.Inthispicture,theredoesnotseemtobeanyroom–orneed–forthetrainingofcharacter,orthetrainingofpeople’smotivationsandtheirdesires.Bycontrast,thePlatowhowroteRep.II–Xobviouslyheldthatvirtueis,atanyrateinitsbeginning,amatterprimarilyofcharac-terandofthetrainingofone’semotionsanddesires.ThustheprimaryeducationofchildrenconsideredinBooksII–IIIoftheRepublicdoesnotlookmuchlikedialectic.Indeed,itlooksmoreliketheformationofcharacterbylargelynon-intellectualmeans–rigorouslycensoredstoriesaboutgodsandheroes,censoredmusic,andcarefullysupervisedphysicalactivities.ForthePlatooftheRepublic,then,charactertrainingistheabsolutebasisofvirtue(howevermuchitremainsthecasethatthepersonofcompletevirtuemustalso,intheend,haveexpertknowledgeofthegood).IndeedtheguardiansofPlato’sidealstategoonhavingtheircharactertestedevenwhiletheyareengagedintheirfinalstudiestobecomeguardiansofthatidealstate.Thuscharacterdisqualifiessomehumanbeingsforhumangoodness,regardlessoftheirbeliefs.ThisisnotthepictureapparentlyembracedbyPlatowhen,stillundertheformidableinfluenceofhismaster,hewaswritingmanyoftheearlydialogues.TheSocraticpicturemustsurelyseemaltogetherstrangetous,atleastatfirstglance.Howcouldmereintellectbesufficienttomakeusgoodpersons?TheanswerhastodowiththeSocratictheoryofdesire–oraswemightputit,theSocraticpsychologyofaction.AccordingtoSocrates,alldesiresproductiveofactionaredesiresforthegood.Theyaredesiresforone’sowngood(Meno77c8–d1,d7,Grg.468b6withd3)–one’sownrealgood,notjustone’sownapparentgood(whatonethinksofasone’sowngood:8Grg.468c2–5,d1–6).Theearlydialoguesseemclearlyenoughtoidentifytheagent’sgoodwithhisorherownhappiness(Euthd.278e3ff.,esp.279a2–3,a5,280a4–c4,d4–e2,281b2–4,282a1–b7;Symp.204e1–205a8).Butthenifeveryvoluntaryactionproceedsfromdesireforone’sownrealgood,goodpeoplewillnotdifferfrombadpeopleinthefundamentaldesirethatgeneratestheiractions(Meno78b5–6).Onthe8.Ifone’sactiondidnotleadtoone’srealgood,butjusttowhatseemedtoonetobetherealgood(thatisanapparentgood),then,Socratesholds,onedidnotwanttodotheactiononedid(Grg.468c–d).Onewantedtodoinsteadtheactionthatwouldhaveledtothatrealgoodforthesakeofwhichonedidtheaction.Plato’spointheremaybeputasfollows:Wantingtodosomethingisnotatwo-placerelationbetweenapersonandanaction,butathree-placerelationbetweenaperson,anaction,andtherealgoodtowhichtheaction(infavorablecircumstances)isthemeans.SeePenner(1991),PennerandRowe(1994).PriortoPenner(1991),mostscholarstookitasobviousthat,forSocratesasforAristotle,theclaimthatalldesireisforthegoodwastheclaimthatalldesirewasfortheapparentgood,i.e.,forwhattheagentthoughtwasbestfortheagent–evenif,unbeknownsttotheagent,itwasnotinfactbestfortheagent.(HelenwantedtherunningawaywithParisunderthedescription“good”.)Onsuchaview,shedidwanttherunningawaywithParisthatendedbymakinghermiserable.(Ifshedidn’twanttodoit,whydidshedoit?)OnthequitedifferentviewherederivedfromtheGorgias,Helenhadnodesireforthataction.Insteadherdesirewasthe(incoherent)desiretodothatactionwhichisboththebestactionforherallthingsconsidered(whateverthatmightbe–shecouldn’tbequitesurewhatitwas)andtheactionshetooktobethebest,namelyrunningawaywithParis.Buttheactionshediddo,theonethatmadehermiserable,isnotthatreallybestactionshewantedtodo.154ACTC0915420/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’sethics:earlyandmiddledialoguesSocraticpsychologyofactionweareallthesameinthisrespect:Ineverythingwedo,wearemoreorlessreflectivelylookingtothehappinessofourownlife.Butifonepersonwillnotdifferfromanotherinthefundamentaldesirethatpro-ducesallaction,howisitthatsomeactvirtuously,someviciously?Ifwedonotdifferintheendweallseek,thenpresumablywedifferonlyinthemeanstothatendwhichwechoose,believingthemtobethebestavailabletousatthetime.Butonthatshowing,thedifferencecanonlyresideinourmoreorlessreflectivebeliefsastowhatparticularactionisthebestmeansopentous,atthetimeofaction,toourownrealhappiness.Thatis,differencesbetweenpeoplewhichwethinkofasdifferencesintheirmotivesandintentionsare,ontheSocraticview,theconsequencesolelyoftheirbeliefs.Hence,onthisview,ifSmithwantstoharmme,andJoneswantstohelpme,thatisnotbecauseofanydifferenceinfundamentaldesires,butsolelybecauseSmithholdsthebeliefthatharmingmewillleadtohisrealgood(perhapsbecauseofanothermoregeneralbeliefabouttheusesofharmtoothersforbeinghappy),whileJonesholdsthebeliefthathelpingmewillleadtohisrealgood(perhapsbecauseJones,likeSocrateshimself,believesthatharmingothersalwaysresultsinharmtoyou:Ap.25d6–e5.)ForSocrates,then,Jones’svirtueisknowledge,Smith’sviceignorance.Noticethefollowingcorollary:thereisreallyonlyonewaytochangeSmith’sbehavior.Thisistoengageindialecticwithhimasawayofchanginghisbeliefs.Virtuethusbecomesknowledge.Tobecomemorevirtuousistocometounderstandbetterwhatisandisnotameanstoone’sownrealgood.But,now,ifPlatoendorsesthisSocraticviewofthenatureofdesireandhumangoodnessintheearlydialogues,whydoesheabandonitwhenhecomestoRep.II–X?Becauseatsomepoint–perhaps(thoughthisisamereconjecture)undertheinflu-enceofthePythagoreanphilosophershemetonhisfirstvisittoItalyandSicilysomeelevenyearsafterSocrates’death–hehascometoanewviewaboutthehumanpsyche(Grg.493a1–494a5),aviewaccordingtowhichPlatoconcludesinRep.IVthathumanactiondoesnotalwaysflowfromanagent’sfundamentaldesireforhisorherowngood,butsometimesalsoflowsfromothermoreirrational–and(wemightsay)morephysiological–desires,suchasthirst,hunger,andthedesireforsex(cf.point(c)onpage152).Thisistheparts-of-the-souldoctrineofRep.IV.Accordingtothisdoctrine,Reason,theRationalPartofthesoul,actssolelyfromitsfundamentaldesireforthe(real)goodoftheentireindividual.(Sofar,thePlatonicrationalpartofthesoulisexactlyliketheSocraticindividualasawhole.)Toleave9asidefornowthedesiresofthespiritedpart,theappetitivepartdesiresfood,drink,9.ThedesiresofthespiritedpartseemtobemainlydesirestosupportReasoninitsattemptstocontroltheappetitivedesires.ButthenwhynotsimplyhavedesiresofReasonattemptingtocontrolappetite?(Plato’sargumentsareinanycasenotverygoodfortherebeingthisthirdpartofthepsyche.Whythendoeshepersistinpositingthisthirdpart?)AlreadyintheGorgias(e.g.,505b–c),Socratesisatleastsuggestingananalogybetweenpunishing(kolazein)unrulymembersofsocietyanddisciplining(kolazein:“todiscipline”cf.akolasia:“indiscipline”,moreusually“self-indulgence”)unrulybodilyappetitesinthesoul.IftheRepublicthendevelopsanexplicitandextensiveanalogybetweencityandsoul,anditisnaturaltodepictthepunishingofunrulycitizensastheactionofthemilitarythatservetherulers,ratherthanoftherulersthemselves,itmayhavecometoseemnaturaltoPlatothatheseekinthesoulanagencyfordiscipliningappetitesdistinctfromtheRationalpart.155ACTC0915520/03/2006,04:02PM\nterrypennersex,andthelike–generallyspeakingentirelyindependentlyofReason’sbeliefsaboutwhatisgoodfortheindividualasawhole.Appetite–thedesireforinsulin-rush,letussay–movesmetotakethiscookie.Reasonsays“Thiswillbebadfortheindividualasawhole.”Buttheappetiteforinsulin-rushdoesn’tquit;andbeingtoomuchforReason,leadsmetotakethecookie–againstmybetterjudgment.SotoowithLeontius,atRep.IV,439e–440a,whoseReasonsaysitisbestnottoactoncertainbaseeroticdesires–toviewapileofcorpses–atthesametimeashisappetiteleadshim,cursing,10torunoverandviewthecorpses.Themostimportantfeatureofthisdoctrineofthetripartitesoulisnottheclaimthatthesoulhasparts(apointonwhichAristotlecriticizesPlato)buttheclaimthatactionissometimesproducedbydesiresotherthanthefundamentaldesireforgood:morephysiological,non-rationaldesires,suchasthirst,hunger,andsexualdesire(apointonwhichAristotlefollowsPlato).Onthisnewview,theseirrationaldesireswillsome-times(non-intellectually)overcomeone’sdesireforgood(thisiswhatAristotlecalledakrasia,or“weaknessofwill”),andsometimestheywill(non-intellectually)corrupteitherone’sdesireforgood(thisiswhatAristotlecalledakolasia,or“wickedness”)orone’sfundamentalbeliefsaboutthegood(Plato’sversionofakolasia–verymuchondisplayinRep.VIII–IX).Asaconsequence,PlatointheRepubliccomestotheviewthatmoraleducationwillrequirenotjustrationaldiscussion,butthecontrolandredirec-tion(byatleastsomenon-rationalmeans)ofone’sirrationaldesiresandemotions,sothattheyneitherovercomethedesiresofReasonnorcorruptReason’sbeliefsaboutthegood.Thegoodpersonbecomesthepersonofgoodcharacter.ForSocrates,bycontrast,thereisnosuchthingasAristotelianakrasiaandnosuchthingasakolasia.11Thereisonlyignorance.Suchthenisthebackground,incontrastingpsychologiesofaction,forthedifferencebetweentheSocraticviewthatvirtueisknowledgeandthePlatonicviewthatthetrain-ingofcharacter(inatleastpartlynon-intellectualways)isanecessarypreconditiontotheacquiringofthatwisdomwhich,inPlatoasinSocrates,isnecessarytovirtue.TheDesireforGoodinPlatonicEthicsButwhataboutethics?DoesthePlatowhowroteRep.II–XalsoholddifferentethicalviewsfromtheSocraticPlatowhowrotemanyoftheearlydialogues?ThesuggestiontobemadehereisthatinthemainlinesoftheRepublic,wefindnochangesinethical10.PlatorepresentsthiscaseasAppetiteopposingnotReason,buttheSpiritedpart.(Seeprecedingnote.)ItistruethatsomescholarsdenythatPlatoispresentingthecaseofLeontiusasacaseofactingcontrarytoone’sdesireforwhatisbest.Butthisseemsadesperatemeasuretoavoidtheclearimplicationsofthetext.ItistruethatatVI,506e–507a,Platoisstillsayingthatalldesirefromwhichactionproceedsisdesireforgood.Butitisprobable(VI,505d)thatPlatoisinthiscontextsimplyspeakingofactionsonewouldchoosetodo(asopposedtothoseactionsforcedonusbyourirrationaldesires)–somethingweknowhappensalsointheopeningsentenceofAristotle’sNicomacheanEthics.11.ButseeDevereux(1995).156ACTC0915620/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’sethics:earlyandmiddledialoguestheorythatarenotexpectedconsequencesofthechangeinpsychologyofaction,whereinaddedtotheagent’srationaldesiresforhisorherowngood,therearealsoirrationaldesiresthat,insomeonenotproperlyeducated,willcorruptReason’sbeliefsandovercomeReason’sdesires.Itistruethatthereisafeatureofthedescriptionjustgivenwhichleavesmanycommentatorsdissatisfied,sincetheywanttodenythatthedesireforgoodthatwefindintheRepublicisinthiswayegoistic.(Threeparagraphsback,weclaimedthatthegoodmyReasondesiresismygood.)Accordingtomanycommentators,however,thePlatonicFormoftheGoodthat,intheRepublic,standsoveralltheotherForms,comestodirectthephilosopher’sthoughtandaspirationontoahigherandmoregenerallevel–tosomethingclosertotheideaofmostmodernphilosophers,accordingtowhichthegooddesiredbythegoodpersonisnottheperson’sowngood,butthegoodgenerally,includingthegoodofone’sfellowcitizensandthegoodofothersquitegener-ally.Inmostinterpretations,thisflowsfromtheidea–notadoptedhere–thattheFormsare“self-predicational”inacertainabsolute(non-relative)way,sothattheFormoftheGoodis,first,itselfagoodthing,and,second,agoodthingwhichisnotgoodforme(orrelativetome)or–forthatmatter–goodforyou,orgoodforanyone.Itisgoodperiod.Hencethegooddesiredbythosewhosecharactersandintellectshavebeenappropri-atelytrainedbecomesnotthegoodforanyone,evenforone’sfellow-citizensorforhumansquitegenerally,butawholenewkindofgood:animpersonal(andideal)good–notperhapsquiteidenticalwithmoralgood,butasclosetoitasPlatoevercomes.Asecondsuggestionmaybeinfluencinginterpretershere–aparticularlystrongwayofunderstandingtheideaofthe“transcendence”oftheForms.ThesuggestionisthattheFormoftheGoodortheFormofBeautyaremorethansimplytherealnaturesofthegoodorofbeauty.(Thatis,theyarenotanalogoustowhataFormofHappinesswouldbeifweimaginedsuchathinginPlato–somethinggivinguspreciselytherealnatureofhumanhappinessthatistheobjectoftheSocraticscienceofthegood12andthebad.)IfwetaketheFormoftheGoodortheFormofBeautyasmorethanjustanobjectofSocraticsciences,whattheGoodItselfandtheBeautifulItselfwillturnouttobe–iftheyarestrongly“transcendent”inthisway–isnotjustabstractobjects(intelligiblesasopposedtoperceptualphenomena)which,whetheroneknowsitornot,onewhodesiresorloveswishestopartakein.Instead,theFormoftheGoodwillbeawholenewotherworldlygood,goingbeyondanyhumangood(andindeedbeyondthegoodofanythinginthephenomenalworld),agoodwhichfewhumansgettocontemplateletaloneconsciouslydesiretobepartoftheirlives.AFormoftheGood,conceivedalongthelinesofthissuggestion,couldbesomesortofmoralgoodbeyond13anycreature.12.Cf.Tht.175cforsomethinglikethisideainanothermiddledialogue.13.Similarly,onthestrong“transcendence”viewoftheForms,whichsomefindatSymp.210a–211c,whatwearetodoistoturnawayfromallattachmentstobeautifulperceptiblestoformanewattachmenttoanidealobjectinanotherworld,whichobjectisitselfthemostbeautifulofbeautifulobjects–asVlastos(1965)putsit,winninghandsdownallbeautycon-testswithbeautifulphenomena.Bycontrast,onthereadingfavoredhere,loveforbeautifulperceptiblesisreallyattachmenttotheseperceptiblesforloveofthatrealnatureofbeautythatresidesinthem.(Justso,onereadingoftheLysishasitthatwhenLysis“makesmuchof”157ACTC0915720/03/2006,04:02PM\nterrypennerTheissuesherearehighlycontroversial,withperhapsamajorityofscholarstakingthelinethattheFormoftheGoodisthiskindofself-predicationaland“stronglytran-14scendent”being.NeverthelessitmaybepointedoutagainstsuchaviewoftheeffectthattheFormoftheGoodhasonPlato’sethics,thatthisvaliantandingeniouseffort15tostopPlato’sethicsfrombeingegoisticinitsgoalsdestroystheintendedparallelbetweenReasonandtherulersoftheIdealCity.For,aswillbemadeclearbelow,itiscentraltoPlato’suseoftheIntellectualRulingClassasamodelfortheRationalPartofthepsychethatasthedirectingdesireoftheRulersisforthegoodoftheentirecity,sothedirectingdesireofReasonshouldbeforthegoodoftheentireindividual.Butthen(asclaimedtwoparagraphsback)thegoodthatmyReasonseeksmustbemyowngood,asthehappinessitseeksmustbemyownhappiness.Ifwesetasideconsiderationsoftheself-predicationalandthe“stronglytranscend-ent”notionoftheForms,thebestevidenceforanon-egoisticgoodintheRepublicconcernsaminor,ifimportant,detailintheconstructionoftheidealcity–Plato’sinsistenceonmakingsurethatthoseselectedtorulearethosethatinfacthaveabetterlifeavailabletothemthanruling,namely,alifeofstudyoftheForms(VII,519b–521b).Notbeingeagertorule,suchrulerswon’tlooktobenefitthemselvesbyruling,butmerelytodowhatisnecessaryandjustduringsuchtimesastheyareforcedtoabandontheirstudies.Dowenothaveinthisfeatureoftheconstructionoftheidealcityapictureofpeopleactingjustlyandcontrarytowhatismostintheirself-interest?Isthisnotapictureofhumangoodnessthatrunscontrarytotheideathatthejustlifeisthehappiestlife?OrisitmerelyadetailintheconstructionoftheidealcitythatPlatohopedtogetawaywith,allowinghimselftobeseducedbytheepigramthattheonlypeopleyouwanttohaveasrulersarepeoplewhoseelessadvantagetorulingthantodoingsomethingelse?Or–splittingthedifference–doweseehereasymptomoftheemergingtensioninPlato’sthoughtasheturnsmoreandmoretoaninterestin16thegoalsofpolitics?Menexenus,whathelovesinMenexenusistherealgood–the“firstfriend”–that,atbest,thetwoseektogether,especiallyinargument.Similarly,whenLysisdesirestodrink,whathedesiresinthatactionistherealgoodtowhichthatactionisthebestmeans:Cf.n.3above.)Howcanitbethatwealldesirethereal(andeventranscendent)natureofthegood(theForm)ifwhatweeachdesireisourownrealgood?Thedesirefortherealnatureofthegood,morefullyexpressedisthedesirethattherealnatureofthegood(theForm)berealizedinourownlives.14.Annas(1981),Cooper(1977),Irwin(1977,1995),Santas(2001),White(1979).15.MosttreatmentsoftheRepublicseemanxioustoavoidmakingitegoisticinitsgoals–evenIrwin(1977,1995),whofollowsPenner(1973b)inmakingatleastSocraticethicsegoistic.16.Ep.VII,324b–325c,tellsusofPlato’sinitialdeterminationtoenterpoliticswhenhismother’scousinCritias(leaderoftheoligarchic“ThirtyTyrants”)andherbrotherCharmidesundertooktoreformtheAtheniangovernment.ThisambitionwasabortedwhenPlatosawhowhisrelativestreatedhis“olderfriend”Socrates.ForSocrates’holdinghimselfbackaltogetherfrompoliticallife,seeespeciallyAp.31c–32a,32e(onpoliticalactivityasanactualobstructiontothatcareforthesoulthatconsistsintheexaminedlife).ForPlato’sgradualreturnofinterest,atleastinthepoliticsofidealsocieties,seeEp.VII,324b–326b.TheGorgiastoo,esp.501b1ff.with515a–521a,showssignsofa158ACTC0915820/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’sethics:earlyandmiddledialoguesAtanyrate,thepresenttreatmentwillsupposethatevenifinthispassagePlatoshouldfeelsometemptationtoabandontheuniversalityoftheclaimthattheaimofpeople’srationaldesiresisalwaystheirownself-interest,theRepublicasawholecannotbedoingso.Forevenasidefromtheegoisticimplicationsofthecity/soulmodel,theRepublic’smainpointsurelyremainsthatthejustpersonisalwayshappierthantheunjust–sothatthereisinthisrespectnochangebetweentheconceptionofthegoodinSocratesandtheconceptionofthegoodintheRepublic.Foronetodesirerealgoodistowanttherealgoodweallaimattoberealizedinone’sownlife.IfthisseemstoanyonetomakePlato’sjustpersonaselfishperson,itneedstobepointedoutthatselfishnessissomethingquitedifferentfrompursuingone’sself-interest.Forselfishnessisapolicyofnotcaringaboutthegoodofothers.NeitherSocratesnorPlatowouldhavethoughtthispolicyasensiblewaytogoaboutsecuringone’sownbestinterests.Indeed,itwasSocrates’beliefthatinthelongrunitisneverinyourinteresttoharmothers(Ap.25c–26a,Grg.,Rep.I,335b6–e6,cf.Tht.173a7–b3).Still,modernmoralphilosophers–manyofthemanxioustohavesomethingtosay(ordo)17tothosewhowrongothersandappeartogetawaywithit–tendtoviewwithdistastethissuggestionthatthereisnothingdisreputableaboutlookingtoone’sownself-interest.Weseeherethatinspiteoftheclearenoughdistinctionbetweenselfishnessandself-interest,moralphilosopherstendtoremainuneasyaboutPlatoasarolemodelforthemoralphilosopher.Inhisjustlycelebratedinaugurallecture,“DutyandInterest”of1928,H.R.PrichardpointsouthowimportantitistotheRepublicthatPlatohasSocrates,bothinBookIandintheremainingninebooksoftheRepublic,acceptaslegitimatethequestionwhethertheunjustorthejustarehappier.Therein,Prichardavers,Platogrants,ineffect,thatwecannotclaimjusticetobeavirtueunlesswecanshowthatitisinourinteresttobejust.But,likemostmodernmoralphilosophers,Pricharddoesnotthinksuchaself-interestedapproachtowardsjusticeormoralitycanpossiblybejustified.IndeedPrichardsuggeststhattheRepublicinacceptingthisquestionsetsmoralphilosophyoffonthewrongfootaltogether.Thequestionisnotwhatisinourself-interest,butwhatisright.Whileitwouldbenicetobeabletoassureourselvesthat“Honestyisthebestpolicy,”suchaview,Prichardthinks,ishardlytobereliedupon,andmoralphilosophersmustaccordinglyredirecttheiraudience’sattentionawayfromquestionsofself-interesttoquestionsofrightandwrong.Insodoing,theymustturnawayfromthemoralphilosophyoftheRepublic.cautiousreturnofpoliticalinterest.SeealsoRep.VI,495a–497a,forimplicitPlatonicregretsaboutCritiasandAlcibiades,andevencriticismsofSocrates’holdinghimselfbackfrompolitics.TheRepublic’sviewthatrulersneedpaymentofsomesort(I,345b–347e)andthatitwouldnotbeinthephilosopher-king’sinteresttoruleifacityistobewell-ruled(VII,520d–521aand519d–520a)doesnotcoherewiththeviewintheGorgias(515d–520e)thatrulingistheoneartwhereonedoesnotneedtobepaid.Perhapsthetwoformerviewsspeakmoretoconven-tionalideasofgood(asdoesRepIV,419a–421c,withV,465e–466c),whiletheviewintheGorgiasspeakstowhatistruebynature?17.Mightthisanxietyitselfnotflowfromacertainsortofself-interest?159ACTC0915920/03/2006,04:02PM\nterrypennerItistruethatPrichardseessomehopeforPlatoinadistinctionPlatodrawsatthebeginningofBookII,357a–358d,between(a)thingsgoodinthemselvesandwithoutfurtherconsequences(e.g.,harmlesspleasures),(b)thingsgoodinthemselvesandgoodfortheirconsequences(e.g.,thinking,seeing,andbeinghealthy),and(c)thingsgoodonlyintheirconsequences(e.g.,medicaltreatmentandmoney).Prichardthinksthatinplacingjusticealongwithhealthingroup(b),Platoisshowingsomeinterestinjusticeasagoodinitself,i.e.,asclosetoamoralgood.Butitisnotclearhowhealthorharmlesspleasurescouldbemoralgoods.SoperhapsPrichardtakesmoresolacefromthispassagethanheshould.LetuspursuetheevidenceonthenatureofPlato’sethicsinsomeofthedetailsofthetreatmentofjusticeintheRepublic.PeculiaritiesoftheTreatmentofJusticeasPsychologicalWell-adjustmentBookIoftheRepublichasalltheearmarksofadialoguefromtheSocraticperiodwhichhasbeenslightlyeditedtoserveasaprefacetotherestoftheRepublic.ItbeginsbySocratesexaminingandrefutinganswerstothequestion“Whatisjustice?”givenby18theyoungmanPolemarchusandthesophistThrasymachus.Butbeforelong,PlatoallowsThrasymachustoredirectthemainquestionawayfrom“Whatisjustice?”to“Doesjusticeorinjusticemakeonehappier?”Socratesgiveshisargumentsonthesideofjustice.ButthoseargumentsdonotsatisfythetwoyoungmenGlauconandAdeimantus(whoareinfactPlato’solderbrothers).AtthebeginningofBookII,whichconstitutesawholenewbeginningtotheenterpriseoftheRepublic,thetwobrothersthrowdowntoSocratesthechallengetoshow(whattheywouldthemselvesliketobelieve)that:“thecompletelyjustlifewillbehappierthanthecompletelyunjustlife,evenwhenalltherewardsofareputationforjusticearestrippedfromthejustpersonandaddedtotheunjustperson.”–atallorder.Inrespondingtothischallenge,Socratesrangesoverawiderangeoftopics,someofthemnotedabove:thedivisionoflaborandtheorganizationofanidealsocietyintoanintellectualrulingclass,amilitaryclass,andaclassofworkers(BooksII–IV);thedivisionofthepsycheintoReason,theSpiritedpart,andAppetite;theplaceofdoctorsandjudgesinagoodsociety(BookIV);equalityofwomen;eugenics,communismofproperty,wives,andchildrenamongrulers;Knowledgevs.Opinion(BookV);Ideas18.OneofthemostnoteworthyfeaturesofBookIisSocrates’constantlyinsertingintohishandlingoftheaccountsofPolemarchusandThrasymachusanideathatwassurelyinitiallyveryfarfromtheirminds–theideathatjusticeissomeformofexpertise,akintomedicine,navigation,andthelike.Suchanideaseemstotallyforeigntotheirown,respectively,traditional(?)andpositivisticaccountsofjustice.Socratessimplyreadsthisidea–theideathatvirtueisknowledge–intotheiraccount.TheideaisalsoratheroutofkeepingwithRep.II–X.(ButweshouldnotethatthereisanappearanceinBookIofthelaterideaofjusticeasinsteadaformofpsychologicalwell-adjustment:351a7–352a8.)160ACTC0916020/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’sethics:earlyandmiddledialoguesorForms;testingofthecharacteroffuturerulers;highereducationoftherulers,includingacurriculumofstudies–withphilosophicaldialecticasthehigheststudy(BooksVI–VII);thesociologyofthedegenerationofpoliticalsocietiesandofindividualcharacter(BooksVIII–IX);therelativemeritsofnarrativeanddramaticpoetry;thecensoringofdramatists;theimmortalityofthesoul;punishmentsandrewardsintheafterlife;andthesoul’sfreedomofchoiceintheafterlifeconcerningwhatwillbeit’snextincarnation(BookX).ButPlatothreadshiswaythroughallthesedigressionsandnear-digressionswithhiseyealwaysonthechallengetoshowthejustlifehappier.ButthoughthisquestionofthehappinessofthejusthasbecomethemainquestionofRep.II–X,PlatoinsistsagainatthebeginningofBookIIonreturningtowhatBookIhassaidisthepriorquestion,“Whatisjustice?”AndwhatanextraordinaryanswerPlatogives,mainlyinBooksII–IV,tothequestion“Whatisjustice?”!Justiceintheindividual,Platoseemstobetellingushere,isacertainsortofwell-adjustmentofdifferentpartsofthesoultoeachother.Someonemightobject,“Butwhathaspsychologicalwell-adjustmenttodowithjustice?Canonenotbepsychologicallywell-adjustedbutactunjustly?Andcanonenotactjustlybysheerwill-power,eventhoughsomewhatpsychologicallyill-adjusted?HasPlatonotillegitimatelychangedthesubjectfromthenotionofjusticeasweunder-standit,tosomeothernotion(well-adjustment)whichdoesn’tseemtobeanotionofjusticeatall?Wewanttoknowwhetherjusticewillmakeushappier,andallPlatotellsus,inreplyis‘Yes,psychologicalwell-adjustmentwillmakeushappier!’”SooddlyirrelevantdoesthePlatonicreplyhereseem,thatsomeareinclinedsimplytothrowuptheirhandsandsupposethatinRep.II–XPlatoisnot,afterall,somuchinterestedinthequestionwhetherjustindividualsarehappierthanunjustindividualsasheisinaquestioninpoliticalphilosophy,namely,“Howshouldonegoaboutconstructinginthoughtanidealstate?”Atanyrate,thisishowtheRepublicisoftentaken–asnotsomuchanethicaltreatise(withdigressions)asatreatiseinutopianpoliticalphilosophy(withdigressions).ButtotreattheRepublicasprimarilyaworkofutopianpoliticalphilosophy,howeverimaginativeanddaring,istomisconstruethemainaimanddirectionoftheRepublic,nottomentionPlato’sliteraryart.True,Platodoeshaveaninterestintheidealcondi-tionsforajustpoliticalsocietyjustasamatteroffindingwaystooptimizepoliticalarrangementswithinthecity.WeseethisinBookV’sdigressionsontheequalityofwomenandoncommunalfamilylifefortheguardians,inthefragmentaryaccountofthesubject-matteroftheRepublicthatshowsupatthebeginningoftheTimaeus,andintheevidentpoliticallongingexpressedinhisdiscussionsofthephilosopherking–andperhapseveninPlato’sownmotivesforhisthreevisitstothecourtsofDionysiusIandDionysiusII.(Cf.alson.16above.)Nevertheless,theRepublic’spurposeinstudy-ingjusticeinanidealstateistightlyconstrainedbytheneedtosaywhatjusticeisintheindividual.Thatis,whateverPlato’sinterestintheidealstatefromotherpointsofview,orinotherworks,itmustbeinsistedthattheidealstateshowsupintheRepublicprimarilyintheserviceofdeterminingwhatjusticeintheindividualis,andwhetherthejustindividualishappierthantheunjustindividual.Buttomaintainthis,weshallhavetoseehowPlatocouldhavethoughtthathisexaminationoftheidealstatecould161ACTC0916120/03/2006,04:02PM\nterrypennerprovideinsightintowhatjusticeisintheindividualandwhetheritisalwaysmore19beneficialtotheindividualthancompleteinjustice.Broadlyspeaking,Platothinksthatjusticeintheidealcityhastodowiththebehaviorofthecitizensofthatcitytowardseachother.Membersineachofitsclassesaretoplaytheirownroleandnotinterferewithothersplayingtheirownrole.Bymodernlights,thisdoesnotseemterriblyoffthemarkasanaccountofsocialjustice.Fortheideaofdoingyourfairshareandnotinterferingwithothersisnotsodifferentfromtheideaofjusticeasfairnessbetweendifferentmembersofthesociety(thoughperhapstheRepublic’saccountemphasizesrathermoretheimportanceofaperson’sroleinsociety,asopposedtotherightsofthepersonwithinsociety).ThusPlatodoesnotyetappeartohavechangedthesubjectonus,evenifhisviewsaboutthesubjectaresomewhatdifferentfromours.Realtroublewillonlyariselater.Thisaccountofjusticeintheidealcityisparticularizedintermsofitsthreeclasses:theintellectualscommand,withknowledge,whatisbestforthecityasawhole;thesoldiersfollowtheordersoftheintellectualclassindefendingthecityagainstexternalandinternalenemies;andtheworkersdealwithmorenarrowlypracticalneedsofthecitywhilegoingalongwiththecommandsoftherulersandsoldiers.Atthispoint,Platocouldhavesuggestedthatwereadofffromthisaccountofthejusticeinternaltothecity,anaccountofthejusticeoftheindividualcitizenintermsofthatcitizen’sexternalrelationstoothercitizens.Thisdoesnotseemsounusualanidea:tounderstandthejusticeofindividualswithinajustsocietyintermsoftheirbehaviortowardsotherindividualswithinthatsociety.IfPlatohaddonethis,theresultwould,again(astwoparagraphsback)notbethatdifferentfromournotionofjustice.ButthisisnotwhatPlatodoes.Instead,hetellsusthatifjusticeinacityisamatteroftheinternalstructuralrelationswithinthecity,thenjusticeintheindividualisalsoamatterofinternalstructure–theinternalstructuralrelationswithintheindividual’spsyche.Astheidealcityhasthreeparts(theguardianswhohaveknowledgeandlooktothegoodoftheentirecity;themilitarywhodefendthecityfromdangerfromoutsideaswellasfromwithin;andtheworkerclasswhodotheirownthingwhilegoingalongwiththecommandsoftheguardians),sotoo,inparallel,doestheindi-vidualpsychehavethreeparts(Reasonwhosejobistohaveknowledgeandlooktothegoodoftheentireperson;theSpiritedpartwhichfollowsReason’sordersandprotectstheentirepersonagainstunthinkingimpulsesoftheAppetitivePart;andtheAppetitivePartitself).Andasjusticeintheidealcityisaninternalstructuring,inaccordancewithwhicheachofitsthreeparts(classes)fulfillsitsownfunctionand19.Theissuehereisnotwhether“theRepublicisnotatbottomaworkofpoliticalphilosophyatall”(seeLane,plato’spoliticalphilosophy,inthisvolume),ifthatwouldexcludethegenuineinterestinpoliticalarrangementswhichevidentlyspillsouteverywhereintheRepublic(cf.para.3ofthischapter,aswellasparas.2and6ofthepresentsection).RatheritiswhethertheinterestinpoliticalarrangementsrepresentsaprimaryinterestoftheRepublic,orthatinterest–withintheworkitself–isstrictlysubordinatedtopursuitofthetwocentralquestions,“Whatisjusticeintheindividual?”and“DoesCompleteJusticemaketheindividualhappierthanCompleteInjustice?”162ACTC0916220/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’sethics:earlyandmiddledialoguesdoesnotinterferewithotherpartsastheytrytofulfilltheirs,sotoojusticeintheindividualisthesameinternalstructuringofthepartsofthepsyche,inwhicheachofitsthreepartsfulfillsitsownfunctionanddoesnotinterferewiththefunctionsoftheotherparts.Hence,insteadofjusticebeing,asweexpected,arelationexternalto–between–thecitizensofthejustcity,itisarelationinternaltoanyindividual–whatevercityheorshebeacitizenof.Itis,aswehavesaid,akindofpsychologicalwell-adjustment–acertainwell-adjustmentofthethreepartsofthepsychetoeachother.Thusweare,afterall,stuckwiththeproblemofdefendingPlatoagainstthechargeofchangingthesubjectfromjusticeasweallknowittosomethinglikepsychological20well-adjustment.Theoddityofthisturnawayfromjusticeasweconceiveit–wetendtoconceiveitlessintermsofourpsychologyandmoreintermsoftherelationswestandintowardsothers–willbeintensifiedif,followingCooper(1977,sec.1),wenotethat,byPlato’saccountofjustice,mostcitizensofthejustcityarenotjustatall.For,bytheaccountofthethreeclassesPlatogives,onlythemembersoftheintellectualclasshavetheknowledgeofthegoodofthewholecitythatwehaveseenmustbepresentbytheaboveaccountofjustice.Plainly,Platohaslittleinterestinwhatwemaysupposeisthejusticeoftheordinarycitizenoftheidealcity.Whatheisinterestedinismerelytheinternalstructureoftheidealcityasawhole,andtheverysameinternalstructureintheindividual,nomatterwhatstatetheindividualisacitizenof.OnecanhardlyfailtowonderathowPlatocametosuchanextraordinaryaccountofjusticeintheindividual.ButsupposeforthemomentthatwegrantPlatothisaccountofjustice.Then,hethinks,itisgoingtobefairlystraightforwardtoshowthatthejustpersonishappier,eveniftheunjustpersonistheonewhogetsalltherewardsofreputationforbeingjust.ForhemakesclearattheveryendofBookIVthathethinkshehasavailableananalogybetweenhealthandmedicinethatwilldothetrick.(ThisanalogyisalsotobefoundintheCritoandGorgias.)It’ssimple:Ashealthisacertainwell-adjustmentof20.SeeSachs(1963)withPenner(2005).ItmustbegrantedthatPlatohasSocratestellusatIV,435c–dthatthispsychologicalwell-adjustmentaccountofjusticeisnotaccurate,andthatalonger,fullerroadmustbetakentogetthataccount;andthatatVI,504d–506a,hespellsoutwhatislackinginthisaccount.Whatislackingissomethinggreaterthanjustice:theFormoftheGood,fromwhichjusticeandallotherthingsbecome“usefulandbeneficial”tous.Pro-ponentsofthe“stronglytranscendent”readingoftheFormsnotedabovemaybetemptedheretosaythatPlatoisturningawayfromthepsychologicalwell-adjustmentaccountofjusticetosomemuchmoreunworldlyFormsofJusticeandtheGood.Butonthereadingfollowedhere,itisonlybeingsaidthatforthepsychologicalwell-adjustmentinwhichjusticeconsiststobetruejustice,oneneedstoadd,toanyjusticewederivefromBookIV,knowledgeoftherealnatureoftheGood.Thissaysthatthejustperson’sReasonmustseekwithknowledge,therealgoodofthewholeindividual.Justso,Euthd.280b3–281b4,andMeno87e5–88d3saythatforcourage(onsomecharacterization)tobeagood,itmustbeusedwithwisdom–theknowledgeofthegood.ThepointintheRepublicisthussimplythatjusticemorefullycharacterizedremainspsycholog-icalwell-adjustment–butawell-adjustmentdirectedbythefullknowledgeoftherealnatureofthegoodthatistobegainedfromknowledgeoftheFormoftheGood.163ACTC0916320/03/2006,04:02PM\nterrypennerbodilyelementstoeachother,andnoonecanbehappywiththosepartsnotproperlyadjustedtoeachother–sincelifeishardlyworthliving,nomatterhowmuchmoneyorhowmanyotheradvantagesonehas,ifone’sbodyisravagedbyill-health–sotoo,onewhosepsychedoesnothaveitspartswelladjustedtoeachotherstandsnochance21ofhappiness,nomatterhowmuchmoneyorhowmanyotheradvantagesonehas.Ifwecanacceptthisanalogybetweenhealthandwell-adjustmentofthesoul,thentheseargumentswillestablishthatthejustlifeishappierthanthecompletelyunjustlife.(ThebrilliantBooksVIIIandIXshowPlatoattemptingtoconfirmhisconclusionbyexaminingvariousunjustformsofcity,bothlessunjustandcompletelyunjust,andthecorrespondingformsofpsyche,evidentlyarguingthatthejustlifeishappierandmorepleasantthanthemanyformsofunjustlife.)ButevenifwesucceedinconvincingourselvesthatPlatocananswerH.W.B.Joseph’squestionwhetherthereasonablywell-adjustedpersonwhoactsunjustlyonlyonacertainfewoccasions–whenhecangetawaywithit–isn’thappierthanthecompletelyjustperson,wearestillstuckwiththefeelingthatjusticeasweunderstandithasverylittletodowithpsychologicalwell-adjustment.Sothequestionremains:WhyistheRepublic’sanswertothequestion,“Whatisjustice?”sopeculiar?PsychologicalWell-adjustmentaswhattheSocraticScienceofJusticemustbecomegiventhenewPlatonicPsychologyofActionTheexplanationtobeofferedhereiscontinuouswiththeclaimabovethatthereisnochangefromSocratictoPlatonicethicsthatdoesnotflowfromthechangeinthepsychologyofaction.ItmakesthePlatonicaccountofjusticeastraightforwardadaptationoftheSocraticaccountofjusticetotherequisitechangesinthepsychologyofaction.First,then,letustrytoofferanaccountofwhatSocrateswouldhavesaidjusticeis.Thereisnotmuchdiscussionofjusticeintheearlydialogues.ButtheHippiasMinor,likeRepublicI(seen.18above),treatsjusticestraightforwardlyasascience.And,intheProtagoras,wefindmaterialfromwhichafulleraccountcanbeextrapolated.HerePlatodepictsSocratestakingontheviewsofProtagorasaboutvirtueanditsteachability–viewsnotaltogetherdissimilarfromthoseintheRepublicabouthowtheyoungaretobecomevirtuous.(ThemaindifferenceisthatwheretheRepublicwantstheintellectualrulingclassinchargeofeducation,Protagorasseemstobeappealingtothedemocraticidealofthewholeadultcitizenbodybeneficiallyeducatingtheyoung–anidealSocratesridiculesatAp.24c–25c,asat19d–20cheseemstoridiculetheideaofeducationbythesophists.)ThemethodsofeducationProtagorasemploys,however,arelargelysimilartothosewefindinRep.II–X:reproof;reformativepunish-ment;education;beatings;thereadingofgoodpoets;andmusicandgymnasticexerciseonlyofthesorttoencourageharmonyofsoul.21.Again,echoesoftheEuthydemusandMenopassagescitedinn.20.Cf.alsoRep.VI,505a–b.164ACTC0916420/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’sethics:earlyandmiddledialoguesInhisresponse,SocratesstudiouslyavoidseverythinginthelargeeducationalcanvaspaintedinProtagoras’GreatSpeech(320c–328d)exceptfor“onelittlething”Socratesneedstobeclearonbeforehecangraspthewholepicture(329d).This“onelittlething”hadcomeupwhenProtagorasarguedthatwhiletheotherartsthatthecityneedscaneachbepracticedbyonlyafewwithspecialisttraining,thereisonethingthateverycitizenneedsifthereistobeacity:“justice,temperance,piety–whichtogetherIcalltheonethinghumanvirtue”(324e–325a,329c).Areyousaying,Protagoras,thatvirtueisonething,andjustice,temperance,andpietyare(distinct)partsofit?Orthatwhatwehaveinthenames“justice,”“temperance,”“piety,”andsoforthisjustfivedifferentnamesforthesamething?TherestoftheProtagorasisconsumedbySocratespursuingthisquestionsoseeminglyirrelevant22tothemaindirectionofProtagoras’GreatSpeech.WhydoesSocratesdothis?IfwelookathowSocratesshowsthatcourageisidenticalwithwisdom(358d–360e,correcting349d–351b),wegetsomeideaofhowhisthoughtworks.Themanythinkthatthecourageousandthecowardlygotowardsdifferentthings,sincethecourageousgotowardsthefearful–intobattle–andthecowardlyawayfromthefearful–awayfrombattle.ButSocratespointsout(359c–dwith358c–d)thatthecourageousdon’tgotowardsthefearfulthinkingitfearful.Rather,theygotowardsthefearfulthinkingitgoodtogotowardsthefearful,justasthecowardlyrunawayfromthefearfulthinkingthatgoodtodo.Everyonegoestowardswhattheythinkgood,pleasant,andfine,andnooneerrswillingly(ingoingtowardssuchthings).Thatis,alldesireisforthegood.Sothedifferencecanonlybethatthecourageousarewiseaboutthegood,thecowardlyignorant.Thatis,courageiswisdomaboutthegood,cowardiceignoranceofthegood(360c–d).Thuscourageandwisdomarenottwodistinctpartsoftheonethingvirtue.“Courage”and“wisdom”aretwodifferentnamesofthesamething.Nowthisargumentisitselfderivedfromanearlierargumentdesignedtoshowthatwhatthemanycall“beingovercomebypleasure”(351b–357e)or“beingovercomebyfear”or“beingovercomebyoneself”(359d)isreallyignoranceofwhatpleasures,orgoods,areworthtradingforwhatinlife.TheupshotisthatwhatPlatoelsewherecalls“temperance”isalsoidenticalwithwisdom,sothat“temperance,”“courage,”and“wisdom”aredifferentnamesforthesamething,namely,thescienceofwhatgoodsorpleasuresareworthtradingforwhatinlife(the“measuringart”).Itistruethat,forhistoricalreasons,wecallthisscience“courage”insituationsinvolvingfear,and“temperance”insituationsinvolvingtemptationtoindulgeone’sbodilyappetites.ButthesameappliestocallingtheplanetVenus“TheMorningStar”atdawn,and“TheEveningStar”atdusk.Ourusingdifferentnamesondifferentoccasionsisnoargumentthattheystandfordifferentthings.22.Platoissogoodatportrayingopposingpointsofview,suchasthoseofProtagoras,thatsomescholarsthinkPlatointheearlydialoguesdoesnotintendustoembracethepositionsputforwardbySocrates,butratheracompositeoftheviewsofallinterlocutors.Atthatrate,PlatointheProtagorasisactuallyendorsingtheviewsofProtagorasprettywellasmuchasthoseofSocrates.SeeO’Brien(1967)andKahn(1996).(SuchanapproachtoPlato’sintentionswouldhardlybedefensiblefortheIonorHippiasMinor,letalonefortheApologyorCrito.)165ACTC0916520/03/2006,04:02PM\nterrypennerTheresultisthatweseeSocrateshereendorsingtheclaim(alsoatPrt.329d,349b)that“courage,”“temperance,”“wisdom,”“piety,”and“justice”arefivedifferentnames23ofthesamething–theknowledgeofwhatisworthtradingforwhatinlife.Whatismore,whatwehavesaidaboveshouldhaveledustoexpectthisresult.Ifthefunda-mentaldesireleadingtoactionisexactlythesameineveryone–desirefortheirowngood–thereisnothingleftforthegoodpersontobebutonegoodatgettinghisorherowngood.(Cf.HippiasMinor,notforgettingat376b,thatnooneerrswillinglyatgettingtheirowngood.)Hence,virtueisknowledge.Indeedeveryvirtueistheverysameknowledge.ButthenwhatwouldSocratessayaboutjustice,giventheaboveaccountoftheunityofallvirtue?Itseemsplainenough(especiallyfromRep.I)thatSocrateswouldaccepttheusualviewofinjustice–thatitconsistsingettingthebetterofothers–morepreciselyin(tryingto)getone’sowngoodbydeprivingothersoftheirgood.(“Tryingto”hasbeeninsertedheresince,aswehaveseenabove,itisalsoSocrates’viewthatharmingothersisneverinone’sinterest,sothatthereisinfactnosuchthingasgettingone’sowngoodbyharmingothers.)Thisbeingso,itmaybesuggestedthatifSocrateshadgivenanaccountofjusticeparalleltotheaccountshegivesofcourageandtemperanceintheProtagoras,hewouldhavesaidjusticeisthesameknowledgetheyare,andthattheword“justice”is,forhistoricalreasons,usedforthatknowledgeinsituationswherethereisatemptationtotrytogetone’sowngoodbyharmingothers.(TheCritoinfactshowsSocratesallbutidentifyingharmwithinjustice.)Ifthisisright,wecannowsaywhatwewouldexpecttohappentothisaccountofjusticeif,asinRep.II–X,thepsychebeginstoadmitofirrationaldesirescausingactionsinoppositiontowhatwasinSocratesthefundamentaldesirecausingeveryvoluntaryaction.Truthsreachedbydialecticandtheexaminedlifewouldnolongerbesufficienttoensuregoodaction.Onewouldneedone’scharactertobetrainedandtheirrationaldesirescontrolledbyReason.(Eitherthat,orwithoutsuchtrainingandcontrolonewouldnotbeabletoapprehendtherequisitetruths.)Buttheaimwouldstillbethesame–theachievingofone’sowngoodinthewisestwaypossibleandwithouttheefforttogainone’sowngoodattheexpenseofharmingothers(sinceharmingotherswillalwaysresultinharmtoyou).That,Ibelieve,iswhatwehaveintheideaofjusticeaspsychologicalwell-adjustment.ItispreciselywhatwewouldexpectfromaSocraticaccountofjusticemodifiedtotakeaccountofthechangeinpsychologythatcomeswiththedoctrineofthetripartitesoul.SothereisthesameaimintheRepublicasintheearlydialogues–togetwhatisreallybestforoneself.Thedifferenceisonlythatintheearlydialogues,thiscanbedonesolelybyintellect,whileintheRepublicitneedsalsocharacter.ItisworthmentioningthatthisdifferenceinpsychologyofactionbetweentheearlydialoguesandRep.II–XshowsupalsointheconceptionoftheidealcitywithwhichPlatoworksthere.FortheidealcityPlatodiscussesisnottheidealcitySocratesfirstdescribes–rural,decent,andunwarlike,ifrude–andwhichGlaucondescribesasprovidingitscitizenswithadietnomoreinterestingthanthatprovidedtopigs23.SoPenner(1973a,1992a),followedbyIrwin(1977,1995),Taylor(1976,1991);contraVlastos(1973).166ACTC0916620/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’sethics:earlyandmiddledialogues(II,372a–d).TheidealcityPlatochoosestodiscussisratherthe“fevered”city,wherepeoplehavethekindsofdesires,andcravingsforluxuriesthatcanonlybesatisfiedbywarsofconquest–withtheresultthatthe“ideal”cityturnsouttorequiretheabilitytowagewarinordertoacquireextragoodsbyconquest,andhencealsotorequireamilitaryclass.Onceagainoneasks:Whyshouldonewhoisinterestedinjusticestart24fromthepremisethatmembersofajustcitywillbewarlike?Thereason,onemaysuspect,isthattheidealcityhastobeparalleltothejustpsyche.Thejustpsychehasalltheseunrulyappetitestocontendwith–appetitesthat,intheabsenceofjustice,sometimesovercomeReason(chieflyinBookIV)andappetitesthatsometimescorruptReason,makingittreat,asgood,thingsthatareinfactbad.Theresultisthat,corre-spondingtothesestructuralfactsaboutthepsyche,theidealcitymusthaveitspartscontendingwithbasedesiresandthecravingforluxuries.(Asremarkedinnote9,theneedforthemilitaryinthemodelissimplythatitispoliticallyimplausibletohavetheintellectualclassbeingtheoneswhocontrolunrulyworkers.)Such,then,isthecaseforsupposingthatjusticeintheRepublicispsychologicalwell-adjustment–becausethatisthestateofsoul,replacingSocraticintellectualknowledgeofthegood,whichenablesonetoachieveone’sownmaximumgoodinsituationsoftemptationtotrytogetone’sowngoodattheexpenseofothers.Ifthepsychologyofactionhaschanged,theethicsinvolvesnofurtherchanges.TheDevelopmentofGreekEthicsThroughPlatoInconclusion,itmaybeusefultoseeSocraticandPlatonicethicsinthecontextofthedevelopmentofmoraltheoryofthefifthandearlyfourthcenturies.(IadapthereascenariofromPrichard.)Firstwehavetraditionalmoralitywherelawsandcon-ventionsarethoughtofashandeddownbythegods.Thenwehavethesophisticenlightenmentthat,asAristophanesnotes,pointsoutthatlawsareinfactmadeupbymen,sothatitbecomesrationaltoignoretheselawsandconventions,insteadsimplyfixingon(andannouncing:Cf.nn.5,8above)whatonethinksonewantsandthenusingsophisticandrhetoricaltechniquestosatisfythosesupposedwants.Inthiscon-testbetweentraditionalmoralityandtheSophists,Socratesdidnotalignhimselfwithtradition–evenifhedidholdthatsomeofthethingsheldtobegoodbyconventionwouldalso,surprisingly,turnoutalsotobegoodbynature.Sothis“corrupteroftheyoung”wasfalselyassimilatedtotheSophistsinthepublicmind.ButSocratesalsodoesnotalignhimselfwiththeSophists.HearguesthatwhattheSophiststookastheeasypartisinfactthehardpart–knowingwhatonewants,thatis,knowingwhattherealgoodis.Hencehisexclusivelydialecticalpursuitofknowledgeoftherealgood–apursuittobeengagedineveryday.Socratesalsotakesit,forreasonsconnected24.And,whatismore,warlikeinawaythatdisregardstheneedforthecitytobejustinitsexternalrelationstootherstates?Ofthatexternaljustice,thereisscarcelyawordintheRepublic–anotheroddfeatureofPlato’snotionofjustice,atleastfromamodernpointofview.WouldwenotexpectPlato’sdescriptionofajustcitytoincludethatitbefairandeven-handedinitstreatmentofotherstates?Butthatwedonotfind.167ACTC0916720/03/2006,04:02PM\nterrypennerwithhispsychologyofaction,thatsuchknowledge(couldonebutgainit)wouldalsobesufficientforhumangoodnessandforthehuman’smaximizationofhisorherownhappiness.AsforPlato’saccountofhumangoodness(justice)–providedweresistcertaininterpretationsoftheFormoftheGoodnotedabove–thatdiffersfromtheSocraticaccountsolelyinthedifferentpsychologyofactionthatisoperative.InthenewPlatonicpsychology,whatoneneedsifoneistoachievehumangoodnessandone’sownmaximumgoodischaracterandthetrainingofone’sirrationalimpulses–inadditiontothatknowledgeofthegoodthat,inSocrates,wasself-sufficient.BibliographyWorksCitedAnnas,J.(1981).AnIntroductiontoPlato’sRepublic.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Cooper,J.(1977).“ThePsychologyofJusticeinPlato’sRepublic.”AmericanPhilosophicalQuar-terly,14,151–7.Devereux,D.(1995).“Socrates’KantianConceptionofVirtue.”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilo-sophy33,381–408.Halliwell,S.(1994).“TheCambridgeCompaniontoPlato.”Dialogos,1,128–34.Irwin,T.(1977).Plato’sMoralTheory.Oxford:ClarendonPress.——.(1995).Plato’sEthics.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Kahn,C.(1996).PlatoandtheSocraticDialogue.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Nettleship,H.(1925).LecturesontheRepublicofPlato(2ndedn.).London:Macmillan.(Firstedition1906.)O’Brien,M.J.(1967).TheSocraticParadoxesandtheGreekMind.ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress.Penner,T.(1973a).“TheUnityofVirtue.”PhilosophicalReview,82,35–68.——.(1973b).“SocratesonVirtueandMotivation.”InE.N.Lee,A.P.D.MourelatosandR.Rorty(eds.),ExegesisandArgument(FestschriftforGregoryVlastos).[Phronesis,suppl.vol.1],(pp.133–51)Assen:Royalvan,Gorcum/NewYork:HumanitiesPress.——.(1987).TheAscentfromNominalism:SomeExistenceArgumentsinPlato’sMiddleDialogues.Dordrecht:Reidel.——.(1988).“SocratesontheImpossibilityofBelief-RelativeSciences.”ProceedingsoftheBostonAreaColloquiuminAncientPhilosophy,3,263–325.——.(1990).“PlatoandDavidson:PartsoftheSoulandWeaknessofWill.”InD.Copp(ed.),CanadianPhilosophers,CanadianJournalofPhilosophy,suppl.vol.,16,37–45.——.(1991).“DesireandPowerinSocrates:TheArgumentofGorgias466a–468ethatOratorsandTyrantshavenoPowerintheCity.”Apeiron,24,147–202.——.(1992a).“WhatLachesandNiciasMiss:andWhetherSocratesthinksCourageisonlyaPartofVirtue.”AncientPhilosophy,12,1–27.——.(1992b).“SocratesandtheEarlyDialogues.”InR.Kraut(ed.),TheCambridgeCompaniontoPlato(pp.121–69).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(2002).“TheHistoricalSocratesandPlato’sEarlyDialogues:SomePhilosophicalQuestions.”InJ.AnnasandC.J.Rowe(eds.),NewPerspectivesonPlato,ModernandAncient.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.——.(2005).“PlatonicJusticeandtheMeaningof‘Justice.’”JournaloftheInternationalPlatoSociety,5,1–76.onlineat:.Penner,T.andRowe,C.J.(1994).“TheDesireforGood:IstheMenoconsistentwiththeGorgias?”Phronesis,39,1–25.168ACTC0916820/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’sethics:earlyandmiddledialoguesPenner,T.andRowe,C.J.(2005).Plato’sLysis.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Reshotko,N.(ed.).(2003).Desire,IdentityandExistence.Kelowna,BC:AcademicPrintingPress.Sachs,D.(1963).“AFallacyinPlato’sRepublic.”PhilosophicalReview,72,141–58.Santas,G.(1979).Socrates:PhilosophyinPlato’sEarlyDialogues.London:Routledge.——.(2001).GoodnessandJustice:Plato,Aristotle,andtheModerns.Malden,Mass.:Blackwell.Taylor,C.C.W.(1976).Plato:Protagoras.Oxford:ClarendonPress.——.(1991).Plato:Protagoras(revisededn.).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Vlastos,G.(1965).“DegreesofReality.”InR.Bamrough(ed.),NewEssaysonPlatoandAristotle(pp.1–18).NewYork:Routledge&KeganPaul.——.(1973).“TheUnityoftheVirtuesintheProtagoras.”ReviewofMetaphysics25,415–58.ReprintedwithanappendixinVlastos(1981).——.(1981).PlatonicStudies.2ndedn.(pp.221–69).Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.——.(1991).Socrates:IronistandMoralPhilosopher.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.White,N.P.(1979).ACompaniontoPlato’sRepublic.Indianapolis:Hackett.FurtherReadingWhite(1979)isafinecommentaryontheRepublicfromapointofviewquitedifferentfromthepresentone.Alsoquitedifferent,andquiteexcellent,isSantas(2001).Amoretraditional,andveryreadabletakeontheRepublicistobefoundinNettleship(1925).Forcontrastingviewsontheearlydialogues,seeSantas(1979)andPenner(2002)withthereferencesinthoseplaces.169ACTC0916920/03/2006,04:02PM\nmelissalane10Plato’sPoliticalPhilosophy:TheRepublic,theStatesman,andtheLawsMELISSALANEIfSocratesissaidtohaveinventedethics,itishispupilPlatowhohasbeencreditedby1posteritywiththeinventionofpoliticalphilosophy.SocratestaughtPlatothatthe2fundamentalquestionofhowtolivewellwasbothaquestiondemandingphilosophicalinquiry(asopposedtobeingansweredauthoritativelybypoetry,law,ortradition),andaquestionwhichtrenchedontheclaimsofexistingpoliticalregimestobegoodregimes.Forifthoseregimesfailedtopromotethepracticeofphilosophywhichcoulduniquelyidentify(andperhapsevenconstitute)thehumangood,theirprinciplesoforganizationandvaluemustbefaulty.DistinguishingSocratesfromPlatoisahazardousbusiness,sinceallourevidenceofSocrates’viewsisindirectandmostofitcomesfromPlato’sdialoguesthemselves.Nevertheless,mostreadersofPlatotodayassumethatthe“Socrates”whofiguresasacharacterinPlato’sRepublicisnottobeidentifiedwiththehistoricalSocrates.AndsinceSocratesdoesnotappearintheLawsandappearsonlyatthebeginningoftheStatesman,allthreedialoguesweareconsideringasthecoreofPlato’spoliticalphilosophyare3generallyregardedasexpressingtheideasofPlatoratherthanthoseofSocrates.Ontheseterms,wecansaythatPlatodidnotfollowhisteacherinrestrictinghimselfin1.AccordingtoCicero(Tusc.5.4):“Socrates,however,calledphilosophydownfromheavenandplaceditinthemidstofourcities,evenintroduceditintoourhomes,andforcedittoaskquestionsaboutourlife,morals,andthegoodandbadinthings.”Foranargumentthatpoliticalphilosophywasinventedbypro-democraticthinkersinAthensratherthanbythecriticofdemocracyPlato,seeFarrar(1988);thecontrarycase–thatpoliticalphilosophywasagenreinventedbyPlatoinorderbettertoexpresshiscritiqueofAtheniandemocracy–isputstronglybyOber(1998);andseealsoNightingale(1995).2.“Euprattein”(“dowell”)aretheclosingwordsoftheRepublic,linkedetymologicallytoeudaemonia,thestateofhappinessor,literally,beingwelltreatedbythegods.3.ManyscholarstakethefactthatboththemethodandcertainassumptionsorpositionsintheRepublicdivergesofarfromtherelativelyunifiedgroupof“early”dialogues,toindicatethatthe“Socrates”oftheRepublichasbecomeamouthpieceforPlato’sviews,althoughithasbecomefashionabletopointoutthatonecannotnecessarilyidentifytheviewsofadialogue’sauthorwiththoseexpressedbyanyonecharacterwithinthedialogue.Itremainstruethat,whateveronethinksastowhetheranyofthedialoguescanbetakentoexpresstheviewseitherof(Plato’sversionof)thehistoricalSocratesorofPlatohimself,thetextureandprojectoftheRepublicareinimportantwaysverydifferentfrommostotherdialoguesinwhichSocratesappears(seethesectionontheRepublicbelow).170ACTC1017020/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’spoliticalphilosophypoliticalmatterstoacritiqueoftheethicsand(byimplication)thepoliticsofAthens.Hewentfurther,offeringintwodialoguesfull-scalereconstructionsofwhatagoodcitymightlooklike.AndhealsowentbeyondSocratesinhisexplorationsofwhatphilosophyitselfshouldbe,drawingonPythagoreanandEleaticsourcesaswell(thePythagoreanswerethemselvessteepedinpoliticalconcerns).Insum,Platosearchedforapoliticalart(politikEtechnE),aformofknowledgewhichcanusepowertoproduceethicalgood,asopposedtousingpowerforthegratificationofdesireorhonor(Wallach,2001,p.1).Thefundamentalaxiomofhispoliticalthoughtistheclaimthatknowledgemustgovernor“rule”humanaction–indeed,thatgenuineknowledgeisthemostimportantandperhaps(asisarguedintheStatesman)thesolepropercriterionofgoodrule.ThiswastheconsistentorientingprincipleofPlato’spoliticalthought,onewhichhetooktobeantitheticalnotonlytoAthens,butalsotoallotherregimesofhisownday.Itinformsallthreeofthedialoguestobeconsideredinthischapter.Yetthethreedialoguesdifferfromeachotheralongatleasttwocrucialdimensions.First,theirprojectsandpurposesarequitedifferent.ThepointoftheRepublicistoshowthatknowledgeintherulinggrouporelementisthekeytowell-beingandhealthinthecityandsoulalike.TheburdenoftheStatesmanistoexplicatewhatsuchrulingknowledgecouldconsistin,andwhatthenatureofsuchrulecouldbe.AndthepurposeoftheLawsistoshowhowknowledgecanbeembeddedinthestructureofthecityitself,sothatthecitylikethedialoguebecomesaninstantiationoftheveryprinciplethatitadvocates–theprinciplethatknowledgemustrule(Nightingale,1993).Second,thepsychology,epistemology,andmetaphysicswhichPlatousestounderpinhispoliticalargumentschangesincrucialrespectsbetweenthethreedialogues.Yethisconcernwithdistinctquestionsaboutpoliticsineachmeansthatitmaybetooswifttoclaim(asdoBobonich,2002,pp.1–8andpassim;andRowe,2003,p.92)thatitischangesinpsychologyandepistemologythatdrivethechangesinPlato’spolitics,andnotviceversa.Differingpoliticalprojectsmaythemselvesimplyandgeneratedifferentviewsofmotivationandpossibleknowledge.Thematrixresultingfromchangesonbothaxesyieldsacorpusofpoliticalphilo-sophywhichisatonceoneandmany,bothunifiedbycommonthemesandinternallydifferentiated.Theachievementofunityinthecityis,asJean-FrançoisPradeau(2002)hasshown,amajorconcernforPlato,asisthemoregeneralphilosophicalstatusofbeingoneorwholedespitehavingmanyparts(Harte,2002;McCabe,1994).Soitisonlyfittingthatbothhispoliticalphilosophyitselfandtheprincipalworksinwhichheexpresseditareachievementsofthiskind.Despitetheirdifferentcastsofcharacters,theRepublicandtheLawsareacommonorderofmagnitudelongerthanallofPlato’sotherdialogues,andthefactthatbothdepictaspectsofanenvisagedadmirablecityatgreatlengthhasledreaderssomindedtoidentifythemasthecoretextsofPlato’spoliticalphilosophy.ThecasefortreatingtheStatesmanasathirdsuchcorepoliticaltextisdifferent,andmorerecent.WhereastheRepublicandtheLawsbuildlegalandpoliticaledificesonthefoundationalclaimthatknowledgeshouldrule,theStatesmanexcavatesthemeaningofthatfoundationitself.Itisaccordinglyashorterandmoreabstractdialogue,onethatofferspainstakingclarification(andinsomerespectsrevision,aswillbeshownbelow)ofalimitedbutvitalcontentioninPlato’spoliticalthought.171ACTC1017120/03/2006,04:02PM\nmelissalaneButwhilethereisacaseforcallingtheRepublic,theStatesmanandtheLawsa4distinctbodyofworkconstituting“Plato’spoliticalphilosophy,”twocaveatsmustbeenteredtothatcasebeforeitisfurtherpursued.ThefirstisthatthesearenotaloneamongPlato’sworksinhavingapoliticaldimension.Allhisdialoguesdo.Inpart,thisisbecausepoliticsandindeedeverydaylifeweresaturatedwithethicaltermsinancientAthens,albeittermswhichPlatorejected,andbecausehisphilosophicalinvestigationsofvirtueandnaturethemselvesbearonpoliticalquestions.Butfurther,anAthenianjurycondemnedSocratestodeath.Theresultingdilemmas–isphilosophicalknow-ledgeatwarwiththeequalityofdemocraticopinion?Ifso,howcandemocracytoleratephilosophy,andhowcanphilosophytoleratedemocracy?–pervadethePlatoniccorpusasawhole.Thesecondpointistheconverseofthefirst.ForwhileallofPlato’sworksbearonpolitics,allofthemalsoaddressquestionsotherthanpolitics.OnemightsaythatPlatotreatspolitics,butalsoputsitinitsplace:thatofacrucialbutinstrumentalhumanconcern,whichlikeallpurelyhumanconcernsisfurthersubordinatedtowhatisdivine.IfPlatoinventedpoliticalphilosophy,healsoinsistedthatitisatoncecon-nectedtotherestofphilosophy(psychology,epistemology,ethics,andmetaphysics)andthatitdoesnotexhaustthepurposeofphilosophy.Ourthreedialoguesillustratetheformerpointbyeachrestingmostheavilyonaparticularphilosophicalplank–ethicsintheRepublic,epistemologyintheStatesman,theologyintheLaws.Andtheyillustratethelatterpointbyshowing(eachinitsownway)thatthereasonstobeconcernedwithpoliticsarelocatedinwhatliesbeyondpolitics–theeschatologicalfuturelifeofthesoulintheRepublicandtheLaws,generaldialecticalorphilosophicalabilityintheStatesman.RepublicHavingcontendedthattheRepublicbelongsinthecorpusofPlato’spoliticalphilo-sophy,wemustimmediatelyconfrontachallenge.Forithasbeenarguedthat,giventhatthetextisgovernedbyanethicalquestion–whyshouldanyonebotherbeingjust?–itisnotatbottomaworkofpoliticalphilosophyatall(Annas,1999;seethediscussionofthisquestioninPenner,plato’sethics,inthisvolume).Onthisview,thesketchofKallipolis(astheidealcitydescribedintheRepublicissometimescalled)isamerecartoon,meantasanillustrationofthepossibilitiesofgoverningone’ssoulrather5thanasablueprintforapoliticalregime.4.WhereasanauthorlikeKlosko(1986)spentmostofhistimeontheRepublicandtreatedtheStatesmanandtheLawscursorilyasstagesofdecline,themorerecentcontributionofSamaras(2002)interpretsthesequenceasbuildinguptotheLawsasaclimax.SamarasaddsabriefconsiderationoftheTimaeusandCritiasbetweentheStatesmanandtheLaws.Wallach(2001)treatsafargreaternumberofdialoguesasintegraltohisaccountofPlato’spoliticalthought.5.“Blueprint”hereisashorthandwayofcapturingwhatmostparticipantsinthisdebatetakea“political”dialoguetobe;forcriticismoftheideathatthepoliticsofthedialogueinvolvea“blueprint”atall,seeWaldron(1995,pp.159andpassim),thoughheadherestotheviewbeing172ACTC1017220/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’spoliticalphilosophyItisrighttopointoutthatethicsmotivatestheRepublic,andthatconcernforthefateoftheindividualimmortalsoulconcludesit.SocratesgoessofarastosaythatevenifGlauconisrightthatthecitytheyhavedescribeddoesnotexist“anywhereonearth”(andcannotdosowithoutthehelpof“divinegoodluck”),“perhaps...thereisamodelofitinheaven,foranyonewhowantstolookatitandtomakehimselfitscitizenonthestrengthofwhathesees”(IX,592b).Truepoliticalphilosophydescribesthecityinwhichthephilosopherwouldwishtobeanactivecitizen,andsolongasthatcitydoesnotexist,thephilosopherwillrestricthimselftosculptingitsorderinhisownsoulratherthanseekingtotakepartinpubliclife.Nevertheless,toconcludethatpoliticsintheRepublicisatbestasideshowismistaken.Byplacingpoliticsinitsethicalandeschatologicalcontexts,thattextshowsjustwhyandhowpoliticsmatterssoprofoundly–andsowhyexistingregimesaresodangerouslyperverse.WhileitcanbearguedthatethicsovershadowspoliticsintheRepublic,itisequallytruetosaythatpoliticsthereinfiltratesethics,showingthatthereexistapoliticsofself-careandapoliticsoffriendshipaswellastheconven-tionalpoliticsofthecity.Allofthesepoliticalregimes,largeandsmall,areinstrumentsnecessarytogivepeoplethechancetobeashappyastheycanbe.Althoughonlytruephilosopherscanandwillbetrulyhappy–sincehappinessdependsontheharmoni-ousruleofreasonwhichonlytheycansecureforthemselves–otherpeoplewillbeashappyaspossibleinthislifeonlyiftheyliveinKallipolis,andonlytherearetheylikelytohavetheopportunitytodobetterforthemselvesbychoosingrationallyforthelifetocome.SoPlatoisnotmerelyusingpoliticstoillustratetrickypointsinethics.Heisgenuinelyseekingtoinventapoliticalphilosophy,onewhichcanexposewhyvirtuallyallofthepoliticalargumentsofhisday(bothforandagainstdemocracy)areshallowandbankrupt,“sophistry”ratherthan“philosophy.”ItisintheRepublicthatPlatoinventsanewconceptuallanguage–rootedinapsychology,anepistemologyandametaphysics–whichunderwriteshisprofoundcritiqueofdemocraticandindeedallexistingpoliticsasindifferenttovalue,tovirtue,andtoknowledge.ButiftheRepublictakesthisgiantstepforwardinthecorpusofPlato’swritings,itgrowsoutofquestionsworriedoverrepeatedlyinotherdialogues.InseveraldialoguesSocratesraisesthequestionofwhetherthereisanymasterknowledge:akindofknow-ledgethatwouldgoverntheentirecourseoflifeandspecificallythegoodofthesoul,inthewaythatmedicalknowledgeisacknowledgedtogovernthegoodofthebody(e.g.,Prt.313a–b;seegenerallyonthe“masterknowledge”aporeticdialogues,Sprague,1976).HealsosuggeststhatifknowledgeisthecriterionthatAtheniansacceptwhentheyarechoosingdoctorsorshipcaptains,shoulditnotafortioribethecriterionusedwhenmakingpoliticaldecisions?(SocratesintheGorgias,502d–e:goodoratorswithphilosophicalknowledgewould“settheirsightsonmakingthecitizensasgoodaspossiblethroughtheirspeeches,”asopposedtotheAthenianoratorswhoare“bentuponthegratificationofthecitizensand...slightthecommongoodforthesakeofcriticizedhere,thatthedialogueisethicalasopposedtopolitical:hesaysthat“theconstructionofanidealsocietyisimaginedbySocratesandhisfriendsnotasthearticulationofapoliticalproposalbutasawayofansweringanethicalchallenge”(p.143).SeealsoLane(1999,pp.120–1,134–5).173ACTC1017320/03/2006,04:02PM\nmelissalanetheirownprivategood.”)Butthedifficultyliesinknowingwhetherthereisanysuchoverallknowledgerelevanttothesuccessandhappinessoflife,andwhatitscontentmightbe.TheRepublictriumphantlyanswersthisquestionbylinkingtheconceptionofFormswhichemergesinotherdialogues(notablythePhaedo)withtheconceptionoftheknowledgeofchoiceworthiness–orgoodness–whichemergesinthe“masterknow-ledge”dialogues.TherulersshouldknowtheFormoftheGood,butonlythephilo-sopherscanknowthis–hencethephilosophersshouldrule.ThesepatheticcreatureswhoskulkincornersandappeartosophistslikeCallicles(Grg.484c–485e)andeventodecentyoungmenlikeAdeimantus(Rep.VI,487c–d)tobepoliticallyuseless,utterlyirrelevanttotherealbusinessoflife,areinfacttheprincipalhopeforanycity’ssalvation.Yetevenhereliesdanger,intwodirections.Thefirstishowtopreventexploitationoftheruledbytherulers:howcanrulersbekeptgentleguard-dogsratherthanbecomingrapaciouswolves?Virtuallyanyonewhowantspowermaywantit,orcometowanttouseit,toexploittheruledratherthanservethem.BooksII–IVoutlineananswer,whichisthendeepenedinthesecond“philosophical”descriptionoftheidealcityinBooksV–VII,andwhichisnotalwaysrecognizedasbeingasstartlingasitis.ForSocratesdoesnotrelyonthefactthattherulerswillbewise(BooksII–IV)andevengenuinelyphilosophical(BooksV–VII)asasufficientsafeguardoftheirjusticetowardtheruled.Rather,therulingguardiansmustbedeprivedofanypossibilityofexploitingthosetheyrule,bythedrasticexpedientofbeingdeprivedthemselvesoffamilybondsandprivateproperty.Onlyifrulershavenochildrenorrelativestofavour,andnochanceofaccumulatingpropertytofavourthemwith,willthosetheygovernbetrulysafe.ToputitinthetermsofBookI,onlyashepherdwithoutprospectofwealthorfamilywillcareforhissheepfortheirsakeratherthanhisown.Theseconddangertakestheformofaparadox.Itwasarguedinresponsetothefirstdangerthatonlythosewhodonotwanttoruleandhavenoprivateincentivetowanttorule,canbetrustedtorule.Howthencanthereluctantpotentialrulersbeinducedtorule?BookIalreadysketchesoneanswertothis.Socratesstatesthat“wagesmustbeprovidedtoapersonifhe’stobewillingtorule,whetherintheformofmoneyorhonor[moneybeingrejectedinBookVwhencommunismfortheguardiansisintro-duced]orapenaltyifherefuses”(347a).But,hecontinues,“goodpeoplewon’tbewillingtoruleforthesakeofeithermoneyorhonor....So,ifthey’retobewillingtorule,somecompulsionorpunishmentmustbebroughttobearonthem...”(347b).ThisisamplifiedinonedirectioninBookIV(419a–421c),whenSocratesretortstoAdeimantus–whoistroubledthattherulers,deprivedofmoneyandluxury,willnotbehappy–thatjusticewillbemosteasilyfoundwhenthewholecityishappy.Thisinturndependsontherulersplayingtheirpartalongwiththeothergroupsofcitizens,thoughSocrateslaterpointedlyobservestoAdeimantus’brotherthattheguardian-rulerswillenjoyvictoryandpublicacclaimandsohappinessmorethanthatofOlympicvictors(V,465d–e).ItisamplifiedinadifferentdirectioninBookVI(499b–d),inthethoughtthatphilosophersunwillingtorulemaysometimesbe“compelled”bychanceornecessity(whichGreekthoughtdidnotsharplydistinguish)torule,orexistingkingsmaybeinspiredby“agod”tolovephilosophy.Buttheproblemisnowherefullyresolved.Agoodpoliticalregimeisvitalifthemajorityofpeople–allbutthe174ACTC1017420/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’spoliticalphilosophyphilosophers–aretobeabletobeasnon-miserableastheycanbe,yettheprospects6ofestablishingsucharegimearehazardous,chancy,andextremelydim.Letusreturntotheethicalframeoftheargument,assetoutespeciallyinBooksI–IIandIX.ThetextopenswithadiscussionaboutthenatureofjusticeatthehomeofawealthymeticlivinginthePiraeus,theAthenianportwhichstandsoutsidethewallsofthecityproper.Thisdiscussion,inwhichthreeinterlocutorssuccessivelyreplaceoneanotherintheroleofbeingquestionedbySocrates,anticipatesmanyofthepointsmadeintheremainderofthetext.ForpresentpurposesthecrucialpartistheexchangebetweenSocratesandThrasymachus,a“sophist”whoaggressivelyexposeswhatheseesastheargumentativeploysusedbySocratesagainstthepreviousspeaker.Thrasymachustakesthepositionthatjusticeistheadvantageofthestrongasdefinedbythemfortheirpurposesincontrollingandexploitingtheweak:ifshepherdscarefortheirflock,itisonlytofattenthemforamorevaluablekill.Socratestriestoarguethatactingjustlyisinfactintheinterestsofthejustperson.Buttwoofthelistenersarenotfullyconvinced.WhileThrasymachusarguesthatthestrongpullthewoolovertheeyesoftheweak(justiceisneverintheinterestsoftheruled),thesetwoyouthsposeaslightlydifferentproblem.Forthem,theweakmayhavereasontobejustratherthanunjustiftheyknowtheycan’tgetawaywithfloutingthelawspublicly.Butthebestthingfortheweakwouldbetobeabletogetawaywithactingunjustly.Whileitisbetterforthemtopullthewoolovertheirowneyesthannottodosoiftheonlyalternativeistobedestroyed,itwouldbebetterstillforthemtodeceivetheirfellowsinsteadofthemselvesbygettingunjustgainsatnoreputationalcost.Thesetwointerlocutors–brothersbearingthenamesofPlato’sactualbrothers,GlauconandAdeimantus–thereforechallengeSocratesmorefullytoanswerthequestion,whybejust?Theyexplainthatwhiletheydonotbelievethatitisbettertobeunjust,theyequallydon’tbelievethatthecasethatjusticeiswhatreallybenefitstheindividualhasbeenmadewellenoughbyanyofthepoetsorphilosopherswhohaveaddressedthequestion.Nowonderthatmanyoftheyoungarecynicalaboutdoingwhattheirelderstellthemisrightandlivingonthestraightandnarrowpath;eventhesetwo,whohavewithstoodthetemptationsofinjustice,arenotimmunetothevauntingofitsattractions.TherestoftheRepublicisSocrates’responsetothisrequest,intheformofanattemptedproofthatjustice–nottheapparentattractionsofinjustice–iswhatmosttrulybenefitstheindividual.Inpassingweshouldnotethatitiscrucialtothedialogue’sstructure(andtowhatdistinguishesitfromthe“Socratic”dialogues)thattheyouthfulbrothersatnopointthemselvesdefendthecontentionthatitisbettertobeunjust–theymerelysaythattheyhavenothearditbesufficientlywellrefutedandaskSocratestodoso.Intheaporeticdialogues,Socratescharacteristicallyinsiststhatthepersonheisquestioning6.Onelineofcommentators,inspiredbyLeoStrauss,hasindeedheldthatthereal,hiddenmessageoftheRepublicisthattherealizationoftheidealcityisimpossible–contrarytoSocrates’repeatedassertionsinBookVofthewaysinwhichtheregimewillbe“possible”and“beneficial.”SeeStrauss(1987)andtherepresentativedebatebetweenBloom(1977)andHall(1977).Theviewtakenhereisthatitispossibletorealizetheidealcity,thoughthismaydependondivineaid(seebelow).175ACTC1017520/03/2006,04:02PM\nmelissalanemustsaysincerelywhatheactuallybelieves.Here,GlauconandAdeimantusareatpainstodenythattheythemselvesbelievethatitisbetter(foroneself)toactunjustlyratherthanjustly.Insteadofputtingenergyintorefutation,therefore,Socratesisfreetoputhisenergyintoconstructiveargument–andthebrothers,whoassertthattheyhavebeentemptedby,butneversuccumbedto,theclaimthatinjusticereallypays,arepresentedasfreetobepersuaded.Socrates’responseis,inanutshell,toarguethatjusticeiswhatreallybenefitstheindividualbecausejusticecontributesalongwiththeotherthreecardinalvirtuestotheharmonyofthesoul.Thejustpersonisatpeacewithhimselfbecauseandinsofarashissouliswell-ordered;theunjustpersonismiserablebecausehissoulisdividedanddisordered.Andtheproperorderofthesoulisforittobegovernedbyknowledge.Thisiswherethebrothers’ethicalquestion“whyjustice,”intersectswiththeclassicSocraticproblematicaboutknowledgeruling.Eachperson’shappinessdependsontheirsoulbeingruledbyknowledge.Butonlyinthecaseoftruephilosophersistheirreasoncapableofdoingthejobalone.Formostpeople,thepossibilityofhappinessandjusticedependsontheirreasonbeingsupplementedbysurrogatereasonfromoutside:eitherbecausetheirownreasonhasnotattainedthetrueobjectsofknowledgewhichthesurrogatereasonhasdone,orbecausetheirownreasonistooweaktodothejobonitsown.“[I]tisbetterforeveryonetoberuledbydivinereason,preferablywithinhimselfandhisown,otherwiseimposedfromwithout,sothatasfaraspossible,allwillbealikeandfriends,governedbythesamething”(IX,590d).Beinggovernedbysuchsurrogateexternalreasonmaynotbeenoughtomakeanon-philosopherreallyjustorhappy.Butitwillgetthemascloseastheycanget,andinparticularwillsavethemfromtheout-of-controlappetitesthatwouldotherwiserendertheirmiserycomplete.SuchaportraitofcompletemiseryisdrawninBookIX–thetyrant–andisidentifiedastheepitomeoftheunjustperson,incontrastwiththephilosopherwhoistheepitomeofthejust.Invirtueofhisabilitytosatisfyallhislusts–theveryabilitywhichGlauconandAdeimantushadhearddescribedasadmirableforthosewhocanattainit–heismiserable.Theobjectsoflustdonotconferhappiness.Onlyawell-orderedsoulruledbyreasoncandothat,sobeingruledbylustandgreed,thetyrantforfeitshischanceforhappiness.Atthispointtheargumenthascomefullcircle–fromthetemptationsoftyrannydescribedbyGlauconandAdeimantusinBookII,totheabhorrencewithwhichGlauconmeetsthedescriptionofthetyrantinthetermsjustsketchedinBookIX.ButtheRepublicdoesnotendthere.ThebrothershadoriginallychallengedSocratestoprovethatjusticepaysinitself,notinvirtueoftherewardswhichareputationforjusticemightattract.GlauconvividlyposedthechallengebytellingthestoryoftheringofGyges(II,359c–360d),aringwhichmakesitsbearerinvisibleandsoallowshimtoprofitfrominjustice;healsoimaginesajustpersonwho,conversely,ismalignedandmaltreatedsoastosufferfromallmannerofworldlyevils–reviledandpoor,ishisjusticeanyrealconsolation?InBooksIXandXSocratescompletestheargumentbypointingouttheusualbenefitswhichbeingjustbringsinitstrain,togetherwiththemoreunusualones–namely,thebenefitjusticeconfersonyounotonlyinthislifebutinthenext.ThemythofErisoneofseveraleschatologicalmythsinPlato.Here,inaneatandimportanttwist,whatjusticegainsyouafterdeathisnotadivinelyconferredreward,butrathertheabilitytochoosewisely–uncloudedbylustorambition–amongthevariouslivesonofferforthenextlife.Itisthelinkbetweenjusticeand176ACTC1017620/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’spoliticalphilosophywisdom–thatis,betweenvirtueandknowledge–ratherthanjusticealonewhichisthekeytohappinessintheRepublic.Theskeletonoftheargumentshouldnowbeclear.Atitscorearetwocentralribs,onepsychological,theotherepistemological.WemaysaythatthepsychologyoftheRepublicpluralizes,politicizes,andplatonizesthesoul.Forwhatdoesitmeanforsoulstobepotentiallydividedandsobadlyorwell-ordered?TheideathatinjusticearisesfromadividedanddisorderedsoulcontradictsthethesisofmanySocraticdialoguesthatevil(includinginjustice)isdoneonlyoutofignorance,athesiswhichdeniesthepossibilityofactingagainstwhatyouknowtoberightorbest(thepossibilityofakrasiaor“weaknessofwill”).IntheRepublic,evilmaybedoneduetoignorance–onemayhaveawell-enough-orderedsoulbutone’sreasonisnotsufficientlywellcultivatedtohaveattainedmoralknowledge.Butevilmayalsobedoneoutofdisorderofthesoul,andthisisexplainedforthefirsttimebyapluralizationofthesoul:eachsoulhasparts.Byanalogywithsocial-functionalclassesinthecity,itisarguedthattherearethreepartsofthesoul.Appetiteandreasonareobviouscandidatesfortwoofthese;indeed,thethoughtthatappetitecansometimesopposereasonisattheheartofthefolkunderstandingofakrasiawhichSocratessocounter-intuitivelydeniesinotherdia-logues.Thethirdpartishardertoisolate;DanielleAllen(2000,pp.245–6)hasshownhowtheargumentidentifyingthisasthethumosorspiritedpartservestotransformtheAthenianpoliticalandpsychologicallandscape,bypromptingreaderstorejecttheresultsofangryAthenianpunishmentsandseekinsteadtofindtheirhonorinthecourseofreason.Eachofthese“agent-like”partsofthesoulhasacharacteristicgoalandiscapableofaprimitiveformofpracticalreasoningtoattainthatgoal(Bobonich,2002,pp.217–22).Thisisonereasonthat“appetite”isabettertranslationofepithumiathan“desire,”becauseallthreepartshavetheirowncharacteristic“desires.”Appetiteseekssatisfactionforparticularbodilywantsandchoosesobjectswhichitbelieveswillsatisfythosewants,believingfurtherthatthesatisfactionofwantsconstitutesthegoodlife.Thumosseekshonorandevaluateswhatittakestobeoccasionstodisplaycourageinordertoachievethatgoal,believingfurtherthattheattainmentofhonorconstitutesthegoodlife.Reasonseeksknowledgeincludingknowledgeofthegood,believing(whenproperlyeducated)thattheattainmentofsuchknowledgeconstitutesthegoodlife.Suchapsychicstructureisnotonlyplural,butalsopolitical.Bythisismeantthatthesoulisfiguredasamini-polis,apoliticalunitinwhichorderandrulemustbeestablished.Whatmustmostbeavoidedisstasis,orfactionaluprisingsagainstgoodrule–inthecaseofthesoul,thishappenswhenthumosalliesitselfwithappetiteinsteadofwithitsnaturalally,reason.Anditisthethesisthatreasonisthebestrulerofthesoulwhichconstitutesthesoul’splatonization.Thesoulisnotideallyademo-cracy.Thejustificationfortheruleofreasonisnotthatithasbeenchosenbytheothertwopartstorule,butbecauseitsruleisthebestandonlypathtohappinessfortheindividual.Freedom,asSocratesconcludesinBookIX,canonlybegiventochildrenortocitiesonceaconstitutionor“politeia”hasbeenestablishedinthem(IX,590e).Thisaccounthasbeencalledinconsistentandcontradictory(Williams,1973).Ifeachindividualhasatripartitesoul,howcanthecityconsistofthreedistinct“parts”orsocialgroupseachcorrespondingtoasinglepartoftheindividualsoul?JonathanLear(1998[1992])hasresolvedthisapparentinconsistencybyoffering177ACTC1017720/03/2006,04:02PM\nmelissalaneapsychodynamicsoftheinteractionbetweensoulandcity,showinghowtheapparentlystaticmodelofBooksII–IVcomestolifeinthepsycho-civic-dramasof7regimedegenerationinBooksVIII–IX.Eachtimocrat,say,doeshavethreepartstohissoul,butthethumosorhonor-lovingpartispredominant,settingthegoalsforthepersonasawhole,andsostampingitscharacteronthecitywhereheandthoselikehimpredominate.Why,though,shouldreasonbewillingtoruleinthesoul,giventheacuteandunresolvedproblemsinthetextastowhyandindeedwhetherphilosopherswouldbewillingtoruleinthecity?Thisisthesecondobjection.ThebestexplanationastowhyreasonshouldbereadytoruleinthesoulappealstothefactthatreasoninPlatoisanintrinsicorderer,inherentlymotivatedtopromotetheexistenceofgoodorderintheworld.Butifthiswereenoughalsotoanswerthequestionastowhythephilosopherswouldbewillingtoruleinthecity,thereiterationoftherolesofchance,necessity,andcompulsioninbringingthemtodosowouldbepointless.Thedisjuncturebetweenthewillingnessofpsychicreasonandlivingphilosopherstorulecanbeexplainedasfollows.Byrulinginthesoul,reasonisperforminganaturalorderingfunction:itsroleinthesoulisindeedthatofinnateandintrinsicorderer.Butitisnotnatural,inthePlatonicsenseofwhatisteleologicallybest,thatoneperson’sreasonshouldhavetoorderthesoulofanother.Thepoliticalrelationship,thatis,isnotnatural.Itisneces-saryonlybecauseoftheweakness,perversion,orfailureofthereasonofthepersonwhoneeds(inPlatonicterms)toberuled.Soreason,whichwouldbeteleologicallydriventocontemplatetheFormsandestablishjusticeinitsownbearer’ssoul,isforcedtoturnawayfromthoseperfectionsinordertocompensatefortheweaknessesofreasoninothers.Thisconducestojusticeinthatitenablesreasoneverywheretobebolsteredinitsrightfultaskofruling,andsoenablesthecityasawholetobeashappyaspossible.Anditmayberequiredbyjusticeifsodoingrepaysadebtincurredintheeducationofthephilosophers.Butifitcanbeexplainedasasurrogateprocedurerequiredby“goodness,”itformsnopartof“bestness,”andsoreason’sintrinsicorderingfunctiondoesnotsolvetheproblemofwhythephilosophersshouldbewillingtorule.WehaveherebeguntotrenchontheultimatemetaphysicalteachingoftheRepublic,thatis,theFormoftheGood.Fortosaythatreason’sproperobjectisknowledge,aswassaidabove,isnotyettohavesaidenough.Aswasshownattheoutsetofthisdis-cussionoftheRepublic,thequestionraisedbymanyotherdialoguesis–knowledgeofwhat?Whatkindofknowledgeisitthatiscapableofgoverningourlivesforthebest?“Whatkind”canmean“whatnature”or“whatcontent,”andtheRepublicaddressesbothofthesemeaningsforthequestionabove.First,thenatureoftheknowledgerelevanttopoliticsandappropriateasanobjectforreason.Thisknowledgemustremainstableacrossmanydifferentcontexts,ifitistobeusefulforpoliticallife.So,7.Ferrari(2003)haschallengedLear’saccount,arguingthattheseprocessesarenotevidentinthetextofthedialogueandofferingadifferentinterpretationofthecity–soulrelationship(andtheproblemsitraises)fromthosegivennotonlybyLearbutalsobytheclassicpapertowhichLearhimselfhadresponded(Williams,1973):thischallengecannotbeassessedhere,butthepresentauthorremainspersuadedofthevalueofLear’sinsight.178ACTC1017820/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’spoliticalphilosophySocratesargues,itcannotoweanythingtothosecontextsinthemselves:itcannotberelativeorsituational.Platothereforeinfersthattheremustbeobjectsofknowledgewhicharebynaturecontext-independent,unalteredbychangesintimeandspace.Itistheabsolutenatureoftheseobjectsthatenablesthemtoserveasastandardandtouchstonebywhichthephilosophersorientthemselvesintheworldofaction.TheseobjectsaretheForms.Thereisnotexactlya“theoryofForms”intheRepublic–theremarksmadeaboutthemarecalledprovisionalandinsufficient.Yettheaspirationtoknowledgewhichistimelessandcontext-independent,andwhichisalsovalue-relevantandsorelevanttoaction,isembodiedunforgettablyinSocrates’contrastbetweenthosewholoveordinarysensuousobjectsandthosewholovetheForms.ButtherearemanyForms–thebeautiful,thejust,alongsidethemoreproblematicexampleinBookXoftheFormofthecouch(onBookX,seeBurnyeat,1999).Whichone–whatcontent–isthemostfundamentallyrelevanttopoliticalknowledge?TheRepublicsweepstoananswerbymeansofagrandmetaphysicalanalogyinBookVI.Justasthelightofthesunmakesphysicalobjectsvisible,sothelightoftheGoodmakestheFormsintelligible–thatis,visibletothemind’seye.TheGood,becauseintelligibilityandpurposecanonlybeunderstoodinlightof(intermsof)goodness.AstheTimaeussuggests,theworldcanbeexplainedonlyinsofarasitisgood;wheregoodnessrunsout,sodoesexplanation,andweareleftconfrontingsheer,8merematter.GraspingtheGoodis,therefore,thefundamentalaimofreasonandsotheorientingpurposeofanywell-orderedsoul.PuttingtheGoodintopracticeisthespecialtaskofpoliticiansinthecityasitisthetaskofeachpersoninhisorherownlife.LovingandseekingaftertheGood–evenifonedoesnothavefullcontemplativeknowledgeofit–isitselfenoughtoquietandtameallotherpossibledesiresinthesoul.Andthisiswhythosewhoareconvertedtothecauseofreasonandphilosophy–eveniftheylackafullphilosophicaleducation–willthemselvesbejust.ContrarytothosewhohavefollowedSachs(1963)inclaimingthatPlatohassimplyperformedabaitandswitch,substitutingjusticeaspsychicharmonyfortheconventionalinterpersonaljusticewhichheissupposedtobedefending,theRepublictakespainstopointoutthatpeoplewhoarepsychicallyjustwillhavenomotivetobehaveunjustlytowardsothers.Havingdefinedjusticeinthesoulasinthecityaseachpartdoingitsownwork,SocratesassuresGlauconthattheycandispelany“doubts”astowhetherjusticeinthesoulisthesameasinthecity“byappealingtoordinarycases”(IV,442d–e):“Forexample,ifwehadtocometoanagreementaboutwhethersomeonesimilarintrainingandnaturetoour[just]cityhadembezzledadepositofgoldorsilverthathehadaccepted,whodoyouthinkwouldconsiderhimtohavedoneit?”(443a).Glauconisquicktoagreethatnoonewouldsuspectthepsy-chicallyjustpersonofsuchembezzlement,nor,inresponsetofurtherquestionsbySocrates,of“templerobberies,thefts,betrayalsoffriendsinprivatelifeorofcitiesinpubliclife...[being]untrustworthyinkeepinganoathorotheragreement...[orengagingin]adultery,disrespectforparents,andneglectofthegods”(443a).8.ForadifferentaccountofexplanationintheTimaeus,groundedinmathematicsratherthanexplicitappealtothegood,seeinthisvolumeBrisson,plato’snaturalphilosophyandmetaphysics.179ACTC1017920/03/2006,04:02PM\nmelissalanePutsimply,thepsychicallyjusthavenodesireforthefruitsofinjustice,theirdesirebeingorientedsolelytowardthegood.Thejustman“putshimselfinorder,ishisownfriend,andharmonizesthethreepartsofhimselflikethreelimitingnotesinamusicalscale...”(IV,443d).Socrates’friendshipforGlauconandAdeimantuscanaidthemtobefriendthemselvesinthisway,eveniftheymustclingonlytoanintimationoftheGoodratherthanafullandcompletecontemplativeknowledgeofit.Suchfriendship,embeddednotinelenchusbutinconstructiveconversation,isinonesensepolitical,sinceitinvolvesSocratesusinghisreasontoimproveandbolsterthatoftheyouths.Butitismorenaturalthanordinarypoliticssinceitisbasedonapotentialaffinityofreasonandvirtue,andtheaspirationtoatrulymutualfriendshipinvirtueakinto9thatwhichAristotlewouldlateridealize.Thepoliticsoffriendshipaims,wemightsay,tooutgrowtheneedforpoliticsatall.Wherefriendshipsucceeds,itcanimple-mentethicsatleastinindividualsouls;whereitfailsorisimpossible,thefullpoliticsofKallipolismustawaitthechanceornecessityoftheruleofphilosophers.StatesmanTheRepublicisframedasaninquiryintothedefinitionofjusticeanditsbearingonhappiness;theStatesman,asaninquiryintothedefinitionoftheeponymouspersonwithgenuinepoliticalknowledge.Fortheformer,thepurposeofaninquiryintorulingknowledgeistoestablishjusticeandhappiness;forthelatter,thepurposeoftheinquiryissimplytodefinethenatureofthatknowledgewhichcouldrulemoreprecisely.InparticulartheStatesmanmakestwopointswhichgounnoticedintheRepublic:rulingknowledgeisnotsimplyknowledgeofthegood,butknowledgeofthegoodintime(thekairos);andsuchinherentlyflexibleknowledgeofthekairosmustbemadeauthoritativeovertheunchangingandapproximaterequirementsoffixedlaws(Lane,1998,pp.132–3,139–45,193–202).SofortheStatesman,theantithesisofthetruestatesmanisthesophistconceivedasapolitician–thepersonwhopretendstoknow-ledgebutexercisesrulewithoutit.Suchasophistmaybefoundinanykindofregimelackinggenuineknowledge,whichistosayinallregimesexistinginPlato’sday.IntheRepublic,incontrast,theantithesisofthetruestatesman,thatistosay,ofthephilosopher-ruler,isaswehaveseenthetyrant–notsimplyanypersonwhoruleswithoutknowledge,butspecificallythatignorantrulerwhoseappetitesandpowerare10mostspectacularlyunbridled.Thesameequation–thosewhoknowshouldrule–liesattheheartofbothdialogues.IntheRepublic,therelevantknowledgeisdefinedasknowledgeofthegood,andattentionisfocusedontheperspectiveoftherulers–howtheywillbeeducated,thepuritanicalconditionsinwhichtheymustlive(eugenicbreeding,norecognized9.Inthisvolume,seePakaluk,aristotle’sethics.10.SoinRepublicVIII,democracyisthenext-to-worstoftheimperfectregimes,betteronlythantyranny.IntheStatesman(303a–b),democracywithouttrueknowledgeisthebestofbadregimes(definedasregimesnotgovernedbyatruestatesman)sincedemocratshavelesspowerofactionthantyrantsandoligarchsandsocandointheirignorancetheleastharm.180ACTC1018020/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’spoliticalphilosophyfamilies,noproperty)inordertoexcludethegreedwhichwouldshattertheirunityasagroup.IntheStatesman,therelevantknowledgeisdefinedasknowledgeofthegoodintime,andattentionisfocusedondefiningthatknowledgeasopposedtootherforms(andpretences)ofknowledge–thetruestatesmanbecomesacipher,hisperspectivebeingreducedtothenatureofhisknowledgealone.Theeffortofdefinitionitselfcom-mandsattentioninthelatterdialogue;theloosemethodsofanalogywhichSocrateshadusedintheRepublic,contrastwiththeprecisemethodologicalinstructionsandcorrectionsissuedbytheEleaticStrangerintheStatesman.AndwhereasthemythofErcementedthereasonsfortheindividualtobejustandvirtuous,the“myth”oftheStatesman–afabricationfromthreelegendswithaparticularversionofthelegendaryruleofKronosatitscore–insteadservestodefinetheconditionsofpoliticallifeforwhathasearlierbeencalledthe“humanherd.”TheRepublic’smythteachesthatjusticepays;theStatesman’s,thatpoliticsisnecessary,non-grandiose,andmustbecarefullydistinguishedfromtheotherarts(Lane,1998,pp.117–25).Wesawearlierthatitisnotimplausible(thoughultimatelyunpersuasive)toarguethattheRepublicisessentiallyanethicalratherthanpoliticaldialogue.OnecouldmakenosuchargumentabouttheStatesman.Thisisaphilosophicaldialogueaboutpolitics(Migliori,1996,p.197),whereastheLaws,asweshallseebelow,islargelyaworkofpolitics.AnotherwaytoputthedifferencesbetweentheprojectsoftheRepublicandtheStatesmanistosaywithMalcolmSchofield(1999,p.37)thatwhereastheRepublicbeginswiththequestionofthegoodorbestpoliticalregimeanddiscussesstatecraftasawaytobringthisregimeabout(andsobecomespreoccupiedwiththequestionofhowwould-berulerscouldgaintheknowledgeneededtodoso),theStatesmanincontrastbeginswiththemoregeneralquestionofthenatureofpoliticalexpertiseinruleassuch,sayingnothingabouthowsomeonemightacquireitandrelativelylittleaboutwhatthecityruledbyitwouldbelike.TheStatesman’sprojectisatoncemoregeneralandmorenarrow.Inreturnforthisnarrownessoffocus,whichexcludessomeofthefundamentalchallengesofpoliticallife,theStatesmanoffersamorecomplexunderstandingofthenatureofpoliticalknowledgeandindeedofthenatureofknowledgeitself.Themethodsofdivisionandofexamplewhichareemployed(alongwiththemyth)layoutthestructureofknowledgeoftherelationshipbetweendifferentartsintermsofdifferen-tiationandinterrelationship.TheStatesman’sknowledgeislocatedwithinthisstructureandconsistsingraspingthestructureasawhole.Thepriceofthissystematicinvestigationistheabandonmentofvirtuallyallmean-ingfuldialecticalinteraction;attheoutsettheStrangerannounceshispreferenceformonologue,orifneedbe,fordialoguewithasuitablytractableinterlocutor,andhisanonymitystripshimofthepoliticalentanglementswhichthecharacterofSocrateswouldhavebroughttomindforanyGreekreader.TheRepublicseekstoredirectambitiousyouthtothelifeofphilosophybyofferingthemacompellingargumentinthemouthofthecharismaticSocrates;intheStatesman,ayoungerboyservesmainlyasafoilforaStrangerwhosecityisrenownedformetaphysicsratherthanethics,andwhoseageisnotspecified–heappearsageless,anonymous,thevoiceofpurediscriminatingreason.(WeshallseelaterthattheLaws,incontrasttoboth,isaconversationamongoldmen[Schofield,2003,pp.4–6andpassim];lackingeitherpoliticalambitiontobetamed,ortheimpetustosetoutonacomprehensive181ACTC1018120/03/2006,04:02PM\nmelissalanephilosophicalquest,theydevotethemselvestoreflectionontheirexperiencesofpoliticallife.)ButperhapsthemoststartlingapparentcontrastbetweentheStatesman,ontheonehand,andtheRepublicandLawsontheother,istheircharacterizationoftheruleoflaw.WhilelawisnotflaggedasaproblematictopicintheRepublic,itisrelieduponasaformofsurrogatereason,bothintheenvisagingofhowthephilosopherswillproceedtorule,andinthelaw-makingwhichSocratesandhisinterlocutorsthemselvesengageinas“founders”oftheidealcity.AndintheLaws,asweshallseelater,lawisconceivedasmorethanmerelyasurrogateforreason:itiscalledtheembodimentofdivinereasonitself.TowardtheendoftheStatesman,however,theStrangerhomesinonthedistinctionbetweensophistsandstatesmenbyrecallingthattheirwholediscussionhasbeenguidedbythecrucialcriterioninvolved:thepossessionorlackofexpertise.Sowhereas,hesuggests,existingregimesclassifythem-selvesasdemocraciesoroligarchies,tyranniesormonarchies,onthebasisofcriteriasuchasthewealthoftherulers,thevoluntarywillingnessofthesubjectstoberuled,ortheuseofwrittenlaws,noneofthesecriteriaisrelevanttothedefinitionofstate-craft(293a–e).Thetruestatesmanmightforcethingsonhissubjects,ordispensewiththeuseoflawsaltogether,withoutforfeitinghisclaimtobepracticinganartwhichbenefitedsubjectsbymakingthembetter.HereYoungSocratesisdriventoobject,inthenameoffundamentalGreekassump-tionsratherthanspecificallydemocraticones:hedoesnotquestiontheuseofforceonunwillingsubjects,butfindsithardtoacceptthatonecouldrulewithoutlaws(293e)11–thismaysimplystrikehimasanoxymoron.InresponsetheStrangerdevelopsthethoughtthatlawisinherentlyimperfect,inthatitisunabletoaddressitselftoindividualpeculiaritiesorchangingcircumstances.Statecraft,itwillemerge,isdefinedbyitsabilitytojudgewhensomethingshouldbedoneornotdone,whereaslawcanonlyrepeatthesameorderoverandover.Yetintheabsenceofthetruestatesman,orwhenpeopleare(wrongly)fearfulthatatruestatesmanwouldharmratherthanbenefitthem,thesecond-bestplanistosticktoexistinglawsrigidlyratherthansufferthemtobechangedforselfishorstupidreasonsbysomeoneignorant.The“sophists”includeboththosewhopresideoverthesecond-bestconstitutionsinwhichlawisobserved,andthosewhomakeabadsituationworsebyattemptingtochangethelawswithoutknowledge:theycompriseallpoliticiansexceptthetruestatesman.AsChristopherRowehaspersuasivelyifcontroversiallyargued,thesesecond-best11.TheideathatrulewithoutlawwouldseemtoYoungSocratesanoxymoronnowseemstothiswriterthemostattractiveexplanationofwhyheobjectstothispointinparticular(andnot,e.g.,tothearguedirrelevanceofforcevs.voluntariness).ThisisnotincompatiblewithLane(1998,pp.148–52),whicharguesagainstGill’s(1995)readingofYoungSocratesasaspokesmanforAthenianconstitutionalism,onthegroundthattheAtheniansdidnotconceivetheirlawsasa“restrainingframework”whichcouldnotbechanged.ButitnowseemstomeclearthattheuseoflawwouldseemtoYoungSocratestobeafeatureofanypossibleandexistingregime;itislefttotheEleaticStrangertopointoutthatthemereexistenceoflawsisnotwhatdistinguishesregimes,butrathertheirstanceineitherobservingorfailingtoobservetheirlaws.182ACTC1018220/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’spoliticalphilosophyregimeshavenomeansofaccesstothelawswhichatruestatesmanwouldprescribe:theirvirtueas“second-best”liesonlyintheirstickingtowhateverlawstheyhappentohave(Rowe,1995,ad.loc.;Rowe,2001,pp.68–74;butseecriticisminSamaras,2002,pp.171–80).Oncethiscriterialpoint(Cooper,1999,p.101)hasbeenestablished–thatnothingisrelevanttothedefinitionofanexpertexcepthisexpertise–itcanbeadmittedthatthestatesmanwillindeeduselawstoestablishthenecessarycommonopinionbetweendivergentgroupsofcitizens.Inthispassagethetwosummativeaccountsofstatecraft–theone,itsdefinitioninrelationtotherivalarts,asthemasterartwhichgovernswheneachoftheotherartsshouldact(305c–d);theother,asthepoliticalweaverofcivicunity(305e)–cometogether.Thestatesmanwasdefinedagainsthisclosestrivals–rhetors,generals,andjudges–intermsofhisknowingthe“kairos”–therightmomentoropportunity–whenitisfittingtouseorpronouncepersuasionorforce,warorpeace,guiltorinnocence.Nowitturnsoutthataspoliticalweaver,histaskistoembedrecognitionofthekairosinthejudgmentsofthecitizens,modifyingtheirnaturaltendenciestomisjudgeincharacteristicways(sometooboldly,otherstootimidly)sothatbothgroupscanbemadevirtuous(courageousormoderate)and12unitedbycommonopinionandbymarriages(Lane,1998,pp.171–82).Definedbyhisexpertknowledgeofthekairos(whichAristotlewouldcall“thegoodintime”),theStatesmancanunlikeordinarysophisticlawmakersshapethelawsandmodifythemwhennecessarysothatthegoodcanbeachieveddespitethefluxofcircumstance.ImagesusedbytheStrangersuggestthatthestatesmanwillnotbeapermanentresidentofthecitywhoselawsheframes.Heiscomparedtoanathleticscoachortrainer,andtoadoctor,bothofwhommaygoawayforawhileleavingwrittenprescriptions(laws)fortheirpatientstofollow,yetwhoshouldbeobeyedifonreturntheyorderthewrittenprescriptionstobediscardedorchanged.Thepracticeofvol-untarilyorcompulsorilyleavingthecityforwhichtheyhadwrittenlawswasnotunknownamongGreeklawgivers.TheideaofalawgiverorstatesmanwhostandsoutsidethecitythatheshapesherebecomescentraltoPlato’spoliticalthought.Whereasreaderstendtocontrastthisitineranteponymousstatesmanwiththeresidentand(eventually)nativephilosopher-rulersoftheRepublic,thisisamistake.ForasSocrates’eagernesstoconvinceeventheguardianstobelievethe“noblelie”aboutthecity’soriginsintheRepublic(III,414d)shows,theRepublic’srulersbelongwithinthecityratherthanoutside.ItisSocratesandhisinterlocutorsintheRepublicwhoaretherealcounterpartstothestatesmanoftheStatesman,astotheinterlocutorsoftheLaws.OncethesuperiorityofknowledgeoverlawhasbeenvindicatedbytheStatesman,thedialogueiscontenttoconsiderthestatesmanasalegislatorwhenheneedstobe,butstressesthroughoutthathisroleistobeoutsidethecity,anoccasionalsojournerthereratherthanaresidentornativeruler.Asthisdialoguebringsoutmore12.Arends(2001,pp.136–8)hasrightlycriticizedthetranslationinLane(1998),of307d,contrastingitwiththecorrecttranslationbyRowe(reprintedinCooper,1997),whichrunsasfollows:“thisdisagreement,oftheseclassesofpeople,isasortofplay;butinrelationtothemostimportantthings,itturnsouttobeadiseasewhichisthemosthatefulofallforcities.”183ACTC1018320/03/2006,04:02PM\nmelissalaneclearlythanmost,Plato’spoliticalthoughtisframedandlocatedmostcomfortablyatthelevelofthestatesmanwhoshapes,founds,andthenwithdraws,notthatoftheordinaryorregularparticipantinpoliticallife.TheLawsIftheRepublicisaworkofsoaringmoral-politicalimagination,andtheStatesmanoneofpainstakingmethodologico-politicalclarification,theLawsisaworkofcomprehens-ive“theologico-political”(Laks,2000,p.292)reflectionandprescription.ItisuniqueamongPlato’sdialoguesinitssetting,andinthefactthatSocratesplaysnoroleinit.WhereasmanydialoguesshowSocratestalkingprimarilywithAtheniancitizens(asintheRepublic)ordepictvisitorsand“strangers”toAthens(asintheStatesman),thisonepresentsan“AthenianStranger”inconversationwithtwofellowoldmen,theSpartanMegillusandtheCretanClinias,whilewalkingtothetopofMt.IdainCretetosacrificeatZeus’sshrine.Ithasbeenobservedthatthispresentsadeliberateformofinter-culturaldialogue,betweenoldmenwhoescapethewiselawmaker’sbanonlegalquestioninganddissentamongtheyoung,butwholackthephilosophicalbentoftheEleaticStranger(Gill,2003).WhiletheconversationbeginswiththeAthenianStrangersimplyproposingthattheyoccupythemselveswithdiscussionoflawsandconstitutions(infact,itfamouslybeginswiththeword“theos,”astheStrangeraskshiscompanionswhethertheirpeopleascribetheauthorshipoftheirlawstogodorman),ittakesanewturnattheendofBookIII,whenCliniasrevealsthathehasbeenchosenasoneoftenmenofCnossos(acityinCrete)toframethelegislationforthenewcolonyofMagnesia.Therestoftheconversation,whichconsistsofninefurtherbooks(andaccordingtoancienttestimonywasleftonwaxtabletsatPlato’sdeath,whichhasbeentakentoimplythatitwasunfinished),constructsamodellegislativeframeworkforthisnewcolony.Itisimportanttonotethat,liketheidealcityoftheRepublic(II,369a;IX,592a–b),thecityoftheLawsisfounded“inspeech”(III,702e)ratherthaninactuality;thepurposeistoadviseCliniasforhislaterpracticaldeliberationsratherthantoenactthosedeliberationsthemselves.Yetitmattersequallythatthecolonyinviewwillbepopulatedby“volunteers,”whosefallibilityandflawededucationisnotseentoposeamortalthreattothenewcity,whereastheRepublicisdriventosuggestthateveryoneovertheageoftenshouldbeexiledtothecountrysideinordertostarttheneworderoffwithacleanslate.Here,thepeoplecomefirstandthecity’srulemustbeadjustedtosuitthem(withinlimits:inbothdialogues,hopelesslybadpeoplearetobeexiled),whereasintheRepublic,therulerscomefirstanditistheircharacterandknowledgethatdeterminethenatureofthecity.Indeed,intheLawsthepeoplewillthemselvesplayanactiveroleinrulingthemselves,abalancebetween“monarchy”and“demo-cracy”beingacrucialaspectoftheconstitution(III,693e).Thephilosopherswhomustbeever-presentandever-watchfulintheRepubliccontrastwiththestatesmanwhowithdrawsintheStatesman,andbothcontrastwiththeLawswheretheconstitutionforMagnesiainvolvesnosinglerulerorgroupofrulersinwhomknowledgeuniquelyresides.184ACTC1018420/03/2006,04:02PM\nplato’spoliticalphilosophyItisimportanttonoteherethattheAthenianStranger’sclaim–repeatedseveraltimesinthetext–thatthecityofMagnesiaisofthe“secondrank,”isnevermadeexplicitlywithreferencetotheRepublic.InBookVoftheLaws,thefirst-ranking“idealsociety”isdescribedasa“communityofwives,childrenandallproperty,”aphraseundeniablyevocativeoftheRepublic.Butthiscommunityisspecifiedas“putintopracticeaswidelyaspossiblethroughouttheentirestate”(739c),asopposedtotheRepublicwhereitisexplicitlyrestrictedtotheguardian-rulers.BookIXoftheLawsbycontrastdoesseemimplicitlytosuggestthatthecityoftheLawsissecond-best,ascomparednottothecityoftheRepublicbuttothatoftheStatesman.Thepreludetolawsaboutviolenceexplainsthenecessityoflawsbysayingthat:“nomanhassuf-ficientnaturalgiftsbothtodiscernwhatbenefitsmenintheirsocialrelationshipsandtobeconstantlyreadyandabletoputhisknowledgetothebestpracticaluse”(875a)(emphasisintheEnglishtranslationusedbutnotintheGreek).SoitwillbedifficultforanyonetograspthetheoreticaltruththattheaimofthetruepolitikEtechnEis“nottheinterestofprivateindividuals,butthecommongood”;andevenifsomeonecouldgraspthisandgainapositionofabsolutecontroloveracity,“hishumannaturewillalwaysdrivehimtolooktohisownadvantageandtheliningofhisownpocket”(875b).ThissoundslikeacritiqueofthepossibilityoftheStates-man’sidealrulerevercomingtoexist.ButtheAtheniancontinuestoaffirmboththesuperiorityofsuchrulebyknowledge(ratherthanlaw)andthepossibilitythatthe“graceofGod”couldbringitabout:ButifeverbythegraceofGod(theiamoira)somenaturalgeniuswereborn,andhadthechancetoassumesuchpower,hewouldhavenoneedoflawstocontrolhim.Knowledgeisunsurpassedbyanylaworregulation;reason,ifitisgenuineandreallyenjoysitsnaturalfreedom,shouldhaveuniversalpower:itisnotrightthatitshouldbeunderthecontrolofanythingelse,asthoughitweresomesortofslave.Butasitis,suchacharacterisnowheretobefound,exceptahintofithereandthere.Thatiswhyweneedtochoosethesecondalternative,lawandregulation,whichembodygeneralprinciples,butcannot13provideforeveryindividualcase.(875c–d)ItisstrikingthattheRepublic,too,invokestheneedfora“divinedispensation”(theoumoiran,VI,493a)inordertosavethesoulofapotentialphilosopher(andsopotentialrulerorfounderofKallipolis)fromcorruption.Paradoxically,then,itisthepoliticalprojectsoftheRepublicandtheStatesman–wheretheologyisfarlessemphasized–whicharesaidtodependfortheirverypossibilityofrealizationondivineintervention.Magnesia,whichrequiresnodivinedispensationtobeestablished(despitetheAthenian’spiousprayerfordivinefavor,IV,712b,andasopposedtotheregimeruledbythe“naturalgenius”describedabove),isthereforenotatheocracy(aregimeruled13.SeeSchofield(2003,pp.7–11),contrastingthispassagewithIV,712b–715eandXII,957c(wheretheruleoflawisidentifiedwithreasonanddivinity)andcomparingallthreewiththeStatesman.SchofieldsuggeststhattheLaws’theologicalframeworkanditslimitedphilo-sophicalambitionsgotogether.185ACTC1018520/03/2006,04:03PM\nmelissalanebythegods),norisitaregimeactuallyneedingthegodstoexist.Itisratheraregimerestingonbeliefinthegods.Thisbeliefisbothparadigmaticallyrationalandabeliefinthedivinityofreason,ortherationalityofthedivinity(ies),whichiswhyAndréLaks(2000,p.262)forhispartcallsMagnesiaa“noocracy.”Whythecentralrolehereforbeliefintheology?Intheabsenceofphilosopherstoruleandtorespect,thepeopleneedtofearthegods.Itisnotsimplythattheologyisapracticalwaytosecuremoralprinciplesamongageneralpopulation(asarguedbySchofield,2003,p.13),thoughtheLawsdoesrelyonthisasamethod.Respectfulfear(aidos)ofthegodsistobefundamentaltothemotivationalstructureofthevirtuouscitizen.Butitisonlyessentialbecausetheexternalsurrogatereasonofthephilo-sophersoftheRepublicishereabsent.LawintheLawsistheembodimentofreason,buttobeefficaciousinthecityitmustbeinternalizedinthesoulsofthecitizens.Beliefinthegodsinternalizesidealrulersinthesoulwhosurpasseventhephilosopher-rulersoftheRepublic.WhereastheRepublichasdifficultyinestablishingwhythephilo-sopherswillbewillingtorule,aswesawabove,theLawscanassertthatthegodscareforhumansbecausecareisavirtueandtreatthemjustlybecausejusticeisavirtue(900d).Thegods’ruleisperfectlyvirtuous;unlikemortalrulers,theyhavenoneedtocontroltheirappetitesinordertobeproofagainstbribery,injustice,orindifference.Theproofofthiscomesinthe“prelude”addressedtoanimaginedyouthfulatheist,whichoccupiesvirtuallythewholeofBookX,andseekstorebuttheatheisticclaimsthateitherthereisnogod,orthegodsdonotcareabouthumans,orthegodscanbebribedbyprayersandsacrifices.TheAthenianinvokestheprimacyofsoulinthecosmos,asimmortalandtheoldestofallgeneratedentities,inordertoshowthatrationalintelligenceisfundamentalandpervasive,andthatthisrationalintelligencewillnecessarilybevirtuousandlovevirtue.WesawthattheRepublicisbuiltonfundamentalcontentionsintwokeyareas:psychologyandepistemology.TheStatesmanmakespsychologyvirtuallyafunctionofepistemology,totheextentthatittreatsthesubjectatall.NowtheLawsreversestheemphasis:ithaslittleconcernwithepistemology(exceptforanotableemphasisonignoranceasonecauseofevil,e.g.,IX,863c–e)butadeepandabidingconcernwithpsychology.Therolesofpleasureandshameaseffectivemotivatingexperiencesinthesoularestressed,againsttheone-sidedDoricemphasisonfear;truevirtue,whichistheStranger’sproclaimedgoalfortheconstitution–thatitshouldfostervirtueinthecitizens–consistsnotinrepressingthepleasuresbutinrationallyshapingthemtoitsownends.Pleasureandpain,thumos(angerorspiritedness),andignoranceareallmentionedashumanmentalandemotionalstates(pathE)whichcanunderminereasonandsotherationalpurposesofthelaw.ButtheLawsdoesnottreatanyoftheseasindependentpartsofthesoulwiththeirownevaluativepurposes,nordoesitinvoketheirdominanceinthesoulasdemarcatingdifferentclassesofcitizens.Thisnewpsychologyunderpinsanewemphasisinthewaythatthelawissaidtooperate.IntheRepublic,educationandlawarebothtreatedasessential,butthelinksbetweenthemassucharenotexploredatanylength.TheLawstreatstheprincipalandidealfunctionofalllawsaseducative:the“prelude”partofthelawaimstoper-suadethecitizenstoactasitprescribes,sothattheneedforthecoerciveaspectoflawcanbereducedsofaraspossible,thoughneverentirelyabolished.Thefamouspassagescontrastingtheoperationof“freedoctors”(thatis,doctorstreatingfreemen)186ACTC1018620/03/2006,04:03PM\nplato’spoliticalphilosophyand“slavedoctors”(thatis,doctorstreatingslaves)aremostnaturallyreadtosupporttheideathatthelaws,likefreedoctors,seektobeefficaciousthroughrationalpersua-sionofthosetheygovern(IV,720a–e;IX,857c–e).Butsomecriticshavechallengedtherationalityoftheactualpreludescontained(asexamples)inthetextoftheLaws,andhavegoneontoarguethatPlatoisnothereenvisagingrationallyautonomouscitizenswhooperateprimarilyonthebasisofrationalargument:withtheirbehaviorsocontrolledandprescribed,restrictionsontheirabilitytotravelabroad,strictmilitarydiscipline,isPlatoreallydepictingacityofpotentiallyrationalandvirtuouscitizens,oracityofthought-policedrobots?Casesforandagainsttherationalityofthepreludesasdescribed,andasexemplified,14havebeenmadepowerfullyonbothsides.Thepresentwritercontendsthatwhilethepreludesareconceivedasrational,and(withallowancesforcontext)aremostlypresentedasexercisesinrationalpersuasion,PlatoalsoconsistentlyintheLaws(asintheRepublic)insistson,anddramatizes,thefactthatcompulsionandpersuasioncan-notalwaysbesoreadilydistinguishedintheoryorseparatedinpractice.Socratesiscompelledtoexplainthecommunityofwives,childrenandpropertyintheRepublic(V,449a–450b);itislessoftennoticedthattheLawsalsoinvolvestwonotabledramaticreferencestocompulsionshouldpersuasionfail.InBookVI(753a)theAthenianpro-posestoCliniasthatheshouldhimselfbecomeacitizenofthenewcolonyofMagnesia,“withyourconsent(failingwhich,you’llbegentlycompelled).”InBookXII,CliniasandMegillusagreeinturnthattheymustgettheAthenianhimselftojointhecolonybyrefusing“tolethimleaveus,”andusing“entreatiesandeveryrusewecanthinkof”(thatis,persuasionanddeception)toaccomplishthataim(969c).InBookIValso,theyoungdictatorwhoseruleiscalledtheeasiestandquickestwaytochangethe15lawsofastate,issaidtocombine“persuasionwithcompulsion”(711c).Inshort,theroleofpersuasionisimportant,butnotunaccompaniedbycompulsionwhetherbylegalpenaltiesorbyotherforces.Anditsroleisrathertoshapethechar-acterofthecitizensthantoacknowledgetheirindependentrightastheultimatejudgesofpoliticalpower,inthewaythatpracticesofpersuasionintheAthenianassemblyandlawcourtsdid.TheruleoflawinPlato’svisionheretakesovertheauthorityofthedemocraticAthenianassembly,andaccordsauthoritytothecitizensonlyinsofarastheyarethemselvesmoldedtorecognizeitsownrationalityandauthority(Allen,2000,pp.179–90).“Voluntary”acceptanceofrulebythecitizensofatruepoliteia–ascontrastedwiththe“unwilling”subjectsofthefactionalregimesoftyranny,oligarchyanddemocracy–doesnotexcludearoleforcompulsioninmoldingthatacceptance(VIII,832c–d).14.Forthecaseagainst,seeforexampleStalley(1994),andthemoremoderateLaks(2000,pp.289–90),bothcriticizingBobonich(1999[1991]).Samaras(2002,pp.310–25)advancesthedebatebyarguingthatwhilethetheoryofpreludesisindeedoneofrationalpersuasion(evenifnotallpreludesinthetextexhibitthis),Plato’scommitmenttorationalpersuasionheredoesnotcommithimtoaliberalviewofindividualchoiceorfreedom.15.Nevertheless,oneplacewherepersuasionandcompulsionareconjoinedintheRepublic–inordertogettheruleofphilosophersstartedinthefirstplace–isavoidedintheLawsbytheassumptionthatthecolonistswillbe(screened)volunteers(IV,708aff.;V,741a).187ACTC1018720/03/2006,04:03PM\nmelissalaneGiventhatthepsychologyoftheLawsdoeslayemphasis(thoughnotsoleemphasis)onrationalpersuasion,itunderpinsapoliticsinwhichcitizenscanplaydiverseroles.TheestablishmentofthemagistraciesinBookVIinvolveslaw-wardens,commanders,aCouncilanditssubdivisions,stewardsforthecity,theland,andthemarkets,officialsforeducationandcompetitioninmusicandgymnastic,andjudges.Allthesearetobeelectedbyvariousformsofrestrictednominationandsuffrage,manyinvolvingprop-ertyclass:democraticequalitymusthaveitsshareinthecity,thoughitislesscorrectandperfectthanthekindofequalitywhichisproportionaltoworth,butitssharecannotbecompleteasintheAthenianpracticeofselectionbylot.InBookXIItheeuthunai,orscrutineersofthelaw-wardens,aregivenafarmoreexaltedrolethantheofficeofthatnameinAthens;theyaretheguardianswhomustguardtheguardians.AndBookXIIalsointroducesthefamousorinfamous“NocturnalCouncil”(amoreaccuratenamewouldbethelesssinister“DawnCouncil,”astheyaretomeetneardawn),agroupofexperiencedandwiseelderlymen,eachaccompaniedbyanappren-ticeyoungerman.Theyhavenomagisterialpowerinthecitybutarechargedwithreviewingitslaws,partlyinlightofembassiestotheoutside,inordertomakesurethattheyremainasrationalaspossible.AlthoughtheStrangeracknowledgesthatmanydetailsmustbeomittedandlefttothelaw-wardenstodetermine,whatstrikesanyreaderofBooksVII–VIIIistheextraordinarylevelofdetailwhichisinfactprovided.TheAtheniandeclaresearlierthat,“Nothing,sofaraspossible,shallbeleftunguarded”(VI,760a),andinfact,nothingsofaraspossibleistobeleftunregulated:infants’clothing,children’sgames,pregnantwomen’sdiet,allareprescribedsoastobeginshapingtheexperienceofpleasuresandpainsfromtheverymomentofconception,goingontoagriculturalandmarketlawstosafeguardthefoodsupply.BooksIX,XI,andpartofXIIaretheprincipallocusofthepenallawsandthediscussionofpunishment,whichisconsist-entwithPlatonicprinciplesofpunishmentelsewhereinthecorpusinholdingthatpunishmentshouldaimatimprovingtheoffender’ssoul.TheAthenianalsokeepsfaithwiththeSocraticparadoxthatnoonedoesinjusticewillingly,copingwithitsradicalimplicationsforthepenalcodebyreassigningthedistinctionbetweenvoluntaryandinvoluntarycriminalactiontothenotionofinjuryeffectedratherthanthatof(alwaysinvoluntary)injusticeintended.Throughouttheworkisreiteratedthethemeofage,contrastingthepoliticaldifferencebetweenoldmenwhocanbetrustedonthebasisofexperience,andyoungmenwhomayberashintheirjudgmentsofcity,self,andgods,andwhoneedtobetemperedtorespectthelaw.Alsoreiteratedisthethemeofthedivinityofreasonwhichcanbeembodiedinlaws,andsoguidemortalnaturewithadivinecord.ThesetwothemestogetherhelptoshowthatthesupposedActonianpessimismaboutabsolutepowercorruptingabsolutelyisnotinfactpresentintheLaws.Thepassagewhereitismostoftendiscerned(IX,875b–d)saysthatanymanwithknowledgeandpowerwillbedrivenbyhis“humannature”tousethatpowerforhisownadvantage.Butthisdoesnotexcludethepossibilityraisedinthe“goldencord”puppetimage(I,645a)thathis“humannature”mightbecontrolledbysomethingdivineinhim.IftheemphasisondivinityinpoliticalaffairsdistinguishestheLawsfromotherPlatonicworks,thisveryemphasismakesitpossibleforthedialoguetokeepfaithwiththeaspirationtorulerswithknowledgeandvirtuewhichcharacterizesthemall.188ACTC1018820/03/2006,04:03PM\nplato’spoliticalphilosophyConclusionInwritingthesethreedialoguesPlatoexploredwhatpoliticalphilosophycouldandshouldbefromdifferentanglesandaccordingtodifferentunderstandingsofphilosophyitself.YetallPlato’spoliticalexplorationspursuethebasicthoughtthatknowledgealonecanmakeactionvirtuousandsomakepeoplehappyandtheirlivesworthliving.Itfollowsthatwhoeverpossessessuchknowledge–whichPlatoassumesthroughouthisworktobepotentiallyandatmostonlyafewpeople–mustensurethatsomehoworotheritgovernstheactionsofall.Plato’spoliticalphilosophy,asenunciatedinthethreemajorworksconsideredinthischapter,goesbeyondthecriticismofAtheniandemocracywithwhichitpresum-ablybegan,toinquireintotheethicalbasisofpowerandthetruesignificanceofallexistingconstitutionalforms.Thedialoguesspeakthroughmanyvoicestoexplorethepossibilityofconstructingapoliticsaimingatvirtue,forsoulswhoaredivided,inaworldconstrainedbynecessityandrequiringthedivineorsemi-divineguidanceof16reasonintheformofphilosophy,statecraft,orlaw.BibliographyWorksCitedN.B.TheLatinizationoftheGreektitleoftheStatesman,bywhichitissometimescalled,isthePoliticus.Allen,D.S.(2000).TheWorldofPrometheus:ThePoliticsofPunishinginDemocraticAthens.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Annas,J.(1999).PlatonicEthics:OldandNew.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.Arends,F.(2001).“ReviewArticle–TheLongMarchtoPlato’sStatesmanContinued.”Polis,18,125–52.Bloom,A.(1977).“ResponsetoHall.”PoliticalTheory,5,293–313.Bobonich,C.(1999[1991]).“Persuasion,Compulsion,andFreedominPlato’sLaws.”InG.Fine(ed.),Platovol.2:Ethics,Politics,ReligionandTheSoul(pp.373–403).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.——.(2002).Plato’sUtopiaRecast:HisLaterEthicsandPolitics.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Burnyeat,M.F.(1999).“CultureandSocietyinPlato’sRepublic.”InG.B.Peterson(ed.),TheTannerLecturesonHumanValues,vol.20(pp.215–324).SaltLakeCity:UniversityofUtahPress.Cooper,J.M.(1999).“Plato’sStatesmanandPolitics.”ProceedingsoftheBostonAreaColloquiuminAncientPhilosophy,13,71–104.——.(ed.)withHutchinson,D.S.(assoc.ed.).(1997).Plato:CompleteWorks.Indianapolis:Hackett.Farrar,C.(1988).TheOriginsofDemocraticThinking:TheInventionofPoliticsinClassicalAthens.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.16.Thankstotheeditors,AdamRachlis,andMalcolmSchofieldforcommentsonpreviousversions.189ACTC1018920/03/2006,04:03PM\nmelissalaneFerrari,G.R.F.(2003).CityandSoulinPlato’sRepublic.SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.Gill,C.(1995).“RethinkingConstitutionalisminStatesman291–303.”InC.J.Rowe(ed.),Read-ingtheStatesman.ProceedingsoftheThirdSymposiumPlatonicum(pp.292–305).SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.——.(2003).‘TheLaws–IsitaRealDialogue?’.InS.ScolnicovandL.Brisson(eds.),Plato’sLaws:FromTheoryintoPractice.ProceedingsoftheSixthSymposiumPlatonicum(pp.42–7).SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.Hall,D.(1977).“TheRepublicandthe‘LimitsofPolitics.’”PoliticalTheory,5,293–313.Halliwell,S.(ed.,tans.,andnotes).(1993).Plato:RepublicV.Warminster:ArisandPhillips.Harte,V.(2002).PlatoonPartsandWholes:TheMetaphysicsofStructure.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Klosko,G.(1986).TheDevelopmentofPlato’sPoliticalTheory.London:Methuen.Laks,A.(2000).“TheLaws.”InC.RoweadM.Schofield(eds.),TheCambridgeHistoryofGreekandRomanPoliticalThought(pp.258–92).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Lane,M.[S.](1998).MethodandPoliticsinPlato’sStatesman.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(1999).“Plato,Popper,Strauss,andUtopianism:OpenSecrets?”HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterly,16,119–42.Lear,J.(1998[1992]).“InsideandOutsidetheRepublic.”InJ.Lear.Open-minded:WorkingOuttheLogicoftheSoul.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.McCabe,M.M.(1994).Plato’sIndividuals.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Migliori,M.(1996).Artepoliticaemetreticaassiologica:commentariostorico-filosoficoal“Politico”diPlatone.Milan:VitaePensiero.Nightingale,A.(1993).“Writing/ReadingaSacredText:ALiteraryInterpretationofPlato’sLaws.”ClassicalPhilology,88,279–300.——.(1995).GenresinDialogue:PlatoandtheConstructofPhilosophy.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Ober,J.(1998).PoliticalDissentinDemocraticAthens:AthenianCriticsofPopularRule.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Pradeau,J.-F.(2002).PlatoandtheCity.AnewIntroductiontoPlato’sPoliticalThought.Trans.byJ.LloydwithforewordbyC.Gill.Exeter:UniversityofExeterPress.(OriginallypublishedasPlatonetlacité,1997).Rowe,C.J.(ed.,trans.andnotes).(1995).Plato:Statesman.Warminster:ArisandPhillips.——.(2001).“KillingSocrates:Plato’sLaterThoughtsonDemocracy.”JournalofHellenicStudies,121,63–76.——.(2003).“Socrates,theLaws,andtheLaws.”InS.ScolnicovandL.Brisson(eds.),Plato’sLaws:FromTheoryintoPractice.ProceedingsoftheSixthSymposiumPlatonicum(pp.87–97).SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.Sachs,D.(1963).“AFallacyinPlato’sRepublic.”PhilosophicalReview,72,141–58.Samaras,T.(2002).PlatoonDemocracy.NewYork:PeterLang.Schofield,M.(1999).“TheDisappearingPhilosopher-King.”InM.Schofield,SavingtheCity:Philosopher-KingsandOtherClassicalParadigms(pp.31–50).LondonandNewYork:Routledge.——.(2003).“ReligionandPhilosophyintheLaws.”InS.ScolnicovandL.Brisson(eds.),Plato’sLaws:FromTheoryintoPractice.ProceedingsoftheSixthSymposiumPlatonicum(pp.1–13).SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.Sprague,R.K.(1976).Plato’sPhilosopher-King:AStudyoftheTheoreticalBackground.Columbia,SC:UniversityofSouthCarolinaPress.Stalley,R.F.(1994).“PersuasioninPlato’sLaws.”HistoryofPoliticalThought,15,157–77.Strauss,L.(1987).“Plato”.InJ.CropseyandL.Strauss(eds.),HistoryofPoliticalPhilosophy.3rdedn.Chicago:Rand-McNally.(Originalworkpublished1963.)190ACTC1019020/03/2006,04:03PM\nplato’spoliticalphilosophyWaldron,J.(1995).“WhatPlatoWouldAllow”.InI.ShapiroandJ.WagnerDeCew(eds.),TheoryandPractice(=Nomos37).NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.Wallach,J.R.(2001).ThePlatonicPoliticalArt:AStudyofCriticalReasonandDemocracy.UniversityPark,Pa.:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress.Williams,B.(1973).“TheAnalogyoftheCityandSoulinPlato’sRepublic.”InE.N.Lee,A.P.D.Mourelatos,andR.Rorty(eds.),ExegesisandArgument(pp.196–206).NewYork:HumanitiesPress.FurtherReadingBenardete,S.(1984).TheBeingoftheBeautiful:Plato’sTheaetetus,Sophist,andStatesman.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.——.(1989).Socrates’sSecondSailing:OnPlato’sRepublic.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Burnyeat,M.F.(1992).“UtopiaandFantasy:ThePracticabilityofPlato’sIdeallyJustCity.”InJ.HopkinsandA.Savile(eds.),Psychoanalysis,MindandArt:PerspectivesonRichardWollheim(pp.175–87).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Morrow,G.R.(1960).Plato’sCretanCity:AHistoricalInterpretationoftheLaws.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Rosen,S.(1995).Plato’sStatesman:TheWebofPolitics.NewHaven,Conn.:YaleUniversityPress.Saunders,T.(1991).Plato’sPenalCode:Tradition,Controversy,andReforminGreekPenology.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Strauss,L.(1975).TheArgumentandtheActionofPlato’sLaws.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Tuana,N.(ed.).(1994).FeministInterpretationsofPlato.UniversityPark,Pa.:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress.Vlastos,G.(1977).“TheTheoryofSocialJusticeinPlato’sRepublic.”InH.F.North(ed.),InterpretationsofPlato(=Mnemosynesuppl.vol.50)(pp.1–40).Repr.inG.Vlastos,StudiesinGreekphilosophy.vol.2:Socrates,Plato,andtheirTradition(pp.69–103)(D.W.Grahamed.).Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Yunis,H.(1996).TamingDemocracy:ModelsofPoliticalRhetoricinClassicalAthens.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.191ACTC1019120/03/2006,04:03PM\nnoburunotomi11Plato’sMetaphysicsandDialecticNOBURUNOTOMIDidPlatodoMetaphysics?Platoisoftenadmiredorattackedasachampionofmetaphysics.Whatisthepowerofhisthinkingthatfascinatesphilosophersandmakesthemresist?Plato’sphilosophyhaslongbeenstimulatingphilosophicalspirits,andhastherebyframedtheWesterntraditionofmetaphysics.Metaphysics,inturn,becameacentralthemeinPlatonicstudies.Thisthemeismoredifficulttodealwiththanonemightsuppose,however,sincePlatohimselfneverdescribeshisownprojectas“metaphysics,”asLeibniz,Kant,andHeidegger,forinstance,do.DiscussingPlato’smetaphysicsinevitablyraisesthequestionofwhatphilosophyis.ButthisquestionisexactlywhatPlatoinvitesus,readersofhisdialogues,toconsider,soastoengageinphilosophywithhim.Hereweshouldnottakemetaphysicsforgranted,norshouldweprojectourmoderncon-ceptionontoPlato.Instead,thischapterwillinvestigateabasicquestion:didPlatodometaphysics,andifso,inwhatway?Forthisquestionis,Ibelieve,crucialtotheunderstandingofPlato’smetaphysicalimpact.Letusbeginbylookingbrieflyatthemeaningofmetaphysics.Platowasclearlyinnocentofthespecificareaofphilosophycalled“metaphysics.”Thisconceptwasbornlater,atearliestwhenhispupilAristotlewroteasetoftreatisesorlecturenotes,whichwerethreecenturieslatereditedandentitledTametataphusika(whichmeanswhatcomesafterthetreatisesonnaturalthings,i.e.physics).Thelatertraditionreinterpretedthistitleasdealingwithwhatisbeyond(meta)naturalthings.InthosetreatisesAristotlediscusses“beingasbeing”withitsfocuson“substance”(theprimarybeing),andthegod(s)asthefirstprinciple,whichexistsbeyondnaturalthings.Hecallsthis“firstphilosophy,”incontrasttophysics,whichdealswiththingschangingintimeandspace(seeM.L.Gill,firstphilosophyinaristotle,inthisvolume).MetaphysicswasestablishedonthebasisofwhatAristotleinheritedfromPlato,althoughinsomerespectsAristotleclearlydepartedfromPlatonicthinking.Forwhiletheseparationofthetwodomains–theunchangingprinciplesandthechangingorchangeablethings–originatesinPlato,Aristotledrasticallyalterstheirontologicalstatus.Thetitle“Plato’smetaphysics”is,strictlyspeaking,notonlyanachronisticbutalsomisleadinginasense,sincewefindnoindependenttreatiseinPlatothatdealswithmetaphysics.TheAristoteliandivisionofphilosophyhardlyappliestoPlato’sworks,whichareallgivenindialogueform.Eachdialoguetreatsmultipleissuesinasinglelineofconversation.TheRepublic,forexample,startswiththemundanetopicof192ACTC1119220/03/2006,04:03PM\nplato’smetaphysicsanddialecticsenility,andthenraisesethicalproblemsconcerningjusticeandlooksforadefinitionofit.Thedialoguealsocoverspolitics,education,literarycriticism,sociology,psycho-logy,ontology,epistemology,andsciences.Allthesetopicsarecloselyinterconnectedwitheachother,sothatitisalmostimpossibletosingleoneout.Attheclimaxofthedialogue,however,comeswhatwemightcallmetaphysics:Socratesintroducesatheorythatpositsthingsinthemselves,namely,beautyitself,justiceitself,andgoodnessitself.Thesearecalled“forms,”andtheargumentsforformshavetraditionallybeentreatedunderthenameofPlato’stheoryofforms(inthischapter,Iusetheword“form”asrepresentativeoftherelatedvocabularyincluding“idea”;“Form”withtheinitialcapitalletterFisoftenusedforPlato,incontrastwithAristotelianorSocratic“form,”butthisisasheerconventionofsomemodernscholarship).Despitetheriskofanachronism,therearealsogoodreasons,bothhistoricalandphilosophical,fordiscussingPlato’smetaphysics;forbasedonAristotle’sreport,thetheoryofformshastraditionallybeenrecognizedasthat.Thetheoryofformsandthelivingdialoguecreateatension,whichculminatesinthephilosophicalmethodcalled“dialectic,”andinthistensionliestheessenceofPlato’smetaphysicalthinking.InthischapterIwilldemonstratehowthetensionbetweenthetwoilluminateswhatPlato’smetaphysicsis,orratherwhatmetaphysicscanbeforPlato.Aristotle’sAccountofPlato’sTheoryofFormsAsamemberofPlato’sAcademyfromhisyouth,Aristotlewasfamiliarwiththebasicthinkingaboutforms.ItisAristotle,aseverecritic,whoframedourviewon“Plato’smetaphysics.”EspeciallythefirstbookoftheMetaphysics,indealingwiththehistoryofphilosophy,summarizesPlato’sposition(A.6;similaraccountsaregivenatM.4,1078b12–17,andM.9,1086a32–b13).SoletusobservewhatAristotlepresentsthereasthekernelofhismaster’sthought.Aristotleintroducesandcriticallyexaminestheviewsofhispredecessors,fromThalestoPlato,onfirstprinciples.Theydiscoveredonlyoneorafewofthefourcauses,namely,material,formal,efficient,andfinalcauses,whileAristotlesucceedsinfindingallthefour.AristotleturnstoPlatoafterexaminingthePythagoreans,whobelievedthatnumbersaretheprinciplesofallthings(A.5).HereIintroducethefirstthreesectionsofA.6,whicharemostrelevanttoourargument.Thefirstsection(987a29–b14)startswithacommentconnectingPlatotothePythagoreans:hebasicallyfollowedthembutwithtwoimportantdepartures.InhisyouthhelearnedHeracliteanismfromCratylusandmaintaineditsdoctrineevenatalaterstage,that“allsensiblethingsareeverinastateoffluxandthereisnoknow-ledgeaboutthem.”Moreover,PlatoadoptedSocrates’methodofseekinguniversalsthroughdefinition:Platoacceptedhis(sc.Socrates’)teaching,butheldthattheproblemappliednottoanysensiblethingbuttoentitiesofanotherkind–forthisreason,thatthecommondefinitioncouldnotbeadefinitionofanysensiblething,astheywerealwayschanging.Thingsofthisothersort,then,hecalledforms,andsensiblethings,hesaid,wereapartfromthese,andwereallcalledafterthese;forthemultitudeofthingswhichhavethesamenameas193ACTC1119320/03/2006,04:03PM\nnoburunotomitheformexistbyparticipationinit.Onlythename“participation”wasnew;forthePythagoreanssaythatthingsexistbyimitationofnumbers,andPlatosaystheyexistbyparticipation,changingthename.(Met.A.6,987b4–13)Threefactors–Heracliteanism,Socrates,andPythagoreanism–aresaidtoshapePlato’sbasicthoughts:first,sensiblethingsarealwayschangingandcanneverbegraspedbyknowledge;second,unchangingformsexistseparatelyastheobjectsofuniversaldefinitionandofknowledge;third,sensiblethingsexistbyparticipatingintheforms.ThisaccounthasbecomethestandardunderstandingofPlato’stheoryoftranscendentforms,butatthesametimewemustkeepinmindthatthisquasi-historicalaccountismadetofitAristotle’sownphilosophicalscheme.Socrates’philosophyshowsprimaryinfluence,especiallyinthosedialogueswhereSocratesasksaboutmoralproperties,“Whatisit?”(tiestin)andseeksdefinitions,withmostinquiriesendinginaporia.ManymodernscholarstakethisphilosophicalactivitytobecomethestartingpointforPlato:hetriestoanswerthisdifficultquestionbyproposingforms.Formsareneverchangingandcanthereforebeobjectsofuniversaldefinition.Actually,theEuthyphro,oneoftheearlierdialogues,whichexaminespiety,usestheword“form”(idea,eidos)fortheobjectsofdefinition(5d,6d–e).Socratesaskshisinterlocutortostatetheformitself:bylookinguponthatformitselfandusingitasamodel,oneissupposedtobeabletoexplainwhyanypiousactionispious.Similarly,theLysisintroduces“thefirstfriend,thatforthesakeofwhichwesaythatalltherestarefriendstoo”(219c–d).Theseexpressionsindicatethatthenotionof“form”developsfromthesingleobjectfordefinitionrequiredbytheSocraticquestion.How-ever,theydonotindicateontologicalseparationortranscendence,forwhichotherfactorsareneeded(cf.Allen,1970).AsfortheHeracliteaninfluence,Aristotle’saccountisoftendoubtedbecausethefluxtheoryshowsscarcelyatraceattheearlierstage.Also,itbecomesthetargetofseverecriticismlaterintheTheaetetus,althoughitisdisputed(sinceantiquity;cf.Sedley,1996)whatmessageshouldbedrawnfromthiscriticism:thefluxtheorymayeitherremainvalidwithinthesensibleworld,orberejectedasinvalidaltogether(cf.Burnyeat,1990).Aristotle’saccountseemstobecommittedtothefirstoption.Next,apartfromthetwocoresofPythagoreanism,namely,transmigrationofthesoul(apparentintheGorgias,Phaedo,Phaedrus,andelsewhere)andgeneralinterestinmathematicsandnumbers(intheRepublicandTimaeus,inparticular),itisunclearhowdeepthePythagoreaninfluenceonPlatois.DespiteAristotle’sreport,therelationbetweensensiblesandformsdoesnotnecessarilycorrespondtothatbetweenthingsandnumbers,sincethePythagoreansoftenequatethingswithnumbers(ratherthanseparatingthem).AristotlegivesprioritytoPythagoreanismbecausesuchanexpositionwasfashionableintheAcademy(certainlyonPlato’sinitiative);theessenceofPlato’sphilosophywascastbacktovariousandoftenvaguePythagoreanorigins.Thus,Aristotle’saccount,thoughitmaysoundauthoritative,presentsPlato’stheoryasheunderstandsit.FortheoriginsofPlato’stheory,wemusttakeatleasttwomoreimportantfactorsintoaccount,namely,ParmenidesandProtagoras,whoseomissionbetraysthedefectsofAristotle’saccountashistorical.ParmenidesisnodoubtapredecessormostimportantforPlato,astestifiedintheParmenides(mainspeaker)andSophist(target194ACTC1119420/03/2006,04:03PM\nplato’smetaphysicsanddialecticofexamination).Parmenidesarguedthatthereisoneabsolutebeing,whichallowsneitherpluralitynoranychangeintimeandspace.Plato’scharacterizationofthetranscendentformsreflectstheonebeingofParmenides.Separationofformsfromsensiblesmustcomefrom,oratleastbebasedon,theParmenideandistinctionbetweentheunchangedbeingandmanychangingappearances.Ontheotherhand,thefamoussophistProtagorasremainsachiefantagonistforPlato.ConnectedwiththeHeracliteanfluxtheory,ProtagoreanrelativismisformallyrejectedintheTheaetetus:theequationofappearancewithrealityandofopinionwithknowledgeistoberepudiated(inmyview,however,ProtagoreanismcontinuestobeamajortargetintheSophist).Inthenextsection,AristotleaddsPlato’sviewonmathematics:Further,besidessensiblethingsandformshesaystherearetheobjectsofmathematics,whichoccupyanintermediateposition,differingfromsensiblethingsinbeingeternalandunchangeable,andfromformsinthattherearemanyalike,whiletheformitselfisineachcaseunique.(Met.A.6,987b14–18)Clearasthestatementis,itiscontroversialwhetherPlatoadmitsanintermediateontologicalstatusformathematicalobjects,suchasnumbersandgeometricalfigures.TheonlydirecttreatmentofthemappearsintheSimileoftheLineintheRepublic(VI,510b–511e),buttherePlato’swordsareambivalentandbewilderinterpreters.Manymodernscholarsareinclinedtodenytheirindependentstatusintermediatebetweenformsandsensibles.Aristotle’saccountmaybehisowninterpretationandresponsetowhatPlatoputsasadifficultytobeconsidered(cf.Burnyeat,1987).Then,inthethirdsection,Aristotleproceedstoanaccountofthecompositionofforms.Beforeexaminingthissection,letusseetheconclusionAristotledrawsfromtheaccount:concerningthefirstprinciples,Platousesonlytwoofthefour,namely,formalandmaterialcauses.Thus,AristotleformulatesPlato’smetaphysicsintermsofhisownschemeof“formandmatter,”whichthemselvesarethemajorlegacyofPlato’smetaphysics.Atthesametimethemetaphysicalsystemgivenhereleavesmanyissuesopen.Infact,Aristotlehimselfreportsitsopenness:“Butwhattheparticipationortheimitationoftheformscouldbetheyleftforourcommoninquiry”(987b13–14).ThetheoryofformswasathemetobediscussedinasharedresearchprojectintheAcademy.TheUnwrittenDoctrinesInthethirdsection,Aristotle’sformalaccountcruciallydiffersfromwhatweseeinPlato’sowndialogues:Sincetheformsarethecausesofallotherthings,hethoughttheirelementsweretheelementsofallthings.Asmatter,thegreatandthesmallwereprinciples;assubstance,theone;forfromthegreatandthesmall,byparticipationintheone,comethenumbers(ortheforms).(987b18–22)Theoneisnotanaturalnumber;theGreeksusuallybegintocountnumberfromtwo,whereasoneistheunitofnumbers.Itistheultimateformalprinciple,fromwhich195ACTC1119520/03/2006,04:03PM\nnoburunotominumbersandformscometobe.Ontheotherhand,“thegreatandthesmall,”else-wherecalled“theindefinitedyad,”isregardedasthematerialprinciplethatacceptsformalcharacters.Thisreport,however,hasnoclearequivalentinPlato.Inseveralplaces,Aristotlepresentsthisfundamentaltheory,orwhathesometimescalls“theUnwrittenDoctrines”(agraphadogmata)(Phys.IV.2,209b14–15),whosecontentswerealsohintedatbyseveralancientauthors.AnaturalconjectureisthatPlatodiscussedsuchideaswithhiscolleaguesintheAcademy,whoheard,interpreted,andcriticizedthemashismetaphysicaldoctrines.AlthoughlittleisknownaboutPlato’sactivitiesintheAcademy,afamousepisodeisrecordedbyAristoxenus,apupilofAristotle.OncePlatoannouncedthathewouldgivealecture“OntheGood,”andpeoplegatheredinexpectationtohearaboutordinarygoodthings,suchaswealth,health,andhappiness.Theirexpectationwassoondashed,however,sincePlatodiscussedonlymathematics,andconcludedthatgoodisone.Hearingthis,peopleweregreatlydisappointed.Thensomescornedtheaffairandotherscriticizedit(Harm.II,30–31).WhentheNeoplatonists,beginningwithPlotinus,deepenedPlato’sontology,theyusedthesematerialsassupplementarytothedialogues.Suchfundamentalprinciplesastheoneandtheindefinitedyadfittheirhierarchicalsystematizationofbeings:thesupremegood(identicalwiththeone)isthefundamentalprinciple,fromwhichallbeingssuccessivelyemanate.HereweshouldbearinmindthatmostPlatonists(afterMiddlePlatonism)mademuchuseofAristotleintheirinterpretationofPlato.ThewayAristotleunderstandsPlato’smetaphysics,includingtheoraltradition,wasdeeplyimplantedinthePlatonisttradition.(SeeBrissonandPradeau,plotinus,andHoffmann,whatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?,inthisvolume.)Thefragmentarystateoftheevidencemakesitdifficulttoreconstructexactlywhatthedoctrinesare.Inthesearchforcluesinthedialogues,somescholars,relyingonAristotle’sidentificationofthesecondkind,the“unlimited,”withthedyad(Phys.III.6,206b27–28),suggestthatthedoctrinescorrespondtotheontologicaldivisionofallthingsintofourkindsinthePhilebus(23c–27c):limit,unlimited(apeiron),themixtureofthetwo,andthecauseofthemixture.Inaddition,theNeoplatonistsemphasizedthetranscendenceoftheformofthegood,expressedas“beyondbeing”intheSimileoftheSunintheRepublic(VI,509b),andsoughtitsproofsinthelaterdialogues,especiallytheSophistandtheParmenides.Modernscholarship,especiallyGermanphilologysincethenineteenthcentury,focusedexclusivelyonthedialogues,andtendedtoignoretheoraltraditionasunreli-ableorirrelevant.Againstthis,scholarsofTübingenUniversity,startinginthe1960s,begantoadvocateanewesotericism.TheyseektheessenceofPlato’smetaphysicsintheindirecttradition,whiletheydowngradethedialogues,takingthemeaningof“unwritten”toindicatePlato’sintentionaldecisionnottoputhisfundamentaldoctrinesinthewrittendocuments(theyappeal,controversially,tohiscriticismofwrittenspeechesatPhdr.274b–278bandEp.VII,341a–345c).AssumingthatPlatoheldarigidsystemofmetaphysicaldoctrines,theytrytouncoverthehiddenmeaningsinthewritings.TheypushinanesotericwaythestrongtemptationsinceAristotletoseeametaphysicalsysteminPlato’sthinking.YettheUnwrittenDoctrinesmightwellbehisseminalideasorsuggestionsforfurtherinquiry.196ACTC1119620/03/2006,04:03PM\nplato’smetaphysicsanddialecticItseemsnecessarytotaketheindirecttestimonyintoaccount,butthatshouldnotleadtotheextreme.WhilePlatowaswellawareofthedangerofblindlytrustinginwrittenwords(whichisopposedtophilosophyasone’sownthinkingandsharedresearch),thisbynomeansimpliesthatheneverputshisfundamentalthoughtsinhiswritings.ThedialoguesremainthemainsourceforourunderstandingofPlato’smetaphysics.AnalyticalandDialogicalReadingsInadditiontothetensionbetweensystematicformulationandlivelythinking,thereisanotherkindoftensionwithinscholarlyapproachestothedialogues,betweenana-lyticalargumentanddialogicalreading.Sincethesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,analyticinterpretationofPlatohasflourished.ThemostfamousanalysisappearedinGregoryVlastos’articlein1954,“TheThirdManArgumentintheParmenides.”Vlastosformulatesinaclear,analyticalfashionthehiddenassumptionsthatyieldanundesirableinfiniteregressinthefirstpartoftheParmenides:“Isupposeyouthinkthereisoneformineachcaseonthefollowingground:when-eversomenumberofthingsseemtoyoutobelarge,perhapsthereseemstobesomeonecharacter,thesameasyoulookatthemall,andfromthatyouconcludethatthelargeisone.”“That’strue,”hesaid.“Whataboutthelargeitselfandtheotherlargethings?Ifyoulookatthemallinthesamewaywiththesoul’seye,someonelargeagainappears,bywhichalltheseappearlarge?”“Itseemsso.”“Soanotherformoflargenesswillmakeitsappearance,whichhasemergedalongsidelargenessitselfandthethingsthatpartakeofit,andinturnanotheroverallthese,bywhichallofthemwillbelarge.Eachofyourformswillnolongerbeone,butunlimitedinmultitude.”(132a–b)Vlastosextractsfromthisbrieftexttwopremisesthatcontradicteachotherwhenputsidebyside.Thefirstpremiseiswhathecallstheself-predicationassumption:“AnyFormcanbepredicatedofitself.Largenessisitselflarge.F-nessisitselfF.”Thesecondisthenon-identityassumption:“Ifanythinghasacertaincharacter,itcannotbeidenticalwiththeForminvirtueofwhichweapprehendthatcharacter.IfxisF,xcannotbeidenticalwithF-ness.”Thesepremisesaresobasicandsoindis-pensableforPlato’stheoryofformsthatanycontradictionbetweenthemcausesalogicalconsequencefataltothetheory.ConcludingthatPlatocannotavoidthisconsequence,Vlastospraiseshishonestyasaphilosopherinadmittingperplexitiesinhisownthought.Scholarswerestimulatedtorespondtothisprovocativethesisoverdecades.SomeagreedwithVlastosthatthecontradictionisinevitableandthatPlatomusthaveabandonedhisowntheoryoftranscendentformsaftertheParmenides(the197ACTC1119720/03/2006,04:03PM\nnoburunotomi“developmentalist”view),whileotherstriedtoremovetheallegedcontradictionandsawbasicallythesametheoryinthelaterdialogues(“unitarian”).Manyscholarswerekeenonfindingfaultwithself-predication,whichappearsinseveraldialoguesfromearlytolate(e.g.Prt.330c–e,Sph.255a–b).Aself-predicativesentence,suchas“largenessitselfislarge,”maylookoddinlightofthemodernnotionofpredication,butPlatoobviouslyholdsthattheexpression“islarge”canproperlybesaidinaprimarywayoftheformlargenessandthenofmanysensiblethingsinaderivativeway(cf.Phd.100c).Itishighlyquestionablewhethertheverb“tobe”inPlato,hereorelsewhere,isthoroughlyanalyzableintermsofthemoderndistinctionbetweenidentity,predication,andexistence(orbetweencompleteandincompleteuses).Ifitcannotbe,wemustseekanotherwaytounderstandPlato’sargument.Vlastos’analyticalreading,whichinspiresandprovokesphilosophicalresponses,hasmuchincommonwithAristotle’sreading.Infact,thecatchword“theThirdManArgument”comesfromAristotle’sreport,whichusestheformofman(SE22,178b36–179a10),butnotfromPlato’sownargument.Infact,theGreektext–theconversationbetweenParmenides(questioner)andSocrates(respondent)–allowsalternativereadings,whichmayleadtodifferentlinesofinterpretation.Forexample,thetwophrasesitalicizedintheabovequotationallowdifferentrenderings:“eachformisone/againwon’tsomeonethingappearlarge”;thesemayfittheircontextmore(cf.Gill,1996).Plato’stextcontainsfarricherpossibilitiesthanVlastos’verdict.AnalyticphilosopherssharetheassumptionthattheycanextractargumentsfromthedialoguetoreconstructPlato’stheory.Forthatpurpose,theynormallyidentifythemainspeaker–Socrates,theEleaticvisitor,ortheAthenianvisitor–withtheauthorPlato.However,thiswayofreadingthedialoguesisnowunderfire.Somecriticalreactionsandalternativeapproacheshavebeenproposedoverthepastfewdecades.Theyreconsiderthedialogueform,inwhichPlatoputshisphilosophicalthinking,andemphasizethedramaticcharacters,contexts,andmodesofdiscourse.Eachdialogueshouldbereadasawhole,notanypartinisolation.Theypointoutthecosttheana-lyticalapproachpaysbyabstractingfromPlato’sargument.(SeeC.Gill,theplatonicdialogue,inthisvolume.)Usingvariousmethods(occasionallycontrarytoeachother),thenewtrendsometimesgoessofarastodenythepossibilityofseeingany“argument”inPlato’sdialogues.Thetendencytoavoid“philosophical”parts,especiallythoseconcerningtheforms,isnoticeableintheliteraryreading.WeshouldrememberthattheAnalyticmethodisvalidandstimulatingwhereverthelogicofargumentsistobeclarified.Accordingly,theDialogicalreadingshouldbepursuedincombinationwithanalysisofphilosophicalarguments.Analyticalinterpretersrecentlytakemoreaccountofcontextandmode.Forexample,whiletheThirdManArgumentusedtobetreatedinisolation,recentstudiesplacetheargumentwithinthewholedialogue,especiallyinconnectionwiththesecondpartofthedialogue(Gill,1996;Meinwald,1991).Also,thesecondregressargument(Prm.132c–133a),whichisoftendeemedthesametypeasthefirst,isreconsideredinitscontextandshowntohaveadifferentargumentativestructure(Schofield,1996).Now,followingthedialogicalsuggestions,letusexaminehowparticularcontextsandmodesofdiscourseconveyPlato’smetaphysicalthinking.198ACTC1119820/03/2006,04:03PM\nplato’smetaphysicsanddialecticModesandContextsforPresentingtheFormsWefindseveralpassagesconcerningtranscendentformsinagroupofdialogues,namely,thePhaedo,Symposium,Republic,Phaedrus,andpossiblyCratylus.Theseareusuallycalledthemiddledialoguesbecausetheyshowsomecommonfeaturesasdistinctfromthoseoftheearlierandlaterones.Herewefaceadifficultquestion:howshouldwediscussthetheoryofforms,notfromAristotle’sviewpointoronhisProcrusteanbed,butastheoriginofandstimulusformetaphysicalthinking?Sinceeachdialogueisanindependentandself-containedwholelikeauniverse(afavoritemetaphoroftheNeoplatonists),weshouldcarefullyexaminevariousmodesandcontextsinwhichtheformsarepresented.First,thePhaedoisoftenregardedasthefirstdialoguethatpresentsthetranscendentforms.IndepictingthelastdayofSocrates’lifeinprison,hisdialogueconcerninghowphilosophersfacedeathappealstotheexistenceofforms,suchasjustice,beauty,andgoodnessthemselves(65dff.,whichweshalldiscussbelow).Ontheotherhand,theformsarereintroducedlaterinthedialogueasafresh“hypothesis”forthefinalproofofthesoul’simmortality(100b–107b).WhenSocrateshastoavoidthedeadlockcausedbytheseverecriticismagainstthepermanentexistenceofthesoul(86e–88b),hypothesisisadoptedasaphilosophicalmethod:positapropositionasahypothesis,andexaminewhetherotherpropositionsagreewithit;whenthehypothesisitselfneedsexplanation,hypothesizeahigherproposition(100a,101d–e).Thetranscendentformsarepositedinthefollowinghypothesis:“Ifthereisanythingbeautifulbesidesthebeautifulitself,itisbeautifulfornootherreasonthanthatitparticipatesinthatbeautiful,andIsaysowitheverything”(100c).Thishypothesisprovidesanexplanatoryschemeconcerninghowthingscometobe,passaway,andareinthisworld.WhenSimmias,whoislargeinrelationtoSocrates,becomessmallinrelationtoPhaedo,thelargenessthatSimmiashasinhimbyparticipatinginlargenessitself(oftencalled“immanentform,character”)isreplacedbysmallnessinhim.Amoresophisticatedtheoryfinallydemonstratestheimmortalityofthesoulbymeansoftheformoflife.Inthisway,theformsaredis-cussedindifferentpartsofthedialogue.Thefinalargumentleavesthemaspostulatesratherthanasproved.Next,theSymposiumdescribesasuccessionofencomiaonLovebytheparticipantsinaparty,whichculminatesinthespeechofSocrates.HepraisesLovebyrelatingthedialogueheoncehadwithamysticwomannamedDiotima(201d–212c).DiotimarevealedtoSocratesthetranscendentcharacterofbeautyitselfastheultimatemystery;theascentfrommanybodilybeautiestoeternalbeauty(209e–212a).Sheemphasizestheextremedifficultyinfollowingthiscourseandreachingtheultimateform.Heretheformisintentionallyintroducedinamodeutterlydifferentfromordinaryphilosophicalargumentorsoberproof.Then,theRepublicfirstintroducestheformswhenSocratesisobligedtodefendhisboldthesisthatthephilosophershouldbearulerortheruleraphilosopherintheidealstate.HisinterlocutorGlauconaskswhatthephilosopheris,andSocratesrepliesthatheisaloverofseeingthetruth.Truthconsistsinknowingtheforms:199ACTC1119920/03/2006,04:03PM\nnoburunotomi“Sincethebeautifulistheoppositeoftheugly,therearetwo.”“Ofcourse.”“Andsincetheyaretwo,eachisone?”“Igrantthatalso.”“Andthesameaccountistrueofthejustandtheunjust,thegoodandthebad,andalltheforms.Eachofthemisitselfone,butbecausetheymanifestthemselveseverywhereinassociationwithactions,bodies,andoneanother,eachofthemappearstobemany.”“That’sright.”(V,475e–476a)HereSocratesundertakestodistinguishbetweenknowledgeandopinionbyappealtotheirdifferentobjects(V,476a–480a).Knowledge,beingunfailinglytrue,dealswithwhatisalwaysthesame,whereasopinion,lyingbetweenknowledgeandignorance,dealswithmanythingsthatbothareandarenotsomethingatdifferenttimes,indifferentrespects,orfromdifferentpointsofview.Thisargumentappearstobestraight-forwardtomanyscholars,whouseitforthestandardinterpretationofthetheoryofforms.However,weshouldbemorecautiousaboutitscontext.Socrateshereintendstopersuadeasupposedopponentcalledaloverofsights,whodoesnotbelieveinthebeautifulitselfandotherformsasdistinctrealities,butseesmanybeautifulthingsonly.Glauconrepliesonbehalfoftheloverofsights,andSocratestriestopersuadehimtoadmittheexistenceofforms,startingfromordinaryexperienceswithoutassumingtheforms.Theargumentisclearlyintendedaspersuasion,oratleastconstitutesonlyanearlystageofthewholeprocessculminatingintheformofthegood.Thelaterstageputsforwardtheformofthegoodasthegreatestsubjectoflearningforthephilosopher-ruler.However,Socratesabruptlyconfesseshisignoranceofthegooditself,andaskspermissiontopresentsimiles(orimages):“ByZeus,Socrates,”Glauconsaid,“don’tdesertuswiththeendalmostinsight.We’llbesatisfiedifyoudiscussthegoodasyoudiscussedjustice,moderation,andtherest.”“That,myfriend,”Isaid,“wouldsatisfymetoo,butI’mafraidthatIwon’tbeuptoitandthatI’lldisgracemyselfandlookridiculousbytrying.Solet’sabandonthequestforwhatthegooditselfisforthetimebeing,foreventoarriveatmyownviewaboutitistoobigatopicforthediscussionwearenowstartedon.ButIamwillingtotellyouaboutwhatisapparentlyanoffspringofthegoodandmostlikeit.”(VI,506d–e)Thenheproposesthreesimilesinsuccession,namely,theSun,theLine,andtheCave,toilluminatewhattheformofthegoodislike.First,theformofthegoodiscomparedtoitsoffspring,thesun(VI,507a–509c);justasthesunmakesoursightpossibleinthesensibleworld,sothegoodisthecauseofknowledge,truth,andbeingintheintelligibleworld.Next,thelineproportionallydividedintofoursectionsrepresentsthedifferentstagesofourcognition(VI,509c–511e):imagingandbelief(inthesensibledomain),andthoughtandknowledge(intheintelligible).Finally,ourhumancondi-tioniscomparedtoalifedeepinsideacave(VII,514a–521b).Weareseatedfacingthe200ACTC1120020/03/2006,04:03PM\nplato’smetaphysicsanddialecticwall,onwhichvariousshadowsareprojectedfromthelightbehind.Weareusedtotakingthoseshadowstobereal,butoncereleasedandforcedtoturnourheadstotheback,wegetperplexedbutfinallybeholdthethingsthatcasttheshadows.Ascendingoutofthecaveandseeingtheoutsideworldcorrespondtoeducationtoseetheforms,aboveall,theformofthegood(thesunoutside),whiledescendingbackintothecavecorrespondstothephilosopher’sdutytoengageinpolitics.Thesubsequenteduca-tionalprogramofmathematicsanddialecticisdesignedtoredirectoursoul’seyefromordinaryexperiencesandtoleadusuptotheunderstandingofformsthemselves.Themetaphorofimageandmodel,representingtherelationbetweensensiblethingandintelligibleform,prevailsinthesimiles,whicharethemselvesimages.Theinterpreta-tionofthesesimilesisextremelydifficult,especiallyhowtheyrelatetoeachother.Forexample,thefourfolddivisionofthelineatfirstsightappearstocorrespondtothefourstagesinsideandoutsidethecave,butthereareseveraldetailsthatrefusesucheasymatching.Thethreesimilespresumablyillustratedifferentaspectsoftheformofthegood,whichresisttranslationintoastandardargumentoratheory.Thus,thepresen-tationofformsintheRepublicisagaincarefullysituatedinparticularcontexts,andPlatousesvariousmodesofpresentation.AnyattempttogeneralizePlato’stheoryofformsfromtheseargumentsrequiresextraordinarycaution.Finally,thePhaedrusshowscharacteristicsbothofthemiddleandthelaterdialogues;thegreatMythofthedestinyofoursouldepictstheworldoftranscendentforms(246a–257a),andthedialecticalmethodofdivisionandcollection,whichPlatousesinhislatedialogues,isformallyintroduced(tobeconsideredinthefinalsectionofthischapter).IntheMyth,thesoulislikenedto“thenaturalunionofateamofwingedhorsesandtheircharioteer.”ItmarcheswithZeusandothergodsinheaventoobservealltheforms,andfeastsonthem.Occasionallythesoul’ssteersmanlosescontrolofthebad-temperedhorse,sothatthesouleventuallyfallsdowntotheearth.Itswingsarewoundedinthefall.Fortheirrecovery,thesoulneedslove,torecollecttheformsthroughlookingatthetracesofthecelestialbeautyinthebelovedperson.Theformsarethusdescribedinthecosmic,divine,mystic,andethicalmythastheoriginalspherewhereoursoulaspirestoreturn.Oursurveyofthemainappearancesofformsinthemiddledialogueshasrevealedtheirpeculiarfeatures.Thetheoryofforms,thoughusuallyabstractedandinterpretedfromthesepassages,ispresentedinvariouscontextsandmodes,whichmaypreventusfromstraightforwardtreatment.Hypothesis,mysticreport,persuasion,simile,andmyth,allthesemodesseemtoindicatesomefundamentaldifficultiesintalkingaboutforms,andPlato’sawarenessofthem.Platomakesfulluseofthedialogueform,asappropriatediscourseforsuchwarning.ThemorecautiouslywelookatPlato’streatmentofforms,theharderwefindittodiscussthetheorydirectlyasphilosophicalargument.However,thisbynomeansimplies,assomeliteraryscholarssuggest,theinadequacyorimpossibilityofanattempttodiscussPlato’smetaphysicsortheoryofforms.Onthecontrary,howtospeakaboutformsisitselfamainissueforPlato’smetaphysics.Weshouldconsiderthesemodesandcontextsthemselvesashisseriousattemptsatmetaphysics.BymeansofthedialogueformPlatokeepswarningusnottotakeourphilosophicalattemptforgranted,butencouragesustoconsidertogetherwhatphilosophyis.201ACTC1120120/03/2006,04:03PM\nnoburunotomiMetaphysicalImpactasAwakeningOurSoulAcrucialquestioniswhyandhowPlatopositsformsasseparateandtranscendentreality.AfewsuggestionshavealreadybeengivenbyAristotle,whoascribeslogicalandepistemologicalmotivationstoPlato:toanswertheSocraticquestionforuniversaldefinitionandtomeettheconditionfortheobjectsofknowledge.Also,thestrictontologicalrequirementfortheonebeing,broachedbyParmenides,mayhaveshapedPlato’sframeofthought:oneformstandsovermanysensiblethings.However,thesearenotsufficienttoexplainPlato’svariousattemptstopresentformsinthedialogues.HereletussetaboutourownconsiderationbyfocusingonPlato’sexpressionsforformsandtheirethicalimplications.AlthoughentirelymissinginAristotle’saccountandmosttraditionalinterpretations,ethicalquestions,whichareinheritedfromSocrates,clearlymotivatedPlato.(Onthistopic,seealsoPenner,plato’sethics,inthisvolume.)Forthemainexamplesofformsconcernmoralproperties,suchasjustice,moderation,beauty(orfineness),andgoodness,whilemanyothersareintroducedchieflytoillustratethem.Plato’smainconcernliesinhowtolivewellasaphilosopher.LetusbeginbyexaminingPlato’sexpressionsforforms.Heusesseveralwords,namely,“form”(eidos),“idea”(idea),“shape”(morphE),and“kind”(genos),alongwithsuchphrasesas“thingitself”(auto),“itselfbyitself”(autokath’hauto),and“whatitis”(hoestin).ScholarsoftenclaimthatthisvarietyinvocabularyindicatesPlato’sinten-tiontoavoidfixingtechnicalterminology:tokeephisthinkingvividandliving,Platochoosesexpressionswithdifferentnuancesinaccordancewiththecontextsandstagesofdiscourse.Heemploysthetworepresentativeterms,“form”and“idea,”almostequivalently,whereasAristotletendstousethelatterinhiscriticismsofPlatoandtheformerasthepositiveconceptdenotingtheinternalstructureandessence,pairedwith“matter,”inhisownphilosophy.Ontheotherhand,sincetheword“idea”hasacquiredanewconnotationofbeingpresentinone’smind,particularlyinearlymodernphilosophy,manyscholarstendtoavoidunnecessaryconfusionbyavoidingtheword;forPlatohimselfclearlyrejectsthenotionthatformsresideinone’smindasthoughts(Prm.132b–c).ThecommonGreekwords,“form”and“idea,”havetheiretymologicaloriginin“seeing”(idein).WhydoesPlatousethewordsthatareoriginallylinkedwithvision?Visibleformsofthingsarewhatweencounterinourordinarylife:somethingappearstous,forexample,beautiful,large,andequal.Moreover,weexperiencecour-age,justice,goodnessandothermoralcharactersinparticularactionsorpersons.Forexample,inAchilles,amodelsoldier,weseecourage,andinOdysseuswisdom.Wemoldourownformoflifebylookinguponthosemoralcharactersasmodels.Byperformingcourageousactions,wemakeourselvescourageousandseenassuch.Yetvisiblecharacterssuffervariouschanges.Somethingappearsfineinacertainrespectatacertaintime,butthesamethingappearsnotfinesoonafterwardorinanotherrespect.Herethevarietyandinstabilityofsensiblethings,towhichPlatodrawsourattention,comprisesseveralkindsofchange:changeintimeandspace,differenceinrespects,relationtodifferentthings,andperspectiveofobservers.Althoughthephilo-sophicalmeaningsofthesequalificationsare,asscholarsrightlypointout,differentinkind,sensiblethingsareinanycaseboundtosuffersomeorallofthesedeficiencies,202ACTC1120220/03/2006,04:03PM\nplato’smetaphysicsanddialecticnevertoremainthesame.Theconflictingvisualappearancesfirstcauseconfusioninourcognition,buttheymayalsogenerateaskepticalattitudeindecidingwhatshouldbedoneinmoldingone’sowncharacter;forifacertaintypeofactionappearstobebothjustandnotjust,anyonewouldwonderwhetherthatshouldbeperformed.Seeingthissortofconfusionandmistrust,Protagoreanrelativismmayappealtous–thatthereisnosuchabsoluteentityasjusticeorgoodness,sinceeverythingisrelativetoobserversandcircumstances.Thisattitudeneveradmitstheabsolutestatusofthebeautiful,thejust,andthegoodbythemselves,butonlyseesmanybeautifulthings,whicharenotbeautifulaswell.Stayingintherealmofmanyvisiblethingskeepsusawayfromformingagoodlife.Weshouldtranscendthisdimensionofwhatnecessarilysuffers“isandisnot,”andturnoursoul’seyearoundtobeactivatedtobeholdanewdimensionofwhatalwaysandabsolutely“is.”Thatmeanstoadmitrealformsthatneversufferanychange,contradiction,restriction,orperspective(cf.Symp.210e–211b).Oncethetwodimen-sionsareseparated,itturnsoutthatvisiblethingsaregroundedin,andcausedby,theforms.The“forms”or“ideas”areseenwiththesoul’seye,thatis,byintellect,insteadofthephysicaleyes.Toseetheformsofbeauty,justice,goodness,andothersleadsus“tolivewell”(toeuzEn),afamousmottowhichSocratesadvocates(Cri.48b).Platoforthispurposeproposesthenewdimensionofabsoluteandeternalbeings,ascompletelyseparatedfromthesensibles.SeparationisthecentralfeatureofPlato’sforms,butatthesametimesupportsthetwoworldview,forwhichheisoftencriticizedbymodernphilosophers.Inordertoinvestigatehisethicalmotivationsfurther,letusconcentrateonthefirstpartofthePhaedo.ThecontextisSocrates’lastdialogueconcerninghisowndeath,thatis,hissoul’sdeparturetotheotherworld.Separationisindicated,perspicuouslyinthePhaedobutinotherdialoguesaswell,byadding“itself”(auto)toeachword:beautyitself,justiceitself,andsoforth.ThisisexactlywhatAristotleridicules:inhiscriticismofthetheoryofforms,hestatesthatadding“itself”doesnotmakeanydifferencetoeachthing,butonlyunnecessarilyduplicatesentities,suchas“man-itself”incontrastto“man”(cf.ENI.6,1096a34–b3,Met.Z.16,1040b32–34).ThiscriticismisrepeatedinthehistoryofphilosophyunderthenameofOckham’srazor.However,theemphaticword“itself”bearsapar-ticularsignificanceintheethicalargumentofthePhaedo.WhenSocratesadvocateshisthesisthattruephilosopherspracticeandwelcomedeath,hedefinesdeathinthefollowingway:“Bydeathdowenotmeansimplythedepartureofsoulfrombody?Beingdeadconsists,doesitnot,inthebodyhavingbeenpartedfromthesoulandcometobeitselfbyitself,andinthesoulhavingbeenpartedfromthebody,andbeingitselfbyitself(autEnkath’hautEn).Candeathpossiblybeanythingotherthanthat?”(64c;translationbasedonHackforth)Deathisthestateofthesoul’sbeingitselfbyitself,thatis,incompleteseparation.Separationmeansherepurification(katharsis)ofthesoulfromallbodilysensesanddesires,whichalwaysdivertourattentionfromthesoulanditsinquiryintotruebeings.Herethesoulandthebodyratherindicatetwooppositedirectionsofourlife:whereasthecareforthebodyconcernsonlyhowtoincreasewealth,fame,andwhat203ACTC1120320/03/2006,04:03PM\nnoburunotomibelongstous,thecareforthesoul(epimeleiatEspsuchEs)makesusasgoodaspossible(cf.Ap.29d–e).Thesoulisourownself(cf.Alc.1127d–133c),andtherefore,thesoul’sbeingitselfbyitselfconstitutesourtrulybeingourselves.Consequently,topracticeandwillinglyacceptdeathistocareforourownselfthroughseparationofthesoul(cf.Phd.107c,115b–e).Onlytheseparatedsoulperformsitsproperfunction,contemplation,freefromanybodilydisturbances.Thepurestateofcontemplation,calledwisdom(phronEsis,asdistinctfromtheAristotelianpracticalwisdom),concernsjustice,beauty,goodness,andthingsthemselvesbythemselves.Heretranscendentformsappearastheproperobjectsforthesoul.Toadmittheexistenceoftheformsistoadmitthatthesoul,orthetrueself,reallyexists.Althoughourordinarylifeiscontaminatedwithbodilydesiresandinclinations,thecontemplationoftheformswillrestoreourtrueself(asdepictedintheMythofthePhaedrus).WeshouldrememberthatinthePlatonisttraditiontheaimofhumanlifeistobecomelikeagodasmuchaspossible.ThedigressiononphilosophersinTheaetetus176a–bmostclearlypresentsthisview,butsomeotherdialoguescontainsimilarideas(e.g.,Rep.VI,500b–d;X,613a–b;cf.Sedley,1999;andinthisvolumeBetegh,greekphilosophyandreligion).Throughphilosophicaleffortstobeholdtheforms,wehumanbeingsstrivetoliveasgoodalifeaswecan.InthesubsequentsectionofthePhaedo,Socratesbuttressesthisethicalmotivationbythetheoryofrecollection(72e–77b).Sinceweseeequalthingsalsoappearingunequal,weareawarethattheyarealwaysdeficientinbeing,comparedwiththeequalitself.Recollectionistherecoveryofourprenatalknowledgeoftheformsthroughsenseperceptions.Formsarethefinalobjects,forwhichourlifeaspiresinphilosophicalinquiry(cf.Scott,1995,1999).Then,thecrucialconclusionisdrawnthatthepossib-ilityofthesoul’sbeingitselfbyitself(afterdeath)andtheexistenceoftheformsareequalnecessities:theystandorfalltogether(76d–77a).Followingthisparityassump-tion,thetworealmsofbeingsaresharplyseparated(78b–80b):thetruebeingsthatalwaysremainthesame,andthechangingthingsthatneverremainthesame.Whilethelatterarevisiblebysensation,theformerareinvisibleandcanbegraspedonlythroughpurereasoning.Thesouliscognatewiththeunchangingreality.Inthisway,theexistenceandseparationoftranscendentformsisoriginallyrequiredtoestablishourownselfasbeingreallywhatitis.Facingdeath,ortheultimateseparationofthesoul,Socrates’discourserevealstheseparaterealityascorrelativetohistrueself.Thisviewisfinallyconfirmedbythefinalproofofthesoul’simmortalityonthehypothesisthatusestheformoflife(105c–107a).Sincethesoulistheprincipleoflife,thegoodnessofthesoulmakesourlifebliss.Separatingrealityfromourordinaryexperienceisacontinuousprocessthatwillnotbecompleteuntildeath.Thephilosopher’slifeislivedinseekingforthisseparation.Similarly,recognizingformsisacontinuousmovementwemustexperience,frominsidethecaveoutintotherealworld.Inthismovement,weareourselveschangedtoseerealityfromdifferentviewpoints,andeventuallybeyondanyperspective.Shadowyvisioninthisworldistobetransformedintocorrectdiscernmentaccordingtotheforms(cf.Rep.VII,520c).IntheRepublic,philosopherswhobeholdtheformsarecomparedtopeopleawakeincontrasttotheloversofsightswhoaresleepingbuttakethemselvestobeawake(V,476c–d).Plato’smetaphysicsawakensusandurgesoursoultobeholdtruthand204ACTC1120420/03/2006,04:03PM\nplato’smetaphysicsanddialecticreality.Platoisthuschallengingus,hisreaders,andinvitesustothephilosophicaljourneyupwardsthroughdialogue.Hisdiscourseontheformsprovidesnotasystemofdoctrinestobeanalyzedandexplained,butmanifoldstimuliorcatalystsforourownthinkingtowardsreality.CriticismsoftheTheoryofFormsintheParmenidesVariouscontextsandmodesofdiscourseprovetobePlato’sdevicesfortakingus–thosewhowishtojoinhimindoingphilosophy–beyondourordinaryperspectiveinordertolivephilosophers’lives.Bycontrast,theParmenidesforthefirsttimepresentsthetheoryofformsinadirectwayandputsitundercriticalexamination.Thetensionbecomesobviousinthedialogueitself,betweenthediscoursedependentonparticularcontextsandtheargumentindependentofanyviewpoint.Itturnsoutthatthistension,representedintheParmenidesandlatercrystallizedas“dialectic,”istheessenceoftheimpactthatPlato’smetaphysicsproduces.Inanindirectreportoftheremotedialogue,Socratesinyouthproposestranscend-entformsasananswertotheone-manyproblem:howcanonethingbemany?InreplytoZeno’sparadoxicalargument,Socratesdeniesthatathing’sbeingbothoneandmanyisproblematic,ifitparticipatesinforms.ThegreatParmenidesthenrequestsclarificationofthistheoryfromSocrates,andeventuallyrefutesallhissuggestions.Theproposedformulaeconcerningtheformsremindusofthemiddledialogues,especiallythePhaedoandRepublic,andthismakesuswonderaboutPlato’sintention.Doesthistheoryproperlyrepresenthisownphilosophicaltheoryinthemiddledialogues?Ifso,howmuchvaliditydoParmenides’criticismshave?Doesthetheoryoftranscendentformscontainfatalproblemsthatforcethephilosophertoabandonormodifyitinthelaterdialogues?TowhatextentisPlatoawareofthoseproblems?If,ontheotherhand,theproposedtheoryisdifferentfromthatinthemiddledialogues,perhapsPlatoiscriticizingcertainmisunderstandingsofhisfollowers.Notwithstand-ingthedifficultiesthatSocratesconfronts,Parmenidesemphasizesthatformsmustexistifdialecticandphilosophyaretobepreserved,andurgestheinexperiencedSocratestoengagemoreindialecticalpractice(134e–135d).Scholars’interpretationsdiffersubstantiallyonhowtoseePlato’sphilosophicalcareer:positionsarenormallytakenbetweenunitarian,developmentalist,andsomewhereinbetween.ThefirstpartoftheParmenidesprovidesatestforanyinterpreterofPlato’sphilosophy.Herewecannoticethedialogue’speculiarmodeofpresentationthatclearlydiffersfromtheearlierones.TosubjecttheformstosystematictreatmentisaconspicuousschemeoftheParmenides.ThisnewmoderevealsPlato’smainconcerninthedialogue,namely,tobringthepreviousmodesintoquestion.Hiscriticalinvestigationaimsattwoissues:thescopeofformsandthemetaphoricalexpressionsforthem.ThefirstissueisraisedwhenParmenidesasksSocrateswhatformsthereare(130b–e).Thereisaformitselfbyitself,inthecaseoflikeness,justice,beauty,goodnessandotherthingsofthatsort.ButSocratesisuncertainwhethersubstanceslikehumanbeings,fire,andwaterhaveformsinthesameway.Finally,heconfidentlydeniestheexistenceofformsforhair,mud,dirt,andothersuchtrivialthings.Parmenides205ACTC1120520/03/2006,04:03PM\nnoburunotomicommentsthatSocrates’assuranceisduetohisyouth.HerethescopeofformsisexplicitlycalledintoquestionforthefirsttimeinPlato’sdialogues.BeforetheParmenides,differentkindsofformshavebeenproposed:moralproperties,physicalcharacters,mathematicalobjects,andartifacts.Eachcontextofdiscussionhasnaturallylimitedtherangeofforms,butonceproposedasatheory,thisthinkingmustbeelucidated.InRepublicX,whenSocratestriestodefineimitation,heappealstothetheoryofformsasusualprocedure:“Forweare,asyouknow,inthehabitofassumingthattheformwhichcorrespondstoagroupofparticulars,eachtoeach,isalwaysone,andinthatcasewecallthembythesamename(asthatoftheform).”(596a;translationbasedonSmith,1917)Asanillustration,Socratesusestheformsofbedandtable,atwhichcraftsmenlookinmakingphysicalbedsandtables;thosephysicalbedsandtablesare,inturn,imitatedbyartistsinpictures.Asimilarexample,theformofshuttleforweaving,appearsintheCratylus(389b–c).Yetonemaywonder,distancingoneselffromtheparticularcontextofdiscourse,inwhatwayformsofartifactscanexist.Infact,thekeypassagequotedaboveisoftenmisunderstoodasadmittingasingleformcorrespondingtoeverysingleword.Thenotionthateverythinghasaformisobviouslyabsurd,andcannotescapeOckham’srazor.ThisisthecontexttowhichthequestionabouttheextentofformsisdirectedintheParmenides.Inadditiontothestatusofmathematicalobjectsmentionedbefore,thelaterPlatonistshadtofaceanotherdifficultquestionofwhethernegativepropertieslikebadnessandnot-beingtrulyhaveforms(ratherthanbeingprivationsofpositiveforms)–Platooccasionallymentionssuchnegativeformsalongwithpositiveones(forexample,“ugly,unjust,bad”inRep.V,475e–476aquotedabove,p.200:for“not-being,”seethedelicatetreatmentintheSophist).TheParmenidesthusrevealsthetensionregard-ingformsbetweenparticulardiscourseandgeneraltheory.Thistensionpushesusforasharedphilosophicalinquiry,aspursuedintheAcademy.Also,Parmenides’criticismstargetthemetaphoricalexpressionsusedinthepreviousconsiderationofforms.Hefirstquestionsthekeyterm“participation”(methexis)ofsensiblethingsintheform(130e–131e).Ifmanythingsliterallytakepartinaform,doeseachhaveapartoftheformorthewholeofit?Ifapart,theformwillbedivisible;butifthewhole,thesingleformwillbepresentinmanyplacesatonce(buthow?).Thisargumentchallengesthecommonmetaphoricalexpressionfortherelationshipbetweenmanysensiblesandasingleform.Howtoanalyzethepart–wholerelationbecomesacentralphilosophicalissueinthelaterdialogues,beginningwiththesecondpartoftheParmenides(cf.Harte,2002).Theregressoflargeness(theso-calledThirdManArgument)nextariseswhenParmenidesexplainshowtoposittheform,intermsofseeing(132a–b,quotedabove,p.197);bylookingatmanylargethingsandlargenessitselftogetherwiththesoul’seye,wecanobserveanotherlargeness.Herethemetaphorofseeing,prevalentparticularlyintheRepublic,contributestotheundesirableregress.Also,thedistinctionbetweentranscendentandimmanentformsseemsdeliberatelyblurredinthefinalcriticism(133a–134e;cf.Fujisawa,1974).WhenthePhaedooriginallyputsforwardthevisiblecharacterthatparticipatesinthetranscendentform,206ACTC1120620/03/2006,04:03PM\nplato’smetaphysicsanddialecticexpressed,forexample,as“thesmallnessinSimmias”or“thesmallnessthatSimmiashas,”itsrelationshiptotheformisleftopen.Afterhypothesizingtheformwiththeword“participate”(metechein)(100c,quotedabove,p.199),Socratessays:“Isimply,naivelyandperhapsfoolishlyclingtothis,thatnothingelsemakesitbeautifulotherthanthepresence(parousia)of,orthesharing(koinOnia)in,orhoweveryoumaydescribeitsrelationshiptothatbeautifulwementioned,forIwillnotinsistontheprecisenatureoftherelationship,butthatallbeautifulthingsarebeautifulbythebeautiful.”(Phd.100d)Thestatusofimmanentformasdistinctfromtranscendentformraisescontroversy(cf.traditionalviewofDevereux,1994,againstFine,1984,1986).Somescholarssuggestthatthemoredevelopedaccountoftheontologicaltriadofmodel,receptacle,andimage,intheTimaeus,overcomesthisproblem.Furthermore,implicationsintheexpressions,“model”(paradeigma)and“itselfbyitself,”areputunderexamination.Parmenideselicitsanotherinfiniteregressfromthemodel–imagerelation(132c–133a:cf.Schofield,1996);thenhedemonstratesthatcompleteseparationendsinincommunicabilitybetweenthetworealms(133a–134e):ifthereisknowledgeitself,thatdivineknowledgeisnotconcernedwiththingsinourworld.Thus,Platomaybecriticallyexaminingthewayshehaspresentedforms.Althoughrichcontextsandmetaphoricalexpressionsinitiateusintointimatethinkingaboutforms,oncethatthinkingissubjectedtothecommongroundofphilosophicalargument,wecannotbutfaceliteraldifficulties.TheAcademyandtheLaterDevelopmentofDialecticPlato’smetaphysicsdevelopsinthelaterdialogues,drivenbythetensionbetweendynamicthinkinganduniversaltheory.Manyquestionsareleftopen,bywhichPlatoprovokes,besideshimselfinhislaterworks,subsequentphilosophers,beginningwithhispupilAristotle.Platoinvitesustorespond,notjusttolearnhisgreatsystem.ThetensionthathascometolightintheParmenidespromotesinquiryintwodirectionswhichsurelyinfluencedeachother:thephilosophicalactivitiesintheAcademyandPlato’slaterdevelopmentofdialectic.First,whetherthetargetofcriticismintheParmenidesisPlato’sowntheoryoritsinferiorimitations,theargumentobviouslyreflectsopendiscussionsandcriticismsofformsamonghisfellowresearchersintheAcademy.Surprisingly,hissuccessorsintheschool,SpeusippusandXenocrates,arereportedtohaveabandonedthetheoryofformsandinsteaddevelopedtheirownmetaphysicaltheories.Aristotlecriticizes,inhislostworkPeriIdeOn,fiveargumentsproposedtoprovetheexistenceofforms(includingtheThirdManArgument).TheyarebrieflymentionedinMetaphysicsA.9,990b8–17(alsoinM.4,1079a4–13)andsubstantiallydocumentedinacommentaryonitbyAlexanderofAphrodisias(cf.Owen,1957;Fine,1993).OfthoseargumentssomecanbetracedbacktoPlato’sownworks,butothersmayhavebeengivenbyotherPlatonists.Aristotle’scriticalattitudeindicatestheopenandlivelyatmosphereattheAcademy,inwhichPlato’sseminalideasonformswerescrutinizedanddeveloped207ACTC1120720/03/2006,04:03PM\nnoburunotomiintoauniversalunderstanding.ThecritiqueofformsadvancednotonlyPlato’sthink-ing,butmoreimportantly,thatofthecritics,especiallyAristotle.NowwecanclearlyseethatAristotle’sformulationofPlato’smetaphysicsishisowninterpretationofandresponsetohismaster.Thisimpactpromotesfurthercommonandlivelyargument,aimingforuniversaltruthandreality.Second,theshiftappearingintheParmenidesfromparticularmodesandcontextstomoregeneralargumentspointstothedevelopmentofPlato’smainphilosophicalmethod,namely,dialectic(whichmeanstheartorknowledgeofholdingdialogue).Theword“dialectic”(dialektikE)wasoriginallycoinedbyPlatooutoftheordinaryGreekverb“dialegesthai”(toengageindialogue),whichisapreferredmodeofphilo-sophicalinquiryforSocrates.Byaskingthequestion“Whatisavirtue?”andcross-examiningananswerer’sopinions,heinvolvespeopleinphilosophicalinquiry.Socraticdialogue,byusingdefinition,distinction,induction,andanalogy,clarifiestheissueandforcestheinterlocutorstoadmittheirownignorance.Plato’sdialecticis,ontheotherhand,aphilosophicalartofargumentation(logos)todealwithastructuredwholeofreality.Dialecticiansarethosewhohaveasynopticviewonallthings(Rep.VII,537c).Thisdemandforsystemandtotalityencouragesuniversalthinking,onepoleofthemetaphysicaltension.Theeducationalprogramofthephilosopher-rulerintheRepublicclaimsthatdialecticisthehighestknowledge,whichdealswithformsthroughformsthemselvesandendsinforms(VI,510b,511b–c).Nevertheless,thisnotionisnotfullydescribed,nordirectlyappliedtothatdialogue.Laterdialecticdevelopsmainlyinlogical,epistemological,andontologicaldirections.Forlogic,thesecondpartoftheParmenidesdemonstratesdialecticalexercisesthroughsystematicuseofhypothesisonalargescale.Itexaminesconsequencesfrombothpositiveandnegativehypotheses,andtrainsthereaderindetectingambiguities,logicalproblems,andproperwaysofargument.ThePhaedrusofficiallyintroducesthemethodsofcollectionanddivision–thatis,thesearchforacertainunityovermanythingsandtheproperdivisionofagenusintospecies,soastograsptheessenceofthings(265c–266c,273d–e).ThesemethodsareputtouseintheSophistandStatesmantodefine,throughdivision,theartsofasophist,astatesman,andaphilosopher.(Ondivisionanddefinitioninthelatedialogues,see,inthisvolume,Modrak,philosophyoflanguage,sec.onPlato.)Asthehighestknowledgeofthephilosopher,dialecticplaysadoublerole,astheSophistdemonstrates(253b–e;cf.Notomi,1999).Inadditiontopursuingproperdivi-sionofgenericformsintospecificformsfordefinition,itcandiscerntherelationshipbetweenforms,especiallythegreatestkinds,suchasbeing,sameness,andotherness.Formsparticipateinordifferfromeachother,tostructurethewholesphereofreality.Properdiscernmentoftheirrelationshipprovidesthebasisoftruthandknowledge.Also,theStatesman,inusingdialecticalargumentsfordefiningthestatesman,elucidatesthenecessityandimportanceofdialectic:discernmentofbasic“elements”notonlyexplicateseachparticularissue,butadvancesthedialecticalpracticeitself,whichcontributestotheunderstandingofallthings(285c–287a).Throughsuchargumentsasmightseemunimportant(e.g.,definitionoftheartofweaving),dialecticdisplaysitsgeneralapplicationinphilosophy.Finally,dialecticisontologicallyandcosmologicallysignificant.ThePhilebusproposesamorerefineddialecticalmethodtodealwiththeone-manyproblem.Itcertainly208ACTC1120820/03/2006,04:03PM\nplato’smetaphysicsanddialecticindicatesanewstageofconsiderationaboutforms(whichmanyscholarsregardnolongerasthetranscendentformsofthemiddledialogues,butasconceptsorclasses).ThecosmologyoftheTimaeus,comprisingtheform(model),thereceptacle,andtheimage,togetherwiththeworld-makinggodcalledtheDemiurge,reflectsthefourfoldontologicaldivisioninthePhilebus(mentionedabove).Thesehighlyexpertargumentsrepresentthelaterstageofdialectic.Wecanobservethatthetensionbetweenthelivelydialoguesandscientificdialecticcorrespondstothatbetweenlivingdiscourseinparticularcontextsandmodesontheonehand,andpureuniversalreasoningbeyondanyperspectiveontheother.Plato’sdialoguesawakenus,readers,andencourageustopracticeuniversalargument.Ifphilosophyisascentfromourperspectivalworldtotheuniversaltruth,thetensionembodiedinlaterdialecticistheessenceofPlato’smetaphysics.IfyouwishtoappreciatetheoffspringofPlato’smetaphysics,youcanvisitthegalleryofourcontemporaryinterpretations(somearementionedhereandseveralothersarelistedintheBibliography).Butinthatgallery,youmustyourselfbecomeanartistandproduceyourownworks.Thefinalproductshouldbeyourownformoflife,orthebeingofyourself.BibliographyWorksCitedandRelatedWorksAllen,R.E.(ed.).(1965).StudiesinPlato’sMetaphysics.London:Routledge&KeganPaul.——.(1970).Plato’s“Euthyphro”andtheEarlierTheoryofForms.London:Routledge&KeganPaul.——.(1997).Plato’sParmenides.RevisedEdition.TranslatedwithCommentary.NewHeaven,Conn.:YaleUniversityPress.Annas,J.(1999).PlatonicEthics:OldandNew.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.Burnyeat,M.F.(1987).“PlatonismandMathematics:APreludetoDiscussion.”InA.Graeser(ed.),MathematicsandMetaphysicsinAristotle(pp.213–40).BernandStuttgart:Haupt.——.(1990).“Introduction.”TheTheaetetusofPlato,withatranslationofPlato’sTheaetetusbyM.J.Levett,revisedbyM.F.Burnyeat.Indianapolis:Hackett.Cherniss,H.F.(1944).Aristotle’sCriticismofPlatoandtheAcademy.(vol.1).Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.——.(1957).“TheRelationoftheTimaeustoPlato’sLaterDialogues.”AmericanJournalofPhilology,78,225–66=inR.E.Allen(ed.),(1965)StudiesinPlato’sMetaphysics(pp.339–78).London:Routledge&KeganPaul.Cohen,S.M.(1971).“TheLogicoftheThirdMan.”PhilosophicalReview,80,448–75.Repr.inG.Fine(ed.),(1999)Plato.(vol.1):MetaphysicsandEpistemology(pp.275–97).Oxford:Ox-fordUniversityPress.Devereux,D.(1994).“SeparationandImmanenceinPlato’sTheoryofForms.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,12,63–90.Repr.inG.Fine(ed.),(1999)Plato.(vol.1):MetaphysicsandEpistemology(pp.192–214).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.——.(2003).“Plato:Metaphysics.”InC.Shields(ed.),TheBlackwellGuidetoAncientPhilosophy(pp.75–99).Oxford:Blackwell.Fine,G.(1984).“Separation.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,2,31–87.——.(1986).“Immanence.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,4,71–97.209ACTC1120920/03/2006,04:03PM\nnoburunotomi——.(1990).“KnowledgeandBeliefinRepublic5–7.”InS.Everson(ed.),CambridgeCompaniontoAncientThought.(vol.1):Epistemology(pp.85–115).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Repr.inG.Fine(ed.),(1999)Plato.vol.1:MetaphysicsandEpistemology(pp.215–46).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.——.(1993).OnIdeas:Aristotle’sCriticismofPlato’sTheoryofForms.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.——.(ed.).(1999a).Plato.(vol.1):MetaphysicsandEpistemology.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.——.(ed.).(1999b).Plato.(vol.2):Ethics,Politics,Religion,andtheSoul.Oxford:OxfordUniver-sityPress.——.(2003).PlatoonKnowledgeandForms.SelectedEssays.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Fujisawa,N.(1974).“Echein,Metechein,andIdiomsof‘Paradeigmatism’inPlato’sTheoryofForms.”Phronesis,19,30–58.Geach,P.T.(1956).“TheThirdManAgain.”PhilosophicalReview,65,72–82.Repr.inR.E.Allen(ed.),(1965)StudiesinPlato’sMetaphysics(pp.265–77).London:Routledge&KeganPaul.Gill,M.L.(1996).“Introduction.”InPlato,Parmenides.Trans.byM.L.GillandP.Ryan.Indianapolis,Ind.:Hackett.Hackforth,R.(1955).Plato’sPhaedo.TranslatedwithanIntroductionandCommentary.Cam-bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Harte,V.(2002).PlatoonPartsandWholes:TheMetaphysicsofStructure.Oxford:OxfordUniver-sityPress.Krämer,H.J.(1990).PlatoandtheFoundationsofMetaphysics.(ed.andtrans.J.R.Catan).Albany,NY:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Kraut,R.(ed.).(1992).TheCambridgeCompaniontoPlato.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Meinwald,C.C.(1991).Plato’sParmenides.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.——.(1992).“Good-byetotheThirdMan.”InR.Kraut(ed.),TheCambridgeCompaniontoPlato(pp.365–96).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Nehamas,A.(1975).“PlatoontheImperfectionoftheSensibleWorld.”AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly12,105–17.Repr.inG.Fine(ed.),(1999a)Plato.(vol.1):MetaphysicsandEpistemo-logy(pp.171–91).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Notomi,N.(1999).TheUnityofPlato’sSophist:BetweentheSophistandthePhilosopher.Cam-bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Owen,G.E.L.(1953).“ThePlaceoftheTimaeusinPlato’sDialogues.”ClassicalQuarterly,NS3,79–95.Repr.inR.E.Allen(ed.)(1965)StudiesinPlato’sMetaphysics(pp.313–38).London:Routledge&KeganPaul.AlsoinG.E.L.Owen,(1986)Logic,ScienceandDialectic:CollectedPapersinGreekPhilosophy(pp.65–84).(M.C.Nussbaum,ed.).Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.——.(1957).“AProofinthePeriIdeon.”JournalofHellenicStudies,77,103–11.Repr.inR.E.Allen(ed.)(1965)StudiesinPlato’sMetaphysics(pp.293–312).London:Routledge&KeganPaul.AlsoinG.E.L.Owen,(1986)Logic,ScienceandDialectic:CollectedPapersinGreekPhilosophy(pp.165–79).(M.C.Nussbaum,ed.).Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1986.Patterson,R.(1985).ImageandRealityinPlato’sMetaphysics.Indianapolis,Ind.:Hackett.Robinson,R.(1953).Plato’sEarlierDialectic.2ndedn.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Ross,W.D.(1924).Aristotle’sMetaphysics.ARevisedTextwithIntroductionandCommentary.(2vols.).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.——.(1951).Plato’sTheoryofIdeas.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Schofield,M.(1996).“LikenessandLikenessesintheParmenides.”InC.GillandM.M.McCabe(eds.),FormandArgumentinLatePlato(pp.49–77).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.210ACTC1121020/03/2006,04:03PM\nplato’smetaphysicsanddialecticScott,D.(1995).RecollectionandExperience:Plato’sTheoryofLearninganditsSuccessors.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(1999).“PlatonicRecollection.”InG.Fine(ed.),Plato.(vol.1):MetaphysicsandEpistemo-logy(pp.93–124).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Sedley,D.(1996).“ThreePlatonistInterpretationsoftheTheaetetus.”InC.GillandM.M.McCabe(eds.),FormandArgumentinLatePlato(pp.79–103).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.——.(1999).“TheIdealofGodlikeness.”InG.Fine(ed.),Plato.(vol.2):Ethics,Politics,Religion,andtheSoul.(pp.309–28).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Smith,J.A.(1917).“GeneralRelativeClausesinGreek”.ClassicalReview,31,69–71.Szlezák,T.A.(1999).ReadingPlato.(trans.G.Zanker).LondonandNewYork:Routledge.(Originalworkpublished1993.)Vlastos,G.(1954).“TheThirdManArgumentintheParmenides.”PhilosophicalReview63,pp.319–349.Repr.inR.E.Allen(ed.),(1965)StudiesinPlato’sMetaphysics(pp.231–61).London:Routledge&KeganPaul.——.(ed.).(1971).Plato:aCollectionofCriticalEssays(vol.1):MetaphysicsandEpistemology.GardenCity,NY:AnchorBooks.——.(1981).PlatonicStudies.2ndedn.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Wedberg,A.(1955).Plato’sPhilosophyofMathematics.Stockholm:Almquist&Wiksell.——.(1971).“TheTheoryofIdeas.”InG.Vlastos(ed.),Plato:ACollectionofCriticalEssays(vol.1):MetaphysicsandEpistemology(pp.28–52).GardenCity,NY:AnchorBooks.White,N.P.(1992).“Plato’sMetaphysicalEpistemology.”InR.Kraut(ed.),TheCambridgeCompaniontoPlato(pp.277–310).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.FurtherReadingForAristotle’sviewonPlato’stheoryofForms,seeRoss(1924),Cherniss(1944),Owen(1957),andFine(1993);thelasttwodealwithhisargumentsinthelostPeriIdeOnorOnIdeas.Analy-ticalargumentsarecollectedinAllen(ed.)(1965),Vlastos(ed.)(1971),andFine(ed.)(1999a).Forthecontroversyoverthe“ThirdManArgument,”seeVlastos(1954),Geach(1956),Cohen(1971),andMeinwald(1992)amongmany.MoregeneraltreatmentsoftheParmenidesaregiveninAllen(1997),Meinwald(1991),andGill(1996).ThetwomaincontributionsoftheTübingen-MilanoschoolaretranslatedintoEnglish:Krämer(1990)andSzlezák(1999).211ACTC1121120/03/2006,04:03PM\nlucbrisson12Plato’sNaturalPhilosophyandMetaphysicsLUCBRISSONPlato’spositionontheknowledgeofnaturehasbeenthesubjectofdivergentevalu-1ations.ManyscholarsbelievethatPlato’sinfluenceinthisareawasdisastrous,inthatthecentralhypothesishedefends,thatgenuinerealityisrepresentedbyintelligibleforms,ofwhichsensiblethingsaremereimages,leadsmoretometaphysicsandeventomysticismthantothestudyofnaturalphenomena(e.g.,Lloyd,1968,1991).Itmaybe,however,thatPlato’sprocedureofmakingmathematicsthemodelofknow-ledgeanddescribingthestabilitymanifestedinthesensibleworldinmathematicalterms,makeshimaprecursorofmodernscience(Brisson,2000).ThesetwocontradictorypositionscanbeexplainedbytheverystructureofPlato’sthought.Inthisregard,Iwouldliketodevelopthefollowingthreepositions:1.Platowantstoaccountforthesensibleworld,ataskthathadbeenattemptedbeforehimbythosewhowereinterestedinnature.2.Platowasdisappointedbytheconclusionsofhispredecessors:forexample,AnaxagorasinthePhaedo,andParmenidesandZenointheParmenides.3.Asaresultofthisdisappointment,Platoinauguratedmetaphysics;thisledhimtogobeyondnature,andsetforththehypothesisoftheFormsandofthesoul,butthegoalwasstilltoexplainnature.1.ThischapterwasalreadywrittenwhenIbecameawareofA.Gregory’s(2000)andT.K.Johansen’s(2004)books.Inbothcases,Idisagreeonthequestionof“teleology,”whichIbelieveconstitutesananachronism.ThequestionoftelosisexplicitinAristotle,butnotinPlato.PlatodoestalkaboutthegoodnessofthedemiurgeandthebeautyofhisproductatTi.28–30,andhesaysthatthegodmadeonechoiceratherthananother,becauseitwasbetterorbest(e.g.,75e),orbecauseitservedsomegoodpurpose(e.g.,eyelids45d).Butthedemiurgeisgoodbecauseheisagodwhoisalwaysdoingwhatisbest;andhisproductisbeautifulbecauseitistheimageofanintelligiblemodel.Thedemiurgechosetoorganizethecosmosmathematically–acosmoswhosestabilitywecangrasp–becauseusingmathematicswouldresultinagoodandbeautifulproduct,thebestthatcanbedonewithrecalcitrant“necessity,”andnotbecausehewasdrivenbyanAristotelianfinalcause.ThosewhointerprettheTimaeusteleologicallyarerightinaway,butsincetheyrelyonlyonteleologytheymisswhatistrulydistinctiveandimportantaboutPlato’sexplanations:theirmathematicalcomponent.212ACTC1221220/03/2006,04:04PM\nplato’snaturalphilosophyandmetaphysicsSuchaprocedureentailsatwo-stageexplanation.Inthefirststage,Platoborrowstheexplanationofnaturefromhispredecessors,althoughhethoroughlytransformsitbyassociatingtheelementswithgeometricalfigures.Inthesecondstage,hegoesbeyondnature,bybringinginthesoulandtheForms.GoingBeyondNatureinOrdertoExplainitThetermphusis(nature),anounofaction,bringstogetherthreenotions,origin,process,andresult–inotherwords,thegrowthofathinginitstotality,fromitsbirthuntilitsmaturityanddeath.Intheirwritings,towhichthetitlePeriphuseOswassubsequentlygiven,thinkerspriortoPlatoengagedininquiry(historia)notintothenatureofathinginparticular,butintothenatureofthetotalityofthings,thatis,theuniverse.Forthem,thepoint(atleastfromanAristotelianperspective)wastodiscoverthe“materialprinciple,”fromwhichallthingswereengendered.Inshort,priorto2Plato,wecannotreallyspeakof“metaphysics,”understoodasgoingbeyondnature,3sincenoneoftheattemptstoaccountfornaturegoesbeyondnature.YetPlatoshowshimselftobeunsatisfiedbytheseattempts.InthePhaedo,hecriticizesthepositionofAnaxagoras,which,inhisview,doesnotgofarenough.Socrates,whohasjustnarratedhowdisappointedhewasbyreadingAnaxagoras’book,andhowdiscouragedheisbytheexplanationssofarproposedofcausalityinnature–thatis,inthedomainofsensiblethings–explainswhyheisleaningtowardsthehypothesisoftheexistenceofintelligiblerealities(Phd.100c–d).InthefirstpartoftheParmenides,SocratesrespondstotheparadoxesencounteredbyParmenidesandZenointheiranalysisofthesensibleworld(Prm.127d–e),whicharealsodescribedinthesecondpartofthedialogue.Ifwesupposesuchastructure,thesecondpartoftheParmenidesisnotarandomrhapsodyofarguments,butacoherentsetofdeductionsfollowinganoverallplan.Weunderstand,then,howtheseriesofeightdeductionsformtheconceptualstructureofacosmologythatservesastheirbackground.Wearenotdealingwithacosmologicaldescription,aswefindintheTimaeus,butwithaninventoryofthesuppositionsanddefinitionsonwhichsuchadescriptionrelies.Inotherwords,whiletheTimaeusispresentedinnarrativeform,theParmenidesprovides4the“toolbox”requiredfortheconstructionofacosmologicalmodel.ConvincedthatParmenides’thesisthattheworldisauniquewhole(Prm.127e–128a)isuntenable,Socrates,accordingtoPlato,introducesthehypothesisoftheexistenceoftheForms.Infact,forPlato’sSocrates,ouruniversecontainsanindeter-minatenumberofthings,which,althoughdistinctanddifferentfromoneanother,2.AsIhavetriedtoshowinBrisson(1999).3.Onpre-Platonicnaturalphilosophy,seeinthisvolumeHussey,thebeginningsofscienceandphilosophyinarchaicgreece,andCurd,parmenidesandafter:unityandplurality.4.OnthisinterpretationofthesecondpartofthePlato’sParmenides,seeBrisson(2002).ForalternativereadingsofthesecondpartoftheParmenidesdifferentfrommine,butwhichalsoseethedeductionsasfollowingsomeoverallplan,seeSayer(1978)andGill(1996).213ACTC1221320/03/2006,04:04PM\nlucbrissonshareaconsiderablenumberofcharacteristics.ItistherecognitionofthiscommunitythatleadsPlato’sSocratestohypothesizetheexistenceofintelligiblerealitiesseparatedfromsensiblethings,inwhichthesensiblethingsparticipate.Sincetheintelligiblerealitydoesnotchange,andisnotsubjecteithertogenerationortocorruption,itexistsinitself,i.e.,independentlyofotherthings;itshouldthereforebeconsiderednotasaneffect,butasthecauseofitsownbeing.TheserealitiesaredefinedasForms(eidE).TheverytermsuggestsavisualmetaphorwhichPlatousesverywidely,whenhediscussesourgraspoftheintelligible.Thisdistinctionbetweentruebeingandsensiblerealityisformulatedwiththehelpofspatialmetaphors:intheRepublic,wereadofthe“intelligibleplace”(Rep.VI,509d2;seealso508c2andVII,516b–c,532d1),andinthePhaedrusofaplacewhichislocatedbeyondtheheavens(Phdr.247c).Yetthisseparationcannotbecomplete,simplybecausetheFormsaresupposedtoexistinordertosolvetheparadoxesconstantlyraisedbysensiblethings.Sensiblerealitiesreceivetheirnamesfromtheintelligiblerealities.Aboveall,sensiblerealitiescanbeknownonlythroughtheintel-ligible.Ofsensiblerealities,wecanhaveonlyopinion;butopinionissituatedmidwaybetweentheabsenceofknowledgeandtrueknowledge.Trueknowledgehasintelli-giblerealityasitsobject,andisobtainedbyrecollection,understoodastherediscoveryofaknowledge-contentthatwasapprehendedwhenthesoulwasseparatedfromthebody.Thisrediscovery,whichinthisworldistriggeredbytheperceptionofasensibleobjectcorrespondingtointelligiblereality,culminatesinanintuitionassimilatedtointellectualvision.Plato,therefore,wasthefirsttosupposetheexistenceofseparaterealities.Suchaseparationmaycorrespondtoareligiousexperience.However,thefactthattheupperworldconsistsofFormsratherthanofgodsexplainswhy,whereasthereligiousphenomenonseemstobeuniversal,themetaphysicalapproachissoinfrequent.Thesameideaalsoenablesustounderstandhowmetaphysics,evenwhenassimilatedtotheology,constitutesaradicalcritiqueofthetraditionalrepresentationofthedivine.Onecannoteitheraddressprayersoroffersacrificestoanutterlyseparategod.There-fore,asthehistoryoftheexpressionseemstoimply,itisseparationfromnaturethatenablesustodefinemetaphysics.Bythesametoken,metaphysicsisquitenaturallyassociatedwiththeology,fromwhichitisneverthelessdistinctandwhosedissolutionitinthelongrunentails.However,ifweadmitthattruerealityconsistsoftheintelligibleforms,itfollowsthattheknowledgeofsensiblethingscannotbeconsideredasascienceinthestrictsenseoftheterm.Yettoattributeaninferiorstatustothisknowledgeisnotequivalenttodenyingitsexistence.Afterall,inthemajorityofhisworkPlatospeaksofsensiblethingsandtriestosupplyanexplanationforthem.WearethereforejustifiedinraisingthequestionofPlato’sattitudetowardsthe“branchesofknowledge”ofhistime,suchasmathematics,medicine,etc.:Wasitthatofanenlightenedamateur,orofa“genuine5scientist”?5.Thatis,“scientist”inthemodernsenseoftheterm.OnthedevelopmentofGreekmathematicsandmedicineinPlato’stime,seeMueller,greekmathematics,andPellegrin,ancientmedicine,inthisvolume.214ACTC1221420/03/2006,04:04PM\nplato’snaturalphilosophyandmetaphysicsTechnE,epistEmEandalEthEsdoxaBeforewetrytoanswerthisquestion,weshouldconsideranimportantevolutioninPlato’sapproachtotheknowledgeofsensiblethings.TechnEAtfirst,Plato,likeSocrates,foundamodelofaccesstothesensibleinthetechnai.InancientGreek,thetermtechnEdesignatesaverywidevarietyofskillsandcom-petences,whichextendfromthefigurativeartstorhetoric,frommedicineandnaviga-tiontoarchitecture,andwhichincludetheworkofblacksmiths,joiners,andcobblers.Theseskillsandpracticeshavealwaysexistedinoneformoranother,andtheyarecharacterizedbytheirspecialization,sincenoexpertlaysclaimtoknowledgeinitstotality.InthefirstPlatonicwritings,thementionoftechnaihastwoprimaryfunctions(seeBalansard,2001).Itmakespossiblethepreparationofaneffectiveoppositiontoallkindsoffalseknowledge,anditproposesmodelsofknow-how.EverytechnEimpliesanactivity(ergon),whichmayconsistintheproductionofanobject(aflute,forinstance,oraboat),orelsedealwiththeuseoftheseobjects(music,navigation),orwiththecare(therapeia)ofcertainnaturalobjects(land,livestock,orhumanbodies).TechnEseekstocontrolthetotalityofitsobject–forinstance,thehumanbody–butitmustbelimitedtoaparticulararea;itisonthisconditionthatitscompetenceandautonomyareguaranteed.Withinthelimitsofitsowndomain,technEpossessesfullknowledgeoftherationalproceduresofitsintervention,whichitcanaccountforpublicly,andwhichitcantransmitbyteaching.Fromthispointofview,thetechnaidisplayanorm-ativecharacter.Inaddition,theylayclaimtoefficacy(dunamis)whentheyinterveneintheirobject.Becausetheyarealwaysa“know-how,”thetechnaiareabletoserveasamodelforethicsandforpolitics.Atthispoint,twoproblemsarisethatcallintoquestiontheuseoftechnEasamodelofknowledge.Ontheonehand,theobjectsofalltechnaipertaintothesensibleworld,which,forPlato,issubjecttoperpetualchange,andforthisreasoncannotbetheobjectoflanguageandthought.Moreover,everytechnEcontainsinitsprinciplethepursuitoftheinterestsofthepersonpracticingit,whichisnotthecaseforacertainnumberoffieldsofknowledge,inwhichinterestdoesnotcomeintoconsiderationatall.Thisiswhy,withoutcompletelyabandoningtheadvantageshehadderivedfromthetechnai,Plato,beginningwiththeMeno,turnstowardsanotherparadigm:thatofmathematics(thisisthethesisofVlastos,1988).Ifhumanbeingsaretoknowsensiblethingsandspeakaboutthem,sensiblethingsmustdisplayastabilitythatallowsthat.Yetitisonlymathematics,whetherpureorapplied,thatenableshumanbeingstoexplainanddescribethisstability.Puremathematics,consideredasanobjectofstudyinitself,enablesthesoultotearitselfawayfromthesensible,evenif,withintheframeworkofGreekpractice,whichgivesprecedencetoconstruction(byrulerandcompass)overcalculation,themath-ematicianmustconstructfigures,andevenifmathematicsisultimatelybasedonaxioms(moreorlessexplicit),whichcannotbedemonstrated.Inotherwords,theidealcharacterpropertomathematicsallowsPlatotomakeusunderstandwhyitis215ACTC1221520/03/2006,04:04PM\nlucbrissonnecessarytohypothesizetheexistenceofintelligibleforms,ofwhichsensiblethingsaremereimages.EpistEmEMoreover,inawaythatremainsmysteriouseventoday,mathematicsappearsastracesoftheintelligiblewithinthesensible,insofarasitmanifeststhesymmetrythatensuresgenuinestabilitytotherealitiesperceivedbythesenses.Allhumanbeingscandoistoobserveanddescribethisstability,intheframeworkofsuchdifferentbranchesofknowledgeascosmology,astronomy,physics,chemistry,andbiology.Suchaninventoryofthebranchesofknowledgeisanachronistic,forwedonotfindanycon-stitutedbranchofknowledgeinPlatohavingasitsnameoneofthosewehaveenumerated(exceptperhapsastronomy),andtherefore,necessarily,wefindnosysteminwhichthesebranchesofknowledgecouldtaketheirplace.Whatismore,inancientGreek,thereisnopairofcontrastingtermsdesignatingontheonehandtheexactdescriptionofsensiblerealities,andontheothertheintuitionofintelligiblerealities.Thisdivisionofrealityamongmodels,whichconstitutetruereality,andcopies,whichcontainonlyaderivedreality,entailsastrictlyparalleldistinctiononthelevelofknowledgeandofdiscourse.ThisisexplainedatTimaeus29b–cand51d–e,wheretheintellect,whichhasasitsobjecttheintelligibleforms,isopposedtotrueopinion,whichhasforitsobjectsensiblethingsperceivedbythesenses.Thisepistemologicaloppositionalternates,moreover,withthefollowingsociologicalone:“[intrueopinion]everyhumanbeinghasashare,wemustsay,whereasinintellectualintuition[nous]itisthegods[whohaveashare]and,amonghumanbeings,onlyasmallclass”(Ti.51e).Thistinyclassofpeopleisobviouslythephilosophers.AlEthEsdoxaInshort,science(epistEmE)dealswithtruereality,whichisthemodelofeverysensiblerealityofthesametype.Thistruerealityisperceivedbytheintellect(nous).Theknow-ledgethatresultsfromthisprocess,likethediscoursethattransmitsthisknowledge,iscertain,andisreservedforphilosophers.Trueopinion(alEthEsdoxa),bycontrast,isconcernedwithcopiesoftruereality.Thesederivedrealitiesareperceivedbysensation(aisthEsis),which,throughtheintermediaryofrecollection,leadstowardstheintelligible.Theknowledgethatresultsfromsensation,however,cannotachievecertainty,forithasonlychangingimagesasitsobjects.Thesameholdstrueofthediscoursethattransmitsthisknowledge,andwhichPlatoqualifiesasa“likelystory”(eikosmuthos)or“likelydiscourse”(eikoslogos),simplybecausethisdiscoursecannotbetrueinthefullsenseoftheword,sinceitdealswithimages,andnotwiththetruerealitywhichisitsmodel.Mathematics,pureandappliedEvenifwecannotgiveadeterminatestatustomathematicalorgeometricalobjectsassuch,theyneverthelesseachhaveaFormthatcorrespondstothem–thatofTwoorof216ACTC1221620/03/2006,04:04PM\nplato’snaturalphilosophyandmetaphysicstheCircle,forinstance.Bethatasitmay,wemustadmittheessentialroleofmathematicssinceitmediatedbetweenthesensibleandtheintelligible.Mathematicsenablesthesoultoriseupfromthesensibletotheintelligible,anditsactionenablesthepresenceoftheintelligiblewithinthesensibletobeensured.InPlato–andthisisaveryimportantcharacteristic–mathematicsplaysapivotalroleintheprocessofeducation.IntheRepublic(II,372d–IV,427c),afterdemonstratingtheexistenceofawarriorclass,fromwhomareselectedthosewhowillbecomethephilosopherswhowillleadthecity,SocratesdescribestoGlaucontheprogramofeducationthatwillbeusedtotrainthesephilosophers.Thewarriors,someofwhomaredestinedtobecomephilo-6sophers,willfirstbeinitiatedintopuremathematics,thevariousbranchesofwhicharereviewed.Arithmetic(VII,522c–526c)enablesustobegintoapprehendsomethingsuperiortothesensible.Eachsensibleperceptionbringswithitthesensibleperceptionofitsopposite;andthemindcannotbecomeconsciousoftheunityandpluralitylatentindiversityuntilsensationgivesitinformationonthecontraryattributesofthesameobject.Althoughsuchconsciousnessofunityremainsrudimentary,thisistrulyanactofpureintelligence.Geometry(526c–527c)isjustasindispensablefortheachievementofhighereduca-tion,foritenablesustoreachresultsthatareabstract,universal,andeven,onemightsay,eternal.Experienceshows,moreover,thatwhereasarithmeticmakesthemindmoreagile,geometryeducatesit.Geometryisimmediatelyunderstoodasplanegeometry.Butwemustalsoconsidergeometryinthree-dimensionalspace–thegeometryofsolids,thatistosaystereometry(527d–528e)–forthatisrequiredfortheapplicationofmathematicstoastronomy,whichisthescienceofsolidsinmotion.Wethenmoveontothegeometryofbodiesinmotion,whichinterestsastronomy(529a–530c).Theskycanbeseenasanimmensemovingpicture.Likegeometry,however,astronomymustgobeyondphenomena,inordertodeterminethegeneralprinciplesthataccountforthemotionofsolids.Itmustthereforeabandonthecon-templationoftheheavens,inordertotakeaninterestintherealproblems,whichare7mathematicalinnature,bystudyingabstracttheorems.Thetheoryofmusiccanbeelevatednotonlyabovedisputesbetweenmusicians,butalsoabovethelimitsimposeduponitbythePythagoreans,whowereinterestedonlyintheharmoniesperceptibletotheear.Thosewhowishtobecomephilosophersmustrisetotheuniversalandabstractcontemplationofharmonicratiosthemselves,aswecanseefromtheTimaeus,wheresuchratiosaccountfortheregularityofthemovementsoftheheavenlybodieswhichemitnosound;hencetheimportanceofharmonics(530c–531c).Aswehaveseen,mathematicspresentstwofaces,asinseparableasthoseofacoin:oneisorientedtowardstheintelligible,whichitallowsustoreach;andtheotheris6.Onthissubject,seePritchard(1995).7.Onthissubject,seethepolemicalworkeditedbyJ.P.Anton(1981).SeealsoMueller(1992).217ACTC1221720/03/2006,04:04PM\nlucbrissonorientedtowardsthesensible,whereitrepresentsthe“tracesoftheintelligible.”Atthislevel,mathematicsintervenesineveryareaofknowledge.CosmologyIntheTimaeus,Platodevelopsacosmology.Hesetsforthasimple,yetcoherentandrigorousrepresentationoftheuniverse,thepropertiesofwhichappearasthelogically-deducedconsequencesofalimitedsetofpresuppositions,evenifsuchpresuppositionsremainimplicitandpoorlyexplainedinthisdialogue.Moreover,theTimaeusappearsasthefirstcosmologyinwhichsuchadescriptioniscarriedoutwiththehelpofmathematics,andnotmerelywiththehelpofordinarylanguage.Aristotle,particu-larlyintheDeCaeloandthePhysics,neverstopscriticizingPlato’smathematizationoftheuniverse.However–anditisinthisrespectthattheTimaeusisanchoredintradi-tion,includingmyth–Plato’sdescriptionoftheuniverseremainstiedtoadescriptionoftheoriginofman,andevenoftheoriginofsociety,asisillustratedbythemythofAtlantis,summarizedatthebeginningofthedialogueandnarratedintheCritias.ForPlato,acosmologythataimstosetforthasimplerepresentationoftheuniversemustbeabletoanswerthesetwoquestions:Onwhatconditionsisthesensibleworldknowable?Howcanwedescribeit?Thesequestionsareinspiredbythefollowingconviction:incessantchangecannotbeconsideredtobetruereality.Inordertobecomeanobjectofknowledgeanddiscourse,thesensibleworldmust,eveninitstransformations,displaysomethingthatdoesnotchange,somethingthatisgenuinelypermanent,andwhichisthereforeidenticalineverycase.Platorespondstothisdemandbymakingthefollowinghypothesis,whichpresentsadoubleaspect:thereexistsaworldofintelligibleforms,immutableanduniversalrealitiesthataretheobjectoftrueknowledgeanddiscourse,andthereisaworldofsensiblerealities,which8participateintheforms,ofwhichtheyaremerecopies.Sinceresemblancemaybedefinedasidentityreducedtocertainaspects,sensiblethings,iftheyareonlyimagesoftheintelligibleforms,mustsimultaneouslydisplayacertainresemblancetotheintelligibleformsandbedissimilartothem,lesttheybeconfusedwiththecorrespondingintelligibleforms.Thedemiurgeguaranteesresem-blance,whereaschOraexplainsdifference.WemusthypothesizetheexistenceofchOra,inordertoexplainwhysensiblethingsaredifferentfromtheintelligibleforms,inwhichtheyneverthelessparticipate(Ti.52c–d).ChOraisthatwhichsuppliesalocationforsensiblethings,whicharetherebysituatedinexteriority,separatefromoneanother.AnanalysisofthediscoursewhichdealswithsensiblethingsenablesPlatotoshowhowchOraisthestablereceptacleinwhichsensiblethingsappear,andfromwhich,afteracertainlapseoftime,theydisappear(Ti.52b).Moreover,someofPlato’simagesandmetaphors,likethe“mother”andthe“nursemaid,”suggestthatchOraisinasenseconstitutiveofsensiblethings.Sensiblethingsdisplaythusacertainconsistency,whichexplainswhytheyareimpenetrable,andsocannotoccupythesameplaceatthesametime.InthiswaychOraenablesustoexplainwhysensiblethings,althoughtheymustresembletheintelligible,aredifferent8.Onparticipation,seeNotomi,plato’smetaphysicsanddialectic,inthisvolume.218ACTC1221820/03/2006,04:04PM\nplato’snaturalphilosophyandmetaphysicsfromit:theyarelocatedsomewhere,andtheyaresubjecttoacertainconsistency,ifwetakethisterminaverywideandimprecisesense.SochOraincludesadoubleaspect,bothspatialandconstitutive,asweshallseebelow;andthisiswhywemustresistthetemptationtoidentifychOrawithakindofdefectivematter(hulE),asAristotledid.Initself,chOraisbereftofmeasureandproportion,butasaresultofthisitcanacceptallkindsofmeasuresandproportion.Nevertheless,chOraisneverdescribedintheTimaeusassuchandinitspurestate.Whenthedemiurgeundertakestointroducemeasureandproportionintoit,italreadypresentstracesofthefourelements(Ti.52d–53c),whichareagitatedbyamechanicalmovementbereftoforderandofmeasure.PlatocallsthisprincipleofresistanceanankE,atermthatisusuallytranslated“necessity,”butwhichshouldbeunderstoodasthesetofunavoidableconsequenceswhich,inthesensibleworld,imposeseverelimitsuponeveryrationalintention.Byadmittingthepersistentpresenceof“necessity”intheuniverse,withwhichfirstthedemiurge,andthentheworldsoulmustdeal,Platoacknowledgesthattheorderpresupposedbyhiscosmologicalmodelcannotbutremainpartialandprovisional.WearethusfarfromLeibnizianoptimism.Sinceorderreignsoveronlyapartoftheuniverse,allcosmologicalexplanationsarecondemnedtoremainpartialandprovisional.Inthesensibleworld,permanenceismanifestedwiththefollowingcharacteristics:causality,stability,andsymmetry.Thereiscausalityifeveryeventdependsonacause;stabilityifthesamecausealwaysproducesthesameeffect;andsymmetryifthisrela-tionofcausalityremainsinvariantdespiteincessanttransformations.Thisinvariance,whichcanbeexpressedintermsofmathematicalratios,infactconstitutestheessentialpartofthesensibleworldthathumanbeingscancometoknowanddescribe.Nevertheless,theknowledgeanddiscoursethathavesensiblethingsastheirobjectmaintainarelationofcopytomodelwiththeknowledgeanddiscoursethathaveintelligibleformsastheirobject.Thisrelationissimilartothatofsensiblethingswithregardtointelligibleforms.Thisknowledgeandthediscoursethatexpressesitarenevertrue,butremainprobable,fortheydealonlywithimages,andnotwithtruereality.Thedemiurgefabricatestheuniverse,whichisalivingbeingendowedwithasoulandabody,bykeepinghiseyesfixedontheintelligible.AstronomyWhydoesPlatoconsidertheuniversetobealivingbeing–thatis,asabeingendowedwithasoul?InancientGreece,themainproblemincosmology,aswehaveseen,istoaccountforwhatisorderlyinthesensibleworldalthoughitchangesconstantly,andaboveallforthemostregularmovementsobservedinit,thoseofthecelestialbodies.Inthiscase,however,howcanweexplainboththeexistenceofmovementandoftheorderthismovementmanifests?ItwasNewtonwho,in1687,formulatedthelawofgravitation:twobodiesexertaforceofattractionupononeanotherproportionaltotheirmassesandinverselyproportionaltothesquareoftheirdistance.Thelawofinertia,accordingtowhichabodywhichisnotsubjecttoanyforcecanonlybeatrestordisplayrectilinearanduniformmotion,hadtoawaitGalileotobeformulated,andNewtontobeextendedtocelestialbodies.Iftheselawsarenotavailable,onemusthypothesizeamotionthatis219ACTC1221920/03/2006,04:04PM\nlucbrissonnotperceivedbythesenses,butwhichaccountsfortheoriginandthepersistenceofthetotalityofmovementsintheuniverse,andespeciallyofthemostnobleofthem,thosethatanimatethecelestialbodies.AccordingtoPlato,thisrealityisthesameinnatureastheprincipleofspontaneousmovementinlivingbeings:itisasoul.Thishypothesisisjustasplausibleasthatoftheexistenceof“movementatadistance.”Inlivingbeings,whichare,bydefinition,endowedwiththeprincipleofspontaneousmovementwhichPlatocalls“soul,”acertainregularitywithinchangemanifestsitself:amemberofagivenspeciesengendersanothermemberofthespecies,livesaspecificnumberofyears,displayscertaincharacteristics,etc.Moreover,thehumansoulisendowedwithanintellect,whichensuresitabehaviorcoherentandinconformitywithintentionsthataremoreorlesswell-defined.Ananalogouslineofreasoningallowsustoassociatethesetwodomainsoffacts,andsupposethatthesensibleworldhasasoulendowedwithreason(Ti.30a–c),asisthecaseforhumans.Sincethisisso,wecanbetterunderstandhowthedemiurgegoesaboutfabricatingthebodyandsoulofthislivingbeingwhichincludesalllivingbeings–thatis,theuniverse.Theworldsoul,whichensuresthepermanenceofthemathematicalorderestablishedbythedemiurgewithintheuniverse,displaysthefollowingcharacteristics,wheneveritcomestoexertabsolutepower(Ti.34c):itisanintermediatereality,whichresemblesaseriesofoverlappingcircles(themost“noble”ofplanefigures,foritpresentsthegreatestsymmetry),whichareinterrelatedmathematicallywithoneanother,andwhichexplainallmotionintheuniverse,whetherpsychicorphysical.Thisrealityintermediatebetweenthesensibleandtheintelligiblerepresents,withinthesensible,theoriginofallorderlymotion,thecircularmovementsoftheheavenlybodies,andtherectilinearmovementsofsublunaryrealities.Thus,theTimaeuspresentstheconstitutionoftheworldsoulasifitweretheconstructionofanarmillarysphere,i.e.,aglobemadeupofringsorcircles,representingthemovementoftheheavensandthestars(mentionedatTi.40d).Wemustbearthisimageinmindtocomprehendwhatfollows.Bybringinginmathematicalrelations(geometrical,arithmetical,andharmonic),whicharealsousedinmusic,attheleveloftheworldsoul,Platoismerelytryingtoaccountforthetwocharacteristicsofpermanenceandregularity,characteristicsthathavebeenobservedsinceearliestantiquityintheheavenlybodies,andthathaveledhumanbeingstoregardthemasdivine.Inordertoaccountforthesetwocharacter-istics,Platoformulatestwopostulates:1)Themovementsoftheheavenlybodiesfol-lowacirculartrajectory,sothattheirmotionispermanent.2)Thesemotionsobeylawsdefinedbythreetypesofmathematicalrelationsknownatthetime,sothattheirmovementisregular,despiteappearancestothecontrary(seeKnorr,1990).9IntheTimaeus(38c–39e),Platoproposesanastronomicalsystemofastonishingsimplicity.Indeed,thisastronomicalexplanationbringsonlythefollowingtwoelementsintoplay:thecircularmovementofthecelestialbodies,ahypothesiswhichwasaccepteduntilKepler(thelawoforbits,in1609),andthreetypesofmathematicalrelations:geometrical,mathematical,andharmonic.Theextraordinarycomplexity9.ForatableofcelestialmotionsintheTimaeus,seeCornford(1937,pp.136–7).220ACTC1222020/03/2006,04:04PM\nplato’snaturalphilosophyandmetaphysicsofthemovementswhichseemtoaffectthecelestialbodiesisthusreducedtotwoelementsofmathematicalnature:circlesandmeans.PhysicsandchemistryThedemiurgeadaptsthissoultotheworld’sbody(Ti.34b,36d–e),whichappearsasagiganticsphere,since,asthecopyofaperfectoriginal,thisbodymusthavetheperfectandsymmetricalform.Inthegeometryofthree-dimensionalspace,noformismoresymmetricalthanthesphere.TheelementsInconformitywithatraditionalopinionthatprobablygoesbacktoEmpedocles,andwhichwastocontinuedowntotheeighteenthcentury,Platotakesforgrantedthatthebodyoftheuniverseisfabricatedexclusivelyfromthefourelements:fire,air,water,andearth(Ti.56b–c).Yethegoesmuchfurther.Ontheonehand,hesetsforthamathematicalargument,tojustifythefactthattheremustbefourelements.Aboveall,heisconsciousofshowingahighdegreeoforiginality(Ti.53e)byestablishingacorrespondencebetweenthefourelementsandthefourregularpolyhedra–thatis,hetransposesthewholeofphysicalrealityandthechangesthataffectitintomathemat-10icalterms.Thesefourpolyhedraarethemselvesconstructedfromtwotypesofsurfaces,whichthemselvesresultfromtwotypesofright-angledtriangles.ThemathematicalconstitutionoftheelementsThetwotypesofright-angletriangleswhichplayaroleinthebeginningaretheright-angledisoscelestriangle,whichishalfofasquare(Figure12.1b),andtheright-angledscalenetriangle,whichishalfofanequilateraltriangleofsidex(Figure12.1a).abxx/2xx32x/2x/2Figure12.110.ItshouldbenotedthattheconstructionofthefirstregularpolyhedraisattributedtoTheaetetus(415–369bce),acontemporaryofSocrates,whomPlatodepictsintheprologueofthedialoguewhichbearshisname(Theaetetus);thisindicatesthatPlatodevotedconsiderableattentiontothedevelopmentofmathematicsinhistime.221ACTC1222120/03/2006,04:04PM\nlucbrissonab1124234356Figure12.2Thesetwoelementaryright-angledtrianglesenterintotheconstructionoftwoothertypesofsurface:thesquareandtheequilateraltriangle.Asquareresultsfromtheunionoffourright-angledisoscelestriangles(Ti.55b)(Figure12.2b);andanequilat-eraltriangleistheresultoftheunionofsixright-angledscalenetrianglesTi.54d–e)(Figure12.2a).Inordertoconstituteasquare,tworight-angledisoscelestriangleswouldhavesufficed,justaswouldtworight-angledscalenetriangleshavesufficedtoconstituteanequilateraltriangle.Wemaysuppose,however,that,inthecaseofthesquareandoftheequilateraltriangle,Platowantstofindacenterofaxialsymmetry(cf.Euclid,Elements,XII,18,scholium),whichwouldensurethatnoneofthetrianglesthatmakeupthesquareortheequilateraltrianglecouldhavepreeminenceovertheothers.ThismayperhapsbeanimplicitcriticismofPythagoreanism,inwhichrightandlefthadopposingvalues.Equilateraltrianglesareusedtoconstructthreeregularpolyhedra:thetetrahedron(Ti.54e–55a,4equilateraltriangles,Figure12.3a),theoctahedron(Ti.55a,eightequilateraltriangles,Figure12.3b),andtheicosahedron(Ti.55a–b,20equilateraltriangles,Figure12.3c),associatedrespectivelywithfire,air,andwater.Inaddition,squaresareusedtomakeupthecube(Ti.55b–c,6squares,Figure12.3d),whichisassociatedwithearth.Finally,thereisafleetingmentionofthedodecahedron,theregularpolyhedronthatismostsimilartothesphere(Ti.55c),thegeometricalfigureassociatedwiththebodyoftheworld(cf.Ep.XIII[apocryphal],363d).Allthepropertiesofthepolyhedraassociatedwiththefourelementsmaybegatheredtogetherinaneasilyreadabletable(seeTable12.1).TwoobservationsresultfromanattentivereadingofTable12.1:abcdTetrahedronFireOctahedronAirIcosahedronWaterCubeEarthFigure12.3222ACTC1222220/03/2006,04:04PM\nplato’snaturalphilosophyandmetaphysicsTable12.1ElementRegularsolidNumberoffacesNumberofright-angledtrianglesfiretetrahedron4equilateraltriangles24scalenesairoctahedron8equilateraltriangles48scaleneswatericosahedron20equilateraltriangles120scalenesearthcube6squares24isosceles1.Theregularpolyhedrathatcorrespondtothevariouselementsaredescribedexclusivelyasafunctionofthenumberoffacesthatmakeuptheirenvelope;and2.theedgesofthesefacesaredefinedonthebasisofanoriginalvaluethatcorrespondstothelengthofthehypotenuseoftheelementaryright-angledtrianglesthatcom-posethem;butthisvalueremainsindeterminate(Ti.57c–d).Suchindeterminacyhasconsiderableimportance,fortworeasons:ontheonehand,itreducestheexplanatorypowerofthegeometricalmodelproposedbyPlato,bygoingagainstitssimplicity;ontheotherhand,however,itallowsthevarietiesofoneandthesameelementtobebetterexplained.Platowantstoshowhowthecosmologicalmodelheproposes,andwhichcanbereducedtofourelements,assimilatedtoregularpolyhedracomposedofequilateraltrianglesandsquares,themselvesmadeupofregularscaleneandisoscelestriangles,allowsforthedescriptionoftheobjectsoftheentiresensibleworld,whicharemerevarietiesofthefourelements,ortheircombination,andevenforthedescriptionoftheirproperties.AtTi.58c–61c,wefindafewexamplesthatwillillustratethispoint(Table12.2).Themostcomplexsubstancesfoundintheuniverseare,indeed,onlyvarietiesofthefourelements.Theentirematerialstructureoftheuniverseisreducibletothefourelementsandultimatelytotwokindsofequilateraltriangles.ThemutualtransformationofthreeoftheseelementsInordertoaccountforthemutualtransformationsofthesepolyhedra–thetetrahed-ron(associatedwithfire),theoctahedron(associatedwithair),andtheicosahedron(associatedwithwater)–Platotakesintoconsiderationonlythenumberofsurfaceswhichconstitutetheirenvelope.ThecorrespondencesestablishedbetweenthenumberTable12.2ElementPolyhedronSidesWeightMobilitySharpnessEarthCube6SquaresHeavierStableMalleableWaterIcosahedron20TrianglesHeavyLessmobileSharpAirOctahedron8TrianglesLightMobileSharperFireTetrahedron4TrianglesLighterVerymobileSharpest223ACTC1222320/03/2006,04:04PM\nlucbrissonTable12.31[fire]=4∆2[fire]=2×4∆=8∆=1[air]1[fire]+2[air]=4∆+2×8∆=20∆=1[water]112/2[air]=2/2×8∆=20∆=1[water]ofequilateraltrianglesmakingupthesurfaceofthesepolyhedraenabletheformula-tionofthemathematicalequivalenciesthatexplainhowtheelementsaretransformedintooneanother,andhowgenerationandcorruptioninthesensibleworldoccur.Suchanexplanationisbaseduponthefollowingpresupposition:thetwotypesofright-angledelementarytrianglescanneitherbecreatednordestroyed.Consequently,ineverytransformation,thenumberoftrianglesofeachspeciesimplicatedinatrans-formationisconserved.Inaddition,onlytheelementswhichcorrespondtopolyhedrawhosefacesareformsofequilateraltrianglescanbetransformedintooneanother.Itfollowsthatwater,air,andfirecanbetransformedintooneanother.Earth,whichcorrespondstothecube,whosefacesaresquares,isaffectedonlybyprocessesofdecompositionandrecomposition.Inshort,thetransformationoftheelementsisconsideredasafunctionofthesurfacesmakinguptheregularpolyhedra,andnot,aswouldbenatural,asafunctionoftheirvolumes.Therulesofthemutualtransforma-tionoffire,air,andwatercanbesummarizedinarelativelysimpletable(Table12.3).Suchasolutionissurprising,forittakesintoconsiderationonlythesurfacessur-roundingthepolyhedra,eventhoughthesepolyhedraarevolumes.Howcanweexplainthissurprisingsolution?Threeexplanationscanbeadvanced:1.AswecanstillnoteinEuclid,whatdefinesapolyhedronisitsform,i.e.,itslimit,whichcorrespondstothesetofitsfaces.2.Theindeterminacyofthelengthofthehypotenuseoftheelementaryright-angledtrianglesthatcomposetheequilateraltrianglesmakesitdifficulttoexplainthemutualtransformationofpolyhedrawhosefacesarenotequilateraltrianglesofthesamesurface.Inotherwords,onlyelementsofcorrespondingvarieties(whosefacesareequilateraltrianglesofthesamedimension)canbetransformedintooneanother.3.ThemathematicsknowninPlato’stimeencounterednumerousdifficultieswhenitcametoextractingsquareroots,anditwasunabletoextractcuberoots.TheproblemofchangeTheexplanationsproposedsofardonotsufficetoaccountforthemechanicalchangesthataffectthewholeofthesensibleworld,becausetheylackthefollowingaxioms:1.Everythingthatiscorporealmustbesomewhere(Ti.52b).2.Theuniverseisnotuniform,andthemotionobservedinitoriginatesinthelackofuniformityfoundwithinit(Ti.57e).Thislackofuniformitycanbeexplainedin224ACTC1222420/03/2006,04:04PM\nplato’snaturalphilosophyandmetaphysicstwoways.Aweakinterpretationjustifiesitbythefactthatthereexistfourregularpolyhedrathatcannotfitperfectlyintooneanother.Astrongerinterpretationstatesthatthisnon-uniformityresultsfromthefactthatthelengthofthehypo-tenuseoftheelementaryright-angledtrianglesremainsindeterminate;itfollowsthatthedimensionsoftheelementarypolyhedrathatmakeupallsensiblethingscanbedifferent.Thislackofuniformitythusexplainstheincessantchangetowhichthesensibleworldissubject,achangetheworldsoulwilltrytosetinorder,butonlywhereitcan.3.Thereisnovoidinthesensibleworld(Ti.58a,cf.79c),or,whatamountstothesamething,everywhereisfilledwithsomething,thatissomethingcorporeal.4.Theworldsphereenvelopsallthatiscorporeal.Withinthissphere,thefourele-mentsaredistributedinfourconcentriclayers(Ti.33b,53a,48a–b),andbetweenthoselayersexchangesareexplainedasfollows.Sincethereisnovoid,thepar-ticles,whichhaveacertainweight,cannotspreadtoinfinitytowardstheoutside,while,ontheinside,theycanonlycirculatewithinthealways-filledinterstices,originatingfromtheabsenceofhomogeneityamongtheelements.Theresultisachainreaction(Ti.58b;cf.76candLawsX,849c),whichentailsaprocess(Ti.58b)displayingthetwomovementsthatgovernalltransformationsofonebodyintoanother,whichwehavementionedabove:divisionandcondensation,decompositionandrecomposition.WemustultimatelyimaginethePlatonicuniverseasavastspherefilledwithahomogeneousfluid,bereftofallcharacteristics–thatis,chOra.Yetthegreatestpartofitisenclosedwithinenvelopesthatdelimittheoutersurfaceofeachofthefourregularpolyhedra:tetrahedron,octahedron,icosahedron,andcube.Theseelementarycom-ponentstendtobedistributedinfourconcentriclayers;butthistendencyrunscoun-tertothemovementofrotationthatcarriesalongthewholeofthesphere.Theresultofthismovementisthedisplacementoftheregularpolyhedra,oramodificationofnature,withfirebecomingair,airbecomingwater,andviceversa.Thisrepresentationintroducesacontradiction:inthePlatonicuniverse,wemustconsiderboththecon-tinuitythatcharacterizeschOra,andthediscontinuitytheregularpolyhedrainevitablyestablish.PlatonicphysicsisthusneitheratomisticlikethatofLeucippusandDemocritus,noraphysicsofcontinuity,likethatofParmenides,Zeno,andMelissus;itisintermediatebetweenthetwo.Wemustacknowledgethatsincethemechanicalmovementsofthesensibleworldaredominatedbyasoulthatdisplaysaparticularlyrigorousmathematicalstructure,andsincethedemiurgehasfashionedchOramathematically,introducingtheregularpolyhedraintoit,everytransformationofonebodyintoanothercanbeexplainedintermsofmathematicalinteractionsandcorrelations.Mathematicsallowsustoapplytothesensibleworldcertainpredicatesoftheintelligibleworldinwhichitparticipates;thesensibleworldthusacquirespermanenceandregularity.Ultimately,itismath-ematicsthataccountsfortheparticipationofthesensibleworldintheintelligibleworld.Andifthesensibleworldisindeedanimageoftheintelligible,itmustthereforebeconstructedmathematically;fromthispointofview,mathematicsfixesthelimitsofPlatoniccosmology.Nevertheless,itremainstruethatPlatowasabletousethemostelaborateconceptsofferedbythemathematicsofhistime;wemustconsequently225ACTC1222520/03/2006,04:04PM\nlucbrissonrecallthatthelimitsofPlato’scosmologycoincidewiththelimitsofthemathematicsofhistime.Ultimately,nothingguaranteesthatthemechanicalmotionjustdescribedwillalwaysdisplayenoughregularityandordertoallowpeopletothinkaboutit,speakofit,andactwithinit.Therefore,Platomakestheworldsoulprolongtheactionofthedemiurge;thishypothesisnotonlyexplainswhyandhowthemotionofthesublunarybodiesisorderly,butalsohowandwhyitisalsoconstantlysubjecttomathematicallaws,givingitthepossibilityofdisplayingacertainregularityandpermanence.Themoretheworldsoulisruledbyrigorousmathematicallaws,themorethemotionsthataffectthesublunarysensibleworldarelikelytobeorderly.BiologyIfwedefinebiologyasknowledgethatdealswithlivingbeings,wefaceawholeseriesofproblemswhenwetakeupthequestioninPlato.Forhim,alivingbeingisoneendowedwithasoul,wherethesoul,aswehavealreadyseen,isdefinedastheself-movingprincipleofallspontaneousmotion,physicalaswellaspsychic.Sincetheyareimmortal,allsoulspresentthemselvesassubstitutesfortheworldsoul,theconstitutionofwhichisdescribedatTi.35a–b.Beingsendowedwithasoulareneverthelessclassedhierarchically.Atthesummitarethegodsanddaemons;thencomehumanbeings–menandwomen–andtheanimalsthatliveintheair,ontheearthandinthewater;plantsarerankedatthebottom.Thus,whenwewishtospeakofbiology,weareforcedtomakeadistinction.Wemustseparatehumanbeingsandanimals,sincetheyaredistinctbothfromplants,whichpossessonlyanappetitivesoul,andfromthegods(includingtheworldandthecelestialbodies)andthedaemons,whosebodyisnotsubjecttocorruption.Neverthe-less,if,asPlatobelieves,oneandthesamesoulpassesthroughvariousanimalbodies,thenthedifferencebetweenhumanbeingsandbeastsisradicallyattenuated.Itisahumansoul,displayingthesamestructureasthatofgodsanddaemons,whichanim-atesthebodiesofmen,women,andevenallanimals(accordingtothedefinitiongivenabove)thatliveandmoveintheair,ontheearthandinthewater.Asaresult,men,women,andalltheanimalsarehumanbeings,originallymale,butsubjecttoaprocessofdegenerationasafunctionoftheusetheyhavemadeoftheirreasoninapreviouslife.Humanbeingsareconstitutedonthesamemodelastheuniverse(kosmos):theypossessasoul,whoserationalpartdisplaysthesametwocirclesthatconstitutetheworldsoul;thesecircleshavethesamemathematicalproportionsastheworldsoul.Thehumanbodyisfabricatedoutofthefourelementsthatconstitutetheworld’sbody,andonlyofthesefourelements.Wecouldthereforesaythatthehumanbeingisamicrocosm(amini-universe).Twofeaturesenableustoestablishadistinctionbetweenthismicrocosmandtheworld.Contrarytothebodyoftheworld,ahumanbodyissubjecttodestruction;andthehumansoulexperiencesahistorythatmakesitpassintodifferentbodies,asafunctionofitscontemplationoftheintelligible,bothwhenitisseparatedfromallbodiesandwhenitoccupiesabody(Ti.90e–92c).Verygenerally,then,ahumanbeingcanthereforebeconsideredasacomposite,whichprovisionallyassociatesahumansoulwithabodyofmasculineorfemininesex.226ACTC1222620/03/2006,04:04PM\nplato’snaturalphilosophyandmetaphysicsTheconstitutionofthebodyTwotypesofbasictissuesmakeupthebodyofhumanbeings:marrowandflesh.Inordertofabricatemarrow,thedemiurgefirstchoosessmoothregulartriangles,whichcanproducefire,water,air,andearthofthemostexactform.Hemixestheseperfecttrianglestogetherinordertoconstitutethemarrow,withwhichhefabricatesthebrain,spinalmarrow,andbonemarrow;marrowisvaluedtothisextent:itisherethatthevariouspartsofthesoulwillcometobeanchored,asweshallseebelow.Thenthedemiurgecontinueshiswork:afterirrigatingandwateringdownpureearth,siftedwithmarrow,thedemiurgefabricatesthesubstanceofbone,whichheusestofashiontheskull,thespinalcolumn,andalltheotherbones.Thistimeusingelementscomposedofordinarytriangularsurfaces,thedemiurgethenundertakestoconstituteflesh,outofamixtureofwater,fire,andearth,towhichheaddsaleavenmadeupofsaltandofacid,whichalsoconsistsofordinarytriangles.Flesh,whenitdries,causestheappearanceofafilm,whichistheskin.Ontheskull,themoisture,whichcomesoutthroughtheholespiercedintheskinbyfireandisforcedbackundertheskinbytheair,takesrootandgivesbirthtohair.Outofamixtureofboneandfleshwithoutleaven,thedemiurgefabricatesthetendons,whichheusestoattachthebonestoeachother.Finally,hefabricatesthenailsoutofamixtureoftendons,flesh,andair.Thehumanbodyisthusreducedtothefourelementscorrespondingtothefourregularpolyhedra,whicharethemselvesconstructedoutofsurfacesresultingfromthearrangementoftwotypesofright-angledtriangles:isoscelesandscalene.Themathematicalqualitiesofthesetwobasictrianglesexplainthedifferencebetweenmarrow,theanchor-pointofthesoulinman,andflesh,whichisacompletelymortalsubstance.Hereevenbiologyismathematized,atleastdowntoitsmostelementarylevel.Thedestructionofthehumanbodybyillnessesisalsodescribedinmathematicaltermsatitsmostbasiclevel,sinceitisultimatelyexplainedbyadissociationortrans-mutationofitsconstituents,whichcanalsobeassociatedwiththefourelements,associatedwiththefourregularpolyhedra.Deathoccurswhenthemarrowinwhichthesoulisanchoredisgravelydamaged;inthiscase,thebondsthatholdthesoultothebodyrelaxandletgo.Threesystems,thecirculatorysystem(Ti.77c–78a),therespiratorysystem(Ti.78a–80d),andthenutritivesystem(Ti.80d–81e),explaintheorderlyfunctioningofthehumanbody,whichisdestroyedbyseveraltypesofillness(Ti.82b–86a).Thecirculatorysystemisdescribedbymeansofthemetaphorofagarden.Thedescriptiontakesplaceintwostages.Firsttobementionedarethenetworksofvessels(Ti.77c–e)whichtransportthebloodtoallthepartsofthebody.ThenPlatodescribesthecirculation,withinthesevessels(Ti.77e–78b),ofthebloodthatresultsfromthedecomposition,throughfire,offood.Thecirculationofbloodhasadoublefunction:itensuresthenutritionofallthepartsofthebody,anditisthevehicleofsensation.Thegeneralterm“vessels”isusedhere,forthedistinctionbetweenveinsandarterieswasnotestablisheduntilHarveyin1628.Therespiratorysystem(Ti.78a–80d)isdescribedonthemodelofalobsterpot.Thispotcontainstwoparts:acentralcavitymadeoffire,whichisinsidethetrunk,227ACTC1222720/03/2006,04:04PM\nlucbrissonandtwotunnelsmadeofair,whichpassthroughthenoseandthemouth(Ti.78a–d).Thisentirestructureissubjecttoanalternativemovement,whichcausesthethoraxtoriseandfall,andwhichcontinuesaslongaslifedoes.Air,followedbyfire,isinfactsubjecttoacircularmotion;itisbreathedinthroughthenoseandmouth,andbreathedoutthroughthebody(Ti.78d–79a)inacircularmotionPlatoassimilatestoseveralotherspeciesofmotion(79a–80c).Thecircularityofallthemotionsmentionedisexplainedbythewilltoaccountfortheirpermanence.Platothenmovesontothenutritivesystem(Ti.80d–81e).Bloodplaysthemainroleinnutrition,anditresultsfromthedecompositionoffoodbyfire,whichgivesblooditsredcolor.Thisfoodmaybeintheformofdrinkorsolidfood(Ti.80d–e)whichistakenexclusivelyfromplants.Fire,which,aswehavejustseen,followsairintherespiratoryprocess,dissolvesthefoodwhenitpassesthroughthestomach,andforcesthebloodresultingfromthisdecompositiontointroduceitselfintothevesselsadaptedtothispurpose.Transportedthroughallthepartsofthebody,thebloodnour-ishesthemarrow,flesh,andthewholeofthebody(Ti.80e–81b).Mortalillnessesoccurwhenthemarrow,inwhichthevariouspartsofthesoulareanchored,becauseitisnourishedinappropriately,degeneratesanddecomposes(Ti.81b–e).Theillnessesthatdestroythehumanbodyaredividedintothreegroups.Someillnessesareduetoanexcess,adefect,orapoordistributionoftheelementarycom-ponents(i.e.,thefourelements)thatconstitutethehumanbody(Ti.81e–82b).Otherillnessescomefromthedecompositionoftissues(fleshandtendons)which,astheyliquefy,pollutetheblood(Ti.82b–84d).Athirdgroupofillnessespertainstoeachoftheelementsthatmakeupthehumanbody:earth,water,air,andfire.Thesearefevers(Ti.86a),certainillnessesthatconcernthebreath(Ti.84d–85a),andthoserelativetophlegm(Ti.85a–b)andbile(Ti.85b–86a).ObservationandExperimentalVerificationThestrengthofGreekscienceresidesessentiallyinitsformaldialecticalanddemon-strativetechniques.TheancientGreeksdevotedconsiderableefforttodevelopinganaxiomaticsystem,andtousingmathematicsastheprivilegedinstrumentforunderstandingnaturalphenomena.TheempiricalmethodalsoachievedconsiderableprogressamongtheGreeks,inbothresearchandpractice.Historyandgeographywerethefirstdomainstoengageinthecarefulandexhaustivegatheringofinformation;butthispracticewassoonextendedfirsttomedicine,andthentoseveraldomains:zoology,botany,andsoon.Nevertheless,empiricalobservationmustbecarefullydistinguishedfromtheoreticalobservation.Evenifbothtypesofobservationoverlap,alltheoreticalobservationpresentsadeliberatecharacter.Inthisregard,Aristotlerightlyinsistsonthedistinc-tionbetweentheobservationscarriedoutbyfishermeninthecontextoftheiractivity,andthoseundertakeninordertocarryoutascientificinvestigationonfish.Wemustaddanotherdistinction,betweenobservationproperlysocalled,andawarenessofitsimportanceforresearch.Tocarryoutdetailedresearchonanimals,plants,minerals,stars,musicalnotes,orillnesses,isonething,butquiteanothertohaveanexplicitmethodologythatattributesapreciseroletoempiricaldatawithinscientificresearch.228ACTC1222820/03/2006,04:04PM\nplato’snaturalphilosophyandmetaphysicsThetwoconcernsjustmentionedarepresentinPlato,albeitnotatthelevelofself-awareness,andnottothesameextentasinAristotle.ThisgeneralattitudecanalsobefoundintheTimaeus.AlthoughseveralpropositionsmadebyPlatocouldbesubjectedtoverificationandeventuallyturnedouttobefalse,thefollowingneverthelessrevealthatPlatowassensitivetoacertainformofobservation,andwasnotimmediatelyopposedtoallexperimentalverification.Thisistrueofthemovementof“planets”(Ti.39a–d),ofthegreaterdensityofgoldthanbronze(Ti.59b–c),oftherelationbetweentherapidityofasoundanditspitch(Ti.67b),andabovealltheneedforcircularmotion(Ti.79e–80d)inaworldthatcontainsnovoid.Theseexamplessuggestthatdespiteallthetechnicalproblemshehadtoface,Plato,intheTimaeus,formulatesstatementsthattrulypertaintocosmology,andthatconflictneitherwithlogicnorwithsensoryexperience.InancientGreece,thesearchforcertaintywasoftencounterbalancedbyanabsenceofempiricalinformation.Inaddition,“evidence”and“experiments”werefrequentlyusedtocorroborateatheoryratherthantotestit.Inshort,competitivedebate,oragOn,seemsultimatelytohavefurnishedtheframeworkinwhichthesciencesofnatureweredevelopedinancientGreece.Thepointwastoestablishamodelofexplanation,onthelevelofdiscourse,bypresentingconvincingargumentsforit,ratherthantoimposeitonthelevelofreality,bytestingitagainstthefactstodeterminewhetheritcouldwithstandthetestorcouldbetterexplainthefactsthansomeothertheory.Twotypesofexplanation,sometechnicalandtheotherstheoretical,canbeadvancedtoexplainPlato’sreticencewithregardtoexperimentalverification.TechnicallimitsThemeasuringoperationmaybeconsideredthefundamentalactofscience.Inordertoprogress,sciencemustdefineparticularlyabstractconceptsbeforehand,amongthefirstofwhichareunitsofmeasure.Letusnote,forexample,thetremendousimport-anceassumedforthedevelopmentofsciencebysuchunitsofmeasureastemperatureexpressedindegrees,acceleration,energy,electriccharge,entropy,quantityofinfor-mationasmeasuredinbits,etc.,andtheelaborationofinstrumentsallowingthemtobemeasured.InPlato’stime,knownstandardsofmeasure,whichconcernedonlylength,weight,volume,andtime,didnotdisplayanyuniversality,sincetheyvariedasafunctionofindividualcities,andremainedhighlyunreliable,giventheprimitivenatureofmeasuringinstruments.Inadditiontothelackofappropriateabstractmeas-ures,anotherfactor,nolessdecisive,alsocameintoplay:mathematicsinPlato’stimewasinaparticularlyprimitivestate,andseveralofitsdevelopmentsnowconsideredessentialwerestilllacking.However,severalexamplesdatingfromHellenistictimesrevealtheingenuitythatwasusedtosurmountortogetaroundthesedifficulties.Inviewofwhathasjustbeensaid,itshouldbeevidentthat,eveniftheyattainedafairlyadvancedlevelingeometry,eveniftheysucceededinaccomplishingtechnicalexploits,asisshownbytheirarchitecture,theirsculpture,andtheirceramics,andalthoughtheirmethodsofnavigationimpliedtheuseoftechnicalprocedures,albeitprimitive,theGreeksofPlato’stimedidnothaveavailablethetoolswhichcouldhaveenabledthemtoconceive,define,andtoputintopracticeexperimentsintendedtoverifytheirhypothesesinthedomainofscientificknowledge.229ACTC1222920/03/2006,04:04PM\nlucbrissonTheoreticalprejudicesExperimentalverification,thatabsolutelydecisiveprocedureofquestioningNature,escapedPlato,who,aftersettingforthhistheoryofcolors,exclaims:Towanttotest[aphysicalphenomenon]underthecontrolofexperience(skopoumenosbasanonlambanoi)wouldmeanbeingunawareofthedifferencebetweenmenandthegods,foronlyagod...possessesthenecessaryknowledgeandpower,whereasamongmennoneiscapable...norwilltheyeverbeinthefuture.(Ti.68d–e)ForPlato,experimentalverificationthusimpliestheexactreproductionofNature,ataskthatisasimpossibleforusasitwasforhim.Letmementionjustoneparticularaspectofatheoryofverification,withintheframeworkofapurelylocal,controlled,andrepeatableexperiment.Today,experi-mentationexhibitsthefollowingcharacteristic:inthecourseofanexperiment,onlyaverylimitednumberofparametersisallowedtovary,ontheassumptionthatalltherestoftheuniverse,withitsenormouscomplexity,anditslargenumberofvariables,willexercisenoinfluenceontheexperimentinprogress:ceterisparibus,“everythingelsedoesnotcount.”Toreachthisceterisparibus,alltheexperimenter’singenuitymustbebroughtintoplay,whichsometimesleadshimtoconstructgiganticinstru-mentssuchasparticleaccelerators.NowPlato,whoclearlyhadneithertheinstru-ments,northeunitsofmeasure,northemathematicallanguagewhichwouldhaveenabledhimtodoso,didnottrytocarryoutthistypeofexperiment.ThisdefectexplainswhythemodelsofexplanationheproposedintheTimaeusremainbereftofalloperativevalue.Byneglectingobservation,andespeciallybyrefusingexperimentalverification,Platocondemnedhisexplanationstoimpotence.Why,indeed,shouldoneprefertheexplanationsheproposedtoothersthatwereintuitivelymoreplausibleandusedordinarylanguage,lessabstrusethanthemathematicswhoseusewasreservedforasmallnumberofspecialists?Onthelevelofthehistoryofscience,therefore,Platoremainsanambiguousfigure–verymodernwhenheappealstomathematicsandwhenhecomplieswiththerigorsofdeductiveargumentation,butverytraditionalwhenheholdsobservationtobeworthlittle,andexperimentalverificationtobeimpossible.BibliographyWorksCitedAnton,J.P.(ed.).(1981).ScienceandtheSciencesinPlato.Buffalo,NY:CaravanBooks.(ArticlesbyVlastos,Mourelatos,TurnbullandMuelleronRepublicVII,528e–530c.)Balansard,A.(2001).TechnedanslesdialoguesdePlaton.L’empreintedelaSophistique.Introduc-tioninEnglishbyLucBrisson.SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.Brisson,L.(1999).“Unsilonganonymat.”InJ.-M.NarbonneandL.Langlois(eds.),Lamétaphysique.sonhistoire,sacritique,sesenjeux(pp.37–60).CollectionZétésis.Paris:Vrin/Québec:Pressedel’UniversitéLaval.230ACTC1223020/03/2006,04:04PM\nplato’snaturalphilosophyandmetaphysics——.(2000).“LerôledesmathématiquesdansleTiméeselonlesinterprétationscontemporaines.”InA.Neschke-Hentschke(ed.),LeTiméedePlaton.Contributionsàl’Histoiredesaréception(pp.295–315).Louvain:BibliothèquePhilosophiquedeLouvain/Paris:Peeters.——.(2002).“IstheWorldOne?ANewInterpretationofPlato’sParmenides.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,22,1–20.Cornford,F.M.(1937).Plato’sCosmology.London:Routledge&KeganPaul.Gill,M.L.(1996).“Introduction.”InM.L.GillandP.Ryan(trans.),Plato.Parmenides(pp.1–109).Indianapolis:Hackett.Gregory,A.(2000).Plato’sPhilosophyofScience.London:Duckworth.Johansen,T.K.(2004).Plato’sNaturalPhilosophy.AStudyoftheTimaeus-Critias.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Knorr,W.(1990).“PlatoandEudoxusonthePlanetaryMotions.”JournalfortheHistoryofAstronomy,21,313–29.Lloyd,G.E.R.(1968).“PlatoasaNaturalScientist.”JournalofHellenicStudies,88,78–92.——.(1991).“PlatoonMathematicsandNature,MythandScience.”InG.E.R.Lloyd,MethodandProblemsinGreekScience(pp.335–51).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.(Originallypublished1983inJapanese.)Mueller,I.(1992).“MathematicalMethodandPhilosophicalTruth.”InR.Kraut(ed.),TheCambridgeCompanionofPlato(pp.170–99).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Pritchard,P.(1995).Plato’sPhilosophyofMathematics.SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.Sayer,K.M.(1978).“Plato’sParmenides:WhytheEightHypothesesarenotContradictory.”Phronesis,23,123–50.Vlastos,G.(1988).“ElenchusandMathematics:ATurning-pointinPlato’sPhilosophicalDevelopment.”AmericanJournalofPhilology,109,362–96.Repr.inH.H.Benson(ed.).(1992),EssaysonthePhilosophyofSocrates(pp.137–61).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.FurtherReadingBrisson,L.(1992).Platon,Timée/Critias.Newtranslation(inFrench),introductionandnotes,withthecollaborationofMichelPatillonforthetranslation.GF618.Paris:Flammarion.Broadie,S.(2000).“TheodicyandPseudo-historyintheTimaeus.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,21,1–28.Burnyeat,M.F.(2000).“PlatoonWhyMathematicsisGoodfortheSoul.”InT.Smiley(ed.),MathematicsandNecessity:EssaysintheHistoryofPhilosophy(pp.1–82).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress/BritishAcademy.Calvo,T.andBrisson,L.(eds.).(1997).InterpretingtheTimaeus-Critias.ProceedingsoftheFourthSymposiumPlatonicum.SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.Natali,C.andMaso,S.(eds.).(2003).PlatoPhysicus.CosmologiaeantropologienelTimeo.Amsterdam:Hakkert.O’Brien,D.(1984).TheoriesofWeightintheAncientWorld.FouressaysonDemocritus,PlatoandAristotle.AStudyintheDevelopmentofIdeas.(vol2):Plato,WeightandSensation.TheTwoTheoriesoftheTimaeus.Paris:LesBellesLettres/Leiden:Brill.Sedley,D.N.(1997).“BecomingLiketheGod.”InT.CalvoandL.Brisson(eds.),InterpretingtheTimaeus-Critias(pp.327–39).ProceedingsoftheFourthSymposiumPlatonicum.SanktAugustin:AcademiaVerlag.Vlastos,G.(1975).Plato’sUniverse.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Zeyl,D.J.(2000).Plato.Timeaus.TranslationwithIntroduction.Indianapolis:Hackett.231ACTC1223120/03/2006,04:04PM\nACTC1223220/03/2006,04:04PM\nPartIIIAristotleACTC1323320/03/2006,04:04PM\npierrepellegrin234ACTC1323420/03/2006,04:04PM\nthearistotelianway13TheAristotelianWayPIERREPELLEGRINTheancientsthemselvesregardedPlatoandAristotleasthetwogreatestphilosopherswhohadeverlived.Thisevaluationhasenduredintomoderntimes,aswitnessedbythejudgmentofColeridgecitedintheIntroductiontothisvolume,amongmanyothers.Aristotle,infact,initiateda“styleofthought”thathasdeeplymarkedthehistoryofphilosophytothepresentday;and,ofthetwo“greats”inquestion,hehasindisputablyexercisedthedeeperandmorelastinghistoricalinfluenceonwesternthought.Dante,whomadehimthe“masterofthosewhoknow,”wasnotmistaken.Wecangainaccesstothis“Aristotelianthought”byconsideringsomehistoricalandbiographicalfactsaboutAristotlehimself.Aristotlewasbornin384bce,inStagira,aChalcideancity.ThoughGreekbylanguageandculture,hewasthereforeasubjectofthekingofMacedonia,withwhomhisfather,aphysician,maintainedfriendlyrelations(cf.Pellegrin,1996).Itisremark-able,forthatmatter,thatwiththeexceptionofSocratesandPlatoallthegreatGreekphilosopherscamefromtheperipheryof,orfromoutside,theGreekpolitico-culturalsphere.ThisclosenessofAristotle’sfamilytotheMacedoniandynastyisdoubtlessattherootofoneofthemostnotableepisodesofAristotle’slife,namelytheteachinghelavishedontheMacedonianprincewhowouldbecomeAlexandertheGreat.ForPhilip,Alexander’sfather,Aristotlewasnodoubtonlya“secondchoice”:ifhewantedtogivehissonaGreekeducation,butwithouthishavingtoleaveMacedonia,heprobablycouldnotcallonpeopleaswell-knownasPlatoorIsocrates,whowerehardlyinclinedtoleaveAthens.Whenhebecametheprince’stutor,AristotlehadnotyetfoundedtheLyceumandwasnotyetrecognizedasamajorphilosopher.Abouttherelationsbetweenteacherandpupil–whostudiedwithAristotlefromtheageof13to20–weknowlittleforcertain,anditisbettertoleaveasidethemanystoriesonthesubject.Yetthereisonepointonwhichtoreflect.Alexanderwastheprincipalagentinaradicalchangeinworldhistory,whichhistorianshavemarkedbysayingthathisreigncompletesthe“classical”periodandbeginsthe“Hellenistic”one.Amongthemanychanges,weareaboveallinterestedinthepoliticaltransformationoftheGreekworld.Thecity,whichwasthebasicpoliticalunitoftheclassicalGreekworld,giveswaytolargekingdomsandpersistsonlyasamunicipalentity.AlexanderhimselfwantedtoputanendtoGreekethnocentrism,whichregardedallnon-Hellenes,oratleastallnon-Greekspeakers,as“barbarians.”Hethusconceivedagreatprojectofpoliticalandeven“biological”fusion–sinceheencouragedhisofficerstomarryPersianwomen–betweentheGreco-MacedoniansandthepeoplesunderPersiandomination.Aristotlewasnotthetheoristofthisnewworldbeingbornbeforehiseyes.Onthe235ACTC1323520/03/2006,04:04PM\npierrepellegrincontrary,hebuttressedthecitybytakingittobethemostdevelopedformofhumanassociation.Further,followingatheoryofclimates,otherversionsofwhicharefoundinPlatoandintheHippocratictreatiseAirs,Waters,Places,AristotlethoughtthatduetotheirenvironmentonlytheGreekswereabletocombinelibertywithintelligenceandtoliveinacity,whereasthebarbarianswere,atleastintendency,ofaslavishnature.ThisAristotelianbackwardnessinpoliticsisperhapsthemainreasonfortherelativedisinterestinAristotle’spoliticalphilosophyamonglatergenerations,sinceitrestsuponahistoricallymoribundreality.ThePoliticswasnottranslatedintoArabic.Aristotlewasthelastofthe“classicalphilosophers,”notthefirstoftheHellenisticones.Inhisconceptionoftheworld,he,whoseGreeknesshasbeenquestioned,remainedstrictlyGreek.Thesecond“greatman”towhomAristotlemustberelatedisobviouslyPlato.TheyoungAristotlemetPlatoatabout17,whenhecametoAthensandbecameamemberoftheAcademy.ItseemscertainthatAristotlewasacriticalstudent,butitishardreallytojudgewhathisattitudewastowardPlato,becausethetraditionofferstwocontrarypicturesofit.Ononepicture,Aristotlewasaquasi-orthodoxPlatonistwhosecriticismofthetheoryofFormswasintheendnomorevirulentthanthatfoundinPlato’sdialoguesthemselves,especiallybeginningwiththeParmenides.Onthecon-traryone,interpretershaveregardedAristotleastheanti-Platonicphilosopherparexcellence.AninterestingexampleofthisinterpretivedichotomyconcernsthequestionofwhenexactlyAristotlefoundedhisownschool,theLyceum.SomeholdingthathedidsoduringthelifetimeofPlato–whothen,accordingtoDiogenesLaertius,comparedhimtoacoltkickingoutagainstitsmother–whileaccordingtoothershedidnotdecidetofoundhisownschooluntiltheheadshipoftheAcademy,havingfirsteludedhiminfavorofSpeusippus,eludedhimforthesecondtime,infavorofXenocrates.Thissecondhypothesisseemsmoresolid,andtodayitisgenerallyagreedthattheLyceumwasfoundedin335.Behindthebiographicalanecdoteliesafunda-mentaldifferenceininterpretationofimmenseconsequence.TheNeoplatonicphilo-sopherswhodominatedthephilosophicalsceneattheendofantiquity,allofwhomcommentedonAristotle(cf.Hoffmann,whatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?,inthisvolume),inclinedtowardaconciliatoryattitude,accordingtowhich,ontheonehand,thereisnodivergencebetweenPlatoandAristotle,and,ontheother,thestudyofAristotleisapreliminarytothatofPlatoforthestudentofphilosophy.InlateantiquityandintheByzantineworld,treatisesonthe“harmonyofPlatoandAristotle”camealmosttoconstitutealiterarygenre.Inthisareatwoaspectsmustbedistinguished.First,thereistheextenttowhichAristotleadheredtoPlatonisttheses.Forexample,oneofthemosttenaciouscom-monplacesofthehistoryofphilosophy–andonethatisfarfrombeingwhollyfalse–isthatAristotlereplacedthesupra-sensiblePlatonicformswithaformthatisinvolvedinmatter.ThereisalsothequestionofdifferencesofstructurebetweenPlatonicandAristotelianthought.Onthefirstpoint,aswehaveseen,traditioninantiquitywavered,withamajoritytendingtoregardPlatoandAristotleasintheoreticalharmony.Modernandcon-temporaryinterpreters,onthecontrary,havemostoftenheldthatthepositionsofAristotleandthoseofPlatowereirreconcilable.Letusconsiderafewofthegreat236ACTC1323620/03/2006,04:04PM\nthearistotelianwaydivergencesthatthetraditionhasclaimedtodiscoverbetweenthetwophilosophers.TheodorGomperzsoughttoexplainwhatseemedtohimtobeaninternaltensionintheAristoteliancorpusasastrugglebetweentwotendenciesinAristotle,orratherbetweentwocoexistingpersonalitiesinhim,whomGomperzcalled“thePlatonist”andthe“theAsclepiad”(cf.Gomperz,1920).ThespeculativeboldnesstransmittedtohimbythecompanyofPlatowastemperedbyanempiricaltendencyinheritedfromAris-totle’sphysicianfather.Inthesamevein,manyinterpretershaveopposedtheeminentrolethatPlatogivestomathematicstoasupposedexperimentalbentinAristotle.Whenwelookatthingsmoreclosely,thecontrastbetweenPlatoandAristotleisnotasdefiniteasitseems.Aristotleisfarfromhavingneglectedmathematics,andifitisnot“invasive”inhisworks,thatismainlybecauseitisnot,ornotmainly,atheoreticaltoolbutaparticularsciencealongsideothers,asweshallseeagainbelow.AsfortheideathatAristotlewishedtointroduceintophilosophyanempiricismacquiredfromthecompanyofphysicians,itisinonesensethereverseofthetruth.Farfromhavingwishedto“medicalize”philosophy,Aristotleonthecontraryattemptedtoputmedicinebackunderthecontrolofphilosophy(cf.Pellegrin,ancientmedicineanditscontri-butiontothephilosophicaltradition,inthisvolume).OnemightaddthatAristotleretainsthemainrequirementsof“scientific”knowledgeaccordingtoPlato,inparticulartheuniversalityandnecessityofitspropositionsaswellastheimmutabilityofitsobject(cf.BodnárandPellegrin,aristotle,physics,andcosmology,inthisvolume).Inaword,discussionofthedegreeofconvergencebetweenPlato’sthesesandthoseofAristotleleadstoundecidablequestionsratherthanindisputableresults.Bycon-trast,whatclearlydistinguishesAristotlefromPlatointhedomainofepistemologyisAristotle’sfundamentalandunshakeableconfidenceinperception.Oneofhisbasicideas,infact,isthatnaturehassufficientlyfurnisheduswiththeinstrumentsneededtogiveusadequateknowledgeofreality.ThisisnottoimplythatAristotlewasnotawareoftherisksoferrortowhichperceptionexposesus;butforhimtheseerrorsareforeseeableandavoidable.Inthecognitivedomain,the“powerofperception,”tobor-rowthetitleofabookbyDeborahModrak(Modrak,1987),isimmense:firstbecauseperceptiongivesusanaccuratepictureofthingsastheyare,thenbecauseperceptionservesasakindofmodelforeveryothercognitiveprocess,andfinallybecausepercep-tionisanecessaryconditionforallotherkindsofknowledge.HerethereisarealbreakwithPlatonism.Fromourmodernpointofview,wecanrendertwocontraryverdictsonthisaspectofAristotelianism.ManyhaveextolledAristotle’s“returntothereal”afterthespeculativeexcessesofPlatothatledtothemysticaldoctrinesoftheNeoplatonists.Thusthose,andtheyaremany,whobelievethatmodernscienceisfundamentallyempirical–whichisamanifestuntruth–seeinAristotleascientistora“proto-scientist”inthemodernsense.Thosewhoaremoreinformedbothaboutthehistoryofscienceandabouttheverynatureofscientificknowledgeknowthatsciencebeginsanddevelopsinthefaceofperceptualevidence.Thustheanti-Aristotelianmove-mentoftheRenaissancedidnothavesimply,orevenmainly,anti-religiousmotives,ashastoooftenbeensaidandtaught–becauseAristotlehadbeenannexedbytheThomists–butratherscientificones.Furthermore,itisverystrikingthatthemakersofthenewworld,asagainstAristotle’sworld–whichwastheworldofourperception,withtheearthmotionlessatthecenter,objectsdefinedbytheirqualities,etc.–soughttheirinspirationandtheirmodelsinthePlatonisttradition(cf.Koyré,1957).237ACTC1323720/03/2006,04:04PM\npierrepellegrinWhenonecomestowhatwerecalledabovethe“differencesinstructure”betweenPlatonismandAristotelianism,nofurtherdoubtispossible:Aristotleisindeedentirelyopposedtohisteacheronsomefundamentalpoints.Itisatthislevelthatonemustseekwhatismostcharacteristicof“Aristotelianthought.”Weshallconsidertwoofthesepoints.Aristotledidnotdoubtforoneinstantthatherepresentedtheultimateperfectionofhumanthought.Manyphilosophershavetakenthesamepositionabouttheirownthought.ItistruenonethelessthatAristotelianism,incontrasttoPlatonism,isadeeplyhistoricalwayofthinking.Intheintroductionweappliedtheterm“teleological”tothisformofhistoricism,insofarasAristotleseeshisownsystemastheculminatingpointofthehistoryofthought.AccordingtoAristotle,allphilosophers,oralmostall,haveexpressedsomepartofthetruth,atruthhesaidwashardtoattainandalsohardtomissentirely(Met.a.1,993a30).Aristotle’spositionhereaccordswithwhathethoughtaboutthepowersofperception:throughoursense-organs,realityconstrainseventhemostunwilling,suchastheEleatics,toseeitasitis(cf.Phys.I.5,188b30).ThiscontrastbetweenPlato,whothinksafreshattheendofahistorymadeupoferrors,andAristotle,whotakeshisplaceinahistoricaldevelopmentofthediscoveryofthetruth,recursthroughoutthehistoryofphilosophy:fromthisviewpointDescartesisonPlato’ssideandHegelonAristotle’s.Butthemostpronouncedstructuralcontrastbetweenthetwophilosophersconcernstheirconceptionofscientificknowledgeitself,thistermbeingunderstoodintheancientsense.ForPlato,whatintheRepublichecalleddialecticisthescienceofeverything.Theothersciencesare,pedagogically,waysofaccesstoitand,theoretically,derivativefromit.Aristotle,onthecontrary,conceivedofknowledgeasirremediablydivided.Thebasicthesisofhisepistemologyisthatthereisonescience(epistEmE)pergenus(genos),andadisciplinethatconcernsseveralgeneraisnotitselfascience,evenifseveralsciencescanmakeuseofit.Thuswedonotdemonstrategeometricalpropertieswithinandbymeansofarithmeticalscience,andifAristotleindeedalludedtoakindofgeneralmathematics,itremainedatheoreticalphantom.Inpracticethissystemismoreflexiblethanitseemstobe,sinceitleavessomeroomforsciencessubordinatetooneanotherandforscienceswhoseobjectsareconcernedwithseveralgenerabecausetheycanbeconsideredfromdifferentpointsofview:thusopticsdependsongeometrywhenweconsiderlightraysasstraightlinesandonphysicswhenweconsidertheirmaterialcomposition.AstilldeeperdivisionseparateswhatBookEoftheMetaphysicscallstheoretical,practical,andproductivesciences.Leavingasidethelatter,whichareinfactrationaltechniqueslikearchitecture,weseethatthetheoreticalsciences,ofwhichthethreegreattypesaremathematics,physics,andtheology,haveadifferentkindofrationalitythanpracticalscienceslikepoliticsandethics(seeKeyt,aristotle’spoliticalphilosophy,inthisvolume).Thisdivisionofknowledgeintoirreduciblydifferenttypeshasextraordinarilyimportantconsequences.Itisnolongerthephilosopherwhoisthebestmathematician,butneitherishetheonewhoshouldbusyhimselfwithrulingthecity.Atmostthephilosophercanparticipateinmoldingthelegislator.Platoalreadysentadviserstoprinces,butinthehopethatsomedayphilosopherswouldtakepower.Aristotleconfinestheirroletothatofteachersandadvisers.238ACTC1323820/03/2006,04:04PM\nthearistotelianwayWhatAristotleobjectstoinPlatoiscertainlywhathasbeencalledhis“idealism,”whichdrovehimtopositsupra-sensibleentitiesthatintheendareuseless.Butitisalso,andperhapsprimarily,thathisthinkingrestsonaconfusionbetweennotionsandmethodsthatmustbedistinguished.ThusatthebeginningofthePolitics,AristotlecriticizesthePlatonists–withoutnamingthem,however–becausetheyappealtoanotionof“power”thatisaconceptualgrab-bagintowhichanythingmaybeput,whereasthepowerofslave-master,thehusband,thefather,theking,andthemagistrateareproperlydistinguished,becausethesepowersare“ofdifferentkinds.”Historically,thisAristotelianorganizationofknowledgehashadanextraordinaryinfluence,especiallyontheinstitutionalplane.UponitwasmodeledtheorganizationofstudiesattheMuseuminAlexandria,forexample.Initspartitionbydisciplines–physics,metaphysics,psychology,politics,etc.–abooklikethisoneis,fromacertainviewpoint,moreAristotelianthatPlatonic;butthereasonsarepedagogicalratherthantheoretical.Herewealsofindakindofoscillationinhistorybetweenaunitaryvisionofthesciencesandareturntoapluralconceptionofknowledge.Atthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury,forexample,thephysicalsciencesclaimedtoabsorballthesciences,notjustbiology(withthe“chemistryoflife”)butalsopsychologyandthosesciencesknownas“social.”ThePlatonicdialecticianthendonnedthegarbofthephysicist.ThisunificationonaphysicalistbasiswasalreadypresentinDescartes.Todaythepractice,ifnotthetheory,ofthesciencesseemsorientedrathertoapluralistapproach.Weare,tothatextent,inanAristotelianage:thissituationperhapspartlyexplainstheinfatuationwithAristotlethatemergedinthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury.Thusthesciencesofourdayarealldiscovering(orrediscovering)Aristotelianrootsbothindividuallyandintheirorganization.Forthehistorianofphilosophy,theAristoteliancorpusdisplayscertainspecifictraits.Themostimportantaretheresultofthewaythesetextsweretransmitted.Thehistoryofthistransmissionisofthemostromanticsort,anditisimpossiblecompletelytodisentanglethetruefromthelegendaryintheaccountsthathavecomedowntous.Theophrastus,Aristotle’ssuccessorasheadoftheLyceum,lefthislibrarycontainingAristotle’sworksinparticulartoNeleusofSkepsis,thesonofhisformerco-discipleCoriscus.ThisisnodoubtthesameCoriscuswhomAristotleoftentakesasanexampleofanindividualman.AsthekingsofPergamum,theAttalids,wantedtobuildalibraryabletorivalthatofAlexandria,andtothatendconductedaveritablehuntforbooks,theheirsofNeleus,fearingtheirpossessionswouldbestolenfromthem,hidAristotle’sworksinacellar,fromwhichtheywerenotremoveduntilacenturyandahalflaterbyacertainAppelliconofTeos,whowasintheemployofthekingMithridates.AppelliconhadcopiesmadeofAristotle’stexts.WhenMithridateswasdefeatedbytheRomans,thelibraryinquestionendedupinRomeinthehandsofTyrranion,aremarkablemanwhowasCicero’slibrarianandthetutorofhisson,whotookuptheprojectofeditingAristotle’sworks.Buttheenterprisewasreallybroughttocomple-tiononlybyAndronicusofRhodes,theeleventhsuccessortoAristotleasheadoftheLyceum(fromabout70to50bce).AndronicuscorrectedandeditedthetextsofAris-totleand,mostimportant,setthemintheorderinwhichtheyhavebeentransmitted239ACTC1323920/03/2006,04:04PM\npierrepellegrintous.AlllatereditionsarethusmerelyreincarnationsofthatofAndronicusofRhodes(seeMejer,ancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltradition,inthisvolume).Whydwellatsuchlengthonwhatseems,atfirstsight,amereseriesofanecdotes?Wecan,infact,drawsomesignificantelementsfromit.First,accordingtothishistory,theworksofAristotlethatweknowremainedunknowntotheeducatedpublicfortwocenturiesafterthedeathofthemaster.NodoubtAndronicusexaggeratedthingsalittleforthesakeofakindofpublicityfortheeditionhepublished.ButonthewholeitseemsestablishedthatwhattheeducatedpublicknewbeforeAndronicuswas“another”Aristotle,onewhowroteworksforpublication,includingacertainnumberofdialoguesinthePlatonicmanner.ThisAristotleismoreorlesscompletelylosttous.Asecondveryimportantpoint:theAristotlewehavehasthusbeensubjecttotwokindsofintervention.Foronething,thetextswerenotoriginallyintendedforpublica-tion,butrathersprangfromAristotle’steaching,andweredoubtlesspartlyre-written,especiallytotakeaccountofcommentsofthestudents.ThenAndronicusputthetextsinasystematicorderthatseemedadequatetohimbutdoesnotreflecttheplaceAristotleintendedtogivetoeachofthem.Thiseditorialtaskalsoimpliesmanyadjust-ments,divisions,andadditionsonthepartofaneditorwho,likethoseofhistime,didnothaveamoderneditor’srespectfortheletterofthetext.Inbrief,contrarytowhatholdsinthecaseofPlato,wedonothaveatextthatis,strictlyspeaking,fromAristotle’sownhand(or,moreprecisely,dictatedbyhim,sincetheancientsdidnotwritebutratherdictatedtheworkspublishedundertheirnames).Ifthereis,indeed,astylerecognizableinalltheAristoteliantreatises,wecanbynomeansspeakofitasAristotle’sstyle,whereasweknowthestyleofPlatothroughthedialogues.ThemostimportantconsequenceofthisisthatachronologyofAristotle’stextscannotbeestablishedonthebasisofstylisticevidence,ashasbeendoneforPlato’sdialogues(seeC.Gill,theplatonicdialogue,inthisvolume).When,therefore,twopassagespresentdifferentviewsandconsequentlycanbepresumedtohavebeenwrittenatdifferenttimesinAristotle’slife,wecantellwhichisearlieronlybyrelyingondoctrinalcriteria.ItwasonlyinthetwentiethcenturythathistoriansofphilosophyreallyappliedthemselvestotheproblemofAristotle’sdoctrinaldevelopment.ThefoundingworkonthequestionisthatofWernerJaeger,Aristotle:FundamentalsoftheHistoryofhisDevelopment,firstpublishedinGermanin1923.Jaeger’scentralideaisthatthevari-ousAristoteliantextscanbedatedaccordingtotheirgreaterorlesserdistancefromPlatonism,withthemorePlatonicpassagesbelongingtoanearlierperiodofAristotle’sactivity,whenhewasmoreinfluencedbytheteachingoftheAcademy.Thismethodencounterstwodifficulties.First,determiningthe“degreeofPlatonism”ofatextisverydifficultformultiplereasons(forexample,thepresenceofPlatonicechoesinthevocabularyusedbyAristotleisnotasignofgreaterproximitytoPlatonism).Second,andaboveall,Jaeger’spositionrestsonapsychologicalandtheoreticalsuppositionwhosetruthisnotatallevident:whyshouldAristotlehavemovedawayfromthePlatonismtowhichhemoreorlessadheredinhisyouth?WhyshouldhenotratherhaverejectedPlatonismwhenhewasyoung,todrawnearertoitlater,assomethink(cf.Düring,1966,Owen,1965)?ThefundamentalflawinthemanystudiesdevotedtoAristotle’schronologyisthusthatonelooksfor,andfinds,intheAristoteliancorpussupportforapreconceivedideaofAristotle’sintellectualhistory.Forexample,240ACTC1324020/03/2006,04:04PM\nthearistotelianwaymanyhavefounditentirely“natural”that,afterthemysticaltendenciesofyouth,aswitnessedforinstancebyadialoguelikeEudemus,ortheImmortalityoftheSoul,inwhichAristotleissaidtohaveheldthatthebestthinghumanscandoistodieasswiftlyaspossiblesothattheirsoulscanreturntotheirtruehomeland,Aristotlebecamemore“positive”and,forexample,developedhisstudiesasanaturalist.Suchapositionisclearlyweak.Thebestthingisthustoleaveasideallchronologicalhypo-thesesinreadingtheAristoteliancorpus,whilerecognizingthatAristotleverylikelydidevolveinthecourseofhisphilosophicalcareer.OurtendencytoseeAristoteliandoctrineashighlysystematiccouldevenberegardedastheeffectofanillusionduetotheinterventionofAndronicus.ThissupposedsystematicitymaybeoneofthesourcesoftheimageofarigidanddogmaticAristotle,oftencontrastedwithaflexibleandseductivePlato.Thetruthismorenuanced.Aristotleisnotadogmatist,inthepejorativesense,butasearcher.Thisisseen,forexample,inhispracticeofdialecticandintherolehegivestodoxographiesinhisphilosophicalwork.ForAristotle,dialecticisnolongerthesupremescienceitwasintheRepublic;ratheritbecomes,likerhetoric–towhichdialecticis,accordingtoAristotle,veryclose–adisciplinethatcodifiesdiscussionbetweentwodisputantsonanygivenquestion.DialecticthusstillhastheuniversalvalueithadforPlato,butitlosesitsscientificcharacterbecauseitisnotconfinedtoonegenus.Now,onefunctionofdialecticthathasmuchinterestedcommentatorsisitsroleinestablishingtheprinciplesofthesciences.AccordingtotheletterofAristotle’stext(Top.I.2,101a36),dialectic“exam-ines”thenotionsinvolvedintheprinciplesinlightof“reputableopinions”(endoxa),thatis,opinionsgrantedbyeveryone,orbymostpeople,orbythewise,orbythemajorityofthem.Inshort,farfrombeingamanoftheschoolorsect,Aristotlecontinues,intheSocratictradition,tosubmitphilosophicalactivitytothescrutinyofthemaninthestreet.AsforAristotle’suseofdoxography,itconformstowhatwassaidabove:allopinionsmustbetakenintoaccountbecauseall–exceptthoseofparadox-seekerssuchastheSophists–expressasideofthetruth.ThisisthemainreasonforthepresenceofextensivedoxographiesatthebeginningofalmostalltheAristoteliantreatises.FromthisalsostemsoneoftheremarkablecharacteristicsofAristotle’sschool,theLyceum,whichwasastorehouseofknowledgeandobjects:carryingonapracticealreadypresentintheAcademy,itcollectedthepoliticalconstitutionsofnumerouscitiesandbarbarianpeoples(thesourcessay250or255)aswellaslistsof“customs.”EachofAristotle’sassistantswasinchargeofaparticulardisciplineandofitshistory(Eudemuswasinchargeofgeometry,arithmetic,andastronomy;Theophrastusofbiolo-gicalsciences;someothersofmusic,literarycriticism,etc.).Aristotleseems,moreover,tohavebegunanewrelationtowritingbyowningalibraryhimself,whichnoone,withfewexceptions(e.g.,Euripides),haddonebefore.Hewasknownas“thereader.”Infact,theLyceumoperatedasthefirstuniversityinthequasi-modernsenseoftheword,muchmorethandidtheAcademyortheHellenisticphilosophicalschools.Thiswasdue,fundamentally,toAristotle’sconceptionofknowledge:anyoneinterestedinaparticularsubjectcouldcometotheLyceumwithouthavingtogiveupthatinterest.Onthecontrary,hefoundhisplaceintheglobalresearchprogramoftheschool.Untiltheendofantiquity,theLyceumremainedoneofthegreatphilosophicalschools241ACTC1324120/03/2006,04:04PM\npierrepellegrin(cf.Moraux,1973,1984).Thiscanbeseenineveryperiodofancienthistory.Oneexample:Galen’sfatherthoughtthatacompleteeducationforhissonshouldincludeinstructionbyaPeripateticteacher;andwhenGalenarrivedinRome,hefoundaveryactivePeripateticintellectualcircle,whichhadconnectionsinthehighestcirclesofRomansociety.ButAristotle’sglorydayswouldcomemuchlater.NowadayswestillthinkwithintheintellectualframeworkputinplacebytheRenaissanceandmodernscience.ThissciencewaslargelyconstructedinoppositiontoAristotelianism.Theattacksdirectedagainstit,becauseoftheirpassion,theirexcessivenessand,often,theirbadfaith,areinfactatributetotheconceptualstrengthofthePeripateticphilosophy.StartingwiththefirstrediscoveryoftheGreektexts,whichtookplaceinthetimeoftheCrusades,WesternChristianthinkers,oratleastthebestofthemsuchasAlbertusMagnusandThomasAquinas,foundinAristotlenotjustamassofknowledgetowhichtheydidnothaveaccessbutalsoaneffectivewayofthinkingfortheirowntime.HerewefindagaincharacteristicsofAristotelianismwementionedearlier:itsencyclopedictendency,anditswayofarticulatingdifferentkindsofknowledge.Marie-DominiqueChenuhasconvincinglyshownthetruereasonsfortheAristotelianrevivalofthethirteenthcentury(Chenu,1954).ThomasAquinasobviouslycontinuedtobelievethatGodcaninterveneintheworldwhereverandwheneverHepleases,evenoverturningtheorderofnature.Butthenewworldbornaroundthecitiesinfactlivedinanaturethatwascoherent,autonomous,andnolongerexplicitlydependentonspecialdivinedecreesforeachofitsevents.APlatonistvision,asrevisedbyAugustine,thatrelatedallofrealityandalleventstoafirstprincipleastheirsinglesourcewasnolongeradequatetothisnewworld.But,aswehaveseen,itischaracteristicofAristotelianismtoarticulate,ifnotwithoutdifficultyorobscurity,aglobalvisionofbeinganddistinctdomainsofreality,towhichdifferentcognitiveaimscorrespond.HerewefindagainthecardinalruleofAristotelianepistemology,whichconfineseverysciencetoasinglegenus.ThebenefitsofsuchavisionweresuchthatThomasAquinasdidnothesitatetopayanenormouspricetoannexAristotle:thereconciliationofAristotle’sthoughtwithaJudaeo-Christiantheologycompletelyalientoit.ThusAristotelianismlivedonandcon-tinuedtospeak.AsPicodellaMirandolaputit,“SineThomamutusessetAristoteles.”BibliographyTexts,Translations,andReferenceWorksforAristotleAristotle’sworksarecitedbyBekkernumbers:pageandcolumnofAristotelisoperaeditedbyImmanuelBekkerpublishedbythePrussianAcademy(1831–70).Berlin:G.Reimer.ThefirsttwovolumesincludethetextofAristotleeditedbyBekker(2columns);vol.3containssomeLatintranslations;vol.4:containsexcerptsfromthecommentators;vol.5istheIndexAristotelicusbyH.Bonitz,whichhasbeenseparatelypublished(listedbelow).AllsubsequenteditionsoftheGreektextusetheBekkernumbers.ConcordanceBonitz,H.(1870).IndexAristotelicus.2edn.,1955.Berlin.Repr.Graz:AkademischeDruck-u.Verlagsanstalt.242ACTC1324220/03/2006,04:04PM\nthearistotelianwayModerneditionsofAristotleareintheseriesOxfordClassicalTexts(variouseditors).Oxford:ClarendonPress.AnumberofthemaintextshavebeeneditedwithcommentarybyW.D.Ross.Thoseusedarecitedintheseparatebibliographiesinthissection.EnglishtranslationofAristotleBarnes,J.(ed.).(1984).TheCompleteWorksofAristotle.TherevisedOxfordtranslation.(2vols.).Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.AncientCommentariesCommentariainAristotelemGraeca(citedasCAG).Variouseditors.(23vols.)Berlin:G.Reimer,1882–1909.TheseworksarecurrentlybeingtranslatedintoEnglishintheseriesAncientCommentatorsonAristotle.R.Sorabji(GeneralEditor).Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress/London:Duckworth.MedievalCommentariesAverroes.JunctaseditionVenice1562–74.Repr.byMinerva,FrankfurtamMain1962.AquinasCommentariesonAristotlearepublishedbyMarietti.SomeofthesecommentarieshavebeentranslatedintoEnglish.TheDumbOxBooksintendtobringoutalltheAristoteliancom-mentariesinEnglish.SomeoftheEnglishtranslationscurrentlyavailableare:Blackwell,R.J.,Spath,R.J.,andThirlkel,W.E.(trans.).(1963).St.ThomasAquinas.CommentaryonAristotle’sPhysics.IntroductionbyV.J.Bourke.London:Routledge&KeganPaul.Foster,K.,O.P.andHumphries,Fr.S.,O.P.(trans.).(1951).Atistotle’sDeAnimawiththeCommentaryofSt.ThomasAquinas.IntroductionbyIvoThomas,O.P.London:Routledge&KeganPaul.Litzinger,C.I.,O.P.(trans.).(1993).St.ThomasAquinas.CommentaryonAristotle’sNicomacheanEthics.ForewordbyRalphMcInerny.NotreDame,Ind.:DumbOxBooks1993.(Translationoriginallypublished1964.)WorksCitedChenu,M.-D.(1954).Introductionàl’étudedesaintThomasd’Aquin.Paris:Vrin.Düring,I.(1966).Aristoteles.DarstellungundInterpretationseinesDenkens.Heidelberg:Universitätverlag.Gomperz,T.(1920).GreekThinkers:AHistoryofAncientPhilosophy(trans.L.MagnusandG.G.Berry)(4vols.).London:J.Murray.(OriginalworkpublishedinGerman1896–1909.)Jaeger,W.(1923).Aristoteles,GrundlegungeinerGeschichteseinerEntwicklung.Berlin:WeidmannscheBuchhandlung.(EnglishversionAristotle:FundamentalsoftheHistoryofhisDevelopment.(trans.R.Robinson).2ndedn.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.1948.Koyré,A.(1957).FromtheClosedWorldtotheInfiniteUniverse.Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.Modrak,D.(1987).Aristotle.ThePowerofPerception.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Moraux,P.(1973,1984).DerAristotelismusbeidenGriechen.(2vols.)Berlin:deGruyter.243ACTC1324320/03/2006,04:04PM\npierrepellegrinOwen,G.E.L.(1965).“ThePlatonismofAristotle.”ProceedingsoftheBritishAcademy,50,125–50.Repr.inG.E.L.Owen,(1986).Logic,Science,andDialectic:CollectedPapersinGreekPhilosophy(M.C.Nussbaum,ed.)(pp.200–20).London:Duckworth/Ithaca,NYCornellUniversityPress.Pellegrin,P.(1996).“Aristote,Hippocrate,Œdipe.”InR.WitternandP.Pellegrin(eds.),HippokratischeMedizinundantikePhilosophie(pp.183–98).Hidelsheim,Zürich/NewYork:Olms.FurtherReadingGottschalk,H.B.(1987).“AristotelianPhilosophyintheRomanWorldfromtheTimeofCicerototheEndoftheSecondCenturyAD.”ANRWII.36(2),1079–174.Grayeff,F.(1974).AristotleandhisSchool.London:Duckworth.Lynch,J.P.(1972).Aristotle’sSchool.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Natali,C.(1991).BiosTheoretikos.LaVitadiAristoteleel’OrganizationedellasuaScuola.Bologna:IlMulino.244ACTC1324420/03/2006,04:04PM\naristotle’slogicandtheoryofscience14Aristotle’sLogicandTheoryofScienceWOLFGANGDETELKnowledgeandAnalysisAristotle’slogicandtheoryofsciencehavebeenhandeddowntousintwotextsthatarenowadayscalledPriorAnalyticsandPosteriorAnalytics,respectively.ButAristotlehimselfusuallyrefersbothtohislogicandhistheoryofscienceas“analytics”(e.g.,Top.VIII.11,162a11–12;Met.Z.12,1037b8–9;ENVI.3,1139b27;Rh.I.2,1356b10),andtheveryfirstsentenceofthePriorAnalyticsannouncesanenquiryaboutdemon-strativeknowledgewhichisthespecifictopicofthePosteriorAnalytics:“Firstwemuststatethesubjectoftheenquiryandwhatitisabout:thesubjectisdemonstration,anditisaboutdemonstrativeknowledge”(APr.I.1,24a10–11).Hence,forAristotletheprocedureofanalysis(analusis)iscrucialforbothlogicandthetheoryofscience,andhislogiccalledsyllogisticissimplyapartofhistheoryofscientificknowledgeanddemonstration.WecanonlyunderstandinwhichwayAristotleputsanalysistowork1inlogicandscienceifwefirstlookbrieflyathisbasicnotionofknowledge(epistEmE).AristotletookoverfromPlatotheideathatknowledgeinthepropersenseisaboutuniversalfactsintheuniverse.However,whileknowledgeofuniversalfactsis,forAristotle,certainlyabasickindofknowledge,scientificknowledgeconsistsinknowingthecausesofgivenfacts,thecausesbeing,ofcourse,themselvesfacts(APo.I.2,71b9–16):Firstwehavetoestablishthefacts;and“whenweknowthefactweseekthereasonwhy”(APo.II.1,esp.89b29–31).Inthisway,science(epistEmE)is,ontheonehand,aspecificstateoftheknowingsubject,and,ontheotherhand,thesetofspecifictheorieswehave–accordingtoadequatemethods–establishedandgraspedifweareinthespecificepistemicstatecalledscience.Aristotlecaresalotaboutreliablemethodsofestablishingfacts;buthismaincon-cernintheAnalyticsisthemethodologyoffindingcausesforgivenfacts.Giventhatallanimalshaveastomachwewanttoknowwhythatisso.Afirstideamightbethatallanimalstakeinfoodfromoutsideandthereforeneedanorganforreceivinganddigestingfood,andthisisjustthestomach(PAIII.14,674a12–19).Giventhatallstatuesmadeofmetalareheavywewanttoknowwhy.Ananswermightbethatallthesestatuesareofbronzeandbronzeisaprettyheavymetal.Findingoutaboutcausesofgivenfactsclearlycomesdown,linguisticallyspeaking,tolookingforadequate1.Forhisdiscussionofnamesandassertions,anotherpreliminarytopic,seeModrak,philo-sophyoflanguage,inthisvolume.245ACTC1424520/03/2006,04:05PM\nwolfgangdetelpremisesforagivenconclusion.Morespecifically,ifwenote,asAristotledid,thestandardformofapredicationCisanAinverselyasAbelongs(asaproperty)toC’s(letusabbreviatethisbyAC),scientificknowledgeofACprovides,inthesimplestcase,premisesABandBCforACsuchthatthenewtermBpointstothecause.Forinstance,whydoesbeingheavy(A)belongtostatuesofmetal(C)?Becausethereisapropertyconsistingofbronze(B)suchthatbeingheavybelongstoallthingsconsistingofbronze(AB)andconsistingofbronzebelongstostatuesofmetal(BC).Itisatthispointthatwecanseehowtheprocedureofanalysisentersthepicture.Theunderlyingideaisthat,ingeneral,knowledgeofadomainentailsknowingallthesimplestpartsofthisdomain(Phys.I.1,184a9–14;Met.H.1,1042a5–6),andthemethodoftheoreticallydividingadomainintoitssimplestpartsiscalledanalysis(ENIII.3,1112b20–24).Analysiscanbeapplied,forinstance,tomeans–endrelationsin2ethics(ibid.)andtotwo-dimensionaldiagramsingeometry(Met.Q.9,1051a21–26),butisusedmostprominentlyinlogic(APr.I.44,50b30,51a1–3)andscience(APr.I.32,47a3–5;APo.I.12,78a7;I.32,88b15–20;II.5,91b12–13).Inparticular,ifweseek,inascientificenterprise,thecausesofgivenfacts,thisisanimportantcaseofanalysis:wetrytoanalyzegivenfactsintermsoffurtherfactsthatpointtocausesofthegivenfacts.Linguisticallyspeaking,wetrytoanalyze,inthesimplestcase,agivenpropositionACbyprovidingathirdtermBsuchthatABandBCarepremisesoftheconclusionACandthus,ACisanalyzedintoABandBC.Thetwopremiseshaveoneterm,themiddleterm,viz.B,incommon;theothertwoterms,viz.AandC,arecalledextremes.IftherearenomoremiddletermssuchthatABandBCcanthemselvesbeanalyzed,ABandBCareimmediate,i.e.arethesimplestlogicalpartsofAC.Thiscanbeillustratedbytheformula:DA:AB–BC:CIf,however,therearemoremiddletermssuchthatthepremisesABandBCcanthem-selvesbefurtheranalyzed,theanalysishastobecontinueduntilwegettoimmediatepremises.Thisamountsto,asAristotlecallsit,thickeningACbyfillingACwithallthemiddletermswehavefound(APo.I.23,84b19–85a1).Forinstance,letB,D,EbeallthemiddletermswecanfindforAC,suchthatABandBCarepremisesofACandADandDBareinturnimmediatepremisesofAB,whileBEandECareimmediatepremisesofBC,thenthiscanbeillustratedbytheformula:D*A:AD–DB–BE–EC:CTobesure,thiskindofanalysisisanalysisinempiricalsciences,notinsyllogistic.EvenfromthethindescriptionofthissortofanalysisthatIhavepresentedsofaritbecomesevidentthatscientificanalysisisbasicallyabottom-upprocedure,notatop-downpro-cedure;itstartsfromgivenfactsorconclusions,andlooksforcausesandpremises,2.Ingeometry,circleandstraightlinearethesimplestpartsofthegeometricalcontinuum;thisiswhyproofsingeometryhavetousecompassesandruler:constructingdiagramsbyusingcompassesandrulercomesdowntoanalyzingthediagramsintotheirsimplestparts.246ACTC1424620/03/2006,04:05PM\naristotle’slogicandtheoryofscienceandmaybeforcausesofthesecausesandpremisesofthesepremises.Analysislooksforsufficientpremisesofgivenconclusionsandis,therefore,notadeductivemethod.TheRelationBetweenPriorandPosteriorAnalyticsSofar,wehavebeentalkinginaquiteinformalway.Interestingly,Aristotle’sdefinitionofadeductionatthebeginningoftheAnalyticslooksquiteinformaltoo:“Adeduction(sullogismos)isadiscourseinwhich,certainthingsbeingposited,somethingotherthanthethingslaiddownfollowsofnecessityinvirtueofthefactthattheyarethese”(APr.I.1,24b18–20;similarlyTop.I.1,100a25–27).Somescholarsareworriedaboutthisdefinition,sinceitdoesnotseemtobeconnectedwithanotionoflogicalvalidity.IthasevenbeenarguedthatAristotle’sdefinitionofdeductionreflectsanearlystageinthedevelopmentofhistheoryofscienceanddemonstrationthatdidnotpresupposeformalsyllogisticaspresentedinthePriorAnalytics(Barnes,1969,1981;Solmsen,1929).Thereisagooddealofevidenceforthischronologicalguess.ThePriorAnalyticsisinmanytechnicalrespectsfarmoredevelopedthanthePosteriorAnalytics,anditisobviouslydesignedtosolveanumberofproof-theoreticalproblemsposedbyaninformalsketchofatheoryofdemonstration.Themostimportantoftheseproblemsiswhichpremisesaregoodpremisesforagivenconclusionandwhytheyaregoodones.Itisprimarilythesequestionsthatthesyllogisticseekstoanswer.Thisimpliesalsothattheinitialinformalconceptofdeductionberestrictedtoaformalnotionofdeductionbasedontheideaoflogicalvalidity.Inaddition,giventheideathatscientificknowledgeisprimarilyconcernedwiththeuniversalitissmallwonderthatalogicthatissupposedtoprovideasoundlogicalfoundationforthetheoryofscienceismainlyconcernedwithanalyzingthelogicalrelationsbetweenuniversalandparticularquantifiedpropositions.Thatiswhy,tousemodernterms,Aristotle’ssyllogisticis,notapropositionallogic,butafirst-orderpredicatelogic.Allthisis,ofcourse,fullyconsistentwiththeviewthatintheAnalyticsaswereadittoday,syllogisticistheofficiallogicofthetheoryofscience.Thatis,wemusttakethesyllogistic(thePriorAnalytics)tobewhatAristotlesaysitis:theoreticallypreliminarytothetheoryofscience(thePosteriorAnalytics)(seee.g.,APr.I.4,25b26–31;Smith,1989,p.xiii;Detel,1993,vol.1,pp.110–14).SyllogisticInpresentingalogicthatishelpfulforatheoryofscience,Aristotlefirstdeterminesacanonicalformofsyllogisticpropositions:Asyllogisticpropositioniseitherauniversalaffirmativeorauniversalnegativeoraparticularaffirmativeoraparticularnegativeproposition,i.e.hasoneofthefollowingfourforms:1.AbelongstoeveryB(inshortAaB);2.AbelongstonoB(inshortAeB);3.AbelongstosomeB(inshortAiB);4.AdoesnotbelongtosomeB(inshortAoB)247ACTC1424720/03/2006,04:05PM\nwolfgangdetel(whereAandBareusuallyone-placeduniversaltermsanda,e,i,oarethesyllogisticrelations)(APr.I.2,25a4–5).Aswehaveseen,thebasicformofanargumentbasedonananalysis,forinstanceinscience,consistsoftwopremisesandaconclusion.Therefore,Aristotlelooks,inhissyllogistic,atformsoforderedsequencesofthreesyllogisticpropositions.Inparticular,heexaminesdeductionshavingaspremisestwosyllogisticpropositionssharingoneterm,andthisisthecase,ifthecommontermiseithersubjectofonepremiseandpredicateoftheother,orsubjectofbothpremises,orpredicateofbothpremises.Inthisway,hegetsexactlythreedifferentformsofsuchsequences–calledsyllogisticfigures–3concerningagivenconclusionAC.Ingeneralterms,thesefiguresareasfollows:(1)A×B,B×C⇒A×C;(2)B×A,B×C⇒A×C;(3)A×B,C×B⇒A×C(wherexisoneofthefoursyllogisticrelationsandA,B,andCarevariablesforuniversalterms).Thelogicaltraditionusuallycallsanorderedsequenceofsyllogisticpropositionsthathastheformofoneofthethreesyllogisticfiguresamood.Clearly,thereare192(=3×4×4×4)moods.ItisthemostimportanttaskofAristotle’ssyllogistictodeterminewhichofthe192moodsaresyllogisticallyvalid.AnditisinformulatingandsolvingthisproblemthatwecanseeAristotleasbeingthefirstthinkertofullygrasptheideaofaformallogic.Thecrucialproposalisthattherearefourdeductionsinthefirstfigurethatareperfect,i.e.suchthattheconclusionfollowsevidentlyofnecessityfromitspremises.Theseperfectdeductionsare:A1AaB,BaC⇒AaC(Barbara)A2AeB,BaC⇒AeC(Celarent)A3AaB,BiC⇒AiC(Darii)A4AeB,BiC⇒AoC(Ferio)AristotlejustifieshisclaimthatA1andA2areperfectdeductionsbysaying:“wehavealreadyexplainedinwhichwaywesay:beingpredicatedofall”(APr.I.4,25b39–40,cf.I.1,24a18),and:“ithasbeendefinedinwhichwaywesay:beingpredicatedof4none”(APr.I.4,26a27;cf.I.1,24a18–19).AlthoughAristotledidnothaveaclearnotionofmeaning,itseemsevidentthatheinfactjustifiedthelogicalvalidityatleastofA1andA2bypointingtothemeaningofthesyllogisticrelationsaande:ingeneralterms,3.ThisproceduremightprovideanexplanationwhyAristotlenevermentionsafourthsyl-logisticfigurethatcouldbeconstructedbychangingtheorderofthetermsinthepremises,i.e.,B×A,C×B⇒A×C(hedoesdiscussdeductionsofthisform,though,buttreatsthemasdeductionsofthefirstfigure)(Patzig,1968,Smith,1989).4.IndeeditsufficestotalkaboutA1andA2alonebecause,asAristotlelatercorrectlynotes,A3andA4,althoughbelongingtotheperfectdeductionsthevalidityofwhichcanbejustifiedbythewaywetalkaboutthesyllogisticrelations,canneverthelessbeprovedonthebasisofA2(theproofsarepresentedinAPr.I.7,29b1–14).248ACTC1424820/03/2006,04:05PM\naristotle’slogicandtheoryofsciencedeductionsarelogicallyvalidiftheyarevalidonlyinvirtueofthemeaningofthelogicalconstantstheycontain.Thatiswhywecanuse,indoingformallogic,variablesforthenon-logicalvocabulary,asAristotledoesforthefirsttimeinthehistoryofthought:suchistheconceptionofformallogic.Furthermore,itisevidentthatgiventhewayweusethesyllogisticrelationswecanpropose:L1AeB⇒¬(AiB)L2AaB⇒¬(AoB)Finally,Aristotletakesitthattheprincipleofindirectproof(whichhecallstheprincipleofdeductionsleadingtotheimpossible)isvalid,forinstanceinthefollowingform:RILetR,S,Tbethreesyllogisticpropositions,then,ifthededuction¬T,S⇒¬Risvalid,thedeductionR,S⇒Tisvalidtoo.ThereisnojustificationofRIinthePriorAnalytics(onlyadiscussioninI.29),butsinceRIfollowsfromtheprincipleoftheexcludedmiddlewhichisinturnextensivelydefendedinMet.G,wecanrecognizeRIasatleastindirectlyjustified.AssumptionsA1–A2,L1–L2andRIareasufficientlogicalfoundationforapproachingthenextchallengethesyllogistichastomeet:toprovesyllogisticallywhichmoodsofthesecondandthirdsyllogisticfigurearesyllogisticallyvalid.Itisincon-nectionwithgraspingthenotionofalogicalproofandwithconstructingeffectivelysuchproofsthattheconceptionofanalysisagainprovestobehelpful.AnditisherethatwecanseehowAristotleputsanalysistoworkinhissyllogistic.ThebasicideaisthatifR,S⇒Tisadeductionthatisnotperfect,asyllogisticproofofthisdeductionconsistsinanalyzingitintoperfectoralreadyproveddeductions.Thiskindofsyllogisticanalysiscomesdowntofillingthegapbetweenpremisesandcon-clusionofthedeductionwithperfectorproveddeductions.ThegeneralschemeforthesyllogisticanalysisofthedeductionD(R,S⇒T)isaccordinglytheproofformula:PR,S:D1(R,S⇒X1)–D2(X2,X3⇒X4)–...–Dn(Xn−1,Xn⇒T):T,wheretheDsareperfectorproveddeductionssuchthatthefirstofthemstartswiththepremisesofthedeductionthatistobeprovedandallfollowingonesuseaspremisestwoofthesyllogisticpropositionsthatshowupbeforeintherow(R,S,ortheXi)untilTisreached.Inthisway,deductionDisindeedanalyzedintodeductionsD1–Dn.ProofsinAristotle’ssyllogisticareanalyses,notofsyllogisticpropositionsintoother5syllogisticpropositions,butofdeductionsintootherdeductions.5.Aristotledoesnotusethenotionofanalysisinthiscontext,butsaysratherthattheimper-fectdeductionsarecompletedby,orreducedto,perfectdeductionsandconversionrulesbymakingthemperfectbycertainsupplementaryassumptions(thesupplementaryassumptionssimplybeingperfectdeductionsandconversionrules)(e.g.APr.I.5,28a1–9;I.6,29a14–17,I.7,29b1–2).Butthisisthedescriptionofakindofanalysis;indeed,itwouldbeoddtoassumethatAristotlecallshissyllogistictheoryAnalyticswithoutbeingwillingtoseethemostimportantpartofthistheoryasacaseofanalysis.249ACTC1424920/03/2006,04:05PM\nwolfgangdetelThefirstdeductionsAristotleprovesarenotmoods,butsimplerdeductionswithonlyonepremise,namelytheconversionrules(APr.I.2,25a14–25):K1AeB⇒BeA;K2AiB⇒BiA;K3AaB⇒BiA.Theconversionrulesarefrequentlyusedinproofsofvaliddeductionsinthesecondandthirdfigure(thesedeductionsarecalledimperfectbecausetheyneedtobeproved).Hence,itispossiblethatintheproofformulaPstatedaboveR=SorXi=Xi+1.AccordingtoAristotle,amongthe188moodsthatmustbecheckedforlogicalvalidity,only14provetobesyllogisticallyvalid.Twotypicalproofsorlogicalanalysesrunasfollows:(a)ProofofBaA,BeC⇒AeC(Camestres,secondfigure):BaA,BeC:K1(BeC⇒CeB)–A2(CeB,BaA⇒CeA)–K1(CeA⇒AeC):AeC(b)ProofofAiB,CaB⇒AiC(Disamis,thirdfigure):AiB,CaB:K2(AiB⇒BiA)–A3(CaB,BiA⇒CiA)–K2(CiA⇒AiC):AiC6TheseproofsobviouslysatisfyformulaP,i.e.,aregenuinelogicalanalyses.InterpretationsofAristotle’sSyllogisticLogicAristotle’sPriorAnalyticscontainsmuchmorethanjusttheso-calledassertoricsyllogisticoutlinedabove.Muchofthisadditionalmaterialisdesignedtohelpsolveproblemsemergingfromthetheoryofscience.Mostprominently,sinceascientifictheoryoftenusesmodalpropositions(primarilynecessaryones)Aristotledevelopsamodalsyllogistic(APr.I.8–22)thatleavesunsolved,though,anumberofseriousproblems.Forinstance,Aristotleseemstousethemodaloperatorsinanambiguousway:sometimeshereadsNAaB(whereNabbreviatesnecessary)asitisnecessarythatAaB(theso-calledde-dicto-reading),butsometimesasEverynecessary-AbelongstoB(theso-calledde-re-reading).ThisisoneofthereasonswhyscholarshavesometimesextremedifficultiesunderstandingwhyAristotlecallssomemodaldeductionsvalidorinvalid,respectively(Patterson,1995;Striker,1994).Assertoricandmodalsyllogisticaresupposedtoshowhoweverydeductioncomesabout,asAristotlesays.Butinaddition,therearetwomoreprojectsinPriorAnalyticsI(cf.APr.I.32,47a1–4):first,todefineawayinwhichdeductionsmaybefound(chs.27–31),andsecond,toshowhowagiveninformaldeductioncaneventuallybetrans-formedintoadeductioninthefigures(chs.32–45)(thistransformationisanotherkindofanalysis).PriorAnalyticsIIisbestseenasdiscussingtechnicalconceptsofdialecticintermsofsyllogistictheoryandastryingtosolvefurtherproof-theoreticdifficultiesshowingupinthePosteriorAnalytics(Smith,1989).ForalongtimescholarstriedtoreadAristotle’ssyllogisticasanaxiomaticsysteminthemodernsense(Lukasiewicz,1957;Patzig,1968),theperfectdeductionsbeing6.Aristotledoesnotonlyshowwhichmoodsaresyllogisticallyvalid,healsoshowswhichareinvalid.Andhedoesthisprettymuchinthesamewaymodernlogiciansdoit–byprovidingcountermodels.250ACTC1425020/03/2006,04:05PM\naristotle’slogicandtheoryofsciencetheaxiomsandtheimperfectdeductionsthetheorems.Butaccordingtothisreadingwewouldneedsomemoredeductionrulestogetfromaxiomstotheorems,includingtheoremsfrompropositionallogic.Therearenosuchrulestobefound,though,inthetextofthePriorAnalytics.Therefore,accordingtotheaxiomaticreadingAristotle’ssyllogisticisformallyincomplete.However,itismuchmorenatural,andcorrespondsmuchmorecloselytoformulaPthatisactuallyusedinthetext,tolookattheperfectdeductionsasinferencerulesthatareinferentiallyprimitive(butare,ofcourse,semant-icallyjustifiedastruth-transmitting).Thisinterpretationlooksatsyllogisticasasystemofnaturaldeductioninthemodernsense(Corcoran,1974b;Smiley,1973;Smith,1989).ItpresupposeswhatAristotleseemsinpracticetoassume,namelythatnouniversaltermisempty.UnderthisreadingAristotle’ssyllogisticprovestobebothsoundandformallycomplete(Corcoran,1974b).KnowledgeofFactsKnowledgeoffactsis,forAristotle,thefoundationofscientificknowledge(APr.I.27,743b1–38;APo.I.23,84b19–85a1).Accordingly,Aristotleisconcerned,notonlywiththemethodsofestablishingscientificknowledge,butalsowithscientificmethodsofestablishingknowledgeoffacts.Forinstance,herecommendstostatefactsinsuchawaythattheycanbemoreeasilyincorporatedintoscientificinquiries;thus,weshoulduseanadequateterminologyandshouldavoidhomonymyandambiguities(APo.II.13,97b30–36;II.17,99a4–15)(Lennox,1994).Sometimesfactscanevenbedeductivelyestablished,andthisisoneofthereasonswhywemustcarefullydis-tinguishbetweendeductionsfromsymptomsanddeductionsfromcauses(APo.I.13,78a22–b11).Sometimesscientificresearchstartsfromfactsthatmostpeoplerecognize.Forinstance,askedwhatthunderismostpeoplewouldsaythatthunderisacertainnoiseintheclouds.Propositionsdescribingthesefactsare,therefore,asortofdefinitions(so-callednominaldefinitions)thatdonotneedjustificationandcanserveaspossible8conclusionsofscientificexplanations(APo.II.10,93b29–32,94a14).Onewayofestablishinguniversalfactsisinduction.Aristotleclaimsthat“welearneitherbyinductionorbydemonstrationandthatitisimpossibletoconsideruniversalsexceptthroughinduction”(APo.I.18,81a39–b2).Heevensaysthat,inasense,webecomefamiliarwiththeimmediatepremisesofsciencebyinduction(APo.II.19,100b3–4).ScholarsdisagreeabouthowAristotleconceivedofinduction.Isitaformofargumentleadingfromafinitesetofsingularpremisestoauniversalconclusion(Ross,1957),prettymuchinthemodernsense?AminorityofscholarsdeniesthisandclaimsthatanAristotelianinductionissimplyalistofsingularfactssharingastruc-tureandis,therefore,notanargumentatall(Engberg-Pedersen,1979).Accordingtothisview,universalassumptionscannotbeinferredfromsingularpropositions,but7.ThatfactsareadomainofknowledgeisexplicitlysuggestedatthebeginningofAPo.I.13.8.Forasophisticatedandfar-reachinganalysisofthestatusoffactsinzoology,especiallyconcerningtheclassificationofanimals,seePellegrin(1986).Pellegrinshowsthatthesefactsdonothavescientificstatusandcannotberelatedtoataxonomicproject(insharpoppositiontothetraditionalinterpretation).251ACTC1425120/03/2006,04:05PM\nwolfgangdetelmustratherbealreadypresupposedforclassifyingsingularfactsandestablishinganinduction.Indeed,thereisnotasinglepassageinwhichAristotleunambiguouslycallsthetransitionfromsingulartouniversalpropositionsaninduction.Wemustbecarefulnottoreadformulaslikethisisevidentbyinductionorsecuredbyinduction(Phys.I.2,185a14;Top.IV.2,122a19)aspointingtoaprocedureofdeducingorconcluding;rather,theseformulasarefullyconsistentwiththeclaimthatitisbylookingatcertainsingularfactsorpropositionsasheuristicdevicesthatwecanmakeagoodguessaboutauniversal.Lookingatsomethingsandclassifyingthemunderpresupposeduniversalsasswanandwhite(thefinitelistofthesethingsthusdescribedformingtheinduction)wemayguess,notconclude,thatallswansarewhite.Thisguessholdsgoodaslongaswedonotencounteraswanthatisnotwhite(Top.II.3,110a32–36;VIII.2,157a34–b33;APr.II.26,69b1–8;APo.I.4,73a32–34;II.7,92a37–38).AristotelianCausesAsalreadymentioned,Aristotlethinksthatsciencebuildsontheknowledgeoffactstoexplainthembyfindingoutabouttheircauses(aitiai).Itisimportant,though,nottoconfuseAristoteliancauseswithcausesinthemodernsense.Tobesure,thereisnoagreementamongmodernphilosophersabouthowbesttoanalyzethedifficultnotionsofcauseandcausation,butthestandardviewisthatcausesareearlierthan,andsufficientfor,theireffectsandarebasedonnaturallaws.Itfollowsthatifweknowsomecauseandtheappropriatenaturallaw,wecanpredictthattheeffectwillcomeabout.Aristoteliancausesareinimportantrespectsdifferent.Herearesomeexamples:(i)thefactthatstatuesareofbronzeisanAristoteliancauseofthefactthatthesestatuesareheavy;(ii)thefactthatthemoonisinthemiddlebetweensunandearthisanAristoteliancauseofthefactthatthemooniseclipsed,and(iii)tostayhealthyisanAristoteliancauseofwalkingafterdinnerandotheractivitiessuggestedbymedicineanddietetics;finally,(iv)thefactthatastringisdividedaccordingtotheratio1:2isanAristoteliancauseforthefactthatthestringproducesanoctave.Insuchcases,thecauseisnotlaterthan,andsufficientaswellasnecessaryfor,itseffect(APo.II.12,95a10–24;II.13,97a35–b24)anddoesnotinvolveanotionofnaturallaws(itisonlylaterinStoicphilosophythattheconceptofanaturallawbeginstoemerge,seeFrede,1989).Therefore,knowinganAristoteliancausedoesnotpermitustopredictitseffects;rather,fromeffectswecaninfertheirAristoteliancauses(APo.II.12,95b22–37).AllthisisaclearindicationthatAristoteliancausesarenotcausesinthemodernsense.Aristotle’skeyideaisthatacauseofaneffectisafactthatcananswerthequestionwhytheeffectcomesabout.Andhefeelsthattherearefourkindsofanswerstowhy-questions:onepointstothematerialofthethinginquestion(asincase(i)),anotherpointstotheoriginofitsmovement(asincase(ii)),athirdmentionsit’saim(case(iii)),andafourthlooksatitsform(case(iv)).ThisistheAristoteliandoctrineof9thefourcauses:thematerial,efficient,teleologicalandformalcause(cf.Phys.II.3).Hence,afactBCisanAristoteliancauseofanotherfactACifftheB-propertyofCcan9.OncausesinAristotle’sPhysics,seeBodnárandPellegrin,aristotle’sphysicsandcosmology.252ACTC1425220/03/2006,04:05PM\naristotle’slogicandtheoryofsciencebeclassifiedasmaterial,originofmovement,aimorforminrelationtotheA-propertyofC.Ashortadditionalnoteabouttheteleologicalcauseseemsinorder.Fromearlymoderntimesonmanyphilosophersandscientistshaveseriouslycriticizedthenotionofateleologicalcausebecausethiscauseseemstoexerciseaninfluenceofthefutureonthepast.Thisobjectionis,however,clearlybasedonfalselyreadingthemodernunderstandingofacauseintothenotionofanAristoteliancause.AccordingtoAristotle,BCisateleologicalcauseofACif,roughly,thereisaregulardevelopmentofstatesofCsuchthatusuallyBCisthefinalandmostdevelopedstateofCandACisaregularformerstateinthedevelopmentofCsuchthatACisnecessaryforreachingBC.ThisisonewayofexplainingwhyCgetsintostateAC.Thisideaisempiricallycontentful,consistentandbynomeansabsurd;inparticular,itinnowayinvolvesthatthefuturecanexerciseanyinfluenceonthepastorthepresent(Gotthelf,1987b).Aristoteliancausesandtheireffectsareconnected,notbyanaturallaw,butbyauniversalempiricalregularity.Thatistosay:BC’sbeinganAristoteliancauseofACinvolvesthatAaBisauniversalfactoftheuniverse.AfullexplanationofAChasthereforetomention,notonlythecauseBC,butalsotheregularityAaB(cf.Phys.II.8).DemonstrationTheopeningsentenceoftheAnalyticsshowsthattheideaofademonstration,andofscientificknowledgebasedondemonstrations,liesattheheartofAristotle’slogicandtheoryofscience.Toadequatelyunderstandthisideaitisimportantnottoconfusevaliddeductions,proofs,anddemonstrations–evenmoreso,sincetheLatinformulaquoderatdemonstrandumisnowadayswellknownforresumingproofs.ButforAristotleadeductionis,aswehaveseen,syllogisticallyvalidiffitisaperfectorimperfectdeductioninthetechnicalsense;avaliddeductionis,inturn,aproofiffitspremisescanbetakentobetrue;andfinally,aproofisademonstrationiffitspremisesrevealanAristoteliancause.Aristotlehimselfusesthesameterm(sullogismos)forbothvaliddeductionsandproofs,butadifferentterm(apodeixis)fordemonstrations.AccordingtotheAnalytics,everydemonstrationisasortofvaliddeduction(APr.I.4,25b29–31)andsohastheformofoneofthesyllogisticfigures(APr.I.23,41b1–5;I.25,41b36f.);thereisnodemonstrationwithoutmiddleterm(APo.I.23,84b23–25),andinparticularthefirstsyllogisticfigureprovestobemostimportantfordemonstrativesciences(APoI.14).ThatiswhysyllogisticplaysacrucialroleforAristotle’stheoryofscience.Hisnotionofademonstrationshowsclearlythatheconceivedofthecrucialscientificactivityasconstructinglogicallyvalidexplanationsof10givenfactsrevealinguniversalrelationsbetween(Aristotelian)causesandeffects.Wecan10.ThisideahasbeenrediscoveredinthetwentiethcenturyphilosophyofscienceinthefamousarticlebyHempelandOppenheimonthestructureofahypothetical-deductiveexplana-tion(notethattheauthorsdonotrely,inthisarticle,onamodallyqualifiednotionofcause,butonlyontheideaofauniversalempiricalregularity,prettymuchlikeAristotlesome24centuriesearlier),seeHempelandOppenheim(1948).253ACTC1425320/03/2006,04:05PM\nwolfgangdeteluseexamples(i)to(iv)forAristoteliancausesmentionedintheprecedingsectiontoconstructdemonstrationsthatinstantiatethisidea:(i)*Statuesofmetalareheavybecause,first,bronzeisheavyand,second,statuesof11metalconsistofbronze;symbolicnotation:(a)beingheavyabeingofbronze;(b)beingofbronzeastatuesofmetal;⇒(c)beingheavyastatuesofmetal(ii)*Themooniseclipsedbecause,first,wheneversomethingintheskyisinthemiddlebetweensunandearthitiseclipsed,and,second,themoonisinthemiddlebetweensunandearth;symbolicnotation:(a)beingeclipsedabeinginthemiddlebetweensunandearth(b)beinginthemiddlebetweensunandearthbmoon⇒(c)beingeclipsedbmoon(iii)*Todigestfoodrequireswalkingafterdinneretc.because,first,stayinghealthyrequireswalkingafterdinneretc,and,second,itistheaimofdigestingfoodtostayhealthy;symbolicnotation:(a)walkingafterdinneretc.astayinghealthy(b)stayinghealthyadigestingfood⇒(c)walkingafterdinneretc.adigestingfood(iv)*Astringproducessoundsinanoctavebecause,first,producingsoundsinanoctaverequiresbeingdividedaccordingtotheratio1:2and,second,thisstringisdividedaccordingtotheratio1:2;symbolicnotation:(a)producingsoundsinanoctaveabeingdividedaccordingtoratio1:2(b)beingdividedaccordingtotheratio1:2bstring⇒(c)producingsoundsinanoctavebstring(whereaistherelationbelongstoallandbtherelationbelongsto).Obviously,allfourargumentsaredemonstrations,i.e.validexplanatorydeductionsinthetechnicalAristoteliansense:theyareproofsinoneofthesyllogisticfigures,theirminorpremises(b)pointstooneoftheAristoteliancausesforfact(c),andtheirmajorpremises(a)statesauniversalrelationbetweencauseandeffect.Inmanycasestheconclusionofademonstration,i.e.ofascientificexplanation,isitselfauniversalfact(asin(i)*and(iii)*);inthiscase,boththemajorandtheminorpremisesmustalsobeuniversal.ButAristotlefeelsthattherearesometimesalsoscientificexplanationsofsingularfacts(asin(ii)*and(iv)*)(forexamplesseeAPr.I.33,47b21–34;II.27,70a16–20;APo.I.24,85b30–35;I.34,89b13–15;II.11,94a37–b8);inthiscase,whilethemajorpremiseremainsuniversal,theminorpremisecanbesingulartoo.Someofthesingularfactsthatcanbedemonstratedareevencontingent,forinstancethefactthatthePersianwarcameupontheAthenians(APo.II.11,94a37–b8).ThisisnotinconsistentwithAristotle’sclaimthatthereisnodemonstrationandno11.Formuchmoresophisticatedexamplesofexplainingphenomenabyreferringtomatter,forinstance,theformationofmetalsintheground,seeGill(1997)inherilluminatingdiscussionofMeteor.IV.12.254ACTC1425420/03/2006,04:05PM\naristotle’slogicandtheoryofsciencedemonstrativeknowledgeofthecontingent(APo.I.6,75a18–21;I.30).TheAthenianscouldhavedecidednottoattackSardis,andinthiscasethePersianswouldprobablynothavewagedaterriblewarwiththeAthenians;butgiventhattheAtheniansfirstsackedabigcitylikeSardis,andgiventhemilitarystrengthofthePersiansandtheirstruggleforpower,itwasnecessary,andwecanexplaindemonstratively,thatthePersiansmadewarwithAthens.Tobesure,Aristotlethinksthatdemonstrationsofuniversalfactsarebetterandmorescientificthandemonstrationsofparticularfacts(thisistheclaimofAPo.I.24);butnevertheless,hedoesbynomeansexcludescientificexplanationsofparticularfacts.Constructingdemonstrationsremainsabottom-upprocedure;asAristotleoftenem-phasizes,firstwestatethefactswewanttoexplain,andthenwelookfortheircausesbysearchingforpremisesthatlogicallyimply,andexplainbypointingtoanAristoteliancauseof,thegivenfact(e.g.APo.II.1–2).Sometimestherearedifferentdemonstrationsforagivenfact:thereisnotauniquedemonstrationforeverygivenfact.Anddoinggoodscienceinvolvesusuallyconstructingwholenetsofconnecteddemonstrations,forinmanycasesthepremisesofagivendemonstrationcanthemselvesbedemonstrated;inthesecasesthequestionwhatthedecisivecauseissupposedtobebecomesurgent(allthisisextensivelydiscussedinAPo.II.16–18).PrinciplesConstructingdemonstrationsisfirsttoanalyze,bywayofabottom-upprocedure,agivenfactorconclusionuntilallimmediatedeductivepremisesoftheconclusionarediscovered,andthentodecidewhichofthesepremisescanbeclassifiedasAristoteliancauses.Theimmediatepremiseseverygivendemonstrationdependsonarecalledprimitives(prOta)orprinciples(archai)(ofthisdemonstration)(APo.I.2,72a5–9).Moregenerally,wecantalkaboutprinciplesofawholescientificarea,i.e.,ofthewholenetofconnecteddemonstrationsthatmakeupthescientifictheoryofthisarea.Aristotlecallsprinciplesofthissortdefinitions(horismoi)(APo.I.2,72a19–22).Butifwedefine,say,thecoldandthehot,ornumbersofsomekind,thisdoesnotinitselfimplythattheyexist.Somesciences,suchasgeometry,cansometimesprovethatcertainentitiesexist(inthecaseofgeometry,forexample,byshowinghowtheycanactuallybeconstructed);buteveryspecificsciencemustassumewithoutproofthatthefundamentalentitiesinitsdomainexist.Sometimesitisevidentthattheseentitiesexist;forexample,itisevidentthatthecoldandthehotexist.Butsometimesthisislessevident,asinthecaseofnumbers(APo.I.10,76b15–23).Nonetheless,theseexistenceassumptions,althoughnotbeingpartsofdemonstrations,areprinciplesofasortthathavetobeassumed.Aristotlecallsthemsuppositions(APo.I.2,72a19–21).Finally,whatabouttheinferencerulesprovidedbysyllogisticorthemoregenerallogicalprinciplesliketheprincipleoftheexcludedmiddle?Sincedemonstrationsarevaliddeductions,theseprinciplesarealsotobepresupposedforanyspecificsciencethatproposesdemonstrativeexplanations.Likesuppositions,theydonotshowupasparts(i.e.,premisesorconclusions)ofdemonstrations;butunlikesuppositions,theyholdineverydemonstrativescience.ThisisthethirdkindofprinciplesAristotlerecog-nizes;hecallsthempostulates(APo.I.2,72a15–18).255ACTC1425520/03/2006,04:05PM\nwolfgangdetelThewayAristotledeterminesthethreekindsofprinciplesisnotwithoutproblems,andconsequentlyscholarshavedifferentviewsabouthowexactlytheprincipleshavetobeinterpreted.Thus,itisdoubtfulwhetherdefinitionshaveexistentialimpact,whethersuppositionsarenothingmorethanexistenceassumptions,andwhetherallpostulatesholdinallsciencesorsomeofthemholdinmorethanone,butnotnecessarilyinall,sciences.Itseemsratherclear,though,thatdefinitionsinthefullsense,i.e.,ashighestpremisesofactuallyconstructednetsofdemonstrations,dohaveexistentialimpact,whilethismightnotbeevidentfornominaldefinitions.Moreover,theexamplesofsuppositionsAristotlehintsatsuggestthatatleastanimportantkindofscientificsuppositionisexistenceassumptionsaboutfundamentalentitiesofspecificsciences(moreprecisely,ifGisthespecificdomainorgenusofaspecificscience,aboutGs).Andfinally,atleasttheparadigmcasesofpostulates,i.e.,logicallyvalidinferencerules,holdobviouslyinallsciences.Inanycase,definitionsaretheonlyprinciplesthatarepartsofdemonstrations.Consequently,AristotledevotesaconsiderablepartofthesecondbookofthePosteriorAnalyticstoadiscussionoftherelationbetweendemonstrationsanddefinitions(APo.II.1–10).ThewayAristotledescribesthisrelationiscrucialforourunderstandingofhistheoryofscience;butfirstofallitshouldbeemphasizedthatintheframeworkofthistheorydefinitionsarenot,asolderreadingshaveit,analyticpropositionsinthemodernsense(i.e.,propositionsthataretrueinvirtueofthemeaningsofthewordstheycontain);rather,definitionsare,forAristotle,universalpropositionshavingempirical(ormathematical)content.DefinitionsandDemonstrationsAristotleclaimsthatthereisacloseconnectionbetweendefinitionsanddemonstra-tions.“Whatisaneclipse?Privationoflightfromthemoonbytheearth’sscreening.Whyisthereaneclipse?Or:Whyisthemooneclipsed?Becausethelightleavesitwhentheearthscreensit”(APo.II.2,90a15–17).“Whatisthunder?Extinctionoffireinclouds.Whydoesitthunder?Becausethefireinthecloudsisextinguished”(APo.II.8,93b8–9).“Inallthesecasesitisevidentthatwhatitisandwhyitisarethesame”(APo.II.2,90a14–15).Theseexamplesshowhowwehavetounderstandthecloserelationbetweenthewhatitis(definitions)andthewhyitis(demonstrations):thedefiniensofagooddefinitionthathasexplanatorypowerisjustthemiddletermpointingtoanAristoteliancauseinthecorrespondingdemonstration.Letusassume,asAristotledoes,thatthunderoracertainnoiseinthecloudsthatweusedtocallthunder(A)isadequatelydefinedbyextinctionoffireintheclouds(B)(sothatA:=Bistrue,whichimplies,ofcourse,AaBandBaA),thenforanyCsuchthatAandBbelongtoCwegetthedemonstrationA:=B,BC⇒AC.Inparticular,dependentonthewaywedeterminetheextremeswegetaparticularorauniversaldemonstra-tion,respectively:IfAisthunderandCsomecloudsupthere,thenweexplain,whythereisthunderinthosecloudsupthere:becausethereisanextinctionoffireinthecloudsupthereandthunderisanextinctionoffireintheclouds,i.e.,wegettheparticulardemonstrationA:=B,BbC⇒AbC.If,however,wetakecertainnoiseintheclouds(A)andthunder(C)asextremesandtheexplanatorymiddleterm(B)againas256ACTC1425620/03/2006,04:05PM\naristotle’slogicandtheoryofscienceextinctionoffireintheclouds,thenwecanexplainwhythunderisacertainnoiseintheclouds:becausethunderisanextinctionoffireinthecloudsandthecertainnoiseinthecloudsweusedtocallthunderisanextinctionoffireinthoseclouds,i.e.wegettheuniversaldemonstrationA:=B,BaC⇒AaC(inAPo.II.8,Aristotleoffersbothalternativesaspossiblesymbolization).Thedecisivemessagewegetfromtheseandotherexamplesisthat“withoutademonstrationyoucannotbecomeawareofwhatathingis”(APo.II.8,93b17–18).Thatistosay,whetheragivenuniversalsyllogisticpropositionisadefinitioncanonlybedeterminedifitshowsupasanexplanatorypremiseinademonstrationwehaveactuallyconstructed.However,asAristotleaddsindiscussingthedemonstrativeexplanationofthundersketchedabove,“ifthereisanothermiddletermforthis,itwillbefromamongtheremainingaccounts”(APo.II.8,93b12–14):wemustremindourselvesthatitmaybepossibletoexplain,inturn,thepremisesofourexplanationofthunder;inthiscase,wewillgethigherdefinitionsoutofourdemonstrations.Sotheremightbemediatedefinitions:onlyif,inthecontextoftheentiretheoryofthunderpossiblyconsistingofahierarchyofdemonstrations,wegetfinallytothehighestimmediatedefinitions,havewediscovereddefinitionsasprinciples.ThecrucialpointhereisthatAristotledoesnotthinkthatwefirstgraspthedefinitionsasprinciplesandthentrytoexplain,anddemonstrate,certainphenomenabyusingthedefinitions;onthecontrary,itisonlyfromsuccessfulexplanatorydemonstrationsandwholetheoriesthatwecangetagripoftheprinciplesofascience.Inparticular,tograspdefinitionsashighestprinciples,wehavetocarryoutathoroughscientificanalysisofthewholedomaininquestion.Whilethisisbasicallyabottom-upprocedure,itobviouslyprovidesmanymorepremisesthanconclusions.Thereforewecan,afterhavingcompletedtheanalysisandtheconstructionofthecorrespondingdemonstrations,takethepremiseswehaveestablishedanddeducefromthem,inatop-downmanner,moreconclusions.Doingthisforeverypropositionaboutthegivendomain,i.e.,showinghowagivendomaincanbeanalyzedintoallitselements,istoaxiomatizeourtheoryinanAristotelianway.AsAristotleremarkscorrectly,intheendthenumberofpremisesandconclusionswillbe,inthissortofaxiomatization,moreorlessequal(APo.I.32,88b4–7).Aristotle’sideaofanaxiomatizationisnottocompressthecontentofawholetheoryintoasfewaxiomsaspossible,butrathertoanalyze,andtherebytoseemoreclearlythrough,thecontentofascientifictheory.Havinggraspedtheprinciplesofascientificdomainistobeinthehighestepistemicstate,insight(nous)(APo.II.19,100b7–12);therefore,insightcanitselfbecalledtheprincipleofknowledge(APo.II.19,100b12–16).Moregenerally,ashasbeenmentionedabove,p.246,havinginsightintoagivendomainistohaveknowledgeofthesimplestpartsofthisdomain.Inparticular,inscienceinsightisthe“assumptionofimmediatepremises”(APo.I.33,88b35–89a4).Butsinceitisonthebasisofexperiencethatnotionsofuniversalsareformedinthesoul,theprinciplesasbeinguniversalpropositionscanbegrasped(inaweaksense)byexperience(APr.I.30;APo.II.19).However,experiencecannotgiveusinsightintotheimmediacy,deductiveposition,orcausalityofuniversalsyllogisticpropositions.Therefore,tograspprinciplesinthefullsense,i.e.,tocometoseewhichpropositionsarethehighestimmediateexplanatorydefinitionsofadepartmentalscience,requirestheactualconstructionofthenetofdemonstrations257ACTC1425720/03/2006,04:05PM\nwolfgangdetelthatmakeupthisdepartmentalscience.Therefore,doingsciencesuccessfullydoesnotbegin,butratherendsupwith,havinginsightinthefullestsense.NecessityAtthebeginningofthePosteriorAnalyticsAristotlemakesitclearthatknowledgeofathingisnotonlyawarenessofwhatthecauseofthethingis,butalsoanawarenessthat“itisnotpossibletobeotherwise”(APo.I.2,71b9–12),i.e.,thatitisnecessary(anankaion).Thisisatruism,ofcourse,sincedemonstrativeconclusionsarelogicallynecessaryinrelationtotheirpremises.ButAristotleproceedstoclaimthatpremisesofdemonstrationsarenecessarytoo(APo.I.6,74b15–18).SomescholarsreadapassageinthePosteriorAnalytics(I.4,73a21–24)evenasarguingthatthenecessityofde-monstrativepremisesfollowsfromthenecessityofitsconclusion,althoughAristotleemphasizeselsewherethatthisisnotavalidinferenceinmodalsyllogistic(APo.I.6,75a1–4).ItisimportanttobeclearabouttheprecisesenseinwhichAristotlecallsdemonstrativepremisesnecessaryandevennecessarilytrue,ifonlytoavoidtheim-pressionthatthenecessarytruthofdefinitionsandotherdemonstrativepremisesimpliestheirepistemologicalcertainty.Itistellingthatinthecrucialpassagethatdescribesthekeyfeaturesofdemonstr-ativepremisesnecessityismissing:Demonstrativepremiseshavetobe“trueandprimitiveandimmediateandmorefamiliarthanandpriortoandexplanatoryoftheconclusion”(APo.I.2,71b21–23).Scholarshaveargued,correctly,thattwoofthesesixfeatures,viz.immediacyandexplanatorypower,entailtheotherfour(seeBarnes,1975,pp.98–9;Detel,1993,vol.2,pp.62–3).Basically,therefore,highestdemonstrativepremisesareimmediateandpointtoAristoteliancauses.Wemustcon-clude,then,thatthenecessityofdemonstrativepremisesiscloselytiedtothesetwocharacteristics.Indeed,Aristotleismakingtwodifferentclaims:First,ifanecessaryconclusioncanbededucedfrompremises,itdoesnotfollowthatthepremisesareneces-sary(APo.I.6,75a1–4);butsecond,ifanecessaryconclusioncanbedemonstratedfrompremises,itdoesfollowthatthepremisesarenecessarytoo(APo.I.4,73a21–24;I.6,74b15–17).AndABissupposedtobeanecessarydemonstrativepremiseiffAbelongsinitselftoBorBbelongsinitselftoA.AsAristotle’sexamplesshow,belonginginitselfis,metaphysicallyspeaking,anessentialrelation.ButheexplainsthisrelationepistemologicallybysayingthatAbelongsinitselftoBiffAaBandBaAaretrueandAbelongstothedefinitionofB(APo.I.4,73a34–b5).AndheaddsthatifAbelongsinitselftoB,thenAisnotsaidaboutBasunderlyingsubject(whichcomesdowntosayingthatAisatleastpartially(incaseofadefinitionA:=Bevenfully)identicalwithB),andAbelongstoBbecauseofitself(whichcomesdowntopostulateacausalrelationbetweenAandB)(APo.I.4,73b6–17).Obviously,thisisoneoftheimportantpointsatwhichmetaphysicsentersthetheory12ofscience.Understandingthenecessityofdemonstrativepremisesanddefinitions12.AnothersuchpointisthemetaphysicalargumentinAPo.I.22thatisdesignedtoshowthateveryscientificanalysismustcometoanend,i.e.,thatthesequencesofordereddeductionsanddemonstrationsmustbefiniteandthat,therefore,scientificprinciplesexist.258ACTC1425820/03/2006,04:05PM\naristotle’slogicandtheoryofscienceasbeingfoundedonessentialrelationsinthemetaphysicalsensedoesnothavedramaticepistemologicalimplications,though.Inparticular,itdoesnotimplythatdemonstrativepremisesareepistemologicallycertain;rather,theyare,iftrueatall,metaphysicallynecessaryandnecessarilytrue,whichisconsistentwithassumingthatitmightturnoutthattheyarefalse.Ifsyllogisticpropositionsare,accordingtothecriteriaprovidedbythetheoryofscience,definitionsorhighestimmediateexplanatorypremisesinanactuallyconstructedtheory,thenthisisagoodreasontoassumethatthesepremisesaremetaphysicallynecessaryandrepresentessentialrelations.Therefore,thenecessityofdemonstrativepremisesdoesnotfollowfromthenecessityoftheconclusion,butfromtheverynotionofasuccessfuldemonstration(seeAPo.I.6,74b5–17).ThishasaratherinterestingimpactforAristotle’sconceptofessences.Thetraditionalsimpleviewisthattheessenceofathing(forinstance,ofaspecies)canbecapturedbyoneimmediatedefiningformulapointingtoasingleunifiedcauseofotherpropertiesofthething.Butitseemsclearthatinmanycasesjustonedefinitiondoesnothavetheexplanatorypowertodemonstratethepropertiesofthethinginquestion.Weneedalotmoreimmediateanddemonstratedpremiseswithinthedemonstrativenetinordertoactuallycompletetheexplanations.Inthesecases,then,theessenceofathingisitselfacomplexmatter(seeCharles,1997;Detel,1997;Gotthelf,1997).ScienceandDialecticIntheveryfirstsentenceofhisRhetoric,Aristotleproposestodistinguishbothrhetoricanddialecticfromscience.Indeed,Aristotleconceivesofdialecticasanartofreason-ingthatincludesthecapabilityofdiscussinganyproblemfromanydomainthatwemaycomeacross(Top.I.1,100a18–20).Inmanycases,thedialecticianwillexaminebothagivenpropositionanditsnegation,buttypicallyhewillnotlookforcauses.Allthisdoesnotgoforscience(APo.I.11,77a31–35).Moreover,inexamining,andtryingtorefute,athesisputforwardbyanopponent,thedialecticianmayproceedfromanyassumptiontheopponentagreeswith,withoutbeingobligedtocareaboutthetruthoftheassumption(dialecticadhominem)(APr.I.1,24a22–b2).Hence,dialecticalpremisesarenotscientificpremises.Onthisaccount,itseemsthatdialectichasnothingtodowithscience.However,intheTopics,reasoningisdefinedasdialecticalifitreasonsfromnotedbeliefs(endoxa)thatare“thingswhichareacceptedbyeveryoneorbymostpeople;orbythewise–eitherbyallofthem,orbymost,orbythemostfamousanddistinguished”(Top.I.1,100b21–23).Thisis,obviously,notdialecticadhominem,butdialecticproper:amethodofreasoningthatreliesexclusivelyontypesoftestimonywhichanyonehasaccessto.Aristotlethinksthataproperdialecticalexaminationcansometimesbehelpfulforfindingoutaboutthetruth(Top.I.2,101a35–37).Consequently,Aristotlehimselfarguesoftendialecticallyinaquiteexplicitway,notonlyinhisethicalworks,butalsointhePhysics(seehiscommentatCael.III.4,303a20–24)and,interestingly,alsointhesecondbookofthePosteriorAnalytics,wherehedevotesfivechaptersinarowtoworkingthroughtheproblemsconcerningtherelationofdefinitionsanddemonstrations(APo.II.3–7).SomescholarsevenarguethatforAristotledialectic259ACTC1425920/03/2006,04:05PM\nwolfgangdetelproperis,inethicsaswellasinphysics,sufficientforreachingtheprinciples(Owen,1961).Thisiscertainlyanexaggeration(Bolton,1987).Aristotledoesfeel,though,thatdialecticalreasoningproperissometimesnecessaryforscientificwork.Itcanoftenprovideamorepreciseandadequateinterpretationofgivenproposalsandinthiswaysetthestagefordevelopingscientificanswersfortheproblemsthathavebeendialecticallyworkedthrough(Top.I.2,101a37–b4;Phys.IV.4,211a7–11).Thus,thedialecticalreasoninginAPo.II.3–7clearlysetsthestagefordetermining,inasatisfyingway,theexactrelationbetweendefinitionsanddemonstrations(APo.II.8–10).Itisinthissensethatdialecticmayevendiscusstheprinciplesofscience(Top.I.2,101a37–b4).Onthisview,thereseemstobeanimportantconnectionbetweendialecticandscience.Weshouldnotconcludefromthisevidence,though,thatAristotle’saccountoftherelationbetweendialecticandscienceisinconsistent.Clearly,dialecticalreasoningmaybesometimeshelpfulfor,butremainsdifferentinmethodfrom,science.Theadequatewayofestablishingscientificprinciplesandinparticularscientificdefinitionscannotbeprovidedbydialectic(Bolton,1987).Butsinceinmanycaseswhatallpeoplebelieveistrueandwhatnobodybelievesisfalse(ENX.2,1173a1–2;Met.a.1,993a30–b4),scientistsshouldseetoitthatthebeliefsofexpertsandofmostoftheotherpeopleremainconsistent(Top.I.10,104a5–13)andthatasmanywidelyacceptedbeliefsaspossiblebeprovedtobetrue(ENVII.1,1145b3–7).Itisinthiswaythatscienceis,onAristotle’sview,closelyconnectedtocommonsenseanddialecticalpremises.ThereisastrikingspecificapplicationofthisviewinthePosteriorAnalytics.Nominaldefinitions,beingpropositionsthataspecificscientifictheorymaytrytodemonstrate,aresometimescalled“general”(logikoi)propositionsthatmostpeoplebelievetobetrue.ThisindicatesthatAristotletakesthemtobedialecticalstartingpointsofscientificreasoning.Moreimportantly,intryingtofindadequatepremisesthatwecanusetodemonstratedialecticalnominaldefinitionsAristotlepointstoacceptedback-groundtheoriesthatrenderthemajortermofthegivennominaldefinitionsmoreprecise,therebyproviding,atthesametime,thetheoreticalframeworkthatallpossibledemonstrationshavetofitwith.Forinstance,theclaimthatthunderisacertainnoiseinthecloudsisanominaldialecticaldefinition.Butforthisdefinitiontobecomeascientifictheoremthatmaybedemonstrated,wehavetofillinthebackgroundtheoryofnoises(cf.DeAn.II.6,II.8;Cael.II.9)thatprovidesthescientistswithapreciseinterpretationofthemajortermnoise.Anydemonstrationthatexplainswhythunderisacertainnoiseinthecloudshastobeconsistentwiththisbackgroundtheory.Ifsuchademonstrationcanbeestablished,itshows,howandunderwhichinterpreta-tionthenominaldefinitioncanbedemonstrated(APo.II.8).Thisisamodelofthewayscienceissupposedtoshowwhy,andunderwhichinterpretation,beliefsacceptedbymostpeoplearetrue.FallibilityAristotlewascertainlyconvincedthatitisnotimpossibleforhumanbeingstograspthetruth,evenincomplexscientificinquiries;inthissense,hewasnotaskeptic.But260ACTC1426020/03/2006,04:05PM\naristotle’slogicandtheoryofscienceatthesametimeheemphasizesthat“itisdifficulttobeawarewhetheroneknowsornot”(APo.I.9,76a26),for“astheeyesofbatsaretotheblazeofday,soisthereasoninoursoultothethingswhicharebynaturemostevidentofall”(Met.a.1,993b9–11).Consequently,Aristotlefeelsthatinourstruggletoofferadequatescientificexplanations,alotofthingscangowrong,andsometimeswecannotdecideonceandforallwhethersomethingwentwrong.Asalreadyindicated,thesimplestcaseinquestionistheattempttoestablishauniversalfact,sayAaB.ThisistrueonlyaslongaswedonotfindathingthatisB,butnotA.Furthermore,intryingtofind,bywayofabottom-upanalysis,immediatepremises,howcanwemakesurethatwehavefoundpremisesthataretrulyimmediate?IndiscussinghowscientifictheoriesmayincreaseAristotletalksaboutthediscoveryofnewfactsthatmayforceustoextendthehighestpremisesofourtheory(APo.I.12,78a14–22).Obviously,hetakesintoaccountthatwemay,ateverystageofourscientificresearch,discovernewfacts;itfollowsthatwecannevermakesurethatwehavefoundimmediatepremisesbecausethediscoveryofnewfactsmaypointtonewmiddletermsthatenableustodemonstratepropositionswetookbeforetobeimmediate.ThisiswhyAristotlejustifieshisclaimthat“itisdifficulttobeawarewhetheroneknowsornot”byremarking:“Foritisdifficulttobeawarewhetherweknowfromtheprinciplesofathingornot–andthatiswhatknowingis”(APo.I.9,76a26–30).Aristotlelooksalsoatlogicalwaystorefutegivenuniversalpropositions.Forinstance,heexaminesinwhichwayignorance,i.e.,errorthroughdeduction,comesabout(APo.I.16–17).Inthiscontext,heenvisagessituationsinwhichvaliddeductionsentailfalseconclusions,inparticularconclusionsthatareinconsistentwithotheruniversalpropositionsassumedtobetrue.Insuchcaseswehave,asAristotlecorrectlyremarks,todeterminewhichofthepremisesarefalse.SothereissufficientevidencethatAristotleistalkingaboutdifferentwaysofexaminingthetruth-valueofgivenscientificproposi-tionsbylookingattheirlogicalimplications.Indeed,thisissomethingAristotlehimselfdoesseveraltimesinhisownscientificworks(see,e.g.,Cael.II.13,293a23–30;II.14,297a2–6;III.7,306a5–17;Met.L.8,1073b32–1074a6).Thereareanumberofotherwaysourscientificresearchcanfail.Thus,wemaybeinclinedtodemonstrateinacircularmanner(APo.I.3);wemaybe,indetermin-ingscientificprinciples,satisfiedwithstatingtheirtruthoreventheirplausibility(APo.I.6);wemaysometimescross,withinasequenceofdemonstrations,thespecificdomainofadepartmentalscience(APo.I.7);sometimesscientistsraiseunscientificquestions(APo.I.12),andsometimestheydon’tuseperceptionandinductionatall,ortakethemtobesufficientfordoingscience(APo.I.18).Somescientiststhinktheycangetdefinitionswithoutconstructingdemonstrations(APo.II.3–7),andsomethinkthatthePlatonicmethodofdividingconceptsislogicallyvalid(APo.II.5);sometakeitthatthereis,foreveryexplainablefact,asimpleanduniquedemonstration,andsometakeitthatthereare,foreveryexplainablefact,twoormoredemonstrations(APo.II.16–18).ForAristotle,alltheseassumptionsorinclinationsaremethodologicalmistakesthatareoftennoteasytodetect.Insum,Aristotledoesreflectindifferentrespectsonourweakepistemiccondition,andhetakesmanyscientificproposalsandexplanations,ateverypointofourscientificresearch,toberatherfragileandfallible(Detel,1993).261ACTC1426120/03/2006,04:05PM\nwolfgangdetelApplicabilityAncientbiologyandgeometrydonotseemtoargueinasyllogisticway,anditseemshardtoseehowtheycoulddoso.NeitherdoesAristotlehimself,inhisownbiologicalworks,seemtofollowthemethodologicalrulesherecommendsintheAnalytics.Thisistheapplicationproblem.RecentworkonAristotle’sbiologyindicates,though,thatonacloserlookheinfactdoesuseagreatnumberofrulesproposedintheAnalytics;inparticular,heseemstoassumethathisargumentscanatleastrathereasilyberecon-structedinaformalsyllogisticway,andithasbeenshownthatsuchreconstructionscanactuallybeoffered(Bolton,1987;Detel,1997;Freeland,1990;Gotthelf,1987a,1997;Lennox,1987;McKirahan,1995;andinthisvolumeLennox,aristotle’sbiology;seehoweverModrak,1996).Ingeneralterms,inreadingAristotle’slogicandtheoryofscienceweshouldproceedfromtheassumptionthatthereisaconceptualunityofthesedisciplineswithhismetaphysicsandhisempiricalstudieslikebiologyormeteorology(Pellegrin,1986,p.50).Thecaseofgeometryprovestobealotharder.OneofthemainproblemsisthatEuclideanproofsusetwo-placedpredicatesthatcannoteasilybesymbolizedsyllogistically.Nevertheless,thereisevidencethatAristotlehimselfthoughtthatsyllogisticisapplicabletogeometry,too(APo.II.11,94a20–35).Ofcourse,theeasiestwayofdealingwiththisclaimissimplytodeclareittriviallywrong,andthatisindeedwhatmostscholarsareinclinedtodo.ButifwelookmorecloselyattheexamplesAristotlehintsatwecanseethattheremaybeawayoutofthisproblem:theseexamplessuggestthatasyllogisticsymbolizationofgeometricalproofissupposedtobeextremelygeneral,suchthattheentireideaoftheproofiscontainedinthemiddletermofthedemonstration(Detel,1993,vol.1,pp.172–81;Mendell,1998).Inanycase,Aristotle’scrucialideaisthatformallogicmustbeanessentialpartofatheoryofsciencethatissupposedtoprovidethefoundationforrationallyreconstruct-ingscientificpractice;andthisideaprovedtobeextremelyinfluentialandfruitfulthroughoutthehistoryofscience,althoughsyllogisticturnedouttobetoorestrictedinscopetosupportthisideasufficiently.ReadingsofAristotle’sTheoryofScienceThefirstprinciplesofscienceintheAnalyticshavebeenthought,bycenturiesofcom-mentators,tobesomethinglikeaprioritruthsgraspedbyspecialactsofintellectual13insightthatguaranteetheepistemiccertaintyoftheprinciples.And,sothestorygoeson,oncewehavegraspedtheprincipleswecantrytodeduce,ortodemonstrate,furthertheoremsinatop-downprocedurethatguarantees,becauseofthelogicalvalidityofourdeductions,thetruthofallthetheoremstoo.ThistraditionaloutlineofAristotle’sideaofscienceandscientificactivitycanbecalledtheaxiomaticreading.Indeed,Aristotletellsusthatknowledgeandinsightareepistemicstates“bywhichwe13.ForliteratureonthispointseeDetel,1998,pp.157–8,n.2.262ACTC1426220/03/2006,04:05PM\naristotle’slogicandtheoryofsciencegraspthetruth”andsoare“alwaystrue”(APo.II.19,100b6–8).Hestressesthatwemustbemoreawareof,andmoreconvincedby,theprinciplesofsciencethanbytheirconclusions(APo.I.2,72a15–b4),andthattheseprinciplesmustsomehowbeassumed,althoughtheycannotbeprovedordemonstrated(APo.I.2).Andanappropriatescientifictheoryissupposedtorely,ofcourse,onmethodsandproposalsthatavoidallthemethodologicalmistakesthataremarkedsoexplicitlybyAristotle.TheseandsimilarremarkshavebeentakentoconfirmtheaxiomaticreadingoftheAnalytics.Recentlyscholarshavesuggestedanalternativeinterpretation:“TherearehintsthatthetheoryofthePosteriorAnalyticswasmeanttoprovidetheproperformalaccountandpresentationofthefinishedsystem”(Barnes,1975,p.x;seealsoBarnes,1969,1981;andBauman,1998).Accordingtothispicture,itisextremelyimportantnottoconfusetheaspectofdiscoveryandscientificresearch,ontheonehand,andtheaspectoflearning,teaching,andpresentinganestablishedscientifictheory,ontheotherhand.Discoveryandresearchuseinductionandempiricalinvestigation,andtheylookprimarilyatphenomena,i.e.,atwhatmostpeoplethinktobetrue(seeOwen,1961;Wieland,1962).Essencesofthingsarenothingelsethanthesetofpropertiesthatturnout,inourscientificresearch,tobecausallybasicpropertiesofthesethings;and“insight”asamodeofdiscoveryisabsentfromthePosteriorAnalytics.FromthepointofviewofthispedagogicalreadingoftheAnalytics,Aristotleseemstobea“whole-heartedempiricist”(Barnes,1975,p.259).Influentialscholarsseethepedagogicalreadingas“theneworthodoxyandthenowacceptedinterpretationofthePosteriorAnalytics”(Bolton,1987,p.121;Sorabji,1980,pp.188,194).Finally,somescholarshaveemphasizedthatAristotleseesourscientificactivityasaiming,notattheproductionofentirelynewdiscoveries,butratheratdeepeninggivenknowledgebyprovidingexplanationsofwell-knownphenomena.ThisiswhyquestionsofjustificationarealmostabsentfromthePosteriorAnalytics(Burnyeat,1981;Kosman,1973;Lear,1988;Lesher,1973):Ourgivenknowledgeisnotjustifiedbyexplanationsanddemonstrations;rather,explanationsanddemonstrationsdeepenourgivenknow-ledgeandhelpustobetterunderstandphenomenathatwealreadytaketobethecase.ThereisanicelittleremarkAristotlemakesabouthittingthetruth:“nooneisabletoattainthetruthadequately,whileeveryonesayssomethingtrueaboutthenatureofthings”(Met.a.1,993a31–b4).Thisappliesalsotothethreeinterpretationsofhistheoryofsciencejustoutlined.ThebeginningofwisdominreadingtheAnalyticsconsistsindistinguishingdescriptionsofanidealofscienceandscientificactivitythatshowswhataperfectscientifictheoryshouldlooklike,anddescriptionsoftheepistemicconditionhumanresearchersareinateverymomentoftheirscientificactivityandcareer.Itispreciselybydevelopingaperfectidealofsciencethatonecanindicateinwhichwaywemayfailindoingscienceandinwhichrespectwecannevermakesureonceandforallthatwehaveachievedperfectscientificknowledge.InhistheoryofsciencewecanseeAristotledoingboththings:sketchingwhatperfectscientificknowledgecomesdownto,andindicatinginwhichwayourhumanepistemiccon-ditionisfragileandfallible.Foronlybydoingboththesethingscanweimproveourfragileepistemicconditionandcomeclosertoperfectknowledge.ThisisthebasicassumptionofacomplexreadingoftheAnalytics(Detel,1998,pp.176–7).FromthispointofviewtheaxiomaticreadingfocusesexclusivelyonAristotle’sidealofknowledge.Claimingthatknowledgeandinsightarealwaystrueisaproposalabout263ACTC1426320/03/2006,04:05PM\nwolfgangdetelwhatperfectknowledgeandinsightperfectedbyanalysisshouldbe:ifitisreallyperfectknowledge,itis,andremains,true.Thatishowwedefineperfectknowledge.ButthecrucialflawofthisreadingistotakeAristotle’sthoughtsaboutperfectsciencetocovertheepistemicconditionofhumanscientificresearchtoo.Thepedagogicalreading,ontheotherhand,correctlyemphasizesthatAristotletalks,forinstance,intheveryfirstsentenceofthePosteriorAnalytics,aboutthecontextofteachingandlearningthateveryadequatescientifictheorybelongsto.ItisalsotruethatAristotleseemstothinkthatteachingandlearningascientifictheoryrequirespresentingthetheoryinadeductiveanddemonstrativeframesothatthestudentcanseehowitsproposalsdependoneachother.Butitisclearlywrongtosuggest,asthepedagogicalreadinghasit,thatthereisasharpmethodologicaldis-tinctionbetweenperception,induction,anddialecticalreasoningasbelongingtothecontextofdiscovery,anddeductionanddemonstrationasbelongingtothecontextofteaching,learning,andpresentingthetheory.ThisisobviouslyinconsistentwithAristotle’sclaim,sodecisiveforhisviewofscience,thatscientificactivitiesaimprimarilyatthediscoveryofcauses;thediscoveryofcausesandhighestpremises,however,necessarilyrequirestheconstructionofdemonstrations.Therefore,deductionsanddemonstrationsbelongtothecontextofdiscoverytoo.Finally,itistruethatAristotleis,intheAnalytics,mainlyinterested,notintheknowledgeoffacts,butintheknowledgeofcausesofgivenfactsthatdeepenourknowledgeoffactssimplybyexplainingthemcausally.ButweshouldnotoverlookthatAristotledoesreflect,evenintheAnalytics,alsoonmethodsofestablishingfacts,andthat,ingeneral,questionsofjustificationarebynomeanscompletelyabsentfromtheAnalytics.Thisholdsevenforscientificprinciples.Aristotlecertainlythinksthatscientificprinciplesaregivenintherestrictedsensethattheycannotbeprovedordemonstrated.Butpostulatesandsuppositionscanbejustifiedinlogicandfirstphilo-sophy.Thus,Aristotlehimselfjustifies,forinstance,thelawoftheexcludedmiddleintheMetaphysics(BookG)andthevalidityofsyllogisticinferencesinthePriorAnalytics(BookI).Likewise,itisthejoboffirstphilosophytojustifyexistenceclaimsaboutfundamentalentitiesofscientificdomains,asAristotledemonstratestoo,forinstance,inthecaseofmathematicalentities(MetaphysicsM).Finally,definitionsinthesenseofhighestexplanatoryprinciplesanddemonstrativepremisescannotbedemonstratedorprovedeither,butatthesametimethereisacleardoublesenseinwhichtheycanbejustifiedevenwithinthedepartmentalsciencetheybelongto:asuniversalproposi-tions,theycanandmustbejustifiedbyinductionordeduction(APo.II.19),andasimmediateexplanatorypremisestheymustbejustifiedbyshowingthattheysitatthetopofactuallyconstructedanalysesandsetsofdemonstrationsmakingupawholescientifictheory.OnewayofcharacterizingthecomplexreadingofAristotle’stheoryofscienceistosaythatAristotleconceivedofscience,andofscientificactivity,asanepistemicculture.Ingeneral,acultureisasetofpracticesthatarebasedonsharedbackgroundassumptionsandaretaughtandlearnt;inparticular,anepistemiccultureconsistsofpracticesthataredesignedtoevaluateclaimstoknowledgeandtoproducejustifiedknowledge;atthesametime,anepistemicculturereliesspecificallyonsharedbackgroundassump-tionsaboutwhatperfectknowledgeis,anditsmethodsandresultsaretransmittedbyteachingandlearningthem.Outliningthecomplexreadingthiswaymakesclearthat264ACTC1426420/03/2006,04:05PM\naristotle’slogicandtheoryofscienceitpreservestheadvantagesofthethreeotherreadingssketchedabovewhileatthesametimeavoidingtheirnarrowness.EpistemologicalStatusoftheAnalyticsInAristotle’sclassificationofallsciences(Met.E.1)dialectic,logic,andtheoryofsciencearemissing.Aristotledoesnotseemtocountthemamongthesciences.Thishasprovokedadebateamongscholars(e.g.,Ackrill,1981,p.79;Barnes,1982,p.25;Ross,1923,p.20).ThesuggestionofferedbytheAristoteliantraditionisthatAristotleconsideredthesedisciplinesasmeretoolsofthesciences.ButAristotlehimselfgivesussomecluesthathelptounderstandbetterhowhelookedatthestatusoflogic,dialectic,andthetheoryofscience.Specificsciencesproperaredefinedbythespecificdomain,orgenus(genos),theydealwith.Generaare,inAristotle’sview,radicallydifferentfromeachother:they“havenopathtooneanother,butaretoodistantandwithoutcommonmeasure”(Met.I.4,1055a6–7).Differentgeneraarethereforeseparatedfromeachotherinsuchawaythatthegapbetweenthemis,atleastinanydirectway,impassable(thoughtheremaybeanalogiesbetweenthem).Atthesametime,anygenusisaspaceofspecificdifferencesandincludescontrarykinds(eidE),therelationofcon-trarietybeingdefined,byatheoryofopposites,asthemaximumdifferencebetweenattributessuchthatcontraryattributescannotcoexistinthesamesubjectinthesamerelation(Met.I.4).Everyspecificsciencecan,therefore,bedefineduniquelybyitsspecificgenus,anditexploresthecontrarykindsofitsspecificdomain.Thenotionsofagenus(genos)andakind(eidos)arenot,however,taxonomicconceptsinthemodernsenseofgenusandspecies.Inhisbiology,forinstance,Aristotleappliesthetermgenosoftentothingsthatcountasspeciesinthemoderntaxonomicsense.Animalclassificationsare,inAristotle’sview,outsidescience,thecentralprojectofAristotle’sbiologybeingwhatwemightcallanetiologicalmoriology(Balme,1962;Pellegrin,1986).ItisonthebasisoftheradicalseparationofscientificgenerafromeachotherthatAristotleinsiststhatscientistsarenotpermittedtocrossover,intheirexplanationsanddemon-strations,fromonegenustoanother(APo.I.7).Aristotle’stheoryofscienceis,therefore,avarietyofananti-reductionistscientificpluralismthatputsemphasisonthespecificityanduniquenessofdomainsandtermino-logiesthatareconstitutiveforeveryspecificscience(althoughtherearecasesofsubordinationofonesciencetoanotherwithinthesamegenus;forexample,opticsissubordinatetogeometry).ThereareindicationsthatAristotleconceivedofscientificgeneraasbeingabstractedfromnaturalthingsbyscientificactivity.Thus,forexample,partofestablishingthescienceofbiologyisthatscientistslookatnaturalthingsqualivingthings,andpartofestablishingthescienceofgeometryisthatscientistslookatnaturalthingsquadimensionalentities(Met.M.3,1077b17–1078a26;Phys.II.2,193b31–194a12).ThisisnottosaythatAristotleentertainsananti-realisticpositionaboutscientificgenera;rather,hefeelsthatnaturalthingsarebearersofagreatvarietyofstructuresandcanthereforebelookedatindifferentways.Itisuptothescientistwhatkindofstructurehewantstolookat,therebyabstractingfromotherparametersthatarealsogiveninnaturalthings.265ACTC1426520/03/2006,04:05PM\nwolfgangdetelInanycase,logicandthetheoryofsciencedonotexploreaspecificdomain;for“neitherofthemdealswiththenatureofanydefinitesubject,buttheyaremere14facultiesoffurnishingarguments.”Inaddition,logicandthetheoryofsciencedonotseemtobelookingforcauseseither.Inthesecrucialrespectstheydiffer,likedialectic,fromsciencesproper.Moreimportantly,recognizingandfollowinggeneralmethodologicalrulesisamatter,notofscience,butofeducation.Thus,thewrongdemandthateverythingshouldbedemonstrated(discussedinsomedetailinAPo.I.3)isdueto“wantofeducation,fornottoknowofwhatthingsonemaydemanddemonstration,andofwhatonemaynot,arguessimplywantofeducation”(Met.G.4,1006a5–8).Likewise,itis“themarkofaneducatedmantolookforprecisionineachclassofthingsjustsofarasthenatureofthesubjectsadmits”(ENI.3,1094b24–25).Ingeneral,concerningeverystudyandinvestigation,thereare,accordingtoAristotle,twodifferentkindsofproficiency:oneisakindofacquaintancewiththesubject,providedbysciencesproper;theotheriswhat“maybeproperlycallededucatedknowledgeofthesubject.Foraneducatedmanshouldbeabletoformafairjudgmentastothegoodnessorbadnessofanexpositioninnearlyallbranchesofknowledge,andnotmerelyinsomespecialsubject.”Thereforeinthesciences,inparticularinthenaturalsciences,“theremustbecertaincanons,byreferencetowhichahearershallbeabletocriticizethemethodofaprofessedexposition,quiteindependentlyofthequestionwhetherthestatementsmadebetrueorfalse.”Indeed,ingeneral“tobeeducatedistodothis,andthemanofgeneraleducationwetaketobesuch”(PAI.1,639a1–15)(George,1993).TheseilluminatingremarksshowhowAristotleconceivesofthetruestatusoflogicandatheoryofscience:learningandmasteringthesedisciplinesis,nottobeascientist,buttobeeducatedinthemostgeneralsense;logicandtheoryofsciencearetheverycoreofpaideia.Oneimportantaspectofthisgeneraleducationisarationalcriticalattitudetowardsthestructureandvalidityofproposedarguments.Tousemodernterminology,tobeeducatedinthisgeneralsense,i.e.,touselogicandscientificmethodologyinacriticalandrationalway,istomoveinthespaceofreason,toparticipateinthegameofgivingandaskingforreasons.Theprocessoflearninglogicandscientificmethodologyistotamenatureandtomovefromtherealmofnatureintothespaceofreasons,andthisisoneofthemostimportantconditionsforlivingagoodlife.ItisinthiswaythatAristotlelucidlyandadmirablyshowsusthetruestatus,andthetrueimportance,oftheformaldisciplinesthathehimselfhastheeternalmeritofhavinginvented.BibliographyWorksCitedAckrill,J.L.(1981).AristotlethePhilosopher.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Balme,D.(1962).“GenosandEidosinAristotle’sBiology.”ClassicalQuarterly,12,81–98.14.SeeRh.I.2,1356a32–33.Thisremarkisrestrictedtorhetoricanddialectic,though;butsincesyllogisticinferencerulesbelongalsotodialectic(APr.I.1,24a26–28),thisgoesalsoforsyllogisticlogic,andthereforeafortiorialsofortherulesofscientificargumentsdevelopedinthePosteriorAnalytics.266ACTC1426620/03/2006,04:05PM\naristotle’slogicandtheoryofscienceBarnes,J.(1969).“Aristotle’sTheoryofDemonstration.”Phronesis,14,123–52.——.(1975).Aristotle’sPosteriorAnalytics.Oxford:ClarendonPress.(2ndedn.1994.)——.(1981).“ProofandtheSyllogism.”InE.Berti(ed.),AristotleonScience.ThePosteriorAnalytics(pp.17–59).ProceedingsoftheEighthSymposiumAristotelicum.Padua:EditriceAntenore.——.(1982).Aristotle.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.B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”AncientPhilosophy,14,39–51.Wieland,W.(1962).DiearistotelischePhysik.Göttingen:VandenhoeckandRuprecht.FurtherReadingAncientandRenaissancecommentatorsAlexanderofAphrodisiasWallis,M.(ed.).(1883).InAristotelisAnalyticorumPriorumLibrumICommentarium(CAG,2.1).Berlin:Reimer.PhiloponusWallis,M.(ed.).(1905).InAristotelisAnalyticaPrioraCommentaria(CAG,13.2).Berlin:Reimer.——.(ed.).(1909).InAristotelisAnalyticaPosterioraCommentaria(CAG,13.3).Berlin:Reimer.268ACTC1426820/03/2006,04:05PM\naristotle’slogicandtheoryofscienceZabarellaZabarella,J.(1597).InduosAristotelislibrosPosteriorumAnalyticorumCommentaria.Cologne:LazarusZetzner.(Repr.Hildesheim:Olms.)ModernauthorsAvgelis,N.andPeonidis,F.(eds.).(1998).AristotleonLogic,LanguageandScience(pp.155–82).Thessaloniki:SakkoulasPublications.Barnes,J.,Schofield,M.,andSorabji,R.(eds.).(1975).ArticlesonAristotle.(vol.1):Science.London:Duckworth.Charles,D.(2000).AristotleonMeaningandEssence.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Corcoran,J.(1994).“TheFoundingofLogic.”AncientPhilosophy,14,9–24.Devereux,D.andPellegrin,P.(eds.).(1990).Biologie,LogiqueetMétaphysiquechezAristote.Paris:ÉditionsduCNRS.Ferejohn,M.(1991).TheOriginsofAristotelianScience.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.Frede,M.(1974).“Stoicvs.AristotelianSyllogistic.”ArchivfürGeschichtederPhilosophie,56,1–32.Gill,M.L.(1989).AristotleonSubstance.TheParadoxofUnity.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Gotthelf,A.(ed.).(1985).AristotleonNatureandLivingThings.Pittsburgh/Bristol:Mathesis.——.andLennox,J.G.(eds.).(1987).PhilosophicalIssuesinAristotle’sBiology.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Hintikka,J.(1973).TimeandNecessity:StudiesinAristotle’sTheoryofModality.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Irwin,T.(1989).Aristotle’sFirstPrinciples.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Kakkuri-Knuuttila,M.andKnuuttila,S.(1990).“InductionandConceptualAnalysis.”ActaPhilosophicaFennica,49,294–303.Kullmann,W.(1974).WissenschaftundMethode.InterpretationenzurAristotelischenTheoriederNaturwissenschaft.Berlin:deGruyter.Lennox,J.G.(1994).“PuttingPhilosophyofSciencetotheTest:TheCaseofAristotle’sBiology.”ProceedingsoftheBiennialMeetingsofthePhilosophyofScienceAssociation,2,239–47.Matthen,M.(ed.).(1988).AristotleToday.EssaysonAristotle’sIdealofScience.Edmonton:AcademicPrintingandPublishing.McKirahanJr.,R.D.(1995).“Aristotle’s‘Metaphysics’fromthePerspectiveofthePosteriorAnalytics.”ProceedingsoftheBostonAreaColloquiuminAncientPhilosophy,11,275–97.Mignucci,M.(1975).L’argomentazionedimostrativainAristotele.CommentoagliAnaliticiSecondi.(vol.1).Padua:PublicazioneIstitutodistoriadellafilosofiaedelCentroperricerchediFilosofiamedievale.Owen,G.E.L.(1986).Logic,Science,andDialectic(M.C.Nussbaumed.).Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress/London:Duckworth.Pellegrin,P.(1987).“LogicalDifferenceandBiologicalDifference:TheUnityofAristotle’sThought.”InA.GotthelfandJ.G.Lennox(eds.),PhilosophicalIssuesinAristotle’sBiology(pp.313–38).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(1990).“Del’explicationcausaledanslabiologied’Aristote.”RevuedeMétaphysiqueetdeMorale,105,197–219.Smith,R.(1982).“TheAxiomaticMethodandAristotle’sLogicalMethodology.”SouthwestPhilosophicalStudies,8,49–59.Sosa,E.(1983).“ClassicalAnalysis.”JournalofPhilosophy,80,695–710.Wians,W.(ed.).(1996).Aristotle’sPhilosophicalDevelopment:ProblemsandProspects.Lanham,Md.:Rowman&Littlefield.269ACTC1426920/03/2006,04:05PM\nistvánbodnárandpierrepellegrin15Aristotle’sPhysicsandCosmologyISTVÁNBODNÁRANDPIERREPELLEGRINAristotle,atMet.E.1,1026a6–22,contrastswhathecallsphusikEepistEmE(physicalscience)withtheothertheoreticalsciences,themathematicalsciences,andtheology.Theupshotofthecomparisonisthatphysicsissimilartotheology,becauseboththeologyandphysicstreatsubstances–entitieswhicharecapableofseparateexist-enceontheirown–butthissimilaritydoesnotallowforanidentificationofthetwotheoreticaldisciplines,becausephysics,unliketheology,treatschangeablesubstance,whereastheologicalinquiryinvestigatesthedomainoftheeternalandimmutabledivineentities.This,asAristotlealsostresses,meansthatiftherewerenounmovable,non-physicalentities,physicswouldbefirstphilosophy:itwouldgiveanaccountofeverythingthereisintheworldbyinquiringintotheprinciplesofeverything.Suchapositionhasitsowntheoreticalcoherence,butalsoshowsthetraceofcrisisinthehistoryofphilosophyfromitsbeginningtoAristotle.InafamouspassageinthePartsofAnimals,Aristotle,criticizingtheSocraticsforhavingrestrictedthemselvestoethicsandpolitics,claimedtorevivethepre-Socratictraditionintheinvestigationofnature(historiaperiphuseOs,cf.Hussey,thebeginningsofscienceandphilosophyinarchaicgreece,inthisvolume).Thiskindofphilosophy,whichconsideredallbeingsascomingfromasmallnumberofprinciples–principleswhichweremainlymaterial,beingeithersubstanceslikewaterorfire,orqualititeslikehotandcold,thickandthin–hadbeentoppledbytheattackoftheEleatics,accordingtowhomnobeingcaneithercomefromnot-beingorreturnbacktonot-being.Aristotlere-establishedthepossibilityofphysicsonanewbasis.OnAristotle’saccount,nature,ornaturalbeingstakenasawhole,isnolongerconsideredthetotalityofbeing,andthedomainofchangeableentitiesisnolongerconsideredself-sufficient.Asitturnsout,itneedsforitscontinuedexistenceandchangesthecausalinfluenceofimmutableentities–theprimemovers.Nevertheless,forallthiscausaldependence,physicsremainsaseparatetheoreticalinquiry:whatchangesthereareinthedomainofchangeableentitieswillfundamentallydependontheconstitutionoftheseentities.Evenifathoroughandexhaustiveknowledgeofthesupra-sensibledomainwerepossible,itwouldnotprovideanunderstandingofthevariousprocessesinthechangeablerealm.Forthat,agenuinestudyoftheentitiesendowedwithchangeisindispensable.Physicsandtheologyaredifferentfromeachotherbecausetheyareconcernedwithdifferentandirreducibleobjects,eveniftheseobjectsarerelatedtoeachother.Nowthechangesanychangeableentitywillundergodependontwomainfactors:externalinfluencesexertedontheobject,andalsosomesalientinherentcharacteristicsofthechangingobjectitself.Anexplanationofeveryphysicalprocess,then,hasto270ACTC1527020/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sphysicsandcosmologyappealtobothkindsoffactors.Adiscussionoftheconstitutionandtheinternalcharacteristicsofchangeableobjects–whichalsowillincludethecausalinfluencetheseobjectscanexertononeanother–isaprerequisiteofphysicalinquiry.SofarwehaveconsideredwhatcouldbecalledanepistemologicalanswertoParmenides’critique.Whatisestablished,throughtheAristoteliandivisionofsciences,isthepossibilityofatheoreticalscienceofchangeablebeing,asciencethatinheritedtheconstraintsofEleaticandPlatonicknowledge(eternityandimmutabilityoftheobjectofscience,necessityoftheconnectionsdisplayedbyscience).ButAristotle’sanswertotheParmenideanchallengeisalsoacosmologicalone.Becauseheabandonedthecosmogonicexplanationsofpreviousphilosophers,includ-1ingPlato,Aristotleisthefirst,andinasensethelastcosmologist,atleastinantiquity(cf.Solmsen,1960).Settingasidethequestionoftheoriginoftheuniverse,Aristotletakestheworldtobeperfectandeternal–predicatesrelatedtoeachother,becausesomethingthatisnotperfectcouldnotbeeternal–andalsofiniteandsphericalinitsform.Thisglobalperfectioniscompatiblewithsomelocalimperfections.Therepro-ductionoflivingbeingswithintheboundariesofeternalspecies,forinstance,isbutanimperfectimitationoftheindividualeternityofthecelestialbodies.Inthisveryreproductionmanyaccidentsmaytakeplace,whichcanproduceoffspringofvariousdegreesofmonstrosity.Thoseimperfectionsarerestrictedwithintheboundariesofwhatcommentators,butnotAristotlehimself,havecalledthe“sublunaryregion.”ForAristotle’sworldiscomposedofasetofconcentricspheresthecenterofwhichisthecenteroftheearth,whichistheonlyimmobilepointintheuniverse.Theoutermostsphereisthatofthefixedstarsonwhichconstellationsareattachedandwhichcompletesafullrevolutioninoneday.Beyondthesphereofthefixedstarsthereisneitherspacenorplacenorvoidnortime(Cael.I.9,279a11).Belowthisspherearetheplanetswhicharesetwithinsphereswhichgivethemtheirmovements.AristotleadoptswithsomeemendationsthetheoryofconcentricspherespositedbyEudoxusandrevisedbyCallippus.Thistheoryaimstoexplainhowitispossiblethatthesphereofthefixedstarshasauniformcircularmotion,whereasthatoftheplanets–“planet”means“wandering”inGreek–isnot.Eudoxusproposedthehypothesisofseveralconcentricspheresthathavedifferentaxes,orientationofmotion,andspeeds.Eachplanetisthereforedependentonasystemofseveralspheres,anditsfinaltrajectoryistheresultofthecompositionofthemotionsofthesespheres.(Cf.Duhem,1913;andMendell,2000).Thelastofthesespheres,viz.theoneclosesttous,isthesphereofthemoon.Abovethissphere–intheregioncalled“supralunar”bycommentatorsandmerelydesignatedbytheexpression“thethingsabove”byAristotlehimself–themovementsarecom-plexbutabsolutelyregular.Withinthesublunaryregion,bycontrast,onecanfindacertaindegreeofdisorder.ThisdisorderisoneoftheobstaclesAristotlehadtoovercometobuildupasciencethatcanbeappliedtotherealitiesofthesublunaryregion.Oneexample:inthesublunaryregion,duetothepresenceofperishablematter,allthephenomenaareinsomerespectsindeterminate,andthenecessaryconnectionsarenotvalid“always”butonly“forthemostpart.”1.ForabriefoverviewofthelaterStoiccosmology,seeinthisvolumeBrissonandPradeau,plotinus,p.590.271ACTC1527120/03/2006,04:06PM\nistvánbodnárandpierrepellegrinItiswithinthisclosedandcyclicalworldthatAristotelianphysicshasitssignificance,andinparticularthatthetheoryofchangeisunderstandable.Whatis,then,thedomainofphysicalscience?WhenhereferstothePhysicsasatreatise,AristotlemainlyspeaksoftaperiphuseOsandtaphusika.W.D.Ross,intheintroductionofhiseditionofthePhysics(Ross,1936),mentionsthattheseexpressions,whenusedastitles,mayrefertothreethings:eitherasetoftextsthatincludesatmostthefirstfourbooksofourPhysics,ortheeight(orseven)booksofourPhysics,orthecompletesetofallthephysicaltreatisesthemostcompletelistofwhichisgiveninapassageoftheMeterology,atextthatdeservestobequotedalmostinfull:Wehavealreadydiscussedthefirstcausesofnature,andallnaturalmotion,alsothestarsorderedinthemotionoftheheavens,andthecorporealelements...andbecomingandperishingingeneral.Thereremainsforconsiderationapartofthisinquirywhichallourpredecessorscalledmeteorology.Itisconcernedwitheventsthatarenatural,thoughtheirorderislessperfectthanthatofthefirstelementofbodies....Whentheinquiryintothesemattersisconcluded,letusconsiderwhataccountwecangive,inaccordancewiththemethodwehavefollowed,ofanimalsandplants,bothgenerallyandindetail.(Meteor.I.1,338a20–339a8)Letushavealookateachstageofthislist:“thefirstcausesofnature,andallnaturalmotion”referstothetreatiseweknowasthePhysics.“Thestarsorderedinthemotionoftheheavens”corresponds,inourcorpus,tothefirsttwobooksofOntheHeavens.“Thecorporealelements...andbecomingandperishingingeneral”correspondstothelasttwobooksofOntheHeavensandtothetreatiseOnGenerationandCorruption.Thencomesthe“meteorology”which,accordingtoAristotle,dealswithmanyphenomena–rain,snow,hail,winds,rivers,tides,earthquakes,rainbow,etc.,butalsoshootingstars,comets,auroraborealis,milkyway,etc.–allsituatedinthesublunaryregion,accordingtoAristotle.“Animalsandplants”referstoAristotle’szoologicaltreatisesandhislostbookonplants.AtMeteor.I.1,339a8,Aristotlecon-cludesthat“whenthathasbeendonewemaysaythatthewholeofouroriginalundertaking[i.e.,physics]willsotospeakhavebeencarriedout.”ThePrinciplesofPhysicsBeingascienceinthetrueAristoteliansenseoftheterm,physicsmustbothconcernagenusandbebasedonprinciples(seeDetel,aristotle’slogicandtheoryofscience,inthisvolume).Thegenusisthatofthenaturalbeings,thatis,beingsinsofarastheyhaveaninternalprincipleofchangeandrest.Concerningtheprinciples,thefirstchapterofthePhysicsexplicitlysaysthatphysicsmustestablishitsownprinciplesjustastheothersciencesdo,thatis,byproceedingfromparticulartouniversal.Theseprinciplesareoftwokinds.First,anyphysicalinvestigationwillhavetorelyontwoimportantpreliminaryassumptions:thepresuppositionofplurality,andofmotion.Thesepresuppositionscannotbeestablishedbyphysicsitself;itisthetaskofanotherkindofknowledge–of272ACTC1527220/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sphysicsandcosmologyfirstphilosophy,accordingtosomeinterpreters,butmoreprobablyofdialectic–todiscussanddefendthem(Phys.I.2,184b25–185a20).Thedefenseofplurality,againstEleaticargumentstothecontrary,invokesAristotle’stheoryofcategories.Accordingtothetheoryofcategories,itemswhichcanbesaidtobedonotconstituteasinglegenus.Entitiescomeinavarietyoftendifferentkinds,andamongthemthefunda-mentaldivideisthatbetweensubstances(entitiesbelongingtothefirstcategory),andnon-substancesorattributes(entitiesbelongingtotheotherninecategories).Accord-ingly,iftherewereonlyasingleitemwhichis,wewouldhavetodiscardtheinsightsofthetheoryofcategories,sincethesingleexistingthingcouldfallintoonlyoneofthecategories,anditcouldnotbecharacterizedbyattributesfallingintoanyoftheothercategories.Theothercategorieswouldhavetoremainuninstantiatedinsuchamonisticsetup.Butsuchaninquiryisnotpartofphysicseither.TheotherkindofprincipleisconsideredinBookIofthePhysics,chs.5–9.Giventhattheobjectofphysicsisdefinedbyitsmutability,Aristotleintroducesaunifiedaccountofchange:inanyprocessofchangeormotionanunderlyingsubject(ahupokeimenon)acquiresaform(aneidos)itpreviouslylacked.Beforethechangethesubjectischaracterizedbytheprivationoftheform(thesterEsis).Insuchcasesthetwoend-pointsofchangestandtoeachotherasopposites.Thisistruealsoincasesinwhichchangedoesnotstartfromoneoftheextremes,ordoesnotreachanextremeattheendoftheprocess:asAristotlesubmits,intermediatepointscombinebothopposites,andcandodutyinlieuoftheseopposites(Phys.V.1,224b28–35).Suchopposition,however,doesnotholdinthecaseofcelestialrevolutions:theserevolutionsgoonforever,withoutbeginningorend,andarenotcharacterizedbytheoppositionofstartingpointandendpoint,orofanypointalongthecircumferenceoftheircircularpaths.(SeeCael.I.4andII.3.)Atfirstsight,thisaccountdiffersfromtheoneAristotlecangiveaboutnon-substantialchangewithintheframeworkoftheCategoriesonlyinitsterminology.Oncethesameframeworkisappliedalsotocasesofsubstantialchange,andanunderlyingmatter(hulE)isidentifiedinprocessesofthegenerationandperishingofsubstances,substantialentities,whichtheCategoriestreatsassimpleunanalyzed2entities,turnouttobeconstitutedoutofmatterandform.Forsubstantialchange,asubstanceneedstohavegeneratableandperishablematter.Indeed,inprocessesofgenerationandperishingthesubjectofthechangewillbeneithertheobjectitself,northeindependentlyexistingsubstance(s)fromwhichtheobjectisgeneratedorintowhichitperishes.Onlythosecasescountassubstantial2.Asaconsequenceofthisadditionallevelofanalysis,AristotlenolongerneedstomaintainafundamentaldistinctionoftheCategories.Hedoesnotdistinguishbetweenentitieswhichcanbepredicatedofasubject–widerkindspredicableofindividualsoroflessgeneralkinds–andentitieswhichareinsubjects,i.e.,inhereinthem.Oncesubstancesareanalyzedintomatterandform,theformcanbesaidtobeinthematter,andtobepredicatedofthematter.Similarly,intheparlanceoftheworkswheretheanalysisofsubstancesintotheirmatterandformispresent,theinherentattributesofasubstancearesaidtobepredicatedofthesubstance(see,e.g..Met.Z.3,1029a20–24).Onthisrelationbetweenformandmatter,whicharguablycreatesdifficultiesforAristotle,seeGill,firstphilosophyinaristotle,inthisvolume.273ACTC1527320/03/2006,04:06PM\nistvánbodnárandpierrepellegringenerationsinwhich“thewholechangeswithoutanythingperceptibleremainingasthesamesubstratum”(GCI.4,319b14–16,trans.Williams).Thismeansthatinthesecasestheunderlyingmatterhastobesomethingwhichisnotperceptibleinitself,eventhoughitmaypossessperceptibleattributes.Aristotle’sexamplesforsuchattributeswhichremainunchangedthroughaprocessofsubstantialchangearetransparencyandcoldness(or,withWilliams’emendation,transparencyandwetness)ofairandwater.Aristotlestressesin319b21–24thatinsuchcases,eventhoughtheyarepresentinboththepreexistingentityandtheoutcome,suchoverarchingattributescannotserveasthesubstrateofgenerationandperishing.Insomecases,thematteroftheproductisgeneratedatthesametimeastheproductitself–organsaregeneratedasanintegralpartofthegenerationoflivingbeings.Butthenthegenerationofthismatteralsoneedstobeaccountedfor.Atthelastremovethedivisionintomatterandformhastoaccountforthegenerationofhomogeneousmassesfromoneanother,whereonehomogeneousmassiscompletelyreplacedbyanotheronethroughtheprocess.Aristotle’sexamplesat319b16–17forsuchrockbottomgenerationsarethebiologicalchangeofseedintoblood,andtheelementalchangesfromwaterintoair,orfromairintowater.Accordingly,thesecaseswillinvokeamatterwhichcannotexistonitsown,and3canfeatureonlyasthematerialcomponentofanentityendowedwithform.ButAristotleintroducesmatternotonlyasthebearerofsubstantialchange.Inthecaseofnon-substantialchanges,eventhoughtheunderlyingsubjectofthechangeisasubstance,Aristotlesubmitsthatthesubstance,inordertobeabletoundergothechangeinquestion,needstobeconstitutedoftherightkindofmaterial–matterthatcanengageinlocomotion,orundergoqualitativeandquantitativechanges.ItisimportanttostressherethatAristotle’sclaimcanbetakeninatleasttwodifferentways,dependingonwhichmattertheclaimisabout.Theclaimmakesexcellentsenseabouttheproximatematter–thatcollectionofentitiesthatareorganizeddirectlybytheformintothesubstancetheentityis.Whatevercapacitiesthesubstancehas,mustbeaccountedforbythecapacitiesofthematerialcomponentofthesubstance.WithAristotle’sexample,ifalivingbeingisabletoperformanarrayoflifefunctions,ithastobeconstitutedoftherightkindofmatter–inthiscase,oftherightkindoforgans–whichhavethecapacityofperformingthesefunctions.Inthiscasethereisastrictone-to-onecorrespondencebetweenthecapacitiesoftheentityandthoseofitsmatter.3.Cf.alsoGCI.5,320b20,whereAristotlerejectstheexistenceofacommoncorporeality–i.e.,ofacorporealentitywhichcouldexistonitsown,andwouldconstitutethesubstrateofhomogeneouselementalmasses.Itisafurtherpointwhetherthematerialcomponentofelementalmassesisafactorcommontotheseelements–whichwouldbethetraditionaldoctrineofprimematter–orwhetherwhatcountsasthematerialcomponentinagenerationandperishingdependsontheactualpairofelementsgeneratedfromeachother.Thislatteroptionwouldhavetheconsequencethatthematerialcomponentofelementscouldnotbeidentifiedforindividualelements,butonlyforpairsofelements.ButAristotle’swordingatGCI.5,320b12–14,isapparentlymorecommitted,sayingthatthematerialcomponentis“numericallyoneandthesameforallof[theelements],althoughitisdifferentinaccountforeachofthem.”274ACTC1527420/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sphysicsandcosmologyButAristotle’sclaimispresumablyaboutremotematter,orevenabouttheremotestmatter:whateverservesasthefundamentalmaterialcomponentoftheconstituentsofthematerialcounterpartofthesubstanceinquestion.WeareinclinedtotakeAristotle’sclaimthisway,becauseitisnotformulatedwithastrictone-to-onecorrespondenceinmind.Toremainwithourexample,thecapacitiesofthelifefunctionscanbelocatedattheleveloftheorgansoftheorganism,whereasthetissuesconstitutingtheseorganswillhaveahostofdifferentcapacities,outofwhich,duetotheformsorganizingthesetissuesintodifferentorgans,organswithdifferentcapacitieswillemerge.IfwetakeAristotle’sclaiminthisway,itwillstressthattheemergingcapacitiesofasubstance,correspondingtothecapacitiesofitsproximatematerialcomponent,willberootedinthedifferent,fundamentalcapacitiesofsomeultimatematerial,manifestinthepoten-4tialitiesoftheelements–fire,air,water,andearth–andtheircombinations.TheScienceofNaturalBeingsPhysics,aswehaveseen,studiesagenus–itisthescienceofnaturalbeings,themaincharacteristicofwhichistobemobile.Insofarasphysicsisascience,itoffersexplana-tionsthatareincludedwithinauniversallyvalidframeworkofcausalexplanation.Explanationsaboutthefeaturesorthebehaviorofanentityrefertoafactorresponsibleforthisfeatureorbehavior–theyspecifythecause(aitionoraitia)ofthefeatureorbehavior.Differentcausescanbequotedforthesamefeatureorbehavior,becausedifferentcausesexplainindifferentways.ThesedifferentwaysaregroupedbyAristotleunderfourheadings,theso-calledfourcauses.Whenthematterortheformofanentityisspecifiedastheresponsiblefactorforastateofaffairs,itisintroducedasmaterialorformalcause.Theseparationofthematerialandformalcausesasdistincttypesimpliesthatifsomethingisexplicableintermsofmatterorform,explanationsintermsofformwillbedifferentinkindfromthoseintermsofmatter.Asarulethereisacollaborationbetweenthesecauses–matterprovidesthepotentialitiesthatareactualizedbytheform–butthisisnotsuchthatthetwotypesofexplanationwouldoverlap.Rather,thesecausallyrelevantentitiesgiverisetoahierarchicstructureofexplanation.Inorderforaformtoberealized,oneneedstohavesuitablematter.Thissuitablematterbringswithittherequiredfeaturesintothecompositeofmatterandform.Thesefeatures,then,areontheonehandthecontributionofthematter,andassuchthematteristhe(material)causeofthesefeaturesofthecompositeentity,whereasontheotherhandtheyareindispensablepresuppositionsfortherealizationoftheform,andtothatextenttheir4.Notethattheclaimisaboutcompositeentities,constitutedofmatterandform.Pureformswillbeactualitieswhicharenottiedtothecapacitiesofamaterialcomponent.Indeed,evenwithincompositeentitiesAristotle’sclaimdoesnotexcludetheexistenceofsomefundamentallynovelactualities,providedsomeformswhichcanexistindependentlyofmattercanentertheconstitutionofcompositeentities:cf.thevexedquestionofAristotle’sdiscussionoftheactiveintellectinDeAn.III.5.Onthistopic,seeCaston,aristotle’spsychology,inthisvolume.275ACTC1527520/03/2006,04:06PM\nistvánbodnárandpierrepellegrinpresenceispromptedbytheform.Tothisextenttheformisatthesametimeafinalcauseforthepotentialitiesthatarepresentinordertomakeitsemergencepossible.SuchdependencerelationsbetweenmatterandformarelabeledbyAristotleascasesofhypotheticalnecessity.TouseAristotle’sexample,ifthereistobeahouse,oneneedsbricks,slabs,mortaretc.:thismeansineachcasematerialwithsuitablepropertieswithinadefiniterange.Explanationsoftenspecifyentitiesbeyondtheroleplayedbythematterandtheformoftheentityitself.ThesecasesaregroupedbyAristotleasefficient(ormoving)causesontheonehandandasfinalcausesontheother.Efficientcausesoperateinastraightforwardmannerbyinitiatingprocessesandbringingabouttheireffects,whereasfinalcausesaccountforprocessesandentitiesbybeingwhattheseprocessesandentitiesarefor,theirobjectiveendorgoal.Efficientcausespossesstheactivecapacitytobringaboutchangeorrest,whiletheyexertthiscausalpoweronasubjectoronsomepreexistingmatterwiththematchingpassivecapacitytoundergothechangeorremainatrest.(Cf.Met.Q.8,1049b5–10,andQ.1,1046a11–13).Butefficientcausationneednotissuefromtheoutside.Anefficientcausecanalsobeinternal.Insuchcasesitwillbe,inaspecificfunction,oneofthepartsoftheentityinquestion,oritcanevenbeidenticalwiththeformalaspectoftheentity.But,aswehavenoticed,mobilityisthemaincharacteristicofnaturalbeings.Nownoteverysortofmobilitymakesabeinganaturalbeing.Anature(phusis),accordingtoAristotle,isaninnerprincipleorsource(archE)ofchangeandbeingatrest(Phys.II.1,1928b8–32).Thismeansthatwhenanentitymovesorisatrestaccordingtoitsnature(phuseiorkataphusin)weneednotspecifyanyothercauseoftheevent.Wehavetodescribehow–towhatextent,throughwhatotherprocesses,andduetowhatagency–thepreconditionsfortheprocessofchangeorbeingatrestarepresent,butoncewehaveprovidedanaccountofthesepreconditions,wehavegivenacompleteaccountoftheprocess.Thenatureoftheentityisinandofitselfsufficienttoinduce5andtoexplaintheprocess,ifnothingexternalinterferes.Suchnaturalprocessesofchangeorrestarecontrastedwithcasesinwhichtheprocessiseffectedbyconstraintorforce(biai),againstthenatureofanentity(paraphusin).Insuchcasesboththeactivepotentialityoftheexternalconstraintandthepassivepotentialityonwhichthisexternalconstraintisoperativeneedtobespecified.Natures,then,inawaydodoubleduty–onceanatureisoperative,neitheraninde-pendentfurtheractive,noranindependentfurtherpassivecapacityneedstobeinvoked–butthis,aswillbeclearfromAristotle’sdiscussion,needsahostofqualifications.5.Thisshouldbecontrastedtomodernessentialism,inwhichthenature–thecomplexofessentialfeatures–ofanentitycangiverisetofundamentallydifferentbehaviorunderdifferentcircumstances,wherethesecircumstancescannotbedescribedasonlyprovidingpreconditionsorcreatingobstaclesforthenaturalcourseofevents.ThisfundamentaldifferencebetweenmodernessentialismandAristotle’sexplanationsintermsofnaturesisdiscussedbySarahBroadieinWaterlow(1982,ch.1).Onnatureinitsapplicationtolivingthings,seeLennox,aristotle’sbiology,andforadiscussionofnatureinhispoliticalphilosophy,seeKeyt,aristotle’spoliticalphilosophy,sectionon“Nature,”inthisvolume.276ACTC1527620/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sphysicsandcosmologyAsinternalprinciplesofchange,naturesneedtofallintooneofthefourclassesofcauses–otherwisetheywouldconstituteanexceptional,fifthkindofcausalefficacy.Asitturnsout,theycanfeatureinanyofthefourcausalfunctions.However,whennatureisanexplanatoryfactorasmatter–whenthenaturalmotionorrestofanentityisexplainedbythemattertheentityismadeof–behindthenatureasmatterthereisafurtherexplanatoryfactor,afeatureofthismatteritself,whichinturnatsome6levelofanalysisisdeterminedbytheformofthematterorsomepartofthematter.Henceonecouldmakethemorerestrictedclaimthatnaturesareoperativeultimatelyasformsoftheentityorofsomeembeddedconstituentoftheentity,asfinalcausesorasefficientcauses.Onecanfurtheraddthatformandfinalcauseoftencoincide.Afirstefficientcauseisnotthesameentityastheeffect,butisneverthelessthesameinform(orinspecies,eidei)(Phys.II.6,198a24–27,cf.Met.H.4,1044a32–b1).Thisistheprincipleofsynonymy,whichwewilldiscussbelow.Naturesasinternalprinciplesofmotionandrest,althoughnotnecessarilymovingcausesthemselves,standinanexclusiverelationshiptotheefficientormovingcausesofthesemotionsandrests.InsomecaseswhenAristotleisnotspecifyingthefirstmovingcause,hecanasserttheidentityofnatureandmovingcause.Accordingly,thesouloflivingbeingswillbe7identifiedasthesubstance(i.e.,form)andthemovingcauseoftheseorganisms.Inothercases,asweshallsee,eventhoughthenatureisnotidenticalwiththemovingcause,itwillbelinkedtoitinanintimatemanner.Motion,CausalInteraction,andCausationalSynonymyAtthebeginningofBookIIIofthePhysics,Aristotlewrites:“sincenatureisaprincipleofmotionandchange,andthatisthesubjectofourinquiry,wemustnotneglectwhatmotionis.Forifitisunknown,naturetoowouldbeunknown”(200b12–15).Becausemotionorchange(kinEsis)ismentionedinthedefinitionofnature,adiscussionofnaturewillalsoincludeanaccountofwhatmotionis.TheCategoriesincludealongsidetheothercategoriesthecategoriesofactionandpassion,whichcanhouseprocessesandmotions,providedeverymotionoccursastheeffectofamoveronanentitymoved.Oncethefurtheranalyticaltoolsofmatter,form,potentiality(orcapacity,dunamis),andactuality(oractivity,energeia)areavailable,eachmotioncanbereassignedtothecategoryinwhichthemotionassucheffectsachange.Thiscanoccurinfiveofthecategories:(1)substance;(2)quality;(3)quantity;(4)place;and(5)relation.Time,whichinsomemanuscriptsisalsoonthelistofcategoriesofPhys.V.1,isinvolvedin6.Cf.theclaimofPhys.II.1,192b34,thatnaturealwaysisinasubstrate,andfurther,seePhys.II.1,193a36–b8,whereAristotlesubmitsthatform,ratherthanmatter,istheinternalsourceofmotionandrest,becauseitisrelatedtomatterasactualitytopotentiality.ThislatterclaimisreformulatedinMet.D.4,1015a15–16,whereAristotleclaimsthatmatteriscallednatureonaccountofhavingthecapacitytoreceiveform,whichisnatureinthestrictsense.7.Seee.g.DeAn.II.4,415b8–27,whereafteridentifyingthesoulassubstance(i.e.,asform),andasmovingcause,thepassagespecifiesameaninginwhichthesoulisalsoaspecialfinalcause,asthebeneficiary(hOi)oftheprocessesinthelivingbeing.277ACTC1527720/03/2006,04:06PM\nistvánbodnárandpierrepellegrinallformsofmotion(seee.g.,Phys.V.4,227b24–26,andVIII.8,262a2–5),butthereisnomotioninrespectoftime.Changesofrelationsare,ontheotherhand,accidental,astheyoccuralsoinentitiesinwhichnochangeoccursatall,iftheentitytowhichtheystandinrelationundergoessomechange(Phys.V.2,225b11–13).HenceAris-totlecanclaimthatthereareasmanytypesofmotionandchangeastherearekindsofbeing(Phys.III.1,201a8–9=Met.K.9,1065b13–14),meaningonlythefirstfourofthesekinds.Hecallsthesechangesgenerationandcorruptionforchangeaccordingtosubstance,alterationforchangeaccordingtoquality,augmentationanddiminutionforchangeaccordingtoquantity,andlocomotionforchangeaccordingtoplace.ThereisaninterestingvariationinAristotle’svocabulary,whichhascausedalotofinktoflow.Insomepassagesheusesthegeneralterm“motion”(kinEsis)asthegenerictermforallkindsofchanges,whereasotherpassagesrestrictkinEsistochangesaccordingtoquality,quantityandplace,andusethetermmetabolEasthegeneraltermtocoverthekinEseisandthechangeaccordingtosubstance.Thishasbeen,amongcommentators,theoriginofsomechronologicalhypothesesaboutthefinalformofAristotle’sdoctrine.Wewillnotdecideonamatterthatisactuallyundecidable.Thereisneverthelessadifferencebetweengenerationandcorruptionontheonehandandallotherchangesontheother,whichreflectsthedifferencebetweensubstanceandalltheothercategories.Withinthefourdomainsinwhichgenuinechangecanoccur,changealwaysrequirestheexistenceofapotentialitythatcanbeactualized.Butchangeisneitheridenticaltothispotentiality,nortothelackofaproperty,nor,withoutfurtherqualifications,totheactualitywhichisacquiredwhenthepotentialityisactualized(Phys.III.2,201b33–35).Itisaspecialkindofactuality,theactualityofthepotentialinsofarasitispotential(Phys.III.1,201a27–29).Aristotle’sformulationstronglysuggeststhatthepotentialityactualizedintheprocessofchangeisnotaseparateandindependentpotentialityformotion,alongsidetheentity’spotentialityfortheend-stateoftheprocess:theprocessof,say,house-building,andtheendresult,thehouse,aredifferentactualizationsofthesamepotentialityofasetofmaterialsthatisbuildableintoahouse.NotonlywouldAristotle’sdefinitionbeuninformativeandcircularotherwise–amountingtothetautologousclaimthatchangeistheactualiza-tionofthecapacityforchange–thefurtherqualificationinthedefinition,thatchangeistheactualityofthepotentialinsofarasitispotential,wouldbecompletelyidle.Thisfurtherrestrictionismeanttoselectthoseamongthedifferenttypesofrealizationsofthesamepotentialitieswhich,asAristotlestresses,aretheincompleteactualitiesofthesepotentialities.Aristotlecanfurtheraddthatthepotentialityactualizedintheprocessisanincompletepotentialityonly(Phys.III.2,201b32–33).Accordingly,potentialitiesforchangearereadmittedintotheontology.Nevertheless,theydonotfeatureaspotentialitiesintheirownright,butastheincompletevariantsofthefunda-mentalpotentialityforanendresult.Itisimportanttonotethatpotentialityinthisdiscussionthroughoutexcludesactuality.Inaformulationcloselymatchingtheformulationoftheprincipleofnon-contradiction,Aristotleassertsthat“somethingsarethesame[=havethesameproperties,arethesamesubstances]bothinpotentialityandinactuality,butnotatthesametimeornotinthesamerespect,ase.g.[athingis]warminactualityandcoldinpotentiality”(Phys.III.1,201a19–22).HenceAristotle’sdefinitioncanpickoutthis278ACTC1527820/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sphysicsandcosmologyintermediateentity,whichistheactualityofapotentialitythatcannolongerbepresentaspotentialityonceithasbeenreplacedbythecorrespondingpropertyinactuality.Ifamotionhasamover,itisthedutyoftheentityeffectingchangetoconfertherequisiteformontheobjectchanged,asPhys.III.2,202a9–11,putsit.Buttherearefurtherimportantrequirementsforsuchachangetooccur.Firstofall,thesemotionsorchangesoccurthroughtheinteractionoftwopotentialities.One,thepassivepoten-tiality,isintheobjectundergoingchange,theother,theactivepotentiality,isintheentityinitiatingchange.Thetwopotentialitiesneedtomatcheachother:whenthereisapotentialityforbeingheatedintheobjectundergoingchange,theprocessneedstobeinitiatedbyanotherobjectpossessinganactivepotentialityforeffectingheat.ThisistruetotheextentthatAristotlecanclaimthatthedefinitionofpassivepotentialityisdependentonthatoftheactivepotentiality(Met.Q.1,1046a11–13).Thesetwopotentialitiesneedtoworkintandem,and,consequently,Aristotlecanclaimthatthereisonlyasingleprocessgoingon,whichislocatedintheentitymoved.Whenaprocessofinstructionoccurs,itisidenticaltoaprocessofknowledgeacquisition,whichhappensinthemindofthelearner.Hencealthoughactionandpassionretaintheircategoricaldifference,becausetheiraccountisdifferent,whattheysubsistin,themotion,willbethesame(Phys.III.3,202b19–22).Aristotle,however,doesnotonlyrequirethepresenceofamatchingpairofactiveandpassivecapacities,butsubscribestoanevenstrongerprinciple,thatthecausemusthavethepropertyitbringsaboutintheeffect.InAristotle’sfavoriteexample:thehumaninactualityproducesahumanfromthehumaninpotentiality.Theprin-ciple–whichwecouldtermtheprincipleofcausationalsynonymy–comesfromPlato(see,e.g.,Phd.100b–101d),butAristotlehashisownreasonsforendorsingit,ashisscienceatteststothepresenceandoperationofcausallyactiveformsateach8levelofanalysisofthephysicalworld.Hence,Aristotle’sformsarethecausallysignificantcomponentsofthesubstanceeffectingachange.Accordingly,whenitcomestospecifyingthemovingcauseofanartifact,Aristotlereferstotheartofthecraftsmanasthefundamentalcomponentoperativeinthechange(SeeGCI.7,324a29–35;Phys.II.3,195b21–25).Incaseswherealivingbeingisgenerated,itistheparentalformwhichistransmittedtothe9newlyemerginglivingbeing.Itis,nevertheless,importanttonotethatAristotlerestrictstheprincipleofcausalsynonymyindifferentandsubtleways.Mostimportantly,thereisadomainofcasesinwhichapropertyofanobjectisactualizedbutisexemptedfromtherequirementsofthisprinciple.TheactualizationofapropertycanbethecontinuationofapreviouscausalprocesstotheextentthatAristotleclaimsitisthesecondactuality,following8.Ontheearlierhistoryoftheprincipleofcausationalsynonymy,seeMourelatos,theconceptoftheuniversalinsomelaterpre-platoniccosmologists,pp.61–4.9.Inthegenerationoftheelements,Aristotledescribestheirgeneratoras“thatwhichproducesweight,”or“thatwhichproduceslightness,”atCael.IV.3,310a31–32.Butelementsarealsoexhaustivelycharacterizedbythepairofelementalpropertieshot–coldanddry–moist,andthesearealsocausallyoperativeintheprocesseswhenoneelementalmasstransformsanotherelement,seeGCI.7,324b5–14;andcf.Phys.VIII.5,257b9–10.279ACTC1527920/03/2006,04:06PM\nistvánbodnárandpierrepellegrinuponapreviouslyacquiredfirstactuality.ToelucidatethisdistinctionAristotlecon-traststhepossessionofknowledge,andtheactualuseofknowledgeonehasacquiredbeforehand(DeAn.II.5,417a21–b27).Insuchacasetheemergenceofthesecondactualitydoesnotrequireanadditionalexternalefficientcause.Theoperationofthisfirstactuality,throughwhichtheactualityisreinforcedandraisedtoahigher,morecompleterealization,canbethemereextensionoftheoperationoftheoriginalefficientcause.Alternatively,theentitywhichhasacquiredthisfirstactualitycanalreadyitselfbecausallyresponsibleforitsownactivities,includingtheonesthatbringittoalevelofhigheractuality.Itisimportanttonotethattheseclaimsarefarfromtrivial:theyrestonfurtherclaimsthattheverydefinitionsofthesefirstactualities(whatitistobeanelement,ananimal,orknowledge)inseparablyincludetheseactivities.Second,theprincipleiscouchedintermsthatdonotincludelocomotions:itissubstantial,qualitative,orquantitativeformthatisclaimedtobetransmittedthroughtheefficacyofthecause.Itiseasytoseewhy:thewayitslocationbelongstoanentityisdifferentfromthewayitsotherqualificationsbelongtoit.Henceitwouldbeextremelyawkwardtospeakofatransmissionofthisqualificationinthesamewaythatonespeaksofthetransmissionoftheotherthree.Locomotions,then,formaseparatecase,whichisnotsubsumedwithoutfurtherelucidationunderthegeneralschemeforcausation.Third,theprincipleofcausationalsynonymyisrestrictedtosubstancesattheendof10Met.Z.9,andinthefirsthalfofthesamechapterthenon-standardpresenceofsomecausallyrelevantformsmayalsobeenvisaged.Aristotle’sexampleisthatthereisheatinmotion,whichproducesheatinthebody(Met.Z.9,1034a26–27)whenthedoctorrubsthepatientintheappropriatemanner.Thisheatinthemotioncanbethepresenceofanactivepotentialityinthemotionwhichisabletoelicitheatinthebody,withoutheatbeingpredicableofmotionitself.Alltheserestrictionsnotwithstanding,Aristotlecanclaimthattheprincipleofcausationalsynonymyremainsuniversallyvalid.Thisisso,becauseallthreerestric-tionsabovespecifycaseswhereAristotlecanclaimthatapreceding,moreprominentcausehasalreadysatisfiedtherequirement:inthecaseofsecondactualitiesthefirstactualitywascalledintoexistencebyasynonymouscauseinthefirstplace;locomotions,qualitative,andquantitativechanges,evenifnotcausedbyasynonymousentity,canbepartofalargerpatternofcausation,inwhichasubstanceiscausedbyasubstanceofthesamekind;andcausalchainsproducingsubstancescanbeclaimedtostartoutinvariablyfromsynonymoussubstances.Thismeansthatthetwomajorparadigmsofsuchcausationarenaturalgenerationandartificialproduction,andinbothcasestheforms–thenatureofthenaturalentity,andtheartofthecraftsman10.Cf.Met.L.3,1070a4–5,whichannouncestheprincipleofsynonymyforsubstantialitemsonly,andGCI.5,320b17–20,wheretheprincipleofcausalsynonymyisrelaxedtothealmostnon-committalrequirementthatinsomecasesaninstanceofthesameentityinactualityiscausallyefficacious,whereasinothercasesthecauseisanactuality,butnotofthesamekindastheeffect.Aristotle’sexampleforthelatteristheprocesseffectingrigidity:thisdoesnotrequireacausethatisactuallyrigid.280ACTC1528020/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sphysicsandcosmology11exercisinghisartrespectively–arethecausallyoperativeentitiesinitiatingchange.Thishaswide-rangingconsequencesforthestatusofformsinseveralrespects.First,thecausalrelevanceoftheseformsshowsthatnotjustanyarrangementorconfigura-tioncanqualifyasafull-fledgedform.True,privationsarealsoformsinsomesense(Phys.II.1,193b19–20),butthisisnotthesamesenseinwhichthecausallyoperativeforms,describableinevaluativeterms,canbecalledforms.Moreover,thecausalrelevanceofformsallowsAristotletoswitch(e.g.,inGCI.7)withoutfurthernoticebetweenthecraftsmanandthecraftitselfastheappropriatespecificationoftheefficientcauseinthesecases.WeshouldnotethatwiththelatterAristotlespecifiedcausesthatareunmoved.Theydonoteffectmotionbybeinginmotionthemselves,andsincetheyareinone-sidedcontactwiththeentitytheyeffectmotionin,theyarenotunderanyreactiveinfluenceduringthisprocesseither.AristotelianKinematicsMostofthetreatisecalledPhysics–whetherconstitutedaswehaveitbyAristotlehimselforbylatereditors–is,quitenaturally,devotedtoastudyofchange.ManyothernotionsconsideredinthePhysics,likeplace,time,infinity,void(theconclusionaboutthevoidisthatthereisnovoidatallintheuniverse)areconsideredintheirrelationtochange.NowAristotleproposesinthePhysicsasubtleandgrandiosetheoryofchangeandparticularlyoflocomotion.ThisAristoteliankinematicswillbedefinitelytoppledonlybymodernphysicsoriginatingwithGalileo.Amongchanges,Aristotlerecognizesthepriorityoflocomotion(phora),andthepriorityofcircularlocomotiontoalltheotherformsoflocomotion.Accordingtohimanylocomotioniseithercircular,orrectilinear,oraformmixedofthetwo.Hecon-siderssuchanaffirmationasevident,ontheassumptionthatastraightlineandacirclearetheonlysimplelines,andthat,therefore,thesimplemovementsarethemovementswhichtakeplacealongasimplepath.Furthermore,hepostulatesthatalllocomotionsareeithersimpleorcomposedofsimplelocomotions.SuchapositionhasbeencriticizedsinceAntiquity,withintheAristotelianschoolitself.ThusSimplicius(InCael.13.25)saysthatXenarchusofSeleukia,aPeripateticofthefirstcenturybce,claimedthatthehelixofthecylinderwasalsoasimpleline“becauseanyofitspartscorrespondstoanyother.”But,accordingtoAristotle,circularlocomotionissimplerthanrectilinearbecauseitcanbeinfiniteandeternal.Moreprecisely,AristotlesaysthatarectilinearmovementgoingeternallyfromAtoBandfromBtoAisnotasingle11.Aristotlecanrefertothecausallyoperativeforminthemindofthecraftsmanasidenticaltotheformoftheemergingartificialobject,butthisisclearlyapartialdescriptiononly(Met.Z.7,1032b11–14;forarestricted,morecircumspectidentificationofformandcraft,seeMet.L.4,1070b33andMet.L.10,1075b10):theformoftheobjectinthecraftsman’smindneedstoincludealltherelevantinformationoftherulesofthetradeabouthowtoeffectthisparticularforminthematter;ithastobeembeddedin(aworkableportionof)thecraftitself(seePhys.II.1,193b12–17,forthedifferenceoftheformsofthecauseandoftheeffectinartificialchange).281ACTC1528120/03/2006,04:06PM\nistvánbodnárandpierrepellegrinmovementsincethereisastopateachextremity,asweshallseelater.ThereisinanycasenoactualinfinitelineinAristotle’sworld.Moreover,amongthecircularlocomotions,onlyonethatisuniform,i.e.withaconstantspeed,canbeeternal,sincealocomotionthatacceleratesordeceleratesduringaninfinitetimewouldhaveaninfinitelygreatorsmallspeed.Itisquiteimportanttounderstandthatthefoundationofthisdoctrineiscosmological.AristotlearguesattheopeningofPhysicsBookVIIIthatmotionandchangeintheuniversecanhavenobeginning,becausetheoccurrenceofchangepresupposesapreviousprocessofchange.WiththisargumentAristotlecanestablishaneternalchainofmotionsandrefutetheclaimthattherecouldhavebeenapreviousstationarystateoftheuniverse.Buttheeternalpresenceofmotionintheuniverse,Aristotleargues,needstorelyonaneternalcausethatguaranteesitspersistence.Ifmotionwerepresentintheuniverseonlythroughanunendingsuccessionofprocessesoffiniteduration,theoccurrenceofeveryconstitutiveprocesswithintheserieswouldbecontingent,renderingthewholeseriesacontingentone.Hencehepostulatesthattheinfinitesuccessionoffiniteprocessesintheuniversedependsonaneternalmotion(oronseveraleternalmotions),namelytheeternalrevolutionoftheheavenlyspheres,whichinturndependsononeorseveralunmovedmovers(Phys.VIII.6,258b26–259a9).Thepriorityoftheeternalcelestialrevolutions,furthermore,guaranteesthecausalfinitudeoftheuniverse.Thisisso,eventhoughthereareinfinitecausalchains:sincemaleparentsaretheefficientcausesoftheiroffspring,andAristotelianspeciesareeternal,behindeverysingleindividualofthespeciesthereisaninfiniteseriesofmaleancestors,eachcausallyresponsibleforthesubsequentmembersintheseries.Neverthelessthefinitesublunaryuniverseonitsownwouldalreadyhavereachedadeadlock,astateofcompleteseparationoftheelementalmassesintotheircon-centricallyarrangednaturalplaces,wereitnotfortheconstantexcitationcausedbythecelestialmotions,producingheatinthesublunarydomain,especiallyintheimmediatevicinityofthesun(seeCael.II.7,289a19–35;andcf.thespecialcaseofthephysician’srubcausingheatinthebodyofthepatientmentionedabove,whichwillturnouttobeanalogoustothemostfundamentalinteractionbetweenthecelestial12andthesublunarydomains).Giventheroleofcelestialmotioninsublunarychange,Aristotlewillbeentitledtoassertthatthecauseofthehumanbeingishisorher13father,andbesides,thesunanditsannualpathalongtheecliptic.Theeternalcelestialrevolutionsprovideacausalsupportmechanismforeachandeverysublunarybeing,embeddedinfinitecausalchainsofsublunaryprocesses.Thiseternalmaintenance,inturn,allowsforthepresenceofinfinitesublunarycausalchains,12.AccordingtoAristotle,thesunisnotwarmbyitself,warmthbeingproducedbythefrictionofitsmovementontheairduetoitsmotion.Thisistrueforallthecelestialbodies(Cael.II.7,289a19).13.SeeMet.L.5,1071a14–17,whereAristotlealsomentionsthatthesunanditsmotionalongtheeclipticaremovingcausesbutarenotinstancesofthesameformastheireffects–i.e.,theprincipleofcausationalsynonymydoesnotholdintheircase.Foranalmostcrypticallyshorthandformofthesameexample,seePhys.II.2,194b13.282ACTC1528220/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sphysicsandcosmologyliketheinfiniteseriesofmaleancestorsanyindividualhas.Butthedependenceofthisinfinitesublunarycausalchainontheeternalcelestialmotionscanalwaysbespelledoutintermsofthedependencerelationsthatholdamongeternalrevolutionsandfinitesublunarycausalchains.Besidesthedistinctionsbetweencircular,rectilinear,andmixedmovementsontheonehand,anduniformandnon-uniformmovementsontheother,thereisathirdcrucialdistinction:thatbetweennaturalmovementsandmovementsagainstorcon-trarytonature.Eachoftheelementsthatcomposetheuniverse–earth,water,air,fire,andthefifthelementwhichconstitutesthecelestialspheres–hasanaturalplace.Firenaturallygoesupward,earthdownward,whereasairandwaterendupintheintermediateregionsduetotheirnaturaltendency.Thefifthelementhasanaturaltendencytomoveinacirclearoundthecenteroftheuniverse.Aristotlecalls“naturalplace”theplacetowardwhichanelementnaturallygoes,and“naturalmotion”themotionwhichleadsthiselementtoitsnaturalplace.Anunnatural,orviolent,move-ment,onthecontrary,takesthemobileawayfromitsnaturalplace,as,forinstance,themotionofaheavybodythrownupwarddoes.Whengoingawayfromitsnaturalplacethemovementhasatendencytoloseits“force”–asthestonewhicheventuallystopsitsupwardtrajectoryandfallsdown–whereasthemovementwhichleadsathingtowarditsnaturalplaceincreasesits“force.”Inthisrespectthequalities“heavy”and“light”arenotrelativeterms,butabsoluteones(cf.O’Brien,1981).Earthisheavyandfireislight,butonecannotsaythatfireislessheavythanearth,sincefireisnotheavyatall;orthatearthislesslightthanfire,sinceearthisnotlightatall.Wemustnoticethatthisisnottrueonlyof“pure”elements(whichcannotbefoundinevery-daylife,sincetheelementearthisnottheearthweputinflowerpots,butacomponentthatcannotbeperceivedexceptincombinationwithsomeothers)butitisalsotrueofthebodiesweseearoundus.Thosebodiesactaccordingtotheirmaincomponent:bodieswhicharemainlycomposedofearthgonaturallydownward,whereasfierybodiesgonaturallyupward.OneofAristotle’smajorpresuppositionsisthatthedivi-sionofmotionsintothosethatarenaturalandthosethatarecontrarytonatureisexhaustive.Therearenochangestowhichthenatureoftheentitywouldbeindiffer-entorneutral.Wemustnote,however,thatAristotle’saccountofheavenlymotionsrequiresaclassoflocomotionsofsuchanintermediatestatus,becauseheholdsboththatthereisnoforcedmotioninthecelestialdomain,andatthesametimethatplanetarymotionsaretheresultofthecompositionofrotationsofseveraldifferentspheres,eachofwhichperformsapartofthesemotionsasitsown,whereastheothercomponentisasitweresuperaddedtoit(Cael.II.12,293a9–11;cf.Met.L.6,1072a9–18).Bymeansofthesethreedistinctions,Aristotleintendstobuildupatheoryofchangethatincludeskindsofchangesthatseemabsolutelyheterogeneoustoeachother,notonlyallthechangesthatoccurinlivingbeings–locomotion,andalsogrowth,assimilationoffood,decay,etc.–butalsothemovementofprojectilesandallthetransformationsofinanimateobjects.ThefundamentalinsightoftheAristoteliantheoryofmovementisthateverythingmovedismovedbyamoverwhichisinimmediatecontactwithwhatismoved.Thiscontactisofoneoftwogreatkinds:inthecaseoflivingbeingsthemoverisinternal;intheothercasesthemoverisexternalandthecontactisbycontiguity.ThisisconsistentwiththeAristotelianconceptionofaworld283ACTC1528320/03/2006,04:06PM\nistvánbodnárandpierrepellegrindeprivedofvoid.Themovedismovedaslongasthemovermovesit.Tomakethissituationintelligible,Aristotle,onceagain,appealstohisdistinctionbetweenactualityandpotentiality.Hedoesnotsaythatmovementissimplyproducedbythemover,forthemobilemusttosomeextenthavethemovementinitself.Aswepointedoutearlier,Aristotle’sanalysesofactualityshowthattwothingsmayhavethesameactuality;thustheinstructor’steachingisthesameactualityasthestudent’slearning(Phys.III.3,202b6–8).Movementwill,therefore,bethecommonactivityofthemoverandthemoved.Consequently,movementisnotsomethingthatcancontinuetoexistbyitself,sinceitsexistencedependsonthepersistenceoftheactionofthemover.Rest,andmostparticularly,naturalrest,onthecontrary,is,accordingtoAristotle,astate.ThisisoneofthemaindifferencesbetweenAristotelianandmodernkinematics.InBookVIIofthePhysics,Aristotlemakesthiscontiguityofthemoverandthemovedalittleclearer,inthecaseofthethreekindsofmovement(inthenarrowsenseofthisword):locomotion,alteration,andquantitativechange.Inthecaseoflocomo-tion,forinstance,hedistinguishesfourkindsoflocomotion,ofwhichalltheothersarevarietiesorcompositions:pulling,pushing,carrying,andtwirling.Packingandcombing,forexample,aretwoformsofpushing–pushingtogetherandpushingapart.Butonecangofurtherandsaythatcarryingandtwirlingarereducibletoformsofpullingandpushingaswell:thesearethetwofundamentalformsoflocomotion.Inthecaseofalteration,Aristotlegivestheexampleofsenseperceptioninwhichtheperceivedobjectaltersthesense.Theresultisthat,inthiscasetoo,thereisacommonactivityofthemoverandthemovedwhichareincontacteitherwithorwithoutanintermediary,since“coloriscontinuouswiththelight,andthelightwithsight”(Phys.VII.2,245a7).Whenconsideringtherequirementofcontiguityinthecaseofaugmentationanddiminution,Aristotleclearlyhasinmindvitalprocesses.Thiskinematics,whichisatthesametimeadynamics,bestowedtofollowinggen-erationsasetofproblemswhichwereobstaclestothedevelopmentofmodernscience.Letusconsidertwoofthoseproblems.ProjectilemotionisnoteasytodealwithfromanAristotelianperspective,becauseonceajavelinhasleftthehand,itseemstocontinueitstrajectory“byitself,”and,therefore,itseemsthatthereisnofurthercontiguitybetweenthemoverandthemoved.Insuchacase,Aristotlesays,itisthemedium,namelytheair,whichtransmitstheimpulsiongivenbythehandandcontinuestotransmitituptotheendofthemovement.Tobesure,Aristotleisnotveryexplicitabouthowandthereasonwhytheairkeepsandtransmitsmovement.InthetreatiseOntheHeavensIII.2,hemerelyremarksthat“theforceusesairasaninstrument”:airisabletotransmitthecausalinfluenceitreceivesfromthemovertofurtherpocketsofair,exertingaforcethatwouldlaterbecalledthevisimpressa.Thistheoryhasbeencriticized,andevenridiculed,sinceantiquity.ThusPhiloponusrecommendstosoldierstousebellowsasapropellerfortheirjavelins...(InPhys.641.19).Butthecaseofnaturalmotionisnolessobscure.Wemightevenwanttoparaphrasethisasthequery:Whencedoestheforceeffectingthesemotionsoriginate?Taketheexampleofafallingstone.Aristotledescribesitsmovementdownward,i.e.,towardthecenteroftheearth,ifthereisnoobstacle,asanaturalmovement–amovementtowarditsnaturalplace.Thestoneindeedismainlycomposedofearthyingredientsandis,therefore,heavybynature.Aristotlealsonoticesthatthismovementaccelerates,contrarytowhathappensinthe284ACTC1528420/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sphysicsandcosmologycaseoftheunnaturalmovementofthejavelin.Finally,Aristotlethinksthatthespeedincreasesproportionallytotheweightofthefallingbody.Wewillreturntothis.Aristotle’sTheoryoftheContinuumOntheoccasionofhisanalysisofmotioninthePhysics,Aristotleprovidesthehistoryofsciencewithoneofhismostremarkablecontributionsinproposingatheoryofthecontinuumofunprecedentedgenerality.Accordingtohim,indeed,everychangeiscontinuous,andwhenthiscontinuityisinterruptedthismeansthatthechangehasalsobeeninterruptedtobereplacedbyrestoranotherchange.Heretoothehistoricalcontextiscrucial.InthelastthreebooksofthePhysicsAristotlecriticizestwoadversarieswhohavenotmuchincommon,namelyZenoofEleaandtheAtomists.Wehave,then,aplaywiththreeprotagonists.AristotlehimselfmentionsthatAtomismclaimedtoanswertheParmenideanchallenge(GCI.8).Fortheatoms,beingungenerated,imperishable,andimmutable,inawayinheritedthecharacteristicsofParmenideanbeing.Theiraggregationsmake14thedifferentthingsthatexistintheuniverse.ZenoofElea,thesecondgreatEleaticfigureafterParmenides,sharesanimportantpositionwithAristotleonthisquestion:bothofthemclaimthatthedoctrineofindivisiblemagnitudesisincoherent.Forifacontinuousmagnitudeistakentobecomposedofindivisibles–i.e.,ifitisnotindefinitelydivisible–therearebuttwopossibilities.Eithertheindivisibleistrulyamagnitudeand,inthatcase,whycanitnotalsobedivided?ortheindivisibleisnottrulyamagnitudeand,inthatcase,howcananadditionofnon-magnitudesresultinamagnitude?FromthisrefutationofthetheoryofindivisiblemagnitudesZenodrawstheradicalconclusionthatacontinuumisunintelligible.Accordingtowhatweknowofhispositions–herewehavetorememberthatourmainsourceforZeno’sdoctrineispreciselyAristotle’sPhysicsandthecommentatorsoftheAristotelianPhysics–Zenobaseshiscriticismofacontinuumonacriticismofanessentiallycontinuousreality,viz.motion.If,ontheonehand,acontinuum–inthiscaselengthandtime–iscomposedofindivisibles,howcananarrowthathasbeenlaunchedgofromoneplacetoanother?If,ontheotherhand,acontinuumisinfinitelydivisible,howcanamotionbegin,sincethereisalwaysamomentbeforethemomentatwhichthemotionbegins?Allthisisbasedontheimpossibilityoftherebeinganactualinfinity.AristotleobjectsbothtothehypothesisofindivisiblemagnitudesandtoZeno.Itisworthmentioningthatmathematicianshadalreadymadeanattempt,actuallyasuccessfulone,tocircumventZeno’scritique.Eudoxusistheauthorofageneraltheoryofproportionsthatencompassescommensurableaswellasincommensurablemagnitudes(Cf.Euclid’sElementsBookV,def.5,and,inthisvolume,seeMueller’sgreekmathematics,pp.700–4).Accordingly,thisdefinitionseesnodifficultyinspeakingaboutmagnitudesbeinginthesamerationomatterwhethertheyarecommensurableorincommensurablewitheachother.Aristotlenotonlyknewofthisgeneraltheoryofmathematicalratios,buthealsoregardeditasarevolutionary14.Onfifth-centuryatomism,seeCurd,parmenidesandafter,inthisvolume.285ACTC1528520/03/2006,04:06PM\nistvánbodnárandpierrepellegrinnoveltyofthepreviousgeneration(APo.I.5,74a18).InthelastbooksofthePhysics,andparticularlyinBookVI,helaysdownageneraltheoryofcontinuousphysicalmagnitudeswhich,thoughdefinitelyrefutingthedoctrinesofindivisibles,reestablishes,againstZeno,thepossibilityofmovement,and,bythesametoken,thepossibilityofphysics.Aristotle’stheoryisageneralonetoo,becausehedoesnotmerelyapplythenotionofacontinuumtolengths,surfaces,andvolumes,asmathematiciansbeforehimdid,butalsototimeandchange,inclaimingofmagnitudes,times,andchangesthateitherallofthemarecomposedofindivisibles,ornoneofthemis(Phys.VI.1)(cf.Waschkies,1991).InBookVIofthePhysics,Aristotleproposesarichandsurprisingtheoryofthecontinuum,which,asSimpliciussays,goesbeyondthecommonconceptionofwhatamagnitudeis(InPhys.925.7ff.).Thistheoryputstogethertwothesesapparentlyincompatiblewitheachother.Ontheonehand,ineverycontinuouslinethereisnothingbutpoints,andwhenalineisdividedbyanintersectionwithanotherline,suchadivisionismadeatapoint.Ontheotherhand,alineisnotmadeofpoints,becausepointshavingnoextensionarenotpartsoftheline.Thisistrueforacontinuoustimeandinstants(called“nows”byAristotle),andforacontinuousmovementandwhatwouldcorrespondtoaninstantinthedomainofmovement,whichAristotlecalls“kinEma”.Usingtheevidenttruth,that“athingisdividedintowhatitismadeof”(VI.1,231b10),heobjectsthatifthesemagnitudesconsistedofindivisibleentitieslikepointsor“nows,”theywouldhavetobedivisibleintotheseverycomponents.Butrelationsbetweenlengthandpoints,timeandinstantsareneitherarelationbetweenawholeanditsparts(pointsarenotsegmentsoftheline),norarelationbetweenacontainerandsomethingcontained(pointsarenotinalineaswaterisinaglass),norarelationbetweencomponentsandacompound(pointsarenottoalineasanatomofhydrogenistowateror,inArisotelianterms,asearthistoflesh).TodescribesucharelationAristotleusesatermwhichwastohavearemarkablefateinmathematicsinsayingthatpointandinstantare“limits”ofthelineandofthetime.Aristotle’sanswertoZeno’sparadoxesis,infact,basedonanewapproachtotherelationshipbetweenthefiniteandtheinfinite.AccordingtoZeno,ifthereisaninfin-itenumberofpointsinafiniteline,amobilewhichtraversesafinitemagnitudeABhastogothroughaninfinitenumberofplacesintermediarybetweenAandB.ByAristotle’slightsthisargumentconfusestwokindsofinfinity,whicharecarefullydistinguishedinthePhysics.Thefinitelineisnotcomposedofaninfinitenumberoffinitemagnitudes,thatis,inAristotelianterms,theinfinitewhichisinthefinitelineisnotaninfinite“byaddition”but“bydivision.”Aristotlealsosaysthatanymagnitudeisinfinite,notinactuality,butbydivision(Phys.III.6,206a16).ThisdoctrinebecomesclearerifwerefertotwodifferentoperationsthatAristotlecontrastswitheachotherinBookIIIofthePhysics.OntheonehandonefindswhatAristotlecalls“thebisec-tionsofamagnitude”(III.7,207b11),thatisthefactthatanymagnitudecanbedividedintwoparts,thesepartsbeinginturndivisible,andsoon.Inamoregeneralformulation,wehave:“ifwetakeadeterminatepartofafinitemagnitudeandaddanotherpartdeterminedbythesameratio,weshallnottraversethegivenmagni-tude”(III.6,206b7–9),whichis,afterall,aversionofthefirstofZeno’sargumentontheimpossibilityofmotion(themovingobject,beforereachingtheendofafinite286ACTC1528620/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sphysicsandcosmologylength,mustfirstreachthehalfofthislength,andsoon,cf.VI.9,239b11).Thisinfinitedivisibilityofamagnitudeshows,betterthananyotherexample,whatisthestatusoftheinfiniteinAristotle:“theinfiniteexistsinnootherwaybutpotentially”(III.6,206b12).Ontheotherhand,Aristotleremarksthat“everyfinitemagnitudeisexhaustedbymeansofanydeterminatequantityhoweversmall”(206b11),whichistakenasanaxiombyArchimedes(OntheSphereandCylinderI,axiom5;cf.Euclid,Elem.V,def.4).Onecanseeheretherejectionofanyinfinitesimalapproachofmath-ematicsaswellasofphysics,andthefoundationofthescienceofthecontinuumontheideathatitisirreducibletothediscontinuum.AristotlesharedwithalmostalltheGreekthinkerstheconvictionthatinfinitywouldbecontrarytoperfectionandanobstacletoscientificknowledge.Withhisdoctrineoftheindefinitelydivisiblecontinuityhefoundawaytointegrateinfinitywithinhisfiniteuniverse.OneofthemajorpositionsofAristoteliankinematicsisthateverychangehappensintimeandtakesacertainamountoftime.Sinceaninstantisnotacertainamountoftimebutthelimitofatime,therecanbenomovementinaninstant.Itis,therefore,impossibletodeterminetheveryinstantatwhichamovementbegins,becauseoncesuchaninstanthasbeendetermined,onecanalwaysimagineaninstantprevioustoitwhichwouldbethetruebeginningofthemovement.Thesameistrueofastateofrestfollowingamovement:itisimpossibletoassignafirstinstantforitwithoutfallingintoaninfiniteregress.Nowitisalwayspossibletointerruptamovementbycuttingitatsomeinstantinatime.Aristotledevotedattentiontotheproblemoftheunityofamovement.Accordingtohim,amovementhasthreecomponents:themobile,that“inwhich”themovementtakesplace(thetrajectoryofalocomotion,forexample)andthetimeinwhichthemovementiscompleted.Amovementis“absolutelyone”aslongasnoneofthesefactorshasbeenchanged.AlocomotionfromAtoBandfromBtoA,forinstance,isnotabsolutelyonesinceitisinterrupted.Anymovementwhichisoneis,bythesametoken,continuous,andthisdoesnotmeanthatithastobeuniform.Thebeginningofamovementmaythereforebedefinednegativelyastheinstantatwhichtheprecedingmovement(orrest)ends.Onecasehasbeentakentocontradictthisdoctrine.Aristotlesometimesrecognizesthatachangeoccursinstantaneously,forinstance,thefreezingofwater(Phys.VIII.3,253b26).Butfreezingisanevent,andnotachange,thathappensattheendofacontinuouschange(orofseveralcontinuouschanges,iftheprocessisinterrupted),viz.thecoolingofthewater.TheCausesofElementalMotionsBookVIIIofthePhysicsarguesforthethesisthatforeachmotion,whethernaturalorcontrarytonature,theremustbeamover.Wehaveseenthatincasesofforcedmotionmoversarepresentinaperspicuousway,andthatthisisnotnecessarilysowithnaturalmotions.Apartfromthecasesinwhichthenatureoftheentityisatthesametimeitsmoving(efficient)cause–i.e.,apartfromlivingbeings,whosenature,thesoul,istheirformandanefficientcauseaswell–themoverisinconspicuousintheremaininglargeclassofnaturalmotions,thenaturalmotionsoftheelements,namely,287ACTC1528720/03/2006,04:06PM\nistvánbodnárandpierrepellegrinthefallingofheavybodiesandthemovementupwardoflightones.Forinthecaseofthefallingstonethismotionmustalsohaveanexternalmover,sincethestoneisnotalivingbeing,and,therefore,thecausecannotbeits“soul.”Butifthecenteroftheearthexertedanattractiononthestone,thestonewouldhavetoreceivethisattractionthroughamedium–air,forexample.Andwhatistheroleofthestoneinthemotion?Itmustobviouslyhaveasalientroletobecalledanentitywhichmovesaccordingtoitsnature.Similarly,howwillweexplaintheaccelerationofnaturalmotion,e.g.,ofafallingbody?Aristotlesaysthat“Earthmovesmorequicklytheneareritistothecenteroftheearth”(Cael.I.8,277a28).Whyisthatso,givenAristotle’skinematics?Simplicius(InPhys.1212.30)takesAristotletoassimilatethiscomingnearertothenaturalplacetoanactualization:whenearthgoesdownwardandfireupward“theygotowardstheirproperactuality”(Phys.VIII.4,255a30),becausetheactualityoftheheavyandthelightistoberespectivelyupanddown(see255b11).ThepassageinwhichAristotledealswiththisquestioninthemostexplicit,ifnottheclearest,wayisCael.IV.3.InthischapterAristotledescribesthemotionofeachbodytowardsitsnaturalplaceas“amotiontowardsitsownform”(310a33).Thencomesacontroversialpassage:Forsomethingtomovetoitsownplaceisforittomovetoitslike.Forthesuccessivemembersoftheseriesarelikeoneanother:water,Imean,islikeairandairlikefire...[andintheotherdirection]airislikewater,butwaterislikeearth;fortherelationofeachouterbodytothatwhichisnextwithinitisthatofformtomatter(310b10–15,trans.J.L.Stocks)Stocks’interpretationshouldprobablybeadopted:“The‘place’(centreandextremityasexplained)givesformtothebody,andthebodyinreachingitsplaceattainsitsform,i.e.,completesthetransitionfrompotentialitytoactuality.Inasense,then,ifthepotentialisliketheactual,itmoves‘toitslike’”(Stocksn.3adloc.).Nevertheless,thenature,theinternalprincipleofmotionandrestoftheelementsisnotthemovingcauseofthesemotions,Aristotleclaims,becauseifitwere,thenitwouldbeuptotheelementarymassestodeterminewhentheyperformsuchamotion.Moreovertheprincipleofcausationalsynonymyrulesoutthatahomogeneousmass,withoutaninternaldemarcationofthemovedcomponentandthemover,couldpossiblymoveitself(Phys.VIII.4,255a5–18).Thisissobecauseincaseonepartofahomogeneousbodycouldmoveanotherpart,thiswouldmeanthatchangewouldoccureventhoughnotransmissionofacausallyrelevantpropertyfromtheactiveparttotheexactlysimilarpassiveonecouldbespecified.Thisimpliesthateventhoughthequestionwhytheelementsmovetotheirnaturalplacescanbeansweredbyanappealtotheirrespectivenaturesascauses(“thecauseisthattheyarenaturallytowardssomewhere,andthisiswhatitistobelightandtobeheavy”Phys.VIII.4,255b13–17),thisdoesnotyetspecifytheirmover.Sincetheirthrustisinasingledirection,theelementscannotcircumventfairlysimpleobstaclestheyencounterontheirway(asealedcontainercanretainairunderwater;theroofstaysputpressingdownonthewallsofabuilding,etc.);hencewhoeverremovestheseobstaclesiscausallyresponsiblefortheensuingelementalmotions.Butsomeonewhoremovesanobstaclewillnotbethepropermovingcause,withoutfurtherqualification.Forthe288ACTC1528820/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sphysicsandcosmologyidentificationofthemovingcauseoftheselocomotionsAristotleinvokeshisdistinctionoftwopotentialities.Someheavymaterialispotentiallylight,sinceitcanbetransformedintoalightmaterialinaprocessofgeneration,buttheemerginglightmaterialisstillpotentialinasenseuntilithasacquireditsfull-fledgedstatus,whichinvolvesthatithasarrivedatthatregionofthecosmoswhichisitsnaturalplace,orisasneartoitsnaturalplaceastheelementcangetwithinthecosmos(seeGill,forthcoming).Thiswillthensuggestthatthenaturallocomotionoftheelementsisapossiblypostponed,completingstagewithinasingleoverarchingprocess,andhenceinthesecasesAristotlecanidentifythecauseofthesecondstageoftheprocesswiththeefficientcauseofthefirststage,theentitywhichgeneratedtheelementinthefirstplace(Phys.VIII.4,256a1,andCael.IV.3,310a31–32).UnmovedMoversOnceitisestablishedthatthereisamoverforeachchange,thefinitecausalchainscanbefolloweduptotheprimaryinstanceofmotion,thecelestialrevolutions,thesun’smotionalongtheeclipticresponsibleforseasonalchangesbeingforemostamongthem.Whetherthecosmoshasunmovedormovedmovers,moreover,andwhethertheuniverseiscausallyclosedorneedssomecontinuousexternalcausalinfluenceforitspreservation,dependsthenultimatelyonthestatusofcelestialmotions.Revolutionsinthecelestialrealmarethenaturalmotionsofthespecialelementthatconstitutesthecelestialspheres.This,however,doesnotexcludethattheyareinneedofanexternalunmovedmover:themotionsofthesublunaryelementsalsooccurundertheinfluenceofamovingcause.Nevertheless,thecelestialbodiescannotbemovedbyanexternalmoverofthesamesortasthesublunaryelements.Thesecelestialbodiesareeternalandungenerated;henceAristotlecannotappealtotheentitywhichproducedthemasresponsiblefortheirlocomotions.Astheydonotencounteranyhindranceduringtheirrevolutions,thereisnoroomforanadmittedlyaccidentalmoverwhichwouldremovetheobstacles.Nevertheless,ascelestialrevolutionsaremotions,albeiteternalones,theyincludesomecomponentofpotentiality,whichisactualizedinthemotion,andhencethispotentialcomponentisinneedofanactualityasamover.Thisrequirementimpliesthatwhatevercanbethemoveroftheseeternalmotionsneedstobeinactualitywithoutanyrestrictions(Met.L.6).Moreover,such15anentityhastopossessaninfinitepower,whichitcommunicatestothemovedcelestialsphere;henceitcannotbedivisibleandcannothaveextension(Phys.VIII.10).Allthistestifiestotheexceptionalstatusofthefirstmovement,andbehindit,ofthefirstmoverintheuniverse.Themoverofthesespheresisapureactuality,butthisactualityisnotwhatistransmittedincausation.Aswehaveseenabove,thiswouldnotbeexceptionalyet:locomotionneednotbecausedonthetransmissionmodelofcausation.Butallsuchlocomotionscouldbeembeddedinlargerpatternsofcausationwhichobservedtheprincipleofcausationalsynonymy,anditisexactlysuchalarger15.Thewordusedhereforpowerisdunamis,butastheunmovedmoverisnothingbutactualityitcannotrefertoanintrinsicinfinitepotentialityofthemover.289ACTC1528920/03/2006,04:06PM\nistvánbodnárandpierrepellegrinpatternofcausationwhichismissinginthecaseofcelestialmotions.Instead,whatwehearinMet.L.6isthatthemovermovesasanobjectofloveandstriving,whichcomesperilouslyclosetoabandoningtheclaimsofPhysicsVIIIaboutanunmovedmoverwhichisanefficientcauseofthemotionsofthecosmos.Nevertheless,thisroleoftheunmovedmoverisparalleledbytheultimateunmovedfactoroftheself-motionofanimals,theobjectofdesire,whichmovesthefacultyofdesire,andthenthisfacultyinturncausesthelocomotionoftheanimal(seeDeAn.III.10,433a9–30;cf.MA6).Althoughthedetailsofthisaccountdonotcarryoverto16thecelestialcasewithoutdifficulty,Aristotlemayfeelentitledtouseitassettingout,intheterminologyofhisphysics,themodeofoperationofasupra-physicalentitywithoutwhichtheuniversecannotfunctionandpersist.BibliographyTexts,Translations,andCommentariesAllan,D.J.(1936).AristotelisDeCaelolibriIV.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Charlton,W.(1970).Aristotle’sPhysicsBooksIandII.ClarendonAristotleSeries.Oxford:ClarendonPress.(2ndedn.1992.)Dalimier,C.andPellegrin,P.(2004).Aristote,Traitéduciel.Text,Translation,andNotes.Paris:Flammarion.Diels,H.(1882,1885).Simplicius.InAristotelisPhysicorumcommentaria(CAG9,10).Berlin:Reimer.Fobes,F.H.(1919).AristotelisMeteorologicorumlibriIV.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.Guthrie,W.K.C.(1971).Aristotle.OntheHeavens.LoebClassicalLibrary.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress/London:Heinemann.Heiberg,I.L.(1894).Simplicius.InAristotelisDeCaelocommentaria(CAG7).Berlin:Reimer.Joachim,H.H.(1926).Aristotle,OnComing-To-BeandPassing-Away(DeGenerationeetCorruptione).ARevisedTextwithIntroductionandCommentary.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Lee,H.D.P.(1952).Aristotle.Meteorologica.LoebClassicalLibrary.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress/London:Heinemann.Moraux,P.(1965).Aristote.DuCiel.Text,translation,notes.Paris:LesBellesLettres.Nussbaum,M.C.(1978).Aristotle’sDeMotuAnimalium.TextwithTranslation,Commentary,andInterpretiveEssays.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Pellegrin,P.(2000,2002).Aristote,Physique.TranslationandNotes.Paris:Flammarion.Ross,W.D.(1936).Aristotle,Physics.ARevisedTextwithIntroductionandCommentary.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Ross,W.D.andFobes,F.H.(1929).Theophrastus.Metaphysics.Oxford:ClarendonPress.(Repr.in1982byOlms.)Stocks,J.L.(1930).Aristotle,DeCaelo.Oxford:ClarendonPress.16.Indeed,TheophrastusMet.8–9,5a28–5b10,remarksthatthefactthatthemoverofthecelestialrevolutionsisanobjectofstrivingwouldimplythatthefirstchangetheunmovedmovereffectswouldbetheverystrivinginthesoulsofthecelestialbodies,andnotthecelestialrevolutions.290ACTC1529020/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sphysicsandcosmologyVitelli,H.(1887,1888).Philoponus.InAristotelisPhysicorumcommentaria(CAG16,17).Berlin:Reimer.Williams,C.J.F.(1982).Aristotle’sDeGenerationeetCorruptione.ClarendonAristotleSeries.Oxford:ClarendonPress.WorksCitedBerti,E.(1985).“LasuprématiedumouvementlocalselonAristote:sesconséquencesetsesapories.”InJ.Wiesner(ed.),AristotelesWerkundWirkung(FestschriftforPaulMoraux).(vol.1,pp.123–50).Berlin:deGruyter.DeGandt,F.andSouffrin,F.(1991).LaPhysiqued’Aristoteetlesconditionsd’unesciencedelanature.Paris:Vrin.Duhem,P.(1913).Lesystèmedumonde.Paris:Hermann.Gill,M.L.(forthcoming).“TheTheoryoftheElementsinDeCaeloIIIandIV.”InA.C.BowenandC.Wildberg(eds.),ACompaniontoAristotle’sCosmology:CollectedPapersontheDeCaelo.Mendell,H.(2000).“TheTroublewithEudoxus.”InP.Suppes,J.M.E.Moravcsik,andH.Mendell(eds.),AncientandMedievalTraditionsintheExactSciences(pp.59–138).Stanford:CSLIPublications.O’Brien,D.(1981).TheoriesofWeightintheAncientWorld.FourEssaysonDemocritus,PlatoandAristotle.AStudyintheDevelopmentofIdeas.(vol.1):DemocritusWeightandSize.Paris:LesBellesLettresandLeiden:Brill.Solmsen,F.(1960).Aristotle’sSystemofthePhysicalWorld.AComparisonwithhisPredecessors.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.Waschkies,H.-J.(1991).“MathematicalContinuumandContinuityofMovement.”InF.DeGandtandF.Souffrin,F.(eds.),LaPhysiqued’Aristoteetlesconditionsd’unesciencedelanature(pp.151–79).Paris:Vrin.Waterlow,S.(1982).Nature,Change,andAgencyinAristotle’sPhysics.Oxford:ClarendonPress.FurtherreadingBodnár,I.(1997).“MoversandElementalMotionsinAristotle.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,15,81–117.Gill,M.L.andLennox,J.G.(eds.).(1994).Self-Motion:FromAristotletoNewton.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPressGraham,D.W.(1999).Aristotle’sPhysicsVIII.ClarendonAristotleSeries.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Hussey,E.(1983).Aristotle’sPhysicsIII–IV.ClarendonAristotleSeries.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Judson,L.(ed.).(1991).Aristotle’sPhysics.ACollectionofEssays.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Legatt,S.(1995).Aristotle,OnTheHeavensIandII,withanIntroduction,TranslationandCom-mentary.Warminster:ArisandPhillips.291ACTC1529120/03/2006,04:06PM\njamesg.lennox16Aristotle’sBiologyandAristotle’sPhilosophyJAMESG.LENNOXIntroductionThefirstbookofOnthePartsofAnimals(PA)beginsbyoutliningitspurpose,whichistoestablishasetofstandardsforjudgingnaturalinvestigations(639a15).Thenextfourchapterspursuethispurpose,discussingtheappropriatelevelofgeneralityforsuchstudies,themodesofcausalityandnecessitytobeused,themethodofdivision,themeansofidentifyingnaturalkinds,andmuchmore.Judgingbythequestionsaskedandtheexamplesused,Aristotleisfocusedexclusivelyontheinvestigationofanimals–yetheneverdescribeshisfocusinsuchterms.Rather,heclaimstobedevelopingstandardsfornaturalinquiry,andinparticularforinquiryintothosenaturalthingsthatcometobeandpassaway.Itisnotuntilthefifthchapter,whichbeginsbydividingupthenaturaldomainintothosethingsthatareeternalandthosethatcometobeandpassaway,thatthediscussionissaidtobeaboutanimalsinparticular.Sincewehavecompletedstatingthewaythingsappeartousaboutthedivinethings,itremainstospeakaboutanimalnature,omittingnothingwithinourpower,whetheroflesserorgreateresteem.Foreveninthestudyofanimalsdisagreeabletoperception,thenaturethatcraftedthemlikewiseprovidesextraordinarypleasurestothosewhoareabletoknowtheircausesandarebynaturephilosophers.(PAI.5,645a4–10)Theopeningsentenceofthischaptercontraststhosenaturallyconstitutedsubstantialbeings(ousiai)thatareeternalwiththosethatpartakeofgenerationandperishing(644b23–24),anddescribestheformerasdivine,settingthecontextforthecontrastintheabovequotation.Butnow,andfinally,thediscussionissaidtobeaboutanimalnature(peritEszOikEsphuseOs),evenaboutthenaturesofanimalsdisagreeabletothesenses.Thepuzzleis,ofcourse,whyadiscussionthatappearstobeexclusivelyzoologicalinfocusisconsistentlycharacterizedasdevelopingstandardsnotmerelyforthestudyoflivingthings,butfortheinvestigationofnaturequitegenerally.Onewayofrespond-ingtothispuzzleistosaythatitderivesfromananachronism.Biology,itissometimessaid,isanewscience,aninventionofthenineteenthcentury.ToimaginethatasetoftreatiseswritteninancientGreecewithtitlessuchasOnthePartsofAnimals,OntheGenerationofAnimals(GA),OnAnimalLocomotion(IA)orHistoryofAnimals(HA),constitutesanearlystageinthehistoryofbiologyprojectsourlabelsontoalien292ACTC1629220/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophyterritory,andcausesthereadertosearchinvainfortheprinciplesandmethodsof1biologicalsciencewheretherecouldnotpossiblybeany.Thisansweriseasy,butwrong-headed.Byanyreasonablemoderndefinitionof2biology,Aristotle’s“animalstudies”arebiological.Theyare,thatis,general,theoreticalinvestigationsofthelivingworld,aimedatsystematicallyorganizingdatacollectedbycarefulandcontrolledobservationandexperiment(ifsystematicdissectiondoneforthesakeofansweringanatomicalandfunctionalquestionsisaformofexperiment)andatintegratedcausalexplanationofthesedata.ThoughAristotleclearlyseesthemaspartofawiderinvestigationofnature,theyappeartobe(thisiswhatPAIisallabout)adistinctivepartwithdistinctivestandardsofinvestigation.(OntheplaceofbiologyinAristotle’sbroaderinvestigationofnature,seeBodnárandPellegrin,aristotle’sphysicsandcosmology,inthisvolume.)Foralesseasybutmoreadequateresponse,weneedtoturntoAristotle’smeta-physics.Modernmetaphysicalprejudicesarereductionist.Weexpectsomeonewhoistalkingaboutgeneralprinciplesofnaturalinvestigationtobefocusedprimarilyontheultimatematerialconstituentsoftheworld.Afterall,isthatnottheobviouswaytoachievegenerality?Obvioustous,perhaps–butnottoAristotle.Supposeonlyasubset,andaratherimpoverishedsubsetatthat,oftheprinciplesthatgovernnaturalprocessesoperateatthelevelofnature’smaterialconstituents.Supposethatafullandcompleteunder-standingofalltheprinciplesandcausesofnaturalthingsemergesonlyinthedomainoflivingnature.Ifthiswereyourpointofview,anessaydevotedtodefiningthestand-ardsappropriatetoanimalinvestigationwouldatthesametimebeseenasprovidingstandardspropertotheinvestigationofnatureinitsmostrobustsense.IshallarguelaterthattheseareAristotle’ssuppositions,andthatthisexplainsthefactthatPAI.1–5isinfactabouttheproperwaytoinvestigateanimalsandtojudgesuchinvestigationsandyetdoesnotgetaroundtosayingsountilchapter5.WefindtheconversepatterninBookIIofAristotle’sPhysics.Itpurportstobeafull-blowndevelopmentoftheprinciplesfornaturalinvestigation.Butthisveryquicklyturnsintoadefenseofthestudyofbothmaterialandformalnature,andofgivingprioritytotheformalnature,whichturnsouttobethatforthesakeofwhichnaturalchangesoccur,aswell.Thisfocusonteleologicallyorganizedcompositesofmatterandformcarriesovertothediscussionofcausalityandchanceinchapters3–7andtotheargumentfortheextensionofteleologicalreasoningtothestudyofnatureinchapters8and9.Thoughthisbookpurportstobedevelopinganadequateaccountofthe1.Coleman(1977,p.1):“Biologywasintroducedinthenineteenthcentury.Firstcametheword;acenturyofincessantactivitywasneededtocreateathrivingscience.”Cunningham(1999,p.22):“Andyetalittlereflectionwillremindusthatbiology,asaterm,asadiscipline,asadomainofknowledge,isofveryrecentconstruction.”2.AccordingtoWebster’sNewWorldDictionary,CollegeEdition,forexample,“biology”refersto“thescienceoflivingorganismsandlifeprocesses,includingthestudyofgrowth,structure,andreproduction.”WhenIusethephrase“Aristotle’sbiology,”ImeantosuggestthereisagroupoftreatiseswithintheAristoteliancorpusthatmakesacontributiontosuchascience.Idon’tmeantosuggestthatitlooksatalllikeours.293ACTC1629320/03/2006,04:06PM\njamesg.lennoxprinciplesandcausesofnaturegenerally,thefocusseemstobeonlivingnature;inchapter8,forexample,heclaimstobearguingfortheextensionofteleologytonature,not,ornotmerely,toplantsandanimals.Andyettheexamplesheusestoillustratetheteleologyofnatureareallorganic.Again,orsoIshallargue,thismakesgoodsensefromanAristotelianperspective.Thefocusisonlivingnature,whereformandgoal-directedactionsaredominant.Ofcoursethematerialsthatgointotheconstitutionofanimalsalsooftenrequireteleologicalexplanation,butalwaysbyreferencetoformandfunction.Onewillhavetoexplainhowmaterialelements,operatingaccordingtotheirownnatures,neverthelesschange,meld,andareorganizedintolivingsystemsoftissuesandorgans.Sotheanswertoourpuzzleseemstobethis:whenAristotlethinksofthestudyofnature,heisthinking,firstandforemost,ofthestudyoflivingnature.Oneoftenseesthishabitofthoughtinunexpectedplaces.InMetaphysicsE.1,forexample,heisattemptingtodistinguishfirstphilosophy,thestudyofbeingquabeing,fromthetwootherdomainsoftheoreticalknowledge,thestudiesofnatureandofmathematics.Incharacterizingthestudyofnature(phusikEepistEmE),asthestudyofcombinationsofmatterandform,hegivesalistofexamples:forexampleeye,face,flesh,bone,animalgenerally,leaf,root,bark,plantgenerally(forofnoneoftheseisthereanaccountwithoutchange,butalwaystheaccountincludesmatter).(1026a1–3)These–animals,plants,andtheirparts–arethesortsofthingthenaturalscientiststudies.Ofcourse,afullunderstandingofthemmustincludeanunderstandingofthematerialsthatconstitutethemaswell;andwewillseethatAristotletakesthisobligationveryseriously.3BiologyandtheTheoryofKnowledgeButifAristotlebelievesthatthestudyofnatureisfirstandforemostthestudyoflivingnature,andiftheinvestigationofnatureis,asMetaphysicsE.1states,oneformoftheoreticalunderstanding(theoretikEepistEmE),thenaninvestigationofAristotle’sstudyofanimalshasanimportantroletoplayinanyinvestigationofhisepistemology,ortheoryofknowledge.Thisistruenotonlybecausetheinvestigationofanimalsisaimedattheoreticalknowledge,butbecauseitisbyfarAristotle’smostsustainedtheoreticalinvestigation,comprising(dependingonwhichtreatisesyouinclude)between25and30percentofAristotle’sextantwritings.Moreoverhissinglesustainedcontributiontoepistemology,thePosteriorAnalytics(APo.),presentsatheoryofscientificknowledge,sothathavingaseriesoftreatisesthatreporttheresultsofasustained3.WolfgangDetel’sdiscussionofAristotle’sAnalyticsinthisvolume,aristotle’slogicandtheoryofscience,servesasvaluablebackgroundtothissection,especiallyinthatwesharetheviewthatthebiologicalworksareconsciousexercisesindemonstrativescienceandthusvaluableexamplesofAristotle’stheoryofdemonstrationinpractice.294ACTC1629420/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophyscientificinvestigationcarriedoutbyitsauthormayhelpusinunderstandingthat4work.Atfirstpass,however,exploringAristotle’sbiologyforhelpinunderstandinghistheoryofknowledgeseemsunpromising.Notoriously,Aristotle’saccountof“demon-strativeunderstanding”intheAPo.appliesparadigmaticallytoaxiomatized,deductivesystemsbasedonself-evidentfirstprinciples.Iftherewereanythinginfourth-centurybceGreecethatwouldhelpusinunderstandingsuchatheory,surelyitwouldbe5geometry,notbiology.ButhereiswhereAristotle’sinvestigationsofanimalscanhelptoshedlightontheAnalyticsprogram.FortheyhelpustoseethattheabovedescriptionofthePosteriorAnalyticsisamisleadingcaricature.Infact,adetailedcomparisonofitsexplorationsofknowledge,inquiry,causality,division,definitionanddemonstrationwithAristotle’sbiologicalinquiries,causaldemonstrations,divisionsanddefinitionsprovidesuswitharicherandmorerealisticpictureoftheAnalyticsprogram.Thefullcaseforthisclaim6istobefoundinresearchdoneoverthepastthreedecades.Herethereisonlyroomforanoutlineofthatcase,andthenoneexample.ThePosteriorAnalyticscontainstwobooks.Theabovecaricatureisacaricatureofonlyonethreadofthefirstsixchaptersofthefirstbook.Thesecondbookannouncesitselfasasustaineddiscussionofthedifferentinquiriesthatarecomponentsofallscientificresearch.4.IrealizeIamheresendingupmanyredflags,whichIwillacknowledgewithoutattemptingto“runthemdown.”ThereisanongoingdebateabouthowproperlytocharacterizethePosteriorAnalytics.ItisclearfromtheopeningparagraphofthePriorAnalyticsthatAristotlesawthefourbooksofourtwo“Analytics”asconstitutingasingleproject(seeDetel,loc.cit.).Thetemptationtoreadthefirsttwo(APr.)as“formallogic”andthesecondtwo(APo.)as“philosophyofscience”or“epistemology”shouldberesisted.Buttheprevioussentenceintroducesanotherredflag.Twentieth-centuryphilosophyhasdevelopedinsuchawaythatthetheoryofknowledgeandthephilosophyofscienceappeartobeverydifferententerprises.However,notonlyisthisnotthecaseforAristotle,butitisarguablynotgenerallytrueofthehistoryofphilosophybeforeKant(seeBurnyeat,1981).Moreover,sayingthatAPo.presentsatheoryofscientificknowledgewillraiseeyebrows.Byaddingtheadjective“scientific”here,Imeantocapturetheideathatthisworkisconcernedwithsuchtopicsasthenatureofproof,formsofinquiryandtheirrelations,explanation,causality,andinduction;andthatitexemplifiestheseideasbydrawingonthepracticesofbranchesofmathematicsandnaturalphilosophy.Aristotleclearlyintendsittobeanabstractenoughpresentationtofindapplicationacrossthemathematicalandnaturalsciences,occasionallyusinganexamplefromeachdomaintoillustrateasingleabstractphilosophicalpoint.ItisamatterofmuchdisputewhetherAristotleimaginesthatthesameistrueoffirstphilosophyormetaphysics.5.Werethistrueitwouldbeextremelyunfortunate,sincethereisvirtuallynothingofGreekgeometryextantbeforeEuclid,wholivedagenerationafterAristotle.Theburdenofthenextparagraph,however,isthatitisnottrue.(Forwhatwedoknowaboutgeometry,seeMueller,greekmathematicstothetimeofeuclid,inthisvolume).6.SeeBalme(1987a,1987b);Bolton(1987,1997);Charles(1990,1997,2000);Detel(1997,1999,thisvolume);Gotthelf(1987,1997a,1997b);Kullmann(1974,1985,1997,1999);Lennox(1987a,1990,1997a,1997b,2001a,2001b,2001c);Lloyd(1990,1996);Pellegrin(1982,1986).295ACTC1629520/03/2006,04:06PM\njamesg.lennoxThethingsaboutwhichweinquireareequalinnumbertothethingsweunderstand.Weinquireaboutfourthings:thefact,thereasonwhy,ifsomethingis,whatsomethingis.(APo.II.1,89b23–25)Moreover,thesefourinquiriesarepaired,andthereisanaturalsequenceineachpair.Whenweknowthefactweinquireaboutthereasonwhy(e.g.,knowingthatitiseclipsedorthattheearthmoves,weinquireintothereasonwhyitiseclipsedorwhytheearthmoves).(APo.II.1,89b29–31)Andhavingcometoknowthatitis,weinquirewhatitis(e.g.,Thenwhatisagod?Orwhatisaman?).(APo.II.1,89b34–35)Thoughitcannotbecapturedinareadabletranslation,itisimportanttoknowthatwhatIhaverendered“thefact,”above,isliterally“thethat”–soinGreekitisobviousthattheexample,“thatthemooniseclipsed,”illustratesthefirstinquiry.Moreimport-antly,thelastquotedpassageaboveindicatesthatAristotleisaimingtounderstandhowthesepairsofinquiriesarerelated.Forhavingbeguntoillustratethedistinctionbetweeninquiryiforwhethersomethingisandwhatitiswiththequestion“whetherthereisorisnotacentauroragod,”hethencharacterizestheknowledgeachievedas“knowingthatitis.”Thisiscodifiedinthenextchapterbynotingthat“factual”inquiriestaketwoforms,unqualifiedandpredicative,theformerbeing“existential”inquiries–aretherecentaurs?–thelatterbeing“attributive”inquiries–isthemoonsufferingeclipse?Moreover,itbecomesclearthatAristotleseesthesetwosequencedpairsofresearchasintimatelyconnectedtooneanother.Hefirstconnectsthembymeansofhissyllogisticconceptof“middleterm,”thetermwhichiscommontothetwopremisesinasyllogisticproof,andwhichthuswarrantstheconclusion:Thusitresultsthatinallourresearchweseekeitherifthereisamiddletermorwhatthemiddletermis.Forthemiddletermisthecause,andthisisineverycasewhatissought.(APo.II.2,90a7–9)Thatis,inanyvalidsyllogisticinferencethemiddletermsharedbythepremisesisthewarrantfortheconclusion.Inscientificexplanation,however,themiddletermmustalsoidentifythecauseofthefactgivenintheconclusion.Ifwhatweseektoexplainistheperiodicsoundofnoiseintheclouds,themiddletermneedstoidentifythecauseoftheconnectionbetweenthatnoiseandclouds.Moreover,onAristotle’saccountoftherelationshipbetweencausaldemonstrationandscientificdefinition,knowingthatcausewillgiveusagraspoftheessenceofthunder.Thereisadifferencebetweensayingwhyitthundersandwhatthunderis.Intheonecaseyouwillsay:Becausethefireisextinguishedintheclouds.But:Whatisthunder?–Anoiseoffirebeingextinguishedintheclouds.Hencethesameaccountisgivenindifferentways:inonewayitisacontinuousdemonstration,intheotheradefinition.(APo.II.10,94a4–8)NowonemayexploretheunfoldingofthesecomplicatedideasaboutinquirywithinthePosteriorAnalyticsitself.Aristotlerecursregularlytoanumberofstandardexamples296ACTC1629620/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophy–especiallyresearchaboutthunderandeclipses,butalso,andimportantly,seasonallossofleavesinbroad-leafedplants.Buttheseexamplespresentmanyproblems–itissafetosaytheyraiseasmanyinterpretivequestionsinunderstandingAristotle’stheoryastheyhelpresolve.SoitisworthaskingwhetherAristotle’ssustainedtheoreticalinvestigationintoanimalscanbeusedasaresourceforunderstandinghistheoryofresearchitself.Thefollowingthreepassages–onefromtheHistoryofAnimals(abetterthoughlessfamiliartranslationwouldbeInquiryintoAnimals),onefromOnAnimalLocomotionandonefromOnthePartsofAnimals–suggestthattheansweris“yes.”FortheysuggestthattheentirebiologicalprojectisorganizedinaccordancewiththetheoryofinquirydevelopedinAPo.II.Ifthatisso,wewillbeabletousetheseinvestigationsasaresourceforseeinghow,andhowwell,theAnalyticstheoryofscientificknowledgeworkswhenembodiedinAristotle’smostsustainedinvestigationofnature.Wewillnotbeforcedtodependsolelyontheschematic,problematic,andsometimesfictitious,examplesAristotleoccasionallyalludestointheAnalyticsitself.LetusbeginwithapassageinthefirstbookoftheHistoryofAnimals.AfterfivechaptersinwhichAristotlelaysoutthekindsofdifferencesamonganimalstobestudiedandsketchesthewaysinwhichtheyaretobeinvestigated,hemakesthefollowingsweepingprogrammaticstatementabouttheinvestigationtocome,andwhereitfitsintheentirescientificstudyofanimals.Thesethings,then,havenowbeensaidbywayofoutlinetoprovideatasteofwhatthingsneedtobestudied,andwhatitisaboutthemthatneedstobestudied,inorderthatwemayfirstgraspthedifferencesandtheattributesbelongingtoallanimals.Afterwedothis,wemustattempttodiscoverthecauses.Foritisnaturaltocarryouttheinvestiga-tioninthisway,beginningwiththeinquiryintoeachthing;forfromtheseinquiriesitbecomesclearbothaboutwhichthings(perihOn)thedemonstration(tEnapodeixin)shouldbeandfromwhichthings(exhOn)itshouldproceed.(HAI.6,491a7–14)Thenaturalwaytoproceed,then,istobeginwithinquiry(historia),withtheaimofgraspingthedifferencesbetween,andattributesof,alltheanimals;andthentoattempttodiscovertheircauses.Thisisnaturalbecause,giventhatourgoalisdemonstrativeunderstanding,wewanttoendupwithacleardistinctionbetweentheexplananda(theperihOn)andtheexplanans(theexhOn).TheHistoryofAnimalscharacterizesitselfasacontributiontothefirstofthesetwoinquiries,andlooksforwardtoinvestigationsthataimtodiscoverthecauses–thereasonswhyanimalshavetheattributestheyhaveanddifferinthewaysthattheydo.InthelanguageofthePosteriorAnalytics:HAestablishesthefact,e.g.,thatallanimalswithlungshavewindpipes,orthatallcetaceahavelungsandareviviparous,typicallyseekingtoidentifygroupsbymeansofdis-7coveringco-extensivedifferentiaewiththeaidofthemethodofdivision.WorkssuchasPartsofAnimalsorGenerationofAnimalsseektoestablishthereasonwhy–thecause–ofthefact.IfheisfollowingthemethoddescribedintheAnalytics,thesecausal7.OntheuseandsignificanceofthismethodologyinHA,seeGotthelf(1988,1997a);andLennox(1987a,1990,1991).297ACTC1629720/03/2006,04:06PM\njamesg.lennoxexplanationsshouldatthesametimegivesusanessentialdefinitionofwhatitistobeawindpipeortobeviviparous.Hiscausalinvestigationsstressthattheypresupposethatthepreliminaryworkofinquiry,establishingthefactsatthemostgenerallevelpossible,hasbeenaccomplished.Herearetwoexplicitstatementstothateffect,onefromthebeginningofhisstudyofthecausesofthedifferencesinanimallocomotion,onefromthebeginningofhisstudyofthecausesofthedifferencesamongthepartsofanimals.Clearlythereneedstobeastudyofallofthese[questionsaboutanimallocomotion]andanyothersofthesamekind;forthat(hotimen)thesethingsarethusisclearfromourinquiryintonature(tEshistoriastEsphusikEs);thereasonwhy(diotide)mustnowbeinvestigated.(IA1,704b7–10)Fromwhichpartsandfromhowmanypartseachoftheanimalsisconstitutedhasbeenexhibitedmoreclearlyintheinquiriesaboutthem(entaishistoriaistaisperiautOn);itisthecausesowingtowhicheachanimalhasthischaracterthatmustnowbeexamined,ontheirownandapart(chorisantaskath’hauta)fromwhatwassaidintheinquiries.(PAII.1,646a8–12)EachofthesepassagesexplicitlydescribesthestudyofanimalswithwhichAristotleisengagedinthelanguageofAristotle’stheoryofresearchinAPo.II.1.Indeed,thepassagefromHAI.6doessobyinsistingthatthenaturalmethodtouseistofirstgetclearonthedifferencesandattributestobedemonstrated(“establishthefactthat...”)beforegoingontofindthecauses(“thereasonwhy,i.e.,thecause”)tobeappealedtointhesedemonstrations.TheIAandPA,ontheotherhand,refertothemselvesascarryingouttheprojectofdiscoveringthecausesthatprovidethereasonswhythevariouskindsofanimalsaredifferentiatedastheyare,andacknowledgethattheyaregoingontodothispreciselybecausethefactualinvestigationintothelocomotionandpartsofanimalshasbeenaccomplishedandrecordedin“theinquiriesintoanimals,”i.e.,ourHA.(Note,bytheway,anotherinstanceofthepuzzlewithwhichwebegan–whatareusuallycalledbyAristotleinquiriesintoanimalsare,intheIA2passagequotedabove,referredtosimplyasinquiryintonature.)Ineverycase,Aristotleemphasizesthedistinctiononwhichwearefocused,makingitallbutcertainthatheisremindingusofhisphilosophyofscientificresearch.Theseprogrammaticstatements,soclearlyreflectingthetheoryofinquirypresentedanddefendedinAPo.II,givesusgoodreasontoexpectthattheinvestigationofanimalsmayprovideuswithasustainedinvestigationcarriedoutinwaysthatself-consciouslyreflectthetheoryofresearchoutlinedinAPo.II.Lookingatthebiologicalworksinthislighthasturnedouttobeanextremelyfruitfultoolbothforinvestigatingtheirstruc-tureandmethods,butequallyfortheinvestigationofAristotle’stheoryofscientific8researchandtheoryofknowledge.BypursuingthislineofresearchintoAristotle’sinvestigationofanimalsonegetsaveryprecisesenseofwhyAristotleinsists,intheAnalytics,thattheproperuseof8.Seetheworkcitedinnote6.ThefirstcomprehensiveinvestigationofthisrelationshipinmoderntimesisthatofKullmann(1974).298ACTC1629820/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophydivisionisbothnecessaryforthepursuitofknowledgeandwhyheisequallyinsistentthatitisbynomeanssufficient(cf.APr.I.31;APo.II.13,96b25–97a6).Asmanystudies,followinguponthepioneeringworkofDavidBalme(1961,1987),havenowestablished,theHistoryofAnimalsisaworkthatfromfirsttolastworksbymeansofdivisionofanimaldifferences.ItisorganizedasastudyoffourkindsofanimaldifferencesfirstmentionedinHA’sfirstchapterastheprincipleobjectsofstudy(at486b22–487a14)–differencesinparts(BooksI–IV),inmodesofactivity(BooksV,VI,IX),inwaysoflife(BookVII)andincharacters(BookVIII).Theseinturnaresub-divided;discussionofthenon-uniformpartsofanimalswithblood(I.7–III.1)isfollowedbythatoftheiruniformparts(III.2–22);withadiscussionofthepartsofanimalswithoutbloodconcludingthediscussionofdifferencesinparts(IV.1–8).BookIVconcludeswithadiscussionofdifferencesinsensoryfaculties,voice,anddifferences9relatedtosex.ItisonlyonceAristotlebeginstodistinguishdifferencesamong,say,uniformpartsthatvariousgroupingsofanimalsplayanimportantroleinorganizingthediscussion.Andinsofarastherearerelativelystablegeneralgroupingsofanimals,theseareidentifiedbynotingtheirpossessionofstablecorrelationsamongdifferentiae–forexample,therearealargenumberofdifferentanimalsallofwhichhavewings,feathers,beaks(bonysnoutswithoutlipsorteeth),andtwofleshlesslegs,acombinationwhich10hasbeengiventhename“bird.”Inothercasessuchgroupshavenotbeengenerallyrecognized,andAristotlesimplyreferstothembymeansofsomeoftheirmostimportantcorrelateddifferences–thefour-leggedandlive-bearinganimals,forexample.WhatisclearfromthepracticeoftheHistoryofAnimalsisboththevalueofdivisionanditslimitations.Divisionbyitselfdoesnotprovideyouwiththeaxesofdivision;rathertheyarepresupposed.Divisiondoesnotgiveyouthekinds–somethingmustbedonewiththeproductsofdivisionsinorderforaresearchertorecognizetheoreticallysignificantkinds.Whygroupanimalstogetherbasedontheirpossessionoffourlegsandtheabilitytoproducelivingoffspringratherthaneggs?Certainlyeachofthesetraitsistheproductofadivision,oneofmodesoflocomotionandoneofmodesofreproduction.Butthosedivisionsdonottellyouthatanimalswithfourlegsthatbearlivingyoungconstituteascientificallysignificantgroup.Asecondlimitationofdivisionisitsindifferencetothedistinctionbetweencausallyfundamentalcharacteristicsandproperattributes,tousethelanguageoftheAnalytics.YetbeingabletodistinguishtheseisabsolutelyfundamentaltoAristotelianscience.AcarefulcomparativestudyoftheHistoryofAnimals,ontheonehand,andworkssuchasOnthePartsorOntheGenerationofAnimalsagainprovidesinsightintohowAristotle11understandsanddeploysthisdistinctioninhisactualscientificpractice.Andaswehaveseenabove,Aristotledrawsexplicitattentiontoitsimportanceforhisbiological9.Thisisanoverview.Foramoredetailedaccount,lookatGotthelf(1988)andLennox(1991,2001a).10.CompareHAI.6,490b7–491a6,II.15,505b26–506a10,andIV.8,534b12–15.11.Forworkonthissubject,eachreachingsomewhatdifferentresults,compareBolton(1987);Charles(2000,ch.12);Gotthelf(1997b);Kullmann(1974);Lennox(1987a),alsoinLennox(2001a).299ACTC1629920/03/2006,04:06PM\njamesg.lennoxinvestigationsinanumberofkeytextswithinthoseinvestigationsthemselves.Tostudyindetailtheinterplaybetweendefinition,causaldemonstration,anddivisioninthebiologyistoseeAristotleworkingthroughjustthoseproblemswhichformthecentralquestionofPosteriorAnalyticsII–howpreciselyaredefinition,causaldemon-stration,anddivisionrelatedtooneanotherinthequestforscientificunderstanding?BiologyandMetaphysicsOnereasonourpredecessorsdidnotarriveatthiswayofproceedingisthattherewasno“whatitistobe”(totiEneinai)andno“definedsubstantialbeing”(tohorizisthaitEnousian).Democritustouchedonitfirst,nothoweverasnecessaryforthestudyofnature,butbecausehewascarriedawaybythesubjectitself;whileinSocrates’timeinterestinthisgrew,butresearchintothenaturalworldceased,andphilosophersturnedinsteadtopracticalvirtueandpolitics.(PAI.1,642a24–31)ThesewordsconcludealongandcomplexdefensebyAristotleofanewwayofinvest-igatingthenaturalworld.Theapproachheisrecommendingappearstorequire,first,thedevelopmentofcertainmetaphysicalpreliminariesand,second,theapplicationofthosemetaphysicalpreliminariestotheinvestigationofnature.Intheintroductiontothischapter,IindicatedthatinordertounderstandAristotle’shabitofusingtheterm“nature”whenwhatheseemstobeprimarilyfocusedonislivingnature,oneneedstounderstandhismetaphysicalpresuppositions.Itisnowtimetogivesomesubstancetothatclaim.Fromamodernstandpoint,twotreatisesintheAristoteliancorpustreattopicswewouldnowrelegatetometaphysics:hisMetaphysicsandhisDeAnima.Thefirstisaninvestigationintobeing–notintothisorthatsortofbeing,butintobeingassuch(onthistopic,seealsoGill,firstphilosophyinaristotle,inthisvolume).Thesecondinvestigatesthesoul,thatis,thesource(archE)oflife(onthistopic,seealsoCaston,aristotle’spsychology,inthisvolume).Thetwoendupbeingcloselyrelatedstudies,becauseAristotle’sisametaphysicsthatelevateslivingbeingtoaplaceofontologicalprimacy,andtheprincipleandcauseoflivingbeing–psuchE,soul–toaplaceofmetaphysicalprimacy.AsaconsequenceofAristotle’sexplorationofthequestion“What12isbeing?,”thestudyoflivingthingsbecomesthemostelevatedofnaturalinvestigations.12.Aristotle’smetaphysicalinquiriesresultinbiology’sprideofplaceinnaturalphilosophy;andperhapsnaturalphilosophy’sprideofplaceamongformsofknowledge.AmongAristotle’sthreetheoreticalformsofknowledge,metaphysicsissaidtobefirstphilosophy,whilethestudyofnatureiscalledsecondphilosophy.Indeed,Aristotlesaysthatiftherewerenothingapartfromnaturallyconstitutedthings,thestudyofnaturewouldbefirstphilosophy(Met.E.1,1026a7–32).Therefore,theclaimthathismetaphysicalviewssomehowderivefromhisbiologicalinvestigationshastheconnectionexactlythewrongwayaround.Studiesexploringcon-nectionsbetweenAristotle’sMetaphysicsandhiszoologicaltreatisesincludeBalme(1987a,1987c);Charles(1990,1997,2000);Cooper(1987,1988);Freeland(1987),Furth(1988);Gill(1989);Gotthelf(1985a);Kosman(1987);Lennox(1985,1987b,1990,1997a);Lloyd(1990,1996);Pellegrin(1982,1986);Witt(1985).300ACTC1630020/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophyAnyviewontheargumentofthecentralbooksoftheMetaphysicswill,ofcourse,becontroversial.OnthatsubjectImustbesomewhatdogmatichere,andhopethiswillbeforgivenintheinterestsofpursuingtheprimaryinterestinthischapter:HowmightaninvestigationofAristotle’sbiologicalworkshelpustobetterunderstandthatargument,and(conversely)howdoesthatargumentinformhisinvestigationoflivingthings?Firstphilosophyisdistinguishedfromothertheoreticalinquiriesbecauseitaimstodiscovertheprinciplesandcausesofbeingquabeing(E.1,1025b3–4;cf.G.1,1003a20–32).Met.Z–Qnarrowthefocustotheprimarybeing,substantialbeing(ousia).AsAristotleputsit:Indeedthethingsoughtlongago,nowandalways,andthatisalwayspuzzling–whatisbeing?–comesdowntothis:whatissubstantialbeing?(Z.1,1028b3–4)Z.2famouslybeginsthisinquirywithalistofbodiestowhichsubstantialbeingseems13mostobviouslytobelong:Thisiswhywesaytheanimals,plants,andtheirpartsaresubstantialbeings,andnaturalbodiessuchasfire,water,earth,andeachthingofthissort;andagainasmanythingsasarepartsoftheseorcomefromthese,eitherfrompartsofthemorallofthem,e.g.,theheavenanditsparts,stars,moon,andsun.Butwhetherthesearetheonlysubstantialbeingsorwhetherthereareothers–orwhethernoneoftheseare,butratherothers–mustbeinvestigated.(1028b8–16)Itisopen,then,fortheseprimafaciecandidatestobeeliminated.AndindeeditlooksasifbyZ.16notonlyuniversals,butthepartsofanimalsandtheelements,havebeeneliminated,oratleastdemoted.Itisclearthatmostofthethingsbelievedtobesubstantialbeingsarepotentialities;thisistrueofthepartsofanimals(fornoneofthesecanexistwhenseparated;whenseparatedtheyallexistasmatter)andalsoofearth,fire,andair.Fornoneofthemisone;rathertheyarelikeheaps,untilconcoctedandsomeonethingcomestobefromthem.(1040b5–10)Itakethepointtobethattherearegoodreasonstothinktheitemsmentionedherefailcertaintestsforsubstantialbeing.Animalpartsontheirownfailtheindependencetest;elementalbodiesontheirownfailtheunitytest.13.Or“tobepresentin”.TheGreekverbhuparchein,canhaveeithersense,andhereitmakesamajordifference.IsAristotlesayingthatthesearethethingsthatseemobviouslytobelabeled“substances”;orishesayingthesearethethingsthatmostobviouslyseemtohavesubstantialbeingwithinthem?Takeninthelatterway,evenatthelevelofwhatismanifestandobvious,thereisnoobviousanswertotheinquiryintowhatsubstantialbeingis,butonlytotheinquiryaboutwheretolookforsuchathing.Takenintheformerway,thisisalistofthingsthatappeartobesubstances.Ofcourse,onecanstillgoontoinquireintowhataboutthemmakesthemsubstances;butneverthelesstherewouldalreadybeananswertothequestion“Whatissub-stantialbeing?”301ACTC1630120/03/2006,04:06PM\njamesg.lennoxNowatthispointitwouldbeaverygoodthingtoknowmoreabouthowAristotlethinksoftherelationshipbetweenanimalsandtheirparts,andbetweenelements14unconcoctedandtheunitythatemergeswhentheyareconcocted.Itwouldalsohelptounderstandwhyconcoctionisabletoprovideaunitythatelevatesamerelypotentialsubstantialbeingtoanactualone.SuchunderstandingisavailablebyexaminingtheexplanatoryfunctionofconcoctioninPartsofAnimals,GenerationofAnimals,ParvaNaturaliaandMeteorologyIV.Indoingso,onediscoversthatthepartsofanimalsfallintotwobroadcategories,uniform(flesh,bone,semen,sinew)andnon-uniform(eye,hand,wing).PAII.1isasustainedaccountofthisdistinction,andGAII.6isadiscussionofthedevelopmentofmanyofthemoutofnutritiveblood.Thenon-uniformpartstypicallyhavecomplexfunctionsthatrequirethemtobemadeofanumberofuniformparts(thehand,asAristotlenotes,requiressoftflesh,hardbone,flexiblesinewsandsemi-hardnails(cf.PAII.1,646b10–26).Theuniformpartssuchasflesh,bone,teeth,orhair,areconstitutedbyconcoctionfromtheelementalbodies;theyarenot,however,merecombinationsofamountsoftheactualelementsinvolved.Concoction,rather,producesanemergententity,auniformorhomogenousmaterial,thepartsofwhich,nomatterhowoftendivided,willcontinuetodisplaytheemergentpropertiesofthatuniformentity,propertiesnotfoundinanyofthecomponents,eithersinglyorincombination.MeteorologyIV.1–7explainsindetailwhatconcoctionisandhowitproducesuniformbodieswiththeseemergentproperties;chapters8–11provideaclassificationoftheseemergentuniformmaterialsbyreferencetoalistof18pairsofdispositionalproperties,andthenrelatestheseemergentpropertiesbacktotheelementalconstitutionsoutofwhichconcoctionproducesthem.Thissustaineddiscussionhasaddedphilosophicalimportanceinthatitaccomplishesthesetasksbydeployingathoroughly“bottomup”explanatorystrategy,appealingtotheefficientcausesofheatingandcoolingandconsequentcondensing,evaporation,anddrying,andneveroncementioningthegoalsorfunctionsoftheuniformstructuresthatemerge,evenwhenthosestructuresareinfactorganic.However,thelastchapterofMeteorologyIV,chapter12,alsomakesitclearthatwhathasprecededisnotacompleteaccountofanysuchmaterialsashaveafunctionwithinastructuredsystemofnon-uniformparts.Itisasustainedphilosophicaldis-cussionofthecentralityofteleologicalexplanationsinanycasewhereonemustunderstandthefunctionforthesakeofwhichtheuniformpartwasconcocted.ItconcludesbydirectingthereadertotextssuchasPAII.1forafullerunderstanding.Indeed,PAII.1stressesthateventothinkofthemorecomplexnatureas“emergent”getsthepriorityrelationswrong.Ingenerationthingsareopposedtothewaytheyareinsubstantialbeing;forthingsposterioringenerationarepriorinnature,andthefinalstageofgenerationispriorinnature.(646a24–26)Andwithrespecttoorganismsinparticular,14.SeetheclaimatMet.Z.17,1041b11–33,regardingtherelationoffleshandbonetotheelements.302ACTC1630220/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophyThusanimalshavebeenconstitutedfrombothoftheseparts[uniformandnon-uniform],buttheuniformpartsareforthesakeofthenon-uniform;forofthelattertherearefunctionsandactions,e.g.,ofeye,nostril,andtheentireface,offinger,hand,andtheentirearm.(PAII.1,646b10–14)Thesefunctionalparts,suchaseyeandfinger,moreover,areonlytrulysuchwhentheyarecapableofactingforthesakeoftheorganism–“noneofthepartsofacorpse15isanylongersuch–Imean,e.g.,anylongeraneyeorahand”(I.1,641a3–4).Intheend,then,thebeingoftheseparts,allthewaydowntotheelements,isparasiticonthebeingofalivingthing–withthestressonliving.Forasthejust-citedpassageaboutcorpsesmakesclear,itisnotinvirtueofbeingapartofabodythataneyeisaneye,butinvirtueofitscapacitytomakeafunctionalcontributiontothelifeofanorganism.ItmaywellbeaprimarytaskofDeAnimatounderstandthecentralityoflifetothebeingoftheseparadigmaticnaturalsubstances,asubjectIwilltakeupinthenextsection.TherehavebeenhintsthroughoutMetaphysicsZthatanimalsandplantshaveaspecialstatusthatneedstobeexplored.Forexample:Amongthethingsthatcometobe,somedosobynature,somebyart,andsomespontaneously–butallcometobebysomething,fromsomething,andsomething....Thosegenerationsarenaturalofwhichthegenerationisfromnature;butthatfromwhichitcomestobeiswhatwecallmatter,whilethatbywhichissomeoneofthosethingsthatarebynature,andthatwhichcomestobeisahumanbeingoraplantorsomeotherthingofthatsort,whichwedeclaretobesubstantialbeingsmostofall.Nowgenerallythereisbothanaturefromwhichandanatureinvirtueofwhich;forthatwhichhascometobe,e.g.,aplantorananimal,hasanature;andthatbywhichitcomestobe,thenaturespokenofinvirtueoftheform,isalikeinform[towhathascometobe]thoughinanother;forahumanbeinggeneratesahumanbeing.(ExcerptsfromMet.Z.7,1032a12–26)Noticethatplantsandanimalsareheresaidtobeparadigmaticexamplesofthingsgeneratedbynature,thoughagainthefocusisonnaturalthingsthatreproduce,aswewouldsay–wheretheagentandtheproductareoneandthesameinform.AsAristotlestressesbothinDeAnimaandGenerationofAnimals,thisabilitytoreplicateformallowsorganismsto“participateintheeternalanddivine”–organismscometobeandpassaway,buttheirformlivesonintheiroffspring.(cf.DeAn.II.4,415a22–b2;GAII.1,731b24–732a1)InpassageslikethisinZthereisanapparenttensionbetweentheinsistencethatthecompositeoutcomesofnaturalgenerationaremostofallousiai(substantialbeings,15.Distinguishinguniformfromnon-uniformpartsbyassigningfunctionsonlytothelatterisanover-simplification.Anorganizedyetuniformpart(e.g.,theliver)maybe,functionally,anorgan.LaterinPAIIAristotlearguesthatbonesareonlytrulyboneswhentheyarepartsofafunctioningskeleton(II.9,654a32–b2),thatfleshistheorganoftouchperception(II.8,653b20–26),andthatbrainisanorganformaintainingthepropertemperatureintheorganism(II.7,652b6–26).ItisthusnotsurprisingtofindthatatGAII.1,734b24–31,heappliesthehomonymyprinciple,theprinciplethattobeanorganicpartthestructuremustbeabletofunction,indifferentlytofaceandflesh.303ACTC1630320/03/2006,04:06PM\njamesg.lennoxe.g.,Z.8,1034a4)andthattheirformalnatureismostofallousia(thistensiondrivesthedialecticofZ.10–11,forexample).Thereareplaces,however,whereAristotleseemstodeclarethatheisspeakinginhisownvoice.Thatthereisacertainstateofaporiaaboutdefinitions,andduetowhatcause,hasbeendiscussed.Andforthisreasontoreduceeverythinginthisway,i.e.,toabstractawaythematter,isunhelpful;forsomethingsareequally“thisinthis”or“thesedisposedthus.”Andthecomparisontotheanimal,whichtheyoungerSocratesusedtomake,isnotagoodone,foritleadsawayfromthetruth,andtothesuppositionthatahumanbeingcanexistwithoutitsparts,justasthecirclecanexistwithoutthebronze.Butthecasesarenotalike;forananimalissomethingthatisperceptible,andcannotbedefinedwithoutchange,northereforewithoutitspartssomehowbeinginacertainstate.Foritisnotthehandineverypossibleconditionthatisapartofahumanbeing,butthehandabletoperformitsfunction,andsoensouled–ifitisnotensouled,itisnotapart.(Met.Z.11,1036b21–32)Thesuggestionhereseemstobethatwhilethefactthatcircularitycanbefoundinanynumberofmaterialsallowsmattertobeignoredinthedefinitionofacircle,itwouldbewrongtothinkthattheconnectionbetweensoulandbodyinaplantoranimalissimilartothatbetweencircularityand(say)bronze.Onceyousaythattobeananimalistobecapableofperception,youareatoncesayingthatitisabeingwithinstrumentalpartscapableofundergoingcertainchangesandperformingcertainfunctions.Tobeensouledistobeabodycapableofsuchfunctions.Therelationofsoulandbodyisutterlyunliketherelationofmathematicalfigureandbody.ItwillbenoticedthatthisargumentisthecomplementofthatmadeinPartsofAnimalsIandII–justastheeyeofacorpseisnotrueeye,sotootherecanbenovisionintheabsenceofthematerialpreconditionsofvision.Thedefinitionoftheeye,orofanentireanimal,requiresreferencetothefunctionalcapacitiesofappropriatebodies.Interestingly,whenAristotleannounces“anothersortofbeginning”(1041a6)inZ.17,oneinwhichwewillfocusonsubstantialbeingasasourceandcause(1041a10),hebeginsbyremindingusaboutthetheoryofinquiryinPosteriorAna-16lyticsII.“Thereasonwhy(todiati)isalwayssoughtinthismanner,[byasking]thereasonwhyonethingbelongstoanother”(1041a12–13).Thecentralproblemofthechapter,however,isthattheobjectsoftheinquirywearecurrentlyengagedinappeartolackthispredicativestructure.Afterreviewingthefamiliar“thunder”examplefromAPo.II,hebeginstodiscussthesemoredifficultcasesofinquiry:“Andwhyarethesethings,e.g.,thesebricksandstones,ahouse?”Itisnowapparentthat[whenoneaskssuchaquestion]oneisinquiringintothecause(andthis,speakinglogically(logikOs)iswhatitisforittobe),whichinsomecasesiswhatitisfor,asperhapsinthecaseofahouseorabed,andinothercaseswhatfirstmovedit;forthistooisacause.Thislattercauseissoughtinthecaseofcoming-to-beandperishing,whiletheformerisalsosoughtinthecaseofbeing.(1041a26–33)16.“ReadersofZ.17shouldboneuponPosteriorAnalyticsII.1–2and7–11”Burnyeat(2001,p.75).304ACTC1630420/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophyThissortofinquiry,whichleadsustoconcludethatgoalsandagentsarethecauses17weareseeking,notsurprisinglyalsoleadsultimatelytoform(1041b8).Buttherelationshipofformtothematerialsit“causes”tobesomecomplexobjectispuzzling.Ifasameteorologistyouareinvestigatingthunder,youbeginbyassumingthatthunderpicksoutacertainrangeofnoisesthatbelonginsomewayorothertoclouds,andyouareseekingthecauseofthatconnection.Whenyoudiscoverthatfireisextinguishedinthecloudsattheverytimethatthenoisewecallthunderoccurs,andyouhavepriorknowledgethatextinctionoffirecausessuchanoise,youhaveyourcause.Butwhenyouaskwhatitisthatcausesbricksandmortartobeahouse,yourinquiryisverydifferent.First,inasenseitisinappropriatetosaythesematerials“belongto”thehouse–properlyspeaking,theyarethehouse,inawaythatthecloudsarenotthunder.Second,ifwhatitisthatmakesthosematerialsahouseisthefunctionthehouseperforms(hintedataboveandstatedexplicitlyinMetaphysicsH.2,1043a14–21),itisnotthecauseofthehouseinthewaythatextinguishingoffireisthecauseofanoiseintheclouds.ItiswiththisverypuzzlethatMet.Zends.Itwouldseemthatthis[causeweareseeking]issomethingotherthananelement,anditissurelythecauseofonethingbeingfleshwhileanotherisasyllable,andsimilarlyinothercases.Andthisisthesubstantialbeing(ousia)ofeachthing;forthisistheprimarycauseofbeing(aitionprOtontoueinai).Nowsincesomethingsarenotsubstances,butallthosethataresubstances(ousiai)areconstitutedinaccordancewithnatureandbynature,itwouldappearthatthis“nature”issubstantialbeing(ousia),whichisnotanelementbutasource(archE).(1041b25–31)Therearemanypuzzlesinthischapter,andIwanttosuggestfeaturesofAristotle’sbiologicalworksthatmighthelpinsolvingthem.IfAristotleisseriousthatthekeytounderstandingsubstantialbeingisunderstandingthecausalrelationshipbetweenformalnaturesandmaterialnatures,thenthereisnobetterplacetolookforhelpthan18tothebiologicalworks.ThePartsofAnimalsisdevotedinlargeparttoexplainingthedifferencesintheconstitution,position,andoperationsoftheorgansandtissuesofanimalsbyappealtotheirfunctional,thatis,formalnatures.Theterm“nature”isusedover200timesinthatwork,referringsometimestothematerialconstituentsoftheanimalandsometimestoitsform.Formalnaturesarebothagentsandgoals.Asanagent,forexample,thenutritivesoulisacapacitythefunctionofwhichistotransformnutrientsfirstintobloodandthenintotheappropriatetissuesandthentotransportthem,inappropriateamounts,toappropriateplaces.Buttheseprocessesarealltakingplaceforthesakeofthemaintenanceofanorganismwiththoseverylivingcapacities17.Thoughthereferencetoformisinallthemanuscripts,ithasforreasonsbothofsyntaxandsensebeensuspectedofbeingagloss.Cf.Burnyeat(2001,p.60,n.124),fortheargumentsandacoupleofsuggestionsinfavorofitsretention.18.Cf.Burnyeat(2001,p.61):“Itfollowsthatthesubstantialbeingofsuchthings,astheprimarycauseoftheirbeingthenaturalthingstheyare,justisthatinternalprincipleofchangeandstability–theirnature.Aristotlemeans,butdoesnotexpresslysay:natureasform.”305ACTC1630520/03/2006,04:06PM\njamesg.lennox–theyarethegoal.Assuming(andregularlyremindingus)throughoutthat“naturedoesnothinginvain,butalwayswhatisbest,fromthepossibilities,forthesubstantialbeingofeachkindofanimal”(IA2,704b14–16),Aristotletreatsformalnaturesasthecausesofanimalsbeingastheyare:Sothen,whatthenatureofthehornsisforhasbeenstated,andthecauseonaccountofwhichsomeanimalshavethemwhileothersdonot;butsincethenecessarynatureisofsuchacharacter,wemustsayhowthenatureaccordingtotheaccount(hEkatatonlogonphusis)hasmadeuseofthethingsthatbelongofnecessityforthesakeofsomething.(PAIII.2,663b22–24)Thediscussionthenproceedstoexplainhowitisthatnatureprovidesmaterials,whichcouldjustaseasilyhavebeenusedforhoofsorteeth,tothetopoftheheadfortheconstructionofhorns.Theformalnatureofhornedviviparousquadrupedsisacause19innomerely“formal”manner!Moreover,whenAristotlesaysrepeatedlythatnaturedoeswhatisbestforeachkindofanimal’ssubstantialbeing(ousia),heseemsclearlytobereferringtotheformalnatureoftheanimal.Ifthatisso,thenonceagainweseethatnatureisportrayedbothasanagentandasagoalinthesepassages.DiscussionsofanumberofotherfundamentalquestionsinAristotle’sMetaphysicshavebeenenrichedbystudyinghiszoologicalworkscarefully.AllanGotthelfinvest-igatedallthetextsinPartsofAnimalsinwhichAristotlereferredtosomefeatureasinthesubstantialbeing(ousia),orinitsaccount(logostEsousias),orinthebeing(einai)orthewhat-it-is-to-be(totiEneinai)ofsomekindofanimal.Antecedentlyonemighthavethoughtthereferenceswouldallbetofeaturesonthesideof“soul”and“form,”buthisinvestigationshoweddecisivelyotherwise.Beingabletoperceive,fly,andswimwerementioned;butsotoowerebeingblooded,havingalung,andhavinglongandslimbodies.Whatdoesonemakeofthat?AneasysolutionwouldbetosupposethatthesetermsarebeingusedinadifferentmannerthanintheMetaphysics–butthesearephilo-sophicalexpressionsandthisisadesperatesolution.AnotherpossibilityisthatthesepassagesrecommendthatwetakeseriouslyAristotle’ssuggestionthat,atleastinthecaseofnaturalthings,therelationshipbetweenbodyandsoul,formandmatter,isanintimateoneandthatdefinitionswillreflectthisfact.Twopointsdiscussedearlierencourageustothinkinthisdirection.First,Aristotleurgesustorecognizethatawingthatcannottakeflightisawinginnameonly–theaccountofawingmustincludeanaccountofitsbiologicalfunction.Second,andconversely,marblewingsdonottakeflight–theaccountofawingmustincludeanaccountoftheappropriatematerialsforinstrumentsofflight,thefeathers,hollowbones,connectiontoappropriate19.Forafullerdiscussionanddefense,seeLennox(1997a,1997b).ForadefenseofformasefficientcauseinthecontextofAristotle’stheoryofanimalgeneration,seeCode(1987,pp.51–60).AtopicthatwouldrequireachaptertoitselfsimplytoreviewthecurrentstatusofdiscussionisAristotle’sunderstandingofteleologyasgoalcausation.Areviewoftheliteratureupto1992preparedbyAllanGotthelfcanbefoundintheBalme(1990,pp.172–3).306ACTC1630620/03/2006,04:06PM\naristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophymusclesofappropriateorganisms,etc.Tocallananimalbloodedistosaymuchmorethanthattheyaremadeupofared,viscousfluid;itistosaythingsabouttheirmodesofperception,nutrition,andreproduction,andevenaboutthenumberoflimbstheycanhave.Tosayanorganismisperceptiveistosayithastohavecertainsortsoforgansconstitutedofcertainsortsofmaterialsorganizedinappropriateways(cf.Charles,2000,chs.11–12;Ferejohn,1994).Likewise,ontheissueofwhetherAristotle’sformsaregeneralorparticular–wheretheMetaphysicshasseemedtoendorseanddisparagebothanswers–thebiologicalworks,andespeciallyGenerationofAnimals,haveonceagainbeenhelpfulindealingwiththedifficulty(cf.Balme,1987a,pp.18–19,1987c;Cooper,1988;Furth,1988;Witt,1985).BookIVofthatworkincludesadiscussionofinheritance,andattemptstoprovideanexplanationforthecomplexpatternsoffamilyresem-blancemaintainedthroughthegenerativeprocess.Arguably,thatdiscussiondescribesresemblancesbetweenindividualchildrenandtheirparentsasformallikenesses,aviewthatconflictswithsomeunderstandingsofwhatAristotlecouldmeanbya“formallikeness.”IwillclosethissectionwithonefinalexampleofthemetaphysicalrewardsofexploringAristotle’sscientificaccountoflivingthings.ExplorationsofMeteoro-logyIV,abookdevotedtoexplainingthegenerationandconstitutionof“uniform”or“homogenous”things–includinguniformpartsofanimalsandplants–haveraisedquestionsabouthowseriouslyAristotletakesmateriallevelaccountsofnaturalthings(cf.,Freudenthal,1995;Furley,1989,ch.12;Gill,1997).ForMeteorologyIVself-consciouslyapproachesuniformpartsfrom“thebottomup,”notevenreferringtothemas“parts”untilitlookstowardthebiologicalworksinthelastchapter.Blood,semen,bone,sinew,hair,andmanymorestuffsarediscussedindetail–butwithnotonewordabouttheirbiologicalfunctions.InthefinalchapterofMeteor.IV,Aristotledescribeswhathehasdone,andpreparesusforadifferentlookatthese“uniformthings”whenwemoveontoournextinvestigation,thatofplantsandanimals,apreparationthatincludesoneofthemostrichandcomplexdiscussionsofteleologyintheentirecorpus.Onlyashelooksforwardtozoologyandbotanydoeshebegintorefertocertain“uniforms”asuniformpartsoforganisms(cf.Furley,1989,pp.132–48;Gill,1997,pp.145–62).Ifthesamephilosopherwhotellsusthatnaturalthingsaretobeinvestigated“likethesnub,”i.e.,ascompositesofmatterandform,canalsocarryoutapurelymateriallevelinvestigationofthiskind,itconstrainsourinterpretationofhisremarksaboutnaturalinquiry.NordoesMeteorologyIVstandaloneinthisrespect.GenerationofAnimalsVbeginswithaphilosophicallyrichdiscussionofwheninvestigationshouldbeprimarilyteleological,andwhennot.Wequicklylearnwhyheisdiscussingthisissue.ForheannouncesthattherestofBookVwillprovideaccountsoffeaturesofanimalsthatdonotcometobeforthesakeofanything,butsimplyandonlyduetomaterialnecessity.Oncemore,acarefulstudyofthezoologicalcorpusconstrainsphilosophicalinterpretation–inthiscaseinterpretationthatputsexcessiveemphasisonAristotle’steleologicalworldview.Ateleologisthecertainlyis,butonewhoclearlybelievesthatteleologyhasitslimits,andthatevenwhenitisaninappropriateexplanatorytool,thereisplentyofscientificworktobedone.307ACTC1630720/03/2006,04:06PM\njamesg.lennoxSoul,Life,andReasonAswehaveseen,theontologyofsubstantialbeingsisnotthecoreoftheargumentoftheMetaphysics.Aristotleismuchmoreconcernedtodeterminewhattheprinciplesandcausesofsubstantialbeingare–which,itseems,willhavepriorclaimtothelabelsubstantialbeing.Andiflivingbeingsareprimarycandidatesforsubstantialbeing,thenastudyoftheprincipleandcauseoflivingbeingisaninvestigationofoverarchingimportance.That,ofcourse,ishowDeAnima(DeAn.)advertisesitself:Letusassumethatknowledgeisamongthenobleandhonorablethings,butthatonesortismoresothananothereitherinvirtueofitsprecisionorbybeingofbetterandmorewonderfulthings;onthatassumptionwemightreasonablyholdthattheinquiryaboutthesoulisamongprimarybranchesofknowledgeforbothreasons.Andknowledgeofthesoulseemstocontributegreatlytoalltruth,butmostofalltotruthaboutnature;for[thesoul]isasortoffirstprinciple(hoionarchE)ofanimals.Andweareseekingtostudyandtoknowbothitsnatureanditsbeing,andthenwhateverthingsareattributedtoit,amongwhichsomeseemtobeproperaffectionsofthesoul,othersofanimalsaswellonaccountofthesoul.(DeAn.I.1,402a1–12)Anumberoffeaturesofthispassage,andindeedofthechapteritintroduces,areintimatelyrelatedtothethemesofthischapter.Notice,first,thatthegroundfortheclaimthatknowledgeofsoulwillmakeamajorcontributiontotruthaboutnature(withoutqualification)isthatitis“asortoffirstprincipleofanimals.”Thequalifica-tionhereis,Ibelieve,anindicationthatAristotlewill,bytheendofBookI,beinsistingonathesisaboutthesoulhisreaderswillfindsomewhatunorthodox,namelythatitisalsoaprincipleofplantlife.Thataside,weoncemoreseethatforAristotletheinvestigationofnatureis,firstandforemost,aninvestigationoflivingnature.Second,notethedistinctionbetweenstudyingthenatureandbeingofsoulandstudyingitsattributes,andwithinthislattercategorybetweenattributesbelongingtothesoulitselfandthosebelongingalsotoanimalsbecausetheyareensouled.WhileitwilltakeustoofarafieldtopursuetheimplicationsofthesedistinctionsforAristotle’sinvestigationofnature,itisworthnotingthatthechaptercontinuesbyopeningupthequestionofwhetherthereisasinglemethod(miatismethodos)fortheinvestigationofathing’sbeingandwhatitis(touperitEnousiankaitoutiesti),inthewaythat?demonstrationisamethodforknowingathing’sproperattributes;orwhethertherewillneedtobeadistinctmodeofinquiryineachcase.Thatis,weareplungedintoquestionsaboutwhethertheprinciplesofinquiryanddemonstrationestablishedinthePosteriorAnalyticsareapplicableeverywhere,includinghere,ornot.Readingthispassage,inlightofthecomplicationsaboutstatingauniversaldefinitionofthesoulwhichengagesAristotleinthefirstthreechaptersofDeAn.II,onecanseethatheisself-consciouslyconcernedwiththepressuresthatmaybeputonhistheoryofscientificknowledgebyinvestigationofthesoul.ItishardnottohearechoesofAPo.II.7–8inthispassageaswell.Having,inthefirstsixchaptersofAPo.IIexploredthequestionofhowdefinition,demonstration,anddivisionarerelated,Aristotlebeginschapter7withthequestion:“Thenhowwilladefinerexhibit(deixei)thebeing(tEnousian)ofathingorwhatitis(totiestin)?”308ACTC1630820/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophy(92a34–35).Andwhen,inthefollowingchapter,hebeginsworkingonapositiveresolutiontothisquestion,hepointsoutthatapreliminarystepis,inonewayoranother,gettingagriponthesubjectbeinginvestigated.Sometimesthisisaccom-plished“bygraspingsomethingofthethingitself–ofthunder,thatitisasortofnoiseintheclouds;ofaneclipse,thatitisasortofprivationoflight;ofman,thatheisasortofanimal;ofsoul,thatitisaself-movingthing”(93a21–24).IfoneconsidersDeAnimaasaninquiryaimedatascientificdefinitionofsoul,oneisforcedtoreturntotheveryquestionsthatwesawwerecentraltoMetaphysicsZ.AndthatispreciselywhatAristotledoes.Perhapsitisfirstnecessarytodetermineintowhichofthekinds[toplacesoul]andwhatitis;Imeanwhetheritisaparticularandasubstantialbeing,oraquality,oraquantity,oroneoftheotherdivisiblecategories;andnextwhetheritisamongthingswhichexistpotentiallyorisratheracompleteactualityofsomesort–forthisisnosmalldifference.(DeAn.I.1,402a23–27)Havingbeentoldthatthisisthefirstthingtodetermine,itcomesasnosurprisethatthebeginningofhispositiveaccountinDeAn.II.1opensasitdoes:Enoughsaid,then,ofthedeliverancesofourpredecessorsaboutsoul;wereturnagaintothebeginningandattempttodeterminewhatsoulisandwhatwouldbethemostcommonaccountofit.Wesaythatsubstantialbeing(ousian)isonekindofbeing,andsubstantialbeingisinonewayasmatterandinitselfisnotaparticularthing,inanotherwayitisshapeandform,andinathirdwayitisthecompositeofthese.Andthematterispotentiality,whiletheformiscompleteactuality(entelecheia),andthatintwoways,asknowledgeisandasstudyingis.Nowbodieswouldseemmostofalltobesubstantialbeings(ousias),andofthesemostofallnaturalbodies,sincethesearefirstprinciplesoftheothers.Andamongnaturalthingssomehavelife,somedonot;andbylifewemeanthecapacityofself-nourishmentaswellasgrowthanddecay.Everynaturalbodyhavinglifewould,then,beacompositesubstantialbeing(ousiai...hOssunthetE).Andsinceitisabodyofsuchakind[weareconsidering],thatis,onehavinglife,thebodywouldnotbeasoul;forthebodyisnotamongthethingsthataresaidofasubject,butratheritexistsassubjectandmatter.Thereforesoulmustbesubstantialbeinginthesenseofformofanaturalbodyhavinglifepoten-tially.Butsubstantialbeingiscompleteactuality.Thereforesouliscompleteactualityofsuchabody.But“completeactuality”isspokenofintwoways,asknowledgeisandasstudyingis.Thusitisclearthatsouliscompleteactualityasknowledgeis.(DeAn.II.1,412a3–24)ItisclearthatcertainresultsoftheMetaphysicsZ–Qarebeingdeployedhere,inordertolocatesoulinjustthewaysrequestedinthefirstchapterofDeAn.I–itisinthecategoryofsubstantialbeing,butthingsinthatcategorycanhavethestatusofmatter,formorcomposite.Thoughtheargumentfortreatingsoulasformisopentovariousinterpretations,itlooksasifAristotle’sviewisthatnaturalbodieswithlifehavelifeinvirtueofsoul,andthus(giventheoptions)theirbodyhasthestatusofunderlyingsubjectandmatterwithinthecomposite,whichmeanssoulmusthavethestatusofform.Whenhethengoesontoassertthatsubstantialbeingiscompleteactuality,309ACTC1630920/03/2006,04:07PM\njamesg.lennoxitseemsheistalkingaboutsubstantialbeingasform;whichallowshimthequickinferencetosoulbeingcompleteactuality;andthoughIhavenotgivenit,hegoesontoprovideaplausibleargumentfordecidinginwhichofthetwosensesofcompleteactualitysoulissuch.DeAnima,asIhavecharacterizeditsofar,wouldseemtohaveanobviousrelation-shiptoAristotle’sinvestigationsofanimals.Animalsarelivingthings;knowledgeofthesoulisknowledgeofthefirstprincipleoflife;thesoulmust,then,beamongthefirstprinciplesofthescientificstudyofanimals.Andsomuchseemstobetrue.Indeed,theopeningofDeSensusaysasmuch:Sincewehavepreviouslydefinedsoulbyitselfandthepowersofeachofitsparts,wemustnextinvestigatetheanimalsandallthingswithlife,whichoftheiractivitiesaredistinctiveandwhichcommon.Sothenletthatwhichhasbeenstatedaboutthesoulbeassumed(hupokeisthO);wemustnowspeakabouttherest,andfirstofallabouttheprimarythings.(Sens.1,436a1–6)ButatthesametimeAristotleinsiststhatasignificantportionoftheinvestigationofthesoulisoutsidethepurviewofthenaturalphilosopher.However,itisnotthecasethatallsoulisasourceofchange,norallitsparts;rather,ofgrowththesourceisthepartwhichispresenteveninplants,ofalterationtheperceptivepart,andoflocomotionsomeotherpart,andnottherational;forlocomotionispresentinotheranimalstoo,butthoughtinnoneoftheothers.Soitisclearthatthenaturalscientistshouldnotspeakofallsoul;fornotallofthesoulisanature,butsomepartofit,onepartorevenmore.Further,noneoftheabstractobjectscanbeobjectsofnaturalstudy,sincenaturedoeseverythingforthesakeofsomething.(PAI.1,641b5–11;cf.Met.E.1,1026a17).Naturalphilosophytakesasitssubjectthingsthatchangeinvirtueofasourcewithinthemselves.Insofarassoulissuchaninherentsourceofchange–ofgrowth,alteration,locomotion–itisaproperobjectfornaturalstudy.Butreason(nous)isdeniedthatstatus.Thoughitcannotbedonehere,agoodcasecanbemadethatAristotlehonorsthisargumentinthebreach(cf.Lennox,1999).SotheconnectionofthestudyofthesoultoAristotle’sanimalstudies,whichincludethestudyofhumanbeingswithrationalsouls,mustbemorecomplicatedthanitappearsatfirstglance.ForAristotle’sinvestigationsofanimalsarefromfirsttolastnaturalinvestigations,whileatleastpartoftheinvestigationofsoulfallsbeyondtheexpertiseofthenaturalphilosopher.Fromahistoricalstandpointthisisnot,ofcourse,anunusualpositiontotake.Eventodaytherearedistinguishedpractitionersofthephilosophyofmindwhoseewhattheydoasessentiallyunconnectedtowhatthenaturalscienceshavetosayaboutourbrainsandnervoussystems.Aristotleseemedtohavedoubtsaboutwhetherunderstandingthefunctionsofthehumanheart,whichonhisaccountwasthecentralorganofcognition,wouldinvolveunderstandinghumanreason,justascertainphilosopherstodayhavesimilardoubtsaboutwhetherunderstandingthebrainwillinvolveunderstandingthemind.310ACTC1631020/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophyConclusionInthischapterIhavetriedtoindicatewaysinwhichcarefulattentiontoAristotle’sinvestigationsofanimalshasbeen,andcanbe,avaluableaidtounderstandinghisinvestigationsofknowledgeandofbeing,i.e.,thePosteriorAnalyticsandtheMeta-physics.Conversely,Ihavearguedthathisbiologicalstudiesareilluminatedwhenseeninthelightofhisviewsaboutthenatureofinquiryanddemonstrationintheformerworkandthenaturesubstance,matter,andforminthelatter.ApivotaltextintryingtounderstandtherelationshipbetweenAristotle’sepistemo-logicalandmetaphysicalviews,ontheonehand,andhisscienceoflivingthingsontheother,isDeAnima.InthepenultimatesectionofthisdiscussionIhaveraisedanumberofquestionsaboutitsrelationshiptotheMetaphysicsandPosteriorAnalyticsontheonehand,andtoAristotle’svariousstudiesofanimalsontheother.Thereare,ofcourse,manyotherrespectsinwhichattendingtoAristotle’sinvestigationsofanimalscaninformworkonAristotle’sphilosophy,andviceversa.Thebibliographyappendedtothischapterprovidesthereaderwithaguidetosomeofthebestworkofthiskind.Thereismuchworkstilltobedone.BibliographyTexts,Translations,Commentaries,IndexesBalme,D.M.(2003).Aristotle:HistoriaAnimalium.(vol.1):BooksI–XText(PreparedforPublicationbyA.Gotthelf).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(1991).Aristotle.HistoryofAnimals,BooksVII–X.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.——.(1992).Aristotle.DePartibusAnimaliumIandDeGenerationeAnimaliumI(withpassagesfromII.1–3)(WithaReportonRecentWorkandanAdditionalBibliographybyA.Gotthelf).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Bodson,L.(1990).Aristote:DePartibusAnimalium,IndexVerborum,ListesdeFréquence.Liège:CentreInformatiquedePhilosophieetLettres.DrossaartLulofs,H.J.(196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istotelianCorpus(trans.AnthonyPreus).Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.——.(1987).“LogicalDifferenceandBiologicalDifference:TheUnityofAristotle’sThought.”InA.GotthelfandJ.G.Lennox(eds.),PhilosophicalIssuesinAristotle’sBiology(pp.313–38).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Preus,A.(1975).ScienceandPhilosophyinAristotle’sBiologicalWorks.Hildesheim:Olms.Ross,W.D.(1924).Aristotle’sMetaphysics.ARevisedTextwithIntroductionandCommentary.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Simpson,G.G.(1964).ThisViewofLife.NewYork:Harcourt,Brace,andWorld.Witt,C.(1985).“Form,Reproduction,andInheritedCharacteristicsinAristotle’sGenerationofAnimals.”Phronesis,30,46–57.314ACTC1631420/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophyFurtherReadingSeeWorksCitedforbibliographicaldetails.Bowen(ed.).(1991):AfinecollectionofessaysonthethemeoftherelationshipbetweenphilosophyandthespecialsciencesinclassicalGreece.Charles(2000):AnimpressivereadingofthePosteriorAnalyticswithchaptersonitsrelation-shiptoAristotle’sbiologicalwritings.Furth(1988):AlivelyexplorationofAristotle’smetaphysicsalwayswithaneyeontheinsightstobegleanedfromthebiologicalworks.Gotthelf(ed.).(1985a):AfestschrifthonoringDavidM.Balme,thepre-eminentinterpreterofAristotle’sbiologyinthetwentiethcentury,itincludesanumberoffineessaysontherelationshipbetweenAristotle’sbiologicalwritingsandhislogic,metaphysics,andnaturalphilosophy.GotthelfandLennox(eds.).(1987):ArichcollectionofessaysthatfocusonthebiologicalwritingsasasourceofinsightintoAristotle’smetaphysicalandepistemologicalthought.GüntherandRengakos(eds.).(1997):AcollectionofessayshonoringWolfgangKullmann,theauthorofWissenschaftundMethode(Kullmann(1974)),thefirstthoroughgoingstudyofthebiologicalworksfromthestandpointoftheirrelationshiptoAristotle’sPosteriorAnalytics.KullmannandFöllinger(eds.).(1997):ThepublishedproceedingsofaconferenceorganizedbytheeditorsonthetopicofAristotle’sbiology.Lennox,J.G.(2001a):ThisvolumecollectstogetheradozenpreviouslypublishedessaysontherelationshipbetweenAristotle’sgeneralviewsaboutthenatureofscienceandhisbiologicalstudies.Lloyd(1996):Thisvolume,byoneofthefield’spre-eminentscholars,includesanumberofessaysontherelationshipbetweenAristotle’snaturalscienceandhismoregeneralphilo-sophicalviews.Marcos(1996):AnexcellentintroductiontothegeneralthemeoftherelevanceofAristotle’ssystematicstudyofanimalstootheraspectsofhisphilosophy.Pellegrin(1982,Englishtrans.1986):ThisvolumearguesvigorouslyforunderstandingAristotle’sanimalinvestigationsinAristotle’sownterms,andforthemisunderstandingsthatarisefromnotdoingso.315ACTC1631520/03/2006,04:07PM\nvictorcaston17Aristotle’sPsychologyVICTORCASTONAristotle’spsychology–whathecallsthe“studyofthesoul”(hEtEspsuchEshistoria)–occupiesaprominentplacebothinhisownphilosophyandintheWesternphilo-sophicaltraditionasawhole.Inhisownsystem,psychologyistheculminationofmetaphysicsandnaturalscience.ForAristotle,livingthingsaretheparadigmofnaturalobjectsandsubstancesingeneral,andsoofferthebestcasefortheapplicationofhistheories.Psychologyalsoservesasafoundationfortherestofhisphilosophy,insofarasitprovidesaframeworkforunderstandingthought,speech,andaction,andtovariousextentshislogic,rhetoric,politics,andethicsalldrawontheseviews.Itsinfluenceonsubsequentphilosophershasalsobeengreat.DuringtheRomanempire,laterPlatonistsappropriatedmanyofhisdoctrines,especiallythoseconcernedwithcognition.Inmedievalscholasticism,theybecomepartofacommonlegacy,sharedwidelybyphilosopherswhodifferinmanyotherrespects.Theythusbelongtothebackdropagainstwhichearlymodernphilosophersattemptedtodistinguishthemselves,apointofreferenceandapointofdeparturetowhichsometwentiethcenturyphilo-sopherssoughttoreturn,intheireffortstoshakefreeofDescartes’grip.ManystillregardAristotle’stheoryasofferinganattractivemiddlecourse,whichavoidstheextremesofbothextravagantdualismandcrudematerialism.Withsomuchatstake,itisnotsurprisingthattherehasbeenheatedcontroversyaboutAristotle’spsycho-logyinrecentyears,asregardsbothitsprecisenatureanditsviability.Somemisunderstandingscanbeavoidedattheoutsetbybeingcarefulaboutthewords“soul”and“mind.”Wetendtoassociatethefirstwithreligioustraditions,inwhichthesoulisregardedasaseparatesubstance,divinelyimplantedinusandcapableofimmortallife.Thesecondterm,“mind,”isoftenconstruedinasimilarlydualisticway,althoughitowesmoretoDescartesthantoreligion.Heretheassump-tionisthat“themental”and“thephysical”aremutuallyexclusive,wherethementalischaracterizedasineradicablyprivateandsubjective.NeitherofthesepreconceptionsisatworkinAristotle.IninquiringafterthenatureofthesoulorpsuchE,AristotleislookingfornothingotherthanthebasisorarchEoflife–thatinvirtueofwhichlivingthingsarealiveandbehaveinthewaysdistinctiveoflivingthings,whateverthatshouldturnouttobe.Hedoesnotprejudgethequestionofwhetherthisisaseparateimmaterialsubstance(asPlatothought),oramaterialone(asDemocritusthought),orsomethingelsealtogether.Forallweknowattheoutset,thesoulmightbeinsepar-ablefromthebody,oralternatively,itmightbecapableofseparateexistence.Suchconclusionsaretobeestablishedbyargument,basedonwhatitistobealiveandthecharacteristicsthatdistinguishlivingfromnonlivingthings.Thefactthatthisis316ACTC1731620/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’spsychologyAristotle’sstartingpoint,andnotquestionsaboutskepticismandcertainty,explainswhyheisnotpreoccupiedwithmanyoftheissuesthatpreoccupyDescartes.1Thesoul,then,isthatbywhichweperceive,feel,thinkandact,sincetheseareallactivitiespeculiartolivingthings.Tothisextent,Aristotle’suseof“soul”isquitesimilartoouruseof“mind.”Wecommonlysaythatweperformtheseactivities“withourminds,”withoutimplyinganythingCartesianaboutdualismorprivacy.Butthetwoarenotpreciseequivalents.Asthebasisoflife,thesoulforAristotleisalsothatin2virtueofwhichwegrow,digest,reproduce,andbreathe.Infact,hecriticizeshispredecessorsfornothavingpaidattentiontothis,andpointedlyinsiststhatplantsalsohaveasoul,eventhoughheregardsthemasincapableofperception,thought,feeling,3oraction.Insofarasitstudiesvitalcapacitiesaswellasmentalones,psychologyhasabroaderscopeforAristotlethanphilosophyofminddoesforus.Butapartfromthisdifferenceinextension,theywillhavemuchincommon.Manyoftheissuesthatariseinconnectionwiththemind–forexample,mechanism,reduction,andemergence–havestructuralanaloguesforvitalphenomenamoregenerally.Thedifferencesbetweenthesephenomenawillmakeadifference,ofcourse,astohowweanswerthesequestionsineachcase.ButthisissomethingAristotlehimselfemphasizes.Theunityofthephenomenathatpsychologystudiesisonlyalooseone.Wecannotgiveasingle,generalaccountofthesoul,hebelieves,thatwillapplyacrosstheboardandstillbesubstantiveandilluminating.Instead,wemustattendtothespecificactivitiesthatarecharacteristicofdifferentkindsoflivingthing.Incertainways,perceptionandthoughtdifferfromdigestion.Butinotherways,perceptionhasmoreincommonwithdigestion,andAristotlewillregardthoughtastheoddoneout.Bykeepingallofthesephenomenatogetherwithinasingleareaofstudy,wearelesslikelytogeneralizefalselyaboutthenatureorpeculiarityofthe“soul”andthe“mind.”TheSoul–BodyRelationOneofthechiefconcernsofAristotle’streatiseDeAnimaistherelationofthesoulto4thebody.Aristotlewantstoaccountforthewayinwhichtheycanbesaidtobe“one,”aswellasthewayinwhichtheydiffer;andherepeatedlyreturnstotheques-tionofwhetherthereisanysenseinwhichthesoulcanbesaidtobe“separable”(chOristos).Hisownsolutionappealstothecentralconceptsofhismetaphysics.Heregardsthebodyasthematterandthesoulastheformofalivingthing(DeAn.II.1,1.DeAn.I.5,411a26–30;II.2,413b11–13;II.3,414a29–b1.2.DeAn.I.5,410b16–411a2,411a30;II.2,413a21–b8;II.3,414a31;II.4,415a22–b2,b23–26,416a6–b29;III.12,434a22–26.Seealso“OnLengthandShortnessofLife”and“OnYouth,OldAge,LifeandDeathandRespiration”inhisParvaNaturalia,aswellasthetreatmentofreproductioninGenerationofAnimals.3.DeAn.I.4,409a9–10;I.5,411b27–28;II.2,413a25–b1;II.3,414b32–415a3;III.12,434a26.4.ForAristotle’streatmentofthistopicinhisbiologicalworks,seeLennox,aristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophy,esp.the“BiologyandMetaphysics”section,inthisvolume.317ACTC1731720/03/2006,04:07PM\nvictorcaston412a15–b6)–hence,thedescriptionofhisviewas“hylomorphism,”literally,“matter-form-ism.”Thetwoarecorrelativetooneanother.Thepartsandmaterialsthatmakeupaconcreteobjectareitsmatter,whilethewaytheyareorganizedintoawholethatcanfunctionintheappropriatewaysisitsform.Ifwegrantthis,heclaims,thenthereisnomorepointtoaskingwhethersoulandbodyareonethanthereisinthecaseofwaxanditsshape(412b6–8).Thesoulisnotitselfacertainkindofbody(astheAtomiststhink),butneithercanitexistwithoutabody(asthePlatoniststhink).Itissomethingthatbelongstoabodyofagivensortandsoinheresinit(II.2,414a17–22).Most,ifnotall,ofwhatlivingthingsdoorundergowillthusbetheactivityofbodyandsoultogether(I.1,403a3–19,b17–19).TheonlyexceptionAristotleiswillingtoconsideristheunderstanding(nous);andeventhiswillnotbeseparable,ifitalwaysrequiresthepowerofrepresentation,whichisnecessarilyembodied(403a8–16).Ingeneral,psychologicalstatesarealsotobeunderstoodhylomorphically,justlikethecompositelivingthingthathasthem,as“enmatteredstructures”(enhuloilogoi)thatmustbedefinedintermsofboththeirformalorganizationandtheirmaterialrealiza-tions.Beingangry,forexample,isatonceadesireforreprisalandaboilingofthebloodaroundtheheart(403a24–b9).HylomorphismiswidelyregardedasthesortofmiddlecourseforwhichAristotleisfamous,anuancedsolutionthatdoesjusticetotheintuitionsoneachside,withoutgoingtoeitherextreme.Othersseeitinsteadasabeguiling,butultimatelyhopeless,5attempttohavethingsbothways.Wecannothopetoresolvethisquestion,though,withoutamorepreciseunderstandingofthepositionitself,andonthisantecedentquestionthereisadismayingrangeofresponsesintheliterature.Scholarsdifferover6evenquitebasicquestions,suchaswhetherAristotleisamaterialistoradualist,not7tomentionmorerefinedones,likewhetherheiscommittedtofunctionalism,89psychophysicalsupervenience,oremergentism.Beforeexploringthesedebates,itmayhelptoseewhyonesimpleanswerwillnotdo.AttheopeningofDeAnimaII.1,Aristotlesuggeststhatbodyandsoulareeach5.ThisaccusationisleveledinWilliams(1986),althoughtheworryisalreadypresentinAckrill’sseminalarticle(1972–3).AdifferentchargeofincoherenceispursuedatlengthinGranger(1996).6.Foranonreductivematerialism:Caston(1997);Charles(1984);Irwin(1991);andWedin(1992,1996).Foradualistreading:Hamlyn(1978);Heinaman(1990);Robinson(1983);andSisko(2000).7.Forafunctionalistreading:Irwin(1991);Shields(1990).Againstafunctionalistreading:Burnyeat(1992);CodeandMoravcsik(1992);Granger(1990);Heinaman(1990).8.Forthesupervenienceofpsychologicalstatesonmaterialstates:Charles(1984,pp.214,246);Shields(1988,pp.106,131–4;and1993,p.165);Wedin(1992,1996);and,withqualifications,Caston(1992and1997,pp.332–7).Againstsupervenience:Burnyeat(1992,p.23);Granger(1990,1993);Heinaman(1990,p.101(thoughcf.p.90)).9.ForthesuggestionthatAristotleisanemergentist,seeAckrill((1972–3)1979,p.74);Caston(1997,pp.326–8,and1999b);Heinaman(1990,p.91);Robinson(1983).(NotethatbothRobinsonandHeinamantakeemergentismtobeincompatiblewithmaterialismandsupervenience,whileItakeittoimplyboth).Againstanemergentistreading,seeMiller(1999);Sisko(2000).318ACTC1731820/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’spsychology“substances”orousiaiandthattheindividualcomposedfromthesetwoisathird(412a6–b9).Therecouldnotbeaclearerstatement,onemightthink,ofsubstancedualism.Butthetraditionaltranslationof“substance”ismisleading.TheGreek,asAristotleusesit,signifiessomething’sbeing,whatsomethingis,andthepointheismakingisthatthereisasystematicambiguitywhenwespeakaboutwhatathingis:inoneway,itisthekindortypeofthingitisandwhatitistobethatsortofthing;inanotherway,itisthematterthatconstitutesorcomposessuchthings;andinyetanother,itisthecompoundofthetwo,thatis,thissortofnatureasrealizedbythatsort10ofmatter.Bodyandsoularethereforenot“substances”inthewaythatsubstancedualismrequires.Theyarenottwospeciesofasinglegenus,eachofwhichcanexistindependentlyonitsown.Rather,eachisasubstanceinafundamentallydifferentsense,asmatterandasform,andbothmustbeconjoinedfortheretobeanindividualatall.Wecanapproachthispointinanotherway.IfhylomorphismcommittedAristotletosubstancedualism,hewouldbeasubstancedualistnotonlywithregardtohumans,animals,andevenplants,butallnaturalbodies.Thedistinctionbetweenmatterandformisnotpeculiartolivingthings,butappliestoallnaturalsubstancesacrosstheboard.Inapplyingittolivingthings,Aristotleisthereforetreatingthemonaparwiththerestofthenaturalworld.Innoneofthesecasescanaformexistindependentofmatter.Formisnotanadditionalingredientalongsidethematerialsthatconstituteanindividual,whichcanbeseparatedfromtherest.Itisrathertheorganizationofthesematerialsintoacertainkindofthing,thatinvirtueofwhichtheyaresuchathingandpossesstherelevantcapacities(Met.Z.17).Itcannotexistapartonitsown.ThesesameconsiderationssufficetoshowthatAristotlecannotbeaneliminativeorreductivematerialisteither.Hisanalysispresupposesthatthereissuchathingasthesoul,nottomentionpsychologicalphenomena;andthatthereisafundamental,irreducibledistinctionbetweenthesoulandthebody,andmoregenerallybetweentheirformalandmaterialcontributionsintheanalysisofpsychologicalphenomena.Ontheotherhand,becausethesoulisnecessarilytheformofthebodyandpsychologicalphenomenahavebothaformalandamaterialaspect,hemustneverthelessbesome11kindofmaterialist,thoughofanonreductivesort.WemightsaythatAristotlerejects“typeidentity,”whileacceptingacertain“tokenidentity.”Soulandbodyconstitutedistincttypes:whatitistobeanimateisdifferentfromwhatitistobeembodied,sinceoneconsistsinbeingorganizedinacertainway,theotherinbeingcomposedofcertainkindsofmaterialandparts.Nevertheless,anindividuallivingthingisbothanimateandembodied–eachoftheseisrightlysaidtobesomethingthelivingindi-vidualis(andthusitsbeingorousia)–andsothesametokeninstantiatesbothtypes.Aristotleextendsthesameanalysistopsychologicalphenomena.Myangeronaparticularoccasionisbothadesireforreprisalandaboilingofmyblood,eventhoughwhatitistodesirereprisaldiffersfromwhatitistohaveone’sbloodboil.10.Formoreonbeingandsubstance,seeM.L.Gill,firstphilosophyinaristotle,inthisvolume.11.Iambracketingforthemoment(asAristotleoftendoeshimself)thequestionofwhetherthoughtconstitutesagenuineexceptiontothisrule.Seepp.335–41below.319ACTC1731920/03/2006,04:07PM\nvictorcastonBetweenthesetwoextremes,thereisstillawiderangeofoptions,dependingonhowthematter–formrelationistobeunderstood.Itisinthisconnectionthattechnicalconceptssuchasfunctionalism,supervenience,andemergentismhavebeeninvokedinrecentyears.FunctionalismFunctionalism,perhapsthepredominantapproachinphilosophyofmindoverthepast30years,hasalsobeenthesubjectofintensedebateamongAristotlescholars.ThefunctionalistinterpretationofAristotlewasinitiallyembracedquitewidely,encouragedbytheendorsementofHilaryPutnam,oneoffunctionalism’searly12pioneers.Butduringthepastdecade,ithassufferedsomethingofabacklash,triggeredbyMylesBurnyeat’spolemic,“IsanAristotelianPhilosophyofMindStillCredible?”(1992).Itendswiththisdefiantchallenge:“HenceallwecandowiththeAristotelianphilosophyofmindanditstheoryofperception...iswhattheseventeenthcenturydid:junkit...newfunctionalistmindsdonotfitintooldAristotelianbodies”(p.26).13Thesubsequentdebatehasproducedalargeandwide-rangingliterature.Butlittleofitinfactconcernsfunctionalismassuch.Thefocushasinsteadbeenonothertheses,whichareallegedlypresupposedorimpliedbyfunctionalism,suchassuper-venienceormultiplerealization.Butifweconsiderfunctionalisminitsownright,twothingsbecomeimmediatelyclear:(i)suchanapproachcontainsdeepinsightsaboutAristotle’spsychology,whichdeserverecognition;yet(ii)inthetechnicalsense,Aristotlecannotbeafunctionalist.Accordingtofunctionalism,eachmentalstateisdefinedbyitsfunctionalrole,thatis,byallthewaysinwhichitcaninteractcausally,inmediatingbetweensensoryinputs,behavioraloutputsandothermentalstates.Whatplaysorrealizesthisrolewillbe–or,atleast,isgenerallyexpectedtobe–somematerialstate.Butitisnotspecifiedassuchinthedefinition.Whatisrequiredisthatitbeastatewhosecausalpowerssuitittoplaythefunctionalroleinquestion.Consequently,evenifaroleisalwaysrealizedbyacertaintypeofmaterialstate,itwillnotbeidentifiedassuch.Infact,theremightevenbeseveraltypesofmaterialstatethataresuitedtoplaythesamerole.Functionaldefinitionsthusleaveopenthepossibilityofmultiplerealization.Thespecificationofafunctionalroleconstrainsthekindofstatesthatcouldplayit,withoutguaranteeingthatthereisauniquerealizationor,forthatmatter,several.Nothinginthedefinition12.Putnam(1975c)describeshisownviewas“substantiallythesame”asAristotle’s,“althoughstatedabitmorepreciselywiththeaidofthevocabularyofcontemporaryscientificmethodologyandcybernetics”(1975b,p.xiv;cf.1975c,p.302and1975a,p.279).HeneverintendedtheprecisedetailsinvolvingTuringmachinestobeattributedtoAristotle,onlythegeneralstrategyoffunctionalanalysis(NussbaumandPutnam,1992,p.48).SeealsoBlock(1980,pp.171,177).13.Seee.g.,Bradshaw(1997);Broackes(1999);Broadie(1992);Burnyeat(1995,2001,2002);Caston(2005);CodeandMoravcsik(1992);Cohen(1992);Everson(1997);Freeland(1992);Granger(1990,1992);Johansen(1998);Lloyd(1992);Magee(2000);Miller(1999);NussbaumandPutnam(1992);Price(1996);Sisko(1996,1998);Sorabji(1992,2001);Whiting(1992);Woolf(1999).320ACTC1732020/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’spsychology14explicitlyrequireseitheroutcome.Functionalexplanationsare,tothisextent,autonomousfrommaterialones.Theessenceofmentalityconsistsnotinwhatrealizesorconstitutesthesestates,butinwhattheydo.IfweconsiderAristotle’spsychologyfromthisperspective,threethemesbecomesalient.First,Aristotle’sconceptionofformingeneralisafunctionalone,inasuitablybroadsenseoftheterm.InMeteorologyIV.12,hecharacterizesforms,andhencewhateachthingis,intermsofwhateachthingcando.NothingcanproperlybesaidtobelongtoakindKunlessitisabletoperformtheactivitiescharacteristicofKs–ifitisnotabletosatisfythiscondition,itcanbecalledaKonly“homonymously”orbycourtesy,duetoextrinsicsimilarities.Aristotleappliesthisviewexplicitlytolivingthings(DeAn.II.1,esp.412b10–413a3),andemploysfunctionalanalysistoexplorethespecificorganizationofdifferentkindsofsouls.Each,infact,isdefinedbyitscapa-cities,suchasthecapacitytodigest,toperceive,tothinkandtomove(DeAn.II.2,413b11–13).Second,matterplaysasubsidiaryroleforAristotletoo.Everylivingthing,assomethingthatundergoeschange,mustbeembodied.Thetypeofmatterisconstrainedonlybyitsfunction,throughwhatAristotlecalls“hypotheticalnecessity”(Phys.II.9;PAI.1).AsubstanceofacertainkindKmusthaveasuitabletypeofmatter,ifitistoperformtheactivitiescharacteristicofKs.Justasasawcannotbemadeofjustanything,butmustbemadeofametalsuchasiron(Phys.II.9,200a10–13),sotooagivensoulcannotexistinjustanytypeofbody;itmustbeinabodyoftherightsort(DeAn.I.3,407b20–26;II.2,414a22–27).Beyondmeetingthissuitabilityrequire-ment,however,thetypeofmatterisnotimportanttowhatathingis,and,intheabstract,morethanonetypeofmattermightconceivablydo.Anaxemightbemadefromvariouskindsofmetal(PAI.1,642a9–11),andperhapsahumancouldbecon-stitutedfromsomethingotherthanfleshandbones(Met.Z.10–11).Third,forAristotlepsychologicalexplanationsare“fromthetopdown”–theygiveprimacytoform.Onebeginsbylookingatthetypeofactivitiesalivingthingcanperform,inordertodevelopafunctionalanalysisofthecapacitiesrequiredforsuchactivities.Onlythencanoneturntothedetailsofhowtheseactivitiesareimplementedinspecificmaterials,andhowthesemightmalfunctioninvariousways.Psychologicalexplanationthuspresupposesamaterialaccount.Butitalsopossessesakindofautonomy,whichcon-strainstheexplanatoryroleofthematerialaccount,ratherthanviceversa.EachofthesethemesiscentraltoAristotle’spsychology.Buttheystilldonotamounttofunctionalism.Functionalismisprimarilyathesisaboutmentalstates:theyaretobedefinedholistically,byspecifyingthefunctionalroleofallthestatessimultaneouslyviatheRamsey-Lewismethodoftheoreticalidentifications,purelyintermsoftheir15causalrelationstooneanother.Thisremovesallmentaltermsfromthedefiniens,14.Itisworthemphasizingthatmultiplerealizabilityonlyentailsepistemicpossibility:forallweknow,theremightbeseveraltypesofmaterialstatethatsatisfythedefinition,sinceitdoesnotexplicitlyspecifyacertaintypeofmaterialstate,muchlessonethatuniquelysatisfiesit.Butitdoesnotfollowthatmultiplerealizationisagenuinephysicalpossibilityinanygivencase,asissometimesalleged.Epistemicpossibilityisjustaquestionofwhatis“leftopen”bythedefinition,duetoitsabstractness.15.FortheclassicstatementoftheRamsey-Lewismethod,seeD.Lewis(1970);andforitsapplicationtofunctionalism,D.Lewis(1972),andLoar(1981).321ACTC1732120/03/2006,04:07PM\nvictorcastonleavingatopic-neutralcharacterizationofmentalstatesthatcanbeusedtoidentifytheunderlyingmaterialstates.Aristotle’smainemphasis,incontrast,isnotonmentalorpsychologicalstates,butonthesoulandthecapacitiesthatconstituteit.Andwhilehedoesdiscusstheproperdefinitionofpsychologicalstates(DeAn.I.1,403a25–b19),theschemaheendorsesdoesnotapproachafunctionaldefinitioneitherinspiritordetail.Itmakesnoattempttocapturetheholisticnatureofpsychologicalstatesor16theirfunctionalroles.Nordoeshedefinethembytheircausalroles,byspecifyingalloftheircausesandeffectsindifferentcircumstances.Hedoesrequirethatthedefinitionstatetheefficientcauseofapsychologicalstate,alongwithitsmatter,form,17andaim–thatis,eachofhisfouraitiaorexplanatoryfactors(403a26–27).Buthisownemphasis,moreover,isnotontheefficientcause,butonmatterandform,andthisdirectlyconflictswithfunctionalism.Theexampleheprovides,adefinitionofanger,showsthisclearly(403a30–b1).Itlackstheabstractnessoffunctionalist18definitions,becauseitspecifiesthematterastheblood’sboiling.Italsoviolatestopic-neutrality,becauseitspecifiestheformasadesireforreprisal.Aristotlethereforedoesnotattempttoeliminateeitherpsychologicalormaterialvocabularyfromhisdefinitions,oneofthekeymotivationsbehindcontemporaryfunctionalism.SupervenienceandhomonymyEvenifweputfunctionalismtooneside,thedebatehasraisedimportantquestionsaboutrelatedissues,whichareofindependentinterest.Burnyeat’stwomainobjectionstofunctionalistinterpretations,forexample,turnonthemodalstatusoftherelationbetweenthebodyandthesoul.OneofthemclaimsthatonAristotle’stheoryitlacksthenecessitythatfunctionalismrequires.Theotherclaimsthatitlacksthecontingencythatfunctionalismrequires.Thefirstobjectionconcernswhetherthementalorthepsychologicalsupervenesonthephysical,whether,thatis,asubject’spsychologicalstatesnecessarilycovarywithitsphysicalormaterialstates.Ifthereissupervenience,thengivencertainmaterialstates,certainpsychologicalstatesmustobtainofnecessity:therecannotbeadifference19inthelatterwithoutsomedifferenceintheformer.Againstthis,Burnyeatandothers16.InRh.II.1–11,Aristotledoesoffersomerelationalcharacterizationsofvariousemotions.Evenifthesewereintendedasproperdefinitionsforpurposesofpsychology(orpartsofsuchdefinitions),theydonotmakethecriticalmovetowardspickingoutpsychologicalstatesintermsoftheircausalrole.Theymainlyconcernthestructureoftheemotion’sintentionalcontent.17.Someonemightsuggestthattheaimortelosofapsychologicalstatecorrespondstoitscausaleffects,ofwhichitistheefficientcause.Butthisisstillafarcryfromspecifyingastate’scausalrole.Whatisatissueforfunctionalismisthefullrangeofeffectsastatecanhavewithinone’spsychologicaleconomy,notjusttheultimateaimintended(suchasreprisalinthecaseofanger).18.Heinaman(1990,pp.100–2).19.Itisworthemphasizingthat“supervenience,”asIamusingithere,signifiesnothingmorethanthispatternofcovariation.Toclaimthatthementalsupervenesonthephysical,then,ismuchweakerthantoclaimthatitisacausalconsequenceofthephysical,muchlessalogicalconsequenceorsomehowmetaphysicallydependent.Formoreonsupervenience,seetheclassicarticlesbyKim(1984,1990).322ACTC1732220/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’spsychology20havearguedthatAristotlerejectssupervenience,citingDeAn.I.1,403a21–22.Itispossibletobeinsamesortofmaterialstatethatoneisinwhenangrywithoutbeingangry:herewouldbeadifferenceinone’spsychologicalconditionwithoutacorrespondingdifferenceinone’smaterialconditions.OnBurnyeat’sinterpretation,achangeinperceptionlikewisedoesnotrequireanychangeinone’smaterialstate,butonlyachangeinexternalobjects.Othersarguethatunderstandingdoesnotsupervene21onbodilystates.Aristotledoesnot,ofcourse,speakdirectlyofsupervenience.Butvariousremarkscommithimtoit.Tobeginwith,hethinksthatsoulssuperveneonbodies.Hecastig-ateshispredecessorsforspeakingasifanytypeofsoulcouldbepresentinanytypeofbody.Onthecontrary,heurges,“eachbodyseemstohaveitsownformandstructure”(DeAn.I.3,407b20–24;cf.II.2,414a22–28).Anything,thatis,whichhasacertainkindofbodymusthaveacertainkindofsoul:therecannotbedifferenceinsoulswithoutacorrespondingdifferenceinbodies.Thegenerationofsubstancesquitegenerally,infact,supervenesonmaterialchanges,andsoafortiorithegenera-tionoflivingthingsandtheirsouls(Phys.VII.3,esp.246a4–8);andsimilarremarksapplytothedemiseanddestructionoflivingthings.Aristotledoesnotmakeablanketstatementwithregardtothesupervenienceofpsychologicalstates.Butthepassagecitedabove,asevidenceagainstsupervenience,actuallyfavorsitoncloserinspection.Aristotlesaysthatwheneverweareinthatsamebodilystate,weareangry,evenifthesortsofexternalstimulithatnormallyprovokeangerareabsent.Indeed,wecanhaveemotionssuchasfearevenwhentherearenoexternalstimulioftherelevantsort;butifwearenotintherightstate,evenpronouncedstimuliwillnotresultinan22emotionalreaction(403a19–25).Wewillconsiderperceptionandthoughtmorecloselyinthesectionsbelow.Butnothingthereisincompatiblewithsupervenienceeither.Ifanything,Aristotleisfacedwiththeoppositeproblem.Thefactthatabodyoftherelevantsortmusthaveasoulseemstoimplythatitisessentiallyaliveorensouled.Butthenwhenalivingthingdies,thatbodywillceasetoexistaswell–itcannotexistassuch,whateverelsesurvives,withoutthesoulthatnecessarilyaccompaniesit.Whatwasfleshwillnolongerbefleshexcept“homonymously,”thatis,inname23alone.Ifso,thenlivingthingsseemtobequiteunliketheartifactsthatfigureinAristotle’sexamples,suchasabronzesphere,wherethematterhasthatformonlycontingentlyandcanbeidentifiedindependentlyofthecompoundintowhichitenters.Thisposesasecondproblemforthefunctionalistinterpretation,Burnyeatargues(1992,p.26;cf.17),becauseitpresupposes“theartifactmodel”:itrequiresthatmaterialstatesbeidentifiableindependentlyofpsychologicalstatesandcontingentlyrelatedtothem.Ifhomonymyisagenuineproblem,though,itwouldthreatenagooddealmore.Aristotle’saccountofsubstantialchange,ofhowsubstancescometobeandceaseto20.Burnyeat(1992,p.23);Heinaman(1990,p.101).21.Robinson(1991,p.211);Shields(1993,p.165);Sisko(2000).22.Foracloserexaminationoftheevidenceforsupervenience,seeCaston(1997,pp.332–7).23.Meteor.IV.12;GAII.1,734b24–31;Met.Z.10,1035b23–25;cf.GCI.5,321b28–32.323ACTC1732320/03/2006,04:07PM\nvictorcastonbe,holdsthatthematterofasubstanceunderliesthesetransformations.Todothis,though,themattermustexistbeforethesubstancehascometobeandmustremainafterthesubstancehasceasedtobe.Inshort,itmustbecapableofexistingindepend-entlyofthesubstancetowhichitbelongs.AndsincelivingthingsaretheparadigmaticsubstancesforAristotle–indeed,theymaybetheonlygenuinesubstancesforhim–thesameshouldapplyhere.Butitdoesnot,ifwhatwassaidabouthomonymyaboveiscorrect:thematterofalivingthingcannotexistindependently.Ifso,thenwhatAristotlesaysabouthomonymyisatoddswithoneofthemaintenetsofhismetaphysics,concerningsubstantialchange.Either(a)Aristotleisgrosslyinconsistent,or(b)hehasabandonedhisviewsaboutsubstantialchange,or(c)hehasadifferentunderstandingofhomonymy,whichallowsthatsomeofthematterofalivingthing24canexistindependentlyofit.Ofthese,(c)isplainlythebestoption.Yethowcansomematterexistindependentlyofalivingthing,whilesomedoesnot?Oneattractivesolutionsuggeststhatwedistinguishtwokindsofmatter:(i)functionalmatter,suchashandsoruniformparts,likefleshandbones,whicharespecifiedbyreferencetothefunctionofthesubstanceasawhole,andthusitsform;and(ii)compositionalmatter,suchasearthandfire,fromwhichthefunctionalmatter,andthusultimatelythesubstance,isformed.Functionalmattercannotexistapartfromthefunctioningwhole,excepthomonymously,innamealone,becauseitcannotplaythatfunctionapartfromthesubstanceinquestion.Butcompositionalmattercanexistindependentlyofthatsubstance,becauseitcanbespecifiedwithoutreferencetothefunctioningwhole–indeed,itmustbeableto,ifitistounderliesubstantialchange.Infact,Aristotledrawsjustthissortofdistinctionbetweentwosensesoftheword“flesh.”Weusethewordinonesensetorefertotheform,towhatitistobefleshandbeabletodothingscharacteristicofflesh.Butinanothersense,weuseittorefertothematterthatconstitutesflesh(GCI.5,321b19–22).Aristotlecanthereforeappealtohomonymywhenspeakingoffunctionalmatter,whileaccountingforsubstantialchangeinterms25ofcompositionalmatter.Compositionalmatterisnotonlyimportantforproblemsconcerninghomonymy.Itisimportantforsupervenienceaswell.Thesoulanditscapacitiestriviallysuperveneonthefunctionalmatteroflivingthings,sincefunctionalmatterbydefinitionimpliesthepresenceofthefunctionalwhole.Itisasubstantivequestion,however,whetherthesoulanditscapacitiessuperveneonthecompositionalmatteroflivingthings,andsowhetherpsychologicalstatessuperveneonmaterialstates.Itissignificant,then,thattheevidenceforsuperveniencementionstheelements,andnotmerelyflesh,bones,orvitalheat(seeCaston,1997,p.336).24.CompareAckrill’sdiscussionofthealternatives([1972–3]1979,pp.70–5).25.Forafullandclearstatementofthissolution,seeWhiting(1992),basedonher(1984),esp.pp.223–34;thesamesolutionappearsinIrwin(1988,pp.241–5),framedintermsof“proximate”and“non-proximate”matter.Chapter4ofGill(1989)appealstothedistinction(pp.127–30,cf.163),butGilldoesnotregardit,ortherestofMet.Z,asrepresentingAristotle’sfinalview;rather,itposesaproblemforhim,whichisonlysolvedlaterinMet.HandQonadifferentbasis.Foracloseexaminationofdifferentconceptionsofmatterandthewaysinwhichtheyrelatetosupervenienceandhomonymy,seeLewis(1994).324ACTC1732420/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’spsychologyMentalcausationandemergentismAnotherobjectiontofunctionalism,whichhasbroaderramifications,concernscausa-tion.Aristotlecannotbeafunctionalist,itisargued,becauseheregardspsychologicalstatesandthesoulitselfasefficientcauses.Functionalists,incontrast,locatetherealcausalpowerintheunderlyingmaterialstates:forthem,itisclaimed,causalexplana-26tionworks“fromthebottomup,”not“fromthetopdown,”asAristotleprefers.Somethinkthatsuperveniencealsoprecludespsychologicalstatesfrombeingefficientcausesintheirownright.Ifso,thenquestionsofmentalcausationwillstillposeadifficultyfortheseinterpretations,eveniffunctionalismhasbeenabandoned.Partoftheproblemhereisduetothemetaphoricaluseof“up”and“down,”whichisboundtocauseconfusionunlesswedistinguishcarefullythedifferentissuesinvolved.Ifpsychologicalstatessuperveneonmaterialstates,thereisasenseinwhichthe“lower”materialstatesofalivingthingdetermineorevennecessitatewhich“higher”psychologicalstatesithas:givencertainmaterialstates,itmusthavecertainpsycho-logicalstates.Butthesehigherstatesarenotcausedbythelowerones.ConsidertheanalogySimmiasoffersinPlato’sPhaedo(92e–93a;cf.85e–86c).Wheneveramusicalinstrumentlikealyreisinacertainphysicalstate,eachstringhavingaspecificlengthandtensionofitsown–itfollowsnecessarilythattheinstrumenthasacertaintuningorharmonia.Butthetuningisnotacausalconsequenceofthestrings’tension,somuchassomethingthatcovarieswithit:forthestringstohaveadifferenttuning,theywouldhavetohaveadifferenttension.Determination“fromthebottomup”isanontologicalissueaboutwhichpropertiesorstatesathinghas,givenothersthatithas.Itsaysnothingaboutcausalresponsibility.Itmightbethatcausalresponsibilityalwaysresidesonthelowestlevel,andthattheselowerstatesareprimarilywhatdrivesthings.Butitalsomightnot.Thereisnothinginherentinsuperveniencethatrequireshigher-levelstatestobeepiphenomenal,incapableofbringinganythingaboutintheirownright.Insomecases,itmightbethehigher-levelstates,andnotthelower-levelones,whicharecausallyresponsible–theremight,thatis,bedownwardcausation,eventhoughthereisdeterminationfromthebottomup.Whichhigher-levelstatesathinghaswillbedeterminedbythelower-levelstatesithas.Butthecausalpowersofthelower-levelstatesthemselvesarenotsufficienttoexplaintheresult.Inthissense,thehigher-levelstateshavegenuinelynew,emergentcausalpowersthatarenotreducibletothelower-levelones,eventhoughtheysuperveneuponthem.Inthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies,emergentistssuchasJohnStuartMillandC.LloydMorganarguedthatthiswasinfactthewaythatchemistrywasrelatedtophysics:whichchemicalpropertiesasubstancehaddependedonwhichphysicalpropertiesithad;buttheircausalpowerscouldnotbeexplainedbytheirphysicalpropertiesalone,atleast27notbeforetheadventofquantummechanics.26.Code(1987);CodeandMoravcsik(1992);Granger(1990,1996);cf.Cohen(1992,pp.71–2).Foraclearstatementoftheproblemofmentalcausationforfunctionalismgenerally,seeBlock(1990).27.Foranexcellenttreatmentofemergentism,historicallyandsystematically,seeMcLaughlin(1992).325ACTC1732520/03/2006,04:07PM\nvictorcastonAristotlebelievesthatthesoul,unlikethetuningofaninstrument,hascausalefficacyinitsownright,whichisnotreducibletobodilyproperties(DeAn.I.4,407b34–28408a5).Themostdramaticcaseconcernsorganicratherthanmentalphenomena.Aristotlearguesthatthesoulaloneisresponsibleforthecohesionofalivingthing:ontheirown,thematerialelementsthatconstituteitwoulddispersetotheirnaturalplaces(DeAn.II.4,416a6–9).Buthelikewiseregardsmentalstates,suchasdesireandphantasia,astheproperefficientcausesofactionandspeech;theunderlyingmaterialstateshaveamerelyinstrumentalrole(MA6,700b17–20;DeAn.III.10,29433b13–27).Aristotleisthuscommittedto“downwardcausation.”Notalloftheeffectsofalivingthingarebroughtaboutbyitinsofarasitismaterial.Somearetheresult,atleastinpart,ofapsychologicalstate,preciselyinsofarasitispsychological.Whetherornotdownwardcausationiscompatiblewithfunctionalism,itiscom-patiblewithsupervenience;toacceptbothsupervenienceanddownwardcausationisjusttoacceptemergentism.Downwardcausation,then,neednotcommitAristotletoeithervitalismordualism;andindeedneitherviewfitshisoverallapproachinpsychology.Thefourmaterialelementsjointlyexhausttheconstitutionoflivingthings,30astheydoeverythingelseinthesublunaryworld.Inthissense,alllivingthingsarefullymaterial,withoutremainder.Formisnotreducibletomatter,butitisnotaghostlyelementinjectedintothematerialworldeither.Aristotleridiculesanytheorythatexplainsmentalphenomenabyintroducing“minddust”–asoul-element,in31effect–whethermaterialorimmaterial.Formisrathertheorganizationofexistingmaterialateachlevelofcomplexityintonewsubstanceswithnewcapabilities(Met.Z.17).Thesubstantialnaturesthatresultareultimatelybasedonconfigurationsofthefourelements,eventhoughtheyareirreducibletothem.Thisisnotpeculiartolifeandconsciousness.Itholdsequallyforinanimatematteraswell.The18chemicalpropertiesAristotlediscussesinMeteorologyIV.8–9alreadygowellbeyondthefourelementalqualitiesofthehot,cold,moistanddry,eventhoughtheyarebasedonthem.Thetheoryoftheelementsisnotenough,therefore,toaccountforthebehaviorofevenrelativelysimplebodies.ForAristotle,chemistry,biology,andpsychologyhaveacrucialexplanatoryroleaswell.Hethustendstowardsaformofemergentism:apositioncommittedtodownwardcausation,whileupholdingthesupervenienceofhigherstates,includingpsychologicalstates,onlower,materialones.Ifso,thenforAristotlepsychologicalstateswouldhavegenuinelynewcausalpowersoftheirown,whicharenotreducibletothoseoftheunderlyingmaterialstates,withoutbeingbasic.Whichpsychologicalstatesalivingthinghaswillstillbeafunctionofitsmaterialstates.28.Thishasbeenrecognizedbyanumberofrecentauthors:Nussbaum(1986,pp.277–81)(rejectingherearlierviewinher1978,pp.88,152–53,188);Code(1987,passim,1991,p.111),CodeandMoravcsik(1992,p.139);Granger(1990,1996);andCaston(1997,pp.329–31).ForanexplorationoftheharmoniatheoryinPlatoandAristotleanditslateraftermath,seeCaston(1997).29.Foracloserexaminationoftheevidence,seeCaston(1997,pp.326–32).30.Meteor.IV.12,389b26–28.Cf.I.2,339a19–20,a27–28;GCII.7,334b16–20;PAII.1,646b12–24.31.DeAn.I.3,406b15–25;I.4,409a10–15;I.5,409a31–411a2.326ACTC1732620/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’spsychologyPerceptionInadditiontothesoul–bodyrelation,thetopicofperceptionconstitutesoneofAristotle’scentralconcerns.NinechaptersofDeAnimaaredevotedexclusivelytoit(DeAn.II.5–III.2),aswellasaseparateessay,“OnPerceptionandPerceptibles,”intheshortessaysreferredtoastheParvaNaturalia.Theseviewshaveramificationsaswell,sinceheregardsmanyofourothermentalabilities–suchasphantasia,desire,memory,32anddreams–asgroundedintheperceptualsystem,andconsidersunderstandingtobeanalogoustoperceptionincertainimportantways(DeAn.III.4,429a13–18).InDeAnimaII.6,Aristotledistinguishesthreekindsofperception,dependingonwhetherwhatisperceivedis“exclusively,”“commonly,”or“extrinsically”perceptible.Somethingisexclusivelyperceptibleifitcanbeperceivedbyonlyonesense,suchassightortaste.Colors,flavors,tones,odorsandsoonfallintothisclass.Somethingiscommonlyperceptibleifitcanbeperceivedbymorethanonesense.Aristotlelists33motionandrest,number,shape,andextensionasbelongingtothisgroup.Bothofthesekindsofobjectareintrinsicallyperceptible.Otherkindsofobject,suchasthesonofDiares,arealsoperceptible,butonlyextrinsically.Theyaresomethingthatweperceiveonlyinvirtueofotherfeatures,whicharethemselvesintrinsicallyperceptible.Aristotleregardswhatisexclusivelyperceptibleasfundamental,anditiswithrespecttothesethatthenatureofeachsenseistobedefined(418a24–25).Suchperception34isalwaystrue,whiletheothersaresubjecttoerrorinvaryingdegrees.Givenitsexclusiveconcernwithsensiblequalities,itsinfallibility,anditsfoundationalrole,itisnotunreasonabletothinkofthisbasicformofperceptionas“sensation,”eventhoughtheterminologyisnotAristotle’s,incontrastwiththecomplexactivitythatcon-stitutesourordinaryperceptualexperience(andtypicallyinvolvesallthreeformsofperception).IndevelopinghiscausalmodelofcognitioninDeAnimaII.5,II.12,andIII.4,Aristotleisconcernedalmostexclusivelywithperceptioninthismostbasicsense.ThecausalmodelAristotletakessensationtobeaboutwhatbringsitabout,namely,aparticularsensiblequality.Thecolorofanobject–jadegreen,say–intrinsicallyhastheabilitytoaffectatransparentmediumlikeairorwater,whichinturnaffectstheeyeofaperceiver,causinghimtoseethatcolor.Aristotleisthuscommittednotonlytotherealityofsensiblequalities,buttotheircausalefficacy.Itiscolor,primarily,whichiscapableofbeingseen,becauseitisthisqualitythatcanaffecttheeyeintherightwaysoasto35producesight(DeAn.II.7,418a26–b2).Heexplicitlyrejectstheviewofsubjectivists,32.Seee.g.,DeAn.III.7,431a12–14;Mem.1,449b24–25,450a10–12;Insomn.1,459a16–19.33.DeAn.II.6,418a17–18;III.1,425a14–20;Sens.1,437a8–9.ContrastPlato’slistof“commons”atTht.185c–d.34.DeAn.II.6,418a11;III.3,427b12(butcf.428b18–25);III.6,430b29–30;Sens.4,442b8–10;Met.G.5,1010b2–3.35.Thisiswell-emphasizedbySarahBroadie(1992).Foralternativeaccountsofhisrealismanditsramifications,seeEverson(1997,ch.3),andBroackes(1999).327ACTC1732720/03/2006,04:07PM\nvictorcastonwhoholdthattherewouldnotbecolors,flavors,andsoon,ifperceiversdidnotexist.Buthisrejectionisqualified.OnAristotle’sview,sensiblequalitieswouldstillexistwithoutperceivers.Butsincetheywouldnotactuallybesensed,theywouldnotfullyrealizetheirnature.Theywouldinsteadexistonlyatthe“firstlevel”ofactuality:theywouldactuallybecapableofproducingsensation,buttheywouldnotactuallybe36producingit.Whenasenseisactedonbyasensiblequality,botharebroughtintoactivity,onesensing,theotherbeingsensed.Aristotleexplainsthisashedoesanyagent–patientinteraction(Phys.III.3).Theactivityofthepatient(thesense)andtheactivityoftheagent(thesensiblequality)are“oneandthesame”andtakeplaceinthepatient.Buttheir“beingisdifferent”–whatitistobetheoneandwhatitistobetheotheraredistinct(DeAn.III.2,425b26–426a26).Andjustlikeotheragent–patientinteractions,itconsistsinthepatient(thesense)takingontheformoftheagent(thesensible).Initially,theyareonlypotentiallyalike,butasaresultoftheinteractionthesense37comestoactuallybethesortofthingthesensibleisalready.Thischangedoesnotalterthenatureofthesense,causingittoloseitsperceptualcapacity.Tothecontrary,thesenserealizesitsnaturethroughthischange,byexercisingitscapacity,likeabuilderbuilding(II.5,417a21–b19).Butsensationdiffersfromotherchanges,suchasaplant’sbeingwarmedorcooled,insofarasitreceivestheform“withoutthematter.”Justasabronzesignetringproducesasealinginwax,butdoesnotmakeitanotherseal,soasenseis“informed”withtheformofthesensible,withoutbecominganexactreplicaofitsobject(DeAn.II.12,424a17–24,a32–b2).Aristotleridiculesviewsthatrequireaninternalreplica.Wedonothaveastoneinoursoul,hereplies,butonlytheformofthestone(DeAn.I.5,409b23–410a13;III.8,431b20–432a3).Theliteralism–spiritualismdebateThepreciseimplicationsoftheseviewsare,notsurprisingly,thesubjectofconsider-ablecontroversy.Somemaintainthatthesenseorganliterallytakesontheformofthesensiblequalityitsenses,sothat,whenIlookataroseandthenanazuresky,somepartofmyeyesliterallyturnscrimsonfirstandthenazure.Receivingform“withoutthematter”is,onthisview,anentirelyordinaryalteration.Aristotle’sphraseindic-atesthattheorganreceivesonlytheformofthesensibleobjectandnotitsmatter,sothatthereisnoinfluxofmatterfromtheobject(asEmpedoclesimagined).Butinadditiontobeinganordinaryalteration,thischangeisalsoaperceiving,becauseittakesplaceintheappropriatepartofasentientbeing,namely,afunctioningsense38organ.Suchaviewhas,forobviousreasons,cometobecalled“literalism.”Againstthis,MylesBurnyeatandothershavearguedthatthereisnophysiologicalchangethatoccursduringperception.Incomingtoseeazure,allthatoccursismy36.DeAn.III.2,426a15–26;Met.G.5,1010b30–1011a2;Q.3,1047a4–10;Cat.7,7b22–8a12.OnemightworrywhethertheseviewscompromiseAristotle’srealism:seeIrwin(1988,pp.313–14).37.DeAn.II.5,416b32–417a20,418a5–6.Cf.III.4,429a13–18.38.Slakey(1961);Sorabji([1974]1979,pp.49–50,esp.n.22(cf.pp.54–6));Everson(1997).Slakeyalreadyidentifiesthisviewas“theliteralinterpretation”(pp.473–4).328ACTC1732820/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’spsychologycomingtoseeit.Perceptionisstillanembodiedprocessonthisview–itisachangeoforinabodilyorgan.Anditisa“physical”changeinsofarasAristotleviewsitasacompletelynaturalchange.Butthereisnomaterialprocessunderlyingthischangethatcanbedescribedintopic-neutralterms.Theonlymaterialconditionsnecessaryforperceptionarestandingconditions,suchashavinganundamagedeye,aclearandilluminatedmediumwhichisnotobscuredbyinterveningobjects,andsoon.Theabilitytoperceive,onBurnyeat’sview,isabasicpowerofmatterthatdoesnotinvolveanyfurtherunderlyingchanges.Itisforthisreason,heurges,thatAristotle’sphilo-sophyofmindisnolongercredible.Itpresupposesaviewaboutmatter,anditsbasicpowers,thatwecannolongeraccept,muchlessfindintelligible:forus,matterisnot“pregnantwithconsciousness,”somethingthatisjust,initself,capableofperception.ForAristotle,Burnyeatclaims,itis.Suchapositionhascometobecalled“spiritualism,”becauseitregardsperception,withThomasAquinas,asa“spiritual”change–one39thatisphysicalandembodied,butnotamaterialchange.Muchofthedebatehereturnsoncloseanalysesofkeytextsandcannotbetreated,40evencursorily,insuchabriefspace.Evenso,thereisgoodreasontothinkthatliteralismandspiritualismdonotexhaustthepossibilities,andthatbothinfactaremistaken.Theargumentsforspiritualismarelargelynegative.ThemostambitiousargumentsclaimthatcertainofAristotle’sdoctrines,suchasthedistinctionofperceptionfrom41ordinaryalterationsorthecausalefficacyofsensiblequalities,precludeliteralism.Butbothoverstatethecase.Perceptionisnotanalterationinthecustomarysense,accordingtoAristotle,becauseitdoesnotdestroyourabilitytoperceive,butratherrealizesit,“justasabuilderdoeswhenbuilding”(DeAn.II.5,417b6–15).Butwewouldn’tinferfromthisthatabuildercanbuildwithoutanymaterialchangegoingon,seated,asitwere,witharmsfolded.Onthecontrary,thebuilderrealizeshisbuildingabilitypreciselythroughmaterialchangessuchashammeringandsawing.Suchchangesarenotonlyessential.Theyinsomesenseconstitutehisactivityasabuilder.Butthenthisdoctrinecannotruleoutsuchchangesinperceptioneither.Thesecondargument,incontrast,whichconcernstheefficacyofsensiblequalities,doesprecludematerialalterationsfromplayinganindependentcausalrole.Butitdoesnotruleoutthepresenceofunderlyingmaterialalterations,asasuperveniencebase–thatis,itoverlooksthepossibilitythatAristotleisanemergentist.Materialalterationsmightwellunderlieperception,then,withoutbeingincausalcompetitionwithsensiblequalitiesandsounderminingtheircausalrole.Aristotleisnotinfactsilentaboutmaterialchangesinperception,asissometimesthought.Havingclassedperceptionasastateor“affection”ofthesoul(DeAn.I.1,403a3–8),hesaysthatthebodyundergoessomethingalongwithalltheaffectionsofthesoul,achangethatcanthereforebedistinguishedfromtheaffectionitself(a16–19,cf.b17–19).InGenerationofAnimalshealsoclearlystatesthatvisibleobjectsaffecttheeyebothinsofarastheyaremoistandinsofarastheyaretransparent(V.1,39.Broadie(1992);Burnyeat(1992,1995,2001,2002);Johansen(1998);Magee(2000).40.Iofferadetailedanalysisin“TheSpiritandtheLetter:AristotleonPerception”(2005).41.Forthefirstargument,seeesp.Burnyeat(2002),andforthesecond,Broadie(1992,pp.143–5,150–1).329ACTC1732920/03/2006,04:07PM\nvictorcaston779b26–780a7).Changeinthelatterrespectconstitutesseeing.Butthisdoesnotprecludechangeintheformerrespect,amaterial–indeed,elemental–change,andthesechanges,hegoesontoexplain,haveconsequencesforhowwesee.Literalismisnotwithoutitsdifficulties.Literalismisnotmerelycommittedtounder-lyingmaterialchangesinperception.Itiscommittedtoaquitespecificchange:itclaimsthatwhenweperceiveasensiblequalityF,ourorgancomestobeFinjustthesamesensethattheobjectisF.ButAristotleseemstorejectthis.Iftheexactsamequalitieswereexemplified,theobjectwouldbereplicatedwithinthesubject,andAristotleridiculessuchviewsmercilessly.Wedonothaveastoneorahumaninoursoulwhenwecometoknowone,orgoodandnot-good,oranyotherpredication(DeAn.I.5,409b23–410a13;III.8,431b21–29).WhateveritmeanswhenAristotleclaimsthatthesense“becomeslike”thesensiblequalityF,therefore,thesensecannotbecomeFinthesamesensethattheobjectis,sincethatwouldresultinaninternalreplica.ButthenAristotlerejectsliteralism.Thisleavesacrucialgap.Aristotlemightbecommittedtounderlyingmaterialchangesinperception,withoutbeingcommittedtointernalreplicas.Thisisclearfromhisaccountofunderstanding.Whenwethinkofobjectswhicharelargeandfaraway,wedosobymeansofchangeswithinusthatembodytheproportionsoftheobjectsinquestion,withouthavingtheexactsamemagnitudes,orevennecessarilymagnitudesalongthesamedimensions(Mem.2,452b9–16).Theseinternalchangesmodelorrepresenttheobjectswethinkabout,byhavingphysicalmagnitudesthatembodythesameproportionsand,perhapsmorefundamentally,bysharingcertaincausalpowersincommon.Havingthesameproportionsisonewayofbeingsimilartosomethinginaprecisesensewithoutnecessarilybeingareplica.Itisworthnoting,then,thatAristotleappealstoproportionsextensivelyinhisaccountofsensiblequalities.Colors,sounds,odors,andtemperaturesarealltreatedasproportionsofcontraryqualities.Crimson,forexample,isamixtureofwhiteandblackinoneproportion,purple42another.Asenseorgancouldthusbecomelikeasensiblequalitybytakingonthesameproportionsasthequalitypossesses,yetavoidreplicatingitbyexhibitingthoseproportionsinadifferentsetofcontraries:theeyemighttakeontheproportionthatcrimsonhas,butexemplifyitnotinblackandwhite,butinothercontraries,suchashotandcoldorviscousandrunny.Sothereistextualaswellaslogicalspacefor43alternativematerialchangesinperception.ConsciousnessTherehasbeendebatewithinthescholarlyliteratureastowhetherAristotlehada44conceptofconsciousness.Inasense,eachsideisright.Aristotleclearlydistinguishes42.DeAn.III.2,426b3–7;Sens.3,440b1–26;4,442a13–31;GAV.7,786b25–787b20;APo.II.2,90a18–22;GCII.7,334b14–16.Onthispoint,seeSorabji(1972).43.Forthislineofinterpretation,seeBradshaw(1997);Bynum(1987);Caston(2005);Lear(1988,pp.109–16);Modrak(1987,pp.56–62,cf.28);Price(1996);Silverman(1989);Tweedale(1992,pp.226–30);Ward(1988).44.Against:Hamlyn(1993,p.xiii,and1978,p.12);Rorty(1979,pp.38–61);Wilkes(1988,pp.20–1).For:Hardie(1976);Kahn([1966]1979);Modrak(1980–1,1987,ch.6).330ACTC1733020/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’spsychologybeingawakeandalertfrombeingasleeporknockedout,wherethenotionofcon-sciousnesscomesclosetothatofperceiving.Ontheotherhand,hedoesnotuseanysinglewordtopickoutthephenomenawehaveinmind,andhedoesnotsharetheepistemologicalconcernsdistinctiveoftheCartesianconception,suchasprivacyorindubitability.Butinanothersense,theseobservationsareallbesidethepoint.Aristotlehasagooddealtosayaboutthehigher-orderawarenesswehaveofourownmentalstates,andthisisasenseof“consciousness”whichisclearlyofinteresttoday.AristotleaskshowweareabletoperceivethatweseeattheopeningofDeAnimaIII.2(425b12–25),andheoffersasetofargumentstoshowthatitisbyperceptionitself.Thedetailsarecontroversial,butvirtuallyallcommentatorshavetakenthem45toruleoutadistinctcapacityofhigher-orderawareness,suchasaninnersense.ThiswouldputDeAnimainconflictwithhisessay“OnSleepandWaking,”though,wherehearguesthatwedothisnotinvirtueofvision,butratheracommonsense(2,455a15–22).ButtheargumentsinDeAnimaIII.2arebetterreadasrulingoutadistinctactivityofbeingawarethatweareperceiving.Instead,weperceivethatweseeanazureskybytheverysameperceptualactbywhichweseethesky.Higher-orderawarenessisthusintrinsictoeachactofperception.Itdoesnotbelongtoanyparticularsensemodalityassuch,buttothecommonperceptualabilitythatunderliesthesystem46asawhole.PhantasiaAfterAristotlecompleteshisdiscussionofperceptualabilitiesinDeAnimaIII.2,heturnstothetopicsofthought(III.4–6)anddesireandaction(III.9–11).Butnotimmediately.InDeAnimaIII.3,heintroducesanewability,distinctfromalltherest,whichhecalls“phantasia.”Thisabilitywillplayacentralrolenotonlyinhisaccountsofthoughtanddesire,butalsoinhisaccountsofmemory,dreams,passions,andaspectsofperceptualexperiencethatgobeyondmeresensation.ButasthefirstchapterofDeAnimaalreadymakesclear,ithasespeciallysignificantconsequencesfortheunderstanding.This,amongallmentalcapacities,isthemostlikelytobe“separable.”But,Aristotlewarns,ifitrequiresphantasia,eventheunderstandingcannotexistapartfromthebody(I.1,403a8–10).Anditdoesinfactrequirephantasia.InthelastpartofDeAnimaandintheParvaNaturalia,Aristotlerepeatedlyclaimsthatwedonotever47thinkwithoutaphantasma,thestatewehavewhenweareusingphantasia(III.3,428a1–2).“Phantasia”and“phantasma”aremostcommonlyrendered“imagination”and“image.”Butthesetranslationsareloadedandpotentiallymisleading.Likethecognates“fantasy”and“fancy,”theyhavealonghistoryoftheoreticalusageinphilosophy,45.Seee.g.,Hamlyn(1993,pp.121–2);Kosman(1975,pp.500–2);Modrak(1980–1);Osborne(1983).46.Foradetaileddefenseofthisreading,seeCaston(2002).47.DeAn.III.8,432a9,andMem.1,449b31–450a14;cf.alsoDeAn.III.7,431a15,b2;andIII.8,432a4–5,a12–14.331ACTC1733120/03/2006,04:07PM\nvictorcastonpsychology,andpoetics,especiallyinthepastfourcenturies,whichstronglycolorsourassociations.ButAristotlestandsatthebeginningofthishistory,whichevolveswellbeyondhisoriginalconcerns.Whenwespeakofimagination,forexample,weoftenhaveinmindasourceofcreativityandinvention.ButthesearenotapartofAristotle’sconcernswhenheintroducesphantasia.Andwhileithasconnectionstomentalimageryandvisualization,itmaybewrongtothinkofaphantasmaassome-thingwhichisviewedwiththemind’seye.Manyinterpretationsdomakejustthisassumption,conditionedbythetranslation“image.”ButitisnotpartofthemeaningoftheGreek.SuchquestionscanonlyberesolvedbylookingatAristotle’sactualusageandthedetailsofhistheory.AlthoughAristotleisnotthefirsttousetheterm,“phantasia”isatechnicalterm.Derivedfromthepassiveverb“phantazesthai,”itsignifiesthecapacitythroughwhichthingsaremadetophainesthai,toappearorseemtoustobethecase.Itthushasmoretodowiththingsappearingacertainwayinexperiencethanwithinventingimaginaryscenes.Platoactuallydefinesphantasiaas“abeliefthatcomesaboutthroughpercep-tion”(Sph.264a–b;cf.Tht.152a–c).Aristotlerejectstheclaimthatitisakindofbelief,buthetooisthinkingalongsimilarlines.Thesunappearstobeafootwide,heargues,eventhoughwebelieveandinfactknowthatitisnot,butlargerthantheearth(DeAn.III.3,428a24–b9),justasthetwolinesinaMüller-Lyerdiagram(touseamodernexample)continuetolookunequalevenafterwehaveconvincedourselvesthattheyareinfactequal.Thewaythingsappeartoushasacertainindependencefromwhatwebelieve.Becauseofthis,AristotleregardsphantasiaasmorerudimentarythanbeliefandevenmorecloselyconnectedwithperceptualexperiencethanPlatohadclaimed.Whatenablesustohaveexperiencesofthissort?Itisnotsimplyperception,sincethingscanappeartousotherthantheyare.Yetitissomethinglikeperceptionandclearlyplaysapartinperceptualexperience,morebroadlyconceived.This,accordingtothelastthirdofDeAnimaIII.3,iswhatphantasiais.Aristotleproposesthatitisatraceorechoofperceptualactivity.Itthusbearsasimilarcontenttoperception,evenaftertheoriginalperceptualencounterhasended,andsoisabletofalselyrepresenthowthingsareintheworld(428b10–429a9).IntheParvaNaturalia,Aristotleexplicitlycomparesphantasmatatorepresentations,suggestingthattheyarereproducedfromperceptualactivity,likeanimpressionfromasignetring(Mem.1,450a27–32).Intheseessays,healsodiscussesthephysiologymoreextensively,beginningwithhowthetracespersistintheperipheralorgans,wheretheycanbringaboutafter-imagesandotherperceptualillusions(Insomn.2),andthenhowtheyproceedtothecentralperceptualorgan(which,forAristotle,istheheart).Alongtheway,theyaresubjecttodistortion,resultingindreamsthatcandeviatewildlyfromourwakingexperience(Insomn.3).Becausethesephantasmatacanbestoredforlongperiodsinthewallsoftheheart(Mem.1,450a32–b11),weareabletorememberexperienceslongpast,aswellassearchforandretrieveparticularitems(Mem.2).Thereareevenafewtantalizingdetailsaboutthemechanismsofrepresentationitself,atleastasregardsmagnitudesandtheirordering(Mem.2,452b7–453a4).TherichnessofdetailinthelastthirdofDeAnimaIII.3,corroboratedbytheParvaNaturalia,hasrightlyledmanyinterpreterstoemphasizethispartofAristotle’saccount.Butithasalsotraditionallybeenconstruedintermsofmentalimages,especiallybeforetheriseofbehaviorism,whenintrospectionwasstilldominantin332ACTC1733220/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’spsychologypsychology.Onthisinterpretation,phantasmataarenotmerelyrepresentationsthatbearthecontentofmentalacts.Thewaytheyrepresentobjectsisbybeingviewedinternally,bybeingthemselvestheobjectsofaninternalmentalact.Consequently,theyareliketheperceptsfromwhichtheyarecopiedbysubjectivelyresemblingthem,thoughtheyarefainterandlessvivid(cf.Rh.I.11,1370a28–29).TheechoesofBritishempiricismherearenotaccidental.SuchinterpretationsoftenalludeexplicitlytoHobbes’characterizationoftheimaginationasakindof“decayingsense”orHume’sdescriptionofitasa“faintandlanguidperception.”Growingconcernsaboutmentalimagesinthetwentiethcenturyhaveledtoare-examinationofthisreading.ThemostinfluentialcritiqueswereadvancedbyMalcolmSchofield(1978)andMarthaNussbaum(1978).BothallowthatAristotleinplacestreatsphantasmataasmentalimages,butdenythatthisisessentialtotheirfunction.SchofieldemphasizesAristotle’ssensitivitytoordinarylanguage,especiallyskepticalornon-committalusesofthephrase“itappearsthat”inwakingexperience,whichismoreevidentinthemiddlesectionofDeAnimaIII.3(427b6–428b9).Heconcludesthatphantasiaisa“loose-knit,familyconcept”(p.106),bestunderstoodasapassivecapacityforhaving“non-paradigmaticsensoryexperiences”(pp.101–2).NussbaumsimilarlyregardsAristotleaslackinga“canonicaltheory”(p.222).ButsheemphasizesthemorepositiverolephantasiaplaysinAristotle’saccountofaction,bothlaterinDeAnima(III.9–11)andinDeMotuAnimalium(6–11).Here,shecon-tends,Aristotletreatsphantasiaasacapacitytoperceiveobjectsascertainsortsofthings,inparticularassomethingworthpursuingoravoiding.Bothstresstheinter-pretivecharacterofphantasiaanditspervasiveroleinordinaryperceptualexperience,asopposedtodreamsandvisualization.Withtheresurgenceofinterestinrepresentationaltheoriesofmindinthelastquarterofthetwentiethcentury,thependulumhasswungback,atleastinpart.DeborahModrak(1987),MichaelWedin(1988)andDorotheaFrede(1992)defendtheoverallcoherenceofAristotle’stheoryagainstSchofield’sandNussbaum’scritiques.ButwhilebothModrakandFredeacceptthetraditionalviewthatphantasmataareimages,Wedin’saccountmarksmoreofanewdeparturebyconstruingAristotle’saccountalong“cognitivist”lines.Phantasiaisnotafull-fledgedfacultyintheAristote-liansense,butasystemofinternalrepresentationthatsubservestheotherfaculties,whererepresentationsorphantasmataarenotthemselvesobjectsofphantasia,orindeedHumeanimagesatall.Instead,theyaretobeunderstoodasphysicalstatesofthebody,whichpossesstheircontentinvirtueoftheirsimilaritytoanobject,togetherwiththeirroleinthecognitivesystemasawhole.Thereismuchtobesaidforthisgeneralapproach.Aristotleexplicitlytreatsphantasmataasrepresentationsthatunderwritethecontentofmentalstatesgenerally.Thisnaturallyincludesimagisticexperienceandvisualization.Butactivevisualizationisnotnecessaryfortheserepresentationstobeartheircontentandsoperformtheircognitiverole.Touseascholasticdistinction,theyarethat“bywhich”(aquo)mentalstatesareaboutobjects.Buttheyarenotingeneralsomething“towardswhich”(adquem)mentalstatesaredirected–ingeneraltheyarenotthemselvestheobjectsofmentalstates.Criticismsofrepresentationaltheories,fromtheearlymodernperiodon,oftenassumethatarepresentationmustbetheobjectofsomeinternalmentalstateinordertorepresentanotherobject.ButAristotledoesnotappeartothinkthatthisis333ACTC1733320/03/2006,04:07PM\nvictorcastonnecessary.Itmaysimplybethatbywhichourmentalstatesaredirectedatobjects,withoutitselfbeinganobjectofamentalstateatall.Thequestionofsubjectiveresemb-lance,therefore,neednotarise:phantasmatadonotrepresentbybeinglookedatand48comparedtotheobjectstheyrepresent.TotheextentthatAristotledoesappealtosimilarity,itisobjective,physicalsimilaritiesthatmatter,suchaspossessingmagnitudeswiththesameproportionsasthoseoftheobjectorhavingsimilarcausalpowerswith49respecttothecognitivesystem.Infact,Aristotlealsoexplainssimilarityinartisticrepresentationbyreferencetocausalpowers,indistinguishingsignsfromlikenesses50(Pol.VIII.5,1340a18–35).ThesuggestionthatphantasiaisaformofinternalrepresentationthatunderliesmentalstatesquitegenerallyalsofitsthecontextsinwhichAristotleinvokesit.Onseveraloccasions,heraisespuzzlesconcerningintentionalityandmentalcontent,whichheusesasabasisforrejectingothertheories–anyadequatetheory,hebelieves,musthaveasolutiontothem.Herejectsbothpre-SocraticandPlatonicaccounts,forexample,becausetheycannotsolvetheproblemofpresenceinabsenceinitsfullgenerality–theproblem,thatis,ofexplaininghowwecanrememberorthinkofobjectsthatareabsent,whethertheyaresimplyabsentfromourimmediateenvironment,ornolongerexistent,orhaveneverexistedatall.Butasolutioncanbefound,hebelieves,ifwe51positinternalrepresentationsorphantasmata.Similarlyatheorymusthaveasolutiontotheproblemoferror,ofexplaininghowitispossibleforthecontentofourmentalstatestodeviatenotonlyfromimmediatestimuliinourenvironment,butfromthewaythingsareintheworldmoregenerally.ThisisthetaskAristotlesetsexplicitlyintheopeningsectionofDeAnimaIII.3(427a17–b6).Thispassage,thoughoverlookedbymostdiscussions,makesclearthestructureoftheentirechapter.Aristotletauntshispredecessorsfornotbeingabletoexplainhowerrorispossiblegiventheirsimplecausalaccountofcognition,accordingtowhich“likeisknownbylike.”Onsuchaviewamentalstateisinvariablyaboutwhatbringsitaboutandsoalwayscorrespondstoactualconditionsintheworld–itcannoterrordeviatefromthewaythingsare.WhatmakesthiscritiqueespeciallyinterestingisthatAristotle’sownaccountofthemostbasicformsofperceptionandthoughtdoesnotdifferinthisregardandAristotle52accordinglytakesbothsensationandunderstandingtobeincapableoferror.ThedifferenceisthatAristotledoesnotthinkthatallcognitioncanbereducedtothesetwobasicactivities–thesimplecausalmodelofcognitionthatunderliesthemdoesnotaccountforcontentingeneral.Adifferentkindofactivityisrequired:phantasia.Inthesecondsectionofthechapter(427b6–428b9),hearguesthatphantasiaisdistinct48.Thereareofcoursecaseswherewedoreflectonthecontentofourmentalstates–forexample,whenwewonderwhetherwearegenuinelyrememberingornot(Mem.1,450b20–451a14),orwhetherwearedreaming(Insomn.3,462a5–7)–andinsuchcases,wedoconsiderthesimilarityoftheircontenttothatofperceptualexperiences.Butitdoesnotentailthatphantasmatapossesstheircontentinthefirstplacebysubjectiveresemblance.49.Similarproportions:Mem.2,452ab11–22.Similarcausalpowers:Insomn.2,460b23–25;MA7,701b17–22;11,703b18–20.50.Formoreextensivediscussionanddefenseoftheseclaims,seeCaston(1998a).51.Mem.1,450a27–32;2,452b11–16;PeriIdeOn81.25–82.6Harlfinger.52.Forsensation,seen.34above;forunderstanding,n.55below.334ACTC1733420/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’spsychologyfromperception,thought,oranycombinationofthetwo.Thewayitisgeneratedfromperception,hearguesinthethirdsection(428b10–429a9),explainswhyitscontentissimilartoperception,yetalsocapableofdeviatingfromactualconditionsintheworld.Phantasiacanrepresenttheworldfalselyaswellastruly(428b17)andthusis53akeyfactorinexplainingthecomplexbehaviorofanimals(428b16–17,429a4–8).ThoughtAristotle’s“noetic”–hisaccountofnousorthought(DeAn.III.4–8)–isoneofthemostinfluentialpartsofhisentirepsychology.Itisalsooneofthemostcontroversial,asitisdecisiveforseveralissuesoflargerimportance,includingdualismandpersonalimmortality.Giventhepredominanceofthesemetaphysicalissuesintheliterature,itisworthwhiletostartwithhisviewsoncontentandintentionalityinstead,whichhavereceivedcomparativelylessattention.ThecontentofthoughtAristotle’streatmentofthoughtresembles,incertainlarge-scalefeatures,histreat-mentofperception.Justashedistinguishedabasicformofperception,whichwecalled“sensation,”fromotherformsofperception,healsosinglesoutabasicformofthinkingfrommorecomplexonesthatincludepropositionalthoughtandreasoning.Thisbasicformofthinkingornousisperhapsbestthoughtofas“understanding.”Its54objectisalwaysanatureoressence,aboutwhichonecannotbeinerror:eitherone55graspsitoronedoesn’t.Itsinfallibility,liketheinfallibilityofsensation,canbetracedtothesimplecausalmodelthatunderliesbothaccounts.Understandingisabouttheobjectthatbringsitabout,whichcausestheunderstandingtobecomelikeitinform,withoutbecomingtheobjectitself(DeAn.III.4,429a13–18;Met.L.7,1072a30).Forhumans,eachactofunderstandingisgroundedinphantasiaandsoultimatelyperception.Withoutanysensoryexperience,humanscouldnotlearnorgraspany-thing(DeAn.III.8,432a3–8).Butwealsoretainthecontentsofsuchexperiencesinmemory,whichallowsustohavetheobjectsofunderstandingavailablewithinusandsothinkwheneverwewant(II.5,417b19–26;III.4,429b5–9).Theobjectsofunder-standingaresaidtobe“in”phantasmata.Hence,theircontentsinsomesensedependonquasi-perceptualcontent(seep.332above)whichthereforeconstrainwhatwe56arecapableofunderstanding.Butevenifconceptsarenotwithoutphantasmata,theyarenotreducibletophantasmataeither(III.8,432a12–13),sinceunderstandingis“oftheuniversal”(II.5,417b22–23).Thisdifferenceisplainlyduetotheinteractionofphantasmataandtheunderstanding,butonthiscrucialquestionAristotlesaysverylittle.Accordingtoonecommoninterpretation,itconsistsintheliteral“abstraction”53.AclosereadingofthechapteranditsstructurecanbefoundinCaston(1996).54.DeAn.III.4,429b10–22;III.6,430b27–29.55.DeAn.III.6,430a26–27,b27–28;Met.Q.10,1051b15–32,1052a1–4;cf.Int.1,16a9–13.ThemetaphoroftouchisusedatMet.Q.10,1051b24–25;cf.L.7,1072b21.56.Seee.g.,DeAn.III.7,431b18–19;Mem.1,450a7–14.335ACTC1733520/03/2006,04:07PM\nvictorcastonofintelligibleformsfrommaterialphantasmata,bystrippingawayorremovingthemattertoyielddisembodiedforms,freedfromtheirparticularity.ButtheonlyprocessAristotleexplicitlydescribesismorelikeselectivelyattending,orbetterignoring,partsofaphantasma’scontent,aswedowhenweusediagramsingeometryandignorethosefeatureswhichareirrelevanttoourpurposes(Mem.1,450a1–10).Thisbasicformofthoughtiscontrastedwithamorediscursiveformhereferstoasdianoia.Thistypeofthinkinginvolvesthe“combinationanddivision”ofbasicconcepts,5758toproduceanewcompoundunity,whichiscapableoffalsehoodaswellastruth.TheanalogyAristotledrawswithwordsandsentencessuggeststhathetakesbothcombinationanddivisiontobeformsofpredication,whereoneconceptiseitherappliedtoanotherorwithheldfromit.Understanding,incontrast,islikeutteringa59singleword.Aristotleoffersfewfurtherdetails.ApartfromthecrypticremarksatDeAn.III.6,430b20–23,forexample,verylittleissaidabouthowthemind“divides”concepts.Evencombinationisnotentirelyclear,as“combining”and“dividing”60ordinarilysignifysymmetricoperations,whereaspredicationisnonsymmetric.Onewouldalsoliketoknowmoreaboutthebasic“simple”concepts,whichareuncombined61andundivided(orperhapsevenindivisible).ThemetaphysicsofunderstandingAristotledevotesconsiderablymoreattentiontothemetaphysicsofunderstanding:thenatureoftheunderstandingasbothacapacityandanactivity,itsrelationtothebody,andtheexistenceofasecondunderstanding,theso-called“agentintellect,”whichhesaysisaloneimmortal(DeAn.III.5,430a23).Itwillbepossiblehereonlytooutlinethemajorissues.AristotlebeginsDeAnimaIII.4byconfrontingaquestionthathasdoggedhimthroughoutthetreatise,namely,whethertheunderstandingis“separable”(chOristos).62Untilthispoint,hehasofferedonlyhedgedandqualifiedremarks.Plainly,itissepar-ableinsofarasitisconceptuallydistinctfromothercapacities.Thequestionnowiswhetheritisspatiallydistinctaswell(429a10–13).Heconcludesthatitdoesnothaveanorganofitsown,butis“uncompounded”withthebody(Anaxagoras’phrase),onthegroundsthatifithadanyactualqualitiesofitsownpriortoitsexercise–asitwould,ifitwerecompoundedwiththebody–thesewouldblockitfromunderstanding63thingsthatwecaninfactgrasp(429a18–27).Priortograspingsomething,there57.DeAn.III.6,430a27–28,b5–6;8,432a10–12.Cf.III.11,434a9–10.58.DeAn.III.6,430a27–28,b1–4;III.8,432a10–12;Int.1,16a9–18.59.Int.1,16a9–18;DeAn.III.7,431a8–10,a14–16.OnAristotle’spsychosemanticsmoregenerally,seeCharles(2000)andModrak(2001).60.Forsomespeculationsalongtheselines,seeCaston(1998b).61.Onthisquestion,seeAubenque(1979)andBerti(1978).62.DeAn.I.1,403a3–b19;I.4,408b18–29;II.1,413a4–7;II.2,413b24–27;II.3,414b18–19,415a11–12.63.Aristotleactuallyclaimsthattheunderstandinggraspseverything.Buthisargumentonlyrequiresthatbeingmixedwiththebodywouldpreventusfromthinkingsomethingsweactu-allycanthink.SeeCaston(2000).336ACTC1733620/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’spsychologyisnothingmoretotheunderstandingbeyondtheabilityitself,likeaslateonwhichnothinghasyetbeenwritten(429a24–27,429b31–430a2).Thismakesitevenlessvulnerablethanourperceptualabilities.Ifanything,highlyintelligibleobjects64strengthenourabilityratherthandebilitateit(429a29–b5).Onthefaceofit,thisconclusionsoundslikeastrongaffirmationofdualism.Butitsexactimportislessclearincontext.Tobeginwith,itdoesnotimplythatthehumanunderstandingcanexistonitsown,independentlyofthebody.Intheverynextchapter,heclaimsthatthisintellectisperishable,incontrastwithanother,which“aloneisimmortalandeternal”(DeAn.III.5,430a22–25).Nordoesitimplythattheunderstandingcanfunctionindependentlyofthebody’sinvolvement.Aswehaveseen,allhumanunderstandingpresupposesphantasmata–itactuallygraspsitsobjects“in”phantasmata–andsocannottakeplacewithoutcertainbodilyactivities.Aristotle’sstatedconclusionismoremodestandlimitedinanycase.Itneedmeannomorethanthis:thatthereisnoorganofunderstanding,thatis,nodiscretepartofthebodythatisdedicatedtoitsfunctioning,asthereisforeachoftheothercapacitiesthatmakeupthesoul.ItisinthissensethatAristotlecanclaimthatthereisnothingmoretotheunderstanding,priortoactuallygraspingsomething,thanits“nature,”namely,themereabilityitselftounderstand.Beyondtheequipmentwealreadypossessforotherfunctions,thereisnospecialapparatusforunderstandingthatexistsevenwhenitisnotbeingexercised.TogobacktothequestionAristotleraisesatthebeginningofthechapter,theabilitytounderstandwouldbeseparateonlyinthesenseofbeingconceptuallydistinctfromourotherabilities.Itcannotfurtherbelocatedinsomeparticularpartofourbodies.Itispartoftheformofthebody,butitisnottheformofpartofthebody,ashehadintimatedearlier(cf.II.1,413a4–7).Suchaclaimiscompatiblewithvariousformsofmaterialism(evenifitrunscountertoourownviewthatthebrainistheseatofcognitiveactivity).Somehavefeltthattheunderstandingmustbean“immaterialfaculty”inastronger65sense,though,whichnomaterialistcouldcountenance.Butitisdifficulttogivetheseclaimsaprecisemeaning.Thereisatemptationtoimagineanincorporealorgan,somethinganalogoustoabodilysenseorgan,butdematerializedand,asitwere,diaphanous.SuchaviewwouldconflictwithAristotle’sstatedargument,however.Foranimmaterialorganwouldhavetobesomethingactual,beyondthemereabilityofunderstanding,whichwouldexistevenwhenitisnotbeingexercised–otherwise,itwouldbean“organ”onlyinname,andtherewouldbenothingtodistinguishthisviewfromtheminimalistreadinggivenabove.Yetifthisorganissomethingactualpriortoactsofunderstanding,itwillhavecharacteristicsofitsown,whichwouldobstructthefullrangeofunderstanding,againstwhatAristotleclaims.Anyinterpretation,infact,otherthantheminimalistreadingwillconfrontthesameobjection.Iftheunderstanding,priortoitsexercise,isnothingmorethanthemereabilitytounderstand,therecannotbeanythingmoretotheunderstanding,whethermaterialorimmaterial,thatexistsbetweenepisodesofunderstanding.Thecapacitytounderstandissomethingthatbelongstothehumanbeingasawhole,withoutanyadditionalspecialapparatus.64.Forcloseexaminationsofthisargument,seeCaston(2000);Shields(1997);Sisko(1999).65.SeeHamlyn(1978);Robinson(1983);andnowSisko(2000).337ACTC1733720/03/2006,04:07PM\nvictorcastonAristotle’sargumenthasconsequencesforhisviewsaboutcognitionmoregenerally.Oneofthemostinterestingfeaturesoftheargumentisthewayitlinkstheconstitutionoftheunderstandingtothecontentsitisabletoentertain.Itrestsoncertainassumptionsabouthowformsmustbereceivedforcognitiontotakeplace,andhowtheconstitu-tionofmaterialorgansaffectsperformanceinspecificways.Suchassumptionsare66clearlyimportantintryingtoevaluatehisviewsonmentalcontent.The“agentintellect”Thesedifficultiespale,however,whenwecometoDeAnimaIII.5,achapterofamere16lines.Init,Aristotlearguesthattheremustbeasecondunderstanding,traditionallyreferredtoasthe“agentintellect”(nouspoiEtikosor,inLatin,intellectusagens),whichaloneis“immortalandeternal”(430a22–23).Thereisnotaphraseinthechapterwhoseinterpretationhasnotbeendisputed.Butplainlyitisdecisiveformanyoftheissueswehavebeenraising.Ifeachpersonhasanagentintellectoftheirown,Aristotleiscommittednotonlytopersonalimmortality,buttoagenuinelyrobustsubstancedualism,wherethehumansoul,orpartofitatanyrate,canexistafterourdemise,independentofthebody.Itisnotsurprisingthatoverthelast2,300yearsithas67occasionedmorecontroversythananyotherpassageinthecorpus.Thechapterconsistsoftwoparts:anextendedinference,arguingfortheexistenceofthesecondunderstanding(430a10–17);andacompendiouslistofitsattributes(a17–25).Ineverykindfoundinnature,Aristotleclaims,thereis(i)somethingthatservesasmatterandhasthepotentialtobecomeeachofthethingsinthatkindand(ii)somethingthatistheproductivecausethatmakesallthethingsinthatkind,comparabletothewaythatart(technE)isrelatedtomatterandlightmakespotentialcolorsintoactualones.Thisdistinction,heargues,isalsofoundinthesoul:oneunderstandinghasthecapacitytobecomeallthings,anothertomakeallthings.Thelatterunderstandingisnotonlyseparate,inviolable,andunmixed,itisalsobyitsveryessenceinactuality–itisnotthecasethatitsometimesthinksandsometimesdoesnot.Thus,eventhoughthecapacitytounderstandprecedestheactivityofunder-standingintheindividual,intheuniverseasawholetheactivityofunderstandingisprior.Thissecondunderstanding,takenseparatelyjustbyitself,isalone“immortalandeternal.”Theotherunderstandingisperishable.Theidentityofthesecondunderstandingisverymuchindispute.Onetradition,championedbyThomasAquinasanddominantthroughoutthetwentiethcentury,holdsthat(a)eachhumanbeinghasan“agentintellect”ofhisown,whichguarantees68someformofcontinuedexistenceafterdeath.Butthisisn’ttheonlywaytoconstrueAristotle’sconclusionthatthedistinctionbetweenagentandpatientcanalsobefound66.Foranattempttospelloutsomeoftheseassumptionsmoreprecisely,seeCaston(2000).67.ThemostdetailedaccountofancientinterpretationsisstillKurfess(1911).InEnglish,seeBlumenthal(1996,ch.11);Brentano(1977,pp.4–24);Kal(1988,pp.93–109).68.ThomasAquinasST1aq.79a.4–5;SCGII.76–78;InIIIDeAn.lect.10;Quaest.DeAn.a.5;DeSpir.Creat.a.10.Forrepresentativeexamplesfromthetwentiethcentury,seeRist(1966),andRoss(1949,pp.148–53).338ACTC1733820/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’spsychology“inthesoul.”Itneednotimplythatbothunderstandingscanbefoundwithineach69humansoul,butonlyamongsoulsgenerally.Thefactthatthissecondunderstand-ingissupposedtobeeternalandinactualitybyitsveryessencesuggeststhat(b)itbelongstoadifferentkindofsoul,either(1)oneofthehigherintelligences,asmanyof70themedievalArabicandItalianRenaissancecommentatorsheld,or(2)Godhimself,71asAlexanderofAphrodisiasmaintained(second–thirdcenturyce).Thereisextensiveoverlap,infact,betweentheattributesofthesecondunderstandingandthoseofthe72divineunderstandinglistedinMetaphysicsL.7–9,whichisheldtobeunique.Oneither(b1)or(b2),personalimmortalityisoutofthequestion,asissubstancedualism.Onanyofthesereadings,though,Aristotle’snaturalismwouldbeindoubt.Fortheyalltakethesecondunderstandingtoplayadirectandessentialroleintheproductionofordinaryhumanthoughts,andthiswouldseemtoprecludeanaturalisticaccount,whetherthesecondunderstandingissupposedtobeahigherintelligence,likeGod,orahumanintellectcapableofexistingindependentlyfromthebody.ThisconsequencehasbeencombatedrecentlybyMichaelWedin,whoarguesthatAristotle’saccountis“stubbornlynaturalistic”(1988,p.194).Infact,itisthoroughlyfunctionalistandcognitivistinspirit,heclaims,especiallythedistinctionbetweentwokindsofunder-standing.Aristotlefirstexplainsthebasicfeaturesofcognitiveactivitybypositingasingle,unifiedfacultyofunderstandinginDeAnimaIII.4.Buthegoesontoraisetwopuzzlesattheendofthechapter(429b22–430a9),whichprompthimtoofferadeeperanalysis,ata“lower,sub-personallevel.”DeAnimaIII.5offersus,ineffect,adis-tinctionbetweentwo“subsystems”withinasingle,unifiedmindthattogetherallowustothinkspontaneously,asself-movers.Thismovedoesnotthreatennaturalism,accordingtoWedin,becausethe“productivemind”isnotliterallydivine,eternal,orindependentofthebody.Itisactivewheneveritexists,butitdoesnotexistforeverorfunctioncontinuously(pp.178–9,189–90).Itiseternalonlyinthesensethatamathematicalobjectis,insofarasbotharedefinedabstractlywithoutreferencetothebody;yetneithercanexistorfunctionwithoutabody(pp.190–3).Productivemindisseparableonlyinsofarasitisnottheactualityorformofadiscreteorgan(pp.182–3,186).Somemayrejectsuchaninterpretationasoverlydeflationary:itisdifficultnottotake“eternal”asmeaningexistingatalltimes.ButitwouldbewrongtoblameWedin’scommitmentto“stubbornnaturalism.”Therealculpritisthenearlyuniversalassumptionthatthesecondunderstandingisinstrumentalintheproductionofordinarythoughts.Absentthis,itiseasytoofferanaturalisticreadingwithoutbeingdeflation-ary.Thesecondunderstandingcanbeliterallyeternal,andevenGod,ifthecausalmechanismsofhumanthoughtinvolvenothingmorethanthefirstintellecttogetherwiththelowerfaculties.Oneofthegreatestdifficultiesforthetradition,infact,hasalwaysbeentospecifywhatthesecondunderstandingisrequiredtodo.Suggestionsrunthegamut,includingtheabstractionofuniversalsfromimages(whichisitself69.Ifanything,thelogicalstructureoftheargumentrequiresthattheybelongtodistinctkindsofsoul:seeCaston(1999a,pp.205–11).70.SeeDavidson(1992)andKessler(1988).71.SeeMoraux(1942).72.SeeCaston(1999a,pp.211–12).339ACTC1733920/03/2006,04:07PM\nvictorcastonexplainedindiverseways),selectiveattention,theabilitytothinkspontaneously,andevenfreechoice.Buttheseareentirelyspeculative.Aristotlesaysnothingdeterminateabouthowthesecondunderstandingwouldproducethoughts–infact,thisintellectisneverexpresslyreferredtooutsideDeAnimaIII.5.Andthatchapter,beyonditsinitialdistinctionbetweenanunderstandingthat“becomesallthings”andanotherthat“makesallthings,”onlyoffersanalogiestoartandtolight,whichhaveprovenextremelymalleablethroughoutthetradition.SocommentatorshavesearchedforlacunaeinAristotle’saccountthatneedtobefilled.Butifthesecondunderstandingplayedsuchacriticalroleintheproductionofhumanthoughts,itwouldnothavebeentohiscredittohaveintroduceditinthisway.Itwouldbelittlemorethanadeusexmachina,amagicalproblemsolver,mentionedonlyinanexceedinglytelegraphicandcrypticmanner.Worse,manyproposalsaredifficulttoreconcilewithwhatAristotleactuallydoessay,inparticularabouttheparallelbetweenunderstandingandsensa-tion.Whetheronetakesthe“agentintellect”toactdirectlyonourreceptiveunder-standingorindirectlybyactingonanobjectofunderstanding(whichinturnactsonthereceptiveunderstanding),nothingcomparableisfoundinsensation.Aristotlemakesnosimilarcallforan“agentsense,”whosecausalinterventionisrequiredifsensible73objectsaretohaveanyeffectonourcapacitytosense.Instead,thesensibleobjectactsdirectlytoproduceasensationofitself.Iftheobjectofunderstandingcannotactsimilarly,asistraditionallyassumed,thentheparallelAristotledrawsbetweensensationandunderstandingandtheirrespectiveobjectscannotrundeepatall:thesimplecausalmodelusedtoexplainsensationwillbeinadequateforunderstanding.Butwhatexactlyisinadequateaboutthismodelinthecaseofunderstanding?Whatisitabouttheobjectofunderstandingthatpreventsitfromactinginaparallelfashion?Andwhichdifferencesbetweenthetwoactivitiesdemandtheintroductionofanewagentthatisitselfakindofunderstanding,ratherthananobject?What,finally,willremainofAristotle’sprominentclaimattheopeningofDeAnimaIII.4thattheunderstandingis“relatedtoitsobjectsinjustthesameway”thatsensationistoitsobjects(429a15–18)?Thesedifficultiesareavoidedifwedenythatthesecondunderstandingispartof74whatwewouldcallthecausalmechanismsofthought.ThecapacitiesAristotlediscussesatlengthintheDeAnimaaresufficientontheirowntoproducethought.Humanunderstandingdoesinfactworkonthesamemodelassensation:theobjectofunderstandingisable,onitsown,toactonthereceptiveunderstanding,causingustograspit,justasobjectsofsensationactonthesenses.Thesecondunderstandingisnotapartofthisaccountatall,butisintroducedonlyagainstthebackdropof“thewholeofnature”(430a10).Atthispointinhisdiscussion,asattheclimaxofhisothergreatworks(Met.L.7–9,ENX.7,andEEVIII.2–3),Aristotleconsidershissubjectinitslarger,theologicalcontext.Onthisreading,thesecondunderstandingissimplyGod,whoissaidtobeeternalandpureactivity(Met.L.7,1072a25–26,b27–28;73.Althoughthisdidnotstopsomemedievalcommentatorsfromworryingaboutthis:seeDewender(1996)andPattin(1988),andinEnglish,Kennedy(1966);MacClintock(1956).74.SeeCaston(1999a),aswellasFrede(1996),whichgivesanalliedreading,thoughdiffer-entinbothitsmotivationsanddetails.340ACTC1734020/03/2006,04:07PM\naristotle’spsychologycf.L.9,1075a10).HisroleasthePrimeMover,moreover,assomethingthatisulti-matelyresponsibleforallmovementintheuniverse,showshowAristotlemighthaveregardedhimas“producing”allthoughts.AccordingtoAristotle,Godmakestheheav-enlyspheresmove“inthewayabeloveddoes”(L.7,1072b3),bybeingtheobjectoftheirstriving,anendpointtowardswhichalltheireffortstend.Aristotleexplicitlyregardsthiskindoffinalcauseasanefficientcause(poiEtikonkaikinEtikon,L.10,1075b8–10,b30–35).Butitisnotatriggeringcause,asmovedmoversare,whichcanonlybringaboutchangebydirectcontact(GCI.6–7).Godisanunmovedmover,astandingconditionthathelpstoexplaincertaingeneralpatternsofchange,ratherthantheoccurrenceandpeculiaritiesofparticularepisodes.Theintermittentandim-perfectexerciseofourcapacityforunderstandingissomethingthatcanbefullyappre-ciatedonlybyreferencetothemostcompleteandperfectexampleofunderstanding,God.Itisonlythenthatweunderstandwhatunderstandingreallyis.Butepisodesofunderstanding–whyIsucceedinunderstandingsomethingonthisoccasionratherthanfail,orwhyIhaveanunderstandingofthisthingratherthansomethingelse–mustbeaccountedforinentirelynon-transcendentterms,byreferencetotheobjectsinmysurrounding,mycognitivehistory,andmyveryhumancapacities.Theseare,oneandall,thecapacitiesofanembodiedbeing,eveniftheyarenotallformsofaspecificpartofthebody,andtheyallperishwiththebodyatdeath.Inthisway,anaturalisticaccountofthecausalmechanismsofhumanthoughtcanbepreserved.Theidiosyncraticsenseinwhichthesecondunderstandingis“productive”dependsheavilyonAristotle’sviewsaboutexplanation,andinparticularthecentralimpor-tancethatteleologyhasforhim.Butitdoesnotinterferewithwhatwewouldcallthecausalaccountofthought.BibliographyWorksCitedAckrill,J.L.([1972–3]1979).“Aristotle’sDefinitionsofpsuchE.”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,73,119–33.Repr.inJ.Barnes,M.Schofield,andR.Sorabji(eds.),(1979).ArticlesonAristotle.(4vols.).vol.4:PsychologyandAesthetics(pp.65–75).London:Duckworth.Aubenque,P.(1979).“LapenséedusimpledanslaMétaphysique(Z.17etQ.10).”InP.Aubenque(ed.),ÉtudessurlaMetaphysiqued’Aristote(pp.69–88).ProceedingsoftheSixthSymposiumAristotelicum.Paris:Vrin.Berti,E.(1978).“TheIntellectionof‘Indivisibles’AccordingtoAristotle,DeAnimaIII.6.”InG.E.R.LloydandG.E.L.Owen(eds.),AristotleonMindandtheSenses(pp.141–63).Proceed-ingsoftheSeventh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meobjects(togetherwithsomeothers)arealsothedomainofwisdom,thoughtheyarestudiedfromadifferentperspective,asweshallsee.TheMetaphysicsassumesthatitsaudienceisversedinAristotle’snaturalphilosophy.TheMetaphysicscomesaftertheworksonnaturalphilosophyinthesensethatitusestheirfindingsindevelopingitsownargument.Thissciencecomesafterphysicsintheorderoflearning(Burnyeat,2001,pp.111–24).Butinanotherrespectthetitle“metaphysics”ismisleading.Aristotle’sMetaphysicsreliesnotonlyonhisinvestigationsintonaturalphilosophybutalsoonhisOrganon(theso-called“logical”worksliketheCategories,Topics,andAnalytics),worksprimarilydevotedtomethodology,butwhichalsolayout,atanabstractlevel,thelogicalandcausalrelationsbetweenentities.TheaudienceoftheMetaphysicsisexpectedtobeacquaintedwiththeseworksaswell.Asweshallsee,AristotleoftenopenshistreatmentoftopicsintheMetaphysicswithaframeworkadaptedfromthelogicalworks.Sothe1.PerhapsthetitleisduetoAndronicusofRhodes(firstcenturybce)oranearlierHellenisticeditor.OnthetraditionaboutthetransmissionofAristotle’stexts,seePellegrin,thearistotelianway,inthisvolume.ThearrangementofthecorpusreliesontheHellenisticdivisionofphilo-sophyintologic,physics,andethics.Sometimesphysicswasdividedintophysicsproperandtheology.ThefactthatAristotleoccasionallycallshisproject“theology”mightexplainwhytheMetaphysicswasgroupedwithhisworksonnaturalphilosophy.ThetitlehasoftenbeentakentodesignatetheplaceoftheMetaphysicsinAristotle’scollectedworks,afterthephysics.SeeRoss(1953,p.xxxii,n.2).2.SeeBodnárandPellegrin,aristotle’sphysicsandcosmology,inthisvolume.347ACTC1834720/03/2006,04:08PM\nmarylouisegilltitle“metaphysics”istoonarrow:theworkpresupposesknowledgeoftheOrganon,aswellasphysics.ThatmetaphysicscomesafterphysicsintheorderoflearningshouldnotobscurethefactthatAristotleregardsmetaphysicsasexplanatorilypriortonaturalphilo-sophy.Onseveraloccasionshedistinguisheswhatismoreknowabletousfromwhat3ismoreknowablebynatureorsimply.Thingsmoreknowabletousare,hesays,moreaccessibletoperception,whereasthingsmoreknowablebynaturearefurtherfromperception,butexplainthemorefamiliarthings.Thecorrectprocedure,hesays,istostartaninquirywiththingsmoreknowabletous,thingstowhichwehavedirectperceptualaccess,andthroughthestudyofthemtoarriveattheircausesandprinciples,whicharemoreknowablebynature.ThismethodologyisadvocatedinthePosteriorAnalyticsandpracticedinthenaturalsciences(startwiththeobservableoragreed4facts,proceedtotheirexplanation),butitalsoappearstoholdbetweenphysicsandmetaphysics,forthefollowingreason.Thedomainofphysicsisrestrictedtothingssubjecttochange.ButAristotlegivesargumentstoshowthatthecontinuityofcelestialmotionandofgenerationanddestructioninthesublunaryrealmisultimatelycausedbymoversthatareseparatefromphysicalthingsandnotthemselvessubjecttochange(Met.L.6–10).Investiga-tionoftheseunmovedmovers–theprinciplesandfirstcausesofmotion–fallsoutsidethedomainofphysics.Itisthetaskofanothertheoreticaldiscipline,distinctfromphysics,tostudytheseparateandunchangeableprinciplesonwhichallchangeablethingsdepend–principlesAristotleregardsasdivine.Hecallsthedisciplinetheology5(Met.E.1,1026a18–19).HealsocallsitFirstPhilosophy(philosophiaprOtE).FirstPhilosophyisnotrestrictedtotheinvestigationofdivinesubstance.AttheendofMetaphysicsE.1,Aristotlesaysthatthissciencewillalsoinvestigatewhatisas(orqua)being,bothwhatitis(tiesti)andthethingsthatbelongtoitasbeing(1026a31–32).MetaphysicsG.1andthebeginningofE.1saymoreaboutthisgeneralproject(cf.Met.K.3,1061a28–b17).Aristotlecarefullydistinguishesitfromthespecialsciences.Thespecialsciencesmarkoffsomegenusofbeing–forinstance,physicsstudiesthingssubjecttochange,geometrystudiesmagnitudes,andarithmeticnumbers.Thesedis-ciplinesinvestigatethesameobjectsoroverlappingdomainsofobjectsbuttheytreatthemfromdifferentperspectives,ignoringthosefeaturesnotrelevanttothediscipline.Thusgeometryconsidersobjectssimplyasextended.Physicsconsidersthosesameobjectsbutinsofarastheychange.Zoologyconsidersasubsetofthoseobjectsthatareself-movers.FirstPhilosophyinvestigatestheobjectsofphysicsandtheircausesandprinciples,butitconsidersthemfromahighlyabstractperspective–simplyasbeing.SomescholarsthinkthatAristotlehastwosortsofmetaphysicalprojects,whicharedistinct,onedescribedinMetaphysicsG,whichtheycallgeneralmetaphysicsor3.E.g.,APo.I.2,71b33–72a5;Phys.I.1;Met.Z.3,1029b3–12.4.SeeDetel,aristotle’slogicandtheoryofscience,andfortheapplicationinbiology,seeLennox,aristotle’sbiology,pp.294–300inthisvolume.5.InadditiontoreferencestohisprojectasFirstPhilosophywithintheMetaphysics,referencestoitoccurinAristotle’sworksonnaturalphilosophy:Phys.I.9,192a34–b1;II.2,194b14–15;Cael.I.8,277b9–12,referforwardtotheproject.MA6,700b6–9refersbacktoit.Met.Z.11,1037a10–17,referstophysicsassecondphilosophy.348ACTC1834820/03/2006,04:08PM\nfirstphilosophyinaristotleontology,sinceitinvestigateseverythingthatisinsofarasitis;theothercalledspecialmetaphysicsortheology,sinceittreatsthemostvaluablegenusofbeing,divinesub-6stance.OnthisviewAristotlelaysoutthegeneralscienceinMetaphysicsGandpursuesitinthecentralbooksoftheMetaphysics(Z,HandpossiblyQ).Generalmetaphysicsisthoughttoanticipatespecialmetaphysics,sinceZmentionsaninvestigationof7separate,immaterial,non-sensiblesubstances,tobeundertakenlater.Zseemstopreparethewayforthatmorespecializedstudy.MetaphysicsListheobviousplacetolookforAristotle’streatmentofspecialmeta-physics.Yetscholarshavefoundthistextdisappointing.First,hespendshalfthebooktravelingthesamegroundexploredinZHQ.Whyincludethesechapters,ifthetopicofFirstPhilosophyisdivineimmaterialsubstance?WhynotrelyontheargumentinZHQ,andmovedirectlytotheologyinL?MetaphysicsL,contrarytoexpectation,buildsuptodivinesubstancefromobservationsaboutordinarysensiblesubstances,perish-ableandimperishable.Indeed,Lappearstoargueforafirstunmovedmover,relyingonconsiderationsfromphysics.AsecondsourceofdisappointmentisthatAristotle’stheologyisexpectedtoinvestigatewhatitistobeintheprimarysense–whatitistobeadivinesubstance.Thisparadigmaticbeingissupposedtoexplainthederivativesorts8ofbeingofsubstantialformsandmaterialsubstances.Instead,thebeingofdivinesubstance,thoughofararefiedsort(pureactualityoractivity),seemsnottodifferinkindfromthatofmundanesubstances.Myview,whichIsketchinthischapter,isthatAristotleiscommittedtoasingle9scienceofFirstPhilosophy,whichistheinvestigationofbeingquabeing.Thatisthestudyofallbeing,andthereforeincludesdivinesubstance,whichisthefirstcauseandprincipleofbeing.ThatfirstcauseisadequatelytreatedinMetaphysicsL,butthebulkofAristotle’sproject,whichhereworksinL.1–5,iscarriedoutinZ,H,andQ.TheScienceofBeingquaBeingFirstPhilosophydiffersstructurallyfromthespecialsciences.Whereastheymarkoffapartofbeing–agenus–andundertaketoexplainfactsaboutobjectsthatfallwithinthatgenus,Aristotleinsists(againstPlato)thatbeingisnotagenus(APo.II.7,92b14;Met.B.3,998b22).Beingdividesimmediatelyintothecategories(substance,quantity,quality,andtherest),whicharethemselvesthehighestgenera(cf.Matthews,1995).MetaphysicsG.2articulatesthestructuralrelationsamongbeingswithadeviceknown10asfocalmeaning(proshenlegomenon).Theideaisthatthereisaprimarysortofbeing,andthatothersortsofbeingsaredeterminedaswhattheyareinrelationtoit.6.Frede(1987),Owens(1978),Patzig(1979).Onthisissue,seeMenn(Forthcoming).7.Z.2,1028b30–31;Z.11,1037a10–13;Z.16,1040b34–1041a3;Z.17,1041a7–9.8.SeeFrede’sIntroductioninFredeandCharles(2000,pp.2,50).ForacritiqueoftheprevailingviewsonL,seeMenn(Forthcoming).9.MyperspectiveonFirstPhilosophyisindebtedtothepenetratingstudybySefrin-Weis(2002),whoreconstructsAristotle’sprojectofFirstPhilosophyasarticulatedinMetaphysicsA,B,G,E,andtherelevantchaptersofK.10.ThelabelcomesfromOwen(1960).349ACTC1834920/03/2006,04:08PM\nmarylouisegillFocalmeaningmustbedistinguishedfromtwoothernotions,whichAristotledefinesintheCategories:homonymyandsynonymy(Cat.1).Twoormoreitemsarehomonymous,iftheysharethesamename,buttheaccountofwhythenameappliestothemisdifferent.Forinstance,therisinggroundborderingariverandafinancialinstitutionarebothcalleda“bank,”butfordifferentreasons.Twoormoreitemsaresynonymous,iftheysharethesamename,andthenameappliestothemforthesamereason.Forinstance,ahumanbeingandahorsearecalled“animal”synonymously,becausethenameappliestobothforthesamereason:botharecalled“animal,”becausetheyarelivingthingsthatcanmovethemselves.Ifthingsbelongtothesamegenus,theyaresynonymouswithrespecttothatgenus.11Focalmeaningisaspecialkindofhomonymy.Oneormoreitemsarefocallyrelatedtoasingleitem,iftheysharethesamename,butneitherforthesamereasonnormerelyforadifferentreason.Ingivingthereasonwhythenameappliestoasecondaryitem,wemustmentiontheprimaryitem.Aristotleillustrateswiththename“medical.”Adoctor,apatient,aninstrument,aninstruction,andapracticeareallcalled“medical”withreferencetoaprimarycase,medicalknowledge.Wementionmedicalknowledgeintheaccountoftheothers.Adoctoriscalled“medical”becauseshepossessesmedicalknowledge,apatientbecauseheisarecipientofmedicalknow-ledge,andaninstrumentbecauseitisusedintheapplicationofmedicalknowledge(G.2,1003a34–b4).Wemustthereforefirstunderstandwhatmedicalknowledgeis,ifwearetounderstandthethingsthatarefocallyrelatedtoit.Still–andthisistheimportantandcontroversialpoint–wecannotsimplyderivetheothersfromananalysisofthefocalterm.Thefocusdeterminespartofwhatthesecondaryitemis.Fullunderstand-ingrequiresthatweuncoverwhatelsethatentityisandhowitisrelatedtotheprimaryterm.Aristotleclaimsthat“being,”like“medical,”issaidinmanyways,butnotmerelyhomonymously.Instead,entitiesaresaidto“be”withreferencetoaprimarycase,the12beingofsubstance.Somethingsarebeingsbecausetheyareaffectionsofsubstance,11.Thisclaimiscontroversial,sincemanyscholarsthinkthatfocalmeaningis,ultimately,akindofsynonymy.IampersuadedbytheargumentsofSefrin-Weis(2002),whochallengesthewidelyacceptedviewofOwen(1960,1965)andmorerecentviews,includingBolton(1994,1996)andCode(1996,1997).ForanearliercritiqueofOwenalongsimilarlines,seeBerti(1971),whofocusedontheevidencefromtheEudemianEthics.12.“Substance”isthetraditionaltranslationofousiainAristotle.TheGreekwordisanabstractnounderivedfromthefeminineparticiple(ousa)oftheverb“tobe”(einai).Thetransla-tionofousiaas“substance”ismisleading,becausethenoun“substance”derivesfromtheLatinverb“tostandunder,”whichcapturesonlyonefunctionofanAristotelianousia,beinganunderlyingsubject(Greek:hupokeimenon).MoreseriousisthelossoftheetymologicalconnectionwithbeingandthecloudingoftheconnectionwithPlato,whousedthewordousiafortheentitiesheregardedasmostreal:Forms.Somescholarspreferthetranslation“substantialbeing,”butthisiscumbersome.Iwillthereforeretainthetraditional“substance,”butreadersshouldkeepinmindtheassociationwithbeing.Ontheword’setymology,seeCollinge(1971).IstvánBodnár,towhomIowethereference,hassuggestedtomethatCollinge’sderivationofgerousia(“councilofelders”)couldinprinciplebetransferredtoousia.Thefundamentalissueishowoldornewtheetymologicaldevelopmentis,andweunfortunatelylackdataonthis.350ACTC1835020/03/2006,04:08PM\nfirstphilosophyinaristotlesomebecausetheyleadtosubstanceorbecausetheyaredestructions,privations,qualitiesorproductionsofsubstance(1003a33–b10).Althoughbeingresemblesmedicalinthatsecondaryitemsareunderstoodviatheprimaryitem,beingdiffersfrommedicalinthatthingsinvestigatedsimplyasbeingsareconsideredapartfromanyspecificcon-tent.Westudythesecondarybeingsbyinvestigatingthenatureoftheirdependenceontheprimaryentity.FirstPhilosophyinquiresintothecausalstructureofreality(cf.Sefrin-Weis,2002,chs.9and10).CategoriesandChangeAschematicandpartialframeworkofAristotle’sontologyislaidoutintheCategories.ThereAristotlearguesthatthingslikeaparticularmanandaparticularhorseareprimarysubstances.Theyaretheultimatesubjectsonwhicheverythingelsedependsforitsexistence.Non-substantialproperties(suchasquantitiesandqualities),whichcharacterizesubstances,andsubstantialspeciesandgenera,whichidentifythemspecificallyandmoregenerally,alldependontheprimaryobjectsfortheirexistence.Removetheprimarysubstances–thebasicsubjects–andeverythingelseisremovedaswell(Cat.5,2a34–b6).TheCategoriestreatsitsprimaryobjectsasatomicentities13anddoesnotanalyzethemfurther.InthePhysicsAristotletacklestheproblemofchangeandanalyzessubstancesintomatterandform.Parmenideshaddeniedthepossibilityofchange,arguingthatchangewouldinvolvetheemergenceofsomethingoutofnothing.Aristotleagreedwithhispredecessorthatthereisnoabsolutebecoming.Histaskwastoaccountforchangewithoutadmittingtheemergenceofsomethingfromnothing.InPhysicsI.7Aristotlearguesthateverychangeinvolvesthreeprinciples:apairofopposites–aformfand14privation~f–andanunderlyingsubjectx.Achangebringssomethingnewintotheworld:freplaces~f.Butthechangeisnotamerereplacement,withthepre-existingentityperishingintonothingandtheproductemergingoutofnothing,becausepartoftheproductwasthereallalong–thesubjectx,whichwascharacterizedfirstas~fandthenasf.Innon-substantialchanges(changesofquality,quantity,orplace)thecontinuantisaCategories-typeprimarysubstance,suchasaparticularmanoraparticularhorse,andtheformandprivationarepairsofterms,whichareproperlyopposed,inoneofthecategoriesofquality,quantity,orplace.Therelationbetweenanon-substantialpropertyorprivationandtheunderlyingsubjectisaccidental,becausethesubjectremainswhatitisinitsownrightwhenoneofthepairofoppositesreplacestheother.Socratesremainsamanwhenhebecomesdarkfrompaleormusicalfromunmusical.Iwillspeakoftherelationbetweenapredicateandasubjectinsuchcasesascategorialpredication.BelowweshallexaminethemoresubtlevarietiesofpredicationAristotlesetsoutinthePosteriorAnalytics.Aristotleclaimsthatsubstantialgenerationcanalsobeanalyzedintermsofthreeprinciples.Inthiscaseasubstanceistheproductofthechangeandsocannotbewhatpersiststhroughit.Matterisintroducedasthepersistingsubject,andformisthepositive13.ForadifferentviewabouttheCategories,seeDevereux(1992).14.Thedesignation“~f”appliestoanystateonarangethatleadstof.351ACTC1835120/03/2006,04:08PM\nmarylouisegillmemberofapairofopposites.Anewsubstance(e.g.,astatue)comestobewhenmatter(e.g.,bronze)acquiresaform(ashape)itoriginallylacked.ItemsinthefirstcategoryareanalyzedinthePhysicsintomatterandformtoaccountfortheirsub-stantialgeneration,andtherelationbetweenthemappearstobeanalogoustothatbetweenanon-substantialpropertyandaCategories-typeprimarysubstance.ThusAristotleappearstoextendcategorialpredicationtotherelationbetweenformandmatter.TheMetaphysicsagreeswiththePhysicsintreatingitemsinthefirstcategoryascompositesofasubject(matter)andapredicate(form),oftencalledhylomorphiccomplexes.WhatBeingisPrimary?OnceCategories-typeprimarysubstancesareanalyzedintomatterandform,theirprimacybecomesquestionable:Isthecompositeprimary?Ahylomorphiccomplexcanbeanalyzedintomatterandform,andsoispresumablyposteriortothem.Isoneofitscomponentsprimary?GiventheemphasisonsubjecthoodintheCategories,matterclaimspriority,sinceformispredicatedofit.InMetaphysicsZ.3Aristotlelaysoutanargumentthatmatteraloneissubstanceonthesubject-criterion,butherejectstheconclusion,pointingoutthattherearefurthercriteriaforsubstance,whichmatterfailstosatisfy.Sotheformandthecompositeseemtohaveabetterclaimthanmattertobesubstance(1029a26–30).ManyscholarsthinkthatMetaphysicsZawardsprimacytoform,thecomponentthatdetermineswhatacompositeis.IdisagreewiththiswidespreadassessmentofZ.IwillarguethatZpresentsobjectionstoeachofitscandidatesforsubstance:matter(Z.3),thecomposite(Z.4–11),andform(Z.13–16).ThestrategyofZistoshowthatwecansavenoneofthem,ifwethinkofmatterandformonthecategorialschemeofpredication.Formcannotbepredicatedofmatterinthewaythatanon-substantialpropertyispredicatedofaCategories-typeprimarysubstance(e.g.,aswhitenessispredicatedofSocrates).Iwillarguethatnosolutiontotheproblemofprimacyisforthcomingaslongasthecategorialschemeofpredicationisappliedtosubstance.Tosalvagesubstantialbeing,MetaphysicsHandQre-conceiveofmatterandformonadifferentmodel:potentialityandactuality.AristotlepreparesthewayforthisreassessmentinE.2(cf.Met.D.7).Hesaysthatbeinghasavarietyofmeanings:(1)accidental;(2)truth;(3)theschemeofthecategories;and(4)potentialityandactuality(1026a33–b2).MetaphysicsEitselftreatsaccidentalbeingandbeingastruth,andconcludesthatneitherservesthepresentpurpose(E.4,1027b33–1028a6).Thatleaves(3),categorialbeing,and(4),potentialandactualbeing.Aristotle’staskistoinvestigatethecausesandprinciplesofbeingitselfquabeing(E.4,1028a3–4),andhedoessofirstintermsofcategorialbeing.Iarguethatthisapproachfailsforsubstantialbeing.Hethenappealstopotentialand15actualbeing,aschemethatprovesmoresuccessful.IwilloutlinethestrategyinZHQandthenturnfinallyandverybrieflytothetheologyinMetaphysicsL.15.Otherscholarsarguethattheinvestigationofcategorialbeingandtheinvestigationofpotentialityandactualityaretwodistinctinvestigationswithdifferentgoals.SeeWitt(2003)andYu(1997).352ACTC1835220/03/2006,04:08PM\nfirstphilosophyinaristotleOverviewofMetaphysicsZZopenswithtwointroductorychapters.Z.1arguesthatthestudyofbeingmustinthefirstplacebeastudyofsubstance,sinceothersortsofbeings(qualities,quantities,andsoon)dependfortheirexistenceandforwhattheyareonsubstances.Tounderstandthoseotherentities,then,wemustunderstandsubstancefirst.ZHQfocusmainlyonthatfirsttask.Z.2listsexamplesofsubstance,includingthingspeoplewidelyagreeon:animalsandplantsandtheirparts,thefourelements–earth,water,air,andfire–andtheheavenlybodies.Otherexamplesareproposedbyparticularindividualsorschools,suchasPlatonicForms,numbers,andthelimitsofbodies.Partofthetask,saysAristotle,istodeterminewhichitemsbelongonthelistandwhichnot,andwhetherthereis(orare)someothersubstance(s)apartfromtheperceptibleones.Butfirst,inordertoevaluatetheclaims,heneedstoaddressadifferentsortofquestion:Whatissubstance?Whatisitaboutthoseentitiesthatmakesthemseemtobesubstances?Z.3statesthat“substance”(ousia)isunderstoodinavarietyofways,butespeciallyfour:(1)essence,(2)universal,(3)genus,and(4)underlyingsubject.Thesearecriteria16onemightreasonablythinkaprimarysubstanceshouldsatisfy.Someofthem(universal,genus)willberejected;others(essence,subject)willbekeptandclarified.MetaphysicsZisstructuredlooselyaroundthislist.Z.3examinestheclaimthatbeinganunderlyingsubjectmakessomethingasubstance.Z.4–12spelloutwhatanessenceisandarguethataprimarythinganditsessenceareidentical.Z.13–16examineandrejecttheclaimthatauniversalissubstance.Thegenusreceivesnoseparatetreat-17mentbutappearstoberejectedtogetherwiththeuniversal.Z.17startsanewandconsiderssubstanceasaprincipleandcausethatexplainswhymatterconstitutesacomposite.SubjectAristotledefinesasubjectinZ.3asthatofwhichotherthingsarepredicatedbutnotitselfpredicatedofanythingelse(1028b36–37).Takeastatue.Threeitemshaveaclaimtobeasubject:thematter(bronze),theform(theshapeofthestatue),andthecompositeofboth(thebronzestatue)(1029a2–5).Aristotlethencomplainsthathisdefinitionisunclear,andthatinconsequencematteraloneturnsouttobesubstance(1029a9–10).Thebulkofthechapterdemonstrateswhythisisso,andintroducesfurtherconstraintsonsubstancetoavoidthatoutcome.16.Anumberofscholarscontendthatthisfourfoldlistspecifieswhatmightcountasthesubstanceofasubstance–whatcomponentof,say,Socratescountsashissubstance?Idisagree.WhenAristotlesaysthattheessence,etc.,seemtobethesubstanceofeachthing(ousia...hekastou),heisaskingforthereasonwhytheexamplesinZ.2areregardedassub-stances.Forahelpfuldiscussionofthisissue,seeDevereux(2003,pp.161–6).17.InhissummaryofZinH.1,Aristotlementionsthegenustogetherwiththeuniversal(1042a13–16)andsaysthatneitherisasubstance(1042a21–22).353ACTC1835320/03/2006,04:08PM\nmarylouisegillThemainargumentinZ.3ispuzzling,ifonebringstoZtheinsightsofAristotle’sphysicsandreflectsonhisexample:thebronzestatue.OneexpectsAristotletoaskaboutthebronzestatue:whatcountsastheunderlyingsubject?Thestatue?No,thestatueisashapepredicatedofbronze.Thebronzeshouldtrumptheothersastheunderlyingsubject.Butisthebronzetheprimaryunderlyingsubject?Thebronzeisacompoundofmorebasicmaterialingredients,copperandtin,combinedinacertainratio.AndthosemetalsarethemselvescompoundsoftheAristotelianelementswaterandearth.Arewaterandearthprimary?Scholarssinceantiquityhavereasonedthat,sinceAristotlethinksthatearth,water,air,andfirecanbetransformedintooneanother,theremustbeayetmoreultimatesubjectthatsurvivestheirtransforma-tions,anentitytraditionallyknownasprimematter–somethingthatisnothinginits18ownrightbutunderliesallmaterialbodiesinthesublunaryrealm.InZ.3Aristotlestripsoffpropertiestoarriveatmatter,butnotthroughrepeatedhylomorphicanalysis.Insteadhefirstremovesthequalities,thenthequantities(length,breadth,anddepth),andsaysweseenothingleft,unlessthereissomethingdeterminedbythese.Andso,hesays,mattermustappeartobetheonlysubstance(1029a11–19).Hethendefinesmatterassomethingthathasnocategorialbeinginitsownright(kath’hauto):Itisneithersomething,norsomuch,noranythingelsebywhichbeingisdetermined(1029a20–21).“For,”hesays,“thereissomethingofwhicheachoftheseispredicated,whosebeing(toeinai)isdifferentfromthatofeachofthepredicates”(1029a21–23).Thissubjectisnothinginitsownright:allcategorialproperties(includingtheirnegations)belongtoitaccidentally(1029a24–26).Contrarytoexpectation,matterisreachedasitweredirectly,assoonasallcategorialpredicates(includingsubstantialpredicates)havebeenremoved.Thisisnotprimematter–somethingreachedbystrippingofflayersandlayersofform.SomescholarshavethoughtthatZ.3presentsAristotle’sconceptofmatter,ofwhichbronzeisan19example.ButbronzeisnotagoodexampleofthematteradvertisedinZ.3.Tobesure,theshapeofastatueisaccidentaltothebronze(sincethebronzecansurviveitsremoval),butthebronzeissomethinginitsownright:bronze.Bronzecannotceasetobebronzeandstillbewhatitis.Thepassageislesspeculiar,ifwerecognize,first,thatAristotleisrelyingoncategorialpredication,andsecond,thatheisreflectingonthesubject-predicatemodelfromahighlyabstractperspective–simplyintermsofbeing,theperspectiveofFirstPhilo-sophy.Hisclaimisthathisinitialdefinitionofasubjectleadstoacuriousresult.Whenallcategorialbeingisremoved,thereissomethingwhosebeingisdifferentfromallcategorialbeing:abaresubject.Abaresubjectcannotbesubstance,heobjects,becausesubstancemustbeseparateandathis(todeti).Sotheformandthecompositehaveabetterclaimthanmattertobesubstance(1029a27–30).18.Aristotle’scommitmenttoprimematterhasbeendisputedsincethemid-twentiethcentury.See,e.g.,Charlton(1970),Furth(1988),Gill(1989),andKing(1956).Versionsofthetraditionalinterpretationhavebeendefendedby,e.g.,Happ(1971)andRobinson(1974).SeeS.Cohen(1984,and1996,ch.3),fortheattractivesuggestion(whichIalsoreject)thatprimematterhassomeessentialproperties,suchasextension.Cf.Sorabji(1988,ch.1).19.E.g.,Dancy(1978),FredeandPatzig(1988).354ACTC1835420/03/2006,04:08PM\nfirstphilosophyinaristotle20Z.3doesnotelaborateonseparationandthisness.InZ.1Aristotlesaidthatnon-substantialpropertiesarenotseparatefromsubstancebutdependonadefinitesubjectofwhichtheyarepredicated(1028a22–29).Substancealoneisseparate(1028a34–35).Theseclaimssuggestthatthingsfailtobeseparateiftheydependfortheirexistenceonsomedefinitesubjecttowhichtheybelong.Somethingisseparateifitisadefinitesubjectofwhichpropertiesarepredicated,butdoesnotdependforitsexistenceonanyofthem.IfthisiswhatAristotlemeansbyseparation,whyismatterinZ.3notseparate?Matterisasubjecttowhichpropertiesbelong,anditdoesnotdependforitsexistenceonanyofthem.Morelikelymatterfailsbecauseitisnotadefinitesubject.Thebeingofmatter,thoughdistinctfromallcategorialbeing,isnothingdefinite,sinceithasnocategorialbeinginitsownright.Apparently,forasubjecttobesubstance,itmustbesomethingdefinite.Z.1alsomentionsthisness.Aristotlesaidthatbeingissaidinmanyways.Inthefirstplaceitsignifieswhatsomethingis(tiesti)andathis(todeti),andthentheothercategories(1028a10–13).Thisnessisadistinguishingfeatureofsubstance.Scholarsoftentakethisnesstoindicateparticularity.AlthoughAristotle’suseofthephraseintheCategoriessupportsthisclaim(Cat.5,3b10–18),itsapplicationisprobablynotsorestricted.Reflectiononthephraseitselfsuggestsanotherrelevantfactor.Thephrasecanbeliterallytranslatedintwoways:“somethis”or“thissomething.”Ineithercaseonetermpresumablyindicatesakind,andtheothersomethingthatfallsunderthatkind.Theitemmarkedoffcouldbeeitheraparticularthatfallsunderakind(somehorse,thishorse)oradeterminationofawiderkind(asortofhorse,thissortofhorse).Thatthisnessdoesnotsimplymean“particular”seemsassured,sincematterinZ.321failsthetest.Abaresubjectissurelyaparticular.Matter’slackofthisnessisrootedinadifferentfault.Asliteraltranslationsoftodetisuggest,somethingcountsasathisonlyifitissomethingdeterminateorparticularthatfallsunderakind.MatterinZ.3maybeaparticular,butitdoesnotfallunderakind,sinceithasnocategorialbeing,andafortiorinosubstantialbeing,initsownright.InfactAristotelianmatterisnotabaresubject.Bronze,andanyotherinstanceofmatter,hassomecategorialbeinginitsownright.ThatiswhyAristotleregularly22referstomatterasonewaytobesubstance.Z.3demonstratesthatifmatterisconceivedasabaresubjectitcannotbesubstance,eventhoughitsbeingisindependentofallcategorialbeing.Laterweshallseethat,accordingtoZ,anysortofmatterthatconstitutesacompositeisdistinctinbeingfromit.Thisfactwillcauseserious20.Onseparation,seethedebatebetweenFineandMorrison,esp.Fine(1984)andMorrison(1985).SeealsotherecentassessmentinReeve(2000,§1.1).Onthisness,seeFredeandPatzig(1988,vol.2,p.15),andGill(1989,pp.31–4).21.Note,too,thatformpassesthetest.Iftodetimeansparticular,Aristotle’sdesignationofformastodetidecidesthequestionwhetherformisaparticularorauniversal.Idoubtthatthestatusofformcanbedecidedsimplyonthatground,because,aswehavenoted,todeticanbeconstruedassomethingdeterminate(e.g.,Arabian)thatfallsunderakind(horse).Onthatconstrualatodetiisalowestkind,somethingthatcannotbefurtherdifferentiated.Nothingpreventsanentityofthatsortoccurringinmorethanonesubject.22.EvenafterrejectingthebaresubjectassubstanceinZ.3,Aristotlespeaksofmatterasoneofthreewaystobesubstance(1029a30–33);cf.Z.10,1035a1–2;H.1,1042a32–b3.355ACTC1835520/03/2006,04:08PM\nmarylouisegillmischief–indeeditwillpreventboththecompositeandtheformfrombeingprimarysubstance.EssenceZ.4turnstothenexttopicontheagenda:essence.Aristotlesayshewillfirstspeak“logically”(logikOs)aboutit.Hethengivesacuriousargument.Whatistheessenceofyou?Theessenceofeachthing,hesays,iswhatitissaidtobekath’hauto(“invirtueofitself”).Tobeyouisnottobemusical,sinceyouarenotmusicalinvirtueofyourself.Whatyouareinvirtueofyourselfisyouressence.Butyouressenceisnoteverythingyouareinvirtueofyourself.Itisnotwhatsomethingiskath’hautointhewaythatwhiteistosurface.Noristheessencefromboth:beingawhitesurface.Theaccountoftheessenceofeachthingmustspecifythethingwithoutmentioningit.So,forexample,ifbeingawhitesurfaceisbeingasmoothsurface,thenthebeingforwhiteisthesameasthebeingforsmooth(1029b13–22).Why,havingstartedoutusingyouashisexample,doesAristotleswitchhalfwaythroughtheargumenttotalkaboutawhitesurface?WeknowfromlaterinZthathethinksyouressenceisyourform–yoursoul(Z.7,1032b1–2withZ.11,1035b14–16).Whydoeshenotappealtomatterandformhere?Hecouldhaveargued:Youraccidentalproperties(likemusicality)arenotyouressence.Yourmatterisnotyouressence.Thecombinationofyourformandyourmatterisnotyouressence.Youressenceisyourform.Theargumentfromexclusionwouldhavebeenclear.ButthatisnotAristotle’sprocedure.Insteadofmentioningmatterandform,hetriestomakehispointwithsomeobscureremarksaboutawhitesurface.Whydoeshedothis?23SomescholarsarguethatZoperatesattwodistinctlevelsofdiscourse.Callthisthetwo-levelshypothesis.Aristotlesaidattheoutsetthathewouldfirstspeak“logically”aboutessence.Onelevelhasbeendubbed“logical.”AstrikingfeatureoftheenvisagedlogicalsectionsisthatAristotlerestrictshisterminologytovocabularyfromtheOrganon–“substance”(ousia),“essence,”“definition,”“subject”and“predicate,”“genus”and“species”(eidosinitsOrganonsense),“universal”and“particular,”andthecategories(Burnyeat,2001,p.8).Thesesectionsdonotmentionmatterandform,whichnotori-ouslyalsogounmentionedintheOrganon.MatterandformareconspicuouslyabsentfromthewholeofZ.4–6.ThosesectionsofZthatdoappealtomatterandformhavebeenlabeled“metaphysical.”Whatdifferenceinaimissupposedtodistinguishthelogicalandmetaphysicallevels?Themostplausiblesuggestionisthatthelogicalleveldevelopsthestructureforametaphysicaltheory,whereasthemetaphysicallevelfillsinthatstructurebydefend-ingaparticularmetaphysicaltheory.Thedistinctionisthusbetweenformandcontent.OnthisviewourpassageatthebeginningofZ.4ignoresmatterandform,becauseAristotleisworkingout,ataformallevel,whatanessenceis,withoutprivileging23.Burnyeat(2001),Code(1997,esp.pp.6–8),Loux(1991,esp.ch.3andthesummary,pp.109–11).356ACTC1835620/03/2006,04:08PM\nfirstphilosophyinaristotlehisownmetaphysicaltheoryinadvance.Theaccountissupposedtoberichenoughtocapturealternatives(e.g.,Plato’stheoryaswellashisown)andneutralamongcompetitors.OurpassageevidentlydoesrelyontheOrganonandisinthatsense“logical.”Inparticular,Aristotleusesadistinctionbetweentwosortsofkath’hautopredicatesandaccidentalpredicatesfromPosteriorAnalyticsI.4.TherehesaysthatYbelongstoXkath’hautoinoneway,ifYispredicatedofX,andYmustbementionedintheaccountofwhatXis(callYanessentialpredicateofX,sinceYmustbelongtoXifXistobewhatitis).Forinstance,animalisanessentialpredicateofCallias,becauseanimalispredicatedofCalliasandmustbementionedintheaccountofwhatCalliasis(73a34–37;cf.Met.D.18,1022a25–29).YbelongstoXkath’hautoinasecondway,ifYispredicatedofX,andXmustbementionedintheaccountofwhatYis(callYaspecialpredicateofX:theaccountofY–thepredicate–mustmentionthekindofthingofwhichitispredicated)(73a37–b3).Forinstance,oddisaspecialpredicateofnumber,becauseoddispredicatedofnumber,andnumbermustbementionedintheaccountofwhatoddis.Snubnessisaspecialpredicateofnose,becausesnubnessispredicatedofthenose,andthenosemustbementionedintheaccountofwhatsnubnessis.Snubness,AristotletellsusinZ.5,isconcavityinanose(concavityinthelegsissomethingelse:bowleggedness).YisanaccidentalpredicateofX,ifYispredicatedofX,butneithertermismentionedintheaccountoftheother.Aristotle’sfavoriteexampleofanaccidentalpredicateiswhitepredicatedofman.WhatIhavesofarbeencalling“categorialpredication,”applicableinAristotle’stheoryofchange,correspondstowhatthePosteriorAnalyticscallsaccidentalpredication.OurpassageinZ.4canbeclarifiedbymeansofthePosteriorAnalyticsdistinctions.FirstAristotleexcludesyouraccidents(likebeingmusical)fromyouressence.Thenhesaysthatyouressenceiswhatyouarekath’hauto,butnoteverythingyouarekath’hauto.Youressenceisnotwhatyouarekath’hautointhewaythatwhiteistosurface.Whiteispredicatedofsurface,andsurfacemustbementionedintheaccountofwhatwhiteis.Aristotlethinksthatwhiteness(andothercolors)canoccuronlyinsurfacesandthatthedefinitionofwhitenessmustspecifythatprimaryrecipient(Met.D.18,1022a29–32,withZ.5,1030b23–28).Thereissomethingtowhichyoubelongasaspecialpredicate,inthewaythatwhitebelongstosurface,whichmustsimilarlybementionedintheaccountofwhatyouare.Whatyouarespeciallycontributestoyourbeing,butisnotpartofyouressence.Thedistinctionbetweenbeingandessenceisimportant.Thebeingofanentityiseverythingtheentityiskath’hauto–bothessentiallyandspecially.Theessenceofanentityissimplywhatitisessentially,kath’hautointhefirstway.OurpassageinZ.4mentionsneithermatternorform,butyouressenceturnsouttobeyourformandnotyourmatter.Thetwo-levelshypothesisexplainswhyAristotleignoresmatterandforminpartsofMetaphysicsZ,butIthinkitmisconstrueshisproject.Aristotlehasareasontoignorematterandformincertainpartsofhisargument,becausethesubject-matterofFirstPhilosophyisbeing.Youandabronzestatuearesubstances–beingsinthefirstcategory.Matterandformarerelevanttotheanalysisofthese.ButothersortsofentitiesbesidessubstancesareincludedinthedomainofFirstPhilosophy.FirstPhilosophystudiesentitiesinthenon-substancecategories(qualities,quantities,etc.)357ACTC1835720/03/2006,04:08PM\nmarylouisegillanditstudiescategorialcompounds,likewhiteman.Aristotleavoidsmentioningmatterandformwhenhespeaksgenerallyaboutthewholedomainofhisscience.ThatAristotleisinterestedinallbeings,andnotmerelythoseinthefirstcategory,becomesevidentfromhisremarksthatdirectlyfollowourpassageinZ.4:Sincetherearealsocompounds(suntheta)correspondingtotheothercategories(forthereissomesubjectforeachofthem,e.g.,forqualityandquantityandwhenandwhereandmotion),wemustconsiderwhetherthereisanaccountoftheessenceforeachofthem.(1029b22–26)Youservedasanexampletointroducethequestionabouttheessenceofcompoundsinallthecategories,includingaccidentalcompoundslikewhiteman,whosecom-ponentsareanon-substantialpropertyandasubstance,notformandmatter.Aristotle’sdiscourseisabstract,butheisnotpresentingtheformalframeworkforametaphysicaltheorytobefilledinlaterwithhisowntheoryofsubstance.Heisworkingoutatheoryofbeingandisaskingwhatcountsasbeingintheprimarysenseandwhy.ThewholediscussioninZ(indeedintheMetaphysicsasawhole)takesplaceatasinglelevel,thelevelofbeing,andAristotleaimsatimpartialitybetweensortsofbeings.Matterandformareintroducedwhenhefocusesparticularlyonitemsinthefirstcategory(towhichhewillturninZ.7).Butitemsinthefirstcategoryarepartofalargerfield,whichincludesitemsinnon-substancecategories(likewhite)andcategorial24compounds,likewhitemanaswell.Aristotle’staskinZ.4–6istoshowwhatanentitymustbeliketocountasaprimarybeing.HearguesinZ.4thatifanentityEissomethingprimary,itisnotanalyzedasYpredicatedofX,whereXdiffersinbeingfromY(1030a2–11).Anythingthatcanbesoanalyzedfailstobeprimary,becauseitmustbeexplainedintermsofitsmorebasiccomponents.Accidentalcompoundslikewhitemanarenotprimary,sincetheaccountofwhitemanmentionstwothings,whiteandman,whicharedefinedindependentlyofeachother.Snubnessisnotprimary.Snubnessisnotitselfacompound(itisaquality),butitisanalyzedasYinX,concavityinanose(Z.5).InZ.6Aristotlearguesthatsomethingsucceedsasprimary,ifitanditsessenceareoneandthesame(1032a4–6).AsIunderstandtheZ.6criterion,theessenceofaprimarythingispredicatedofthatthingandexhaustswhatthesubjectis:theessence25andthebeingofthesubjectareidentical.Thereisnothingelsethatthesubjectisspecially,whichcontributestoitsbeingandmustthereforebementionedinitsdefiningaccount.Inthecaseofprimarythings,beingandessencecoincide.Onlythoseentitieswhosebeingisexhaustedbytheiressenceareprimary,becausetheyareexplained24.Seeesp.Aristotle’ssummaryattheendofZ.4,1030b11–13.25.InZ.6AristotleusesPlatonicFormsascandidatesforprimarythings.InthePlatoniccontexttheZ.6criterioniscalledSelf-Predication:TheFormFisF(Justiceisjust,Largenessislarge).Inmyview,theZ.6criterionandPlatonicSelf-Predicationbothinvolvegenuinepredica-tion.ManyscholarsreadtheZ.6Thesisasanidentityclaim,withoutinsistingthatpredicationisalsoinvolved.SeeCode(1985,1986)andLewis(2003).SomescholarsarguethattheZ.6criterionissomethingweakerthanidentity:M.Cohen(1978),Dahl(2003),Spellman(1995).MyviewsharesmuchincommonwithMatthews(2003).358ACTC1835820/03/2006,04:08PM\nfirstphilosophyinaristotlethroughthemselves,notthroughanythingmorebasic.Mostentitiesfailtobeprimary,becausetheirbeingandessencearedistinct.Thoseentitiesmustbedefinedwithreferencetotheirmorebasiccomponents–bothwhattheyareessentiallyandwhattheyarespecially.TheProblemofMatterManyscholarsthinkthatZ.7–9arelatecomerstoMetaphysicsZ,whichintrudeonthemainargument.Idonotsharethisview.Z.7–9strikereadersasintrusive,becausetheytreatbecoming,atopicthatseemsmoreappropriatetophysicsthantoFirst26Philosophy.ButinfactAristotlehasagoodreasontoincludeZ.7–9.Substantialgeneration,thoughpropertophysics,isalsovitaltoAristotle’sdevelopingargumentinZ.Itrevealsthatmatterprecludestheprimacyofmaterialcomposites.Howdoesmatterjeopardizecomposites?AristotleclaimedinZ.3thatevenabaresubjectdiffersinbeingfromitspredicates.OrdinaryAristotelianmatter,likebronze,issomethinginitsownright(bronzeisbronze).Hewillarguethat,whateverthematteris,itdiffersinbeingfromthecompositeitconstitutes.RecallthatinthePhysicsAristotleclaimedthatallchangesareanalyzedbymeansofthreeprinciples–apairofoppositesandanunderlyingsubject.Thesubjectsurvivesthechangeandischaracterizedfirstbyoneoppositeandthenbytheother.Insubstantialgenerationsthecontinuantismatter.Matterpre-existsthechange,constitutestheproduct,andpersistswhentheproductisdestroyed.Reflectiononmatterinsubstantialgenerationrevealsthatcompositesinthefirstcategoryresembletheaccidentalcompoundwhiteman.Thisisbecausethematterthatpersiststhroughgenerationandthecompositeitconstituteshavedifferentpersistenceconditions.Thebronzethatconstitutesastatueexistsbeforethestatuewasmadeandcansurvivewhentheformofthestatuehasbeenremoved.Evenifwefocusonmatterandformquabeing,anddisregardtheirspecificcontent,thefactthatmatteroutlaststhecompositeshowsthatitmakesadistinctcontributiontowhatthecompositeis:Mattercontributestothecomposite’sbeing.Forthisreasonmattermustbementionedintheaccountofwhatacompositeis.AristotleasksinZ.7:Ismatteramongthethings[mentioned]intheaccount?Wesaywhatbrazenspheresareinbothways,mentioningthematter,thatitisbronze,andtheform,thatitissuchandsuchshape,andthisisthegenusintowhich[abrazensphere]isfirstplaced.Soabrazenspherehasmatterinitsaccount.(1033a1–5)InZ.8heextendsthisconclusiontolivingorganismsandtheirspeciesandgenera(1033b24–26).HerepeatsthepointaboutspeciesinZ.10.Aspecieslikemanorhorseis27auniversalcompositecomposedofformandmattertakenuniversally(1035b27–30).26.ButseeBuchheim(2001,pp.220–7),whoarguesthatbecomingiscrucialforAristotle’smetaphysicalproject.SeealsoFerejohn(2003).27.Aristotleusesthewordeidosforbothspecies(e.g.,man)andsubstantialform(e.g.,humansoul).Driscoll(1981)broughtclaritytothewholeissueandshowedwhyitisimportanttokeepthetwonotionsdistinct.359ACTC1835920/03/2006,04:08PM\nmarylouisegillTheanalysisofsubstantialgenerationdemonstratesthatCategories-typeprimarysubstances,suchasaparticularmanandaparticularhorse,plustheirspeciesandgenera–man,horse,animal–failtobeprimaryinZ’ssense.TheaimofZ.7–9istoshowthis,andalsotoarguethatformisnotgenerated(Z.8,1033a28–b19).Theargumentthatformisnotgenerated(andsodoesnotcontainmatter)isonestepinAristotle’slargerargumenttoprovethatformneednotbedefinedwithreferencetomatter,anargumenthecompletesinZ.11(1036a26–b7).Formisnotlikesnubness:itneednotbedefinedwithreferencetoitsprimaryrecipient.Composites,however,areanalyzedasYpredicatedofX(thisinthat),andXisdistinctinbeingfromY(1036b21–32).Whereassoulisthesameastheessenceofsoul,andsosatisfiestheZ.6criterion,manisnotthesameastheessenceofman(Z.11,1037a33–b7;cf.H.3,1043b2–4).Socompositesinthefirstcategoryarenotprimarybutmustbeexplainedintermsoftheirmorebasiccomponents.AristotleconcludeshistreatmentofessenceinZ.11bydenyingprimacytocomposites.Theawardgoestoform,whosebeingisexhaustedbyitsessence.TheStatusofFormManyscholarstaketheconclusionofZ.11tobeAristotle’sfinalconclusioninZ:primarysubstanceisform.AlthoughthatisAristotle’sverdictinthesectiononessence,thestatusofformcomesintoquestioninthethirdsection,whoseofficialtargetisthe(Platonist)claimthatsubstanceisauniversal.InZ.13Aristotlearguesthatnouniversalisasubstance,aconclusionherepeatsattheendofZ.16(1041a3–5).Themainproblemforformissubjecthood.AristotleclaimedinZ.3andrepeatsinZ.13(1038b15–16)thatsubstanceisabasicsubject,somethingofwhichotherthingsarepredicatedbutnotitselfpredicatedofanythingelse.Formispredicatedofmatter,whichisonesortofsubject(1038b5–6).AristotleclaimedinZ.3anddemonstratedinhistreatmentofgenerationinZ.7–9thatmatterisdistinctinbeingfromthecompos-iteitconstitutes,andsodistinctinbeingfromtheformofthatcomposite.Wehaveseenthatmatterdeprivesthecompositeofsubstantialityontheessencecriterion,becausethecompositeisanalyzedasthisinthat.Liketheaccidentalcompoundwhiteman,thebeingofacompositeisdeterminedintwoways–byitsconstituentformandmatter.Formsatisfiestheessencecriterion:itsbeingisexhaustedbyitsessence.Butmatterdeprivesformofsubstantialityinadifferentway,becauseformispredicatedofit.Formfailstosatisfythesubjectcriterion.Substantialformcanbedefinedthroughitself,butitdependsforitsexistenceonmatterofwhichitispredicated.ThisisnottheoccasionforadetailedanalysisofZ.13(formyanalysis,seeGill,2001).Z.13isapivotalchapterforscholarswhosharetheviewthatAristotleconcludesinZthatprimarysubstanceisform.ForsomethischapterprovesthatAristotelian28formsarenotuniversalsbutparticulars.Othersreconstructthechaptertoshowthatform,thoughitisauniversal,escapestheobjectionsbroughtagainstuniversals28.E.g.,FredeandPatzig(1988,vol.1,pp.36–57;vol.2,pp.241–63),Irwin(1988,sec.140),Spellman(1995),andWitt(1989,pp.155–62).360ACTC1836020/03/2006,04:08PM\nfirstphilosophyinaristotle29inthischapter.IthinkAristotle’sobjectionstotheuniversalaredevastatingforform,whetherformisauniversaloraparticular.Formisexcludedasprimarybythecategorialschemeofpredication,accordingtowhichitispredicatedaccidentallyofmatter.Theproblemisthesamewhetherformispredicatedofonebitofmatterormany.Onmyinterpretation,Z.13–16showthatevenformcannotbesubstance.IfIamright,ZreachesadeadendinZ.16:Noneofthecandidatesforsubstanceisprimary.Notthematter.Notthecomposite.Nottheform.Theimpasseiscreatedbythecategorialschemeofpredication,whichAristotleextendstosubstantialbeing.Heneedsadifferentapproach.Z.17makesafreshstart,andAristotlepursuesthethreadinH.1–5,usingtheconceptsofpotentialityandactuality.PotentialityandActualityFirstAristotlemapshisconceptsofpotentialityandactualityontohiscategorialschemeofpredication.Thisstrategyisuselessinsalvaginganythingasprimarysubstance,butletusfollowhislead.RecallthemodelofchangeinthePhysics.Aristotleanalyzedchangebymeansofthreeprinciples–apairoftermsproperlyopposed(fand~f),andanunderlyingsubjectx,whichisfirstintheprivativestate,theninthepositivestate.Alltermsandtheircombinationscanbetaggedasactualities–thegoal(f),theproduct30(fx),theprivation(~f),thepre-existingsubject(~fx),andthepersistingsubject(x).Inaddition,thechangexundergoesfrom~ftofislabeledanactuality–anincompleteone.Changeisanincompleteactuality,becauseitisdirectedtowardagoal(f)beyond31itself.Thegoalterminatesandcompletesthechange.Apotentialityisdefinedwithreferencetotheactualityforwhichitisthepotential-ity.Thepotentialityforhealthdiffersfromthepotentialityformusic.Apotentialityforfappliestoasubjectx,onlyifxissuitedtobeinthepositivestate:xmustbetherightkindofsubjecttobef.Notallsubjectsarepotentiallyhealthy(livingorganismsare;inorganicmaterialsarenot).Anysubjectthatispotentiallyfisalsopotentially~f,anditretainsthatdualpotentialitywhetherornotitisactuallyf.Thusbricks,whicharepotentiallyahouse,arestillpotentiallyahousewhetherornottheycomposeanactualhouse.InDeAnimaII.5Aristotledistinguisheslevelsofpotentialityandactuality.Asubjectxhasafirst-levelpotentialityforf,ifitissuitedtobefbutisactually~f.Whenxisactuallyfitsactualityisfirst-level.Typicallyfisitselfacapacityforsomeactivity(f-ing).Sofxisnotonlyatthefirstlevelofactuality;italsohasasecond-levelpotentiality,whichmayormaynotbeexercised.Theactivity(f-ing)isasecond-level29.Therearemanyversionsofthisapproach,includingWoods(1967)(cf.his1991);Lewis(1991,ch.11),Loux(1991,ch.6).Cf.Wedin(2000,ch.9).30.Theprivationisdefinedwithreferencetothepositiveterm–e.g.,sicknessisdefinedwithreferencetohealth(Z.7,1032b2–6).31.Onthistopic,seeGill(1989,ch.6),Kosman(1969,1984),Waterlow(1982,ch.3),and,inthisvolume,seeBodnárandPellegrin,aristotle’sphysicsandcosmology,esp.pp.277–81.361ACTC1836120/03/2006,04:08PM\nmarylouisegillactuality.Unlikeachange,whichleadstoastatebeyonditself,andsoisincomplete,anactivityiscompleteassoonasitstartsandforaslongasitlasts.There-descriptionofmatterandformintermsofpotentialityandactualitydoesnotovercomethepuzzlesinZ.Considerahouse,whichhassomeclaimtobeasubstance.Abuilderbuildsahouseoutofbricks,stones,andwood.Beforehestarts,thematerialslyinginaheaphaveafirst-levelpotentialitytobeahouse:theyaretherightsortsofmaterialstobeahouse,buttheylacktheformofahouse.Oncethehousehasbeenbuilt,thesamematerialsconstituteanactualhouse.Theactualityisfirst-level.Aristotlespecifiestheformofahouseas“avesselcapableofprotectinggoodsandbodies”(H.2,1043a16–18).Thisformenablesthehousetoperformitsfunctionofactuallyprotectinggoodsandbodies.Thisactivityisasecond-levelactuality.Ahouseisnotagenuineunity.Thebricks,stones,andwoodorganizedintoahouseareactuallyahouse,andtheyhaveasecond-levelpotentialitytobeactivelyahouse.Butthosematerials–thesuitablex–arenotonlypotentiallyandactuallyahouse.Theyarealsoactuallybricks,stones,andwood,andtheycanretainthatidentitywhen32thehouseistorndown.Let’scallthesecompositionalmaterialstheremnantmatter.Ifthematerialscanremainwhattheywerewhentheorganizationisremoved,thatorganizationisaccidentaltowhattheyactuallyareinthemselves,namely,bricks,stones,andwood.Thebeingofthehouseisdeterminedintwoways,byitsform33andbyitsmatter,asthisinthat.Thisexamplerevealsthatthesubjectxremainsatroublemaker,evenwhenAristotlere-describesthesituationintermsofpotentialityandactuality.Therelationbetweenmatterandforminlivingorganismsdiffersfromthatinartifacts,butthedifferenceonwhichAristotlefocusesinMetaphysicsZandH.1–5merelyrelocatestheproblem.OnnumerousoccasionsAristotleinsiststhatthematerialpartsoflivingorganisms,ifseparatedfromthewhole,arewhattheywereinnameonly–homonymously.Forinstance,aseveredarmisanarminnameonlyandnobetterthanasculptedorpaintedarm.Whatistrueforeachbodilypartistrueforthewholebody(DeAn.II.1,412b17–25).Ahumancorpseisnotahumanbodywiththesoulremoved.Itisahumanbodyinnameonly(Meteor.IV.12,389b31).Whenanorganismdies,whatisleftisnottheorganicmatter.Thematter,aswellasthecom-posite,isdestroyedwhentheorganismdies.Aristotle’shomonymyprincipleindicateshisconvictionthattherelationbetweenformandmatterinlivingorganismsisnotanaccidentalrelation.Onthecontrary,theformdeterminesthepropertiesandcapacitiesthemattermusthavetocarryoutthevariousorganicfunctions.Sincetheformdeterminesthematter,therelationbetweenformandmatterinlivingorganismsis34essential.Letuscallthematter,whoseidentityisdeterminedbytheformoftheorganism,thefunctionalmatter.Functionalmatterhascertainsecond-levelpotentialitiesinvirtueoftheformoftheobjectwhosematteritis.32.ThisvividlabelisWedin’s(2000).33.SeeAristotle’sthreewaysofdefiningahouseatH.2,1043a14–21.34.TheclassicdiscussionofthistopicisAckrill(1972–3).Inthisvolume,seeLennox,aristotle’sbiologyandaristotle’sphilosophy,pp.300–10andCaston,aristotle’spsycho-logy,pp.320–4.362ACTC1836220/03/2006,04:08PM\nfirstphilosophyinaristotleTheproblemofdualitypersists,however.Evenifthefunctionalmatterisdeterminedaswhatitisbytheformofthewholeobjectwhosematteritis,thefunctionsbelongtosomelowerlevelsubject,theremnantmatter,whichsurviveswhenthewholeis35destroyed.InMetaphysicsZ.10,AristotlesaysthatCalliasisdestroyedintofleshandbones(1035a18–19,a33).Iffleshandbonessurvivethedestructionofalivingorganism,theywrecktheunityofthewhole,eveniftheyarefunctionallyorganizedintoanorganicbodywithintheanimal.Thebeingofthecompositeisdeterminedintwoways,bytheform(soul)andbytheremnantmatter(fleshandbones).InGenerationofAnimalsII.1,Aristotleconfrontsthisissue.Flesh,hesays,islikeaface.Aftertheorganismdies,fleshiscalledfleshonlyhomonymously(734b24–31).Thusheincludestheuniformparts,likefleshandbone,withthenonuniformparts,likeafaceandanarm,asconstituentsofthefunctionalmatter.Stilltheproblemdoesnotgoaway.Whataboutthematterofflesh–compositionalflesh(GCI.5,321b19–32)ortheearthandwaterofwhichfleshiscomposed?Ifhylomorphicanalysisuncoversremnantmatter,howeverremote,thatisthex-factor.Theremnantmatterunderminesthecompositeontheessencecriterionanditunderminessubstantialformonthesubjectcriterion.Form–MatterPredicationInthesecondhalfofMetaphysicsH.6Aristotlesketcheswhatappearstobeanewconceptionofmatterandformintermsofpotentialityandactuality.Hisdiscussionconcernsabronzesphere.Isitaunity?Attheendofthechapterhesays:But,aswehavesaid,theultimate(eschatE)matterandtheformarethesameandone,theoneinpotentiality,theotherinactuality,sothatitislikeseekingwhatisthecauseofonenessandofbeingone;foreachthingissomeonething,andthethinginpotentialityandthethinginactualityaresomehowone,sothatthecauseisnothingelseunlessthereissomethingthatcausedthemovementfrompotentialitytoactuality.Andallthosethingsthathavenomatteraresimplyjustsomeonething.(1045b17–23)WhydoIthinktheconceptionisnew?Aristotleistalkingaboutabronzesphere,notacompoundofformandfunctionalmatter(onthispoint,seeLoux,1995).HisinterestistheunityoftheformandwhatIhavesofarbeencallingtheremnantmatter,thematterthatpersistswhenacompositeisdestroyed.Hisclaimisthatsomehowthebronzeandthesphericalshapeareoneandthesame,theoneinpotentiality,theotherinactuality.WhereasonthecategorialschemeofpredicationXandYweretwothings,YpredicatedofadistinctX,hispresentclaimisthatXandYaresomehowone.Howcantheybe?AristotleelaborateshisanswerinQ.7.InMetaphysicsQ.7Aristotleconsiderstherelationbetweenthecompositionalmatter(e.g.,bronze)andtheformoftheproduct(theshapeofthestatue).Hearguesthattherelationdiffersfromthatbetweenanordinarysubstanceanditsnon-substantial35.Onthistopic,seethediscussionsbyS.Cohen(1984,andhismoredetailed1996),andLewis(1994).Rhenius(2006)givesarigorouscritiqueofLewis’sposition.363ACTC1836320/03/2006,04:08PM\nmarylouisegillproperties.Hespeaksoftwosortsofpredication:categorialpredicationandform-matterpredication.AristotlesignalshisdistinctionbyappealtoordinaryGreekusage.Hesaysthatpeoplecorrectlypreferadjectivestonounsinspecifyingbothanobject’snon-substantialpropertiesanditsmatter.Wecallaman“healthy,”not“health,”and“musical,”not“musicality.”Similarly,wecallabox“wooden,”not“wood,”andastatue“brazen,”36not“bronze.”Categorialpredicationholdsasbeforebetweenasubstanceanditsnon-substantialproperties.Thesubstanceisadefinitesubject,athis(todeti),andanon-substantialpropertyispredicatedofit.Insuchcases,Aristotlesays,theultimatethingisasubstance(ousia)(1049a29–34).Thesituationisdifferentforformandmatter.Hesays:Inthecaseofthingsthatarenotso[i.e.,notrelatedasnon-substantialpropertiestoasubstance],butthethingpredicatedissomedefiniteform(eidosti)andthis(todeti),theultimatethingismatter(hulE)andmaterialsubstance(ousiahulikE).Andcalling[athing]“that-en”withreferencetoitsmatteranditsaffectionsturnsouttobequitecorrect.Forbothareindefinite(aorista).(1049a34–b2)Form–matterpredicationisnotordinarypredication.Theitempredicatedissaidtobesomedefiniteformandthis(todeti),andthematterofwhichitispredicatedisvariously37characterizedasindefinite(1049b2),potential(1049a21,a23),auniversal(1049a28),andnotathis(1049a27–29).TheindefinitenessofmatterdiffersfromtheindefinitenessofthebaresubjectinZ.3.HereAristotlecomparestheindefinitenessofmattertothatofathing’snon-substantialproperties.Non-substantialpropertieshavedefinitecontent.Theirindefinitenessisrootedintheirdependenceonadefiniteobjecttowhichtheybelong.Matteronthenewpredicationmodelisindefiniteinasimilarway.Wecanspecifythematter(spelloutitscontent),butlikenon-substantialpro-pertiesitdependsforitsexistenceonthedefiniteobjectwhosematteritis.Thissharedindefinitenessexplainswhypeoplearecorrecttopreferadjectivestonounsinspecifyingbothanobject’spropertiesandmatter.Tounderstandthenewform–matterrelation,itishelpfultoconsiderAristotle’saccountofmixtureinOnGenerationandCorruptionI.10.Hearguesthattheingredientsofamixtureexistactuallybeforetheyarecombinedbutareonlypotentiallypresentinthecompound(GCI.10,327b22–31).Thinkofcake.Theingredientsofcakeareeggs,flour,sugar,butter,milk,andsoon.Theseexistseparatelyandactuallybeforetheyaremixed,butoncetheyarecombinedandthebatterisbaked,theproductisaspongystuffinwhichtheingredientsarenolongeractuallypresent.Aristotlewasnotan36.Oncebefore,inZ.7,Aristotleconsideredthislinguisticpoint(1033a5–23).Onthatoccasionhisaimwastogivearationaleforthefactthatlinguisticusageconflictswiththemetaphysicalfactsdictatedbythecategorialschemeofpredication:Ifbronzeisadefinitesubjectofwhichtheshapeofastatueispredicated,itshouldbeperfectlycorrecttocallthestatue“bronze,”justaswecallamusicalman“man.”ThefactthatGreekusagefavors“brazenstatue”and“woodenbox”wassomethingAristotletriedtoexplainawayinZ.7.37.Contrarytomoderneditors,Ireadkatholou(“universal”)at1049a28withallthemanuscripts.364ACTC1836420/03/2006,04:08PM\nfirstphilosophyinaristotleatomist:ananalysisofcompoundsdoesnotyieldelementalparticles.Hesaysthattheingredientsareonlypotentiallypresentinthecompound.Theyarepotentiallypresent,38becausecomponentsofthatsortareleftbehindwhenthecompoundisdestroyed.Theoriginalingredientsmakeacontributiontothecompound:someofitspropertiesareduetotheingredients.Forexample,theoriginalingredientsofcakeaccountforitsflavor,moisture,weight,consistency,color,andsoforth.Theimportantpointisthatthosepropertiescharacterizethehigherlevelcompound:thereisnoremnantmattertowhichtheformofthathighercompoundbelongs.OnthenewmodelinQ.7thematterisnotanindependentsubjecttowhichtheformalpropertiesbelong.Instead,thematterissomethingpotentialanddeterminable,39whichtheformdifferentiatesintoaparticularobject.Inplaceofremnantmatter,AristotleintroduceswhatIcallgenericmatter(Gill,1989,ch.5).Thisgenericmattercanbethoughtofeitherassomethingdeterminable,whichtheformdifferentiatesintotheobject,orasacollectionofmaterialpropertiesthatcharacterizethehigherlevelobject.Anadvantageofthenewmatter–formrelationisthatastatueisnottwothingswithdifferentpersistenceconditions,butjustonething–thestatue.Theproximate40genericmatterofthestatueisacollectionofpropertiesthatbelongtoit.Thematerialpropertiesthatconnectanobjectwithitssimpleroriginsaccountforcertainaspectsofthething’sbehavior,buttheydonotcontributetothenatureofthehigherlevelobject.FormandFunctionalMatterAristotle’sre-conceptionofremnantmatterasgenericmatterinH.6andQ.7allows41compositesofmatterandformtobeunifiedobjects.Thataccount,thoughvitaltohisdefenseofthesubstantialityoflivingorganisms,alsoappliestomaterialstuffslikethemetalsandartifactslikebronzespheres,whicharenotgenuineAristoteliansubstances.Toseewhylivingorganismsaregenuinesubstances,whereasstuffsandartifactsarenot,wemustconsiderAristotle’sfurtheranalysisofpotentialityandactualityinMetaphysicsQ.Q.1opensbyremindingusofthemainprojectofZHQ.Aristotleisinvestigatingbeingintheprimarysense,thebeingofsubstance(1045b27–32).Itisinrelationto38.Infact,thecomponentsextractedaretypicallynotofthesortusedinitsproduction,butelements–earth,water,air,andfire–thatcomposedtheoriginalingredients.Cf.Aristotle’scyclicalmodelofgenerationanddestructionatMet.H.5,1044b29–1045a6.39.Cf.Brunschwig(1979)andJaulin(1999).Bothscholarstreatmatterasdeterminable,likeagenus.Wedifferonthestatusofthematerialgenus.SeeGill(Forthcoming).40.InQ.7Aristotleinsiststhatanobjectiscalled“that-en”onlywithreferencetothenextitemdown,nottoanythinglower.Aboxiscalledneither“earthen”nor“earth,”but“wooden”(1049a22).Thisisbecausethelowerlevelmatteristransformedintomatteratthenextlevelup,contributingsomeofitspropertiestoit,andsoonupthechain.Forthisreasontheproductischaracterizedbythepropertiesofitsproximategenericmatteralone.SeefurtherGill(Forthcoming).41.Foradifferentaccountoftheunityofcomposites,seeScaltsas(1994).365ACTC1836520/03/2006,04:08PM\nmarylouisegillthisbeingthatothersortsofbeings(qualities,quantities,etc.)areunderstood.Q,liketheprecedingbooks,investigatessubstantialbeing,butitadoptsanewapproachtothatinvestigation.InQ.1Aristotledistinguishestwopotentiality–actualitymodels42(1045b32–1046a4).Thefirstmodeltreatspotentialityinthestrictestsense,whichappliestochange,buthesaysitisnotthemostusefulforthepresentproject.Evenso,hedevotesthefirstfivechaptersofQtoit.InQ.6(1048a28–30)heindicatesthatthefirstmodelhelpstoclarifythesecond,whichhewillapplytosubstance.Thefirstpotentiality–actualitymodelconcernsthetransitionfromafirst-levelpotentialitytoafirst-levelactuality(achange)andtheproductthatresultsfromthatchange.InQAristotleisprimarilyinterestedinthecausalprinciplesofsuchchanges.Heidentifiestwo,oneactiveandonepassive.Changeinvolvesamoverandamoved,andeachischaracterizedbyaspecialsortof43potency(dunamis).Aristotledefinesanactivepotencyas“theprincipleofchangeinanotherthingor[inthethingitself]asother”(Q.1,1046a10–11).Apassivepotencyisaprincipleofpassivechangebyanotherthingorbythethingitselfasother(1046a11–26).Activeandpassivepotenciescorrespondintheirgoal:astateftoberealizedinthepatient.Butactiveandpassivepotencypairsareinitiallyopposed–theagentisf(orhasfinmind),andthepatientis~f.Bymeansofthechangetheagent44bringsthepatientintoastatethatcorrespondstotheagent’sownactivepotency(f).Theactivepotencytypicallybelongstoanentityotherthantheobjectchangedbut,inthespecialcaseofself-change,aswhenadoctorcureshimself,theactivepotencybelongstothemoveritselfconsideredasother.Thedoctoractsinvirtueofhisknow-ledgeofhealth(f);heundergoesachangeinvirtueofhisprivationofhealth(~f).Bymeansofachangethedoctor,asthepatient,acquireshealth(f).Aristotleregardsanactivepotencyasafirstmovingcause:itdoesnotitselfbringabouttheoutcome,but42.Onthistopic,seetheclassicpaperbyKosman(1984).SeealsoGill(1989,chs.6and7,and2003).43.ItranslatethesameGreekworddunamissometimesas“potentiality”andsometimesas“potency.”Iuse“potentiality”indiscussingAristotle’sdistinctionsbetweendunamisandenergeia/entelecheia(“actuality”).Iprefer“potency”indiscussinganobject’sprincipleofactiveorpassivechange,becauseitlendsitselfmorenaturallythan“potentiality”toactiveandpassiveconstrual.AlthoughIusetwotranslations,Idonotintendtherebytodistinguishtwoindependentmeaningsofdunamis.SomescholarsdothinkAristotlehastwodistinctnotions,eithercausalpowerandpossibility(Charlton(1991),Freeland(1986)),orcausalpowerandpotentiality(inactivepower)(Witt(2003)).Ithinkthereisasinglecore/focalnotionofdunamisinQ,thatofactivepowertochangesomethingelse(1046a10–11;cf.D.12,1019b35–1020a2).Theothersortsofdunamisaredefinedwithreferencetothat.Frede(1994)arguesthatthereisonlyonenotionofpotentiality–causalpower–inQ,whichAristotleusesinvariousways.AlthoughIagreethatthereisagenericsamenessamongthenotions(see1049b5–10,quotedbelow,p.367,whereAristotleclaimsthatnatureisinthesamegenusasdunamis:thegenusispresumablysimplycausalpotency),Ithinktherearespecificdifferencesamongthenotionsthatfallunderthatkind,andthatoneofthoseisthecorenotion.44.BodnárandPellegrin(thisvolume)callthistheprincipleofcausationalsynonymy.Forthebackgroundofthisnotion,seeMourelatos,theconceptoftheuniversalinsomelaterpre-platoniccosmologists,pp.61–4.366ACTC1836620/03/2006,04:08PM\nfirstphilosophyinaristotleitspresenceintheagentenablestheagenttodoso.AnactivepotencyiswhatAristotlecallsanunmovedmover.Thesecondpotentiality–actualitymodelresemblesthefirstinallitsbasiccomponents.Likethefirstmodel,thesecondemploysanactivepotencyandapassivepotency;andlikethefirst,thesecondconcernstwomainactualities–amotionandaproduct.Butunlikethefirst,thesecondmodelinvolvesanagentandapatientthatactandsufferinrespectofthesameform(f),andunlikethefirst,thesecondconcernsamotionthatisnotachange,butanactivity.MetaphysicsQ.8specifiesapotency,whichAristotlecallsanatureandcontrastswiththeactivepotencyfamiliarfromQ.1.Hesays:Imeanbypotencynotonlytheonethathasbeendefined,whichiscalledanactiveprincipleofchangeinanotherthingorasother,butgenerallyeveryprincipleofmotionandrest.Fornatureisalsointhesamegenusaspotency;foritisaprincipleofactivemotion,yetnotinanotherthingbutinthethingitselfasitself.(1049b5–10)Thesinglemodification,thattheprincipleofactivemotionisinthethingitselfasitself,yieldsaschemequitedifferentfromthepreviousone.Incontextsofchangetheagentactsonasubjectdeprivedofacertainpositivecharacter.Bymeansofachangethepatientcomestobeotherthanitpreviouslywasandisassimilatedtothepositivestateoftheagent.Onthesecondpotentiality–actualitymodeltheagentandthepatientactandsufferinvirtueofthesamepositivecharacter,andinnaturalcasesactiveandpassivepotenciesarelocatedinthesameindividual.Forinstance,alivingorganismhasaperceptivesoul,whichisanactivepotency,anditsbodypossessessenseorgans,whichhaveacorrespondingpassivepotency.Whentheorganismperceives,perceptionisajointoperationofitsactiveandpassivepotencies.Perceptiondoesnotchangetheperceiver–theperceiverdoesnotbecomeotherthanitpreviouslywas.Perceptionandtheorganism’sothernaturalfunctionsareactivitiesthatexpresstheorganism’snature.Themajordifferencebetweenlivingorganismsandallothermaterialobjectsisthattheiractivepotency,thecauseoftheircharacteristicbehavior,isinternal,notexternaltothem.Whereasanaxdependsforitsactivityonsomeonewhowieldstheax,alivingorganismisboththeactivesourceandsubjectofitsactivities.Livingorganismshaveanautonomythatothermaterialobjectslack.PrimarySubstancesTheanalysisofsubstantialbeingintermsofpotentialityandactualityreinstatesmanycompositesasprimarysubstances.LivingorganismslikeSocratesandthehorseBucephalusareunifiedobjects,despitetheircompositionfrommatter.Matterdoesnotpreventtheirunityafterall.Bytreatingthelowerlevel(generic)matterassomethingdeterminableandnotasadefinitesubjecttowhichpropertiesbelong,Aristotlecanarguethatthematterthatconnectsanobjectwithitssimpleroriginssimplycharacterizestheobjectanddoesnotcontributetowhatitis.Hecanthenarguethatthenatureofthefunctionalmatterisexhaustedbytheformoftheorganism.Thereisnothingelseofwhichthefunctionsarepredicatedwhichcontributesspeciallytowhattheyare.367ACTC1836720/03/2006,04:08PM\nmarylouisegillPredicatingtheformofthefunctionalmatteristhereforenotacaseofpredicatingonethingofanother(YinX,whereXisdistinctinbeingfromY).Thebeingofalivingorganismanditsessenceare,afterall,identical.Theformofanorganismjustistheorganism’sactivepotencyanditsmatterisitsfunctionalbody,whichisessentially(andexhaustively)determinedbythecorrespondingpassivepotency.Anorganismactsonitselfasitselfandthemotionisitscharacteristicactivity,itsmodeofliving.Theresidualmaterialproperties(withreferencetowhichpartsoftheorganicbodyarecalled“x-en”)remainindependentoftheform.Thesepropertiesstillhaveanimportantroletoplay.RecallwhatAristotlesaidinH.6:“Foreachthingissomeonething,andthethinginpotentialityandthethinginactualityaresomehowone”(1045b20–21).Whyonly“somehow”one?Ihavearguedthattheformandthematteroflivingorganismsarecharacterizedbyactiveandpassiveversionsofthesamefunctionalproperties.Butbecauseorganismsaregeneratedoutofsimplermatterandwillbedestroyedintosimplermatter,theyalsopossessdispositionalpropertiesoftheproximategenericmatter.Forthisreasoncomplexorganismseasilydegenerateintosimplerstuff.Theresidualmaterialpropertiestendtosubverttheunityofthewhole,withtheresultthattheunityisunstableandmustbeconstantlymaintained(seeGill,1989,ch.7).Thosematerialpropertiesaccountforthefactthatmaterialsubstances45growtired,weaken,andfinallycollapse.Becauseanorganismtendstodegenerate,stayingthesameisconsiderablework.Soanorganism’scharacteristicactivityismorethananexpressionofwhatitis.Suchactivityisalsoitsmeansofself-preservationandrenewal.Thisdynamicpreservationisthejointmanifestationofitsactiveandpassivepotencies,andthatactivitymaintainstheorganismastheunifiedthingthatitis.TheologyIhavearguedthatlivingorganismsareprimarysubstances,whosecharacteristicbehavioriscausedbyaninnerprinciple,anactivepotency,whichAristotlecallstheirnature(phusis).Thesesubstancesareperishable,andthesourceoftheirperishabilityistheirproximategenericmatter.Thismatterisnotadistinctsubjectwithintheobject,butapotentialityofthehigherlevelobject.Thatpotentialitycanceasetobeactualized.Whenthepotentialitytobethehigherobjectceasestobeactualized,theorganismdies–itisreducedtosimplerstuff.Livingorganismsdonotdependonacausebeyondthemselvestoexplaintheirnaturalbehavior.Theiractiveprincipleisinternal.Whatdoesstillneedexplanation,however,arethecomplexpatternsofgenerationandperishingintheterrestrialrealm.ThisquestionpromptsAristotletodiscusstheheavensandtoappealtoanultimatedivineprinciple,afirstunmovedmover.InMetaphysicsL.5Aristotlementionstwoexternalmovingcausesofhumanbeings,thefatherandthesuninitsobliquecourse(1071a14–17).Thesunplaysavitalrole45.SeeAristotle’sdiscussionoftheheavenlybodiesinMet.Q.8.Becausetheydonothavethesamesortofmatterassublunaryobjects,theynevertireoftheirproperactivity,asdoperishablethings.Matterofperishablethings,whichistheirpotentialitytobeandnottobe,isthecauseoftiringandperishability(1050b20–28).368ACTC1836820/03/2006,04:08PM\nfirstphilosophyinaristotleinsubstantialgenerationanddestruction.Itstwofoldmotion–itsdailywestwardmotionwiththesphereofthefixedstarsandannualeastwardmotionalongtheecliptic,resultinginlongerandshorterdays–translatesitselfdowntothesublunaryrealmintheelementalchangewitnessedinseasonalvariation.Thesun’scomplexmotionaccountsfortheorderlycyclicalpatternofgenerationanddestructioninthesublunary46realm.MetaphysicsL.1distinguishesthreesortsofsubstances:perceptibleperishablesub-stances,likeplantsandanimals;perceptibleimperishablesubstances,likethesunandstars;andunmovedsubstance,whichhearguesisseparatefromphysicalthings(1069a30–b2).Aristotlearguesinthefollowingway:Whatensuresthecontinuityofgenerationanddestructioninallitssplendidvariety?Hisanswer:thecomplexeternalcircularmotionsoftheheavenlybodies.Whatensuresthecontinuityofthosemotions?Hisanswer:anunmovedmover,oneforeachheavenlysphere(L.6,1071b3–11;L.8).ThePrimeMoverisfirstintroducedasthecauseoftheeternalrotationoftheoutermostsphere,thesphereofthefixedstars(L.7,1072a23–26;1072b3–10).Butthisfirstmoveraccountsformorethanthecontinuousrotationoftheoutermostsphere.InL.10Aristotleasksinwhatwaythegoodiscontainedintheuniverse:Isitcontainedinsomethingseparatebyitselforintheorderoftheparts?Orisitcontainedinbothways,likeanarmy,whosegoodisbothintheorderandthegeneral?Aristotlesaysthatthegoodiscontainedinbothways,butitismorethegeneral,sincethegeneraldoesnotdependontheorder,whereastheorderdependsonhim(1075a11–25).Aristotle’sPrimeMoveristheprincipleofcosmicorder(seeKahn,1985).ThePrimeMover’sconstantactivityguaranteesthatthingscontinuetobehaveaccordingtotheirnaturesforthegoodofoneanotherandforthegoodofthewhole.AristotlearguesthatthePrimeMoverisapureactuality–asecond-actualityoractivity.Heexcludesfromitallvestigesofpotentiality.Ifthefirstmovercontainedanypotency(dunamis),itsactivitymightfail,anditwoulddependonsomethingelsetoensurethecontinuityofitsactivity(L.9).ThePrimeMover’sdivinebeingdoesnotdifferinkindfromtheactivebeingofordinaryterrestrialsubstances.ThedifferenceisthatAristotle’sGodalwaysenjoystheactivitythatweearthlysubstancesachieveonly47sometimesandforashorttime(L.7).BibliographyTextsandCommentariesJaeger,W.(1957).AristotelisMetaphysica.OxfordClassicalText.Oxford:ClarendonPress.FurthertextsandcommentariesontheGreektextoftheMetaphysicsarelistedinWorksCited:Ross(1953);andFredeandPatzig(1988)(onBookZ).46.Ontheroleofthesuninthecontinuityofgenerationanddestructionanditspatternedvariety,seeGCII.10,esp.336a31–b24.Cf.Met.L.6,1072a9–18.47.IthankIstvánBodnárandPaulCoppockforvaluablecommentsonthispaper.ToHeikeSefrin-WeisIowespecialthanks(seen.9above)forre-orientingmythinkingaboutAristotle’sconceptionofbeingintheMetaphysics.369ACTC1836920/03/2006,04:08PM\nmarylouisegillWorksCitedAckrill,J.L.([1972–3]1997).“Aristotle’sDefinitionsofPsuchE.”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,73,119–33.Repr.inJ.L.Ackrill,EssaysonPlatoandAristotle(pp.163–78).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Berti,E.(1971).“MultiplicitéetunitédubienselonEEI.8.”InP.MoreauandD.Harlfinger(eds.),UntersuchungenzurEudemischenEthik(pp.157–84).ProceedingsoftheFifthSymposiumAristotelicum.Berlin:deGruyter.Bolton,R.(1994).“Aristotle’sConceptionofMetaphysicsasaScience.”InT.Scaltsas,D.Charles,andM.L.Gill(eds.),Unity,Identity,andExplanationinAristotle’sMetaphysics(pp.321–54).Oxford:ClarendonPress.——.(1996).“ScienceandtheScienceofSubstanceinAristotle’sMetaphysicsZ.”InF.A.LewisandR.Bolton(eds.),Form,Matter,andMixtureinAristotle(pp.231–80).Oxford/Malden,Mass.:Blackwell.CorrectedversionofspecialissueofPacificPhilosophicalQuarterly,76(1995).Brunschwig,J.(1979).“Laforme,prédicatdelamatière?”InP.Aubenque(ed.).ÉtudessurlaMétaphysiqued’Aristote(pp.131–66.).ProceedingsoftheSixthSymposiumAristotelicum.Paris:Vrin.Buchheim,T.(2001).“TheFunctionsoftheConceptofPhysisinAristotle’sMetaphysics.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,20,201–34.Burnyeat,M.F.(2001).AMapofMetaphysicsZeta.Pittsburgh,Pa.:Mathesis.Charlton,W.(1970).Aristotle’sPhysicsI,II.Oxford:ClarendonPress.——.(1991).“AristotleandtheUsesofActuality.”ProceedingsoftheBostonAreaColloquiuminAncientPhilosophy,5,1–22.Code,A,(1985).“OntheOriginsofsomeAristotelianThesesaboutPredication.”InJ.BogenandJ.E.McGuire(eds.).HowThingsAre(pp.101–31).Dordrecht:Reidel.——.1986.“Aristotle:EssenceandAccident.”InR.E.GrandyandR.Warner(eds.),PhilosophicalGroundsofRationality:Intentions,Categories,Ends(pp.411–39).Oxford:ClarendonPress.——.(1996).“OwenandtheDevelopmentofAristotle’sMetaphysics.”InW.Wians(ed.).Aristotle’sPhilosophicalDevelopment(pp.303–25).Lanham,Md.:RowmanandLittlefield.——.(1997).“Aristotle’sMetaphysicsasaScienceofPrinciples.”RevueInternationaledePhilosophie,201,357–78.Cohen,M.(1978).“IndividualandEssenceinAristotle’sMetaphysics.”InG.C.Simmons(ed.).Paideia:SpecialAristotleIssue(pp.75–85).Brockport,NY.Cohen,S.(1984).“Aristotle’sDoctrineofMaterialSubstrate.”PhilosophicalReview,93,171–94.——.(1996).AristotleonNatureandIncompleteSubstance.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Collinge,N.E.(1971).“TheSenateandtheEssence:gerousi/aandou0si/a.”Glotta,49,218–29.Dahl,N.(2003).“OnSubstanceBeingtheSameasitsEssenceinMetaphysicsvii6:TheArgumentaboutPlatonicForms.”AncientPhilosophy,23,153–79.Dancy,R.(1978).“OnSomeofAristotle’sSecondThoughtsaboutSubstances:Matter.”Philo-sophicalReview,87,372–413.Devereux,D.(1992).“InherenceandPrimarySubstanceinAristotle’sCategories.”AncientPhilosophy12,113–31.——.(2003).“TheRelationshipbetweenBooksZetaandEtaofAristotle’sMetaphysics.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,25,159–211.Driscoll,J.(1981).“EIDHinAristotle’sEarlierandLaterTheoriesofSubstance.”InD.J.O’Meara(ed.).StudiesinAristotle(pp.129–59).Washington,DC:CatholicUniversityofAmericaPress.Ferejohn,M.(2003).“LogicalandPhysicalInquiriesinAristotle’sMetaphysics.”TheModernSchoolman,80,325–50.370ACTC1837020/03/2006,04:08PM\nfirstphilosophyinaristotleFine,G.(1984).“Separation.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,2,31–87.Frede,M.(1987).“TheUnityofGeneralandSpecialMetaphysics:Aristotle’sConceptionofMetaphysics.”InM.Frede,EssaysinAncientPhilosophy(pp.81–95).Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress.——.(1994).“Aristotle’sNotionofPotentialityinMetaphysicsQ.”InT.Scaltsas,D.Charles,andM.L.Gill(eds.),Unity,Identity,andExplanationinAristotle’sMetaphysics(pp.173–93).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Frede,M.andCharles,D.(eds.).(2000).Aristotle’sMetaphysicsLambda.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Frede,M.andPatzig,G.(1988).AristotelesMetaphysikZ.Text.ÜbersetzungundKommentar.(2vols.).Munich:C.H.Beck.Freeland,C.(1986).“AristotleonPossibilitiesandCapacities.”AncientPhilosophy,6,69–89.Furth,M.(1988).Substance,FormandPsyche:AnAristoteleanMetaphysics.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Gill,M.L.(1989).AristotleonSubstance:TheParadoxofUnity.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.——.(2001).“Aristotl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idge:CambridgeUniversityPress.AguidetosomeofthemainissuesdebatedintheMetaphysicsandsurveyofrecentliterature:Gill,M.L.(2005).“Aristotle’sMetaphysicsReconsidered.”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy,43,223–51.372ACTC1837220/03/2006,04:08PM\nfirstphilosophyinaristotleUsefulcollectionsofpaperscitedaboveare:Frede,M.andCharles,D.(eds.).(2000);Scaltsas,T.,Charles,D.,andGill,M.L.(eds.).(1994).Seealso:Barnes,J.,Schofield,M.,andSorabji(eds.).(1979).ArticlesonAristotle.(vol.3):Metaphysics.London:Duckworth.TranslationsandPhilosophicalCommentariesBostock,D.(1994).Aristotle’sMetaphysics.BooksZandH.ClarendonAristotleSeries.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Kirwan,C.(1993).Aristotle’sMetaphysics.BooksG,D,andE(2ndedn.).ClarendonAristotleSeries.Oxford:ClarendonPress.373ACTC1837320/03/2006,04:08PM\nmichaelpakaluk19Aristotle’sEthicsMICHAELPAKALUKWiththeexception,apparently,ofafewpassagesinBookV,onjustice,andthedoubletreatmentofpleasure,inVII.11–14andX.1–5,Aristotle’sNicomacheanEthics(EN)is1aremarkablycoherentbook.AtthebeginningAristotletellsuswhatheaimstodo;hethencarriesthisout,inasystematicfashion,withdeviationsfromthegeneralplanreadilyexplainable;andthen,attheend,hedeclaresthathehassucceeded(byhislights)incarryingoutwhathehadoriginallyproposed.Thetreatise’sgeneralcoherenceis,moreover,underwrittenbyfrequenteditorialreferencesbackwardsandforwards.ENostensiblyhasthecharacterofasearchbackwards(zEtEsis,cf.I.13,1102a13);itsapparentaimis,simply,toidentifytheultimategoodofhumanlife,whichAristotlevariouslycalls“thehighestachievablegood”(I.4,1095a16);“thegood”(I.2,1094a23);“thebestthing”(1094a23);“thehumangood”(1094b7,1098a16);“doingwell”(I.4,1095a19);or“happiness”(1095a20).Thetreatisemightthereforemoreappro-priatelybecalled,not“Ethics”,butrathersomethinglike“Whattheultimategoodofhumanlifeis.”Anythingmorethatwewouldwishtoregardasethicsis,atbest,introducedbyAristotleasitwereincidentally,inthecourseofhisattempttoidentifythisultimategood.Aristotle’ssearchforthisgoodhasthefourelementsthatmustcomposeanysystematicsearch.First,onemustgivearoughdescriptionofwhatoneislookingfor;second,onemustspecifyafieldinwhichtoconductthesearch;third,onemustproceedsystematicallythroughthespecifiedfield;and,fourth,onemustverifywhetherasuspectedcandidateisinfacttheobjectsought.1.FourtreatisesonethicshavecomedowntousasattributedtoAristotle:theNicomacheanEthics(EN);EudemianEthics(EE);MagnaMoralia(MM);andOnVirtuesandVices(VV).OnemightalsoaddthereconstructedProtrepticus(Protr.),whichisethicalinsofarasitarguesforacertainviewofwhatmakeslifeworthliving.ButVViscertainlyspurious;MMprobablyso;andEE,oftensuspectedofbeinginauthentic,isnonethelesssofrequentlycorruptinitstext,orobscureinitsmeaning,thatrarelymayitbeusedwithconfidencetoclarifyEN,ratherthanthereverse.YetProtr.andENseemtoagreeinoutlookandspirit.HenceIshallfocushereonENandtakethattreatisetoexpressAristotle’sconsideredethicalviews.(Kenny(1978),isthestartingpointfordiscussionsofthedatingandauthenticityofthetreatises.Perhapsthebestdiscussionofthetwotreatmentsofpleasure,whichattemptstoreconcilethem,isOwen(1971–2).)374ACTC1937420/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’sethicsSimilarly,atthebeginningofENAristotle,first,setsdowntwobasiccriteriawhich,hethinks,wouldneedtobesatisfiedbyanultimategood:itmustbetrulyultimate(teleiotaton),inthesensethatitcannotbeworthhavingforthesakeofanythingelse,whereasanythingelseworthhavingmustbeworthhavingforthesakeofit;anditfurthermoremustbeself-sufficient(autarkEs),inthesensethat,ifweweretohavethisgood,thenwewouldneednothingelse(I.7,1097a30–b21).Second,hedelimitsthefieldofthesearch,chieflybymeansofhisfamous“FunctionArgument”:weshouldlookfortheultimategood,Aristotleargues,amongthoseactivitiesthatareexpressionsofthevarioushumanvirtues;theultimategoodwillbeonesuchactivity,themostultimateofthese(1098a17–18);and,usingasimpleaccountofhumanpsychology,hederivesalistofthevirtues(I.13).Third,Aristotlesystematicallyexaminesthesevirtuesandtheircorrespondingactivities;thisinvestigationconstitutesthebulkofthetreatise,BooksIII–IX.Fourth,andfinally,whenhehascompletedthissystematicexamination,helooksbackonwhatwasestablishedand,relyingmainlyonthecriteria(ofultimacyandself-sufficiency)thathehadarticulatedatthebeginning,hepicksoutonesuchactivityastheultimategood:theultimatehumangood,Aristotleconcludes,istheactivitythatwecanengageinthroughthevirtueofspeculativewisdom(X.7).ThisconclusionisbroadlyconsonantwiththeviewpointoftheProtrepticus(hintedattooelsewhereinthecorpus,suchasatMet.A.1–2),whereanimpassionedAristotleinsiststhat“Humankindpossessesnothingdivineorblessedthatisofanyaccountexceptwhatthereisinusofmindandunderstanding:thisaloneofourpossessionsseemstobeimmortal,thisalonedivine.Byvirtueofbeingabletoshareinthisfaculty,life,howeverwretchedanddifficultbynature,isyetsocleverlyarrangedthathumanbeingsseemtobegodsincomparisonwithallothercreatures”(Protr.B109Barnes=p.45Ross).GoodnessisGoal-likeInordertounderstandthisclaimcorrectly,however,itisimportanttoattendtosomeofAristotle’sremarksintheopeningchaptersofEN(I.1–2),onthenatureofgoals,whichconstitutesAristotle’sdevelopmentofthePlatonicnotionofa“craft”(technE).ItisclearfromtheexampleshegivesthatAristotleregardsagoal(telos)asarepeat-ableresultofacertainkind,whichservesasaprincipleoforganizationfortheactionsofsomeonewho(orsomethingwhich)hasacorrespondingroleorability.Bridlemakersmakebridles,repeatedly;generalswinbattles,repeatedly.Tosaythat“victoryinbattleisthegoalofageneral,”istosaythatanyactionofageneral,insofarasheisactingasageneral,canbeunderstoodasdirectedatsomeparticularvictory(whetherplanned,merely,orinfactachieved;whetherhisownorwonbyanalliedgeneral–thereisnoneedtotakeagoaltobeegoisticinthefirstplace).Humanactionasdirectedtowardagoalisperiodicincharacter,andthegreatbulkofitconsistsofpreparationforattainingagoal.Thegoalisthataroundwhichtheotheractivityisorganized.Thus,ageneralwinsbattlesonlyperiodically,duringcampaigns,andmostofhisactivitydirectedatwinningbattleswillinvolvesomethingbesidesfightingabattle,e.g.trooptraining;troopmovement;logistics;preparationofweapons;etc.Similarly,toclaimthat“activityofspeculativewisdomisthegoalofa(good)humanbeing”is,sofar,to375ACTC1937520/03/2006,04:09PM\nmichaelpakalukclaimnomorethanthatanyactionofa(good)humanbeing,insofarasheisactingwellasahumanbeing,canbeunderstoodasdirectedatsomeparticularexerciseofspeculativewisdom(whetherplanned,merely,orinfactachieved;whetherhisown,orthatofacomrade).Itfollowsfromthisthatif,withAristotle,werefertotheultimatehumangoalas“happiness”(eudaimonia,atermwhichmeans,literally,“beingblessedby(orwith)agod”),thenhappinessisarepeatableresultofacertainkind,achievedbysomeonewhohasacorrespondingroleorability;itisnotsomethingthat(aswemightimagine)comesaboutonceforall,orrandomly.Happinessoccursatintervalswithinalifewelllived,anditsoccurrenceorganizestheotheractivitiesofsuchalife.Tosaythat“hap-pinessisactivityofspeculativewisdom”istosaythatactivityofthatsort,periodically2attained,shouldserveastheorganizingprincipleofhumanlife.Itbecomesnecessarytodistinguish,then,betweenhappinessandahappylife:ahappylifewouldpresumablybeoneinwhichhappinessisattainedwithasufficientfrequency(although,again,perhapsbyafriendratherthanbyoneself)andwith3sufficientreliability,sothatthelifeasawholecancountashappy.(Note,however,thatAristotledoesnotsaywithanyprecisionwhatdegreeormannerofattainmentofhappinesssufficestomakealifehappy.Norshouldweexpecthimtodoso:Howmanyvictoriesneedageneralwin,orhowfrequentlyneedhewinthem,tobesuccessfulasageneral?Thequestionisjustaboutmeaningless.)Additionally,weshoulddistinguishbetweensgoalsthatareattainablebyanindi-vidual,actingonhisown,andthosethatareattainableonlythroughjointactionwithothers,whoconsequentlyformalongwithoneselfan“association”(koinOnia,seeVIII.9–12)fortheattainingofthatgoal.Weseekagoalinassociationwithotherswhenitiseithernotpossibleatall,orpracticallyspeakingunworkable,toachievethatgoalthroughone’sownefforts.Weseekagoalthroughalargerassociation,whenitiseithernotpossibleatall,orpracticallyspeakingunworkable,toachievethatgoalthroughtheeffortsofasmallerassociation.Thus:eachfarmerinAthensneededtodefendhisfarmagainstattacksfromothercity-states;thisisnotsomethingthathecouldpracticallyspeakingdobyhisownefforts;hencefarmersandothercitizenswouldbepartofamilitia,whichjointlyprovidedforindividualdefense.Again,eachcity-stateinGreeceneededtodefenditselfagainstPersianattacks;thisisnotsomethingthattheseparatemilitiasmighteffectivelydoontheirown;hence,thecity-statesformedaleagueforcommondefense.Aristotleregardshappiness–theactivityofspeculativewisdom–tobeagoalthatiseithernotattainableatallbyanindividual’sefforts,ornotpracticallyspeakingsoattainable.Heregardsit,rather,assomethingthatisattainablethroughwhatheregardsasthecommoneffortsofthenatural,completeunitofhumanassociation,thatis,thecity-state.Thismakessense:thenatural,universalgoalforhumanbeings,2.IncontrastitisperhapsmostcommoninEnglishtotake“happiness”eithersubjectively,toindicateafeeling,orobjectively,tosignifyaconditionofalifetakenasawhole.Aninfluentialarticle,whicharguesthatAristotleintendseudaimoniainthelattersense,isKraut(1979a).3.ThedistinctioniscorrectlystressedinanimportantarticlebyHeinaman(1988).376ACTC1937620/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’sethicsissomethingthatistobeattained,Aristotlethinks,bythenatural,completeunitofassociation.Hence,attheverybeginningofEN,heisclearthatthegoalheisseekingafteristheobjectof“politicalcraft”(politikE,I.2,1094b11)andproperlytheultimategoalofpoliticaladministration;andthroughoutENheappealstotheintentionsandeffortsoflegislators–indeed,ENseemstobeaddressedprincipallytolegislators(cf.4X.9;I.13,1102a7–10,II.1,1103b3–4;II.3,1105a12).Areaderoftodaymightobjecttothisidea:Isn’titobviouslypossibleforanindi-vidual,onhisown,toengageinactivityofspeculativewisdom?Whatcouldbeeasierthantotakeupabookofphilosophy(say)andstartthinkingaboutit?Thecontrastwithmilitarydefenseisevident,andthishardlyrequiresthejointactionofcitizensinpoliticalsociety.But,asisclearfromtheopeningbookoftheMetaphysics(A.1,981b14–24),insayingthattheactivityofspeculativewisdomisagoal,andachievement,ofpoliticalcraft,Aristotleisthinkingaboutthemuchlargerpicture,ofhowitisthatanindividualmightbefree,inthefirstplace,topickupthatbookofphilosophyandthinkaboutit.Aristotle’sviewisthattheachievementoftheultimategoalofhumanliferequiresleisure(scholE,ENX.7,1177b4–22),thatis,atemporaryfreedomfromconcernforthenecessitiesoflife;butthatthereisleisureatallisanachievementofpoliticalsociety;andthatleisureisputtoitsproperusebycitizens(education,thinking,andculture–ratherthan,say,militarytraining,orhedonisticenjoyment)isalsoanartifactofagoodsystemoflawsandeducation.Thus,throughoutENAristotletakesitforgrantedthattheultimategoalofhumanactionissomethingthatisproperlysoughtandattainedinastableandsoundlycon-stitutedpoliticalsociety.Butthisforestalls,atleast,aworrythatiscommonlyfeltbyreadersofEN.ItisthoughtthatENisatreatiseon“ethics,”inoursense,andthenitisnoted,withconsternation,thatonefailstofindinENanydirection,exceptofarathervaguesort,astowhatsortsofactionsaretobedoneandwhatsortstobeavoided.Ethicswouldseemtoinvolvethearticulationandjustificationofrulesforaction,butnothinglikethisisfoundinEN.(Issuicideeverpermissible?Whatconstitutesstealing,andwhyisitwrongtosteal?Whatisthereasonwhymurderisforbidden?Underwhatconditionsissexualintercourselicit?Andsoon.)Indeed,apartfromsomeveryroughremarksinBookV,whereinjusticeisanalyzedasakindofinequality,Aristotleseemssimplytotakevariousmoralprinciplesforgranted,forinstance,thatadulteryisalwayswrong(II.6,1107a11–15).Theworryariseslargelybecausewepresumethatthereissuchathing,insomeformorother,asa“morallaw,”andweexpectatreatiseonEthicstodiscussmorallaws.ButforAristotletherelevantlawgoverningactionissimplythelawofpoliticalsociety(henceitbecomesaseriousquestion,forhim,whetheragoodhumanbeingandagoodcitizenarethesamething,cf.Pol.III.3);andheregardsitasfairlyobvious(correctlyso)thatsuchthingsastheftandmurderneedtobeoutlawedinastableandsoundlyconstitutedpoliticalsociety.Ingeneral,whatwetaketobeamatterofmorality,hetakestobeprimarilyamatteroflegislation,andhepresumesthat4.OntherelationshipbetweenAristotle’sethicsandpoliticalphilosophy,seeKeyt,aristotle’spoliticalphilosophy,inthisvolume.377ACTC1937720/03/2006,04:09PM\nmichaelpakalukconstraintsonactionthatmightappeardifficulttounderstandorjustify,ifconsideredasapplyingsimplytoanindividual,willseemrelativelyeasytoaccept,ifregardedasbindingonpoliticalsocietyasawhole.(Recallthat,onPlato’slights,thepositiontakenbyanamoralistsuchasThrasymachusissimplythatheshouldbeabletobehaveasifatyrant,andthereforeasifhelivedapartfrompoliticalsociety,withallof5politicalsocietyministeringtohiswants.)Inasense,then,inENAristotledefers,toalaterconsiderationoflegislation,manyoftheissuesthatwewouldwanttoinvestigateasmattersofpersonalconduct(justasitisinPlato’sLaws,nottheRepublic,thatwefindanythinglikeacodeofconduct).And,infact,Ethicsseemstohavebeenregarded6byAristotleasseamlesslylinkedtoPolitics(cf.ENX.9).Ingeneral,itisdifficulttooverestimatetheimportance,forAristotle’sethics,ofthe7notionthatgoodnesshasthecharacterofagoal.ThathewillinsistonthisisclearfromtheopeninglinesofEN:“Everycraftandeverydiscipline,andsimilarlyactionandplan,seemstoaimataparticulargood,whichisthereasonwhy(dio)thegoodhasbeenpronounced,correctlyso,tobe‘whateverythingdesires.’Butthereappearstobeacertaindifferenceamonggoals....”(I.1,1094a1–4)Whatisofinteresthereisnotwhetherthepassage,asisoftenalleged,commitsa“quantifiershift”fallacy,inargu-8ingfrom“all/some”to“some/all”–clearly,Aristotlemightbejustlychargedwithsuchafallacyonlyifhethoughtthat“Thereisasinglegoodthateverythingaimsat”followsdirectly,andwithnofurtherpremises,from“Everythingaimsatsomegoodorother.”Buthisphrasingdoesnotsuggestthis(theinferentialparticlediogenerallyindicatesonlythatalaterclaimreceivessupportfromanearlierone,notthatitisdeductivelyimpliedbythatearlierclaim);andelsewhereinENAristotleindicatesthatafairlysubtleargument,withdiverseandcontroversialpremises,wouldberequiredtomovefromtheoneclaimtotheother(cf.VII.13,1153b25–32;X.2,1172b35–1173a5).Rather,whatisinterestingaboutthepassageishowAristotleimmediatelymovesfromtalkofgoods,totalkofgoals:Aristotlemakesuseoftheclaimthat“thegoodiswhateverythingdesires”asajustificationforceasingtotalkaboutgoods.Infact,itisthenotionof“ultimacy”or“finality,”notthatofgoodness,whichdominatesthefirstbookofEN;goodnessisintroducedandexaminedprincipallyinAristotle’sintricaterefutationinI.6ofthePlatonicclaimthatgoodnessissomethingcommon(koinon,1096a28,b25)andseparatelyexisting(chOriston,1096b22).Toholdthatgoodnessis“incommon”istoholdthat,foranytwothingsthataregood,thereissomeattributeorpropertywhichtheybothshare;and,inconsequenceofthis,thesethingsdifferingoodness“asregardsmoreandless”(mallonkaihEtton,cf.VIII.1,1155b15),thatis,theonemaybeproperlysaidtohavemore,less,orthesamedegreeofgoodnessastheother.Aristotleholds,rather,thattheterm“good”takeson5.SeetherelatedremarksbyLane,plato’spoliticalphilosophy,inthisvolume.6.SeeBodéüs(1993),foraninfluentialstatementofaviewofthissort.NotethatitisnotclaimedthatAristotleisalegalpositivist:heclearlyassertsinENV.7thatonlyinsomecasesissomethingwrongonlybecauseitisproscribed;inothercasestheexplanationforitsbeingwrongwillneedtoreferalsotothecharacteristics(thatis,the“nature”)oftheactproscribed,oroftheagentsinvolved.7.OnthispointseetheveryhelpfuldiscussioninWhite(1988).8.ThechargeisperhapsstatedmostpointedlyinGeach(1972,pp.1–2).378ACTC1937820/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’sethicsadifferentmeaning,amountingtoadifferenceinkind,whenitisappliedacrossthingsthatdifferinkind.Theterm“good”inthephrase“agoodknife”signifiessomethingdifferent,andincommensurable,withwhatthattermsignifiesinthephrase“agoodpiano.”Thedoctrinelooksobscureandpuzzlinguntilwetranslateitintotalkofgoalsor“ends,”inwhichcaseitbecomesmundane:ofcourse,whataknifeismeanttodo(its“goal”)isdifferentinkindfromwhatapianoismeanttodo,andthus,similarly,whatmakesaknifesuchthatitcandotheoneisdifferentinkindfromwhatmakesapianosuchthatitcandotheother.Thesenotions,too,areintroducedrightatthebeginningofEN:“Sincetherearemany[kindsof]actionsandcraftsanddisciplines,therearealsomany[kindsof]goals”(I.1,1094a6–8;cf.I.7,1097a16–18).Ifgoodnessisnot“incommon,”inthewayexplained,then,quitegenerally,classi-ficationshavingtodowithgoods–thatistosay,goals–willnotbehaveinthesamewayasthoseinvolvingattributesthatareincommon.Inparticular,inadiscussionwithinethicsweshouldnotexpecttofindgenus-speciestreesthatbehaveinthesameway,ororderingsofattributesthatcouldbedisplayedusingdevicessuchasVenndiagrams.Rather,whatwillbethecaseisthattherelevantgood,orgoal,willserveasakindofstandardforpredication,andotherusageswillbeobliquelyrelatedtothis(whatissometimescalled“centralcase”or“idealtype”analysis).Hencethedistinctionbetweenan“unqualified”useofaterm(theuseofthattermsimpliciter,orhaplOs),anda“qualified”useofaterm(secundumquid),becomesthemostimportantdeviceofclassificationforethics;and,indeed,Aristotleemploysitfrequently.Thecentralcaseispriorbecauseitismostexplanatory:eachofthevariousobliquecasesmaybeunder-stoodinrelationtothecentralcase(becauseeachinsomesense“wishestobe”whatisfoundinthecentralcase),whereasnoobliquecasequiteilluminatesanyotherobliquecaseinthesameway,andeachistooimpoverishedtoilluminatethecentralcase.Becausethecentralcaseisthusprior,itis“universal,”asbindingtogetherthevariousobliquecasesintoasingleclass(forexample,noonewouldtakesuchoppositephenomenaascowardiceandrecklessboldnesstogotogether,ifcouragedidnotservetounitethem).OnereasonPlatowishedtoinsistthatgoodnessis“incommon,”isthatthisviewcoheresbestwiththeviewthatthereisaseparateFormorIdeaofGoodness,inwhichparticulargoodsparticipate,andfromwhichtheyderivetheirgoodness.Allparticulargoods,then,wouldhavethesamethingincommon(namelywhateachderivesfromitsparticipationintheForm),andtheywouldvaryindegree,asgoods,dependingupontheirclosenessto,ordistancefrom,theForm.AristotleofcoursewillelsewheregivelogicalandmetaphysicalargumentsagainstseparateForms:intheEthicsperhapshisprincipalargumentagainstaFormofgoodnessissimplythatsuchaFormseemsirrelevantforaction(I.6,1096b35–1097a14).Thiscriticismisdecisiveif,again,good-nesshasthecharacterofagoal.CriteriaofanUltimateGoodWedistinguishedfourstagesintheostensibleprojectofEN,thesearchfortheultimategoalofhumanlife,andwemaygetafairsenseofthescopeandplanofthetreatisebybrieflyexaminingeachoftheseinturn.379ACTC1937920/03/2006,04:09PM\nmichaelpakalukThefirststagewastosetdowncriteriatoidentifywhatoneislookingfor,andacriterionofthissortisadumbratedalreadyatthebeginningofI.2:If,then,thereisagoalofpracticalmatterswhichissuchthat(i)wewishforitonaccountofitself,and(ii)wewishforotherthingsonaccountofit,(iii)anditisnotthecasethatwewishforeverythingonaccountofsomethingelse(sincethustherewillbeaninfiniteprogression,theconsequencebeingthatstrivingisemptyandvain),itisclearthatthis9wouldbethegoodandthebestthing.(1094a18–21)Aristotleholdsthatsomethingthatsatisfies(i)and(ii)“hasthenatureofagoal”oris“goal-like”(teleion,I.7,1097a25–30);andweshouldtake(iii)tobesettingdownathirdrequirement,thatis,thatthethingunderconsiderationisnot,inturn,wishedforonaccountofsomethingelse.AristotleaddssomeslightrefinementsinI.7:Wesaythatthatwhichistobesoughtinitsownrightis“moregoal-like”thanthatwhichistobesoughtonaccountofsomethingelse;andalsothatthatwhichisneverreasonablychosen(haireton)onaccountofsomethingelseis“moregoal-like”thanthosethingsthatarereasonablychosenbothintheirownrightandonaccountofsomething;andalso,then,wesaythatathingis“withoutqualificationgoal-like”ifitisalwaysreasonablychoseninitsownrightandneveronaccountofsomethingelse.(1097a30–34)BothofthesepassagesimplyinitiallyathreefolddivisionofgoodsnotunlikethatwhichPlatodrawsinRep.II(357b–d):goodsthatarepurelyinstrumental,inthesensethatwewouldnotwantthem,exceptfortheirconsequences;goodswewantbothinthemselvesandbecauseoftheirconsequences;andthesortofgoodthat,asPlatosays,“wewouldwelcome,notfromdesiringitsconsequences,butgreetingitforthesakeofitself.”ButnotethatPlatousestheindicativemoodtospecifythefirsttwoclasses(goodsthatwedowantonlyfortheirconsequences,oradditionallyfortheirownsake)andtheoptativeinspecifyingthethirdclass(agoodthatwewouldwant,evenapartfromitsconsequences).Thissuggeststhatafurtherdistinctioncouldbemadeinthislastclass,whichtherefinementsintheI.7passage,involvingtemporalqualifications(“always,”“never”),aremeanttoachieve.ThesetemporalqualificationsareconsistentwithAristotle’sconceptionofanendasbeing,aswassaid,arepeatableinstanceofageneralkind.Anendwhich,innoneofitsinstances,isfurthersubordinatedtosomethingelse,ismoregoal-likethanonewhich,insomeofitsinstances,isreasonablysosubordinated–evenifthereinfactare,orwecouldconceiveof,instancesinwhichthelattermightbesought,withoutitsbeingfurthersubordinated.Notethatevenifitisnecessary,ifstrivingisnottobe“emptyandvain,”thattherebegoalsthatarenotineveryinstanceadditionallysoughtforthesakeofsomethingelse,nothingwouldguaranteethattherebeagoalthatis,asAristotleputsit,“goal-likewithoutqualification,”thatis,whichisneversoughtforthesakeofanythingelse.9.AprovocativeexaminationofthispassagemaybefoundinWedin(1981).380ACTC1938020/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’sethicsThatiswhyAristotleprovisionallyprovidesaspaceforsuchanend,byusingthetermeudaimonia(“happiness”):eudaimonia,hepointsout,istakentobethesortofendthatisneveradditionallysoughtforthesakeofsomethingelse,whereasothergoal-likethings,insomeoftheirinstances,arereasonablysoughtforitssake(I.7,1097a34).(TheclaimwouldnotbeconvincingifputforwardusinganyoftheotherexpressionsthatAristotletendstouseasequivalenttoeudaimonia,suchas“thehumangood”or“thehighestgood”.)Butheneednothavetakenthisadditionalstep;hemightsimplyhavesaidthattheultimategoalofhumanlifewouldsimplybethemostgoal-likething,evenifnothingisgoal-likewithoutqualification.And,indeed,sometimeshepreferstospeakinthisway(e.g.,1097a36;1098a18,cf.I.8,1099a30).Asecondmarkoftheultimatehumangoodis,Aristotlethinks,thatitis“self-sufficient.”Nowwecandistinguishbetweenself-sufficiencyaspertainingtoagoodpossessedorenjoyed,andself-sufficiencyaspertainingtothesubjectwhohasorenjoyssomegood,andAristotleisquicktosaythat,bythemarkof“selfsufficiency,”hedoesnotmeanthelatter:itwillnotbeanisolatedindividual,butrathersomeonewithfamilyandfriendsatleast,whohasandenjoystheultimatehumangood(I.7,1097b8–14).Butagoodisself-sufficient,ifitissuchthattakenonitsown(i)itmakesalifeonethatisworthchoosingand(ii)itmakessomeonelackinginnothing(1097b14–16).Clearlythisisadistinctcriterionfromthefirst:trueenough,apurelyinstrumentalgoodbecomesentirelydispensable,oncewehavethatforthesakeofwhichweemploythatinstrument;butthereisnoreasontothinkthatpossessionofthemostgoal-likeofaclassofnon-instrumentalgoodswouldmakethoseothersdispensable.So,again,tomakethepointgothrough,Aristotlehastorelyontheforceofthetermeudaimonia,becauseitdoesseemasthough,ifwepossessedeudaimonia(happiness),theneverythingelsewouldbeunnecessary.Notethatweneednot,however,takeself-sufficiencytobeanall-or-nothingattribute:itwouldpresumablymakesensetoregardsomegoodsasmoreorlessself-sufficientthanothers,if,toagreaterorlesserextent,theirpossessionrenderedothergoodsdispensable.Furthermore,agoodmightpresumablybeself-sufficient,toacertainextent,becauseitimpliedareeducationofourdesires,orachangeinwhatwewanted,andnotsimplybecauseitsomehowcaptured,orcombinedintoone,everythingthatwewanted,takingthosewantstoremainfixed.FromvariouspassagesintheProtrepticus,itisclearthatAristotleviewstheself-sufficiencyoftheultimatehumangoodinthefirstway:“Thenwhatisitamongexistingthingsforthesakeofwhichnatureandgodhavebroughtusintobeing?Pythagoras,whenaskedaboutthis,an-swered,‘Toobservetheheavens,’andheusedtosaythathewasanobserverofnatureandhadcomeintolifeforthesakeofthis.AndwhensomebodyaskedAnaxagorasforwhatendonewouldchoosetocomeintobeingandlive,heissaidtohaveansweredthequestionbysaying,‘Toobservetheheavensandthestars,moonandsuninthem,’everythingelsebeingworthnothing”(DK59B18andProtr.B19Barnes=p.42Ross).Thesuggestionisthatthingsthatweoncevaluedcometoseemtobeworthlessoncewecontemplatetheheavens.Andthiswouldbeconsistentwiththegeneraltenor,too,ofPlato’sthought:forPlato,thecontemplationoftheFormsisself-sufficient,notbe-causethatactivitycontainswhatonewanted(suchassexandpleasuresfromeating)beforeundergoingthetrainingandself-disciplinewhichled,eventually,tothatcon-templation;rather,aglimpseoftheFormsmakesusloseourdesiresforotherthings.381ACTC1938120/03/2006,04:09PM\nmichaelpakalukNotethat,onthisconception,themoreself-sufficientagoodonepossesses,thegreaterthesimplicityanddetachmentwhichisdisplayedinone’slife(cf.X.8,1178b33–101179a22).AParticularActivityinAccordancewithVirtueThesecondstageintheostensibleprojectofthetreatisewastodelimitthefieldinwhichtoconductthesearchfortheultimategood:Whatsortofthingarewelookingfor?Aristotle’sviewisthattheultimatehumangoodwillbefoundwithinthefield:activitiesinaccordancewithavirtue(thatis,whichwecandoonlythroughhavingvirtue).Thatistosay,theultimatehumanendwillbesomethingthatoneachievesonlythroughtheputtingintopracticeofavirtue,andwhichcountsastheactualiza-tionofthatvirtue.Negatively,Aristotlesupportsthisconclusionbyeliminating,throughwhathecalls“published”considerations(I.5,1096a3),popularcontendersfortheultimateend:itcannotbebodilypleasure,whichwouldbeslavishandanimalistic;orhonor,whichisconferredforthesakeofvirtueandthereforeisnotultimate;orwealth,whichclearlyisinstrumental(I.5,1095b14–1096a9).Positively,Aristotlereachesthisconclusionthroughwhatisknownasthe“Func-tionArgument”(I.7,1097b22–1098a20).Thatargumentpresupposesthat,gener-ally,thegoodofathingwillbelocatedinsomekindofresult,achievement,orproduct(ergon)forwhichthethingisdesigned.Forinstance,the“goodofashoemaker”willbelocatedintheshoesthatheproduces:shoemakersexisttomakeshoes;ashoemakerdoeswellifhemakesgoodshoes;andapersonwhoisashoemaker,then,insofarasheisashoemaker,achieveswhathe“desires”,asashoemaker,ifhemakesgoodshoes.Notethat,onthisconception,somethingisa“goodofX”ora“goodforX”,notinthefirstinstancebecauseitcontributestoastateofsatisfactionofX,orremediessomekindofdeficiencyinX,butratherbecauseitservesasakindofoffshootorrealizationofX,whichisbroughtaboutintherightsortofwaybyX.The“FunctionArgument”mightthereforejustaswellbecalledthe“ProductArgument”.Itisindebted,yes,toPlato’ssimilarargumentattheendofRepublicI,butalsotoPlato’sconceptionintheSym-11posiumofprocreativeactivityasfollowingnaturallyuponvirtue.ImmediatelybeforetheFunctionArgument,Aristotlehadconcludedthattheultimatehumangoalwouldbesomethingthatis“goal-likewithoutqualification”and10.NotethatscholarsdebatewhetherI.7,1097b16–20givesyetathirdcriterionoftheultimategood,acriterionof“greatestpreferability”–thatitisthesortofthingthatistobereasonablypreferredwhenorifitiscomparedsinglywithothergoods.Possiblythepassageissimplyintendedtoclarifythefirstcriterion.Afulldiscussion,withanexcellentsurveyofthevastsecondaryliterature,maybefoundinLawrence(1997).11.Aristotlesometimeswishestodistinguishbetweenanergoninthesenseofa“product”andanaction(praxis):aproductiswherethereisanendofactionapartfromthatactionitself(I.1,1094a3–5,cf.VI.4).Sointhatsensehappiness,somethingsoughtnotforthesakeofsomethingelse,couldnotbeaproduct:“achievement”mightbeabetterterm.Yettheword“product”isusefulhereashighlightingthedistinctnessbetweentheachievementofavirtueandthevirtuethroughwhichweachieveit.382ACTC1938220/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’sethics“self-sufficient.”AftertheFunctionArgument,heassertsthatagoalofthissortwillbefoundamongactivitieswecanonlyachievethroughvirtue.ThepointoftheFunctionArgument,then,issimplytoadvanceAristotle’soverallprojectbyjustthisonestep.Ittellsustolookatthoseactivitiesthatcorrespondtothevirtuesofathing,ifweare12tofindtheultimategoodofathing.Theargumentdoesthisthroughpointingoutthelogicalinterrelationships,asAristotleconceivesthem,between“goodfor,”“function”(or“product”),“good,”and“virtue.”Thatwhichisgoodforathingofacertainkind,aswassaid,isitsfunction(orproduct),thatis,whatathingofthatkindisdesignedtoproduce.Agoodthingofthatkindwillproduceagoodproduct,whereasabadthingwillproduceabadproduct.Agoodthingofacertainkindisonethathasthoseattributesthatenableittoproduceitsproductwell.Thoseattributessimplyarethevirtuesofathingofthatkind.Thus,itisonaccountofthevirtuesofathingthatitwillsucceedinproducingagoodproduct,andthusachievingwhatisgoodforit.Hence,ifwewishedtodiscoverwhatwasgoodforathing,itwouldsufficetolookatitsvirtues–thosetraitsthatcontributedtoitsbeingagoodthingofthatkind–andthentolookatwhatitwasmadeabletoproduce,throughtheagencyofthosevirtues.Itsgoodwouldhavetobesomethingitwasrenderedabletoproduce,byatraitthatservedtomakeitagoodthingofthatkind.Aristotletakestheserelationshipsandclaimstoholdgenerally,andthusalsointhecaseofhumanbeings.Supposeahumanbeinghasafunction.Thenheisdesignedtoproducesomething,andwhatheisdesignedtoproducewillbewhatis“goodfor”him,asahumanbeing.Agoodhumanbeingwillproducethiswell,abadhumanbeingwillproduceitpoorlyornotatall.Butagoodhumanbeingisrenderedgoodpreciselybyhavingthevirtues.Thus,whatis“goodfor”ahumanbeingwillbesomethingthatheproducesthroughemployingthevirtues.Thus,ifwelookatthevariousvirtues,andseewhatisbroughtaboutthroughemployingthem,then–applyingthecriteriaalreadysetdownforanultimategood–weshallbeabletodiscovertheultimategood13ofahumanbeing.Theargumenttakesitforgrantedthathumanbeingshaveafunction(or“prod-uct”),butAristotleinpassingprovidesacoupleofcompressedargumentsforthispresupposition:“Coulditbethattherearecertainproductsandactionsbelongingtoabuilder,orashoemaker,butthattherearenonethatbelongtoahumanbeing,andthatheisnaturallybereftofanythingtodo?Andjustas,foraneyeorhandorfoot(and,generally,foreachofhisparts)thereisevidentlysomeparticulartask,soshouldn’tonepositaswellsomeparticulartaskforthehumanbeing,apartfromallofthese?”(I.7,1097b28–33).Thatis,apparently:humanbeingscouldnotacquireoccupationsorroles,ifthesewerenotgraftedontosomeantecedentnaturalfunction;andtheascriptionofafunctiontoapartmakessenseonlyifwepresupposesomefunctionforthewhole.(Theargumentsareofcoursecontroversialandopentoobjection.ThatAristotleargueswithsuchcompressionshowsthatheisrelying,atthispoint,onhis12.Foranalternativebutcomplementaryview,seeLawrence(2001).13.ThisconstrualoftheFunctionArgument,Ibelieve,defusestheobjectionraisedbyGlassen(1957),thatAristotletriestoanswerthequestion,“Whatisthegoodofahumanbeing?”bychangingthesubjectandtellingus“Whatisitthatmakesahumanbeinggood?”383ACTC1938320/03/2006,04:09PM\nmichaelpakalukaudience’sagreementwiththeteleologicalunderstandingofnaturethathedefends14inPhysicsII.)IntheRepublicPlatohadstipulatedthatthefunctionofathingisthatwhich“italonecando,oritalonecandowell”(I.352e–353b).Takingupthisidea,plausibleandintuitiveifoneacceptsateleologicalviewofnature,Aristotlearguesthatthehumanfunctionhastobesomethingthathumanbeingsalonecando;buttheyalone(assume:ofthingsinthesublunaryrealm,whichisoursphereofaction)havearationalaspecttotheirsoul;and(ashepresumes,alongwithPlato,cf.Rep.I.353d)thetaskofthesoulistolive;andthusthehumanfunctionmustbe,orinvolve,theactivityoflifeoftherationalaspectofthesoul;andvirtueswouldbetraitsthroughthe15employmentofwhichahumanbeingmightcarryoutthatsortofactivitywell.ThisconclusionallowsAristotletogeneratealistofvirtues(I.13).Thereare:(i)traitsthathelpthesoulcarryoutitsrationalactivitywell,inthesensethatthesetraitspertaindirectlytothataspectofthesoul:practicalwisdom(intelligenceasregardstheorderingoftemporalmatters)andphilosophicalwisdom(intelligenceasregardsatemporalmatters)(cf.VI.1,1138b35–1139a17).Then(ii)therearetraitsthathelpthesoulcarryoutitsrationalactivity,byinsuringthatthenon-rationalpartsofthesoularedulyresponsivetotherationalparts.Thesearethe“virtuesofcharacter,”principally,courage(andreia);chastemoderationofappetite(sOphrosunE);generosity(eleutheriotEs);andjustice(dikaiosunE).TheSystematicExaminationoftheVirtuesAswassaid,thebulkofENconsists,then,ofanexaminationofthecharacteristicactivitiesandeffectsofthesevirtues,becauseAristotlewishestoworksystematicallythroughhisdelimitedfieldofinvestigation,beforereachingaconclusionaboutwhich“activityinaccordancewithvirtue”istheultimateendofahumanbeing.Ofcourse,givenhischaracteristic,encyclopedicaspirations,incarryingoutthissearchAristotlealsointendstotouchuponallofthemoresalientelementsofthemorallife:thenatureofpleasureandpain(VII.11–14,andX.1–5);moralpsychology(III.1–5);weaknessofwill(VII.1–10);andfriendship(VIIIandIX).Aristotlethinksoftheemotionsandvirtuesasideallycomposinganaturalmoralconstitution(cf.sustEma,IX.8,1168b32)ofahumanbeing,andtheorderinwhichheconsidersthevirtuesreflectsthis.Roughly,thevirtuesthatheconsidersearlierinhisdiscussionaremeanttobeunderthecontrolofthevirtuesheconsiderslater,andtheearlieronesworksoastoenabletheactivityofthelaterones.Hebeginsbyconsideringfirstthevirtuesthatpertainmostdirectlytothenon-rationalaspectofthesoul,courageandmoderation(cf.III.10,1117b23–24),andheconcludesbycomparing14.OnAristotle’steleologicalconceptionofnatureinthePhysics,seeinthisvolumeBodnárandPellegrin,aristotle’sphysicsandcosmology,pp.275–7;andforadiscussionofnatureinhisbiology,seeLennox,aristotle’sbiology,pp.300–10.15.UsefuldiscussionsoftheFunctionArgumentmaybefoundinGomez-Lobo(1989),Kraut(1979b),andWhiting(1988).384ACTC1938420/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’sethicsthetwoarchitectonicintellectualvirtues.Thisveryorderingofthevirtuesismeanttobeanargumentthattheultimatehumanendwillbetheactivityofoneoftheseintellectualvirtues.AlthoughAristotleseemstoregardhislistofthevirtuesasexhaustive,henowheregivesanargumentforthisview.Moreover,therearedifficultiesasregardshismannerofindividuatingthevirtues.Forinstance,hetakescouragetobe,mostcentrally,thecorrecthandlingoffeelingsoffearandboldness,bysomeonewhoisputinthepositionofpotentiallylosinghislife,inagloriousfashion,onthefieldofbattle(III.6,1115a32–35).Courageshownbysailorsatsea,forinstance,orthe“courage”wemightthinkisshownby,say,desperatelyillpersonswhononethelessperseverecheerfully,issome-thingAristotleregardsasincidental.Thereasonispresumablythat,again,hethinksofhumanbeingsasintendedbynaturetoliveinpoliticalsociety;hence,itisnecessarytomakeimplicitreferencetotherequirementsofastablepoliticalsociety,inordertoexplainthevirtues–andagoodmilitarydefense,requiringcourage,isnecessaryforastablepoliticalsociety.Similarly,generosityisrequiredforreciprocityandthecorrectuseofcommercialgoodsamongfriends;justiceforreciprocityandmarketrelationsamongstrangers;andsoon.Aristotlefamouslydefinesavirtueofcharacterasastablecharacteristic(hexis)ofthesoul,whichconsistentlyachievesinactionastandardthatisintermediate(meson)asbetweenextremes,wherethatstandardisestablishedbypracticalreason,oristhestandardthatwouldbeacceptedbyapersonwhohasgoodpracticalreason(II.6,1106b36–1107a6).This“DoctrineoftheMean”seemsnottobeacounselofmodera-tion(“nothinginexcess”)–sinceotherwisetherewouldbenoneedtoappealtoastandardsetdownfromwithout,bypracticalreason–butratheranobservationaboutthenatureofthecontrarietythatonefindsinthedomainofthevirtues:althoughvirtueandviceareopposed,unliketypicalcasesofoppositioneachvirtuewillhavetwoopposites(oneateachextreme)ratherthanone.Thusopposedtocouragearebothcowardiceandfoolhardiness;opposedtogenerosityarebothprofligacyandstingi-ness;andsoon.OfcoursetheDoctrineoftheMeanhaspracticalimplications,towhichAristotledrawsattentionwithmuchshrewdness,suchasthatapersonshoulddeterminetowhichextremeheis,bytemperamentorupbringing,moredisposedtogo,andthenattempttoovercompensateforthis,byactingasifhewouldgotothe16otherextreme(II.9,1109a30–35).ItisfruitfultointerpretAristotle’sdiscussionofthevariousvirtuesasasustainedpolemicagainstPlato,intendedtoeliminatecompetitorsfortheultimatehumangoal.Platotypicallyholdstoastrongversionoftheunityofthevirtues–hetendstothinkofthevariousvirtuesasmerelydifferentmanifestationsofoneandthesamekindofknowledge–andatdifferentpointscourage;chastemoderation;greatnessofoutlook(magnanimity,megalopsucheia);andjusticegetidentifiedwiththissingleessentialtrait.Aristotle,incontrast,aimstodeflatethesevariousvirtues,byassigningthemratherhumdrumcivicresponsibilities,fallingwithindiscretedomains:couragemanagesfeelingsoffearandboldnessrelevanttomilitarydefense;chastemoderationhandles16.TheprecisesignificanceoftheDoctrineoftheMeanismuchdebated.SeeBroadie(1991,pp.95–103)andUrmson(1973).385ACTC1938520/03/2006,04:09PM\nmichaelpakalukourdesireforpleasuresoftouchassociatedwithnaturalactivitiesforsustainingandreproducingthespecies;justicedealswitheconomicexchangesandcivicpenalties;magnanimityisanattitudetowardhonorandstandinginsociety.Itwouldbeabsurdtotakeanyoneoftheseoperations,onitsown,soevidentlycontributingtosometotaleffectofpoliticalsociety,tobetheultimatehumangood.(Andnotethat,forAristotle,thesevariousvirtuestypicallygotogetherandareunited,notlogicallyoressen-tially,butbecausetheyformpartofacoherentnaturalsystem,IV.13,1144b21–1145a2.)So,again,thefieldisclearedforthetwoarchitectonicintellectualvirtues:theultimatehumangoalwouldhavetobetheactivityofoneofthese.TheActivityofSpeculativeWisdomItisrelativelyeasytoconclude,ofthetwointellectualvirtues,thattheactivityofphilosophicalwisdomismoregoal-like,andthusthatitconstitutestheultimategoal:Ifhappinessisanactivityinaccordancewithavirtue,onemightreasonablyexpectthatitbeinaccordancewiththebestvirtue;butthiswouldbethevirtueofthebestpart.Whether,then,thisbemind(nous)orsomeotherthing,whichinfactbynatureseemstoruleandexerciseauthorityandtakethoughtofnobleanddivinethings,andwhetherthisisinfactitselfdivineorratherthemostdivineofthethingsinus,theactivityofthispart,asgovernedbyitsappropriatevirtue,wouldbeultimatehappiness.Thatthisisspeculativeactivitywehavealreadysaid.(X.7,1177a12–18)Aristotleconfirmsthisconclusionbyapplyingthecriteriahehadsetdownearlier.Speculativeactivitywhichisexpressiveofphilosophicalwisdomismostgoal-like,because(i)itisneverchosenforthesakeofanythingelse,since,Aristotleclaims,“nothingresultsfromit,apartfromtheactivityofspeculation”(1177b2),and(ii)weseekeverythingelseforitssake,becausewedoeverythingelsethatwedoinordertoprocureleisure,andspeculativeactivity,Aristotlethinks,iswhatweshoulduseleisurefor,ratherthanamusementsandpleasurablediversions,cf.X.6,1176b9–1177a11.(Presumably,insayingthat“nothingresultsfromit”,hemeansbyitsowntendencyornature:Imightdomathproblems,forinstance,tohelpmyselffallasleep,butthatIfallasleepissomething“incidental”tothatactivity.Ontheotherhand,thatacitybeprotectedisnotincidentaltotheactivityofcourage.)Furthermore,itismoreself-sufficientthananyotheractivity.Why?“Bothaphilo-sophicallywiseperson,andajustperson,andanyonewithanyoftheothervirtues,needsthosethingsthatarenecessaryforliving;however,afterbeingsufficientlyequippedwithsuchthings,ajustpersonneedsthosetowardswhomandwithwhomhecanactjustly,andlikewisealsoamoderateperson,andacourageousperson,andeachoftheothervirtuoussorts,butaphilosophicallywisepersoniscapableofengaginginspeculativeactivityonhisown”(X.7,1177a28–33).SometimesAristotleiscriticizedhereforadvertingtoanotionofself-sufficiencythathehadrejectedearlier,viz.self-sufficiencyasinvolvingtheactivityofapersononhisown,apartfromfriends,relatives,orfellowcitizens.Butinfactthepointisdirectedattheactivity(the386ACTC1938620/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’sethicsgood),nottheagent(thesubjectofthegood):theactivityofspeculationdependsuponfewerthingsthatareoutsideitself,andthusasanactivityitismoreself-sufficient.Itdoesnotfollowfromthisthattheactivitywilltypicallybepossessedorenjoyedbyindividualsontheirown,and,infact,Aristotle’sdoctrinethathappinessneedstobesharedwithfriendstobeenjoyed,impliesthecontrary(IX.9,IX.12).Hisclaimthat“ahappypersonneedsfriends”isnottheabsurdclaimthat,supposingthatsomeoneishappy,hewillstillstandinneedoffriends,butratherthatanyhumanactivitythatcountsashappinessmustbesocial,fromthenatureofhumanlifeitself.Theactivitywhichproceedsfromthevirtueofphilosophicalwisdomishappiness,butalifeofsuchactivity,thatis,consistingofthatactivityalone,issomethingsuper-human:havingbodies,Aristotleconcedes,wemusttendtobodilyneeds,tokeepour-selvesalive(X.7,1177b26–30).Nevertheless,itdoesnotfollowthatweshouldholdbackfrompursuinghappiness,insofarasweareable;rather,ourgoalshouldbetobeactiveinthatwaytothegreatestextentpossible(1177b31–33).Fortheworthofthatactivity,Aristotlecontends,exceedswhateveralltheotherpartsinuscanachieve,and,inanycase,toaimtoengageintheactivityofspeculativewisdomisnot,properlyspeaking,tochoosethewell-beingofonlyonepartofus,sinceeachhumanbeingappropriatelyidentifieshimselfwiththatpartoraspectofhimwhichthinks(1177b34–1178a4).Furthermore,everysortofthinghasaproperfunctionoractivity,whichwillinvolveprincipallyjustonepartoraspectofit,towhichtherestofitisdirectedandsubordinated(andtowardswhichthatthingisurgedbyitsproperpleasure);andforahumanbeing,thatactivityisthinking,andalifeorganizedtobringthisaboutisbest(1178a5–8).AlthoughAristotledoesnotwaverfromhisviewthathappinessisspeculativeactivitygovernedbythevirtueofphilosophicalwisdom,heacknowledgesinpassingthattheactivityofpracticalwisdomcanserveasanorganizingprinciple,too,forahumanlife,andthatthatsortoflifewouldbeahappylifeinaqualifiedandsecondarysense(X.8,1178a9–10).Butobjectivelyconsideredsuchalifeshouldberankedafter,andnotpreferredover,alifesubordinatedtophilosophicalwisdom(andpresumably,too,inaproperlyorderedpoliticalsociety,lifeofthatsortisdirectedtowardsspeculativeactivity).Aristotle’sreasonsforthisrankingoccupythebulkofX.7–8:alifeorganizedaroundspeculativeactivityisdivineincharacter(1177b26–1178a8);itisthemostself-sufficient(1178a9–b7);itisthesortoflifewhichthegodslive,yeteverythingintheuniversestrivestobelikethegods,sothatthissortoflifehasmoreofthecharacterofanend(1178b7–32);andalifeofthatsort,preciselybecauseitissimilartothelifeofthegods,ismoredeartothegods(1179a22–32).ThisappealtothegodsisanexpressionofAristotle’sgeneralview,whichheshareswithPlato,thateverykindofthingstrivestoimitatethedivineinthemannerinwhichitissuited(cf.DeAn.II.4,17415a26–b7;GCII.10,336b27–34;GAII.1,731b24–35).ThatAristotleinthiswaygroundshislastargumentsabouthappinessonhistheology,andtheorderingofnaturethatisentailedbythattheology,confirmsthatthepurposeallalongoftheEthicshasbeentoidentifyobjectivelytheultimateendofthehumanspecies.17.Onthistopic,seeBetegh,greekphilosophyandreligion,inthisvolume.387ACTC1938720/03/2006,04:09PM\nmichaelpakalukConclusionSothen,theostensibleprojectofENistoexaminesystematicallytheactivitiesthatcorrespondtothevariousvirtues,inordertoseewhichonequalifiesastheultimateend.Theactivitycorrespondingtoanyvirtue,Aristotlethinks,isgoal-like(teleion):itisworthdoingforitsownsake,apartfromanythingthatfollowsfromit.Buttheactivitycorrespondingtothevirtueofphilosophicalwisdomisthemostgoal-like(teleiotaton)inthisclass.Suchactivity,therefore,istheultimategoalofhumanlifeandwhatcountsashappinessforus–whichistheostensibleconclusionofthetreatise.Butthisconclusionseemstoleaveuswithvariousdifficulties.Thereisadifficultyaboutbalancing:Howshouldsomeonereasonablytradeoffthepursuitofthemostgoal-likeactivitywiththepursuitofotheractivitiesthataregoal-likebutsubordinatedtoit?Thereisadifficultytooaboutmotivation:tosaythatspeculativeactivityisthemostgoal-likeistosay,atleast,thatotheractivitiesaredoneforthesakeofthat;butthenhowcanonecoherentlydothoseotheractivitiesfortheirownsakeaswell(itmightseemproblematictosaythatXisdoneforitsownsakeandalsoforthesakeofY)?Moreover,thereisanethicaldifficulty:ifallothergoal-likeactivityissubordinatedtospeculativeactivity,thenwhywouldn’titbeadvisabletodosomethingcontrarytooneoftheothervirtues,ifdoingsowouldincreaseone’sopportunityforspeculativeactivity(astockexampleis:supposingonecouldgetawaywithit,whyshouldn’tsomeonekillawealthyrelativetogainalargeinheritance,sothatonehasmoreleisureforspeculativeactivity)?Inviewofthesedifficultiessomecommentatorshaveproposedwhatiscalledan18“inclusive”interpretationofEN.Ontheostensibleprojectofthetreatise,Aristotleislookingforasinglekindofactivity,whichinitsvariousrepetitionscountsasthehumangoal,andheexaminesthevariousvirtuesasastageinselectingoutthatactivity.Accordingtotheinclusiveinterpretation,incontrast,Aristotleregardstheultimategoalasacomplex,attainedonceforalloveralifetime,whichincludesallactivitiesworthdoingintheirownright,andheexaminesthevariousvirtuesinordertocollecttogetherallactivitiesofthatsort.Theinclusiveinterpretationgetstextualsupportprincipallythroughinterpretingthetermsteleion,teleiotation(whichwehavebeenrendering“goal-like”,“mostgoal-like”)as,rather,“complete”and“mostcomplete”(whichtheGreekallows),inwhichcaseAristotle,inlookingforourultimategoal,19islookingforthemostcompletegood.Furthermore,thisinterpretationtakestheself-sufficiencycriterionoftheultimategoodasactuallytoimplyitscompleteness,since,ifitlackedanyofthegoodsworthhavingintheirownright,itwouldnotbeself-sufficient.Theinclusiveinterpretationwouldresolvethedifficultyaboutbalancingbymakingitunimportant:whatmattersmostinahappylifeisthatoneengageinallinherently18.ThelocusclassicusforthisinterpretationisAckrill(1974).19.AndthereforewhenAristotleentertainsthesuggestionthattherearemultipleends(e.g.,atI.7,1097a30),hedoessowithaviewtowardcollectingthesetogether,tocreatethemostcompletegood,ratherthanselectingoutfromtheseasingle,mostultimateend.388ACTC1938820/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’sethicsvaluableactivities,andpresumablytherewouldbemanysuitablewaysofbalancingthem.Furthermore,sinceontheinclusiveinterpretationinherentlygoodactivitiesarerelatedtotheultimateendaspartstowhole,thenthemotivationaldifficultyseemstobesolvedaswell:itiscoherenttoholdthatoneischoosingapartbothforitsownsakeandalsoforthesakeofthewholewhichitcomposes.Finally,theethicaldifficultyalsoseemstobesolved:iftheultimategoodcontainsalltheactivitiesofthevariousvirtues,thennonecanbeslighted:tokillthewealthyrelativewouldsimplybetofailtoachievethecompletehumangood.Againsttheinclusiveinterpretationonemighturgethattotaketeleionas“com-plete,”inthosepassageswheretheultimategoodisdiscussed,isatoddswiththefundamentalthemeofENthatagoodsimplyissomethingthatisgoal-like(not“com-plete”);andnothingcompelsthatweunderstandtheself-sufficiencyrequirementtoimplycompleteness,since,aswehaveseen,agoodcanbeself-sufficientbyeffecting20achangeindesires,asmuchasbysatisfyingallantecedentdesires.Furthermore,theinclusiveinterpretationwouldresolvethedifficultiesmentionedonlybycreatinganewone,involvingtheoverallcoherenceofEN:evenifBooksI–IXadmitofaninclusiveinterpretation,undeniablyBookXisnotputtingforwardsuchaview.Andif,inreply,aproponentoftheinclusiveviewweretoconcedethat,althoughAristotletakestheultimategoodtobeacomplexgood,henonethelesswishesinBookXtoregardthiscomplexasordered,withspeculativeactivityoccupyingthehighestposition,thenallthedifficultiescropupagain:weneedtoknowhowtobalancethelowergoodsinthecomplexagainstthehighest;andthereseemstobeanew,notevidentlyintelligiblesenseinwhichalowergoodinthecomplexistobesought“forthesakeof”thehighest;andthereseemstobenoreasonwhy,ifbotharenotattainabletogether,wemightnottradeoffoneofthelowergoodsinthecomplextoattainmoreofthehighestgood.Onemightadditionallymaintainthattheinclusiveviewisunnecessary:Aristotle,itwouldseem,isnotinsensitivetothedifficultiesinhisostensibleconclusion,andinBookXheoffersasolution,whichatleastrequiresseriousconsideration.Aristotleseemstounderstandhisconclusion,thattheultimategoodisspeculat-iveactivity,asimplyinga“transvaluationofvalues.”Onemighthavesupposedthatspeculativeactivitywassimplyoneamongmanygoodpursuits,perhapsevenlessvaluablethanothersbecauseofitsapparentuselessness.Therefore,beforeencounter-ingAristotle’sarguments,onemighthavelookeduponspeculativeactivityassome-thingpraiseworthybutoptional:goodtodo,ifonehassparetimeandsufficientmeans.ButtheforceoftheargumentofENistogiveanentirelydifferentplacetospeculativeactivity.Inclaimingthatitisourultimategoal,Aristotleisclaimingthatitiswhatweare“meant”todo;ideally,wewouldsimplyengageinthatconstantly.Butgiventhatwearecompositebeings,withabodyanditsneeds,weunfortunatelyneedtoallotsometime–nomorethanisnecessary,andthiswillbelittle–totakingcareofthebody.Sotheruleofactionimpliedbythistransvaluationofvalues,whichposits20.Heinaman(1988)arguespersuasivelythatinfacttheself-sufficiencycriterionimpliesjusttheopposite,thatis,thattheultimategoodcannotbeaninclusivegood.389ACTC1938920/03/2006,04:09PM\nmichaelpakalukspeculationastheultimateend,isthis:engageinspeculation,unlessclearnecessity21(construedausterely)requiresustodootherwise.Notethatallofthevirtuesbesidesspeculativewisdomcomeintoplayonlyasaconsequenceofthisnecessity.Itisinbuyingandsellingthatweneedjustice;indefendingthecitythatweneedcourage;andinorderingthewholemachineryoftheeconomythatweneedpracticalwisdom.Thesevirtues,then,comeintoplay,asitwere,“onahypothesis”:giventhatweare(regrettably)constrainedtotaketimeoutfromourchiefactivity(speculation),thenweshouldactinthosedomainsinaccord-ancewiththevariousothervirtues.Yetthisthenimpliesstraightforwardsolutionstothestateddifficulties.Balancing:usetheruleofactionstatedabove.Motivation:thesenseinwhichwedoanactioninaccordancewithoneoftheothervirtues(actcourageously,justly,andsoon)forthesakeofspeculativeactivityisthatthevirtuousactionispiggybackedontoanecessaryactivity(fightingawar,conductingbusiness),whichwemustattendtobeforedevotingourselvestospeculativeactivity;itistheactivityregardedasnecessarywhich,strictly,isforthesakeofspeculativeactivity.Thedifficultyaboutethics:foranactiontobecoherentlydone(onemightmaintain)ithastobesoughtasanactionofacertainkind;butsince(inthestockexample)thepersonkillshisrelativetogaintheopportunitytospeculate,hisactioniscorrectlyconstruedasaninstanceof“doingbusiness”;butonthehypothesisthatheis“doingbusiness,”heshoulddosorightly,whichexcludessurreptitiouslykillingarelativeandcollectingtheinheritance.Actionsofthatsortarenotrightlydonetoadvancespeculativeactivity,then,forthesamereasonthattheyarenotrightlydoneatall.Onthislastpoint,oneistemptedtosuspectthatAristotlesimplypresumes,asbasic,thatoneshouldneverdoanything“shameful”or“base”(aischron),andactionscon-22trarytothevirtuesare“base.”Onemighteventrytogiveasophisticated,“internalist”defenseofthatpresupposition’sbeingbasic:goodbehaviorhasitsownreasonability,onemightinsist,apparenttothosewhoarealreadygood,andinaccessibletothosewhoarenot;toengageinethicsissimplytogetclearer,then,aboutcertainsortsofcommitments,builtintoone’scharacter,thatonealreadyhas;hence,noonewhowasraisedpoorlyandlackedtherequisitecommitmentswouldbesuitablypositionedeven23todeliberateaboutethics.Howeverthisstrategybegsthequestionofwhybeingraisedwellimpliesbecomingthesortofpersonwhowithoutqualificationrejectsdoingactionscontrarytothevirtues.AlternativelyonemightsuspectthatthereasonthatAristotleinnosinglepassagearguesforabsoluteproscriptionsagainstviciousbehavior,isthathetakesitasnearly24everywheresupported,assomethingoverdeterminedbythesubjectmatterofEthics.21.SeeLawrence(1993)foradiscussionalongsimilarlines.22.PerhapsthisisaninheritancefromPlato:seeGrg.474c–475e.23.TheclassicstatementofthisviewisM.Burnyeat,“AristotleonLearningtobeGood,”inRorty(1981).24.Aristotle’sremarksinI.3–4abouttheroughcharacterofgeneralizationsinethicsdonotimplythatheisnotcommittedtotheprinciplethat“oneshouldneveractunjustly.”ForavigorousdiscussionofthispointseeKaczor(1997).390ACTC1939020/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’sethicsIndeed,itseemsopentoAristotletoreachthatconclusioninvariousways.Forinstance,speculativeactivityistheultimateendforahumanbeing;thusitmustbesoughtandpossessedinahumanway,whichimplies,aswassaid,thatitbesoughtandpossessedinthecontextofpoliticalsociety:andsurreptitiousmurderisnotcompatiblewithstablepoliticalsociety.Or,again,speculativeactivityshouldserveastheorganizingprincipleofalifewell-lived;butotheractivitiesarecorrectlyorganizedastendingtowardsit,onlyiftheyareintelligentlysubordinatedtoit,yet(Aristotlemightsay)practicalintelligencerequiresthatwetreatthingsinthewaytheydeserve,bythosewiththerequisiteauthority,andintheexampleeithertherelativedoesnotdeservetobekilled,orhedoesbuttheagentcouldnotwithproprietydecideuponandexecute25thesentence.Then,too,thereareresponseswhichcoulddrawupontherichdoctrineoffriendshipthatAristotlebuildsintohisEthics.Thus,aswassaid,Aristotleholds,nodoubtrightly,that,whateverapersonunderstandsbyhappiness,hemusttakethatactivitytobeonethathesharesinwithfriends:sincenoonecanbehappywithoutfriends(IX.9,1169b17–18);andeachpersonwishesespeciallytodo,withhisfriends,whathetakeshappinesstobe(12,1172a1–6).Butnoonewhosurreptitiouslymurderedarelativecouldmaintainafriendshipofthebestsort,ashavingtohidethisfromhisfriends(violatingfrankness,parrhEsia,2,1165a29),or,ifhetoldthem,theywouldnolongerlovehimasgoodorbeabletotrusthim(VIII.3,1156b25–29;1157a20–24);and,themurdererwouldhatehimself,andthusdestroyhisself-love,fromwhichhisaffectionforhisfriendsisderived(IX.4,1166b11–13,b25–29).Or,again,itisnotclearthatsomeonewhocommittedamurdercouldsucceedinlovinghimself,onthegroundsthathewouldnot,inasense,evenbethesamemoralagentasthepersonwholaterwantedtoputbloodshedasideanddevotehimselfinnocentlytocontemplation.Admittedly,explanationsofthissort–andmoreareeasilyimagined–canseemunsatisfactory,becauseoftheircontingency,butAristotlemightpleadthatpresumablyitisenough,forthepurposesofpracticalreasoning,iftheyrestuponobviousand26inescapableattributesofhumannatureandhumansociallife.BibliographyWorksCitedAckrill,J.L.(1974).“AristotleonEudaimonia.”ProceedingsoftheBritishAcademy,60,339–59.Bodéüs,R.(1993).ThePoliticalDimensionsofAristotle’sEthics.(J.E.Garrett,trans.).Albany,NY:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Broadie,S.(1991).EthicswithAristotle.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Foot,P.(2001).NaturalGoodness.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Geach,P.(1972).LogicMatters.Oxford:Blackwell.25.Clearlythisexplanationputsheavyweightonthedifficultnotionsof“desert”(toaxion)and“fittingness”or“propriety”(toprepon);AristotlereliescruciallyonthesenotionsthroughoutEN(seeespeciallyX.8,1178a13),yetheneveranalyzesthem.Foranattemptofanexplana-tion,ifnotananalysis,seeLear(2004).26.Forarecentphilosophicaldevelopmentofanoutlookofthissort,seeFoot(2001).391ACTC1939120/03/2006,04:09PM\nmichaelpakalukGlassen,P.(1957).“AFallacyinAristotle’sArgumentabouttheGood.”PhilosophicalQuarterly,7,319–22.Gomez-Lobo,A.(1989).“TheErgonInference.”Phronesis,34,170–84.Heinaman,R.(1988).“EudaimoniaandSelf-SufficiencyintheNicomacheanEthics.”Phronesis,33,31–53.Kaczor,C.(1997).“ExceptionlessNormsinAristotle?ThomasAquinasandTwentieth-CenturyInterpretationsoftheNicomacheanEthics.”Thomist,61,33–62.Kenny,A.(1978).TheAristotelianEthics.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Kraut,R.(1979a).“TwoConceptionsofHappiness.”PhilosophicalReview,88,167–97.——.(1979b).“ThePeculiarFunctionofHumanBeings.”CanadianJournalofPhilosophy,9,467–78.Lawrence,G.(1993).“AristotleandtheIdealLife.”PhilosophicalReview,102,1–34.——.(1997).“Nonaggregatability,Inclusiveness,andtheTheoryofFocalValue:NE1.7.1097b16–20.”Phronesis,42,32–76.——.(2001).“TheFunctionoftheFunctionArgument.”AncientPhilosophy,21,445–75.Lear,G.R.(2004).HappyLivesandtheHighestGood.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Owen,G.E.L.(1971–2).“AristotelianPleasures.”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,72,135–52.Rorty,A.O.(ed.).(1981).EssaysonAristotle’sEthics.Berkeley,Cal.:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Urmson,J.O.(1973).“Aristotle’sDoctrineoftheMean.”AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly,10,223–30.Wedin,M.(1981).“AristotleontheGoodforMan.”Mind,90,243–62.White,N.P.(1988).“GoodasGoal.”SouthernJournalofPhilosophy,27,suppl.,169–93.Whiting,J.(1988).“Aristotle’sFunctionArgument:ADefense.”AncientPhilosophy,8,33–48.FurtherReadingBarnes,J.,Schofield,M.,andSorabji,R.(eds.).(1977).ArticlesonAristotle.(vol.2):EthicsandPolitics.NewYork:St.Martin’sPress.Bostock,D.(2000).Aristotle’sEthics.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Broadie,S.andRowe,C.(eds.andtrans.).(2002).Aristotle:NicomacheanEthics.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Cooper,J.(1975).ReasonandHumanGoodinAristotle.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.Gauthier,R.A.andJolif,Y.(eds.andtrans.).(1958–9).Aristote:L’ÉthiqueàNicomaque.2ndedn.1970.Louvain:PublicationsUniversitaires.Hardie,W.F.R.(1980).Aristotle’sEthicalTheory.2ndedn.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Kraut,R.(1989).AristotleontheHumanGood.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Litzinger,C.I.(trans.).(1993).ThomasAquinas:CommentaryonAristotle’sNicomacheanEthics.SouthBend,Ind.:DumbOxBooks.Pakaluk,M.(ed.andtrans.).(1998).Aristotle:NicomacheanEthicsVIIIandIX.Oxford:ClarendonPress.——.(2005).Aristotle’sNicomacheanEthics:AnIntroduction.Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-sityPress.Rorty,A.O.(ed.).(1981).EssaysonAristotle’sEthics.Berkeley,Cal.:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Urmson,J.O.(1988).Aristotle’sEthics.Oxford:Blackwell.392ACTC1939220/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’spoliticalphilosophy20Aristotle’sPoliticalPhilosophyDAVIDKEYTIntroductionAristotle’sEthicsandPoliticsaretwovolumesofasingleworkonwhatAristotlecalls“thephilosophyofthingshuman”(ENX.9,1181b15).TheintimateconnectionofthetwotreatisesissignaledbythefactthattheopeningandclosingchaptersoftheNicomacheanEthics(I.1–3,X.9)discusspoliticalscienceanditsfinalparagraphoutlinesaprogramofaworkonpolitics.AristotleevencallstheEthicsapoliticaltreatise(ENI.2,1094b10–11;Rh.I.2,1356a25–27;[MM]I.1,1181a24–28,b24–28).Itiseasytoseewhy.Manyofthevirtuesitcatalogssuchasbravery,munificence(megaloprepeia),andjusticerelateonewayoranothertoapoliticalcommunity(seeENIII.8,1116a17–29;IV.2,1122b19–23;V.1,1129b17–19);thelifeofmoralvirtueisforAristotleapoliticallife(seeENX.8,1178a9–28especiallya27);andthetheoryoftheEthicscannotbeputintopracticewithouttheaidofstatesmen(politikoi)andlawgivers(ENX.9).ThePolitics,ontheotherhand,presupposesatreatiseonethics.Justiceisoneofitsmainconcepts,andtheidealpoliticalcommunitysketchedinPoliticsVIIandVIIIpresupposesanaccountofvirtueandhappiness.ThePoliticsreferssixtimestoawork1onEthics(II.2,1261a31;III.9,1280a18;12,1282b20;IV.11,1295a36;VII.13,21332a8,1332a22).TheexpressionphilosophiapolitikE(politicalphilosophy)occursbutonceinAristotle’sextantwritings(Pol.III.12,1282b23);hismoreusualtermforpoliticalphilosophyishEpolitikE[sc.epistEmE](politicalscience).AristotlegivesanaccountofthegeneralnatureofpoliticalscienceintheNicomacheanEthics(I.1–3;13,1102a5–13;VI.8;X.9,1180b28–1181b23),andenumeratesinthePolitics(IV.1–2)thevariousproblemswithwhichithastodeal.Politicalscience,wearetoldintheformertreatise,isthemostsovereign(kuriOtatE)andarchitectonicscience;itsend,orgoal,whichisnothinglessthanthesupremehumangood,includes(periechei)theendsofalltheothersciences(ENI.2;kuriOtatEs:1094a26;periechoi:1094b6).Theotherartsandsciencesareunderitasmanualcraftsmen(cheirotechnai)areunderarchitects(Met.A.1,981a30–b1;ENVI.8,1141b29).Itassignstoeachoftheotherartsandsciencesitsrolewithinthepoliticalcommunity:itdecideswhetheranartorscienceistobetaught,towhatextent,andtowhom;anditusestheotherartsasmeanstoitsownend(ENI.2,1.UnlessotherwiseindicatedallreferencesaretothePolitics.2.FormoreontherelationofthetwotreatisesseeNewman(1887–1902,vol.2,pp.385–401).393ACTC2039320/03/2006,04:09PM\ndavidkeyt1094a28–b5).Forexample,itusesmilitarystrategytofurtheritsownendofpeace(ENX.7,1177b5–6).Politicalscience,socharacterized,istheartoflegislation(EN3I.2,1094b5,VI.8;1141b24–25);anditsworksarelaws(ENX.9,1181a23).Astreatisesinpracticalphilosophy,theEthicsandthePoliticsaimatusefulnessaswellasknowledge(I.3,1253b14–18,11,1258b9–10;ENI.3,1095a5–6;II.2,1103b26–29;X.9,1179a35–b4;Met.a.1,993b20–21).Thoseforwhomtheyareusefularestatesmenandlawgivers(IV.1,1288b27,1289a7;V.9,1309b35–36;VI.5,1319b33;ENI.13,1102a8,a18,a23;III.1,1109b34).Thetruestatesman(politikos)inAristotle’sviewpursues,throughlegislation,thegoalofpoliticalscience(politikE)–thesupremehumangood.Hewishestomakehiscitizensgoodpeoplewhodonoblethings(ENI.9,1099b29–32,13;1102a7–25).Tofashiongoodlawthetruestatesmanwillthusneedtounderstandhumangoodnessandhowitisattained–thesubjectoftheEthics.Butgoodlawisimpossibleoutsideagoodpoliticalcommunity.Sohewillalsoneedtounderstandhowpoliticalcommunitiesareorganized–thesubjectofthePolitics.Thelinkbetweenthesupremehumangoodandthelegislationofstatesmanandlawgiversishabituation.AccordingtotheEthicsthesupremehumangoodishappiness;4happinessisactivityinaccordancewiththemoralandintellectualvirtues;themoralvirtuesareacquiredbyhabituation;suchhabituationisguidedbylaw;andlawisfashionedbystatesmenandlawgivers(ENI.7;II.1;X.9).Aristotle’scharacterizationofpoliticalscienceintheopeningpagesoftheNicomacheanEthicsmatchesinitsverywordshischaracterizationofthepoliticalcommunityintheopeningparagraphofthePolitics,towhichwenowturn.ThepolisThePoliticsbeginswithanargument.UsingthesametermsasinNicomacheanEthicsI.2,Aristotleclaimsthatthepolisisthecommunitythatismostsovereign(kuriOtatE)ofallandthatincludes(periechei)alltheothers;andthen,onthebasisoftheprinciplethateverycommunityaimsatsomegood,heinfersthatthepolisaimsatthemost5sovereigngood(I.1,1252a1–7;periechousa:1252a6).Theinclusionofonecommunity3.InENVI.8AristotledividespolitikEinthebroadsenseintotwospecies.Oneistheartoflegislation;theotherhasasitstwosubspeciesdeliberationandadjudicationandissaidtobepolitikEinthenarrowsense.ThisisthereverseofwhatonewouldhaveexpectedonthebasisofAristotle’suseofthewordinENI.2wherepolitikEisusedforthelegislativeart.4.Amongtheintellectualvirtuesthemostimportantarepracticalandtheoreticalwisdom(phronEsisandsophia).Aristotlethinksthattoactinaccordancewithmoralvirtueandpracticalwisdomisentirelyandexclusivelyhuman(ENX.8)butthatwearelikegodswhenweengageintheoreticalactivity(theOria)(Met.L.7,1072b13–26;ENX.7,especially1177b26–1178a2).Thisidearaisesatleasttwoquestions.Thefirstistherelationofthelowertothehigherformofactivityinthebest(andhappiest)lifeforanindividual.Thesecondistheplaceoftheoreticalorphilosophicalactivityinanidealpolis.Thissecondquestionisaddressedonpp.402–6below;thefirstisdiscussedinKeyt(1983and1989),andinthisvolumeinPakaluk,aristotle’sethics.5.ForamoreconcretepictureoftheancientGreekpolisseeEhrenberg(1969).394ACTC2039420/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’spoliticalphilosophyinanotherofwhichAristotlespeaksisnottheinclusionofthemembersoftheonecommunityamongthemembersoftheother,buttheinclusionoftheend,orgoal,oftheonecommunityintheend,orgoal,oftheother.Anarmy,forexample,isincludedinapolisinsofarasitsend–victoryorplunderorconquest–isincludedintheendofthepolis(ENVIII.9,1160a14–29),notastheLacedaemoniansareincludedamongthePeloponnesians(Top.VII.1,152a16–18).Thesovereigntyreferredtoisthatofauthorityandpower(IV.9,1294b33–34).Furthermore,weknowfromtheEthicsthatthemostsovereigngoodisgoodlifeandhappiness(ENI.4,1095a14–20).IntheveryfirstparagraphofthePolitics,then,Aristotlesubscribestoamaximalistcon-ceptionofapoliticalcommunity,accordingtowhichtheachievementofgoodlifeandhappinessisthepropergoalofitspowerandauthority,includingitspowertocoerce.Thisisacontroversialconclusiondemandingfurtherdefense,fortheall-inclusivenessofthepolisthatAristotlepostulatesexpressestheverypointpoliticalphilosophersdispute.Wereturntothisissuebelow.TheportraitofthepolisthatAristotlesketchesinthisopeningparagraph,oneshouldnote,ishighlyidealized.Heishardpressedtociteasingleexamplethatfitshisdescription,andacknowledgesthatfew,ifany,realpoleishavegoodlifeandhappinessastheirend(VII.2,1324b3–9;14,1333b5–14).ItissometimesclaimedthatAristotle’sargumentplaysuponanambiguityintheword“polis”(Mulgan,1977,pp.16–17).Aristotle,soitisclaimed,usestheword“polis”inaninclusiveandanexclusivesensecorrespondingtothetwoaspectsofhisdualcharacterizationofthepolis.Intheinclusivesensetheword“polis”referstothemostinclusivecommunity;intheexclusivesenseitreferstothemostsovereigncom-munity.Aristotle’sconclusion,accordingtothisanalysis,isinvalidbecausetheword“polis”shiftsitsmeaningfromonepremiseofhisargumenttoanother.IntermsofmodernpoliticalphilosophyAristotleshiftsfromspeakingofthewholeofsocietyinonepremisetospeakingofthestate,themonopolizeroflegitimatecoercion,intheother(fordetailsseeKeyt,1991b,pp.253–6).Butthisaccountoftwosensesof“polis”maynotberight.WhenAristotlesaysthatmanis(1)theonlyanimalthatlaughs(PAIII.10,673a8)and(2)theonlyanimalthatpossessesreason(VII.l3,1332b4–5),heisnotgivingtheword“man”(anthrOpos)twosenses.Similarly,ifAristotlebelievesthatthemostsovereigncommunityandthecommunitythatincludesallothersarethesamecommunity,hecanrefertothiscommunityasthepoliswithoutequivoca-tion.ButthisidentityseemstofollowfromAristotle’sview,towhichwenowturn,thatthepolisisanaturalentity.NatureAristotleremarksthatinconstructingapolisastatesmanoralawgiver,justlikeaweaverorashipbuilder,musthavesuitablematter(hulE),andindicatesthatthematterinquestionisapopulation,especiallyacitizenpopulation,andaterritory(VII.4,1325b37–1326a8).Hisideaseemstobethatalawgiverbringsapolisintobeingbyimposingformuponmatter,aconstitution(politeia)uponcitizens(politai).(ForthenotionthattheformofapolisisitsconstitutionseeIII.3,1276a17–b13.)Bythisanalysisapolisisanartifactof(practical)reason.SinceartandreasonareusuallyopposedtonatureinAristotle(VII.14,1333a23;Phys.II.6,198a10;Met.Z.7,395ACTC2039520/03/2006,04:09PM\ndavidkeyt1032a12–13;ENIII.3,1112a31–33),onewouldexpecthimtodenythatthepolisisanaturalentity.But,contrarytoexpectations,Aristotlefamouslyclaimsthatthepolisisanaturalentity(I.2,1252b30,1253a2,a25;VII.8,1328a22).Thisisoneofthethreebasictheoremsofhispoliticalphilosophy,theothertwobeingthatmanisbynatureapoliticalanimalandthatthepolisispriorbynaturetotheindividual(I.2,1253a2–3,a19;III.6,1278b19;seealsoKeyt,1991aandDepew,1995).Hisprincipalargumentforhisfirsttheoremisthefollowing:thehousehold,beinggroundedonthenaturalinstinctsforself-preservationandprocreation,existsbynature;thevillagecomestobefromandisthecompletionofthehousehold;sothevillageexistsbynature;thepoliscomestobefromandisthecompletionofthevillage;sothepolistooexistsbynature(I.2,1252a24–b34).Theideaseemstobethatonecommunityisthecompletionofanotherifitservesawiderrangeofpurposesthantheother.Thus,thehousehold,thevillage,andthepolisserverespectivelydailypurposes,non-dailypurposes,andthepurposesofawholelife(I.2,1252b12–16;ENVIII.9,1160a21–23).WecannowunderstandwhyAristotleidentifiesthemostinclusivecommunitywiththemostsovereign.Whenanaturalentityhasanend,italwayshasapartwhosefunctionitistorealizethatend.Torealizeitsendofgeneratingprogeny,forexample,everyplantandanimalhasareproductivesoul(DeAn.II.4,416b23–25;GAII.1,735a17–19).Thus,ifthemostinclusivecommunityisanaturalentityandhasgoodlifeandhappinessasanend,itmusthaveapartwhosefunctionitistorealizethisend.Aristotlethinksthatthispartisitsgoverningclass(seeIV.4,1291a24–28),orsovereignelement(III.6,1278b8–14;7,1279a25–28),andstopsjustshortofidentifyingthepartwiththewhole:“Apolisandeveryothercomposite,”hesays,“seemstobemostofallitsmostsovereignelement(tokuriOtaton)”(ENIX.8,1168b31–32).Aristotle’sargumentforthenaturalnessofthepolisobviouslydependsuponsomeprincipleofthetransitivityofnaturalness,butithasproveddifficulttoformulateaprinciplethatisnotopentoobviousobjections(seeKeyt,1991a,pp.130–1).Onerecentproposalisthis:acommunitythatcomestobefromanotherandthatservesnaturalendsthataremoreinclusiveorofahigherorderthanthoseservedbytheotherexistsbynatureiftheotherexistsbynature(Miller,1995,p.42;seealsoSaunders,1995,pp.67–8).Therearetwomajorproblemsinapplyingthisprinciple.Thefirstistoestablishthatsomeinitialcommunityexistsbynature;thesecondistodeterminewhethersomethingisorisnotanaturalend.Considerthefollowingapplicationoftheprinciple.Walkingseemstobeasnaturalasprocreation.Giventhatpeoplehaveanimpetus(hormE)toassociatewithoneanother(I.2,1253a29),awalkingclubwouldthusseemtoexistbynature.Aredancingandsingingnaturalends?Ifso,thenbytheproposedprincipleagroupofstrollingminstrelsthatcomesintobeingwhenawalkingclubbeginstosingwhileitwalksexistsbynature.Butifevengroupsofstrollingminstrelsexistbynature,theproposedprinciplelosesitsplausibility.Theconceptofnaturalexistencebecomessoattenuatedastobevirtuallymeaningless(Robinson,1962,p.xxii).Ontheotherhand,nottocountsinginganddancingasnaturalendsseemsadhoc,designedsimplytorestricttheapplicationoftheproposedprinciple.Theconceptofnaturalexistenceisimportantbecauseitpavesthewayforthenotionofanunnaturalcondition.Onlyanaturalentitycanbeinanunnaturalcondition:ahorsecanbeblindanddeaf,butnotastatueofahorse.Whetheramanisina396ACTC2039620/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’spoliticalphilosophynaturaloranunnaturalcondition,Aristotleexplains,dependsupontherelationofruleandsubordinationbetweenhissoulandhisbodyandbetweenhisreasonandhisemotions(I.5,1254a34–b9).Similarly,whetherapolisisinanaturaloranunnaturalconditiondependsontherelationofruleandsubordinationamongthesectionsofitspopulation,whichisdeterminedbyitspoliticalorganization(taxis),orconstitution(III.1,1274b38;6,1278b8–10;IV.1,1289a15–18).Someconstitutions,Aristotlemaintains,areaccordingtonature(kataphusin),whereasothersarecontrarytonature(paraphusin)(III.17,1287b37–41).TounderstandthisdistinctionweneedtorecallAristotle’sidentificationoftheforced6andtheunnatural.“Whatisbyforce(bia(i))andwhatiscontrarytonature,”hesays,“arethesame”(Cael.III.2,300a23;seealsoPhys.IV.8,215a1–3;V.6,230a29–30;GAV.8,788b27).FireinanAristoteliancosmosmovesupwardtowarditsnaturalplacebynaturebutdownwardonlybyforceandcontrarytonature(GCII.6,333b26–30andelsewhere).Theidentificationoftheforcedandtheunnaturalisafeaturebothofanimateandinanimatenature(GAII.4,739a4;III.8,777a18–19;V.8,788b27)7andextendseventohumanbeings(EEII.8,1224a15–30;Rh.I.11,1370a9).TheconstitutionsthatAristotlethinkscontrarytonaturearepreciselythosethatarebasedonforce(III.3,1276a12–13;10,1281a23–24).NaturesuppliesthenormativeelementofAristotle’spoliticalphilosophyandkeepsitfrombeingentirelydescriptiveandpragmatic.Aristotlebelievesthatnatureandjusticeareconnected,andsubscribestotwoprinciplesrelatingthem:apositiveprinciplelinkingthejustandthenatural(I.5,1255a1–3;III.17,1287b37–39;VII.9,1329a13–17)andanegativeprinciplelinkingtheunjustandtheunnatural(I.10,1258a40–b2;VII.3,1325b7–10;andseeI.3,1253b20–23).(ForbothprinciplestogetherseeI.5,1254a17–20andIII.16,1287a8–18.)Thoughthesejustice-of-natureprinciplesgounexplainedandunsupportedinthePolitics,theyarenotultimateprinciplesforAristotle.Theyfollowsyllogisticallyfromhisnaturalteleologysupplementedbyonefurtherpremise.AccordingtoAristotelianteleology“naturemakeseverythingforthesakeofsomething”(I.2,1252b32;PAI.1,641b12,5,645a23–26;Phys.II.8),wherethissomething,theend,orgoal,ofthemaking,issomethinggood(I.1,1252b34–1253a1;Phys.II.2,194a32–33;3,195a23–25;Met.A.3,983a31–32andespeciallySomno2,455b16–25).Toreachthepositiveprincipleweneedapremiserelatinggoodnessandjustice(forwhichseeIII.12,1282b16–17;13,1283a38–40togetherwithKeyt,1996,pp.131–2).Wethenhavethefollowingsyllogism:Everythingnaturalisgood.8Everything(withinthesphereofsocialconduct)thatisgoodisjust.Therefore,everything(withinthesphereofsocialconduct)thatisnaturalisjust.6.OnAristotle’sdistinctionbetweenwhatisnaturalandwhatiscontrarytonature,seeBodnárandPellegrin,aristotle’sphysicsandcosmology,inthisvolume,esp.pp.275–7.7.Ontheroleofnatureinanimatethings,seeinthisvolumeLennox,aristotle’sbiology,esp.pp.300–10.8.Thisrestrictionisnecessarybecausethesphereofjusticeisnarrowerthantherealmofnature.397ACTC2039720/03/2006,04:09PM\ndavidkeytThenegativeprinciple,thateverything(withinthesphereofsocialconduct)thatisunnaturalisunjust,canbederivedsimilarlymutatismutandis(fordetailsseeKeyt,1996,p.132).Onemightquestionthevalidityofthissyllogism.Foritisnotclearthatitsmiddletermhasthesamemeaninginbothpremises.AccordingtoAristotelianteleologythegoodthatnaturepursuesisthegoodoftheindividualtree,mollusk,orhumanbeing(Phys.II.7,198b8–9),whereasthejustisnottheindividual’sgood,butanother’sgood(ENV.1,1130a3–4;6,1134b5–6).ThisproblemunderscorestheimportanceforAristotleofestablishingthatmanisbynatureasocialorpoliticalanimalwhosegoodistiedtothegoodofothers.Withoutthisbasictheoremthesyllogismgroundinghispositivejustice-of-natureprinciplewouldcommitthefallacyoffourterms.Aristotle’spoliticalnaturalismshouldbereadasaresponsetotheoppositechal-lengesofProtagoreanrelativismandPlatonism.Protagoreanrelativismistheviewthat“whateverthingsappearjustandfinetoeachpolisaresoforitaslongasitholdsbythem”(Plato,Tht.167c4–5).ForProtagorasthereisnoexternalorabsolutestand-ardofjudgment;anyconstitutionthatappearsjustandfinetothoselivingunderitis9justandfineforthem.SuchaviewisanathematobothPlatoandAristotle.LikeAristotle,Platotriestoavoiditbyanappealtonature(LawsX,888d7–890d8),thoughhisconceptofnatureisradicallydifferentfromAristotle’s.ForPlatotherealmofnatureistheworldofForms(Phd.103b5;Rep.X,597b5–7,c2,598a1–3;Prm.132d2);and“thejustbynature”(Rep.VI,501b2)istheFormofjustice,anincorporealentity(Phd.65d4–66a10;Sph.246b8)existingbeyondtimeandspace(Ti.37c6–38c3,51e6–1052b2).Aristotlewishestoavoidrelativismwithoutinvokingsuchasuprasensiblestandard.Thisheendeavorstodobybringingnaturedowntoearth.Heidentifiesnaturewiththesensibleworld(Met.L.1,1069a30–b2)andseekshisstandardinthis11world.Thisisanobleprojectwithwhichmanycontemporaryphilosopherswillbeinsympathy.Itsfull-scalepursuitinthePoliticsgivesthetreatiseitsgreatnessasaworkofphilosophy.DistributiveJusticeThetwomainconceptsinAristotle’spoliticalphilosophyasidefromthestrictlypolitical,referredtoinGreekbytermsonthestempolit-,arenatureandjustice.Havingdis-cussednature,weturnnowtojustice.AristotledevotesanentirebookoftheEthicstothistopic:NicomacheanEthicsV=EudemianEthicsIV.Inthisbookhefirstdistinguishesuniversalfromparticularjustice–thelawful(tonomimon)fromtheequal(toison)(ENV.1,1129a34;2,1130b9)–andthendividesparticularjusticeintodistributiveandcorrective(ENV.2,1130b30–1131a1),theformerbeingconcernedwithestablishingequality,thelatterwithrestoringit.9.Onthistopic,seeinthisvolumeBarney,thesophisticmovement,pp.87–90.10.OntheroleofFormsinPlato’spoliticalthought,seeLane,plato’spoliticalphilosophy,esp.pp.172–80.11.ThedifferencebetweenPlatoandAristotleisbeautifullyillustratedinRaphael’sfamouspaintingTheSchoolofAthens.398ACTC2039820/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’spoliticalphilosophyThefocusofAristotle’spoliticalphilosophyisondistributivejustice.ThePoliticscanbereadasanapplicationoftheabstracttheoryofdistributivejusticelaidoutinNicomacheanEthicsV.3,whichisinitsturnadevelopmentofaPlatonicidea(Grg.507e6–508a8;LawsVI,756e9–758a2).(AristotlerefersexplicitlytoNicomacheanEthicsV.3atPoliticsIII.9,1280a18,and12,1282b20.)Distributivejustice,accordingtothistheory,isakindofgeometricproportioninvolvingatleasttwopersons,AandB,andtwothings,CandD.AdistributioninwhichCandDareallottedtoAandBrespectivelyisjustiftheratioofCtoDisthesameasthatofAtoB:CA=DBTheratiosimplyabasisofcomparisonbothofthepersonsandofthethings.Personsdonotstandinratiostoeachotherpersebutonlyincertainrespectssuchasheight,age,wealth,andsoforth;nordothings.Thebasisofcomparisonofthethingsistheirpositiveornegativevalue,andthatofthepersonsistheirworth(axia).Whenthisfactoristakenintoaccount,theformulabecomes:ThevalueofCTheworthofpersonA=ThevalueofDTheworthofpersonBFinally,thedummynames“C”and“D”canbeeliminatedinfavorofdefinitedescrip-tionsofCandD:ThevalueofthethingallottedtoATheworthofpersonA=ThevalueofthethingallottedtoBTheworthofpersonBAdistributionisjustaccordingtoAristotle’stheoryifitfollowsthisformula–ifthevalueofthethingitallotstoonepersonstandstothevalueofthethingitallotstoanotherastheworthoftheonepersonstandstotheworthoftheother.(ForadetailedanalysisseeGalston,1980,pp.145–50.)Thethingsdistributedbytheformulaaretheapportionablegoods:honor,money,andsafety(ENV.2,1130b2,b30–33).ThegreatestoftheseinAristotle’seyesishonor(ENIV.3,1123b20–21),whichincludesnotonlyrespectandtokensofesteem(Rh.I.5,1361a27–b2)butalsopoliticaloffice(III.10,1281a31).Politicalofficeisthegreatestoftheapportionablegoodsbecausethepoliticalcommunityistheprimaryarenaofdistribution.Thosewhowinofficeinsuchacommunitymakeandadministerthelawsregardingproperty,militaryservice,andevenpoliticalofficeitself,andthuscontrolallfurtherdistributionsoftheapportionablegoods.ThebasicofficesinanancientGreekpoliswerethoseofassemblyman(ekklEsiastEs)andjuror(dikastEs).Tobeafullcitizen(politEshaplOs)wastohavetherighttositintheassemblyandtoserveonjuries(III.1,1275a22–33,b13–21).Fullcitizenshipwasthusthebasicapportionablegoodandthefocusofdisputesoverdistributivejustice.Thepartiestosuchdisputeswerethosewithaprima-facieclaimtofullcitizenship.InancientGreecethesewerethefreebornadultmalenativesresidinginapolis.The399ACTC2039920/03/2006,04:09PM\ndavidkeytvoicesofwomen,children,aliens,andslaves–themajorityofthepopulation–werenotheard.Disputesoverdistributivejustice,Aristotlesays,arenotovertheprincipleofdistributivejusticeitself(III.12,1282b18–21;V.1,1301a26–27;ENV.3,1131a10–14),noroverthevalueofthethingsbeingdistributed(III.9,1280a18–19),butovertheworthoftheclaimantstoashareofthedistribution.“Allagree,”Aristotlesays,“thatthejustindistributionmustbeaccordingtoworthofsomesort,thoughalldonotrecognizethesamesortofworth;butdemocratssayitisfreedom,oligarchswealthorgoodbirth,andaristocratsvirtue”(ENV.3,1131a25–28).Disputesbreakout,inotherwords,becausepeopleevaluateworthbydifferentstandards.ItisusefulheretoborrowthedistinctionfromJohnRawls(1971,pp.5–6,9–10)betweentheformalandabstractconceptofdistributivejusticeexpressedbytheformulaaboveandthevariousconcreteconceptionsofdistributivejusticethatresultwhentheworthmentionedintheformulaisevaluatedaccordingtovariousstandards.Thus,thedemocraticcon-ceptionofjusticeevaluatesworthaccordingtothestandardoffreedom;theoligarchic,accordingtothestandardofwealth.Oligarchsanddemocratssharethesameconceptofdistributivejustice,butnotthesameconception.NotbeingaProtagoreanrelativist,Aristotlethinksthereisacorrectstandardofworth.Whatisit?ThisisacentralquestionofAristotle’spoliticalphilosophy.HebeginstoaddressitinPoliticsIII.12byseekingcriteriaforevaluatingthevariousstandards.Inacomplexargumentherejectstheideathat,otherthingsbeingequal,“superiorityinanygood”(height,physicalbeauty,goodcomplexion,goodbirth)isarationalgroundfordistributingpoliticalofficesunequally.Hisfirstthoughtisthatarationalbasisfordistributingpoliticalofficeisprovidedonlybythosepersonalqualitiessuchasjusticeandpoliticalvirtuethatfitamanforpoliticaloffice.Sothefirstcriterionheconsidersisfitness.ButlaterinthesamechapterAristotleacknowledgestheimportanceoffreedomandwealthinapoliticalcommunity–“therecouldnotbeapolis,”hesays,“whollyofneedypeople,anymorethanofslaves”(III.12,1283a18–19)–andendorsesfreedomandwealthasreasonablestandardsofworth.SinceAristotleneverarguesthatfreestatusorwealthfitsamanforpoliticaloffice,hisideaseemstobethattheyarereasonablestandardsbecausetheycontributesomehowtoapoliticalcommunity.Heseems,then,tohaveintroducedasecondcriterion:con-tribution(III.9,1281a4;12,1283a1–2).Thetwocriteriaarenotthesamesinceapersonwhoisunfittedtoparticipateinacertainactivitymightstillmakeacontribu-tiontoit.Apersonwithnoathleticskillsmightprovidetheequipmentfortheteam.(OnthesetwocriteriaseeNewman,1887–1902,vol.1,pp.249–50,andIrwin,1988,pp.427–8.)Neithercriterioncanbeapplieduntilthenatureofapoliticalcommunityisclarified.Somepeople,Aristotlenotes,thinkofapoliticalcommunityasajoint-stockcompanywhoseendistoenrichtheshareholders(III.9,1280a25–31;IV.8,1294a11;Rh.I.8,1366a5);othersregarditasafreesocietywhereoneisable“toliveasonewishes”(VI.2,1317b11–12;IV.9,1294a11;Rh.I.8,1366a4);stillotherslookuponitasanethicalcommunitydirectedtoeducationandvirtue(IV.8,1294a9–11;Rh.I.8,1366a5–6).Acontributiontooneoftheseenterprisesmightbethedestructionofanother.Afocusuponreturnoncapitalmightcontributetothesuccessofajoint-stockcompanybutdestroyanethicalcommunity.Similarly,aqualitythatfitsaman400ACTC2040020/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’spoliticalphilosophyforaleadershippositioninajoint-stockcompany,suchascompetitiveness,mightdisqualifyhimforsuchapositioninanethicalcommunity.Thus,insearchingforthecorrectstandardofworthAristotleisledtotheprimequestion,Whatisapoliticalcommunity?Or,asAristotlephrasesit,Whatisapolis(III.1,1274b33–34)?Thesearchforthecorrectstandardofworthbecomesintheendasearchforadefinitionofwhatitistobeapolis(seeTop.VII.3,153a15–16andMet.Z.5,1031a12).ThesearchisconductedinPoliticsIII.9.WhatAristotleseeksinthischapterisarealdefinitionof“polis”pergenusetdifferentiam.Hetakesitforgrantedthatapolisisakindofcommunity(I.1,1252a1;III.3,1276b1),sohistaskistofindthefeaturethatdifferentiatesapolisfromotherspeciesofthesamegenus.Thisfeatureisitsend,orgoal.Hetriestofinditbyaneliminationargument.Insuchanargumentonerulesouteachdistinctpossibilityinturnuntilonlyoneremains,whichmust,then,bethecorrectone.Aristotleconsiderssixpossibilities:property,self-preservation,mutualdefense,trade,preventionofinjustice,andgoodlife.Heeliminatesfiveonthegroundthat,takenseverallyorjointly,theydifferentiateatmostanalliance,notapoliticalcommunity(1280b8–33;seealsoII.2,1261a24–25),andinfersthatthesixthpos-sibility,goodlife,isthetrueend.Apolis,heconcludes,is“acommunityofhouseholdsandclansinlivingwell,forthesakeofaperfectandself-sufficientlife”(1280b33–35;seealsoVII.8,1328a35–37).Aristotleisnowinapositiontodeterminethecorrectstandardofworth.Combininghisdefinitionof“polis”withthecontributioncriterion,heclaimsthat“thosewhocon-tributemosttosuchacommunityhavealargershareinthepolisthanthosewhoareequalorsuperiorinfreedomandbirthbutunequalinpoliticalvirtue,orthosewhoexceedinwealthbutareexceededinvirtue”(III.9,1281a4–8).Insayingthatthosepossessingpoliticalvirtue“havealargershareinthepolis”thanthefreeorthewealthy,heacknowledgesagainthatthefreeandthewealthyalsohaveashare,albeitasmallerone,andthatthecorrectstandardofworth,thoughheavilyweightedinfavorofvirtue,mustincludefreedomandwealthaswellasvirtue.ThestandardthatAristotleendorsesasthecorrectoneis“virtuefullyfurnishedwithexternalmeans”(IV.2,1289a31–33;VII.1,1323b41–1324a1).SincethisconclusionstandsorfallsalongwithAristotle’sdefinitionof“polis,”weneedtoexaminetheeliminationargumentthatleadstohisdefinition.Aristotle’sargumentseemstobevulnerableonatleasttwoscores.First,hislistofthepossibleendsofapolisisincomplete.Anendhementionselsewhere,forexample,butfailstomentioninPoliticsIII.9isthatpursuedbySparta:conquestandwar(II.9,1271b2–3;VII.2,1324b5–9,1325a3–4;14,1333b12–14).Second,ineliminatingthefirstfivecandidateshereliesonthecontroversialassumptionthatapolisismorethananallianceandhencemusthaveahigherendthananalliance.Philosopherswhoadoptaminimalistviewofapoliticalcommunitywillthinksuchanassumptionbegsthequestion.Theyarguethatapolisissimplyakindofalliancealongwithcommercialandmilitaryalliances.Justasamilitaryallianceisanallianceofpoleis,apolisisanallianceofhouseholds.Aristotlehimselfmentionstwosuchminimalists,Lycophron(III.9,1280b10–12)andHippodamus(II.8;seeespecially1267b37–39).NotonlydoesAristotle’sargumentseemtofail,butitsconclusionseemspatentlyfalse.(Abadargumentcanhaveatrueconclusion.)Forgoodlifeisnotanendthatverymanypoliticalcommunitiespursue.Aristotledoesnotofferanyexamples.But401ACTC2040120/03/2006,04:09PM\ndavidkeytonewaytodefeatadefinition,asAristotlepointsoutintheTopics,istoshowthatitisnottrueofeverymemberofthespeciesbeingdefined:“forthedefinitionof‘man’mustbetrueofeveryman”(Top.VI.1,139a25–27).Butperhapsthisrequirementondefinitionsistoostringent.Havingtwofeetmightbepartofthedefinitionof“man”(seeTop.I.7,103a27;V.4,133a3,b8)eventhoughsomehumansarebornwithoutthem.Thedefinitionofanaturalentitydefinesitinanatural,ratherthananunnatural,condition.Sincethepolisisanaturalentity,adefinitionofitcannotberefutedbycitingpoleisofwhichthedefinitionisnottrue,ifthesepoleisareinanunnaturalcondition,asallthosearethathaveconstitutionsbasedonforce.ThisisnodoubtthereasonthatAristotleclaims,notthathisdefinitionof“polis”istrueofeverypolis,butonlythatitwillbeacceptabletothosewho“givethoughttogoodgovernment”and“inquireaccurately”(III.9,1280b6,b28).Aristotle’stheoryofdistributivejusticethuscomestorestuponanaccountofwhatitistobe,notjustanypolis,butapolisinanatural,ratherthananunnatural,condition.AristotlesketchesapictureofsuchapolisinPoliticsVIIandVIII.“Thepolisofourprayers”TheostensiblesubjectofPoliticsVIIandVIIIisthebestconstitution(VII.1,1323a14;2,1325a15;9,1328b34;13,1332a4),butAristotle’sdiscussioninthesetwobooks12rangesfarbeyondthestrictlyconstitutional.Whatheactuallydescribesisapolisideallysituatedonidealterritory,withanidealpopulation,anidealeducationalsystem,andanidealconstitution.Hedescribes,notmerelyanidealconstitution,buteachofthefourcausesof“thepolisofourprayers”(VII.4,1325b36):final(VII.1–3,13–15),efficient(VII.4,1325b40–1326a5),material(VII.4–7,11–12),andformal(VII.8–10).Theconstitutionisthefourth(III.3,1276a17–b13).Thefinalcauseofthebestpolis,itsendorgoal,istolivewell(I.2,1252b30;III.9,1280a31–32)orhappily(VII.1,1323b1;13,1331b38–39),wherehappinessis“anactualizationandasortofperfectuseofvirtue”(VII.8,1328a37–38;seealsoVII.13,1332a7–10;ENI.7,1098a7–20;EEII.1,1219a38–39).Wesaymoreaboutthisbelow.Theefficientcauseofapolisisthelawgiverwhodesigneditsconstitution.Thematerialcauseofapolisisitspopulation,especiallyitscitizenpopulation,anditsterritory(VII.4,1325b37–1326a8).Thenumberoffullcitizensofanidealpolisshouldbedeterminedbythefunction(ergon)ofsuchapolis(VII.4,1326a13–25),thatis,byitsend,orfinalcause;andthesizeofitstotalpopulationincludingwomen,children,residentaliens,andslavesshouldbedeterminedinturnbythenumberofitsfullcitizens.Thus,thebodyofitsfullcitizensshouldbesmallenoughtobeself-sufficientforlivingwellinthecontextofapoliticalcommunitywhileitstotalpopulation12.TherelationofbooksVII–VIIItotherestofthePoliticsisamatterofcontroversy.Somescholarsrejectthetraditionalorderinwhichthetwobooks,ratherillogically,imme-diatelyfollowthreecloselyconnectedbooksdealingwithimperfectconstitutionsandconstitu-tionalpreservationanddestruction,andplacethem,wheretheyseemtobelong,immediatelyafterBookIIIonthegeneraltheoryofconstitutions.ForopposingviewsseeKraut(2002,pp.181–9)andSimpson(1998,pp.xvii–xx).402ACTC2040220/03/2006,04:09PM\naristotle’spoliticalphilosophyshouldbelargeenoughforthepolistobeself-sufficientinthenecessitiesoflife(VII.4,1326b2–9).Aristotledoesnotofferanynumbers,thoughhedoesthinkthatthe5,040fullcitizensofPlato’ssecond-bestpolisoftheLawswouldrequireanunrealisticallylargeterritorythesizeofBabylontocarryapopulationlargeenoughtosupportsomanypeoplelivinginidlenessalongwiththeirwivesandservants(II.6,1265a10–17).(FortheenormoussizeofBabylonseeIII.3,1276a27–30.)Somuchforthequantityoffullcitizensinanidealpolis.Asfortheirquality,theymusthavethepsychiccapabilityofacquiringthemoralandintellectualvirtues:theymustbespirited(thumoeideis)andintelligent(dianoEtikoi)GreeksratherthanspiritedbutintellectuallydeficientEuropeansorintelligentbutspiritlessAsians(VII.7,1327b20–36).Thelawgiverdevelopstheirpsychiccapability,makesthemintomenofvirtue,byhabitu-ationandinstruction(VII.7,1327b36–38;13,1332a38–b11;seealsoENII.1,1103a14–18;X.9).Anidealterritoryissuperlativelyself-sufficient(VII.5,1326b26–30,butseeVII.6,1327a25–27),hasahealthyclimate(VII.11,1330a38–b17),iseasytodefend(VII.5,1326b39–1327a3),andislargeenoughtoallowthecitizensofapolisfoundedonittoliveatleisurefreelyandtemperately(VII.5,1326b30–32).Suchapolisshouldideallyhavewalls(VII.11,1330b32–1331a18)andaccesstothesea(VII.6).OnehistoricalpolisthatcameclosetosatisfyingAristotle’sphysicalrequirements,tojudgefromitsruins,washisownnativecityofStagira.Thesocial,economic,andpoliticalstructureofAristotle’sidealpolis–itscon-stitutionanditsformalcause–isoutlinedinPoliticsVII.8–10.Aristotlebeginsbydistinguishingtheproperpartsofapolisfromthosethingsthatarenotpartsbutareindispensableforitsexistence.Itsproperpartsarethemen(womenareignoredthrough-outVII.8–10)whocanshareinitsend,orgoal.Thus,theproperpartsoftheidealpolisarethemenwhoarecapableoflivingalifeofvirtuousactivity.Manywhoareindispensablefortheexistenceoftheidealpolisareincapableoflivingsuchalife.Thelivesofartisans,merchants,andshopkeepersare“sordidandopposedtovirtue,”whilefarmerslacktheleisurenecessary“forthegrowthofvirtueandforpoliticalactivities”(VII.9,1328b39–1329a2).Theproperpartsoftheidealpolisareitscitizens.Thosewhoareindispensablebutnotproperpartsaremereaccessories.Sincenofreenativeintheidealpolisistobeexcludedfromfullcitizenship(VII.13,1332a34–35),theaccessoriesmustbeeitherslavesoraliens.Thefarmerswillideallybeslaves(VII.9,1329a25–26;10,1330a25–28),whilecraftsmen,merchants,andshopkeeperswillpresumablyberesidentaliens(metoikoi)orforeignvisitors,astheyareinPlato’ssecond-bestpolisoftheLaws(VIII,846d1–847b6,XI,920a3–4).Eachofthefullcitizenswillownland(VII.9,1329a17–19;10,1329b36–37,1330a9–25)(whichwillnot,however,shieldthemfromthevicissitudesoffortune(VII.10,1330a5–8)).Citizen-shipisthusdistributedaccordingtotheAristotelianstandard:virtuefullyfurnishedwithexternalmeans(VII.1,1323b40–1324a2).SoinAristotle’sviewtheidealpolismustbeideallyjust.Itshouldalsoberemarkablystable.Sincethefree,thewealthy,andthevirtuousareexactlythesamemen,thedivisionsamongfreenativesthatregularlyleadtofactionwillbenonexistent.Aristotleassignstrade,industry,andagriculturetoslavesandalienssothathiscitizensmayhaveleisurefrommaterialconcernsforhappylives,livesofvirtuousactivity(II.9,1269a34–36;11,1273a32–35;VII.9,1329a1–2).Butwhichvirtues403ACTC2040320/03/2006,04:10PM\ndavidkeytdotheyhavetoexercise?Certainlyallthemoralvirtues.Theyarebrave,temperate,just(VII.1,1323a27–34,b32–36;9,1328b38),evengreat-souled(megalopsuchoi)(VII.7,1328a9–10;VIII.3,1338b2–4).Theymustalsohavepracticalwisdomsincenoonecanpossessthemoralvirtueswithoutit(ENVI.13,1144b30–1145a6).Somuchisclear.Butdotheypossesstheoreticalwisdom?Aretheyabletoengageintheoreticalactivity(theOria)?Thishasbeendoubted,primarilybecausethePolitics,inspiteofcontaininganentirebookoneducationaltheory,containsbutasingleallusiontohighereducation(VIII.2,1337a42:taperitta,theextraordinarythings,forwhichseeSusemihlandHicks,1894,pp.571and619;andKraut,1997,p.176).WhenthisfactiscoupledwithAristotle’sadmissionthatsomepeopleareabletodeveloptheirpracticalbutnottheirtheoreticalreason(VII.14,1333a23–29),itiseasytoconcludethatthemajorityofhiscitizensarenotmenoftheoreticalwisdomandthatthetheoreticallifeisnotthegoaloftheidealpolis(Kraut,1997,pp.138–40;2002,pp.197–202;Lord,1982,pp.196–202;Solmsen,1964,pp.217–18).Assensibleasthisinterpretationsounds,itisprobablymistaken.AristotledoesnotsayornecessarilyimplyatPoliticsVII.14,1333a23–29,thatsomeofhiscitizenswillbeincapableofdevelopingtheirtheoreticalreason;heimpliesonlythatsomepeopleareincapable.Moreover,theoreticalwisdomappearstobeamongthevirtuesthatAristotleexpectsinhiscitizens.Indiscussingthevirtuesneededforworkandleisure,warandpeace,hesaysthat“braveryandenduranceareneededforwork,philosophyforleisure,temperanceandjusticeatbothtimes”(VII.15,1334a22–25;seealsoa28–40).Thephilosophyneededexclusivelyforleisurecannotbethevirtueoftheentireintellect,ofpracticalandtheoreticalreasontogether,assomehavemaintained(Newman,1887–1902,vol.1,pp.346–7,vol.2,p.255,vol.3,p.450)orthevirtueofpracticalreasonalone;fortheseareneededforbothworkandleisure.Itmustthenbethevirtueoftheoreticalreason,whoseexerciseistheoreticalactivity(theOria).ThisinterpretationissupportedbythefactthatthepropertiesattributedtophilosophyinthePoliticsarethoseattributedtotheoreticalactivityintheNicomacheanEthics:painlesspleasure,self-sufficiency,leisuredness(compareII.7,1267a7–12withENX.7,1177a17–b26,andnotetheuseof“philosophy”asastylisticvariantfor“theoreticalactivity”at1177a25).Itseems,then,thatthetheoreticallifeisthehighestendoftheidealpolis(Newman,1887–1902,vol.1,p.200;Stewart,1892,vol.1,pp.59–62;SusemihlandHicks,1894,pp.48–9,619)justasitisofeachindividualhumanbeing(ENX.7).ThereisthusnoneedtoevadetheclearmeaningofAristotle’softrepeatedprinciplethatthegoalofthebestmanandofthebestpolisarethesame(VII.2,1324a5–8;3,1325b30–32;14,1333b37;15,1334a11–13).Aristotle’sidealcitysetsthestandardfornaturalnessand,consequently,forAristo-telianjustice.Wecannowexplainwhytheidealpolisisinacompletelynaturalcon-dition.Firstofall,theendoftheidealcityisthehighestendofhumanlife,theoreticalactivity.Second,itsconstitutiondistributesmilitary,political,andreligiousofficestoitsadultmalecitizensinamannerthatcorrespondstothenaturalstagesoflife(VII.14,1332b35–38).Inhisphysicalprimeacitizenservesasahopliteinthearmedforces;inhismentalprimeheheadsahouseholdandparticipatesinthepoliticallifeofhispolisasafullcitizen;whenhegrowsold,hebecomesapriest(VII.9,1329a2–17).Third,theconstitutiondistributespoliticalofficeonlytothenaturallysuperiorsex(I.5,1254b13–14;12,1259b1–3).And,finally,itassignsnaturalslavestonatural404ACTC2040420/03/2006,04:10PM\naristotle’spoliticalphilosophymasters.ThesocialandpoliticalstructureoftheidealpolisistoAristotle’seyecom-pletelynaturalbecauseitreflectswhathetakestobethenaturalhierarchyofhumanbeingsandthenaturalstagesoflife.InanAristotelianuniverse,temporallyinfiniteinbothdirections,onemightexpectsuperbinstancesofeverytypeofnaturalobjecttocropupfromtimetotime–com-pletelyhealthyhorses,forexample,withnoweaknessesorabnormalities,andcom-pletelynaturalpoleis.ThisleadsonetowonderjusthowdistantAristotlethinkshisidealpolisisfromhistoricalreality.Plato,afterall,conjecturesthathisidealpolismayexistinsomecorneroftheworldorsomepointintime(Rep.VI,499c7–d6);andAristotleisableonoccasiontolookbeyondparochialtime(II.5,1264a1–5;VII.10,1329b25–35).Aristotleneveraddressesthequestionofhistoricalreality,thoughhedoesinsistthatpoliticalidealsshouldpresupposenothingimpossible(II.6,1265a17–18;VII.4,1325b38–39),whichmeansthatinhiseyestheidealpolislieswithintherealmofpossibility.Buttherearemanydegreesofpossibilityrangingfrommerelogi-calconsistencytopoliticalfeasibility.SothequestionarisesoftheclosenessofthepossibilitydemandedbyAristotletohistoricalreality.Scholarlyopiniononthismatterspansawidespectrum:theidealpolisisanunapproachableideal(Yack,1993,p.3);itisanapproachablebutunattainablestandard,possibleinprinciplebutunattainableinpractice(Miller,1995,p.252);itisapresentpossibility(Kraut,1997,p.140);itisnotonlypossiblebutpractical(Stalley,1991,pp.198–9);itisapracticalmodelforthefoundationofanewGreekpolis(Ober,1998,p.328n).OnemightwonderwhetherAristotelianideasdonotimplytheexistenceoftheidealpolisatsomepointintime.Forinadditiontotheideamentionedabovethatitwouldbeoddifatypeofnaturalentitynever,throughoutthewholeofinfinitetime,appearedinacompletelynaturalcondition,thereistheAristotelianprinciplethateverypossibilityisrealizedatsomepointintime(Cael.I.12;Top.II.11,115b17–18;Met.Q.3,1047a10–14;4,1047b3–6).Thoughthescopeofthisprincipleisrestricted–thepossibilitythatagivencloakwillbecutupwillneverberealizedifthecloakwearsoutfirst(Int.9,19a12–14)–Aristotle’sidealpolisseemstofallwithinitsscope;fortheprincipleappliesatleasttonaturalentities(Waterlow,1982,pp.141–58),ofwhichtheidealpolisisonekind(VII.8,1328a21–25).WecannotleaveAristotle’sidealpoliswithoutconsideringitsunattractivefeatures:slavery,thesubordinationofwomen,ethnicprejudice,contemptforindustryandtrade,anddenigrationoflabor.TheseareallreflectiveofpopularGreekvaluesofthefourthcenturybce(Keyt,1991b,pp.267–8):thepolisofourprayersisthepolisprayedforbyancientGreekmales.Butitwasnotlefttomoderntimestoquestionthesevalues.ThereportofdiversevoicesisapartofAristotelianmethodology.WeneedlooknofurtherthanthePoliticsitselfforanindictmentofAristotle’sideal.Aristotlereportstheviewofthosewhoconsiderslaveryunjust(I.3,1253b20–23),examinesoneofPlato’sargu-mentsforplacingwomenonanequalfootingwithmen(II.5,1264b4–6;seeRep.V,451d–457c),discussesthedemocraticviewthatartisansarefitforfullcitizenship(III.5),referstothebarbarianEgyptianswithrespect(VII.10,1329a40–b5,b23–25),andrankstheconstitutionofbarbarianCarthagejustbelowthebestconstitution(IV.7,1293b14–19).(ForthedivisionofthehumanraceintoGreekandbarbarianseeCael.I.3,270b7–8,andPlato,Plt.262c10–d6.)NotonlydoesAristotlereportacon-traryvoiceonthesubjectofslavery,butasweshallseeinthenextsectionhisdefense405ACTC2040520/03/2006,04:10PM\ndavidkeytofnaturalslaveryisatoddswithhisownprinciples.TheotherrepugnantfeaturesofAristotle’sidealweshallnotpursue.SlaveryAristotle’sdefenseofnaturalslaveryservesatleasttwopurposes.Thefirstrelatestothenaturalnessofthepolis.Aristotleneedstoprovethatthehouseholdisnaturalasasteptowardprovingthatthepolisisnatural;thisinvolvesshowingthatthevariousrelationsinthehousehold–husbandandwife,masterandslave,fatherandchild(I.2,1252a24–b15;I.12)–arenatural;andthemostproblematicoftheseisthatofmastertoslave.ThesecondpurposerelatestothejusticeofAristotle’sidealpolis.Theleisureofitscitizensissecuredbythelaborofslaves;sounlessslaverycanbejustifiedtheidealpolis,insteadofbeingperfectlyjust,willbegrosslyunjust.Aristotle’sdefenseofnaturalslaveryturnsonanotionthathedefinesbutdoesnotlabel,whichweshallcall“weak-mindedness.”Apersonisweak-mindedifhecompletelylacksthedeliberativepartofthesoul(I.13,1260a12)and“sharesinreasontotheextentofapprehendingitbutwithoutpossessingit”(I.5,1254b22–23).Aristotlethinkstherearemanysuchpeople.Theironlyfunctionbeingbodilylabor(I.5,1254b18–19),theyarenomorethanensouledtools(ENVIII.11,1161b4).Aristotleclaimsthattheystand,inrespectofrulingandbeingruled,tothefullyrationalasthebodystandstothesoulandasbeasttoman(I.5,1254b16–20).Hethinksitisnaturalforthebodytoberuleddespoticallybythesoulandforloweranimalstoberuleddespoticallybyhumans(I.5,1254b2–13).Soheinfersthatitisnaturalfortheweak-mindedtoberuleddespoticallybythefullyrational(I.5,1254b16–23).Butdespoticruleistheruleofamasteroverslaves(I.7,1255b16–18;IV.11,1295b19–22).Theconclusionnowfollowsthatitisnaturaland(bythepositivejustice-of-natureprinciple)justfortheweak-mindedtobeslavesandtoberuledbyamaster(I.5,1255a1–3).Buttheruleofamaster(hEdespoteia)isrulewithaviewtotheadvantageofthemasterandonlyincidentallywithaviewtotheadvantageoftheslave(III.6,1278b32–37).ThebasisofAristotle’sargumentisathreefoldassociationthatisrepeatedoftenenoughintheEthicsandPoliticstoappearacommonplace:masteristoslaveassoulistobodyandasacraftsmanistohistools(see,inadditiontotheabove,ENVIII.11,1161b4;EEVII.9,1241b17–19,b22–24;10,1242a28–29).InPoliticsI.13Aristotleraisesaproblemaboutthisthreefoldassociationthateffectivelyunderminesit.Theproblemisthis.Anintemperateandcowardlyslavewillfailtofulfillthefunctionofaslave(I.13,1260a33–36).Agoodslavemust,then,betemperateandhavethebraveryofasubordinate(forwhichseeI.13,1260a23).Butthemoralvirtuesarehigherthanthevirtuesofatoolorthevirtuesofthebody(I.13,1259b22–25);temperance,forexample,ismorevaluablethanthesharpnessofaknifeorthehealthandstrengthofabody.Butifaslaveweresimplyatoolorsimplyabody,hisvirtuescouldnotexceedthoseofatoolorthoseofthebody;thegoodnessofaslavewouldconsistsimplyofhishealthandstrengthandabilitytodohiswork.Sincethisisnotthecase,aslavecannotbynaturebesimplyatoolorabody.406ACTC2040620/03/2006,04:10PM\naristotle’spoliticalphilosophyAristotleexpressestheproblemasadilemma:ifthereisavirtueofaslavehigher(timiOtera)thanthatofatoolorofbodilyservice,suchastemperance,bravery,orjustice,aslavewillnotdiffer(innature)fromafreeman;butifnot,a(natural)slave13hasnoshareinreasonand,consequently,isnothuman(I.13,1259b21–28).Theimplicitconclusionofthisdilemmaisthateitherslavesdonotdifferinnaturefromfreemenorelsetheyarenothuman.Soifslavesarehuman,theydonotdifferinnaturefromfreemen.Inotherwords,naturedoesnotdividemankindintofreeandslave,theverypositionAristotlesetouttorefute.Itshouldbenoted,furthermore,thatAristotelianprinciples,correctlyapplied,entailthecorrectmoralstancewithrespecttotheweak-minded.Aristotle’scharacterizationoftheweak-mindedasthosewhoshareinreasontotheextentofapprehendingitbutwithoutpossessingit(I.5,1254b22–23)resembleshischaracterizationoftheorecticsoul:“theappetitiveandingeneralthedesiderative(orektikon)part[ofthesoul]shares[inreason]inaway,insofarasitlistensandisobedienttoit”(EN.I.13,1102b30–31;seealsoPol.VII.14,1333a16–19;15,1334b17–28.)Theweak-minded,then,areanalogues,notofthebody,butoftheorecticsoul.ButAristotlemaintainsthat“thesoulrulesthebodywithadespoticrulewhereasmindrulesdesire(orexis)withapoliticalandregalrule”(I.5,1254b4–6).Itwouldseemtofollowthattheweak-minded,beinganalogoustotheorecticsoul,shouldberuledwithapoliticalandregalrule(Newman,1887–1902,vol.2,p.146).Butregalandpoliticalrule,unlikedespoticrule,isexercisedwithaviewtotheadvantageoftheruledrathertheruler(III.6,1279a17–21;7,1279a25–39).Thus,Aristotelianprinciplesyieldthecorrectmoralstance:theweak-mindedshouldberuledwithaviewtotheirownadvantage.ConstitutionsOneimportantelementofAristotle’spoliticalnaturalism,aswesaidbefore,ishisideathattheconditionofanygivenpolisiseithernatural(andhencegood)orunnatural(andhencebad).TobeinanaturalconditionitisnecessaryinAristotle’sviewforapolistohaveaconstitutionthatisaccordingtonature.(Butnotsufficient:otherrequirementsarethatitsconstitutionbestableanditscitizenslaw-abiding.)SowecomefinallytothemainsubjectofthePolitics:constitutions.Aristotledefinesaconstitutionintwoways:asanarrangement(taxis)oftheinhab-itants,primarilythecitizens,ofapolis(III.1,1274b38–41)andasanarrangementofpoliticaloffices(III.6,1278b8–11).Thelatteristhemorefundamentaldefinition:aconstitutionarrangesthecitizensofapolisbyarrangingthepoliticalofficesthattheyfill.Suchanarrangementsetsthedistributiveprincipleforfullcitizenship,theeligibilityconditionsforeachoffice,andtheend,orgoalofthepolis(IV.1,1289a15–18),whichitisthefunction(ergon)ofthepolis(VII.4,1326a13)toattain.SomeconstitutionsinAristotle’sviewarecorrect(orthai),othersdeviant(parekbaseis).Thosethatarecorrectaimatthecommonadvantage(tokoinE(i)sumpheron);those13.ImpliedbyAristotle’swords:“ifnot,thisisabsurdsincetheyarehumansandshareinreason.”407ACTC2040720/03/2006,04:10PM\ndavidkeytthataredeviantseekonlytherulers’ownadvantage(III.6,1279a17–20).Sinceunderanyconstitutionthereareeitherone,few,ormanyrulers,therearesixtypesofcon-stitutioninall:kingshipanditsdeviation,tyranny,haveoneruler;aristocracyanditsdeviation,oligarchy,haveonlyafew;andso-calledconstitution(orpolity)anditsdeviation,democracy,havemany(III.7,1279a25–39,b4–6).Aristotlethinksthisinitialclassificationofconstitutionsisbasedonaccidentalratherthanessentialproperties(III.8,1279b34–39)andsuperimposesuponitonefollowingethicalandsocio-economicratherthannumericalprinciples(III.7,1279a39–b4,b7–10;III.8).Virtueistheethicalprinciple;wealthandpoverty(orwealthandfreedom)thesocio-economic.Aristotlethinksthatvirtuecomesinvariousdegrees(ENVII.1,1144a15–27),thehigherthedegreetherarer.Militaryvirtue,thevirtueofahoplite,ismorecommonthancompletevirtue(III.7,1279a39–b2);andcompletevirtuemorecommonthanthetranscendentvirtue(hEhuperhEmasaretE)ofheroes(ENVII.1,1145a18–27).Kingshipisnowdefined,intermsechoingAristotle’sdescriptionof14thevirtueofheroes,asrulebyamanoftranscendentvirtue(I.12,1259b10–17;III.13,1284a3–12;IV.2,1289a41–b1;VII.14,1332b16–23);aristocracyasruleby(afew)menofcompletevirtue(IV.7,1293b3–5);andso-calledconstitutionasruleby(many)menofmilitaryvirtue(III.7,1279a37–b4).Theseareofcourseidealizeddefini-tions.Asforthedeviantconstitutions,democracyisdefinedastheruleofthe(many)poor(orfree)andoligarchyastheruleofthe(few)wealthy(III.8,1279b34–1280a6;IV.4,1290b17–20).IndefiningdemocracyAristotleoscillatesbetweenpoverty(seeIII.7,1279b8–9;8,1279b18–19)andfreedom(seeIV.4,1290b1;8,1294a11;VI.2,1317a40–41),thedifferentiaeofproletarianandegalitariandemocracyrespectively.Aristotledoesnotrevisehisinitialdefinitionoftyrannyastheruleofonemanforhisownadvantage(III.7,1279b6–7),thoughheobviouslyregardstyrannyastheruleofonevileman(V.11,1315b4–10;Keyt,1999,pp.170–1).Thesixconstitutionsformamoralhierarchy,thebetterthecorrectconstitutiontheworseitsdeviation:kingship,aristocracy,polity,democracy,oligarchy,andtyranny(IV.2,1289a38–b5).ThemostinterestingandcontroversialpartofAristotle’sclassificationishisdivisionofconstitutionsintocorrectanddeviant.ThomasHobbes,forexample,thinksthedivisionisentirelysubjective.“[TyrannyandOligarchy],”hesays,“arenotthenamesofotherFormesofGovernment,butofthesameFormesmisliked.FortheythatarediscontentedunderMonarchy,callitTyranny;andtheythataredispleasedwithAris-tocracy,callitOligarchy”(1651,ch.19,p.95).ToevaluateAristotle’sideaweneedtounderstandhisnotionofthecommonadvantage.Tobeginwith,whoseadvantageisit?Thecommonadvantageisnottheadvantageofeveryinhabitantofagivenpolis.Thecommonadvantagedoesnotincludetheadvantageofslaves(III.6,1278b32–37),norapparentlytheadvantageofresidentaliensorforeignvisitors.Aristotleequatesthecommonadvantagewiththecommonadvantageofthecitizens(III.13,1283b40–42).Butthecommonadvantagecanhardlybetheadvantageexclusivelyoffullcitizens.Thefullcitizensofapolisareitsrulers,andthecommonadvantageisdis-tinguishedfromtherulers’ownadvantage.Norcanitbetheadvantageoffullcitizens14.Boththekingandtheheroaresaidtohavean“excessofvirtue”(aretEshuperbolE)(III.13,1284a4;ENVII.1,1145a23–24).408ACTC2040820/03/2006,04:10PM\naristotle’spoliticalphilosophytogetherwiththeirwivesandchildren,foritisdifficulttodriveawedgebetweenaman’sownadvantageandthatofhishousehold.Theconceptofthecommonadvantageimpliesabodyofsecond-classcitizens–freeunenfranchisednative-bornadultmales.Aristotle,indeed,askswhethersuchmenaretobecalled“citizens”(III.5,1277b33–39),mentionsthecitizenwhoisruled(hoarchomenospolitEs)ratherthanruler(III.5,1278a16–17),andspeaksofcitizensunderkingshipandtyranny(III.14,1285a25–29;V.11,1314b12–13),whocanonlybesecond-classcitizens,thekingandthetyrantbeingtheonlyfullcitizensinakingshipandatyranny.Thecommonadvantageseems,then,tobetheadvantageofallthefirst-andsecond-classcitizensinapolis.Butnowasecondquestionarises.For,asAristotlepointsout,theword“all”isambiguous;itcanbetakeneithercollectivelyordistributively(II.3,1261b16–32,V.8,1307b35–39).(“Theyallliftedthestone”canmeaneither“Theyliftedthestonetogether”or“Eachinturnliftedthestonebyhimself.”)Thequestion,then,iswhetherthecommonadvantageistheadvantageofallthecitizenscollectivelyordistributively.ThelatterisAristotle’sanswer.Thecommonadvantageisassociatedwithlivingfinely(tozEnkalOs)(III.6,1278b21–24);thatis,withlivingalifeofvirtueandhappiness.Buthappiness,Aristotleclaims,isnotlikeevenness,whichcanbepresentinawholewithoutbeingpresentineitherofitsparts(i.e.,2=1+1);awholecannotbehappy,unlessallormostorsomeofitspartsarehappy(II.5,1264b17–22).Thus,thecom-monadvantageisnottheadvantageofthecitizenscollectively.Thatitisalso(ideallyatleast)nottheadvantagedistributivelyofmostratherthanallcitizensissuggestedbythefollowingpassage:“Evenifitispossibleforalltobegoodwithouteachcitizenindividuallybeinggood,thelatterismorechoiceworthy;forallbeinggoodfollowsfromeachbeinggood”(VII.13,1332a36–38).(FormoreonthecommonadvantageseeMiller,1995,pp.194–224).Athirdquestionconcernsabroad-baseddemocracyinwhicheveryfreenative-bornadultmaleisafullcitizenandwherethecommonadvantageandtherulers’ownadvantagearethesame.Suchademocracy,contrarytoAristotle’sclassification,wouldseemtobecorrectratherthandeviant.Aristotle,indeed,allowsforsucha“good”democracy(VI.2,1318a3–10;Keyt,1999,pp.202–3),buthethinksthategalitariandemocracyusuallydegeneratesintoproletariandemocracyinwhichthepoorusetheirsuperiornumberstovirtuallydisenfranchisetherich(VI.2,1317b3–10).ByAristotle’sjustice-of-natureprinciplesconstitutionsthatareaccordingtonature(kataphusin)arejust(III.6,1279a17–19)andthosethatarecontrarytonature(paraphusin)areunjust(III.11,1282b8–13).WecannowexplainwhyAristotlethinksthatcorrectconstitutionsareaccordingtonatureanddeviantconstitutionscontrarytonature(III.17,1287b37–41).Thecorrectconstitutionsareaccordingtonaturebecausetheydistributepoliticalofficeaccordingtoastandardofworthvalidatedbytheidealpolis,which,forthereasonsgivenearlier,ispre-eminentlynatural.ThisstandardisofcoursetheAristotelianstandard:virtuefullyfurnishedwithexternalmeans(VII.1,1323b40–1324a2).(Onlymenofvirtue,wemightadd,willrulewithaviewtothecommon,ratherthantheirown,advantage.)ThatthedeviantconstitutionsarecontrarytonatureisaconsequenceoftheirdespotismandtheAristotelianequationoftheforcedandtheunnatural.Seekingonlytheirownadvantage,therulersunderadeviantconstitutiontreatthoseoutsidetheconstitution,thesecond-classcitizens,asslaves(III.6,1279a19–21;IV.11,1295b19–23).Sincenofreemanwillenduresuch409ACTC2040920/03/2006,04:10PM\ndavidkeyttreatmentwillingly(seeIV.10,1295a17–23),theseoutsidersobeytheirrulersonlybecausetheyareforcedto(III.3,1276a12–13;10,1281a23–24).Likeamodernpoliticaltheorist,Aristotledistinguishesbetweenaconstitutionandthelawsmadeunderit(IV.1,1289a11–25;seealsoII.12,1273b32–34,1274b15–19;III.11,1282b8–13;15,1286a2–4).Thelawsinhisviewreflecttheconstitution(IV.1,1289a13–15)anditsjusticeorinjustice:democracieshavedemocraticlaws,oligarchiesoligarchiclaws,(un)justconstitutions(un)justlaws(III.10,1281a37;11,1282b10–11;IV.9,1294b6–7;V.9,1310a14–18).Henotes,however,thatwhenaconstitutionchanges,thetendencyofpeople,actingoutofhabit,tocontinueobservingthepre-existinglawsoftengivesthenewconstitutionthecastoftheold(IV.5,1292b11–21).Theimportanceofeducationnowemerges.Forlawsthatarenotobeyedandcon-stitutionsthatarenothonoredareworthless(IV.8,1294a3–7;V.9,1310a12–18).Forapolistosurviveitscitizensmustbehabituatedtoobeyitslawsandeducatedinthespiritofitsconstitution(II.8,1269a20–21;MA10,703a29–34).ThisispartofwhatAristotlemeanswhenhesaysthattheconstitutionisacertainwayoflifeofapolis(IV.11,1295a40–b1).Thus,educationisaprimetopicofAristotle’spoliticalphilosophy;anentirebookofthePoliticsisdevotedtoit.TheGoodManandtheGoodCitizenWeshallconcludewithabriefwordaboutAristotle’sfamousdistinctionbetweenthegoodmanandthegoodcitizen.Thefunctionofacitizen,Aristotlemaintains,istopreservetheconstitutionofhispolis.Agoodcitizen,then,isonewhoperformsthisfunctionwell(fortheinferenceseeENI.7.1098a11–12).Amongotherthingsagoodcitizenisdisposedtoobeythelawsofhispolis,tobejustinthebroadsenseoftheterm(ENV.1,1129b11).Butthedispositiontoobeydemocraticlawsisdifferentfromthedispositiontoobeyoligarchiclaws.Thevirtueofthegoodcitizenisthusrelativetotheconstitutionunderwhichhelives.Ontheotherhand,thevirtueofagoodmaninAristotle’sviewisalwaysoneandthesame.Thevirtueofthegoodcitizenmust,then,bedistinctfromthatofthegoodman(III.4,1276b26–34;V.9,1309a36–39).Thetwocoincide,Aristotleclaims,onlyinthefullcitizensoftheidealpolis(III.5,1278a40–b5;IV.7,1293b1–7).Foritisonlyintheidealpolisthatcitizenswillbedisposedtoobeylawsthatarewithoutqualificationjust,anditisonlythefullcitizens–therulers–ofsuchapoliswhomustpossesspracticalwisdom,orphronEsis,theintellectualvirtuecharacteristicofagoodman(ENVI.8;13,1144b30–32).Theyoungercitizens,thoseservingashoplites,whoareintheirphysicalbutnottheirmentalprime,beingintellectuallyimmaturehavetrueopinionsinlieuofpracticalwisdom,andconsequentlyarenotyetgoodmenandarenotyetqualifiedtobefullcitizens,orrulers(III.4,1277a14–16,1277b25–30;VII.9,1329a2–17;14,1333a11–13).Aristotledoesnotdrawouttheconsequencesofhisanalysis.Oneobviouscon-sequenceofhisdefinitionofagoodcitizenisthatsuchapersoncanbeatmostareformer,neverarevolutionary.Hecanworktoimprovetheconstitutionunderwhichhelives–tomoderateanextremedemocracylikeAthens,forexample–but,devotedasheistothepreservationoftheconstitutionofhispolis,hecannotstrivetoreplaceit410ACTC2041020/03/2006,04:10PM\naristotle’spoliticalphilosophywithabetterconstitution.Italsofollowsthatagoodmanlivingunderadeviantconstitution–underademocraticconstitution,forexample–cannotbeagoodcitizen.Agoodmanisjustwithoutqualification,whereasagoodcitizenofademocracywillbedisposedtoobeydemocraticlaws,which,thoughjustfromthestandpointof15democracy,arewithoutqualificationunjust(III.11,1282b8–13).BibliographyWorksCitedDepew,D.J.(1995).“HumansandOtherPoliticalAnimalsinAristotle’sHistoryofAnimals.”Phronesis,40,156–81.Ehrenberg,V.(1969).TheGreekState.2ndedn.London:Methuen.Galston,W.A.(1980).JusticeandtheHumanGood.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Hobbes,T.(1651).Leviathan.London:Crooke.Irwin,T.H.(1988).Aristotle’sFirstPrinciples.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Keyt,D.(1983).“IntellectualisminAristotle.”InJ.P.AntonandA.Preus(eds.),EssaysinAncientGreekPhilosophy(vol.2,pp.364–87).Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.——.(1989).“TheMeaningofBIOSinAristotle’sEthicsandPolitics.”AncientPhilosophy,9,15–21.——.(1991a).“ThreeBasicTheoremsinAristotle’sPolitics.”InD.KeytandF.D.Miller(eds.),ACompaniontoAristotle’sPolitics(pp.118–41).Oxford:Blackwell.——.(1991b).“Aristotle’sTheoryofDistributiveJustice.”InD.KeytandF.D.Miller(eds.),ACompaniontoAristotle’sPolitics(pp.238–78).Oxford:Blackwell.——.(1996).“AristotleandtheAncientRootsofAnarchism.”Topoi,15,129–42.——.(1999).AristotlePolitics:BooksVandVI.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Keyt,D.andMiller,F.D.(eds.).(1991).ACompaniontoAristotle’sPolitics.Oxford:Blackwell.Kraut,R.(1997).AristotlePolitics:BooksVIIandVIII.Oxford:ClarendonPress.——.(2002).Aristotle:PoliticalPhilosophy.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Lord,C.(1982).EducationandCultureinthePoliticalThoughtofAristotle.Ithaca:CornellUniver-sityPress.Miller,F.D.(1995).Nature,Justice,andRightsinAristotle’sPolitics.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Mulgan,R.G.(1977).Aristotle’sPoliticalTheory.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Newman,W.L.(1887–1902).ThePoliticsofAristotle.(4vols.).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Ober,J.(1998).PoliticalDissentinDemocraticAthens.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Rawls,J.(1971).ATheoryofJustice.Cambridge,Mass.:BelknapPress.Robinson,R.(1962).AristotlePolitics:BooksIIIandIV.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Repr.withasupplementaryessaybyD.Keyt,1995.Saunders,T.J.(1995).AristotlePolitics:BooksIandII.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Simpson,P.L.P.(1998).APhilosophicalCommentaryonthePoliticsofAristotle.ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress.Solmsen,F.(1964).“LeisureandPlayinAristotle’sidealState.”RheinischesMuseumfürPhilologie,107,193–220.Stalley,R.F.(1991).“Aristotle’sCriticismofPlato’sRepublic.”InD.KeytandF.D.Miller(eds.),ACompaniontoAristotle’sPolitics(pp.182–99).Oxford:Blackwell.15.IamgratefultoFredD.Miller,ChristineKeyt,andtheeditorsofthisvolumeforhelpfulcommentsonearlierdraftsofthischapter.411ACTC2041120/03/2006,04:10PM\ndavidkeytStewart,J.A.(1892).NotesontheNicomacheanEthicsofAristotle.(2vols.).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Susemihl,F.andHicks,R.D.(1894).ThePoliticsofAristotle.London:Macmillan.Waterlow,S.(1982).PassageandPossibility.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Yack,B.(1993).TheProblemsofaPoliticalAnima:Community,Justice,andConflictinAristotelianPoliticalThought.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.FurtherReadingAubenque,P.(ed.).(1993).AristotePolitique:ÉtudessurlaPolitiqued’Aristote.Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance.Lord,C.,O’Connor,D.K.,andBodéüs,R.(eds.).(1991).EssaysontheFoundationsofAristotelianPoliticalScience.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Nichols,M.P.(1992).CitizensandStatesmen:AStudyofAristotle’sPolitics.Lanham,Md.:Rowman&Littlefield.Patzig,G.(ed.).(1990).AristotelesPolitik.ProceedingsoftheNinthSymposiumAristotelicum.Göttingen:VanderhoeckandRuprecht.Swanson,J.A.(1992).ThePublicandthePrivateinAristotle’sPoliticalPhilosophy.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.Taylor,C.C.W.(1995).“Politics.”InJ.Barnes(ed.),TheCambridgeCompaniontoAristotle(pp.233–58).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.412ACTC2041220/03/2006,04:10PM\nPartIVPhilosophyintheHellenisticAgeACTC2141320/03/2006,04:10PM\nthomasbénatouïl414ACTC2141420/03/2006,04:10PM\nphilosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimes21PhilosophicSchoolsinHellenisticandRomanTimesTHOMASBÉNATOUÏLWhatwasaphilosophical“school”inantiquity?ThetermsusedintheGreektextsallowustodistinguishseveraldimensionsintheconcept,evenifintheendtheybecameinterchangeable.ScholEoriginallydesignatedtheleisureoneenjoystoeducateoneselfandtoparticipateinthepoliticalandculturallifeofone’scity:“school”isthusatfirstaphaseoflifeandanoccupationforamanwhoisfreeandabletoprovideforhisownneeds.ThetermscholEsubsequentlycametodesignatemorenarrowlyaninstitutionforapprenticeship,liketheEnglishword.Still,aphilosophical“school”wasnotmerelythat:itwasinthefirstinstanceasetofreceivedteachings(diatribE),andabovealla“schoolofthought”(hairesis)aswellasa“succession”(diadochE)ofteachers–acontinuoustraditionofthinkerswhohadcultivatedandtransmittedtostudentsadoctrineandamethodspecifictoafirstteacher,thefounderoftheschool.Thephilo-sophicalschoolthusconstitutedasocialmodelforthelegitimationandspreadoftruth,whichinGreecesucceededothermorereligiousandpoliticalmodels,fromwhichtheschoolnonethelessborrowedcertainfeatures(Détienne,1996).ThefamouswordsattributedtoAristotle,“IamafriendofPlatobutevenmoreoftruth,”expressbothauniversalattitudeandthehistoricallyspecificarticulationofsocialrelationsandintel-lectualactivitiesthatconstitutetheancient“philosophicalschool.”Althoughtherewerealsoschoolsofrhetoricand,aboveall,ofmedicine(seePellegrin,ancientmedicine,inthisvolume),itwasinphilosophythatthescholasticmodelplayedthemostimportantandenduringrole,somuchsothatancienthistoriansofphilo-sophyattemptedtoassignallphilosopherstoasmallnumberofmostlyartificialschol-asticlineages:ourmostimportantsourceforthehistoryofancientphilosophicalschools,DiogenesLaertius’LivesandOpinionsoftheFamousPhilosophers,providesthe1bestexampleofsuchaconstruction.Infact,onlyintheHellenisticperioddidthegreatmajorityofpracticingphilosophersbelongtoorganizedandflourishingschools,thenatureofwhichweshalltrytopenetrategradually,byconsideringfirsttheirinsti-tutionalhistory,thentheirinternalorganizationandactivities,andfinallythepracticeofphilosophythatdevelopedinthem.1.SeeMejer,ancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltradition,inthisvolume,andMansfeld(1999).415ACTC2141520/03/2006,04:10PM\nthomasbénatouïlABriefHistoryofPhilosophicalSchoolsinAntiquityTheoriginsThefourgreatphilosophicalschoolsoftheHellenisticperiodwerefoundedinAthensbetweenthebeginningandtheendofthefourthcenturybce.Yetembryonicschoolsexistedearlierandelsewhere.Mostofthepre-Socraticphilosophershadhaddiscipleswhohadlearnedandthendevelopedormodifiedthedoctrineoftheirteacher.Forexample,thiswasthecasewithThales,inMiletus(Ionia)inthesixthcenturybce,whohadhiskinsmanAnaximanderforastudent,whohimselftaughthisdoctrinestoAnaximenes.Similarly,inthefifthcenturyinsouthernItaly,ParmenideshadZenoandMelissusasstudents.ButitwasPythagoras,alittleearlierandinthesameregion,whowasthefirsttogatheraroundhimselfarealgroupofdisciples.Onthemodelofcertainreligioussects(Burkert,1982)ormilitarybrotherhoods(Détienne,1963),the“Pythagoreans”weredefinedbythepassingoftestsofinitiation,respectforritualrulesfixedbyPythagoras,adherencetohissecretdoctrines,andbyacommunallifethatcouldextendtothesharingofalltheirbelongings.Bycontrast,fifth-centurysophistssuchasProtagoras,Hippias,andGorgias,wereitinerantprofessorsimpartingmainlyrhetoricalandpoliticalknowledgeintheformofshortlessonsforallwhowere2willingtopaythem.AsJean-PierreVernant(1982,ch.4;cf.Détienne,1996,ch.6)hasremarked,Greekphilosophywouldhesitatethroughoutitsentirehistorybetweenthesetwooriginalpedagogicalmodels:religiousinitiationandpublicdebate.Socratesinparticularmixedthesetwomodels.Morethananyotherfigure,hedrewnumerousapprenticephilosopherstoAthens,evenafterhisdeath.Amongallofhisfollowerswhogatheredcirclesofstudentsaroundthemselves,onlyPlatogavebirthtoarealinstitutionforteachingandresearchthatsurvivedhimformanygenerations:foundedneartheAcademyin387,itisthefirstofthefourgreatAthenianphilosoph-icalschools.Aristotlestudiedinitfor20yearsandsubsequentlyfoundedhisownschoolintheLyceum,in335.Epicurus’sschool,theGarden,datesfrom306,anditisaround301thatZenoofCitiumbeginstoteachinthePaintedColonnade(Stoa).Thehabitthustookholdofcallingthefourgreatschoolsandtheirmembersafterthe3localeswheretheirinstructiontookplaceinAthens.TheHellenisticgoldenageHowweretheseschoolsabletoperpetuatethemselvesafterthedeathoftheirfounders?FollowingWilamowitz-Moellendorff(1965,pp.263–91)itwaslongthoughtthatthephilosophicalschools–exceptfortheStoa–werereligioussocietiesdedicatedtothe2.SeeBarney,thesophisticmovement,inthisvolume.3.Peripatos,thenamecommonlygiventoAristotle’sschool(alsocalled“Lyceum”),meansaspaceprovidedforstrolling,inapublicorprivatelocation(Lynch,1972,p.74).Studentsofaschoolareusuallycalledafteritsname(Academics,Peripatetics,Stoics)exceptforthePythagoreans,theEpicureans(andthefirstStoics,whoaresometimescalled“Zenonians”).Theepithet“Platonists”appearsonlyfromthesecondcenturyceonward(Glucker,1978,pp.206–20).416ACTC2141620/03/2006,04:10PM\nphilosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimescultoftheMuses,whichallowedthemtobeofficiallyrecognizedbytheCityofAthensandtodevelop,withinastableinstitutionalframework,instructioncomparabletothatofamodernuniversity,andevencertainreligiousactivities(Boyancé,1936).4Today,however,thisanalysisisthoughttolackforevidence.Philosophicalschoolsseemrathertohavebeenakindofprivatefoundationorbrotherhood,dedicatedtoteachingandphilosophicalreflection:theheadoftheschool,or“scholarch,”wasthesoleownerofthepropertyitused(land,furniture,books,statues).Heusuallylivedintheschoolandhadtoarrangeforhisheirstocontinuetoputittotheserviceofphilosophy:thiscomesoutclearlyinthewillsofthePeripateticsTheophrastusandLyco,andinthatofEpicurus,whichhavebeenpreservedforusbyDiogenesLaertius(5.52–53,70and10.16–17).Thefirsttwogivethe“promenade”oftheLyceumtoagroupofeminentschoolmemberstopursueanddevelopitsphilosophicalactivities;thethirdmustleavetheGardentoamemberofhisfamily,butgivesitsusufructtoHermarchus,hissuccessorasheadoftheschool.Likemanyfoundersandheadsofschools,thelatterwasnotanAtheniancitizenandthereforehadnorighttoownrealestateinAthens.UnliketheAcademyandtheGarden,whichwerefoundedbyAtheni-ans,theLyceum,beginningwithTheophrastus,controlledaprivateparceloflandonlybyspecialdispensation;andnosourcementionsrealestateinconnectionwiththeStoa(Ludlam,2003),theheadsofwhichmostlycamefromAsiaMinor,whereEpicurus,anAthenianbornonSamos,hadhimselflongtaughtbeforecomingtoAthens.TheintellectualreputationofthecityinfactdrewdisciplesfromthewholeoftheHellenisticGreekworld.Thus,itwasmainly,ifnotonly,theexistenceofthescholarchateandthetrans-missionofthisofficefromonememberoftheschooltoa“successor”thatguaranteedtheunityandlongevityofaphilosophicalschool.Eachscholarchnormallyheldthisofficeforlifeanddesignatedhissuccessorfromamongtheleadingmembersoftheschoolorallowedthelattertoelectthenewscholarch.Sometimesdiscipleswhohadbeenpassedoverforthesuccessionlefttheirteacher’sschooltoopentheirown.Inadditiontothesedissidents,alsoteachingatAthensweretheheirsoftheSocraticschools,suchasDiodorusCronus,StilpoofMegara,andDiogenesofSinope(theCynic)andhissuccessors(seeDeclevaCaizzi,minorsocratics,inthisvolume).TheHellenisticphilosophicalsceneneverthelesswaslargelydominatedbythegreatphilosophicalschools,althoughtheLyceumseemstohaveessentiallydedicated5itselffirsttohistoricalandscientificinvestigations,andlatertorhetoricalandbio-graphicalones,playingonlyaminorroleinphilosophicaldebateafterTheophrastusandStrato,ofwhosesuccessorslittleisknown.Bycontrast,weknowmoreorless4.SeethecriticismsofLynch(1972),Glucker(1978),andthemorenuancedassessmentsofIsnardiParente(1986),Natali(1991)andDorandi(1999b).5.Inthisdomain(mathematics,astronomy,medicine,geography,grammar,philology)itwasnottheAthenianschoolsbuttheAlexandrianMuseumanditsfamouslibrarythatcon-stitutedthemostactivecenterintheHellenisticworld:thiswasnotaphilosophicalschoolbutaresearchinstitutioncreated(andfinanced)bytheking,PtolemyI,whowasinspiredbyPeripateticthinkerslikeDemetriusofPhaleronandStratoofLampsachus.ThusAlexandrianauthors(biographers,historians)oftencametobecalled“Peripatetics”eventhoughtheyhadnotstudiedattheLyceum.417ACTC2141720/03/2006,04:10PM\nthomasbénatouïlpreciselywhowerethescholarchsofthethreeotherschoolsdowntothefirstcenturybce(Dorandi,1999a).ItwasatthistimethatthesuccessionseemstohavebeeninterruptedintheStoaandtheAcademy,withPanaetiusofRhodes,Stoicscholarchuntilabout110bce,andPhiloofLarissa,whodiedin84bce,havingfledAthenswhenitwasbesiegedbySullaonbehalfofRomein88(Glucker,1978).Philo’sgreatrival,AntiochusofAscalon,forhispartleftforAlexandriabeforereturningtoAthenstofoundthereaschoolclaimingtobethetrueheirofthe“OldAcademy.”AsfarastheGardenisconcerned,thelastscholarchswhosenamesareknowntousdatefromthesameperiod(ZenoofSidon,whodiedaround75,Phaedrus,thenPatro);butthesuccessionseemstohavecontinueduntilamuchlaterperiod(D.L.10.9),asattested,forexample,byaletterfromtheempressPlotinathatasksHadriantoauthorizethenominationofascholarchfortheGardenwhowasnotaRomancitizen(Glucker,1978,pp.365–6).FromthebeginningoftheempiretotheendofantiquityTheinterruptedsuccessionintheStoaandtheAcademy,anditsobscurityintheGarden,doesnotmeanthattheseschoolswereentirelyunrepresentedinAthens,butittestifiestothedisplacementoftheHellenisticworld’scenterofgravitytowardRome,wherePanaetius,forexample,spentagreatpartofhislife,duetohisconnectionswiththeScipionicCircle,andwherePhiloseemstohaveendedhisdays.Greekphilo-sophersestablishedthemselves,taughtandworkedinRomeundertheprotectionofcultivatedaristocrats.ThebestexampleistheSyrianPhilodemusofGadara,astudentofZenoofSidonandtheanimatingspiritofaveryactiveEpicureancirclebasedatPiso’svillainHerculaneum.ItwasalsoRomewherePythagoreanismrevivedinthefirstcenturybce,andwhereAndronicusofRhodescompiledanedition,basedonmanuscriptsbroughtbackfromGreecebySulla,oftheAristoteliantreatisesusedwithintheLyceum:thisworkisasign,maybeevenacause,oftherebirthofAristotelianisminthefirstcenturybce.Forallthat,RomedidnotsimplyreplaceAthens.Whatweseeisratheradecentral-izationoftheschools:themostinfluentialphilosophersrarelytaughtinAthens,recall-ingthesituationbeforethetimeofSocrates.AtRhodesinparticular(whereAristotle’sdiscipleEudemushadopenedaPeripateticschoolasearlyas322bce),therewas,inthefirstcenturybce,aStoicschooldirectedbyPosidonius,themostinfluentialstudentofPanaetius,andanEpicureanschoolthatdisplayedacertainintellectualindepend-encefromtheGarden(Sedley,1989).Inthesameperiod,manyphilosopherswereteachinginAlexandria,whichremaineduntiltheendofAntiquityoneoftheworldcapitalsforphilosophyandparticularlyforPlatonism,althoughthislatterphilosophy,morethantheothers,continuedtobeassociatedwithAthens,whereAmmonius(theteacherofPlutarchofChaeronea(50–125ce)),CalvenusTaurus,andLonginustaught.Duringthisperiod,nevertheless,itisStoicismthatdominates,duenotsomuchtotheprestigeofitsteachersastoitsinfluenceonmanyRomanstatesmenandwriters(Gill,2003).TheancientslaveEpictetus,educatedinRomebyMusoniusRufus,aRomanpoliticianandStoicteacher,gainedfameforhisausterelifeandopenedaschoolinNicopolisinGreece.418ACTC2141820/03/2006,04:10PM\nphilosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimesAlongsidethese“private”schools,gatheredaroundaphilosopherwhoseinfluencehaspreservedhisnameforus,therewereinmanycities,suchasAlexandria,Tarsus,andPergamum,municipalchairsofphilosophy(usuallyoneforeachofthefourgreatschools),theholdersofwhichwereappointedandpaidbythecitytoprovideforthehighereducationofyoungcitizens(Hadot,1984,ch.5).Inthesamespirit,in176ceMarcusAureliuscreatedimperialchairsofrhetoricandphilosophyinAthens(oneorperhapstwoforeachschool).Theholderofeachchairwasappointedforlifebytheleadingcitizensinrecognitionofhislearningandpaidfromtheimperialtreasury(Lucian,Eunuchus3–4),buthetaughtinhisownhouse,asdidotherphilosopherswhoseincomedependedonthegenerosityoftheirstudents.ThoughtheyattractedmanycandidatephilosophersandmanystudentstoAthens,weknowveryfewofthenamesofholdersoftheimperialchairs.Amongthem,onlyonewasaninfluentialphilosopher:thePeripateticAlexanderofAphrodisias,atthebeginningofthethirdcenturyce.Thebest-knownandmostoriginalphilosophersofthethirdandfourthcenturiescewereinfactPlatonistswhogatheredgroupsofdisciples.Plotinus(205–70)studiedphilosophyinAlexandria,thenopenedaschoolinRome,whereheresidedinthehouseholdofaricharistocrat(seeBrissonandPradeau,plotinus,inthisvolume).Iamblichus(240–326)studiedinRomeandtaughthissynthesisofPlatonismandPythagoreanismatApameainSyria,wherehehadmanystudents.ItisonlyinthefifthcenturythatAthensregaineditspreeminence,relativetoRomeandAlexandria,throughtheimpulseofPlutarchofAthens(died432).SetupinhisresidencesouthoftheAcropolis,hisschoolwaswealthy,attractedmanystudents,andbecamethemostactiveandinfluentialPlatonicschooloflateAntiquity.AsuccessionevendevelopedinitthatwascomparabletothoseoftheHellenisticschools,includingSyrianus,Proclus6(412–85),Marinus,Isidorus,ZenodotusandDamascius(died529)(seeHoffmann,whatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?,inthisvolume).ThisschoolpresenteditselfastheheirtoPlato’sAcademy,althoughithadnoconnectionwithit,eitherlegal7ormaterial,norwiththeimperialchairsofphilosophy.Inthisperiod,theprincipaladversariesofthePlatonistshadforalongtimebeennottheotherphilosophicalschoolsbutrathertheChristians,whowerehostiletothedefenseofpaganismunder-takenbythePlatonists(Hadot,1998c).In529,theemperorJustiniandecreedapro-hibitionofteachingbypagans.YetthePlatonistschoolsdidnotimmediatelydisappear(Lynch,1972,pp.163–8).Someoftheirleadingmembers,likeSimplicius,lefttoteachinPersiabeforebeingallowedtoreturntoAthens,wheretheyhadnosuccessors.InAlexandria,thelastpaganPlatonistteacher,Olympiodorus,wassucceededbyChris-tians,likeElias,DavidandStephanos,whowasthen(after610)calledtoteachintheimperial“University”inByzantium.6.Nosuccessionofsuchlengthisattestedforanyoftheverymanyschoolsopenedbetweenthefirstcenturybceandthefifthcenturyce.Organizedaroundafamousteacher,mostdidnotsurvivethedeathofthefounderorhisfirstsuccessor.7.SeethecorrectiveaccountsofLynch(1972,pp.177–89)andGlucker(1978),particularlytherefutationofthethesisofthe“goldenchain,”i.e.,thatacontinuousinstitutionalsuccessionholdsforheadsoftheAcademyfromPlatotoDamascius.419ACTC2141920/03/2006,04:10PM\nthomasbénatouïlLifeintheSchoolsWhatdidlifeconsistofinthephilosophicalschools?Howwasinstructionconducted,whowerethestudents,andwhatweretheytaught?Wehaveverylittleinformationonthissubject,“suchmattersbeinguniversallyknownatthetimeandseeminglyunworthyofmention”(DeWitt,1936).Inaddition,practicesmusthavebeenfairlydiversedependingontheschoolandtheperiod.WecanneverthelessattempttogiveageneralideaofwhattheteachingofphilosophywaslikeintheHellenisticschools.TeachersandstudentsAsubstantialproportionofthestudentsintheschoolsconsistedofephebes,youngGreeksofgoodfamilies,whoseeducationforcitizenship,organizedbythecity,com-prisedphysical,military,rhetorical,andphilosophicaltraining.Joiningtheephebeswerecuriousolderpeoplewithprofessions,andforeignstudentsandvisitors,particu-larlyyoungRomanaristocrats,manyofwhomcompletedtheireducationinAthensinthefirstcenturybceorinMarseillesacenturylater(Strabo14.5.81).Notallofthesestudentswereattachedtoaschool,butallattendedthepubliclecturesthatthevari-ousscholarchsgave(alongsiderhetors)inthegymnasiums,underthecolonnades,orinahallreservedforcourses,theexhedra(Vitruvius,OnArchitecture5.11.2).Themostcharismaticphilosophers,suchasTheophrastus,Arcesilaus,orAristoofChios,attractedlargeraudiencesthantherest.Itwasforthesakeoftheseyoungmenintrainingthatmanycitieslatercreatedmunicipalchairsofrhetoricandphilosophy.Forexample,beforelearningmedicine,Galen(bornin129ce)studiedthefourgreatphilosophicaldoctrineswithfourprofessorsinPergamum.Inthisperiod,studentswerenotalwaysnumerousorassiduous:Tauruscomplainsthatphilosophershadtowaitatthedoorsoftheirrichstudentsuntilnoon(Gell.NA7.10.5).Amongtheexternal“auditors”(akroatai)ofthepubliclectures,somedevelopedatasteforphilosophyandforaparticularteacher,becominghisdisciples(zElOtai)forseveralyears.Theexistenceofoneortwowomendisciplesisattestedformanyschools,butnotfortheLyceumortheStoa(D.L.2.86;3.46;6.96;10.5).Disciplesenteredacommunityof“companions”(hetairoi)or“friends”(philoi)devotedtothepracticeofphilosophy.Amongthemthe“youngest”(neaniskoi),stillintraining,weredistin-guishedfromsomemoreorlesssubstantialnumberofphilosopherswhowere“older”(presbuteroi),whofrequentlylivedtogether,gavecourses,andadministeredtheschool,sometimesrotatingoffices(D.L.5.4),thescholarchoftenbeingonlytheprimuminterparesandtheofficialrepresentativeoftheschool,particularlyinthepubliccourses.Theleadingmembersoftheschoolwereoftenlinkedbyfamilialrelations(Natali,1991,pp.71–3),onwhichtheschoolreliedinordertopersist.Inthesamespirit,thescholarchsoftheAcademywereburiedwithintheschoolandthebirthdaysofSocratesandPlatowerecelebratedeachyear.Inhiswill(D.L.10.18),Epicuruspro-videdforfestivalscelebratinghismemory,thoseofhisfirstcompanionsandofhisfamily:itwasamatterofbindingtheschoolcommunitytogetherinthemannerofafamilyorareligiousbrotherhood,andofrecallingthemodelforimitationprovidedbythelifeandthoughtofthefounders(Clay,1998,pp.67–102).420ACTC2142020/03/2006,04:10PM\nphilosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimesTeachingandresearchItmustbeemphasizedthatthediscipleslearnednotjustargumentsanddoctrinesbutalsoattitudesandbehaviorinaccordancewiththem,inconformitywiththeancientconceptionofphilosophyasawayoflife(Hadot,2002).AsSenecasays(AdLuc.6.6,trans.R.M.Gummere),“CleanthescouldnothavebeentheexpressimageofZenoifhehadmerelyheardhislectures;hesharedhislife,sawintohishiddenpurposes,andwatchedhimtoseewhetherhelivedaccordingtohisownrules.”PhilosopherslikeZenoandXenocrateswerefamedasmuchfortheirtemperanceasfortheirdoctrines.Likeningtheworkofthephilosophertothatofthephysician,theyundertooktoimprovetheconductoftheircircle,asiswitnessedbymanyanecdotespreservedbyDiogenesLaertius,andbyPhilodemus’sworkOnFrankCriticism,whichshowshowemulationandthecorrectionoffaultsshouldbemanagedamongEpicureandisciples(Konstanetal.,1998),whowereguidedbythemaxim,“ActinallthingsasifEpicuruswerewatching”(Sen.,AdLuc.25.5).Ofcourse,alongsidethisconstantpracticaltraining,thescholarchsandtheirassistantsgavemoretheoreticalcourses.Certainscientificdisciplines,orrhetoric,wereconsideredprerequisitesorindispensablecomplementstophilosophicalinstructionintheAcademyandtheLyceum,whiletheywereheldtobeuselessorevenharmfulintheGardenandintheStoaatitsstart(Hadot,1984,ch.2).Thestudentsalsohadto8preparethemselvesforargument,ontheoccasionofdialecticalcontests,andforhand-lingvariouslogicalmethods,suchasdivision(diairesis)attheAcademy(Epicrates,inAthenaeus,Deipnosophistai2.59D)orformalproceduresofdemonstration(sullogismos)intheLyceumandtheStoa.Asforcoursesinphilosophyinthepropersense,theymostoftentookadialecticalformintheHellenisticperiod:theteacherdiscussedaquestionor“thesis”–sometimesbyinterrogatingastudentintheSocraticmanner–andproposedademonstrationorrefutationofthethesis(orbothintheskepticalAcademyofCarneades),thenansweredthestudents’questions(Hadot,1998b).Intheimperialperiod,bycontrast,intheschoolsofEpictetus,Taurus,Plotinus,orProclus,philosophicallecturesfocusedontheexplicationoftextsofpastphilosopherslikeChrysippus,Aristotle,orPlato(Hadot,1998aand2002;Sedley,1997).WithEpictetus,astudentbeganbyreadingandcommentinguponthetext,thenwascorrectedbytheteacher,whomightthendiscussforitsownsakethequestionaddressedinthetext;thiswasalsowhatPlotinusdid(Porphyry,LifeofPlotinus13;Goulet-Cazé,1982).IntheNeoplatonicschools,thestudentsfollowedagenuinecourseofstudyoftheworksofAristotle,Plato,andofreligioustexts,eachofthemcommentateduponaccordingto9asystematichermeneuticalmethod.Havingbecomecompanionsofthescholarchafterasufficientlylongstayintheschool,disciplesleftittoteachtheirknowledgeelsewhereorremainedtoassistthescholarchintrainingyoungerdisciplesandinpolemicswithotherschools.Anotherimportantactivityforthediscipleswaseditingtheworksofthescholarch.ForteacherslikePyrrho,Carneades,andEpictetus,whoheldtotheSocraticmodelandwrotenoth-ing,disciplesoftentookituponthemselvestorecordtheirteachingsinwriting.Also,8.TheirruleswerecodifiedbyAristotleinTopicsVIII(Moraux,1968).9.Formoredetails,seeMejerandHoffmann,inthisvolume.421ACTC2142120/03/2006,04:10PM\nthomasbénatouïlsomeschoolsdedicatedthemselvesnotjusttoteaching,discussion,andthephilo-sophicallife,butalsotoscientificresearch,principallymathematicalintheAcademy,moreempiricalandhistoricalintheLyceum(zoology,law,biography).Theseinvest-igationsrequiredthecollectionofmanymaterials(specimens,maps)andparticularlybooks(Natali,1991),somuchsothattheactivitiesoftheseschoolsdependedgreatlyontheirlibraries,andthelossofthesemayhavebeenoneofthecausesoftheirdecline,especiallyoftheLyceum(Sedley,2003,p.25).PhilosophersandpoliticallifeFarfrombeingshutinuponthemselves,philosophicalschoolsmaintainedconstantrelationswiththeestablishedpoliticalpowers,ifonlybecausetheyparticipatedinthetrainingofyoungcitizens,receivingpaymentandhonorsinreturn.Forhisgoodinflu-enceontheyouth,AthenshonoredZenobothbeforeandafterhisdeath(D.L.7.6–12).Butcitiesmightalsoaskphilosophers,astheyalsodidorators,toserveasambas-sadorstoforeignpowers:themostfamousexampleisthejourneytoRomein155bcebyCarneades,DiogenesofBabylonandCritolaus(scholarchsoftheAcademy,theStoa,andtheLyceum)toaskfortheabrogationofafineagainstAthens.Ifthisepisoderemainsexceptionalbecauseitinvolvedthescholarchsoftheschools,10thelatternonethelessdidnotdisdainpoliticalactivity.OneoftheavowedaimsoftheAcademy,andtoalesserextenttheStoa,wasthetrainingofpoliticians,andmanypassedthroughthem.TheLyceumandtheGardenclaimedrathertostandapartfrompoliticsandtodedicatethemselvesrespectivelytothe“theoretical”(or“scholastic”)life(Bodéus,1993)andtotheenjoyment,amongfriends,ofapeacefulphilosophicallife.Still,Athenswastwiceledbymenfromtheseschools.DemetriusofPhaleron,astudentofTheophrastus,governedAthensfrom317to307bceinthenameofthekingofMacedonia,andseemedsomuchtofavorthephilosophicalschoolsthat,afterhisfall,thephilosophershadtofleeAthensbecauseofanewlawforbiddingthemtoleadschoolswithoutthepermissionoftheAssembly.(Thelawwasrepealedafterayear.)Later,between88and87bce,thePeripateticAthenionandtheEpicureanAristionplayedanimportantpartinrallyingAthenstothecauseofMithridatesagainstRome,whichprovokedthesiegeofthecitybySullaandtheruinofmostoftheschools(Ferrary,1988).IntheHellenisticperiod,however,politicalpowerwasconcentratedinthehandsofkingswhowereheirstothegeneralsofAlexandertheGreatratherthanincityassemblies.Thesekingsactivelysoughtoutthecompanyofphilosophers.ZenoseveraltimesreceivedvisitsandgenerousgiftsfromthekingofMacedonia,AntigonusGonatas(D.L.7.6–8).ScholarchssuchasZeno,Cleanthes,andtheAcademicLacydesgener-allydeclinedtheinvitationsofkings,towhomtheypreferredtosendoneoftheirdisciples.ThustheStoicSphaerusleftforthecourtofPtolemyinAlexandria,whichwasfrequentedalsobytheEpicureanColotes,StilpoofMegaraandsomeCyrenaics.Thesephilosophersmightbecomeadviserstotheprince,asSphaeruswastothekingsofSparta(Erskine,1990).ThisrolebecamecharacteristicofStoicphilosophersin10.SeeBrown,hellenisticcosmopolitanism,inthisvolume,foradiscussionofStoicandEpicureanattitudesaboutpolitics.422ACTC2142220/03/2006,04:10PM\nphilosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimesrepublican,theninimperialRome(Rawson,1989):forinstance,AugustushadforadvisersAthenodorusofTarsus,whowashistutor,andArius,twoStoicswhoalsowrotephilosophicalworksandendedtheircareersasthegovernorsofcities.PhilosophersenjoyedthereaftervaryingdegreesoffavorfromthesucceedingRomanemperors:fromNerotoDomitian,severalStoicphilosophersandpoliticianswereexiledororderedtocommitsuicidebecauseoftheircriticismsofthepowerful,whileunderHadrianandMarcusAurelius,philosophywasinfavoranditsprofessorsreceivedprivileges.SpecificCharacteristicsofPhilosophyintheHellenisticSchoolsWemustnowexaminetheeffectsofthescholasticorganizationwehavejustdescribedontheintellectualactivitytakingplaceinitsmidst.Whatdid“philosophizing”meanforaleadingmemberofaphilosophicalschool?Wasthispracticerecognizedaslegitim-ateorgenuinephilosophybyallthinkers?TeachinganddogmatismEventhoughthegreaterpartofancientphilosophicalteachingwasoral,thecomposi-tionofwrittenworkswasanimportantphilosophicalactivity.Someworks,suchasPlato’sdialogues,wereintendedtopresentthethoughtoftheschooltothepublicatlargeandtoattractstudents.Others,likethoseworksofAristotlethathavesurvived,werethetextsforcoursesrestrictedtodisciples,whencetheirmoretechnicalandsometimestentativecharacter.IntheHellenisticperiod,thisdistinctionbetween“exoteric”and“acroamatic”works(Gell.NA20.5.5)gavewaytoavarietyofworksthatwereforthemostpartdogmaticandauthoritative–thatis,theytransmittedanorganizedbodyoftruthstoanactualorpotentialdisciple.ThisisparticularlythecasewiththewritingsofEpicurus,whichpresenteddifferentversionsofhisdoctrinedependingonthelevelofadvancementoftheiraudience,frommnemonicmaximstoOnNature(whichexamined,in37books,everydetailandproblemofthedoctrine),includingsummariesfornovices,studentsinahurry,andthoseinneedofanaide-mémoire(Hadot,1969;Wolff,2000).Hellenisticphilosophersthuswrotenotonlytreatisesonquestionsbearingonthethreepartsofphilosophy(methodsofknowingandofdiscourse[logic],thestudyofNature[physics],theoreticalandpracticalethics)butalsonumerous“summaries”and“introductions”topromotethespreadoftheirdoctrines(Mansfeld,1999).Toconvincestudentstoabandoncurrentopinionsandtoadopttheirdoctrineratherthansomeotherone,philosophershad,aboveall,toresorttovarioustechniquesofpersuasion(Lloyd,1979,chs.2and4).Mostallowedtheuseofrhetoricindiscoursesaddressedtolargeaudiences,eveniftheStoicsrefusedtomakelong,ornatespeeches.Butitwasdialectic,inthefirstinstance,bymeansofquestion-and-answerorsyllo-gisms,thatwasusedintheoralorwrittenlessons.TheStoicsdevelopeddialecticagreatdeal,inordertoprovetheirthesesonthebasisoftheirstudents’opinionsandtorefuteallobjections(LS31P),butalsotoelaboratetheirsystem,whichclaimedabsolutecoherence(Cic.,Fin.3.74).TheEpicureans,ontheotherhand,adoptedan423ACTC2142320/03/2006,04:10PM\nthomasbénatouïlanalogicalmethodofinductionfromsensationstogroundtheirtheses.Butallheldthattheidealdiscipleshouldhavenodoubtsatallaboutthedoctrineandshouldknowhowtorespondtoalltheskeptics’refutations,relyingespeciallyon“commonnotions”or“preconceptions”:elementaryideassharedbyallmenandmadeexplicitbyphilosophers(Epict.Diss.1.22).Yetsomewerenotconvincedthatthesetheoreticaleffortswereindispensabletoattainingthegoalofphilosophy,thegoodlife.AlltheHellenisticschools,exceptper-hapstheLyceum,recognizedtheprimacyofethicsandofpractice.Thetherapeuticfunctionofdoctrineswasexplicitandprimary;worksrecalledtheexemplarylivesandthemoralpreceptsofthefoundersoftheschools.EveninPlato’stime,however,DiogenesofSinopequestionedtheethicalefficacyofthephilosophicalschools(D.L.6.24).Followinghim,theCynicsrejected,throughoutallofantiquity,theschools’approachtophilosophy(see,forexample,Lucian,Demonax)infavorofa“shortcuttovirtue”(D.L.6.104):anaustereandsolitarylifeaimingforself-sufficiency.Theirteachingcamedowntoaggressivelycensuringthehabitsofthosetheyencountered(Goulet-Cazé,1990).SomeancienthistoriansofphilosophythusdeniedtoCynicismthestatusofa“schoolofthought”(hairesis)(D.L.6.103).Intheschools,however,thereweresomewhoweresympathetictoCyniccriticism:thePeripateticDicaearchusemphasizedthatSocratesdidnotteachinaschoolsetting(Plut.Anseni796D)andEpictetusceaselesslyremindedhisstudentsofthedangersofschooleducation:syl-logismsandthetextsofauthorswerenottobestudiedtoshineintellectuallyintheschool,butrathertoknowhowtoliveoutsideofit(Colardeau,2004).SuccessionandorthodoxyAsDavidSedleyhasemphasized,theprimaryeffectoftheprincipleof“succession”istheauthorityitconfersonthethoughtoftheschool’sfounder.Themaintaskofsucceedingscholarchswasnottoproposenewdoctrinesbuttospread,clarifyandsometimestodevelopthedoctrinesofthefounder(whohimselfgenerallyclaimedtobeextendingatraditionofthoughtandnottobe“original”).TheStoicChrysippusgaveevidenceofhisindependentspiritwhenhesaidtohismaster“thatallhewantedwastobetoldwhatthedoctrines(dogmata)were;hewouldsetouttheproofsforhimself”(D.L.7.179,trans.Hicks).Yetthisremarkalsoshowsthatthedefenseoftheschool’s“dogmas”wasnotincompatiblewithimportantphilosophicalwork:theneedtoshowthetruthofallthefounder’sdoctrines,todefendthemagainsttheattacksoftheschool’sadversaries,ledtomanyinnovationsandinternaldebatesineveryschool.EvenamongthePythagoreans,the“acousmatic”disciples,whoclaimedtoadhere,withoutexaminingthem,solelytothosepreceptsheardfromthefounder’sownlips,werechallengedbythe“mathematicians,”whosoughttosystematizehisscientificandphilosophicaldoctrines.Later,themanydebatesamongtheStoicsaboutthedefinitionofrepresentationortherelationsbetweenreasonandthepassionsweresimultaneouslydebatesaboutthethesesandtextsofZeno(Sedley,2003),justastheEpicureansdiscussedthestatusofrhetoric,forexample,bywayofinterpretingwhatEpicurushadsaidaboutit(Sedley,1989).Thedoctrineoftheschoolwasthusenrichedbythecontributionsofeachdebateandeachscholarch.IfthatoftheGardenclaimedalwaystoremainascloseaspossible424ACTC2142420/03/2006,04:10PM\nphilosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimestothetextsofEpicurus(Erler,1993),thephilosophyoftheStoawasmuchmoreopentoevolution,whileholdinginviolableagreatmanyoftheprinciplespositedbyZeno.AmongZeno’sfirstdisciples,severaldisputedsomeofhisthesesanddidnotrecognizetheauthorityofCleanthes,hisofficialsuccessor.Chrysippus,thethirdscholarch,developedfromZeno’steachingasystematicanddeepeneddoctrine,whichbecamealmostinitsentiretythatoftheschool,withoutChrysippusbecominganauthoritybeyondallcriticism.IntheAcademyandtheLyceumthefoundershadlefttheirdis-ciplesgreaterlibertyinresearchanddiscussion.ItisdifficulttoextractasystematicdoctrinefromPlato’sdialogues,somuchsothathissuccessorsfeltthemselvesentitledtodropthetheoryofFormsand,beginningwithArcesilaus,toargueagainsttheStoicsthatmancannotattaintoanycertainknowledgeandthatphilosophyshouldnotrecognizeanyauthority(Cic.Tusc.5.83)(seeLévy,thenewacademyanditsrivals,inthisvolume).ThesuccessorsofAristotle,fortheirpart,extendedthespiritofhisinvestigationstoareashedidnottreatinacompleteorsatisfactoryway,suchasbotany,andTheophrastusandStratodidnothesitatetoquestionthecoherenceoftheprinciplesofhisphysics.Fromthefirstcenturybceon,weobserveattemptstomaketheauthoritiesofseveralschoolsconverge.TheStoicsPanaetiusandPosidoniusaccordgreatauthoritytoPlatoandtoAristotle,whointhisperiodreturntocenterstage(Frede,1999).AntiochusofAscalonbrokewiththeskepticalAcademyandclaimedtorediscovertheoriginaldoctrineofthe“OldAcademy,”saidtobecommontoPlato,hisimmediatesuccessors,11Aristotle,andevenZeno,despitethedistortionimposedonitbythelatter.ThecaseofAntiochusalsoshowshownewphilosophersmoreandmorepresenttheirownthoughtastherediscoveryofancientdoctrine(seeZambon,middleplatonism,inthisvolume).TheskepticAenesidemusthusclaimstorevivethephilosophyofPyrrho.Posidonius,forhispart,tracescertainaspectsofStoicdoctrinetoPythagoras,bywayofPlatoasintermediary.Thesetendenciestoward“archaism”(Boys-Stones,2001)and“eclecticism”(DillonandLong,1988)developedgraduallyduringtheChristianeraandwenthandinhandwiththespreadofcommentaryasamethodofphilosoph-icalreflection:theNeoplatonistsinparticularappropriatedAristotleasmuchasPlatoandsought,intheirrivalrywiththeChristians,totracebacktheirowndoctrinestoveryancient(andsometimesmythical)authors.PolemicsanddoxographyWehavealreadyindicatedthefundamentalroleofcontroversiesbetweenschoolsintheformationoftheirdoctrinesandmethods.ThepresenceinAthensofnumerousrivalphilosophersduringalmostalloftheHellenisticepochcertainlyexplainsthegreatphilosophicalvitalityoftheperiod(Cic.Tusc.2.4).ThemaindebatewastheonebetweenthenaturalismoftheStoaandtheskepticismoftheNewAcademy(seeLévy,inthisvolume).ItsintensityresultedpartlyfromthefactthatbothschoolsclaimedtoinheritanddevelopthethoughtofSocrates,whichnourishedmanyHellenisticdebates:nothavingdeliveredanygenuineteaching,Socratescouldbeclaimedasan11.SeeSharples,theproblemofsources,sectiontitled“TheDebateaboutHappiness,”inthisvolume.425ACTC2142520/03/2006,04:10PM\nthomasbénatouïlauthoritybymanydivergentphilosophies(seeDeclevaCaizzi,inthisvolume).OnlytheEpicureansrejectedtheauthorityofSocratesandtheypolemicizedasmuchagainsttheStoaasagainsttheNewAcademy.Apartfromtheirshareoflogicalobjections,empiricalcounterexamples,andhistor-icalandmythologicalarguments,Hellenisticpolemicswerefoughtwithtwooriginalweapons.First,therewerepersonalattacksontherivalphilosopher’swayoflife,justifiedbytheimportanceofethicsinphilosophy;thus,forexample,thedebatesoverthelife–debauchedorsimpleandgenerous–ofEpicurus,whichweresupposedtoundermineorlegitimatehishedonism(D.L.10.3–11).Thentherewereaccusationsofdoctrinalplagiarism,whichallowedthedenunciationoftherivalphilosophyforalackofspecificityandconsistency.EpicureanatomismwasthusoftenattackedasanunrigorouscopyofthatofDemocritus,andCarneadesfollowedbyAntiochustriedtoshowthatStoicethics,strippedofitsartificialterminology,amountedeithertotheethicsofAristotleoranethicsofindifference,sinceaccordingtothemnointermediatesolutionwascoherent(Cic.Fin.4–5).Polemics,whichinwritinggaverisetonumerousworksofrefutation(“AgainstX”),thereforeborenotonlyonthetruthofthesesbutontheirplaceinthewholeofactualandpossibledoctrines.Fromthisflowstheimportancegrantedtodoxography,thatis,themoreorlesssystematiccollectionofthedifferentphilosophicalopinionsthathadbeenadvancedoneachquestion(Mansfeld,1999,andinthisvolumeMejer).Already,Aristotlebeganhiscourseswithasummaryoftheopinionsofhispredecessors,toshowhowhisownresolvedtheircontradictions(Mansion,1980).IntheHellenisticperiod,thephilosophicaluseofdoxographywasoftenpolemical.Chrysippus,forexample,proposeda“division”ofpossibleethicalpositionsshowingthattheStoicwastheonlyviableandseriousone,whilethecontemporary“division”byCarneadeshadoppositeaims(Algra,1997;Lévy,1999).TheintensityandreflexivityoftheseHellenisticpolemicsstirredupmanycritiquesoutsidetheschools.Philosopherswerereproachedwithbeingassurethattheypos-sessedthetruthastheywereunabletoreachagreement(Lucian,Icaromenippus5–10),orwithfoundingnewschoolsonlytomakemoneybyattractingstudents(DiodorusofSicily2.29.6).ThisconfusionofthebewilderedstudentwhodoesnotknowwhotobelieveissometimesalsofoundamongthephilosophersoftheRomanperiod,intheformofasuspicionofpolemics,tingedwithsyncretismorskepticism.JustasGalenwillshowthatepistemologicaldisputesbetweenmedicalschoolswenthandinhandwithagreementabouttherapies(OnSects4.7–8),CiceroandSenecaemphasizethatdisagreementsoverethicaldoctrinesoftenmaskabasicagreementaboutthepracticalattitudesofthewiseman.Moreradically,thePyrrhonianskepticsclaimedtoshowthatthedissension(diaphOnia)amongphilosopherswasirreducible.Usingdoxographytofreehimselffromdogmatism,SextusEmpiricusthusproposedasystematicrefutationofallknowndoctrines(AgainsttheProfessors),supposedtoshowthatnoneismore(orless)plausiblethananother,sothatpeaceofmindcanonlybefoundoutsideofthemandtheschools(seeBrunschwig,pyrrhonism,inthisvolume).Butdidnotthisskepticismanditssectariesthemselvesconstituteanewhairesisinthedissonantconcertofthephilosophicalschools(D.L.1.20and9.70)?Ofcourse,thePyrrhonistsandtheiradversarieswerenotinagreementonthispoint...426ACTC2142620/03/2006,04:10PM\nphilosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimesBibliographyWorksCitedAlgra,K.(1997).“Chrysippus,Carneades,Cicero.TheEthicaldivisionesinCicero’sLucullus.”InB.InwoodandJ.Mansfeld(eds.),AssentandArgument.StudiesinCicero’sAcademicBooks(pp.107–39).Leiden:Brill.——,Barnes,J.,Mansfeld,J.,andSchofield,M.(eds.).(1999).TheCambridgeHistoryofHellenisticPhilosophy.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Bodéus,R.(1993).ThePoliticalDimensionsofAristotle’sEthics.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.(Originalworkpublished1982.)Boyancé,P.(1936).Lecultedesmuseschezlesphilosophesgrecs.Paris:deBoccard.Boys-Stones,G.(2001).Post-HellenisticPhilosophy.Oxford:OxfordUniversit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,U.von(1965).AntigonosvonKarystos.Berlin:Olms.(Originalworkpublishedin1881.)Wolff,F.(2000).“Êtrediscipled’Épicure.”InL’être,l’homme,ledisciple(pp.253–88).Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance.428ACTC2142820/03/2006,04:10PM\nphilosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimesFurtherReadingSeeMejer,ancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltradition,inthisvolume,“WorksCited”and“FurtherReading,”foradditionalreferences.André,J.-M.(1987).“Lesécolesphilosophiquesauxdeuxpremierssièclesdel’Empire.”ANRWII.36–1,5–77.Brunt,P.A.(1975).“StoicismandthePrincipate.”PapersoftheBritishSchoolatRome,43,7–35.Burkert,W.(1972).LoreandScienceinAncientPythagoreanism(trans.E.L.Minar).Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversity.(Originalworkpublished1962.)Centrone,B.(2000).“Cosasignificaesserepitagoricoinetàinperiale.”InA.Brancacci(ed.),Lafilosofiainetàimperiale.Lescuoleeletradizionefilosofiche(pp.137–69).Naples:Bibliopolis.Cherniss,H.(1945).TheRiddleoftheEarlyAcademy.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Clarke,M.L.(1971).HigherEducationintheAncientWorld.London:Routledge.Collins,R.(1998).TheSociologyofPhilosophies.AGlobalTheoryofIntellectualChange,Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.Daly,L.W.(1950).“RomanStudyAbroad.”AmericanJournalofPhilology,71,40–58.Delorme,J.(1960).Gymnasion.Étudessurlesmonumentsconsacrésàl’éducationenGrèce.Paris:DeBoccard.Donini,P.(1994).“Testiecommenti,manualieinsegnamento:laformasistematicaeimetodidellafilosofiainetàpostellenistica.”ANRWII.36–7,5027–100.Dorandi,T.(1991a).RicerchesullaCronologiadeiFilosofiEllenistici.Stuttgart:Teubner.Gottschalk,H.B.(1987).“AristotelianPhilosophyintheRomanWorld.”ANRWII.36–2,1079–174.HabichtC.(1997).AthensfromAlexandertoAntony(trans.D.L.Schneider).Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.(Originalworkpublished1995.)Hadot,I.(1970).“TraditionstoïcienneetidéespolitiquesautempsdesGracques.”Revuedesétudeslatines,48,133–79.Manning,C.E.(1994).“SchoolPhilosophyandPopularPhilosophyintheRomanEmpire.”ANRWII.36–7,4995–5026.Marrou,H.-I.(1982).AHistoryofEducationinAntiquity(trans.G.Lamb).Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress.(Originalworkpublished1948.)Meyer,B.F.andSaunders,E.P.(1982).JewishandChristianSelf-Definition.(vol.3):Self-DefinitionintheGraeco-RomanWorld.Philadelphia:Fortress.Mitsis,P.(2003).“TheInstitutionsofHellenisticPhilosophy.”InA.Erskine(ed.),ACompaniontotheHellenisticWorld(pp.464–76).Oxford:Blackwell.Natali,C.(2000).“SchoolsandSitesofLearning.”InJ.BrunschwigandG.E.R.Lloyd(eds.),GreekThought:AGuidetoClassicalKnowledge(trans.C.Porter).Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.(Originalworkpublished1996.)Nock,A.D.(1933).Conversion.TheOldandtheNewinReligionfromAlexandertheGreattoAugustineofHippo.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Pélékidis,C.(1962).Histoiredel’éphébieattiquedesoriginesà31avantJésus-Christ.Paris:deBoccard.Sedley,D.(1976).“EpicurusandhisProfessionalRivals.”CahiersdePhilologie,1,119–59.——.(1981).“TheEndoftheAcademy.AReviewofJ.Glucker,AntiochusandtheLateAcademy.”Phronesis,36,67–75.——.(2003).“PhilodemusandtheDecentralisationofPhilosophy.”CronacheErcolanesi,33,31–41.Snyder,G.(2000).TeachersandTextsintheAncientWorld.London:Routledge.429ACTC2142920/03/2006,04:10PM\nrobertw.sharples22TheProblemofSourcesROBERTW.SHARPLESTheExtentoftheProblemToavaryingextentwearedependentonancientsecondarysourcesforourknow-1ledgeofalltheHellenisticphilosophicalschools.ThesurvivingwritingsofEpicurusareeithersummariesrequiringexpansionandelucidation(theLettersandstillmorethePrincipalDoctrines)orfragmentaryandinneedofreconstruction(thepapyrusfragmentsofhismajorworkOnNaturepreservedamongthecharredremainsoftheEpicureanlibraryatHerculaneumburied,andhencepreserved,bytheeruptionofVesuvius).WehavenothingatalloftheoriginalwritingsoftheearlyStoics,apartfromquotationsinlaterancientsourcesandafewfragmentsonpapyrus;andthereisgoodreasontosupposethatwhat,withthebenefitofhindsight,appearsasadistinc-tionbetween“orthodox”earlyStoicismandhereticalvariantsisinfactevidenceforcompetinginterpretationsoftheviewsofZeno,thefounderoftheschool,oneofwhicheventuallyprevailed(withtheresultthatlatersourcesdisparagethephilosophicalmeritsandinterestofthedefeatedviews:cf.Boys-Stones,1996,esp.pp.88and94).DiogenesLaertiusgivesusanextensivesummaryofStoicdoctrines,butonewhichisoflimitedusefulnessjustbecauseitisasummaryofdoctrines;likemanyotherancientreportsoftheviewsofphilosophers,itgivesustheconclusionsofarguments,butnot2thereasonsthatledtotheiradoption(cf.Furley,1999,p.433).AsfortheAcademicSceptics,notonlydidCarneadeshimselfnotcommithisdoctrinestowriting,butourknowledgeevenofthewritingsofhisfollowersisatsecond-hand,andthesamephe-nomenonofcompetinginterpretationsoccursasinthecaseoftheStoics,intherivalrybetweenClitomachusandMetrodorus(cf.LS,vol.1,p.448).AndforbothPyrrhohimselfandneo-PyrrhonianskepticismbeforeSextusEmpiricuswearedependentinpartonsecondarysourcesandinpartonthewritingsofSextushimself,whichbytheirveryextensivenessmaydominateourthinkingandmakeuslessalerttovariationsintheearlierthinkingoftheschool–orindeedtovariationsinSextus’ownthoughtatdifferentperiodsofhiscareer(cf.Bett,1997,pp.xii–xxxii).InthisrespecttheHellenisticperiodisnotuntypicalofallGreekphilosophybeforetheRomanperiod.Fromthefourthcenturybcethewritingsoftwomajorfigures1.Ontheschoolsthemselves,seeBénatouïl,philosophicschoolsinhellenisiticandromantimes,inthisvolume.2.OnDiogenesLaertiusasasourceandasabiographer,seeMejer,ancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltradition,inthisvolume.430ACTC2243020/03/2006,04:11PM\ntheproblemofsourcessurvive,complete(Plato)ortoasubstantialthoughoddlyselectiveextent(Aristotle,whosepublishedworksarelostbutwhoseschool-treatisessurvive).Buttheworksofmanyothersfromthatperiodandearlierarelost;andthatmoretextssurvivefromtheRomanperiod(thoughmanydonot)isduetothegeneraltendencyofnewbookstodriveoutoldones–exceptinthecaseofoldbookswhicharedeemedtobeclassicsandpreservedbyacontinuingtradition:andtheStoicandEpicureantraditionswereeclipsedinlateantiquitybyNeoplatonism.Ithasbeencalculated(Runia,1989,pp.23,35–6)thatof316knownphilosopherswritinginGreekintheperiod600bceto600ce,theworksofonlyPlato,Plotinus,andpossiblyMarcusAureliussurviveintheirentirety,andoftheremaindernolessthan256areknowntousonlythroughquotationsand/orsecond-handreportsconveyedbyotherauthors.Butdependenceonsecondaryevidencelaystrapsfortheunwary;itisthepurposeofthischaptertoindicatesomeofthese,andtodosowiththeaidofspecificexamples.Ifthereportsofoneparticularwriter,Cicero,seemtohaveparticu-larprominenceinwhatfollows,itisbecauseheisbothamajorsourceforourknow-ledgeofthephilosophyoftheHellenisticperiodandaskilledwriterandadvocate;thelatterrole,asweshallsee,complicatesouruseofhimintheformer.CollectionsofFragmentsSincesomuchofourevidenceissecond-hand,thosestudyingHellenisticphilosophyarenecessarilydependentoncollectionsoffragmentsandtestimonia(thestrictdis-tinctionbeingthatfragmentsareverbatimquotations;butinpractice,andgiventhedifficultiesofdistinguishingbetweenquotationandparaphrase,“fragments”isoftenlooselyusedtorefertoboth).Suchcollectionshavetheirownpitfalls(wellpointedoutbyMansfeld(1999,p.27);andseeinthisvolumethechapterbyMejer).ThestandardreferencecollectionofevidencefortheStoicsisstillvonArnim(SVF)(1903–24),thoughthisisbeingreplacedbytheworkoftheUtrechtStoicsproject(directedbyJ.Mansfeld),andthegeneralreaderwilluseLS(LongandSedley,1987).VonArnimpresentsinhisfirstvolumetheevidencethatislinkedtospecificStoicsbeforeChrysippus,andtheninasecondvolumeandmostofathirdallthatwhichrelateseithertoChrysippushimselfor,invonArnim’sview,totheearlyStoicsingeneral.(ThelatterpartofthethirdvolumecontainsevidenceexplicitlyconnectedwithChrysippus’successors).Chrysippuswasregardedashavingcodifiedthedoc-trinesoftheschool(D.L.7.183),andthistosomeextentjustifiesvonArnim’sarrange-ment;hedoesmoreoverspecifyinhispreface(vol.I,p.v)howheusesdifferentsizesandstylesoftypetodistinguishbetween(i)verbatimquotationsofChrysippusinlatersources,(ii)reportsofChrysippus’views,and(iii)“textswhichseemedinsomewayusefulforunderstandingChrysippus’teaching.”ButscholarshavenotalwaysheededvonArnim’swarning,andhavesometimestendedtotreathiscollectionasifallthematerialinitwasChrysippus’actualwords.TheproblemofdeterminingthestatusofanygiventextasevidenceforStoicismisexacerbatedbythefactthatStoictermino-logybecamesomethingofastandardphilosophicallanguageforlaterantiquity–carryingwithit,tosomeextentbutnotaltogether,atendencytoseeissuesinStoicterms.NoristhedangerconfinedtothatoftreatingasauthenticallyStoictextsinclass431ACTC2243120/03/2006,04:11PM\nrobertw.sharples(iii)whichvonArnimdidnotintendtopresentassuch;thearrangementofhiscol-lectioninvitesreaderstoseeStoicdoctrineaslesssusceptibletochangeovertimethanitactuallywas,andtoreadlaterformulationsbackintotheearlierperiodoftheschool(seeBobzien1998aand1998b,andthefollowingsection“TheReporter’sOwnAgenda”).Othercollectionsofevidencecanalsohavedangersfortheunwary.Forexample,therecentcollectionoftheevidencerelatingtoAristotle’scolleagueTheophrastus,theuseofwhombyEpicurusinparticularhasbeenemphasizedbySedley(1998,pp.166–85),includesallreferencestohimbynameinancientandmedievalsourcesupto1450ce(Fortenbaughetal.,1992;forthemethodologyseevol.1,pp.4–14.).Themerefactoftheinclusionofapieceofevidencethusimpliesnojudgmentastoitsreliability,andreadersareexpresslydirectedtothecommentaryfordiscussionoftheseissues.Thiscollectionalsoincludesthecontextofeachreportintheancientsourcefromwhichitcomes,insofarasthisisrelevanttoassessingthereport;thereportsthemselvesvarybetweenquotation,paraphraseofTheophrastus’ownwords,andreportingofhisviewsinthereporter’sownterms.Clearly,themereoccurrenceofparticulartermsandexpressionsinreportsofthethirdtypesaysnothinginitselfaboutTheophrastus’ownterminology;individualinstancesneedtobeexaminedindetail.Itisintrinsicallymoredifficultinthecaseofreferencestoanauthorwritinginprosetodistinguishbetweenanactualreportanditscontext,andtodecidewhetherareportisverbatimquotation(exceptwherethisisexplicitlyindicatedintheancientsource)thanitisinthecaseofprosewritersquotingfrompoeticalauthors.Therearemoreoverdangersinignoringtheoriginalcontextofareport.Epiphanius,bishopofSalamisinCyprusinthefourthcenturyce,givesareport(Haer.III2.9.35–39=OnFaith9.35–39)ofthephysicaltheoriesofvariousPeripatetics,concludingwithCritolaus,whowentwithCarneadesandtheStoicDiogenesofBabylononthenotoriousphilosophicalembassytoRomein156bce.ThereseemsgoodreasontosupposethatthereportwasoriginallyformulatedbyCritolaushimself,andthattheviewsitattributestoAristotleareinfactCritolaus’owninterpretationofAristotle’sviews(cf.Sharples,2002,pp.22–3).Wehrli,theeditorofthefragmentsofCritolaus,howeverargued(1969b,p.66)thatthereportisPythagorean,ratherthananaccur-atereportofCritolaus’views,andsupportsthisbyCicero’sclaimatFin.5.14(=fr.11inWehrli,1969b)thatCritolaus’viewsdifferedfromAristotle’s.Butthecontextofthatpassageisethicsratherthanphysics.Wehrliindeednotesthis(1969b,p.64);butitcallsintoquestionthevalidityofhisusingitinthewayhedoestodiscreditEpiphanius’report.True,itmentionsnospecificethicaldoctrineinconnectionwithCritolaus,unlikethephilosopherswhoprecedeandfollowhiminthelist.PerhapsthenCicerointendedageneralcommentonCritolaus’doctrines,becausehehadnospecificethicalinformationtogive(thoughsuchtherewas:seepp.440–1);butthepointatleastneedsarguing.Sometimes,indeed,thelimitationsofacollectionoffragmentsmayresultfromtheprogressofknowledge.ThecontinualprocessofdeciphermentofthepapyrifromHerculaneum,andinparticularthere-readingofalreadyeditedtextswithnewtech-nologicalaids,meansthatthepapyrustextsinthemostrecentstandardcollection(Arrighetti,1973)cannolongeralwaysbereliedupon.AsworkonthedeciphermentandreconstructionoftheHerculaneumpapyricontinues,thewritingsoftheEpicurean432ACTC2243220/03/2006,04:11PM\ntheproblemofsourcesPhilodemuswillbecomeanincreasinglyimportantsource,andnotjustforEpicurean-ism.Hispractice–toavaryingextent,indeed,indifferentworks–ofsummarizingtheviewsofpredecessorsbeforecriticizingthemmaymakehimaparticularlyvaluablesourceasmoreinformationbecomesavailable(cf.Janko,1995,pp.87–92;Obbink,1996,p.18andn.3,pp.81–2,88,98–9,523).Evenso,thestateofthetextsmayleadtodifficultiesinpracticeindistinguishingbetweenPhilodemus’viewsandthoseheisreportingfromothers(Obbink,1996,p.282).Epicurus,ontheotherhand,neverquotedfromanyone,atleastifwemaybelieveD.L.10.26.Evenwhenwecanbesurethatwehavecorrectlyidentifiedwhatinasecondarysourcereflectstheoriginalauthorwhoseviewsarebeingreported,andwhatdoesnot,fragmentaryevidencecanstillmislead.AsMansfeld(1999,p.27)notes,someancientsources,byidentifyingastandardsetofviewsassociatedwithaschoolandthencon-centratingoncaseswhereindividualsdivergedfromthese,maygiveanimpressionthattherewasmoredisagreementthanwasinfactthecase.(Cf.alsoSharples,1998,esp.pp.271–2;andonfragmentsingeneralKidd,1986,1998.)TheReporter’sOwnAgendaEventhosewhosetouttowritethehistoryofphilosophyassuch,ratherthantodeveloptheirownphilosophicalarguments,canonlyescapefromtheirownphilo-sophicalpreconceptionswithdifficulty,ifatall.Thisisnottosaythattheattemptisnotworthmaking;stilllessthatallinterpretationsareequallyvalid.Themoralisratherthatitisbettertobeawareofourownpresuppositionsthantobeuncon-sciouslyattheirmercy.Forthisreasonaloneallhistoryofphilosophyneedstobephilosophicallyinformed.Butthestudyofearlierphilosophicaltheoriesfromapurelyhistoricalperspectiveisarelativelyrecentdevelopment(cf.Mansfeld,1999,p.16).Eventodayphilosopherswhorefertotheircontemporariesandtheirrecentpredeces-sorsdoso,generallyspeaking,notwiththeaimofestablishingexactlywhatthoseotherphilosophersthink,butasameanstoanend,thatofdevelopingtheirownpositionsandarguments.Theirownpreoccupationsinfluencewhattheyemphasizeinthecontributionsofotherphilosophers,andhowtheyinterpretthosecontributions.Andinclassicalantiquity(andintheMiddleAges,bothIslamicandChristian)itwastheuseofpredecessorsforphilosophicalpurposes,ratherthantheestablishingofanaccuratehistoricalrecord,thatwasparamount.ThetendentiousnessofAristotle’streatmentofhispredecessors,andaboveallofPlato,iswellknown;butthepracticecertainlydidnotstop,orstart,withAristotle.Plato’sSocratesisinfuriatinglyreadytoregardpeopleascommittedtowhatheseesastheimplicationsoftheirviews,inspiteoftheirprotests(e.g.,Plato,Grg.466e).Theextremecaseiswhenwritersthemselvesinventargumentsforapositiontheyoppose,inordertodemolishthem;thishappensnow,andithappenedinantiquitytoo.Sometimesindeeditishardtotellwhetheranauthorisreportingorfabricating.(AcaseinpointistheobjectiontoAlexanderofAphrodisias’ownaccountofresponsibleactionattributedbyhimtohisopponents,andthenrefuted,inhisOnFatechs.26ff.;cf.Sharples,2001a,p.563andn.347).ThephilosophicalwritingsofCiceroareaprimarysourcefortheHellenisticperiod.Cicero’sphilosophicalworksareforthemostpartdialogues,inwhichthesupporters433ACTC2243320/03/2006,04:11PM\nrobertw.sharplesofrivalviewsarepresentedarguingagainstoneanother;andthereisadirectconnec-tionbetweenthisformofwriting,Cicero’sownAcademicskepticism,andhispracticeasanoratorandadvocate.Heexplicitlystates(DeOr.3.80=LS68L;cf.Tusc.2.9)thatthePeripateticandAcademicpracticesofarguingrespectivelyforbothsidesofaques-tionoragainstallviewsproposedarehelpfulasrhetoricaltraining;andanadvocateneedstobeawareoftheargumentsonbothsidesofthecaseinordertopresentthemostconvincingpossiblecaseforthesideheisrepresenting.Asweshallsee,Cicerodidnotleavehiscourtroomskillsbehindhimwhenhecametowritephilosophy;andthatisafactweneglectatourperil.NotthatweshouldgototheotherextremeanddismissCiceroaslackingintegrityasareporter:notonlywouldthisbetodepriveourselvesofamajorsourceofinformation,butweshouldalsorealizethat,inpresent-ingtheviewsofothersinthelightofhisownunderstandingoftheissues,Ciceroissimplydoingwhatisnaturalforthoseengagedinphilosophicaldebate.Stokes’com-ment(1995,p.170)onCicero’spresentationoftheEpicureantheoryofpleasureinDeFinibus1ispertinent:“Notall,andindeedfewcriticsinantiquityweresocarefulasCiceroheretodistinguishfortheattentivereaderwheretheyarereportingandwheretheyareconductingdialecticalcriticism.”Cicerowasnotindeedthefirsttouserhetoricaldevicesinphilosophicaldebate(cf.Mansfeld,2001,pp.241–2).Butinhisexperthandstheymaymisleadusallthemoreeffectively.WhileCicerocertainlyusedearlierwrittensources,hedidnotsimplytranslatethemintoLatinmechanically,orcompilehisphilosophicalworksbythemereunreflectiveconcatenationofmaterialfromdifferentsources.(ForoneplacewherewecanseeCiceroatwork,selectingandrearrangingmaterialfromhissource,seeObbink,1996,p.97.)EvenLucretius,whofollowshisEpicureansource-textsclosely,canaltertheforceofanoriginalargument,aswhenhetreatstheanalogywithvisibleminimaasanactualargumentforindivisibleminimalpartsoftheatomratherthanas,initself,aclarifica-tionoftheirnature(cf.LS9Aand9BwithLS’scommentatvol.1,p.42).Hecanalsobegaquestionoranticipateanargumentintheinterestsofeffectiveexposition,forexamplewhenat1.150headdstoEpicurus’argumentthatnothingcomesfromnoth-ingthecommentthatitdoesnotdosobydivineagency,whichisnotstrictlyrelevantwheretheclaimthatnothingcomesfromnothingisbeingadvancedaspartoftheproofofthebasicatomictheory(cf.,Asmis,1983,p.57;Classen,1968,pp.80–1;Gottschalk,1996,p.234).Sedley(1998,pp.198–9)defendsLucretiusonthegroundsthattosaythatnothingcomesfromnothingistoremoveoneargumentfortheneedtoinvokedivineagencyforwhatwouldotherwisebeinexplicable;butitmayalsobeappropriatetosay,withAsmis,thatLucretiusisinfluencedbytherequirementsofexpositionratherthanbythoseoflogic.Lucretiusgoesontoarguethatthefactthatthingsdonotcometobeinanarbitrarywayshowsthattheycomefromdefinite“seeds”(1.169=LS4B).SotoodoesEpicurusatthecorrespondingpointinhisownexpositioninLettertoHerodotus38.ButLucretiushasalreadyindicatedat1.59thathewilluse“seeds”asoneofhistermsforatoms,whichEpicurusdoesnotdo(Sedley,1999,pp.363–4);andifthereadertakesthetermthus,Lucretiuswillhaveintro-ducedareferencetotheatomictheoryintoanearlystageoftheveryargumentthatismeanttoestablishit.Thisismorelikelytobedeliberaterhetoricaldesignthantheresultofcarelessness(cf.,Asmis,1983,p.59;Classen,1968,p.83);fromtheoutset434ACTC2243420/03/2006,04:11PM\ntheproblemofsourcesLucretiusanticipatesfeaturesofhistheorywhichhehasyettodemonstrate,whichisagoodtechniqueforinstructionandpersuasion,butnotforlogicaldemonstration.(IndeedClassen(1968,pp.81–2)arguesthatLucretiusmustbejudgedbymorestrin-gentstandardsthanEpicurusbecauseheisseekingtoconvinceageneralpublicratherthanwritingforthosewhoarealreadymembersoftheschoolfamiliarwithEpicurus’doctrines.)ButforourpresentpurposethequestionwhetherornotLucretius’ap-proachislegitimate,andindeedthequestionwhetherornotitisdeliberate,arebesidethepoint:comparisonwithsurvivingtextsofEpicurusshowsthatLucretiuschangestheexpressionofEpicurus’argumentsinsubtleways–andifhedoessowherewecancheck,hemayalsodosowherewecannot.(Cf.Classen(1968,pp.80–3)andSedley(1998,pp.193–9),andingeneralfortherelationbetweenLucretiusandEpicurus,cf.Sedley,1998.)However,thephilosophicalpreoccupationsofthereportermaynotalwaysbethecorrect,orcomplete,explanationforthedistinctivecharacterofareport.AmajorsourcefortheStoictheoryoffateandresponsibilityhasbeenthetreatiseOnFatebyAlexanderofAphrodisias,whichdoesnotactuallynametheStoicsanywhere,andarguesagainstadeterministpositionwhichis,incomparisonwithwhatwecanre-constructfromothersourcesfortheearlyStoa,attheleastselectivebothbydisregard-ingsomeaspectsandbygivingparticularemphasistoothers.ThishasbeenexplainedbysayingthatAlexanderisinterestedinarguingagainstdeterminismasaphilosoph-icalthesis,ratherthanagainstahistoricalposition,andthatthisiswhyhedoesnotnameitsproponents(cf.Sharples,1983,pp.19–20);buttheviewhasgainedsupport,particularlyinthewritingsofSusanneBobzien(1998a,pp.372–5;1998b),thattheStoictheorychangedanddevelopedovertime,andthatAlexanderisengagedinpolemicwithaparticularformofthetheoryadvancednearerhisowntime(c.200ce)andinsomerespectsclosertomoremodernformulations(suchasLaplaceandeter-minism)thanChrysippus’ownstatementshadbeen.Ithaslongbeenrecognizedthatweriskmisinterpretation–attheveryleast,theintroductionofafalseemphasis–ifweencumberSophoclesintheOedipusTyrannuswithourownphilosophicalbaggagederivingfromtwomillenniaofdebateaboutresponsibilityanddivinepredestination(Dodds,1966,p.42),andthatAristotle’sapproachtomaterialnecessitationisnotthatofnineteenth-centuryscience(Balme,1939;1992,pp.82–3).ItmaybethatweneedtotakethesamelessontoheartwhendealingwiththeearlyStoaaswell.ButthecorollarywhereAlexanderisconcernedisthatthewayinwhichanauthorpresentstheviewsofhisopponentsisnotalwaystobeexplainedbyhisownpreoccupations;sometimesitmaybeduetoformulationsofthoseviews,bytheopponentsthemselves,whicharenototherwisewellknowntous.CiceroandEpicurus:TheAtomicSwerveAgainsttheStoicdilemmathateithereverythingincludinghumanactionmustbepredeterminedorelsesomeuncausedmotionmustoccur,Carneadesarguedthathumanactioncanbefreeandyetnotuncausedbecausethecauseoftheactionisinthevoluntarymotionitself.AndbythesametokenhearguedthatEpicurusdidnotneedtherandomswerveofatomstomaintainfreedomfromdeterminism(Cic.Fat.435ACTC2243520/03/2006,04:11PM\nrobertw.sharples21–25=LS20E).DavidSedleyhasarguednotonlythatCarneadeswasright,butalsothatEpicuruswashimselfreadytodispensewiththeswerve.Bothclaimsseemquestionable.Ihavediscussedtheissueelsewhere(Sharples,1991,pp.7–8,175–7;1991–3,pp.178–82),butImentionitagainherebecausetodosowillhighlightissuesintheuseofsecondaryevidence,andofCicero’sevidenceinparticular.(Cf.alsoEverson1999,pp.554–7;Purinton,1999,esp.pp.285–99.)SedleyfindsCarneades’viewconvincing,andtheEpicureanatomicswerveunsatis-factory.However,whiletherearecertainlyproblems–ofwhichEpicurushimselfmayormaynothavebeenaware–inreconcilingtherandomnessoftheswervewithresponsiblehumanaction,itisattheveryleastarguablethatinpostulatingtheswerveEpicuruswasright,andthatinsayingitwasunnecessaryCarneadeswaswrong.Eitherallthathappensispredetermined,orelseeventsmustoccurthataretosomeextentatleastindependentoftheirchronologicalantecedents,andtothatextenttheymustoccurwithnopriorcause.Intermsoftheatomistpictureofcontinuallycollidingandreboundingatoms,whosetrajectorieswillbedeterminedbythepriormovementsofthemselvesandoftheotheratomswithwhichtheycollide,thismustamounttoadeviationorswerveofanatomfromitspreviouspath.Whetherthisdeviationiscausedbysomehigheragency,forexamplebyapowerofthehumansoulindependentofitsunderlyingatomicmake-up,isaseparateissue,thoughthereareproblemsinincorpor-atingsuchaviewintoEpicurus’atomictheory.Whatdoesseemclearisthatontheatomicleveleachswervemustbeuncaused,becauseifitwerecauseditcouldonthatlevelbecausedonlybyprioratomicmovements,andifitwerecausedbytheseitwouldatleastinprinciplebepredictableandtheverypointofitsintroductionwouldbelost.Cicero,however(Fat.22=LS20E2),presentsthecauselessnessoftheatomicswerveassomethingEpicurusiscompelledunwillinglytoaccept.Thismightgivetheimpres-sionthatEpicurushimselffoundthecauselessnessoftheswerveanembarrassment.Infact,however,Cicero’sstatementisnotinitselfevidenceofanythingofthesort.Cicerohimselfridiculestheclaimthattheswervehasnocause(Fat.46–48);andwhenhepresentsEpicurusasembarrassedbythis,heisengagingincourt-roomrhet-oric.Whatbetterwaytocallanopponent’sviewintoquestionbeforeanaudiencethantosuggestthatevenhewouldbehappiernottoholdit?Somecautionisindeedneededhere.Sedley(LSvol.2,p.110)haspointedoutthatthereislittleevidencethatEpicurusdidhimselfassertthattheswervehasnocause;theonlyplacewhereabsenceofcauseisattributedtoEpicurushimselfisCic.Fin.1.19.But,first,oursourcesarelimitedandtendentious,and,second,weneednotindeedsupposethatEpicurusmadetheclaimthattheswervehasnocauseexplicitly.ThecontextinwhichitwouldbeappropriatetodosoisinreplytotheStoicclaimthattodenydeterminismistointroduceuncausedmotion;andthatclaimis,itwouldseem,laterthanEpicurus’introductionoftheatomicswerve,perhapsevenaresponsetoit(however,ononeancienttextthathasbeenthoughttoimplythis,cf.Boys-Stones,1996).EpicuruswasworriednotbyStoicdeterminismbutbythedetermin-isticimplications,ashesawthem,ofDemocritus’atomism.MyclaimisonlythattheclaimthattheswervehasnocausereflectswhatEpicurushopeditwouldachievemoreaccurately,eventhoughinthetermsofasubsequentdebate,thandoestheclaimthatanuncausedswerveisredundant.436ACTC2243620/03/2006,04:11PM\ntheproblemofsourcesInarguingthusIaminfluencedbymyownviewthathumanfreewillrequiresaradicaldenialofphysicaldeterminism,justasthosewhofindCarneades’positiononthisparticularissueplausibleareineffectacceptingapositioninthatdebateakintoRichardTaylor’s“agentcausation”(cf.Taylor,1967,p.369).Thereisnothingsur-prisinginthis;itisaconsequenceofthe“principleofcharity”thatmoderninterpreterswilltendtounderstandancientphilosophersinwaysthattheythemselvesfindphilo-sophicallyplausible.Thequestionisalwayshowfarcharityshouldextend.Theviewsofmoderninterpretersalsoaffecttheirassessmentofancientcriticismsofparticularphilosophicalpositions:forexample,scholarswhoseownviewofthefree-willprob-lemisthatresponsibilityanddeterminismarecompatiblehavesometimesregardedancientcriticismsofthesimilarStoicpositionassimplymisunderstandingormisrepres-entingtheStoics’views(Frede,1982,pp.276–98;Rist,1969,pp.112ff.)–whichistrue,fromaStoicviewpoint.Theneedforthehistorianistobeawarethatdifferentpositionsaretakenonmanyissuesbyphilosophersevennow,andtousethataware-nesstoarriveatanunderstandingoftheviewsofbothsidesinancientdebates.SedleyfurtherarguesthatCarneades(asreportedbyCicero)suggeststhatEpicuruswouldbebetteroffwithouttheatomicswerve,andthatsinceCarneadesasaskeptichasnopositiveviewsofhisown,hemustargueentirelyonthebasisofthebeliefsofthoseheiscriticizing(LSvol.2,p.110).ButwhiletheAcademicskepticscertainlyargueonthebasisoftheiropponents’principles,thisdoesnotmeanthateveryprincipletheyappealtoisonethattheiropponentswouldaccept.Forexample,Ciceroreportsthefollowing:“[P]Ifthesagewilleverassenttoanything,hewillsometimeshaveopinions;but[Q]hewillneverhaveopinions;therefore[R]hewillnotassenttoanything.”Arcesilausapprovedthisconclusion,forheendorsedboththefirstandthesecond(premise).(Cic.Acad.II.(Lucullus)66–77=LS69G2)TheStoicswouldcertainlyacceptthat[Q]thesagewillnotholdopinions(definedasassenttoapropositionofwhichonedoesnotactuallyhaveknowledge);buttheywouldnotaccept[P].Andthereasonforthatcanbeseenbyspellingouttheimplicitreasoningonwhich[P]isbased:[A]Thewisemanwillsometimesassent.[B]Certaintyisimpossible.[C]Toassenttowhatisuncertainistohaveopinionratherthanknowledge.[D]Thewisemanwillsometimesassenttowhatisuncertain.[fromAandB][E]Thewisemanwillsometimeshaveopinions.[fromCandD]TheStoicswouldaccept[A]and[C],butnottheimplicitpremise[B].Itistruethat[B]isthebasicclaim–or,ifwearetoavoiddogmatism,thebasicfinding–ofskepticism,andsoitmightbearguedthatitisaspecialcaseandnotevidenceforageneralreadinessonthepartofAcademicSkepticstointroduceintotheirargumentsotherpremisesthattheiropponentswouldnotaccept.ButwealsoknowfromCicero(Fat.17–20,26–28(=LS70G),37–38)thatCarneadeswaspre-paredtoargueagainstbothEpicurusandtheStoicsthattheywerejointlywrongin437ACTC2243720/03/2006,04:11PM\nrobertw.sharplestheirsharedviewthatthetruthofthepredictionofaneventisincompatiblewiththateventnotbeingpredetermined.Cicero’stendentiouspresentationoftheviewofothersisnotconfinedtoEpicurean-ism.Hepreservesforusavaluablepieceofinformation;theStoicChrysippusarguedthatthepredictionsofdivinersshouldbeformulatednotasconditionals(“IfsomeonewasbornattherisingoftheDogstar,thatmanwillnotdieatsea”)butasnegatedconjunctions(“notboth:someonewasbornattherisingoftheDogstar,andthatmanwilldieatsea”:Cic.Fat.15=LS38E).Sedleyhasshown(1982,pp.253–55)thatChrysippusintendedtherebytoindicatethatthesignsthatforetoldthefuturewerenotthemselvesthedirectcausesofthefutureevents,butratherwerefoundregularlytobeconnectedwitheventsofthattype(cf.Cic.Div.1.118=LS42E)–divinationbeingregardedbytheStoicsasanempiricallybasedscience,howeveroddthismayseemtous.Inthisrespectdivinationistobecontrastedwithsciencessuchasmedicineandgeometrywhichdoconcernthemselveswithcausesorexplanations(thoughthequestionwhethermedicineshouldinvolveitselfwithcausalexplanationsorjustwithobservationswasitselfdebated:cf.Cambiano,1999,pp.604–13).ButCicero,evenwhilepreservingthebasicinformation,missesthepointentirely,mockingChrysippusforhispresumptionintellingastrologershowtoformulatetheirpropositions,andsayingthatthedoctorsandgeometriciansmightaswellfollowthesameadvice.ImportingDistinctions:DicaearchusontheSoul,PlutarchontheOctopusCicero’sdiscussionoftheatomicswerveshowsthatweoftenhavetodealwiththepossibleinfluenceofthephilosophicalviewsofinterpretersatmorethanonelevel:forexample,thoseoftheancientreporterandthoseofthemodernscholarsinterpretingthereport.(Andthelatterwillalsoenterintoanyattempttoassesstheformer.)Italsohighlightsthefactthatwhilewecannotexpectanancientwritertotakeanexplicitpositiononaquestion(inthiscase,thatofuncausedevents)intermsinwhichitwasnotyetformulatedwhenhewrote,neithercanwedisregardthequestioninourownassessmentofhisthoughtasifitwasequallyunfamiliartous.(Thatiswhyphilo-sophersareprepared,wherehistoriansmightnotbe,tocomparesynchronicallyviewsadvancedinwidelydifferingperiods.Thereisanexcellentdiscussionofthisissue,thoughinrelationtoperiodsofancientphilosophybeforeandafterthatwithwhichwearehereconcerned,inO’Brien,1993.)WearetoldbysomesourcesthatAristotle’spupilDicaearchusdefinedthesoulasaharmonyofthebodilyelements(textscollectedinDicaearchusfr.12inWehrli,1967;cf.fr.11);byothersthathedenieditsveryexistence(textscollectedinfrr.7and8Wehrli).Leavingasidethequestionwhetherthereferencetothebodilyelementsisalaterintrusionintothereports,assuggestedbyGottschalk(1971,pp.186–8),themostplausibleexplanationofthecontradictionseemstobethatDicaearchus’viewofthesoulwasepiphenomenalist,regardingitassomethingthatisproducedbyandsupervenesonthestructureofthebody,andthatthereportsclaimingthathedenieditsexistencealtogetherreflecttheviewsofthose(notablyPlatonists)forwhomtheissuewaswhetherthesoulexistedinitsownrightandwhetheritcoulddosoin438ACTC2243820/03/2006,04:11PM\ntheproblemofsourcesseparationfromthebody.Thereports,inotherwords,cannotbeassessedindepend-entlyofthereporters’ownstarting-pointsandphilosophicalagendas.ButthecaseofDicaearchusmayalsoservetoshowthedifficultyofestablishingthepositionofanancientphilosopherwhereamoderndistinctionisconcerned,especiallywhenourknowledgeofthatphilosopher’sviewsisitselfatsecondhand.Caston(1997,pp.345–6)arguesthatDicaearchus’doctrineofthesoulisepiphenomenalist,inasenseofthattermthatdistinguishesitfromanemergentistview:bothimplythatthesoulsupervenesonthebodilystructure,butthelatterclaims,whiletheformerdenies,thatthesoulhascausalpowersofitsown.Thishoweverseemsinprincipledifficulttoestablish.Fortodosoinvolvesreadingintoancientsecondarysources(specifically,pseudo-Plutarch,OnDesireandGrief5)distinctionsofwhichthosesourceswereprob-ablythemselvesunawarewhileformulatingtheirreports;inwhichcase,evenifDicaearchushimselftookaclearpositionontheissue,canwerelyonthesourcestohavetransmittedit?(Cf.Sharples,2001b,pp.156–9.)ThecaseofDicaearchushighlightsanotherprobleminusingtheevidenceofCicero.ForwhileCiceroisoneofthosewhoreportthatDicaearchusdeniedtheexistenceofthesoulaltogether(Dicaearchusfr.7andfr.8c–finWehrli,1967),elsewhereheattributestohimtheviewthatthesoulengagesinprophecymosteffectivelywhenfunctioningseparatelyfromthebodyinsleep(frr.15and16Wehrli).Itmaybepos-sibletofindwaystoreconcilethesetwoclaims(foranexplorationofhowthismightbedoneseeSharples,2001b,pp.165–8);itmayalsobe,asWehrli(1967,p.46)sug-gested,thatCicerohasmisattributedtoDicaearchusaviewactuallyputforwardbyCicero’sowncontemporaryCratippus.ButtheimportantpointforpresentpurposesisthatCicerohimselfshowsnointerestinreconcilingtheapparentlyconflictingclaims.Hereferstotheviewsofearlierphilosophersasandwhenitsuitshisargument;heisconcernedwiththeimmediatecontextratherthanwiththeconsistencyofthehistor-icalrecord.Andthisisexactlywhatonewouldexpectbothfromawriterwhoseinterestisphilosophicalratherthanhistoricalandfromarhetoricianwhoseinterestisintheimmediatedebate.(Cf.Sharples,2001b,pp.171–3;and,foranotherinstancewhereCicero’sconcentrationontheimmediatecontextmaymisleadinterpreterswhoregardhisphilosophicalwritingsasmoresystematicthantheyactuallyare,cf.Sharples,1995a,p.271.)Apparentcontradictionsinreportsbyasingleancientsourcemaysometimesbeexplainedbythereporter’simposingdistinctionswhichthethinkerbeingreportedwouldnotacceptorwouldnotdrawinthesameway.Forexample,referringtotheoctopus’changingcolorforreasonsofcamouflage,PlutarchatonepointseemstoattributetoTheophrastus(fr.365CinFortenbaughetal.,1992)theviewthatthisisapurposefulactionontheoctopus’part,atanother(fr.365D)theviewthatitisamechanicalreactionbroughtaboutphysiologicallythroughfear.ButforaPeripateticlikeTheophrastus,naturebringsaboutpurposefulresultsthroughmechanicalcauses;thetwoarenotopposed,andthefurtheronedescendsinthehierarchyoflivingcrea-turesthelessofadistinctiontherewillbebetweenthem(cf.Sharples1995b,p.41).Sometimestheeffectofthephilosophicalstandpointofanancientsourcecanbereinforcedbythatofmoderncritics.Forexample,CiceroandPlutarchreportthatStrato,thethirdheadofAristotle’sschool,deniedconsciouspurposeinnature(Strato,frr.32,33and35,inWehrli,1969b).Theydoindeedgofurtherandsay,respectively,439ACTC2243920/03/2006,04:11PM\nrobertw.sharplesthatnatureforStrato“lackedform”(figura)andthatStratomadechancepriorandnatureposterior.Butitisstillimportantforusininterpretingthesereportstoremem-berthatforAristotletoothereisnoconsciouspurposeinnature(cf.Furley,1999,p.416n.7;Repici,1988,pp.117–56).Forsomemoderninterpretershaveargued,onthebasisofthisancientevidence,thatStratoirretrievablydamagedtheAristoteliantradition,andbroughtaboutitsdecline,byintroducingmaterialism.ButboththeirreadingofAristotlehimselfandtheirjudgmentofStratomayreflecttheirownanti-materialistictendencies–betheyPlatonizing,Thomistic,orHegelian.TheDebateAboutHappinessCicerowasapupiloftheAcademicPhiloofLarissaandafellow-studentofAntiochusofAscalon,whobrokewiththeskepticalAcademyandclaimedtorestorean“oldphilosophy,”dogmaticincharacter,whichwassharedbyPlato,Aristotle,and3theStoics,thoughPlatowasitspurestexponent.Antiochushasbeenseenbysomemodernscholarsasconstructinganartificialsynthesisfromtheideasofdifferentschools.Butinhisownhistoricalsettinghispositiondoesnotseemsounreasonable;thetwomaingroupsofphilosophersactiveinhistimewhoareexcludedfromthe“oldphilo-sophy”aretheAcademicSkepticsontheonehandandtheEpicureans,whoidentifiedthegoodwithpleasure,ontheother,anditiscertainlytruethatPlato,Aristotle,andtheStoicshaveitincommonthattheyarenotskepticsandthattheyarenothedon-ists.Moreover,recentworkbyDavidSedley(1998,pp.76–7;2001)hasshownthatwhathaspreviouslyseemedtobeAntiochus’misattributiontotheOldAcademyoftheStoictheoryoftwophysicalprinciples,GodandMatter,mayinfacthaveasoundhistoricalbasis,notsomuchwherePlatohimselfisconcernedasforthefourthheadoftheAcademy,Polemo,whowastheteacheroftheStoicZeno.Antiochusmayhavebeenamoreaccuratehistorianthanhasbeenthought.Hewasnothoweversettingouttobeahistorian,exceptincidentally,buttodevelopaphilosophicalposition.Andhisreportsneedtobereadinthatlight.Oneissuethatpreoccupiedhimwasthatofthesufficiencyofvirtueforhappiness,athesismain-4tainedindifferentwaysbothbytheStoicsandbyAntiochushimself.TheissueisdiscussedbyAristotleatlengthinNicomacheanEthicsI.8–10,arrivingatapositionwhichisfinelynuanced;virtueisnotsufficientforhappinessbutitissufficienttoavoidwretchedness(cf.Annas,1993,pp.36–7,413–18).AntiochusconstructedapictureinwhichAristotle’ssuccessors,ratherthanAristotlehimself,wereresponsiblefor“weakening”virtue.PartofthebasisforthiswasTheophrastus’treatiseOntheHappyLife(Cic.Acad.I.33;cf.Fin.5.12).Wedonotourselvespossessthetreatise,andsocannotjudge.ButitisthenrathersurprisingtofindVitruviuscitingTheophrastusontheeducatedperson’scontemptforfortune(OnArchitecture6,prologue§2).Wecan-notresolvethediscrepancy;butitseemsatleastpossiblethatAntiochus,orCicerohimself,wantedtoemphasizearangeofcompetingpositions,andthathisapproachtoTheophrastuswasatleastinpartinfluencedbythedesiretofindrepresentativesfor3.SeeZambon,middleplatonism,inthisvolume.4.Onthistopic,seealsoBett,stoicethics,inthisvolume.440ACTC2244020/03/2006,04:11PM\ntheproblemofsourcesthese,withtheconsequentoversimplification.Suchaprocessisnotafterallunknowninteachingandwritingeventoday.Totakebutoneexample,ithasbecomecustom-arytoemphasizethecontrastbetweenancientGreekeudaemonistethicsandKantianethics;butthismayinvolveoversimplificationonbothsides,correctedbyseveralofthecontributionsinEngstromandWhiting(1996).AnotherexamplemaybeGalen’scontrastbetweenthedoctrineofatripartitesoul,attributedbyhimtobothPlatoandPosidonius,andthedoctrineofaunifiedsoul,whichheattributestoChrysippus(cf.Gill,1998).Noristheeffectoflaterphilosophicaldebatesonthetraditionconfinedtothecreationofover-simplifiedcontrasts;StephenWhite(2002,2004)hasshownhowthepreoccupationsoflater(andhostile)reportershaveled,notonlytoafailuretoappreciatethecontributionsinethicsofthePeripateticsHieronymusandLycointheirownproperhistoricalperspective,buttoafailuretorealizethattheymademuchofacontributionatall.Thedesiretoproduceclearlycontrastedpositionsmayaffectnotonlythereportingofpredecessorsbutthedevelopmentofdoctrineitself.Critolausclaimedthatthegoaloflifewasmadeupofallthreeofthestandardkindsofgoods,thoseofthesoul,thoseofthebody,andexternalgoods(Critolausfrr.19–20inWehrli1969b).ThisatleastdoesseemtogobeyondanythingAristotleindicates,atleastintheEthics(Rh.I.5,1360b14ff.isanothermatter;cf.Rist,1989,pp.137–8,areferenceIowetoRogerCrisp);DiogenesLaertius5.30doesattributesuchaviewtoAristotle,butthissimplyshowsthat,onthisasonotherissues,thereportofAristotle’sviewsinDiogenesispartofthesametraditionasCritolaus.(ThusbothDiogenesandthereportinEpiphaniuswhichmaybeduetoCritolaus–above,p.432–attributetoAristotletheviewthatdivineprovidenceisconcernedonlywiththeheavensandnotwiththeterrestrialregion.)Cicero’scomplaintinFin.5.14thatCritolausadoptedanun-Aristotelianpositioncan,therefore,beseenashavingsomejustification;andweknowthatCritolauswasattackedinturnbyothers(AriusDidymus(?)ap.Stob.Ecl.2.7.14=2.126,22–127,2Wachsmuth.Cf.Annas,1993,p.415).Itseemslikelythathere,aselsewhereinhisteaching,CritolausinterpretedAristotleinawaythatwasintendedtodistancehisviewsfromthoseoftheStoicsandtoemphasizetheirdistinctivefeatures(cf.Sharples,forthcoming).MistakesandMisrepresentations,SimpleandLessSimpleSometimes,however,straightforwarderrorandmisunderstandingaretheonlyplaus-ibleexplanation.DiogenesLaertius(7.127=PosidoniusF173EK)reportsthatwhiletheStoicsingeneralheldthatvirtueissufficientforhappiness,PanaetiusandPosidoniusclaimedthat“healthandresourcesandstrength”werealsoneeded.Itmaybethatalltheywereclaimingwasthatthesewereneededinordertopracticevirtue;buteventhiswouldbeadivergencefromthetraditionalStoicposition,accordingtowhich–andinconflictwithtraditionalGreekideas–evenaslavecouldbevirtuous.Itmayalsobe,asJohnRisthassuggested(1969,p.9),thatthereissomeconfusionatworkhereinthesourcesbetweentwomeaningsoftheGreekwordchreia,whichmaymeaneitherthatthevirtuouspersonhasneedofmaterialresources,orjustthathewillbeabletomakeuseofthem.441ACTC2244120/03/2006,04:11PM\nrobertw.sharplesHowever,twootherreportsgofurther.DiogenesLaertius7.103(=PosidoniusF171EK)claimsthatPosidoniusregardedhealthandwealthasgoods.Thisseemsunlikelyinitself,andismadeevenmoredoubtfulbythefactthatSeneca(Ep.87.35=F170EK;cf.87.31)attributestoPosidoniustheverysameargumentforwealthandhealthnotbeinggood(thattheycansometimesdoharm)thatDiogenesattributestotheortho-doxStoicswithwhomhecontrastsPosidonius.Somesortofmisunderstandingseemstohaveoccurred(cf.onthisEdelsteinandKidd,1988–99,vol.2,pp.639–41;Kidd,1986,pp.8–9,24–6).EvenmoreextremeisthereportbyEpiphanius(Haer.III2.9.46=OnFaith9.46=F172EK)that“PosidoniusofApameasaidthatthegreatestgoodamongmenwaswealthandhealth.”Eitherthisisafurtherexaggerationofamis-understandinglikethatalreadyfoundinDiogenes;or,conceivably,acommentbyPosidoniusonthemistakenviewsofmankindhasbeenpresentedasastatementofhisownview(cf.EdelsteinandKidd,1988–99,vol.2,pp.641–2).Thepossibilityoftextualcorruptionisalwayspresent.Totakebutoneexample,Aëtius2.9.3reportsPosidoniusassayingthatwhatisoutsidetheworld(i.e.,void,emptyspace)isnotinfinitebutsufficient(all’hoson)forittodissolveinto(whenitisperiodicallyturnedentirelytofireandhenceexpands).ThetextofAëtiushastobereconstructedfromlatersources(cf.MansfeldandRunia,1997),butherethosesourcesagree.However,almostallothersourcessaythatfortheStoicsthevoidwasinfinite;andforall’hosonKidd(EdelsteinandKidd,1988–99,vol.2,pp.391–4commentaryonPosidoniusF97abEK)thereforesuggestsreadingkath’hoson,whichwouldindicatethatthespaceoutsidetheworldisnotinfiniteforthatreason;afiniteworlddoesnotneedinfinitespacetoexpandintoevenwhenturnedtofire,butthatdoesnotinitselfprecludethevoid’sbeinginfinite.Sometimesdistortionsaremoresubtle.Chrysippus’useoftheanalogyofacylindertoexplainhowpredeterminedactionscanstillbeourresponsibilityisrecordedbothbyCicero,Fat.39–43(LS62C)andbyGellius,NA7.2.6–13(LS62D).Thecylinderandconerollonlyiftheyarepushed;butthefactthattheyroll,andthewayinwhichtheyroll,areduetotheirshape.Similarlyouractionsaretheresultofexternalstimuli,butthewayinwhichwereactdependsuponournature.However,whileGelliusmakesitclearthatforChrysippusournatureisasmuchpredeterminedastheexternalstimulusis,bothalikebeingpartofthedeterministnexusofcausesandeffects,inCicero’saccountwhatisemphasizedisthatexternalfactorscontributetoouractionbutdonotdetermineit,thefactthatournatureandtheexternalfactorstogetherdosobeingleftunclear.Cicerowritesasifthefactthatexternalfactorsdonotontheirowndetermineouraction,afactonwhichbothChrysippusandthosewhodenydetermin-ismcanagree,weretheimportantone.IthassometimesbeenthoughtthatthisshowstheinfluenceofanattemptbyAntiochustominimizethedifferencebetweenChrysippusandthosewhodenieddeterminism;butthisisquestionable,andtheone-sidednessoftheaccountmayrather,asDonini(1989,pp.139–43)hasargued,reflectthefrag-mentarystateofourtextofthisworkofCicero,thecompleteversionhavingpresentedChrysippus’viewinawaythatemphasizeddifferentaspectsatdifferentpointsinordertoemphasizeitssupposedinconsistency(cf.Sharples,1991,pp.20–2,187–8,192–4,andreferencesthere).AtOnFate39Cicerowritesthat“Chrysippus,likearespectedarbitrator,seemstohavewantedtostrikeabalance,butinfactinclinesrathertothosewhowantthe442ACTC2244220/03/2006,04:11PM\ntheproblemofsourcesmovementsofthemindtobefreefromnecessity.However,bytheexpressionsheusesheslipsintodifficultiessuchthatheunwillinglysupportsthenecessityoffate.”Argu-ablyChrysippus’ownwordsmightbeabetterindicationofhisrealpositionthanwhatCicero,fromadifferentandhostilephilosophicalperspective,suggestshewantedtoclaimbutadmitshedidnotactuallysay.Chrysippusdidindeedholdthat,whileevery-thingisfated,noteverythingthatisfatedisnecessary(cf.LS§38).ButthatisnotthedistinctionCiceroismakinginthispassage;forjustbeforeithehascontrastedtwogroups,thosewhoclaimthatfatenecessitateseverythingandthosewhoclaimthatvoluntarymentalmovementsdonotinvolvefateatall.Itisthepositionofthislattergroupthathegoeson,inthepassagequoted,tosuggest–tendentiously,asIsuppose–thatChrysippuswantedtoadoptbutfailedtodoso.(Butthepassageishighlycontroversial;cf.Hankinson,1999,pp.530–31.)Theclaimthatfateisonlyaninitiatingcauseisalsomentionedasapossibleinter-pretationofChrysippusbyPlutarch(St.rep.47,1056B=LS55R),whoreferstoitinordertopointoutthatitconflictswithChrysippus’generalbeliefintheuniversalityoffate.ThistreatiseofPlutarchisdevotedtofindingasmanyostensibleinconsistenciesaspossibleinthewritingsoftheStoicsingeneralandofChrysippusinparticular;ithastheincidentaladvantage–whichwascertainlynottheonePlutarchenvisaged–ofpreservingforusaconsiderablenumberofverbatimquotationsofworksofChrysippuswhosetextisotherwisenowlost.Notsurprisinglygiventhisaim,Plutarch’sinterpretationsaresometimestendentious;forexample,heclaimsthatChrysippus’criticismofAristoofChios,whoclaimedthatthedifferentvirtuesareasinglevirtueinrelationtodifferentcontexts,isinconsistentwithChrysippus’ownendorsementofZeno’sdefinitionsofthevirtuesaspracticalwisdomindifferentcontexts.ButwhatPlutarchhasfailedtonoteisthatforZenothecontentofthepracticalwisdomwillbedifferentindifferentcontexts,sothatZeno’sdefinitionsallowfordistinctionsthatAristo’spositiondoesnot.(Cf.LSvol.1,p.384;Donini,1999,p.718;andonPlutarch’streatiseingeneralBoys-Stones,1997;Kidd,1998.)In§37ofthesametreatise(=LS54S)PlutarchreportsChrysippusasconsideringwhymisfortunesmayoccur,eventhoughtheuniverseasawholeisorderedbydivineprovidence,andasaskingwhetherthisisbecausesomedetailsareneglected,ashap-pensinalargehousehold,orbecausetheyareinthechargeofinferiorspirits(daimoniaphaula).Bothsuggestions,andinparticularthesecond,seem(asPlutarchnaturallypointsout)inconsistentwithChrysippus’generalview,andonemustask,withBabut(1969,pp.261–2)whetherPlutarchhasreportedasagenuinequestionwhatwasinfactarhetoricalquestioninvitingtheanswer“no.”Itmaynotbeirrelevantthatearlierinthetreatise(§10=LS31P)PlutarchcriticizesChrysippusforsettingoutpositionsopposedtohisownsoeffectivelythatheunderminedhisowncase(andalsoforinconsistency,indoingthiswhilesayingthatoneshouldexpressarivalpositioninawaythatemphasizesitsinadequacy,andforbehavingunphilosophically–inpropos-ingtotreatrivalviewsunfairly).Plutarchindeedhimselfgoesontolikenthe“inferiorspirits”toevilandmaddenedgovernorsandgenerals,thusimplyingthatChrysippustoointendedthemtobenotjustnegligentbutpositivelyevil;butthatisnotneces-sarilytheimplicationoftheactualwordsthathequotes.However,eveninthistreatisePlutarch’streatment,ormistreatment,ofChrysippusisnotsimplyarbitraryorpurelydestructive.GeorgeBoys-Stoneshasarguedthat443ACTC2244320/03/2006,04:11PM\nrobertw.sharplesPlutarch’sapproachreflectshisbeliefthattheStoicpositionisuntenable,andmorespecificallythatinattemptingtolivetheirphilosophytheStoicsareattemptingtoputintopracticewhatiscontradictoryandthereforeimpossible;theycanonlylivetheirphilosophybyre-interpretingitinawaywhichwouldinvolvediscardingtheirmis-takendivergencesfromthetruePlatonictradition(Boys-Stones,1997,especiallyp.47n.12).OnemaycompareAlexanderofAphrodisias’treatmentofhisopponentsinOnFate,bothinarguingthattheirdoctrinesareandmustbeinconflictwiththeiractualpractice(18188.17ff.,19190.15ff.)andindismissingtheirinterpretationsofsuchconceptsaschanceandresponsibility(“whatdependsonus”)assimplyfailingtotakeaccountofagreedandevidentfacts(7172.9ff.,13181.10ff.,14182.20ff.).IndeedatonepointAlexanderaccuseshisopponentsofsimultaneouslydeceivingboththemselvesandtheiraudience(8173.22–3).ThenatureofthegodsaccordingtoEpicurusisatopicofcurrentscholarlydebate(cf.LSvol.1,pp.145–9,andMansfeld,1999,pp.456–7,472–4).ItisuncertainwhetherEpicurushimselflocatedthegodsinourminds,astheproductofstreamsofatomicimagesflowingthere,orwhetherhelefttheirlocationunclear.ButObbink(1996,p.7n.5)haspointedoutthatthespecificclaimthatEpicurus’godsarelocatedinthespacesbetweenworld-systems(theintermundia)occursnowhereearlierthanCicero,anddoesnotseemtohavebeenpresentinCicero’ssources;andlaterrefer-encesforthemostpartseemtoderivefromCicero.WhetherornotObbinkisrightinsuggestingthatCiceroengagedin“willfulmisinterpretation”ofLucretius’descriptionoftheabodeofthegods(3.18–25),thisprovidesanotherexampleofthewayinwhichaninfluentialauthor’sformulationofsomeoneelse’sdoctrinecanitselfbecomecanonical.AndwemaynotethatitisnoneotherthanCicerohimselfwhoprovidestheevidencethatsuggeststhatthegodsareinourmindsafterall(LS23E7).ConclusionTheuncertaintiesinherentinthenatureofoursourcesforHellenisticphilosophyshouldnotleadustodespairofthepossibilityofinterpretingandunderstandingtheviewsthatwereputforwardintheperiodandthereasoningbehindthem.Theyshouldratherleadusnottotakestatementsintheancientsecondarysourcestooreadilyatfacevalue,andcauseustorealizethatacloserapproximationtocertaintyispossibleonsomepointsthanonothers.Theassessmentofthesources,andthestudyofmisrepresentationandmisunderstandingandthereasonsforthem,isalsoastudythathasapeculiarfascinationofitsown.BibliographyWorksCitedAlgra,K.,Barnes,J.,Mansfeld,J.,andSchofield,M.(eds.).(1999).TheCambridgeHistoryofHellenisticPhilosophy.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Annas,J.(1993).TheMoralityofHappiness.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.vonArnim,H.(ed.).(1903–24).(CitedasSVF).StoicorumVeterumFragmenta[FragmentsoftheEarlyStoics].(4vols.).Leipzig:Teubner.444ACTC2244420/03/2006,04:11PM\ntheproblemofsourcesArrighetti,G.(ed.).(1973).Epicuro:Opere.2ndedn.Turin:Einaudi.Asmis,E.(1983).“ReasonandRhetoricinLucretius.”AmericanJournalofPhilology,104,36–66.Babut,D.(1969).Plutarqueetlestoïcisme.Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance.Balme,D.M.(1939).“GreekScienceandMechanism.I,AristotleonNatureandChance.”ClassicalQuarterly,33,129–38.——.(1992).Aristotle:DepartibusanimaliumIandDegenerationeanimaliumI.2ndedn.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Bett,R.(1997).SextusEmpiricus:AgainsttheEthicists.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Bobzien,S.(1998a).DeterminismandFreedominStoicPhilosophy.Oxford:ClarendonPress.——.(1998b).“TheInadvertentConceptionandLateBirthoftheFree-willProblem.”Phronesis,43,133–75.——.(2000).“DidEpicurusDiscovertheFreeWillProblem?”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilo-sophy,19,287–337.Boys-Stones,G.R.(1996).“TheepeleustikEdunamisinAristo’sPsychologyofAction.”Phronesis,41,75–94.——.(1997).“Thyrsus-beareroftheAcademyorEnthusiastforPlato?Plutarch’sDeStoicorumrepugnantiis.”InJ.Mossman(ed.),PlutarchandhisIntellectualWorld(pp.41–58).London:Duckworth.Cambiano,G.(1999).“Philosophy,ScienceandMedicine.”InK.Algraetal.(eds.),TheCam-bridgeHistoryofHellenisticPhilosophy(pp.585–613).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Caston,V.(1997).“Epiphenomenalisms:AncientandModern.”PhilosophicalReview,106,309–63.Classen,C.J.(1968).“PoetryandRhetoricinLucretius.”TransactionsoftheAmericanPhilologicalAssociation,99,77–118.Repr.inC.J.Classen(ed.),ProblemederLukrezforschung(pp.331–74).Hildesheim:Olms,1986.Dodds,E.R.(1966).“OnMisunderstandingtheOedipusRex.”GreeceandRome,13,37–49.Donini,P.L.(1989).Ethos:Aristoteleeildeterminismo.Alessandria(Torino):Dell’Orso.——.(1999).“StoicEthics(VIII–XI).”InK.Algraetal.(eds.),TheCambridgeHistoryofHellenis-ticPhilosophy(pp.705–38).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Edelstein,L.andKidd,I.G.(eds.).(1988–99).(CitedasEK).Posidonius:TheFragments.(3vols.).2ndedition.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Engstrom,S.andWhiting,J.(eds.).(1996).Aristotle,KantandtheStoics:RethinkingHappinessandDuty.Cambrid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ountain.(D.L.4.22)ArcesilausthusdrewfromhisPlatonistteacherstheideathatphilosophyshouldhaveanaristocraticcharacter,andfromthisperspectivehecouldonlyseethenewsystemsthatappearedintheHellenisticperiodasconcessionstothemob:didn’ttheypromisethosewhofollowedtheirpreceptsthattheywouldattaintruthandabsolutehappinessandthustotransformthemintotheequalsofgods?OnepossibleinterpretationoftheneworientationhegavetothePlatonicschoolisthathesawinuniversaldoubtatoncethemeanstocombatthephilosophicaltendencieshecondemnedandtoperpetu-atetheintellectualstrictnesshehadadmiredinhisteachers.Inspiteofafewancienttestimoniestowhichweshallreturn,almostnoonebelievesthathisskepticismwasafrontconcealingadogmaticPlatonismthathecommunicatedtoafewdisciples.HisskepticalinterpretationofPlatocertainlyrestedontheaporeticcharacterofsomedialogues,butalsoonalltheformulationsthroughwhichPlato,evenindialoguesthathavenothingaporeticaboutthem,expressedhowdifficultitisforameremortaltoapproachthetruth.LikeSocrates,Arcesilauswrotenophilosophicalworks,andlikehimpracticedrefutation,theelenchos;butunlikeSocratesheassertedthathehadabsolutelynocertainties,noteventhefamous“IknowthatIknownothing.”HethusproposedtosurpassPlatoinskepticism,whichhejustifiedthroughtheideathattherewasnothingdogmaticinPlato,oratanyratenothingsimilartothedogmatismoftheStoicsorEpicureans.ItwouldbetoosimpletoimaginethatforArcesilausandhissuccessorstherewasontheonehandtherelationtoPlatoandontheothertherefutationofthephilosoph-icalsystemsarisingintheHellenisticperiod.Eveniftheevidenceisscarce,itseemsmuchlikelierthathisinterpretationofPlatohaditsproximatecauseinaphilosophical449ACTC2344920/03/2006,04:11PM\ncarloslévyenvironmentofwhichcertainelements(therejectionofalltranscendence,andabso-lutedogmatismconceivedofasacorrelateofimmanence)werebynatureshockingtoathinkerinthePlatonictraditionandthat,onthecontrary,hiscriticismofthenewdoctrineswasrootedinPlatonicnotionssuchastheimperativetoinvestigateandthedialecticalrelationtothebeliefsofothers.Butitisnecessarytotakeintoaccountanotheraspect,ahistoricalandculturalone.Despitetheirveryelementarystructures,whichhasbeenwellshownbyJ.Glucker(1978),thephilosophicalschoolswereinsti-tutionsand,assuch,thephenomenaofrivalry,ofstruggleforapowerthatwasnolessimportantforbeingintellectual,werenostrangerstothem.TheAcademy,theoldest,themostprestigiousoftheschools,alsothemostspecificallyAthenian,couldonlybehostiletotheStoa,foundedbyaretiredPhoenicianimporterofpurple-dyedmaterial,andtotheGarden,whichitsawasalaterecrudescenceofDemocritus,justasitcouldonlydespisePyrrho,theobscurepainterfromElisturnedphilosopherofappearances.Itistheserelations,highlyconflictualforreasonsbothphilosophicalandnon-philosophical,thatweproposetoexaminehere.TheAcademyandPyrrhonismOuruseoftheterm“skeptic”todescribeboththeNewAcademyandPyrrhonismobviouslyencouragesasearchfortiesbetweenthetwostreamsofthought,andtherearestilltodayseekerswhowillnotresignthemselvestoadmittingthattheyaretwoentirelyheterogeneouscurrents.Theproblemisnotnew,sinceinthecatalogofPlutarch’streatisesisthetitleofaworkhedevotedtothedifferencesbetweentheAcademicsandthePyrrhonists,whichhasnotcomedowntous.Similarly,AulusGellius(NA11.5.6–8)wrotethat“itisanoldquestionandonetreatedbymanyGreekauthorswhether,andinwhatmeasure,thePyrrhonistsandtheAcademicsdifferfromoneanother.”Thetestimoniesonwhichwecanrelyinordertoassembletheelementsofananswertothisquestionarescarceandhardtointerpret.FromtheAcademicside,PyrrhoispresentonlyinthephilosophicalworksofCicero,whereheisnevercitedasaskeptic.WefindhimmanytimesoverintheprincipalethicaldoxographiesalongsidethedissidentStoicsHerillusandAriston,thethreebeingregardedastherepresentativesofanethicofabsoluteindifference.Itisalsomadeclearthattheirdoctrinesquicklyfellintodesuetude.TheseCiceronianpassagesseemtoustoincludetwoelementsthatshouldbecarefullydistinguished:theideaofassociatingPyrrhowiththesetwodissidentsmayhavebeentheworkofpeoplewhousedthisregroupingasapolemicaltool;theperceptionofPyrrhoasamoralistperfectlyindifferenttoevery-thingthatwasnottheabsolutegood–oratanyratewasnotwhatheregardedassuch–wasinitselfnotatallabsurd.LikeotherHellenisticphilosophers,Pyrrhosoughtperfectinternalserenity;hewassimplytheonewhowentthefurthestinthisdirec-tion,sinceheaimed“tosloughofftheman”(fr.15aDeclevaCaizzi),thatis,todestroynotonlyopinionsbutevensensations,thinkingthustoarriveatastateofinsensibil-ity,ofapathy.WhatissurprisingintheCiceroniantestimonyisnotsomuchhismentionofPyrrhoasamoralistashiscompletesilenceontheepistemologicalaspectsofPyrrhonistthought.Tothis,acertaininterpretivecurrentrepliesthatCicero’ssilenceisnotunjustifiedsincePyrrhonismdidnotoriginallyincludeepistemology.450ACTC2345020/03/2006,04:11PM\nthenewacademyanditsrivalsWecannotfullyenterintothisdebate,butallthesameitmayberemarkedthatwhentheNewAcademywishedtojustifyitsorientation,itspunoutlonggenealogiesin-cludingthinkersverydistantfromskepticisminthenarrowsenseoftheterm.EveniftheethicalcomponentofPyrrhonismseemedmoreimportanttotheAcademicsthanthelaterepistemologicalaspects,thefactthattheynevermentionPyrrhoexceptasanindifferentistdoesnotnecessarilyreflectpurelyphilosophicalmotives.ThatisallthemoretruesinceArcesilausandhissuccessorscouldnotignorethattheywereexplicitlyaccusedofplagiarizingPyrrho.Themostfamoustestimonywehaveregard-ingthisaccusationisthelinebythedissidentStoicAristo,thesamewhofoundhimselfalongsidePyrrhointheAcademicdoxographies,andwhowrote,parodyingtheHomericdescriptionoftheChimera:“Platobefore,Pyrrhobehind,inthemiddleDiodorus”(frr.32–35DeclevaCaizzi),whichamountedtodescribingthethoughtofArcesilausasamonstrousassemblageofPlatonism,Pyrrhonism,andMegariandialectic.Sextus(PH1.234)citesthislinetoprovethatsomeaccusedArcesilausofpracticinganesotericdogmatism,transmittingthePlatonic“dogmas”onlytohismostgifteddisciples,butthisinterpretationiscompletelyillogical.Infact,ifthelineisunder-stoodasexpressinganoppositionbetweentheapparentteachingofArcesilausandtherealityofhisthought,itwouldhavetobeadmittedthattheesotericdoctrinewasPyrrhonism,notPlatonism.WhatAristonreallymeanttosaywasthatArcesilaus’sdoctrinehadnooriginality,butwasratherajumbleofelementsborrowedfromphilo-sophersasdifferentastheycouldpossiblybe.TheideathatArcesilaus“borrowed”atleastapartofhisdoctrinewasclearlycurrentamongthePyrrhoniststhemselves.Likemanyotherphilosophers,ArcesilauswasaccusedbyTimonbothofvanityandofseekingtheapprovalofthemob,aparticularlyseriousaccusationforanAcademic,but,morespecifically,hewasreproachedwithhavingpilferedfromPyrrho.Suchisthemeaningoftwolines(frr.31–32DiMarco)whosedetailsgiverisetodivergentinterpretations,butwhosegeneralsenseisclear:likeAriston,TimonunderlinedtheheteroclitecharacterofArcesilaus’sthoughtand,inthesetwolines,highlightedbymeansofanepicparodythePyrrhonistandMegariancomponentsheclaimedtocoexistintheAcademic’steaching.Theabsence,afterTimon,ofstrongpersonalitiesabletotakecontrolofthePyrrhonisttraditionallowedtheAcademytoreinforceitsstrategyofkeepingquietabouttheconflictthathadbroughtitintooppositionwithPyrrho’sdisciple,andofconfiningPyrrhonismtothecategoryofindifferentistdoctrines,vanishedonestoboot.Ciceroisthemoststrikingwitnessofthisneo-AcademicconvictionthatthePyrrhonistproblemnolongerexisted.Whatisparadoxicalaboutthetextsinwhichheexpressesthisisthat,atjustaboutthesamemoment,andapparentlywithoutCicero’sknowledge,PyrrhonismwasbeingrebornattheinitiativeofAenesidemus,veryprobablyaformerdiscipleoftheAcademy.Thelatter,disappointedintheskepticism,toolaxinhisview,oftheneo-Academics,undertooktoreviveskepticalthoughtbylayingclaimtoPyrrho.Infact,asfaraswecantellonthebasisofthescarceevidencewehave,theneo-PyrrhonismofAenesidemusowedmuchmoretoneo-AcademicskepticismthantooriginalPyrrhonism,butreferringtoPyrrhoaboveallallowedhim,inafashionthatmaybethoughtsomewhatfantastical,tomakeroomforskepticalradicalism.Bychoos-ingPyrrho,butalsoHeraclitus,asemblemsforhisrenovationofskepticism–thefirstignoredbytheNewAcademyforthereasonswehavegiven,thesecondregardedby451ACTC2345120/03/2006,04:11PM\ncarloslévytheStoicsastheirforebear–Aenesidemusconstructedapedigreeforskepticismthat2owednothingtothatoftheneo-Academics.AtraceoftheseambiguitiesistobefoundinthewaySextusEmpiricuslocatesneo-PyrrhonisminrelationtotheNewAcademyinOutlinesofPyrrhonism(1.220–235).Hefirstfirmlydistinguishestheneo-Academicsfromthetrueskeptics,whoforhimcanonlybethePyrrhonists,beforeaffirmingthatArcesilausseemstohimtohave“entirelysharedthedoctrinesofthePyrrhonists.”Thisattitude,fromSextus’spointofview,wasdoublyadvantageous:ontheonehand,itreassertedtheideathatArcesilausdrewhisinspirationfromPyrrho,allthewhileinsinuatingthattheAcademichadperhapspracticedadogmaticPlatonismbehindafaçadeofskepticism;ontheother,itintroducedaruptureintothehistoryoftheNewAcademybetweenArcesilaus,whowasperhapsanauthenticskeptic,andhissuccessors,accusedofbeingnotskepticsbutprobabilists.TheNewAcademyandEpicureanismAgreatfancierofluxuryandpleasure,Arcesilaus,asanindividual,wascomparedtoasecondAristippusbyDiogenesLaertius(4.40).Nonetheless,fromaphilosophicalviewpointArcesilauscouldnotfeel,eitherasaPlatonistorasaskeptic,theslightestsympathyfortheEpicureansystem,whichmusthavelookedtohimlikeamixtureofDemocriteanphysicsandCyrenaichedonism.ThiscontemptforEpicurusonthepartofthefounderoftheskepticalAcademyshowsthroughinananecdoterecountedbyDiogenesLaertius.Arcesilaus,askedwhypeopleleftotherschoolsforthatofEpicurusbutneverthatofEpicurusforanother,replied(D.L.4.43):“Ifoneisaman,onecanbecomeaeunuch,butifoneisaeunuch,onecannotbecomeaman.”Thephilosoph-icaldistancebetweentheAcademyandtheGardenwastoogreatfortheirrelationstohavethecomplicatedcharacterofthosebetweentheAcademicsandtheStoics.TheAcademicscouldreckonthattheStoicsystemcontainedcorruptedelementsofPlatonism;intheEpicureantheyrediscoveredeverythingthatthePlatonictraditionhadalwayscombated.Neo-AcademiccriticismofEpicureanismwasorganizedaroundtwosometimescontradictoryaxes.Ontheonehand,itwasemphasizedthatEpicurushadcontributednothingnew,whileontheotherhewasvigorouslycondemnedforhavingintroducedparticularlyabsurdandimmoralideas.AsfortheEpicureans,despitethecontempttheyaffectedfortheotherschools,theytookacloseinterest,atleastinthefirstcenturyce,inthehistoryoftheAcademy,asisprovedbytheexistenceofaworkbyPhilodemusdevotedtothedifferentscholarchsoftheAcademy(Dorandi,1997).Intherealmofphysics,ourprincipalsourceforreconstructingtheAcademic–EpicureanconfrontationisthefirstbookofCicero’sDeNaturaDeorum.Itcontainstheclassicaccusationofplagiarism:“WhatisthereinthephysicsofEpicurus,”askstheAcademicCotta,“thatdoesnotcomefromDemocritus?”(ND1.73).Furtheronitissaid(1.120),morefiguratively,thatEpicurusdivertedtheDemocriteansourcetowaterhisowngarden.Atthemost,Cicerograntsthatthedoctrineoftheclinamen2.Forfurtherdiscussion,seeBrunschwig,pyrrhonism,inthisvolume.452ACTC2345220/03/2006,04:11PM\nthenewacademyanditsrivals3(swerve)isnotaborrowingfromDemocritus.AsfarasconcernstheEpicureanposi-tiononthegods,theAcademicrefutationcenteredontwocomplaints:absurdityandhypocrisy.TheEpicureansassertanabsurditywhentheysaythatthegodsaremadeofa“quasi-matter”andthattheyhavehumanform,andtheyareaccusedofdevelop-ingsuchatheologynotfromconvictionbutfromcowardice,toavoidtheaccusationofatheism.Tothiswasaddedamorespecificallyphilosophicalcomplaint:howcanoneassertboththatthegodsdonotcareaboutmenandthatitisnecessarytofeelpietytowardthem?ThemethodswefindappliedinBook2ofDeFinibusarenotfundamentallydifferent.TheretooalloriginalityisdeniedtoEpicureanism,thoughinamoresophisticatedway.Ineffect,theAcademicCicerotrapstheEpicureansinadilemma.Iftheygivetheword“pleasure”itsusualmeaning,theirthoughtisinnowaydifferentfromthatoftheCyrenaics,thatis,itisadefenseofallpleasures.Bycontrast,ifby“pleasure”theymeantheabsenceofsuffering,theirthoughtdiffersinnowayfromthatofHieronymus,whothusdefinedthesupremegood.WhattheAcademicpretendsnottoknowisthatEpicureanethicsispreciselyallaboutthetransitionfromkineticpleasure,thatimme-diatesatisfactionofthesensesthat,accordingtoEpicurus,issoughtsincebirth,tocatastematicpleasure,thatperfectserenityattainedthroughthewisecalculationofpleasures.WhiletheconceptionofpleasureinEpicureanismisfundamentallydynamic,theAcademicdemandsfromtheEpicureansadefinitioninthePlatonictradition,basedontheprincipleofdivision.Sincetheyareneitherwillingnorabletoaccedetothisdemand,theyareaccusedofpracticingaphilosophythatseekstopleasethegreatestnumberandwhichtodosorenouncesallintellectualstrictness.Forexample,Plutarch(NonpossesuavitervivisecundumEpicurum,1093D)reproachestheEpicure-answithartificiallybanishingallintellectualpleasures,thoseprovidedbythereadingofworksofhistory,bymathematics,oragainbymusic.Inthesameway,Epicurean-ism’sefforttopreservethefourtraditionalvirtuesbygivingthemanewconceptualfoundation,sinceitbasesthemnotontranscendentrealitiesbutonpleasureandutility,ismaderidiculousbytheAcademicrefusaltoseeEpicureanpleasureasany-thingbuttheimmediatesatisfactionofthesenses.JustasEpicuruswasaccusedofhavingdevelopedatheologyonlytoavoidthedeservedreproachofatheism,soheisaccusedofhavingpreservedonlythenameofvirtueforfearofbeingchargedwithimmoralism.Finally,intheRoman,asintheGreek,context,theenemiesofEpicure-anismcondemneditsclaimtofoundcommunitiesisolatedfromtheworld,andinparticularfrompolitics.TheEpicureantheoryofknowledge,thecanonic,gaveoccasionforfewercriticisms,probablybecausetheAcademicsweretooabsorbedinrefutingStoicideasinthisarea.Inageneralway,itmaybesaidthatthiscanonwasassimilatedtoanabsurdcon-fidenceinsensation.Theexampleconstantlygivenisthatofthesun.Epicurus,convincedofthetruthfulnessofsensations,assertedineffectthatthesizeofthesunisthesizeoureyesperceiveittobe.ThiswasconstantlyusedbytheiradversariesintheAcademyastheproofthatEpicureanismwasunabletounderstandanythingatallaboutscience.Inaddition,theAcademicsusedtheEpicureancanonasadialectical3.OnCiceroasasourceforEpicureanviewsonthistopic,seeSharples,theproblemofsources,thesectionentitled“CiceroandEpicurus:TheAtomicSwerve,”inthisvolume.453ACTC2345320/03/2006,04:11PM\ncarloslévyweaponintheircriticismoftheStoictheoryofknowledge.Why,theyaskedtheStoics,don’tyoudothesameastheEpicureans,whobyassertingthatallsensationsaretrueshowthemselvestobemoreconsistentthanyou,sinceyourtheoryofrepresenta-tionstatesthatmostrepresentationsaretrue,withoutbeingabletodefinepreciselywhatdistinguishesfalseones?Onthequestionofknowledge,ourevidenceabouttheAcademiccriticismofEpicureanismisscarce,whileintheoppositedirectionLucretius,inBook4ofDeRerumNatura,letsusseethecarewithwhichtheEpicureansrefutedskepticalarguments.Thus,regardingtheargument,sofrequentlyusedbytheSkeptics,aboutthesquaretowerthatfromafarlooksround,Lucretiusexplains(Lucr.4.353–360)thatthegreatmassofairoccupyingsuchanintervalmakestheanglesbecomeobtuse,thendisappear.Theatomsthusarriveatoureyesinadifferentpositionfrom4theonetheyoriginallyhad.Buttheworkthatbestallowsustoimaginetheargu-mentsandmethodsusedbytheEpicureansagainsttheAcademicsisPlutarch’sAgainstColotes.ColotesofLampsachuswasoneofthefirstdisciplesofEpicurus.Hewroteaworkinwhichheclaimedtoshowthatthedoctrinesofotherphilosophershadtheeffectofmakinglifeimpossible.ArcesilauswasColotes’favoritetarget,bothasaskepticandasrepresentingaPlatonictraditionColotescouldonlycondemn.AgainstArcesilausColotesusedtheargumentmostoftenemployedagainstSkeptics,thatofapraxia,thatis,theaccusationofmakingactionimpossiblebyrefusingtoadmitthatwehavecer-tainknowledgethatcanguideusinourlives.ButhealsoattackedtheattemptathistoricallegitimationthroughwhichArcesilauswantedtoshowthat,longbeforehim,veryillustriousphilosophers,manypre-Socraticsamongthem,hadquestionedthepossibilityofattainingtocertainknowledge.Therehadthusbeen,sincethebeginningsofEpicureanism,arealwilltomountaveryfiercebattleagainsttheNewAcademy.IfthisaggressivenessdidnotelicitfromtheAcademicsasgreatareactionasmighthavebeenexpected,itisbecausetheNewAcademyprincipallyconcentrateditseffortsagainstStoicism,regardingEpicureanismasanintellectuallylessdevelopedandlessinterestingdoctrinethanStoicism.TheNewAcademyandStoicismCarneades,whowasafterArcesilausthemostbrilliantrepresentativeoftheskepticalAcademy,wasinthehabitofsaying,“IfChrysippushadnotexisted,Iwouldnotexist”(D.L.4.62),thusparodyingthelineexpressingtheimportanceofChrysippusinthehistoryoftheStoa,“IfChrysippushadnotexisted,theStoawouldnotexist”(D.L.7.183).Carneadesthereforedidnothesitatetorecognizetheextremeimportanceoftheanti-Stoicdialecticinhisownthought.ThisdialectichasbeenatthecenterofthestudyoftheNewAcademysincethetwofoundingarticlesbyP.Couissin,whichwerepublishedin1929andwhoseimportancetoresearchisnowmuchgreaterthanatthetimeoftheirpublication.Theveryexistenceofthisdialecticalrelationship,sostrongandsolong-lasting,raisesacertainnumberofquestions.WhywasStoicismthefavoredtargetoftheNewAcademy?Tounderstandthis,wemusttakeintoaccountasetofbothhistoricalandphilosophicalreasons.Unlikethe4.Seefurther,Morel,epicureanism,thesectionentitled“TheCriteriaofTruth,”inthisvolume.454ACTC2345420/03/2006,04:11PM\nthenewacademyanditsrivalsEpicureans,whocouldseemtophilosophersofthePlatonictraditionlikearesurgenceofanoldenemy,Democritus,StoicismwasrootedtwiceoverintheSocratic-Platonictradition.AsastudentoftheCynicCrates,ZenoofCitiumbelongedtooneofthemostpowerfulandoriginalSocraticcurrents.AsastudentofXenocratesandPolemo,hewasaproductoftheAcademybythesamerightasArcesilaus–whencethedisputa-tion,soprominentinneo-Academicdialectic,oftheveryidentityoftheStoa.Fromtheperspectiveoftheneo-Academics,Zeno’sdecisiontocreateanewschoolcouldonlybeamarkofvanity,iftheStoicteachingwasofSocratic-Platonicinspiration,orabetrayal,ifitconstitutedabreakwiththattradition.TheAcademyhadalreadyexperiencedasomewhatsimilarsituationwiththecreationofAristotle’sLyceum,butthegrowthofStoicismtookplacepreciselyagainstthebackgroundoftheLyceum’sdecadenceafterTheophrastus.Athens,whichhaderredsoofteninthepast,immedi-atelyrecognizedZenoasagreatphilosopher,bestowingimportanthonorsonhim.ThekingofMacedonia,AntigonusGonatas,cametohearhiminAthensandaskedhimtoteachathome,promisingtomakehimthepreceptorofthewholeMacedonianpeople.SuchasituationcouldonlyexacerbateAcademicconcernaboutStoicdogmas.ThedialecticpracticedbytheNewAcademyhasbeeninterpreted,roughlyspeak-ing,intwodifferentways.ForCouissinandhissuccessorsitconsistedintakingaStoicthesisPanddrawingfromitaconclusionQ2entirelydifferentfromQ1,theconclusionthattheStoicshaddrawnfromit.Fromsuchaperspective,theAcademiccontributesnonewproposition,nooriginalconcept;heonlycorrectsthestatementsofhisadversaryandamendsthesenseofthenotionsthelatteruses,andhedefendsQ2asaprobableproposition.TheStoic,forhispart,findshimselfinatheoreticaldilemmawhosealternativesareequallyunacceptabletohim:eithertoabandonPortoadoptQ2.Thesecondinterpretation,defendedespeciallybyA.M.Ioppolo(1986),laysmuchgreaterstressonthecontributionoftheAcademic,whocombatsStoicismnotjustbycorrectingthelogicalmovementbutbyopposingStoicconceptswithspecificallyAca-demiconesderivedfromthePlatonictradition.Despitetheirobviousdifferences,thesetwointerpretationshaveatleastonepointincommon:theyraisethequestionoftheexistenceofcertainconvictionsinneo-Academicthought.CouissinprimarilyinsistedonthedestructiveworkcarriedoutbytheNewAcademyintheinterioroftheStoicsystem,butitisclearfromreadingthetestimonyofCiceroandSextusEmpiricusthatthefundamentalconceptsoftheneo-Academics,suchasthatofsuspensionofjudg-mentandthatofprobability,werenotsimplyresultsofStoicsubversion.Theyex-pressedtheAcademy’sownconvictions.Intheotherdirection,thosewhohavejustlypointedoutthatmanyofthenotionsusedbytheNewAcademyexistedwellbeforetheemergenceofStoicism,particularlyinPlatoandAristotle,haveneglectedthefactthattheemergenceofStoicismdidhaveimportantsemanticconsequences.Thisschoolinfactsucceededmorethananyotherinwidelyimposingnotjustitsneologismsbutalsoitsnewusesofoldterms.Tryingtodefinethegeneralthrustofthedialectic,onecanconcludethatwhattheNewAcademymostcriticizedinStoicthoughtwastheclaimtobeabletopass,withintheworldandwithoutagenuinebreak,fromtheimmediatedeliverancesofthesensestothehighestintellectualrealities,thosethatinPlatocannotbeunderstoodwithoutreferencetotheForms.TheNewAcademyneverexplicitlyusedPlatonicthemesinitscriticismofStoicism,andyetitdrawsonaPlatonicinspirationtotheextentthatit455ACTC2345520/03/2006,04:11PM\ncarloslévyalwaysexpressedadistrustnotjustofthesensesbutalsoofareasonthatclaimedtobeabletoattaintotruthbyworkingexclusivelyonthedeliverancesofthesenses.TheStoicsagedoesnotcontemplatetranscendentrealities,butratherissimplythemaninwhomthetransitionfromsensationtoperfectreasonhastakenplace.Thisitinerary,exceptionalbutinnowayutopian,makeshimtheequalofthegods.Asfarasthetheoryofknowledgeisconcerned,Academiccriticismprincipallyboreontheconceptof“cataleptic”representation.BythistermtheStoicsindicatedthatmostofthetimenaturedoesnotdeceiveus,thatitgivesusinsensationfaithfulimagesofreality.Lucullus,whodefendstheStoictheoryofknowledgeinCicero’sAcademica,expressesthis(Acad.II.19)veryprecisely:“Thereis,hesaid,verygreattruthinthesenses,aslongastheyaresoundandhealthyandeverythingthatimpedesthemandpreventsthemfromactingiskeptawayfromthem.”“Cataleptic”representa-tionsconstitutethevastmajorityofthoseperceivedbyanindividualingoodhealth.Theyare,saytheStoics,intrinsicsignsofmanifesttruth,invirtueofwhichtheycannotbeconfusedwiththosethatcharacterizedreams,intoxication,ormadness.Every“cataleptic”representationpresentsthreecharacteristics:(a)itcomesfromarealobject;(b)itisafaithfulimageofthisobject;and(c)itissuchthatitcouldnotcomefromanobjectthatdidnotexistorwasnottheonefromwhichitcame.Becausetheyhavethischaracterofmanifestness,“cataleptic”representationsalmostirresist-iblyelicitassent,whichyetremainsunderourcontrolandconstitutestheinstrumentofourfreedom.Fortheneo-Academics,theideathatmostofourrepresentationsareimagesofthereal,andthatoursensesthusdeceiveusonlyveryexceptionally,isunacceptable.Theyalsobroughtthefullforceoftheirdialectictobearonclause(c),theoneassertinginfallibility.Theyworkedstrenuouslytoshow,usingeveryexampleofsensoryerror,thatthereisnotasinglerepresentationofwhichonecanassertwithabsolutecertaintythatitcorrespondstoarealobjectfromwhichitseemstocome.Accordingtothem,onemust,withrespecttoanyrepresentation,howevermanifestandcertainitmayseem,practiceepochE,thatis,suspendone’sjudgment.TheStoicsretortedthatsuchanattitudecondemnsustoinaction,sinceallouractions,fromthesimplesttothemostcomplex,areimplicitlybasedontheideathatweliveinaveryrealworldandthatthesensesdonotdeceiveus.Theyemphasizedthatthesensoryerrorsinvokedbytheneo-Academicstakeplaceinexceptionalstatesinwhichthesubject’sreasonisdisturbedbysleep,intoxication,ormadness.Tothisargumentfrominaction,alreadyusedbytheEpicureans,ArcesilausandhissuccessorsrepliedthattheirdialectictookaimatthecharacterofcertaintythattheStoicsattributedtorepre-sentationandnotatrepresentationitself.Inotherwords,theyacceptedas“probable,”“plausible,”(eulogonforArcesilaus,pithanonforCarneades)therepresentationsthattheStoicscalled“cataleptic,”andtheythoughttomakeactionpossibleonthebasisofthisnotionofprobability.YettheconfrontationbetweentheStoaandtheNewAcad-emywasnotconfinedtotheinterpretationofsensoryrepresentations.TheStoicsheldthat“cataleptic”representationsarethefoundationonwhichanindividual’sentireintellectisbuilt,andthattheirtruthisthenecessaryconditionfortheelaborationfromthemofconceptsandtechniquesaswellasforthefunctioningofmemory.Stillmore,“cataleptic”representationistheimmediatemodelforwhatoughttobetherelationtonature:thesageishewhoadherestoreasonwiththesamefacility,thesameconfidence,withwhichthecommonrunofmortalsadherestosensation.456ACTC2345620/03/2006,04:11PM\nthenewacademyanditsrivalsContrariwise,inthethinkingoftheNewAcademythesageisonewho,facedwithanyethicalorintellectualproblem,isabletosuspendjudgment,ashedoeswithregardtoanysensoryrepresentationatall.OnemaysaythattheAcademicsageischaracter-izedbythecriticaldistanceheestablishesbetweenhimselfandtheworld,andtheStoicsagebythewilltoadheretotheorderofaworldthat,forhim,isperfectlyrational.FortheStoicsasfortheneo-Academics,wisdomisthepolaroppositeofopinion,butfortheformerthebestweaponagainstdoxaistounderstandandaccepttheworld;forthelatteritistodistrustit.Thingsarenotfundamentallydifferentwithregardtoethics.FortheStoics,natureinawayconfersabirthrightoneverylivingcreature,whetherananimalorahumanbeing,infurnishingitwithoikeiOsis,thatis,theélanvitalthatmakesitstrive,frombirth,topersistinitsownexistence,toseekwhatisgoodforitsnatureandtofleefromwhatisharmfultoit.Atthebeginning,thehumanbeing,whodoesnotbecomearationalbeinguntiltheageofseven,isnotfundamentallydifferentfromtheanimals,butashegrowsupheperceives–oratanyrateheshouldperceive–thatthethingshespontaneouslysoughtoutasgood,thosethatinLatinarecalledprimanaturae,havenoabsolutevaluebutareindifferentincomparisonwiththeonlytruegood,know-ledgeofmoralbeauty.Asaverysimpleexample,fortheStoicslifeasabiologicalphenomenonhasatbestarelativevalue;itisapositiveindifferent,a“preferable.”Itisbetter,asageneralrule,tobealivethantobedead,buttheshortlifeofavirtuousbeingispreferable,fromtheethicalviewpoint,tothelonglifeofatyrant,whichshowsthatlifeinitselfcannotberegardedasagenuinegood.Inallthis,saidtheneo-Academics,therewasnothingbutincoherenceandhypocrisy.Whatshockedthephilo-sophersofthePlatonictraditionwas,aboveall,theStoicclaimtobasehumanethicsonavitalimpulsecommontomanandanimal.JustastheydeconstructedtheEpicureansystembycallingupontheEpicureanstochoosebetweentheabsenceofsufferingandsensualpleasure,theyclaimedthattheStoicscouldnotatthesametimeaffirmthatmanseekscertainobjectsthatheregardsasnaturalgoodsandclaimthatthelatterhavenovaluewithrespecttoethics.FortheNewAcademy,intheirheartstheStoicsrecognizedothergoodsbesidesvirtue,butunlikethePeripateticstheydidnothavethecouragetoadmitit.OtheraspectsofStoicdoctrineattractedthederisionoftheneo-Academics.TheyregardedthemoralradicalismthatledtheStoicstoassertthatallmoralfaultsareequallygraveasanabsurdity.Cicero,inProMurena(61),exploitsitforaslightlycheaprhetoricaleffectbysayingthatforaStoic“thecrimeofkillingaroosterwithoutneedisasgreatasstranglingone’sgrandfather.”Similarly,theymockedtheCynicalaspectsofZeno’sRepublic,aworkwritteninaspiritofanti-Platonicpolemic,inwhichthefounderofStoicismrejectedcommonlyacceptedsocialrules.Finally,theydisputedthatitwaspossibletoeradicatecompletelythepassionsofthehumansoul,astheStoicsaspiredtodo,whoheldthatthehumansoulcontainsnoirrationalelementandthatpassionisadiseaseofreasonwhosecureisnotimpossible.Thevariousaspectsofthiscritiquecanallberelatedtothesameidea:therejectionofStoicimmanentism,thatis,inparticular,theStoicideathatmancanattainmoralperfectionwithoutrecoursetoanyrealityotherthanthosehefindsintheworld.Butwhatexactlyisthisworld?FortheStoics,thereisnoneedtoimagineademiurgebuildingtheworldinimitationoftheforms.Theworldresultsfromtheactionoflogosoninertmatter,thereisnodifferencebetweenGod,providence,phusisandlogos,457ACTC2345720/03/2006,04:11PM\ncarloslévyeverythingismaterialandeverythingisrational.Thereisnoplaceforchanceinthisworld,everythingisgovernedbyfate,everythinghasacause,andsoeverythingcanbeforeseen.ThisexplainswhytheStoicsdefendeddivination,eveniftheyrecognizedthatitgaverisetomanyabuses.Whatismore,naturecreatedtheworldtomakeit“thecityofmenandgods,”andconceivedofeverythingintheinterestsofthesebeings,whoaretheonlyrationalones.TheStoicsdidnotrejectthegodsofmythology;theyregardedthemnotasanaberrationbutasanaïveandpartialvisionofdivinityonthepartofmenwholackedthecapacitytounderstandwhatitreallyis.Allthisobviouslyfurnishedsubjectsforcriticismbytheneo-Academics,whoassertedthatitwascontradictorytoclaimthateverythingisdeterminedbyfateandatthesametime5towanttosafeguardhumanfreedom.Carneadesrefusedtogranttherathercom-plicateddistinctionofcausesthroughwhichChrysippussoughttoreconcilefateandfreedom;heassertedratherthatthehumanwillcannotbeinsertedintofate,andthatitisitsowncause–adistantecho,perhaps,oftheself-motionofthesoulinPlato.Similarly,hehelduptoridiculethebeliefindivinationandheldthatbywishingtoconfuseGodandtheworldtheStoicsdestroyedtheveryideaofdivinityandthattheymightaswellregardnatureasasystemofpurelymechanicalforces.Inallthiscriti-cismofStoicimmanentism,theNewAcademymadeabundantuseofthesorites,thedialecticalproceedingthatallowsaninsensibletransitionfromonepropositiontoitscontrary.ThesoriteshighlightedthecontradictionsofaHeracliteanconceptionoftheworld,Stoicismbeingperceivedasneo-Heraclitean.GiventheirconclusionthattheStoicconceptionoftheworldwasfundamentallymistaken,theneo-Academicscouldonlyurgethemtopursueaninvestigationintothenatureofthings.Allthesame,itwillbenoticedthatatnotimedidtheirdialectic,howeveruniversalitsaspiration,attacktheTimaeus,andthatitthusleftPlatoasatleastapossiblesolutiontothisshortcomingofStoicism.TheNewAcademyandMiddlePlatonismThethoughtoftheNewAcademyamalgamatedtwodifferentelements,Socratic-Platonicinspirationandradicalskepticism,whosecoexistencewaspossibleonlythroughthetensioncreatedbytheconfrontationwithStoicism.Intime,thelatterlostitscentralpositionandfissuresbegantoopeninneo-Academicskepticism.ThesuccessorsofCarneadesweredividedovertheinterpretationofitsteaching.Clitomachus,an“orthodox”interpreterofCarneadianthought,arguedforthemain-tenanceofepochEinallitsrigor;whilePhiloofLarissa,thelastscholarchoftheAcad-emy,inworkswritteninRomeafterhisflightfromAthensin88bce,formulatedinnovationsofwhichthemostimportantwastheassertionthatthingsareknowablebynature,buttheycannotbeknownonthebasisoftheStoiccriterion,the“cata-leptic”representation.Inotherwords,PhiloaffirmsthattheskepticismoftheNewAcademyhadessentiallybeenananti-Stoicism.Philocontinuedtocriticizethe“cata-leptic”representation,andheassertedtheunityoftheAcademymorestronglythan5.OntheSoicsandneo-Academicsonfateandfreedom,seeSharples,theproblemofsources,inthisvolume.458ACTC2345820/03/2006,04:11PM\nthenewacademyanditsrivalshispredecessors,butheseems,tojudgebythemeagersurvivingevidence,nottohaveproposedanypathofaccesstothisknowledgewhosepossibilityhetheoreticallyadmitted.Nevertheless,thisdevelopmentintheNewAcademywastohaveimportantandparadoxicalconsequences.WehavealreadymentionedAenesidemus’sdecisiontorecreateanauthenticskepticismbyappealtoPyrrho.Further,AntiochusofAscalon,whohadbeenastudentofPhiloofLarissa,brokewithhisteacher,holdingthatthedoubtoftheNewAcademycontradictedtheteachingofPlatoandhisimmediatesuccessors.HeclaimedtorevivetheOldAcademy,referringbythisnametoatoler-ablyheterocliteviewamalgamatingPlatonic,Peripatetic,andStoicelements.TheinnovationsofPhiloofLarissaandtheeclecticdogmatismofAntiochusofAscalonopentheperiodthathasbeencalledMiddlePlatonism,featuringpersonalitiesasrichanddiverseasPhiloofAlexandria,ApuleiusandPlutarch.AfterthedeathofPhiloofLarissaaround84bce,neo-Academicinspirationseemstohavedisappeared,andCiceropresentshimselfastherepresentativeofanabandoneddoctrine.Yet,evenwithinMiddlePlatonism,skepticalelementsarepresent,alongsideverydogmaticinterpreta-tionsofPlato.WithPhiloofAlexandria,notonlydoestheDeEbrietatecontainaversionoftheskepticalModesofAenesidemus,butneo-AcademicconceptslikethoseofepochE,pithanonandeulogonareintegratedintoafideistperspective,skepticismthenbeingtheexpressionofthenothingnessofhumanreasonbeforethedivineomnipo-tence.AsfarasPlutarchisconcerned,JanOpsomer(1998)hasshowntheextenttowhichPlatonicandneo-Academicthemesaretightlyentwinedinthisauthorwho,morethananyother,defendedtheideaoftheunityoftheAcademythroughoutallthevicissitudesofitshistory.FarfromcompletelydisappearingwithPhiloofLarissa,theskepticismoftheNewAcademythusexercisedadefiniteinfluenceonimportantphilosophicalcurrents,neo-PyrrhonistskepticismandMiddlePlatonism,whichintheirownwayperpetuatedinthehistoryofphilosophythetwocontradictoryelementsthatNewAcademystrovetomakecoexistfortwocenturies.BibliographySourcesGeneralLong,A.A.andSedley,D.(eds.).(1987).(CitedasLS).TheHellenisticPhilosophers.(2vols.).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.AulusGelliusRolfe,J.C.(ed.,trans.,notes).(1927–8).AulusGellius.TheAtticNights.(3vols.).LoebClassicalLibrary.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress/London:Heinemann.CiceroPease,A.S.(ed.,comm.).(1955–8).Cicero.Denaturadeorum(2vols.).Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.Rackham,H.(ed.,trans.,notes).(1914).Cicero.Definibusbonorumetmalorum.LoebClassicalLibrary.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPressandLondon:Heinemann.459ACTC2345920/03/2006,04:11PM\ncarloslévy——.(ed.,trans.,notes).(1933).Cicero.Denaturadeorum.Academica.LoebClassicalLibrary.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPressandLondon:Heinemann.Reid,J.S.(ed.,comm.).(1885).Cicero.M.T.CiceronisAcademica.London:Macmillan.DiogenesLaertiusGoulet-Cazé,M.-O.etal.(ed.,trans.comm.).(1999).DiogèneLaërce.Viesetdoctrinesdesphilosophesillustres.Paris:Librairiegénéralefrançaise.Hicks,R.D.(ed.,trans.,notes).(1972).DiogenesLaertius.Livesofeminentphilosophers.LoebClassicalLibrary.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPressandLondon:Heinemann.LucretiusRouse,H.D.andSmith,M.F.(ed.,trans.,notes).(1975).Lucretius.Dererumnatura.LoebClassicalLibrary.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress/London:Heinemann.PhiloofAlexandriaGorez,J.(ed.,trans.).(1962).PhiloofAlexandria.Deebrietate.Desobrietate.Paris:EditionsduCerf.PhilodemusDorandi,T.(ed.,trans.,notes).(1991).Filodemo.Storiadeifilosofi:Platoneel’Academia(PHerc.1021e164).Naples:Bibliopolis.PlutarchCherniss,H.(ed.,trans.,notes).(1976).Plutarch.Plutarch’smoralia,XIII,2.(Anti-Stoictreatise.).Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPressandLondon:Heinemann.Einarson,B.andDeLacy,P.H.(ed.,trans.,notes).(1967).Plutarch’smoralia,XIV(Anti-EpicurianTreatise).LoebClassicalLibrary.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPressandLondon:Heinemann.PyrrhoDeclevaCaizzi,F.(ed.,trans.,comm.).(1981).Pirrone.Testimonianze.Naples:Bibliopolis.SextusEmpiricusAnnas,J.andBarnes,J.(trans.).(1994).SextusEmpiricus.OutlinesofScepticism.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Bury,R.G.(ed.,trans.,notes).(1976).SextusEmpiricus.OutlinesofPyrrhonism.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress/London:Heinemann.Pellegrin,P.(ed.,trans.,notes).(1997).SextusEmpiricus.Esquissespyrrhoniennes(PurrOneiaihupotupOseis).Paris:Seuil.TimonDiMarco,M.(ed.).(1989).TimonediFliunto.Silli.Introduzione,edizionecritica,traduzioneecommento.DiRome:Edizionidell’Ateneo.Variousneo-AcademicsMette,H.J.(1984).“ZweiAkademikerheute:KrantorundArkesilaos.”Lustrum,26,7–94.——.(1985).“WeitereAkademikerheute:vonLakydesbiszuKleitomachos.”Lustrum,27,39–148.460ACTC2346020/03/2006,04:11PM\nthenewacademyanditsrivalsWorksCitedCouissin,P.(1929a).“LestoïcismedelaNouvelleAcadémie.”Revued’HistoiredelaPhilosophie,3,241–76.Englishtrans.inM.Burnyeat(ed.).(1983),TheSkepticalTradition(pp.31–63).Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.——.(1929b).“L’origineetl’évolutiondel’epochè.”RevuedesÉtudesGrecques,42,373–97.Glucker,J.(1978).AntiochusandthelateAcademy.Göttingen:VandenhoeckandRuprecht.Ioppolo,A.M.(1986).Opinioneescienza:ildebattitotraStoicieAccademicinelIIIenelIIsecoloa.C.Naples:Bibliopolis.Opsomer,J.(1998).IntheSearchofTruth.Bruxelles:VerhandelingenvandeKoninklijkeAcademievoorWetenschappen,LetterenenSchoneKunstenvanBelgië.FurtherReadingsAlgra,K.A.(1997).“Chrysippus,Carneades,Cicero:TheEthicalDivisionsinCicero’sLucul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nogoodwaytogiveahistoricalandphilosophicalaccountofPyrrhonismwithintheboundsofabriefchapter.Itwouldrequireabook,onthemodelofBrochard(1887),Hankinson(1995),orBett(2000).PerhapstheleastbadwaywouldbetosetoutfromtheideathatPyrrhonistthoughtisreactive,depend-ingforitsexistenceonwhatitcriticizes;butthismethodwouldagainleadtoill-proportionedexposition,duetothecomplexityofthedebatesatissue.Hereweshallfollow,insequence,twoguidingthreadsthatappeartohavesomehistoricalvalidity.FirstweshalltracewhatseemstobetheoffensivephaseofPyrrhonism’sdevelopment;thatis,thelongworkofassembling,reinforcing,andrefiningthePyrrhonistarsenal;thenweshallstrivetoseehowPyrrhonism,havingreachedthehighestdegreeofoffensiveperfectionofwhichitwascapable,undertooktodefenditselfagainstthemainobjectionsbroughtagainstit.1.SeeSextusEmpiricus,OutlinesofPyrrhonism[hereafter:PH]1.16–17;DiogenesLaertius[hereafter:D.L.]1,20.Ishallrefertotheancientworkswhentheseareeasilyaccessible;tomoderncollections(LongandSedley=LS)whentheyarenot.2.Whencetheplaceofthepresentchapterinthisvolume.465ACTC2446520/03/2006,04:12PM\njacquesbrunschwigForaquickestimateofthedivergencebetweenthestartingpointandtheendofthelongPyrrhonisttradition,itisenoughtorecall,tobeginwith,thattheterm“Pyrrhonism,”bywhichseventeenth-andeighteenth-centuryphilosophersfrequentlymeantskepticism,didnothavethesamedominanceamongtheancients.Thesucces-sorsofPyrrhousedadiversenomenclature(seePH1.7,D.L.9.69–70):“skeptics”(observersorexaminers),“zetetics”(searchers),“ephectics”(practitionersoftheepochEorsuspensionofjudgment),“aporetics”(exploitersofaporiai,i.e.,impasses).Thelabel“Pyrrhonist,”putinleadingpositionbyDiogenesLaertius,whileSextusputsitlast,seemstohavearousedsomescruples,atleastinlatertimes(seeTheodosiusinD.L.9.70):howcouldonereallycalloneselfaPyrrhonistifonecouldnotknowPyrrho’s“movementsofthought”?AnddidPyrrhonothaveprecursors?Sextusrepliestothesearguments,butverycautiously(PH1.7:“ItappearstousthatPyrrhodevotedhimselftoskepsismorecompletelyandmorebrilliantlythanhispredecessors”).If,ontheotherhand,theterm“skeptic”clearlypredominatesinSextus,thatisdoubtlessinordertodistinguishtheskepsisoftheSkepticsfromtheirrivalsinthe“skepticizing”Academy:rightlyorwrongly,SextusregardstheAcademicsasdog-matistsinreverse:theydeclarethatitisimpossibletofindthetruth(PH1.2–3).(SeeLévy’schapterinthisvolume.)ThePyrrhonists,who“continuetoseekit,”arethetrue“examiners.”PyrrhoandTimonDiogenesLaertius’sbiographyofPyrrho(see9.61–69)isvivid,ifnotalwayscredible.Wecanfairlyeasilymakeoutinittworivalpicturesoftheman:aneccentricguruandamodest,gentlesage.TheguruaccompaniedhisteacherandfriendAnaxarchus,afavoriteofAlexandertheGreat,totheEast;hehadbizarreideasandbehavedbizarrely.Themodest,gentlesagelivedpeacefullyinthecountrywithhissister.Theguru’sambitionwasto“stripofftheman,”butthemodest,gentlesagehumblyacknowledgedthatitwasnoteasy,andthathedidnotalwaysattaintoithimself.Perhapsthisiswhytheancientshadsomedifficultyplacinghischaracterinthephilosophiclandscapeofantiquity.TheextravagantPyrrhowastheonewhodis-coveredaradicallynovelwaytofulfilltheprogramof“happiness”(eudaimonia)setforthemselvesbyallthephilosophicalschoolsofGreece.TheconventionalPyrrhowastheonewhotooknote,likemanyothersbeforehim,oftheweaknessofhumanknow-ledge.ThatiswhyheisreadilyinsertedintoasuccessiongoingbacktoHomer(D.L.9.71–73)or,lessfancifully,intoaskepticizinglineagestemmingfromXenophanes,ZenoofElea,andDemocritus(D.L.9.72–73).Evenhispartisansdonotgosofarastoisolatehimentirely:Timon,themostfamousofhiscircle,energeticallymocksallotherphilosophers,butisrelativelyindulgenttowardsomeofthem,aboveallXenophanes.Later,SextustakescaretocomparePyrrhonismwith“neighboring”philosophies(PH1.210–241),notingthedifferences,tobesure,butalsohighlightingthecommontraitsthatexplainhowtheycouldsometimeshavebeenconflated.NordomodernhistorianshesitatetospeakofPyrrho’s“precursors”orthe“antecedents”ofPyrrhonism.ThisassimilationistreadingoftherelationsbetweenPyrrhoandhispredecessorspusheshisthoughttowardepistemologicalquestions.Itisofapiecewithanequally466ACTC2446620/03/2006,04:12PM\npyrrhonismassimilationistreadingofhisrelationstohisposterity,aposteritythatisitselfacri-tiqueofbeliefandknowledge.Theproblemisthustounderstandtheconnection,forPyrrhohimself,betweentheethicalrevolutionandthe“pre-neo-Pyrrhonist”skepticismweinstinctivelycredittoPyrrhonism’seponymousfounder.Nevertheless,perhapsoneshouldlayitdownasaprinciple,whendealingwithaPyrrhoaswithaSocrates,thattheessentialthingistoassesstheeffecttheyhadonthosewhoknewthem,orevenonthosewhoheardtellofthem.ConsideramanlikeTimon,whosecharacterwasasdifferentascouldbefromhis(seehisportraitinD.L.9.109–115):whatabouthisteachercouldhavestruckhimsopower-fully?Wouldithavebeenaboundlesscuriosityandappetiteforreflectionabouttheproblemsofknowledge?Thatthemewasalreadyfairlywell-wornatthetime.Unprecedented,ontheotherhand,oralmostso,wasthenatureheascribedtohappiness:notthepossessionofanabsolute,supremegood,butrathertheinnerattainmentofcertain“privative”attitudes,suchasapatheia(absenceofaffects),adiaphora(indifference),ataraxia(imperturbability),astorgia(freedomfromattach-ments),apragmosunE(uninvolvementwiththeaffairsofothers),aphasia(silenceorlaconism).Epicurus,whowaspassionatelyinterestedinPyrrho’s“lifestyle”(D.L.9.64),mayevenhavecomplimentedhimforbeingamathEs(ignorant)andapaideutos(uncultivated)(seeSedley,1976).WhenTimondescribedhisoverwhelmingencoun-terwithhisteacher,whatheaskedofhimwasthesecretofhissuperhumantranquil-lity(D.L.9.65);and,intheanswerheseemstoputinPyrrho’smouth(S.E.M11.19–20),thelatterexpresseshimselfintermssoassuredthatmoderninterpretation(Burnyeat,1980a)hashadtolavishtreasuresofingenuityonreconcilingthemwithPyrrho’s“skepticism.”ButTimonhasleftusnotjusttracesofhisenthusiasm.Afamousandceaselesslydiscussedtext,aquotationorparaphrasetransmittedbythePeripateticAristocles,summarizesthethoughtofPyrrho(and/orthePyrrhonists).Wecanhardlyavoidquotingithere,inourownarticulationofquestionsandreplies,withthewarningthateverydetailofourtranslationissubjecttocontroversy.PyrrhoofElis...didnothimselfleaveanythingwritten.ItishisdiscipleTimonwhosaysthatitisnecessaryforthosewhowanttobehappytoconsiderthefollowingthreepoints:[Q1]first,whatarethecharacteristicsofthingsaccordingtotheirnature;[Q2]second,whatattitudeshouldwetaketowardthem[them=thethings];[Q3]lastly,whatbenefitthosewhotakethisattitudewillfindinit.[R1]Asfarasconcernsthings,Timonsays[R1a]thatPyrrhodeclaresthemalltobeequallyindifferent,unstableandindeterminate;[R1b]thatforthisreasonneitheroursensationsnorouropinionsaretrueorfalse.[R2a]Forthisreason,therefore,wecannothavetheleastconfidenceinthem[=thesensationsandopinions],[R2b]butmustratherbewithoutopinions,withoutinclinations,withoutwaverings,[R2c]sayingofeachthingthatitinnowayismorethanisnot,orthatitatonceisandisnot,orthatitneitherisnorisnot.[R3]Forthosewhotakethisattitude,accordingtoTimon,thebenefitwillbe[R3a]firstaphasia,[R3b]followedbyataraxia;[R3c]butAenesidemussaysthatitispleasure.Sucharethemainpointsofwhattheyhavesaid.(Eus.Praep.Evang.14.18.2–5=LS1F2–6=Caizzi53)FromamongthemanycommentscalledforbythistestimonyfromTimon/Aristocles(hereafter:TA),hereisabriefselection.467ACTC2446720/03/2006,04:12PM\njacquesbrunschwig1.ItisapitythatnolaterPyrrhonistseemstohaveknownofTA:onewouldbecurioustoknowhisreactiontoso“un-Pyrrhonian”aninitialquestionasQ1;forifthereisanysphereinwhichaPyrrhonistshouldpracticetheepochE,itissurelythatwhichconcernsthepropertiesbelongingto“things”“accordingtotheirnature,”“truly,”“inthemselves.”2.Still,itmaybesuggested,evenifQ1wasnotaskepticalquestion,R1amighthavebeenaskepticalanswertoit.Theadjectivesitemployscouldimplythatitiswewholackthecognitivemeanstodistinguishthings,todeterminethem,todecidewhetherornottheyhavethisorthatproperty.R1awouldthenexpressanepistemologicalskepticism.However,inordertoanswerQ1inthetermsinwhichthequestionwasposed,IthinkR1amustratherhavemeantthatthe“things”do3notexhibit“objective”differences,andthatitiswewhoalltoohastilyintroducedistinctionsbetweenthemthatdonotbelongtothem“accordingtotheirnature.”Letusnoteinpassing,albeitquickly,thatonecouldretainthethreatenedlinkbetweenR1aandthelater“Pyrrhonist”traditionifoneweretoacceptaproposed4emendationtothetextofR1b.Insteadof“forthisreason(diatouto)neitheroursensationsnorouropinionsaretrueorfalse,”theemendedtextwouldmean“forthereason(diato)thatneitheroursensationsnorouropinionsaretrueorfalse.”Themetaphysicalthesisoftheindeterminacyofthings(R1a)wouldthenhaveacognitivebasis(R1b),namely,thelackofdeterminatetruthvalueofoursensa-tionsandouropinions.Butitseemsunclearthatthefallibilityofourcognitivefacultiescangroundagenuinelymetaphysicalthesis.Besides,theproposedemenda-tionhasnotwonuniversalacceptance,andmorethanonewayhasbeenfoundtorendertheinference,aspresentedinthereceivedtext,moreorlessacceptable.3.Tohisownnon-skepticalquestionQ1,then,Pyrrhowouldofferanequallynon-skepticalanswer,R1a.Thisclaimwillbefoundastonishing;butrecentresearchtendstoemphasizethedivergencebetweenPyrrhoandthe(neo)Pyrrhonists.Atmostwecouldsaythattheindeterminacythesisisdogmaticinonesense,whileinanotheritisanti-dogmatic.Itisanti-dogmaticinthatitforbidsustodecideinadeterminatewayonthe“natural”propertiesofthings;forexample,tosaythatsuchandsuchathingisFbynatureratherthannotF,orthatsuchandsuchanotherthingisbynaturenotFratherthanF.Butitisdogmaticinthatititselftakesadeterminatepositionontheissueofwhetherornotthingsingeneralaredistinctinnaturefromoneanother(asamatteroffact,Pyrrhodoesnotsaythatthingsareinnowaymoredistinctthannon-distinct).Intheterminologyofrecentdis-5cussions,onewouldcallitanegativemeta-dogmaticthesis.Amongtheremainingcontroversialquestions,thefollowingrequiresafewwords:whatscopedidPyrrhoattributetoQ1andR1?Atfirstsight,TAisdefinitelyuniversal:thePyrrhonistthesiscoversalldeterminations,distinctions,andcharacterizationsof3.Itwouldthereforebeagenuine“metaphysicalthesis,”a“thesisoftheindeterminacyofthings,”asBett(2000)maintains.4.SeeZeller(1909)andStopper(1983).5.Onthisterminology,seeespeciallythepreciseexplicationssuppliedbyBarnes(1992,pp.4252n.54and4254n.72).468ACTC2446820/03/2006,04:12PM\npyrrhonism“things.”Forexample,R2cinfersfromR1thatwemustsay(grantingthetranslationproposedhere)“ofeach,thatitinnowayismorethanisnot,orthatitatonceisandisnot,orthatitneitherisnorisnot.”Whythenarewenottosaywhatthelearnedandtheignorantalikesayallthetime:thisisFandthatisnotF?Verylikely,duetoaprinciplewhich(despitethephilosophicaldisastersithaswrought)wasexplicitlyorimplicitlyacceptedalmosteverywhereinGreekthought(seeBurnyeat,1979).AccordingtoBett(2000),whocallsthisprin-ciple“theinvariabilitycondition,”wemayformulateitasfollows:somethingthatisFonlyincertaincircumstances(butnotFinothers),orFonlyincertainrelations(butnotinothers)is,bythatveryfact,not“Fbynature,”not“reallyF.”TAdeniesthattherearepredicatesthatsatisfytheinvariabilitycondition,thatis,predicatestrueinallthecircumstancesandrelationsofthesubjectsofwhichtheyaretrue.If,however,wereadthetestimonyasitistransmittedtous,keepingR1band6R2ainmind,itseemsthatwhatPyrrhoexplicitlycondemnsistheordinaryusageofpredicatesappliedonthebasisofasensationoranopinion:hereTAspeaksneitherofknowledgenorofscience.Bydisqualifyingsensationsandopinions,Pyrrhoattackstheinformationsources(orsupposedsuch)thatgroundourperceptualjudgmentsand7valuejudgments,andthatordinarilyguideourdailylife.DoesthePyrrhonistcritiquetakeaimatperceptualjudgmentsaswellasatvaluejudgments?Thedebateisspirited,eventoday.Infavorofaninterpretationrestricted8toethicalpredicates,whichisfarfrombeinguniversallyaccepted,wemayrecallherethatTAisframedbyanoriginalprojectthatisovertlyeudaimonistic.WemayalsorecalltheformulationofR3,whichmentionsataraxiaasamongthebenefitsthatadeptsofthePyrrhonistwaycanexpect.Inthiscirclethatclosessovisiblyonitself,itisnotveryclearwhatrolethecritiqueofperceptualjudgmentscouldplay.Whatwouldbeparticularlydisturbingaboutbelievingandsayingthatsnowiswhite?Andwhatwouldbeparticularlyreassuringaboutbelievingandsayingthatitisnomorewhitethanblack?Tounderstandthis,wewouldhavetosketchatleastafewofthelinks,complexonesmoreover,thatlaterPyrrhonistsweretoestablishbetweena(general)epochEandataraxia(forexample,PH1.29);butnothinglikethisappearsinTA,anabsencethatseemsinsufficientlyexplainedbyitscharacterasasummary.Finally,onthispoint,wemightprofitablycompareTAwiththegeneraldescriptionofPyrrho’sthoughtinD.L.9.61:“Hesaidthatnothingisfineorvile,justorunjust,andsimilarlyforeverything,thatnothingisintruth,butonlybycustomandhabitisitthatmendoallthattheydo;infact,accordingtohim,each6.InBrunschwig(1994),onthebasisofsomegrammaticalobservations,Isuggestedattribut-ingtheinsertionofR1bandR2atoTimon,alongwiththe“epistemologicalturn”stampedonPyrrho’sthoughtbythisinsertion.Thatdebatable(anddebated)hypothesiswouldnaturallybeoutofplaceinaworksuchasthepresentone.7.Intheterminologyofcurrentdiscussions,onewouldsaythathis“skepticism”isofthe“rustic”type,asopposedtothe“urban”skepticismthatleavesordinarybeliefsintactandonlyattacksthedoctrinesofphilosophersandthelearned.Forthesediscussions,seeBarnes(1982);Burnyeat(1983,1984);Frede(1984,1987);Brennan(1994).8.Despiteweightysupporters,suchasBrochard(1887),Robin(1944),vonFritz(1963),DeclevaCaizzi(1981),andAusland(1989).469ACTC2446920/03/2006,04:12PM\njacquesbrunschwigthingisnomorethisthanthat.”Hereweseethattheuniversalvocabulary(“similarlyforall,”“nothing,”“eachthing”)doesnotkeeptheexamplesadduced(“fine,”“vile,”“just,”“unjust,”“whatmendo”)frombeinglimitedtothesphereofvaluesandprac-ticallife.IfweweretoadmitthatPyrrhohimselfhadinmindonlyanepochEconfinedtoethical-politicalpredicates,perhapswewouldappreciatebetterthescopeandpoweroftheintellectualadvancesachievedinthePyrrhonisttradition.Ifeverythinghadbeeninplacefromthestart,thePyrrhonistswouldnothaveworkedashard,andwewouldhavefeweroccasionstowonderifoneofoursourcesgivesusamisleadingaccountofaversionofskepticismattestedbyanother,oranexactaccountofadiffer-entversion(seeBarnes,1992,p.4253).FromTimontoAenesidemusThehistoryofPyrrhonismafterPyrrhoandTimonwasalreadyasubjectofdiscussioninantiquity(D.L.9.115–116).Accordingtosome,Timonhaddisciples,whosesucces-sorsformedanuninterruptedseriesofskepticalphilosophersandempiricistphysiciansdowntoSextusandhispupilSaturninus.Manyofthefiguresmentionedarenomorethannamestous,andthelistingraisessomeproblemsofchronology.Accordingtoothers(asconfirmedbythetestimonyofCicero,Off.1.6;Fin.5.8),Pyrrhohimselfhadwaivedhisrighttospeakaboutsuchvitalphilosophicaltopicsasdutiesandends,andhisinfluencesufferedalongeclipse.ButPyrrhonismeventuallyresurged.Theagentofthisresurrection,accordingtotheempiricistphysicianMenodotus,hadbeenanotherphysician,PtolemyofCyrene;butaccordingtoAristocles,followedonthispointbyallmoderncommentators,theimpetuswasduetoAenesidemus,inthefirstcenturybce.AsnothingindicatesthatAenesidemus,ofwhoselifeweknowverylittle,wasaphysi-cian,itmaybesuggestedthatMenodotuswasconcernedtogivetheleadingroletooneofhiscolleagues.Aboveall,AenesidemusisfamousfortheTenModes(or“tropes”)forinducingepochEthatareattributedtohim(S.E.M7.345)andofwhichseveralaccountsremain(PH1.31–163,D.L.9.79–88,PhiloofAlexandria,OnDrunkenness169–205),though9unfortunatelynothisown.Further,afairlydetailedsummaryofhisPyrrhonianDiscoursesineightbooks,hassurvived,drawnupbytheeruditePhotius,theninth-centurypatriarchofConstantinople(LS71C,72L).The“modesofAenesidemus”aresomanymeansofinducingepochE,startingfromtheconflictsofappearances(inthegreatmajorityofcases,sensoryappearances).Togiveaquicksurvey(thoughthetextsareclearandabundant),wemaysaythattheyrestupondifferences(1)betweenanimals,(2)betweenmen,(3)intheconstitutionofsense-organs,(4)incircumstances,(5)inpositionsanddistances,(6)inmixtures,(7)inquantities,oragainondifferencesdepending(8)onrelations,(9)onfrequencyorrarity,or(10)ontraditions,customs,andculturalcontexts.Quiteunderstandably,theTenModesfocusedtheattentionofancientastheyhaveofmoderncommentators.Theypresentedakindofsumma,relativelywellordered9.Thesetextsareadmirablycollected,translated,andcommentedoninAnnasandBarnes(1985).470ACTC2447020/03/2006,04:12PM\npyrrhonismandarticulated,ofargument-typesemployedbythePyrrhonistsagainsttheirdog-maticadversaries,ataparticularmomentintheirhistoricalcourse.Butinasense,thisfocusisregrettable:thelistoftheTenModesisvisiblyindebtedtoearliermaterialaccumulatedbygenerationsofphilosophers(whetherPyrrhonistsornot)preoccupiedwiththerecurrentproblemoftheconflictofappearances.Further,thislistwascer-tainlyreworkedlaterinvariouswaysbyAenesidemusand/orhissuccessorssoastosystematizeitfurther(seeespeciallyPH1.38–39,onthereductionoftheTenModestothree“superordinate”modes–thatbasedonwhojudges,thatbasedonwhatisjudged,andthatbasedonboth–andofthesetoasinglesuprememode,thatofrelation).ThetextsdealingwiththeTenModesare,therefore,probablynotthebestsourceforanassessmentofAenesidemus’sowncontributiontothedevelopmentofPyrrhonism.Forexample,onthephilosophicallevelthesubtlestinterpretershavediscernedinSextus’saccount,butalsointhatofDiogenes,anuneasycoexistencebetweentwo10strategiesthatareinprincipledistinct.Ontheone,whichisproperlyspeakingrelat-ivist,aconflictofappearancesdoesnotreallyinduceepochE:xappearsFtoAandnotFtoB,andthatisallthereistosayaboutit.Thequestion,“ButisitorisitnotFbynature?”doesnotarise.Ontheother,conformingmoretoSextus’sversionofPyrrhonism,thisquestionisneitherillegitimatenorabsurd;itismerelyundecided,atleastsofar,thusallowingtheskeptictoclaimthathe“continuestosearch.”Photius’ssummary,thankstoitsverymarginality,hassomechanceofprovidinguswithlesshopelesslyencumberedevidence.BasedonadirectreadingofAenesidemus’smajorwork,itsuppliespreciousinformationaboutthescopeofhisreflectionsandtheintentionsmotivatinghislabors.BeginningwithBookI,AenesidemuslaidoutthemostimportanteventsintheintervalthatseparatedhimfromPyrrho:namely,theappearanceofAcademicskepticismandthelongseriesofessentiallyepistemologicaldebatesthatmatcheditssuccessiverepresentatives,ArcesilausandCarneades,againsttheteachersofancientStoicism,ZenoofCitiumandChrysippus.Thisdevelopmentperhapshadapersonaldimensionforhim,ifitistrue,ashasbeengenerallybelievedonthestrengthofapassagefromPhotius,thathehimselfhadbeenamemberoftheAcademybefore11breakingwithit,disgustedbyitsincreasingconcessionstoStoicdogmatism.WhatiscertainisthatAenesidemusformulatedhispositionwithexplicitreferencebothtoPyrrho(positively)andtotheAcademics(negatively).Butthesetworeferencepoints,farfrombeingmerelyjuxtaposed,wereininteraction.Forexample,AenesidemusgaveprominentplacetohisexpositionofPyrrho’seudaimonistproject;yet,indeclin-ingtoasserteventhemostslightlymetaphysicalprinciplesimilartoPyrrho’sthesisofindeterminacy,hewasnodoubttacitlytakingtheanti-dogmatismoftheAcademicsintoaccount.Again,heequallytookintoaccounttheimportanceofepistemologicalquestionsintheconcernsoftheAcademicsandintheirdebateswiththeStoics,goingsofarasexplicitlytointroduceacomponentofPyrrhonistblessednessthatechoedthesedebatesinaway.WitnessthisratherremarkablephrasingfromPhotius:“HewhophilosophizesinthemannerofPyrrhoisblessedinallways,butinparticularhe10.SeeAnnasandBarnes(1985,pp.97–8);andalsoStriker([1983]1996);Bett(2000).11.Thisreconstruction,however,hasbeencontestedbyDeclevaCaizzi(1992).471ACTC2447120/03/2006,04:12PM\njacquesbrunschwighasthewisdom(sophosesti)toknow(eidenai)tothehighestdegreethathegraspsnothingfirmly(kateilEptai);andevenwithrespecttothingsheknows,heissoscrupu-lous(gennaios)thathegiveshisassentnomoretotheaffirmationthantothedenial”(LS71C3).Aenesidemus’scomplaintsagainsttheAcademicsmay,itappears,besummarizedasfollows:1.Theyaredogmatic,inthesensethattheyunhesitatinglyassertcertainthingsandunambiguouslydenyothers.Whichthings?Accordingtothecontextofthispassage(LS71C5–6),atleastgeneralmeta-dogmaticclaimslike“allthingsareungraspable”(orevenlike“allthingsaregraspable”),andnodoubtalsodogmaticclaimsaboutthisorthatparticularthing.2.ThemostrecentAcademics,especially,hadadoptedmanyStoicdogmas,tothepointwheretheirdiscussionsgavetheimpressionof“StoicsfightingwithStoics”(LS71C9).Theonlyremainingboneofcontentionwasthefamous“cognitive12impression”(phantasiakataleptikE),theStoiccriterionoftruth.3.TheAcademicsareunawarethattheirnegativemeta-dogmaticassertionsand13theirpositivedogmaticonesareinmutualconflict(LS71C11–12).Onallthesepoints,AenesidemusregardsthePyrrhonists,“aporeticandfreefromalldogma,”asunassailable.1.Theyeschewallgeneralmetadogmaticclaimslike“allthingsareungraspable,”“inaccessible,”“graspable,”or“accessible,”oreven“someareaccessible.”Aenesidemusrecommendssayinginstead:“theyarenomoreaccessiblethaninaccessible,ortheyaresometimesaccessibleandsometimesnot,ortheyareaccessibletothismanandnottothatone.”2.Theyalsoeschewallparticulardogmaticclaims,especially,ofcourse,allthoseoftheStoicsaboutethical,epistemological,orothermatters.Theformularecom-mendedbyAenesidemusisthereforethatthings“arenomorethisthanthat,orthattheyaresometimesthisandsometimesnot,orthattheyarethisforthismanbutnotforthatone,andevenentirelynonexistentforthisthirdone.”NoticethedifferencesbetweentheformulasrecommendedbyAenesidemusandthosefavoredbyPyrrho:whilesomeofthelatter(“eachthingatonceisFandisnotF,”“itneitherisFnorisnotF”)seemtoviolatetheprinciplesofnon-contradictionandexcludedmiddle,AenesidemusseemstowanttoacknowledgeAristotle’sre-finementstohisformulationofthefirstone(Met.G.3,1005b19:“itisimpossibleforthesamepredicatetobelongtothesamesubjectatthesametimeandinthesamerelation.”)12.Adetailcertainlyworthsettingnexttothethesis(puzzlinginanycase)attributedtotheAcademicPhiloofLarissa,whoassertedthat“insofarasoneconsiderstheStoiccriterion,thatis,thecognitiveimpression,thingsareungraspable,butthat,insofarasoneconsidersthenatureofthingsthemselves,theyaregraspable”(PH1.235).13.Thetextisuncertain.Onadifficultpoint,LongandSedleyadoptanemendationsuggestedinconversationbyF.Sandbach.472ACTC2447220/03/2006,04:12PM\npyrrhonism3.Finally,AenesidemusclaimsthatthePyrrhonistpositioniscompletelyconsistent.NotonlydoesitavoidthecontradictionshedetectedintheAcademicposition,itisalsoforearmedagainstatypeofcontradictionwithwhichsome“skepticizing”formulationsareconstantlycharged:howcanonesay“IknowthatIknownoth-ing,”“IaffirmthatIaffirmnothing”?Afewrareancientphilosophers,sensitivetodistinctionsinlevelsofknowledgeandlanguage,hadfoundsuchclaimsperfectly1415acceptable;others,muchmorenumerous,hadfoundthemtotallyinadmissible.Aenesidemusisclearlyalignedwiththelattergroup;buttoavoidthedifficulty,heseemstohaveexploredtwodistinctpaths.Theonethatwastofindthegreatestfavorinthelaterhistoryofskepticismconsistedinincludingskepticalpronouncementswithintheirownscope:accordingtoAenesidemus,“thePyrrhonistdeterminesabsolutelynothing,noteventhisveryclaimthatnothingisdetermined.”Butheaddsasome-whatembarrassedcomment,seeminglyawarethatheispressinganinnovationtothelimitsofthesayable:“Weputitthisway,forlackofawaytoexpressthethought”(LS71C8).Anothersolution,whichdidnothavethesamesuccess,issketchedinthepassagecitedabove(LS71C3):ittakesadvantageoftheshadesofmeaningdistin-guishingdifferentcognitiveterms,inproportiontotheirforceinordinaryusageorintheirtechnicalemploymentbythisorthatphilosophicalschool.Ordinaryverbsofknowing,e.g.,eidenaiandgignOskein,thustakeonaweakersensebytheirverycon-trastwiththosetowhichStoicusagehadtypicallygivenastrongerone,suchaskatalambanein(“tograsp”)andsunkatatithesthai(“togiveone’sassent”).Henceitisnolongercontradictorytosaythatone“knows,”inaweaksense,thatonecan“knownothing,”inastrongone.DidAenesidemussucceedinhisprojectofconstructinga“Pyrrhonism”genuinely“freefromalldogma?”Itmustbeadmitted,ifweexaminethesummaries(verybriefones,tobesure)thatPhotiusgaveofhisPyrrhonistDiscoursesII–VIII,thatAenesidemusdidnotrefrainfrom“unambiguously”denying,notjustthepossibilityofknowingagreatmanythings,buttheveryexistenceof,amongotherthings,severalessential1617toolsintheapparatusofpositivedogmatism,suchastruths,causes,andsigns.ThelacunaeorindefinitenessinAenesidemus’sPyrrhonismmayalsoexplainoneofthemostenigmaticfeaturesofhisreputation:hisrelationtoHeraclitus.AtPH1.210,SextusreportsthataccordingtoAenesidemus,skepticismisa“path”towardthephilo-sophyofHeraclitus:ifcontrarypropertiesappeartobelongtothesamething,then,itseems,oneisbutastepfromthinkingthattheyactuallybelongtothesamething,inaccordancewiththedoctrinetraditionallycreditedtoHeraclitus.Sextuscallsthis18slide“absurd,”buthedoesnotsaythatAenesidemusthoughtitso.Itisdoubtless14.Socrates,accordingtoArcesilaus(Cic.Acad.I.45);theStoicAntipater(Acad.II.28).15.MetrodorusofChios(M7.88),Arcesilaus(Cic.Acad.I.45),Carneades(Acad.II.28).16.Aenesidemus’sEightModesagainstcauseshavebeenpreservedinPH1.180–185.17.ForabriefdiscussionofthePyrrhonistsonsigns,seeModrak,philosophyoflanguage,inthisvolume.18.Moreover,Sextusseveraltimesmentionsopinions,definitelydogmatic,whichheattributesto“AenesidemusinaccordancewithHeraclitus.”Herewecandonomorethanmentionthisformulation,overwhichmuchinkhasbeenspilled.473ACTC2447320/03/2006,04:12PM\njacquesbrunschwigunderstandablethattheauthoroftheTenModeswastemptedeithertoslideinthiswayhimselforatleasttounderstandthatotherscouldhave:forif,forexample,thesamethingXappearsFtoAandnotFtoB,itiseasytosupposethatthisisnotjustbecauseAisdisposedinonewayandBinanother,butalsobecauseXhassomeintrinsicpropertythatexplainswhyitappearsFtopeoplewhoaredisposedasAis,andsomeotherpropertythatexplainswhyitappearsnotFtopeopledisposedasBis.AgrippaAftertheverymodestenlightenmentaffordedusbytheAenesidemeanevidence,wearefortunate,sotospeak,toknowalmostnothingofAgrippa,nodoubtthegreatestofthePyrrhonists.Historically,hestandssomewherebetweenAenesidemusandSextus;andhiscontributiontoPyrrhonismconsists,forus,inafewlinesexpoundingtheFiveModesheintroduced,nottosupplanttheTenofAenesidemusbuttocompleteandenrichthem.TheseModesareattributedtohimbyD.L.9.88–89.Sextusgivesabarelylesscompressedaccount,attributingthemmerelytothe“mostrecent”skeptics.ThispassagefromSextusisundoubtedly,alongwithTA,theonlytextthatcanandmustbecitedinfull,unparaphrased,inanexpositionofPyrrhonism.Hereitis(inaversionthatnothingassuresusisfromthehandofAgrippahimself):[1]Themodebasedondissonance(diaphOnia)leadsustofindthatwithregardtothematterunderdiscussiontherehasarisenbothamongordinarypeopleandamongthe19philosophersanundecidedconflictbecauseofwhichweareunableeithertochooseathingorrejectit,andsofallbackonepochE.[2]TheModebaseduponinfiniteregressisthatwherebyweassertthatthethingadducedasaproofofthematterproposedneedsafurtherproof,andthisagainanother,andsoontoinfinity,sothattheconsequenceisepochE,aswepossessnostartingpointforourargument.[3]Themodebasedonrelativ-20ity,aswehavealreadysaid,isthatwherebytheobjecthassuchorsuchanappearanceinrelationtothesubjectjudgingandtoobjectsconsideredatthesametime,butastoitsrealnatureweadoptepochE.[4]WehavethemodebasedonhypothesiswhentheDog-matists,beingforcedintoaninfiniteregress,takeastheirstarting-pointsomethingwhichtheydonotestablishbyargumentbutclaimtoassumeasgrantedsimplyandwithout21demonstration.[5]TheModeofcircularreasoningistheformusedwhentheproofitselfwhichoughttoestablishthematterofinquiryrequiresconfirmationderivedfromthatmatter;inthiscase,beingunabletoassumeeitherinordertoestablishtheother,weadoptepochEwithrespecttoboth.(PH1.164–169,Trans.byJ.B.Bury,slightlymodified)LiketheAenesidemeanmodes,Agrippa’sare“modesofepochE”:theeffectofeachindividuallyistopushustowardepochE,asindicatedbymostoftheformulasterminat-ingtheparticularaccounts.Buttheirscopeisdistinctlymoreuniversal:theyallowusnotjusttoexploitallsortsofconflictsamongsensibleappearances,butalsotoundermineanyseriesofargumentswhateverthatpurportstoreachadeterminate19.anepikritos:onthistranslation,seebelow.20.SeePH1.135–140,inthecontextofadiscussionoftheTenModesofAenesidemus.21.hodediallElos:literally,“theonethroughtheotherandtheotherthroughtheone.”474ACTC2447420/03/2006,04:12PM\npyrrhonism22conclusiononanydisputedquestionatall,whateveritsnature.Furthermore,adetailgiveninpassingintheaccountofMode4showsthattheModesofAgrippacouldalsofunctionincombinationwitheachother:whenthedogmatist,forcedbyMode2intoaninfiniteregress,resortstoassumingahypothesisthathetakesforgranted,theskepticcanthenmeethimwiththespecificcriticismofthismoverecom-mendedbyMode4.BasedonthisisolatedremarkandseveralargumentspressedhereandtherebySextus,Agrippahasbeencelebratedforconstructing,inhisModes,aphilosophicalnetthatleavesthedogmatistnoescape,whateverpropositionhemayundertaketodefend.RightaftertheexpositionoftheseModes(hereafter,E),Sextussetshimselftoshow,ineffect,that“allmattersunderinquirymaybereduced(anagein)tothese[Five]Modes”(PH1.170–177,hereafter,A).ButtherelationbetweenthepassagesAandEisstrangeinmultiplerespects,tothepointwherethebestpresent-daycommentatorontheFiveModeshasrenouncedtheuseofA,preferringtoreconstructamodifiedversionoftheAgrippan“net”onphilosophicallyfirmerfoundations(Barnes,1990,pp.114ff.)Whilereferringthereadertothismagisterialstudy,towhichIowemuch,Ishallhereproposeadifferentreadingexercise,onewhosemoremodestandcertainlysketchierpurposewillbetoshow,bycomparingcertaindetailsofAandE,thatAgrippadidnothimselfdeliver,alongwiththeFiveModesdescribedinE,thesystematicmethodofapplyingthemthatApurportstogive.Perhapshewasunabletodoso,ordidnotwishto,oragainperhapshiswordsandpersonalcommentarieswerenottransmittedtohissuccessors.ItwillemergefromthisexercisethatinthelaterhistoryofPyrrhonismtheModesofAgrippa,despitetheircrystallineclarity,werethetopicofreflectiveandcoordinatingwork–ratherlaboriouswork,whosetracesareallthemoreinterestingfortheirveryuncertainty.Herefollowafewremarksalongthisline:1.UnlikeE,whichneitherdoesnorneedstoconcernitselfwiththis,AaimstoshowthatMode1,thatofdiaphOnia(“dissonance”),appliestoallmattersofinquiry.A,therefore,prefacestheexpositionofthismodewithauniversaldemonstration.Butthisdemonstrationproceeds,oddlyenough,byapartitionofthedomaininquestion:allmattersofinquiryare“sensible”or“intelligible”(perhapsrather,in23Sextus’svocabulary,perceptibleorimperceptible);now,thereisdissonanceabouteverythingthatexists(onlythesensible?Oronlytheintelligible?Orboth?);there-foredissonanceuniversallyaffectsallmattersofinquiry.2.InE,Mode1comesintoplaywhenwe“find(heuriskomen)thatwithregardtothematterunderdiscussiontherehasarisen(gegenEmenEn)bothamongordinary22.TheirconnectionwiththedifficultiesraisedbyAristotleregardingthepossibilityofdemonstrativescienceingeneral(APo.I.3)hasbeennotedseveraltimes.Inparticular,seeBarnes(1990,pp.120–2).OndemonstrativescienceinAristotle,seeDetel,aristotle’slogicandtheoryofscience,inthisvolume.23.PerhapswehavehereakindofinjectionofAenesidemusintoAgrippa(seethebeginningofPhotius’ssummary:“thereisnofirmbasisforcognitivegrasping,neitherbysensationnorbythought”LS71C1).Nodoubtonecouldsaythesameaboutthemodeofrelativity,whichalreadyfitsratheruneasilyintotheTenModesofAenesidemus(seeAnnasandBarnes,1985,pp.130–45)andfitsstillmoreuneasilyintoEaswellasintoA.Butwecannotpursuethispointhere.475ACTC2447520/03/2006,04:12PM\njacquesbrunschwigpeopleandamongthephilosophersananepikritosconflict.”Thewordanepikritosisambiguous:itcanmeaneither“undecided”or“undecidable”(seeBarnes,1990,pp.17–20).Here,thecontextinvitesthetranslation“undecided”:theexistenceoftheconflictanditsanepikritoscharacterareintherealmoffacts,aboutwhichonefindsthattheyhaveheld.Arethere“decided”conflicts?Thetextsaysnothingofthem,andwithgoodreason;forMode1issupposedtoleaddirectlytoepochE,and“decided”conflicts,ifsuchthingsexisted,couldhardlyhavethateffect.Ontheotherhand,Aexplicitlydistinguishesdissonancesaccordingtowhethertheyareepikritosoranepikritos,andthatisnolesseasilyunderstood:ananepikritosdis-sonanceimmediatelyinducessuspension,asinE;butanepikritosdissonance(thatis,onethatadogmatistwouldcallepikritos)mustbetakenunderconsidera-tion,foritisinthisdialecticalsituationthattheskepticwillaskhisadversarytotellhim“whatwouldbetheoriginofthedecision”;onthebasisoftheanswer,dependingonitscontent,hewillbringtobeartheotherModesbesidesMode1.Themanyfuture-tenseverbsfoundinA(“Whatwillthedogmatistssay,fromwherewilltheyobtaintheirdecision–willitbefromasensible,orfromanintel-ligible?”)revealthatthequestionisnowwhetherthematterunderdiscussionisdecidable(as,inprinciple,thedogmatistmaintains)orundecidable(astheskeptic,thankstohissetofModes,takeshimselftobeabletoestablish).Twodistinctversionsofskepticismareencapsulated,itseemstome,inthisshiftofmeaning:inE,thesituationofundecidedconflictpsychologicallyinducesadefactoepochE;inA,thesituationofundecidableconflictrationallyinducesadejureepochE.3.Thepartition,introducedatthebeginningofA,betweensensibleandintelligiblemakesitseffectfeltintherestofthepassage.Amongothers,Mode2,thatofinfiniteregress,isexplainedseparatelydependingonwhethertheregressaffectstermsthatareallsensible(§171)orallintelligible(§176),whichisagratuitousrestrictionontheconceptofaninfiniteregress.Similarly,therelativityofsensiblestosensingsubjectsandthatofintelligiblestothinkingsubjectsare,withoutanyparticularneed,notedseparately(§§175and177).Finallyandaboveall,AshowsthatMode4prohibitsthedogmatistfrompositingahypothesistakenforgranted,andfromthusescapingthepincersinwhichhewascaughtbythejointoperation24ofMode2andMode5;butAshowsthistwiceinarow,inmuchthesameterms,onceforthesensible(§172),thenfortheintelligible(§176).Theimport-ancethisconfersonMode4,incontrasttoitslessprominentroleinE,wouldcertainlyexplainwhythereasonsforitsparticularforcemightbeexpoundedinAwithafairlyunwontedwealthofdetail(§§173–174).4.Wealsofindanon-negligibledifferencebetweenEandAintheiraccountsofMode5,thediallElos.InE,thismodeisdefinedinclearandsimpleterms:thereisdiallElos,thatis,reciprocalreasoning,whentwopropositionsaresetforthasbeingsorelatedthatoneisjustifiedbytheotherandtheotherbythefirst.Themorecomplexcaseofcircularreasoning,inwhichaseriesofpropositionsloopsbacktoitsfirstmember,isnotmentioned.Nevertheless,whetherreciprocalorcircularreasoningisinquestion,thepropositionsthateffecttheclosureofthediallElosarethemselvesindividuallythesameineachoftheiroccurrences.InA,ontheother24.WhichAmentionsinproximitytoeachother(§172),surelyforthisreason.476ACTC2447620/03/2006,04:12PM\npyrrhonismhand,thenotionofthediallElosistransformedbytheinitialdistinctionbetweensensibleandintelligible:first,itsjointoperationwithinfiniteregressispresentedtwiceover(§172forsensibles,§176forintelligibles);next,andaboveall,Apre-supposesthatdiallElosisalreadypresentwhenapropositionbelongingtooneofthesetwotypes(e.g.,thesensiblepropositionSP1)isjustifiedbyapropositionbelongingtotheother(say,IP1),thenconversely(IP1beingjustifiedinturnbyapropositiondistinctfromSP1butofthesametype,say,SP2),andsoon,sothataseriesofalternatingborrowingsfromthetwotypesSPandIPherecountsasakindofdiallElos.Thisis,attheveryleast,adegenerateuseoftheconceptofdiallElos.Thesefewremarks,andothersonemightadd,showataminimumthattheauthorofA(nomatterwhetheritisSextusofoneofhissources)isnotthatofE.ThegreatAgrippaleftsomethingtobeworkedonbyhissuccessors,andtheymadeofitwhattheycould.SextusEmpiricusForus,ashewasthroughouthistory,SextusEmpiricusisthelastandmostimportantsourceforancientskepticism.Heiseulogizedattheendoftheskeptical“succession”inD.L.9.116;andheistheonlyancientskepticwhoseworkhasbeeninlargeparttransmittedtous.Sinceithasbeenpreserved,wemayaswellsayafewwordsaboutit.Themanu-scripttraditiondivideshiswritingsintotwoworks:1.OutlinesofPyrrhonism(PyrrhOneioihupotupOseis=PH),inthreebooks(BookI:“general”presentationofskepticalphilosophy;BooksIIandIII:“special”presenta-tion,articulatedaccordingtothedivisiontraditionalintheHellenisticschools,logicinII,physicsandethicsinIII);2.AgainsttheProfessors(ortheScientists)(ProsmathEmatikous=Adversusmathematicos=M),inelevenbooks.ItisacknowledgedthatMbringstogethertwodistinctworks.MBooks1–6(towhichnothingcorrespondsinPH)successivelycriticizestheartscharacteristicoftraditionaleducation,namely,tobeginwith,twofutureelementsofthemedievaltrivium,gram-25marandrhetoric,thenfourdisciplinesthatmorevaguelyheraldthefuturequadrivium,26geometry,arithmetic,astrology(notastronomy),andmusic.M7–11reproducesthetripartiteHellenisticdivisionofPH2–3:logic(7–8),physics(9–10),ethics(11).M7–11hadbeenprecededbyageneralpresentationofskepticism,whichwasnot27PH1butcorrespondedtoitinthesamewaythatM7–11correspondstoPH2–3.25.Thethirddisciplineofthetrivium,logic,findsitsplaceinthedifferingorganizationofM7–11.26.Cf.Plato,Prt.318e.27.SeeJanácek’snumerousstudies,esp.1963.Abibliography,completetothedateofitspublication,istobefoundinBarnes(1992,pp.4298–9).477ACTC2447720/03/2006,04:12PM\njacquesbrunschwigThisgeneralpresentationhasnotbeenpreserved,whichisobviouslyagreatpitybutmaybeasignthat,atsomepointorinsomeeyes,PH1hadcometoberegardedasmakingitotiosetopreservethebooksthatcorrespondedtoit.OneofthehistoricallyimportantfeaturesofSextus’workisthusthatitincludes,onalargenumberoftopics,severaldifferenttreatmentsofthesametheme.Thesedoubletshaveturnedtheattentionofscholarstoproblemsofsources–DidSextusdrawondifferentsources?Didheworkoutdifferenttreatmentsonthebasisofthesamesources?WhataretherelationsbetweenhissourcesandthoseofDiogenesLaertius289.61–116?–andtoproblemsofchronology–asbetweenM7–11andPH2–3,whichwascomposedfirst?Whichdidtheauthorwritewiththeotheroneathand?InthewakeofJanácek’smeticulousinvestigations,amoreorlessgeneralcon-sensushadariseninfavorofdatingthecompositionofPHbeforethatofM.ThecriteriausedbyJanácek,essentiallybasedoncomparisonsofstyle,vocabulary,andconnect-ingparticlesinparallelpassages,wereatokenofobjectivity;toaspiretocriticizesocarefullyconstructedamonumentinafewlineswouldobviouslyberidiculous.Letussimplyremarkthataparticulardifferenceofstyleorvocabularyintwoparallelpassagesmaybeascompatiblewiththeanteriorityoftheoneasoftheother:iftextA,forexample,usesamorevariedvocabularythantextB,thatmaybebecauseSextus,takingaccountoftheliterarygenresandpedagogicalpurposesofhisdifferentworks,wantedtosimplifyhisvocabularyinwritingB,orbecausehewantedtoembellishitinwritingA.Furthermore,recentcommentatorswhohaveapproachedthechronolog-icalproblemsusingphilosophicalcriteria(ofclarity,coherence,conceptualprecision)29haveoftenreachedconclusionscontrarytoJanácek’s.ItseemsthewindisbeginningtoshiftonthequestionofSextianchronology.Theproblemisnotpurelyscholarly.Inthetraditionalview,PHreallywasan“outline,”ayouthfulessay,introductoryandnotverypersonalincharacter;M7–11,bycontrast,wasthemagnumopusofalifetimeofwork,a“summa”ofancientskepticism.Doxographyandthecollectionofargumentsandcounter-argumentsnaturallyhav-ingagreatpartinit,Sextusessentiallyappearedasadoxographerandcompiler.ThereversalofthechronologicalrelationbetweenM7–11andPHmaybeatoncetheeffectandthecauseofanewestimationofPH.The“progress”and“improve-ments”detectableinitrelativetoM,whetherinthegeneralorganizationofitscontents,inthechoiceandformulationofarguments,inthedefinitionofconcepts,orinanyotherarea,donotentail,tobesure,thatPHislaterthanM:SextuscouldhaveusedbettersourceswhenhecomposedPH;and,afterall,laterworksarenotnecessarilybetterthanyouthfulones.Atanyrate,thedetectionofthis“progress”hasencouragedare-readingofPH,freedfromtheobsessionwithchronology,butnot30withoutphilosophicalimpact.28.Onthismatter,whichwemusthereleaveaside,thebestaccountisthatofBarnes(1992).29.Forafewdetailedstudies,seeGlidden(1983);Brunschwig(1994,1995);Bett(1997).Forfullertreatments,seeBett(2000);Dye(2001).30.Are-readingattestedbyseveralrecenttranslations:AnnasandBarnes(1994);Mates(1995);Pellegrin(1997).Byacoincidencethatisdoubtlessreallynotone,ithappenedthatduringthepreparationofthischapterIhadoccasiontoreadtwocompletelyindependentun-publishedstudies:Johnsen(2001),andDye(2001).Bothbeginbythrowingintorelief,throughacitationandacommentary,the“crucial”passagePH1.4,whichhasnoequivalentinM.478ACTC2447820/03/2006,04:12PM\npyrrhonismTheexegeticalbenefitisparadoxicallytwofold.WhenSextustreatsthesamesubjecttwice,onereadsthePHversionwithrenewedcare,withoutpresupposingthattheMversionmustbeourtouchstone.AndwhereSextushasnotleftusdoublets,asinthecaseofPH1,onepaysthemoreattentiontotheonlysurvivingversion.Sextus’workisabundant,generallywellwritten,withamanifestandconstantpedagogicalcare;nothingcanreplacereadingandstudyingitforoneself.IfwewishedneverthelesstocharacterizeschematicallytheversionofPyrrhonismitpresents,wewoulddrawattention,assuggestedattheoutset,totheimportanceofthedefensiveeffortitembodies,bycontrastwiththeconstructionoftheoffensivearsenalofPyrrhon-ism,sofaraswehavebeenabletotraceitbycallingupthegreatfiguresofPyrrho,Timon,Aenesidemus,andAgrippa.TheobjectionsagainstwhichPyrrhonismhasalwayshadtodefenditselfareessen-tiallyoftwokinds:onthetheoreticallevel,ithasbeenchargedwithbeingincoherent,orevenself-refuting;onthepracticallevel,ithasbeenaccusedof“makinglifeimpos-sible,”inthesensethatifonewishedtorefrain(andifonereallycouldrefrain)fromholdinganyopinions,astheskepticrecommendsandclaimstodo,onecouldneitherlivenoract:howcanoneliveoractwithoutbelievingthatthedooristotherightandthewindowtotheleft?Howcanone“liveone’sskepticism”?Onecannodoubtthinkinskepticalfashionatcertaintimes,andlivelikeeveryoneelseatothers;butone31cannotdobothatonce.Asconcernstheaccusationofincoherence,thegravestobjectionagainstwhichthePyrrhonistshadtodefendthemselvesinantiquitywasnotthattheyupheldone32propositionhere,whiletheywereupholdinganotherthatcontradictedit.Moreformidable,itseems,wastheaccusationthattheirassertions“refutethemselves.”Strangelyenough,theirreactiontothischargestillremainstodaythesubjectofan“undecideddissonance”amongthecommentators.Itismostoftenmaintainedthat,farfromrejectingtheaccusation,theskepticsacceptedit,evenwithpleasure,while3334specifyingthattheirformulasandarguments,eveniftheydorefutethemselves,dosoonlyafterhavingrefutedwhattheyweresupposedtorefute.Sextusfrequentlyemploys,inthiscontext,thefamousmetaphorsofpurgativedrugsthateliminatethem-selvesafterhavingeliminatednoxioushumors,ofthefirethatconsumesitselfafterhavingconsumeditsfuel,or(thisonetakenupagainbyWittgenstein)oftheladderthatonekicksawayafterusingittoclimbontothewall.Thesemetaphorsenabledthe31.SeeBurnyeat([1980b],1983)reconsideringHume’s“challenge.”32.Modernanalyses,basedasmuchonhistoricalasonphilosophicalconsiderations,aremoredemandingonthispoint.Cf.Barnes(1992,pp.4252ff).Onaparticularpoint,Bett(1997,incorporatedalsoin2000,p.212)hasshownthatinM11,thebookdedicatedtothecriticismofthemoralists,Sextusdistancedhimselffromhis“official”positionbymaintaining,notthatweshouldsuspendjudgmentaboutwhatisreallygoodorbad(iftherebesuch),butthatnothingisreally,orbynature,goodorbad.ThiswouldseemtobeavestigeofAenesidemus’sposition.33.Forexample,thefamoussloganswhoseauthenticallyskepticalmeaningisspecifiedbySextusatPH1.187–208.34.Forexample,theformidablepuzzleconstitutedbythedemonstrationthattherearenodemonstrations(cf.PH2.188andM8.480).479ACTC2447920/03/2006,04:12PM\njacquesbrunschwigskepticbothtobenefit,inafirstapplication,fromtheanti-dogmaticefficacyofskepticalformulations,andtoremove,inasecond,thedogmaticstatustheirveryassertionthreatenedtogivethem.Nonetheless,thisinterpretationhasrecentlybeencriticized,withnoteworthyarguments,byCastagnoli(2000),whoundertakestoshowthatSextus,farfromadmittingtothechargeofself-refutation,perfectedaverysubtlemeans35ofrejectingit.Imentionthisdiscussion,whichcannotbesummarizedhere,onlybecauseitpro-videsanoccasiontomentionadetailwhichitsprotagonistshaveperhapsnottakensufficientlyintoaccount,andwhichIshouldliketoexploitinclosing.Sextusdedicatesaparticularlyimportantchapter(PH1.3–15)tothequestion:“Doestheskepticdog-matize?”Inthestrongsenseoftheterm“dogmatize,”ofcourse,hisanswerisnegative.Insupportofthisanswer,hefirstadvances,intwoslightlydifferentforms,the“self-cancellation”argument:“aformulasuchas‘Nomore(thisthanthat)’(oudenmallon)assertsthatititselfis,likealltherest,‘nomore(thisthanthat),’andthuscancelsitself(sumperigraphei)alongwiththerest”(1.14).Nevertheless,Sextusatonceadds:“And,mostimportantofall(todemegiston),inhisenunciationoftheseformulastheskeptic36stateswhatappearstohimself(toheautOiphainomenon)andannounceshisownim-pression(pathos)withoutexpressinganopinion(adoxastOs),withoutmakinganyposi-tiveassertionregardingtheexternalrealities.”(1.15,trans.Bury,slightlymodified.)Itisnodoubtlegitimatetolayparticularemphasisonthetransition(“Andmostimportantofall”)thatseparatestheself-cancellationargumentfromwhatIshall37callthe“apangelia”argument.Thistransitionintimatesthat,beyondtherefinedmaneuversofself-cancellation,theapangeliaremainsthehightrumpinSextus’defens-ivegame,theargumentwhich,atthelimit,makestheothersneedless.Furthermore,hehastenedrightfromthestartinthePH(1.4)tothrowtheapangeliaoverthewhole38ofhisworklikeaprotectiveshield:“Ourtaskatpresent,”hewrites,“istodescribeinoutline(hupotupOtikOs)theskepticdoctrine,firstpremisingthatofnoneofourfuturestatementsdowepositivelyaffirmthatthefactisexactlyaswestateit,butwesimplyreport(apangellomen)eachfact,likeachronicler(historikOs),asitappearstousatthemoment(katatonunphainomenonhEmin).”(Trans.Bury,slightlymodified.)Thusplayingtheapangeliacard,theskepticrendershimselfinvulnerable:ifhedoesnotclaimthedignityof“objective”truthforanassertionthatmerelymakespublicwhatappearsso(phainomenon)tohimand“reports”thepathosthatheundergoes,35.HisdistinctionbetweenperitropE(“self-refutation”)andperigraphE(“self-cancellation”)particularlymeritsreflection.Hementions(p.264,n.3)theprincipaldefendersofthepositionhecriticizes,amongothersBurnyeat(1980b),Hankinson(1995),andespeciallyMcPherran(1987),hismaintarget.36.Apangellei:onecouldalsotranslate“reports”or“tells.”37.Theword(whichevokestheideaof“message”,or“news”–nottomention“angel”and“evangel”)appearsonlyinPH,neglectingtwoirrelevantoccurrencesinM2.OutsideSextus’swork,ithasaninterestingequivalentintheexomologEseis(“avowals”)invokedinthesamecontextinD.L.9.104.38.Thispluralform,likethosethatfollow,posesaproblemthatseemstohavebeenbarelystudied.WhetheritdenotestheauthorofPHinparticular(asissurelythecasehere)oralltheskepticscollectively(asissurelythecaseelsewhere),canSextusknowthatwhatappearssotohimisalsowhatappearssotothem?480ACTC2448020/03/2006,04:12PM\npyrrhonismhowcanhebepersuadedthatheiswrongtohavetheimpressionthathehas,ortoundergotheexperiencethathedoes?Thedogmatist“willshowhimselfrash,by39tryingtoupsetanotherman’spathosbydiscourse;forjustasnobodycanbydis-courseconvincethejoyfulmanthatheisnotjoyful,orthemaninpainthatheisnotinpain,sonobodycanconvincethemanwhoisconvincedthatheisnotconvinced.”(M8.475,trans.Bury,slightlymodified.)Thisdiscreetbutdecisiveassimilationofthecaseofintellectualpathostothatofaffectivepathosenablestheskeptictodisarmallofhisadversaries’argumentsinadvance.Theothersideofthecoinisthathisownargumentsareinnobettercase.Butthisisaconsequenceheisreadytoaccept.InapassageattheendofPH3(280–281)thathasnotalwaysbeentakenseriouslyenough,hepresentshimself,likethephysicianheis,asa“philanthropist,”wishingto“curebylogos,asbesthecan,self-conceitandrashness,”i.e.,typicaldogmaticailments(trans.Bury,slightlymodified).Justasthedoctorappliesremediesofvariousstrengthstothesick,accordingtotheseverityoftheirillness,sodoestheskepticusestrongeror“milder”argumentsdependingonthedegreeofthedogmatists’afflictions.Itisnotoutofthequestionthatsomedogmatists,likesomepatients,areincurable:thedutyofthehealerofsouls,asofthebody,istotakegoodcare,nottoproduceresults(Arist.Top.I.3,101b5–10).Itisthereforepossible,onthetheoreticallevel,forthedebatebetweenskepticsanddogmatiststoresult,afteravehementexchangeofargumentsandcounter-arguments,inakindofdraw.Butifthesuperiorityofskepticismtodogmatismdoesnot(andcannot)consistinitsgreatertruthaboutmattersaboutwhichdogmatismpretendstobetrue,theninwhatdoesitconsist?Wecansuggestthefollowinganswer:itconsistsinskepticism’sgreaterethicalefficacy.Pyrrhonismwas,fromthestart,aprogramforhappiness,andseemsnevertohaveforgottenit(exceptperhapswithAgrippa,buthowcanweknow?).Thequestion,fromthatmomentforward,wasthefollowing:inwhatwayisonehappywhenoneisaskeptic,andinwhatwayisonehappierwhenoneisaskepticthanwhenoneisnot?Toanswerthisquestion,theskepticmustfirstfreehimselffromthechargeofapraxia,the“impossibilityofacting”towhichhisskepticismwouldsupposedlycondemnhim:forhowcanheclaimtobehappyifhisprinciplesprecludethoseminimalconditionsofhappinessthattheverypossibilityoflivingandofactingseemtobe?Sextusappearsnottobeverytroubledbythisobjection;iftheskepticsuspendsjudgmentregardingtheexistenceofacriterionoftruth,stillheavailshimselfofacriterionofaction–appearance–thatoffersnooccasionfortheslightestinvestigation,sinceitconsistsinaninvoluntarypathos(PH1.23–24):Adheringthentoappearances,weliveinaccordancewiththenormalrulesoflife,undogmatically(adoxastos),seeingthatwecannotremainentirelyinactive(anenergetoi).Anditwouldseemthatthisregulationoflifeisfourfold,andthatonepartofitliesintheguidanceofNature,anotherintheconstraintoftheaffects,anotherinthetraditionoflawsandcustoms,anotherintheinstructionofthearts.(Trans.Bury,slightlymodified)Theskepticdoesnotclaimthatthisconformismwillmakehimhappy;itwillmerelyallowhimnottobeinactive,andhencetolive,evenifnottolivewell(hiscriterionof39.Or“argument”(logos);similarlyinthefollowinglines.481ACTC2448120/03/2006,04:12PM\njacquesbrunschwigactionisnotamoralcriterion,PH1.17).Itisjustamatterofremovingapreliminaryobstacle,notofachievingtheend.HowthenarewetounderstandwhatenablesPyrrhonismtopresentitself(rightly40orwrongly)asbetterplacedthanitsrivalstoassurethehappinessofitsadepts?Forthatresult,thereseemtobetwonecessaryconditionswhosejointsatisfactionisnotamatterofcourse:inonesense,theattainmentofPyrrhonisthappinessmustdependonus,andonlyonus,onourwork,onourefforts;and,inadifferentsense,thishappinessmustbeunhopedfor,surpassingwhatonecannormallyexpectofthehumancon-dition.Althoughwehavehadtogivethelargestroleinthischaptertotheoreticalskepticism,itisrighttonote,atleastbriefly,thatthePyrrhonistsalsoworkedagreatdealinthefieldofethics,astherathertempestuoushistoryoftheirreflectionsonthetelos(thesovereign“end”ofhumanexistence)mayshow.Throughatleastoneofhisaspects(his“guru”side),Pyrrhohadsetthebarveryhigh:itisnodoubtwithrespecttohimthatitwaswonderedwhetherhis“end”was41ornotapatheia,theabsenceofallaffectandfeeling.Thetermataraxia(“imperturb-ability”),whichfiguresamongthe“benefits”ofthePyrrhonistattitudeaccordingtoTA,mayalreadyrepresentanattenuationofapatheia:foronecan“feel”pathEwithouttherebybeing“troubled”or“perturbed”bythem;theirfurtherhistorywillshowthatthePyrrhonistsdidfulljusticetothisobservation.Inthisfurtherhistory,atleasttwodistinctpositionsmaybediscerned.AccordingtoD.L.9.107,whichattributesthisposition(already)toTimonaswellastoAenesidemus,theendwasnolongerdefinedintermsofamoraldisposition,butratherintermsofanintellectualone:epochEitselfisthe“end”oftheskeptics(seealsoPH1.30),probablybecauseitcanbeachievedbymeansofadialecticalcompetencethatitisuptoustoacquire.Stillataraxia,themoraldispositionthatpreviouslyconstitutedtheendbutwhichisnotachievedbymerelyintellectualwork,remainsincloserelationwiththenew“end”:thetextsaysthatit“follows”epochE“likeitsshadow.”Ontheotherhand,thesequelofthispassage(D.L.9.108),whilestillpurportingtobeanexegesisofthepositionattributedtoTimonandAenesidemus,specifiesthatbeyondtherealmofthingsthatdependonlyonus,thereisarealminwhichwenecessarilyundergounavoidablepathE(suchashunger,thirst,andpain),whichimpliesanunavoidablelimitationofthe“maximalist”idealofapatheia.Thedistinctionbetweenthesetworealms,anditsconsequencesforthedefinitionoftheend,reappearinaslightlydifferentforminthechapterSextusdevotestothetelosofskepticism(PH1.25–30).Here,theendovertlydividesintotwocomponents,anintellectualandanaffectiveone,namely,“ataraxiainmattersofopinion”and42“metriopatheia[moderationofaffects]inthoseofunavoidablenecessities.”Butletus40.M11frequentlystressesthesetwocomplementarythemes:adogmatist(whobelievesthatsomethingsaregoodbynatureandothersbadbynature)cannotattaineudaimonia;askeptic,believingnosuchthing,canbythatverymeansattainit.Hewilllive“happilyandunperturbed,”eudaimonOskaiatarachOs(11.118).41.D.L.9.108(whereapatheiaiscontrastedwithpraiotEs,“mildness”).SeealsoCic.Acad.II.42.130:Pyrrhosaidthatthewiseman“doesnotevenfeel”(nesentirequidem=apatheia)thedifferencestowardwhichtheStoicAristoofChiosrecommendedadiaphoria,“indifference.”42.Heretheshyingfromthestandardtermapatheiabecomespatent.482ACTC2448220/03/2006,04:12PM\npyrrhonismconsiderafewmoredetails.Intheremainderofthechapter,wecaninfactdistinguishtwoexplanatorydevelopments(§§26–28and29–30),notpreciselycongruentandeachdedicatedtoexplainingthisdivision.Inthefirstpassage,Sextusfirstexpoundswhatonemightcallthephilosophicalpathtoataraxia.Thefoundersofskepticism(“noblenatures,”asPH1.12describesthem)soughttoattainthisendthroughthediscoveryoftruth,adiscoverysupposedtoputanendto“contradictionsinthings”andtoimpassesininvestigation;but,fallinginto“contradictionsofequalweight,”theyadoptedepochEandthelatterledthem“bychance”(tuchikOs)toataraxiainmattersofopinion(quitegenerally).YetSextusalsoexpoundswhatonemightcallanethicalpathtoataraxia.AmongtheopinionsaffectedquitegenerallybyepochE,oneclassinparticularimmediatelycauses“dis-quiet”(tarachE):thoseinvirtueofwhichwethinkthatsuchandsuchthingsaregood(orbad)“bynature.”If,forexample,oneconsiderssomethingonepossessestobegood“bynature,”onewillbedisquietedbytheideaoflosingit;andifitissomethingonedoesnotpossess,onewillbejustasmuchdisquietedbythedesiretohaveit.Byriddingoneselfofsuch“superadded”opinions,onewillceaseto“strain”intheslightesttopursueortofleewhateveritmaybe:suppressthecauseofyourtarachEandyouwillsuppressitseffect.Byitsspecificeffectonthiskindofopinion,ataraxiacontributes,andcontributesunfailingly,tometriopatheia;thusthetwocomponentsoftheskepticaltelos,ataraxiainmattersofopinionandmetriopatheiaintherealmoftheunavoidable,remainlinked.Inthesecondexplanatorypassage,theseparationbetweenthesesametwocom-ponentsismuchmoredefinite.WhenSextusnowdescribesmetriopatheia,heseemsdeliberatelytoavoidsayingthatthosewhostandinneedofitarevictimsoftarachEandthosewhoattainitenjoyataraxia.Thetermataraxianowoccursonlyinthedescrip-tionofthephilosophicalpath;andthistimetheskepticsaresaidtohavehadthesameexperienceasthepainterApelles,who,despairingofrepresentingahorse’sfrothinhispainting,finallyhurledatthecanvasthespongeheusedtocleanhisbrushes.Thefroth,hopedforanddespairedof,waswonderfullycapturedbythemarkofthesponge.Similarly,forthosewhopracticedepochE,“ataraxiafollowedasifbychance(hoiontuchikOs),asashadowfollowsthebody”(PH1.29,trans.Bury,slightlymodified).Reflectingonthisstriking“collage”oftheinvocationofchance(mentionedbyitselfinD.L.9.107)andtheimageoftheshadow(usedbyitselfinPH1.26),wemightwonderwhetheritwasnotobligatorytochoosebetweenthem;forinfacttheshadowdoesnotfollowthebodybychance,butbynecessity,atleastifthesunisshining.ButperhapsPyrrhonismowesitsuniqueglamourpreciselytotherelation,sosubtlywovenofchanceandnecessity,bywhichitcametolinkitsintellectualcommitmenttoitsmoralbenefit.Afterall,theincidentofthespongebefellnotjustanypainter,butthegreatApelles.Andallthesame,itwashewhohadpaintedthehorse.BibliographyEditions,Translations,CommentariesofAncientTextsAnnas,J.andBarnes,J.(1985).TheModesofScepticism–AncientTextsandModernInterpreta-tions.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.483ACTC2448320/03/2006,04:12PM\njacquesbrunschwig——.(1994).SextusEmpiricus:OutlinesofScepticism.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Bett,R.(1997).SextusEmpi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tion.Itisthankstoan“affective”criterion,pleasure,thatweareabletochooseahappylife,butthislifeisaccessibletousonlythroughtheintermediaryofakindofscienceofhappiness.BecausethesedifficultiesaffecttheveryprinciplesofancientEpicureanism,itisessentialtounder-standhowitsexponentstriedtoresolvethem.ThephilosophicaltraditionfoundedbyEpicurus(341–270bce)isoneofthemosthomogeneousofantiquity.Itdidundergoacertainevolution,owingtosuccessivepolemics,tohistoricalconditions,andtotheliteraryandphilosophicaltemperamentofauthors,particularlyLucretius.Nonetheless,theEpicureans,withoutrenouncingtheirfreedomofspeech,appealconstantlyandwithgreatrespecttotheirfirstteacher.Hewastheauthorofaconsiderablebodyofwork,nowlargelylost.Still,Book10ofDiogenesLaertius’LivesandOpinionscontainsaprecious“lifeofEpicurus”andrepro-ducesthethreephilosophicaltextsthatconstitutethebasisofourdocumentaryevid-ence:theLetterstoHerodotus,Pythocles,andMenoeceus.Thesearefollowedby40PrincipalDoctrinesonethics.ButDiogenesLaertiuscites41titlesofworksbyEpicurusandspecifiesthatheismentioningonlyhisbestworks(10.27–28).Amongthese,OnNature(Periphuseos),in37books,musthavebeenthemostimportantinallrespects.486ACTC2548620/03/2006,04:13PM\nepicureanismWehaveafewfragmentsofit,thankstotheexcavationsatHerculaneumandthe1papyrologicalstudiesbasedonthem.Epicuruswasnotasolitarythinker,andaround306–305hefoundedhisownschool,theGarden,intheimmediateenvironsofAthens.Hisfirst-generationdisciples,especiallyHermarchus,whosucceededtotheheadshipoftheGarden,Colotes,Polystratus,andMetrodorus,contributedtodeepeningthedoctrine.TheinfluenceoftheGardengraduallyextendedbeyondthecircleoffirst-generationdisciplesand,inthefirstcenturybeforeourera,RomebecomesthesiteofanimportantEpicureanrevival,thankstothedebatesbetweenthegreatphilosophicalschools.OurmainEpi-cureanwitnessestothisphenomenonarePhilodemusofGadaraandaboveallLucretius.Theformer,aGreekphilosopherfromSyria,istheauthorofaveryimportantbodyofworkdealingwithethics,aesthetics,politics,logic,theology,andthepositionsofthevariousphilosophicalschools.Thefragmentsofhistreatises,preservedinthepapyriofHerculaneum,constituteasourcethatisdamagedbutverypreciousfordevelopmentsinEpicureanismandforitsnewareasofinterest,suchaspoetryandthehistoryof2philosophicalmovements.WeknowpracticallynothingaboutthelifeofLucretius,andonlythetextofhispoem,OntheNatureofThings(Dererumnatura),allowsustoformanideaofhisphilosophicalproject.Lucretiushimselfclaimstobeameretrans-latororimitatorofEpicurus(Lucr.3.6).Weshallseethathisundeniablefidelityshouldnotconcealagreatformaloriginalityandagenuineintentiontoelaboratethedoc-3trineonseveralfundamentalpoints.Further,wewouldnotunderstandEpicureanismaswellifwedidnothaveavailableexternal,sometimeshostile,sources.TheseincludethevariouspolemicaltreatisesonwhichPlutarchpartlydraws,butalsothetesti-moniesleftusbyCiceroinDeNaturadeorum(Book1)andDefinibusbonorumetmalorum(Books1and2).Finally,thefragmentsofDiogenesofOenanda’smuralinscription,inLycia,attesttothepersistenceoftheEpicureantraditionuntilthesecondcenturyofourownera,eveniftheyarecontemporarywiththeretreatofitsinfluenceinthe4ancientworld.PhysicsTheDemocriteanheritageEpicureanphysicsisbasedonextremelysimpleprinciples:realityisconstitutedbybodiesandvoid;bodiesareeitherindivisible,i.e.,atoms(atoma),orelsecompositesofatoms.Theatomsareunlimitedinnumber,andthevoidinwhichtheymoveisunlimited.Also,theAllitselfisunlimited.Worldsarelikewiseunlimitedinnumber.Theexposi-tionoftheseprinciplestakesupthefirstparagraphs(Hdt.39–44)thatfollowthe1.Theeditionsresultingfromthesestudiesarepublished,forthemostpart,inthejournalCronacheErcolanesiandinthecollection,“LaScuoladiEpicuro,”Naples:Bibliopolis.2.OnPhilodemus’positionintheEpicureantradition,seeAuvrayAssayasandDelattre(2001).3.Onthisquestion,seeSedley(1998).4.FormoreampleinformationontheHellenisticschoolsandquestionsaboutsources,seeErler(1994);andinthisvolumethechaptersbyBénatouïl,philosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimes,andSharples,theproblemofsources.487ACTC2548720/03/2006,04:13PM\npierre-mariemorelprologuetoEpicurus’LettertoHerodotus.Now,thelatteristheauthoritativeepitomeforeveryonewhowantstoacquiretheknowledgeneededforhappiness.Thescienceofnature,oncereducedtoitsessentials,infactpromisesalifefreefromdisturbancetothosewhostudyitsdetails,asitdoestothosewhomasteronlyitsbasicprinciples(Hdt.35–37).InEpicurus’eyes,then,thisexpositionrepresentswhatismostessentialwithintheessential,whatismostelementarywithintheelementary.ThescienceofhappinessthatEpicureanismaimstobuildisthusinthefirstinstanceaphysics.AlthoughEpicurusclaimstodemonstratehisownintellectualautonomyandtobeexclusivelyhisownstudentandnooneelse’s(D.L.10.13),thisphysicaldoctrineis,5initsmainlines,theonethatDemocritusofAbderahadelaboratedbeforehim.Thisindirectconnectionisattestedbyseveralancientsources,especiallyCicero,SextusEmpiricus,andClementofAlexandria.DiogenesLaertius(10.2)evenrelatesthatEpicurusthrewhimselfintophilosophyafterdiscoveringthebooksofDemocritus.Epicurusnonethelessformulatesmanyimplicitcriticismsagainsttherealfounderofatomism,whomhenicknames“Lerocritus,”whichwouldmean:hewhoexerciseshisjudgment–orwhodisputes–aboutabsurdities.Hethusseemsatoncetoappro-priateAbderitephysicsandtoreviseit.ThisdoubleattitudeisprobablyinlargepartrequiredbytheneedtoanswerthecriticismsAristotlehadadvancedagainstDemocritus(seeesp.Furley,1967).Besides,EpicureanismwillnotcontentitselfwithrevisingAbderitephysics:itwillalsodisputethehegemonyofitsprimaryexplanatoryprin-ciple,i.e.,necessity.TherevisionofphysicsTheEpicureanrevisionbearsprincipallyonthreepoints:theinfinityofatomicshapes,thestructureoftheatom,andthevariationsinthemotionsofatoms.Democritushadpositednotonlytheinfinityofatoms,butalsothatoftheirshapes,thusbasingthewholeexplanationofeventsandphysicalstructuresonalimitlesscombinationofshapes(seeesp.Simpl.InPhys.28.15=DK68A38).Itisnotcertain,however,thatDemocrituspushedthedoctrineofinfinitytoitsultimateconclusions.Hemaythusnothavegonesofarastoassertboththattheatomisimperceptiblebynatureandthattherecouldbeanatomthesizeofaworld.Inanycase,theEpicureansjudgedthathisconceptionofatomicinfinitywasdefectiveonthispoint.Epicurusholdsforhispartthattheshapesarenotabsolutelyinfiniteinnumber,butonlyinconceivablymany,thoughthereisaninfinitenumberofatomsofeachoftheseshapes(Hdt.42–43;55–56;Lucr.2.479–588).Thisdisagreementisnomeredetail:itrevealsimportantmethodologicalandepi-stemologicaldifferences.Epicurusmakesclearinparagraph56oftheLettertoHerodotusthatitisnotnecessary,inordertoexplainthedifferencesbetweensensiblequalities,thatsizesbestrictlyinfinite.Thusheprivilegesaparticularlyeconomicalmethodonthespeculativelevel,andsodefinesasortofprincipleofsufficientexplanation,ofwhichwefindnotraceinthetestimoniaandfragmentsoftheAbderitecorpus.Togetherwiththis,heinvokesthetestimonyofsense-experience,whichpreventsusfromadmittingatomslargeenoughtobeperceptible.Now,Democritushaddeveloped5.OnDemocritus’physics,seeCurd,parmenidesandafter,inthisvolume.488ACTC2548820/03/2006,04:13PM\nepicureanismatheoryofknowledgethatwasverycriticalofsense-experience,andsohecouldnot6evaluatetheatomictheorybyreferencetothetestimonyofthesenses.Furthermore,Lucretiusmakesclearthatastrictinfinityofshapeswouldhaveasconsequenceaninfinityofvariationsbetweensensiblequalities.Lackingtheabilitytodiscernboundariesbetweenthelatter,wewouldthereforeperceivenothingdistinct.Sensibleimpressionswouldvaryinfinitely.Butnosuchthingtakesplace:simplybyperceiving,wedistin-guishdifferencesoftemperature,ofcolor,ofodor,andoftaste(Lucr.2.500–521).Therevisionofatomismalsobearsontheverystructureoftheatom.AccordingtoDemocritus,thesmallnessandsolidityoftheatomattesttoitsphysicalindivisibility.We,therefore,havenoreallystrongreasontoreconsiderthethesisthattheAbderiteatom,anindivisiblepolyhedron,lacksparts.Aristotle,however,objectsthat,invirtueofthecontinuityofspace,theatommustbemathematicallydivisible(Phys.VI.10,240b8ff.).Evenifonepostulatesitsphysicalindivisibility,astheatomistsdo,nobodycancrossaspatialboundaryallatonce.Wemust,therefore,beabletodistinguishinitthepartsthathavenotyetcrossedtheboundaryfromthosethathavedoneso.Thus,accordingtoAristotle,somethingindivisible“canneithermovenorchangeinanyway”(240b31).Thisobjectionisparticularlycruel:theAbderitesmeantpreciselytorespondtotheEleaticnegationofmotionbyraisingthemovementofatomsinthevoidtotherankofanunquestionableprinciple.Aristotlethusdestroyedtheveryfoundationoftheirphysics.ItisnotsurprisingthatEpicuruswouldhavewishedtoanswerthisobjection.Hedidsobyconcedingthattheatomdoes,inonesense,haveparts:“concurringwiththedoctrineofLeucippusandDemocritusaboutthefirstbodies,hepreservedtheirimpassibility,butremovedfromthemthepropertyofbeingwithoutparts,meaningthustoanswerAristotle”(Simpl.InPhys.925.19–22).Theatomthushasultimateparts–theminimaepartesofLucretius–whicharetheunitsofmeasure,butwhichareinseparablefromthewholetheyconstituteand,becauseofthis,incap-ableofproducingbythemselvesanymotionsoraggregations.Theyareconceivedbyanalogywiththeultimatethresholdofsense-perception(Hdt.59;Lucr.1.599–634).Asfarasthemotionsofatomsareconcerned,theEpicureantextsalsocontainimportantrefinementsnotfoundinthetestimoniaavailabletousontheAbderites:atomsmoveatequalspeedinthevoid,nomatterwhattheirweight,theirtrajectoriesbeingmodifiedbyimpacts(Hdt.61–62;Lucr.2.238–239);andanatom’sownweightisthecauseofitsdownwardmovement(Hdt.61;Lucr.2.190).AccordingtoCicero(Fat.20.46),theEpicureansdifferonthispointfromDemocritus,forwhomonlyimpactsareresponsibleforthemotionsofatoms.Nevertheless,itremainstruethat,forDemocritusasfortheEpicureans,thereisnobeginningtothepresenceofmotionintheuniverse.Finally,thedoctrineoftheswerve–clinameninLatin,parenklisisinGreek–ofatoms7constitutesadecisiveinnovationrelativetothefirstversionofatomism.Lucretiusimaginesthefollowingsituation(2.221–224):ifweightwastheonlyoriginal6.Intruth,thispointseemstoposeaproblemforDemocritushimself,ashesuggestsbyimaginingacontradictorydialoguebetweenthesensesandreason(Gal.Med.exp.15Walzer-Frede=DK68B125).7.Fortheneo-Academiccritiqueoftheatomicswerve,seeSharplesinthisvolume,sectiontitled“CiceroandEpicurus:theAtomicSwerve.”489ACTC2548920/03/2006,04:13PM\npierre-mariemorelprincipleofthemotionofatoms,wouldnotthelatterfalldownwardthroughtheinfinitevoid,likedropsofrain?Howthencouldtheycollidewitheachother,andhowcouldnatureproduceanythingatallundersuchconditions?Wemustsupposethataminuteswerveaffectsthefirstmovementoftheseatomsinordertounderstandthespontan-eousgenerationofcorporealcombinationsand,indirectly,theformationofworlds.Theswerveisthusjustasprimitiveastherelationbetweentheweightandthedownwardmotionoftheatom.Thisdoctrinealsohasanethicalsideand,inLucretius,groundsthepossibilityoffreeaction.ItthushasacentralroleinthetheoreticalstructureoftheLucretianpoem,butitalsoposesredoubtableproblemsofinterpretation.Inthefirstplace,wedonotknowifEpicurusalreadyheldit,asLucretius,Aëtius,andDiogenesofOenandaassureus.TheonlyextendedandreasonedexpositionwehaveofitisinBook2ofDeRerumNatura(Lucr.2.184–293)andwefindnomentionatalloftheswerveinthesurvivingtextsofEpicurus.Onthewhole,moderninterpretershavetakenthefollowingpositions:somethinkEpicurusmayhavecomelatetothedoctrineoftheswerve,whichwouldexplainitsabsencefromtheLettertoHerodotus;othersjudgethatitsabsencefromthesurvivingtextsofEpicurusisduemerelytolacunae;finally,othersdoubtthatEpicurusisitsauthor.Infact,itmustbeaskedwhetherhereallyneededthedoctrineoftheswerve,orwhetherhethoughthimselftohavesolvedbyothermeansthedifficultiesitclaimstosolve.Weshallcomebacktothisquestioninconnectionwithcosmogonyandalsotheexplanationoffreeaction.Further,itisfairlydifficulttogiveapositivedescriptionoftheprocessoftheswervesolelybythelightoftheLucretianpassage,andevenmoresotoexplaintherelationbetweentheswerveandvoluntarydecision:theclinamen,duetoitssomewhatindeter-minatecharacter,makesroomfortheideaofabreakinthemechanicalchainofstrictlyphysicalcauses(Lucr.2.251–293),butgivesnopositiveexplanationoftheprocessofdecisionitself.Forinstance,Lucretius’textdoesnotmakeitcompletelyclearwhethertheclinamenisamotionthatisnecessaryforvoluntarydecision,orwhetherithappensafterthedecision,asaresponsetoastimulus.Inthissense,itconstitutesmerelyaconditionofthepossibility,notatruecause,offreeaction.Still,theessentialthingistounderstandthemotivationstowhichthisdoctrineresponds.Aswehaveseen,inLucretiusitcompletesthedescriptionoftheatomicmechanism.TheRomanpoetmustalsohavebeenconcernedtoopposetheStoicdoctrineoffate.TothesemotivesmaybeaddedoneoftheconstantpreoccupationsoftheEpicureantradition:tocontestDemocritus’thesisthatnecessityistheprincipleofallthings(D.L.9.45=DK68A1;Arist.GAV.8,789b2=DK68A66).Now,thisrejectionofnecessitarianismforcesanewrepresentationofnature,ofitsorganization,andofitspower.ItthereforecontributesdirectlytothedefinitionofEpicureannaturalism.Anew“nature”Theclinamen,aswehaveseen,isaconditionoffreeactionbecauseitgivesaphysicalgroundforthepossibilityofabreakinthechainofmechanicalcauses.Justasatomspossessamotivecausebeyondweightandimpacts,sowehaveacapacitytoshieldourselves,atleastpartially,fromtheexternalnecessityofexternalforcesandtheinternalnecessityofourpassivetendencies(Lucr.2.272–293).Lucretiusthusindic-atesthatthereisnaturalnecessity,butthatitisneitherall-powerfulnorhegemonic.490ACTC2549020/03/2006,04:13PM\nepicureanismPriortothemoralproblematic,however,andastheLucretianaccountdedicatedtotheclinamenshows,therejectionofnecessitarianismrelatesfirstofalltoarecon-siderationoftheDemocriteanconceptionofnaturalprinciples.True,theAbderiteconceptionofnecessityismorecomplexandmorenuancedthantheEpicureansseemtohaverecognized:retainingonlythemostcompulsivedimensionofDemocriteanneces-sity,theysetitoveragainstcontingency,chance,andindeterminacy.InDemocritus,thenotionofnecessityappliesjustasmuchtoorder–theorganizationofworlds,thecausalchainofevents–astodisorder,suchasthemotionofatomsoutsideofworlds.Chanceisthereforeanaspectofnecessity.Nevertheless,andbythesametoken,chanceassuchhasnospecificcausalfunction.ForLucretius,onthecontrary,theindetermin-acycharacterizingtheclinamenistheconditionsinequanonofthegenesisofallorgan-ization:withouttheclinamen,“naturewouldhavecreatednothing”(2.224).Thefirstprinciplesofthingsarethuscharacterizedbytheirinconstancy,andorder,alwaysprecarious,istheoutcomeofaprimaldisorder.FromthisitmayseemparadoxicalthatLucretiusrepresentsnatureallegorically,makingitinsomefashiontheorganizingsubjectoftheworld.Natureisinfacta“creator”(naturacreatrix:1.629and2.1117)or“sovereign”(naturagubernans:5.77),andshe“demands”(naturacogit).Sheinstitutesthecovenantsorcontractsthatguar-anteetherelativeconstancyofphenomena,e.g.,thestabilityofspecies.Mustweseeintheseexpressions,beyondtheirmetaphoricalaspect,aconcessiontoakindofintentionalteleologyorprovidentialism?Infact,naturehasnoothercreativepowerthanthatwhichtheatomsexerciseintheirownway,i.e.,blindly.Theatomsdonotdeliberateanddonotdecideanything,notonlybecausetheyareinanimateandhavenomentalattributes,butalsobecausetheydonotneedto:organizationemergesspontaneouslyfromaninfinityoftrialseventuallyresultingintherealizationofviableandstablestructures(1.1023–1090).Thatiswhynature“accomplisheseverythingherself,spontaneously,withoutanydivineassistance”(2.1092).8Inthesecircumstances,itisperfectlylegitimatetospeakof“nature”asatotality:manistounderstandthecovenantsofnatureandtoseethemforwhattheyare,i.e.,decreesthatareinviolableandinthatsensenecessary,whosecosmologicalmanifesta-tionsarenonethelesscontingentandprecarious.Necessity,farfrombeinghegemonic,ishenceforthintheserviceofnature.CosmologyandAnthropologyAcosmologyofselectionThepointofdeparturefortheEpicureanexplanationofthegenerationandinternalorganizationofworldsislikewiseanambivalentrelationtothethoughtofDemocritus.8.Andnotjustinordertodenotetheessenceorthephysicalfoundationsofthings.WhilewefindnotraceinDemocritusofa“nature”understoodasatotality,Epicurususesphusistomeantheessentialpropertiesofthings,orthethingsthemselves,aswellasthetotalityofwhatexists.SometimesLucretiususesnaturainthefirstsense,butthesecondisverydefinitelypredominantforhim.491ACTC2549120/03/2006,04:13PM\npierre-mariemorelEpicurus’LettertoPythoclesletsusformagoodideaoftheGarden’sthesesonthisquestion(seealsoLucr.5.416–508).AsinDemocritus,theworldsarelimitlessandofmultipleshapes.However,theEpicureanscontributeanimportantcorrection:itisnotenoughtoinvoke,astheAbderitedoes,aprimeval“vortex”(dinE)ofatomsofwhateversorttoexplaintheformationofacosmicstructure;wemustassumethepresenceofappropriateseeds(spermata)(Pyth.89–90).Althoughthispointhasbeendebated,theseseedsareprobablyatoms,whichmeansthatEpicurusintroducesanewlimitationwithinthephysicsoftheinfinitethatDemocritushadelaborated:itisnotjusttheinfinityoftheatomsandtheircombinationsthatexplains,inprincipleaswellasinfact,theexistenceofworlds,butalsoakindofspontaneousselectionwithinthisinfinity.Itfollowsthattheworldscanhardlybeofallpossibleshapes.Democritus,forhispart,thoughtthatsomelackedanimals,plants,andwetness,thatsomelackedbothsunandmoon,thoughinotherstherewereseveral(Hippol.Haer.1.13=DK68A40).DetailsoftheformationofworldsareoflittleimportanceforEpicurus,sinceknowingaboutthemisunnecessaryforourhappiness.Besides,theconditionsnecessaryforsuchaprocessarevariable.Theessentialthingistoaccountinthesimplestpossiblewayforarealitywhichthenwillgivenomoreoccasionforastonishment,anymorethanweshouldbeastonishedormadefearfulbyothercelestialphenomena,suchaseclipsesorthunder.TheEpicureansthusinsistinvari-ouswaysonthespontaneityofthetransitionfromtheinitialdisorderofatomicmotionstotheformationofacosmicstructure.Thisspontaneityislinkedtothecon-tinuitythatEpicurusdiscernsintherelationoftheisolatedatomtotheatominacomposite.Infact,thefundamentalcategoryofEpicureanphysicsis“body,”ratherthantheatom.ThismaybeverifiedbyobservingtheargumentativeprocedureoftheLettertoHerodotus,whichmentionsbodiesbeforeitmentionsatoms,andwhichlumpsthelatterinwiththeformer:“amongthebodies,somearecompositeandothersarethoseofwhichthecompositesaremade”(Hdt.40–41).Thereisthereforenoontolo-gicalgapbetweenatomsandcomposites,butratherafunctionaldistinctionwithintheentiretyof“body.”Bynature,atomsarebothindependentandapttoaggregatewitheachothertoformbodies.TheLucretiantermsfortheatomconfirmthis:atomsarenotsimply“matter”(materiesormateria);theyarealsothe“firstprinciplesofthings”(primordiarerum),the“firstbodies”(corporaprima),the“seedsofthings”(seminarerum)andtheir“generativeprinciples”(genitaliarerum),allexpressionsthatmakereferencetocomposites.Thus,whenhespeaksoftheformationofworldsandoftheirinfinity,startingwithparagraph45oftheLettertoHerodotus,Epicurussuggeststhattheatomshavetwocausalroles:“Itisnotpossiblefortheatomswhichwehavejustdescribed,outofwhich(exhOn)aworldcancometobeorbywhich(huph’hOn)aworldcanbeproduced,tobeexhaustedinasingleoralimitednumberofworlds...”Theplaywiththeprepositionsexandhupo,suggeststhatatoms,consideredascease-lesslyinmotion,arenotjustcomponents(“outofwhich”),butalsotherealspontane-ousagentsorimmediatemovingprinciples(“bywhich”)oftheformationofworlds.Itisnotimpossible,thoughitcannotbestateddefinitively,thatthecosmogonicalpurposeoftheLucretianclinamenwasretrospectivelytomakeexplicitthisfunctionofatoms.492ACTC2549220/03/2006,04:13PM\nepicureanismHumanlifeandthelimitsofconformitywithnatureAsDemocritushadbeforethem,theEpicureansextendtheircosmogonicalhypo-thesestoincludeaviewofthegenesisanddevelopmentofhumankind.Epicureananthropologyisananthropologyofspontaneousprogress:thehumanspeciescameoutoftheearthandtheriseofsocialexistence,language,technicalskills,laws,andpoliticalinstitutionsispartofthehistoryofourworld.Itisthusnotaprocessalientonature.Thelatter,EpicurussaysatthebeginningoftheanthropologicalpassageintheLettertoHerodotus(75–76),“hasbeentaughtandcompelled,abundantlyandinmanyways,bythingsthemselves.”Lucretiusexplainstheinstitutionoflanguage,forexample,bysayingthatnature(natura)causedtheutteranceofthevarioussoundsoflanguageandthatutility(utilitas)ledmentosettleonthenamesofthings(Lucr.5.1028–1029).Thisexample,however,becauseitdistinguishestwofactors–natureandutility–showsthelimitsoftherelationtonature:natureitselfisintheprocessofbecominganditisdiversified;soitcannotsuggesttomanimmutablenormshecouldmerelyapply.Technicalskills,tobesure,derivefromanimitationofnature:thesunteachesmentocooktheirfoodandtosoftenit(Lucr.5.1102–1104);nature,throughthespontaneoussproutingofberriesandacorns,providesthemodel(specimen)forsowing,anditisattheoriginofourpracticeofgrafting(1361–1367).Nevertheless,humanprogressisnotanevermorefaithfulimitationofnature,butratheracontinuousadaptationtonaturalconditions.Languages,forinstance,thoughtheyhaveanaturalorigin,differentiatethemselvesbecauseofthediversityofthefeelingsandexperiencesspecifictoeachpeople(Epic.Hdt.75–76).Humanactioningeneralisthusinspiredandguidedbynature,butitcannotrestcontentwithmerelyimitatingnature.Thedefinitionofwhatisjust,inthePrincipalDoctrines(KD31–37),isaparticularlyrevealingexampleofthisphenomenon.Ontheonehand,Epicurusgivesanappar-entlynaturalistdefinitionofjustice:“thejusticearisingfromnatureisapledgeofmutualutilityneithertoharmoneanothernortosufferharm”(KD31).Ontheother,heseemstosubscribetoaconventionalist,orevenrelativist,conceptionofthejustorofjustice:justiceisnotsomethingthatexistsinitself,butismerelyacertaincontract(sunthEkE).Itisanagreementthatmen,assembledtogether,drawupinaparticularplaceataparticulartime,concerningwhatitispropertodoandnottodo,forthepurposeofnotharmingeachother(KD33).Thedefinitionofjusticealsolegitimatelyvariesfromonetimetoanotherandfromonepeopletoanother,insuchawaythatwhatisregardedasjustatagiventimemaynotbesoregardedinothertimes(KD37–38).Actually,Epicurus’pointofviewcannotbeassimilatedtosheerrelativism,forhisconceptionrestsontwoconstants:thecorrespondencebetweenthejustandtheuseful(sumpheron)andthefactthatcommoninterestisthesolecriterionofusefulnessinpolitics.Thesharedexperienceofwhatisusefulincollectivelifeallowsustogivearealcontenttothepreconceptionorpre-notion(prolEpsis)thatwehaveof9thejust.Thus,througharelationthatisbothnaturalandvariable–whatisusefulto9.OntheroleofpreconceptionsinEpicureanism,seealsoModrak,philosophyoflanguage,inthisvolume.493ACTC2549320/03/2006,04:13PM\npierre-mariemorelthecommunity–the(natural)realityofcommonlifeislinkedtothe(conventional)realityoflegalrules.Naturecannotdeterminenormsinthismatter,forthejustvaries10withthechangesofhistoricalbecoming.Natureiscontenttomarklimits–thosewithinwhichthedefinitionofcommonusefulnessvaries–andleavestomantheresponsibilityforlegaldecisions.TheattributiontoEpicurusofaformoflegalnatural-ism(seeespeciallyAlberti,1995),therefore,cannotcompletelyavoidtheconvention-alistreading(defended,withqualifications,byGoldschmidt,1977):withoutbreakingawayfromnature,Epicurusrejectseveryconceptionofjusticethatclaimstoabstractfromdifferencesbetweenpeoplesandfromthemovementofhistory(seeMorel,2000).EpistemologyTheoriginofrepresentationsWehaveseenthatthefundamentalobjectsofEpicureanphysicsareentitiesthatarehiddenornon-evident(adEla):atomsandvoid.Still,everypropositionabouttheseentitiesmustbecomparedwiththeevidenceofthingsthatdoappear(taphainomena).Weshallseebelowwhattherulesareforthiscomparison,butwecanstatenowthattheintellectualgraspoftheprinciplesisalwaysdependentontheevidenceofthesenses.Forinstance,intheLettertoHerodotus,theunfoldingofwhichseemstoexcludeallpreviouslyacquiredtheoreticalknowledge,theappealtosensoryexperienceismandatedattheoutset.Onemightobjecttosuchamethodthatitusesmeansofknowingwhosevalidityithasnotpreviouslyestablished,andthatitshouldseek,independentlyofphysics,anepistemologicaljustificationforthetransitionfromthevisibletotheinvisible.Epicureantextspropose,asareplytothisobjection,thephysiologicalexplanationofsensations:visionresultsfromthereceptionofreplicas(tupoi)orimages(eidOla)originatingspontaneouslyfromtheseenobject.Becausetheyaretransmittedemana-tionsthatpreservethestructureandpropertiesoftheobject,thesereplicasallowustoformarepresentationorappearance(phantasia)whichremainsin“sympathy”(sumpatheia)withit.Thissameprincipleofsympathyalsoholdsfortheothersenses(Hdt.48–53;Lucr.4.46–268).Theappearanceis,therefore,notpurelysubjective,andevenlessisitstrictlymental:weperceivesomethingthattheobjectitselfproduces,andtheprocessthroughwhichweperceivethisthingcanbedescribedinthesamewayasanyothernaturalprocess.Physicsthusexplainsthewayinwhichwerepresenttoourselvesthephenomenathatinturnundergirdpropositionsabouthiddenentities.Asweshallsee,thisjustificationfortheappealtotheevidenceofthesensesisdecisiveontheepistemologicallevel,foritappliesderivativelytorepresentationsthatarenotimmediatelysensory.Itthusallowsforthedefinitionofthecriteriaoftruth.10.TheviewtakenbyEpicurusclearlydoesnotamounttoevokingthefirsthumansocieties(onthispointseeLucr.5.1019–1027and1108–1160,andHermarchus’genealogy,citedatlengthbyPorphyry,Abst.1.7–12):thevariationsofthejustarealsothoseofhistoryintheircourse.494ACTC2549420/03/2006,04:13PM\nepicureanismThecriteriaoftruthBecauseoursensationsarephysicallysimilartotheirobjects,theycanbecalled“true”priortoanyjudgmentabouttheirtruthorfalsity.Theexplanationoftheoriginofsensationsthusleadstoanassimilationoftruthtoreality.Thetruthofsensation,therefore,doesnotneedtobeguaranteedtoajudgmentthatwouldbeitscriterion.Still,twoobjectionsmayberaised.Firstofall,sincesensationisdefinedasapassivereception,howcanitbyitselfplaytheroleofacriterion,thatis,anactiverole,capableofgroundingacriticalattitudetowardourownrepresentations?Second,ifsensationistruerightfromthestart,howarewetoaccountforperceptualerrors?Anappositeanswertothefirstobjectionspecifiesthatthesensoryimpressiondoesnotactuallybecomeanappearance(phantasia)unlesswe“grasp[it]byapplyingourselvestoitthroughthoughtorelsethroughthesenseorgans”(Hdt.50).Sensation,likethemind’sperception,isanepibolE,thatis,a“projection”towardtheobject.Thelatteristhusnotmerelyreceivedbutalso“aimedat.”Itsimageisatthesametimeagrasping-of-an-image(phantastikEepibolE:Hdt.50–51).Consequently,sensationinvolvesboththephysicalreceptivitythatmakesittrue,andtheactofattentionwithoutwhichitcouldnotindicatewhatistrue.Itisthereforenotpurelypassive.Still,howarewetoexoneratethisactivityfromallresponsibilityforproducingperceptualerrors,suchashallucinationsandopticalillusions?TheEpicureanstakeatwo-foldattitude,atoncedefensiveandpositive,inresponsetothisstandardobjection.Lucretiusdefendstheinfallibilityofsensationsbyshowingthatnosense,suchassightorsmell,canbecorrectedbyadifferentsense:sightcannotbecorrectedbyhearing,orhearingbytouch,ortouchbytaste,sinceeachsensehasaparticularanddistinctpower(4.486–490).Asforreason,itcomesfromsensationandsocannotrefuteit,sinceitwouldrefuteitselfinclaimingtorefuteitsownorigin(4.483–485;seealsoD.L.10.32).Wemustthereforeadmitthaterrorcomesfromsomeothermentalmove-mentdistinctfromsensation.IfIseeasquaretowerinthedistanceasround,itisnotsensationitselfthatdeceivesme,butratherthebeliefIformwhenIhavethesensation(Lucr.4.353–363;S.E.M7.208–209).Hereonceagainwemustgobacktothephysics:theflowofimages(eidOla)fromthesquaretowerthatIseeinthedistanceconveystomeanimageofaroundtowerbecauseoftheerosiontheysufferinpassingthroughtheairoveralongdistance.Nevertheless,theimagefinallyreceivedisarealimage,theactualpresenceofwhatisemanatingfromtheobject.Thesensationisthereforenotintrinsicallyfalse,foritistrue,whenIperceivethetowerasround,Idoperceiveitasround,evenifinitselfitissquare.Thedistortionoftheimages(eidOla)isanepistemologicallyneutralphysicalprocess.Theerrorreallycomesfromthatwhichis“addedbyopinion”(prodoxazomenon)andisnotsubsequentlysubjectedtoaverificationcapableofconfirmingit(Hdt.50).Thisjudgmentdependsonsensations,butitisdistinctfromthelatter.Thisishowitiswiththeerroneousjudgmentaccord-ingtowhichthetowerthatweseefromafarisreallyround,whenwehavenocon-firmationofit,nothavingvariedourexperienceoftheobject.Thesensationisnotjustnon-false:itthefirstpositivemanifestationofwhatistrue.Sensationisthereforethefirstcriterionoftruth,butitisnottheonlyone.DiogenesLaertius(10.31)reportsthat,accordingtoEpicurus’Canon,thecriteriaoftrutharesensations,preconceptions(prolEpseis)andfeelings(cf.S.E.M7.203–216).Wedonot495ACTC2549520/03/2006,04:13PM\npierre-mariemorelhave,intheEpicureantexts,anaccountexpresslydedicatedtopreconceptions,butDiogenesLaertius’summaryindicatesthattheyhavetwocorrelativefunctions:theretentioninmemoryofrepeatedsensations–thenotionofmanderivesfromthesensoryexperiencewehavehadofindividualhumanbeings–andtheanticipatoryapprehensionofobjectsthatmaycorrespondtolatersensations–whatappearstomeinthedistancemaybeahorse,anox,oraman(10.33).Asforaffections(pathE),theydisclosepleasureandpaininanevidentmanner(10.34)andforthisreasonplayacentralroleinEpicureanethics.ThemethodofjudgmentThistheoryofthecriteriaofknowledgemayseematfirstsighttobeanaïveempiri-cism.Itsapplication,however,showsthatitisnosuchthing,fortheEpicureansinnowayclaimtoreducetheknowledgeofhiddenentitiestoadirectextensionoftheperceptionofphenomena.Oureyesseeshadeandlight,buttheydonotteachaboutthedifferencebetweenthem:“reason(ratioanimi)alonemustdiscernthem,andtheeyesareunabletoknowthenatureofthings(naturarerum)”(Lucr.4.384–385).Thenaturarerum,whichconstitutestheverysubjectmatterofLucretius’poem,trulyunveilsitselfonlytotheeyesofreason.AllthesubtletyofEpicureanmethodologyliesinthedifferentmodesoftransitionfromconceptions(epinoia)tosensationsandin-versely:byacquaintance,analogy,resemblance,andcomposition(D.L.10.32).Thesemodes,andanalogyinparticular,relatepropositionsabouthiddenthingstosensoryevidencethroughacomplexmethodforverifyingbeliefs.ThetestimonyofDiogenesLaertiusandSextusEmpiricusonthe“canonic,”Philodemus’treatiseOnSigns,aswellasargumentativeproceduresusedbyEpicurusandLucretius,allowustounderstanditsrules.Whenbeliefsrelatetowhatcanbetheobjectofadirectsensoryexperience,theirtruthisestablishedbyconfirmation(epimarturEsis)andtheirfalsitybynon-confirmation(oukepimarturEsis).Thus,whenIbelievethatPlatoiscomingtowardme,Istillneedconfirmationoritsopposite,non-confirmation,whichsensoryexperiencewillprovidemewhenthemanIseehascomenear.Whenbeliefsrelatetohiddenthings,theycanbethesubjectofanon-infirmation(oukantimarturEsis)oraninfirmation(antimarturEsis).InthiscaseImustestablisharelationofconsequencebetweentheinvisibleandsensoryevidence.Thelattercannotbedirectlyconfirmed,butitcanbeestablishedbynon-infirmation.Takeforexampletheexistenceofthevoid.Weassumetheexistenceofmotion.Butthisimpliestheexistenceofthevoid(Hdt.40).Therefore,weposittheexistenceofthevoid.Thusthecontraryhypothesisisinfirmedandtheconclusioniswarranted.Iftheinferencedoesnotinfirmthecontraryhypothesis,itjustifiesaresorttomultipleexplanations,asinthecaseofcelestialphenomena.Eclipsesofthesunandmoon,forexample,canbeexplainedbytheirbeingextinguished,orbytheirbeinghiddenbyotherbodies.Furthermore,thedifferentexplanationsofasinglephenomenonmaynotonlybecompatiblebutmayevenbeconjoined(Pyth.96).ItisapeculiarityofEpicureanepistemologythatitallowsthatasinglephenomenonmaybeexplainedindifferentways(Pyth.86–87,93–96;Hdt.79).Ontheonehand,thesamephenomenon,suchasthunderorearthquake,maybeexplaineddifferentlydependingonwhichworlditoccursin;ontheother,withinasingleworld,itmaybeopentoapluralityofexplanatoryhypotheses.Giventhatahypothesisisnotinfirmed496ACTC2549620/03/2006,04:13PM\nepicureanismandthatitiscompatiblewiththemainprinciplesofphysics,then,evenifotherhypo-thesesalsomeetthesameconditions,itfulfillsitsonlytruefunction:topreserveourataraxia(absenceofdisturbance)byshowingthatitispointlesstoinvokegodsinordertoexplainnaturalevents.Itshouldthereforeberegardedassufficient.Epicureanscienceisthusawareofitsownlimits.Wecanpossesssomecertainties,sincesensationandtherepresentationsdirectlyderivedfromitareevident,andwhatisevidentrequiresnoproof.Nevertheless,theinfinityoftheAllandthecomplexityandremotenessofsomeparticularphysicalprocessesmandatethemethodjustdescribed.Forinstance,aftercomparingatomiccombinationstothoseofthelettersthatmakeuptheversesheiswriting,Lucretiussaysfurtherthatatomshavemorenumerouspowerstocreatethediversityofthings(1.827–829).Thisindicatesthathumandiscourseisunabletoencompassthetotalityofthatforwhichitnonethelessgivesanexplanation.Knowledgeofnatureisthusinthissenseimperfect.Itissuf-ficient,however,tofreeusfromanxietyinthefaceoftheunknownandtogroundtheconditionsforhappiness.EthicsNaturalphilosophyandthehappylifeWehaveseenthatknowledgeofnatureiswhollyorientedtowardethics.Ifknowledgedidnotmakeushappier,itwouldbeuseless.Thetaskofphilosophy,whichistoleadustohappiness,isthustheonlyonethatisabsolutelynecessary.Itistheonlyindis-pensableactivity,andthustheonlyactivitythatisentirelysuitedtoournature.Epicurusinfactshareswiththephilosophersoftheintellectualgenerationprecedinghim–especiallyPlatoandAristotle–thisideathatmentendbynaturetowardtheattainmentoftheirhappiness,evenif,moreoftenthannot,theyemployinadequatemeanstoit.Thepointofknowingnatureispreciselytoallowustodiscernwhatgoodsandactivitiesarewellmatchedtoourownnature.Now,theimageofnaturetheEpicureansfoundinAbderiteatomismrulesout,astheyseeit,thepossibilityofbothlivinginconformitywithnatureandactingfreely.Therefore,theydefendanewconceptionofnaturewhich,aswehaveseen,limitsthepowerofnecessity.Theatomicswerveisonemeanscontributingtothislimitation,butnottheonlyone.Epicureantextsinvokeatleasttwootherkindsofargument:fromtheconsequencesofnecessitarianismandfromitsabsurdity.Theargumentfromtheconsequencesconsistsindenyingthathappinessandmoralconductwouldbepossible,underthehypothesisthatphysicalnecessityisall-powerful,becausethelatterwouldentirelyeliminatetheresponsibilityoftheagent.DiogenesofOenoanda,moreover,joinsthisargumenttotheappealtotheclinamen,byimplicitlyassociatingallthetheoreticiansoffatewithDemocritus:ifeverythingismovedbynecessityandtheatomshavenofreemovement–i.e.,noswerve–andonebelievesinfate,thenwecannolongeradmonishorblame(fr.54Smith=LS20G).InhisOnNature,EpicurustakesaimattheAbderitesthemselvesandassertsthattheycannotsaythat“necessityandchancearethecausesofallthings”andatthesametimecontinuetoact,withoutbringingtheirdoctrineintoconflictwiththeiractions.Now,this497ACTC2549720/03/2006,04:13PM\npierre-mariemorelcontradictorysituationputsthem,notinastateofhappiness,butonthecontraryinastateofinternaldisturbance(PHerc.1056;Epic.Nat.34.30Arrighetti=LS20C).Necessitarianismisthusasdisastrousforhappinessasformoralresponsibility.Further,itleadstodespair,astheLettertoMenoeceusmakesclear:“Foritwouldbebettertofollowthemythologyaboutgodsthanbeaslavetothefateofthenaturalphilosophers:theformeratleasthintsatthehopeofbeggingthegodsoffbymeansofworship,whereasthelatterinvolvesaninexorablenecessity”(Men.134).TheEpicureansage,havinglearnedphysics,knowsforhispartthatnecessityisnothegemonicandthat“whatdependsonus,withwhichculpabilityanditsoppositearenaturallyassociated,isfreefromanymaster”(Men.133).Theargumentfromtheabsurdityofnecessitarianismconsistsinsayingthatonecannotcoherentlyclaimthatnecessityistheonlycause:“themanwhosaysthatalleventsarenecessitatedhasnogroundforcriticizingthemanwhosaysthatnotalleventsarenecessitated;foraccordingtohimthis[i.e.,thislastassertion]isitselfanecessitatedevent”(Epic.SV40).Infact,fromthenecessitarian’sownviewpoint,thepositioncontrarytohisisjustifiedtotheextentthatitsownexistenceisnecessary.Itthereforeexpressesjustaswellashisowndoesthelawofnecessarydetermination.Thisdoesnotmeanthatwemustdenyallformsofnecessityor,inparticular,themechanicalcharacterofstrictlyphysicalcausality.DidtheEpicureanswanttodevelopananti-reductionisttheoryofemergentpropertiesandtoshieldmentalmotionsandjudgmentsfromthechainofatomicmotions(forthisinterpretation,seeSedley,1983and1988)?Theymay,moremodestly,havebeenextollingadaptationtotheconstraintsofnatureandtohavethoughtthatthepossibilityoffreeactionwasindirectlywarrantedbytheargumentswehavejustsketched.EpicurusstatesthattheEpicureansagehasfacedthenecessitiesofexistence(taanankaia),knowinghowtogiveratherthantotakehisportion,forheisrichintheinternaltreasureofhisself-sufficiency(SV44).Tobehappy,then,onemustacknowledgenecessity,whichassumesthatnoteverythingissubjecttoit:“Necessityisanevil,butthereisnonecessitytolivewithnecessity”(SV9).Epicurus’ethicsthusadumbratesthedistinction,madefamousmainlybyimperialStoicism,betweenwhatdependsonusandwhatdoesnot.Now,naturalphilosophydelineatesthepreciseboundariesaroundwhatbelongstome,teachingthatwhatliesbeyondthemisnottobefeared.Thisisespeciallysointhecaseofdeath:physicsteachesmethatthesouliscorporeal,composedofatoms,andthatitscognitivefunctionsdependontheproportionofitsatomsfoundintheaggregateitmakestogetherwiththebody.Itthereforedoesnotsurvivedeath,andIexperiencenosensationswhateveroncethisboundaryispassed.Knowingthatdeathistheendofallsensation,andthatno“I”persistsifitcannotfeel,IknowthatIamnotcontemporarywithmyowndeath.Thelatteristhus“nothingtome”andIexperiencenosufferingbecauseofit,sothatitisnolongertobefeared(Men.124–127).Lucretiusinvokes,insupportofthisdoctrine,theforceofnaturalcompactsandsogivesacosmologicaljustificationfortheoccurrenceofdeath:theoldmanmustyieldhisplacebecauseeverythingmustparticipateintheformationofsomethingelse,inconformitywiththeprocessofatomiccompensation(Lucr.3.962–972).Hereagain,thecon-straintofnaturallawsshouldnotdisheartenus:toknowthateveryindividuallifehasanendisalsototurnawayfromthefruitlessdesireforimmortality.Inageneralway,naturalphilosophycontributestothepreparationofwhatPhilodemus(Againstthe498ACTC2549820/03/2006,04:13PM\nepicureanismSophists4.9–14=LS25J)willcallthe“quadrupleremedy”(tetrapharmakos)againstthedisturbancesthatkeepusfromhappiness.Thecontentsofthisprogram,whichunderliesthestructureoftheLettertoMenoeceusandisrepeatedbyPrincipalDoctrines1–4,arethefollowing:thereisnothingtofearfromthegods;deathisnothinginrelationtoourselves;thehighestofallpleasuresisattainableandisequivalenttotheeliminationofallsuffering;weareabletoenduresufferingbecauseitisnotunlimited.MenandgodsTheologyoffersagoodexampleofthesyntheticcharacterofEpicureanphilosophyandofitsabilitytoincludephysics,thetheoryofknowledge,andethicsinthesamemovement.ThefirstinjunctionintheLettertoMenoeceusistoseethegodsforwhattheyare,i.e.,happy,indestructiblelivingbeings,andtoattributetothemnothinginconsistentwiththesetwofundamentalproperties(Men.123–124).Thisethicalprescriptionmakesatwofoldappealtophysics.Inthefirstplace,itdissociatesthegodsfromnaturalphenomena,especiallycelestialones,whichmengenerallyattributetotheirwillortotheiranger:acorollaryofthebeatitudeofthegodsistheirindifference11totheorderoftheuniverseandtohumanaffairs(Hdt.76–78).Inthesecondplace,itassumesthatthegodshaveaphysicalnatureorstatuswhichexplainstheirinde-structibilityandgroundstheirbeatitude.Unfortunately,theEpicureantextsareratherimpreciseonthispoint.Consequentlysomecommentators(see,forexample:LongandSedley,1987,vol.1,pp.144–49)thinkthegodsdonotreallydifferfromtherepresentationsweformofthem,andthattheyareinfactmentalconstructs.Godwouldthereforebenothingmorethanaflowofimagescorrespondingtotheconceptwehaveofhim.Inthetextthatpaysclosestattentiontothequestionofthephysicalstatusofthegods(Cic.ND1.43–49=LS23E),theEpicureanVelleiusstatesfurtherthattheformofthegodsisnotasolidbodybuta“quasi-body,”thebloodofwhichis“quasi-blood.”Thisinterpretation,whichoptsforaminimalrelationtophysics,isespeciallyurgedoutofaconcerntotakeaccountofanthropomorphictendenciesintheEpicureanconceptionofthegods:thesetendenciessuggestaspontaneous“transfer”onthepartofourthinking,whichtendstoattributetothegodsthetraitsweperceiveinvigorousandhappymen.Velleiuscreditsthegodswiththehumanform,sinceitisthemostbeautiful(Cic.ND1.46;seealsothescholiumtoKD1)andPhilodemusassumesthattheyconverseinGreek,becauseGreekisthelanguageofsages(OntheGods3,col.14Diels).Wecouldthusreducethetensionbetween,ontheonehand,therationalandcriticaltheology,ortheminimalreligiosity,thatispredominantintheLettertoMenoeceus,and,ontheotherhand,theacceptanceofakindofliterallydescriptivetheology,compatiblewithcer-taintraditionalandpopularrepresentationsofthegods.However,the“conceptualist”interpretation,leavingasidethefactthatitisnotexplicitlyattestedbyanyauthenticallyEpicureantext,raisesotherproblems.Itpre-cludesanypositiveaccountofthestatementthatthegodsliveinthe“interworlds”(Lucr.5.146–155;Cic.ND1.18);oroftheideathattheirnaturereconstitutesitself11.SeealsoKD1;Lucr.2.167–183,1009–1104;5.156–194,1186–1240;6.68–79;Cic.ND1.45=LS23E4–5;DiogenesofOenoanda,fr.19-iiiSmith.499ACTC2549920/03/2006,04:13PM\npierre-mariemorelateveryinstantthroughacontinuousflowofatoms(asVelleiussuggestsinCic.ND1.49),whichimpliesthattheyarecorporeal.Inaddition,itisveryhardtothinkofthemas“livingbeings”iftheyaremereobjectsofthought.Iftheyareimages(eidOla),thenintheorytheyshouldbelifeless,sinceimagesbythemselveshaveneithersensationnorreason(DiogenesofOenoanda,fr.10Smith;Plut.OntheDisappearanceofOracles,420B–C).Finally,theanthropomorphicaspectsoftheologymaybeunderstoodbyreferencetothestatusofournaturalpreconceptionaboutthegods:EpicurusgivesaratherindefinitecontenttothisprolEpsisaboutthegods,mentioningonlybeatitudeandindestructibility,buthedoesnotforbidustocreditthemwithotherattributes.Theessentialthingisnottoattributeanythingtothemthatisincompatiblewiththesefundamentalproperties.Moreover,wemustattributetothemanythingthatcancon-tributetothepreservationoftheseproperties(Men.123).Ourpreconceptionaboutthegods,inthisrespectlikeourpreconceptionaboutthejust,constitutesakindofframe-workforvariationoraregulativenotion,notarealdefinitionofthedivine.AccordingtoLucretius,wecanthusspeakofBacchustorefertowine,orsaythattheEarthistheMotherofthegods,aslongaswedonotletourselvesbecontaminatedbytheestab-lishedreligion(Lucr.2.655–660).Epicureananthropomorphism,therefore,doesnotexpressanontologicaldeficiencyinthedivine,butratheralogicalconsequenceofthemethodofnon-infirmationasappliedtoourpreconceptionaboutthegods:thefactthatgodshavehumanformisnotinfirmedbytheirbeatitudeandindestructibility.Somemembersoftheschool–suchthecharacterofVelleiusinCicero(ND1.48),andDemetriusofLaconia([TheShapeofGod]col.15Santoro)–seemmerelytohaveextendedtheviewpointopenedupbytheTeacheroftheGardenwhentheyassertthatthegodsmustnecessarilybehumanintheirform,sincenootherisfoundtohavethefacultyofreason.Velleius’furthersuggestion–thehumanformisalsothemostbeau-tiful–isthefinaloutcomeofthislogic.Inanycase,wecanascribetotheEpicureansarealisttheologythatiscompatiblewithitsanthropomorphicaspects.PleasureasanendTheassimilationofhappinesstopleasureisthemostwell-knownfeatureofEpicurean-ismandtheonethathasearneditthemostcriticism.ThosethatCiceroformulatesinthesecondbookofDeFinibus,andthetreatisebyPlutarchentitledThatitisImpossibletoLivePleasantlyifOneFollowsEpicurus,providegoodexamples.Thisassimilation,however,isnotanarbitrarytheoreticaldictum,forEpicurustakesgreatpainstojustifyit.Paragraphs128–129oftheLettertoMenoeceusgiveafairlypreciseideaofhisargu-ment.Letusstartwiththestatementthatknowledgeofnatureleadstoknowledgeofwhatisnaturallysuitableforus.Now,aswehaveseen,menbynatureseekthelifeofhappiness,whichhasforitsend“thehealthofthebodyandtheabsenceofdisturbance(ataraxia)inthesoul”(Men.128).Theabsenceofdisturbance,sinceitisastateinwhichnothingislacking,isabsenceofpain.Thelatteristhereforefundamentallythenaturalendthatwepursue.ButEpicurusseemstothinkthatthereisnointermediatestatebetweenpainandpleasure,doubtlessbecauseofhisassimilationofpaintoastateoflackingandbecausethereisnointermediatestatebetweenlackingandtheabsenceofalack.Theabsenceofpainthereforecoincideswithpleasureitself,sothatthelatteristhegoalofthehappylife,ourfirstandcongenital(sungenikonorsumphuton)good.500ACTC2550020/03/2006,04:13PM\nepicureanismNotallpleasures,however,correspondtothesamedegreeofpacificationofthesoul.Sometexts,infact,distinguishbetween“kinetic”pleasures,suchasthepleasureofdrinkingwhenthirsty,and“static”or“catastematic”ones.Thelatter,absenceofphys-icalpainandataraxia,expressastateofstabilityinourconstitution(katastEma)(LS21Q–T).Thefactthatwecanattainathresholdofequilibriuminpleasureclearlyshowsthatthelatter,farfromcondemningustounlimiteddesires,determinesalimitthatmakesitsufficientforhappiness.Pleasure,ontheotherhand,isnotonlytheend-pointofaprocessofmentalpacification:itisalsoitsprecondition.ThisiswhatEpicurussuggestswhenheexplainsthat“pleasureistheprinciple(archE)andtheend(telos)ofthehappylife”(Men.128).The“canonic”infactconfersacriterialroleonfeeling(pathos),andtheprincipalfeelingsarepreciselypainandpleasure.Now,feelingisacriterionthatisatoncecognitiveandpractical:itteachesuswhatissuitabletousandwhatisnot,anditmotivatesourchoiceandavoidance(D.L.10.34;Men.129).Assuch,itestab-lishesadirectconnectionbetweenknowledgeandaction.Pleasureisthereforeatboththebeginningandtheendoftheactivitiesthatcharacterizethehappylife.TheopponentsofEpicureanismdidnotfailtodenouncethishedonism,whichseemsatfirstsighttoneglectconcernforothers,andtolicenseanegoisticethicattheex-penseofproperlymoralconduct.TheEpicureanchoiceofalifesurroundedbyfriends,withdrawnfrompubliclife(KD27;SV58;Lucr.5.1120–1135),doesnotwhollyremovethisambiguity.Friendshipprovidessecurityaboveallandseemsinthatsensetohavepersonaltranquilityasitsultimateend(KD27,28,40).TheEpicureanreplymayperhapsrestonaconceptionofhumanrelationswemightdescribeasanideal12ofrestrictedsociability.If,indeed,oneregardsfriendshipnotassomethingmerelyauxiliarytohappinessbutasapreconditionofthehappylife,itnolongerlookslikejustonemeansamongotherstoassureone’sownsecurity.TheportraitofthesagethatconcludestheLettertoMenoeceusfitsthisview:helivesamonghisfellows“likeagodamongmen”(Men.135).TheEpicureansagebydefinition,therefore,livesinacommunity–atleastideally–whichimpliesthathedoesnothavetochoosefriendship.Thelatterimposesitselfofitsownaccordasacomponentofthegoodlife.Furthermore,Epicurusmakesitplainthatitisfriendshipthatprovidesthegreatestpleasure(KD40).Nevertheless,itremainstruethatfriendshipisonlyoneparticularsphereofsociability,andafairlysmallone.Itthusisnotenoughtoprovethatthelifeofpleasureisconsistentwithvirtueinallitsforms.ThesolutionisundoubtedlytobefoundintheEpicureanconceptionofprudence(phronEsis):ifeverypleasureis,inprinciple,good,itdoesnotfollowthateverypleasureoughttobechosen.Thechoiceofapleasureassumesinthefirstplacethatonegivesaprivilegedplace,amongpleasures,tothosethatarebothnaturalandnecessarytohappiness;thatis,thosethatcanbeattainedthroughphilosophyandfriendship.Thesearedistinctfrompleasuresthatarenecessaryfortheabsenceofbodilydisturb-anceorforthesatisfactionofvitalneeds,aswellasmerelynaturaldesires–suchassexualdesire.Naturaldesiresingeneralarecontrastedwithvaindesires(Men.127).Choosingtopursueapleasurerequires,ontheotherhand,aprudentcalculationoftheconsequences,ananticipatorycomparisonoftheresultingpleasuresandpains.12.Onthistopic,seealsoBrown,hellenisticcosmopolitanism,thesectiononEpicureanism.501ACTC2550120/03/2006,04:13PM\npierre-mariemorelThiscalculationispreciselywherevirtuecomesin:prudenceteachesthatpleasureisinseparablefromprudenceitself,fromprobityandfromjustice(Men.132).Wemustthusassumethatpleasuresthatareharmfultoothershaveconsequencesthatarecontrarytopleasure:reproach,punishment,andinnerturmoil.Hence“thevirtuesnaturallyaccompanythepleasantlifeandthepleasantlifeisinseparablefromthem”(Men.132).Itwillbeobjectedthatthevirtuesareheremerelythemeansorinstru-mentsofpleasure.PerhapstheEpicureansoptedforapragmaticattitudeandthoughtitwasfutile,inordertoestablishtheprinciplesofmoralconduct,toassignthemanyhigherstatus.Inanycase,itseemedabsurdtothemtothinkofrepressingpleasure,theonlystateperfectlynaturaltous,inthenameofvirtue.ConclusionEpicureanphilosophyisaparadoxicalnaturalism:natureinitselfisdeprivedofallfinalpurpose,buthumanbeingsaretoliveaccordingtothenaturalendofpleasure.Yet,Epicureanismovercomesthisdifficulty.Inthefirstplace,conformitytonatureisnotsubmissiontoadutyconsideredasanobjectivebeing,butratherreferstoafactualstate:disorderisjustasnaturalasorder,andthelatterisonlyatemporaryarrange-mentoftheformer.Now,itisthroughconsciousnessofthisverystateofthingsthatwecanbringordertooursoulandpreserveitfromdisturbance.Consequently,theEpicureanssought,innature,notprescriptionsbutlimits:thosefixedbynaturalcompacts,butalsothelimitsofdesiresandofevils.Wemustalsocorrecttwofairlyfrequentmisunderstandings:thepictureofEpicureanethicsaspurelyintuitiveoraffectiveandtheideathatphysicsismerelyatheoreticalpreparationforthehappylife.Toliveaccordingtonatureinfactassumesthatoneengagesinrationaldiscourseaboutit:naturalphilosophygroundsinreasonwhatpleasureandsufferingrevealintheirownfashionasfeelings.Further,phusiologiaisnomerepropaedeutic,becauseitisasyntheticattitudethatneverisolatesethicsfromphysicsandthetheoryofknow-ledge:physics,inthemanneroftheLettertoHerodotus’sargumentation,istobeboileddowntoelementarythesesthatarememorized,internalized,andputintopractice.Itisthusactualizedintheveryactivityofseekinghappiness.Forinstance,onecanandshouldnotjustthinkbutevendrilloneselfandgetusedtothinking–continuallyandateverymoment–thatdeathisnothingtous(Men.124).Becauseitis,inthissense,aphilosophyforactualapplication,Epicureanisminitswayovercomestheoppositionoftheoryandpractice:itisatthesametimeascienceofnatureandanattitudeinconformitywithnature.Itsnaturalismisinseparablybothlearnedandlived.BibliographyAncientTextsandCommentariesEpicurusArrighetti,G.(ed.).(1973).Epicuro,Opere.Torino:Einaudi.Bailey,C.(ed.).(1926).Epicurus,TheExtantRemains.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Usener,H.(ed.).(1887).Epicurea.Leipzig:Teubner.502ACTC2550220/03/2006,04:13PM\nepicureanismLucretiusSmith,M.F.(ed.).(1975).Lucretius,Dererumnatura,withanEnglishtrans.byW.H.D.Rouse.Revisedwithnewtext,introd.,notesandindexbyM.F.Smith.LoebClassicalLibrary.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress/London:Heinemann.Epicureantradition(selection)DeLacy,Ph.AndDeLacy,E.A.(eds.).(1978).Philodemus,OnMethodsofInference.Naples:Bibliopolis.Diels,H.(ed.).(1916).PhilodemosüberdieGötter.Book1.AbhandlungenderköniglichPreussischenAkademiederWissenschaften,philosophisch-historischeKlasse7.Berlin.Long,A.A.andSedley,D.N.(eds.).(1987).(CitedasLS).TheHellenisticPhilosophers.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Obbink,D.(ed.).(1996).PhilodemusonPiety,PartI.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Santoro,M.(ed.).(2000).[DemetrioLacone].[Laformadeldio](PHerc.1055).Naples:Bibliopolis.Smith,M.F.(ed.).(1993).DiogenesofOinoanda.TheEpicureanInscription.Naples:Bibliopolis.WorksCitedAlberti,A.(1995).“TheEpicureanTheoryofLawandJustice.”InA.LaksandM.Schofield(eds.),JusticeandGenerosity,StudiesinHellenisticSocialandPoliticalPhilosophy(pp.161–90).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.AuvrayAssayas,C.andDelattre,D.(eds.).(2001).CicéronetPhilodème.Lapolémiqueenphilosophie.Paris:EditionsRued’Ulm.Erler,M.(1994).Chap.“Epikur”;“DieSchuleEpikurs”;“Lukrez.”InH.Flashar(ed.),DiehellenistischePhilosophie,GrundrissderGeschichtederPhilosophie–DiePhilosophiederAntike,(vol.4–1:pp.29–490).Basel:Schwabe.Frede,M.(ed.).(1985).Galen,ThreeTreatisesontheNatureofScience.Trans.R.WalzerandM.Frede,withanIntroductionbyM.Frede.Indianapolis,Ind.:Hackett.[CitedasWalzer-Frede.]Furley,D.J.(1967).TwoStudiesintheGreekAtomists.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Goldschmidt,V.(1977).LaDoctrined’Épicureetledroit.Paris:Vrin.Morel,P.-M.(2000).“Épicure,l’histoireetledroit.”RevuedesÉtudesAnciennes,102,393–411.Sedley,D.(1983).“Epicurus’RefutationofDeterminism.”InSUZHTHSIS.Studisull’epicureismogrecoeromano(FestschriftforM.Gigante)(pp.11–51).Bibl.dellaParoladelPassato,16-I.Naples:Macchiaroli.——.(1988).“EpicureanAnti-Reductionism.”InJ.BarnesandM.Mignucci(eds.),MatterandMetaphysics(pp.295–327).Naples:Bibliopolis.——.(1998).LucretiusandtheTransformationofGreekWisdom.Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-sityPress.FurtherReadingAlgra,K.A.,Koenen,M.H.,andSchrijvers,P.H.(eds.).(1997).LucretiusandhisIntellectualBackground.Amsterdam:VerhandelingenderKoniklijkeAkademievanWetenschappen.Asmis,E.(1984).Epicurus’ScientificMethod.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.Bailey,C.(1928).TheGreekAtomistsandEpicurus.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Clay,D.(1998).ParadosisandSurvival.ThreeChaptersintheHistoryofEpicureanPhilosophy.AnnArbor,Mich.:UniversityofMichiganPress.503ACTC2550320/03/2006,04:13PM\npierre-mariemorelErler,M.(ed.).(2000).EpikureismusinderSpätenRepublikundderKaiserzeit.PhilosophiederAntike11.Stuttgart:Steiner.Giannantoni,G.andGigante,M.(eds.).(1996).Epicureismogrecoeromano.(3vols).Naples:Bibliopolis.Goulet,R.(2000).“Épicure.”InR.Goulet(ed.),Dictionnairedesphilosophesantiques.(vol.3):d’EccélosàJuvénal.Paris:EditionsCNRS.Konstan,D.(1973).SomeAspectsofEpicureanPsychology.Leiden:Brill.Mitsis,P.(1988).Epicurus’EthicalTheory.ThePleasuresofInvulnerability.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.Morel,P.-M.(2000).Atomeetnécessité.Démocrite,Épicure,Lucrèce.Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance.Salem,J.(1989).Telundieuparmileshommes.L’éthiqued’Épicure.Paris:Vrin.——.(1990).LaMortn’estrienpournous.Lucrèceetl’éthique.Paris:Vrin.Warren,J.(2004).FacingDeath.EpicurusandhisCritics.Oxford:ClarendonPress.504ACTC2550420/03/2006,04:13PM\nstoiclogic26StoicLogicKATERINAIERODIAKONOUIntroductionLogicasapartofphilosophyAccordingtomostStoicphilosophers,logicisapartofphilosophy,theotherpartsbeingphysicsandethics(Aët.1,prooem.2=LS26A;D.L.7.39=LS26B1).TheStoicsdistinguishthesethreepartsofphilosophy,becauseeachparthasitsownparticularsubject-matterandaim,yettheyareatthesametimeinseparablyintertwined.Butwhatisthesubject-matterofStoiclogic?TheStoicsdonotusetheterm“logic”(logikE)aswedonowadays.Logicforthemisthestudyoflogos,thatis,thestudyofreasonasrevealedinarticulatespeech.Thus,logicasapartofphilosophyismeanttoexamineeverythingtodowithrationaldiscourse.TheStoicsdividelogicintorhetoric(rhetorikE)anddialectic(dialektikE):rhetoricistheartofspeakingwellintheformofwhole,continuousspeeches;dialectic,ontheotherhand,istheartofconductingdiscussionsbymeansofshortquestionsandanswers,butinamuchbroadersense,itisalsodefinedasthescienceofwhatistrue,whatisfalse,andwhatisneithertruenorfalse(D.L.7.41–42=LS31A1–5).Dialecticitselfissubdividedintothetopicsofsignificationsandutterances,thatis,itseparatelystudieswhatissignifiedbyourutterancesandtheutterancesthemselves.Thestudyofwhatissignifiedcoverswhatgetssaidbyusingallsortsofutterances,butmainlybyusingdeclarativesentences,andhencepropositions,therelationsbetweenthem,theargumentscomposedofsuchpropositions,andespeciallytheirvalidity.Often,though,italsocovershowwedistinguishtruefromfalseimpressions(phantasiai),becauseontheStoics’viewitisonthebasisofcriteriafortrueimpressionsthatweareabletodeterminewhichpropositionsaretrue.Thestudyofutterancesincludespurelylinguisticandgrammaticalphenomena,thatis,aphysicalaccountofsoundappropri-atelyformedbythespeechorgans,adiscussionofthephonemesorlettersofthealphabet,ananalysisofthepartsofspeech,anexaminationofthecriteriaforgoodstyle(D.L.7.43–44=LS31A7–9).Therefore,although“dialectic”istheStoictermmostcloselycorrespondingtooursenseof“logic,”theStoicsincludeunderdialecticagooddealthatwewouldcallepistemology,philosophyoflanguage,grammar,andlinguistics.Inwhatfollowswewillmainlybeconcernedwiththenarrowsenseofdialecticthatfits,moreorless,ourmodernunderstandingoflogicalstudies.Thusdefined,Stoiclogicaimsatasystematicunderstandingoftherulesofrational-ity,whichcanassistustothinkclearlyandcorrectly,andprotectusfrombeingmisled505ACTC2650520/03/2006,04:14PM\nkaterinaierodiakonoubyfallaciousargumentsinallkindsofrationaldiscourse.Inotherwords,logicismeanttohelppeoplediscussandarguecorrectly,askandanswerquestionsmethodically,explorealltheargumentsforandagainstagiventhesis,distinguishthetruefromthefalse,clarifyambiguousstatements,solveparadoxes.Ingeneral,theaimoflogicistheestablishmentofatrueandstableunderstandingoftheworld,anunderstandingthatissupposedtobeessentialtohumanbeingsiftheyaretoliveawell-reasonedandorderedlife(D.L.7.46–48=LS31B).Hence,logicturnsouttobebothaprerequisitefortheproperunderstandingofthephysicalworldandanecessarycomponentofamorallife.GiventheStoics’beliefintherationalityofnature,logicbecomesinseparablefromtheotherpartsofphilosophy,andthisforthefollowingreason:whereastheendofphysicsisknowingtheworldanditsorder,andthatofethicsislivinginaccordancewiththenaturalorder,logicaimsatdistinguishingthetruefromthefalse,andthusmakesitpossibletofindoutthetruthsinthedomainsofrealitywhichbelongtotheotherpartsofphilosophy.ThatiswhytheStoicscometounderstandlogicasaparticularlyimportantpartofphilosophy,andthatisexactlywhytheyinsistthatthephilosophermustbe,morethananythingelse,adialectician:ThereasonwhytheStoicsadopttheseviewsinlogicistogivethestrongestpossibleconfirmationtotheirclaimthatthewisemanisalwaysadialectician.Forallthingsareobservedthroughthestudyconductedindiscourses,whethertheybelongtothedomainofphysicsorequallythatofethics.Astologic,thatgoeswithoutsaying.(D.L.7.83=LS31C)Toshowthespecialroleoflogicintheinterrelationbetweenthethreepartsofphilo-sophy,theStoicsmoreovercomparelogictotheshellofanegg,tothesurroundingwallofafertilefield,tothefortificationofacity,ortothebonesandsinewsofalivingbeing(D.L.7.40=LS26B3;S.E.M7.19=LS26D).AlthoughtheStoicsregardlogicasagenuinepartofphilosophy,theycertainlydonotconsideritasamereauxiliaryinstrumenttoethicsandphysics.Infact,thereseemstohavebeenaconsiderabledisputeovertheissuewhetherlogicisapart(meros)ormerelyaninstrument(organon)ofphilosophy,adisputewhich,althoughittookplacemostprobablyonlyinlateantiquity,helpsustoreconstructthereasoningbehindtheStoics’insistenceonregardinglogicasanintegralconstituentofphilo-sophy(Alexander,InAPr.1.4–4.29;Ammonius,InAPr.8.15–11.21;Philoponus,InAPr.6.19–9.20).Foritbecomesclearthat,giventhesubject-matterandaimofStoiclogic,theStoicshaveeveryreasontobelievethattheirlogicdoesnotsimplyprovidetheotherscienceswithdemonstrativemethods.Rather,Stoiclogicdealswithaparticulardomainofrealityofitsown,whichisdistinctbothfromthesubject-matterofphysicsandthatofethics,namelyitdealswithpropositionsandtheirinterrela-tions;for,aswewillshortlysee,theStoicsviewpropositionsasstatesofaffairswhich,althoughtheydonotexistasbodiesdo,definitelyarepartofrealityinthattheyobtainand,iftrue,arefacts.Furthermore,initsconcernwithtruth,Stoiclogicgoesbeyondtheboundsofascienceaimingonlyatproducingproofsforscientifictheorems;amongotherthings,itismeanttoenableustodistinguishbetweenthetrueandthefalsequitegenerally.506ACTC2650620/03/2006,04:14PM\nstoiclogicTheStoiclogiciansandtheirsourcesTobetterunderstandtheemergenceofStoiclogic,itisusefultogetanideaofthelogicalbackgroundoutofwhichithistoricallydeveloped.TherearetwophilosophicalschoolsthatcouldhaveinfluencedStoicphilosophersintheirlogicalinterests:first,ofcourse,Aristotleandhisfollowers,mainlyTheophrastusandEudemus,andsecond,1theMegarians,likeDiodorusCronusandPhiloofMegara.Indeed,theprevailingviewinthenineteenthcenturywasthatStoiclogicshouldbeconsideredasameresupplementtoAristotle’slogicaltheory;forStoiclogic,soitwasalleged,doesnothingmorethaneithercopyAristotelianlogicordevelopitinavacuousandformalway.Itisonlysinceaboutthemiddleofthetwentiethcentury,aftertheimportantadvancesinsymboliclogic,thatithasbecomeobvioushowStoiclogicessentiallydiffersfromAristotelianlogic.IthasevenbeensuggestedthattheStoicscouldnotpossiblyhavebeeninfluencedbyAristotle,becauseafterthedeathofTheophrastusAristotle’sesotericalwritings,andthereforehislogicalworks,werenolongeravailableandwereonlyrecoveredinthefirstcenturybce.IthinkitisextremelyimplausibletoassumethatAristotle’slogicalwritingswerenotavailabletotheearlyStoiclogicians.But,eveniftheStoicswerefamiliarwiththesetreatises,therecanbenodoubtabouttheoriginalityoftheStoiclogicalsystem;juststudyingStoiclogicandcomparingitwithwhatweknowaboutAristotelianlogicprovidesuswithadequateproofthattheyaretworadicallydifferentsystems.Itistrue,ontheotherhand,thatTheophrastusandEudemuspublishedtreatisesaboutwhattheycalledsyllogisms“basedonahypothesis”(exhupotheseOs),whichAristotle(APr.I.29,45b15–20)hadpromisedtowriteabout,butneverdid,andthesesyllo-gismshaveagreatdealincommonwiththetypesofsyllogismstheStoicsdiscuss.However,thereisnoevidencethatthePeripateticlogiciansanticipatedtheoutstand-ingfeatureofStoiclogic,namelyconstructingalogicalsystemtoprovethevalidityofawholeclassofarguments,thoughofadifferentkindthanthoseAristotlefocusedoninhissyllogistic.AsfarastheMegariansareconcerned,thehistoricalconnectionsbetweenthemandtheStoicsarewell-documented.ZenoknewbothDiodorusandPhilowell,andChrysippuswrotetreatisesinwhichhecriticizedtheirlogicalviews.However,althoughDiodorusandPhilowerenotexclusivelyconcernedwiththestudyoflogicalpuzzlesorparadoxes,inconnectionwithwhichtheyareusuallymentioned,butalsoputforwardoriginalviews,forinstanceaboutlogicalmodalitiesandthetruthconditionsofconditionalpropositions,theynevercameclosetoconstructingalogicalsystemaselaborateandsophisticatedasthatoftheStoics.ButwhatdoweactuallyknowabouttheStoicphilosopherswhowereparticularlyinstrumentalinthedevelopmentofStoiclogic?Thephilosopherwhoimmediatelycomestomind,ofcourse,isChrysippus:“He[Chrysippus]becamesorenownedindialecticthatitwasthegeneralopinionthatifthegodshaddialectic,itwouldbenodifferentfromthatofChrysippus”(D.L.7.180=LS31Q).Indeed,toconfirmChrysippus’reputationastheprincipalStoiclogician,oneneedsonlytogothroughthelonglistoflogicalbooksattributedtohimbyDiogenesLaertius(D.L.7.189–198).ButChrysippus1.OntheMegarians,seeDeclevaCaizzi,minorsocratics,inthisvolume.507ACTC2650720/03/2006,04:14PM\nkaterinaierodiakonouwasnotaloneamongtheStoicsinhisinterestinlogic.ForthoughitmayhavebeenthecasethatZenoandCleanthes,beforeChrysippus,werenotlogiciansinthesensethattheyconstructedaformallogicalsystem,theybothusedvalidargumentsofaconsiderableleveloflogicalcomplexityinordertoestablishtheirphilosophicaltheses;and,giventheratherstandardizedpatternsoftheirarguments,onemightthinkthattheymusthavebeenawareofthelogicalformsinvirtueofwhichtheselogicalargumentsarevalid.Also,logicalstudiesintheStoicschoolcertainlydidnotdiewithChrysippus;therewerelaterStoiclogicians,andtheydidnotsimplyparrotChrysippus’doctrines.ThereissomeevidencethatStoicphilosophers,likePosidonius,AthenodorusandEpictetus,madefurtheradditionstotheChrysippeansystem,andeventhattheydivergedfromChrysippus’logicalthesesonlesserissues.Havingsaidthat,however,itisnotatalleasytodistinguishbetweenChrysippus’ownviewsandthoseofhissuccessors,giventhestateofthesurvivingevidence;forinstance,ourancientsourcesusuallyattributethelogicaldoctrinestotheStoicsingeneral,andnottoindividualStoics.Moreover,thefactthatmostofoursourcesforStoiclogicarequitehostileandlatemakesourprojectofreconstructingtheStoiclogicalsystemseemextremelyproblematic.Butitisnotimpossible.Needlesstosay,though,thereisalwaysplentyofspacefordifferentinterpretationsofthesurvivingtexts,andthusplentyofdisagreementamongmodernscholarsonmanypointsofdetail.TheStoicLogicalSystemLektaandaxiomataThemaincharacteristicofStoiclogicisthattheinferencesitstudiesareaboutrela-tionsbetweenitemsthathavethestructureofpropositions.WhereasAristotlefocusedhisattentiononinferencesthatinvolverelationsbetweenterms,andthusintroduced2alogicalsystemsimilartowhatwenowadayscall“predicatelogic,”Stoiclogicmarksthebeginningofwhatisnowcalled“propositionallogic.”Tosay,though,thatStoiclogicispropositionalmaybesomewhatmisleading;for,tostartwith,theStoicshavequiteadifferentunderstandingofwhatapropositionis,ortousetheirownterm,ofwhatanaxiOma(assertible)is:“TheysaythatanaxiOmaisacompletelektonwhich,asfarasititselfisconcerned,canbeasserted”(S.E.PH2.104=LS35C2).SoinordertofullygrasptheStoicdefinitionofanaxiOma,wefirstneedtogetsome3ideaabouttheStoicnotionofalekton(sayable).Lekta(Sayables)ThetermlektonisderivedfromtheGreekverb“legein,”i.e.,“tosay,”anditis,there-fore,whathasbeenorgetssaidorsomethingwhichcanbesaid.Infact,theStoicsdistinguishbetweenwhatgetssaidbyutteringorusinganexpressionandthe2.OnAristotle’slogic,seeDetel,aristotle’slogicandtheoryofscience,inthisvolume.3.OnthesayablesintheStoictheoryofmeaning,seealsoModrak,philosophyoflanguage.508ACTC2650820/03/2006,04:14PM\nstoiclogicexpressionitselfwhichweutteroruseinsayingsomething.Forinstance,theydis-tinguishbetweentheexpression“Catoiswalking,”whichisusedtosaythatCatoiswalking,andwhatgetssaidbyusingthisexpression,namelythatCatoiswalking(Sen.Ep.117.13=LS33E).Sothekindofitemwhichgetssaidbyusingtheappropri-ateexpressionintheappropriateway,theStoicscallalekton.TheStoicsalsotalkaboutalektonasthestateofaffairssignified,i.e.,thesignifica-tion(sEmainomenon),distinguishingitfromtheutterancewhichisthesignifier(sEmainon),andfromthecorporealentitywhichthelektonisabout(tunchanon)(S.E.M7.11–12=LS33B).Thuslektaareitemsthatareplacedbetweenmerevocalsoundsorwrittensentencesontheonehandandtheobjectsintheworldontheother;veryroughlyspeaking,lektaaretheunderlyingmeaningsineverythingwesay,aswellasineverythingwethink.ForlektaaredefinedbytheStoicsalsoasthecontentofourthoughts:“Theysaythatalektoniswhatsubsistsinaccordancewitharationalimpression”(D.L.7.63=LS33F2;S.E.M7.70=LS33C).Butnoteverythingthatgetsthoughtgetssaid,andnoteverythingthatcanbesaidgetsthought.Thereareindeedmanythingsthatnevergetthoughtorsaid,althoughtheyaretheretobethoughtorsaid.Inotherwords,Stoiclektaarenotmind-dependentitems;atthesametime,though,theycertainlydonotexistinthewaybodiesexistintheworld.TheStoicsstressthatlektaareincorporeal,likevoid,place,andtime(S.E.M10.218=LS27D),andinordertocharacterizetheirmodeofbeing,theyintroducethenotionofsubsistence(huphistanai),asopposedtoexistence(einai).Reality,theyclaim,isnotjustconstitutedbycorporealentities,butalsobypredicatestrueofbodiesandpropositionstrueaboutbodies.Hence,lektaaregiveninStoiconto-logysomestatus,namelythestatus,notofbodies,butofincorporealsomethings.TheStoicsdividelektaintocompleteandincomplete(D.L.7.63=LS33F).Incom-pletelektaincludepredicates,likeforinstancewhatismeantby“writes,”foritissimplyathingtosayaboutsomething.Ontheotherhand,questions,oaths,invoca-tions,addresses,commands,curses,areallcompletelekta.ButfortheStoiclogicalsystemthemostimportantkindofacompletelektoniswhatwecallaproposition,forexample,thatSocrateswrites,andthistheStoicscallanaxiOma.AxiOmata(Assertibles)SoletusreturntoSextus’definitionofaStoicaxiOma:“TheysaythatanaxiOmaisacompletelektonwhich,asfarasititselfisconcerned,canbeasserted”(S.E.PH2.104=LS35C2).AndletusalsoquotethedefinitionthatDiogenesattributestoChrysippushimself:“AnaxiOmaisthatwhichistrueorfalse,oracompletestateofaffairswhich,sofarasitselfisconcerned,canbeasserted,asChrysippussaysinhisDialecticaldefinitions”(D.L.7.65=LS34A).ItthusseemsthatthepropertyofbeingtrueorfalseiswhatdifferentiatesanaxiOmafromothertypesofcompletelekta,butanaxiOmaismainlydefinedbythefactthatitisthekindofitemsuchthatinsayingthissortofthingoneisassertingsomething.Whydowethenpreferthetranslation“assertible”ratherthanthemorecommonterm“proposition?”Itistrue,ofcourse,thatStoicaxiOmataandpropositionsasweconceivethemsharecommoncharacteristics.Forinstance,theyareexpressedbycompleteindicativeordeclarativesentences,theyareeithertrueorfalse,andtheyare509ACTC2650920/03/2006,04:14PM\nkaterinaierodiakonouincorporeal.ButweshouldalsounderlinethedifferencesbetweenaxiOmataandpro-positions.Forinstance,whileapropositionistimelesslytrueorfalse,anaxiOmaisassertedataparticulartimeandhasaparticulartense;thatistosay,anaxiOmacaninprinciplechangeitstruth-valuewithoutceasingtobethesameaxiOma.Forexample,theaxiOma“Itisday”istruewhenitisdayandfalsewhenitisnot(D.L.7.65=LS34E).TheaxiOmatathatchangetheirtruth-valuearecalledbytheStoics“changing”(metapiptonta).Forexample,theconditional“IfDionisalive,Dionwillbealive”isachangingaxiOma;itisnottrueatalltimes,fortherewillbeatimewhentheanteced-entwillbetrueandtheconsequentfalse,andthustheconditionalwillbefalse(Simpl.InPhys.1299.36–1300.10=LS37K).Also,sinceStoicaxiOmataincludetokenreflex-iveelements,likeforinstance“this”or“I,”theymayceasetoexistandpresumablyalso,thoughthisisnotclearlystated,begintoexistatdefinitetimes.ForaStoicaxiOmarequiresthereferentofareferringexpressionasitssubject,otherwiseitissaidtobedestroyed;thedestructionofanaxiOmaisitsceasingtobeexpressible.Forexample,theaxiOma“Thismanisdead”isdestroyedatDion’sdeath,if“thisman”referstoDion(Alexander,InAPr.177.25–178.1=LS38F).Beingaparticularclassoflekta,axiOmatadonotexistasbodiesdo,buttheycanbesaidtosubsist.Inaddition,theStoicsmakeafurtherdistinction:ifanaxiOmaisfalse,itonlysubsists(huphistanai),butifitistrue,itisafactandthusalsocanbesaidtobepresentorthere(huparchein).InthissensetrueaxiOmatacorrespondtotheworld’shavingcertainfeatures,andtheyareavailabletobethoughtandexpressedwhetheranyoneisthinkingaboutthemornot.Ontheotherhand,sincefalseaxiOmataaresaidtosubsist,thephilosophicalquestionofhowfalsestatementsandthoughtsarepossiblegetsareasonableanswer;falseaxiOmataarethecontradictoriesoffacts,andhencehavesomestatus.Finally,axiOmataaredividedintosimpleandnon-simpleaxiOmata.SimpleaxiomataAccordingtoSextus,simpleaxiOmataarethosewhicharenotcomposedeitherofarepeatedaxiOmaorofseveralaxiOmata;e.g.,“Itisday”or“Socratesistalking”(S.E.M8.93–98=LS34H).SimpleaxiOmataareagaindividedintodefinite(hOrismena/katagoreutika),indefinite(aorista),andintermediate(mesa/katEgorika).DefiniteaxiOmataarethosethatareexpressedthroughdemonstrativereference(deixis),i.e.,throughanon-verbal,phys-icalactofindicatingsomethingsimultaneouslywiththeutteranceofasentencewithademonstrative,e.g.,“Thisoneiswalking.”IndefiniteaxiOmataarethosethataregovernedbysomeindefiniteconstituent,i.e.,theyarecomposedbyoneormoreinde-finitepronounsandapredicate,e.g.,“Someoneiswalking.”IntermediateaxiOmataarethosethatareneitherindefiniteastothesubject,fortheymarkoffitsspecifickind,nordefinite,fortheyarenotpointingatthesubjectitself,i.e.,theyconsistofanominativecaseandapredicate,e.g.,“Amaniswalking”or“Socratesiswalking.”Asfortheirtruthconditions,definiteaxiOmata,suchas“Thisoneiswalking,”aretruewheneverthepredicate,suchas“walking,”belongstothethingidentifiedby“thisone”(S.E.M8.100=LS34I).Thatistosay,ofcourse,thatdefiniteaxiOmataareourmeansofstatingwithprecisiontheparticularfactsintheworld.Thetruthofthe510ACTC2651020/03/2006,04:14PM\nstoiclogicindefiniteaxiOmataiscontingentuponthoseofthecorrespondingdefiniteones;forinstance,“Someoneiswalking”comesouttruewhenadefiniteoneoftheform“Thisoneiswalking”istrue(S.E.M8.98=LS34H10).ItisinterestingthattheStoicsrejectedpropernamesassubjectsofdefiniteaxiOmata,forontheirviewpropernamessignifyqualitiesandcouldfailtorefer;forinstance,the“Socraticity”ofSocratesmarksoffaspecificindividual,butnotsomethingnecessarilypresentnow,asdoes“thisone.”TheaboveclassificationbySextusdoesnotseemtobeanexhaustivedivisionofsimpleaxiOmata;itisratheradivisionofaffirmativesimpleaxiOmata.DiogenesLaertiusproposesinsteadsixclassesofsimpleaxiOmata,ofwhichthelastthreeclassesaresimilartotheonesdiscussedbySextus,whilethefirstthreeclassesarealldifferentkindsofnegativeaxiOmata(D.L.7.69–70=LS34K):First,anegativeaxiOma(apophatikon)consistsofanegativeparticleandanaxiOma,e.g.,“Not:itisday.”Aspecialcaseofthisisthedoublenegationorsuper-negation(huperapophatikon),whichisthenegationofanegativeaxiOma,e.g.,“Not:not:itisday.”Second,thedenial(arnEtikon),iscomposedofadenyingparticle,like“noone,”andapredicate,e.g.,“Nooneiswalking.”Third,theprivative(sterEtikon),iscomposedofaprivativeparticleandapotentialaxiOma,e.g.,“Thismanisunkind,”i.e.,“un”and“Thismaniskind.”Itseems,therefore,thattheStoicsthinkofnegativeaxiOmata,aswellasofthedoublenegation,assimpleaxiOmata.Thatistosay,introducinganegativeparticledoesnot,byitself,makeanaxiOmanon-simple,thoughnegationcanalsoapplytonon-simpleaxiOmata.ThenegationofasimpleaxiOmaisitselfsimple,thatofanon-simpleaxiOmanon-simple.Itisalsoimportanttonotethatthescopeofthenegativeparticleis,accordingtotheStoics,theentireaxiOma;thatmeans,forinstance,thatanaxiOmaoftheform“Itisnotday”wasregardedasaffirmativeandnotasnegative.Hence,thenegativeparticle“not”wasnotregardedbytheStoiclogiciansasacon-nective(sundesmos);forsuchconnectivesbindtogetherpartsofspeech,andthenegativeparticledoesnotdothat(D.L.7.58).Finally,Stoicnegationistruth-functional;thatistosay,thenegativeparticle“not,”ifaddedtotrueaxiOmata,makesthemfalse,whereasifaddedtofalseaxiOmatamakesthemtrue.Moreover,anaxiOmaanditsnegationformapairofcontradictories(antikeimena).Thus,contradictoriesareaxiOmataoneofwhichexceedstheotherbyanegative,providedthatthenegativeisprefixedandcontrolsorgovernsthewholeaxiOma(S.E.M8.88–90=LS34G);e.g.,“Itisday”and“Not:itisday”arecontradictories.Non-simpleaxiomataNon-simpleaxiOmataarethosethatarecomposedeitherofarepeatedaxiOmaorofseveralaxiOmatathatarecombinedbyoneormoreconnectives(S.E.M8.95).Themaintypesofnon-simpleaxiOmatastudiedbytheStoiclogiciansarethefollowing(D.L.7.71–74=LS35A;S.E.M8.125–127):1.AconjunctiveaxiOma(sumpeplegmenon)isonewhichisconjoinedbythecon-junctiveconnective“and”or“both...and...,”e.g.,“Bothitisdayanditislight.”TheStoicsgavetheobvioustruth-conditionsforconjunctions,i.e.,thetruthoftheconjunctiondependssolelyonthetruthorfalsityoftheconjuncts,andnotontheircontent.AconjunctiveaxiOmaistrueifandonlyifallitsconjunctsare511ACTC2651120/03/2006,04:14PM\nkaterinaierodiakonoutrue.However,itseemsthatthisStoicviewwasnotgenerallyaccepted,butwasinneedofdefense.ForopponentsfailedtounderstandthataconjunctiveaxiOmashouldbetreatedasoneassertion,andclaimedthatifsomeoftheconjunctsweretrueandothersfalse,itnaturallyshouldbedescribedas“nomoretruethanfalse,”thoughtheyallowedthatitmightperhapsbecalledtrueifmostoftheconjunctsweretrue.2.AdisjunctiveaxiOma(diezeugmenon)isonethatisdisjoinedbythedisjunctiveconnective“or”or“either...or...,”e.g.,“Eitheritisdayoritisnight.”TheStoicsunderstandthedisjunctiverelationasexhaustiveandexclusive.Thatistosay,theminimalrequirementforthetruthofadisjunctionwasthatoneandonlyonedisjunctistrue.3.AconditionalaxiOma(sunEmmenon)isonelinkedbytheconditionalconnective“if”(ei),e.g.,“Ifitisday,itislight.”Aconditional,accordingtotheStoics,istruewhenthereis“connection”(sunartEsis)betweentheantecedentandthecon-sequent,i.e.,whenthecontradictoryofitsconsequentconflictswiththeantecedent.Forinstance,theconditional“Ifitisday,itisday”istrue,sincethecontradictoryofitsconsequent“Not:itisday”conflictswithitsantecedent“Itisday.”Acondi-tionalisfalsewhenthecontradictoryofitsconsequentdoesnotconflictwithitsantecedent.Forinstance,theconditional“Ifitisday,Iamtalking”isfalse,sincethecontradictoryofitsconsequent“Not:Iamtalking”doesnotconflictwithitsantecedent“Itisday.”Hence,Chrysippusassignedtotheconditionalconnective“if”astrongsense,com-paredtowhatoursourcesattributetoPhiloofMegaraandDiodorusCronus.ForPhiloclaimedthataconditionalistruesimplywhenitdoesnothaveatrueantecedentandafalseconsequent,e.g.,“Ifitisday,Iamtalking.”Infact,thisuseoftheconditionalconnective“if”isequivalenttowhatwenowadayscall“materialimplication”andisclearlytruth-functional.Diodorus,ontheotherhand,saidthataconditionalistruewhenitneitherwasnorisabletohaveatrueantecedentandafalseconsequent.Onthisviewtheconditional“Ifitisday,Iamtalking”isfalse,sincewhenitisdaybutIhavefallensilentitwillhaveatrueantecedentandafalseconsequent;buttheconditional“Iftherearenopartlesselementsofthings,therearepartlesselementsofthings”istrue,foritwillalwayshavethefalseantecedent“Therearepartlesselementsofthings.”OntheStoicview,however,boththeconditional“Ifitisday,Iamtalking,”andtheconditional“Iftherearenopartlesselementsofthings,therearepartlesselementsofthings”arefalse,sinceinthemthereisnoconnectionbetweentheante-cedentandtheconsequent(S.E.PH2.110–113=LS35B).TheStoicinterpretationoftheconditionalconnective“if”hasthedisadvantageofrenderingatleastpartoftheirlogicnontruth-functional.Ontheotherhand,itisabletoadequatelyexpressintelligibleconnectionsinnatureandavoidcasesthatarecounter-intuitive,suchastheconditionals“Ifitisday,Iamtalking”or“Iftherearenopartlesselementsofthings,therearepartlesselementsofthings.”Similarly,theStoics’interestinadequatelyexpressingintelligibleconnectionsinnatureshowsinChrysippus’decisionnottousetheconditionalwhendiscussingastrologicalpredictionsmerelybasedonempiricalobservationofthecorrelationsbetweenastralandterrestrialevents.Forexample,itmaybethatitisnotthecaseboththatFabiuswasbornattherisingof512ACTC2651220/03/2006,04:14PM\nstoiclogicthedog-starandthatFabiuswilldieatsea.Chrysippuswouldnotexpressthisas“IfFabiusisbornattherisingofthedog-star,hewillnotdieatsea,”preciselybecausehewasnotconvincedthattherewasanecessarycausalconnectionbetweenbeingbornatthattimeoftheyearanddyingondryland.ThisisthereasonwhyChrysippuspreferredinsuchcasesthenegatedconjunction,i.e.,“Not:BothFabiuswasbornattherisingofthedog-starandFabiuswilldieatsea”(Cic.Fat.12–15=LS38E).Needlesstosay,non-simpleaxiOmatacanbecomposedofmorethantwosimpleaxiOmata,eitherbecausetheconstituentaxiOmataarethemselvesnon-simple,orbecausecertainconnectives,namelytheconjunctiveandthedisjunctiveconnective,aretwo-or-more-placefunctions.Forinstance,theStoicsusetheconditional“Ifbothitisdayandthesunisabovetheearth,itislight,”orthethree-placedisjunction“Eitherwealthisgoodoritiseviloritisindifferent.”Butwefindinoursourcesmorekindsofnon-simpleaxiOmata,apartfromcon-junctions,disjunctions,andconditionals;mostoftheseadditionalnon-simpleaxiOmatamayhavebeenintroducedafterChrysippus.Forinstance,asubconditionalaxiOma(parasunEmmenon)isonewhichisjoinedbytheconnective“since”(epei).Asub-conditionalistruewhentheconsequentfollowsfromtheantecedent,andtheanteced-entholds,e.g.,“Sinceitisday,thesunisabovetheearth,”whensaidindaytime;itisfalsewheniteitherhasafalseantecedent,orhasaconsequentwhichdoesnotfollowfromtheantecedent,e.g.,“Sinceitisnight,Dioniswalking.”AsubdisjunctiveaxiOma(paradiezeugmenon)isanon-simpleaxiOmawhichisindistinguishableinitslin-guisticformfromadisjunctiveaxiOma,butwhichistrueeitherwhenitssubdisjunctsdonotconflictwitheachotherorwhenthecontradictoriesofitssubdisjunctsarenotmutuallyincompatible.Forexample,thesubdisjunctiveaxiOma“Eitheryouarerun-ningoryouarewalkingoryouarestanding”istrue,becausethecontradictoriesofthedisjunctsarenotmutuallyincompatible(Gell.NA16.8.12–14=LS35E).AcausalaxiOma(aitiOdes)isonewhichisjoinedbytheconnective“because”(dioti),e.g.,“Becauseitisday,itislight”(D.L.7.72).Thetruthconditionsofthiskindofnon-simpleaxiOmaunfortunatelyhavenotsurvived.ModalitiesAlthoughStoiclogicdoesnotdealwithaxiOmataoftheform“Itispossiblethatitisday,”simpleandnon-simpleaxiOmataarestandardlyclassifiedaspossible,impossible,necessary,andnon-necessary.FortheStoiclogiciansregarded,liketruthandfalse-hood,modalitiestooaspropertiesofaxiOmata;so,accordingtotheirview,anaxiOmamayinprinciplechangeitsmodalvalue,sinceithasitatatime.StoicmodallogicdevelopedoutofthedebateoverDiodorusCronus’famousMasterArgument(kurieuOnlogos),whichEpictetusdiscussesinthefollowingtext:Theseseemtobethesortofstarting-pointsfromwhichtheMasterArgumentisposed.Thefollowingthreepropositionsmutuallyconflict:“Everypasttruthisnecessary”;“Some-thingimpossibledoesnotfollowfromsomethingpossible”;and“Thereissomethingpossiblewhichneitherisnorwillbetrue.”Diodorussawthisconflictandexploitedtheconvincingnessofthefirsttwotoestablishtheconclusionthat“Nothingwhichneitherisnorwillbetrueispossible.”Nowsomewillretainthepair“Thereissomethingpossiblewhichneitherisnorwillbetrue”and“Somethingimpossibledoesnotfollow513ACTC2651320/03/2006,04:14PM\nkaterinaierodiakonoufromsomethingpossible,”butdenythat“Everypasttruthisnecessary.”ThisseemstohavebeenthelinetakenbyCleanthesandhiscircle,andwasingeneralendorsedbyAntipater.Whereasotherswillretaintheotherpair,that“Thereissomethingwhichneitherisnorwillbetrue,”andthat“Everypasttruthisnecessary,”butholdthatsome-thingimpossibledoesfollowfromsomethingpossible.Toretainallthreeisimpossiblebecauseoftheirmutualconflict.Soifsomeoneasksme,“Whichofthemdoyouretain?”Ishallanswer“Idon’tknow;butmyinformationisthatDiodorusretainedthefirstpairImentioned,thecirclesofPathoides(Ithink)andCleanthesthesecondpair,andChrysippusandhiscirclethethirdpair.”(Epict.Diss.2.19.1–5=LS38A)Thus,itseemsthattheStoicsmadevariousattemptstorebutDiodorus’viewthatnothingispossiblewhichneitherisnorwillbe,reactingtothethreatofaweakenedformoflogicaldeterminismentailedbysuchaclaim.Inaddition,AlexanderofAphrodisias(InAPr.177.25–178.1=LS38F)givesussomefurtherinformationaboutChrysippus’attackonthesecondpremiseoftheMasterArgument.Forinordertoshowthatnothingprecludesthatsomethingimpossiblefollowsfromsomethingpossible,Chrysippusisreportedtohaveusedasanexampletheconditional“IfDionisdead,thisoneisdead,”andthisforthefollowingreasons:First,theantecedent“Dionisdead”ispossible,sinceitwillbetrueatsometime.Second,theconsequent“Thisoneisdead”isimpossible,foranyaxiOmathatneitherisnorevercanbetrueisimpossible,and“Thisoneisdead”isnecessarilyeitherfalse,namelyaslongasDionisalive,ordestroyed,namelywhenDionisdead.Third,theconditionalistrueaccordingtoallthedifferenttruth-conditionsforconditionals.ReactingbothtowardsDiodorus’definitionofthepossibleas“thatwhichisorwillbe”andPhilo’sdefinitionas“thatwhichispredicatedinaccordancewiththebarefitnessofthesubject,evenifitispreventedfromcomingaboutbysomenecessaryexternalfactor”(Alexander,InAPr.183.34–184.10=LS38B;Boethius,Int.234.22–26=LS38C),Chrysippusproposedhisownaccountofthepossible:ApossibleaxiOma(dunaton)isthatwhichadmitsofbeingtrue,andisnotpreventedbyexternalfactorsfrombeingtrue,e.g.,“Dionisalive”(D.L.7.75=LS38D;Boethius,Int.234.27–235.4).Giventhisdefinitionofthepossible,Chrysippusdefinedtheotherthreestand-ardmodalpropertiesofaxiOmatasoastoyieldtheexpectedlogicalrelations;forinstance,thatthenecessaryissomethingofwhichitisnotpossiblethatitisnotthecase,orthatthepossibleandtheimpossibleaswellasthenecessaryandthenon-necessaryarecontradictorytoeachother.Hence,animpossibleaxiOma(adunaton)isdefinedasthatwhichdoesnotadmitofbeingtrue,oradmitsofbeingtruebutispreventedbyexternalfactorsfrombeingtrue,e.g.,“Theearthflies.”AnecessaryaxiOma(anankaion)isthatwhichistrueanddoesnotadmitofbeingfalse,oradmitsofbeingfalsebutispreventedbyexternalfactorsfrombeingfalse,e.g.,“Virtueisbeneficial.”Anon-necessaryaxiOma(oukanankaion)isthatwhichiscapableofbeingfalse,andisnotpreventedbyexternalfactorsfrombeingfalse,e.g.,“Dioniswalking.”TwofurthermodalitieswerealsostudiedbytheStoiclogicians;namely,plausibilityandprobability(D.L.7.75–76):AplausibleaxiOma(pithanon)isthatwhichinvitesassenttoit,e.g.,“Ifsomeonegavebirthtoanything,sheisitsmother.”AprobableorreasonableaxiOma(eulogon)isthatwhichhashigherchancesofbeingtruethanfalse,e.g.,“Ishallbealivetomorrow.”514ACTC2651420/03/2006,04:14PM\nstoiclogicArgumentsTheStoicsdefineanargument(logos)asacomplexoracompoundofpremises(lEmmata)andaconclusion(epiphora/sumperasma).ThefollowingisatypicalStoicargument(S.E.PH2.135–136=LS36B2;D.L.7.76–77=LS36A1–3):Ifitisday,itislight.Butitisday.Thereforeitislight.Theycallthefirstpremise“leadingpremise”(hEgemonikonlEmma:Galen,Inst.Log.7.1),whiletheycallthesecondpremise“co-assumption”(proslEpsis).ItwastheorthodoxStoicviewthatanargumentmusthavemorethanonepremise,thoughitseemsthatAntipateradmittedinhislogicsingle-premisearguments(monolEmmatoi)(S.E.M8.443=LS36C7),asforinstance(Apul.Int.184.16–23=LS36D):Youareseeing.Thereforeyouarealive.Inaddition,theStoicsdiscussedargumentsintermsoftheirmodes(tropoi),whicharetheabbreviationsofparticulararguments;forinstance,themodeofthepreviousargumentisthefollowing:Ifthefirst,thesecond.Butthefirst.Thereforethesecond.TheordinalnumbersherestandforaxiOmata,andhaveexactlythesameroleasthelettersofthealphabetinAristotelianlogic.Finally,theStoicsalsousedtheso-called“mode-arguments”(logotropoi),inwhichtheaxiOmataaregiveninfullwhenfirstoccurring,butarethenreplacedbyordinalnumbers,obviouslyforpurposesofsimpli-cityandclarity:IfPlatoisalive,Platoisbreathing.Butthefirst.Thereforethesecond.Ofargumentssomearevalidordeductive(perantikoi/sunaktikoi),othersinvalidornon-deductive(aperantoi/asunaktoi).Invalidargumentsoccurwhenthecontradictoryoftheconclusiondoesnotconflictwiththeconjunctionofthepremises(D.L.7.77=LS36A4).Forinstance,theargument:Ifitisday,itislight.Butitisday.ThereforeDioniswalking.515ACTC2651520/03/2006,04:14PM\nkaterinaierodiakonouisinvalid,becausethecontradictoryofitsconclusion,i.e.,“Not:Dioniswalking,”doesnotconflictwiththeconjunctionofitspremises,i.e.,“Bothifitisdayitislightanditisday.”Inotherwords,thevalidityofanargumentdependsonthetruthofthecorrespondingconditionalformedfromtheconjunctionofthepremisesasantecedentandtheconclusionasconsequent(S.E.PH2.137=LS36B3;S.E.M8.416,421).Totakeagainthepreviousargument,itisinvalidbecausethecorrespondingcon-ditional“Ifbothifitisdayitislightanditisday,Dioniswalking”isfalse,atleastaccordingtoChrysippus’truth-conditionsforconditionalaxiOmata.Further,someargumentsaretrue,othersfalse(D.L.7.79=LS36A8–9;S.E.PH2.138–139=LS36B4–6).Truearethoseargumentswhichdeducecorrectlyfromtruepremises,e.g.,Ifvirtuebenefits,viceharms.Butvirtuebenefits.Thereforeviceharms.Falseargumentsarethosewhicheitherhavesomefalsepremise,orareinvalid,e.g.,Ifitisday,itisnight.Butitisday.ThereforeDionisalive.SyllogisticargumentsOfvalidarguments,somearejustcalled“valid,”others“syllogistic”(sullogistikoi).TheStoicsdefinesyllogisticargumentsasthosewhicheitherarewhattheycall“indemonstrable”(anapodeiktoi),orcanbereducedtotheindemonstrables(D.L.7.78=LS36A5).IndemonstrablesorsimplesyllogismsIndemonstrableargumentsarethosewhosevalidityisnotinneedofdemonstration,giventhatitisobviousinitself(D.L.7.79–81=LS36A11–16;S.E.M8.223–227;PH2.157–158).Thelistsofindemonstrableargumentswhicharetobefoundinourancientsourcesvary,butthereisnodoubtthatChrysippushimselfdistinguishedfivedifferenttypesofsucharguments,eachtypebeingcharacterizedbyaparticularbasicforminvirtueofwhichtheargumentsareunderstoodtobeindemonstrable.Astoothersurvivinglistsoftypesofindemonstrables,theyreflectthecriticismsandalterationsthatthestandardlistseemstohaveundergoneatthehandoflaterStoicsinthecenturiesfollowingitsintroduction;theydifferfromChrysippus’listinaddingextratypesofargument,aswellasinobjectingtotheusefulnessorapplica-tionofothers(Cic.Top.57;MartianusCapella4.419–420;Boethius,Cic.Top.358;Cassiodorus,Inst.119.3–4).Thebasiclogicalformsofthefivestandardindemonstrablesaredescribedandillustratedbyexamplesinourtextsasfollows:516ACTC2651620/03/2006,04:14PM\nstoiclogic1.Afirstindemonstrableargumentisconstructedoutofaconditionalanditsante-cedentaspremises,andtheconsequentasconclusion,e.g.,Ifitisday,itislight.Butitisday.Thereforeitislight.2.Asecondindemonstrableargumentisconstructedoutofaconditionalandthecontradictoryofitsconsequentaspremises,andthecontradictoryofitsanteced-entasconclusion,e.g.,Ifitisday,itislight.Butnot:itislight.Thereforenot:itisday.3.Athirdindemonstrableargumentisconstructedoutofanegatedconjunctionandoneofitsconjunctsaspremises,andthecontradictoryoftheotherconjunctasconclusion,e.g.,Not:bothPlatoisdeadandPlatoisalive.ButPlatoisdead.Thereforenot:Platoisalive.4.Afourthindemonstrableargumentisconstructedoutofadisjunctionandoneofitsdisjunctsaspremises,andthecontradictoryoftheotherdisjunctascon-clusion,e.g.,Eitheritisdayoritisnight.Itisday.Thereforenot:itisnight.5.Afifthindemonstrableargumentisconstructedoutofadisjunctionandthecon-tradictoryofoneofitsdisjunctsaspremises,andtheotherdisjunctasconclusion,e.g.,Eitheritisdayoritisnight.Not:itisday.Thereforeitisnight.Ofcourse,thetypesofindemonstrableargumentsincludemanymoreargumentsthanthesimpleexamplesabovesuggest.Forinstance,ifineachtypeofindemonstrablethesimpleaxiOmatathatweusetoconstructthepremisesarenotaffirmative,astheyareintheabovesimpleexamples,buteitherbothnegativeornegativeandaffirmat-iverespectively,wegetdifferentcombinationsofpremises,andhencedifferentindemonstrableargumentsofthesametype.Thatistosay,inthecaseofthefirstindemonstrable,if,insteadofhavingasfirstpremisetheconditional“Ifitisday,itis517ACTC2651720/03/2006,04:14PM\nkaterinaierodiakonoulight,”weusetheconditionals“Ifnot:itisday,not:itislight”or“Ifnot:itisday,itislight”or“Ifitisday,not:itislight,”togetherwiththeappropriateaffirmativeornegativeaxiOmataassecondpremises,westillgetdifferentargumentsofthesamefirsttypeofindemonstrables.Inaddition,itbecomesclearthatmanymoreargumentsareincludedineachtypeofthefiveindemonstrables,ifweconsiderthecasesinwhichtheaxiOmataofthepremisesarethemselvesnon-simple,as,forinstance,inthecaseoftheChrysippeanargumentdiscussedinthefollowingtext:AccordingtoChrysippus(thatarch-enemyofirrationalanimals!)thedogevensharesintheirlegendary“dialectic.”Atanyrate,thismansaysthatthedogapplieshimselftoamultiplefifthindemonstrablewhenhecomestoatripleforkinthepath,and,aftersniffingthetwopathswhichhisquarrydidnottake,setsoffatoncedownthethirdwithoutevensniffingit.For,theancientphilosophersays,thedogisineffectreasoning:“Eithermyquarrywentthisway,orthisway,orthisway.Butneitherthisway,northisway.Thereforethisway.”(S.E.PH1.69=LS36E)ButwhydidChrysippusdecidetosuggestthisparticularlistofthefivetypesofindemonstrablearguments?ItiscertainlynotthecasethatChrysippuswastryingtointroducethesmallestpossiblenumberofdifferenttypesofindemonstrableargu-ments.ForonecouldeasilydispensewiththesecondindemonstrableonthebasisofthefirstindemonstrableandthelogicalprinciplewhichtheStoicscall“thefirstthema,”aprincipleofcontrapositionoftheconclusionwithapremisewhichwewillshortlydiscuss;similarly,thefifthindemonstrableseemstoberedundant,sincewealreadyhavethefourthindemonstrable,ifweavailourselvesagainofthefirstthema.Rather,ithasreasonablybeensuggestedthatChrysippusincludedinhislistofthefiveindemonstrablesalltypesofargumentwhichjustrelyontheargumentativeforceofthedifferentbasictypesofconnectivesknowntohim.Inthecaseofthethirdindemonstrable,forinstance,touseanegatedconjunctionjustistosaythatifoneoftheconjunctsholdstheotherdoesnot;oragain,thefourthandfifthindemonstrablesjustrelyonwhatitmeanstousethedisjunctiveconnective,namelytosaythatifoneofthedisjunctsholdsthecontradictoryoftheotherholdstoo,andifthecontradictoryofonedisjunctholdstheotherdisjunctholdstoo.Non-simplesyllogismsButnotonlyaretheindemonstrablearguments,accordingtotheStoics,syllogistic;oursourcesdiscussStoicexamplesofsyllogisticargumentswhicharenotthemselvesindemonstrable.Forinstance,wefindthefollowingexampleofasyllogisticargumentwhich,thoughitalsohastwopremisesandaconditionalasitsfirstpremise,ismorecomplexthanthefirstorthesecondindemonstrables(S.E.M8.230=LS36G3):Ifitisday,ifitisdayitislight.Butitisday.Thereforeitislight.WealsofindaStoicexampleofanon-simplesyllogismwiththreepremises(S.E.M8.234=LS36G6):518ACTC2651820/03/2006,04:14PM\nstoiclogicIfthingsevidentappearaliketoallthoseinlikeconditionandsignsarethingsevident,signsappearaliketoallthoseinlikecondition.Butsignsdonotappearaliketoallthoseinlikecondition.Andthingsevidentdoappearaliketoallthoseinlikecondition.Thereforesignsarenotthingsevident.Infact,giventhecomplexityofthissyllogisticargument,Sextusalsogivesusitsmode(S.E.M8.235=LS36G7):Ifboththefirstandthesecond,thethird.Butnotthethird.Butalsothefirst.Thereforenotthesecond.AnotherStoicexampleofanon-simplesyllogismwiththreepremisesisthefollowing(S.E.M8.466;PH2.186;cf.M8.281):Ifproofexists,proofexists.Butifproofdoesnotexist,proofexists.Butalsoeitherproofexistsordoesnotexist.Thereforeproofexists.Andweareagaingivenitsmode(S.E.M8.292):Ifthefirst,thenthefirst.Butifnotthefirst,thenthefirst.Butalsoeitherthefirstornotthefirst.Thereforethefirst.Syllogisticarealso,accordingtotheStoics,theso-called“indifferentlyconcludingarguments”(adiaphorOsperainonteslogoi),ofwhichourancientsourcesprovideusthefollowingexample(Alexander,InTop.10.10–12):Eitheritisday,oritislight.Butitisday.Thereforeitisday.Besidesthesenon-simplesyllogisms,therearealsotheso-called“duplicatedarguments”(diaphoroumenoilogoi);theirfirstpremiseisanon-simpleaxiOma,whichisconstructedoutofthesamesimpleaxiOmausedtwiceormoretimes(Alexander,InTop.10.7–10;D.L.7.68–69;S.E.PH2.112),e.g.,Ifitisday,itisday.Butitisday.Thereforeitisday.519ACTC2651920/03/2006,04:14PM\nkaterinaierodiakonouFinally,argumentsofthefollowingkindarealsoregardedbytheStoicsassyllogistic(Origen,Cels.7.15=LS36F):Ifyouknowthatyouaredead,youaredead.Butifyouknowthatyouaredead,not:youaredead.Thereforenot:youknowthatyouaredead.Allthesenon-simplesyllogisms,theStoicsseemtohaveheld,areformedbycombina-tionofsimplesyllogismsorindemonstrables,andthustheycanbereducedtothembypurelylogicalmeans.Indeed,todemonstratethesyllogisticvalidityofanyargumentwhatsoever,theStoiclogiciansconsidereditnecessarytoreduceittooneormoreoftheindemonstrablearguments.Thisprocedureofreducingnon-simplesyllogismstoindemonstrableargumentswascalledbytheStoics“analusis.”AnalysisTogobyitsveryname,analysisisamethodofreducingsomethingtosomethingmorebasicorprior,i.e.,inthiscaseamethodofreducingthenon-simplesyllogismstotheindemonstrables,whichareregardedasthefirstprinciplesoftheStoiclogicalsystem.Tocarryoutthisprocedure,theStoiclogicianshad,accordingtoourancientsources,atleastfourlogicalruleswhichwerecalled“themata”(D.L.7.78=LS36A5;Galen,Plac.2.3.18–19=LS36H),andinLatin“constitutiones”or“exposita”(Apul.Int.191.5–10=LS36I).WeonlyknowthefirstandthethirdStoicthema,anditisonthebasisofextremelymeagerevidencethatmodernscholarshavesuggestedtheirdifferentrecon-structionsoftheothertwo.Thefirstthemaisthefollowing:Iffromtwopropositionsathirdisdeduced,thenfromeitheroneofthemtogetherwiththecontradictoryoftheconclusionthecontradictoryoftheotherisdeduced.(Apul.Int.191.6–10=LS36I)Itcanbeformalizedinthefollowingway:PPC12,1PctrdCctrdP12,1Thethirdthemaisthefollowing:Whenfromtwopropositionsathirdisdeduced,andextrapropositionsarefoundfromwhichoneofthosetwofollowssyllogistically,thesameconclusionwillbededucedfromtheotherofthetwoplustheextrapropositionsfromwhichthatonefollowssyllogistically.(Alexander,InAPr.278.12–14=LS36J;cf.Simpl.InCael.237.2–4)Itcanbeformalizedinthefollowingway:PPC;E,...,EP12,111n2PE,...,E,C11,n1520ACTC2652020/03/2006,04:14PM\nstoiclogicAstothesecondandfourththemata,wetrytoreconstructthemmainlyonthebasisofalogicalprinciple,theso-called“dialecticaltheorem”(dialektikontheOrEma)or“synthetictheorem”(sunthetikontheOrEma),whichismostprobablyPeripateticandwhichissupposedtodo,accordingtoourancientsources(Alexander,InAPr.284.10–17),thesamejobasthesecond,third,andfourththematatogether:Whenwehavethepremisesfromwhichsomeconclusionisdeducible,wepotentiallyhavethatconclusiontoointhesepremises,evenifitisnotexpresslystated.(S.E.M8.231=LS36G4;cf.Alexander,InAPr.274.21–24;278.8–11;283.15–17)Indeed,theonlytwoexamplesofStoicanalysisthathavesurvived,andarebothreportedbySextusEmpiricus,makeuseofthisdialecticaltheoreminordertoreducecertainnon-simplesyllogismstoindemonstrablearguments,andthusprovetheirsyllogisticvalidity.Inparticular,thefirstexampleofanalysis(S.E.M8.232–233=LS36G5)dealswiththefirstnon-simplesyllogismwhichwementionedearlier,namely:Ifitisday,ifitisdayitislight.Butitisday.Thereforeitislight.Thesecondexampleofanalysis(S.E.M8.235–236=LS36G7)dealswiththesecondnon-simplesyllogismthatwehavepreviouslymentioned,namely:Ifthingsevidentappearaliketoallthoseinlikeconditionandsignsarethingsevident,signsappearaliketoallthoseinlikecondition.Butsignsdonotappearaliketoallthoseinlikecondition.Andthingsevidentdoappearaliketoallthoseinlikecondition.Thereforesignsarenotthingsevident.Letusthendiscussindetailthesecondoftheseexamples,sothatwegetaclearerideaofhowStoicanalysisactuallyfunctions,andhowwearesupposedtoapplytheStoicthemata.Tothispurpose,itwouldbeeasiertouse,asSextushimselfdoes,themodeofthenon-simplesyllogism,namely:Ifboththefirstandthesecond,thethird.Butnotthethird.Butalsothefirst.Thereforenotthesecond.Sextussuggeststhatthisargumentcanbereducedtotwoindemonstrablesofdifferenttypes,namelytoasecondandathirdindemonstrableargument,bygoingthroughthefollowingtwosteps:1.Bycombiningthefirstpremise,whichisaconditional,withthesecondpremise,whichisthecontradictoryoftheconditional’sconsequent,wegetasecondindemonstrablewhichhasasitsconclusionthecontradictoryoftheconditional’santecedent:521ACTC2652120/03/2006,04:14PM\nkaterinaierodiakonouIfboththefirstandthesecond,thethird.Butnotthethird.Thereforenot:boththefirstandthesecond.2.Bycombiningtheconclusionofthisindemonstrable,whichisanegatedconjunc-tion,withthethirdremainingpremise,whichaffirmsoneofthetwoconjuncts,wegetathirdindemonstrablewhichhasasitsconclusiontheaffirmationoftheotherconjunct:Not:boththefirstandthesecond.Butthefirst.Thereforenot:thesecond.Hence,thedialecticaltheoreminthiscasevalidatestheuseoftheconclusionofthesecondindemonstrable,thatistosaytheuseofthenegatedconjunction,inthecon-structionofthethirdindemonstrable;for,accordingtothislogicalrule,thenegatedconjunctionwhichisdeducedfromsomeofthepremisesoftheargumentisimplicitlycontainedintheargument,thoughitisnotexpresslystated.Anditisobviousthatwemaysimilarlyusethethirdthema;forasingleapplicationofthethirdthemaonthesecondandthirdindemonstrables,whichwehaveconstructed,couldhelpusdeducethenon-simplesyllogismwhosevaliditywetrytoprove.Tosummarize,Stoicanalysisstartswithanon-simplesyllogismandcontinueswithaseriesofargumentswhichareeitherindemonstrablesorargumentsdirectlyderivedfromtheindemonstrablesbyappropriateapplicationofoneoftheStoicthemata.Indeed,thereareseveralancienttextsthatsuggestthattheStoiclogicians,andinparticularChrysippus,believedthattheirstandardlistoffiveindemonstrablesiscom-pleteinthesenseofcontainingallthatisrequiredforreasoning.Itissaid,forinstance,thateveryargumentisconstructedoutoftheseindemontrables(D.L.7.79=LS36A11),andthatallotherargumentsarethoughttobevalidatedbyreferencetothem(S.E.PH2.156–157;166–167,194).Therefore,wemaycertainlyinferthatsomeclaimofcompletenesswasmadebytheStoicschool,butitisnotatallclearwhatpreciselytheStoics’definitionofcompletenesswas,iftheyeverofferedone.Validarguments,inthenarrowsenseAfterall,theStoicsthemselvesadmitthatwecannotapplythemethodofanalysistoallvalidarguments,thatistosaywecannotreduceallvalidargumentstothefiveindemonstrablesbyusingthefourStoicthemata.For,aswehavealreadysaid,thereareargumentsinStoiclogicwhicharejustvalid,butnotsyllogistic(D.L.7.78=LS36A6).Itseemsthat,accordingtotheStoics,thevalidityofsuchargumentsisguaranteednotbytheirownanalysis,butbytheirbeingequivalenttosyllogisticargu-ments.ToexplainwhatImean,letusbrieflydiscussthetwogroupsofargumentsofthiskindforwhichwehavesomeevidence:theso-called“subsyllogisticarguments”(huposullogistikoilogoi),andthe“unmethodicallyconclusivearguments”(amethodOsperainonteslogoi).522ACTC2652220/03/2006,04:14PM\nstoiclogicSubsyllogisticargumentsdifferfromsyllogismsonlyinthatoneormoreoftheirconstituentaxiOmata,althoughbeingequivalenttothoseinasyllogism,divergefromthemintheirlinguisticform(Gal.Inst.Log.19.6).TheexamplegivenbyDiogenesLaertiustoillustratetheclassofvalidargumentsinthenarrowsensemostprobablyisasubsyllogisticargument;forifitwerenotforthefirstpremisewhichslightlydivergesfromthelinguisticformofanegatedconjunction,theargumentwouldhavebeenathirdindemonstrable(D.L.7.78=LS36A6):“Itisdayanditisnight”isfalse.Butitisday.Thereforenot:itisnight.AlexanderofAphrodisiasalsoseemstodiscussanexampleofasubsyllogisticargu-mentinthefollowingtext:Forwhile“IfAthenB”meansthesameas“BfollowsfromA,”they[i.e.theStoics]saythatthereisasyllogisticargumentifwetaketheexpression“IfAthenB.ButA.ThereforeB,”butthattheargument“BfollowsfromA.ButA.ThereforeB”isnotsyllogisticbutconcluding.(Alexander,InAPr.373.31–35)Ingeneral,whatemergesfromtheStoics’treatmentofsubsyllogisticargumentsisthattheStoiclogicianstriedtoeliminateunnecessaryambiguitiesbystandardizinglanguage,sothattheformofasentencewouldunambiguouslydeterminethetypeofaxiOmaexpressedbyit.ForoneandthesamesentencemayexpressaxiOmatathatbelongtodifferentclasses,andequallytwodifferentsentencesmayexpressthesameaxiOma.Butifthereissomeagreementtofixlanguageuseinacertainway,itbecomespossibletoeasilydiscernthelogicallyrelevantpropertiesofaxiOmataandtheircom-poundsbysimplyexaminingthelinguisticexpressionsused.Thecase,however,oftheunmethodicallyconcludingargumentsismoreperplex-ing;foritisdifficulttobecertainabouttheactualkindsofargumentwhichbelongtothisgroupaswellasaboutthereasonsonthebasisofwhichtheStoicsconsiderthemasvalid.Forinstance,itseemsthatthefollowingargumentisaStoicexampleofanunmethodicallyconcludingargument(Alexander,InAPr.22.17–23;345.28–29;InTop.14.27–15.3;Gal.Inst.Log.17.2):Diosaysthatitisday.ButDiospeakstruly.Thereforeitisday.Ontheotherhand,ourevidenceisunclearastowhetherthefollowingunmethodicallyconcludingargumentisofStoicorigin(Alexander,InAPr.21.31–22.7;344.14–15;InTop.14.21–27):AisequaltoB.CisequaltoB.ThereforeAisequaltoC.523ACTC2652320/03/2006,04:14PM\nkaterinaierodiakonouAndsimilarly,inthefollowingcase(Alexander,InAPr.344.31–34):AhasthesameparentsasB.BhasthesameparentsasC.Therefore,AhasthesameparentsasC.Moreover,itisuncertainwhichthecorrespondingsyllogismsareonthebasisofwhichtheseargumentsare,accordingtotheStoics,valid.ForthefirstexampleAlexanderofAphrodisias(InAPr.345.30–346.4)suggeststhatweaddanappropriateuniversalpremise,whileatthesametimecombiningtheexistingtwopremisesintoone,sothatonemayconstructthefollowingsyllogism:Everythingthatsomeonesayswhenspeakingtrulyisthecase.Dio,speakingtruly,saysthatitisday.Thereforeitisday,asDiosays.ButitisdifficulttoseewhythiswouldbeasatisfactorysolutionfortheStoiclogicians.InvalidargumentsAccordingtotheStoics,invalidargumentsariseinfourways:bydisconnection,byredundancy,bybeingpropoundedinaninvalidschema,andbydeficiency(S.E.M8.429–434=LS36C1–5):1.Argumentsareinvalidbydisconnection(katadiartEsin)whenpremiseshavenoconnectionwithoneanotherorwiththeconclusion,e.g.,Ifitisday,itislight.Butwheatisbeingsoldinthemarket.Thereforeitislight.2.Argumentsareinvalidbyredundancy(kataparolkEn)whentheycontainpremiseswhicharesuperfluousfordrawingtheconclusion,e.g.,Ifitisday,itislight.Butitisday.Butalsovirtuebenefits.Thereforeitislight.3.Argumentsareinvalidbybeingpropoundedinaninvalidschema(enmochthErOischEmati),e.g.,Ifitisday,itislight.Butnot:itisday.Thereforenot:itislight.524ACTC2652420/03/2006,04:14PM\nstoiclogic4.Argumentsareinvalidbydeficiency(kataelleipsin)whentheycontainpremisesthatareincomplete,e.g.,Eitherwealthisbad,orwealthisgood.Butnot:wealthisbad.Thereforewealthisgood.Forthefirstpremiseshouldbe“Eitherwealthisbad,orwealthisgood,orwealthisindifferent”;andmoreover,apremiseismissing.ParadoxesFinally,theStoicsdiscussedsomeargumentswhichtheycalled“sophisms,”andamongwhichwealsofindwhatwenowadaysconsideraslogicalparadoxes:Asophism(sophisma),theysay,isaplausibleargumentdeceitfullyframedtomakeusacceptthefalseorfalse-seemingornon-evidentorotherwiseunacceptableconclusion.(S.E.PH2.229=LS37A2)ThereisabundantevidenceoftheStoics’interestinsolvinglogicalparadoxes;justgoingthroughthelistofChrysippus’logicalworksshowsthatheinparticulartookthemveryseriously(D.L.7.192–198=LS37B).Afterall,thesurprisingconclusionsoftheseseeminglyrathersimpleargumentswereachallengetotheStoics’conceptionofbasiclogicalnotions,suchastruthandfalsehood,sothatitsoonbecameclearthatsolvingtheparadoxeswouldrequirecarefulreappraisalofsomepartsoftheirlogicalsystem.Morespecifically,theStoicswereintriguedbytheparadoxeswhichhadalreadypuzzledtheMegarians,forinstancetheLiarandtheSorites.TheLiarVariousversionsoftheLiarparadoxwereknowninantiquity,butthereisnosingletextthatgivesuswithcertaintythepreciseformulationoftheargument.Forinstance,thefollowingpassagefromCicero’sAcademica,whichmostprobablyisouroldesttesti-monyontheLiar,hasadevastatinglacunaatacrucialpoint:“Ifyousaythatyouarelying,andyousaysotruly,areyoulying***tellingthetruth?”(Cic.Acad.II.95=LS37H5;cf.Gell.NA18.2.9–10).Differentsuggestionshavebeenmadeinordertoemendthetextinasatisfactoryway;onesuchplausiblesuggestionwhichfillsupthelacunaandpresentsuswitharealparadoxreadsasfollows:“Ifyousaythatyouarelying,andyousaysotruly,youarelying,andifyouarelying,youaretellingthetruth.”PresumablyitwasEubulideswhoinventedthisparadoxinthefourthcentury,andaversionofitseemstohavebeenknowntoAristotle(D.L.2.108).ButthereisnodoubtthatitwasChrysippuswhomorethananyoneelseinancienttimestriedtosolveit.ForitisclearfromourancientsourcesthatAcademicSkepticsinhisdayusedthisparadoxtochallengetheStoicviewthatallaxiOmataareeithertrueorfalse,andthustoquestiontheStoiclogicians’faithinthePrincipleofBivalence(Cic.Acad.II.95=LS37H5;Plut.Comm.not.1059D–E=LS37I).525ACTC2652520/03/2006,04:14PM\nkaterinaierodiakonouButdidChrysippusfindasolutiontotheLiarparadox?SomemodernscholarshaveclaimedthatChrysippusisaforerunnerofthemedievalcassantes,i.e.,thosewhobe-lievedthattheLiar’sstatement“Iamlying”isnotanaxiOma,becauseitismeaning-less.Againstthis,ithasbeenconvincinglyarguedthatChrysippusmusthavethoughtthatsuchastatementisanaxiOma,sincetherearecasesinwhichithasaclear-cutmeaningandadefinitetruth-value,giventheconditionsunderwhichitisuttered.ThepeculiarityofthecaseoftheLiar,atleastasitispresentedbyCicero,seemstobe,notonlythatwearenotabletofindoutwhatthetruthofthestatementis,butthatinthiscasethereisnotruthofthematter.SoperhapsChrysippus’viewwasthatincaseslikethisthestatementisneithertruenorfalse.However,ifthisiscorrect,thesolutionwouldputtheverynotionofanaxiOmaundergreatpressureandwouldforcearecon-siderationofitsdefinition.TheSoritesThenameoftheSoritescomesfromtheGreeknoun“sOros,”whichmeans“heap”or“pile.”Asitbecomesclearfromthefollowingtext,thisparadoxexploitsthevaguenessofcertainpredicates,likeforinstance“heap”:WhereforeIsay:tellme,doyouthinkthatasinglegrainofwheatisaheap?ThereuponyousayNo.ThenIsay:whatdoyousayabout2grains?Foritismypurposetoaskyouquestionsinsuccession,andifyoudonotadmitthat2grainsareaheapthenIshallaskyouabout3grains.ThenIshallproceedtointerrogateyoufurtherwithrespectto4grains,then5and6and7and8;andIthinkyouwillsaythatnoneofthesemakesaheap.Also9and10and11arenotaheap...Ifyoudonotsaywithrespecttoanynumbers,asinthecaseofthe100grainsofwheatforexample,thatitnowconstitutesaheap,butafterwardswhenagrainisaddedtoit,yousaythataheaphasnowbeenformed,consequentlythisquantityofcornbecomesaheapbytheadditionofthesinglegrainofwheat,andifthegrainistakenawaytheheapiseliminated,AndIknowofnothingworseandmoreabsurdthanthatthebeingandnot-beingofaheapisdeter-minedbyagrainofcorn.(Gal.Med.exp.17.1=LS37E3)AccordingtoCicero,Chrysippusclaimedthatthisparadoxdoesnotposeanyrealdifficulty,becausethewisemanknowsatwhichmomentheshouldstopreplyingtoquestionsoftheform“Areso-and-somanygrainsaheap?”:“Thatdoesn’tharmme,”hesays,“forlikeaskilleddriverIshallrestrainmyhorsesbeforeIreachtheedge,allthemoresoifwhatthey’reheadingtowardsisaprecipice.InlikemannerIrestrainmyselfinadvanceandstopreplyingtosophisticalquestions.”(Cic.,Acad.II.94=LS37H3)Inaddition,theStoiclogiciansconcernedthemselveswithsophismsofthefollowingkinds,whichatleastarefarlessproblematic:TheVeiledManChrysippus:Nextyou’regoingtohearthequitefascinatingVeiledArgument.Tellme,doyouknowyourownfather?Customer:Yes.Chrysippus:Well,ifIplacesomeoneveiledinfrontofyouandask“Doyouknowthisperson?”whatwillyousay?Customer:Obviously526ACTC2652620/03/2006,04:14PM\nstoiclogicthatIdon’tknowhim.Chrysippus:Butinfactthispersonisyourveryownfather.Soifyoudon’tknowthisperson,youclearlydon’tknowyourownfather.(Lucian,Vit.auct.22=LS37L)TheHornedManIfyouhavenotlostsomething,youhaveitstill.Butyouhavenotlosthorns.Thereforeyoustillhavehorns.(D.L.7.187)Unfortunately,thereisnoevidenceastothewayinwhichtheStoicstriedtosolvethesesophisms.ConclusionAsIindicatedatthebeginningofthechapter,itwasonlytowardsthemiddleofthetwentiethcenturythatStoiclogicbegantobestudiedonitsownmeritsandnotasanappendixtoAristotle’ssyllogistic.ToagreatextentitwastherevivalofinterestinthelogicalcontributionsoftheStoicsthatconvincedscholarstoinvestigatemorecare-fullytheotherpartsofStoicphilosophy,namelyethicsandphysics.TheliteratureonStoiclogicthathassincebeenpublishedhasmanagedtoreconstructalogicalcalculus,whichstillsurprisesuswithitssophisticationanditssimilaritiestomodernsystemsoflogic.Atthesametime,though,italsohasbecomeclearthatweshouldnotfailtotakeseriouslyintoaccountwhatdifferentiatesStoiclogicfromitsmoderncounterparts.Foronlyinthiswaycanwegetabetterunderstandingofhowthehistoryoflogichasevolvedincloseconnectiontotheotherpartsofphilosophy,andmoreimportantly,onlyinthiswaydowehaveachancetoappreciatethepeculiar4featuresandinsightsofancientlogic.BibliographyCollectionsofFragmentsandTranslationsvonArnim,J.(ed.).(1903–1924).(CitedasSVF).StoicorumVeterumFragmenta.(3vols.).vol.4:indexesbyM.Adler.Leipzig:Teubner.Hülser,K.-H.(ed.).(1987–8).DieFragmentezurDialektikderStoiker.(4vols.).Stuttgart/BadCannstatt:Frommann-Holzboog.Long,A.A.andSedley,D.N.(eds.andtrans.).(1987).(CitedasLS).TheHellenisticPhilosophers.(2vols.).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.EditionsofWorksofIndividualAuthorsAlexanderofAphrodisiasHayduck,M.(ed.).(1891).AlexandriAphrodisiensisinAristotelisAnalyticorumpriorumlibrumIcommentarium.CAG,2.1.Berlin:Reimer.4.IwouldliketothankFabioAcerbi,SusanneBobzien,WalterCavini,andMichaelFredefortheirhelpfulcommentsonanearlierversionofthischapter.527ACTC2652720/03/2006,04:14PM\nkaterinaierodiakonouWallies,M.(ed.).(1891).AlexandriAphrodisiensisinAristotelisTopicorumlibrosoctocommentaria.CAG,2.3.Berlin:Reimer.AmmoniusWallies,M.(ed.).(1890).AmmoniiinAristotelisAnalyticorumpriorumlibrumIcommentarium.CAG,4.6.Berlin:Reimer.AristotleRoss,W.D.(ed.).(1964).AristotelisAnalyticaprioraetposteriora.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.BoethiusMinio-Paluello,L.(ed.).(1965).DeInterpretationevelPeriermenias:TranslatioBoethii.InAristotelesLatinus.2.1–2(pp.1–38).Bruges/Paris:DesclèedeBrouwer.Orelli,J.C.andBaiter,J.G.(eds.).(1837).InCiceronisTopicaCommentaria.InM.TulliCiceronisoperaquaesupersunt,5.1.Zürich:Füssli.CassiodorusMynors,R.A.B.(ed.).(1937).Cassiodorisenatorisinstitutiones.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.CiceroWilkins,A.S.(ed.).(1903).M.TulliCiceronis:Topica.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.DiogenesLaertiusLong,H.S.(ed.).(1964).DiogenisLaertiiVitaephilosophorum.(2vols.).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.GalenKalbfleisch,K.(ed.).(1896).Galenus:Institutiologica.Leipzig:Teubner.GelliusMarshall,P.K.(ed.)(1968).AulusGellius:NoctesAtticae.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.MartianusCapellaWillis,J.(ed.).(1985).MartianusCapella.Leibzig:Teubner.PhiloponusWallies,M.(ed.).(1905).IoannisPhiloponiinAristotelisAnalyticaprioracommentaria.CAG,13.2.Berlin:Reimer.SextusEmpiricusMutschmann,H.andMau,J.(eds.).(1954–62).PyrrhoneiHypotyposes.InSextiEmpiriciOpera1.Leipzig:Teubner.Mutschmann,H.andMau,J.(eds.).(1955–61).AdversusMathematicos.InSextiEmpiriciOpera2and3.Leipzig:Teubner.528ACTC2652820/03/2006,04:15PM\nstoiclogicSimpliciusHeiberg,J.L.(ed.).(1894).SimpliciiinAristotelisDecaelocommentaria.CAG,7.Berlin:Reimer.FurtherReadingBarnes,J.(1985).“PithanaSunEmmena.”Elenchos,2,454–67.——.(1990).“LogicalFormandLogicalMatter.”InA.Alberti(ed.).Logica,menteepersona(pp.7–119).Florence:LeoS.Olschki.——.(1997).LogicandtheImperialStoa.Leiden:Brill.——.(1999).“AristotleandStoicLogic.”InK.Ierodiakonou(ed.).TopicsinStoicPhilosophy(pp.23–53).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Bobzien,S.(1996).“StoicSyllogistic.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,14,133–92.——.(1997).“TheStoicsonHypothesesandHypotheticalArguments.”Phronesis,42,299–312.——.(1999).“Logic.TheStoics.”InK.Algra,J.Barnes,J.Mansfeld,andM.Schofield(eds.),TheCambridgeHistoryofHellenisticPhilosophy(pp.92–157).Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-sityPress.Brunschwig,J.(1994).“RemarksontheClassificationofSimplePropositionsinHellenisticLogics.”InPapersinHellenisticPhilosophy(pp.57–71).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Cavini,W.(1996).“Essereedesserevero:sull’usoassolutodihuparxOnellalogicastoica.”InM.FunghiandD.Manetti(eds.),HodoidizEseOs–Leviedellaricerca(FestschriftforFrancescoAdorno)(pp.141–5),Florence:Olschki.Crivelli,P.(1994).“IndefinitePropositionsandAnaphorainStoicLogic.”Phronesis,39,187–206.Döring,K.andEbert,T.(eds.).(1993).DialektikerundStoiker.ZurLogikderStoaundihrerVorlaüfer.Stuttgart:Steiner.Ebert,T.(1991).DialektikerundfrüheStoikerbeiSextusEmpiricus–UntersuchungenzurEntstehungderAussagenlogik.Hypomnemata95.Göttingen:VandenhoeckandRuprecht.Frede,M.(1974).DiestoischeLogik.Göttingen:VandenhoeckandRuprecht.——.(1974).“Stoicvs.AristotelianSyllogistic.”ArchivfürGeschichtederPhilosophie,56,1–32.——.(1994).“TheStoicNotionofaLekton.”InS.Everson(ed.),CompanionstoAncientThought(vol.3):Language(pp.109–28).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Ierodiakonou,K.(1990).AnalysisinStoicLogic.(dissertationLondon).——.(1990).“RediscoveringsomeStoicArguments.”InP.Nicolacopoulos(ed.).GreekStudiesinthePhilosophyandHistoryofScience(pp.137–48).Dordrecht:Kluwer.——.(2002).“Zeno’sArguments.”InT.ScaltsasandA.S.Mason(eds.),ThePhilosophyofZeno(pp.81–112).Larnaca:TheMunicipalityofLarnaca.Kneale,W.andKneale,M.(1962).TheDevelopmentofLogic.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.kukasiewicz,J.(1935).“ZurGeschichtederAussagenlogik.”Erkenntnis,5,111–31.Mates,B.(1953).StoicLogic.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Mignucci,M.(1999).“TheLiarParadoxandtheStoics.”InK.Ierodiakonou(ed.),TopicsinStoicPhilosophy(pp.54–70).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Milne,P.(1995).“OntheCompletenessofnon-PhilonianStoicLogic.”HistoryandPhilosophyofScience,16,39–64.Mueller,I.(1979).“TheCompletenessofStoicPropositionalLogic.”NotreDameJournalofFormalLogic,20,201–15.Schofield,M.(1983).“TheSyllogismsofZenoofCitium.”Phronesis,28,31–58.Sedley,D.N.(1984).“TheNegatedConjunctioninStoicism.”Elenchos,5,311–16.529ACTC2652920/03/2006,04:15PM\nrichardbett27StoicEthicsRICHARDBETTIntroductionTheproperinterpretationoftheroleofnatureisamongthemostcentral,difficult,anddebatedtopicsinthestudyofStoicethics.Oursourcesmakeclearthat,atseveralpointsintheexpositionoftheirethicalsystem,theStoicsmakeanappealtonature.WearetoldofnumerousdifferentStoicformulationsoftheendorgoaloflife(thetelos);mostofthemrefertosomeformofattunementto,orconnectednesswith,natureastheidealtobestrivedfor.Again,theStoicshaveacomplicatedstorytotellabouthumandevelopment–adevelopmentthatmightoptimallyresultintheattain-mentofthisideal–inwhichthetypesofimpulsesgiventousbynaturefigurepromin-ently.Andevenforthosewhofallshortoftheideal(whichtheStoicswereinclinedtothinkincludedalmosteveryonewhohaseverlived),itis,theybelieve,possibletoachieveameasureofwhattheycall“value”(axia)bymeansofthejudiciousselectionofavarietyofitemslabeled“thingsaccordingtonature”(takataphusin).Theconceptofnature,then,willplayacentralroleinthepresentsurvey.IfocusfirstontheStoics’conceptionoftheethicalideal,andofthecharacterofthepersonwhoattainsit.Thisisfollowedbyanaccountoftheirpictureoftheoptimalcourseofhumandevelopment.Thefinalmainsectionisdevotedtothecondition,astheStoicsseeit,ofthoseofuswhofailtoachievetheideal,andthewaysinwhichwedifferfromthosewhodo1achieveit.Stoicphilosophy,includingStoicethics,underwentvariousdevelopmentsovertheseveralcenturiesinwhichitflourished.Mostobviously,inthetransitionfromtheHellenistictotheRomanperiodsethicsgraduallycametooccupycenterstage,eventu-allytothealmostcompleteexclusionofotherareasofphilosophy;intheearlierphaseofStoicism,bycontrast,theotherareasweretreatedasonaparwithethics(and,aswillshortlybecomeclear,stronglyinterconnectedwithit).Therewasalsoagradual1.DiogenesLaertius(D.L.)(7.84=LS56A)openshissurveyofStoicethicswithadivisionoftopicsthat,heclaims,wasadoptedbyanumberofauthoritativeStoicsbeginningwithChrysippus.ThisreflectstheStoics’pervasiveconcernwithtaxonomy.However,giventheextremelyinterconnectedcharacterofallthesetopics,anysuchdivisionisboundtobetosomeextentarbitrary;besides,itisnotentirelyclearhowthetopicsinDiogenes’listaretobedividedup(seeInwood,1999,p.113,n.56).Forbothreasons,IhavefeltnoneedtoadheretoDiogenes’ordering.OnDiogenesLaertiusasasource,seeMejer,ancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltradition,inthisvolume.530ACTC2753022/03/2006,09:02AM\nstoicethicsdecreaseintherigidityoftheStoics’ethicaloutlook,alongwithagradualincreaseininterestindiscussingconditionsbelowtheideal,andinofferingadvicetoordinarynon-idealpractitioners.Thedetailedplottingoftheseandotherdevelopmentsistoolargeataskforthepresentsurvey.TheevidencesuggeststhatStoicethics,likeStoicphilosophyingeneral,firstreacheditsfullyelaboratedstatewithChrysippus.Iwillconcentratemainlyonthis“canonical”versionofStoicethics,withoccasionalglancesforwardtothelaterGreekandRomanStoicsand,lessfrequently,backwardtotheideasoftheoriginalStoicZeno.Asweshallsee,theseexcursionswillsometimesbenecessaryinordertofilloutthepicture.TherearealsointerestinganddifficultquestionsabouttherelationsbetweenStoicism(includingthedevelopmentswithinitjustmen-tioned)andthepoliticalandeconomicconditionsoflaterantiquity.IthasoftenbeensaidthattheethicalidealsprevalentinHellenisticphilosophy,includingStoicism,areareactiontothedemiseofthecity-state,andtheresultingpoliticalimpotenceofalmosteveryoneintheGreekworld,thatoccurredinthewakeofAlexander’sconquests;atageneralleveltheclaimisattractive,butitdeservesdetailedscrutiny.Again,though,2limitationsofspaceforbidmefromundertakingthatproject.TheSageversustheRestofHumanityTheStoicsspendconsiderabletimedescribingthecognitiveandethicalconditionofa3characterreferredtoas“thesage”(hosophos).Wearerepeatedlytoldthat“thesagedoeseverythingwell.”Thisfollows,accordingtoonereport,fromthesage’s“accom-plishingeverythinginaccordancewithcorrectreasonandinaccordancewithvirtue,whichisaskillrelatingtothewholeoflife”;bycontrast,thecommonperson–thatis,everyoneexceptthesage–“doeseverythingbadlyandinaccordancewithallthe4vices”(Stob.2.66,14–67,4=LS61G).Asaresultofthisunerringconduct,andthe2.Forareassessmentofthisissue,seeBrown,hellenisticcosmopolitanism,inthisvolume.Othertopicsofconsiderableinteresthavehadtobeomitted.Mostnotably,thereisthequestionofhow,orinwhatsense,theStoicscanreconcilemoralresponsibilitywiththeirdeterminist–andindeed,providentialist–pictureoftheuniverse.TherearealsoanumberofintriguingissuesinStoicpoliticaltheory.However,itisfairtosaythatthesetopicsarenotascentraltothesubjectasthoseonwhichIdofocus.Onfreedomanddeterminism,seeBobzien(2001),andinthisvolume,Sharples,theproblemofsources;onpoliticaltheoryseeSchofield(1991).3.DespitetheGreekmasculinepronoun,Ipreferthegender-neutraltranslation“sage”tothetraditional“wiseman.”Stoictheorydoesnotacceptthekindofgulfbetweenmen’sandwomen’snaturesallegedby,forexample,Aristotle;andatleastsomeStoicsappeartohaverecognizedtheconsequencethatthehighestlevelsofhumanattainmentwereasopentowomenastomen.CleantheswroteabookcalledOntheFactthatVirtueistheSameforaManandforaWoman(D.L.7.175);andtheRomanStoicMusoniusRufustookuprelatedtopicsinworksentitledWhetherDaughtersShouldbeEducatedintheSameWayasSons(theanswerisyes)andThatWomentooShouldPhilosophize(preservedinsummarybyStobaeus:2.235,23–239,29and2.244,6–247,2).4.Alltranslationsaremyown,includingpassagesthatappearinLongandSedley(1987);theEnglishversionsinthischapterandinLongandSedleyarethereforenotidentical.531ACTC2753120/03/2006,04:15PM\nrichardbettstateofcharacterthatgivesrisetoit,thesageissaidtoachievehappiness;therestofusaredoomedtounhappiness.Thisrigidandstarkdivisionbetweenjusttwotypesofpeople,sagesandnon-sages–theformer,notsurprisingly,beingextremelyrare–isaconsequenceofanumberofStoicthesesaboutvirtue,thegood,andthetelos.VirtueandviceTheStoicsholdthattheonlythingstrulygoodarethevirtues(and,accordingtosomeaccounts,certainotheritemsnecessarilyconnectedtothevirtues,suchasvirtuousactionsandvirtuouspersons).Conversely,theonlythingstrulybadarethevices.Thisleavesahugenumberofthingsthatwemighthaveconsideredeithergoodorbadinathird,intermediatecategory,namelytheindifferent:forexample,health,wealth,orreputation,alongwiththeiropposites,allqualifyasindifferents(D.L.7.101–103=LS58A).Asweshallseeinmoredetaillater,thisdoesnotmean,atleastfororthodoxStoics,thatsuchthingsmake,orshouldmake,nodifferencetoourmotivationsandbehavior.Butitdoesmeanthattheyareirrelevanttoourattainmentofhappiness(eudaimonia);onecanbehappywithouthealthorwealth,orunhappywiththem–indeed,one’slossorgainofhealthorwealthmakesnodifferencetowhetherornotoneishappy.Theattainmentofthegood,ontheotherhand,guaranteeshappiness;indeed,someStoicsaresaidtohavedefinedthegoodintermsofitscapacitytoproducehappiness(S.E.M11.30).Perhapssurprisingly,thisrelegationofeverythingexceptvirtueandvicetothecategoryoftheindifferentissaidtohavebeensupportedbytheconclusionthatvirtueistheonlythingtrulybeneficial,andvicetheonlythingtrulyharmful(LS58A).Health,wealth,andthelikearedescribedasnomorebeneficialthanharmful,onthegroundthatbenefitingisnot“peculiarto”(idion)healthorwealth,norharming“peculiarto”sicknessorpoverty.Thatis,healthandwealtharenot,justassuch,guaranteedtobenefit,norsicknessandpovertyguaranteedtoharm(therearecir-cumstancesinwhichsicknessorpovertyispreferabletohealthorwealth);onlyvirtueisguaranteed,justassuch,tobenefit,andvicetoharm.Onemighthaveexpectedthemoraltobethathealthandwealthbenefitonlysomeofthetime,orfromsomepointsofview,whereasvirtuebenefitsinvariably.ThisisthepositiontakenintwopassagesofPlatotowhichtheStoicsareclearlyindebted(Meno87e–89a,Euthd.280e–281e);hereitisarguedthathealthandwealtharenotinherentlybeneficial,butcanbecomebeneficialwhenusedwithwisdom.ButtheStoics,thoughclearlyrelyingonthesamekindsofconsiderations,drawthestrongerconclusionthatonlyvirtuebenefits(andonlyviceharms),period;forthem,thereisapparentlynosuchthingasamerelytemporaryorcontingentbenefitorharm.ThePlatonicprecedentgoesfurtherthanthepointjustmentioned.LikeSocratesinanumberofPlatonicdialogues,theStoicsalsoconceiveofvirtueinstronglyintel-lectualistterms.Thisisclearlyconnectedwiththeirconceptionofthehumansoul–oratleast,ofthe“rulingpart”(hEgemonikon)ofthesoul–asrationalthroughandthrough,bycontrastwiththeconceptionsuggestedelsewhereinPlato(theRepublic,forexample)andinAristotle,accordingtowhichthesoulhasbothrationalandnon-rationalelements;ifthesoulisnothingbutreason,thenitishardtoseewhatvirtuecouldconsistinotherthanintheperfectionofone’sreason.Inanycase,wearerepeatedly532ACTC2753220/03/2006,04:15PM\nstoicethicstoldthattheStoicstookthevirtuestobespeciesofknowledge(epistEmai)andskills(technai)(e.g.,Stob.2.63,6–7=LS61D1).Thispoint,inturn,isconnectedwithyetanotherthesisofSocraticorPlatonicorigin,theinseparabilityofthevirtues.(TherewassomeinternaldisputeamongtheStoicsabouthowstronglytounderstandtheirinterconnection;butChrysippus,atanyrate,seemstohaveoptedforinseparabilityratherthanoutrightunity.)ThattheStoicsadheredtosomeversionofthisthesismighthavebeeninferredfromtheinherentlysystematiccharacterofknowledgeingeneral,ontheStoicview(Stob.2.73,21–74,1=LS41H2–3,whichactuallycitesthevirtuesasanexampleofthissystematicity).However,wearealsotoldexplicitly(Plut.St.rep.1046E=LS61F1;Stob.2.63,8–10=LS61D1)that,ontheStoicview,anyonewhohasanyonevirtuehasallofthem,andmoreover,thattoactinaccordancewithanyonevirtueistoactinaccordancewithallofthem.Thegeneralideaisclearenough:inordertosettlewhatactionoractionsanyonevirtuedictatesinagivensituation,theperspectivesassociatedwiththeothervirtuesarealsonecessary.Forexample,thequestionofwhatrisksorhardshipsitisappropriatetoundertakeinagivensituation–inotherwords,thequestionofwhatthevirtueofcouragedictates–cannotbesettledwithoutattendingtotheworthofthevariousobjectivesthattheactofundertakingthemwouldpromote;butforthatpurposetheotherthreecanonicalStoicvirtues–practicalwisdom,moderation,andjustice–arejustasrelevantascourageitself.TheevidencesuggeststhatChrysippuswentevenfurther,arguingthateachofthesefourvirtuesincludestheperspectivesthatonewouldnormallyassociatewiththeotherthree.ThismatterandthewholetopicoftheunityofvirtuearewelldiscussedinCooper(1998).TheTelos(Zeno,Cleanthes,Chrysippus)Whyshouldvirtue,sounderstood,bethoughtbothnecessaryandsufficientforhappi-ness?Andwhyshouldthelackofvirtue,sounderstood,betakenasentailingtheactivepresenceofvice(andunhappiness),withnothingbetweenthetwo?Toanswerthesequestions,weneedtobegintolookatStoicaccountsofthetelos,theendorgoalof5life;itisherethatthethemeofnaturebeginstobeimportant.ThesourcesascribenumerousdifferentformulationsofthetelostodifferentStoics,andtwodifferentfor-mulationstoZeno,theschool’sfounder;itistheearlierformulationsthatarerelevantinthepresentcontext.StobaeustellsusthatZenogaveasthetelos“livinginagree-ment”(homologoumenOszEn,Stob.2.75,11–12=LS63B1).HegoesontosaythatZeno’ssuccessors,beginningwithCleanthes,tookthistobeanabbreviatedwayofsaying“livinginagreementwithnature,”andthemselvespreferredthelonger,moreexplicitformulation;Chrysippus,headds,devisedthefurtherversion“livingaccord-ingtoexperienceofthingsthathappenbynature,”thinkingthistobeclearerstill.But5.TheStoicsdistinguishbetweenthetelosandthe“aim”or“target”(skopos);thelatterisacertainoptimalcondition,specifiablewithoutreferencetoanyparticularperson,whereastheformeristheactualexemplificationofthatconditioninone’sownlife.SeeStob.2.77,1–5;2.77,25–27=LS63A3.Butthisdistinctionanditsontologicalcomplexitiesneednotdetainushere.533ACTC2753320/03/2006,04:15PM\nrichardbettDiogenesLaertius,whileagreeingaboutCleanthes’andChrysippus’formulations,saysthatZenoalreadydefinedthetelosas“livinginagreementwithnature,”citingZeno’s6bookOnHumanNature(7.87=LS63C1).ThereisreasontobelievethatZeno’sshorterformulationwasnotinfactsimplyanabbreviationof“livinginagreementwithnature”(hereIaminagreementwithStriker(1996a,pp.223–4)againstInwood(1995,p.654)).ForStobaeusglossesthephrase“livinginagreement”withthewords“thatis,livinginaccordancewithasinglecon-sistentreason–ontheassumptionthatthosewholiveinconflictareunhappy”(2.75,12–76,1=LS63B1).Itappears,then,thatwiththisformulationZenohadinmindtheinternalconsistencyorharmonyofone’sreason,ratherthan(asStobaeusclaimshissuccessorsunderstoodhim)agreementwithnature.Ontheotherhand,sinceZenoapparentlydidalsoofferthelongerformulation,wemustassumethathetookthisinternalconsistencysomehowtoamounttothesamethingas“livinginagreementwithnature”;forthetelosistheonethingtowardswhichone’slifeisoroughttobedirected–bydefinitiontherecannotbemorethanoneofthem.Ifso,hissuccessors’conflationofthetwoformulations(ifithappened)wouldhavebeenasimplificationratherthanadistortion.Wearealsotoldthattherewassomequestionastohowtounderstandtheword“nature”inthephrase“livinginagreementwithnature”:doesitrefertothenatureoftheuniverse,ortohumannaturespecifically(D.L.7.89=LS63C5)?Zeno’sanswertothisquestionisnotreported.Buthisuseofthetwodistinct,yetsupposedlyequivalent,formulationsoftheteloswouldbeeasilyunderstoodifthe“nature”hehadinmindwashumannature;torenderone’sreasonfullyconsistentmightwellbethoughtofastheperfectionofone’snatureasahumanbeing.Chrysippus,however,isreportedtohavetaken“nature”toreferbothtohumanandtocosmicnature;hisexplanationofthis,assummarizedbyDiogenesLaertius(7.88=LS63C3–4),isworthquotinginfull.Thereforethetelosbecomeslivingconsistentlywithnature–thatis,inaccordancebothwithone’sownnatureandwiththatofthewhole–doingnothingthatishabituallyforbiddenbythecommonlaw,whichiscorrectreasonpermeatingallthings,beingthesameasZeus,whoistheleaderoftheadministrationofthethingsthatare.Nowthisitselfisthevirtueofthehappypersonandasmoothflowoflife,whenevereverythingisdoneaccordingtotheharmonyofthespiritineachpersonwiththewilloftheadministratorofthewhole.Amongotherthings,thispassagelinkstheteloswithvirtueandwithhappiness,andthisisnosurprise(compare,e.g.,Stob.2.77,16–21=LS63A1–2);italsomakesclearanimportantconnectionbetweentheStoics’ethicsandtheircosmologyortheology.6.Onefurtherdistinctionmaybeworthmentioninghere,toforestallapossiblemisunder-standing.TheIntroductionincludedareferenceto“thingsinaccordancewithnature,”whicharethekindsofthings(suchashealthorwealth)thatwegenerallyhavereasontoselect.Thephrases“inagreementwithnature”and“inaccordancewithnature”arebynomeansequivalentinStoicethics.Iamcurrentlyfocusingexclusivelyontheformer;Iaddressthelatter,andthedifferencesbetweenthetwo,inthesectiontitled“TheIndifferentandProgresstowardstheGood.”534ACTC2753420/03/2006,04:15PM\nstoicethicsWeshallreturntothesubjectofthetelos,andsomeadditionalformulationsofitofferedbylaterStoics(seepp.540–7).Butwearenowinapositiontomakebettersenseoftheissuesleftasideafewparagraphsback–whyvirtueshouldbethoughtnecessaryandsufficientforhappiness,andwhythereisnothingbetweenvirtueandvice.ThesufficiencyofvirtueforhappinessThepicturesuggestedisasfollows.Forthereasonsnotedearlier,virtueistobeunder-stoodastheperfectionofone’sreason.Now,toperfectone’sreasonisjusttobringitintoastateofsupremeorderandconsistency.Thisorderandconsistency,aswehaveseen,iscapturedinZeno’sshorterformulationofthetelos;itisalsoechoedbyotherpassagesthatstresstheconsistencyandorderlinessofthesage’sdispositionandbehavior(e.g.,D.L.7.89=LS61A;Plut.Virt.mor.441C=LS61B8;Sen.Ep.120.11=LS60E8).Alongwithconsistency,assomeofthesepassagesindicate,isfirmnessorunchangeability;anotherpassage,quotingChrysippus,alsoalludestothe“fixity”(pExis)thatcomeswiththeattainmentofhappiness(Stob.5.906,18–907,5=LS59I).Onceonehasachievedvirtue,then,one’ssoulisasorderedandasstableascouldpossiblybehopedfor.Aswesaw,itisplausibletothinkthatZenosawthisconditionasthefulfillmentofone’snatureasahumanbeing;and,giventheStoics’conceptionofnatureasprovidentiallyorderedaccordingtoarationalplan,itisnotsurprisingthattheywouldthinkofhumansasnaturallydesignedtoachieveastateofperfectpsychicorderandstability(analogoustothatofZeushimself–Plut.Comm.not.1076A–B,partiallyreproducedasLS61J)–wherethisstate,inturn,isunderstoodasperfectedrationality.Butthisstateisalsoastateinwhichoneis“inagreementwithnature”asawhole,notsimplywithone’sownhumannature.One’sownnature,ofcourse,isapartofnatureinitsentirety;andthewholeofnatureisitselfaunifiedsystem,rationallyordereddowntothelastdetail.Nowitmightbesuggested,forthisreason,thatinlivinginagreementwithone’sownnature,oneistherebyautomaticallyfulfillingone’srolein,andsolivinginagreementwith,natureasawhole.However,whiletrue,thisislesssignificantthanitmayseem,becausethosewhofailtoliveinagreementwiththeirownnaturesarealsononethelessfulfillingtheirrolesinnatureasawhole;theirfailureisasmuchapartoftherationallyorderedplanasone’sownsuccess.One’sownsuccessmightperhapsbethoughtofasasortofcollusionwiththedivinewill;butallofus,successesorfailures,haveaplaceintheplanoftheuniverse,sincethatplancoverseverythingthathappens.Therealreasonwhytheperfectionofone’sreasonisalsoastateofagreementwith(universal)natureisslightlydifferent.Thisisthatincludedintheperfectionofone’sreasonisaprocessinwhichonecomestounderstandthenatureofthewholeuniverse;one’sactionsareshapedbyone’sunder-standingofthisnature,andoneismotivatedtoactinsuchawayastobeincon-formitywithitandtoadvanceitsgoalstothebestofone’sability.Thosewholackthisunderstandingdoinfacthaveaplaceintheplanoftheuniverse;butthosewhohavethisunderstandingareawareoftheirplaceinthisplan,andwillinglyfollowthepathordainedforthem.Thisisnottosaythattheyknoweveryeventthatisgoingtooccur;theStoicsstressthateventhesagewilloftenhavetomakechoicesunderconditionsofuncertainty.Buttheydoknowthegeneraloutlineoftheplan,andtheydoknow,of535ACTC2753520/03/2006,04:15PM\nrichardbetteveryeventthatdoesinfactoccur,thatitispartofthatplan.And,giventheirwillingattachmenttotheplan,thismeansthattheycanneverbedisappointed;nomatterwhathappens,theyarecontentwiththeoutcome.WhythereisnothingbetweenvirtueandviceSagesarehappy,then,inthattheirownnaturesarefulfilled,andinthattheyare,inaverystrongsense,intunewiththeworldinwhichtheylive.Onemaynowwonderwhythisshouldhaveanythingtodowithvirtue,ascommonlyunderstood;theexplana-tionofthiswillhavetowaituntilalaterstage.Butwehaveatleastsomeexplanationofwhyhappiness–thatis,“asmoothflowoflife”(D.L.7.88=LS63C4;S.E.M11.30)–shouldbethoughttoaccompanytheperfectionofone’srationality.Andwecannowalsogetsomeideaofwhythereshouldbethoughttobeafundamentalandexclusivedivisionbetweenthosewhohave,andthosewhohavenot,achievedthisstateofperfection.Thosewhohavenotachieveditareoutoftouchwiththemselvesandwiththeworldingeneral.Theylackthepsychicorderandstabilityofthevirtuous,andtheylackthesage’swillingidentificationwiththecourseofeventsthatunfoldsintheworld;itisthereforenotatallthecasethattheycanneverbedisappointed,andtheycannotbesaidtoenjoy“asmoothflowoflife.”Now,sinceviceisdefined,insimpleoppositiontovirtue,asinconsistencyordisharmonyofthesoul(Cic.Tusc.4.29=LS61O1),itfollowsthatanyonewholacksvirtueisinastateofvice.Moreover,cor-respondingtotheinseparabilityofthevirtuesistheinseparabilityofthevices;ifonelacksanyonevirtue,onelacksallofthem,andthelackofanygivenvirtueentailsthepresenceofthecorrespondingvice.Hence,aswesawearlier,anyonewhoisnotasageisbothunhappyandguiltyofallthevices.Thisisnottodenythatsomepeopleareclosertoachievingvirtuethanothers;theStoicsrecognizedthepossibilityofprogress(prokopE)inthisdirection,andweshallreturntothistopic.Butstill,forthosenotinastateofvirtue–howeverclosetoorfarfromattainingthatconditiontheymaybe–itisjustastrueofanyoneofthemasofanyotherthattheyareinastateofvice,andthattheylackhappiness.Itisinthissensethat,astheoriginalStoicsmaintained,“allfailuresareequal”(D.L.7.120–thoughapairofminorlaterStoics,HeracleidesofTarsusandAthenodorus,aresaidtohavedisagreed(7.121)).Thepositionmaynowseemlessparadoxicalandextremethanitlookedatfirst.ButthepicturenowneedstobefilledoutbyanaccountofthedevelopmenttowardsthestateofvirtuethattheStoicsthinkwillideallytakeplace,andofthedifferencesthattheytaketoexistbetweenthekindsofdecision-makingopentothesageandtotherestofus.TheIdealCourseofHumanDevelopmentTheStoicshavemuchtosayaboutastatelabeledoikeiOsis.Therehavebeenmanyattemptstotranslatethisterm:“appropriation”(LongandSedley,1987),“congenial-ity”(InwoodandGerson,1997)and“affiliation”(InwoodandDonini,1999)aresomerecentexamples.Itischaracterizedinonesource(thoughthisdoesnotappeartobeaformaldefinition)as“aperceptionandapprehensionofwhatisone’sown(touoikeiou)”536ACTC2753620/03/2006,04:15PM\nstoicethics(Plut.St.rep.1038C).Itisanorientation,orsetoforientations,giventousbynature(eitherfrombirthorinthecourseofournaturaldevelopment),andhasrecentlybeenwelldescribedas“afoundationinnatureforanobjectiveorderingofpreferences”(Baltzly,2000).Initialoikeiosis–Self-preservationOurinitialoikeiOsistakestheformofanaturalorientationtowardsourownconstitu-tions,fromwhichitfollowsthatwehave,fromthemomentweareborn,anaturalimpulsetowardsself-preservation(D.L.7.85=LS57A1–2;Cic.Fin.3.16;Plut.St.rep.1038B=LS57E).Thisissupportedbyanaprioriteleologicalargument:ofthevariousimaginableoptionsastohowhumans(andotheranimals)mightbedesigned,itisbyfarthemostlikelythataprovidentialnaturewoulddesignussoastohavethiskindoffondnessforourselves(D.L.7.85–86=LS57A2–4).Butitisalsosupportedbyobserva-tionsofabroadlyempiricalkind.Animalandinfantbehaviorissaidtosupportthehypothesisofanaturalimpulsetowardsself-preservation(ratherthan,astheEpicur-eansclaimed,towardspleasure)(Cic.Fin.3.16–17;Sen.Ep.121.5–9).Inaddition,wearesaidtobeendowedwithaperceptionofourselvesandallourparts;thisthemeisprominentinthemeagerremainsofthelaterStoicHierocles’ElementsofEthics(see,e.g.,LS57C).Onthesevariousgrounds,then,theStoicsconcludethatournaturesinitiallyinclineustodowhateverisneededforoursurvivalatminimum,butalso,moreambitiously,forourhealthandflourishing.Developedoikeiosis–ReasonandvirtueButthestorydoesnotendthere.Thenaturaldevelopmentofhumanbeings(andheretheparallelwithotheranimalsends)alsoincludestheemergenceofreason,andthisprofoundlyaffectsthecharacterofouroikeiOsis.Senecaspeaksofanumberofdifferentstagesinthedevelopmentofourconstitutions,andofadifferentoikeiOsiscorrespond-ingtoeachstage(Ep.121.14–16).ThespecificsofthisaccountmaybeSeneca’sowncreativesupplementtotheoriginalStoicposition.ButitisclearthatthatpositionincludedthenotionthatouroikeiOsisdoesnotremainconstant,andthatthereisashiftawayfromtheinitialnarrowattachmenttoourownself-preservation.Instead,asreasoncomesonthescene,actingrationallyitselfcomestobewhatwearenaturallyorientedtowards(D.L.7.86=LS57A5;Cic.Fin.3.21–22=LS59D4–6).Nowreason,aswesawearlier,isboththesourceofandtheawarenessofthegood;theonlygoodisvirtue,andvirtuejustisastateofperfectedreason.Thusthegradualemergenceofreasonisidenticalwithprogresstowardsthegood,andalsotowardsourunderstand-ingofthegood.Thisdoesnothappenautomatically,butrequiresconcertedeffortonourpart;however,ournaturesdoinclineusinthatdirection(Sen.Ep.120.4).And,againtorecall,onceweachievethestateofperfectedreasonandvirtue,ournatureshaveachievedtheirperfection;however,thisstateisalsooneofharmonywith,andunderstandingof,natureasawhole.Whathappenstotheinitialorientationtowardsself-preservationwhen(orif)weachievethisstateofperfectedreason?Thoughthesourcesarenotasexplicitonthispointastheymightbe,itclearlydoesnotbyanymeansdisappear.Asweshallseein537ACTC2753720/03/2006,04:15PM\nrichardbettthenextsection,thereisawholehostofactivities,describedas“accordingtonature”anddirectedtowardsourcontinuedexistenceashealthy,prosperousmembersofthehumanspecies,inwhichitisinthesage’sinterest,justasmuchasintheinterestoftherestofus,toengage;itisfairtothinkoftheseasthedevelopedexpressionofthenaturalimpulsetowardsself-preservationthathasbeenwithussincebirth.Butwhathappensasoneachievesthestateofperfectedreasonisthattheseactivitiescometobeseeninawidercontext.One’sorientationisnownolongertowardsone’sself-preservationalone;rather,asnotedinthepreviousparagraph,itistowardsdoingwhateverreasonorvirtuedictates–whichisalsotowardsdoing(insofarasthisiswithinone’scapabilities)whatevernatureasawhole,orZeus,dictates.Mostofthetimetherewillbenoconflictbetweenthesetwo;thatis,wewillgenerallyhavereasontoassumethatthecontinuationandenhancementofournormalflourishingiswhatnatureasawhole(orZeus)dictates.Buttherewillbeexceptionstothis,andinthesecasestheorientationofthesage’sfullydevelopednaturewillgoagainsttheactivitiesthatapureimpulsetowardsself-preservationwoulddictate.EpictetusquotesChrysippusassaying“IfIreallyknewthatitwasfatedformenowtobeill,Iwouldevenhaveanimpulsetowardsthat”(Diss.2.6.9=LS58J).Chrysippusdoesnottakehimselftobeasage,andtreatsthisimaginedstateofknowledgeaspurelycounterfactual;forhim,actingsoastopreservehishealthisalways,oralmostalways,goingtobethecoursethatreasonrecommends.Andeventhesage,aswasnotedearlier,willregularlyhavetoactinignoranceofthespecificeventsthatZeusornaturehasinstore.Butsometimesitwillbecleartothesage(andonrareoccasionsitmayevenbecleartothenon-sage)thatreason,virtue,ornaturedictatesanactioncontrarytoone’sself-preservation–forexample,thesacrificeofone’slifeforthegoodofhumanityasawhole.Oikeiosisandother-regardingmotivationsThislastexamplepointstowardsonefurtherfeatureoftheStoics’accountofoikeiOsis.SeveraltextsrefertoanoikeiOsistowardsotherhumanbeings.Themostobviousinstancesofthisarethenaturalattachmentsthatwehavetowardsourchildrenand,ingeneral,towardsthoserelatedtous(Hierocles9.3–10=LS57D1;Cic.Fin.3.62=LS57F1).Butitisalsosuggestedthatwehaveanaturalattachmenttowardsallotherhumanbeings,whichexplainsourcomingtogetherintosocieties(Hierocles11.14–18=LS57D2;Cic.Fin.3.63=LS57F2).Atleastthelatteraspectofthis“socialoikeiOsis,”asithasbeencalled,isprobablytobeunderstoodasdevelopingalongwith–indeed,aspartof–thedevelopmentofreason;thatis,itissimplyacomponentinthepicturealreadyoutlined.ThisiscertainlywhatissuggestedbyapassageofCicero’sOnDuties,aworkheavilyindebtedtotheStoicPanaetius.Thepassagereferstothisnaturalfellowshipofhumanbeings,andespeciallyofparentstowardstheirchildren;butthisiscitedinthecourseofanaccountofthedevelopmentofthefourcardinalvirtues,andisexplicitlysaidtobesomethingthatourreason(itselfidentifiedwiththehigherdevelopmentofournature)isresponsiblefor(Off.1.11–14).Andoncethis“socialoikeiOsis”isinplace,wewillrankthecommonadvantageaboveourownadvantage(utilitatem–Cic.Fin.3.64=LS57F3;cf.Epict.Diss.2.10.3–4=LS59Q3).Wecannowseewhyvirtue,understoodintheabstractastheperfectionofone’sreason,shouldbethoughttoincludethekindsofqualities,suchasjustice,that538ACTC2753820/03/2006,04:15PM\nstoicethicsessentiallyinvolvethefair,considerateorhumanetreatmentofothers–qualitiesthatpopularthoughtwouldhaveregardedasamongthevirtues,andthattheStoicsthem-selvesagreedwerevirtues.Wecanalsoseehow,inadeepersense,concernforothersiscompatiblewith–oreveninseparablefrom–self-interest.AsEpictetusputsit,Zeus“hasdesignedthenatureoftherationalanimalinsuchawaythatitcannotachieveanyofitsowngoodsunlessitcontributessomethingtothecommonadvantage”(Diss.1.19.13).Ourowngoodisvirtue,andvirtueincludesactingintheinterestsofothers;thatisjustthewaythathumanbeings,togetherwiththeuniverse,function.Theremay,however,belimitstothecoherenceofthisaccount.Justice,andperhapsothervirtuesaswell,seemtorequiretheimpartialtreatmentofallwhoareaffected,regardlessofthelevelofone’spersonalconnectionswiththem.Itisnoteasytoseehowthisistobebuiltonafoundationofnaturalattachments;evenifweacceptthatthereisanaturalattachmenttoallotherhumanbeings,wemustsurelyalsoadmitthatthedegreeofsuchattachmentswillvarygreatly,dependingontheclosenesstooneself(invarioussenses)ofanygivenperson.Wehaveapassageofanti-Stoicpolemicthateffectivelyexploitsthistensionbetweenwhatisempiricallyplausibleandwhatisethicallydesirable(Anon.InTht.5.18–6.31=LS57H).OntheStoicside,Hieroclesspeaksofaperson’sbeingsurroundedbyaseriesofconcentriccircles,eachcontainingdifferentgroupsofpeople.Thelargestcircleincludestheentirehumanrace.Thesmallercirclesincludesub-groupsofhumanity,andthesmallerthecircle,thecloserone’sattachmenttothepeopleitcontains;thesmallestcircle(exceptfortheonethatsimplycontainsoneself)includesonlyone’simmediatekin(quotedinStob.4.671,7–673,11=LS57G).Hieroclesurgesusconstantlytodrawthecirclestogetherasmuchaspossible–inotherwords,totreatthepeopleinthelargercirclesasiftheyweremembersofthesmallercircles,andsotomoveasfarasonecantowardsequalityinone’sattachments.Butthismetaphorseemstoconcedethatcompleteequalityisnotapracticalpossibility.TherarityofthesageWehavebeenspeakingatsomelengthoftheachievementofperfectrationality.Itisworthrepeatingthatthisstateofperfectionisgenerallyregardedasanextremelyrareaccomplishment.Thismaynothavebeentrueintheveryearliestperiod;inhisRepublicZenodescribedacityofsages,anditisbynomeanscertainthatheregarded7thisasanunattainableutopia.ButChrysippusisquotedasacknowledgingatonepointthathisethicalpronouncementswillstrikeusasontheleveloffiction,notonthelevelofordinaryhumanity(Plut.St.rep.1041F=LS66A);itmayhavebeenChrysippus’muchmoredetaileddelineationofthesage’sconditionthatmadefullyapparenttheextraordinarydifficultyofattainingthiscondition.DiogenesLaertiusreports(7.91)thatChrysippus,Cleanthes,Posidonius,andHecatonallstatedthatvirtueisteachable,andthenadds“thatitisteachableisclearfromthefactthatpeoplebecomegoodfrombeingbad.”Thismakesitsoundasiftheattainmentofgoodness7.However,seenowBrouwer(2002),whicharguesthatneitherZenonoranyotherStoictookhimselftobeasage.539ACTC2753920/03/2006,04:15PM\nrichardbettissomethingobservableandcommon.However,itisnotclearthatthisadditionalcommentcloselyreflectsanythingthattheStoicsinquestionsaid.CertainlythemorestandardlyreportedviewisthatthesageisrarerthanthePhoenix(amythicalbirdofwhichthereisjustonespecimenaliveatanygiventime).StartingatleastasearlyasPanaetius,theStoicshadaninterestinofferingadvicethatmightbeofsomepracticalusetothosewhoarenotsages.Thestandardsforsagehoodwerenotrelaxed;but,asnotedintheIntroduction,theneedtotalkabout(andto)othersbesidesthesagewasincreasinglyrecognized(see,e.g.,Cic.Off.1.46=LS66D;Sen.Ep.116.5=LS66C).Thiswasnot,however,morethanashiftofemphasis;theresourcesfordiscussingtheconditionofthenon-sage,andhowonemightprogresstowardstheconditionofthesage,werepresentinStoicethicsfromthestart.Thenextsectiontakesupthesematters.TheIndifferentandProgresstowardstheGoodDistinctionswithintheindifferentWehaveseenthattheStoicsrecognizenothingaseithergoodorbadbesidesvirtueandvicerespectively;alltheotherthingsthatwemightbeinclinedtoregardashavingpositiveornegativevaluetheyconsigntothecategoryoftheindifferent,onthegroundsthatthesethingsmakenodifferencetowhetherornotoneachieveshappiness.Thisdoesnot,however,meanthattheyareoroughttobewithouteffectonourmotivations–or,forthatmatter,thattheylackvalue.WithinthecategoryoftheindifferenttheStoicsmakeathreefolddistinctionamongindifferentsthatare“inaccordancewithnature”(kataphusin),“contrarytonature”(paraphusin)andneither.Examplesofthefirstgrouparehealth,strength,andtheproperfunctioningofone’ssenseorgans;examplesofthesecondgrouparedisease,weakness,anddisability(Stob.2.79,18–80,3=LS58C1–2–completeversiononlyinvol.2).Indifferentsthatareinaccordancewithnaturearesaidtohave“value”(axia),andthosecontrarytonaturetohave“disvalue”(apaxia);tohavevalue,intherelevantsense,istobethekindofthingthatonehasreason,innormalcircumstances,toselect(eklegein,Stob.2.83,10–84,2=LS858D).Indifferentsthathaveaconsiderableamountofvaluearecalled“preferred,”andthosethathaveaconsiderableamountofdisvaluearecalled“dispreferred”(Stob.2.84,18–24=LS58E1–2);thisleavesthosewithneithervaluenordisvalue,aswellasthosewithasmallamountofeither,inthecategoryofneitherpreferrednor9dispreferred.Apreferredindifferentisthereforesomethingthatthereistypicallystrongreasontoselect.TheextremistStoicAristoofChiosisreportedbySextusEmpiricustohaveobjectedtotheverynotionofpreferredindifferents–and,byimplication,tothewholeideaofassigningvalueordisvaluetoindifferents(M11.64–67=LS58F).Themainreason,8.Nottobeconfusedwith“choosing”(haireisthai),whichistheappropriatestancetotaketowardsthegood.9.D.L.7.106equatesbeingpreferredwithhavingvalue;butthisisprobablyasimplificationofthemorecomplexaccountpreservedinStobaeus.540ACTC2754020/03/2006,04:15PM\nstoicethicsaccordingtoSextus,isthatthethingslabeled“preferredindifferents”arenotinvariablyworthselecting;forexample,sicknesswillbepreferabletohealthifthehealthyarebeingforcedbyatyranttoparticipateinatrocities.ItisnotentirelyclearthatthiswasAristo’sownreasoning,ratherthanSextus’elaborationonAristo’sbasiccontention;DiogenesLaertius7.160alsomakesclearthatAristowasopposedtodistinctionsofvaluewithintheindifferent,butdoesnotofferthisoranyotherreasoninginfavorofthisopposition.However,ifAristodidjustifyhisviewinthewaySextussuggests,hewasmissingthepoint.TheorthodoxStoicsarequitehappytoacceptthatpreferredindifferentsarenotinvariablytobeselectedoverdispreferredones;indeed,torecall,thatwaspreciselythebasisonwhichtheyrefusedtocallsuchthingsbeneficialandthereforegood.Thelabels“preferred”and“dispreferred”applytotypesratherthantoindividualinstances;tocallhealthapreferredindifferentistosaythatitisbynaturesuchastobe(generally)worthselecting,andtheexistenceofoccasionalinstancesinwhichsicknessispreferabletohealthdoesnotunderminethisinanyway.TheKathekon–MeaninganddefinitionThetaxonomyoftheindifferents,then,givesusanaturallybasedframeworkfor10decisionandaction.However,itdoesnottakeusveryfarbyitself.AnotherStoicconceptofgreatimportanceinthisareaisthatofthekathEkon.Thistermisnoteasytotranslate.Zenoissaidtohaveofferedanexplanatoryetymology,katatinashEkein(D.L.7.108=LS59C2),butthistoohasbeenunderstoodinmultipleways.Theinter-pretationthatIfindmostsatisfactoryistotranslatetheetymologyas“comingdownoncertainpersons”–thatis,akathEkonisanactionthatitfallstoacertainpersontodo,orthatitisthatperson’splacetodo–andtotranslatekathEkonitself,inlinewiththis,as“incumbent”(seeCooper,1996,p.269withn.22).CicerotranslateskathEkonbyofficium,whichinturnhasgenerallybeentranslated“duty.”Astheetymologicalgloss(interpretedinthewayjustmentioned)suggests,thisisbynomeanswhollymisleading.However,theterm“duty”hasconnotationsinmodernmoralphilosophy,andinstandardcontemporaryusage,thatcannotbeassumedtobepartoftheStoicconcept;IshallthereforeavoidreferringtokathEkontaasduties.MorehelpfulthananinspectionofthewordkathEkonitselfisthedefinitiongivenofit.WearetoldthatakathEkonisanaction“which,whenithasbeendone,hasareasonabledefense”(D.L.7.107,Stob.2.85,14–15=LS59B1).Now,asBrennan(1996,p.330)pointsout,itistokenorindividualactions,nottypesofactions,thatarethethingsthatareactuallydone;hencetheterm“whenithasbeendone”(prachthen)makesclearthatakathEkonisatokenaction,notatype–mygivingmymotheraspecialgiftonherseventiethbirthday,forexample,ratherthantheaction-type“honoringone’sparents.”KathEkonta,then,areactionsthatadmitofacertaintypeofjustification,labeled“reasonable”(eulogos);thecrucialquestioniswhatismeanthereby“reasonable.”10.Itshouldnotbesupposed,incidentally,thatthistaxonomyislimitedtoitemsthatare,inanintuitivesense,“natural”ratherthanproductsofsociety;oursourcesmakeclearthatpre-ferredindifferentsincludesuchthingsaswealth,reputationandloftysocialclass,anddispreferredindifferentstheiropposites(e.g.,D.L.7.106).541ACTC2754120/03/2006,04:15PM\nrichardbettOnoneview,the“reasonable”justificationinquestionisajustificationthatitwouldbeopentoanysensiblepersontoprovide,ajustificationthatproceedsbygivingreasonsofacommon-sensevarietyfortheaction.Andonthisview,onemightexpectthattheactionsthatqualifiedaskathEkontawouldbeactionsthatpromotedthepre-ferredindifferentsandavoidedthedispreferredindifferents.However,thereareseveralreasonsforthinkingthattheStoicsmusthaveintendedtheterm“reasonable”inamuchmorestringentsense.First,thewordeulogosandcognatesappearinseveralothercontextsinStoicethicswhereitisclearthatitis“reasoning”ofthesage’svarietythatisatissue(seeBrennan,1996,pp.326–7);intheabsenceofanyindicationofanambiguityinusage,onewouldexpectittohavethesameconnotationhere.Second,Diogenessays,inwhatsoundslikeanalternativewayofputtingthesamepoint,thatkathEkontaarethoseactionsthat“reasonenjoinsustodo”(logoshaireipoiein,7.108=LS59E2).Presumably“reason”inthiscontextmeans“reasonfunctioningasitshould”;butfortheStoicsthis,inturn,canonlymean“reasonfunctioningintheperfectwayexemplifiedbythesage.”Finally,if“reasonable”wereunderstoodinthemorerelaxedwaysuggestedabove,thenitwouldfollowthattherewouldbesomecasesinwhichakathEkonwasinfactawrongaction,despiteadmittingofareasonablejustification.However,itseemsclear(paceInwood,1999,pp.109–10)thattherearenoactionsthatarekathEkontaandwrong;rather,thesourcesrepeatedlyindicatethatthekathEkonisjustwhateveractionisinfactthecorrectactiontoperforminthecircumstances(see,e.g.,Cic.Fin.3.59=LS59F4;Stob.5.906,18–907,5=LS59I,withBrennan,111996,p.329).Itappears,then,thatthe“reasonable”justificationthattheStoicsspeakofinthiscontextisthejustificationthattheinfalliblereasonofthesagewouldgenerate.Ifso,thereisnoreasontoassumethatone’skathEkontawillalwaysbethoseactionsthatsecurethepreferredindifferents;if,inagivencircumstance,sicknessispreferabletohealth,thenitistheactionthatmakesonesick,nottheonethatkeepsonehealthy,thatwillbethekathEkon.ThekathekonandrulesUnfortunately,thereseemstobesomeconfusiononthispointinoursources.WeoccasionallyfindlistsoftypesofactioncitedasexamplesofkathEkonta;DiogenesLaertius,forexample,listshonoringone’sparents,brothersandcountry,andspend-ingtimewithfriends(7.108=LS59E2).However,ifthekathEkonisthecorrectactioninanygivencircumstance,thiscannotberight;fortherewillbesomecircumstancesinwhichhonoringone’sparents,etc.,willbethewrongthingtodo.Indeed,theStoicswereemphaticonthenon-existenceofanyexceptionlessrules,atleastatthislevelofgenerality;hencetheirreportedviewthatthesagewillevenengageinincestandcannibalismifcircumstanceswarrant(whichwasgleefullyexploitedbytheStoics’opponents–e.g.S.E.M11.191–195).Ontheotherhand,agreatmanyStoicswrotebookscalledOntheKathekon,andthesebooksdoappeartohavebeendevotedtopracticalguidance,including11.LongandSedley(1987)includeapassageofPhiloofAlexandriawhichappearstoimplythatkathEkontacanbewrong(59H);butthereisnoreasontothinkthatPhiloisfollowingstrictStoicdoctrine.542ACTC2754220/03/2006,04:16PM\nstoicethicsprominentlytheprovisionofrulesofconduct.Assuggestedearlier,PanaetiusappearstohavegivenagreatlyincreasedemphasistothisaspectofStoicethics;butbookswiththistitleareattestedforStoicsallthewaybacktoZeno(seeSedley,1999,esp.p.137).OurmainsurvivingevidenceofthissideofStoicethicsconsistsoftwolonglettersofSeneca(Ep.94,95);butitisclearthatthiswasalwaysconsideredanimport-anttopic.Now,itisdifficulttosee,inlightofthepointjustmentioned,howtheserulescouldhavebeenanythingmorethanprovisionalanddefeasibleguidelines;theonlythingthatisakathEkoninallcircumstanceswhateverislivingvirtuously(D.L.7.109=LS59E4)–anythingmorespecificwillalwaysadmitofexceptions.(Forthisinterpretation,andforreferencetoseveralothers,seeInwood(1999);onthisspecificpointseealsoBrennan(1996,p.331).)However,asamatterofgeneralpolicy,itclearlymakessense,forexample,totakecareofone’shealth;this,then,willnormallybeakathEkon,anditmightwellbehelpfultohaveanaccountofsuchtypesofaction,includinganaccountofwhytheyarenormallykathEkontaandhowonecanlearntospottheexceptions.Itisthiskindofagendathatappearstobereflectedinadistinc-tion,alsoreportedinDiogenesLaertius,betweenkathEkontathatarenotdependentoncircumstancesandkathEkontathataredependentoncircumstances–wheretakingcareofone’shealthistheleadingexampleoftheformer,andmutilatingoneselfandgettingridofone’spropertyareexamplesofthelatter(7.109=LS59E3).Again,thiscannotbeadistinctionbetweenactionsthatareinvariablykathEkontaandactionsthatarenot;aswehaveseen,takingcareofone’shealthisnotinvariablytherightthingtodo.Rather,itmustbeadistinctionbetweenactionsthatarekathEkontawhenspecialcircumstancesdonotobtain(i.e.,normally),andthosethatarekathkontaonlywhenspecialcircumstancesdoobtain(seeSedley,1999,p.132).Thesage’s“Rightactions”TheperformanceofkathEkonta–muchofthetime–iswellwithinthecapabilitiesofthenon-sage.Fortosaythatanactionhasareasonablejustificationisnottosaythattheagentmustbecapableofgivingthatjustification.Bydefinition,thenon-sagedoesnothaveafullunderstandingofwhatmakescertainactionskathEkonta.Butsuchapersoncannonethelessdothekindsofthingsthatwill,forexample,preservehisorherhealth,andtheseveryoftenwillinfactbekathEkonta.Thedifferencebetweenthesageandthenon-sage,then,isnotintheperformanceofkathEkonta–indeed,someoneonthevergeofbecomingasagemightevensucceedinperformingnothingbutkathEkonta(Stob.5.906,18–907,5=LS59I)–butintheframeofmindinwhichtheyareper-formed.Quitesimply,thesage’sactionsareallexpressionsofvirtueorperfectedreason;theymayoftenbeexternallyindistinguishablefromtheactionsofanon-sage,buttheyderivefromthestableandharmoniousdispositiondescribedearlier,andthatmakesallthedifference.TheStoicsusetheterm“rightaction”(katorthOma),andalsotheterm“perfect(teleion)kathEkon,”todesignatethatspecialsub-classofkathEkontathatareexpressionsofthesage’svirtue(Stob.2.85,18–86,4=LS59B4).Stobaeusgivesactingwithpracticalwisdomandwithjusticeasinstancesof“rightactions.”Unfortunately,heagaincreatesthepotentialforconfusionbylisting“marrying,beinganambassador,engagingindialogueandthingslikethis”asinstancesofkathEkontathatarenot“rightactions.”Infact,anyoneoftheseactionswouldbea“rightaction”543ACTC2754320/03/2006,04:16PM\nrichardbettifperformedbyasage;for,torecall,everythingthatthesagedoesisanexpressionofvirtue.However,itistruethattheyarenot“rightactions”inandofthemselves.Thetelos(DiogenesandAntipater)andthedualityof“nature”Itshouldbeclearbynowthatthesage’sattitudetowardstheindifferentsisnotoneofcompletelackofinterest.Onthecontrary,aswehaveseen,thekathEkonwillinmostcasesinvolvethesecuringorretainingofpreferredindifferents,ortheavoidanceofdispreferredindifferents;hencethe“rightaction,”theactionthatthesagewillperform,willinmostcasesconsistinthesecuringorretainingofpreferredindifferents,ortheavoidanceofdispreferredindifferents,inavirtuousway–thatis,asanexpressionofperfectedreason.Again,thecrucialdifferencebetweenthesageandothersistheframeofmind,orthestateofcharacter,thatgivesrisetotheseactions.Now,someStoicsafterChrysippusactuallyincorporatedthispointintotheirformulationsoftheend.AccordingtoDiogenesofBabylon,theendis“reasoningwell(eulogistein)intheselectionandrejectionofthethingsinaccordancewithnature”;andAntipaterisreportedtohavedevisedtwodifferentformulations(towhichwewillshortlyreturn),bothspecifyingasimilarkindoforientationtothethingsinaccordancewithnature(Stob.2.76,9–15=LS58K).Thedifferencesamongthesevariousformulationsprob-ablyreflectacomplicateddebateonthetopicwiththeAcademicCarneades(seeLongandSedley,1987,commentaryonsection64;Striker,1996b).Butitisclearthatallofthemreflectaconceptionofvirtueasinvolvingthecorrectattitudetowardstheindifferents–aconceptionthatwaspresentinStoicismfromthestart.Carneadeswasnottheonlyonetofindsomethingproblematicinthisconception.Ifselectingandrejectingthethingsinaccordancewithnature(normallyselectingthem,butinspecialcasesrejectingthem)iswhatthesageissupposedtodo,howcanitbeclaimedthattheachievement(or,inspecialcases,thesuccessfulavoidance)ofthethingsinaccordancewithnatureissomethingthatthesageconsidersirrelevanttohappiness?Whyaimforthingsthat,byone’sownaccount,makenodifferencewhatevertoone’slevelofwell-being?Thisobjectionispressedinanumberofwaysbyseveraldifferentauthors(seeLongandSedley,1987,section64).TheStoicsreplythatitisnot,infact,theachievementoravoidanceofthethingsinaccordancewithnaturethatoneisaimingfor;rather,whatoneisaimingforistheconditioninwhichoneperformstheselectionorrejectionofthesethingsinaninfallibleway–inotherwords,thelifeofthevirtuousperson.Buttomanythereseemedtobesomethingdeeplyparadoxicalaboutattachingsupremeimportancetoaconditioninwhichoneselectsvariousthings,butnoimportancetothethingsthemselves.TheStoics,fortheirpart,neverclimbeddownonthispoint;wefinditrestated,essentiallyunchanged,inSeneca(Ep.92.11–13=LS64J).Itshouldalsobeclearbynowthattheconceptofnatureplaysaroleinthisaccountattwodifferentpoints(seeStriker,1996a,p.224).Ontheonehand,therearethethings“inaccordancewithnature,”whichareacertainsubsetoftheindifferents–themoresignificantofthemconstitutingthepreferredindifferents;thesearethekindsofthingsthat,otherthingsbeingequal,willtendtopromotetheflourishingofhumanbeings.Ontheotherhand,thereisthelife“inagreementwithnature,”theachievementofwhichistheend;thisisthelifeofthesage,whoseperfectedrationalityconstitutes544ACTC2754420/03/2006,04:16PM\nstoicethicsthehighestdevelopmentofhumannature,andwhoisalsoinharmonywiththecosmicnaturethatgovernseverything.Now,aswehaveseen,thevirtuousandper-fectlyrationalpersonwhoisliving“inagreementwithnature”willgenerallypursuethethings“inaccordancewithnature.”However,thereisbynomeansacompletecorrespondencebetweentheachievementoftheformerandthepursuitofthelatter.First,torepeat,therearesomecaseswherepursuingthethings“inaccordancewithnature”isthewrongthingtodo,andhencenotsomethingthatapersonliving“inagreementwithnature”woulddo.Second,whatreallymatterstothesage(andwhatdistinguishesthesagefromothers),isthevirtueorperfectrationalitywithwhichthesethingsarepursued,nottheiractualattainment;thethings“inaccordancewithnature”are,afterall,onlyindifferents,whereasvirtueorperfectrationality,theachieve-mentofwhichisbothnecessaryandsufficientforliving“inagreementwithnature,”isagood.Despitethefactthatthetwoterms“inaccordancewithnature”and“inagreementwithnature”haveclearlydistinctmeaningsandfunctions–butperhapsunderstand-ably–thereisatendencyfortheirusagetoberuntogether.Cicero,inapassageonoikeiOsisandnaturalhumandevelopmentreferredtoearlier(Fin.3.20–22=LS59D2–6)usesboththeterms“inagreementwithnature”(consentaneanaturae)and“inaccordancewithnature”(secundumnaturam)toapplytotheeventualattainmentandunderstandingofthegood;yet“inaccordancewithnature”alsooccursinthesamepassagetorefertothepreferredindifferents,pursuitofwhichisanearlyoutgrowthof12theinitialimpulsetoself-preservation.Stobaeusalsoatonepointrepresentstheendas“livinginaccordancewithnature”insteadof“livinginagreementwithnature”(2.77,19=LS63A1).And,ifStobaeus’quotationsaretobetrusted,eventheStoics’ownformulationsoftheendillustratethebeginningsofablurringofthedistinction.DiogenesofBabylon,aswesaw,givesastheend“reasoningwellintheselectionandrejectionofthethingsinaccordancewithnature.”Here“thingsinaccordancewithnature”clearlyrefers,aswewouldexpect,toindifferentsthathavevalue;thesage,asanexpressionofperfectedreason,willsometimesselecttheseandsometimesrejectthem.ButDiogenes’successorAntipatersaysthattheendis“toliveunceasinglyselectingthethingsinaccordancewithnatureandrejectingthosecontrarytonature,”oralternatively,“unceasinglyandunalterablydoingeverythinginone’spowertowardsobtainingtheprincipalthingsaccordingtonature”(Stob.2.76,9–15=LS58K).Andhereitseemsequallyclearthat“thingsaccordingtonature”and“thingscontrarytonature”cannotrefertotheindifferentsthathavevalueanddisvaluerespectively;forthenitwouldnotbethecasethatoneshouldinvariablyselecttheformerandrejectthelatter.Rather(ifAntipaterhimselfisnotconfused)thesetermsmustrefertothethingsthat,onanygivenoccasion,thesage’scorrectunderstandingofnaturewoulddictatethatoneselectandreject.Thesewillstill,ofcourse,beindifferents,notgoods;butinthisusage,unlikethestandardusageofDiogenes,preferredindifferentswillalwayswarrantselectionanddispreferredindifferentsrejection.12.InthesamepassagekathEkontaaresaidtooriginateabinitiisnaturae,“fromnature’sstarting-points.”Butthis,too,ispotentiallymisleading.TherelationofthekathEkontonatureiscomplex;aswehaveseen,theperformanceofkathEkontaisnotsimplyequivalenttothepursuitofthepreferredindifferents–asCicero’slanguagemightbetakentosuggest.545ACTC2754520/03/2006,04:16PM\nrichardbettProgressHowisonetoprogresstowardstheconditionofthesage?TheStoicswerehappytoadmitthispossibility,despitetheirinsistenceontheequalityofallviceandtheabsenceofanymiddlegroundbetweenvirtueandvice.Astheysay,someonewhodrownstwofeetbelowthesurfaceoftheoceanisjustasdrownedassomeonewhodrownsmanyfathomsdown(e.g.,Plut.Comm.not.1063A=LS61T);theanalogyillustratestheequalityofvice,butalsothepossibilityofdifferentdegreesofclosenesstovirtue.WehavelittlefromtheHellenisticperiodonthedetailsofhowonemightbeexpectedtomakeprogressinthisarea.ButitisclearthatthiswastakentoinvolveaprogressivelygreaterabilitytodiscernwhatthekathEkonisonanygivenoccasion–agraspofgeneralrulesaswellasagraspofwhentodeviatefromthem–alongsideaprogressivelygreaterconsistencyandorderinone’sowncharacter.(ThepassageofCicerocitedinthepreviousparagraphisasgoodanillustrationofthisasany;forananalysisofthispassage,andonthewholetopicofmoralprogress,seeInwoodandDonini(1999,sec.X).)ThelaterperiodofStoicism,inkeepingwithitsmorepracticalorientation,seesmoreextendedattentiondevotedtothetopic.Senecaoffersarelativelydetailedaccountofthreestagesofprogressalongtheroadtovirtue(Ep.75);thereissomedeviationherefromtherigorsofearlierStoicism–forexample,Senecaspeaks(14)ofapersonbeingfreefromsomeofthevicesbutnotyetfromallofthem–butthesamebasicpointsstillapply.Epictetusalsodevotesachapterspecificallytothetopicofprogress(Diss.1.4);butagreatdealofhiswritinghastodo,inonewayoranother,withthemoralimprovementofthoseofuswhoarenotsages.ThepassionsAnotherthingthatisinvolvedinthetransitionfromvicetovirtue–andthisalsoreceivesconsiderableattentioninSeneca’saccount–istheeliminationofthepassions(astheGreektermpathEisusuallytranslated,though“emotions”issometimespreferred).TheStoicsofferahighlydistinctiveaccountofthepassionsasaspeciesofdefectivebelief;most,ifnotperhapsall,oftheseinvolvethemistakenviewthatsomethingisgoodorbadwhichisinfactindifferent,togetherwithanexcessiveanduncontrolledimpulsetoseekoravoidit.Naturally,thesageisaltogetherfreeofpassionsinthissense.Thisdoesnot,however,preventthesagefromexperiencingcertaincounterpartsofthepassionscalled“goodfeelings”(eupatheiai),whichlacktheobjectionableelementsoferrorandexcess;tosay,then,aspopularconceptionsofStoicismmightencourageonetosay,thatthesageiswithoutemotionsisatbestanoversimplification.WhetherthisentirelyexoneratestheStoicsagefromthechargeofbeingobjectionablycoldandaloofininterpersonalrelationsisanotherquestion;theanswersuggestedbyasectionofEpictetus’Handbook(3)–apassagethatcanplausibly13beseenasinspiredbythestandardStoicposition–isnotencouraging.13.See,however,Reydams-Schils(2002)forarecentattempttodefendatleasttheRomanStoicsagainstthischarge.546ACTC2754620/03/2006,04:16PM\nstoicethicsInthecaseofeverythingthatattractsyouorthatfulfilsaneedorthatyouarefondof,remembertosaywhatsortofthingitis,beginningwiththesmallestthings.Ifyouarefondofajug,say“Iamfondofajug”;forwhenitisbrokenyouwillnotbedisturbed.Ifyoukissyourchildoryourwife,saythatyouarekissingahumanbeing;forwhenitdiesyouwillnotbeupset.TheStoicaccountofthepassionsand“goodfeelings”hasbeenthesubjectofmuchrecentdiscussion;seeinparticularthenumerousessaysonStoicisminSihvolaandEngberg-Pedersen,1998.ConclusionSinceantiquity,Stoicethicshasoftenbeenseenasimpossiblyhigh-minded,andtheconceptionofnaturewithwhichitisintertwinedquestionableatbest.Yetithasalso14beenasourceofinspirationinmanyperiods,uptoandincludingourown–perhapsmoresothananyotherethicalsystemdevelopedbyGreekphilosophers.Itisreason-abletosupposethattherigorousanduncompromisingcharacteroftheStoicethicaloutlookhassomethingtodowiththis.Butitsabilitytospeaktothosewhodonotmeasureuptoitsideals–howeverloftythoseidealsmaybe–issurelyanotherimport-15antfactor.BibliographyWorksCitedBaltzly,D.(2000).“Stoicism.”InTheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(onlineat:).Bobzien,S.(2001).DeterminismandFreedominStoicPhilosophy.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Brennan,T.(1996).“ReasonableImpressionsinStoicism.”Phronesis,41,318–34.Brouwer,R.(2002).“SagehoodandtheStoics.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,23,181–224.Cooper,J.M.(1996).“Eudaimonism,theAppealtoNature,and‘MoralDuty’inStoicism.”InS.EngstromandJ.Whiting(eds.),Aristotle,Kant,andtheStoics:RethinkingHappinessandDuty(pp.261–84).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(1998).“TheUnityofVirtue.”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy,15,233–74.Inwood,B.(1995).ReviewofJuliaAnnas,TheMoralityofHappiness.AncientPhilosophy,15,647–65.14.Astrikingtwentieth-centuryexampleisStockdale(1993).15.TheinitialwritingofthischaptercoincidedwithagraduateseminaronStoicethicsthatItaughtintheFallTermof2001.Iwouldliketothanktheparticipantsinthatseminarforpushingmetoclarifyandrefinemyideas.IalsothankGregBurrill,SeanGreenberg,GeraldineHenchyandJ.B.Schneewindforreadingandcommentingonadraft;andeditorsPierrePellegrinandMaryLouiseGill,aswellasAdamRachlis,forhelpfuladviceonhowtoimprovethepenul-timateversion.547ACTC2754720/03/2006,04:16PM\nrichardbett——.(1999).“RulesandReasoninginStoicEthics.”InK.Ierodiakonou(ed.),TopicsinStoicPhilosophy(pp.95–127).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Inwood,B.andDonini,P.(1999).“StoicEthics.”InK.Algra,J.Barnes,J.Mansfeld,andM.Schofield(eds.),TheCambridgeHistoryofHellenisticPhilosophy(pp.675–738).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Inwood,B.andGerson,L.P.(ed.andtrans.).(1997).HellenisticPhilosophy:IntroductoryRead-ings.2ndedn.Indianapolis:Hackett.Long,A.A.andSedley,D.N.(1987).(CitedasLS).TheHellenisticPhilosophers.(2vols.).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Reydams-Schils,G.(2002).“HumanBondingandOikeiOsisinRomanStoicism.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,22,221–51.Schofield,M.(1991).TheStoicIdeaoftheCity.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Sedley,D.(1999).“TheStoic-PlatonistDebateonkathEkonta.”InK.Ierodiakonou(ed.),TopicsinStoicPhilosophy(pp.128–52).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Sihvola,J.andEngberg-Pedersen,T.(eds.).(1998).TheEmotionsinHellenisticPhilosophy.Dordrecht:Kluwer.Stockdale,J.(1993).CourageUnderFire:TestingEpictetus’sDoctrinesinaLaboratoryofHumanBehavior.Stanford:HooverInstitute.Striker,G.(1996a).“FollowingNature:AStudyinStoicEthics.”InG.Striker,EssaysonHellenisticEpistemologyandEthics(pp.221–80).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.(Originallypublished1991.)——.(1996b).“Antipater,ortheArtofLiving.”InG.Striker,EssaysonHellenisticEpistemologyandEthics(pp.298–315).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.(Originallypublished1986.)FurtherReadingAnnas,J.(1993).TheMoralityofHappiness.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Brunschwig,J.andNussbaum,M.C.(eds.).(1993).PassionsandPerceptions:StudiesinHellenisticPhilosophyofMind.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Inwood,B.(1985).EthicsandHumanActioninEarlyStoicism.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Long,A.A.(1986).HellenisticPhilosophy:Stoics,Epicureans,Sceptics.2ndedn.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.——.(2001).StoicStudies.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.(OriginallyPublished1996byCambridgeUniversityPress.)——.(2002).Epictetus:AStoicandSocraticGuidetoLife.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Nussbaum,M.C.(1994).TheTherapyofDesire:TheoryandPracticeinHellenisticEthics.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Schofield,M.andStriker,G.(eds.).(1986).TheNormsofNature.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Sharples,R.W.(1996).Stoics,EpicureansandSceptics:AnIntroductiontoHellenisticPhilosophy.London/NewYork:Routledge.548ACTC2754820/03/2006,04:16PM\nhellenisticcosmopolitanism28HellenisticCosmopolitanismERICBROWNIntroduction“Whenhewasaskedwherehecamefrom,hewouldsay,‘Iamacitizenoftheworld[kosmopolitEs]’”(D.L.6.63).Thisstory,toldinantiquityaboutbothSocrates(Cic.Tusc.5.108)andDiogenestheCynic(D.L.6.63),recordsaneatdisappointmentoftradi-tionalGreekexpectations.Ordinarily,aGreekwouldidentifyhimselfbythepolisorcityofhisbirth,andtherebyaffirmwhichinstitutionsandwhichbodyofcitizensheldhisallegiance.Thepolisdependedonitscitizenstodefendthecityfromattacks,sustainitsinstitutionsofjustice,andcontributetoitscommongood.Butthecosmopolitandeniesallegiancetohispolisandaffirmsinsteadhisconnectiontotheentireworld.CosmopolitanismhaslongbeenassociatedwiththeStoicandEpicureanphilo-sophyoftheso-calledHellenisticAge,theconventionallyrecognizedperiodbetweentheMacedonianEmpire,whichwasdividedafterthedeathofAlexandertheGreatin323bce,andtheRomanEmpire,whosebirthcanbedatedtothevictoryatActiumofOctavian(laterAugustus)in31bce.ButthetraditionalaccountofHellenisticcosmopolitanismfocusesonitsnegativeaspect,therejectionofallegiancetothelocalpolis,withoutinquiringmuchintoitspositivecommitments,theconnectiontotheentireworld.Thishasbeensofortworeasons.First,aliteralinterpretationofworld-citizenshipisintelligibleinnegativeterms,asarejectionoflocalcitizenship,butseemstomakenosenseinpositivetermsintheabsenceofaworld-state.Second,theoriginsofHellenisticcosmopolitanismhavetraditionallybeenexplainedinawaythatplacesitsnegativeaspectfront-and-center:ithasbeensaidthatinthewakeofAlexandertheGreat’sconqueststhetraditionalpoliscollapsedandcouldnotcommandtheallegiancethatithadoncereceived.Butthetraditionalaccountshouldberejected.First,itsexplanationoftheoriginsofHellenisticcosmopolitanismistwicewrong.ThewidespreadassumptionthatthepoliscollapsedundertheimperialgovernmentsofAlexander’ssuccessorsisatbestcontroversialandatworstflatlymistaken.FocusedattentionontheHellenisticperiodtendstoshowthatthereremainedasignificantsphereofpoliticalactioninthelocalpolisandsignificantopportunitiesforengagementonbehalfofthelocalpolis,andindeed,manyphilosophersintheHellenisticperiodcontinuedtorecommendengagementinlocalpolitics.Moreover,andmoredecisively,theriseofphilosophicalcosmopolitanismpredatestheconquestsofAlexanderandtheallegedcollapseofthepolis.Asalreadynoted,theearliestexpressionsofself-identifiedcosmopolitanismareattributedtoSocratesandtoDiogenestheCynic.549ACTC2854920/03/2006,04:17PM\nericbrownThesecondinadequacyofthetraditionalaccountisitsemphasisonthenegativeaspectofHellenisticcosmopolitanism.SomecloserattentiontotheStoicassertionsthatthecosmosislikeapolisandthatagoodhumanbeinglivesasacitizenofthecosmosrevealspositivecommitmentstobenefithumanbeingsassuchintheabsenceoftheworld-state.Andonceweseethepositiveimportofcosmopolitanisminageneralconcerntobenefithumanbeingsassuchinplaceofaspecialconcerntocultivateacommongoodwithcompatriots,wecanrecognizeasimilarpositivecosmopolitanisminEpicureanthought.Accordingly,thischapteraimstoreplacethetraditionalaccountwithanewexplana-tionoftheoriginsofHellenisticcosmopolitanismandanewappreciationofHellenisticcosmopolitanism’spositiveimport.SocraticRootsofCosmopolitanismThestorythatSocratesidentifiedhimselfasacitizenoftheworldisprobablynottrue.IncontrasttothesamestorytoldaboutDiogenestheCynic,whichissupportedbyavarietyofsources,theportrayalofSocratesasacosmopolitanislimitedtoStoiccontexts,andtheStoicsnotonlysawthemselvesascosmopolitansbutalsowantedtoclaimSocratesasanimportantsourceoftheirideas.Still,theStoicshaveagoodpoint.ThecosmopolitanismthatisexplicitlyembracedbyDiogenestheCynicis1Socratic.Socratesclearlybelievedthateveryhumanbeingiscapableofthesamevirtueandthatnohumanbeingshouldbedoneaninjustice.Lessobviously,theSocratesofPlato’searlydialoguesseemstoholdthefurtherbeliefthateveryhumanbeingisequallyworthyofbeingbenefited,regardlessofconventionalsocialandpoliticalstatus.First,SocratesrejectsthelifeoftraditionalpoliticsthatgivesAtheniansspecialbenefitsthatitdoesnotgivetoforeigners.Second,althoughSocratesrecognizesobligationstoobeyAthensanditslaws,hedoesnotarguefortheseobligationsbyreferencetoanydutytobenefitAthenians.Third,heexplicitlyextendshislife’sworkofexaminingpeople–whichherecognizesasgenuinelybeneficialandthusastheproperworkofpolitics(Grg.521d6–8)–toanyone,Athenianorforeigner(Ap.23b4–6).Ofcourse,SocratesspendsallofhistimeinAthens,andsoheunavoidablybenefitsAthenianstoaspecialdegree,butweneednotthinkthathestaysinAthensoutofanobligationtobenefitAthenians.Rather,heseeshimselfasfreetoleaveanddecidestostayonthegroundsthatonlyAthenshastherequisiterespectforfreespeechthatmakeshiscareerpossible(Grg.461e1–3;cf.Ap.37c5–e2andMeno80b4–7).Sounderstood,Socratesseekstobenefithumanbeingsasbesthecan,andbecausehecannotbenefitallhumanbeingsequallyandcannotevenbenefitpeopleverywellatallifheleavesAthens,herealizesthatthebesthecandoistoremaininAthens,seekingtoexamineanyonehecomesacrossthere.Inotherwords,Socratesreplacesordinarypoliticsand1.OntheoriginoftheCynicsandDiogenesofSinope(theCynic),seeDeclevaCaizzi,minorsocratics,andBénatouïl,philosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimes,inthisvolume.550ACTC2855020/03/2006,04:17PM\nhellenisticcosmopolitanismitsconcentratedserviceofcompatriotswithextraordinarypolitics,whichisaproject2tobesharedasoptimallyaspossiblewithallhumanbeings.Intheseways,theStoicscouldhavejustifiedtheirportrayalofSocratesasacosmo-politan.ButthisjustificationinvolvessomeheavyinterpretationofSocrates’message.Socrateshimselfissilentaboutthenegativethesisofcosmopolitanism,andhedoesnotmuchadvertisehispositivecommitmenttoallhumanbeingsinplaceofaspecialattachmenttoAthenians.(Infact,atonerhetoricallytouchypointheconcedesspecialconcernforAthenians(Ap.30a3–5,andcf.29d7–8forarelated,purelyrhetoricalconcession).)IfwearelookingforanunequivocalembraceofcosmopolitanismthatpavesthewayfortheHellenisticphilosophers,weshouldlookpastSocratestothemanPlatoallegedlycalled“Socratesgonemad”(D.L.6.54),DiogenestheCynic.WedonotknowmuchofDiogenesasidefromthecolorfulanecdotesthataretoldabouthim,buttheseanecdotesconsistentlyrevealamanintentonchallengingconventionalvalues.Wearetoldthatheadoptedunconventionaldress,gotbyonhandouts,andatonetimeoranotherindulgedallhisbodilyfunctionsinthemarket-place.Thesestoriessufficeforustounderstandhiscosmopolitanism.Diogenes’affirma-tionofworld-citizenshipandhisclaimthat“theonlytruepoliticalorder(politeia)isinthecosmos”(D.L.6.72)–ifindeedthisishisclaim,andnottheStoicizinginterpretationoflaterantiquity–fitneatlyaspartofathoroughcampaigntooverthrowstandardobligationsandcustomaryprohibitions.Diogenesdisdainstheconventionsofpoliticsjustashedisdainsallconventions,andCyniccosmopolitanismisreadilyintelligibleasanegativethesis.ItismuchhardertofindinthehistoricalrecordevidencethatDiogenestheCynichadpositivecommitmentstothecosmopolisortocitizensoftheworldgenerally.Diogenesseemstorecognizenocommunitybetweenhimandtherestoftheworld,exceptinsofarasheclearlydesirestoprovokeothersandtobeheededasamodel.Ifwetakethisdesireseriously,wemightseeDiogenesasaprovocativeteacherintheSocratictradition,andifweseeDiogenesasaneducator,wecanbelievethathebuiltintohisunderstandingofagoodhumanlifeacommitmenttohelpingotherhumanbeings,withoutanyspecialattentiontocompatriots.Inthisway,wecouldattributetoDiogenesapositivecosmopolitanism.ButitmustbesaidthatthepositivesideofCyniccosmopolitanismisdeliveredentirelybyourreflectiononDiogenes’wayoflife.Diogenesrejectstheory.Hedoesnotleaveusreasonswhyweshouldrejectconventionaltiestothepolisandembracealifeoftryingtohelpotherstolivemorenaturallives.Thefewreportedremarksthatseemtogivereasons(inD.L.6.70–73;cf.102–105)areprobablyunreliable,devisedtoemphasizethehistoricalconnectionsbetweenCynicismandStoicism.Andthoseremarksaside,Diogenesdoesnotevenleaveadevelopedaccountofwhatisnatural;thereareonlyappealstoculturalvariationasevidenceofconventionalityandmentionsofanimalbehaviorasevidenceofnaturalness.ItwasdisputedinantiquitywhethertheCynicshadaphilosophicalschoolorsimplyawayoflife(D.L.6.103),andeventoday,anyonewishingtofindinCynicisminterestingpositivecommitmentsmustextractthemfromthelivesCynicslivedandmustprovidethereasonsforlivingsuchalife.2.Onthistopic,seealsoMorrison,socrates,inthisvolume.551ACTC2855120/03/2006,04:17PM\nericbrownSoitshouldnotbesaidthatSocraticphilosophybroughttheworldcosmopolitanismasafinishedphilosophicalposition.Itwouldalsobeover-simpletogivetheSocraticsallthecreditforputtingcosmopolitanismonthephilosophicalagenda.SomeSophists,too,drewcosmopolitanconclusionsfromthedistinctionbetweennatureandconven-tionthattheCynicsruthlesslyexploited(AntiphonDK87B44;Hippiasap.Plato,Prt.337c7–d3),andotherintellectualslikeDemocritus(DK68B247)madecosmopolitanclaims.Still,thereareclearSocratictendenciestowardrejectingtiestothelocalpolisandtakingontheprojectofimprovingthelivesofhumanbeingsgenerally,withoutregardtotheirsocialorpoliticalstatus.ThepositivecommitmentisclearerinSocrateshimself,thenegativeoneinDiogenestheCynic.TheseSocratictendenciesarethecentralinfluenceonHellenisticcosmopolitanism,justasSocratismloomslargestforStoicandEpicureanethicsmoregenerally.StoicCosmopolitanism“TheStoicssaythatthecosmosis,asitwere,apolis.”Sogoesthereportofmanyancientauthorities(including,e.g.,Cicero,ND2.154).Apolis,accordingtotheStoicdefinition,isaplacewherehumanbeingsliveoranorganizationofhumanbeings(Stob.2.103,17–20Wachsmuth),putintoorderbylaw(ClementSVF3.327;cf.DioChrysostom,Or.36.20,36.29).Butlawisrightreason(Chrysippus,OnLawap.MarcianusSVF3.314,with,e.g.,Cic.,Leg.1.18),andbecausenoextantcityisactuallyputintoorderbyrightreason,noextantcityactuallydeservesthename“polis”(e.g.,ClementSVF3.327).Theonlyplacewherehumanbeingslivethatisputinorderbyrightreasonisthecosmosasawhole,andsothecosmos–despitethefactthatitisnotaproductofhumanwork,asa“regular”citywouldbe–istheonlytrueclaimanttothetitle“polis.”Thismuchseemsclear,anditexplainswhytheStoicswouldsaythat“thecosmosis,asitwere,apolis.”Butwhatisthesignificanceofthisdoctrine?First,thedoctrineleavesitsmarkontheStoics’conceptionofidealpolitics.ZenowroteaRepublic(Politeia),whichapparentlyimaginedhowapluralityofcitieswouldbeifeveryadultwereasage.Insuchaworld,therewouldbenoneedforinstitutionsofjusticesinceeveryhumanwouldbeinharmonywitheveryother,livingbythesamerightreason.Norwouldtherebeanysignificantdifferencesbetweenthevariouscities,forallofthemwouldinfactbeorderedbythesamerightreason,partsofthesamecosmopolis.Whatismore,inthisidealworldofsages,everyhumanactionwouldharmonizewiththerightreasonthatpervadesthewholeandwouldtherebybenefiteveryhumanbeing.Thisisunmistakablycosmopolitanism,thoughitisover-shadowedinoursourcesbythecontroversyoverotherespeciallyCynictendencies(concerningsexandsuch)inZeno’sRepublic.Becauseofthiscontroversy,somelaterStoicsapparentlydeniedZeno’sauthorshipoftheRepublicorinsistedonitsbeingwrittenearlyinZeno’scareer,butChrysippus,theearlystandard-bearerforStoicorthodoxy,endorsedthework’sauthenticityanddefendedsomeofthework’smostnotoriouselements.ThecosmopolitanismoftheidealsketchedbyZenoandendorsedbyChrysippussuggeststhatthedoctrineofthecosmopolisisnomeremetaphorfortheStoicgoaloflivinginagreementwiththecosmicnatureandrightreason,butitleavesunclear552ACTC2855220/03/2006,04:17PM\nhellenisticcosmopolitanism3exactlyhowcosmopolitanismfeaturesinaStoicethicforhereandnow.ItmightseemnaturaltointerpretStoiccosmopolitanismstillfurtheralongCyniclines.SincetheStoicsdenythatanyextantpolisisdeservingofthename,wemightsupposethattheyrejectthetraditionalviewthatoneshouldservecompatriotsratherthanhumanbeingsgenerally.ThenwecangetonwithexaminingStoicismforwhatCynicismlacks,anaccountofwhypeopleshouldbepositivelycommittedtocultivatingcommongoodswithhumanbeingsassuch,withoutregardtotheirconventionalpoliticalorsocialstatus.Butthereisaproblemforthisview:theStoicsdonotfollowtheCynicsinrejectingengagementinlocalpolitics.“[TheStoics]saythatthesagewillparticipateinpolitics,ifnothingpreventshim–sosaysChrysippusinthefirstbookofOnLives–fortheysaythathewillrestrainviceandpromotevirtue”(D.L.7.121).TherestofourevidenceforChrysippus’OnLivesmakesthisperfectlyclear.Considerthreepassages.First,PlutarchcriticizesChrysippusforemphasizingwaysofmakingmoney(St.rep.1043E):Thathe[sc.,thesage]doesthesethingsforthesakeoftradeandmoney,he[sc.,Chrysippus]hasalsomadeclearearlier[sc.,inBookOneofOnLives(cf.St.rep.1043B–D)]bypositingthreewaysofmakingmoneywhichagreeespeciallywellwiththesage:fromkingship,fromfriends,andthird,afterthese,fromlecturing.Second,muchthesameinformationisprovidedbyStobaeus’summaryofStoicethics,althoughChrysippus’OnLivesisnotnamedandtheaccountofwaysofmakingmoneyisinterruptedbyaremarkaboutfamilylife(Stob.2.109,10–24Wachsmuth):[Theysay]thattherearethreeprincipallives,thekingly,thepolitical,andthird,thelifeconcernedwithknowledge.Similarly,therearealsothreeprincipalwaysofmakingmoney:fromkingship,bywhich[thesage]willeitherbekingorwillthriveonkinglyfunds;second,fromgovernment,forhewillengageinpoliticsinaccordancewithguidingreason,forhewillalsomarryandproducechildren,forthesethingsaccordwiththenatureofarationalanimal,fitforcommunityandlovingothers.Thus,hewillmakemoneybothfromgovernmentandfromfriendswhoareinauthority.Andconcerninggivinglecturesandmakingmoneyfromgivinglectures...theyareagreedonmakingmoneyfrompeopleforeducationandonoccasionallytakingfeesfromthosewholovelearning.Last,PlutarchelaboratesonthefirstwayofmakingmoneydiscussedinChrysippus’OnLives(St.rep.1043B–D):ButChrysippushimselfinthefirstbookofOnLivessaysthatthesagewillvoluntarilyassumekingshipandmakemoneyfromit,andifheisnotabletobeking,hewilllivewithakingandwillserveaking,akinglikeIdanthyrsustheScythianorLeuconthePontian...“For,”hesays,“whileholdingtothesethings[viz.,commonconceptions?cf.S.E.M11.22]letusagainexaminethefactthathewillserveandlivewithprinces,sincewehavemaintainedthistooforreasonsmuchliketheveryconsiderationswhichhavecaused3.ForadiscussionoftheStoicethicalidealoflivinginagreementwithnature,seeBett,stoicethics,inthisvolume.553ACTC2855320/03/2006,04:17PM\nericbrownsomenoteventosuspectit.”Andafteralittle:“Andnotonlywiththosewhohavemadesomeprogressbybeingengagedindisciplinaryactivitiesandcertainhabits,forexampleatthecourtsofLeuconandIdanthyrsos.”Withthesethreepassagesinfrontofus,wecannotsaythattheStoicsageisacosmopolitanbyturninghisbackonlocalpoliticalengagement.Buttwocuriousfeaturesofthisevidencecallforcomment.First,noticethesecondwayofmakingmoney.DoesChrysippusrecommendspongingofffriends?ItcertainlysuitsPlutarch’spolemicalpurposestomakeitsoundthatway(andcf.D.L.7.189),butStobaeusoffersamorerespectableversion.Ifwekeepinmindthattheword“friends(philoi)”wasfrequentlyusedinHellenistictimesofadvisorsatakinglycourt(Konstan,1997,pp.93–108),thenwecanmakesenseofthereports.Chrysippusissayingthatifthesagecannotbeakingoranadvisortoaking(thefirstwayofmakingmoney),thesagewillhappilyworkinotherpoliticalcapacities,seekingsupportfromroyallyconnectedadvisors(thesecondwayofmakingmoney).Whatisstrikingaboutbothofthesegeneralwaysofmakingmoneyistheextenttowhichtheycountadvisingasawayofengaginginpolitics.Advisingdoesnotrequireholdingaformaloffice,nordoesitevenrequirelocalcitizenship.Itissomethingonecandoasaresidentalien.WhichbringsustothesecondinterestingfeatureofChrysippus’waysofmakingmoney.Heendorsesadvisingforeignrulers.Accordingtoourthirdpieceofevidence,Chrysippussaysthatoneshouldcarefullyconsiderwhichcourttoserveasanadvisor,favoring(butnotlimitingoneselfto!)thosekingswhoaremakingprogressalready,andheusesasexamplesofgoodkingsrulersinScythiaandtheCrimea,whichareinthefarreachesoftheworldasitwasthenknown.SowhileChrysippusdoesnotrejectlocalpoliticalengagement,hemaintainsarecognizablycosmopolitanpositionbyurgingconsiderationofengagementinpoliticsabroad.Thereisanimportantpatternofreasoningbeingsuggestedhere,apatternofreasoningthatwecanputinourownterms.Thegoodhumanlifeincludeshelpingotherpeopletolivebetterlives,andthisistheprincipalreasongivenbytheStoicsforengaginginpoliticsatall.Butbecauseofwhatisrequiredtohelpotherpeoplebecomebetter,onecannothelpeveryonebecomebetterinjustthesameway.Soonemustdecidewhomoneisgoingtohelp.Indeliberatingonthisquestion,thecosmopolitanseekstohelphumanbeingsassuch.Thebestwaytohelphumanbeingsassuchmightinvolvestayinghereandhelpingthesepeoplemost.Butitmightrequireemigrating,orotherwisesendingbenefitstoothersabroad.Eitherway,thecosmopol-itan’spurposeisthesame,anditcanbebumperstickeredas“ThinkGlobally,ActLocally.”Thequestionfacingsuchacosmopolitan,andthequestionfacingourinterpretationofStoiccosmopolitanism,isthis:doone’scompatriotscountforanythingspecialwhenoneisconsideringwheretohelphumanbeings?TheanswertothisquestionisperfectlyclearinsomeStoicwritings.IntheStoictheoryof“duties”inCicero’sOnDuties(DeOfficiis),forexample,anyoneconsideringwhomtobenefitshouldreflectontheseriesofconcentriccirclesofrelationsaroundoneandshouldfavorthecloserrelationsbyfavoring,amongothers,fellow-citizensoverforeigners(Cic.Off.1.50–58).TheevidenceisequallyclearintheotherdirectionfortherenegadeStoicAristo,whoisonrecord554ACTC2855420/03/2006,04:17PM\nhellenisticcosmopolitanismfortheCynicclaimthatthat“thefatherland[patris]doesnotexistbynature”(Plut.Deexil.600E).ButtheevidenceonthisquestionismuchlessclearforChrysippus,thestandard-bearerofearlyStoicorthodoxy.SomepassagesthatmightrepresentChrysippeandoctrinesuggestthepossibilityofspecialobligationstoservecompatriots.Thus,forexample,anotherpassageinStobaeus’summaryofethics,paralleltotheonequotedabove,suggestsnotonlythatthesageengagesinthethreewaysofmakingmoneybutalsothathe“consentstomarryandtoproducechildren,bothforhisownsakeandforthesakeofhisfatherland[patris],andheabidesbothlaborsanddeathforit,ifitbeamoderatefatherland”(Stob.2.94,7–20Wachsmuth,quoting14–17).TheseaddendamaynotbeChrysippean:theyappearherenotbecauseoftheirlinktothequestionofhowonecanmakemoneybutbecauseofthedoxographer’sconcernforotherwaysinwhich(atleastsome)Stoicstalkofcontributionstothepolis.Furthermore,itisnotobviousthatthepassagecommitstheStoicstoanyspecialresponsibilitiestoservecompatriots.Rather,itseemstosaythatifonecannotengageinthepreferredcareersandbenefithumanbeingsassuchthroughanovertlypoliticalcareerorthroughlecturingandwritingbooks,thenonewillhavenospecialneedtoemigrate.Inthatcase,onecancontributetothefatherlandbystartingafamilyandwillnot,ifthefatherlandisareasonableplace,shyfromdangersinordertodefendit(cf.D.L.7.130).Inotherwords,thispassageandotherslikeitmightsuggestthatChrysippuswaslessaCyniconthisquestionthanAristo,andclosertothemoreconventionalattitudesofCicero’sDeOfficiis.Butontheotherhand,theymightbesayingonlythatcosmopolitanactivitiesrequirefavorablecircumstances,andthatinemergencies,thebestonecandoforhumanbeingsingeneralistostandwithone’sneighbors.Onthelatterinter-pretation,theCynicismembracedbyChrysippus’defenseofZeno’sRepublicextendsalsotohisconceptionofwhomoneshouldhelpifoneisluckyenoughtochoose.Insum,thedoctrineofthecosmopolisismorethanametaphor.TheStoicsshowadefinitecommitmenttobenefitinghumanbeingsassuchbyrecognizingtheneedtodeliberateaboutwhereonecandothatbest.Moreover,itseemsquitepossiblethatsomeorthodoxStoicslikeChrysippusdonotthinkthatwehaveanyspecialreasontobenefitcompatriotsinsteadofhumanbeingselsewhere,eventhoughitisclearthatsomeotherStoicismslikethatofCicero’sDeOfficiisholdthatoneshoulddeemone’scompatriotsmoredeservingofone’sservicethanforeigners.Thefirstposition,whichjoinstheSocraticimpulsetobenefithumanbeingswiththeCynicrejectionoftheconventionalstatusconferredbylocalcitizenship,wemaycallstrictcosmopoli-tanism.Thesecond,whichmoderatesthestrictpositionbyaddingspecialconsiderationforcompatriots,wemaycallmoderatecosmopolitanism.Bothare,itseems,Stoicpossibilities.EpicureanCosmopolitanismTheEpicureansopposetheengagedversionsofcosmopolitanismfavoredbyStoics.Epicurussetsuptheendofpleasure,understoodastheabsenceofphysicalpainandmentaldisturbance,andheconcludesthatpoliticsanditsmanydisturbancesshould555ACTC2855520/03/2006,04:17PM\nericbrown4beavoided(e.g.,D.L.10.119).Liveunnoticed,hecounsels(Epic.fr.551Usener).Inthisway,Epicurusrejectsthetraditionalserviceofcompatriots,andthusdemonstratessomesympathyforthenegativethesisofcosmopolitanism.YettherearethreewrinklesthatdistinguishtheEpicurean’swithdrawalfromthepolisfromtheCynic’s.Thefirstisminor.UnliketheCynics,Epicurusandhisfollowersrejectengaginginpoliticsonlyconditionally.Theyrealizethattheyneedthesecurityprovidedbylocallawsandinstitutionsasmuchasanyonedoes,andtheyacceptthatiftheselawsandinstitutionsarethreatenedwithcollapse,thentheirpursuitoffreedomofdisturbancerequiresthemtoenterthefray.Theevidencedoesnotexplicitlytellusaboutexactlywhatkindsofimminentdangerwouldcallforengagement.Nordoesittelluswhethercertaindisturbancesmightcallforamovetoanotherlocaleinsteadofengagementonbehalfofthelocallawsandinstitutions.ButtheconditionalcommitmenttothelocalpolisisnotinconsistentwithageneralinsistencethatEpicureansshouldchoosewheretheylive,notboundtohangingoutbytheirfatherlandinordertosavetheircompatriotsshouldtheneedarise,andsothereisnoreasontobelievethattheEpicur-ean’sun-Cynicrecognitionthatpoliticalinstitutionsarevaluableentailsarejectionofcosmopolitanism.Second,thereissomereasontoattributetoatleastsomeEpicureanspositivecosmopolitancommitments,fortheStoa’scommitmentstobuildingcommunitiesasbestonecanwithanygroupofhumanbeings,regardlessofsocialorpoliticalaffiliation,arealsotobefoundintheGarden.Thekeyhereisfriendship.Epicurusdeclaresfriend-shiptobe“byfarthegreatestofthethingswisdomequipsuswithfortheblessednessoflifeasawhole”(KD27),andtheEpicureansestablishacommunityoffriendswhoareforeachotherabulwarkagainstpain.Ifthiscommunityoffriends,asfaroutsidethesphereofconventionalpoliticsasitcansafelybe,isopentoallhumanbeingsassuch,itcouldbeunderstoodasthebestonecandotosharecommunitywithhumanbeingsassuch,andinthiscase,theEpicureansarepositivecosmopolitans.Therearehintssupportingsuchaninterpretation.OneoftheEpicureanSententiaeVaticanae(SV52,withemphasisadded)hasitthat“friendshipdancesaroundtheworld,announcingtoallofusthatweshouldwakeuptotheblessing.”StillmoreclearisthefollowingevidencethatatleastsomeEpicureanscouldcharacterizetheirsearchforfriendsincosmopolitanterms,inoneoftheinscriptionsDiogenesofOenoandamademuchlaterinantiquityforallwhocouldreadthem:“so-calledforeignersreallyarenot,forinrelationtoeachsectionoftheearth,eachhasitsownfatherland,butinrelationtothewholecircumferenceofthisworld,theentireearthisthesinglefatherlandofallandtheworldisonehome”(fr.30,col.2.1–11Smith).Butthird,ifthisinterpretationofEpicureancosmopolitanismissustainable,thenwemustignoreorimpugntwopiecesofevidenceconcerningEpicurus’beliefs.ClementreportsthatEpicurussupposedthatonlyGreekscouldphilosophize(Epic.fr.226Usener),andDiogenesLaertius(10.117)reportsEpicurus’beliefthatasagecouldnotariseineverypeople(ethnos).TheEpicureansholdthatallhumanbeingshavethesamegoal,andthatthesamepursuits(friendship,virtue)arethebestmeanstowardthatgoal.Moreover,Epicurus’successorHermarchussuggeststhatthelawsofjustice,conventionallyestablishedtopromotewhatisusefulandthusdifferentfordifferent4.OntheEpicureans,seealsoMorel,epicureanism,esp.thesectiontitled“PleasureasanEnd.”556ACTC2855620/03/2006,04:17PM\nhellenisticcosmopolitanismpeoples,wouldbeunnecessaryifeveryonewerewiselyconsciousofwhatisuseful.ButifClementandDiogenesLaertiusaretobetrusted,thenEpicurusdidnotthinkthatallpeoplewerecapableofbeingwiselyconsciousofwhatisusefulorthatallpeoplewerecapableofbeingfriends.Whilethisisconsistentwithnegativecosmopoli-tanism’srejectionofspecialobligationstoservecompatriots,itsharplylimitsthecosmopolitanreachofEpicurus’positivecommitments.Thepositivecosmopolitaniscommittedtohumanbeingsassuch,andwhilethisallowsacommitmenttoallhumanbeingsinsofarastheyarepotentialmembersofaglobalcommunity,itclasheswithabeliefthatsomehumanbeingsarenaturallyincapableofbeingmembersofthatglobalcommunity.Withthisbelief–ifheheldit–EpicurusbetrayedtheSocraticrootsofhisproject.TheImportanceofHellenisticCosmopolitanismOnthetraditionalaccount,Hellenisticcosmopolitanismcanseemaquaintdoctrine,adoptedbystrangepeopletodealwithstrangetimes,andthismightmakeusbelievethatiftheHellenisticphilosophers’cosmopolitanideasarerelevanttousatall,theyarerelevantbecauseoftheAlexandrianpowerofcontemporaryeconomicglobalization.ButthisaccountsellsHellenisticcosmopolitanismshort.Thebroadideaofpositivecommitmentstoallotherhumanbeings,transcendingpoliticalboundaries,hasbeenandshouldstillbeoneofthemostinfluentialdevelop-mentsoftheHellenisticphilosophers.Wecanseethisfirstinpoliticalphilosophy,whichforhundredsofyearshasbeenshapedbyHellenisticcosmopolitanismandespeciallybyaversionofthelateStoics’taleoftwocities,“theonegreatandtrulycommon,bywhichgodsandhumanbeingsareembraced...theother,towhichtheconditionofourbirthhasassignedus”(SenecaOtio4.1).ChristiansadoptedthistalkincontrastingCaesar’scitywithGod’s(Matthew22:21),theonealocalpoliticalauthoritywithtemporalaimsandtheotherapotentiallyuniversalcommunityofbelieverswithother-worldlyobjectives(Ephesians2:20),andinthisform,politicalphilosophersinheritedtheproblemofweighingtheauthorityofchurchandstate.PoliticalphilosophershavealsodrawndeeplyfromHellenisticcosmopolitanisminanotheridiombyextendingtheStoicideaofanaturallawofrightreasonthatcoversallhumanbeingsandordersallproperpolitics.ButthelongestreachofHellenisticcosmopolitanismisnotintheparticularfieldofpoliticalphilosophy,butinthemoregeneralinquirythatwasitsoriginalhome.Mostofusnowbelievethatinordertoliveagoodhumanlifeweshouldhelpotherhumanbeingsassuch,atleastundercertaincircumstances.Wefacethequestionsofwhichotherhumanbeingstohelpandwhichcircumstancescallforhelp.Aswefacethesequestions,weshouldrememberthewayinwhichtheEpicureansandtheStoicsdeveloptheSocraticchallengetoconventionalattitudes.TheseHellenisticphilo-sophersshowusthatwecanaimtobenefithumanbeingsassuchwithoutattemptingtoliveoutsideofaparticularplaceandwithouttryingtobenefitallhumanbeingsinjustthesameway.Inthisway,theseHellenisticphilosopherschallengeustoshowthatwehavespecialobligationstocompatriotsinsteadoflazilydecidingthatlifeasusualisagoodlifeafterall.557ACTC2855720/03/2006,04:17PM\nericbrownBibliographySourcesSmith,M.F.(ed.).(1992).TheEpicureanInscription.Naples:Bibliopolis.Stobaeus.AnthologiiLibriduopriores(ed.C.Wachsmuth).Libriduoposteriores(ed.OttoHense).Berlin:Weidmann,1884–94.Usener,H.(ed.).(1887).Epicurea.Leipzig:Teubner.WorksCitedKonstan,D.(1997).FriendshipintheClassicalWorld.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.FurtherReadingAsmis,E.(forthcoming).“ChoosingaCommunity:EpicureanFriendshipandStoicCosmopolitanism.”Baldry,H.C.(1959).“Zeno’sIdealState.”JournalofHellenicStudies,79,3–15.——.(1965).TheUnityofMankindinGreekThought.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Brown,E.(2000).“SocratestheCosmopolitan.”StanfordAgora:AnOnlineJournalofLegalStudies1,74–87.——.(2006).StoicCosmopolitanism.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Moles,J.L.(1995).“TheCynicsandPolitics.”InA.LaksandM.Schofield(eds.),JusticeandGenerosity:StudiesinHellenisticSocialandPoliticalPhilosophy(pp.129–58).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——.(1996).“CynicCosmopolitanism.”InR.B.BranhamandM.-O.Goulet-Cazé(eds.),TheCynics:TheCynicMovementinAntiquityanditsLegacy(pp.105–20).Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Nussbaum,M.C.(forthcoming).TheCosmopolitanTradition.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.Nussbaum,M.C.,etal.(1996).ForLoveofCountry:DebatingtheLimitsofPatriotism.(J.Cohen,ed.).Boston:BeaconPress.Schofield,M.(1991).TheStoicIdeaoftheCity.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Stanton,G.R.(1968).“TheCosmopolitanIdeasofEpictetusandMarcusAurelius.”Phronesis,13,183–95.558ACTC2855820/03/2006,04:17PM\nPartVMiddleandLatePlatonismACTC2955920/03/2006,04:18PM\nmarcozambon560ACTC2956020/03/2006,04:18PM\nmiddleplatonism29MiddlePlatonismMARCOZAMBONMiddlePlatonism:AProblematicLabelInordertooutlinethedevelopmentsinPlatonicphilosophybetweenthefirstcenturybceandthethirdcenturyceweusetodaythelabel“MiddlePlatonism.”Thelabelhasonlycomeintouserecentlyandiscontroversial,becauseitinvolvestheideaofanintermediatestageinthedevelopmentofPlatonicthoughtbetweentheAcademyandtheso-called“Neoplatonism”inauguratedbyPlotinus.AlsothelabelimpliesthatthisintermediatestephasatleastsomecommonfeatureswhichallowustograspthisversionofPlatonismasaunitaryphenomenon.Bothassumptionsaredebatabletoday.TheancientshadalreadyattributedachangeindoctrinetothelastheadofthePlatonicAcademy,AntiochusofAscalon(Barnes,1989):theabandonmentofskepticismandreturntoadogmaticunderstandingofPlato’steachings,inotherwordstheconvictionthatPlatohelddogmata,positivedoctrinesabouttheDivine,thecosmosandthesoul.MiddlePlatonismistakentobeginwiththisturningtodogmaandtoendwithPlotinus.Historicrealityseemssomewhatmorecomplexthantheschemewehavejustoutlined.ItisdifficulttoidentifythecontextinwhichMiddlePlatonismbeganandanauthorwhocanbedescribedasthe“firstMiddlePlatonist.”OthersbesidesAntiochushavebeencreditedwithfoundingMiddlePlatonism:PhiloofLarissa,PosidoniusofApamea,EudorusofAlexandria(Boys-Stones,2001,pp.99–101).Moreover,eventhoughthePlatonistsofthaterasharedsomecommonviews,thepositionstheyheldaresovariedandirreconcilableastomakeitdifficulttoidentifywhatdoctrinalelementscanproperlybecalled“MiddlePlatonic.”Inthelightofthis,itisperhapssafertospeakof“Platonisms”insteadof“MiddlePlatonism.”AsexamplesofthediversePlatonismsofthatageonemaycitetheStoicizingversion,taughtbyAntiochusand,toalesserextent,byAtticus(Baltes,1983);orthefaithfulheritageoftheAcademypropoundedbyPlutarch(Ferrari,1995);oreventhePythagoricizingversionofthosethinkerswho,likeEudorus(Dörrie,1944),ModeratusandNumenius(Frede,1987),arelabeledintheancientsourcesbothasPlatonistsandasPythagoreans.Finally,therewasalsoapro-AristotelianversionofPlatonism,propoundedforinstancebyAlcinous(Göransson,1995),andanopenlyanti-Aristotelianversion,likethatofAtticus,LuciusandNicostratus,whichwecan561ACTC2956120/03/2006,04:18PM\nmarcozambondefineas“orthodox,”becauseitwashostiletoallattemptstoreconcilethethoughtof1PlatoandAristotle.TheassumptionthatPlotinusactsasahistoricdividinglinebetweentwodistinctphasesinthehistoryofPlatonismisdebatable.Actually,inthehistoryofancientPla-tonism,Plotinusisquiteanisolatedfigure.Themostinnovativeandoriginalaspectsofhisthoughtwerenottakenonbyhissuccessors;besidesthat,MiddlePlatonicthinkershelddoctrinesthatappearalsoinPlotinusandhissuccessors(forexample,negativetheologyandthedoctrineoftheOnesuperiortobeing).Aturningpoint,however,inthePlatonismoftheImperialAgedidcomeabout:wecanmakeoutthefirstsignsaroundhalfwaythroughthefirstcenturybcewhen,becauseofthedamagefollowingtheRomanoccupation,theAcademyceasedtoexist2asaninstitutioninAthens.Fromthattimeonwards,beingaPlatonistnolongermeantbeingamemberoftheAcademyfoundedbyPlato:instead,itmeanttrustinginthetruthofthedoctrineheldinPlato’sdialogues,whichwereseenasthemainsourcefortheknowledgeofPlatonicthought(P.Hadot,1987).StartingfromthesecondcenturycewefindevidenceofthetypicalfeatureofImperialPlatonism,bothbeforeandafterPlotinus,namely,theideathatPlato’sdoctrine–whateveritmightbe–countsastheexhaustiveandauthentictruth.Plato’sfollowersgivehimanauthoritysuperiortoallotherphilosophers,regardinghimasthebearerofancientandcompleteknowledge–anattitudewhichhasalmostthecharacterofareligiousrevelation.Thejobofthephilosopheristhoughtof,notintermsofthedevelopmentoftheideasofthemaster,butasthepreservationandinter-pretationofadoctrinethatisheldtobecontained,albeitsometimesimplicitlyandinenigmaticform,inthewritingsofPlato.ThisdidnotpreventPlatonistsoftheImperialAgefromconstructingdifferentandoriginalversionsofPlatonism;still,allofthemshareintheidealofkeepingcompletelyfaithfultowhattheybelievedwastheauthen-3ticdoctrineoftheirteacher.Onemaybetemptedtofollowinthestepsofthosescholarswhothinkweshouldgetridofthemoderndistinctionbetween“Middle”and“Neo”Platonismandgobacktotheancientlabelof“Platonists”todifferentiatethefollowersofPlatooftheImperial4Agefromthe“Academics,”themembersoftheschoolfoundedbyPlato.Forthesakeofclarity,however,itseemsbettertokeepthelabel“MiddlePlatonism,”conventionalasitis,toindicatethehistoricaldevelopmentofPlatonismfromtheendoftheAcad-emyuptoPlotinus.Thelabelwillbeusedwiththismerechronologicalmeaninginwhatfollows.1.TheoppositionbetweenaneclecticsortofPlatonismandanorthodoxonewasproposedbyPraechter(1916and1922),butisbasedonpresuppositionswhicharenowout-of-date:SeeI.Hadot(1990)andDonini(1988).2.Platonismus(1987,§§32–4);Dillon(1979);Glucker(1978).3.ThelanguageofthePlatonistsisinterwovenwithfrequentquotationsandallusionstothePlatonictexts,butverydifferentinterpretationsarepossiblewithonlyslightvariationsintheformandcontextofaquotation:Whittaker(1987a).4.OnthehistoryofthetermPlatoniciasdistinctfromthetermAcademici,seeGlucker(1978,pp.206–25).OntheAcademyintheHellenisticAge,seeinthisvolumeLévy,thenewacademyanditsrivals.562ACTC2956220/03/2006,04:18PM\nmiddleplatonismLiterarysourcesWhentheRomansiegeputanendtotheexistenceoftheAcademy,Athenshadalreadyceasedtobetheonlycitywherephilosophywastaught.Alexandria,Apamea,Pergamum,Smyrna,Tyreandmanyotherplaces,aboveallintheEastoftheMediter-raneanarea,werecentersofactivityofphilosophyteachers,rhetoricians,doctors,stateofficials,andothercultivatedpeoplewho,onverydifferentlevelsofcompetence,wereinterestedinphilosophy.Theliterarysourcesshowahighlydiversepanoramaofpre-PlotinianPlatonism.Therearetechnicalwritings,relatedtoschoolactivityandprovidingtheexegesisof5Platoorotherphilosophers:commentaries,collectionsofquestions,handbooks,lexica.SomefragmentsofananonymousCommentaryontheTheaetetus,theexegeticwritingsofPlutarch(e.g.,thePlatonicQuestionsandthetreatiseOntheGenerationoftheSoulintheTimaeus),theIntroductiontotheDialoguesofPlatobyAlbinus,theDidaskalikosofAlcinous,thehandbooksofNicomachusofGerasaandTheonofSmyrnabearwitnessofthisexegeticalactivity.Therearealsopolemicalwritingsagainstrivalschoolsofphilosophyorotheradversaries(e.g.,theChristians),aswellasworksofahistoricalnature.Thefrag-mentsofAtticus’treatiseAgainstThoseWhoClaimtoInterpretPlatothroughAristotle,andofNumenius’OntheDefectionofAcademicsfromPlato,aswellasofCelsus’anti-Christiantreatise,theTrueStory,giveanideaofthiskindofliterature.WecanalsolearnsomethingaboutawidespreadPlatonicculture,eventhoughoftenofmodestlevel,fromrhetoricworks,fromworksonreligionsuchastheDiscoursesoftherhetoricianMaximusofTyre,fromthewritingsintheHermeticCorpus,fromthefragmentsoftheChaldaeanOracles,andfinallyfromGnosticandearlyChristianliterature.InparticulartheChaldaeanOraclesearnedanextraordinaryprestigeamongPlatonists.ThecollectionwasputtogetheraroundthetimeofMarcusAureliusandclaimstocontainrevelationseitherofdivineoriginortransmittedthroughthesoulofPlatohimself,andutteredinpoeticalformbymediumsduringevocationrituals.Theycon-veyacosmogonyandapsychogonyresemblingNumenius’interpretationofPlato’s6Timaeus(Liefferinge,1999;Lewy,1978).MostofthewritingsbyPlatonistsbeforePlotinus,withtheexceptionofsomeofthetextsmentionedaboveandafewothers,havebeenlostorareknowntousonlythroughquotationsortestimonyinlaterauthors.WehavealargecorpusofwritingsonlyofPlutarchandGalen.Thegreatvarietyofliterarygenres,thehighlyvariablequalityofthematerialsthatwepossess,theconcentrationoftheevidenceinthesec-ondcenturyce,togetherwiththevarietyofphilosophicaloptions,allurgeacertaincautioninourattempttoreconstructanoverallpictureofPlatonismfromthefirstcenturybcetoPlotinus.5.Donini(1994);Fuhrmann(1960);Sedley(1997).6.OnthesignificanceoftheChaldaeanOracles,seeinthisvolumeHoffmann,whatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?563ACTC2956320/03/2006,04:18PM\nmarcozambonPhilosophyasExegesis:DogmaticandSystematicInterpretationofPlato’sThoughtAllPlatonistsoftheImperialAgeagreethatPlatobroughtphilosophytoperfection:Albinus,forexample,statesinhisIntroductionthat“thedoctrine[ofPlato]isperfectandissimilartotheperfectfigureofthecircle”(Alb.Intr.4.149.13–14Reis;seeReis,1997).IntheEvangelicalPreparationbyEusebiusofCaesareawefindtwointerestingtestimoniesofthewayinwhichPlato’srolewasunderstood,onefromthePlatonist7Atticus,theotherfromthePeripateticAristocles.AtticusholdsthatPlatowassentbythegodstorevealphilosophyinitsentirety:Plato,infact,“firstandbetterthanallothersbroughttogetherinaunifiedformthelimbsofphilosophy...andheshoweditasabodyandalivingbeingcompleteineverypart.”Whilehispredecessorswereonlyinterestedinpartialaspectsofphilosophy,Platodealtcompletelywitheveryaspect.AsimilarjudgmentisalsoexpressedbyAristoclesinhisbookOnPhilosophy:“Iftherehaseverbeensomeonewhohasphilosophizedinacompleteandgenuineway,thispersonwasPlato.”AccordingtoAristoclesPlato’spredecessorsonlydealtwithpartsofphilosophy.True,Socratesraisedquestionsinvariousfieldsofphilosophy;buthedidnothavetimetoanswerthembecauseofhisuntimelydeath.Plato,bycontrast,understoodthat“thescienceofdivineandhumanthingsisoneandthesamething”andhedealtwithbothsidesofthisknowledge:cosmologyandtheologyononehand,humanbehaviorandlogicontheother.TheimageofthecircleandthatofthelivingbodyarticulatedintoallitspartscapturetheconvictionthatinPlato’steachingwegetthecompletetruth,ateachingthatenfoldsinacoherentandorderedwayallofreality.WithoutanyhesitationtheseauthorscreditPlatowithadivisionofphilosophyintothreeparts:ethics,physics,andlogic.Thisdivisionisabsentfromhisdialogues,buthadbecomecurrentinHellenistic8philosophy.PhilosophybecameincreasinglyaninterpretationandanalysisofPlato’stext:theproblemswhichattractedmostattentionwereraisedstartingfromPlatoandthepresuppositionthatwhatPlatosaysistrueifoneunderstandsitcorrectly.Aprob-lemforthiseffortwasthatPlato’sdialoguesdonotlendthemselvestothefoundationofanencyclopedicandsystematicconceptionofphilosophy;nordotheysupplyclearandcompleteanswerstoeverypossiblephilosophicalquestion.ThroughouttheImperialAgeanintenseeffortwasmadebyPlatoniststointerpretthedialoguestoshowtheorderedandsystematicnatureofthedoctrinetherein.Testimonyofthisintenseworkcanbefoundinthemanyexegeticwritingsofwhichwehaveword,onlyafewfragmentsofwhichhavecomedowntous.InthefragmentsofananonymousCommentaryontheTheaetetustheauthorrefersto9somecommentsofhisontheTimaeus,thePhaedo,andtheSymposium;theAlcibiadesandtheParmenideswerecertainlycommentedupon;Atticuspossiblycomposeda7.Att.fr.1desPlaces=Eus.Praep.Evang.11.1.2–2.5;Aristocl.fr.1Heiland=Eus.Praep.Evang.11.2.6–3.9;Platonismus(1993,§§99–100).8.OnthetripartitionofphilosophyseeP.Hadot(1979);Platonismus(1996,§101).9.Anon.InTht.35.10–12;48.7–11;70.10–12BastianiniandSedley.564ACTC2956420/03/2006,04:18PM\nmiddleplatonism10commentaryonthePhaedrus;NumeniuscommentedonthemythofErwhichends11theRepublic.However,allthePlatonistsbeforePlotinussharetheconvictionthattheTimaeusisPlato’spreeminentwork,whereheexpoundedhisdoctrineofprinciples,his12theology,cosmology,andthedoctrineofthesoul.Wehavetestimonyofexegetical131415worksdedicatedtothisdialogue,fromEudorus,Plutarch,CalvenusTaurus,Atticus16andLonginus,amongothers.Thecommentatorssetthemselvesthetaskofsolvingtheapparentcontradictionsbetweenthedialogues:PlutarcharguedforhisinterpretationofthePlatonicdoctrineofthesoulbystatingthatitcouldresolvetheapparentconflictbetweentheTimaeus,wherethesoulissaidtobeproducedbythedemiurge,andthePhaedrus,where,onthe17contrary,thesoulappearsashavingalwaysexisted.Plato’sdramaticandnarrativestyleinthedialoguesalsopresentedaproblem.Doesthisservemerelyasrhetoricalornamentationordoesithaveaphilosophicalmeaning?NoteveryoneagreedthatthefirstpartoftheTimeaus(17a–27b)meritedcomment;someconsidereditasimple18narrative.Anotherproblemarosefromthewell-knownclaimoftheTimaeusthattheworldis“generated”(28b–c):doesthismeanthattheworldhadastartingpointintime,asPlutarchprobablyheldandAtticuscertainlydid?Ordoesthedescriptionofthetemporalproductionofthecosmosserveonlyadidacticpurpose,whileinrealityPlato19thoughtthattheworldwaseternal?ThemainstrategyfortheinterpretationofPlatonictexts,especiallywhenPlato’swordsseemedobscureorphilosophicallyirrelevant,wasallegory,astrategybasedontheprinciplethatPlatooftenpresentedinanobscureorveiledwaythosedoctrinesthathedidnotwanttobeaccessible.Onlythosewhowereworthyofunderstandingcoulddoso.ThePlatonistsoftheImperialAgeheldthatPlatohadstatedhisintentionofpresentinghisdoctrine“enigmatically,”sothatacasual,unpreparedreaderwould20notcometoknowit.10.Att.fr.14desPlaces=Procl.InTi.3.247.12–15Diehl.11.Num.fr.35desPlaces=Procl.InRep.2.128.26–131.14Kroll.12.OntheTimaeusitself,seeBrisson,plato’snaturalphilosophyandmetaphysics,inthisvolume.13.Plut.Dean.procr.3(1013B);16(1019E;1020C).14.GenerationoftheSoulintheTimaeus(Dean.procr.)isextant;also,fiveofthetenPlatonicQuestionsaredevotedtotheTimaeus(II,IV,VIIandVIII),whiletheothersaredevotedtotheTheaetetus(I),Republic(III,IX),Phaedrus(VI),Sophist(IX).15.Lakmann(1995).16.OntheMiddleandNeoplatonicexegesisofthedialogues,seePlatonismus(1993,§§78–81);ontheTimaeus:Reydams-Schils(1999);Deuse(1983);Baltes(1976).17.Plut.Dean.procr.8(1015F–1016A);Plat.Phdr.245c–246a;Ti.34b–35a.18.Procl.InTi.1.75.30ff.;129.10ff.Diehl;InAlc.18.13ff.Westerink;InRep.1.5.12ff.Kroll;InPrm.col.658.34ff.Cousin.19.Procl.InTi.1.276.30–277.7Diehl;Platonismus(1998,§137);Zambon(2002,pp.86–9);Baltes(1999aand1976).20.[Plat.]Ep.II,312d.Numeniusgivestheoldestwitnessoftheuseofthispseudo-Platonictext,whichtheancientsheldtobeauthentic:fr.24.51–57desPlaces.Ontheallegoricalexegesis,seeBuffière(1956);Pépin(1976);Lamberton(1989).565ACTC2956520/03/2006,04:18PM\nmarcozambonBeforestartingtointerpretatextareliableeditionwasneededandtheexegetehadtoansweraseriesofpreliminaryquestions:Wastheworkauthentic?Whatwasitsliterarygenre?Whowasitsintendedaudience?Whatproblemdiditattempttoan-21swer?Whatwastheauthor’saiminwritingit?TheMiddlePlatonistswereindebtedtothephilologicalworkoftheAlexandrianscholars,butevensotheyhadtoworkforalongtimetoestablishaproperorderforreadingPlato’sdialoguesandtoremovethespuriousworks.Amongthevariousorderings,Thrasyllus’tetralogicorderinggainedprimacyandisstilladoptedbymoderneditors;buteventhatwasnotunreservedly22acceptedbyeveryone.IfPlato’sdoctrineequalsthetruthitselfandthebestwaytoreachitistostudyPlato’sdialoguesandlearntointerpretthemcorrectly,thisrequireslongpracticeandagoodliteraryandscientificbackground.Thebestplaceforthisactivitywasaschool.Eventhoughtheterm“school”shouldnotbetakeninanarrowsense,wecancharacterizePlatonicphilosophyoftheImperialAgeasa“schoolphilosophy”ora“professor’sPlatonism”(Dörrie,1960,1966;Goulet-Cazé,1989),meaningbythisnottheexistenceofwidespreadinstitutionsoflearning,butratherthatmostofthephilosophersoftheperiodusedteachingmethodsintheirwritings.InspiredbytheeducationalmodelthatPlatohimselfhadoutlinedforthephilosopher-kingintheRepublic,theMiddlePlatonistsalsograduallydevelopeda“trainingplan”forphilosophers,whichincludedknowledgeofwhatwouldlaterbecalledthe“liberalarts”(I.Hadot,1984)andthestudyofaselectionofthemostimportantPlatonicdialoguesaccordingtoasystematicandpropaedeuticorder.AlbinusgivestestimonytothefactthatphilosophyteachersdisagreedaboutwhichPlatonicdialogueshouldbereadfirst;heproposedhisownreadingplanwhichheregardedassuitableforastudentoftherightage,withtherightskillsandboththedesiretoexercisevirtueandtheculturalpreparationnecessarytotakeontheseriousstudyofphilosophy.ThefirstdialoguetobereadistheFirstAlcibiades,becauseitremindsthestudentoftheimportanceofself-knowledge;thenthePhaedo,whichprovidesthemodelofthephilosophicstyleoflifeandoutlinestheessentialthemesofPlatonicphilosophy.ThenheshouldreadtheRepublic,whichinvestigatesandteachesvirtue,andfinallytheTimaeus,whichpresentsPlato’steachingonthedivineorderofthecosmosandthenatureofdivinereality(Alb.Intr.4–5,149.1–150.12Reis).Anotherreadingplan,similartothis,canbefoundintheso-called“canonofIamblichus,”alistoftendialoguescrownedbythetwoheldtobethemostimportant(TimaeusandParmenides).The“canon”isattributedtotheNeoplatonicphilosopherIamblichusbutcountsinalllikelihoodastheconsecrationinwrittenformofa21.Startingfromthissetofquestions,thepracticewasdeveloped,alreadyinMiddlePlatonism,ofprecedingthepropercommentarywithaseriesofpreliminarypoints;anexampleofintroduc-tionsofthistypeisAlbinus’IntroductiontoPlato’sdialogues.OnthissubjectseeMansfeld(1994),andinthisvolume,Hoffmann.22.Tarrant(1993);Festugière(1969);D.L.3.56–62;adifferentplanisproposedbyAlb.Intr.ch.3,explicitlycriticizingtheordergivenbyThrasyllus.SeePlatonismus(1990,§§47–8).566ACTC2956620/03/2006,04:18PM\nmiddleplatonism23practicethathadalreadybeeninuseforsometime.Itisnotpossibletoestablishwhethertherewasapreciseandrigidsuccessioninthereadingsofthedialoguesintheschools,norisitessentialtoourpurposes:rather,whatiswellestablishedandimportanthereisthatsuchaprogressionwasconsiderednecessaryandfullycon-sistentwiththeintentionsofPlatohimself.ContinuityorRuptureinthePlatonicTradition?OneofthemosttypicalfeaturesofPlatonismduringtheImperialAgeisthewide-spreadproductionofhistoriographicalandpolemicalworksthataimedatdefiningthe“school”ofPlato,tomarkitofffromotherschools.TheproblemofdefinitionwasfirstraisedwithinPlatonismitself.HadthedisciplesofPlatopreservedtheteachingsofthemasterandweretheirownteachingslegitimateinstrumentsfortheinterpretationofthedialogues?NoneofthesuccessorsofPlatointheAcademyhaddoubtedbeingalegitimateheirofPlato,eventhoughthedoctrinaldifferencesofthedisciplesconcern-ingthisorthatPlatonicdoctrinewereimportantrightfromthebeginning.AntiochusofAscalonbroughtuptheproblem,statingthatfromArcesilaustoPhiloofLarissatheskepticalorientationoftheAcademyhadcausedtheabandonmentofthegenuineteachingofPlatoandafractureinthetradition.Antiochusheld,there-fore,thatskepticismshouldbeabandonedandthatPlatonistsshouldreturntothetruePlatonicdoctrine,thatis,tothecorpusofhisdogmata(explicitdoctrines).Accord-ingtohim,whatAristotleandtheStoicshadtaughtcoincidedwithPlatonicteaching,albeitinamoreconfusedmanner.AlongwiththeproblemoftheunityandcontinuityoftheschoolofPlatotherewasalsothedebate,attimesheated,aboutAristotle.CouldhebeconsideredanauthenticdiscipleofPlatoornot?(Platonismus,1987,§10;1993,§84.)Thesewerenotjusthistoriographicissues.ThesolutionsgiventotheseproblemsinvolveddifferentinterpretationsofPlatonism.Plutarch,forexample,whobelievedintheunityandcontinuityoftheAcademy,heldapositionconsistentwithskepticism,emphasizingthelimitsofhumanknowledgewithregardtotherealityofthedivine24andtheorderofthecosmos.TheanonymousauthoroftheCommentaryontheTheaetetusalsostatedthattherehadbeennobreakinthetransmissionoftheteach-ingsofPlatobytheAcademy,becausethisteachinghadalwaysbeen,contrarytoappearances,dogmatic(Anon.InTht.54.38–55.13BastianiniandSedley).Numeniustookanopposingviewandthispositionbecametheprevailingone,eveninfluencingmodernhistoriographyontheskepticaltraditionoftheAcademy:theimmediatefollowersofPlato(Speusippus,Xenocrates,Polemon,andAristotle)hadalready23.ThecanonofIamblichusincludedtheAlcibiades,Gorgias,Phaedo,Cratylus,Theaetetus,Sophist,Politicus,Phaedrus,Symposium,Philebus.Itisinterestingtonotethatformanyofthedialoguesincludedinthecanon,wehavetestimonyoftheexistenceofcommentariesorotherexegeticworksalreadyinMiddlePlatonicauthors.Onthesubject,seePlatonismus(1990,§50).24.OnthepermanenceofskepticalthemesinPlatonismduringtheImperialAgeseeOpsomer(1998);Bonazzi(2003).567ACTC2956720/03/2006,04:18PM\nmarcozambonabandonedandbetrayedPlatonicteaching,damagingitsunity(Num.fr.24desPlaces=Eus.Praep.Evang.14.4–5).Thispositionhadacleartheoreticalmotivation:Plato,accordingtoNumenius,unifiedinhisteachingthewisdomofPythagorasandSoc-ratesandbuiltupadoctrinethatwasfullyconsistentwiththatofallpeoplesandtheancientwisemen.AfterPlatotherecouldbenootheroptionthanabsolutefaithful-nesstohisteachingortheabandonmentofthetruth.AnypositivedevelopmentwasheldbyNumeniustobe,toallintentsandpurposes,impossible.ThedissentaboutAristotlewasparticularlyacute.HisworkspresentedmuchmoresystematicandcompleteteachingsthanthePlatonicdialogues(aboveallhiswritingsonlogic,ourOrganon),aswellaspositionswhichwereopenlypolemicalagainstcrucialthemesofPlatonism.Some(Plutarch,Alcinous,theanonymouscommentatorontheTheaetetus)thoughttheycouldintegrate,atleastinpart,theteachingofAris-totlewiththatofPlato;others(Atticus,Lucius,Nicostratus,Numenius)vehementlyopposedthisattempt.ThefirstgroupheldthatAristotledidnotreallymodifyPlato,butmerelyexplainedanddevelopedwhatinthedialogueswassimplysketchedor25implied.Hisanti-Platonismwasexplainedintermsofmisunderstanding,pride,orthestudent’sdesiretodistinguishhimselffromhisteacher.AmongtheauthorswhoopposedinterpretationsofPlatothatreliedonAristoteliandoctrine,Atticusisnoteworthybecauseoftheviolenceofhisattack.InhistreatiseAgainstThoseWhoClaimtoInterpretPlatothroughAristotle,heclaimsthatAristotlehadabandonedtheteachingofPlatoregardingtheaimofphilosophy,theprovidenceofGod,thegenerationoftheworldandthenumberofelementsinthesensibleworld,theimmortalityofthesoulandideas(orForms).Quiteapartfromthedifferentsolutions,itisworthnotingthatboththepro-AristotelianPlatonistsandtheanti-AristotelianPlatonistsacceptedadoctrineastrueonlyiftheythoughtitwascoherentwiththeteachingofPlatoandatleastimplicitlycontainedinit.AnotherwidespreadideawasthatthetruthofthePlatonicdoctrineisconfirmedbyitsrootsinthedistantpast.NumeniusandCelsus,forexample,statedthatitwasinaccordancewithreligiousdoctrinesandancientwisdomnotonlyintheGreektraditionbutalsoinalltheancientandprominentcivilizations(Frede,1987,1994).26ThecontinuityestablishedbetweenthedoctrinesofPythagorasandPlato,aswellasthereferencetotravelsintheOrientandEgyptattributedtoPlatobyseveralsources,gavesupporttotheconvictionthattheknowledgethathumanityhadreceivedfromthegodsinancienttimeswassummedupinhim.BeingaPlatonistmeant,therefore,beingfaithfultoatraditionofwisdomofasacrednature,almosta25.ThetopicofthepresenceinPlatoofthedoctrineofcategoriesisdiscussedinPlut.Dean.procr.23(1023E);Alc.Didask.6.159.43ff.WhittakerandLouis;Anon.InTht.68.7–15BastianiniandSedley.26.Somepre-Plotinianauthors(Eudorus,Moderatus,Nicomachus,Numenius)arealsoknownas“neo-Pythagoreans,”becauseoftheirexplicitclaimofthedependenceofPlatoonPythagoras’steaching.TheirdoctrinesweredevelopedwithinthePlatonismoftheirera,eventhoughoften,bymeansofapocryphaltexts,theywereattributedtoPythagorasandhisdisciples.Thisisthecasewiththetreatisesofpseudo-TimaeusofLocri(ed.byBaltes)andpseudo-Archytas(ed.bySzlezák),whichaimedatattributingthedoctrinesofthePlatonicTimaeusandtheAristotelianCategoriestodisciplesofPythagoras.568ACTC2956820/03/2006,04:18PM\nmiddleplatonismrevelation,whichtracedback,throughSocrates,Pythagoras,Homer,Orpheus,thesagesandthelawgiversofotherpeoples(e.g.,ZoroasterandMoses),totheveryorigins27ofhumanity.CommonDoctrinalTopicsinMiddlePlatonismWhilebearinginmindthegreatvarietyofpositionsamongtheMiddlePlatonicauthorsevenonfundamentalissues,wecanindicateatleastsomelargethematicareasthatcharacterizetheirdoctrines.ComparedwiththeAcademictradition,thePlatonistsoftheImperialAgeshowamuchgreaterinterestintheology.Forinstance,allofthemaccepttheformulaoftheTheaetetus,accordingtowhichphilosophyaims28at“becomingsimilartoGod,asfaraspossible.”BecomingsimilartoGodwasconsideredpossiblebecauseitwasassumedthattherationalsoulwasofanaturehomogeneouswiththedivineandable,therefore,toraiseitselftothedivinelevelthroughaprocessofmoralpurificationandknowledge.Thiswaswhatphilosophywasforandthis,inthePlatonist’sview,amountedalsotothesupremegoodavailable29toman.AswesawinthedescriptionofthereadingorderofthePlatonicdialoguesproposedbyAlbinus,theidealpathofPlatonicphilosophystartedwithself-knowledgeasanimmortalsoulandculminatedintheknowledgeofthefirstprinciplesofreality,presentedintheTimaeus.ReadingtheTimaeusalsoprovidedatripartiteschemeoftheprinciplesthathadgreatcurrencyamongPlatonists,eventhoughitwasnottheonlyoneadopted.Followingthisscheme,theprinciplesofrealityarethedemiurge,ideasandmatter,oftenreinterpretedinAristoteliantermsastheefficient,formaland30materialcauseofreality.ThenatureandthemutualrelationsofthethreeprinciplesweredealtwithinverydifferentwaysbytheauthorspartlybecauseoftheconstantefforttowardstheharmonizationoftopicscomingfromthevariousPlatonicdialogues.Forinstance,intheTimaeustherewasarecognizabledoctrineofthreeprinciplesofreality,butthishadtofittogetherwithadualistictheory,basedontheoppositionbetweenintellectandnecessitystatedinTi.47e–48aandconfirmedbyLawsX,896d–e,whichmentions27.Platonismus(1990,§§64and69);Num.frr.1a–cdesPlaces=Eus.Praep.Evang.9.7.1;Orig.Cels.1.15;4.51;fr.8.13desPlaces=Eus.Praep.Evang.11.10.14;Orig.Cels.1.14.16;6.80;Lamberton(1989);Edwards(1990).28.Plat.Tht.176a–b;Ti.90d;Alb.Intr.5.150.10;6.151.4Reis;Alc.Didask.2.153.8–9;28.181.19–20WhittakerandLouis;Stob.2.7,3=2.49,8–10Wachsmuth.Eudoruswasthefirsttoadopttheformula“tobecomesimilartoGod”astheexpressionofthegoalofphilosophy;cf.Platonismus(1996,§102);Merki(1952).TheformulawasprobablycontrastedwiththeStoicconceptionoftheendofphilosophy:Anon.InTht.7.14–20BastianiniandSedley.29.Onassimilationtogod,seeBetegh,greekphilosophyandreligion;andcf.BrissonandPradeau,plotinus,inthisvolume.30.Ti.27c–29dandthetreatmentinAlc.Didask.8–10;Apul.DePlat.1.5.190–6.193;Platonismus(1996,§113.3).OntheAristoteliancauses,seeinthisvolumeBodnárandPellegrin,aristotle’sphysicsandcosmology,thesection“TheScienceofNaturalBeings.”569ACTC2956920/03/2006,04:18PM\nmarcozambontwosouls,onegoodandonebad,astheprinciplesofreality.Thussomeauthors,Plutarch,Atticus,andNumenius,forexample,superimposedadualisticschemeonthetripartitescheme.ThedemiurgeandtheparadigmwereidentifiedwiththegoodsouloftheLaws,whilematterwasidentifiedwiththebad,disorderedsoul:fromtheirmutualcombinationcameintobeingthecosmosandtheindividualsprovidedwith31rationalsoulsbutalsoinclinedtowardsevil.Ontheotherhand,theRepublicdescribedtheascenttowardsasingleintelligibleprinciple,theideaofGood,whichwasdeclaredtobethecauseofallthingsandplaced32“beyondbeingwithregardtodignityandpower”(Rep.VI,509b).Onthebasisofthisstatement,Numenius,Alcinous,theauthorsoftheOraclesandothersinvestigatedthetranscendenceofthefirstprincipleanddeniedthatitwaspossibletoreachtheknow-ledgeofitthroughthesamecognitivemeansusedtoknowotherthings(Num.fr.2.7–16,22–23desPlaces=Eus.Praep.Evang.11.21.7–22.2).ThispavedthewaytothecarefuldistinctionbetweentheOne-GoodandBeingdevelopedlateronbyPlotinusandhissuccessors,andanegativetheologyappearedsidebysidewiththepositivetheologyasanargumentforthecomprehensionofthe33natureofthefirstprinciple.IstheideaofGoodthereforeidenticaltothedemiurgeoftheTimaeusordoesitbelongtoadifferentlevelofreality?Mustweassumethatthereisonlyoneprincipleforthewholeofrealityorshouldweadmitthatthereareatleasttwo,orevenmore?AndwhatrelationshouldweadmitbetweenGood,thedemiurgeandtheDivineSoulthatPlatotalkedaboutintheLaws?If,accordingtothedefinitionintheSophist,thesoulistheprincipleofmovement,coulditbegeneratedafterthefirstprinciple–asaliteralreadingoftheTimaeuswouldseemtoimply–or,followingtheLaws,mustitbeconceivedasanoriginalprincipleonaparwiththedemiurge,theparadigmandmatter?TheMiddlePlatonicexegeteswerefacedwiththeseandmanyotherproblemsoncetheyhadaffirmed,astheydid,thatinallthedialoguesPlatohadexpoundedasinglecoherentdoctrine.Twoimportantdoctrinaldevelopmentsgobacktopre-PlotinianPlatonism:oneistheinterpretationofthePlatonicdemiurge,inthelightoftheSophistandofAristotle’stheology,asalivingintellectwhichcontainsinitselftheobjectofitsownthought,namely,theIdeas(Armstrong,1960;P.Hadot,1960).Theotheristheconceptionofthedivineasahierarchyofrealities,aconceptionwhichdistinguishesaprimarygod–theabsoluteprinciple–whichisimmobile,superiortobeing,andunknowable;asecondgod,ademiurgicintellectwhichcontainsideas;andsometimesathirdgod,theWorldSoul,whichistheprinciplethatgivesorderandlifetothesensibleworld.Thetheologicalschemearticulatedintotwoorthreegodswaslaidoutindifferentformsbytheauthorswhoadoptedit.ItsdevelopmentwasprobablylinkedtothediffusionofatheologicalinterpretationbothofthehypothesescontainedintheParmenidesandofa31.ThisisthedoctrinewhichPlutarchexpoundsinhisDeIsideetOsiride(e.g.,45.369B–D);alsoNum.fr.52desPlaces=Calc.InTi.295–299;Platonismus(1996,§121).32.OnthispassageseeBaltes(1997);Whittaker(1969).33.TheideaofthetranscendenceandunknowabilityofthefirstprinciplewasoftendiscussedstartingfromTi.28c,Ep.VII,341candPrm.142a;Nock(1962);Whittaker(1973,1978);Tarrant(1983);Arrhetos(2002).SeealsoBrissonandPradeau,inthisvolume.570ACTC2957020/03/2006,04:18PM\nmiddleplatonismpassageofthe(pseudo)-PlatonicEpistleII,whichmentions“threekings”aroundwhich34allthingsmove(312e).Theology,cosmology,andanthropologymadeupaninterconnectedsystemofprob-lemswhosesolutionswerelookedforinthePlatonicdialogues.Thiswasbynomeansaspeculativeexercise.Knowledgeoftheorderofbeingwasconsideredatthesametimetheconditionandtheeffectofawell-orderedandhappylifefromtheethicalpointofviewaswell.Itisinthiscloselinkbetweenknowledgeofthetruthandagoodlifethatwefind,eveninthePlatonismoftheImperialAge,apersistentawarenessofthepoliticalresponsibilityofthephilosopher.Platonicphilosophersthoughtitwastheirdutytoofferguidancetotheircontemporariesonindividualandcollectivevirtuousbehavior.Firstthiswasdonebypracticingandteachingphilosophy,butsomephilo-sopherswerealsomembersofthemagistratureorhadthefunctionsofpriestsatthelocallevel,asPlutarchdid;ortheywereinonewayoranotherintouchwithkingsandemperors,aswereLonginusandPlotinus.Therewasalsoapoliticalconcerninherentinthestruggleagainstthediffusionofmorerecentdoctrines,whichquestionedthesupremacyofPlatonicteaching,inpar-ticularintheanti-ChristianpolemicTrueStorybyCelsus(Andresen,1955).Celsus’oppositiontoChristianitywastherefusalofanoveltywhichwasnotrootedinthereligioustraditionsandwisdomofancientpeopleandwhichalteredthesubordinationofthesensibleworldtotheintelligible(theincarnationofGod’sWord,thebodilyresurrection),somethingwhichwasperceivedasathreattotheethicalandsocialorderonwhichthepeaceintheRomanEmpirewasgrounded.PlatonismasaSynthesisofAncientCultureThefirstcenturiesoftheEmpirewerecharacterizedbyalaboriousprocessoftrans-formationthatledPlatonicphilosophytopresentitselfasthecollectorandsynthesisofthewholeofthescientific,philosophical,sapiential,andreligiousheritageoftheGreekculture.Ahierarchicalandhighlystructuredconceptionofrealitybecamedominantintherepresentationofdivinereality,thenaturalworld,society,andknowledge.TheprimacyandthesacrednessofthefigureandwritingsofPlatoledeithertoaharshstrugglewithrivalauthorsandschoolsortoaconciliatoryattitudepronetoabsorbintoPlatonismdoctrinalcontributionsofthePeripateticandStoictraditionsandtheallegedPythagoreantradition.Thiscomplexworkofassimilationanddemarcationoftherespectiveidentitieswascarriedoutaboveallthroughthediscussionandinterpretationofthetexts.Theschool,thebooks,thelibrary,thedebate,andpublicspeechbecamethevehiclesforphilo-sophicaltrainingandtheexchangeofideas.Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatPlatonismbecamean“academic”disciplineinthemodernsense.ThePlatonistscon-tinuedtoadvocatephilosophynotjustasaformofthoughtbutalsoasawayoflife,whoseaimwastotransformmanandbringhimtothestyleoflifeforwhichhealonewassuited–lifeorientedtowardstheintelligible.34.Also[Plat.]Ep.VI,323d;Dodds(1928);Dörrie(1970).571ACTC2957120/03/2006,04:18PM\nmarcozambonThereligiousexperiencewasbynomeansisolatedfromthismovementtowardssynthesis.Therejectionoftraditionsseenasforeignorsubversive(Christianity,some-timesJudaism)wasaccompaniedbyanincreaseinthevaluegiventomythicalandritualheritage,notjustGreekbutalsobarbarian,interpretedasasymbolicandpartialexpressionofthesametruthtowhichPlato’sphilosophygaveitsall-embracingandfinalform.Inthelastresort,PlatonismitselfbecamewiththeChaldaeanOraclesinacertainsenseareligion,andPlatowasraisedtotheroleofadivinebeingwhorevealshisphilosophytoafewinitiates.BibliographySourcesAlbinusReis,B.(ed.).(1999).DerPlatonikerAlbinosundseinsogenannterPrologos.Prolegomena,Überlieferungsgeschichte,kritischeEditionundÜbersetzung.Wiesbaden:Reichert.AlcinousDillon,J.(1993).Alcinous,TheHandbookofPlatonism.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Whittaker,J.andLouis,P.(eds.).(1990).Alcinoos,EnseignementdesdoctrinesdePlaton.Paris:LesBellesLettres.Anon.InTht.Bastianini,G.andSedley,D.(eds.).(1995).CommentariuminPlatonisTheaetetum.InCorpusdeipapirifilosoficigrecielatini.Testielessiconeipapiridiculturagrecaelatina.PartIII:Commentari(pp.227–562).Florence:Olschki.AntiochusandPhiloMette,H.J.(1986–7).“PhilonvonLarisaundAntiochosvonAskalon.”Lustrum,28–29,9–63.AtticusdesPlaces,É.(ed.).(1977).Atticus,Fragments.Paris:LesBellesLettres.EudorusMazzarelli,C.(1985).“RaccoltaeintrepretazionedelletestimonianzeedeiframmentidelmedioplatonicoEudorodiAlessandria.Parteprima.Testoetraduzionedelletestimonianzeedeiframmentisicuri.”RivistadiFilosofianeo-scolastica,77,197–209.Mazzarelli,C.(1985).“RaccoltaeinterpretazionedelletestimonianzeedeiframmentidelmedioplatonicoEudorodiAlessandria.Parteseconda.Testoetraduzionedelletestimonianzenonsicure.”RivistadiFilosofianeo-scolastica,77,535–55.LonginusBrisson,L.andPatillon,M.(1994).“LonginusPlatonicusPhilosophusetPhilologus.I.LonginusPhilosophus.”InANRWII36.7(pp.5214–99).Berlin:deGruyter.“LonginusPhilologus.”InANRWII34.4,pp.3023–108.572ACTC2957220/03/2006,04:18PM\nmiddleplatonismMännlein-Robert,I.(2001).LonginPhilologeundPhilosoph.EineInterpretationdererhaltenenZeugnisse.München-Leipzig:K.G.Saur.NumeniusdesPlaces,É.(ed.).(1973).Numénius,Fragments.Paris:LesBellesLettres.Petty,R.D.(1993).TheFragmentsofNumenius.Text,TranslationandCommentary.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.ChaldaeanOraclesdesPlaces,É.(ed.).(1971).Oracleschaldaïques.Avecunchoixdecommentairesanciens.Paris:LesBellesLettres.Majercik,R.(1989).TheChaldaeanOracles.Text,TranslationandCommentary.Leiden:Brill.PlutarchPlutarch.(1962–76).Moralia.Variouseditors.15vols.LoebClassicalLibrary.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress/London:Heinemann.Pseudo-ArchytasSzlezák,T.A.(ed.).(1972).Pseudo-Archytas.ÜberdieKategorien.TextezurgriechischenAristoteles-Exegese.Berlin:deGruyter.Pseudo-TimaeusBaltes,M.(ed.).(1972).TimaiosLokros:überdieNaturdesKosmosundderSeele.Leiden:Brill.GeneralWorksandBibliographiesDeitz,L.(1987).BibliographieduplatonismeimpérialantérieuràPlotin:1926–1986.InANRWII36.1(pp.124–82).Berlin:deGruyter.Dillon,J.(1996).TheMiddlePlatonists.AStudyofPlatonism80B.C.toA.D.220.2ndedn.London:Duckworth.Donini,P.(1982).Lescuole,l’anima,l’impero:lafilosofiaanticadaAntiocoaPlotino.Torino:RosenbergandSellier.Festugière,A.-J.(1983).Larévèlationd’HermèsTrismégiste.(3vols.).Paris:LesBellesLettres.(Originalworkpublished1942–54).Gersh,S.(1986).MiddlePlatonismandNeoplatonism.TheLatinTradition.(2vols.).NotreDame,Ind.:UniversityofNotreDamePress.Krämer,H.J.(1964).DerUrsprungderGeistmetaphysik.UntersuchungenzurGeschichtedesPlatonismuszwischenPlatonundPlotin.Amsterdam:Schippers.Lilla,S.(1992).Introduzionealmedioplatonismo.Rome:InstitutumPatristicumAugustinianum.Merlan,P.(1967).“GreekPhilosophyfromPlatotoPlotinus.”InA.H.Armstrong(ed.),TheCambridgeHistoryofLaterGreekandEarlyMedievalPhilosophy(pp.11–132).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Moraux,P.(1984).DerAristotelismusbeidenGriechen.VonAndronikosbisAlexandervonAphrodisias.(vol.2):DerAristotelismusimI.undII.Jh.n.Chr.Berlin:deGruyter.SpecialStudiesAndresen,C.(1955).LogosundNomos.DiePolemikdesKelsoswiderdasChristentum.Berlin:deGruyter.573ACTC2957320/03/2006,04:18PM\nmarcozambonArmstrong,A.H.(1960).“TheBackgroundoftheDoctrine‘ThatIntelligiblesarenotOutsidetheIntellect.’”InLessourcesdePlotin.Dixexposésetdiscussions(pp.391–413).Geneva:FondationHardt.Arrhetos(2002).ArrhetosTheos.L’ineffabilitàdelprimoprincipionelmedioplatonismo(F.Calabi,ed.).Pisa:EdizioniETS.Baltes,M.(1976).DieWeltentstehungdesplatonischenTimaiosnachdenantikenInterpreten.Part1.Leiden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practicedamongthePersiansandthatwhichflourishedamongtheIndians”(Plot.3.15–17).Attheageof38,Plotinuscouldnotbeararms;hejoinedtheEmperor’scourt,probablyatAntioch,andstayedthereforperhapsayear.OpposedbyPhilip,GordiandiedatZaithathefollowingyear.PlotinushurriedlyleftthecourtandreturnedtoRome,wherehesettledpermanently.Heopenedaschoolthere,prob-ablyin246.IfwecanbelievePorphyry,Plotinusthentaught,publishingnowritingsatall,fortenyears.PlotinusbegantowritehistreatisesinthecourseofthefirstyearofthereignofGallienus,attheageof49.Nineyearslater,hehadwrittenalmosthalfhisworks.SuchisthetestimonyofPorphyry,whohavingarrivedatRomein263,notes:“Now,beginningwiththefirstyearofthereignofGallienus,Plotinuswasledtodealinwritingwiththesubjectsthatcameup,andinthetenthyearofthereignofGallienus,whenforthefirsttimeI,Porphyry,wasallowedtomakehisacquaint-ance,hewoundupwritingtwenty-onebooks”(4.9–13).Porphyrythenliststhese21treatises,specifyingtheplaceheassignedtotheminthesix“ninths”(enneadasinGreek),orthemesintowhichhiseditiondividesthetotalityofthePlotiniantreatises.3PorphyrycametoRomeprobablyfromAthens,wherehehadstudiedwithLonginus.DuringthefiveyearsinwhichPorphyryfollowedPlotinus’instruction,from263to268,Plotinuswrote24treatises(22to45).Beforelistingthem,Porphyryclaimstohaveinfluencedhisteacher’sproduction:“[A]ndIbroughttheMasterhimselftomakeapointofmarkingthearticulationsofhisdoctrine,andtowritethemmoreextensively”(Plot.18.21–22).PorphyrydoesnothesitatetoaddthatthebestofthePlotiniantreatisesarethose“theMaster”wrotebetween263and268,whenhisfaithfuldisciplewasbyhisside.Howeverunencumberedbyhumilityitmaybe,Porphyry’stestimonyattestsagenuinediffusionofPlotinus’writings,whichseemtohavecirculatedineducatedcircles.Thetreatiseswerereadanddiscussed,andpolemicswereengagedwithadversariesfromoutsidetheschool.In265,LonginuspublishedatreatiseentitledOntheEnd;byLonginusinAnswertoPlotinusandGentilianusAmelius,andatthetimeheseemstohavepossessedalmostallPlotinus’writings.Alsoaround265,PorphyryreportsthatPlotinuswasaccusedby“peoplewhocamefromGreece”ofplagiarizingNumenius.CopiesofhistreatiseswerethereforeincirculationatAthens.In268,theemperorGallienuswasassassinated,andClaudiussucceededhim.ThisturnofeventsnodoubthadimmediaterepercussionsonPlotinus’school,whichwasundertheprotectionofGallienus’wifeSaloninaandsomeofherassociates.In269,Amelius,Plotinus’otherclosedisciple,leftRomeforApameainSyria.Inthesameyear,Plotinus,whowasgravelyill,withdrewtoCampania.Hediedtherethefollow-ingyear,probablyfromtuberculosis.In269and270,hewrotehislastninetreatises,whichhesenttoPorphyry(treatises46to54).3.OnLonginus,seePatillonandBrisson(2001).578ACTC3057820/03/2006,04:19PM\nplotinusPlotinusasHeadofaSchoolThephilosophytowhichPlotinusdevotedhimselfwasawayoflifethatcouldcertainlynotbereducedtoteachingorwritingtreatises.Asheadofhisschool,Plotinuswasaguide,whoinstructedandgovernedacommunitythatconsistedofyoungpeopletheretoreceiveaneducation,well-offadultswhocametobeinstructed,philosophersandscholarswhowereattractedbytheMaster’srenownorbytheirinterestinthedebatesthatoccupiedhisschool.Withinthiscommunity,instructionwascoordinatedwithspiritualexercises,butitwasalsoassociatedwithreligiouspractice,andcivicinstruction,sothatthestudent’slifewascompletelyinvolved.Plotinuswasregardedasamodel,whoseexistence,asmuchashisdoctrine,servedtoinstructandedifythosewhofollowedhim.ItwasfromthisperspectivethatPorphyrywrotehisLifeofPlotinus,manyofwhoseanecdotesandsayingsthusservedtoempha-sizethedegreeofperfectionPlotinushadachieved.Porphyry’sbiographyveryoftencomesclosetohagiography,becauseitseekstomaintainthememoryofthevirtuesdemonstratedbyPlotinus’workandpersona.AccordingtoPorphyry,Plotinusthusincarnatedtoperfectionthehighestspiritualdemandsofhisowndoctrine;hehadachievedwhat,accordingtohisowntreatises,thesoulshouldachieve:unionwiththeIntellect.Thestoryofthe“ecstasies,”throughwhichhissoulwasdeliveredfromeverythingtounitewiththeintellect,thusbearswitnesstotheaptitudeofeverysoul,ifitiswillingtoundergoakindofspiritualtraining(askEsis),tofindwithinitselftheintelligiblethatisitstruenature,andtheIntellectthatisitsprinciple,and,ultimatelythepsychicpowertoturntowardstheOne,firstprincipleofallthings.Plotinus’TreatisesintheEnneadsPlotinusdidnotwritetheEnneads.Thedivisionofhisworkinto54treatisesis,aswehavesaid,theworkofPorphyry.WhenPorphyrypublishedhisLifeofPlotinus,hecertainlyintendedtoedifyhisreaderonthelifeandteachingofhisMaster,butalsotopresentandjustifyhisorderededitionofhiswritings:“Thus,ouraccountofthelifeofPlotinusisfinished.Now,sincehehimselfconfidedtousthecareofensuringtheorderingandthecorrectnessofhisbooks,andwhenhewasalive,Ipromisedhimtodischargethistask,andIalsoundertookthiscommitmentbeforetheothercom-panions,firstofallIhavethoughtitwellnottoleavethesebookswhichhadbeenproducedpell-mellinchronologicalorder”(Plot.24.1–6).Thiswasagenuineeditorialtask:Porphyryhadrevisedthetextswhichhadbeencirculatedwithintheschool,inorder“toaddpunctuationtothemandcorrectthemistakesthatmayhaveslippedintotheexpression”(26.37–39);hegaveeachtextatitle,andheappearstohavetakentheinitiativetocombinecertaintextsortodivideothers,soastoachievetheexact4distributionoffifty-fourtreatisesinsixEnneads.PorphyrythuscomposedsixEnneads,4.Thetotalof54isnotfortuitous.Porphyrymanifestsaprecisearithmologicalconcern,whichischaracteristicofneo-Pythagoreanspeculations:54istheproductofsix(theperfect579ACTC3057920/03/2006,04:19PM\nlucbrissonandjean-françoispradeauandgroupedthemintothreevolumes:inthefirstvolume,containingthefirstthreeEnneads,Porphyrycollectedtheethical,physical,andcosmologicaltreatises;inasec-ondvolume,containingthefourthandfifthEnneads,thetreatisesconcerningthesoulandtheintellect;finally,thelastvolumecorrespondstothesixthEnnead,whichisdevotedtotheOne.Thiscomposition,whichobeysarigorousnumericalcombination,servesaped-agogicalproject:readingthetreatises,inthisorder,issupposedtoeducatePlotinus’reader,byleadinghimfromthemostcommonethicalquestionstothemostarduousdoctrinaldifficulties.Yetthisorderisnotsimplydoctrinalorscholarly.Theorderisaboveall“psychagogic”–thatis,itaimstoleadthesouloftheattentivereadertoexcellence.Ethicalandphysicalquestionsarethusconceivedasakindofpreliminarypurification,whichteachesthereaderthenecessityofrecognizingwhatheisinhimself:asoul,morecloselyrelatedtothedivineandintelligiblerealitiestowhichitbelongsthantothebodiesorexternalpossessionstowhichitisonlypartiallyandprovisionallyattached.ToreadPlotinusisnotmerelytolearnadoctrine;itistodiscoverourselvesandtobecomebetter,tolearntoseparateourselvesfromthesens-ibleworld,untilfinally,assimilatedtotheintelligible,weareabletocontemplatetheOne,principleofallthings(seeesp.P.Hadot,[1966],1999,p.318).APlatonicCommentatorinaStoicWorldThewholeofPlotinus’workpresentsitselfasonevastcommentary.ThetreatisesfromwhichPorphyrycomposedtheEnneadstirelesslyrepeatthatphilosophyhasalreadytakenplace.Thetruthisknown;itwasconceivedandsetforthbyPlato,morethansixcenturiespreviously.ThisiswhythespiritualexperiencetowhichPlotinusandthenhiseditorPorphyryinvitedtheirreadersassumedtheformofameditationonthePlatonicdialogues.Forus,thewayPlotinusconstantlyappealstotheauthorityofPlatolookslikeadisconcertingdevotiontotheletterofthetext.Yetifweweretostophere,wewouldperhapsmisswhatundertakingacommentaryimpliedforaNeoplatonicauthor.Hewasfullyawareofthedifficulties,ambiguities,andeventhelacunaeofPlato’stext;nevertheless,despiteorperhapsbecauseofthedifficulties,heheldthisworktobethesurestguidethereis.IfPlato’stextis“true,”itisaboveallbecauseitcangivemeaningtohumanexistenceandguideittowardstheperfectionitcanachieve.ToreadthePlatonicdialogues,andabovealltoreadtheminacertainorder,meanttodefine,inordertoadopt,thepathofself-transformation.Thus,muchmorethanasummaofschooldogmastowhichonehadtopledgeallegiance,readingthedialoguesprovedtobethebestmeansandsurestpathforthesoul’sascenttowardstheprinciplenumber,productofthefirstevennumber,two,andthefirstoddnumber,three)andofnine(thesquareofthefirstoddnumber).Porphyrydividedthetreatisessoastoobtainthisnumber.HemaintainsthatPlotinushimselfclassifiedhistreatises,butthedispositionofthefinaleditionseemstobeentirelyPorphyry’sinitiative.Thequestionisstilldebatedofwhethertheprevious“chronological”editionofthetreatiseswasorwasnottheworkofEustochiusorAmelius.Inthispresentation,weshallrefertothechronologicalorderratherthanthesystematicPorphyrianorderoftheEnneads.580ACTC3058020/03/2006,04:19PM\nplotinusfromwhichitoriginated.Onlyassociatingwiththisprinciplecouldensurethesoulgenuinehappiness.Plotinus’questionshaveatwofoldcontext:theimmediatecontextofhisteaching,andthemoreextendedcontextofelaboratingaphilosophicaldoctrinewithinaGreekandRomancultureunderStoicinfluence.Inthecontextofhisschool,Plotinushadtoguideandinspirehisdisciples,byexaminingwiththemquestionsofimportanceandurgency:whatexactlyistherealityinwhichwelive?How,andtowhatend,isthewholeuniverseordered?Whatisourrightfulplacewithinit,andhowcanwebestconductourlives?Eachofthesegeneralquestionscallsforitsshareofanalyses,andonlyiftheseareallcarriedoutcanadoctrinedemonstrateitsphilosophicalper-tinence.Itmust,forinstance,beabletosayexactlywhatthesoulandthebodyare,ofwhichweseemtobecomposed;or,again,howoursoulisapartoftheworlditseekstoknow;orhowitcameforthfromthedivinetowhichitcanassimilateitself.Fromthisviewpoint,thephilosophicalquestionstowhichthetreatisesaredevotedhadalreadybeenagreeduponforcenturies;asPlotinusrepeats,theyareasoldasthemasterworksofPlato.Whatismore,theyhadbeenfaced,evenearlierbyhismostillustriouspredecessors:thePythagoreans,Empedocles,Heraclitus,Parmenides,Anaxagoras,andothers.Thus,philosophy’svocationwasnomoretoreflectonitsreasonforbeingthantofindmotivesortosearchforobjects;allthishadbeengiventoitlongago.However,theresponseswereworthyofdiscussion;allthemoresobecausethird-centurylearnedculturewassodiverse.Thephilosophicallandscapeoflateantiquityhadlosttheclearcontoursitpossessedatthebeginningofthethirdcenturybce,whenthePlatonic,Aristotelian,Stoic,andEpicureanschools,whichhadallbeenrecentlyinstituted,differentiatedthemselvesandconfrontedeachotherwithoutdoctrinalaffiliationsbeingretrospectivelyconfusedorsuspected.Twoorthreecenturieslater,however,forreasonstodobothwiththegeographicalextensionofphilosophicalculture,themultiplicationofinstitutions,andthelocalitiesofteachingintheGreekandRomanworld,andalsowiththeprogressiveconstitutionofacommonphilo-sophicalcultureinthenewMediterraneanempire,doctrinesbecameinextricablymixed.FromtheHellenisticperiodtothecenturyofPlotinus,scholarlyanddoctrinalencountersandcombinationshadbeenpossibleonlythankstothefavorandculturaldiffusionofStoicism,which,formanycenturies,imposeditsconceptuallanguageanditsrepresentationoftheworlduponthephilosophicalspeculationsoftheGreeksandRomans.Thus,thequestionsinheritedfromthephilosophersofthefifthandfourthcenturiesbce,could,inPlotinus’time,beexaminedonlyifonetookastandaboutStoicteachings,whetheronewishedtocarrythemfurther,occasionallymodifyingandcorrectingthem,ortorefutethem,inordertolinkuponceagainwithPlato.AseachofPlotinus’treatisesrecallsinitsownway,todealwithanygivensubjectwastosaywhat“they”thinkaboutit,andhow“they”nameanddefineit,before,eventually,showinghowonemustobjecttothem.LongbeforePlotinus,PlatonistshadbeenreadingandcommentingonthePlatonicworkswithStoictoolsandcategoriesofanalysis,sothattheirobjectionsanddoctrinalinitiativeswere,moreoftenthannot,formulatedwithinthelimitsandintheverylanguageofthiscommonStoicculturetheyweretryingtoescape.581ACTC3058120/03/2006,04:19PM\nlucbrissonandjean-françoispradeauSomeDoctrinalElementsAtthebeginningofthesecondcenturyce,Platonismexperiencedaveritable“Renais-sance,”theconditionsandimplicationsofwhichwerephilosophicalasmuchasreli-gious.CharacteristicofthisrenaissancewasthatitseemedtoariseintheverymidstofStoicism,likeadissatisfactiondenouncingthatdoctrine’sinabilitytoachieveitsowngoals,whetherinthefieldofunderstandingreality,thenatureofthings,ortheacquisitionofwisdomandvirtue.Withinafewgenerations,this“MiddlePlatonic”traditionhademancipateditselfanddevelopedsufficientlytopresentaphilosophicalandculturalalternativetotheStoicRomanempire,yetalsosufficientlyforMiddlePlatonismitselftoexperienceprofoundperturbations(seeZambon,middleplatonism,inthisvolume).Attheturnofthesecond–thirdcenturies,bydintofaconsiderablerevisioninthepracticeofreadingPlato,anewPlatonichermeneutictraditionwasborn,whichwascalled“Neoplatonism”;forus,thefirstandprincipalrepresentativeofthismovementwasPlotinus.PlotinusisdistinguishedfromhisPlatonicpredecessorsnotonlybythecontextofhisquestionsandtheparticularformofhistreatises.Hisworkisdifferentiatedaboveallbyspecificdoctrinalmodifications.Firstofall,itbreakswithseveralofthereligiousattitudesrelatedtotheMiddlePlatonictraditionofthesecondcentury.Plotinusrejectstheurgyandislittleinclined,andindeedfranklyhostile,toGnosticreligiousinflu-ences.Healsodiscreditsmostastrologicalteachings,ashedoesallirrationalritualpractices,whichhedenouncesasphilosophicalorscientificerrors.Next,relyingontheStoicphilosophicalculturethatwasstillcurrentinhistime,PlotinusrenouncesthehighlyambiguousMiddlePlatonisthypothesisofadivinedualityofprinciples,inordertodefendtheworld’sunityandcoherence,andtheuniqueorderofallthings.Withthisgoalinmind,hehadtocompletelyrevisethecurrentlydominantinterpreta-tionoftheTimaeus,which,formorethantwocenturies,hadbeenthedialogueof5referenceforthePlatonists.Astheprincipleofallthings,theMiddlePlatonistspostu-latedagodmingledtogetherwithhisownintellect,adivineIntellectthinkingwithinitselftheintelligibleFormsthataretherealitiesandparadigmsofallthings,adivinitythatabandonedthetaskofproducingallsensiblethingstothecelestialintellect(theintellectoftheworldsoul).PlotinusrenouncesthisconceptionoftheprincipleswhenherefusestoaccordtherankoffirstprincipletotheIntellect;andbyrenouncingithe6inauguratestheNeoplatonictradition.Inverybriefsummary,Plotinus’argumentisasfollows:theIntellect(nous),liketheintelligibleFormsthatareinseparablefromit,cannotbethefirstprinciple,northefirstactivity.Noussuffersfromduality,sinceitisthoughtwhichthinksitselfandalsothinksamultiplicityofintelligibleformswithinitself.Soitmusthaveasimpleandprimarycause:“thereissomethingbeyondtheIntellect,”Plotinusrepeatedlyclaims.Thethen-dominantreadingoftheTimaeusaccountsforthis“something”only5.OntheTimaeusitself,seeBrisson,plato’snaturalphilosophyandmetaphysics,inthisvolume.6.OnthemainfiguresafterPlotinus,seeinthisvolumeHoffmann,whatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?582ACTC3058220/03/2006,04:19PM\nplotinusimperfectly,andtheexplanationforithadtobesoughtinadialogueotherthantheTimaeus:theParmenides,whichdealswith“theOne,”asabsolutelysimpleandbeyondallthings.ThefirsthypothesisofthesecondpartoftheParmenides,at137c–142a,supposestheexistenceofaOnewithoutparts,andwithoutbeginning,bereftofallqualitythatmightmultiplyit,bereftofallfigure,situatedinnoplace,andwithoutmotion.PlotinusintendstousethisPlatonichypothesistodesignatethefirstprinciplemoreappropriately,asthatwhichissimple,consequentlylackingallquality(andtherefore“ineffable”),andthecauseofallthings;itisthecauseofalltherealitiesthat7comeforthfromitinsuccession.Plato’sParmenidesthusbecame,andwastoremainforalltherepresentativesofNeoplatonism,thedialogueofreferenceofPlatonicex-egesis.Itwasunanimouslypresentedasanexplanationofthewayinwhichallthingsgoforthfrom“theFirst.”ThestructureofPlotiniandoctrineisthussituatedatthecrossroadsoftheMiddlePlatonicreading,orratherrevision,oftheTimaeus,andofanunprecedenteduseoftheParmenides.InTreatise10,OntheThreeHypostasesThatHavetheRankofPrinciples,Plotinusex-plainsinafewlines(V.1[10],8.1–27)thewayhehimselfconceivedofhisphilosophicalsituationandproject.PresentinghimselfasanexegeteofPlato,heclaimstobecon-cernedtosetforthaPlatonicdoctrinethatthedialoguescontainimplicitly.Incontrasttohispredecessors,therefore,PlotinusnolongerreliesonlyontheTimaeus,butfindstheprinciplesofhisexegesisintheParmenides,aswellastheultimatelyadequatedescriptionofwhatis,inhisview,thecauseofallthings:theOne.WithregardtotheOne,PlotinusfollowstheParmenides(137cff.),whichdevelopsalltheconsequencesofthehypothesisthattheOneexists.IfwewishtopreservetheunityoftheOne,wecannotattributeanythingtoit:itisbydefinitionwithoutpredicates.AssoonasweaffirmthattheOneissuch-and-suchathing,orthatitpossessessuch-and-suchaquality,weaddanattributetoit,and“multiply”it.WemustthereforereachthedisconcertingconclusionthatwecannotevensaythattheOneexists,sincethatwouldbeequivalenttoattributingbeingtoit,orthepredicate“existence.”Tospeakaboutit(thatis,tosayanythingotherthan“One”–buteventhisistoomuch,sincewearegivingitaname)isalwaystoaddsomethingtoit.Thus,wemustconclude“thatofitthereisnonameordefinition.Ofitthereisneithersciencenorsensationnoropinion”(142a).TheOne,then,asPlotinusoftenrepeats,isineffablesimplicity;thatofwhichwecansaynothingandtowhichwecanattributenothingwithoutadulteratingit.Outofwhatremained,inthePlatonicParmenides,aprovisionalandaporetichypothesis(soonreplacedbyanotherhypothesisconcerningtheOnethatexists),Plotinuschosetomaketheverydefinitionoftheprinciplefromwhichthewholeofrealityproceeds:despiteitsineffablesimplicity,theOneisthecauseofallthings.Inaddition,ifonetakesaninterestinthefollowingPlatonichypotheses,thisuseoftheParmenidesallowsthenamingoftwomodesofbeing,orrather,since“being”isoneof8thesetworealities,twootherrealitiesthatpossessexistence.Threethingsexist:those7.Thesimpleispriortoallthatismultipleorcomposite.O’Meara(1992)hasdevotedalucidchaptertowhathecallsthePlotinian“PPS”(PrincipleofthePriorityoftheSimple).8.Here,theterm“existence”renderstheGreekhupostasis,ofwhichPlotinusmakesatech-nicaluse.Nevertheless,ashasbeenshownbyDörrie([1955]1976),inPlotinusthistermdoes583ACTC3058320/03/2006,04:19PM\nlucbrissonandjean-françoispradeauthree“first”realitiescorrespondingtowhatPlotinusconsiderstheobjectofthefirst9threehypothesesoftheParmenides,andwhichexhaustthetotalityofthereal.Itisthenuptothetreatisestosaywhatiscoveredbyeachofthesethreerealitieswhichhaveanexistenceor“hypostasis,”andtounderstandhowtheyarerelatedtoeachother.ThisispreciselyPlotinus’goalinTreatise10,andhecertainlydoesnotconfinehimself,bywayofPlatonicsources,totheParmenidesalone,butinsteadmakesofthisdialoguethenewmatrixfromwhichitbecomespossibletorereadtheTimaeus,andalsotheRepublic–that,too,isare-castingofMiddlePlatonism.Theconceptualtools,lan-guage,andargumentsheusestoachievethisendarenotsimplythoseofPlato,anymorethantheyareexclusivelyStoic.Plotinusforgeshisdoctrinebydrawinguponvariousscholarlysources,andinhistreatisehecombinesStoicquestionsorargumentswith10anextremelydeftmasteryofthecategoriesandterminologyofAristotle.“Therearethreethings,”saysPlotinus,thatarecalled“principles”and“genuinerealities”becausetheyalonehavearealexistence,or“hypostasis.”Thefirstprincipleis,simply,theOne,thenfollowstheIntellect(whichisalsobeingandlife),andfinally11theSoul.Itisfromthesethreeprimordialrealitiesthatanexplanationofallthingsispossible.Asfarastheirnatureisconcerned,Plotinusgivessufficientlycoherentdefinitionsofthethreerealitiesforustobeabletopresentthembrieflyasfollows,beginningwiththecauseofallthings:theOne,whichistheFirst.TheOneAlthoughhisdiscourseontheOnemarksthebreakwithMiddlePlatonism,inaug-uratingNeoplatonism,PlotinusdoesnotcontenthimselfmerelywithaddingacausenothavethemeaningitwastohaveinPorphyry(wherethehypostaseswouldhenceforthbedistinctandhierarchizedlevelsofreality).Ratherthanbeingahypostasis,Plotinusspeaksofthethreeprincipalrealitiesaspossessinganhypostasis,orrealexistence(see,amongothers,Enn.4V.9[5],5.46orIV.7[2],8.26,whichexplainshowthesoul“receives”anhypostasis).Inthissense,hupostasisisasynonymforousia(thereality,or“essence”ofathing),butwithasubjectiveandsubstrativeconnotation,whichpartlyexplainsitstranslationbyLatinwriters(substantia).9.ThesearerespectivelyPrm.137c–142a,142b–155e,and155e–157b.10.PlotinusoftenusesAristoteliantechnicalvocabulary,whetherheborrowsitfromtheAristotelianworksorfromthediscussionofcommentatorsonAristotle(forinstance,PlotinusseemstoknowthecommentariesofAlexanderofAphrodisiaswell).ItisfromAristotlethatheforgestheessentialpartofhisdescriptionoftheIntellectthatthinksitself,anditisalsoonthebasisofAristotelianconceptsthathedescribestheprincipalmodalitiesofrelationthatlinkthevariousrealitiesamongthemselves;thus,therelationofactualityandpotentialityenableshimtoshowthattherealitythatprecedesitsproductisalwaysmoreactivethanit;elsewhere,therelationofformandmatterenableshimtoestablishthateachrealityinformswhatitproduces.11.Inthestrictsense,theOnethatprecedesandcausesallexistencehasnoexistenceitself;tosupposethatithas,ortospeakofa“reality”initscase,isthuscontrarytothehypothesisofitsabsolutesimplicity.Plotinusrunsintothisdifficultyseveraltimes,particularlyinEnn.VI.8[39],7.47,whereheuneasilyacceptsa“quasi-existenceoftheOne”(hEhoionhupostasisautou).584ACTC3058420/03/2006,04:19PM\nplotinusofthedivineIntellectthatwashispredecessors’ultimateprinciple.Heattributestothisrealitycharacteristicsthatareunprecedented,bothinthePlatonictraditionandinGreekthoughtasawhole:theOneisthatwhichengendersallthingswithoutbeingengenderedbyanythingelse–orrather,inaveryparticularsense,itengendersitselfinallthings.Thissingularhypothesisofaprinciplewhichproceedsfromitself,some-thingwhichthoughtcannevergrasp,receivesvariedexplanationsinthetreatises,whicharesometimesdifficulttoharmonize.YetPlotinusisawareofthisdifficulty,allthemoresobecauseitseemstohiminevitablethattheOne,orwhatisimperfectlynamed“theOne,”ispreciselyaprincipleofwhichthereisnopossibleknowledge:neithertheIntellectwhichtheOneengenders,norafortioritheSoulwhichtheIntel-lectengenders,cangraspbyreflexiveorintellectiveactivityapowerthatescapesall12objectivegrasp.TheOneisabsolutepower,bothunlimitedandsimple.Theonlypossibleperceptionofitiscomprehensive,intheparticularsensethatitisbyunifyingthemselves,andre-discoveringwithinthemselvestheunityfromwhichtheyproceed,thattheIntellectandtheSoulwillbeabletounitewiththeOneaswiththeirgood.Inotherwords,theOneisneverknownbyandinsomethingotherthanitself,asthefirstpowerorthefirstcauseofexistenceandgoodness,andofthebeautyofallithasengendered.ThemostgeneralofthedifficultiesconcerningthestatusoftheOneis,then,thefollowing:howcanthis“one”orthis“First,”fromwhichabsolutelyevery-thingproceeds,andwhichisthegoalofallthings,neverthelessremaindistinctandimmobilewithinitself,inautarchicperfection?Intellect,Being,LifePlotinusfaithfullymaintainstheMiddlePlatonicaxiomaccordingtowhichthe13“intelligibles,”orForms,arenotoutsidetheIntellectthatthinksthem.YetitistheidentificationoftheIntellectwithbeingandlifeandinturnthehypothesisthatthereexistsaprinciplebeyondbeingthatcomplicatethestatusofthissecondreality,andgiveititsproperlyPlotinianaspect.Adiscussionofbeingassuch,henceforthhypostatized,mustbeengaged;forthefactthatbeingisnotthewholeofreality(sincethereistheOne),andthatbeing,therefore,cannotbedistinguishedfromthesubjectthatthinksit,modifiestheclassicalschemeofancienttheoriesofknowledge.Thequestionisnolongersomuchtoknowhowasubjectofknowledge(soulorintellect)knowsanobject(ofthegenusofbeing,a“being”),buthowthefirstprinciple–theOne–engendersonesinglethingwhichisbeingitsintellection.ForPlotinusisnolongercontent,likehisPlatonicorAristotelianpredecessors,toaffirmthatthe12.ThisisinsisteduponparticularlyatEnn.VI.9[9],6.10–15:“Itmustalsobeadmittedthatitisinfinite,notbecauseitsmagnitudeoritsnumbercannotbemeasured,butbecauseoftheboundlessnessofitspower.ForifyouthinkofitasanIntellectoragod,itismorethanthat;again,ifyouunifyitbyreason,thereagainitismorethanwhatyoucanimagineofit,becauseithasmoreunitythanyourthoughtofit;foritisbyitself,andwithoutanyattribute.”13.Thus,amongotherpassages:“Trulyexistentthings,assuch,eachoneofthem,thethingsthattrulyare(taalEthOsonta),arelocatedinthe‘intelligibleplace’”(Enn.V.6[24],6.14–15).585ACTC3058520/03/2006,04:19PM\nlucbrissonandjean-françoispradeau14intellecthasthetotalityofbeingasitsobjectofthought,noreventhateverythingthatexiststhinksinacertainway;buthemaintainsthatIntellectandbeingareoneandthesamething,andthattheIntellectnotonlythinksbeing,butthatitisbeing.HefurtheraffirmsthattheintelligibleForms,whichconstitutetheIntellectasan“intel-ligibleworld,”are,properlyspeaking,theonlyrealitiesthereare.Thus,thePlotiniantreatisesconceivethedistinctionof“twoworlds,”intelligibleandsensible,explainingthatwhatcomesaftertheOneisnotsomuchasimplereality,ortheproductofauniqueagent,asamultiplicity,thatoftheintelligibletotalitythatPlato’sTimaeusnamedthe“intelligiblelivingbeing”(30a–c).NotonlyaretheintelligibleFormsthetruerealities,orbeings,buttheyareinaddi-tiontheonlygenuinelivingthings:theIntellectislife.“Ifwearecorrect,itfollowsnecessarilythatbeingisalive,andthatitliveswithalifethatisperfect”(Enn.III.6[26],6.15–16).Inotherwords,intelligiblebeingisnotdevoidoflife,whichmightbethoughttobeamerepropertyofsensibleandcorporealthings,oronethatonlyappearswithmatter.Onthecontrary,theintelligibleislifeitself,sincesensiblelifeisonlyanimperfect,provisional,andindeterminateimageofit.Theintelligible,notmatter,istheprincipleofalldevelopment,allmovement,andalldetermination.FollowingtheMiddlePlatonistsandcontrarytotheStoics,PlotinusmaintainsthatReality(ousia)isincorporeal.Yetthereismore:bychoosingtoidentifythoughtwithawayofbeingandawayoflife,orwithrealityandlifethemselves,Plotinuscanalsoaffirmthatintellectiveactivityisnothingotherthantheunfoldingoflifeintherealmofbeing.Intellectionisthevitaldeploymentofbeing;itisthegenerationortheproductionoflife.Stoicvitalismhasnotbeensentpacking,buthasbeenassimilatedbythePlotinianintelligibleinsuchawaythatonemay,liketheStoics,saythatallthatexistslivesbyvirtueofthesamelife;andthatthislifeistheimmanentdynamicprinciplebywhichtheworlditselfdeterminesitselforsetsitselfinorder–withtheaddition,however,thatthisvitaldeterminationowesnothingtobodiesortomatter,foritisintelligible.TheSoulBecauseitisengenderedbytheIntellect,andisnevercompletelyseparatedfromit,theSoulisstillpartoftheintelligible.Yetinsofarasitisagenuinereality,possessinganexistence,itisalsoaproductivepower,anditengenderssomething.Soulisthecauseofthesensible,andthecauseoftheexistenceandcontinuityofthesensibleworld,whichisanimageoftheintelligibleworld.Again,Soul,insofarasitisitselfintelligible,guaranteesitssensibleproductacertainparticipationingoodnessandinbeauty,andintherationalityoftheintelligible.Ultimately,however,insofarasSoulinformsandanimatesthesensible,therebyexercisingademiurgicfunction,itis,toitsowndetriment,incontactwiththepureindeterminacyofmatter.Exceptfora“part”ofitselfwhichremainsattachedtotheIntellect,andisintheintelligible,Soulislinkedtothebodyitanimates.AsattestedbytheveryfirstPlotiniantreatises,Soul’s14.Whatismeanthereisthatdivineintellectisthehighestbeingandidenticalwiththeobjectofitsthought.586ACTC3058620/03/2006,04:19PM\nplotinusroleandmodeofbeingareambiguous:PlotinussaysthatSoulhastwolives,thatitis“amphibious”andwindsup“falling”orplungingintothesensibleworldithasengendered.Theseareamongthemaindoctrinaldifficultiesofthesystem.Inthefirstinstance,thisistruesinceallsoulsarenotincarnatedequally:inparticular,wemustdistin-guishthesouloftheworld,whichanimatesaperfectandincorruptiblebody,fromthesoulsofliving,changingindividuals,ceaselesslyaffectedandmortal.Theformerissodifferentfromthelatterthatwearejustifiedinwonderingwhethertheyhavethesame15nature.Anotherdifficultyisthatsoul,asanintelligiblereality,takescareofbodieswhichexistlocallyandtemporallyapartfromoneanother,sincesoulsseemtobecome“separate”fromoneanotherwhentheycomedownintothesensible.Plotinusmustthenprovethatsoulsstayrelated,thattheyare“sisters”whichallremainonesinglereality,andthattheyallexercise,byrightifnotinfact,thesamefunctions.HeapplieshimselftothesolutionofthesedifficultiesinthegreattreatiseOntheSoul(IV.3–5[27–29]).ThebriefTreatise21,HowitisSaidthattheSoulisIntermediaryBetweenIndivisibleRealityandDivisibleReality,hadalreadypointedoutthattheonlywaysuchdifficultiescouldbesolvedwasbyadmittingthat:“Itisintheintelligiblethatgenuinereality(hEalEthinEousia)isfound;theIntellectiswhatisbestinit,butsoulsarealsowithinit,fortheycomeherefromabove.Theintelligibleworldcontainssoulswithoutbodies,sincethisworldcontainssoulsthathavecometobeinbodies,andhavebeendistributedamongthem”(IV.1[21],1.1–4).Althoughthesoulrepresentstheendoftheintelligibleprocession,sincenogenuinerealityexistsafterit,thisdoesnotmeanthatwithitwereachthevoid,ornot-being.Thereissomethingotherthantheintelligible:bodiesthatconsistofmatter,andlivingbeings(humans,forinstance)thatarecombinationsoftheintelligibleandthesensible,yetwhichstillparticipateinbeing,viathesoul.Itisthereforeatthelevelofthesoul,orratheratthelimitittracesbetweenthetwo“worlds,”thattheclassicPlatonicproblemofparticipationisraised16onceagain.Thesesuccinctremindersofwhatthethreerealitiesmightbecannowbecompletedbyasummaryofwhatisrequiredbytheirmutualrelations.InthechapterwehavealreadycitedfromTreatise10,Plotinusmentionsakindofsuccession:firstthereistheOne,thentheIntellectwhich“comesfromtheOne,”andfinallytheSoulwhich,initsturn,comesfromtheIntellect.Here,asthroughoutPlotinus’works,therelationsbetweenthethreerealitiesarecharacterizedbybothexteriorityandtemporalsuccession.Theyaredistinct,andtheyderivefromoneanother.Moderncommentatorsspeakof“procession”todesignatethisprocessofsuccessivegenerations.IfSoulproceedsfromtheIntellect,whichproceedsfromtheOne(which,foritspart,proceedsonlyfromitself),thenwemustclassifythethreerealitiesorprincipleshierarchically,accordingtotheircausalprimacy:theOnecomes15.ThisisoneofthenumerousquestionsanddifficultiesencounteredbythePlotiniandoctrineofthesoul;themostsuggestivestudyonthissubjectremainsBlumenthal(1971).16.Thisproblemofparticipationispartiallydealtwithbymeansofthedoctrineofthelogos:PlotinushypothesizesthatitisnottheSoulitselfthatisindirectcontactwithmatter,butratherthatsomethingofitself,“reasons”or“rationalformulas”–thatis,FormsattheleveloftheSoul–informmatter.Onthisquestion,seemostrecentlytheexplanationsbyBrisson(1999).587ACTC3058720/03/2006,04:19PM\nlucbrissonandjean-françoispradeaufirst,theIntellectsecond,andtheSoulthird.Thisisperhapstheonlyaspectoftheirmutualrelationsthatcanbeappreciatedappropriately;thetwocharacteristicspointedoutabove(exteriorityoftheprinciples,andtheirchronologicalsuccession)areonlyapproximations.AsPlotinusoftenrepeats,wecannotconceivethatthethreeprin-ciplesbegantoexistonagivenday,orthattheirengenderinginvolvesachronologicalsuccessivegeneration,likeabiologicallineage.Similarly,wemustnotbelievethatthesethreerealitiesexistseparatelyfromoneanother,asiftheyeachhadaplace(whichwouldhardlymakesense,sincetheyareincorporeal),orasiftheywerenotinsideoneanother,astheyare.However,despitethefalsenessofsuchrepresentations,Plotinusconstantlyhasrecoursetothem;otherwise,hesays,wecannotspeak.Yetsuchalocalandchrono-logicalrepresentationisnotwithoutvalue,sinceitenablesthedesignationofmostofthediversemutualrelationsoftheprinciples,whicharethushierarchicallyandlocallydistinguishedbysuccessivedegreesofdescentorascent,equivalenttodegreesofperfection.TheOneisabovetheIntellect,whichisabovetheSoul,whichisabovethesensible,intowhichitdescends.TheSoulaspiresonlytorisebackupinitsentiretytotheintelligible,whentheIntellectdirectsitsgazetowardstheOne.Thishierarchicalandverticalrepresentationofrealities,althoughitisthemostcommoninthetreatises,isneverthelessnottheonlyonePlotinususes.AlthoughhespeaksmostoftenoftheIntellectasbeing“above”theSouland“below”theOne,orofprocessionasa“descent,”andofcontemplationasanascent,Plotinusalsousesacircularmetaphorofencompassmentorofcentripetalgravitation,inwhichtheOneisthecenterencompassedbytheIntellect;initsturn,theIntellectissurroundedbytheSoul,whichrotatesaroundit.Thisisindicated,amongotherpassages,bythefollowingimportantpassagefromTreatise28(IV.4[28],16.23–31),OnDifficultiesConcerningtheSoulII.Here,inanimagewhichcouldclearlynotberepresentedbyaverticalstacking,Plotinusmaintainsthateachprincipleorrealityencompassesthatfromwhichitproceeds;andthisrealitythenbecomesthecenteraroundwhichithovers.Plotinusaffirmsthatrealitydoesnotleavebehindthatfromwhichitproceeds,butiseternallyturnedtowardsitscauseoritsprogenitor,whichitalsosomehowcontains.CircularinclusionisthereforeamuchbetterimagethanverticalgenealogyofamajorhypothesisofPlotiniandoctrine:allisinall,andeachreality“possessesallthings.”Inparticular,thismeansthattheIntellect,andeventheOne,areinthe17Soul.InthetenthchapterofTreatise10,Plotinusshowsthattherelationbetweenrealitiesisnotoneofexteriorityorlocalseparation,butthat“justasthesethreerealit-iesareinthenatureofthings,wemustconsiderthattheyarealsoinus”(Enn.V.1[10],10.5–7).Hence,ofcourse,thehumansoulhasthepossibilityofcontemplating,17.Thisalsomeansthattheintelligibleis,toacertainextent,inthesensible,andPlotinusspecifiesthatthesensibleworldrotatesaroundtherealworld,whichistheintelligible:Enn.VI.4[22],2.Treatises22and23demonstratetheuniversalimmanenceoftheintelligibleinthesensible,despitetheirseparation:whatisabove(ekei)neverthelessremains,inasense,presentdownhere(entautha).Inthesameway,wemustadmitthattheIntellect,althoughitdoesnot“belong”toit,isstill“in”theSoul,asismaintainedatEnn.V.3[49],3.588ACTC3058820/03/2006,04:19PM\nplotinusrediscovering,andunitingwiththeprinciplethatengenderedit,withoutseekingitoutsideitself.Again,themetaphorofcircularinclusionexpressesratherwellthatthesecondandthirdrealities–IntellectandSoul–haveadoublenature.Aroundaper-fectlystablecenter,theIntellectalreadyincludesashareofmultiplicity:thatofacirclemadeupofparts.Inturn,theSoulcontainsamultiplicity,anditislinkedtothat“outside,”or“other”intelligenceconstitutedbythesensible(asisindicatedinthequotedtextbythementionof“bodies”).YethowevermultipletheIntellectmaybe,orhowevermobileandlinkedtothesensibletheSoulmaybe,bothofthemneverthelesspossesstheOne,whichisboth18theirobjectofcontemplationandsomethingofthemselves,ortheirpossession.Thismutualbelongingofrealitiesisaccentuatedbytheircommonexerciseofcertainfunctions.Asweshallsee,eachofthethreerealitiesengenderssomethingrelatedtoit,withoutbeingidenticaltoit.Eachoneproducesorilluminates,dominates,andtakescareofwhatithasproduced;ontheotherhand,eachrealitydesireswhatisaboveit,contemplatesit,andstrivestoimitateit.Yettheseactivities,whichconstitutethefirststepsinthedirectionofthe“descent”oftheOnetowardstheSoul,andthesecondstepsofits“reascent,”areneverthelessnotdissociable.Anothercharacteristichypo-thesisofthePlotiniantreatisesisthattheydonotsimplymaintain,astheMiddlePla-tonistsdid,thatoneprincipleproducesanotherbeneathit,bytakingtheprecedingprincipleasamodel,butthatthiscontemplationisitselfproductioninanimmediatesense.Infact,theyareoneandthesameactivity:tocontemplateistoseektoimitatetherealityfromwhichagivenrealityproceeds,andsuchimitationisproduction.Thus,onthebasisofthesemetaphysicalprinciples,Plotinussetsanentireworldinorder,andtherelationslinkingthethreeprinciplestogetherprovideacommonfoundationforthephysicsandtheethicsthetreatisesseektoelaborate.Thearchitec-tureofintelligiblerealityerectedbythePlotiniantreatisescertainlyproposestoresolvethequestionsanddifficultieswhichtheclassicalphilosophicaldoctrines,essentiallythoseofPlato,Aristotle,andtheStoics,hadconfronted.Thesedifficultieswereofbothaphysicalandethicalnature,andwemustunderstandthatthePlotiniansystemofthethreeprincipleswasforgedinordertosolvethem.TheOrganizationoftheUniversePlotinus’doctrinesinthefieldofphysicsmustbere-situatedwithinthecontextofpolemicsthathavetheiroriginintheOldAcademy.AgainstPlato’sTimaeus,Aristotledevelopedacriticismwhichwouldsubsequentlybewidelyacceptedinphilosophy.Theworldwasnolongeranartificialobject,producedbyademiurge,butanaturalbeingthatlivesandpossessestheprincipleofitsbehaviorwithinitself.Thisinternalprinciple,whosenameis“nature”(phusis)(seePhys.II.1,192b1–24),maybecon-sideredfromthepointofviewofform,andfromthatofmatter.Nature,escapingall18.Thisisrecalledinthecontextofanethicalargument,inchapter44ofEnn.IV.4[28],wherePlotinussaysthatthesagedoesnotseekanillusorygoodthingoutsidehimself,but,onthecontrary,heknowsthattheonlytrulygoodthingis“thatwhichhepossesses”theOne(viatheIntellect,withwhichtheSoulisunited).589ACTC3058920/03/2006,04:19PM\nlucbrissonandjean-françoispradeaucontingencyandallintermittence,proceedseconomicallylikeagoodsteward,which,19amongallpossibilities,alwaysproduceswhatisbest(Cael.II.5,288a2).TheStoicswentevenfurtheralongthispathandextendedthenotionofnature,whichforAristotleappliestoindividualthingswithintheuniverse,toacosmicnatureoftheuniverse,byproposingagrandiosevisionoftheuniverseasadivine,livingunity,organizedaccordingtorationallawsandgovernedinitsleastdetailsbyPro-vidence.Asthebasisoftheirphysics,theypostulatetwoprinciples:onehasonlythecapacitytobeaffected:matter(hulE),lackingalldetermination,allmovement,andallinitiative.Theotherhastheabilitytoact,andcontributesform,quality,andmove-menttomatter.Thissecondprincipleis“reason”(logos).Nothingintheuniverseis“this”or“that”;nothingcanevenbecalled“this”or“that,”withoutthepresenceofthisprincipleindependentofmatter.Insuchacontext,thelogoscanalsoreceivethename“god,”foritsactionmakesit,asitwere,theartisanoftheuniverse,butanartisanwhoseartresidesinalltheproductionsofnature.Bytakingthedemandforthedeterminationofmattertoitslimit,Stoicismfounditselfforcedtorecognizethecauseofthemostelementaryphysicalcharacteristicsinthelogosalone,correspondingtothefourelements(fire,air,earth,andwater),andtotheircombinationinsensiblethings.ThisiswhywemayspeakofStoic“corporealism”:theactionoflogosonmatterandbodiesremainsamaterial,corporealactivity.ThisactiveprincipleofthelogosalsohasaphysicalnamefortheStoics:“fire.”Itisnotconcretefire,butonewhichunitesallitspowers.Itisanenergy,andtheotherthreeelements(air,water,andearth),cor-respondtothethreestatesinwhichitcanbefound:gaseous,liquid,andsolid.Again,thisfireisknownasthelogos,identifiedwithgod,canalsobeidentifiedasanigneousbreath,ortheomnipresentpneuma.Inallthepartsoftheworldpenetratedandinformedbypneuma,fire,whichishot,isassociatedwithexpansion,andair,whichiscold,withcontraction.Thisoscillation,whichanimatesallbodiesandensurestheircohesion,iscalled“tension”(tonos),andthistensionisdiversifiedaccordingtotheregionsoftheuniverse.Itassumesthenameof“constitution,”of“holding,”orof“maintenance”(hexis)withininanimatesolids;of“growth”(phusis)inplants,andof“soul”(psuchE)inanimals(SVF2.1013=S.E.M9.78).Inallthesecases,however,its20functionistounifythetotalityofbodies,especiallyincludingtheuniverse.Facedbythishighlycoherentdoctrine,PlotinusexpresseshisfaithfulnesstoPlatonismbyarticulatinghisthoughtaroundthree“hypostases”(theOne,Intellect/Intelligible,andSoulashypostasis),which,althoughthereisnothingcorporealaboutthem,neverthelessrepresentthehighestlevelsofreality.Forthisreason,realitycan-notbereducedtothecorporeal,astheStoicswouldhaveit.TheSoulcontainsthelogoiwhich,withintheSoul,areequivalenttotheForms;moreprecisely,thelogoiaretheFormsontheleveloftheSoul.TheSouldependscausallyontheIntellect,foritisthroughtheintermediaryoftheIntellectthattheOneproducestheSoul.Similarly,theIntellect,whichinawayisresponsiblefortheproductionofthesensibleworld,throughtheintermediaryoftheSoul,cannotbeheldresponsibleforthemannerinwhichthesoulgovernstheworld.19.Cf.BodnárandPellegrin,aristotle’sphysicsandcosmology,inthisvolume,whichdiscussthenaturesofindividualthingswithinthecosmos,notofthecosmosasawhole.20.ThisparagraphsummarizesmaterialinBrunschwig,1997,pp.534–48.590ACTC3059020/03/2006,04:19PM\nplotinusAtthislevel,wearenolongerdealingwiththeSoulconsideredasahypostasis,but21withsoulsinthesensibleworld:thatis,theworldSoulandthesoulsofindividuals.ForalthoughPlotinusinsistsontheunityoftheSoul,theworldSoulandthesoulsofindividualsarenotpartofthatSoulsituatedabovethem;theyareimagesofit.TheworldSouldiffersfromtheindividual’ssoulbecausethebodyitproducesandanim-atesisbetterthanthehumanbody,andaboveall,itdoesnothavetheproblemsthattroublehumansouls,andeventhoseofanimals–althoughPlotinus,whobelievedinmetempsychosis(seeDeuse,1983)wasalsointerestedinanimalsouls.Beneathbodies,whoseconstitutivefoundation,asitwere,itrepresents,ismatter,22whichaccordingtoallindications,emanatesfromtheinferiorpartofthesoul.Thishypothesishasconsiderableethicalconsequences.ByidentifyingtheOnewiththeprimaryGood,andmatterwithevil,PlotinusisobligedtoexplainhowtheGoodseemsnecessarilytoengenderEvil.Thisisaquestiontowhichthetreatisesconstantlyreturn,toelaborateanddeepenanethicaldoctrinewhosemajorargumentisthatofaliberationandareturn,ora“conversion”(epistrophE).HerePlotinusacceptswithoutargumentAristotle’scriticism,which,accordingtohim,isdirectednotattheTimaeus,butatafalseinterpretationofthedialogue.He23takeshisdistancefromthe“craftsman”metaphorPlatouseswhenhedepictsademiurgewhofabricatessensiblethingswhilekeepinghisgazefixedontheintelligibleforms.SincePlotinusrejectstheactionofademiurgeworkinglikeanartisanoranartist,heisledtoconfertheroleofanagent,organizingmatterandenablingtheappearanceofbodies,upontheSoulthatanimatestheworld.HetherebyseemstoinclinetowardsStoicmaterialism.Yet,toavoidfallingintoabsoluteimmanencethatdeniestheseparationoftheOne,theIntellect,andtheSoul–thatis,thethreehypo-stases–heundertakestoemphasizetheroleoftheIntellectandtheIntelligible,byshowingthateventhehypostasisSoul,towhichtheworldSoulandtheindividualsoulsareattached,isnottheabsoluteprinciple,butderivesfromasuperiorprinciple,theIntellect.TheIntellectmaybethoughttoresembleademiurgewhocontemplatestheIntelligible,yetwithouteitherdeliberatingorworking.Plotinus(Enn.III.2[47],2.8–24)explainshowouruniverseisalivingbeing,madeupofmatterandform.Itsexistencecomesaboutbecausematterinitstotalityhasreceivedform,whichprevailsoveritsorganization.However,inordertoorganizematterwiththehelpofForms,anagentisneeded.Inthecaseoftheuniverse,whichisnotatechnicalworkresultingfromart,butaproductionofnature,thisagentisnotanartisanorartistwhodeliberates,calculates,andworks,butthesoulthatinformsmatter,imposingtheformoftheirorganizationuponthefourelements(fire,air,water,andearth).Inthistext,wefindthesketchofacritiqueofartisanalandartisticproduction.Suchproductiondependsonapowerthatisnotpresentinthecraftsman,butoutsideofhim,becausehemustlearntheartorthetechniquehepractices.Fromthisitfollowsthatproductionintheseareasiscontingentandintermittent.Moreover,21.Withinthisgroup,wemustrangethesoulsofgods,daemons,humanbeings,animals,andeventhoseofplants.22.Controversyonthissubjectpersists.AgainstCorrigan(1986),O’Brien(1991,1993,1999)believesmatteremanates.Narbonne(1993)upholdsamuchmorenuancedposition.23.AsPlotinusregardsit.591ACTC3059120/03/2006,04:19PM\nlucbrissonandjean-françoispradeausuchproductionimpliesreasoninganddeliberation.Asaresult,thefabricatedobjectmusthaveanoriginwithintime,andconsequentlyitmustbesubjecttodestruction.Now,asfarasthefabricationoftheuniverseisconcerned,contingency,generation,andcorruptioncannotbeaccepted;thisexplainsrecoursetothelogoi.24Tobeabletoorganizematter,inordertoproducethesensibleuniverse,theSoulincorporatesintelligibleorganizationasitcontemplatesit.Yetdoesn’tthisconclusionpresupposethatthenaturalproductioncarriedoutbytheSoulissubjecttothesameconditionsasartificialproduction,asintheTimaeus?Doesn’titbringusbacktothe“craftsman”viewpoint,thatPlotinuswishedtosetaside?Doesn’tobligingtheSoultocontemplateatranscendentmodelmeanassimilatingitsactiontothatofanartisanorartist?Tobesure,anartisanorartistcouldnotimposeformuponmatterwithoutconceiv-ingthisformbeforehand,or,moreprecisely,withoutreceivingitinthought.Theplanconceivedbyanarchitectisnotacreationofhisfantasy.Itrespondstospecificdemands,anditimposesitselfuponhisreflectionlikeanecessityindependentofhim.Toinsistontheseparatecharacterofintelligibleorganization,andontherealityofthismodel,meansrecognizingtheauthorityofsuchdemands.Yet,ifintelligibleorganiza-tionandtheFormsaresituatedoutsidethethoughtofthecraftsman,andifhehimselfisnottheirauthor,butmusthavereceivedthem,aretheyalsooutsidetheworldSoul?WhycouldthisSoulnotbetheplaceoftheintelligibles,anddiscoverthemwithinitself?ToobligethesoultocontemplatetheintelligibleorganizationintheIntellect,andtointegrateitwithinitself–Isthisnotequivalent,ifnottodissolvingtheSoul,at2526leasttoassimilatingittotheIntellect,andturningitintoitsinstrument?Thesequestionsshouldbeansweredasfollows:first,itisnotnecessaryfortheSoultoperceivetheFormsofthingswithinittodistinguishnaturalproductionfromartificial.TheSoul’sorganizingactivity,althoughitpresupposesthecontemplationoftheForms,retainstheprivilegeofextendingtouniversality,therebyexcludingthedeliberationandcalculationsrequiredforparticularproductions.Consequently,itiseasytounderstandwhytheintelligibleorganization,uponwhichtheSoul’sactivityismodeled,wasnottobefoundwithinitself,atleastnotinthesameway.Indeed,thenotionofthelogosappearspreciselyinordertosafeguardthisseparation;forthesoulexercisesitssecondfunction,thatoforganization,throughtheintermediaryofthelogoi.AtEnn.IV.3[27],10.10–42,Plotinusexplainshow,accordingtohim,theuniverseisproduced.Theuniversemaybecomparedtoaworkofart,butonewhichisnotproducedfromoutside,byanartisanoranartist,asitwasbythedemiurgeoftheTimaeus.Instead,itisproducedfromwithin,bythatorganizingpowerofNature.Itis27ratherasifapieceofmarbleweretogiveitselftheformoftheVenusdeMilo.24.FirstthehypostasisSoul,thentheSouloftheworld,andfinallyalltheotherparticularsouls.25.AtEnn.II.9[33],1.56,itissaidthattheSoulintelligizes(noei),andatEnn.VI.9[9],5.11–12thattheIntellectisfoundwithintheSoul.26.SoulissometimesconsideredastheenergeiaoftheIntellect,whichrepresentsousia;butousiaisnottobeseparatedfromitsenergeia.27.SeeSVF2.1044=AlexanderofAphrodisias,Demixt.225.18ff.Bruns.592ACTC3059220/03/2006,04:19PM\nplotinusYetwhatisNature?ItisapowerthatcorrespondstothelowestpartoftheworldSoul,thepartwhichcomesintocontactwithmatter.Theorganizationtowhichitsubmitsmatterresultsfromtheactionofrationalformulaswhich,withinthehypo-stasisSoul,correspondtotheintelligibleForms.Theseformulasareinastateofdis-persion,andnotsimultaneously,liketheintelligibleformsintheIntellect.BecausetheworldSoulusestheserationalformulasthatexistwithinitinaninferiormode,itisabletoorganizemattersoastobringallbodiesintobeing:bothanimate,forinstance,ahorseoraplane-tree,andinanimate,forinstance,astone.Fromthisperspective,wecansaythatthesensibleuniverseisanimageofalltherationalformulastheworldSoulpossesses.Atthislowerlevel,Plotinusestablishedaveryinterestingdistinctionbetweentheactionofthesoulingeneral,andthatofthebody.Bothseektorenderotherrealitiessimilartothemselves,asafunctionoftherationalformulaseachcontains;butwhereasthesoulisalwaysawake,thebodyisawakeonlyintermittently.Woodtransmitsheatonlywhenitburns,whereasthesoulperpetuallymaintainslifewithinlivingbeings.Plotinus’entireprojectistoexplainhowthesensibleisimpreg-natedbytheintelligible,whichtherebymakesitbeautiful.Fromtheoutset,theoppositionbetweennature(phusis)andartortechnology(technE)preventsPlotinusfromawardingtechnicalproductsandworksofartfirstplaceintheareaofbeauty,forthefollowingfourreasons:1.ForPlotinus,theprocessthatexplainstheconstitutionoftheuniverseis,so28tospeak,spontaneous,withoutanydeliberation,reasoning,orcalculation.Incontrast,artistsandartisansaresubjecttouncertainty.Theyneedtoreflect,whichisequivalenttoaninabilitytobeself-sufficient:“FortoneedcalculationwouldbetodiminishtheIntellect’scapacitytobesufficientuntoitself;asinthearts,wherecalculationisappropriateforartistsindifficultsituations,whereasintheabsenceofdifficulties,artisthemaster,anditdoesitsjob”(Enn.IV.3[27],18.3–4).2.Inordertoproduce,artistsandartisansdependonknowledge,theacquisitionofwhichcomesfromoutside,andischaracterizedbycontingency.3.Artistsusetheirhandsandinstruments,whichatleastimpliesthatnaturehas29comebeforethem.4.Sincetheobjectstheyproduceimitatenature,theyarenotonlybereftoflife,butalsoofthatinternalpower(dunamis)whicheveninanimateobjectspossess.ThisiswhyPlotinusspeaksofindistinctandstrengthlessimitations(amudrakaiasthenEmimEmata),andassimilatesthemtotoys(paignia),despitealltheskillsartistsusefortheirfabrication.TheGoalsoftheHumanSoulInthetraditionofthephilosophicalproblemdiscussedbyPlato–particularlyintheRepublic,wherethecardinalvirtuesmoderation,courage,wisdom,andjusticeare28.Enn.IV.3[27],10.14–17and26–27;V.8[31],7.2–44and12.21–22;II.9[33],4.12–16and12.17–18;VI.7[38],1.28–43;III.2[47],1.1–19.29.Enn.IV.3[27],10.16–17;V.8[31],7.10–12;II.9[33],12.17–18.593ACTC3059320/03/2006,04:19PM\nlucbrissonandjean-françoispradeauenumeratedanddefined–byAristotle,andbytheStoics,Plotinus,inhistreatiseOnVirtues(Enn.I.2[19]),showshowtheethicalpositionsdefendedbyAristotelianism,Stoicism,andPlatonismarecontainedwithinoneanother,soastoformakindofsystem.Plotinusbeginsbymentioningthecivicvirtues–thatis,thoseofthecitizen,corres-pondingtothoseemphasizedbyAristotelianism,whichconsistinimposingmeasureondesiresandpassions.Thecivicvirtuesarevirtuesofapracticalnature,andconcernactionandactivity,orwhatisinaccordorconformitywithnature,intheStoicsense30oftherationallaw.Theyimplyarationalappreciationoftheduties(kathEkonta,aStoicterm)peoplefaceintheireverydaylife.Inotherwords,thesevirtuesconcernthe31soulwhichmustliveinabody,andinsociety.Inthisworld,thesoulsuffersfromtwoevils:unionwithinferiorthings,andtheexcessivenatureofthisunion.Whereasthecivicvirtuescurepeopleofexcesses,thepurificatoryvirtuesallowthemtoreducethesoul’sunionwithinferiorrealitiestoaminimum.WearethenourselvesinaStoiccontext,wherethepurificatoryvirtuesconsistindetachingoneselffromthingsinthesensibleworld,inabstainingfromactionsaccomplishedtogetherwiththebody,andinrefusingtoshareitspassions;thus,thesevirtuesareidentifiedwithpurification.Theybelongtothesoulthatdis-tancesitselffromthebody,inordertodirectitselftowardstruebeing;thatis,towardstheintelligible.Thus,theideahereisofprogresstowardscontemplation,understoodinthePlatonicsenseofthecontemplationoftheintelligible.Thepurificatoryvirtuesbelongtothehumansoul–thatis,tothesoulunitedtothebody.Weacquiretheminthislife,andtheirgoaliscompletelytofreethesoulfromthepassionswhichsofarhad32onlybeengivenameasure.Theirgoalisassimilationtogod–aPlatonicformula.Thedispositioncorrespondingtothesevirtuesisimpassibility(apatheia).Atthissecondlevel,thesoul,notcontentwithimposingalimitandmeasureonthepassions,under-takestofreeitselffromthemcompletely.Thepurificatoryvirtuesconsistindetachingthesoul,asfaraspossible,fromthebody.Ofcourse,thisliberationisonthelevelofjudgment,anddoesnotleadtorealimpassibility.Onlydeathcouldleadtothatcom-pleteimpassibilityequivalenttototalliberation.Yetthereisaparadoxhere:forinordertocontemplate,onemustlive.Thisiswhyhewhopracticesthevirtuescanonlymakeprogresstowardsthisstateofperfection;andthisprogressearnshimthenameofdaimOn,abeingsituatedbetweenthehumanbeing,whoisspoudaioswhenhepracticesthecivicvirtues,andthedivinity,whichthepractitionerofthecontemplat-ivevirtuesassimilates.ForaPlatonist,purificationmustnotbesoughtforitself,butinordertoenablecontemplation.Whereasthecivicvirtuesdeliverthesoulfromthefirstformofevil–thatis,excessivepassions–thepurificatoryvirtuesdeliveritfromthesecondformofevil,whichconsistsforitinunitingwithinferiorthings.Thecivicvirtuesruleourrelationswiththethingsinthisworld,whereasthepurificatoryvirtuesputanendtotheserelations.Thecontemplativevirtuesbelongtothepersonwhoisalreadycontemplative,andwhosesoulhenceforthcontemplatestheintelligible.Unlikethe30.Onthistopic,seeBett,stoicethics,inthisvolume.31.Onthepoliticalimplications,seeBrown,hellenisticcosmopolitanism,inthisvolume,esp.thesectionontheStoics.32.Onthisimportanttopic,cf.Betegh,greekphilosophyandreligion,inthisvolume.594ACTC3059420/03/2006,04:19PM\nplotinusprecedingvirtues,whichindicatedaneffortorprogress,thecontemplativevirtuesareatrest.Theyarethevirtuesofthesoulactingintellectually;forthesoulonlyknowswhatiswithinitbyturningtowardstheintellect.Thesoulpossessesknowledgewithinitself,whichitmustsomehowrememberinthecontextoftheprocessofrecollection.Beforeevenconsideringthisthirdkindofvirtue,Plotinussaysthatthedispositionthatfollowsfromthecontemplativevirtuesmanifestsitselfintheabsenceofpassions,sinceitsgoalisassimilationtogod.Thegoalofthesevirtuesis,therefore,thatoneactwithoutthethoughtofdetachingoneselffromthepassionsevenenteringone’smind.Thepersonwhoisabletoactaccordingtothesevirtuesaloneisagod(theos).Withthesevirtues,theprocessofpurificationreachesitsfullestachievement.Thesoulthatiscompletelyturnedtowardstheintellectnolongerexperiencesanyaffections,butgivesitselfoverentirelytocontemplation.ForaPlatonist,itisindispensablethatvirtuecanbepursuedtothislevel,sinceitconsecratesthere-discoveredunitybetweensoulandintellectthatcorrespondstotheintelligibleworld.Theidealofassimilationtogodistherebyrealized.Bymeansofthepurificatoryvirtues,thepurifiedsouluniteswithwhatengenderedit,theIntellect,whichisindissociablefromtheintelligible.Thisunionfollowsuponthesoul’sconversiontowardsitsprinciple;yetinitthesoulisnolongerasoul,butcoincideswiththeintellect.Hencetheparticularlyambivalentstatusofthesevirtues,whicharenolongervirtuesinthepropersenseoftheterm,butare,sotospeak,models(paradeigmata)ofvirtue.Inthelongrun,fortrulydivineandphilosophicalsouls,contemplationmustbeaccomplishedinunion,andthevirtueswillhenceforthbeonlythememoryofapaththathasledthesoultoassimilateitselftoitsprinciple,todispossessitselfofitself,andunitewiththeIntellect,andtobecome,likeit,“agathoeidEs,”orsimilartotheGood.Thepathtowardshumanexcellencethustakesontheappearanceofareturn,asifoursoulssomehowhadtotravelapathoppositetotheonethatgavebirthtoallthings.Theymustfreethemselvesfromthebody,risebackuptotheintel-ligible,andfinallyunitewithit,inordertoturntowardsthatfromwhichtheycame33forth:theOne.BibliographyWorksCitedBlumenthal,H.(1971).Plotinus’Psychology.HisDoctrinesoftheEmbodiedSoul.LaHaye:Nijhoff.Brisson,L.(1999).“LogosetlogoichezPlotin.Leurnatureetleurrôle.”LesCahiersPhilosophiquesdeStrasbourg,8,87–108.——.Goulet-Cazé,M.O.,Goulet,R.,andO’Brien,D.(1982,1992).Porphyre,LaViedePlotin(2vols.).Paris:Vrin.Brunschwig,J.(1997).“Laphilosophieàl’époquehellénistique.”InM.Canto-Sperber(ed.),Philosophiegrecque(pp.457–591).Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance.Corrigan,K.(1986).“IsThereMoreThanOneGenerationofMatterintheEnneads?”Phronesis,31,195–203.33.TheauthorswouldliketothankMichaelChaseforhistranslationofthischapter.595ACTC3059520/03/2006,04:19PM\nlucbrissonandjean-françoispradeauDeuse,W.(1983).UntersuchungenzurmittelplatonischenundneuplatonischenSeelenlehre.Wiesbaden:Steiner.Dörrie,H.([1955]1976).“Hupostasis.WortundBedeutungsgeschichte.”NachrichtenderAkademiederWissenschafteninGöttingen.Philol.-Hist.Klasse,1955,35–93.Repr.inH.Dörrie,Platonicaminora(pp.12–96).Munich:Fink.Hadot,P.([1966]1999).“LamétaphysiquedePorphyre.”InPorphyre,Entretienssurl’AntiquitéclassiqueXII,(pp.125–63).Vandoeuvres-Genève.Repr.inP.Hadot.Plotin,Porphyre.ÉtudesNéoplatoniciennes(pp.317–53).Paris.LesBellesLettres.Narbonne,J.-M.(1993).Plotin,Lesdeuxmatières(EnnéadeII4[12]),Introduction,textegrec,traductionetcommentaire.Paris:Vrin.O’Brien,D.(1991).PlotinusontheOriginofMatter.AnExerciseintheInterpretationoftheEnneads.Elenchossupp.22.Naples:Bibliopolis.——.(1993).Théodicéeplotinienneetthéodicéegnostique.Leiden:Brill.——.(1999).“LamatièrechezPlotin:sonorigine,sanature.”Phronesis,44,45–71.O’Meara,D.J.(1992).AnIntroductiontotheEnneads.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Patillon,M.andBrisson,L.(eds.).(2001).Longin,Fragments.Artrhétorique.M.Patillon,(ed.),Rufus,Artrhétorique.Paris:LesBellesLettres.FurtherReadingGreektextandtranslationArmstrong,A.H.(1966–88).Plotinus.Loebclassicallibrary.(7vols.).Cambridge,Mass.HarvardUniversityPress/London:Heinemann.Henry,P.andSchwyzer,H.-R.(eds.).(1964–82).PlotiniOpera[editiominor].(3vols).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.BibliographyDufour,R.(2001).“Plotinus:ABibliography1950–2000.”Phronesis,46,237–411.StudiesAtkinson,M.(1983).Plotinus:EnneadV,1.OntheThreePrincipalHypostases.ACommentarywithTranslation.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Baltes,M.(ed.).(1987–2002).DerPlatonismusinderAntike.(6vols.).Stuttgart,BadCannstatt:Frommann–Holzboog.Bussanich,J.(1988).TheOneanditsRelationtoIntellectinPlotinus.Leiden:Brill.Dillon,J.(1996).TheMiddlePlatonists.2ndedn.London:Duckworth.Dodds.E.R.(1928).“TheParmenidesofPlatoandtheOriginoftheNeoplatonic‘One’.”ClassicalQuarterly,22,129–42.Gerson,L.P.(1994).Plotinus.London:Routledge.——.(ed.).(1999).TheCambridgeCompaniontoPlotinus.Cambridge:CambridgeUniverityPress.Hadot,P.(1993).PlotinusorTheSimplicityofVision.(M.Chase,trans.,introductionbyA.I.Davidson).Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.O’Meara,D.J.(1980).“GnosticismandtheMakingoftheWorldinPlotinus.”InB.Layton(ed.),TheRediscoveryofGnosticism.(vol.1,pp.265–378).Leiden:Brill.596ACTC3059620/03/2006,04:19PM\nwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?31WhatwasCommentaryinLateAntiquity?TheExampleoftheNeoplatonicCommentatorsPHILIPPEHOFFMANNNeoplatonicthoughtattheendofantiquity–likethatofmostoftheschoolsoftheHellenisticandRomanperiod–hasanessentiallyexegeticalandscholasticdimension.BeginningwiththeclassicalandHellenisticperiod,philosophyinGreeceisinseparablefromtheexistenceofschools(privateorpublic),oftenorganizedasplacesofcom-munallife(sunousia),inwhichtheexplicationofthetextsoftheschool’sfounderscame1tobeoneofthemainactivities.Thepracticeofexegesisofwrittentextssupplantedtheancientpracticeofdialogue.Itwassustainedthroughitsapplicationtocanonicaltexts,andwasputtoeverydayuseintheframeworkofcoursesintheexplicationoftexts.Thesocialrealityoftheschoolasaninstitution,withitshierarchy,itsdiadochos(i.e.,thesuccessortotheschool’sfounder),itsstructureasaconventicleinwhichcommunallifewaspracticed,itslibrary,itsregulationoftime,anditsprogramsorgan-izedaroundthereadingofcanonicaltexts,constitutesaconcretecontextintowhichweshouldreinsertthepracticeofexegesis,whichistheheartofphilosophicalped-agogyandthematrixofdoctrinalanddogmaticworks.ANetworkofSchoolsFromthethirdtothesixthcenturyce,fromPlotinus,whotaughtinRome,totheprofessorsoftheschoolofAlexandria(Ammonius,Olympiodorus,David,Elias)andtothoseoftheschoolofAthens(PlutarchofAthens,Syrianus,Proclus,Damascius),weobserve,fromtheWest(Rome,Sicily)totheEast(Apamea,Alexandria,Athens),anetworkofschoolsbetweenwhichteachersandstudentsoftentraveled,andatightconnectionbetweenNeoplatonicphilosophyandtheschoolorganization,withthedecisiveworksofPorphyry–astudentofPlotinuswhowasactiveinRomeandinSicily–andofIamblichus,anativeofSyria–towhichweoweexegeticalfindingsasfundamentalastheruleoftheskoposandtheideaofacanonicaldoublecycleofPlato’sdialogues.1.SeeBénatouïl,philosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimes,inthisvolume.597ACTC3159720/03/2006,04:19PM\nphilippehoffmannCertaincitiesareprestigious:Apamea,whereNumeniusandIamblichustaught;Alexandria,wheretheNeoplatonicschoolpursueditsactivitiesafter529,thankstothepolicyoftheChristianJohnPhiloponus;andaboveallAthens,trulythe“holycity.”AftersojournsinApameaandRome,thePlatonictraditioninfactreestablisheditself,afterIamblichus,inAthenswithPlutarchofAthens,whoseabodecouldhavebeentheofficialresidenceofthesuccessionuntilProclus:thusthePlatonic“GoldenChain,”asDamasciuscalledit,waspreservedatthefootoftheAcropolis,thefootofthetempleofAthena.Thebiographicalevidencewehaveallowsusalsotomakeoutmultiplelinkswithsocialelites,andtheformationof“university”familiesandmatrimoniallinkssometimesweavingaNeoplatonicwebaroundtheMediterraneanperiphery.Fromadoctrinalviewpoint,theresearchofIlsetrautHadot(1978)hasconvin-cinglyshownthattherewerenoappreciabledoctrinaldifferencesbetweentheschoolsofAthensandAlexandria,evenifthereperhapsremainedadifferenceofemphasisbetweenAthens,wheretheexplicationofPlatowasamajoractivity,andAlexandria,fromwhichcameverynumerouscommentariesonAristotle.TheReligiousClimateSomebriefgeneralconsiderationsareneededtounderstandtheparticularcharacterofNeoplatonicexegesis,thatis,theintellectual,spiritual,andpaganreligious“climate”inwhichtextswereread(see,e.g.,Festugière,1966,andSaffrey,1984b).Firstofall,aNeoplatonicacademiccommunity,inAthensorAlexandriainthefifthorsixthcentury,probablyhadsomeofthetraitsofareligiouscommunity.Forexample,inthecaseoftheschoolofAthens,itwasa“private”school,receivingbequests,livingoffthereturnsfromrealestateinAttica.AndweknowthatProclusdidnotdisdainparticipa-tioninmunicipallifeinAthens.AsthelifeandworkoftheemperorJulian(fourthcentury)particularlyshows,asalsodoesareadingofDamascius’sLifeofIsidorus,Neoplatonismwasforseveralcen-turiesthephilosophicalbackboneofthemultiformmovement–intellectual,cultural,religious,butalsopolitical–thatwasthe“paganreaction”totheestablishmentofaChristianempire.WhentheemperorJustinian,in529,issuedtheedictforbiddingtheteachingofphilosophyandlawatAthens,itwasnotacoupdegrâcedeliveredtoadyingman,butratherabrutalmeasuretakenagainstaNeoplatonicschooldoubtlessinitsfullvigorafterthepolicyofrestorationcarriedoutbythelastsuccessorofPlato,Damascius(Hoffmann,1994),asattestedbytheimmensecommentariesonEpictetusandAristotle(Categories,Physics,DeCaelo)latercomposed–afterthePersianexile,butwhereitishardtosayprecisely–byDamascius’sstudent,Simplicius.Philosophyandpaganreligionwerethentightlylinked,andNeoplatonismbecametherefugeofthegodsoftheclassicalpantheon–reinterpretedintheframeworkofasystemthat,aftertheOne-Goodandatthesummitofmultiplelevelsoftheintelligible,preservesaplaceforthe“henads.”Atthemomentwhenthecultsweregraduallyprohibited,thetemplesclosed,whenvisibleofficialceremoniesdisappeared,AthenaappearedtoPro-clusinadream,informinghimofherintentiontotakerefugewithhimaftertheclosingoftheParthenon,andoftheprobableremovaltoConstantinopleofthestatueofthe598ACTC3159820/03/2006,04:19PM\nwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?goddess(Marinus,LifeofProclus,ch.30).Thesephilosophersofdiverseorigins(espe-ciallyEasterners,fromEgypttoAsiaMinorbywayofthatNeoplatonicland,Syria)were“Hellenes,”seeminglymorebyvirtueofpaideiathanbytheirethnicorigin.Forthem,Greekwasthenaturallanguageofphilosophy–andthe“terms”ofpropositions,thetencategories,werethemostuniversalformsofhumanunderstanding,beyondthediversityoflanguages(ofwhichAmmoniusalsotookaccount,butinasecondaryway).Philosophy,Revelation,andFaithAcomplexconnectionunitesphilosophy,theology,exegesis,and“revelation”–whichisrecordedingenuine“holyscriptures”(P.Hadot,1987).Atthesametimeastheo-logysetsitselfupasa“science”(Saffrey,1996),astyleoflifedevelops,characterizedbyPythagoreanismandwhollybentuponturning,beyondthedivineclassesandbeyondbeing,inthedirectionoftheOne-Good.Thereadingandinterpretationofcanonicaltextsmustbeunderstoodaspartofaclimateofreligiomentis,whichmakesagrowingplaceforsupra-rationalelements(Saffrey,1981,1984a):theChaldaeanOraclesareatoncetheultimaterevelationsthatthegodshavemadeaboutthemselvesandtheWorld,thetouchstoneofcertaininterpretationsoftextsofPlatoandAristotle,butalsothe“sacredbook”onwhicharefoundedthepracticesoftheurgy(Brisson,2000;Lewy,1956;vanLiefferinge,1999).Defenseoftraditionalgodsandcuriosityaboutallkindsofdivinemanifestation,amongboththeGreeksandthebarbarians;pilgrimagestoholysitesor,asMichelTardieusays,to“paysagesreliques”(Tardieu,1990);pietyupheldtowardthedivinityoftheCosmos,sempiternalanduncreated;theconceptionofphilosophyas“revelation”:insuchacontext,interpretingsuch“authorities”asPlatoandAristotleamountstounveiling–withnoinnovation–ameaningandatruthofwhichthegodsand“divinemen”arethesource.AndtheauthorityofthephilosopherswhowereatthebaseofthedoctrinalsynthesisofNeoplatonism–PlatoandAristotle–isitselfcompletedbythatofaPythagoras,orofthepoetOrpheus.Theinterpreterexplicateswhatisalreadythere:heismerelythevectorofTruth.AsthegrandioseprologueofProclus’sPlatonicTheologyexpressesit,thereisfurthermorenohistoryofTruth,butonlyahistoryofitsmanifestationandofitsunveiling–andSyrianusdefinitivelyestablishedinNeoplatonismthepresuppositionofthe“concord,”sumphOnia,ofphilosophies(Saffrey,1992).AgainsttheChristianityadoptedbytheuncultivatedmasses,aminorityofpepaideumenoiareinpossessionoftheologicalsci-ence:itisinthe(Platonic)orderofthingsthattheadherentsofdoxa,walledupbytheirappetitesandpassions,momentarilyprevailoverthephilosophers(Saffrey,1975).AgainsttheChristians,thepaganphilosophershavetheir“bible,”their“sacredbook”–theChaldaeanOracles,bearersofrevelation–andtheygraduallyforgeaproperlyNeoplatonicconceptofFaith.TheexampleofSimplicius’sCommentaryonAristotle’sPhysicsisemblematicoftheconnectionbetweenlearnedexegesisandreligion:the“use-fulness”ofphysics,Simpliciusexplains,istoprovoketheawakeninginsoulsoftheanagogicaltriadofLove,Truth,andFaith(towhichisaddedafourthterm,Hope);andthesuccessivereadingofthePhysicsandDeCaeloleadsthesoulofthephilosopher-exegeteandthoseofhisaudience(orofhisreaders)toa“union”(henOsis),through599ACTC3159920/03/2006,04:19PM\nphilippehoffmannFaithandthe“vitalsympathy”correlativewithit,withthedivineHeavenandwiththedemiurgicintellectthatproducestheWorld(Hoffmann,2000a).TheCourseinPhilosophy:ADayinProclus’sLifeTextsliketheDiscoursesofEpictetus(e.g.,1.26.1and13;cf.1.10.8),Porphyry’sLifeofPlotinus,orMarinus’sLifeofProclusallowustoenterveryvividlyintotheatmosphereofaphilosophicalschoolinantiquity,and,inthelastexample,ofaNeoplatonicschool.Alessoninphilosophy,inprinciple,andinaschematicfashion,consistedoftwodistinctparts:firstadiscipleread,intheteacher’spresence,a“magistral”text–byPlato,Aristotle,Chrysippus,orZeno–aswellastheearliercommentariesrelatingtothestudiedtext,andthisreading(anagnOsis)wasaccompaniedbytheteacher’sowncommentary:thus,Plotinus’scoursebeganwiththereadingoftheexegetesofPlatoandAristotle(forexample,Severus,Cronius,Numenius,Gaius,Atticus,Aspasius,AlexanderofAphrodisias,Adrastus),afterwhichPlotinussetforthhisownexegesisofthestudiedtext(seePorphyry,LifeofPlotinus14.10–18).Thenakindoffreediscus-siontookplace,thediatribE,inthecourseofwhichvariousquestionswereraisedanddiscussedundertheguidanceoftheprofessor.ItisevenpossibletosketchfairlyconcretelythecourseofaNeoplatonicphilo-sopher’sday,thankstochapter22oftheeulogywronglycalledthe“LifeofProclus,”byMarinus,Proclus’sdisciple(seeSaffrey,1987,pp.xx–xxi=1990,pp.149–51).Thuswemayunderstandtheexistentialframeworkinwhich,allthroughhislife,Proclus’sexegeticalactivitytookplace,consistingincontinuouscommentariesoncanonicalworks(commentariesontheRepublic,theTimaeus,theParmenides)thatwemustcare-fullydistinguishfromhisotherwritings,whichconstitutedpersonalresearchandsometimesissuedinmagisterialsyntheses(includingworksasdifferentintheirliter-aryformastheElementsofTheologyandthePlatonicTheology).Atdawn,Procluspaidhomage,byprostratinghimself,totheSun,whichisthe“offspring”oftheGood(Plato,RepublicVI,507a3),oritsvisibleanalogue(509b2–10,d2–3).AgenuinevicaroftheFirstPrincipleamongmen,attheheadofthePlatonicschool,hebegan,withthisactofphilosophicalpietytowardtheSun(thesubjectofoneoftheHymns:Saffrey,1984c),astudiousdaythatmadehimaprofessor“inthehighestdegreesimilartotheGood.”Thefirsthoursofthemorningwerededicatedtoexplicatingauthorsmakingupthesyl-labusoftheNeoplatonicphilosophicalcursus,organizedaroundthe“smallmysteries”ofphilosophy(Aristotle)andthe“greatmysteries”(Plato).AccordingtoMarinus,hewouldgivefive–sometimesmorethanfive–lessonsexplicatingtextsinasingleday.Thepracticeoftextualexegesis,intheframeworkofinstruction,precededthepersonalworkofwritingandcomposition,andweknowthatProcluswrotesomesevenhun-dred“lines”perday.AsecondprayertotheSunmarkedmidday,whiletheafternoonwasgivenovertophilosophicalconversationwithcolleaguesandtheeveningto“un-written”lessonsandtowhatwewouldcallseminars.Thedayendedasitbegan,byaprayertotheSun:thus,allphilosophicalactivitytookplaceinthelightofthe“off-spring”oftheGood,andonecouldsaythatanaxislinkedtheFirstPrinciple,theSun,andtheMaster,theexegeticalanddogmaticauthorityattheheartoftheNeoplatoniccommunity.Table31.1(basedonSaffrey,1987,p.xx)allowsustoseeclearlyhow,600ACTC3160020/03/2006,04:19PM\nwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?Table31.1ANeoplatonicprofessor’sdayHoursofthedayActivitiesSunrisePrayertotheSunFirsthoursofthemorningClassesexplicatingauthorsontheschoolprogramLatemorningPersonalcompositionNoonPrayertotheSunAfternoonPhilosophicalconversationwithcolleaguesEveningUnwrittenlessonsandseminarsSunsetPrayertotheSunconcretely,exegeticalactivitiesfitintothedailylifeofaNeoplatonicprofessor,andhowactivitiesofwritingweredistinguishedfrompurelyoralcommunication–eachbeingmarkedoffbysilentprayerstotheSun,beyondwhichtheascensiomentisiniti-atedinthepracticeofexegesiswastobepursued.ButProclusalsowroteatnight.Hedevotedhisnightstomeditation,prayer,andthecompositionofhymnsinhonorofthegods(Marinus,Procl.24).Sevenofthesehymnshavebeenpreserved:theyarededicatedtotheSun;toAphrodite,motherofLove;totheMuses;tothegodsoftheChaldaeanOracles;toLycianAphrodite;toHecateandJanus;andtoAthenaofGoodCounsel(Saffrey,1994;vandenBerg,2001).ProclushimselfmayhavegatheredthecollectionofOrphicHymnstransmittedwithhisphilo-sophicalhymns.NeoplatonicPedagogicalThoughtNeoplatonicinstructiongivesacentralplacetothenotionof“authority”:theauthor-ityofrevealedtexts,theauthorityofgreatphilosophers(mainlyPlatoandAristotle)whohave“seen”theTruth,thepersonalandsocialauthorityoftheMasterandtheProfessor,whoholdsthecorrectdoctrineandknowsthemeaningofthetexts.Proclus,wehavejustseen,isdescribedasthe“vicar”oftheOne-Goodandthereisnodoubtthattheauthorityofthediadochosorsuccessor–ineverysenseoftheword–wasimmense.Tobeaprofessorwasalsotopractice“assimilationtogod,”andthiswas,inthetraditionoftheTheaetetus,oneofthesixdefinitionsofphilosophytaughtintheintroductiontothephilosophicalcursus:the“assimilation”waspracticedwithregardtothe“cognitive”faculties(imitationofdivineomniscience)andwithregardtothe“vital”or“practical”faculties(providentialsolicitudefortheimperfectsoulsof2thestudents).Deificationbyinstruction,likedeificationbypolitics,correspondstotheexerciseof“political”virtues–thevirtuesofasoulthatusesitsbodyinthemannerofaninstrument,andthatlivesinsociety–accordingtotheNeoplatonicdoctrineofthevirtues;anditmustthereforeberealizedthattheveryactofteaching–whichconsisted2.Ontheearlierhistoryofthisnotion,seeBetegh,greekphilosophyandreligion,inthisvolume.601ACTC3160120/03/2006,04:19PM\nphilippehoffmannmainlyofcommentaryontexts–wasconceivedasadeificationoftheprofessor,whoguideshisaudienceorhisstudentsonthepathoftheirowndeification(onallthis,seeHoffmann,1998,pp.228–40).TheDoctrinalFecundityofExegeticalMisinterpretationsInamentaluniverseverydifferentfromourown,auniversethatcondemnsoriginalityandenjoinsafaithfulrespectfortheAncients,philosophicalthoughtwillinglysawitselfasamereunfoldingofdoctrinesmoreorlessexplicitly(orimplicitly)containedintextsthathadauthority(treatisesofAristotle,Plato’sdialogues,etc.):Plotinus(Enn.V.1[10],8.10–14)presentedhimselfasmerelythe“exegete”ofveryolddoctrinesofParmenidesandPlato,andevenifthenoveltyofhisthoughtinrelationtoclassicalphilosophyisforusamanifestreality,itnonethelessremainsthatPlotinus–likehis3successors,forthatmatter–musthaveconsideredhimselfanauthenticPlatonist.Theappearanceanddevelopmentofnewdoctrinesarenot,inantiquity,thefruitofadepartureclaimingtobe“original,”butrathertheresultofexegesesthat,ifwemayputitso,abandonthemselvesingoodfaithtothefecundityoferrorsandmisinterpre-tationsofthetextonwhichtheycomment.Inorderforsuchdistortionsofmeaningtoattaintheirfullfecundity,aconstantandminuteattentiontothetextitselfisneces-sary:theroleinitoftheexplicationoftheletterofthetext(thelexis,asdistinctfromthetheOria,i.e.,themeaning,orratherthedoctrine:Festugière,1963)isknown;andithasbeenpossibletoshowthetasteofcertainexegetes,suchasDamascius,foraninterpretationthatattendstotheliterarycontentofthedialogues,whichperhapsledhimtoabetterreadingthanothersofthetextofPlato(Westerink,1971;andHoffmann,1994,p.572).AfoundationalstudybyP.Hadot(1968)hasrevealedthephilosophicalfecundityofmisunderstandingsorincomprehensionsofthemeaningoftexts:theyaretheancientandmedievalwayofproducing“doctrines.”Sincephilosophizingconsistedessentiallyinconductingtheexegesisof“Authorities,”thesearchfortruthwasmostfrequentlyconfoundedwiththesearchforthemeaningoftextsheldtobeauthoritativeonessen-tialphilosophicalandtheologicalquestions,thetruthalreadycontainedinthesetextsneedingonlytobemadeexplicit.Hence,asthemajorityofphilosophicalandtheolo-gicalproblemswereposedinexegeticalterms,theoreticaldevelopmentsproceededaccordingtoamethodwemaydescribeas:(1)arbitrarilysystematizingdisparateformulationsextractedfromcompletelyunrelatedcontexts;(2)amalgamatinglike-wisedisparatephilosophicalnotionsorconceptsoriginatingindifferentorevencon-tradictorydoctrines;and(3)explicatingnotionsnottobefoundatallintheoriginal.Insuchacontext,itisfrequentlyquitevaintotrytointerpretthephilosophersofantiquityintermsofourmodern,post-Hegelianconceptofa“system”–evenif,forexample,amajorwork,Proclus’sElementsofTheology,isa(successful)attempttopresentmoregeometricothewholesystemofreality,asitissuesfromtheOne-Good,accordingtoNeoplatonictheologyandontology;andevenifthePlatonicTheologyistheperfectandsystematicfruitofgenerationsofexegeticalresearchconducted3.SeeBrissonandPradeau,plotinus,inthisvolume.602ACTC3160220/03/2006,04:19PM\nwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?byNeoplatonicphilosophersonthedialoguesofPlato,andparticularlyontheParmenides(Saffrey,1984d).The“Symphonic”Presupposition:Syrianus,andtheHarmonyofPlatoandAristotleaccordingtoSimpliciusSyrianushadwrittentwoworksonOrpheus:OntheTheologyofOrpheusandHarmony(sumphOnia)ofOrpheus,PythagorasandPlatowiththeOracles(i.e.,withtheChaldaeanOracles).ThislattertreatiseseemstohaveexpoundedtheexegeticalprogramthatheldswayintheNeoplatonicschoolinAthens,anddoubtlessalsointheschoolofAlexandria:theruleofharmonyamongauthorities,andoftheharmonyof“divinemen”(Orpheus,Pythagoras,Plato)withtheChaldaeanOraclesrevealedbythegodsthemselves(Saffrey,1992).Unfortunately,wehavelostthecontentsofthistreatise,butareadingoftheNeoplatoniccommentariesoflateantiquityconfirmsthatthesearchforsumphOniabetweenphilosophersmusthavebeentheexegete’sgoldenrule.TheperfectdoctrinalagreementbetweenPlatoandAristotlewasapostulategrantedbyalltheNeoplatonicinterpretersfromPorphyryonward.Alongevolutionofinter-pretativemethods,whichhadbegunwithAntiochusofAscalon,hereculminated4andfounditsperfection(I.Hadot,1978,pp.68–9,72–6,148n.3,195).When,inparticular,andatanearlierstageofthecursus,itcametocommentingonAristotle,thetaskofthegoodexegete(point8ofthefirstintroductoryschemadescribedbelow)wasdefinedthus:“hemust,whenAristotlecontradictsPlato,notconsideronlytheletterofthetext(lexis)andcondemnthediscord(diaphOnia)ofthephilosophers,buttakeintoconsiderationthespirit(nous),andseektotrackdowntheirharmony(sumphOnia)onthemajorityofquestions”(Simpl.InCat.7.29–32).Infact,ifthediscordsareverbal,andpurelyverbal,thatisduetothedifferenceofattitudeofthetwophilosopherswithregardtolanguage,andthustoadifferenceofphilosophicalattitude,butnottoadifferenceofdoctrine:“Itisnecessary,inmyopinion,”Simpliciusexplainselsewhere,toconsideratthesametimetheaim(skopos)andthewords,andtounderstandthatinthesemattersthedivergence(diaphora)betweenthetwophilosophersbearsnotontherealityofthings(pragmata)butonwords(onomata):Plato,onaccountofhistasteforprecision,rejectstheordinaryusage(sunEtheia)ofwords,whereasAristotleemploysit–amethodthat,accordingtohim,isinnowayinjurioustotruth...(Simpl.InCael.69.11–15;cf.15–29)Platoscornsthelanguageofthemultitude,whileAristotledoesnotwishtoabandonit(InCael.679.28–29).Adifferenceinphilosophicalmethodunderliesthisdifferenceinattitudetowardlanguage:thus,itisnotrealityitself(pragma),buttheword(onoma),onwhichbearsthepresentdivergence(diaphora)betweenthephilosophers;anditislikewiseinmostothercases.The4.OnAntiochus,seeLévy,thenewacademyanditsrivals,andZambon,middleplatonism,inthisvolume.603ACTC3160320/03/2006,04:19PM\nphilippehoffmannreasonforitis,Ibelieve,thatoftenAristotlewantstoretaintheordinarymeaningofwordsandsetsout,inbuildinghisarguments,fromwhatismanifesttothesenses,whereasPlatodisplaysseveraltimesoverhiscontemptforordinarysignifications,andrisesgladlytointellectualcontemplation.(InPhys.1249.12–17)Asweshallseebelow(point6ofthefirstintroductoryschema:Simpl.InCat.6.22–30),Plato’sattitudeis“Pythagorean”becausehe“examinesnaturalrealitiesinsofarastheyparticipateinwhatisabovenature,”andhebaseshisdemonstrationsonintellection(nous),whereasAristotlebeginsfromsensation(aisthEsis),consciousofaddressinghimselftobeings“wholivewithsensation,”andhedoesnotsethimselfapartfromnature,studyingtherealitiesthatareabovenatureonlyintheirrelationtonature.Fromanepistemologicalviewpoint,demonstrativeperfectionresultsfromtheconjunctionofthetwotypesofdemonstration(thatwhichbeginsfromintellectionandthatwhichbeginsfromsensation),whichisstrictlycoherentwiththeprincipleofthesumphOniaofPlatoandAristotle(I.Hadot,1978,p.148;Hoffmann,1987b,pp.212–13).Anexampleoffecundmisinterpretation:ThecompositionofthesubstanceoftheheavensThedeterminationofthenatureofcelestialsubstanceoffersaperfectexampleofthisconjunctionofAristotelianandPlatonicmethodsofdemonstration(Simpl.InCael.84.30–85,31;cf.Hoffmann,1987b,pp.213ff.).Simplicius,commentingonBookIofDeCaelo,wantstoshowtheharmonyonafundamentalpointbetweenthedoctrinesofthetwoauthoritiesinapolemicalanti-ChristiancontextandinaspiritoftraditionalpietytowardtheHeavensandtheCosmos:thelatterisnot“born”atamomentoftime–ithasnotemporalorigin–anditisnotconsignedtodestruction:itisunbegottenandincorruptible(astheDeCaeloaffirms).IfPlatosaysitis“begotten,”itisinsofarasitproceedsultimatelyfromtheOne-Good.TheAristotelianassertionoftheexistenceofaprimarybody,unbegottenandincorruptible,withoutchange,growthordiminu-tion,movedonlyinitscircularmotion,anddistinctfromthefoursublunaryelements,conflictsinnowaywiththeteachingsoftheTimaeus,thoughitassertsnodistinc-tionbetweenasublunaryandasupralunarysphere,andthoughitpositsonlythesupremacyoffireintheHeavens–thelatteralsobeingcomposedoftheotherthreeelements(Ti.40a).Wherethemodernhistorianreasonablyseesadifferenceindoc-trine,Simplicius–whorevertstoaProcliancelestialphysicswhoseoriginliesinTreatise40ofPlotinus–seesonlyaperfectsumphOnia:whatAristotlecalls“primarybody”isamixtureofthefourelementsunderthepureformofprinciples(the“sum-mits,”akrotEtes),whichtranscendsthe“sublunary”elements.Thismixtureisdeter-minedinitsessence,characterizedanddenominated,accordingtotheprincipleof“predominance,”bytheelementary“summit”predominatinginit,and,asPlatosays(Ti.40a),whatpredominatesonhighisfire,initspurestform–light(phOs)thatshinesanddoesnotburn,andwhichisasdifferentfromflame(phlox)asfromglowingembers(anthrax)(Ti.58c).TheAristotelian“primarybody,”or“aether,”issuchamixture,thedescriptionofwhichcoincideswiththemeaningattributedtoPlato’stext,anditisthereadingoftheTimaeusthatguidesthatofDeCaelo.Thisexample604ACTC3160420/03/2006,04:19PM\nwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?illustratesthesubtleexegeticalmechanismbymeansofwhichtextsareundulyrecon-ciledinasumphOniathatisafecundmisinterpretation.ItistheNeoplatonists’jointreadingofPlatoandAristotlethatallowsthemtofindasingle,identicaldoctrineofcelestialphysicsintheworksofthetwoauthorities:noticethattheprivilegeaccordedtoPlatooverAristotleisdecisiveinthisproceeding.AndthereligioushorizonofthisphysicsconstructedthroughareconcilingexegesisisthereaffirmationofthepietyhandeddownbytheAncients,andthe“sympathetic”union(henOsis)withtheHeavensandtheDemiurge.TheExplicationofTexts:TheNeoplatoniccursusofStudyAristotle,PropaedeutictoPlatoTheheartoflifeintheNeoplatonicschoolsofAlexandriaandAthenswasconstitutedbydailylessonsintheexplicationoftexts(calledpraxeis),conformingtoastrictprogramcodifiedbeginningwithIamblichus–towhomwasowedthechoiceoftwelveprincipaldialoguesofPlato(Festugière,1969).TheprogramoftheNeoplatoniccursusofstudiesmayalsobereadasanideallistofbooks–thecoreoffundamentalbooks,towhichwasaddedthecorpusoftraditionalcommentaries–constitutingaNeoplatoniclibrary.Withoutgoingintothedetailsofallthequestionsraisedbythecontentsofthiscursus,letusrecallitsmainstages(Goulet-Cazé,1982,pp.277–80;I.Hadot,1978,pp.148–9,160–4;P.Hadot,1979,pp.218–21;Westerink,Trouillard,andSegonds,1990,pp.xlviii–lviff.).Studybeganwiththeauthorsofthetriviumandthequadriviumthatmadeupacyclepropaedeutictophilosophicalstudies(I.Hadot,1984).Thenasetofpreparatoryethicalstudiesandprologuesinvolvedrecoursetothreehortat-orydiscoursesbyIsocrates(discoursesToDemonicus,ToNicocles,andNicocles),tothePythagoreanCarmenaureum(commentarybytheAlexandrianHierocles),totheEnchiridionofEpictetusandtoPorphyry’sIsagoge–withwhichbegantheproperlyphilosophicalinstruction,andonwhichwehaveseveralsixthcenturycommentaries(Ammonius,David,Elias;editedbyA.Busse,intheseriesCommentariainAristotelemGraeca(=CAG)vols.4and18).Thechiefpartofthecursus,afterPorphyry’sIsagogeandvariousIntroductions,wasdedicatedtothereadingofAristotle(the“smallmysteries”ofphilosophy)andPlato(the“greatmysteries”).BecausetheLifeofAristotlewasplacedatthebeginningoftheeditionoftheworksoftheStagiriteandcouldbereadinthatsortofvolume,theIntroductiontothePhilosophyofAristotle,givenprecedingthecommentariesontheCategories,didnotincludeabiography,butratheranelucidationofthenamesofthephilosophicalschools.Theperipateticphilosophy,regardedasapropaedeutictothatofPlato(I.Hadot,1991,1992),andinterpretedfromthis“symphonic”perspective,werestudiedinasequenceofreadingsasfollows:thelogicalwritingsoftheOrganon(inanordertowhichweshallreturnlater);thenthe“practical”writings,withtheEthicsandthePolitics;andfinallythe“theoretical”writings,whichcorrespondedtoPhysics(Physics,DeCaelo,OnGenerationandCorruption,etc.),toMathematics(probablyDeLineisInsecabilibuswasread),andtoTheology,thatis,essentiallythe605ACTC3160520/03/2006,04:19PM\nphilippehoffmannMetaphysics,withwhichthe“smallmysteries”culminated.ThissequenceofreadingsderivedfromaverystrictclassificationoftheworksofAristotle,whichleftasidethetreatisesconsideredtobelessphilosophical,sincetheydealtwithparticularbeings.MarinustellsusthatProclusputonlytwoyearsintorunningthroughthisAristote-lianpropaedeuticcycle.ReadingPlatonicdialoguesAfterthereadingofAristotlecamethatofPlato,basedona“choice”privileging–accordingtothecanonattributedtoIamblichus–certaindialogues(Westerinketal.,1990,pp.lxviii–lxxiii):theyconstitutedaprocessionalandinitiatorypathwayleadingfromthe“propylaea”(theAlcibiadesI)tothe“adytum”ofthetemple(theParmenides).Afirstcyclewasstructured,fundamentally,bytheNeoplatonichierarchyofthevir-tues,andbythedistinctionbetween“political,”“cathartic,”and“theoretical”virtues.The“theoretical”partwasitselfdividedinthree,correspondingtothetriadofnames,notions,andrealities,whichplaysaleadingroleinNeoplatonicontologyandinthedoctrineoflanguage.Thetheoreticalstudyofrealitieswasitselfalsodividedintothestudyofphysicalrealitiesandthestudyoftheologicalrealities.Thefirstcyclethusincluded,insuccession,theAlcibiadesI(whichservedasanintroduction,throughtheknowledgeofoneselfandtheturningtowardoneself),thentheGorgias(whichcorres-pondstothepracticeofthe“political”virtues,thoseofthesoulthatusesthebodyinthemannerofaninstrument,inthecontextofsociallife)andthePhaedo(“cathartic”virtues,correspondingtotheseparationofsoulandbody),theCratylusandtheTheaetetus(“theoretical”virtuestrainedthroughthestudyofnamesandofnotions),theSophistandtheStatesman(“theoretical”virtuestrainedbythestudyofphysicalreal-ities,thenthePhaedrusandtheSymposium(“theoretical”virtuestrainedbythestudyoftheologicalrealities),anditculminatedwiththePhilebus,whichprovidesafirstinstructionabouttheGood,preparatorytothereadingoftheParmenides.Noticethatthiskindofselection,andclassification,impliesthatintheStatesmanonlythecosmologicalmythisretained(correspondingtoaphysics)andintheSymposiumandthePhaedrusonlythedevelopmentofthedoctrineofIdeasorintelligibledivineForms.AlongworkliketheRepublichadnoplaceinthisscheme,butitwasnotonthataccountneglectedorforgotteninNeoplatonicinstruction,asdemonstratedbytheveryexistenceofthegreatCommentarybyProclusonthisdialogue,andthesamemaybesaidoftheLaws.ThisfirstPlatoniccyclewascrownedbyasecondone,organ-izedaccordingtothedivisionbetweenphysicsandtheology:itconsistedinthestudyoftheTimaeusandtheParmenides,towhichProclusdevotedhugecommentariesthankstowhichwehavepartialaccesstotheexegesesofhispredecessorsaswell.Indeed,inmanywaysallofNeoplatonismisaperpetualcommentaryontheParmenides,readwordbywordandceaselesslymeditatedon:thePlatonicdialogueisasacredbook,thereadingofwhich“becomesthereligiousactparexcellence”(Saffrey,1984b,p.171).Beyondphilosophy:OrphicHymnsandChaldaeanOraclesThankstotheParmenides,thesoulraiseditselfuptotheOne.ButtheParmenidesisnotthefinalwordofthecourseinphilosophy:afterthephilosophicalcyclestheOrphic606ACTC3160620/03/2006,04:19PM\nwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?Hymns(theonlybookspossessedbythepaganmonkSarapioninAlexandriainthefifthcentury)andtheChaldaeanOracleswerereadandcommentedon(Festugière,1966[1971,pp.583–4];Goulet-Cazé,1982,pp.277–80).Thiscollectionof“theo-logical”oracles,forgedbytheurgists(Julian,fatherandson)inthesecondcentury,duringthereignofMarcusAurelius,wasatrue“sacredbook,”destinedtoprovidepagantheologyattheendofantiquitywiththeequivalentoftheJewishandChristiansacredbooks:thispaganbibleconstitutedthetouchstoneofallNeoplatonicexegeticalenterprise,andthemeaningsattributedtothedoctrinesofAristotleandPlatowerefoundedonthisrevealedauthority(P.Hadot,1987[1998]).EvenifPlotinuspaidnoattentiontotheseOracles,theirimportancewasthetopicofalivelydebatebetweenPorphyryandIamblichus,andtheywerecommenteduponbyProclusandDamascius.Itisknownthat,inByzantium,theyattractedtheinterestofPsellos,andlaterinthefifteenthcentury,GeorgiusGemisthusPletho.TheBeginningoftheCursus:TheIntroductionsTaughtintheFrameworkoftheExegesisofPorphyry’sIsagogeandAristotle’sCategories,andTheGeneralPrinciplesofExegesisWhenhehadreceivedpreparatoryethicalinstruction,thestudentintheNeoplatonicschoolbeganthestudyofphilosophywithasetofsixdiscourseswhichfollowedoneanother,eachhaving,invariousways,thestatusofan“introduction,”whichledhimtotheheartofanAristotelianpropaedeuticintegratedfromtheoutsetwiththepurestNeoplatonism.Abriefoverviewofthiscomplexstructure(I.Hadot,1987a[1990,p.21ff.];Hoffmann,1998;Westerinketal.,1990,pp.xliii–lvi)showsthedegreetowhichdogmaticinstruction,exegesisofcanonicaltexts,andpsychagogicalconcernsareinseparableintheNeoplatonicschool.Thestudentthusstudied,insuccession:(1)ageneralIntroductiontoPhilosophy,asapartofanintroductiontotheexplicationofPorphyry’sIsagoge.ThecontentofthedifferentIntroductionsthathavebeenpre-servediswellknown,anditisenoughtorecallthattheymainlytaught,afterastudyofwhata“definition”is,thesixancientdefinitionsofPhilosophy:knowledgeofbeingsinsofarastheyarebeings;knowledgeofdivineandhumanrealities;assimilationtogodasfarasispossibleforman;thepracticeofdeath;theartofartsandscienceofsciences;loveofwisdom.Theyalsoexpoundabipartitedivisionofphilosophyintoa“theoretical”anda“practical”part.(2)AnIntroductionspecificallytotheIsagoge,developedineightpoints,thatis,thesevenpointsaddressedinprincipleinconnectionwithAristotle’sCategoriesandothertreatisesoftheStagirite,plusaneighthpoint:“Whatistheformofinstruction?”(3)Porphyry’sIsagoge,whichisanintroductionatoncetoAristotle’sCategories,tologic,andtothewholeofphilosophy.Itwasimportanttoelucidatecorrectlythe“aim”(skopos)andthe“utility”oftheIsagoge,anditwastheoccasiontopreparefortheexplicationoftheCategories.Infact,inNeoplatonicinstruc-tion,thedeterminationoftheusefulnessoftheCategorieswasstrictlyconnectedtothedeterminationoftheusefulness,orratherseveralutilities,oftheIsagoge,justastheaimsofthetwotreatisesareaffiliate,sincebothalikebearonuniversal“signifyingwords.”Ammoniustaughtseveralofthe“utilities”oftheIsagoge:theworkisusefulforthewholeofphilosophy,fortheCategories(thatis,forthereadingofphilosophical607ACTC3160720/03/2006,04:19PM\nphilippehoffmanntreatisescontainingthedoctrineofuniversalpredicates,thatofAristotlebutalsothatofhisPythagoreansourceArchytasofTarentum),“forallthetreatisesofphilosophy,”and“forthewholemethodofdiscoverythatphilosophyemploys”(26.3–5).Thislastexpressionshouldbeunderstoodtorefertothefourmethodsofdialectic(division,definition,demonstration,andanalysis).And,addsAmmonius,eveniftherewerenowrittenphilosophicaltreatises,theIsagogewouldbeuseful“totheverymethodsusedbyphilosophers,thankstowhichthephilosopherscandiscovereveryreality”(35.27–29).AfterAmmonius,theAlexandriansDavidandEliasrearrangedtheseutilitiesunderthreeorfourheads,andEliasgaveprimaryplacetoananthropologicalconsideration:theIsagogeisuseful“forourveryessence”(ousia)aslivingbeingsendowedwiththecapacitytocommunicatewithoneanotherbymeansoflanguage.Inamoreimmedi-atefashion,itwasthepedagogicalneedforexplanationspreliminarytoreadingtheCategoriesthatledPorphyrytodrawup–attherequestofhisaudience,theRomansenatorChrysaorius–an“Introduction”totheCategories:theIsagogeisanexplicationofthemostfundamental“fivewords”ofAristotle’slogic(genus,species,differentia,property,andaccident),andtheirelucidationisanecessarypreliminarytothatoftheCategories.Thencame(4)ageneralIntroductiontothephilosophyofAristotle,whichwastofixthegeneralframeworksfortheexegesisofthewholeofAristotle’sphilo-sophicalcorpus;thisIntroductionisimpartedasthefirstpartoftheIntroductionspecifictotheCategories,anditincludesthetenpointsdescribedbelow.ThefifthstageconsistedoftheIntroductiontotheCategoriesproper,accordingtosixorsevenpointsthatwerealsotobeexamined(somebeingoptional)inconnectionwitheachoftheAristoteliantreatisesofthecursus.TheseschemasseemtohavebeenexpoundedbyProclusinalosttreatiseentitledSunanagnOsis,“ExplicationofaTextundertheSuper-visionofaMaster”(Hadotetal.,1990,pp.26,34).Finally,(6),thereadingoftheCategoriesitselfconstitutedthebeginningoflogicandtheprologuetoPhilosophyasawhole:thegeneralprinciplesofexegesiswereinculcatedthroughoutallthepreviousIntroductions.Thefirstintroductoryschema,intenpoints,formedageneralintroductiontothephilosophyofAristotle,andtotheexegesisofthewholesetoftreatises(seeHadotetal.,1990).1.Whatistheoriginofthenamesofthephilosophicalsects?Theanswersuppliesahistoricalframeworkforthehermeneuticprincipleoftheharmony(sumphOnia)ofthephilosophiesofPlatoandAristotle,whichistoguideallthereadingofAristotle.AristotleispresentedasthesuccessorofPlatothroughtheintermediaryofSpeusippus(Plato’ssuccessorasheadoftheAcademy),andOlympiodoruswentsofarastoimplythatthetruesuccessorofPlato,whenitcametodoctrine,wouldhavebeenAristotleratherthanXenocrates(whosucceededSpeusippus).2.HowarethewritingsofAristotleclassified?TheorganizationoftheAristoteliancorpusproceededfromseveraldistinctions:between“general,”“intermediate,”and“particular”works;between“syntagmatic”and“hypomnematic”works;betweenthedialoguesandtheworksinwhichAristotlespeaksinhisownname(autoprosOpa).ThedivisionallowsustodiscoverthesequenceofreadingsthatconstitutedtheprogramofexegesisforthewholeAristoteliancorpus.Thesyntagmaticworksweretheonlyonestowhichfulldogmaticauthoritywas608ACTC3160820/03/2006,04:19PM\nwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?credited,becausetheirdoctrinalcontentiscompleteandtheyhaveaperfectliteraryform,aswellasatitle.Theyaredividedintothreeclasses:“theoretical”works,classifiedaccordingtothethreefolddivisionintophysics,mathematics,andtheology;“practical”works,classifiedaccordingtothethreefolddivisionintopolitics,economics,andethics;“instrumental”works,alsodividedintothree:thosethatappeartobe“method”(Poetics,Rhetoric,Topics,SophisticalRefuta-tions),thosethatbearon“method”(PosteriorAnalytics),andthosethatprecede“method”(Categories,DeInterpretatione,PriorAnalytics).Basedonthisdivision,thelogicalwritingswerethusarrangedaccordingtoanexegeticalandped-agogicalprogressioninthefollowingorder:theCategories(thedoctrinesofpredic-atesandofthesimpletermsoftheproposition),DeInterpretatione(thedoctrineofthe“declarativestatement”andofthepremisesconstitutingthesyllogism),thePriorAnalytics(thedoctrineofthesyllogismordeductivereasoning),thePosteriorAnalytics(whichculminatesintheteachingofthedemonstrativesyl-logism,the“instrument”fordiscerningtruthandfalsityintheory,thegoodandthebadinpractice),thentheTopicsandtheSophisticalRefutations(noticethatthe“long”Organon,whichincludedthePoeticsandtheRhetoric,hadnosuccessintheworldsoflateantiquityandByzantium).3.WhereoughtonetobeginingrapplingwithAristotle’streatises?Withethics(sincewithoutpurifyingone’swaysonecannotthinkrationally),orwithlogic?TheNeoplatonistsansweredthatoneoughttobeginwithlogic(towhichPorphyry’sIsagoge,thentheCategories,wereanintroduction),butthatpreparatoryethicalinstructionwastobegiven,asapreliminary,inan“unscientific”manner–theexplicatedreadingoftheAristotelianEthicsbeingpossibleonlylaterinthecursus.4.Whatisthe“end”(telos)ofthephilosophyofAristotle?Tothisquestion,Simpliciusrepliesthatthe“end”ishappinessobtainedbyturningtowardtheOne(theascentbacktowardtheFirstPrinciple)andbytheethicalturnthatconsistsinattainingperfectionbythetraininginandpracticeofvirtues.ItisthusBookXoftheNicomacheanEthicsthatteachesthetelos,and“demonstration,”thekeystoneoftheOrganon,isthenecessaryinstrumentofanascendingmovementthat,throughtheinterpretationofauthoritativetexts,isethicalandtheoretical,butalsospiritualandreligious.5.Whatarethemeansforattainingthisend?Theyarethecontentsofthecursusitself(logic,ethics,physics,mathematics,theology).6.WhatmannerofexpressionisemployedinAristotle’swritings?Allthecomment-atorsdescribeAristotle’sstyleascompendious,concise,aporetic,andobscure.PlatoandAristotlepracticeinversemethods:Platostudiesallthings,andespe-ciallyphysicalrealities,basedontheconsiderationofthedivineintelligibleForms,andinthisregardheconformstothe“Pythagorean”method(alsoknownas“doingphysicsasatheologian”),whereasAristotlesetsoutfromcurrentlin-guisticusageandtheusualmeaningsofwords,aswellasfromtheconsiderationofparticularsensiblerealities–thefirstthatclaimtheattentionofthenovice,towhomitseemsnaturalthattheindividualis“primary”substance.Whenhedoestheology,Aristotleremainsa“physicist.”7.WhatisthesourceofAristotle’sobscurity?Thisobscurity,whichAristotlepreferredto(Platonic)myth-makingand(Pythagorean)symbolism,functions609ACTC3160920/03/2006,04:19PM\nphilippehoffmanntoprotectknowledgefrombeingdivulged(truthmustberevealedonlytothosewhoareworthyofit),andfurthermoreitgivestothoseworthyofaccessiontoTruththeopportunitytoexerciseandshapetheirsagacity(agchinoia).Obscurityhasaninitiatoryandgymnasticvalue.8.WhatqualitiesdoesanexegeteofAristotleneedtohave?AccordingtoSimplicius,theexegeteshouldbeatthesamelevelof“greatnessofthought”(megalonoia)asAristotle.HeshouldhaveaperfectandcompleteknowledgeofthewholeofAristotle’swork,aswellasofhislinguistichabits.Heshouldnotdisplaysectarianisminhisexegeticalwork,proceeding“asthoughhewereamemberofthephilosopher’ssect”:hismaximshouldbe,“AmicusPlatosedmagisamicaveritas”(Tarán,1984).Aboveall,heistoseek,onmostpoints,thedeepharmony,thesumphOnia,betweenAristotleandPlato,betweenwhomdisagreementcanonlybeverbal,andcanhardlyconcerndoctrineitself.ThisprincipleofsumphOniaisthegoldenruleofNeoplatonicexegesis,andrespectforitisthemarkoftheexegete“inlovewithknowledge,”philomathEs,anepithetequivalentinthePlatonictraditiontophilosophos.Thispointisofthehighestimportance,becauseitdescribesthetaskoftheexegete–minuteandexhaustiveexplicationofAristotle’stext,consideredinallitsdetailandinthevastcontextofthecorpus–andcreatestheconditionsforakindofautonomyforexegeticalactivity,accountingfortherangeofSimplicius’sowncommentaries.9.Whatarethequalitiesneededbyagood“hearer,”thatis,agoodstudentofAristotelianphilosophy?Heshouldbevirtuous(spoudaiosinthesenseofAristo-telianmetriopathy)oragainwithhisbehaviorrefined(kosmios)attheendofthepreparatoryethicalinstruction,butnotyet“scientific”(this“scientific”ethicalinstructionnotbeingpossibleuntillater,whenmasteryofthesyllogismallowsfortherigorousstudyoftheAristotelianEthics).ThegoodstudentshouldmeditatefrequentlyonthefundamentalnotionsofAristotle’sphilosophy–whichcorrespondstoakindofspiritualexercise,alreadypracticedwithregardtothe“fivewords”whentheIsagogewasexplicated–andheshouldengageinsuchmeditationaloneorinthecompanyoffriendsequally“inlovewithknow-ledge.”Finally,heshoulddenyhimselfall“eristic”chatter,onpainofdeservingpunishment.10.Thetenthpointwasdevotedtothelistofsixorsevenpointsconstitutingthesecondintroductoryschema,whichhadtobeexpoundedbeforethereadingofanyworkbyAristotle–somepointsbeingoptional,whenthepointwasclear–andthisschemaisamplydevelopedintheNeoplatonicintroductionstotheCategories,theinauguraltreatise.ThesixorsevenpointstobetreatedbeforereadinganytreatisebyAristotleIntheintroductiontohisCommentaryontheCategories,Simpliciustreats,inaman-nerbothextremelyprobingandwhollyexemplary,thesevenpointsofthesecondintroductoryschema,inthefollowingorder:610ACTC3161020/03/2006,04:19PM\nwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?1.Whatisthe“aim”ofthetreatise,itsintention(skopos)?Thisgoverningquestion,towhichIamblichusgavetheforceoflaw,orientsallexegesis,anditisencoun-teredinothertypesofcommentary(patristic,medical,orrhetoricalexegesis):allthedoctrinesandassertionsofaphilosopherwhoseworksreceivecommentaryshouldbecoherentwiththisuniqueskopos.(Atreatise,oraPlatonicdialogue,cannothaveseveralskopoi:themeaningoftexts,liketheWorldorReality,isorientedtowardaprincipleofunity.)Thusitwillbeexplainedthatthecategoriesare,inthehumanlanguageproceedingfromincarnatedsouls,thesimplest“words”(phOnai)–establishedatthetimeofa“firstinstitution”–andthatthesewordssignify,throughmediationofsimpleanduniversal“notions”thatareinthesoulandthatcoincidewiththesignifiedsofthesewords,thesimplestandmostuniver-sal“realities”,thatis,the“mostgenericgenera,”beyondwhichtherearenomoreinclusivegenera,since–asAristotlehimselfteaches–beingisnotagenus(see5Hoffmann,1987a).AnotherveryinterestingexampleisthatoftheDeCaelo(Hoffmann,1997,pp.86–8).Simpliciusconfronts,anddiscusses,theinterpretationsofhispre-decessors,i.e.,thecommentatorswhoprecededhiminthestudyoftheDeCaelo:ononeside,AlexanderofAphrodisiasandinamoreancienttimeTheophrastus;onanotherside,IamblichusandSyrianus.AlexanderthinksthattheskoposconcernstheWorldandthesimplebodiesinit(earth,water,air,fire,andcelestialsubstance),andheappealstotheauthorityofTheophrastus.Bycontrast,theNeoplatonicexegetes–IamblichusandSyrianus–accordadistinctprominencetothe“divine”body,andthustothetheologicalaspectofthetreatise,thusprivilegingthefirsttwobooks.AccordingtoIamblichus,thetreatiseismainly“aboutthecelestialanddivinebody,”evenifitincludesinasecondarywaythetheoryoftheUniverseandthatoftheelements.SimpliciusdiscussesAlexander’sopinionaswellasthatofhisNeoplatonicpredecessors,andisledbythe(Neoplatonic)twofoldrequirementoftheunityoftheskoposandtheunityofthetreatiseitselftoaffirmthecoherenceofthefourbooksandtointegratethestudyofthefoursublunaryelementswithinthehorizonoftheuniqueskopos,allthewhilerecognizingtheprimacyofthedivineHeavens–whichgenerouslycommunicatesitsperfectionstothetotalityoftheWorld:“itshouldnotbeheldthattheaimofthetreatise(skopos)concernstheWorld:onthecontrary,itconcernsthesimplebodies,ofwhichtheveryfirstistheHeaven,inwhoseowngoodsithasmadetheWorldasawholeparticipate”(Simpl.InDeCael.5.32–4).2.Whatistheutility(chrEsimon)ofthestudiedtreatise?Inthecaseheretakenasanexample,itwillbesaidthatthedoctrineofthecategoriesisusefulfortheconstructionoftheapodicticsyllogismor“demonstration,”whichistheinstru-ment(organon)fordistinguishingtruthfromfalsityinthedomainof“theory”,goodfrombadinthedomainof“practice”–theoryandpracticebeingthetwo“parts”ofPhilosophy,ofwhichlogic,basedonthedoctrineofthecategories,isthe“instrumentalpart.”Thecategoriesarethe“terms”oftheproposition,theelementsofthedeclarativestatement(logosapophantikos)which,asa“premiss”5.Cf.M.L.Gill,firstphilosophyinaristotle,inthisvolume.611ACTC3161120/03/2006,04:19PM\nphilippehoffmann(protasis),isinturnanelementofdeductivereasoningorsyllogism,ofwhichamajortypeispreciselytheapodicticsyllogism.(Onterms,seeAristotleinModrakphilosophyoflanguage,inthisvolume;andonthesyllogism,seeDetel,aristotle’slogicandtheoryofscience,inthisvolume.)3.Whatplacedoesthetreatiseoccupyinthesequenceofreadings?Eachtreatiseissituated,invirtueofitsskopos,inapreciseplaceinthecursusalreadydescribed,accordingtoastrictprogressioncorrespondingatoncetothesequentialunfold-ingofdoctrinalinstruction,toapedagogical(orpsychagogical)progression,and,fundamentally,toaspiritualandreligiousprogression–sinceeventhedoctrineofthecategoriesconstitutesa“viaticum”towardthecontemplationoftheFormsanddivineprinciples.InthesequenceoftheinitialreadingoftheOrganon,theCategoriesthereforecomesfirst,immediatelybeforeDeIntrepretatione,thePriorandthePosteriorAnalytics.4.Whatjustifiesthetitleofthestudiedtreatise?(SeeHoffmann,1997).Insomecasesthetitleisclearandneedsnojustification:thusDeAnima,“OntheSoul.”Occasionally(DeCaelo,“OntheHeavens”)itselucidationderivesdirectlyfromtheelucidationoftheskopos,andSimpliciusexplainsthatAristotle’streatisedrawsitstitlefromthefirstanddivinebodythatcommunicatesitsperfectionstothewholeWorld.InthecaseoftheCategories,thequestionismuchmorecomplicated.Amultiplicityoftitlesisactuallydiscussedinthephilosophicaltradition.TheNeoplatonicexegetesrejecttitleslike“Pre-Topics”and“Onthekindsofbeing.”InthefirstcasetheydosobecauseitimpliesasequenceandcontiguitybetweentheCategoriesandtheTopics,andthusa“dialectical”readingoftheCategoriesincompatiblewiththearchitectureoftheOrganon–inheritedfromtheeditionofAristotle’swritingsbyAndronicusofRhodes–andwiththeNeoplatonicinterpre-tationthatisinseparablefromit.Inthesecondcase,thetitleisrejectedbecause“Plotinian”titles–thoseofthePorphyrianeditionoftheEnneads–implyastrictlyontologicalinterpretationofthecategories,whicharethusseenasrealitiesratherthanassignifyingwords:sosuchastudybelongstothe“theoretical”partofphilosophyratherthantologic.The“good”titlecanthusonlybe“Categories.”Thewordisnottobetakeninitsrhetoricalsense(“accusation”asopposedto“defense,”apologia),butina“homonymous”sensegivenbyAristotlehimself–whothusactsasonomatothEtEs,or“name-giver”.Thecategoriesarethepre-dicatesparexcellence,thepredicatesthatarepredicatesandnothingelseandwhichsignifythesupremegenerainwhichparticipateallthingsatlowerlevelsofreality–theinterpretationofAristotle’slogicbeingalignedwithaPlatonicontologyfromtheoutset,applyingtheprincipleofsumphOnia.Itwasalsopointedoutthatthetitle,likethetitlesofPlatonicdialoguesandsometitlesofdiscoursesbythesophistAeliusAristides,isinthenominativecase(ratherthantheusualconstruc-tion,peri+genitive):suchaformulationmanifeststhecapacityoflanguagetopresentthethingsthemselves.5.ArewedealingwithanauthenticworkofthePhilosopher?Thedogmaticauthor-ityofthetreatisedependsonitsauthenticity,andthispointis–whenthequestioncanarise–ofprimeimportance.Variousargumentsarediscussed(stylisticanddoctrinalones,butalsotheexistenceofcross-referencesinthecorpus)inorder612ACTC3161220/03/2006,04:19PM\nwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?toestablishtheauthenticityoftheCategories.Astructuralargumentplaysanessentialrole:itisbecauseitisnecessaryforthecompletenessoftheOrganonthattheCategoriesisauthentic.Withoutthisinauguraltreatisegivingthetermsoftheproposition,theOrganonwouldbe“withoutabeginning”and“withoutahead.”6.Whatisthe“divisionintochapters,”thatis,whatisthestructureofthetreatise?A“syntagmatic”treatiseisperfectfromthetwofolddoctrinalandformalviewpoint,anditmusthaveanorganicunity.TheliteraryperfectionoftheCategories,whichis“tripartite,”wouldthereforebeaffirmed;andthecoherenceofthefourbooksofDeCaelo,unifiedbytheskopos,wouldbeinsistedupon.7.TowhatpartofAristotle’sphilosophydoesthetreatisebelong?Thepointisnotindoubtinmostcases(nohesitation,forexample,inthecaseofthePhysics,theDeCaelo,ortheMetaphysics),butitmustbeclarifiedinthecaseoftheCategories,inconformitywithwhathasbeenestablishedinthestudyofseveralotherpoints(theaim,theutility,theplaceinthesequenceofreadings):theCategoriesbelongtothe“instrumentalpart”ofphilosophythatislogic,andthecategoriesshouldbecarefullydistinguished,asgeneric“beings”studiedbyontology,fromthe“words”(phOnai,lexeis)thatgrammarstudies.QuestionsPreliminarytotheStudyofPlatoAlthoughwehaveabundantcommentariesonPlato,theonlytheoreticaltextthatexpoundstheexegeticalprinciplesthatshouldguidethereadingofPlatoisananonym-ousworkattributabletothesecondhalfofthesixthcentury,theProlegomenatothePhilosophyofPlato,whichhasbeeneditedandstudiedbyL.G.Westerink,J.Trouillard,andA.-Ph.Segonds(1990).Weshallrefertotheintroductiontothisedition(1990,pp.lix–lxxvi),aswellastotheparallelpresentationgivenbyI.Hadot(1987a,[1990,pp.30–4,46]).HereisaverybriefsummaryofthisIntroductiontoPlato,whichoccasionallyderivesfrom(lost)prolegomenacomposedbyProclus:A.BiographyofPlatoB.GeneralintroductiontoPlato’sphilosophy,intenpoints:1.Thecharacter(eidos)ofPlato’sphilosophy:thispointconsistsofasummaryhistoryofGreekphilosophy,intendedtoshowthesuperiorityofPlatonism.2.WhydidPlatowrite,unlikePythagorasandSocrates?3.WhatreasonsjustifyPlato’suseofdialogue?4.OfwhatelementsarePlato’sdialoguescomposed?Acorrespondenceissetupbetweentheelementsofthedialogueandthoseofthecosmos:tothelevelofMatter(hulE)correspondthespeakersofthedialogue,itstimeanditsplace;tothelevelofForm(eidos)correspondsitsstyle;toNaturecorrespondstheformoftheteaching,whichmaybeeitheramereexpositionofPlato’sopinionswithoutinvestigationordemonstration,oraninvestigation,oramixtureofthesetwomodes;totheSoulcorrespondsscientificdemonstrations;“totheIntellect613ACTC3161320/03/2006,04:20PM\nphilippehoffmanncorrespondstheproblemfromwhichdemonstrationsprojectinthemannerofacircumference;”todivinitycorrespondsthegoodatwhichthedialogueaims.Anothercorrespondenceissetupwithalistofsixcauses:“tothematerialcausecorrespondthespeakers,thetimeandtheplace;totheformalcause,thestyle;totheefficientcause,thesoul;totheinstrumentalcause,thedemonstrations;totheexemplarycause,theproblems;tothefinalcause,thegoodaimedatbythedialogue.”5.Fromwherearethetitlesofthedialoguesdrawn?Fromthespeaker(prosOpa)orfromrealities(pragmata)?6.Whatistheprincipleofdivisionforthedialogues?(Notthedramaticsituationortheargumentation,butthedoctrineexpounded.)7.Inwhatform(tropos)aretheconversationsinthedialogues(sunousia)presented?Itisaquestionofstudyingtheformoftheactionorthenarration,theconversa-tionsbeingsometimesrepresenteddirectly,sometimesreportedbyoneormoreintermediaries.AnanalogyisproposedbetweenthesesuccessivereportsandthedegreesofknowledgeinRepublicVI.8.Whataretherulesfordeterminingtheaim(skopos)ofeachofPlato’sdialogues?Tenrulesarelaiddownfordeterminingtheskopos.9.WhatistheorderofPlato’sdialogues?Hereisfoundaradicalcritiqueofthe6tetralogicalorder,andadiscussionofthecanonofIamblichus.10.Whatarethemethodsofinstruction?Fifteenmethodsaredistinguished:divineinspiration,demonstration,definition,division,analysis,indication,image,example,induction,analogy,arithmetic,abstraction,addition,history,andetymology.PriortothereadingofeachPlatonicdialogueacertainnumberof“preliminarypoints”weretreated.Wepossessnosummarylist–unlikewhatisavailableforAristotle–butexaminationoftheintroductionstotheNeoplatoniccommentariesonthevariousdialoguesofPlatohasallowedI.Hadot(1987a[1990,pp.32–4,46–7])torecon-structthefollowinglist,whichincludeseightpoints,ofwhichsomeareidenticaltopointsexaminedbeforereadingAristotle’streatises:1.Howisthedramaticsettingofthedialoguepresented?2.Whoarethespeakersofthedialogue,andwhatistheirsymbolicinterpretation?3.Whatisthegeneraltheme(prothesis)ortheaim(skopos)ofthedialogue?4.Whatisthedialogue’splaceintheorderofreadingsofPlato’sdialogues?5.Whatistheutilityofthedialogue?6.Whatisthedivisionintopartsorchaptersofthedialogue?7.Whatisthedialogue’smannerofexpressionandphilosophicalcharacter?8.Whatistheformoftheconversationinthedialogue,andwhatisitssymbolicmeaning?(Thus,thefourconversationsoftheParmenides,thefirstdirect,theothersindirect,arerelatedtofourontologicallevels.)6.OnThrasyllusandthetetralogicalorderofPlato’swritings,seeMejer,ancientphilosophyandthedoxographicaltradition,inthisvolume.614ACTC3161420/03/2006,04:20PM\nwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?Commentariescomposedfromnotestakenintheteacher’scourse(apophones)andcommentariescomposedbytheexegetehimself:ThecommentaryasaspiritualexerciseTheexegetemightchoosetocomposehisowncommentary,whenimportantissuesareatstake:ifthemajorpartofthecommentariesofAmmoniuswerepublishedbyhisdisciples(suchasAsclepiusandPhiloponus),accordingtotheapophOnEsmethod(Richard,1950),theimportanceofhisinvestigationsoftheDeInterpretatione,the“syntagmatic”characterofwhichhedemonstrated,pushedhimtocomposehisowncommentarypersonally,basedonthatofProclus,andaccompaniedbywhatamountstoaneditionofAristotle’stext.BycontrastwiththemassofcommentariesapophOnEs,oftenproductsoftheschoolofAlexandria,whichareeditionsofnotestakenbyaud-itorsinthecoursesofprofessors,thecommentariesofSimplicius,too,are,likethegreatcommentariesofProclus,thefruitofapersonallaborofcompositionandwriting:theyareagenuine“œuvre,”sometimespolemical,animatedbyaconcerntosummarizethephilosophicaltraditionandtodefendtheancestralreligionoftheHellenes.Andinsuchwrittencommentariesitisnotunusualtocomeacrosspagesattestingtotheliterary,rhetoricalcultivationoftheirauthor.Wemustaddanotherdimensionoftheactofwriting:thepracticeof“spiritualexercises”inwriting.WeowetoittheMeditationsofMarcusAurelius–writtenvari-ations,stylisticallyverypolished,onthefundamentaldogmasofStoicism–butalsomanycommentariesoflateantiquity:forexample,theCommentarybySimpliciusontheHandbookofEpictetus,whichIlsetrautHadothasshowntobeagenuinespiritualexerciseinwriting(I.Hadot1978,pp.147–65;1996,pp.51–60).Thisobservationmaybeappliedtomanyothercommentaries,andwemustquoteastrikingpassageinwhichSimpliciusexpressesthemeaningforhimoftheactofreproducing(andofcopying)longpassages,wordforword,fromIamblichus’scommentaryonAristotle’sCategories:Asforme,IhaveevenreadthecommentariesofsomeofthephilosophersIhavemen-tioned;andIhavetakenasamodelthecommentaryofIamblichus,withasmuchcareasIwascapableof,infollowinghimstepforstepandinfrequentlyusingtheverytextofthisphilosopher.Myaim,inmakingthiscopy(apographE),wasontheonehandtoacquireasfaraspossible,bytheveryactofwriting,amoreexactunderstandingofwhatIamblichuswassaying,andontheothertobringtogreaterclarityandmeasurethisman’ssublimityofthought,whichisinaccessibletomostpeople.Third,itwasalsoinacertainmannertoconcentrateinashorterformtheabundantmassofcommentariesofallkinds...(InCat.3.2–9)Thistextclearlydistinguishestwoacts:theliteralcopyingisameditationthatleadsthephilosopher’sintellecttoa“moreexact,”i.e.,true,understandingofthedifficultdoctrinesexpoundedbyhispredecessor,andthiscopyingalternateswithalaborofliteraryrecomposition(simplificationofexpressionandsummaryofearlierexegeses).Further,theuseofthephrase“moreexactintelligence”suggeststhattheactofcopying(apographE)playsanessentialroleinawakeningTruth,whichisoneofthethree“anagogicalpowers”(Love,Truth,Faith)thatdeterminethedynamismofprayeraccordingtoProclusandSimplicius(Hoffmann,2000a).Thisobservationgainsin615ACTC3161520/03/2006,04:20PM\nphilippehoffmanninterestwhenweobserve,elsewhereintheworkofthesameexegete,thattheliterarywholecomprisinghiscommentariesonthePhysicsandontheDeCaeloculminatesinafinalprayerinthefirstperson,addressedtotheDemiurge,whichdescribestheCom-mentaryitselfasa“hymn”inhonoroftheDemiurgeandtheWorld.Thehymnismeantforagod,whichshowshowmuchtheexegesisofAristotlewasorientedtowardNeoplatonicspirituality.HowCommentariesWereComposedTheexegesisproceedsaccordingtoadivisioninto“lemmas”–shorterorlongersec-tionsofthetextreceivingcommentary–andthecommentatorsometimesdistinguishesbetweentheexplicationofwords(lexis)andtheexplicationofpointsofdoctrine(theOria)(Festugière,1963[1971]).Commentariesoftendeployedahugedocumentation,andweknowthatSimplicius’scommentariesaboundwithquotationsandparaphrasesofphilosophers(beginningwiththepre-Socratics)andearlierexegetesbelongtotheperipateticandNeoplatonictraditions.Again,thenotionofan“authority”–whomightbecitedthroughintermediaries–mustbecarefullydistinguishedfromthatofadirect“source”:inhisCommentaryontheCategories,alargepartofSimplicius’svastdocumentationcomesfromhisprincipalifnotexclusivesources,whicharePorphyry’sCommentaryAdGedaliumandIamblichus’sCommentary,itselfdependentonPorphyry.Thequantitativeextentofthecommentariesoflateantiquityalsoraisestheques-tionofthematerialmediaemployed–theuseduringthisperiodoflarge-formatcodicesisknown–butwearereducedtomakingprudentsuppositionsabouttheuseofmicrographytomakewholefoliosortheirmargins(seebelow)holdlargequantitiesoftext:animportantByzantinemanuscriptofAristotle’sOrganon,theVaticanusUrbinasgraecus35(copiedforArethasofCaesariaaround900)offersanexampleofmicro-graphyusedforthetranscriptionofmarginalNeoplatoniccommentaries,anditmaybetheheirofamuchmoreancientbook-makingtradition.Itmayalsobeasked,stillmoreconcretely,whatkindofbookswereusedbytheNeoplatoniccommentators,andhowthepagesofcommentarieswerelaidout(Hoffmann,2000b).Amajorphenomenonofthehistoryofcommentariesinantiquitywasthetransitionfromthepracticeofputtingthetextcommenteduponandthecommentaryinseparatebooks(rolls)tothepracticeofreunitingthecommentarywithtextreceivingcommentaryinthesamebookandonthesamepage–parcelingthecommentaryoutinthemarginsorencirclingthetextcommentedupon.Threesetsofitemsofevidencefortheexistenceofcommentarieswritteninthemarginsofmanuscriptsshouldbementioned:thequestionisinseparablybothcodicological(sinceitisamatteroflayout,theuseofthespaceonthepage)andliterary(inthesensethattheverycompositionofacommentarycouldtakeplacedirectlyinthemarginsofacopy,orcoulddependonsourcesdistributedonthemarginsofanothervolume).ThusthecommentaryonHesiod’sWorksandDays,attributedtoProclusbythetraditionandbytheSuda,isinfactacommentarybyPlutarchofChaeronea,substan-tiallyannotated,inthemarginsofacopy,byProclus,towhomthewholewasthen616ACTC3161620/03/2006,04:20PM\nwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?attributed:thestudyofthiscaseallowsustounderstandthephenomenonofdirectcompositionofamarginalcommentary(FarragianadiSarzana,1978,1981,1987).TheLifeofProclus,byhisdiscipleMarinus,furnishesananalogouscase.Thebio-grapherinformsusthatProclus,athisrequest,wouldrecordlongcommentariesofhisownmakinginthemarginsofacommentarybySyrianusonOrpheus(seeBrisson,1987).Thisiswhatisdescribedinapassagefromchapter27ofthisLife(SaffreyandSegonds,2001,p.32):AsonedayIwasreadinginhispresencethepoemsofOrpheusandheardhimnotonlyrelating,inhisexplications,whatIamblichusandSyrianussaidaboutthem,butalsoaddingmanyotherdevelopmentsmoresuitedtoOrphictheology,Iaskedthephilosophernottoleaveanylongerwithoutcommentaryapoetrysodivinelyinspired,buttocom-mentonittooinaperfectlycompletemanner.Andherepliedtomethathehadoftenwishedtowriteacommentary,butthathehadbeenobviouslypreventedbycertaindreams:hehadseen,hesaid,histeacherhimself,whoforbadehim,withthreats.Where-uponIthoughtofanotherwayofproceeding:IbeggedhimtoconsenttorecordhisopinionsinthemarginsofSyrianus’sbooks.Asourmaster,aperfectimageoftheGood,agreedtothis,andmadenotesinthecommentariesofSyrianus,wethusobtained,inthesamebook,acollectionofalltheiropinions;andsotherearealsoscholiaandcomment-ariesbyProclusonOrpheuswhichareofmanylines,eventhoughhewasnotabletoannotateuptotheendofthemythology,noralloftheRhapsodies.Proclus,therefore,hadathandacopyofSyrianus’scommentarywithmarginslargeenoughforhimtobeabletowriteinthemscholiaandcommentariescorrespondingtotheexegesishedevelopedorally,inoneofthelaststagesoftheNeoplatoniccursusofstudy.AsinthecaseofthecommentaryonHesiod,wegraspaveryinterestinglinkbetweentheprocessofliterarycompositionanditscodicologicalframe.Supplement-aryconfirmationoftheseconclusionscomesfromthestrangefactthattheSudaattributestobothSyrianusandProclusthesametwoworksbearingonOrphism:OntheTheologyofOrpheusandHarmony(SumphOnia)ofOrpheus,Pythagoras,andPlatowiththeChaldaeanOracles.IthasbeenshownthattheseworksaresubstantiallyduetoSyrianus–andthisfactishistoricallyimportant,sincetheSumphOnia,aswehaveseen,islikeamanifestooftheexegeticalpresuppositionsoftheNeoplatonicschoolinthefifthandsixthcenturies.SystematicexaminationofthequotationsfromtheRhapso-diesbyDamascius–whocommentsuponOrphictheologyandintegratesitintotheNeoplatonicsystembyassociatingitwiththetestimonyandauthorityoftheChaldaeanOracles–hasbeenabletoshowthatDamasciuscertainlyhadbeforehimthefamouscopyofthecommentariesofSyrianus(theSumphOniainparticular)whoselargemarginscontainedthescholiaandcommentariesbyProclus(Brisson,1991).ThusweglimpsetheexistenceofasacredbookofthelibraryinwhichthesuccessorsofPlatoworkedinthefifthandsixthcentury.Thesacredsignificanceofsuchabook–preservedinallprobabilityinthelibraryoftheschoolofAthens–intheeyesoftheselastpagandevotees,theNeoplatonicphilosophers,isattestedbyananecdote,reportedbyDamasciushimselfinhisLifeofIsidorus(=HistoriaPhilosopha),whichmentions–wemaysuppose–othercopiesofthesameOrphictexts.InAlexandria,a“paganmonk”bythenameofSarapionlivedinsolitude,whocultivatedpovertyandwhosespirituallifewentfarbeyondthetechnical617ACTC3161720/03/2006,04:20PM\nphilippehoffmannsubtletiesofphilosophy.Onthisaccounthepossessedonlytwoorthreebooks,amongthemthepoemsofOrpheus,andthesewerethebooksthathesenttoIsidorus,theteacherofDamascius,asanactofspiritualrecognition(VitaIsidori,fr.287Suda;231.5–6and233.2–4Zintzen;seeFestugière,1966[1971,p.584]).Thethirdbitofevidence,whichismoreproblematic,isnolessinteresting.InordertoexplainthecompositionandthethematicchoicesofBoethius,whosecommentariesonAristotleusedAtheniansources,JamesShiel(1958,1987)hashypothesizedthatBoethiushadbeforehimamanuscriptofAristotlewhosevastmarginswerefilledwithananthology,arrangedin“chains,”ofextractsfromNeoplatoniccommentaries,espe-ciallyPorphyry’s.Thisopinionhasbeendisputedbyanotherspecialist,StenEbbesen(1987),whojudgesthatthesameliteraryanddoctrinalphenomenacanbeexplainedbytheuseofcodicesincludingonlycommentaries–forexample,acompletePorphyry.Thequestionmustthereforeremainopen,buttakentogethertheseseveralkindsofevidenceopenupstimulatingperspectivesontheconcretecircumstancesofthecompositionofancientcommentaries.BibliographyWorksCitedBrisson,L.(1987).“Proclusetl’Orphisme.”InJ.PépinandH.D.Saffrey(eds.),ProcluslecteuretinterprètedesAnciens(pp.43–104).Paris:ÉditionsduCNRS.——.(1991).“Damasciusetl’Orphisme.”RecherchesetRencontres,3,OrphismeetOrphée(FestschriftforJeanRudhardt),157–209.——.(2000).“LaplacedesOraclesChaldaïquesdanslaThéologiePlatonicienne.”InA.P.SegondsandC.Steel(eds.),ProclusetlaThéologiePlatonicienne(pp.109–62).Leuven-Paris:ActesduColloqueInternationaldeLouvain.Ebbesen,S.(1987).“BoethiusasanAristotelianscholar.”InJ.Wiesner(ed.),Aristoteles:WerkundWirkung.(FestschriftforPaulMoraux)(vol.2,pp.286–311).Berlin:deGruyter.Repr.underthetitle,“BoethiusasanAristotelianCommentator.”InR.Sorabji(ed.),AristotleTransformed.TheAncientCommentatorsandtheirInfluence(pp.373–91).Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.FarragianadiSarzana,C.(1978).“IlcommentarioProclianoalleOpereeiGiorni.I.PlutarcoFontediProclo.”Aevum,52,17–40.——.(1981).“IlcommentarioProclianoalleOpereeiGiorni.II.Destinazioneefortunadell’operanellaScuolad’Ateneedopolasuachiusura.”Aevum,55,22–9.——.(1987).“LecommentaireàHésiodeetlaPaideiaencyclopédiquedeProclus.”InJ.PépinandH.D.Saffrey(eds.),ProcluslecteuretinterprètedesAnciens(pp.21–41).Paris:ÉditionsduCNRS.Festugière,A.-J.(1963).“ModesdecompositiondesCommentairesdeProclus.”MuseumHelveticum,20.Repr.inA.-J.Festugière(1971)Étudesdephilosophiegrecque(pp.551–74).Paris:Vrin.——.(1966).“Proclusetlareligiontraditionnelle.”InMélangesAndréPiganiol(pp.1581–90).Paris.ReprinA.-J.Festugière(1971)Étudesdephilosophiegrecque(pp.575–84).Paris:Vrin.——.(1969).“L’ordredelecturedesdialoguesdePlatonauxVe/VIesiècles.”MuseumHelveticum,26,281–96.ReprinA.-J.Festugière(1971)Étudesdephilosophiegrecque(pp.535–50).Paris:Vrin.——.(1971).Étudesdephilosophiegrecque.Paris:Vrin.618ACTC3161820/03/2006,04:20PM\nwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?Goulet-Cazé,M.-O.(1982).“L’arrière-planscolairedela‘ViedePlotin.’”InL.Brisson,M.-O.Goulet-Cazé,R.Goulet,andD.O’Brien(eds.),Porphyre.LaViedePlotin.(vol.1):Travauxpréliminairesetindexgreccomplet(pp.229–80).Paris:Vrin.Hadot,I.(1978).Leproblèmedunéoplatonismealexandrin:HiéroclèsetSimplicius.Paris:Étudesaugustiniennes.——.(1984).Artslibérauxetphilosophiedanslapenséeantique.Paris:Étudesaugustiniennes.——.(1987a).“Lesintroductionsauxcommentairesexégétiqueschezlesauteursnéoplatoniciensetlesauteurschrétiens.”InM.Tardieu(ed.),Lesrèglesdel’interprétation(pp.99–122).Paris:Cerf.Repr.inI.Hadot,Ph.Hoffmann,P.Hadot,andJ.-P.Mahé(1990).Simplicius.Commentairesurles“Catégories”(pp.21–47).Trans.(intoFrench)directedbyI.Hadot.(vol.1):Introduc-tion.Premièrepartie[pp.1–9,3Kalbfleisch].Leiden:Brill.——.(ed.).(1987b).Simplicius:savie,sonoeuvre,sasurvie(pp.183–221).Berlin:deGruyter.——.(1991).“TheRoleoftheCommentariesonAristotleintheTeachingofPhilosophyAccordingtothePrefacesoftheNeoplatonicCommentariesontheCategories.”InH.BlumenthalandH.Robinson(eds.),AristotleandtheLaterTradition(=OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy.Suppl.vol.1991)(pp.175–89).Oxford:OxfordUniversity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dSegonds,A.-P.(2001).(withcollaborationofConcettaLuna).Marinus:Proclus,ousurleBonheur.Texteétabli,traduitetannoté.Paris:CollectiondesUniversitésdeFrance.Shiel,J.(1958).“Boethius’CommentariesonAristotle.”MedievalandRenaissanceStudies,4,217–44.Areworkedversion(withabibliographicalupdate)inR.Sorabji(ed.)(1990)Aris-totleTransformed.TheAncientCommentatorsandtheirInfluence(pp.349–72).Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.——.(1987).“TheGreekCopyofPorphyrios’IsagogeusedbyBoethius.”InJ.Wiesner(ed.),Aristoteles:WerkundWirkung.(FestschriftforPaulMoraux)(vol.2,pp.312–40).Berlin:deGruyter.620ACTC3162020/03/2006,04:20PM\nwhatwascommentaryinlateantiquity?Tarán,L.(1984).“AmicusPlatosedmagisamicaveritas.FromPlatoandAristotletoCer-vantes.”AntikeundAbendland,30,93–124.Tardieu,M.(1990).Lespaysagesreliques.Routesethaltessyriennesd’IsidoreàSimplicius.Leuven/Paris:Peeters.vandenBerg,R.M.(2001).Proclus’Hymns.Leiden:Brill.vanLiefferinge,C.(1999).LaThéurgie,desOraclesChaldaïquesàProclus.Liège:Centreinter-nationald’étudedelareligiongrecqueantique.Westerink,L.G.(1971).“Damascius,commentateurdePlaton.”InLenéoplatonisme(pp.253–60).Paris:EditionsduCNRS.Repr.inL.G.Westerink(1980).TextsandStudiesinNeoplatonismandByzantineLiterature(pp.271–8).Amsterdam:Hakkert.Westerink,L.G.,Trouillard,J.,andSegonds,A.-P.(1990).ProlégomènesàlaPhilosophiedePlaton.Paris:CollectiondesUniversitésdeFrance.FurtherReadingTheGreektextsoftheNeoplatoniccommentatorsonAristotlehavebeeneditedintheseries,CommentariainAristotelemGraeca(citedasCAG),andalargenumberofthemarecurrentlyavailableinEnglishtranslationintheseries,AncientCommentatorsonAristotle,directedbyRichardK.Sorabji(publishedbyDuckworthandCornell).Collectionsofstudieshavebeenmen-tionedintheabovebibliographyofreferences.Thefollowingwillalsobereadwithprofit:Busse,A.(1891).AmmoniusinPorphyriiisagogensivequinquevoces.CAG4.3.Berlin:Reimer.Goulet-Cazé,M.-O.etal.(eds.).(2000).LeCommentaireentretraditionetinnovation.Paris:Vrin.Hadot,I.(1997).“Lecommentairephilosophiquecontinudansl’Antiquité.”Antiquitétardive,5,169–76.Hadot,I.andHadot,P.(2004).Apprendreàphilosopherdansl’Antiquité.L’enseignementdu“Manueld’Epictète”etsoncommentairenéoplatonicien.Paris:LeLivredePoche.Hadot,P.(1974).“L’harmoniedesphilosophiesdePlotinetd’AristoteselonPorphyredansleCommentairedeDexippesurlesCatégories.”InPlotinoeilNeoplatonismoinOrienteeinOccidente(pp.31–47).Rome:AccademianazionaledeiLincei.EnglishversioninR.Sorabji(ed.),(1990)AristotleTransformed:TheAncientCommentatorsandtheirInfluence(pp.125–40).London:Duckworth/Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.Articlerepr.(inFrench)inP.Hadot(1999)Plotin,Porphyre.Étudesnéoplatoniciennes(pp.355–82).Paris:LesBellesLettres.——.(1976).“LemythedeNarcisseetsoninterprétationparPlotin.”Nouvellerevuedepsychanalyse,13,81–108.Repr.inP.Hadot(1999)Plotin,Porphyre.Étudesnéoplatoniciennes(pp.225–66).Paris:LesBellesLettres.——.(1981).“ImagesmythiquesetthèmesmystiquesdansunpassagedePlotin(V.8.10–13).”InNéoplatonisme.(FestschriftforJeanTrouillard)(pp.205–14).LesCahiersdeFontenay(ÉcolenormalesupérieuredeFontenayauxRoses),no.19–22.——.(1981).“Ouranos,KronosandZeusinPlotinus’TreatiseagainsttheGnostics.”InH.J.BlumenthalandR.A.Markus(eds.),NeoplatonismandearlyChristianThought.(FestschriftforA.H.Armstrong)(pp.124–37).London:VariorumPublications.[OnthephilosophicalinterpretationofthemythofOuranos,CronosandZeus=theOne,theIntellectofSpirit,thesoul:agoodexampleoftheharmonizationoftraditionalmythologicaldataandofphilo-sophicalconcepts].——.(1993).Exercicesspirituelsetphilosophieantique.Paris:Étudesaugustiniennes.Revisedandexpandededition.Paris:Michel,2002.——.(1995).Qu’est-cequelaphilosophieantique?Paris:Gallimard/Folio.621ACTC3162120/03/2006,04:20PM\nphilippehoffmannHoffmann,Ph.(trans.)&Luna,C.(2001).Simplicius.CommentairesurlesCatégoriesd’Aristote.Chapitres2–4(Trans.[intoFrench]byPh.HoffmannandCommentarybyC.Luna).Paris:LesBellesLettres.Pépin,J.(1966).“Porphyre,exégèted’Homère.”InPorphyre.Entretienssurl’AntiquitéClassique(pp.231–66).Vandœuvres-Genève:FondationHardt.Saffrey,H.D.(1981).“L’HymneIVdeProclus,prièreauxdieuxdesOraclesChaldaïques.”InNéoplatonisme(FestschriftforJeanTrouillard)(pp.297–312).Fontenay-aux-Roses.Repr.inH.D.Saffrey(2000)LenéoplatonismeaprèsPlotin(pp.193–206).Paris:Vrin.——.(1981).“Lesnéoplatoniciensetlesmythesgrecs.”InY.Bonnefoy(ed.),Dictionnairedesmythologiesetdesreligionsdessociétéstraditionnellesetdumondeantique.(vol.2[K–Z],pp.157–63).Paris:Flammarion.——.(1987).“CommentSyrianus,lemaîtredel’écolenéoplatonicienned’Athènes,considérait-ilAristote?”InJ.Wiesner(ed.),Aristoteles:WerkundWirkung(FestschriftforPaulMoraux)(vol.2,pp.205–14).Berlin:deGruyter.Repr.inH.D.Saffrey(1990)RecherchessurlenéoplatonismeaprèsPlotin(pp.131–40).Paris:Vrin.VersioninEnglish,entitled“HowdidSyrianusregardAristotle?”inR.Sorabji(ed.)(1990)AristotleTransformed:TheAncientCommentatorsandtheirInfluence(pp.173–79).London:Duckworth/Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.——.(1992).“Proclus,lesMusesetl’amourdeslivresàAthènesauVesiècle.”InH.J.Westra(ed.).FromAthenstoChartres.NeoplatonismandMedievalThought.(FestschriftforEdouardJeauneau)(pp.163–71).Leiden:Brill.Repr.inH.D.Saffrey(2000)LenéoplatonismeaprèsPlotin(pp.169–77).Paris:Vrin.Sheppard,A.(1987).“Proclus’PhilosophicalMethodofExegesis:TheUseofAristotleandtheStoicsintheCommentaryontheCratylus.”InPépin,J.andSaffrey,H.D.(eds.),ProcluslecteuretinterprètedesAnciens(pp.137–51).Paris:ÉditionsduCNRS.Sorabji,R.(ed.).(1990).AristotleTransformed:TheAncientCommentatorsandtheirInfluence.London:Duckworth/Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.——.(2005).ThePhilosophyoftheCommentators,200–600AD:ASourcebook.(3vols.).Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress/London:Duckworth.Steel,C.(1992).“LeSophistecommetextethéologiquedansl’interprétationdeProclus.”InE.P.BosandP.A.Meijer(eds.),OnProclusandhisInfluenceinMedievalPhilosophy(pp.51–64).Leiden:Brill.Strange,S.K.(1987).“Plotinus,Porphyry,andtheNeoplatonicInterpretationofthe‘Categor-ies’.”ANRWII36.2(pp.955–74).622ACTC3162220/03/2006,04:20PM\nPartVICulture,Philosophy,andtheSciencesACTC3262320/03/2006,04:20PM\ngáborbetegh624ACTC3262420/03/2006,04:20PM\ngreekphilosophyandreligion32GreekPhilosophyandReligionGÁBORBETEGHWhenoneconsiderstherelationshipbetweenphilosophyandreligioninantiquity,whatspringsintoone’smindmostreadilyisprobablythetrialandexecutionofSocrates.Socrates,whoinmanywaysrepresentstheparadigmaticfigureofthephilosopher,wastriedonchargesofimpiety,foundguilty,andexecutedbytheAthe-nians.Wecouldthencontinuebyenumeratingsimilarcases–thetrialsofAnaxagoras,Protagoras,andDiagoras,allthreeonchargesofimpiety.Theseinfamousstoriesmightverywellsuggestthattherelationshipbetweenphilosophyandreligionwasthatofvehementandviolentclashes:thephilosopher,thefree-thinkingintellectual,didnotrespectthereligiousdogmasandinstitutionsimposedbytradition,whereasthereligiouspowersofthecitybrutallypenalizedallsuchtransgressions.Oncloserinspectionitturnsouthoweverthat,apartfromthetrialofSocrates,itisoutstandinglydifficulttoestablisheventhemostbasichistoricalfactsaboutthesecases.ItremainsopentodebatewhetherAnaxagorasandProtagoraswereactuallybroughttotrial,orwhetherthelyricpoetDiagorashadanythingtodowithphilo-sophy.Butevenifwetakeatfacevalueeverythingthatwecangatherfromlater,mainlyHellenistic,sources,wehavetorealizethatallthesecasesareconcentratedintheveryspecificpoliticalandintellectualclimateofAthensaroundtheendofthefifthcenturybce.Whenonebroadenstheperspectiveandexaminesthewholeperiodfromthesixthcenturybcetothesixthcenturyce,fromIoniatoItaly,onestartstorealize,onthecontrary,howexceptionaltheseAtheniantrialswere,andingeneralhowrelaxedtherelationshipbetweenreligionandphilosophywas.Itturnsoutthatallthroughantiquity,fromXenophanestothelateNeoplatonists,philosopherskeptformulatingtheirviewsaboutthenatureofthedivine,andtheseviewsalwaysmeantavastdepar-turefromthetraditionalrepresentationsofthegods,andoftenincorporatedacriticismoftraditionalreligiousattitudes.TheseviewsandcriticismswerenolessradicalthantheonespronouncedbySocrates,yettheydidnotresultinopenhostility.Itstartstoappear,then,thatthetrialofSocratesisnotatallcharacteristic;whatneedsexplana-tionisratherwhyinthisparticularcaseandinthosespecifichistoricalcircumstances1thecommunityreactedinsuchanextremeform.Itisnolessremarkablethat,byandlarge,thephilosophers’attitudetowardstradi-tionalreligiositywasamixtureofinnovation,criticism,andconservativism.Theywereopenlycriticalofmanyformsoftraditionalbeliefsandcertainformsofreligious1.OnthecaseofSocrates,seethepapersinSmithandWoodruff(2000),andespeciallyParker(2000);inthisvolumeseeMorrison,socrates.625ACTC3262520/03/2006,04:20PM\ngáborbeteghpractice,buttheywereconvinced(withsomeveryrareexceptions)thatthereligiousinstitutionssanctionedbytraditionshouldbepreserved.Inaway,philosophersdidexactlywhattheindictmentagainstSocratesstates–“theydidnotbelieveinthegodsofthecityandintroducednewgods”–insofarastheypropoundedradicallynovelviewsaboutthenatureandroleofthedivine.Thephilosophersthemselves,however,mostoftenpresentedtheirradicalviewsasmereamendments,conceptualclarifications,orevenasareturntoamoreancienttradition.Theyconceivedoftheirnovelideasascorrectionsthatcanrenderexistingformsofreligiousworshipgenuinelymeaningful.AncientlistsofthosewhodeniedtheexistenceofgodsincludeProdicusofCeos,TheodorusofCyrene,CritiasofAthensandEuhemerus.Asfaraswecanreconstructitonthebasisoftheratherscantyevidence,thecommonstrategyofthesepeoplewastoexplaintheoriginoftheworshipofthegodswithoutreferencetohigher,divinepow-ers.Prodicus,forexample,saidthatearlymandeified“thefruitsofearthandvirtuallyeverythingthatcontributedtohissubsistence.”Somehumanbeingswerealsodeifiedbecauseoftheiroutstandingcontributiontohumanculture:Demeterbecausesheintroducedcorn,Dionysusbecauseheintroducedwine(Philod.DePiet.PHerc.1428fr.19trans.HenrichsandPHerc.1428col.3.12–13Henrichs(=DK84B5)).Soitisnotthecasethatthereisnothingcorrespondingtotherecipientsoftraditionalcults,butratherthattheydonotbelongtoadifferent,divinesphereofreality.Critias,ontheotherhand,wasincludedinthelistsofatheistsonaccountofatheoryexpoundedbyacharacterinoneofhisplays.Accordingtothistheoryaclevermanintroducedtheideaofgodinordertomakepeoplefeardivineretributionforwrong-doingandthereby2makethemmorelaw-abiding(S.E.M9.54).Eveniftheseviewswerenotsustainedbyphilosophicalarguments,theycouldmakethequestion“Whetherthegodsexist?”alegitimatephilosophicaltopic(cf.e.g.,Arist.APo.II.1,89b33;Cic.ND2.4;S.E.M9.49;Aët.Placit.1.7).Asareaction,allmajorphilosophersfromthetimeofPlatodevelopedproofsfortheexistenceofgod(s),butnooneagainstit.Itseemsthatphilosophicalatheisminantiquitywasastraw-man.Itremainstrue,ofcourse,thatphilosopherscouldstillcalloneanother“godless”onaccountoftheircontrastingcharacterizationsofgods.Moreover,besidesproducingargumentsfortheexistenceofgods,philosopherswerealsokeentoexplainthattheirtenetswereperfectlycompatiblewithtraditionalformsofreligiosityandcouldsustaininstitutionalformsofreligiouspractice–andthesearguments,itseems,werenotsimplecover-upstoavoidchargesofimpiety.Thus,philosophersconceivedtheirinno-vationsandcriticismsnotasarupturewithtraditionalreligiosityoradevastatingattackfromtheoutside,butasinternalreformsgroundedonagenuineunderstandingofthenatureofthedivine.Thenorm,asitturnsout,wasthatthecommunityandthereligiousauthoritiestoleratedthephilosophers’speculations,whereasthephilosophersformulatedtheirrespectivetenetswithinthetraditionalframework.2.ProtagorasofAbderaisalsoastandarditemontheancientlistsofatheists,althoughheapparentlyneversaidthat“thegodsdonotexist.”ThefamousopeningsentenceofhisOnGodsisagnosticalsointhisrespect:“Astothegods,Icannotknoweitherthattheyexistorthattheydonotexist,orwhattheirformis;fortherearemanyobstaclestoknowingit:boththeobscurityofthequestionandtheshortnessoflife”(D.L.9.51).OnProtagoras,seeBarney,thesophisticmovement,inthisvolume.626ACTC3262620/03/2006,04:20PM\ngreekphilosophyandreligionTheFrameworkofGreekReligionAlthoughtheGreeksdidnothaveawordcorrespondingtotheEnglishword“reli-gion,”religiousphenomenawereubiquitous,organizingeverymomentofaGreek’slife.Therewasagodsupervisingorprotectingeveryhumanaction,publicorprivate,frommorningtoevening,frombirthtodeath,andbeyonddeath.Rivers,forests,seas,mountains,andtheheavenlybodieswerealsoidentifiedasdivinitiesorseenasinhabitedbygods.ItwasZeuswhorained,andtheseastormedbecausePoseidonwasangry.AlthoughwearenotsurehowexactlyThalesmeantit,hisdictumthat“everythingisfullofgods”(DK11A22)seemsafairrepresentationoftheGreek3experience.Therelationshipbetweenhumansandgodswasestablishedandmaintainedthroughritual.Asallmajorandminoractivitieswereputundertheauspicesofthegods,itwasimperativetoobtainthesanctionoftherelevantgodforthesuccessfulperformanceofanyaction.Itmeantinpracticethateverydayprivateandpubliclifewasorganizedaroundsacrifices,ritualactionswiththeaimofgainingdivineapprovalandcoopera-tion.Large-scalepublicfestivalsalsocreatedandsustainedsocialandpoliticalbondsbetweenindividualsaswellascities,andtheyofferedspiritualcomfortanddistractionfromeverydaylifewithprocessions,sport,dramatic,andothercompetitions.Thisemphasisonritualcanbecontrastedwiththeabsenceofdogma.EachGreekcityhad“sacredlaws,”carvedinstoneorbronzeanddisplayedatpublicplaces,toregulateritualbehaviorandtofixthecalendarofpublicfestivals.Theperformativesideofthecultwasfixedandregulated,butnotitsinterpretation.Therewasnoat-tempttoconstituteandcodifyacreed,acorpusofindisputablebeliefsaboutthedivineanditsrelationtohumans.Intheabsenceofaregulatorydogma,contrastingconcep-tionsandrepresentationsofthegodsco-existedwithoutanyfeelingofantagonism.ThepoemsofHomerandHesiodcertainlycreatedageneralframeofreferenceandastandardwayofthinkingaboutthegods,butlaterauthors,epicpoets,andtragicwriters,hadnoqualmsformulatingalternativeaccountsandwerenotreproachedfordoingso.TheideaofheresyisentirelyalientoGreekreligion.Eusebeia,commendablereligiousattitude,consistednotinfidelitytoacodeofbeliefbutinthecorrectperform-anceofritualobligationsandregularlyhonoringthegodswithgenerous,thoughnotexcessive,offerings.Another,related,featureofGreekreligionisthatithadnoseparatepriestlycaste.Therewereofcourseroledistinctionsintheperformanceofpublicritualsandinthemaintenanceofplacesofcult.Yettheleadingroleswereinprincipleopentoeveryone,andwereinpracticeattributedonthebasisofsocial,politicalandeconomicpower,familymembership,orincertaincasesbylot.Culticofficeswerenotconnectedtospecialclaimsofauthoritativeknowledgeaboutthegodsanddidnotconferspecialpowersontheprieststocontrolandrepressalternativeviews.Inmostcases,thepolit-icalcommunityretainedtheultimatecontroloverreligiousmatters.NotapriestbutagroupofordinarycitizensraisedthechargesagainstSocrates,andnotaclericalbodybuttheassemblyoftheAtheniansdecidedhiscase.3.Cf.Hussey,thebeginningsofscienceandphilosophyinarchaicgreece,inthisvolume.627ACTC3262720/03/2006,04:20PM\ngáborbeteghGreekreligionisalsocharacterizedbytheco-existenceoflocalvariants.The“sacredlaws”variedagreatdealfromonepolistoanother.Mostofthefestivalsandcultplaceswerealsolocal.Themythicalnarrativesaboutthegodswereoftenconnectedtolocalcultsandshowedaconsiderabledegreeofvariation.Ontheotherhand,fromtheeighthcenturybceonwards,somesanctuarieshadattainedawiderimportanceandweredevelopedintoPan-Helleniccultcenters.Suchcultcenters,togetherwiththepoemsofHomerandHesiod,constitutedsharedpointsofreferenceandcreatedasenseofidentity.Therecognitionoftheunderlyingunitydidnothoweverdemandstandardization;differencesandvarietywereacknowledgedasafact.Theabovecharacterizationisformulatedwithconstantreferencetothepolisastheframeworkofpoliticalandsociallife.ItshowstheresilienceoftheinstitutionsofGreekreligionthattheycouldsurvivepracticallyintactthroughthepoliticalandsocialchangesoftheHellenisticage.Itremainstrue,ontheotherhand,thatthedisruptionofthepolisbroughtwithitthegrowingimportanceofmysterycults,whichfocusedmoreontheindividualandhisorherspiritualneeds.Thisgeneralframeworkopenedupthepossibilitiesandsetthelimitsforthephilo-sopherinmattersofreligion.Thelackofafixedcorpusofbeliefsmadeitpossibleforthephilosophertoformulateradicalviewsaboutthegodsandstillfeelhimselfpartofthetradition.Thesamecanexplainthatthecommunitycouldacceptthephilosopher’sspeculationsprovidedthatthesedidnotunderminethebeliefinthesocialandspir-itualimportanceoftheestablishedinstitutionsofworship.Theabsenceofapriestlycastemeantthatthephilosopherdidnotneedtocompeteinclaimsofknowledgewithmembersofafixedsocialgroupendowedwithspecialauthorityandpower.Therivalswerethetraditionalpoets,Homeraboveall,buttherewasnoclergytochallengeandnohighpriesttocontrolthephilosopher’steachings.Remarkably,Socratesdoesnotcross-questionapriestbutthereligiousfanaticEuthyphroinordertodestroyunfoundedclaimsofknowledgeabout“piety.”Finally,therecognitionofco-existingvariantsmadethecommunitymoretoleranttowardsthealternativeideasofferedbythephilo-sopher,aslongastheseviewswerenotfelttothreatenthesocialcohesionandmoralordercreatedbysharedinstitutionsofcult.Intheabsenceofaseparateclericalclassphilosopherswereconfidentthatitwastheirspecialcompetencetoinquireintothenatureofthedivineandtodefinethecorrecthumanattitudetowardsthegods.Beforephilosophyemergedasaprofession-alizedintellectualactivityroughlyinthegenerationofSocrates,thepre-Socratic“sage”couldbothbeareligiousteacherandengageinspeculationsthatarephilosophicallyinteresting.PythagorasandEmpedoclesareexamplesofthistype.Buttheologyremainedaprimarilyphilosophicaldisciplineevenlater.SoAristotlecouldclaimthattheologyisfirstphilosophy(Met.E.1),andChrysippuscouldsaythattheologyisthe“fulfillment”(teletai)ofphilosophy(SVF2.42).Paradoxically,theveryfeaturesthatmadethephilosopher’senterprisepossiblebecamealsohismaintargets.Asweshallseeinthelastsectionofthischapter,themainthrustofthephilosophicalcritiqueofreligionconcernsitsritualisticbehavioralcharacter.Furthermore,philosophicalconceptionsofthedivinehaduniversalisticclaims,leavingverylittleroomforlocalorindividualvariation.Becausethephilosopherhadstrongviewsaboutthenatureofthedivine,hethoughtheknewwhatothersshouldconsidertrue.ThereligiousbeliefsofthecitizeninPlato’sLawsareundermuch628ACTC3262820/03/2006,04:20PM\ngreekphilosophyandreligion4strictercontrolthaninanyexistingGreekpolis.Inaway,philosopherstriedtofixwhatwasleftfluidbytraditionalformsofrepresentationandseizetheroleleftopenbytraditionalreligiousinstitutions.TheConceptualizationoftheDivineAswehaveseen,thepresenceofgodswasfeltineverysphereoftheworld,andritualizedformsofhonoringthegodscreatedthefiberofpublicandprivatelife.Butwhoare,afterall,thesegodswhopermeatetheworldandareworshipedincult?Ofcourse,storiesaretoldandpoemsarecomposedabouttheirbirths,marriages,deal-ings,andfightswitheachother,aswellastheirinvolvementinhumanaffairs.Theirimagesaredisplayedincultstatuesandonpaintings.Butwhatisthegroundforthesepictorialrepresentationsandhowmuchcanweacceptoftheseoftencontradictorystories?Afterall,whoorwhatisagod?Whatdoesitscharacteristicactivityconsistin,andwhatisitsroleinourworld?And,onthewhole,canwefindanswerstothesequestions,andifso,whereshallwestart?Thisapproachtothegodsandtheirtradi-tionalrepresentationsischaracterizedbycriticalreason,demandsofcoherence,and5someformofreductionism;awayofthinkingthatwemaycallphilosophical.ThefirstauthorwhoseworkprominentlydisplaysthisattitudeisXenophanesofColophon(ca.570–475bce).Hisreflectionsonthenatureofthedivinealreadycon-tainingermmanyofthemajortenetsthatlaterphilosopherswillworkoutinmoredetailandargueforwithamoresophisticatedconceptualapparatus.Xenophanes’theologycomprisesacriticalandaconstructiveaspect.Thecriticalaspectconsistsinanattempttoisolateanddiscardtraitswhichpopularbeliefcommonlybutmistakenlyattributestothegods.Heshowsthattheoriginofsuchattributionsisthatpeopletendtopicturethegodsintheirownimage:“Ethiopianssaythattheirgodsaresnub-nosedandblack;/Thraciansthattheirsareblue-eyedandred-haired”(DK21B16,trans.Lesher,1992).Clearly,suchbodilytraitsareaccidentalandtheirdifferencesdonotaffectasharedcorenotionofthegods.Xenophanesinaremarkablethoughtexperimentcarriestheargumenttotheextremeandshowsthatpracticallyallanthropomorphicfeaturesbelonginthisclass:Butifhorsesoroxen,orlionshadhandsorcoulddrawwiththeirhandsandaccomplishsuchworksasmen,horseswoulddrawthefiguresofthegodsassimilartohorses,andtheoxenassimilartooxen,andtheywouldmakethebodiesofthesortwhicheachofthemhad.(DK21B15)4.OnthetheologyinPlato’sLaws,seeLane,plato’spoliticalphilosophy,sectionontheLaws,inthisvolume.5.Ishalltreatthenotionofphilosophicaltheologyrestrictivelyandshallnotdiscusscasesinwhichanentity(thearchEofthepre-SocraticsorPlato’sForms)iscalled“divine”onaccountofsomeofitscharacteristics.Foradefenseofsucharestriction,seeBroadie(1999).629ACTC3262920/03/2006,04:20PM\ngáborbeteghButhowfarcanwegoinstrippingoffnon-essentialfeatures?Whatwillremainasashared,fundamentalnotionofthedivine?Thenagain,thisargumentfrom“localvariations”cannotprovethatnoneofthesecontrastingaccountsiscorrect,butonlythatwecannotrelyonanyoftheminseparatingtruefromfalse.Theoutcomeistwo-fold.Ontheonehand,wecometounderstandthatthebasisoftraditionalrepre-sentationsisveryshaky.Ontheotherhand,theargumentalsoshowsthatweareboundtothehumanperspective,andthehumanperspectivehasseriouslimitations,especiallywhenitcomestounderstandingthegods(seee.g.DK21B34).Thenon-anthropomorphismofgodsbecomesacommonplaceforlaterphilosophers.But,remarkably,Platostillfeelstheneedtoemphasizethatthecosmicgod“needednoeyes,sincetherewasnothingvisibleleftoutsideit;nordiditneedears,sincetherewasnothingaudiblethere,either”and,forsimilarreasons,itdidnotneedorgansforbreath-ingandeating,norhandsorfeet(Ti.33c–34a,trans.Zeyl2000).Onlytheatomistscontinuedtomaintain,somewhatprovocatively,thatthegodshavehumanshapes6(Democritus:S.E.M9.42;Epicurus:scholiumtoKD1).AnothercrucialelementinXenophanes’criticismofpopularrepresentationsofgodsisethical.HereproachesHomerandHesiodforhavingattributedtothegodsallkindsofimmoralacts:“theft,adultery,andmutualdeceit”(DK21B11,B12).ItisimpossibletodecideonthebasisoftheexistingfragmentswhetherXenophanesconsideredtheattributionofillicitactionsasyetanotheraspectofascribinganthropomorphicfea-turestothegods,orwhetherinsteadhethoughtthatimmoralactsareincompatiblewithdivineperfection.Probablyboth.ThistypeofcriticismhasbecomeespeciallyemphaticinthedialoguesofPlato.ForPlato,andprobablyalreadyforSocrates,theunquestionablemajorpremiseofallspeculationaboutthegodsisthat:“Agodreallyisgood,andshouldbespokenofaccordingly”(Rep.II,379b1).Goodnessconceivedastheessentialfeatureofthegodheadentailsthatagodcannotdoanythingharmful7eithertoothergodsortohumanbeings.Twoconclusionsfollownecessarily.First,theviewexpressedbyHomerandsharedbymostpeoplethatinhumanaffairsthegodsarethecausesofgoodandbadalike,mustbefalse.Thegodscanonlybemaderesponsibleforwhatisgoodandbeneficialforus;weourselvesaretobepraisedorblamedfortherest.Theargumenthascrucialramificationsforethicalthinkingasawhole,becauseitshiftsthecenterofresponsibilityfromdivinetohumanagents.Sec-ond,thetraditionalstoriesinwhichgodsareshowntohateandfightwitheachother,doinjustices,andinflictpunishments,mustalsobefalse.Whatisatissuehereisnotonlythetruth-valueofthepoeticrepresentationsofgods,butalsotheirpragmaticroleinformingthecharacterofhumanbeings.AsPlatoemphasizes,childrengrowuplisteningtothesestories,andthedivinebeingspresentedtherebecomepowerfulrolemodelsforthem.Soevenwhenpeoplecommitsuchhorrendousactsasinflictingharshpunishmentsontheirfathers,theycansimplypointtoZeusandsaythathedid6.OntheEpicureantreatmentofthegods,seeMorel,epicureanism,inthisvolume.7.Empedoclesisquiteexceptionalinthisrespect.Hecreatesadualisticschemebypositingtwodivineprinciples,LoveandStrife,who,inadditiontotheirrespectivephysicalfunctions,alsorepresentoppositemoralvalues.AnenigmaticreferenceinPlato’sLawsX(896e)hassometimesbeeninterpretedassuggestingacomparabledualisticscheme.Ontheatomists’godsbeingharmful,seebelow.630ACTC3263020/03/2006,04:20PM\ngreekphilosophyandreligionthesametohisfatherKronos.ThuswehavetocondemnHomerandtheotherpoetsforspeakinguntrulyaboutthegodsandtherebycorruptingtheyouth.Or–andthiswasthemainlineofdefensebothbeforeandafterthetimeofPlato–wehavetosaythat,trulyunderstood,Homerwasspeakingaboutsomethingcompletelydifferentandshouldbeinterpretedallegorically.So,forexample,whenHomerpicturesthegodsinfiercecombatagainsteachotherinIliad20,inrealityheisspeakingabouttheinter-8playofphysicalelementsinthecosmos.Wecancriticizethepoeticaccountsofthegodsasbeingfalse,orwecandeclarethattheyspeakaboutsomethingelse–eitherwayweendupclaimingthatsuchstoriesarenotdirectlyinformativeaboutthegods.Alongwhatlinescouldthephilosopherthenestablishasubstantivenotionofdivinity?Themostcommonstrategywastoisolatesometraitsofthegodsfrompopularbeliefandsetthemascriteriaforattributingfurtherpropertiesandfunctions.ThismethodwastherefromthestartbutbecameexplicitinthemethodologyoftheHellenisticschoolswhentheytookthe“precon-ception”(prolEpsis)ofgodasthestarting-pointfortheologicalinquiries.Butwehavealreadyseen,forexample,howPlatopositsgoodnessasthecoreattributeofdivinity,andthendiscardswhatisincompatiblewithit.Anotheraspectofthisstrategyconsistsinamplifyingthecorefeature(orfeatures)andthenidentifyingthedivinityasthatwhichshowstherelevantfeatureatthehighestdegree.WefindanearlyversionofthisreasoninginXenophanes,whoarguesthattheverynotionofgodentailsthatthereisnothinggreater(DK21A28,A31andC1).Thesameargumenttypeappearedinmanyforms.Simplicius,forexample,attributesthefollowingargumenttoAristotle:Ingeneral,wherethereisabetterthereisalsoabest.Since,then,amongexistingthingsoneisbetterthananother,thereisalsosomethingthatisbest,whichwillbethedivine.(Simpl.InCael.289.2–4=Arist.OnPhilosophy,fr.16Rose)Laterauthors,mostprominentlytheStoics,usedthistypeofargumentalsowiththeaimofprovingtheexistenceofgod:Butthatwhichisperfectandbestwillbebetterthanmanandfulfilledwithallthevirtuesandnotreceptiveofanyevil;andthisanimalwillnotdifferfromgod.God,therefore,exists.(S.E.M9.88;cf.Cic.ND2.33–39)Ifweidentifygodasthatwhichistheultimatebeingintherelevantrespect(goodness,greatness,power,etc.),willitnotfollowthatthereisonlyonegod?Xenophanes’conclusionisinherentlyambiguous:“Thereisonegodgreatestamonggodsandmen”(DK21B23.1).Thiswaveringremainscharacteristicoflaterphilosophers,too.Con-ceptualanalysis,atheoryofcauses,reductionism,andrequirementsoftheoreticalparsimonyinmostcasesdrivethephilosophertotheconceptofauniqueultimatedivinity.Thisonedivinebeing,whichisthefirstcausalprincipleoftheworldandwhichstandsinafundamentalrelationshipwiththetotalityofthings,isthegodthat8.Forthedifferentapologeticreadingsofthisepisode,seethescholiumVenetusBtoIl.20.67,whichprobablygoesbacktoPorphyry.631ACTC3263120/03/2006,04:20PM\ngáborbeteghultimatelyintereststhephilosopher.Thistendencyismanifestalreadyinthepre-Socraticpracticeofcallingtheunderlyingprincipleoftheworld“divine.”Aristotleexplicitlyclaimsthattheologyisthetheoreticalstudyofthefirstcausesandfirstprinciples(seeesp.Met.A.2,982b28–983a10andE.1,1026a17–32).Then,inMeta-physicsL,whichcontainshismostelaboratediscussionofthedivine,hearguesthatthereshouldbeoneultimatedivinesubstanceonwhichtheorderofthewholeworldultimatelydepends(L.7–8;seealsoOnPhilosophyfr.17Rose;Phys.VIII.6;GCII.10,9337a15–24).ThenheendsMetaphysicsLwithaquotationfromHomer:“Theruleofthemanyisnotgood;lettherebeoneruler”(10,1076a4quotingIl.2.204).Yetphilosophersveryoftenleaveopenthepossibilitythattherearefurther,causallylessrelevantentitiescorrespondingtotraditionalpolytheisticconceptions.SoAristotlemaintainsthatthereareother,lessercelestialdivinitiesofafixednumber.Indeed,heclaimsthat,withduedistinctionsmade,hisconceptionoftheeternalcelestialsub-stancescorrespondstotheintuitionofprimevalthinkerswhospokeaboutamultitudeofgods.Theoriginalinsightsubsequentlygotcorruptedandthisishowthemythicalnarrativesaboutanthropomorphicgodswereformulated“withaviewtothepersua-sionofthemultitudeandto[their]legalandutilitarianexpediency”(L.8,1074b1–14).Similarly,PlatointheTimaeusdrawstheimageofafirstgod,thedivinecraftsman,whoiscausallyresponsiblefortheentirevisibleuniverse.Yetheinsiststhattherearealsoother,“younger”gods–thecosmositself,celestialdivinities,andeventhegodsofthetraditionaltheogonies–whoaresituatedatlowerlevelsoftheontologicalhier-archyandwhohavemorelimitedcausalroles.AccordingtoXenophon’stestimony,Socratesmadeacomparabledistinctionbetweenlessergodsandauniquefirstgodwhoiscausallyresponsiblefortheprovidentialorganization,structure,andmain-tenanceofthewholeworld(Mem.4.3.13).TheStoicsgoevenfurther.TheStoicgodistheactiveprinciplethatpermeatesandgivesformtotheothermetaphysicalprinciple,thecompletelypassiveandformlessmatter.Thiswhollyimmanentgodisdirectlycausallyresponsibleforeverythingthatexistsandhappensintheworld,andcanhencealsobecalled“thecommonnatureof10things”or“theworlditself.”Clearly,ifgodisdefinedastheactivecausalprinciple(ortheworlditself),itmustbeunique.TheStoicsreadilyidentifiedtheirgodwithZeus,theonemostpowerfulgodofthetradition.Ontheotherhand,theyhadnoprobleminspeakingaboutgodsintheplural.Theyconsideredthecelestialbodiestobegods,andtheyalsoaccommodatedthetraditionalgodsintheirsystemviaelaborateallegorical11identifications.Whatwefindhereisanattempttomediatebetweenacausaltheory,positingoneultimatecausalprinciple,ontheonehand,andthetraditionalpolythe-isticpantheon,ontheother.AcomparableeffortischaracteristicoftheNeoplatonists.FollowingtheAristotelianconception,theyconsideredtheologyasthestudyofthefirstcauses,whileintheirhighlyspeculativemetaphysicstheydevelopedacomplexhierarchyofcauses.Yet,they,9.SeeBodnárandPellegrin,aristotle’sphysicsandcosmology,inthisvolume.10.OnthehistoricalandphilosophicalconnectionsbetweentheStoicgodandPlato’sTimaeus,seeSedley(2002).11.See,e.g.,D.L.8.147;Cic.ND2.63–69;Philod.DePiet.1428coll.4.12–8.13=coll.356–360(Obbink).632ACTC3263220/03/2006,04:20PM\ngreekphilosophyandreligionandespeciallythelateNeoplatonists,alsoclaimedthataftertheveryfirstprinciple,thedifferentlevelsofthishierarchyareidenticalwiththedifferentgodsmentionedbyGreekandnon-Greek“theologians.”Theoutcome,justtomentiononeexample,isthattheNeoplatonic“all-one,”thesecondlevelinthetriadoftheso-calledhenadicprinciples,getsidentifiedwiththeChaosofHesiodandtheOrphicRhapsodies,theGaiaofanotherOrphictheogony,theNightofAcusilausandEpimenides,theChthoniaofPherecydesofSyrus,theThauteoftheBabylonianmyth,theAreimaniosofthePer-sianmagiandtheSandoftheEgyptianmythology,nottomentiontheMistofthe12SidoniansandtheAirofthePhoenicians(Damascius,DePrincipiis3.159.17ff.).Inpart,thiswasclearlyanattempttoshowtheunityofthepagantraditioninthefaceofthegrowinginfluenceofChristianity.But,aswehavejustseen,thisreconciliatoryattitudehadbeencharacteristicofphilosophicaltheologiesfromthestart.Thecontrastbetweentheseverelylimitedandalwaysfalliblehumanknowledgeandthevastandsecuredivineknowledgewasacommonplaceofepicandlyricpoets.Zeus,andsometimeslessergods,wasevendescribedashavingacomprehensiveknow-ledgeofeverything(seee.g.,Od.20.75“knowswellallthings”).Onthistraditionalbasis,butwithsignificantreshaping,cognition,andrationalitybecamethemostessentialfunctionsofthephilosophers’god.AsHeraclitusputsit“Thewiseisonealone,unwillingandwillingtobecalledbythenameofZeus”(DK22B32).TheninthewakeofAnaxagoras,itbecamecustomaryforphilosopherstocallthedivinecausalprincipleoftheworldMindorIntellect(nous).Thisiswhatwefind,amongothers,inPlato,Aristotle,theStoics,andwithsomerestrictions,theNeoplatonists.Thedoctrineoftheintelligentdivinityisamorerefinedformofanthropomorphism:wedescribethegod(s)byenlargingandextendingourmostnoblecapacities.Themostvaluablehumancapacityisthinking,towhichphilosophersaddthatitisalsothemostpleasanthumanactivity.Ifso,theblesseddivinebeingmustshowthiscapacityinthehighestandpurestform(e.g.,S.E.M9.23).AlreadyXenophanesclaimsaboutthegreatestgodthat“wholehesees,wholehethinks,andwholehehears”(DK21B24).Whatismore,thisgodcangoverntheworldbymerethinking:“butcompletelywith-outtoilheshakesallthingsbythethoughtofhismind”(DK21B25).Thelifeofthedivineisnothingbutcognition.Intheirsearchforthebesthumanlife,PlatoandAristotleclaimedlaterthatalifeofpureintellectualactivity,andnothingbutintellec-tualactivity,isnotapossibilityforahumanbeing–butitistheonlylifeworthyofagod(Phlb.22c;ENX.7,Met.L.9).Thedivine,then,isboththeultimatecausalprincipleandisessentiallyrational;thiscanexplainthatthereisorder,goodness,andbeautyinthecosmos.EmbryonicformsofthisreasoningwerepresentalreadyinHeraclitus,butthesubjectbecameprom-13inentinthegenerationofSocrates.AccordingtotheSocratesofPlato’sPhaedo,the12.Theissueisofcoursemorecomplicated.Plotinusputallthegodsinthesecondhypostasis(Enn.V.1[10],4)andusedthetoolofallegoricalidentificationsveryloosely.Theintroductionofthehenadsinthefirsthypostasistogetherwiththeiridentificationwiththegods,isprobablyduetoSyrianus(Dodds,1963,p.257f.),andopenedthegateforlarge-scalesystematicallegory.13.DiogenesofApolloniaseemstomarkanimportantstepinthisdevelopment(DK64B3,B5).Theeye,Paley’sfavouriteexampleforteleologicaldesigninbiology,wasdescribedastheartifactofacreativeandintelligentdivinityalreadybyEmpedocles(DK31B84andB86).This633ACTC3263320/03/2006,04:20PM\ngáborbeteghcentraltaskofthephilosopheristoexplainthecosmosastheworkofadivineMind.Roughlyatthesametime,theauthoroftheDervenipapyrus,probablyanOrphicinitiationpriest,triedtodothesameinareligiouscontext:heinterpretedthetradi-tionaldivinecharactersoftheOrphictheogonyasdifferentcosmogonicfunctionsofadivineMind.Ontheassumptionthatlastingregularitymeansorderandthepresenceofamath-ematicallyexpressiblepatternmeansrationality,Plato,Aristotle,andtheStoicscon-cludedthatthepresenceofthedivineisparticularlyconspicuousinthemotionoftheheavenlybodies.Inaway,thisreasoningprovidedaphilosophicalunderpinningforthetraditionalviewthattheheavenlybodiesaredivinebeings.ThePlatonistauthoroftheEpinomiswentevenfurtherandproposedinstitutionalizedformsofworshipofthecelestialdivinities(988a).Theargumentbasedonpurposivenessandregularityinnaturewasalsousedasaprooffortheexistenceofgod.Fromtheobservablerationalfunctioningofthecosmos,thepurposefulnessofitsparts,andmostimportantly,theteleologicalstructureofanimals,onehastoconcludethattheremustbeanultimaterationaldivineprincipleresponsibleforallthisbeautyandrationality.Thisargument,knownastheargumentfromdesign,wasusedbySocrates(Xen.Mem.1.4.2–19),developedfurtherbyPlato(LawsXandTimaeus),andgaveoccasiontotheStoicstolistendlessexamplesofprovidentialityinnature(S.E.M9.75–123).ItneverthelessremainedaformidabletaskforPlato,hisfollowers,andinterpreters,toexplainhowexactlythedivineMindandtheorderinthecosmosarerelated.TheTimaeus,whichcanbereadasaresponsetothetasksetbySocratesinthePhaedo,containsanarrativeaboutthedivineMind-craftsmanfashioningthecosmosfromapreviouschaoticstateaccordingtorationalprinciples.YetevenPlato’simmediatedisciplesdisagreedwhetherornotweshouldtakethisstoryatfacevalue.AristotlereadtheTimaeusasacosmogony(Cael.I.11,280a30),andcriticizeditonthegroundthatthecosmosiseternal.Moreover,ifthelifeofAristotle’sgodispurethinking,thisalsomeansthatitcannotactivelyinterveneinthefunctioningofthecosmos.Butthenhowcanitstillfunctionasacauseoftheorderintheworld?Aristotle’ssolutionistrulyoriginal.Thedivinityisthecauseoforderandgoodnessinthecosmosbybeingtheobjectofdesire.Thesubordinatecomponentsoftheworlddesirethedivinityandtrytoemulateitseternalperfection,andtherebytheirbehavioralpatternsbecome14regulated.TheStoics,aswehaveseen,espousedtheoppositesolutionbyaffirmingthatthegodactivelyandpurposefullyinformsmatterandthuscreatestemporallydistinctcosmicorders.Inthisfunction,theStoicgodcangenuinelybecalleda“divinecraftsman”(Cic.ND2.58).Theatomiststookadistinctpositionalsoonthisissuebyholdingthatallthatisregularandseeminglypurposefulintheworldisultimatelyexplicablebysheermechanicalcausation.Theydidnotdenythattherearegods,orthatthegodsareintelligent,oreven(asweshallseeinthenextsection)thatthegodshaveacrucialisallthemoresignificantasEmpedoclesissometimesalsoquotedasanearlyDarwinist.Thewatch,theotherstockexampleoflaterargumentsfromdesign,appearsalreadyinCiceroND2.87–88.14.SeeMet.L.7;GCII.10,336b25–337a8.Thedetailsareproblematicandarehotlydebated.634ACTC3263420/03/2006,04:20PM\ngreekphilosophyandreligionfunctioninthelifeofindividualsandsocieties.Ontheotherhand,theyfirmlybelievedthatthegods,whomtheyexplainedinphysicaltermsaslargelivingatomicimages,15havenoroleintheformationandfunctioningofthephysicalworld.Epicurusrejectedthecosmologicalroleofgodsonthegroundsthatthetoilsofcreatingacos-mosandattendingtoitsmaintenancearesimplyincompatiblewithourpreconception16ofgodsassupremelyhappybeings.Asalatersourceformulatesit“forotherwise[thegod]wouldbewretchedinthemannerofaworkmanandabuilder,burdenedwithcareandfrettingabouttheconstructionofthecosmos”(Aët.Placit.1.7.7trans.Runia).Thedifferencesinattributingcausalrolestothegod(s)arereflectedalsointhedivergentpositionsonthequestionwhetherthegodscareforlivingbeings,andaboveall,forhumans.SocratesinXenophon’sMemorabilia4.3enlistsnumerousexamplestodemonstratethegodhead’sprovidentialloveofmankind(philanthropia).ForPlato,denyingdivineprovidencewasaseriousformofgodlessness.ThemaincharacteroftheLawspresentsalongargumenttotheeffectthatthegodsupervisesnotonlythecosmosatlarge,butismindfulofthesmallestofhumanmatters(LawsX,900d–903a).Similarly,theStoicsclaimedthatoneeitherdeniestheexistenceofthegods,ormustacceptthatthegod(orgods)governstheworldinaprovidentialway.Theyarguedthatprovidentialitynecessarilyfollowsfromsuperiorpowerandperfectration-ality;denyingeitheroftheseattributesisabreachofour“preconception”ofgod.TheStoiccanhenceforthclaimthatDemocritusandEpicurus–andonemightadd,Aristotle–infactdenytheexistenceofgods(Cic.ND2.76–77;forlumpingAristotlewiththeatomists,seee.g.,thePlatonistAtticusfr.3.52–57desPlaces,quotedbySharples,2002).PhilosophicalPietyWhatisapiousact?Whoisapiousindividual?AccordingtoEuthyphro,thereligiousfundamentalistpicturedinthePlatonicdialogueofthesamename,piousistheonewhoisdeartothegods(theophilEs,Euth.7a).AndwhensomeoneaskedtheDelphicoracle“HowamItomakemyselfagreeabletothegods?”hewastoldthat“Byfollow-ingthelawsofthepolis”(Xen.Mem.4.3.16).Theoutcomeisthattheonewhofollowsthelawsofthecityispious.Clearly,suchreadyanswerswillnotsatisfythephilo-sopher.SoSocratesimmediatelyasksEuthyphrowhetherthepiousisdeartothegodsbecauseheispious,orishepiousbecauseheisbeinglovedbythegods?(Euth.10a).Also,evenifoneacceptstheDelphicanswerandfollowsthelawsofthepolis,onecanstillwonderwhyitisdeartothegodsifonecarriesoutalltherequiredsacrificesandreligiousactionsrequiredbythelaw.Dotheyneeditoraretheysimplypleasedbyit,andifso,why?Theseeminglyunproblematicnotionofpietybecomescomplicatedinthehandsofthephilosophers.Wehavejustseenthatthephilosophershadsomethingradicallynoveltosayaboutthenatureofthedivine.Butjustasimportantly,theyhadsomethingnoveltosay15.Foranoverviewoftheancientevidenceconcerningthetheologyoftheearlyatomists,seeTaylor(1999,pp.211–16).16.Cic.ND1.52;Epic.Hdt76–77.635ACTC3263520/03/2006,04:20PM\ngáborbeteghaboutthenatureofman.Philosophicaltheologyandphilosophicalanthropologydevelopedhandinhandandthephilosopher’sconceptionofthecommendablehumanattitudetowardsthedivineistheoutcomeofthisdoubleprocess.Wehavealreadytoucheduponsomeofthecrucialelementsofthisdevelopment.First,wehaveseenthatphilosophicaltheologyhelpedtocultivatethenotionofhumanbeingsasethicallyautonomousagentswhoareresponsiblefortheirownfates.Anothercrucialelementconsistsinemphasizingwhatiscommonbetweengodsandhumans.Traditionalpoetsoftendescribedthehumanconditionbycontrastingitwiththedivine:ourinevitabledeath,severelylimitedcognitivecapacities,andincurablewretchednessweresetagainsttheimmortality,wisdom,andhappinessofthegods.Aspiringtomoreandtryingtotransgressthestrictboundariesofhumanexistencewasaseriousoffensethatdeservedstrictpunishmentfromthegods.Bycontrast,itwascentraltotheanthropologyofmanyphilosophersthateventhoughthehumanconditionisseverelylimited,thereisanelementofthedivineinman.Whatismore,manyofthemtaught,withsignificantindividualvariations,thattheultimateaimofahumanbeingistoenhancetheinner17divineelementandtherebybecomelikegod.Whatcountsastheutmosthubrisinthetraditionalconceptionsbecamethenormativeprogramofhumanlifeinthephilo-sophicaldoctrines.Theascenttodivinestatus,basedonanon-standardanthropology,wasacrucialelementinsomemysteryreligions.TheOrphicmythaboutthebirthofmankindstressedthatthereisaportionofthegodDionysusinus.Therewardoftheproperwayoflifeisthat(possiblyafteracertainnumberofreincarnations)thedivineaspectprevailsandthemortalpartisleftbehind.TheOrphicinitiatecanthustellthegodsintheunder-worldthat“Iboastmyselftobeofyourblessedrace”andbetoldinresponsethat“Happyandblessedone,youwillbeagodinsteadofamortal”(fr.488Bernabé=A1Zunz).Althoughthedetailsaredauntinglydifficulttointerpret,itseemsthatEmpedoclestookovertheeschatologyofmysteryreligions,butintegrateditintotheexplanatoryschemeofhisnaturalphilosophy.Also,Aristotleishesitantaboutwhosaidfirstthat“Mind(nous)isthegodinusandmortallifecontainsaportionofsomegod,”thephilosopherAnaxagorasorhistownsmanHermotimus,amysticseercapableofsham-anisticsoul-journeysandanincarnationofPythagoras’soul(Arist.Protr.fr61Rose;cf.Met.A.3,984b15–22;D.L.8.5).Theviewthattheseparationbetweendivineandhumanisnotabsolutewasapparentlyaninterfacebetweenphilosophersontheonehandandfiguresandmovementsfunctioningatthefringesofconventionalreligiosityontheother.Thereare,however,anumberoffundamentaldifferencesbetweenthedoctrineofsalvationoftheOrphicsandthephilosophicalprogramof“becominglikegod.”First,philosophers,withthepossibleexceptionofEmpedocles,preservedtheideathatthe17.Someofthecentraltextsareasfollows:Plato,Tht.176a–b;Ti.90b–d;withAlcinous,Handbook28;Plotinus,I.2[19],5–6;Aristotle,ENX.7–8;Seneca,Ep.92.3;Epicurus,Men.135.Arguably,thecentralassumptionsarepresentalreadyinHeraclitus’doctrineofdivinefirecoupledwiththeclaimthatthefiery(dry)soulisthewisest(DK22B118).AgoodcasecanbemadeforEmpedocles,too(seemostrecentlyBroadie,1999,pp.219–20).Socrates,ontheotherhand,apparentlyfollowedthemoretraditionalviewandemphasizedthegapbetweengodsandhumans.636ACTC3263620/03/2006,04:20PM\ngreekphilosophyandreligiondifferencebetweengodandmancannotultimatelybeovercome.Becominglikegodisnotthesameasbecomingagod.Second,asinthepolisreligion,sotooinmysteryreligions,thecriterionoffelicitywasprimarilyperformative:ritualpurityandtheproperexecutionoftherequiredsacrificesandinitiationrituals.Asopposedtothis,philosophersputtheemphasisonthenatureofthecommontraitingodandman.Ifintellectormindisthedivineelementinus,itisbyenhancingourrationalitythatwecanbecomelikegod.AsPlatosaysintheTimaeus:[I]famanhasseriouslydevotedhimselftotheloveoflearningandtotruewisdom,ifhehasexercisedtheseaspectsofhimaboveall,thenthereisabsolutelynowaythathisthoughtscanfailtobeimmortalanddivine,shouldtruthcomewithinhisgrasp.(Tim.90c,trans.Zeyl)Intellectualperfectionandthecorrespondingassimilationtogodisalsothewaytobecomepious.ThisisforexampletheAristoteliananswertothequestionsetintheEuthyphro,“Whoisdeartothegods?”Nowhewhoexerciseshisintellect(nous)andcultivatesitseemsbothinthebeststateandmostdeartothegods(theophilestatos).Forifthegodshaveanycareforhumanaffairs,astheyarethoughttohave,itwouldbereasonableboththattheyshoulddelightinthatwhichwasbestandmostakintothem(i.e.intellect)andthattheyshouldrewardthosewholoveandhonorthismost,ascaringforthethingsthataredeartothemandactingbothrightlyandnobly.Andthatalltheseattributesbelongmostofalltothewisemanismanifest.He,therefore,isthedearesttothegods.(ENX.8,1179a24–30)Moreover,becausetheknowerbecomesliketheknown,thebestwaytothinklikeagodistothinkaboutthedivine.Plato,Aristotle,theStoics,andeventheEpicureans,agreethattheemulationofthedivinemustbebasedonapropertheology.WhenoneconsidersthattheprimarymeaningoftheGreekwordteletaiis“themysticritesatinitiation,”Chrysippus’sayingthat“theologyistheteletaiofphilosophy”receivesanewsignification.Theology,thecorrectunderstandingofthenatureofthedivine,istheconditionofbecominglikegod,beingdeartothegods,andtherebyofhavingagoodlife,andnotthefaultlessperformanceoftheritual.Theologyistheinitiationritualforaphilosopher.Butifthecommendableattitudetowardsthegod(s)isthecorrectuseofone’sintel-lect,whatfunctioncantheritualsprescribedbythelawsofthepolisstillhave?Mostphilosophersagreedthat“thebestfirstsacrificetothegodsisapuremindandasoulwithoutpassions,butitisappropriatetobeginthesacrificewithamoderateamountoftheothers[i.e.traditionalmaterialsacrifices]aswell”(Porphyry,Abst.2.61.1–3,thesayingissometimeattributedtoTheophrastus).Mostphilosophersacceptedritualizedformsofworshipupheldbytraditionasafactofhumansocieties.ThiswassufficientbasisevenfortheSkepticstotakepartincults(S.E.M9.49;Cic.ND3.5).Theproblemforthephilosopherswasnotsomuchthepracticesbutrathertheirinterpretation.ThiswastherealtargetalreadyofHeraclitus’harshcriticismofpopularreligion(seeAdomenas,1999).Asamatteroffact,thecultsinPlato’sidealcityintheLaws637ACTC3263720/03/2006,04:20PM\ngáborbeteghcomeveryclosetotheactualAthenianpractice.ForPlato,theimportantpointisthatinstitutionalizedformsofworshipshouldenhancecommunalidentity,soprivateshrinesandcultsareprohibited.Moreimportantly,itisthemostdangerousformofgodless-nesstobelievethatsacrificesandprayersaremeanstoinfluenceorbribethegods(LawsX;cf.Rep.II,365d–366a).Thus,theperformanceofsacrificecanbeeitherasignofpietyortheworstformofgodlessnessdependingontheinterpretationthepractitionerassignstotheact.TheStoicZenotookamoreradicalstancetowardstraditionalformsofworshipwhenhedeclaredthattemplesandcultstatuesshouldnotbeerected,becauseproductsofhumancraftsmenarenotworthmuch,andthere-forearenotsacredeither.This,however,couldnotstoptheStoicsfromworshippingthegodsinthetraditionalwayjustasallotherGreeksdid(Plut.St.rep.1034B).Plotinusapparentlycaredlittlefortraditionalcultactivities.Butritualpractice,intheformoftheurgy,receivedanewsignificanceforthelaterNeoplatonistsinconnectionwithamorepessimisticanthropologyintroducedbyIamblichus.Accordingtothisconception,thehumansoulcompletelydescendedintomatter,andthereforetheritualmanipulationofmatterwasneededforaccessingthedivine(e.g.Iamblichus,Demyst.2.2,withSteel,1978).ThemostinterestingpositioninthisrespectisprobablythatoftheEpicureans.Epicurusretainedthenormativeconceptoftheassimilationtothegods.He,however,puttheemphasisnotsomuchondivinerationality,butratherontheblessed,tranquilexistenceofthegods–thisundisturbed,joyfulstateiswhattheEpicureansageshouldemulate.Aswehaveseenabove,theEpicureangodsdonotinterveneinhumanaffairs.Yettheycanbebeneficialtohumanbeingsinsofaraspeoplewithacorrectunderstandingofthedivinenaturetrytoemulateapositiveparadigm.Agoodlife,onceagain,isultimatelydependentonacorrecttheology.Butgodscanbeharmfulaswell.Whenonethinksofthegodsas“terrifyingtyrants,”mainlybecauseofone’sownbadconscience,thefearofthegodswillmakeone’slifemiserable(Philod.DePiet.coll.71–87Obbink).Thisviewcanfunctionalsoasaphilosophicalaccountofdivinejustice:thegodshelpthebettermentofthegood,butharmthebad.Whatisthefunctionoftherituals,then?Epicurusmaintainsthatitisimperativetoparticipateinpublicandprivaterituals,“notbecausethegodswouldbehostileifwedidnotpray,”butbecause:[I]tisparticularlyatfestivalsthathe[i.e.thewiseman]progressingtoanunder-standingofit[i.e.thenatureofthedivine],throughhavingitsnamethewholetimeonhislips,embracesitwithconvictionmoreseriously.(Philod.DePiet.coll.26–27Obbink).Inotherwords,culticactivityputsthesageinthemostappropriatepsychologicalstatetofeelaweandtherebytrytoemulatethegods.Epicurushadstartlingviewsabouttheconstitutionandnatureofthegods,andhehadanoriginalaccountofhowtheyinfluencethelifeofindividuals.Nonetheless,theseunusualideaspro-videdtheEpicureanwithprofoundreasonstoparticipateinthetraditionalreligiousfestivalsofthecity–wherehecouldalsomeetallthePlatonists,Peripatetics,Stoics,andSkeptics,comingforsomewhatdifferentreasonsbasedonsomewhatdifferentideas.638ACTC3263820/03/2006,04:20PM\ngreekphilosophyandreligionBibliographyWorksCitedAdomenas,M.(1999).“HeraclitusonReligion.”Phronesis,44,87–113.Bernabé,A.(2005).PoetaeEpiciGraeciTestimoniaetfragmenta,ParsII,OrphicorumetOrphicissimiliumtestimoniaetfragmenta,fasc.2.Leigzig:K.G.SaurVerlag.Broadie,S.(1999).“RationalTheology.”InA.A.Long(ed.),TheCambridgeCompaniontoEarlyGreekPhilosophy(pp.205–24).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.DesPlaces,E.(ed.andtrans.).(1977).Atticus.Fragments.Paris:LesBellesLettres.Dodds,E.R.(1963).Proclus:TheElementsofTheology.2ndedn.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Henrichs,A.(1972).“TowardsaNewEditionofPhilodemusOnPiety.”Greek,Roman,andByzantineStudies,13,67–98.——.(1974).“DieKritikderStoischenTheologieimP.Herc.1428.”CronacheErcolanesi,4,5–32.(ForPhilod.DepietatePHerc.1428coll.1–15.)——.(1975).“TheDoxographicalNotes:DemocritusandProdicusonReligion.”HarvardStud-iesinClassicalPhilology,79,93–123.(ForPhilodDepietatefr.19.)Lesher,J.H.(ed.,trans.andcommentary).(1992).XenophanesofColophon:Fragments.Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress.Obbink,D.(ed.withcommentary).(1996).Philodemus:OnPiety.Part1.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Parker,R.(2000).“TheTrialofSocrates:AndaReligiousCrisis?”InN.D.SmithandP.Woodruff(eds.),ReasonandReligioninSocraticPhilosophy(pp.40–54).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Rose,V.(1886).Aristotelisquiferebanturliborumfragmenta.Leipzig.Runia,D.T.(1996).“AtheistsinAëtius.Text,TranslationandCommentsonDePlacitis1.7.1–10.”Mnemosyne,59,542–76.Sedley,D.(2002).“TheOriginsofStoicGod.”InD.FredeandA.Laks(eds.),TraditionsofTheo-logy(pp.41–83).Leiden:Brill.Sharples,R.(2002).“AristotelianTheologyafterAristotle.”InD.FredeandA.Laks(eds.).TraditionsofTheology(pp.1–40).Leiden:Brill.Smith,N.D.andWoodruff,P.(eds.).(2000).ReasonandReligioninSocraticPhilosophy.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Steel,C.(1978).TheChangingSelf.Brussels:TheRoyalAcademy.Taylor,C.C.W.(ed.,trans.andnotes).(1999).TheAtomists.LeucippusandDemocritus:Frag-ments.Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress.Zeyl,D.J.(trans.).(2000).Plato’sTimaeus.Indianapolis/Cambridge:HackettPublishingCompany.Zuntz,G.(1973).Persephone.ThreeEssaysonReligionandThoughtinMagnaGrecia.Oxford:ClarendonPress.FurtherReadingBabut,D.(1974).Lareligiondesphilosophesgrecs.Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance.Burkert,W.(1985).GreekReligion.ArchaicandClassical.(trans.J.Raffarn).Oxford:Blackwell.Cornford,F.M.(1912).FromReligiontoPhilosophy:AStudyintheOriginsofWesternSpeculation.London:Arnold.Drachmann,A.B.(1922).AtheisminPaganAntiquity.London:Gyldendal.Gerson,L.P.(1990).GodandGreekPhilosophy.LondonandNewYork:Routledge.Kingsley,P.(1997).AncientPhilosophy,MysteryandMagic.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Mansfeld,J.(1999).“Theology.”InK.Algra,J.Barnes,J.Mansfeld,andM.Schofield(eds.),TheCambridgeHistoryofHellenisticPhilosophy(pp.452–78).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Most,G.W.(2003).“PhilosophyandReligion.”InD.Sedley(ed.),TheCambridgeCompaniontoGreekandRomanPhilosophy(pp.300–22).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Parker,R.(1996).AthenianReligion:AHistory.Oxford:ClarendonPress.639ACTC3263920/03/2006,04:20PM\ndeborahk.w.modrak33PhilosophyofLanguageDEBORAHK.W.MODRAKInterestinanddebatesaboutAncientGreekphilosophyoflanguagehaveintensifiedinthepast50yearsasphilosophyoflanguagecametoitsownasadistinctandimportantareaofphilosophy.Incontemporaryphilosophyoflanguage,theoriesofmeaningandtheoriesofreferencehavebeentheprimaryfocusofinquiry.Notsurpris-inglyphilosophersturningtotheinterpretationofAncientGreektreatmentsoflan-guagehavebroughttheseconcernstothetableandhaveraisedquestions,suchas,doesaparticularauthorhaveatheoryofmeaning?Doesaparticularauthorhaveanadequateconceptionofreference?Someinterpretershavefoundancientdiscussionsofthesetopicstobehighlyunsatisfactoryfromamodernperspective;othershavedefendedthecontributionstothephilosophyoflanguagemadebyPlatoorAristotleortheStoicsortheEpicureans.Representationasatopicisattheforefrontofmanyancientaccountsoflanguage.Whetherthisfeatureisaliabilityoranassetalsoremainsasubjectofongoingdebateamongmoderninterpreters.AncientGreekphilosophyoflanguage–andtowhatextenta“philosophyoflanguage”shouldbeattributedtoancientauthors–isandislikelytoremainforyearstocomeatopicofinquiryandanoccasionforlivelydisagreements.Pre-SocraticsandSophistsPhilosophyoflanguage,inoursense,doesnotbegininthepre-Socraticperiod.Cer-tainassumptionsaboutthenatureoflanguage,however,shapeseveraloftheearliestworks,mostnotablythoseofHeraclitusandParmenides,andthusthefoundationforAncientGreekphilosophyoflanguageislaid.Heraclitusfamouslychidesothersforneitherhearingnorcomprehendingthelogoseventhoughallthingshappeninaccordancewiththelogos(DK22B1).Herethemultiplemeaningsoflogosseeminplay–logosasword,asaccount,asrule,andasreason.Ontheonehand,thelogosinquestionisconstitutedbyHeraclitus’wordsandheisexpressingfrustrationthatothersdonotattendtowhathehastosay;ontheotherhand,thelogosforHeraclitusisregulativeinanobjectivesense;itisalsoexpressedinnaturalprocesses.Heraclitus’useoflogosexploitstheinherentambiguitybetweenwordandobjectrepresented.Awordisasign,andwhatissignifiedtypicallyisanobjectorstateofaffairsandyetthe640ACTC3364020/03/2006,04:21PM\nphilosophyoflanguageonlywaytoindicatewhatissignifiedisbytheuseoftheword.ThusHeraclitususes1“logos”bothforhisaccountandtherealitythatheclaimstodescribe.InParmenides,theappealtothesemanticfeaturesoflanguageisevenmoreexplicit:“whatisthereforspeakingandthinkingmustbe”(DK28B6).Humanconfusionandwrong-headedthinkingisattributedtoamistakenapplicationofterms:“fortheyestablishedtwoformsintheirmindsfornaming;ofwhichitisnotrighttonameone”(DK28B8).Wordsconceivedinaccordancewithwhatisandappliedcorrectlyarevehiclesfortruthbutnotallwordsmeetthesecriteria.Whentheydonot,wordsmisleadandconfuse.InParmenides’poem,thegoddessmarksthetransitionfromtruthtoopinionbydrawingadistinctionbetweenherowntrustworthyspeech(pistonlogon)andthedeceitfulorderingofherwords(kosmonemonepeonapatelon)(DK28B8.50–53).HerewefindtwoassumptionsthatwillbemadebymanylaterGreekphilosophers:theproperreferentsoftermsareexistentsand,whenwordsfailtopick2outactualexistents,theyarevacuousandmisleading.Thesophists,bycontrast,sawwordsaspowerfultoolsforachievingone’sendsby3persuasion.Toplaythisrole,wordsneednotpickoutactualexistents;theyneedonlyhavecommonlyacceptedmeanings.AccordingtoProtagoras“manisthemeasureofallthings–ofthingsthatare,thattheyare,andofthingsthatarenot,thattheyarenot”(S.E.M7.60).Themeasuredoctrine,whilenotexplicitlyaboutlanguage,expressesanontologicalthesisthatfitsverynicelywiththenotionthatmeaningisnotdeterminedbyreferencetoextra-linguisticobjectsbutbythespeakersofthelanguage.Inasimilarvein,Gorgiasdoesnothesitatetoexpressskepticalviewsaboutourabilitytocommunicatetruthsandyethealsoclaimsthatascausalagentswordsaremorepowerfulthanphysicalforces.Evenifthereisanindependentlyexistingrealityandthespeakerhasknowledgeofit,thereisnoassurancethatherwordswillrefertothatrealityorthattheirmeaningscorrespondtoit(S.E.M7.65–86).Forifthingsthatarearevisibleandaudibleandgenerallyperceptible,andinfactareexternalobjects,andofthesethevisiblearecomprehendedbyvisionandtheaudiblebyhearing,andnotviceversa,howcanthesebecommunicatedtoanother?Forthatbywhichwecommunicateislogos,butlogosisnottheobjects...Sojustasthevisiblecouldnotbecomeaudibleandviceversa,thussincewhatisisanexternalobject,itcouldnotbecomeourlogos.Butifitwerenotlogos,itwouldnothavebeenrevealedtoanother.(S.E.M7.83–85,trans.McKirahan)Thisisaningeniousargument.Gorgiasgrantsforthesakeofargumenttherealityoftheexternalworldandthenpointsoutthatlanguageisnotafeatureofthatworldbutofourexperience.Moreover,logosisasecondaryeffectoftheworld’sactingdirectlyuponoursenses.Hegoesontoarguethat,becauselanguageisaresponseto1.OnHeraclitus’logos,seealsoHussey,thebeginningsofscienceandphilosophyinarchaicgreece,inthisvolume.2.SeeMourelatos,theconceptoftheuniversalinsomelaterpre-platoniccosmologists,inthisvolume,whoarguesthatseverallatepre-Socratics,andespeciallyDemocritus,developedatype–tokendistinction.3.Onthistopic,seealsoBarney,thesophisticmovement,inthisvolume.641ACTC3364120/03/2006,04:21PM\ndeborahk.w.modrakperceptions,thecausalchaingoesinthewrongdirectionforlanguagetoberevelatoryoftheexternalrealitythataffectsusandcausesourutterances.Thisfactaboutlanguagedoesnotlimittheusefulnessofspeechasatoolforpersua-sion.Thepersuasivepowerofwords,Gorgiascontends,issuchthatthereisnothingmorepowerful,nothingmoreabletomovethemindorbodyofaperson.InhisefforttoexonerateHelen,GorgiasarguesthatevenifshewaspersuadedbyParistofleetoTroy,sheisblameless,becausewords(logoi)cancompelthesoulandbodytoact.Insupportofthethesisthatwordscancompelanagenttoact,hecitesanumberofexamplesofwordsgeneratingbeliefs–theabilityofastronomerstopersuadeusofthingsthatwouldotherwiseseemincredible,theacceptanceoffalseclaimsbyaudi-encesatpublicspeakingcompetitionsandtheshiftingallegiancesofthephilosophers(EncomiumofHelen).Inshort,inthewritingsofSocrates’predecessorsandcontemporaries,wefindsev-eralpersistentideasaboutmeaning:wordssomehowgettheirmeaningsinrelationtotheworldasperceived;wordspurporttorepresentthingsastheyare;wordsmayfailinthiscapacity;thisfailureiseitherduetohumanerrorortothesubjectivecharacteroflanguage.TheseviewsprovidethecontextforSocraticdialectic.SocratesSocratesmadethesearchforthedefinitionsofmoraltermscentraltothephilosophicenterprise.AsportrayedbyPlato,Socratesassumedthatmoraltermsreferredtorealitiesthatweresuchthatproperdefinitionsofthemwouldprovideanalysesofthenatureofjustice,temperance,piety,andsoforth.IntheProtagoras,hesays,“Here’sagoodfirstquestion:Isjusticeathingorisitnotathing?Ithinkitis.Whataboutyou?”(330c).HerewefindthesamerealismaboutreferentsandthesamenormativeassumptionsaboutthecorrectuseofwordsthatwedidinParmenides’poem.Thewordisusedcorrectlyjustincasethespeakersucceedsinreferring.Thenewwrinkleisthenotionthatdefinitionscancorrectlyspecifyandanalyzetheactualreferentsofterms.Socrates:Thesameistrueinthecaseofthevirtues.Eveniftheyaremanyandvarious,allofthemhaveoneandthesameformwhichmakesthemvirtues,anditisrighttolooktothiswhenoneisaskedtomakeclearwhatvirtueis.(Meno72c,trans.Grube)TheproperSocraticuseofamoraltermwillberegulatedbyadefinitionthatensuresthatitsintendedreferentisitsactualreferent.Onthispicture,thereisafactofthematteraboutwhetheraspeakerisusingawordcorrectlythatisnotsolelydeterminedbylinguisticpractice.ThatawordisbeingusedinaconventionalwayissimplyirrelevanttothequestionofwhetheritisbeingcorrectlyusedinSocrates’sense,andthusherejectslistsofsynonymsasdefinitions.Socratespressesindividualswhoclaimtoknowwhataparticularmoraltermmeanstoarticulatethecoreconceptthatwillbesatisfiedineverycasewherethetermiscorrectlyused.Hetheninterrogatestheproffereddefinition,andunderscrutiny,thevariouseffortsofinterlocutorstospelloutthemeaningsofmoraltermsarefoundwanting.Despitehisfailuretouncover642ACTC3364220/03/2006,04:21PM\nphilosophyoflanguagedefinitionsthatwouldmeethiscriteria,Socratesappearstopersistinthebeliefthatsuchdefinitionsarenotonlypossiblebutrequiredformorality.SocratesandPlatoElenchus,thecross-examinationofaninterlocutor’sbeliefs,aspracticedbySocrates,however,tacitlyembracesthedistinctionthatGorgiasdrawsbetweenwords(logoi)andthings.Logoiarefundamentallyintheheadandderivativelyexpressedinaudiblesoundsandvisiblewriting;thingsbycontrastaresimplyintheworld.Socratesexam-inesthebeliefsofhisinterlocutorsinordertofindthecorrectdefinitionsof“just,”“pious,”etc.Treatingbeliefsasthewell-springforcorrectdefinitionsistotreatlogoiasobjectsthatareinternaltohumanthought.Plato’sCratylusThefirstphilosophertoframethequestionoftherelationbetweenwordsandthingsasatopicworthyofinvestigationinitsownrightwasPlato.IntheCratylus,theSocratescharacterinvestigatesandrejectstwotheoriesofmeaning.Thetwoarenaturalism4andconventionalismaboutnames;bothapparentlyhadproponentsatthetime.Thenaturalistview,whichisattributedinthedialoguetoafollowerofHeraclitus,Cratylus,heldthatnameseitherarecorrectbecausetheycapturethenatureoftheirreferentsortheyaremeaninglesssoundsthatfailtoreferatall.Theotherviewmakesthecorrect-nessofnamespurelyafunctionofconvention.Bothpositionsareultimatelyrejectedbytheparticipantsinthedialogue.Thefirstviewtobeinvestigatedisconventionalism.TheversionofconventionalismthatSocrates’interlocutor,Hermogenes,espousesisproblematic,becauseheconflatesseveraldifferentpositions.Ontheonehand,conventionistakenbyHermogenestobesynonymouswithagreementamongspeakersandtobesupportedbyactuallinguisticpractice.Quitedifferentsoundsareusedforthesamethingsindifferentnaturallan-guages,andyetspeakersoftheselanguageshavenodifficultyunderstandingtheirownlanguage.Onthispicture,meaningswouldbepublic,andcorrectusewouldbedeterminedbysocialpractice.Ontheotherhand,conventionalismasinterpretedbyHermogenesholdsthatanoriginaldubbingfixesthereferentofthesound,andshouldaspeakerchoosetousethesound“dog”torefertotheanimalthattheothermembersofherlinguisticcommunitycall“horse”heridiosyncraticuseof“dog”wouldbeascorrectasanyotherspeaker’suseof“horse.”Thefailuretorecognizethatconvention-alismneednotsanctionidiolectsprovestobeHermogenes’undoing,asSocratesmakesshortworkofshowinghimthathecannotmaintainhisaccountofthecorrectnessofnamesunlessheiswillingtogiveuptherealistbeliefshehasaboutthetruthcondi-tionsforsentences.Hermogenesisunwillingtodothis.Hadhebeencleverer,hewouldhaverealizedthathecouldconsistentlyespousethethesisthatmeaningisdeterminedbysocialpracticeandacoherenceaccountoftruth.Or,alternativelyhe4.Onthefifth-centurydebatebetweennaturalismandconventionalism,seeBarneyinthisvolume.643ACTC3364320/03/2006,04:21PM\ndeborahk.w.modrakcouldhavedefendedanaccountthatembracedidiolects,adirecttheoryofreferencewhereacausalchainlinksthereferentofatermtoanoriginalactofnaming,andacorrespondencetheoryoftruth.IntheCratylus,however,HermogenesmeeklyfollowsSocrates’leadinexaminingareformulatedtheoryofmeaning.TheradicallysubjectiveelementofHermogenes’theoryisreplacedbytheviewthatwordsmaybecraftedcorrectlyorincorrectly;awordmaysucceedinreferringtoarealobjectoritmayfailtodoso.Socratesthenexploreswithhimthecogencyofamodifiedconventionalismwheretheoriginalmeaningsofwordsaregivenbyhumanbeingsbutwherecorrectnessdependsuponwhetheratermsuccessfullydescribestheobjectitnames(391a–427d).Socrates’initialexamples,viz.propernamesdrawnfromHomerandordinarypractice,seemtoprovidesupportforthistheory,allthemore,becausemanyofthesenamescontaindescriptiveelementsandthusseemtobedisguiseddescriptions(392d–395e).Forinstance,Astyanax,thenameofHector’sson,iscomposedofthewordforcity(astu)andthewordforruler(anax).Asthediscussionprogresses,however,theexamplesbecomemoreandmorefancifulasSoc-ratesshowsthatthewordsnamingmoralvirtuesandtheartsandeven“man”and“woman”arederivedfromotherwordsindicatingmotion.Socratesappliesthesametechniquetothesyllablesmakingupwordsandultimatelytotheletters.Thisreduc-tionleadstosuchnonsensethatSocratesandHermogenesabandontheattempttosaveconventionalism.AlthoughHermogenes’viewsaboutthecorrectnessofnames,reference,andtruthareshowntobeahopelessmuddle,Platopresentsthismuddletodisplayarangeofpossibletheoriesofmeaningandtohighlighttheepistemicimport-anceofquestionsaboutmeaningandreference.ThediscussionwithCratylusismuchshorter.Cratylus’accountofmeaningiscoherent.Heisinapositiontobearealistabouttruth,becauseheviewsnamesasdisguiseddescriptionsthatpickouttheirreferentsbycorrectlydescribingthem.Thereasonthesedescriptionssucceedisthattheystandinanaturalrelationtotheirrefer-ents.Atthemostbasiclevel,thisrelationisresemblance–theresemblancebetweenaspokenwordanditsobject.Iftheoriginalspeakersofalanguagecorrectlyassignedsoundstothings,thenthenamestheygavethingsarecorrect.ThechallengefacingCratylusistoreconcilethispictureofmeaningandreferencewiththephenomenonofculturalchange,andhefailstomeetthischallenge.Eveniftheoriginalname-giversinasocietyassignednamescorrectlyovertime,Socratespointsout,changesinthewordforthesakeofeuphonyorsystematizationwouldleadtomanysoundsnolongerstandinginanimmediaterelationtotheirmeaningsandhencetheirreferents.Thefictionofanoriginalname-giverisadeviceforguaranteeingthatthecorrectrelationobtainsbetweenthemeaningofawordandtheobjectitrepresents.Byshowingthelimitationsofthisdevice,Platounderscorestheneedtogroundtherelationbetweenwordandobjectinsomethingotherthanphoneticimitation.BytheendoftheCratylus,Platohascalledintoquestionbothnaturalismandconventionalismaboutnames,whileatthesametimemaintainingthatunlessreferencetoobjectsbywordssucceeds,sentencescannotperformtheirfunctionastruth-bearers.Conventionalismhasbeenrejectedonthegroundsthat,iflanguageisatoolformarkingrealdistinctionsinthenatureofthings,itisnotmerelyamatterofconvention,forthereisafactofthematterastowhetheraparticularlanguagedividesrealityupatitsproperjoints.Radicalsubjectivismhasbeenrejectedonthegrounds644ACTC3364420/03/2006,04:21PM\nphilosophyoflanguagethatwhataparticularsequenceofsoundsutteredbyamemberofalinguisticcommun-itymeansisdeterminedbypublic,interpersonalcriteria,notbythewhimsofthespeaker.Naturalismhasbeenrejectedbecause,inlightofthehistoricallyconditionednatureoflanguage,ithasproventoodifficulttotellasatisfactorystoryabouttheconnectionbetweenawordandtheobjectthatitrepresents.Inspiteoftherejectionofallthetheoriescanvassed,animportantandinfluentialthesisaboutmeaningandreferencegoesunchallenged:acorrectnameindicatesthenatureofthethingnamed(425d)anditisaverbalrepresentation(dElOma)ofitsreferent.MethodofdivisionThroughouthiscareer,Platostructureddialoguesaroundtheattempttodefineakeyterm.However,inmanyofthelaterdialogues,Platoalsoadvocatesamethod,themethodofdivision,bywhichtoarriveatadefinitionoftheterminquestion.Theobjectofthemethodofdivisionistoproduceapreciselywordeddefinitionthatarticu-latesananalysisoftheconcept.AsdescribedbyPlatointheSophist218e–232aandelsewhere,divisioninvolvestwoprocesses–first,similarparticularsarecollectedandgroupedtogetherunderthemostcomprehensivetermthatseemstoapplytothem,forexample,sophistsfallundersophistryandtypesofsophistryunderart(cf.Plt.258b–267c;Phlb.16c–17a).IntheSophistthefirstexampleofdivisionconcernstheartofanglingandconcludesinadefinitionofangling:Onehalfofallartwasacquisitive–halfoftheacquisitiveartwastakingpossession,halfofpossession-takingwashunting,andhalfofhuntingwasanimal-hunting;halfofanimal-huntingwasaquatichunting;allofthelowerportionofaquatichuntingwasfishing;halfoffishingwashuntingbystriking;andhalfofstrikingwashooking.Andthepartofhookingthatinvolvesablowdrawingathingupwardfromunderneathiscalledbyanamethat’sderivedbythesimilaritytotheactionitself,thatitiscalleddraw-fishingorangling–whichiswhatwe’researchingfor.(221a–c,trans.White)Atthispoint,divisionhasproducedapreciselydefinedconceptthatfitstheparticu-lars.Theinitial,pre-definitionalunderstandingofanglingwasofasortoffishing,akindofwhole;aftertheapplicationofthemethodofdivision,anglingisunderstoodintermsofthegenusandparticulardifferentiaethatdefineit.Theattempttodefinethesophist’sartprovesmuchharderandinitiallyresultsinsixdifferentdefinitionsandfinally,aftertheresolutionofcertainmetaphysicalpuzzles,aseventhandtrulyadequatedefinition.Theinitialdivisionsappeartotaketheshapetheydo,becausetheparticularscollectedunder“sophist”exhibitdifferentcharacter-istics.TheStrangerinitiatesasearchforthesophistandthenastheresultofemployingsixdifferentstrategiesfordividing“art”andthesubordinateuniversalsproducessixdifferentdefinitionsoftheterm“sophist”–eachoneofwhichseemstofitcertainactualsophists.Thesecondandthirddefinitionsdifferonlyinthataccordingtothesecond,thesophisttravelsfromcitytocityasamerchantofideas,andaccordingtothethird,thesophiststaysinonecityasaretailerofideas.Thethirdandfourthdefinitionsdifferonlyinthataccordingtothethird,thesophistretailsthegoodsofanother,andaccordingtothefourth,thesophistretailshisownwork.Thesixth645ACTC3364520/03/2006,04:21PM\ndeborahk.w.modrakdefinitionisonethatPlatowouldacceptasaspecificationofSocrates’art:“apurifierofthesoulfromconceitsthatblockthewaytounderstanding”(232e).Theinclusionofthesixthdefinitionisevidencethattheinitialdivisionsrepresentanattempttoclassifyusagesofthetermasappliedtoindividuals;sincemanyofPlato’scontemporariesconsideredSocratesasophist,hewouldhavebeenincludedintheinitialcollectionofsophistsunderthetermasusedincommonparlance(cf.Dover,1971,p.71).TheStrangersetsthefirstsixdefinitionsaside,however,onthegroundsthattheyfailtocapturethesinglenaturesharedbyallsophists.Atadeeperlevel,thedefectrevealedbytheplethoraofdefinitionsisnotthatthesedefinitionsfailtodelineateaconceptthatfitssomepersonscalledsophists,northattakenjointlytheyfailtohaveexactlythesameextensionassophistEs(sophist)inordinarylanguage,butratherthatthesedefinitionsaretoocloselytiedtotheextensionofthetermaspopularlyusedtoarticulatethecommoncoreconceptthatisatissuehere.Wellthen,supposepeopleapplythenameofasinglesortofexpertisetosomeone,butheappearstohaveexpertknowledgeoflotsofthings.Inacaselikethatdon’tyounoticethatsomething’swrongwiththewayheappears?Isn’titobviousthatifsomebodytakeshimtobeanexpertatmanythings,thenthatobservercan’tbeseeingclearlywhatitisinhisexpertisethatallofthosemanypiecesoflearningfocuson–whichiswhyhecallshimbymanynamesinsteadofone?(232a,trans.White)Theseventhandfinaldefinitionarticulatesthecorenotionsharedbyalltheparticularconceptsthat(correctly)fallundersophistry:“theartofcontradictionmaking,descendedfromaninsincerekindofconceitedmimicryofthesemblance-makingbreed,derivedfromimagemaking,distinguishedasaportion,notdivinebuthuman,ofproduction”(268c–d).Thefinaldefinitionissuchthatitwouldapplytoallthecasescoveredunderthefirstfivedefinitionsbutexcludethepurifierofsouls.Thefinaldefini-tionwouldapplytoallandonlythetypesofactivitythatPlatobelievestobegenuineinstancesofsophistry.Theproperdefinitionisonethatgetsitrightaboutthenatureoftheobject.Itisnormativeandneednotholdofalltheindividualsfallingundertheextensionofthetermasordinarilyused.Theterm“sophist”isappliedtoalargenumberofindividualswithoutdistinguishingbetweenthem.Theinitialdefinitionsproducedbydivisionmaketheirdifferencesexplicitwhilethefinaldefinition,theonethatcaptures“thegenuinesophist,”revealsthedistinctivefeaturesofallformsofsophistryproperlydelimited.Definition,forPlato,isaformofconceptualanalysis,andthemethodofdivisionisananalytictechniqueforarrivingattruth,ifproperlyandcarefullyapplied.Theobjectofdivisionthenistodiscovertherelationsamonglinguisticconceptsthatrevealthestructureoftheextralinguisticworld.Thisiswhydivisionbeginswiththecollectionoftheparticularstowhichtheconceptisappliedandextensionaldefinitionsthatcor-respondtocommonusage.Italsoexplainswhydivision,ifsuccessful,terminatesinaregulativedefinitionthatarticulatesthenatureoftheobjectinquestion.IntheCratylus,awell-formedlanguagewillprovideaconceptualgridthatarticulatesactualdistinc-tions(cf.389d).Themethodofdivisionassumesthatanon-vacuoustermreferstoarealityandthataphilosophicallyperspicuousdefinitionwillarticulatethenatureofthatreality.FromtheCratylustotheSophist,Platomaintainsadistinctionbetween646ACTC3364620/03/2006,04:21PM\nphilosophyoflanguagetheconceptsanddefinitionsofordinarylanguageandthosethatcanbearrivedatthroughreflectionanddialectic.Thelatterdividetheextralinguisticworldupatitsproperjointsandthusprovideaconceptualframeworkforknowledgeandunder-standing.ThisconceptionofdefinitionandthedistinctionbetweenthemeaningsanddefinitionsofordinarylanguageandepistemicallyrigorousdefinitionsandmeaningswillprofoundlyinfluencetheshapeoflaterGreekphilosophiesoflanguage.AristotleThenextphilosophertomakeimportantcontributionstothestudyofmeaningwasAristotle.EvenmorethanPlato,Aristotlehasadevelopedphilosophyoflanguage(Modrak,2001).Hesharesseveralofthepositionsofhispredecessors.Spokensoundsbecomewordsinvirtueofhavingmeaningforthespeakerandthehearer.Wordshavemeaninginvirtueofarelationbetweenthespokensoundandtheworld.Thisrelationmaybesuchthatthewordreferstoanactualexistentoritmaybesuchthatitonlyappearstopickoutanactualobject.AgreeingwithPlato,Aristotlealsodifferentiatesbetweentypesofdefinitions.Therearedefinitionsthatarewhollydeterminedbythelinguisticpracticesofacommunityofspeakers.Thereareotherdefinitionsthatareregulativeinthattheyprovideanobjectivelycorrectanalysisoftheobjectinquestion;Aristotlecallsthese“definitionsofessence.”Aristotle’searliestattempttoaddresstheseissuesisfoundintheDeInterpretatione.Spokenwordsarethesymbolsofmentalexperienceandwrittenwordsarethesymbolsofspokenwords.Justasallhumanshavenotthesamewriting,soallhumanshavenotthesamespokensounds,butthementalexperiences,whichthesedirectlysymbolize,arethesameforall,asalsoarethosethingsofwhichourexperiencesarelikenesses.(Int.1,16a3–8)HereAristotleidentifiesalloftherelevantitems:thewrittenword,thespokenword,thementalstatethatmediatestherelationbetweenwordandobjectandthusaccountsformeaning,theexternalobjectreferredto,andanaturalrelationoflike-nessthatexplainsreference.Unfortunately,thetextisverycompressedanditsaccountofmeaninghasbeenwidelycriticizedinthesecondaryliterature.Inrecentyears,happily,afewvoiceshavebeenraisedinAristotle’sdefense(Charles,2000;Irwin,1982;Modrak,2001).Arguably,thispassageandotherrelatedpassagesintheDeInterpretationeprovideinroughoutlineapromisingandpotentiallyadequatetheoryofmeaning.TheissuesoftheCratylusseemveryclosetoAristotle’streatmentofmeaning.Notonlydoeshe(unliketheparticipantsinthedialogue)distinguishbetweenthelanguage-specificnatureofthephoneticsignassociatedwithaparticularcontentat16a5,buthegoesontostressthatsoundsbecomewordsbyconvention:“nonameisanamenaturallybutonlywhenithasbecomeasymbol”(16a26–27).UnlikeHermogenes,Aristotledistinguishesbetweenthebasicunitformeaning(theword)andthebasicunitfortruth(statement-makingsentences).ThisputshiminabetterpositiontoanswerPlato’schallengetodevelopatheoryofmeaningandreferencethat647ACTC3364720/03/2006,04:21PM\ndeborahk.w.modrakisconsistentwithrealismaboutmeaningandtruth.InDeInterpretatione1,Aristotletreatsthementalstatethatmediatesmeaningasa“blackbox”;hesaysnexttonothingaboutitexceptthatitisalikenessoftheexternalobjectthatisthesourceofmeaning.Apartfromabriefallusiontothepsychologicalwritings,AristotlemakesnofurtherattemptintheDeInterpretationetoexplainhowtheinnerstateworks.Thishascertainadvantages:itallowshimtofocusontheobjectofreferenceandthewordasasignific-antphoneticsignwithoutgettingboggeddowntryingtoexplainhowamentalstatecanhavethepsychologicalcharacterandsemanticfunctionassigneditinhisexplanationofmeaning.Bothwrittenandspokenwordsaresignsandmeaning-bearersthroughlinguisticpractice.Theyaresignsbyconvention(katasunthEkEn).Aristotle’sapproachdiffersfromthatofeitherHermogenesorCratylus.Hermogenesfailstobeclearabouttherelevanceofsocialpracticeindeterminingaconventionalname.Cratyluspositsadirectrelationbetweenspecificsoundsandthethingsrepresentedbythosesounds;thismeansthatheisunabletoexplainphoneticchangesorphoneticdifferencesamonglanguages.AccordingtoAristotle,thesoundbearsnointrinsicrelationtothementalcontentassociatedwiththesoundortheexternalreferentoftheword.Theserelationsaredeterminedbythelinguisticpracticesofaparticularcommunity.Bydistinguish-ingbetweenthephoneticandsemanticfeaturesofwords,Aristotleisabletogivearobustlyrealistaccountofthetruthconditionsofassertionswithoutmakingimplaus-ibleclaimsaboutthesentencetokensusedbydifferentlinguisticgroupstomakethesameassertionsabouttheworld.Aristotlealsodeftlyavoidsthereductionofsigni-ficantsounds(words)tomeaning-bearingvowelsandconsonants.Theword,Aristotleinsists,isthebearerofmeaningnotitsconstituentelements.Aristotleisalsoveryclearthatsentencesnotindividualwordsmakeassertions,someofwhicharetrueorfalse.Justasthereareinthemindthoughtswhichdonotinvolvetruthorfalsity,andalsothosewhichmustbeoneortheother,soitisinspeech.Fortruthandfalsityimplycombinationandseparation.(DeInt.1,16a9–11;cf.Cat.4,2a7–10,Met.E.4,1027b18–28;Q.10,1051b1–17)Astatementismadetrueorfalsifiedbyextra-linguisticstatesofaffairs.Andwhilethetruestatementisinnowaythecauseoftheobject’sexistence,theobjectdoesseeminawaythecauseofthestatement’sbeingtrue;itisbecausetheobjectexistsordoesnotthatthestatementissaidtobetrueorfalse.(Cat.12,14b18–23)Whilethewordsindividuallyarenotvehiclesoftruth,wordsmakeupsentencesandthemeaningofasentenceisafunctionofthemeaningofitsconstituentwords.Theuseoftermswithmeaningsthatfailtocorrespondtoextra-linguisticrealitiesdefeattheclaimtotruthofthestatementsemployingthem.Anepistemicallyadequatelanguagewillcontainmanywordswithmeaningsthatcorrectlyrepresentextra-linguisticrealities.Meanings,onAristotle’saccount,ideallymeettwoconditions:(a)themeaningofasimpletermisasinglecoherentnotionand(b)itisliketheexternalobject.Condition(b)iscouchedinthelanguageofresemblancebyAristotlebecause648ACTC3364820/03/2006,04:21PM\nphilosophyoflanguageresemblanceisarealrelationthatinsuresthattheconceptcorrespondstoanextra-linguisticreality.Whenbothconditionsaremetbyalanguage(whetheranaturallanguageoronedesignedforaspecificpurpose),thelanguageisepistemicallyadequate.Theseconditionsmaybeandoftenareviolatedinonewayoranotherbytermsasemployedinthewell-formedsentencesofanaturallanguage.Despitethispossibility,Aristotleremainsoptimisticabouttheprospectsforepistemicallyadequatelanguages.Hedoesnotdoubtthathumansareabletousewordstoexpresstruthsabouttheworld.HavinggivenathumbnailsketchofatheoryofmeaninginDeInterpretatione1,Aristotleturnshisattentionnottostraightforwardcasesofmeaningandreferencebutrathertoanomalouscases.TheproblematiccasesheconsidersintheDeInterpretationeincludeindefinitetermssuchas“not-man,”compoundedtermssuchas“man-and-horse,”andtermshavingonlynominaldefinitionssuchas“goatstag.”AccordingtoAristotle,themeaningof“not-man”isindefinite;bycontrast,positivepredicatessuchas“man”signifysomethingdefinite(Int.2,16a29–31;3,16b11–15;10,19b9).Indefinitenameshavesignificationinaway(pOssEmainei)Aristotlesays(19b9),andheistentativeforgoodreason,becauseonhisaccountofmeaning,thecoherenceofthementalcontent(itsexpressingonenotion)isonlyonenecessaryconditionformeaning.Inthecaseofnegativenamessuchasnot-man,thisconditionissatisfiedbutinawaythatmakesitimpossibletoevaluatewhetheritsmeaningstandsinarelationoflikenesstoarealobject.Indefinitelymany,arbitrarilyselectedindividualswillsatisfytheconcept“not-man”;theseindividualsneednothaveanypositivecharacter-isticsincommon.Thereisnodefinition(horismos)ordefinableclassunderwhichtheyallfall;thegroupconsistingofthemiswithoutdeterminateconceptualboundaries;itisaoriston(indefinite).AccordingtoAristotle,thesimplesentence,“aman-and-horseiswhite,”iseithermeaninglessorequivalenttothecompoundsentence,“amaniswhiteandahorseiswhite”(8,18a18–25).Treatedasasingleterm“man-and-horse”isnon-referringandsignifiesnothing.(Aristotlearbitrarilyassignsthename“cloak”(himation)totheputativeconceptof“man-and-horse”at18a19,thusmakingitclearthatthisexampleisnotaboutacentaur(kentauros)amythicalcreaturethatishalfhorseandhalfman.)“Man-and-horse”failstocorrespondtoaconceptexpressingasinglerealessence;interpretedasacompoundsubjectconsistingoftwoterms,itencompassestwodistinctessences.Therearesimplynoactualindividualsthatsatisfytheconcept,man-and-horse,unlessitistreatedasacomplexnotionpickingoutatleastoneindividualfromeachoftwodistinctkinds(humansandhorses).Thesuperficiallysimilarterm“goatstag,”however,expressesasingle,coherentno-tion,becauseithasanominaldefinition,albeitonethatisnotsatisfiedbyanyactualexistent(cf.1,16a16–18).Thesignificantdifferencebetween“man-and-horse”and“goatstag”or“centaur,”forAristotle,iswhetherthereisacontextthatwouldallowahearertoformaprecisementalconceptcorrespondingtoanon-referringtermorasentenceinwhichanon-referringtermoccurred(cf.Int.3,16b19–21).Inthecaseof“aman-and-horseiswhite,”thelistenerlackssuchacontextincontrasttoalistenerwhoisfamiliarwiththemythicalcreaturethatishalfgoatandhalfstag.However,inordertosatisfythesecondconditiononmeaning,actualreferentsarerequired.WhenAristotleturnshisattentiontotermsthatseeminglyhavemeaningwithinaspecifiedcontextsuchasmythbutfailtopickoutanythingintheactualworld,he649ACTC3364920/03/2006,04:21PM\ndeborahk.w.modraksolvesthisapparentpuzzlebydistinguishingbetweentermshavinggenuinedefinitions(significationinthestrictsense)andtermshavingonlynominaldefinitions.Nominaldefinitionsareadequateforthepurposesofcommonlinguisticpractice,buttheyarenotadequateforepistemicallyrigorousdiscourse,whichrequiresthattermsbesuchthattheycanbeusedintruesentencesexpressingrealnatures.Havingmademeaninginthestrictsenserequirearelationbetweentheassociatedmentalcontent(notthephoneticsign)andtheworld,Aristotleviewsallsignificanttermsasreferringterms:“Ofexpressionssaidwithoutanycombination,eachsignifieseithersubstanceorquantityorqualificationorarelativeorwhereorwhenorbeing-in-a-positionorhavingordoingorbeingaffected”(Cat.4,1b25–27).Aristotle’sexamplesareinstructive:man,horseforsubstance;four-foot,five-footforquantity;white,grammaticalforquality;double,half,largerforrelation;intheLyceum,intheagoraforwhere;yesterday,last-yearforwhen;islying,issittingforbeinginaposition;hasshoeson,hasarmoronforhaving;cutting,burningfordoing;beingcut,beingburnedforbeingaffected.Thevarietyofgrammaticalitemslistedisstriking.Thegenericlistcontainsnouns,adjectives,adverbs,andinfinitives;theexamplesincludepreposi-tionalphrasesandactiveverbsandinfinitives.Aristotle’sintentisclear:anysignific-ant,simpletermwillfindaplaceinoneoranothercategoryofpredicate.Moreover,Aristotle’ssubsequenttreatmentofeachcategorymakesitclearthatwhatisbeinggroupedis,ontheonehand,atypeofpredicateorterm,andontheother,featuresoftheextra-linguisticworld.Each(non-vacuous)predicatepicksoutacorrespondingfeature.Thedescriptivecontentofthemeaningofthetermdetermineswhichfeaturewillbepickedout.Thesimplestsentenceconsistsintwoterms(asubjectandapredic-ate).Ifbothpickoutactualfeaturesoftheworldandifthesefeaturesarecombinedintheworldasinthestatement,thestatementistrue.If,forinstance,thebirdiswhite,thenthestatement,“thebirdiswhite,”istrue.If,however,therockthebirdissittingoniswhitebutthebirdisbrown,theneventhoughbothfeaturesmentionedinthesentence(bird,white)areactual,thestatementisfalse.DefinitionofessenceInordertodifferentiatebetweentermsthatareepistemicallyadequateandthosethatarenot,inthePosteriorAnalyticsandMetaphysicsAristotlerecognizesseveraltypes5ofdefinition.Ofthese,nominaldefinitionscomeclosesttooureverydaynotionofdefinition.Anysignificantexpression,irrespectiveofwhetheritsreferentactuallyexists,willhaveanominaldefinition.Suchdefinitionsenablespeakersofthesamelanguagetocommunicatewitheachother,evenwhentheconceptstheyemployareconfused,asinthecaseof“sophist”orwhentheconceptonlyappearstorefertosomethingasinthecaseof“goatstag”or“centaur.”Surprisinglyfromamodernper-spective,Aristotleisunwillingtocalltheseformulaedefinitionsinthestrictsense(horismoi);hedescribesthemasformulae(logoi)thatsignifythesameasaname(APo.II.7,92b26–28;cf.92b5–8,b31–32).Attheotherendofthespectrumoftypesof5.Ondefinition,seealsoDetel,aristotle’slogicandtheoryofscience,andLennox,aristotle’sbiology,esp.thesection“BiologyandTheoryofKnowledge,”inthisvolume.650ACTC3365020/03/2006,04:21PM\nphilosophyoflanguagedefinitionaredefinitionsofessence.Unlikethenominaldefinition,aproperdefini-tionisanaccountofthecauseofthething’sexistence,anditisastatementoftheessentialnatureofthething(II.8,93a3–4;II.10,93b29–94a10).Thesedefinitionsunpackanon-vacuousconceptthatcapturesarealnature.Exhypothesiadefinitionofessencemustbesatisfiedbyactuallyexistingentities,whichpossesstheessenceinquestion.Aristotlelooksforsomeintrinsiccharacteristicofthedefinitionofessencethatwoulddifferentiateitfromanominaldefinition.Oneindication,hefinds,ofthedifferencebetweenthetwoisthatthenominaldefinitionpossessesonlyanartificialunity,whiletherealdefinitionisoneessentially(93b35–37).Thereforethereisanessenceonlyofthosethingswhoseformulaisadefinition(horismos).Andthereisadefinitionnotwhereaformulaisidenticalinmeaningtoaword...butwherethereisaformulaofsomethingprimary;andprimarythingsarethosewhichdonotimplythepredicationofoneelementofanother.(Met.Z.4,1030a6–11)Aristotle’saccountofdefinitioniswellsuitedtoanaccountofalanguagetobeusedtodescribetheworldasitreallyis,buthisaccountwouldseemtohaveconsiderablylessapplicationinordinarylinguisticcontexts.Thisimpressionissomewhatmisleading,becauseforAristotlenaturallanguagesarebasedonperceptionsandbeliefsabouttheextra-linguisticworld.Thus,strictdefinitionsshouldbeviewedasrefinementsofearlier,lessperspicuousnominaldefini-tions.InDeInterpretatione1,thementalstatethroughwhichameaningisassociatedwithasoundisitselfalikenessoftheextra-linguisticobject.Thewordsofanaturallanguagehavesignificanceinasocialcontextbutatbasetheirmeaningsaredeter-minedbytheactionoftheexternalworldonthehumanmind.ThisisevidentinAristotle’sclaimthatthementalstateswillbethesameforspeakersofdifferentlan-guages.Sincethereisanextra-linguisticoriginforlinguisticconcepts,thereistypicallysometruthineventhemostconflatedorconfusedconcept.ThisexplainswhyAristotle,likeSocrates,believesthatbyexaminingourordinaryconceptswecanarriveattruth.Intreatiseaftertreatise,Aristotlebeginswithwhatappearprimafacietobelinguisticqueriesonlytodrawfar-reachingconclusionsaboutthetopicathand,beitnaturalscienceorontologyormorality.Thetermsofanaturallanguagehave,ataminimum,nominaldefinitions;theymayalsohavestrictdefinitionsthatcarefulscientific/philosophicalworkwilluncover.Termshavingstrictdefinitionsarerequiredfortheexpressionoftruths.ThesentencesofanAristoteliansciencearetrue,becausetheycorrectlyrepresentnaturesandstatesoftheextra-linguisticworld.Aristotle’saccountofmeaningtakentogetherwithhistheoryofdefinitionprovidestherightsortoffoundationforhisepistemologicalrealismandcommitmenttoatheoryoftruthascorrespondencebetweenrepresentationsoftheworldandtheworld.CognitivebasisofmeaningAristotleprovidesanaccountofhumancognitioninthepsychologicaltreatisesthatisconsistentwiththeroleheassignsthementalstate(pathEma)inDeInterpretatione1.ThepathEmaisanapprehensionofameaningandalikenessoftheexternalobject.As651ACTC3365120/03/2006,04:21PM\ndeborahk.w.modrakemployedinthetheoryofmeaning,thepathEmaisaninternalstate,apsychicstateofanindividual.Itisalsothevehicleofameaningsharedbyspeakersofacommonlanguage.Inthelattercapacity,thepathEmaisanintentionalstate.ThepsychologicalstatethatAristotleidentifieswiththelinguisticpathEmashouldbesuchthatitsatisfiesbothdescriptions;itshouldalsobesuchthatitcouldbedescribedasalikenessofanexternalobject.InthepsychologicaltreatisesAristotledescribesacognitivecapacitythatallowsthemindtostoreandutilizeperceptualinformation;hecallsthiscapacity6phantasia.InoneofthefewreferencestospeechintheDeAnima,Aristotlementionsphantasia:Consequentlyspeechistheimpactoftheinbreathedairagainstthatwhichiscalledthewindpipebythesoulintheseparts...whatproducestheimpactmusthavesoulinitandmustbeaccompaniedbyanactofimaginationforspeechisasoundwithameaning(sEmantikos),andnotmerelytheinbreathedairasacoughis.(II.8,420b27–33)Phantasiaisamodeofsensoryrepresentation.Assuch,itiswellsituatedtoprovidementalcontentsthatarelikenessesofobjectsthathavebeenperceived.Yetsuchcon-tentsseemtoospecifictobesourcesofmeaning.Torememberaspecificcatbytheuseofimageryseemsstraightforward;touse“cat”underappropriatecircumstancesseemstorequireageneralconceptthatlacksthespecificityofaparticularcat.AristotlebrieflyaddressesthischallengeinthefinalchapterofthePosteriorAnalytics;hisansweristhatthehumanmindjustissuchthatitcanthinkthroughaperceptionofaparticulartograspthegeneralconcept(II.19,100a13–14).Thishassomeplausi-bilityinthecaseofwordsnamingnaturalkinds,butitseemssomewhatlessplausiblewhengeneralizedtoallnon-vacuousconcepts.Aristotledoesnotsharethesereserva-tions.HisaccountofthinkingintheDeAnima,moreover,provideshimwithawaytounderstandtherelationbetweentheperceptionoftheparticularandthegraspoftheuniversal.Sincethereisnosubject(pragma)thatexistsseparately,soitseems,apartfrommagnitudeswhichareobjectsofperception,objectsofthought(noEta)existinperceptibleforms,boththeobjectsthatarecalledabstractandthosethatarestatesanddispositionsofperceptibleobjects.(DeAn.III.8,432a3–6)Asthispassagemakesclear,allobjectsofthoughtarepresentedbymeansofpercept-ibleforms.Theuniversalexistsasanobjectofthought,becauseitexistsinsomesenseintheobjectsofperception.Thinkingisawayofcomprehendingorrepresentingtheobjectpresentedsensoriallythroughperceptionorphantasia.Toapprehendtheessenceofwateristoconceptualizeablue,fluidpatchinaparticularway;itistorepresentwaterintermsofitsessentialproperties.Similarly,ifSocratesisperceivedasshort,snub-nosedandbalding,thesensoryrepresentationofSocratesemployedinthinkingabouttheessenceofhumanbeingswouldinclude(someof)theseidiosyncraticchar-acteristics,butthethoughtwouldignorethem.Tograspauniversalistoreinterpretthecontentofanappropriatesensoryrepresentation.Nevertheless,thesensoryrep-resentationisanecessarycomponentofthethought.6.SeealsoCaston,aristotle’spsychology,thesection“Phantasia,”inthisvolume.652ACTC3365220/03/2006,04:21PM\nphilosophyoflanguageAccordingtoAristotle,likenessisthevehicleformeaning.Theapprehensionofameaningisalsotheapprehensionofageneralconcept.Aristotleisabletobringthesetwoseeminglyconflictingcharacteristicstogetherbyappealingtophantasia.Theconceptisalikenessoftheexternalreferentoftheword,becauseatitscorethecomprehensionofthemeaningofthewordistheapprehensionofasensoryrepresentation.Theappealtoresemblance(Aristotlebelieves)isanappealtoanon-arbitraryrelationhavingitssourceinthenatureofthings;inthiscase,itistoappealtofeaturesthataresharedbytheinternalstateandtheexternalobject,andthisnaturalizestherelationbetweeninternalsignsandtheexternalobjectstowhichtheyrefer.ThisstrategyisadoptednotonlybyAristotlebutalsobylaterGreekphilosophersoflanguage.ThedualcharacterofthementalstatemediatingtherelationbetweenwordandobjectinAristotle’stheoryofmeaningislessproblematiconhiscognitivetheorythanitwouldbeotherwise.Theinternalstateisaphantasmaemployedbythelanguageusertorepresentanintelligibleconcept.Theconceptisameaningasgraspedbyanindi-vidual.Theconceptiscommontoanumberofspeakers,becausethatparticularmean-ing,althoughassociatedwithaparticularsoundofaparticularlanguage,isthelogos(account)ofatypeofexternalobject(substance,quality,relation,etc.).Instancesofthetypeareaccessiblebyotherpersonsspeakingthesamelanguageorspeakinganotherlanguage.ThepathEmaisalikenessoftheexternalobjectontwolevels.Asanobjectofphantasiaandasensoryrepresentation,thementalcontentresemblestheobjectinastraightforward,sense-basedway;asalogosormeaning,itistheapprehen-sionofthesensoryrepresentationinawaythatyieldsauniversalconcept.Underoptimalconditionsthemeaningcapturesessentialfeaturesoftheexternalobject,thelogosasmeaningcorrespondstothelogosasstructuralprincipleoftheexternalobject.InAristotle’stheoryofmeaning,onefindstheculminationofearlierviews:logosasspokenwordandastheassertionmadeinspeech;aregulativenotionofmeaningwherenon-vacuousconceptsrequireactualreferentsandcorrespondencetoextra-linguisticrealities;andfinallytherecognitionoftheimportanceofbeingclearaboutboththeculturaldimensionsoflanguageanditsroleasthevehiclefortruth.Intheseandotherrespects,Aristotleoffersatheorythatisbothfarmoredevelopedandmorecompellingthanthoseofhispredecessorsandanaccountthat,becauseitisallofapiecewithearlierGreekconcernsmaystrikeamodernphilosopheroflanguageaseithertoorealistortoopsychologicallybasedtobeparticularlyhelpful.Nevertheless,Aristotle’saccountofmeaningandreferencemarksasignificantadvanceinthephilosophyoflanguage.HellenisticPhilosophyAristotle’sHellenisticsuccessorsfollowinhisfootstepsinviewingmeaningasaphilosophicallyimportanttopicandinaddressingmanyofthesameissueshedoes.TheiraccountsofmeaningembracesomeofthefeaturesoftheDeInterpretationetheoryofmeaninganddivergeatotherpoints.BothEpicureansandStoicsassignfunda-mentalimportancetotwoofthethreerelatainAristotle’ssummaryexplanationofmeaning.Theword(intheformofitsspokenorwrittentoken)andtheexternalreferentarerealandtheirrelationisrequiredforsignification.Bothschoolsapparently653ACTC3365320/03/2006,04:21PM\ndeborahk.w.modrakuseaquasi-technicaltermforreferent(totunchanon)(SVF2.166;Plut.Col.1119F).Bothschoolsexpressreservationsabouttheontologicalstatusofthementalcontentassociatedwiththesound.TheEpicureansseektodenyanybutthemosttenuousstatustoconcepts.TheStoicsrecognizetheimportanceofmentalobjectstothetheoryofmeaningandmoregenerallytologic.Theypositaspecialcategoryofobjectsthataregraspedbythought,expressibleinlanguageandcalledsayables(lekta);theseobjectsdonotexistbutaresaidtosubsistinrelationtothought.Thusmeanings,whilenotrealinthesenseofexisting,arequasi-realassubsistents.BothEpicureansandStoics,however,adoptamorenaturalisticstancethanAristotlewithrespecttohowameaningcomestobeassociatedwithaparticularbitofspeech.Both,however,alsoallowsocialpracticearoleinshapingnaturallanguages.Theydifferoverwhethercommonlinguisticdefinitionscanandshouldbemodifiedbyphilosophersintheefforttoarriveatconceptsthatmorenearlycapturerealnatures.TheEpicureansprefertoacceptthemeaningcommonlyassociatedwiththeword,whereastheStoicsstrivetoproducedefinitionsthatarefullyadequateanalysesoftheirreferents.EpicureansTheEpicureansadoptaradicallynaturalisticstancewithrespecttolanguage.BothPlatoandAristotlehadviewednaturallanguagesasculturalartifacts.IntheCratylus,Platodramatizesthiselementbyintroducingahypotheticalname-giverwhoassignssoundsmeaningsforhissocietyandinthePhilebusheassignsthediscoveryofvowelsandconsonantstoagodoragod-likeperson(18b).TheEpicureansareatpainstorejectthispicturearguingthatitisnotonlyridiculousbutobviouslyfalse.AsLucretiussays:Whyshouldhe[theoriginalname-giver]havebeenabletoindicateallthingswithsounds,andtoutterthevariousnoisesofthetongue,yetothersbesupposednottohavehadthatabilityatthesametime?Besides,ifothershadnotalreadyusedsoundstoeachother,howdidhegetthepreconceptionoftheirusefulness...?(Lucr.5.1043–1049,trans.LongandSedley)Againstthismodeloflanguageascraft,theEpicureansdefendtheviewthatlanguageisanaturalconsequenceoftheworld’simpactonhumanbeings.Thisimpactwassuchthatoriginallyhumansutteredcertainsoundsthatcametobeassociatedwithobjects.Intime,livingingroups,humansagreedtotheuseofspecificsoundsinordertocommunicatebetterwithoneanother.Additionally,philosophersandotherswithspecializedknowledgegavenamestoentitiesthatwerenotperceptible.Humanlan-guagesdevelopasaresultoftheinteractionbetweenacreaturehavingperceptualandvocalcapacitiesofacertainsortanditsenvironment.Epicurusaccommodatesbothculturalandstipulativeassignmentsofmeaningstosoundswithinanaturalisticmodel.UnlikePlato’sCratylus,heneednotinsistuponcoresoundsthatlinkthemeaningofawordtoapre-linguisticvocalresponsetotheenvironment.ThenaturalismaboutmeaningdefendedbyEpicurusandLucretiusismuchmoreplausiblethanthePla-tonicparodyofnaturalism.Aplausiblehistoricalaccountoftheoriginoflanguage,however,isnotbyitselfacompellingtheoryofmeaning.Thestrongnominalistic654ACTC3365420/03/2006,04:21PM\nphilosophyoflanguagestrandinEpicureanthought,moreover,seemstoconstrainwhattheyareentitledto7sayaboutmeaning.InordertomeetthesechallengestheEpicureansmust:(a)identifythecognitiveobjectthroughwhichaparticularmeaningisassociatedwithaparticularsoundinapubliclanguage;(b)provideanaccountofuniversals(ifmeaningsareuniversals);and(c)spellouttheirtheoryofmeaninginawaythataccommodatestheepistemicroleoflanguage.Theworrythattheymightnotbeabletospecifyanappropriatecognitiveobjectwasvoicedbyoneoftheirancientcritics.PlutarchchargesthattheEpicureanshaveabolishedmeaningbecausetheyacknowledgeonlytherolesplayedbythespokenwordandtheexternalobject(Col.1119F).Thesecondproblem–atleastinsofarasitisgeneralizedtoalluniversals–isalsoraisedbyancientcritics.ThethirdproblemarisesbecausetheEpicureans’flexibilityaboutthevariouswaysinwhichmeaningscometobeassociatedwithsoundsseemstoweakentheconnectionbetweentheworldofobjectsandtheworldasrepresentedinutterances.TheEpicureansmakeperceptionsandfeelingsthecriteriaoftruthandsoanyevolutionofmeaningsawayfromprimalvocalresponsestotheenvironmentwouldseemtobeproblematic.Epicurusexplainsmeaningbyappealingtopreconceptions:Preconception,[theEpicureanssay],isasitwereaperception,orcorrectopinion,orconceptionoruniversalstorednotion,i.e.,amemoryofthatwhichhasfrequentlybecomeevidentexternally;e.g.,“SuchandSuchakindofthingisaman.”Forassoonastheword“man”isuttered,immediatelyitspatternalsocomestomindbymeansofpreconception,sincethesensesgivethelead.Thuswhatprimarilyunderlieseachnameissomethingself-evident.Norshouldwehavenamedsomethingifwehadnotpreviouslylearneditspatternbymeansofpreconception.(D.L.10.33,trans.followsLongandSedley)WhatpreciselypreconceptionsareforEpicurus,however,isfarfromclear(Furley,1967;Glidden,1985;Laks,1977;Long,1971a,1971b;Striker,1977).Onthemostlikelyhypothesis,apreconceptionisastabilizedperceptualconceptthatisthedirectconsequenceofbringingpastperceptionstobearinapresentperception.Sincesomeimages(eidOla)enterthebodythroughporesmuchfinerthanthoseofthesenseorgansandtheseimagesactdirectlyonthemind,Epicuruscanexplainthepresenceofpreconceptionsthatarenoteasilytracedbacktoordinaryperceptualexperiences.Suchpreconceptionscouldfunctionasbasicconceptsthatarenotconstructedbythemindbutareavailabletoit.Despitebeingaspontaneousproductofpastperceptionsandpresentstimulation,thepreconceptionexistsinthemindpriortotheparticularexperienceinwhichitisbroughttobear.Becausethepreconceptionisanenduringmentalobject,itisnotsubjecttothevicissitudesofthesensoriallypresentedobject.Becauseapercipienthasaconceptoflion,forinstance,sheisabletocategorizehervisualperceptionsofanapproachinglionastheexperienceofseeingalionwhileherperceptionsmayrangefromablurrylion-likeshapeofindistinctcolortoasharplydefinedlionshapeinvividcolors.Sheisalsoabletotalkaboutthisexperiencebecauseshehasaconceptoflion(D.L.10.33;cf.7.Cf.Morel’sdiscussionofhowtheEpicureansmeetthesechallengesinepicureanism,inthisvolume.655ACTC3365520/03/2006,04:21PM\ndeborahk.w.modrakLucr.4.749–756).ThepreconceptiongivesEpicurusthetoolheneedstoexplainthecognitiveshiftfromthevariousandapparentlyconflictingperceptionsofaparticularliontoanapprehensionthatcanbeusedtoreasonaboutlionsandthatcanserveasempiricalevidencefororagainstanyclaimsmadeaboutthenatureoflions.TheoriginofpreconceptionsinperceptionsenablestheEpicureanstoexplainthelinkbetweenwordandobject.Ontheonehand,theencounterbetweenhumansandtheworldpromptscertainspontaneousvocalizationsandontheother,itpromptstheformationofpreconceptionsthatareconjoinedwiththevocalizations.Thuscriesandothervocalresponsesareproto-words(soundswithassociatedmeanings).Itisonthisbaseofspontaneouscognitiveandvocalreactionstotheexternalworldthatthelin-guisticrefinementsdescribedbyEpicurustakeplace.Preconceptionsdotheworkoflinguisticuniversals;however,theEpicureansremainfirmaboutparticularsbeingontologicallyprior.Inshort,byappealingtopreconceptions,theEpicureanscananswerthefirsttwochallengesfacingtheiraccountofmeaning.Epicurusmayalsohaveananswertothepuzzleabouttheepistemicroleoflanguage.Inatleastoneplace,helistspreconceptionswithfeelingsandperceptionsascriteriaoftruth(D.L.10.31).CriteriaoftruthforEpicurusarespontaneouscognitiveresponsesthatoccasionthoughtbutarenotstructuredbythemind.Thissuggeststhattherearecertainbasicmeaningsthatjustarepreconceptionsandsuchmeaningswouldprovidealinguisticfoundationfortrueexpressions.Thepicturehesketchesseemstobeakindofsemanticfoundationalismwherecertaintermswouldbecomponentsofbasicsen-tencesexpressingtruths.Othertruestatementswouldbederivedfromthebasicones.Fortheprimarysignification(ennoEma)ofeachutterancemustbeseenandneednoaddi-tionaldemonstrationifwearetohavesomethingtowhichtheinquiryortheproblemortheopinionbeforeuscanbereferred.(D.L.10.38,trans.followsHicks)ThisapproachtomeaningwouldbeconsistentwithEpicurus’conceptionoftheroleofbasiccognitionsinmorecomplexones:“Also,allnotions(epinoiai)arisefromthesensesbymeansofconfrontation,analogy,similarityandcombination,withsomecontribu-tionfromreasoning”(D.L.10.32;trans.LongandSedley).Justas,fortheEpicureans,errorenters,notatthelevelofbasicperceptions,allofwhicharetrue,butatlatercognitivestageswhenothercognitiveoperationsareper-formedonthem,errorinlinguisticrepresentationswouldoccurnotatthemostbasiclevelbutatsubsequentstagesoflanguagedevelopmentwhereculturalfactorsplayaroleandstipulativemeaningsareintroduced.Thesechangesarethesourceof“themultifariousconventionsoflanguage”whichEpicuruscautionsagainstinNat.28.31.10.Inaddition,asawaytoprotectthetruth-bearingroleoflanguage,Epicurusmayhavemadethespokenwordthebeareroftruth(S.E.M8.13).AccordingtoPlutarch,theEpicureansareleftwithonlywordsandname-bearers,havingabolishedsayables(Col.1119F).SincetheEpicureansclearlyacceptthattherearepreconceptionsassociatedwithwords,thepointofthecriticismmayhavebeenthat,contrarytotheviewoftheEpicureans,meaningsareinternalobjectshavingthesamestructureasspokenlanguage.TheEpicureansapparentlyrejectthelinguisticmodelofthecognitivestateassociatedwiththespokenwordandmayhaveputinitsplaceasensorymodel.Ontheirepistemology,thiswouldstrengthenthe656ACTC3365620/03/2006,04:21PM\nphilosophyoflanguagetruth-preservingcharacterofbasicsentences,becausementallinguisticrepresenta-tionswouldbemorevulnerabletoerrorthansensory-basedpreconceptions.EpicurusdifferssharplywithPlatoandAristotleovertheroleofdefinitioninfixingmeaningsandfurtheringunderstanding.Epicurusviewsdefinitionswiththesamelevelofsuspicionthatheviewsuniversalsandothercognitiveobjectsthatarenotfirmlyrootedinperceptualexperience.Sincewordscanonlybedefinedbyusingotherwords,itisbetter(Epicurusbelieves)tostickwiththenotionthatattachestothewordandnottrytounpackitusingothermoregeneralterms.Moreover,PlatoandAristotlehadseendefinitionasawaytobringthemeaningofthewordinlinewiththeobjectitrepresented.Theproperdefinitionmight(andoftendid)shiftthemeaningofatermawayfromitscommonlinguisticmeaning.TheEpicureansbelievethatthecommonlinguisticmeaningismorelikelytocorrespondtotherealityrepresentedthananylaterrefinementofthemeaningthroughtechnicaldefinition.Hereasinotherareasofhisepistemology,Epicurusprivilegesthemoreimmediatecognitionoverlessimmedi-atecognitionsthatinvolveadditionalmentalprocesses.EpicurusandhisfollowersofferaclearalternativetothePlatonic-Aristotelianapproachtomeaning.Whileitmeetsthechallengesraisedabove,theEpicureantheoryofmeaningcombinestwopositionsthatareuneasybedfellows–theepistemicsuperi-orityofimmediateexperienceandtheendorsementofordinarylanguage.Theadvicetostayclosetocommonlyacceptedmeaningsisproblematic,becausethecommonlyacceptedmeaningmayormaynot(dependinguponthehistoryoftheword)capturetheexperience(s)thatinitiallypromptedtheformationoftheconcept.Also,precon-ceptionsseembestsuitedtobeingperceptualconceptsandmuchlessadequateasgeneralconceptsofthesortassociatedwiththenamesofabstractobjects.Epicuruswouldnodoubtgrantthiscriticismbutconsideritastrengthofhisapproach;how-ever,viewedfromamoreneutralstance,itwouldseemtobeaweakness.StoicsTheStoicsmadethestudyofsignificationonepartofthestudyoflogic;logicwasdividedintodialecticandrhetoric:Dialectic,theysay,isdividedintothetopicsofsignificationsandutterance;andthatofsignificationsintothetopicsofimpressionsandderivativelysubsistentsayables–proposi-tions,completesayables,predicatesandsimilaractivesandpassives,generaandspecies,alongwithalsoarguments,argumentmodesandsyllogisms,andsophismswhichdependonutteranceandonstatesofaffairs.(D.L.7.43,trans.LongandSedley)JustasAristotlehadincludedadiscussionofmeaningaspartofhislogicalwritings,sotootheStoics.ThelistabovetracksthetopicsofAristotle’sOrganon.Therearediffer-ences,however;theStoicsintroducethenotionofasayable(lekton)andalsohaveadistinctaccountoftheimpression(phantasia).Inaddition,apparentlyinresponsetothesamequeryastheoneraisedintheCratylus,theStoicsrefusedtoincludethestudyof“thecorrectnessofnames”underdialectic,preferringinsteadtofocuson“whateachexistingthingis”and“whatitiscalled”(D.L.7.83);thetopicofcorrectnesswas,however,discussedundergrammar(Frede,1978).657ACTC3365720/03/2006,04:21PM\ndeborahk.w.modrakTheStoicsofferadevelopedtheoryofsignification.Therearethreeitemsofnoteforthem:thespokenword,whatitsignifies,andthereferentoftheword(S.E.M8.11–12).Thewordanditsreferentarebodiesandthusexist.Whatissignified,however,issaidtosubsist.Whatissignified“exists”asanintentionalobjectofarationalimpres-sionorthought;thelatterisaqualificationofamaterialmindandhenceexistsbutwhatthethoughtisaboutmerelysubsists.Ameaningisexpressibleinlanguageandiscalledasayable.IncontrasttoAristotle,theStoicsinsistthatnamesarebynature(phusei).LikeAristotle,theyalsoappealtoresemblancetoexplainsignification.Thequestioniswhether,fortheStoics,itisthesoundthatimitatestheobjectforwhichitstands,orwhetheritistheassociatedsayablethatimitatestheobject.Ifthelatteristheirposition,thentheirtheoryofmeaningmightwellbeseenasanimprovementonAristotle’s.Aristotle’sinternalstatedoesdoubledutyasimageandmeaning,whereastheStoicsayableseemstobeexactlytherightsortofentitytobeameaning.Thesayableisdistinctfromthethoughtofwhichitistheintentionalcontentandfromtheexternalobjecttowhichthewordrefers.However,thereisalsosomeevidencethattheearlyStoicsgaveahistoricalaccountofmeaningaccordingtowhichvocalsoundswerenaturalimitationsofthingsthatwerecodifiedintolanguage.[Arenames]astheStoicsbelieve,ofnature,theprimarysounds(phOnOn)beingimitationsofthethingsofwhichthenamesaresaid?(SVF2.146,trans.LongandSedley)Thispictureledtoworkonetymologiesthatmayhavebeensimilarto,butmoresophisticatedthan,theetymologiesoftheCratylus.ItissomewhatpuzzlingthatafterPlatohadsoclearlydemonstratedthelimitationsofvocalresemblanceasavehicleofmeaningthattheStoicsembracevocalresemblance.Theexplanationpresumablyliesintheemphasistheyputonparticulars.Onlyparticularsarereal.Thisontologicalassumptionapparentlyspawnedthedesiretolinkparticularwordsaudiblytotheirparticularreferents.Thespokenwordisarealparticular;itsauditorycharacterisreal;thewordstandsinarealrelationofauditoryresemblancetoarealobjecttowhichthewordrefers.Thesayable,bycontrast,isnotaconcreteparticular;itisanintentionalobjectofanactofthought.Significantsoundsexpresssayables.Somesayablesareincompleteandarethesignificataofindividualwords.Nounssignifyeithercommonqualitiesorpeculiarqual-ities;verbssignifypredicates(D.L.7.58).Predicatesmustbeassertedofsomethinginordertoexpressacompletethought(D.L.7.64).Othersayablesarecomplete.TheStoicssaythatcompletesayablesincludejudgments(axiOmata),syllogisms,andquestions.Alloftheseexpressassertionseitherdirectlyorindirectlyasqueriesinthattheyexpresscompletethoughts;howeverbeingtrueorfalseisthedefiningfeatureofjudgments–andthus“proposition”isacommontranslationofaxiOmainthiscontext.Beginningwiththesebasicdistinctions,theStoicsconstructanelaborateandsophist-8icatedtheoryofpropositionsandinference(D.L.7.65–83).Thisleavestheminanexcellentpositiontoframetheirtheoryofmeaninginawaythatisconsistentwiththeirconceptionoftruth.8.Onthistopic,seeIerodiakonou,stoiclogic,inthisvolume.658ACTC3365820/03/2006,04:21PM\nphilosophyoflanguageAdetailedaccountofsyntaxiscentraltotheStoicapproach.Theirsyntacticdistinc-tionsapplyinthefirstplacetosurfacegrammarbuttheyseemalsotodelineatetypesofsayables.Therearefivepartsofspeech,viz.thename,theappellative,theverb,theconnectiveparticlesandarticles(D.L.7.57).Atleastsomeofthesewereexplicatedbyappealingtothebasiccategoriesofexistents,viz.substratum(commonandindividual)qualification,dispositionandrelativedisposition.Namesindicateindividuallyquali-fiedthingsandappellatives(commonnouns)indicatecommonlyqualifiedthings(D.L.7.58).Theotherthreesyntacticcategoriesaredefinedwithoutexplicitreferencetotheontologicalcategories.Arguably,however,eachcorrespondstoanontologicalcategorywithverbsindicatingdispositions,connectiveparticlesindicatingrelativedispositions,andarticlesindicatingsubstrata(Graeser,1978).TheStoicsalsorecognizealegitimaterolefordefinition.Aproperdefinitionfur-nishesananalysisoftheconceptinquestionthatisneithernarrowernorbroaderthantheconcept.Itprovidesanoutlinebywhichtolinktheconcepttoitsexternalobject(D.L.7.60).TheroleofdefinitionmayhavebeenprimarilyheuristicfortheStoics–awaytodisambiguatecommonlyusedexpressions.Or,likePlatoandAris-totle,theymayhavehopedtogetcleareronthenatureoftheunderlyingrealitybymeansofdefinition.Definitionsseemedtohaveplayedanimportantroleintheirethicaltheorizing(D.L.7.199–200;Cic.Tusc.4.53).TheStoicsfacethechallengeofreconcilingtheiraccountofmeaninganddefinitionwiththeirontologicalcommitments,becausethey(liketheEpicureans)areunwillingtoincludeuniversalsamongexistents.Onlyparticularsexistandeachparticularisauniqueindividual.Theseindividuals,however,arealsocommonlyqualified,andthisprovidestheStoicswiththebasisforanexplanationoftheuseofuniversalterms.Universalsarenotreal;theyareconcepts(ennoEmata)orfigments(phantasmata)ofthemind(SVF1.65;D.L.7.61).Theyariseinthemind,becausethemindrecognizesthatparticularbodiesarequalifiedgenericallyaswellasindividually.Inastatementsuchas“Socratesisaman,”thepredicate“man”indicatesthatSocratesiscommonlyqualifiedinaparticularway.Thepredicateisanincorporealsayablethatsubsistsinaccordancewitharationalimpression(D.L.7.63).Thesayable,however,isaninten-tionalobjectofthoughtandnot,strictlyspeaking,afigmentofthemind.Treatedasapredicate,theuniversaltermhasasubsistentmeaning,anabstractexpressionofacommonqualificationoftheindividualsthatarequalifiedinaspecificway,e.g.,ashumans.Evenso,thestrongnominalisticthesisthattheuniversalisafigmentofthemindthreatenstoreducetheuniversaltoanideaofafictitiousentity.Onewayoutofthispuzzleistodifferentiatebetweentheuseofauniversaltermasapredicateandtheuseofauniversaltermasasubject.TheStoicsseemparticularlyconcernedaboutthelatter.Theuseofauniversaltermasanominative,especiallyinadefinition,itmightbeargued,isevidencefortheexistenceofanobject(theuniversal)towhichthenamerefers.Inresponse,theStoicsproposetoparaphrasethedefinition,“Manisarationalanimal”as“Ifxisaman,xisarationalanimal”(S.E.M11.8–11).Thisparaphraseprovidesreferentsforthegeneraltermsthatareindividuals.TheStoicsseemtogrant,however,thattheobjectofthedefinitionisthespeciesnottheindividual.Thespeciesisafigmentofthemindcausedbycommonlyqualifiedindividuals.Thereisnoneed(accordingtotheStoics)topositmind-independentuniversalstoserveasthereferents659ACTC3365920/03/2006,04:21PM\ndeborahk.w.modrakofthoughtsaboutkindsorcommoncharacteristics.Eitherthesethoughtsareaboutcommonlyqualifiedindividualsortheyareaboutmentalimagescausedbycommonlyqualifiedindividuals.Toextendthisconceptionofuniversalstothetheoryofmeaning:thesayablethatsubsistsinthecaseofacommonnounsuchas“man”wouldbethepredicate“man”thatsubsistsinaccordancewithrationalimpressionsofcommonlyqualifiedindividualmen.Thiscognitionmightprompttheformationoftheuniversalconcept(ennoEma)thatfunctionsasif(hosanei)itwereapropersubject,asomething(ti),instatementssuchas:“Manistwo-footed.”Althoughthevehiclefortheconceptexistsasacorporealstateofacorporealmind,theconceptdoesnotexistanditisunclearwhetheritevensubsists.AccordingtoAlexander,theconceptisneitherabodynoranincorporeal(SVF2.329).ThisiswhytheStoicsproposetoavoiddefinitionsthatwouldreifytheuniversal.Byparaphrasingdefinitionsbygenusanddifferentiaandpredicatingthoseofindividuals,theyareabletogiveanaccountofdefinitionthatusesonlytermsthatrefereithertoexistingindividualsorcorrespondtosubsistingsayables.TheStoictreatmentofmeaningandrelatedtopicsrepresentsasustainedefforttoclarifythesenotions.WiththeStoics,philosophyoflanguagecomesofageasacoredisciplinewithinphilosophy.Stoiclogic,epistemologyandpsychologyallhaveadecidedlylinguisticcharacter.Bymakingthesayableasubsistentthatisrequiredforallformsofintellection,theStoicsassignadistinctontologicalstatustotheintentionalobjectofthoughtandmakeitproto-linguistic.Thestructureofthesayableismirroredinthestructureofthespokenlanguage.Thecompletesayable,theproposition,isthebasicbuildingblockoflogic.TherealismaboutobjectsofreferencethatcharacterizedtheearliestGreekviewssurvivesintheStoicaccountbutisintegratedintoanaccountofmeaningthatrecognizesthatthecognitiveobjectisaproto-linguisticobject;itisasayable.SkepticsTheSkepticsdonotputforwardsubstantivephilosophicalpositionsoftheirownonlanguageoranyothertopic;forthem,thetaskofthephilosophershouldbetounder-minedogmaticclaimsmadebyothers.TheycriticizevariouselementsofthestorytoldaboutmeaningandtruthbytheStoics.Sextus,aPyrrhonianskeptic,challengestheevidenceforsayables;anyproofgivenfortheexistenceofsayableswouldeitherbegthequestionorbeequivalenttomerelyassertingthatsayablesexistinthefaceofthedenialofthisclaimbyEpicurusandothers(S.E.PH2.107).Moreover,theunder-standingoflanguagewilldependuponapriorgraspoftheextralinguisticobjectbe-causetheassociationofagivensoundwithaparticularobjectoraparticularmentalcontentcannotbethroughconventionalonenorcanitbebynature(S.E.M1.37–38,11.241–242).Wereitbynature,Greekswouldunderstandbarbariansandconversely.Meaningscanalsobechangedatthewhimofspeakers.Consequently,contrarytoStoicdoctrine,therecanbenoscienceofdialecticunderstoodastheknowledgeofthethingsthatsignifyandthethingsthataresignified(S.E.PH2.214).SincetheSkepticsmakeargumentsandattempttopersuadeothers,arguablytheymakecertainassump-tionsaboutmeaningandreference.660ACTC3366020/03/2006,04:21PM\nphilosophyoflanguageForifweabolishedeverysignitwouldnecessarilyresulteitherthatthewordsutteredbyusagainstthesignsignifynothing,or,iftheyaresignificantthattheexistenceofasignisconceded.Butasitis,wemakeuseofthedistinction[betweenindicativeandcommemo-rativesign]andabolishonekindofsignbutaffirmtheother[thecommemorative]...(S.E.M8.290;trans.followsBury)Asacommemorativesign,thewordtriggersaresponsethroughassociationandmemory.WhethertheappealtocommemorativesignsisconsistentwithPyrrhonism9isdebatable(Allen,2001;Glidden,1983).Notwithstanding,theSkepticscontendthattheirphilosophizingcarriesnoontologicalbaggagebutmerelyaccordswithcommonlinguisticpractice(S.E.M8.281–290).Inthisrespect,theyseemtobeGorgias’heirs.ConclusionThereareseveralstrandsinAncientGreekphilosophyoflanguage–realismaboutreferents,truthandmeaning,anemphasisontherevelatoryaspectoflanguage,asearchforthecognitivebasisformeaningandarecognitionofthepersuasivepoweroflanguage.Thereisalsoaconflictinglineofthoughtwithfewerproponents,accordingtowhom,wordsonlyappeartohavemeaningsandrefertoobjects.Onthisview,thechieffunctionofwordsistobe(orappeartobe)usefulforpersuasion.Justasthepre-Socraticemphasisonlogosandtruthinitiatedthediscussionofthesetopicsbyphilosophers,Aristotle’saccountofmeaningprovidedaframeworkinwhichthekeyelementswereword,mentalcontent,externalobjectandthesignrelationthatwoulddominateHellenisticdiscussions.Thelatertreatmentsoflanguage,especiallytheStoictheoryofmeaning,areremarkablysophisticated.Theexplanatorypowerandcom-prehensivenessoftheaccountsputforwardbyAristotle,theEpicureansandtheStoicsaresuchthattheattributionofaphilosophyoflanguagetothemisclearlyappropriate.TheimpactofAncientGreekaccountsoflanguageontheirphilosophicalsuccessorswasprofound.BibliographyEditionsandTranslationsofAncientTextsandCommentariesAristotleAckrill,J.L.(trans.andcomm.).(1963).Aristotle’sCategoriesandDeInterpretatione.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Barnes,J.(ed.).(1984).TheCompleteWorksofAristotle.TheRevisedOxfordTranslation.(2vols.).Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Jaeger,W.(ed.).(1957).AristotelisMetaphysica.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Minio-Paluello,L.(ed.).(1949).AristotelisCategoriaeetLiberDeInterpretatione.Oxford:ClarendonPress.9.Onthedistinctionbetweenindicativeandcommemorativesigns,seealsoPellegrin,ancientmedicineanditscontributiontothephilosophicaltradition,inthisvolume.661ACTC3366120/03/2006,04:21PM\ndeborahk.w.modrakRoss,W.D.(ed.).(1964).AristotelisAnalyticaPrioraetPosteriora.Oxford:ClarendonPress.——.(ed.).(1956).AristotelisDeAnima.Oxford:ClarendonPress.DiogenesLaertiusHicks,R.(ed.andtrans.).(1925).DiogenesLaertiusLivesofEminentPhilosophers.(2vols.).LoebClassicalLibrary.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress/London:Heinemann.EpicurusUsener,H.(ed.).(1887).Epicurea.Leipzig:Teubner.HellenisticphilosophersLong,A.andSedleyD.(eds.andtrans.).(1987).(citedasLS).TheHellenisticPhilosophers.(2vols.).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.LucretiusBailey,C.(ed.).(1947).TitiLucretiCariDererumnaturalibrisex.(3vols.).Oxford:ClarendonPress.PlatoBurnet,J.(ed.).(1900–7).PlatonisOpera.(5vols.).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Cooper,J.M.(ed.ofEnglishtrans.).(1997).Plato.CompleteWorks.Indianapolis:Hackett.Pre-SocraticsDiels,H.(1951–2).(CitedasDK).DieFragmentederVorsokratiker.(3vols.).6thednrevisedbyW.Kranzandoftenreprinted.Berlin:Weidmann.(Originalworkpublished1903.)SextusEmpiricusBury,R.(ed.andtrans.).(1935–49).SextusEmpiricus.(4vols.).LoebClassicalLibrary.Cam-bridge:HarvardUniversityPress/London:Heninemann.StoicsvonArnim,J.(ed.).(1903–24).Stoicorumveterumfragmenta.(=SVF).(3vols.vol.4:indexesbyM.Adler)Leipzig:Teubner.ModernAuthorsAllen,J.(2001).InferenceFromSigns.AncientDebatesAbouttheNatureofEvidence.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Atherton,M.(1993).TheStoicsonAmbiguity.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Charles,D.(2000).AristotleonMeaningandEssence.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Bolton,R.(1976).“EssentialismandSemanticTheoryinAristotle:PosteriorAnalyticsII.7–10.”PhilosophicalReview,85,514–44.——.(1985).“AristotleontheSignificanceofNames.”InLanguageandRealityinGreekPhilo-sophy:ProceedingsoftheGreekPhilosophicalSociety(pp.153–62).Athens.DeMoss,D.andDevereaux,D.(1988).“Essence,ExistenceandNominalDefinitioninAristotle’sPosteriorAnalyticsII.8–10.”Phronesis,33,133–54.662ACTC3366220/03/2006,04:21PM\nphilosophyoflanguageDover,K.(1971).“SocratesintheClouds.”InG.Vlastos(ed.),Socrates(pp.50–70).GardenCity:Doubleday.Frede,M.(1978).“PrinciplesofStoicGrammar.”InJ.Rist(ed.),TheStoics(pp.27–75).Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Furley,D.(1967).TwoStudiesintheGreekAtomists.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Glidden,D.(1983).“SkepticSemiotics.”Phronesis,28,213–255.——.(1985).“EpicureanProlEpsis.”OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,3,175–218.Graeser,A.(1978).“TheStoicTheoryofMeaning.”InJ.Rist(ed.),TheStoics(pp.77–100).Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Irwin,T.(1982).“Aristotle’sConceptofSignification.”InM.SchofieldandM.Nussbaum(eds.),LanguageandLogos(pp.241–66).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Kahn,C.(1973).“LanguageandOntologyintheCratylus.”InE.Lee,A.Mourelatos,andR.Rorty(eds.),ExegesisandArgument(FestschriftforGregoryVlastos).Phronesis,supp.vol.1.Assen:VanGorcum.Ketcham,R.(1979).“Names,FormsandConventionalism:Cratylus383–395.”Phronesis,24,133–47.Kretzmann,N.(1971).“PlatoontheCorrectnessofNames.”AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly,8,126–38.——.(1974).“AristotleonSpokenSoundSignificantbyConvention.”InJ.Corcoran(ed.),AncientLogicandItsModernInterpretations.Dordrecht:Reidel.Laks,A.(1977).“Éditioncritiqueetcommentéedela‘vied’Épicure’dansDiogèneLaërce(x,1–34).”InJ.BollackandA.Laks(eds.),Étudessurl’Épicurismeantique.Lille:Publicationsdel’UniversitédeLilleIII.Long,A.A.(1971a).“AisthEsis,ProlEpsis,andLinguisticTheoryinEpicurus.”BulletinoftheInstituteofClassicalStudies,18,114–33.——.(1971b).“LanguageandThoughtinStoicism.”InA.A.Long(ed.),ProblemsinStoicism(pp.75–113).London:UniversityofLondonAthlonePress.Manetti,G.(1993).TheoriesoftheSigninClassicalAntiquity.(trans.C.Richardson).Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress.Modrak,D.(2001).Aristotle’sTheoryofLanguageandMeaning.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Moravcsik,J.(1973).“TheAnatomyofPlato’sDivisions.”InE.Lee,A.Mourelatos,andR.Rorty(eds.),ExegesisandArgument(FestschriftforGregoryVlastos).Phronesis,supp.vol.1(pp.324–38).Assen:VanGorcum.Striker,G.(1977).“EpicurusontheTruthofSenseImpressions.”ArchivfürGeschichtederPhilosophie,59,125–42.Whitaker,C.(1996).Aristotle’sDeInterpretatione:ContradictionandDialectic.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.663ACTC3366320/03/2006,04:21PM\npierrepellegrin34AncientMedicineanditsContributiontothePhilosophicalTraditionPIERREPELLEGRINInGreekandLatinantiquity,philosophyhadaprivilegedrelationtomedicine.TherationalmedicinestemmingfromHippocrateshadwhatmaybecalleda“theoreticalreputation”equalledonlybymathematics.InPlato’sdialoguesasmuchasinAristo-teliantreatises,medicinefiguresasasciencebothestablishedandincontestable.Invirtueofthis,itfrequentlyservesasanexampleofascientificdiscipline.This“strong”statusofmedicinewillalsomakeitarivalofphilosophy,arivalrythatwilltakediverseformsinthedifferentphasesofthehistoriesofmedicineandofphilosophy.Tobesure,antiquityexperiencedadevelopment,beginningespeciallywiththeHellenisticperiod,inwhichthescienceswereemancipatedfromtheoreticaltutelagetophilosophy;butnoscienceclaimedtoreplacephilosophy,conceivedasall-embracingknowledge.Cer-tainlyonemightregardPythagoreanism,initsassertionthatthingsarenumbers(howeveroneinterpretsthisthesis),asattemptingakindofabsorptionofphilosophybymathematics.But,beyondthefactthattheenterprisewasabortive,itcannotbesaidthatPythagoreanismdefinitelysettwodisciplinesinoppositiontoeachother,onecalled“philosophy”andtheother“mathematics.”Thingsareotherwisewithmedi-cine.Infact,weshallseethatinacertainwaymedicineandphilosophycometocompeteinthesamearena,inthatbothclaimtoregulatethewholeofhumanlife.Thisbecomesevermoretruethemorethatphilosophy,fromHellenisticandespeciallyRomantimesforward,setsitselfthemaingoalofbeinganartofliving.Further,philosophicaldiscourseinthisperiodnotablyincorporatesmedicalterms,images,andmaxims:itisamatterofhealingpassions,ofmoderatinginclinations,offindingthelife-regimensuitabletothesubject’scondition.Beforegoingintofurtherdetailsoftherelationsbetweenmedicineandphilosophy,however,afewremarksareinplaceregardingancientmedicineingeneral.Historianshaveinsistedontheexistence,inGreece,ofarationalmedicine.Some,naïvelyassum-ingtheircontinuity,haveincludeditinthesamehistorywithmodernscientificmedi-cine,findinganticipatoryhintsofBernardianexperimentalismincertainHippocraticwritings(Bourgey,1953,esp.part3).Allthatiscertainlyanexaggeration.Wemustremember,ontheonehand,thattheGreeks,likeallotherpeoples,hadgreatrecoursetoempiricaltherapists,indeedeventocharlatans,aswellastoareligious“medicine”dispensedinthegreatholyplaces;and,ontheother,thatEgyptiandoctors,forex-ample,werenotwantingintheoreticboldnessandconstructedsystems,bothphysi-ologicalandnosological,thatbearcomparisonwithcertainHippocratictreatises.664ACTC3466420/03/2006,04:21PM\nancientmedicineanditscontributiontothephilosophicaltraditionWhatseemsmostcharacteristicofGreek(andthenRoman)medicineisitsdiversity,bothsynchronicanddiachronic.Ifweconsidertheliteraryoutputoftheancientphysicians,whichremainsveryimportanteventhoughonlyapartofithasbeenpreserved,wefindthatatnotimedidanyschoolormovementinmedicineimposeitshegemony.ThiswassoeveninHippocrates’day,eventhoughhedominatedthemedicineofhistimeandservedasamodelforallofancientmedicine,holdinginitaplacethatnophilosophereverheldinphilosophy.Furthermore,thehistoryofancientmedicineispunctuatedbytheoreticalrevolutions(notaccompaniedbycorrespondingrevolutionsintherapy)thatprecludeusfromspeaking–orcontinuingtospeak–of“ancientmedicine”asanundifferentiatedbutstillsignificantunity.Thereareatleastthree“ancientmedicines”:Hippocraticmedicine,Alexandrianmedicineofthethirdcenturybce,andthemedicineofthesectsandnosographies.Nordidphilo-sophyremainself-identicalfromitsappearanceinthesixthcenturybcetotheendofantiquity;consequentlyrelationsbetweenthetwodisciplineswereradicallytransformed.HippocratesWithandAgainstPhilosophyHippocrateswasbornsometenyearsafterSocrates.Heisnamedasauthorofabout50extantwritingsverydifferentintheirtopics,doctrines,anddates.Eversinceantiquitydoubtshavebeenvoicedabouttheauthenticityofsomeofthem,butthegeneraltendencywastoattributethem,ormostofthem,toHippocrateshimself.Nowadaysscholarsaremuchmorewary,and,inanycase,the“Hippocraticquestion”–theproblemofknowingwhichitemsintheHippocraticcorpusarefromHippocrates’ownhand–isofreducedimportance.Itremains,nevertheless,thatamajorityofhis-toriansofancientmedicinemaintainthatthereisakindof“Hippocraticspirit”thatdistinguishestheworksofHippocratesandthoseinhiscirclefromothertreatises.Itisoftentothese“Hippocratic”treatisesthatscientificfeaturesinthemodernsensehavebeenanachronisticallyattributed;forexample,acombinationofobservation,evenofexperimentation,andreasoning.Commentatorshavethusacquiredthe(bad)habitofgivinga“positivist”readingofoneofthediscrepanciestobefoundamongtheworksoftheHippocraticcorpus.Throughthecontroversyreportedbytheauthorofoneofourtreatises,theRegimeninAcuteDiseases,weknowthattwoschools,bothlocatedonthecoastofAsiaMinor,stoodinoppositiontoeachother:one,thatofHippocrates,wasbasedinCos,theotherinCnidos.Inthewakeofanalysestoolengthytoexpoundhere,historiansaccordinglycametoidentifyacertainnumberofworksintheHippocraticcorpusas“Cnidian”:theDiseasesIIandIII,theInternalAffectionsandthegynecologicaltreatises.Thesetreat-isesareincontestablyofamore“archaic”characterthanthegreattreatisesattributedtotheschoolofHippocrates.Theyarecataloguesofdiseasessortedbyspeciesandvariants,withmoreorlessthesameexpositorystructure:name,symptoms,pro-gnosis,therapy.ThetreatisesattributedtotheschoolofCos,bycontrast,aremarkedbyanotableexpositorydiversity.Evenwhen,asintheEpidemics,whatwehavearemerenotes,recordingindividualcasesobservedbyanodoubtitinerantdoctor,givingeventhelocalityofthecaseandthenameofthepatient,i.e.,textsinnosensepartof665ACTC3466520/03/2006,04:21PM\npierrepellegrinatheoreticaloretiologicalaccount,wefindneithertherigidexpositionoftheCnidiantreatisesnorthestereotypedcharacteroftheirtherapeuticprescriptions.ItisnonethelessfutiletoattempttofindadifferenceoftheoreticallevelbetweentheCnidianandtheCoantreatises.Inarevealinglytitledbook,RobertJoly(1966)hasconvincinglyshownthatthetreatisesoftheHippocraticcorpusexpress,oneandall,aprescientificwayofthinking–customarilydescribed,notsolongago,as“primitive”or“archaic”–immersedinwhatAugusteComtecalledthe“metaphysicalage.”Thetheoryofhumors,forexample,oneoftheprincipallegaciesofHippocraticmedicinetotheWesternmedicaltradition,projectsanimaginarypictureofthehumanbodyasthelocusofthefluxandconcentrationoffluidsthateludesallexperimentalconfirma-tion.TherealbasisofthedifferencebetweenCnidianandCoantreatiseslieselsewhere.WemaygraspitbyconsideringtreatisessuchasTheArtandBreaths.Commentatorshavehardlybeensympathetictothesetreatises,findingtheirrhetoricalvirtuositysuspect.Thelastmentioned,forexample,endeavorstoprovethatalldiseasesresultfromamaldistributionofgaseousfluxesinthebody.Tothisenditdeploysalltheresourcesoftheartofspeechmaking,soadvancedinthosetimes,includingtheasson-ancesthatmakediscoursemoreelegant.Itwasthusheldthatitwasasophistickindofdiscourseinwhichtheauthorsoughtabovealltodisplayhisskillasanorator,withoutmuchconcernforthecontentofhisremarks.ThiswasreminiscentoftheboastsofaGorgias,undertakingtodefendcontrarytheseswithequalpersuasiveness.Theterm,andconcept,“iatrosophist”wasthereforecoinedtodenotetheauthorsofsuchdiscourses.JacquesJouanna,inhiseditionofTheArtandBreathsintheBudéSeries,hasirre-versiblyoverthrownthisnotion.AtreatisesuchasBreathsisindeedanepideicticdiscourse–thatis,onedeliveredtoanaudienceinordertopersuade–butnothingprovesthatitscontentisamatterofindifferencetoitsauthor.Itisacaseofaphysicianexpoundingthedoctrinetowhichheadheres,onecorrespondingcloselytothe“levelofHippocraticscience”(orofpre-Socraticphilosophy),butexpoundingitinparticularcircumstances.Perhapssuchexerciseswerelinkedtotheinstitutionof“publicphysi-cians”appointedbycitiestodealwithpublichealthproblems.Theirrecruitment,particularlyindemocraticcitieswhereapopularassemblyhadthelastwordonevery-thing,tookplaceaftera“competition”duringwhichthephysicianwastoconvincethecitizensthathewastheirman.Platomockedthepretensionsofthepeopletojudgethetechnicalabilitiesofexperts.Butwecangivetheinstitutionofpublicphysiciansadifferentreading.Itwas,infact,amatterofmedicine’smakingitsmarkonthepolit-icalspaceopenedupbythefoundingofcities.AsthegroundbreakingworksofJean-PierreVernant(esp.1965)haveshown,whenthecityreplacedearliersocio-politicalsystems,rationalargumentativediscoursereplacedauthoritariandiscoursebasedontradition(usuallywiththebackingofthegods)asthesourceofpower.Inotherdomains,thepropagationofthisformofrationalitybroughtaboutthereplacementofmythicalaccountsoftheoriginsoftheuniversebypre-Socraticcosmogonies.Itis,therefore,notsomuchatheoreticalprogressthatHippocratesand,withhim,theschoolofCosmadeinmedicineasaprogresswemightcallrational.WhereastheschoolofCnidos,sofaraswecantell,seemstohaveremainedwithinthetradi-tionallogicofanauthoritativedoctrineapparentlytransmittedthroughafamilystruc-ture,itisnotablethatHippocrates,eventhoughhehimselfcamefromthistypeof666ACTC3466620/03/2006,04:21PM\nancientmedicineanditscontributiontothephilosophicaltraditionstructure–hisgrandfather,father,andsonswerephysicians–acceptedpayingstudentsfromoutsidehisfamily.Hemayevenhavebeenthefirsttodoso,thoughthiscannotbestatedwithcertainty.Thushisson-in-lawPolybius–linkedtothefamilybymarriage,tobesure–wasaphysician:hewouldbecometheauthorofthefamoustreatiseOnTheNatureofMan.ItisthereforenoexaggerationtosaythatHippocrateswastheonewhoalignedmedicinewithphilosophybymakingitshareinthesamesortofrationalityasthelatter.Medicinethenlost,moreorlessrapidlybutintheenddefinitively,allofitsesotericorinitiationalcharacterandestablisheditselfinthepublicarena.Theresemblancesbetweenmedicineandphilosophythenarestriking.Bothproposeexplanatorysystemsrestingondemonstrations,andbothdevelopthroughthecompetitionofrivaltendencies,whichbecome,inthefourthcenturybceforphilosophyandlessthanacenturylaterformedicine,dulyconstitutedschools.Nootherdisciplinesharedthesetraitswiththemforsuchalongperiod.YetoneofHippocrates’claimstogloryinantiquitywasthatheestablishedthetheoreticalautonomyofmedicinebyfreeingitfromtheyokeofphilosophy(cf.Celsus,prefacetoDeMedicina8).Beforehim,infact,rationalmedicinewasaprovinceofphilosophy,inthesensethatpre-Socraticphilosophyconsistedinwhatwascalled“theinvestigationofnature”or“physics.”Manyofthepre-Socraticphilo-sophersalsorepresentedthemselvesorwererecognizedasphysicians.ThiswasthecasewithEmpedocles,AlcmeonofCroton,Archelaus,andperhapsevenParmenides.Vitalphenomenawereamongthosethatphysicsundertooktoexplainonthesameprinciplesasothernaturalrealities,usuallybythemutualtransformationofelement-aryprinciples.TheconflictbetweenmedicineandphilosophyinHippocrates’time,andthatuptotheendofthe“classic”periodinphilosophy,i.e.,untilthedeathofAristotle,takesontheappearanceofanattemptbymedicinetoescapefromitstheoretictutelagetophilosophy,andaparallelattemptbyphilosophytoreconqueritsempire.ThequestionoftheepistemologicalstatusofmedicineinAristotle,forexample,isverycomplex–toocomplex,atanyrate,tobetreatedhere.Wehardlyknow,infact,wheretoplaceitintheapparentlyexhaustiveclassificationoftheoretical,practical,andproductivesciencesproposedinMetaphysicsE.Whatisclear,ontheotherhand,isthatforAristotle“healthandsicknessarenotthebusinessofthephysicianalone,butalsoofthephysicist,whomustgofarenoughtogivetheircauses...Thosephysicianswhoareeducatedandlearnedmakesomementionofphysicsandclaimtoderivetheirprinciplesfromit”(Resp.21,480b22).ThoughAristotledoesnotreducemedicinetophysics,asthepre-Socraticsdid,bymakingknowledgeofthecausesofhealthandsicknessdependonaphysicalinvestigation–intheAristoteliansenseoftheterm–hethoroughlyre-establishedphilosophy’sholdonmedicine(cf.BodnárandPellegrin,aristotle’sphysicsandcosmology,inthisvolume).WithintheHippocraticcorpusitselfwefindbothtreatisesthataffirmthedependenceofmedicineonnaturalphilo-sophyandothersmilitatinginfavorofitstheoreticalautonomy.ThusthetreatiseOnFleshes–thetitleofwhich,PeriSarchOn,isprobablytheresultofanerrorincopyingPeriArchOn,OnPrinciples–andthetreatiseRegimenmakeastudyofwhatwewouldcallthegenerallawsofnatureapreliminarytoallmedicaldiagnosisandprognosis.ThetreatisesOntheNatureofManandOnAncientMedicine,bycontrast,denouncethereductionismofthephilosophers.Butthescopeofthisanti-philosophicalcritiquemust667ACTC3466720/03/2006,04:21PM\npierrepellegrinbewellunderstood.TheauthorofOntheNatureofManrejectsthepostulateofsomewhoholdthateverythingisconstitutedofasingleelement–the“Milesian”position–whileOnAncientMedicineaccusesthe“newphysicians”offallingundertheinfluenceofthesimplifyingassumptionsofphilosopherswhoexplaineverythingbymeansofprincipleslikethehot,thecold,thedry,themoist,etc.Thisisananti-speculativecritiqueratherthanaproperlytheoreticalone.Whatthephysiciansobjectedtointhephilosopherswastheirreductionism,avoidedbythephysiciansduetothediversityandcomplexityofthesituationstheyconfronted.ThusitisinthenameofexperiencebasedonlengthypracticethatOnAncientMedicineseekstoestablishthedominionofmedicineovereverythingthatconcernshumannature.Hippocraticmedicinethusdidnotthreatentheexplanatorymonopolyofpre-Socraticandclassicalphilosophy.Assoonasitventuredintoetiology,weseeclearlythatitadoptedthepresuppositionsofthisphilosophy,whose“level”itshared,touseagainR.Joly’sterm.Itwaslaterthatmedicineacquiredthemeanstoplayagenuinelycriticalrole,asweshallsee.Nevertheless,medicine’schallengetoahegemonicphilosophywasfarfrombeinginsignificant.Theveryfactthatarationaldiscipline,unanimouslyregardedasa“science,”setsouttogiveitselfitsowntheoreticalfounda-tionsshowsthatwithrespecttophilosophy,whichhadarrogatedtoitselfa“righttoconcernitselfwithallthings,”asHegelsaid,therearetwokindsofdispute.First,thereisinternaldisagreement,whichisconstitutiveofphilosophyitself,duetothefactofitsagonisticoriginanddevelopment.EvenintheheydayoftriumphantNeoplatonism,attheendofantiquity,nophilosophicalschooleverimposeditshegemonyintheGreco-Romanworld,asChristianitywould.Thechallengeofmedicine,ontheotherhand,representsanexternalattack,towhichweknow,atleastthroughoneveryimportantpieceofevidence,thatphilosophygaveinterestedconsideration.ThisisthepassageinPlato’sPhaedrus(269e–270e)inwhichhespeaksoftheHippocraticmethod,accord-ingtowhichthenatureofthewholemustbeknowninordertoknowthatofthepart,thespeciesofthingstobeknownmustbeenumerated,andtherelationsofthethingtobeknowntothingsrelatedtoitmustbeexamined.WemustsurelyunderstandtheHippocraticmethodtobeapplicabletothehumanbody,andparticularlytothedis-easedbody,evenas,whentakenupbyphilosophy,itisapplicabletoeverything,oratleasttomanyotherthings.ThisPlatonicpassageishardtointerpretandhasgivenrisetoanimportantliter-ature.Thecommentatorshave,infact,askedwhatsuchtheoreticalinjunctionsmeantandwhattheyreferredto–forexample,towhat“whole”isPlatoalluding,thewholeuniverse,thewholehumanbody,orsomethingelse?Itisnotthiskindofquestionthatisofinterestus,butratherthatconcerningthetheoreticalrelationPlatodescribesbetweenhimselfandHippocrates,thisHippocrateswhoclaimedtofreemedicinefromthecontrolofphilosophy.Itishardtoknowhowtoreadthepassage,theinterpreta-tionofwhichliesbetweentwoextremes:(i)Platoispromotingtheimportationintophilosophy,andmoreparticularlyintotheinvestigationoftherelationsbetweenrhetoricandthesoul,ofamethoddevelopedinmedicine;(ii)Platoismockingthephysicians’claimtohaveoriginallydevelopedamethodthatthephilosophersac-quiredlongago,andthathehimselfhadsketchedafewpagesaboveindiscussingtheproceduresofdivisionandcollection(265c–266c).Howeverthatmaybe,whetherheisadmiringormocking,PlatorecognizestheexistenceofaHippocraticmethodthat668ACTC3466820/03/2006,04:21PM\nancientmedicineanditscontributiontothephilosophicaltraditionleadstorationalknowledgeofthehumanbody,amethodthatthephysicianofCoshadnotborrowedfromphilosophy.AlexandrianMedicineandtheHellenisticPhilosophicalSchoolsWehaveseenthatmedicineisnoteasilyclassifiedintheAristoteliansystemofthesciences,whichcollectivelyconstitutephilosophy.ThiswillbeequallytrueoftheHellenisticphilosophicalsystems,likethatoftheStoics,whichdividedphilosophyintothreeparts–logic,physics,ethics–adivisionthatpersisteduntilthetwentiethcentury.Medicinedoesnotbelongentirelytoanyoftheseparts,butmobilizesallofthem.ItwasdoubtlessGalenwhoshowedthisbest.Thephysicianshouldobviouslybeaphysicist,butheshouldalsobealogiciantobeabletoinfertruejudgmentsfromhisempiricalobservations.AndGalenwroteseveraltreatisesonlogic,ofwhichtheInstitutioLogicahascomedowntous.Inethics,medicinewillplayanever-largerrolebeginningwiththeHellenisticperiod,competingdirectlywithphilosophy,asweshallseebelow.Thereisthenarealrivalrybetweenmedicineandphilosophy.Butif,asthetitle(andclearlythecontentaswell)ofaGalenictreatiseimplies,“thegoodphysicianmustalsobeaphilosopher,”weshouldnotunderstandthisinjunctionasturningmedicineintoakindofreflectionofphilosophy.Medicinetrulypresentsitselfasaculminationofphilosophy.Thisisparticularlyclearinwhathasbeencalled“Alexandrianmedicine.”AfterthedismembermentofAlexander’sempire,thedynastyofthePtolemies,whichreignedinEgypt,successfullystrovetomakeAlexandriathemainintellectualcenteroftheancientworld–whencethecreationofthefamouslibraryandMuseum,akindofuniversity,dedicatedabovealltophilosophyandphilologybutnotneglectingtheotherdisciplines.Twogreatnamesdominatethemedicineofthisperiod,thebegin-ningofthethirdcenturybce:HerophilusofChalcedonandErasistratusofCeos.Wewilltakethefirstasourexample.Herophilusisknownprimarilyasaverygreatana-tomist,duelargelytohispractice,innovativeatthetime,ofhumandissection,andevenofhumanvivisection,practicedoncondemnedprisoners“pulledfromtheking’sdungeons”(Celsus,prefacetoMed.23).Heiscreditedwiththe“discovery”(amongothers)ofthedifferencebetweensensitiveandmotornerves,theventriclesofthebrain,theovaries,etc.Butweshouldbeclearaboutthescopeofthese“discoveries”:whatshouldwemake,forexample,ofanexactdescriptionoftheovaryintheabsenceofanyideaofwhatovulationmightbe?Herophilusistheveryimageofwhatinthefollowingcenturywillbecalledthe“dogmaticphysician,”thisepithet,thenfreefromtoday’spejorativeconnotation,merelydenotingsomeonewhoprofessesopinions(dogmata):aphysicianwhothoughtthatitisnotthemanifestcauses–suchasindigestion,sunstroke,etc.–thatarethefunda-mentalcausesofdiseases,butratherinterveningchangesattheleveloftheconstitu-entsofthebody–tissues,humors,etc.Thesefundamentalhiddencausescanbeknownbyalogicalinferencefromsymptoms.Itisthisprocedureofinference,whichtheSkepticalphilosophersaswellasGalencalled“indication”(endeixis)–definedastheinferencetothehiddenfromthemanifest,ortotheinvisiblefromthevisible–thatthusfurnishedthecausesofdiseasesonwhichtherapystrovetoact.Havingverified669ACTC3466920/03/2006,04:21PM\npierrepellegrinsuchphenomenaasfever,shivering,thechangeinappearanceorconsistencyofcer-tainpartsofthebody,etc.,thedogmaticphysicianassignstothem,astheirultimatecauses,anexcessordeficiencyofhumors,theunseasonableattachmentofsomehumortoanorgan,or,ifhecleavestoacorpuscularconceptionofthebody’sfunctioning,thecloggingofthepatient’sporesorinternalvesselsbyexcessivelylargeornumerouscorpuscles.Dogmatismisthusnotadoctrinebutratheranattitude–wemightevensayafaithinhumanreason’scapacitytomakediscoveries.Allofthegreatphysiciansoftheclassicalperiod,includingHippocrates,maythusbeincludedamongthedogmatists(Celsus,prefacetoMed.15).ButthepositionofHerophilusisverydifferentfromthatofHippocrates,andthisisinlargepartduetotheprogressofphilosophicalreflection.InAlexandria,theorgan-izationofstudieswasstronglyinfluencedbytheonethatheldswayinAristotle’sLyceum.StratoofLampsacus,thethirdheadofLyceumwasalsotheteacherofPtolemyIIPhiladelphus.Thedevelopment,ontheonehand,ofAristotelianphysics–andespeciallyofbiology,whichisthemainpartofit–andofanatomicalandphysiologicalinvestigationsbyphysicians,ontheother,meantthattheinvestigationofcauses–whichiswhatwasaboveallretainedfromAristotelianism–couldnolongerrestrictitselftothevaguedescriptionsofhumoralfluxesofferedbytheHippocraticphysicians.Stoicismtoo,whichwouldbecomeaprominentfeatureofthephilosophicallandscapebeginninginthesecondhalfofthethirdcenturybce,emphasizedetiology.Comment-atorsarenotinagreementaboutthenatureoftheexplanationsofferedbyHerophilus,mainlybecauseoursourcesarecontradictory.Mostoftheevidence,especiallythat1foundinGalen,depictsHerophilusasadogmaticphysician,inthesensedefinedabove.Otherfragments,includingonesfromGalen,describehim,bycontrast,asaphysicianwhowasverycautiouswithrespectto“hiddencauses,”andevenmakehimapre-cursoroftheEmpiricistschooltobediscussedbelow.HeinrichvonStaden,inhismagis-terialbookonHerophilus(1989),proposesthatheattributedahypotheticalstatustoexplanationsinphysiologyandpathology,whichisperhapstocreditAlexandrianmedicinewithviewsthataretoomodern.AformulationthatGalencreditstoHerophilussays,doubtlesswithregardtoobservedphenomena,andespeciallythosemadeaccess-iblebythedevelopmentofanatomy,“thatthesethingsarethefirst,eveniftheyarenotthefirst”(Meth.Med.X,107K),which,characteristicallyofthedogmaticposition,istoacknowledgethatthecausesthatexplainphenomenaarefirst“bynature,”asAristotleputsit.ButitseemsthatHerophilusdidnotfeelcompetenttodeterminethenatureoftheprimaryentitiesconstitutingallthings(elements,qualities,oratoms).Itisnot,strictlyspeaking,aSkepticalpositionthatisatissue,butHerophilusnon-ethelesscontributedtopreservingthetheoreticalautonomyofmedicineasagainstphilosophy.Thefigure,alreadyproclaimedbyAristotle(cf.Pol.III.11,1282a3),ofthebiologist-physician,nottobefoundinthetreatisesoftheHippocraticcorpus,wasthenestab-lished.Therelationsbetweenmedicineandphilosophywereradicallychangedthereby.ThesituationmaybedescribedbyparaphrasingKant.UntilthetimeofAristotle,philosophershadsucceededinconvincingmanypeople,amongthemnumerous1.Themostexplicittestimony,whichliststhedogmatic(“rationalist”)physicians,comesfromaperhapsapocryphalGalenictreatise,Introductiosivemedicus4.670ACTC3467020/03/2006,04:21PM\nancientmedicineanditscontributiontothephilosophicaltraditionphysicians,thatmedicinewithoutphilosophywasblind.Theimprovement,duetotheresultsofmedicalinvestigation,intheidentificationofthecausesofdiseases,showsthat,atleastinphysics,henceforthphilosophywithoutmedicineisempty.Themostcelebrateddogmaticphysicians,saysCelsus,“laidclaimtothestudyofnatureaswell,judgingthatwithoutitmedicinewasmutilatedandpowerless”(prefacetoMed.9).Alreadysurpassingthephilosophersinphysics,physicians,aswehaveremarked,weresoontobecometheirredoubtablecompetitorsintherealmofethics.Somehavegivenaphilosopho-centricreadingofmedicine’sinterventioninintellec-tualdebate.Forinstance,G.E.R.Lloyd,intheaccountinthenewedition(1991)ofhisarticle,“WhoIsAttackedinOnAncientMedicine?”publishedin1963,setsouttoshowthatthepolemicofOnAncientMedicine,discussedabove,setsinoppositionthetwomaintendenciesofGreekphilosophyandscience:adeductive,axiomaticmodelandanempiricalone.ThewholeAristoteliantraditioninsistedontheimportanceofempiricalexamination.Asearlyasthefourthcenturybce,forexample,theAristotelizinganatomistDioclesofCarystoscriticizedtheetiologizingexcessesofphysiciansandtheirdistrustofexperience.Herophilus,itseems,didthesame.Lloyd’sanalysisisperfectlyacceptableasconcernsphilosophyandhasthesupportofmanytexts,butitrisksreducingmedicinetoaforcesupplementarytooneofthetwoconflictingphilosophicaltendencies.Itisinanycaseuncertainthatsuchaview,eveninits“hardest”version,reallyreducestheimportanceofmedicine.Ontheonehand,onemight,takingtheinverseofLloyd’sview,showthatmedicine,fromtheHippocraticperiodon,isitselfshotthroughwiththeoppositionbetweenatheoreticalandanempiricaltendency;andthatintreatisessuchasRegimenandFleshesthetheoreticalapproachcallsphilosophy,andinparticularthe“inquiryintonature,”toitsaid.Ontheotherhand,ifmedicineisinapositiontoreinforcetheso-calledempiricaltendencyinGreekphilosophy,andthelattermustappealtomedicineinordertowinout,oratleastforreinforcement,thatgivesmedicinetheroleofanarbiterintheintellectualdebate.TheTheoreticalAudacityoftheMedicalSchoolsThisdecisiveinterventionbymedicineinthephilosophicaldebatetakesaremarkableturnduringtheperiodofthedevelopmentofmedical“schools”or“sects,”aperiodinwhichmedicinedemonstratedatheoreticalboldnessbothunprecendentedthenandperhapsunequalledinlatertimes.Firstwemustsayafewwordsaboutthese“sects,”longneglectedbyhistorians,nodoubtbecausetheysawinthemexcessiveandridicu-lousdoctrines.Theterms“school”and“sect”translatetheGreekwordshairesis,asubstantivecorrespondingtotheverbhaireo,“tochoose”–ahereticbeingonewhochoosesapathotherthantheorthodoxline.Inacertainwaythedivisionofthemedicallandscapeintosectsassimilatesmedicinetophilosophy,sincethelatterexistedthroughtheactivityofrivalschools.ThefirstphilosophicalschooltopresentmostofthefeaturesthatwouldcharacterizesubsequentonesisPlato’sAcademy:itsmembersledalargelycommunallife,atoneintheiradmirationoftheteacher,whichwovebetweenthemverystrongfraternalbonds.Itseems,ontheotherhand,thatPlatoimposednophilo-sophicalorthodoxyonhisstudents,whereasoneofthemaintraitsoflaterschools,671ACTC3467120/03/2006,04:21PM\npierrepellegrinincludingAristotle’sLyceum,wastoturntheirmembersintopropagandistsfortheteacher’sdoctrine(Cf.Bénatouïl,philosophicschoolsinhellenisticandromantimes,inthisvolume).Insomefashion,medicalschoolsalreadyexisted,evenfromthetimeofHippocrates:thesemedicalcenterswereinoperationatleastsincethesixthcenturybce,sometimesassociatedwithreligioussanctuariesdedicatedtohealingdivinities;forinstance,atCyreneinpresent-dayLibya,atCrotoninSicilyand,aswehaveseen,atCosandCnidos.AnexceptionalpersonalitysuchasHippocratesmightlendatheoret-icaland/ortherapeutic“style”tothemedicalpracticeofaplace,andthusfoundwhatwemaycalla“proto-school.”WithHerophilus,swiftlyfollowedinthisrespectbyErasistratus,theperiodofthemedicineofthesectstrulybegins.AtAlexandria,Herophilusfoundedaschoolwhosestudentswouldbechargedwithpropagatingtheteacher’sdoctrineaswellashistherapeuticpractices,especiallywithregardtodefend-ingitagainstitseventualdetractors.ThushavebeenpreservedforussourcesbearingonthedivergencesbetweenHerophiliansandErasistrateansovertheusefulnessof2bloodletting.TheschoolsofHerophilusandErasistratussurvivedtheirfounders:theschoolofHerophilusremainedinAlexandriaforabouttwocenturiesbeforeemigrat-ingtoLaodiceainAsiaMinor,andGalen,inthesecondcenturyce,stillmentionstheexistenceofErasistrateanphysicians.ButitwasjustafterthetimeofHerophilusthatoccurredaneventofcapitalimport-ance,notonlyforthehistoryofancientmedicinebutforthehistoryofGreekthoughtand,ultimately,fortheintellectualhistoryofhumanityingeneral.Accordingtothemostplausibleversionofthematter,astudentofHerophilus,PhilinusofCos,founded3theEmpiricistsectorschool.PhilinushadfoundinHerophilushimselfcertainviewsthatsteeredhimtowardthedoctrinehewoulddevelop,butwearefacedwithagenu-inedissidence–dissidencebeing,inphilosophyandhenceforwardinmedicine,oneoftheprocessesbywhichnewschoolswereformed.Empiricismsetsoutinitiallyfromacritiqueofearliermedicine,allrepresentativesofwhicharecollectedundertheepithet“dogmatists,”atermwehavealreadyencountered.Thedogmaticschool,sometimescalled“logical”or“rationalist,”wasnotatrueschool,andnophysicianevercalledhimself“dogmatic.”Itwasconstitutedbyitscritics,ledbytheEmpiricists,whodefineditbymeansofcertaintheoreticalcharacteristicsenumeratedabove.ThebasicpositionoftheEmpiricistsisthatonlywhatcanbegraspedthroughthesensesisknowable,whereaseverythinginferredthrough“indication”offersonlyabaselessandillusoryknowledge.Bymaintainingthatreasonisofnohelpindiscover-inghiddencauses–thatis,ultimately,ingainingknowledgeofnature–theEmpiri-cistsscandalizedtheGreekrationalistconsensus:ascandalfromwhichwearenotentirelysetfree,sinceonlyveryrecentlyhavetheEmpiricistscometoberegardedasanythingbutprovocateursorfools.Inonesense,theyareindeedtheproductsoftheir2.Cf.thetranslationofGalen’streatiseAgainsttheErasistrateansinP.Brain(1986).3.Celsus(prefacetoMed.10)regardsthesectashavingbeenfoundedbySerapionofAlexan-dria(around250bce),butthereareatleasttwoothercandidates:acertainZeuxisofwhomGalenspeaksinhiscommentaryonBookIofHippocrates’Prorrhetic(2.58=XVI,636K):Zeuxis,“themostancientoftheEmpiricists”(thisreferenceseemstohaveescapedDeichgräber,1930),andAcronofAlexandria,adiscipleofEmpedocles(cf.GalenSubfig.emp.1.42Deichgräber).672ACTC3467220/03/2006,04:21PM\nancientmedicineanditscontributiontothephilosophicaltraditiontime,whenStoicandEpicureandogmatismswerebuttheobverseofafeelingofdoubtaboutthecognitivecapacitiesofhumanbeings:Beforethatperiod,therehadcertainlybeennoabsenceofcriticstopointouttheshortcomingsofhumanknowledge,butitissafetosaythatvarioustriumphsinthesciences,particularlyinmathematics,hadenabledphilosophers,whentheyfocusedtheirinquiryonknowledgeassuch,toconcentrateonquestionsaboutitsnature,itsorigin,itsinstruments,anditsstructureofresearchandexposition,ratherthanonthequestionofitsexistenceorpossibility.TheHellenisticperiod,bycontrast,wasaperiodinwhichphilosophers,particularlytheEpicureansandtheStoics,becamesuddenlyandvitallypreoccupiedwithestablishingthatknowledgeispossible,thatourcognitiveaccesstotheworldrestsonaninfalliblebase.(Brunschwig,2000,p.739)Confiningourselvestothemedicaldomain,itisatoncethemostancientcertaintiesandnovelpracticessuchasdissectionthatcometobedoubted.Etiology,i.e.,diagnosis,losesitsentirebasis:attemptstodiscoverwhatishiddenbeingdoomedtofail,notonlydoesreasoningservenopurpose,butitisequallyuselesstopracticeanatomyorvivisection.Ifacause(aitia,aition)canbeassignedtodiseases,itisintheimmediatesenseofthetermaition–whatisresponsiblefortheillnessinquestion.ItiswhattheEmpiricistscalledthe“immediatecause”:heat,cold,variousexcesses,fatigue,atrauma,etc.Atoncemedicine,which,intheGreekintellectuallandscape,hadraiseditselftothelevelofmathematicsasaparadigmaticscience,cannolongerberegardedeitherasascience(epistEmE)orasanart(technE).FortheEmpiricistphysiciantherearethreewaystoacquiresoundknowledge:personalobservation(autopsia);whathasbeenobservedandrecountedbyothersand/orrecordedinwriting(historia);andwhatmaybeanalogicallyderivedfromwhathasbeenobserved–whattheEmpiricistscalled“transitiontothesimilar”:atreatmenteffectiveforonepartofthebodyis“trans-ferred”toanotherpartsimilarlyafflicted,etc.Moreover,theempiricistsinsistthatonlyrepeatedobservationscanestablishwhattheycalla“theorem”–“atheoremisknow-ledgeofathingthatonehasseenacertainnumberoftimes,whiletogetherwiththeabilitytodistinguishtheeventcontrarytoit”(Gal.Subfig.emp.2.46)–atermwhichmustherebestrippedofalltheoreticalconnotation,leavingonlyitsoriginaletymo-logicalmeaning,“whatonesees,”“spectacle.”TheEmpiricistswerenotempiricistsinthemodernsenseoftheterm,andstilllessweretheyanti-rationalistswho,forexample,promotedareturntomagico-religiousmedicine.ItisveryimportanttounderstandtheattitudeoftheEmpiriciststowardrationalprocedure.Beforetryingtoclarifythisquestion,wemustnotethatrecoursetoreasoningseemstohavebeenthesubjectofadebatewithintheEmpiricistschool.Refutingtheidea,propoundedentirelywithoutjustificationbyDeichgräber(1930),theauthorofwhatremainsthestandardreferenceontheEmpiricistschool,accordingtowhichtheEmpiricistschoolwasbynatureincapableofanysignificantevolution,M.Frede(1988,p.89)hasshownthat,whilethefirstEmpiriciststookanextremelineinrejectingallrecoursetoreasoning,laterphysicianslikeHeraclidesofTarentum,4whomFredeseesas“themostimportantEmpiricistmedicalauthor,”hadamuch4.Heraclidesisthoughttohavelivedduringthesecondandfirstcenturiesbce.673ACTC3467320/03/2006,04:21PM\npierrepellegrinmorenuancedposition.Notonlymustoneresorttoreasoninordertoreasonagainstone’sadversaries,asGalensays(Subfig.emp.12.87),butwealsomaywellwonderwhatkindofmedicineitwouldbethatdispensedentirelywithinference.TheEmpiricistslikeHeraclidesofTarentummusthavebeenawareofthedangersofpureempiricismwithwhichtheirpredecessorswerereproached.Wefindatraceof5suchcriticismsinGalen.Forinstance,inhistreatiseonMedicalExperience,Galenpointsout(6.1ff.;30.5ff.WalzerandFrede)thatifthecausalornon-causalcharacteroftheelementsofasituationarenottobetakenintoaccount,theneverythingperceivedmustbeputonthesamelevel:whatthepatientdidbeforetheonsetofthedisease,butequallywhetherhewaswearingawhitecloakoraredone.Inference,however,neednottaketheformof“indication.”Thatis,itneednotbefromsome-thingvisibleandgraspabletosomethinginvisibleandungraspable–theEmpiricistscalledthisprocess,usedbythedogmaticphysicians,“analogism,”aprocesssofunda-mentaltothepracticeofthedogmatiststhattheyarealsotermed“Analogists”(Gal.OnSects1)–butratherfromwhatisgraspabletowhatisgraspable,whencethe“epilogism”theEmpiricistsintroducedinordertodiscoverwhatisprovisionallyhidden,butthenatureofwhichisnotinaccessibletoexperience.EpilogismisinawaythemostextremeformofreasoningacceptabletotheEmpiricists,oratleasttothelessextremistamongthem.Whocouldmaintain,inanycase,thatrepeatedobservation,whichpresupposesthejudgmentthatcasesobservedwithaviewtoestablishinga“theorem”belonginfacttoasingleclass,ortheuseofhistoria,whichcallsfora“criticismofsources,”tosaynothingofthetransitiontothesimilar,involvenoreasoningatall?Further,whenintheSubfiguratioEmpiricaGalenhastheEmpiricistssay,“experiencebasedonpractice,i.e.,expertise,comesonlytomenoftheart,pursu-anttosomeresemblancesamongthethingstheyhavefoundbyexperimentation”(Subfig.emp.2.45),weseehowfartheexperienceonwhichEmpiricismtakesitsstandisfromtheordinaryandunregulatedexperiencetowhichthedogmatistswouldliketoreduceit.Itisamatterofareasonedandsystematicenterprise,ofanexperienceinwhichexternalconditionsarescrupulouslytakenintoaccount.InanarticleoriginallyconceivedasacommentaryonthearticlebyM.Fredecitedabove,M.Matthenmakesaninterestingremark(1988,p.111):whatthe“clear-mindedEmpiricist”rejectsisdemonstration(apodeixis)insofarasitallowsaninfer-encewithaconclusionbearingonwhatisunobservable,“butsomeEmpiricists[i.e.,extremeEmpiricistsfromthebeginningoftheEmpiricistschool]mightalsohavebannedreasoningassuch,becausetheyfailedtodistinguishbetweenargumentandproof.”Intheeyesofdogmaticancientphilosophersandphysicians,tocriticizetheexcessesofreasonisalsotocriticizereasonitself.This,bycontrast,istrueneitherforthe“clear-minded”Empiricistsnorforus.Infact,tomakeonemorestep,thetheoreticalscopeoftheEmpiricistdoctrineisapparent.WecanseeinthepositiontakenbytheEmpiricists,ineffect,averymodern-stylecritiqueofametaphysical(intheComtiansenseoftheterm)applicationofreason.Tobesure,asGalenrepeatsoftenenough,thedogmaticphysicianspreachanalliancebetweenreasoningandobservation,evenexperimenta-tion,andhehimselfadoptedsuchaposition.Butobservationandexperienceasconceivedandpracticedbyallthesepeoplearenotoriouslyincapableofdeciding5.ThistextispreservedmainlyinArabic.674ACTC3467420/03/2006,04:21PM\nancientmedicineanditscontributiontothephilosophicaltraditionbetweenrivaltheories,because,bytheirnature,thesetheoriesareunverifiableandunfalsifiable.Similarly,wemaypointoutthatthetheoreticaldevelopmentsinmedi-cinebroughtaboutbypeoplelikeHerophilusandErasistratuscanhavehadonlythefeeblestconsequencesfortherapy,obligingtheseboldtheoriststofallbackontradi-6tionalcures.AndGalenremarksseveraltimesover,withabitofamusement,thatintheenddogmatistsandEmpiricistsmeetagainovermattersoftherapy.Forinstance,allagreethatafterthebiteofavenomousanimalonemustcausethevenomtobleedaway,andthusnothurrytocicatrizethewound(OnSects4.8).Wemustsayalittleaboutthesecondgreatmedicalschoolthatstoodopposedtodogmatism,theMethodistschool.Fewarethehistorianswho,beforeourrecenttimes,7havenotregardedtheMethodistsasjokersatbestandatworstasfools.Oneexampleofthisillregard:somehistorianshavepurportedtoexplainthattheMethodistphysi-ciansenjoyedgreatcreditamongthedominantRomanclasses–Cicero’sphysicianwasaMethodist–andevenintheimperialpalacebecausetheirsimplistictheoryhadeveryappealtoRomanswhowereunrefinedandlittlegiventotheoreticalspeculation.Infact,Methodismisanadmirablysubtletheory.TheMethodistsdismissdogmatistsandEmpiricistsequally:theyreject,justliketheEmpiricists,explanationsthatresorttohiddenentities,buttheybelieve,asagainsttheEmpiricists,thatexperience–i.e.,observation,infact–isofnohelpinmedicine.Accordingtothem,everyillnessitselfindicatesitsownpropertreatment,justasthirstindicatesitsownremedy,whichisdrink.Allthesame,thisindicationistobereadthroughauniversallyvalidconceptualgrid–thatof“apparentcommunities.”Thisdoctrinedoubtlessexistedinseveralversions,which,forlackoftexts,itwouldcertainlybeverydifficultforhistorianstoreconstructexactly,butthemostwide-spreadwouldseemtobethefollowing:Everypathologicalstateofthebodyresultsfromastateofcompaction,ofrelaxation,oramixtureofcompactionandrelaxation.Thispresupposesthatthebodyitselfcanbedescribedintermsofcondensationandrarefaction:“whenthebodyisinabalancedstateofcondensationandrarefaction,thelivingpersonisingoodhealth,”says,forexample,thepseudo-GalenictreatiseOntheBestSect(26=I,180K).Itmaybeaskedwhatpurposewasservedbysuchaconstruc-tion.Now,wehaveseenthatoneofthedogmatists’maincriticismsoftheEmpiricistswaspreciselythatpurephenomenadonotexist,andthatperceptioncanbeputtouseonlybymeansofatheoreticalconstructionthatbringsordertoit.Thedoctrineofapparentcommunitiesescapesthepitfallsofphenomenalismwithoutfallingbackintothoseofthesearchforinaccessiblecauses.Thisissurelywhatexplainsch.21ofOntheBestSect:itcanhappenthatthesymptomsaresimilarbutthatoneshouldnotusethesametreatment,orthatthesametreatmentshouldbeusedforapparentlydifferentconditions.Theexamplesareinteresting:thesametreatmentmustnotbeused“asinthecaseofphrenitis,forthatwhichresultsfromcompactionandthatwhichresults6.Cf.myarticle,Pellegrin(2000).Thisideahadalreadybeendeveloped,alittleearlierandunknowntome,inMarioVegetti’sexcellent1995paper.7.Therehavebeen,overthecourseofhistory,afewnotableexceptions:In1611ProsperAlpinuspublishedaDeMedicinaMethodicaandDanielLeclerc,inhisHistoryofMedicine,publishedin1723,favorsMethodisttheses.Atthepresenttime,JackiePigeaudisoneofthestaunchestdefendersofMethodism;cf.,forexample,Pigeaud(1991).675ACTC3467520/03/2006,04:21PM\npierrepellegrinfromrelaxation,”whileoneistousethesametreatmentforpleurisyasforphrenitis“iftheyareboththeresultofcompaction”(Opt.Sect.I.163K).WearethusleftwiththeimpressionthattheMethodistschool,thelatestarrivalofthethree,tookintoaccountthecriticismsaddressedtotheEmpiricistschool,whosesuspicionofarbitrarytheoreticalspeculationitnonethelessshared.FortheMethodists,however,itisnotonly“apparentcommunities”thatareindicativeoftherequisitetreatment(acom-pactedstatecallsforinterventiontomakeitcease,etc.).Theyalsotookaccountofthestagereachedinthedevelopmentoftheillness,butinaccordancewithapredeter-minedschema,validinallcases:everyillnesshasabeginning(archê,initium),anincrease(auxEsis,epidosis,augmentum),aparoxysm(acmE,status),andadecline(parakmE,anexis,declinatio).Theterm“apparent”inthephrase“apparentcommunities”thushasanunexpectedmeaning.TheauthorofthetreatiseOntheBestSectwrites:“theydonotmeanby‘apparent’[inthephrase‘apparentcommunities’]whatisgraspedbythesenses.Infactnodisposition[whatisatissueisnodoubtthecompactedandsoforth]isgraspedbythesenses,buttheycallapparentwhatisgraspablebyoneself,evenifitdoesnotfallunderthesenses.”AndtheauthoraddsthatfortheMethodists“apparent”is“approximately”asynonymfor“evident”(enargEs)([Gal.]Opt.Sect26=I,175–176K).Inotherwords,themanifestgeneralitiesavoidtwoobjections:thatofbeinggraspedbythesenses,withalltheuncertaintiesattendingsensibleknowledge;andthatofbeingrationallyestablishedonthebasisofindicativesigns.Weshallreturntothelatterpointbelow.Ahistoricalproblem,whichtakesupanancientcontroversy,willletuscompletethisquickportraitofMethodism.TheidentityofthefounderoftheMethodistschoolhasbeen,sinceantiquity,thesubjectofadisputewithanimportanttheoreticalstake.ThetwomostseriouscandidatesareThemisonofLaodiceainthefirstcenturybce,whowasadiscipleoftheveryfamousAsclepiadesofBythinia,andThessalusofTrallesinthefirstcenturyce(forAsclepiades,seeVallance,1990and1994).SomeevenmakeAsclepiadeshimselfthefounderofMethodism.Asclepiadeswasatoncecel-ebratedandcontroversial,beginningeveninhisowntime–helivedinthesecondcenturybce–sincehewasconsiderednowanoutstandingphysician,nowaswindler.Ofhisdoctrineweshallhererecallonlyhis“corpuscularianism”:vitalfunctionscomedowntofluxesofcorpusclesinthebody,insideappropriatecavitiesthrough“pores.”Illnessesarethusduetoperturbationsofthesefluxes,whatevertheircauses.Howthen,despitethehighlydogmaticcharacterofhisdoctrine–corpusclesandporesareinvisibleentities,disclosedbyrationalinference(“indication”)–canAsclepiadeshavebeensuggestedastheancestor,oreventhefounder,ofMethodism?Thereasonisthat,forAsclepiades,thetwomainconditionsthatleadtoillnessarethedrawingtogetheroftheparticlesconstitutingthebody,whichhastheeffectofcloggingthepores,andtheexcessiveseparationofthesameparticles,whichputsthebodyinastateofrelaxa-tion.ThekinshipwiththeMethodist“apparentcommunities”isclear.ThisallowsVallance(1990,p.139)tohighlightaparallelbetweenAsclepiadianandMethodistdescriptionsofdiseases,andtoshowthattheMethodistsconceptualizednosologicalrealities“inAsclepiadeanintellectualcategories.”Tothisconvergenceintheorymaybeaddedahistoricalandpersonallink,sinceAsclepiadeswastheteacherofThemison,oneofthepossiblefoundersofMethodism.Butthefundamentaldifferencebetween676ACTC3467620/03/2006,04:22PM\nancientmedicineanditscontributiontothephilosophicaltraditionAsclepiadesandtheMethodistsisnolessremarkableforallthat,especiallyforourapproachtoMethodism.WhereasnormalandpathologicalstatesaredescribedbyAsclepiadesintermsoftheactionsofcorpuscles,thethreeMethodistgeneralities“sug-gesttheresultantsituationwithoutreferringtoitsaetiologyatall”(Vallance,1990,p.134):whereAsclepiadesspeaks,forexample,of“obstruction”–where,thatis,hegivesthecausealongwiththeeffect–theMethodistsarecontenttopointoutacompaction;andtheydonotdescribethiscompactionastheeffectofanycausewhatsoever.ThisyieldsanunexpectedpictureofMethodismasakindof“dogmatismwithoutdogmas,”whoseimplicitpositionwouldbesomethinglikethis:LetadventurousspiritslikeAsclepiadessearchforthecausesofstatesofcompaction,statesofrelaxation,andofmixedstates;theMethodistphysician,forhispart,recognizesthatetiologycannotbethesubjectofatruediscourse.DidtheMethodistsgosofarastothinkthatAsclepiadismcouldbeseenasahypotheticaletiology,onethat“worked”intakingaccountofpathologicalrealitiesbutthatcouldeventuallybereplacedbyanotherone?Thatisperhapsto“modernize”themalittletoomuch;and,anyway,wehavenotextsstatingthisexplicitly.Thisuncouplingofapossiblebutuncertaintheoryfromitsmedicalapplicationisapparent,inanyevent,intheremarkableattitudeoftheMeth-odiststowardageneraltheoryofthelivingbody.Wehaveseenabovethatallconsist-entdogmatismhadtorest,intheend,ona“physics.”ItisworthnotingthattheMethodists,withoutdenyingthepossibilityofsuchaphysics,leftitsplaceempty,asitwere:theirdescriptionofthehealthybodyis,inaway,aminimalcharacterization–astateofequilibriumbetweencondensationandrarefaction.TheMethodiststhusrejecttwoattitudes.Theydonotwanttoresttherapyonaspeculativeand,intheend,metaphysicalbiology;butneitherdotheymeantodeclaretheoryimpossibleandtoreducethemedicalarttoapragmaticempiricism.Obviously,thisreconstructionislargelyhypothetical,duetothescarcityoftexts.Butwecanbereasonablysureofatleastonething,namelythatthecompatibilityofthedoctrineofAsclepiadeswithMethodistmedicinewasasubjectofdebateamongtheMethodiststhemselves.Thus,readingCaeliusAurelianusshowsusthatthelaterMeth-8odistsfaultedThemisonfornothavingsufficientlyfreedhimselffromAsclepiades.Caeliusshowshow,bycontrast,Soranus,aMethodistphysicianofthefirstcenturycefromwhomwehaveagreattreatiseongynecology,insomewaysbroughtMethodismtocompletion,whichledhimtobemorecriticalofAsclepiadesthanwerehispredecessors.8.CaeliusAurelianus,aphysician(writinginLatin),wasformerlydatedinthesecondcenturyce,buthasbeenmoveduptothefifthcenturycebythemajorityofspecialists.Wehavetwotreatisesbyhim,OnAcuteDiseasesandOnChronicDiseases,whichareirreplaceablesourcesforthehistoryofancientmedicine.TheonlymoderneditionisDrabkin(1950).OnthestrengthofCaelius’owntestimony,commentatorshavemaintainedthathisworkswereLatintransla-tionsofworkswiththesametitles,nowlost,bySoranusofEphesus:“Soranus,whomIhavehereundertakentotranslateintoLatin”(Ac.2.8),“Soranus,whomI,inmymediocrity,wantedtorenderintoLatin...”writesCaelius(Ac.2.65).Perhapsthisestimatewillsoonberevised,andthesedeclarationsseenascontaininganelementofliteraryfiction.ButitisundeniablethatCaeliusisaMethodist,andthathedoesnotrefrainfromshowingthatMethodismhasaconflict-filledhistory.677ACTC3467720/03/2006,04:22PM\npierrepellegrinEventhemostprovocativeMethodistassertionshavetobere-evaluated.Taketheirclaimthatmedicinecouldbelearnedinsixmonths(forexample,cf.OnSects9.24),whichcausedgreatscandal:isitnotthesignofanacuteawarenessofthelimitsofmedicineintheirtime?Byaccusing,evenifnotexplicitlyintheseterms,theEmpiri-cistsofdogmatism,theMethodistslargelysidewithSextusEmpiricus,whoconsidersthemtobetheonlymedicalschoolinaccordwithPyrrhonianSkepticism(S.E.PH1.238–240):theydonotcommitthemselvesonthenatureofthings,buttheysayhowmorbidstatesappeartothemthroughthemediumoftheirconceptualtools–theapparentcommunitiesandthephasesofdiseases.Theseconceptualtoolsareevident,9butnotthroughobservationorexperience.MedicineandSkepticismWiththeEmpiricistandMethodistschools,medicinebeginsanewrelationshiptophilosophy,andinthefirstinstancewithaquiteparticularkindofphilosophy:Skepticism.TheproblemoftherelationsbetweenSkepticalphilosophyandmedicineisverycomplex,andmuchremainstobedonetomakepossibleitssatisfactorytreat-ment.Chronologically,Skepticism,whetherPyrrhonistorneo-Academic,predatesthebirthoftheEmpiricistsect,sincePyrrhowasbornaround365bceandArcesilaussome50yearslater,whilePhilinuswasactiveinthemiddleofthethirdcenturybce.ButthisdoesruleoutthehypothesisthatSkepticismwasofmedicalorigin.Besides,itishardtoestimatethedegreetowhichSkepticisminfluencedthebirthoftheEmpiricistsect.Asweremarkedabove,ifGalenandawholesideofthedoxographydedicatedtoHerophilusaretobebelieved,themainreasonforthebirthofEmpiricistdoctrineistobesoughtinthehistoryofmedicineitself:itwasfromthedoubtsexpressedbyHerophilusaboutthepossibilityofpenetratingtothecausesofmorbidstates,oratleasttosomeofthem,thatPhilinusdrewtheimpetusforhisownthought.ButthegreatSkepticalchallengetotriumphantGreekrationalismwasalreadyontheintellectualscene,andcouldnothavebeenentirelywithouteffect.Andinfactwefind,especiallyinGalen,whoremainsourmainsourceontheEmpiricistandMethodistsects,passagesshowingthatEmpiricistphysicianshadassimilatedseveralfunda-mentaldoctrinesofSkepticismandsometimesexpressedtheminSkepticalterminology.Thus,togiveoneexample,inthetreatiseOnSects,GalenreportsthattheEmpiricistsdescribed“analogism”asreasoningwhichbeginswithphainomenaandproceedstowardthingsthatare“completelyobscure,”adding,“itwasthenthattheyhadintheirhandsthediscordthatcannotberesolved(anepikritos),whichis,theysay,thesignoftheungrasped(akatalEpsia)–suchistheirlanguage”(OnSects5.11).NowwhatwehavehereisstrictlySkepticallanguage.ButGalen’stestimonyistobetakenwithcaution,notbecauseitmightbeexplicitlyfalse,butbecauseitdoesnotnecessarilydistinguishbetweendifferentperiodsofSkepticimandofEmpiricism.Itis,infact,amatterofmuchmorethanmereborrowing;anditisatruefusionofSkepticismwithmedicinethatwesee,atadatethatisthesubjectofdebateamongspecialists.9.WecanreaffirmmostoftheconclusionsofFrede(1982),whichisdevotedtotheseproblems,andespeciallytotherationalismoftheMethodists.678ACTC3467820/03/2006,04:22PM\nancientmedicineanditscontributiontothephilosophicaltraditionTheperiodizationoftheSkepticalmovementis,infact,adifficultproblem.DiogenesLaertius(9.115),forexample,echoesadisputeamongtheancientsthemselvesoverwhetherTimon,thediscipleofPyrrho,didordidnothaveanysuccessors.ButwhetherwehypothesizeanuninterruptedsuccessionofSkepticalphilosophers,orasortofresurrectionofPyrrhonismafteraperiodofslumber,thepresenceofphysiciansamongtheprotagonistsisveryimportant;and,accordingtoatraditionreportedbytheEmpiricistphysicianMenodotus,itwasevenaphysician,doubtlesshimselfalsoanEmpiricist,PtolemyofCyrene,whorevivedtheschool(cf.Brunschwig,pyrrhonism,inthisvolume).Butcertainlyfromthefirstcenturyceon,andperhapsearlier,thereisgenuinelyafusion,sincethe“heads”oftheSkepticalschoolarealsophysiciansand,accordingtothesources,usuallyEmpiricistphysicians.VictorBrochard(1923,p.350)interpretsthisconvergenceinconnectionwithadistinctionbetweenseveralphasesofPyrrhonistSkepticism:Aenesidemusandhisimmediatesuccessorswere,webelieve,nothingbutdialecticians:theypursuedapurelynegativeaimandintendedonlytooverturndogmatism....TheSkepticsofthelatestperiodarephysicians:iftheytoowishedtodestroydogmatismandphilosophy,andinthesameway,itwasinordertoreplaceitwithart,basedonobserva-tion,withmedicine,i.e.,withakindofscience....Theycombatdogmatismasinourdaythepositivistscombatmetaphysics.Thefirstpartofthisverdictisnodoubttoohasty,ifitsuggeststhatpeoplelikeAenesidemusconfinedthemselvestoadialecticalgame,butthesecondisveryinter-estingandconnectswithwhatwassaidaboveaboutEmpiricismandMethodism.Skepticismmilitatesforanotheruseofreason,andwhenitimplementsitsprogram,itdoessothroughmedicine.Onthispoint,itisquiteremarkablethatSextusEmpiricusseemssimplynolongertomakethedistinctionbetweenphilosophicalandmedicalschools.AttheendofBookIofOutlinesofPyrrhonism,forexample,whenheexaminesSkepticism’s“neighborphilosophies”thataspired,ormighthaveaspired,totakeitsplaceinthehistoryofthought,hesuccessivelycitesHeracliteanism,thephilosophyofDemocritus,Cyrenaicphilosophy,Protagoreanism,theNewAcademy,andEmpiricistmedicine,whichhecomparestoMethodism.Moreover,ithasbeenmaintainedthatwhenSextusspeaksof“dogmatists”inhisstudyofsigns,heisthinkingsometimesofphilosopherssuchastheStoicsandsometimesofphysicians(cf.Allen,2001).Thiscloselinkbetweenphilosophyandmedicineisvisiblewithparticularclarityasregardsaspherementionedabove,whichshoweditself,beginningintheHellenisticperiod,tobeofthehighestimportance:thatofsigns.WhileinAristotlethetheoryofsignswasasortofappendixtotheaccountofthesyllogism,intheHellenisticperiod,especiallyinthetwogreat“dogmatic”schools,theEpicureansandtheStoics,theappealtosignsbecomesthebasicmethodofscientificknowledge.TheStoics,forexample,hadarichandcomplexsemiology,foundbothintheirtheoryoflanguage10andinthepartoftheirlogicconcerningtheinferenceinaconnectiveproposition.(Onthesetopics,seeIerodiakonou,stoiclogic,andModrak,philosophyoflanguage,10.ThusItranslatesunEmmenon,ordinarilyrenderedas“conditional.”679ACTC3467920/03/2006,04:22PM\npierrepellegrininthisvolume.)ItisremarkablethatthemostcompletetreatmentofthenotionofasignthathascomedowntousisfoundinSextusEmpiricus.Onecanmakeoutseveral“accidental”reasonsforthis,suchasthelossoftextsorSextus’specialinterest,asaphysician,insemiology;butthereisalsoamorefundamentalreason,whichisthatPyrrhonianSkepticismisnotanoriginalphilosophywithregardtowhatitneedstofollowclosely–thephilosophiesitattacks.Everythingimportant,atleastquantit-atively,inSextus’accountissobecausethecorrespondingsubjectisimportanttothe“dogmatists.”WehaveseenthatsignsoccupyacentralplaceinHellenisticepistemo-logy.Sextusthereforeneededtolingerfairlylongoversemiology.Buttherearecer-tainlyotherreasonsforthismassivepresenceofsignsinSextus,bornoftherelationsofSkepticismitselftothemedicineofitstime.Ancientauthors,atleastthoseoflateantiquity,seemtohavehadtheimpressionthatthePyrrhonianSkepticsemphasizedevenmoretheimportanceofsigns.ThuswemaycitethisextraordinarydefinitionofthesignintheSuda:“thatthroughwhichtheSkepticsapprehendthatwhichisnon-evident,andwhichtheysuppressbytheirarguments”(4.351).Thesign,then,becameaSkepticalaffair.ThemostelaborateversionofSextus’critiqueofthesignisinBook2(97–133)ofOutlinesofPyrrhonism.Sextustheredistinguishestwosortsofsigns,indicativeandcommemorative.Thisdistinctionrestsonanotherone,bothbeingattributedtothe“dogmatists.”Thefirstdistinctionisbetweenwhatisclear(prodElon)andwhatisobscure(adElon),theobscureitselfbeingdividedintothreecategories:whatisobscureonceandforall(kathapax),forinstance,whetherthestarsareeveninnumber;whatisonoccasion(proskairon)obscure–somethingisobscureinthiswayifitisevidentbynature(thesearethedogmatistsspeaking)butcanonoccasionbehidden,asAthensisfrommeatthismoment–andwhatisobscurebynaturebutcanbegraspedbymeansofsomethingelse,forinstancetheinvisibleporesthroughwhichsweatpasses.TheseareSextus’ownexamples.Againaccordingtothedogmatists,thingsthatareclearneednosign;forexample,“Itisday.”Thingsthatareobscureonceandforallarenotgraspedatall,andsodonothavetobesignified.Thereremainthingsobscureonoccasionandthingsobscurebynature.Theformeraregraspedbymeansofcommemorativesigns,thelatterbyindicativesigns(PH2.99).Thedog-matistsinfactdefinethecommemorativesignaswhathasbeenobserved“evidently”alongwith(hama)whatitsignifies,assmokeisasignforfire,whereastheindicativesignisonethathasnotbeenobservedwithitssignified,butrather“signifiesfromitsnatureanditsownconstitution”(PH2.101),asthemovementsofthebodysignifythesoul.InOutlinesofPyrrhonism2.102,SextusstatesthattheSkepticsacceptedcommem-orativesigns,whichare“renderedcrediblebydailylife”;andhegivestwoexamples:smokeisasignoffire,and“hewhobeholdsascarsaystherehasbeenawound.”Now,awoundisnotobservedalongwith(hama)thewound,inthetemporalsenseof“alongwith.”Moreover,insomecases,anexperteyeisneededtodistinguishascarfrom,forexample,anepidermalrash(thinkofanappendectomyscaryearsaftertheoperation).Thereforethereareprobablyscarsthatweknowtobeconsequentuponwoundsonlyafterinstruction,i.e.,byappealtotheobservationsofothers.ThisiswhattheEmpiricistphysicianscalledhistoria,aswehaveseen.“Alongwith”thushashereasensethatisbothdiachronicandcollective.Thereisatechnicalemploymentof680ACTC3468020/03/2006,04:22PM\nancientmedicineanditscontributiontothephilosophicaltraditioncommemorativesigns,mainlybyphysicians.We,therefore,understand,fromthesemedicalexamples,whatitmeansthattheconnectionbetweenacommemorativesignanditssignifiedmustbeobserved“inanadequateway.”Theexampleofsmokeandfireisinfactmisleading.MostofthecommemorativesignsusedbyEmpiricistphysicians,anddoubtlessMethodistsaswell,arenotsimplyandimmedi-atelyverified,butratherarebasedonobservationsthatarerepeated,careful,andfreefromalltheoreticaland,especially,causalapparatus.WemaycomparethiswitharemarkbySextusinAdversusMathematicos8.204:reddening,thecurvature11ofvessels,andthirstarenotsignsfortheuninitiated,butareso“forEmpiricistphysicians.”Whatareinquestion,then,arecommemorativesigns.Thedistinctionbetweenindicativeandcommemorativesignsisthusnothardandfast:whatforthevulgarorforbadphysiciansisanindicativesign,ornosignatall,canbecomeacommemorativesignfortheEmpiricists,thankstotheirrepeatedandcarefulobservations.Ontheproblemofthesign,whichiscrucialasconcernstherelationsbetweenphilosophyandmedicine,wemayroughlysummarizemattersasfollows.Both,inaboutthesameperiod,madeatransitionfromanepistemologythatwasmainlyetiologicaltoalogicthatwasessentiallysemiological.Thebestillustrationofthis,inphilosophy,isthetransitionfromAristoteliansyllogistic,inwhichthescientificsyllogism,ordemonstration,exhibitsinitsmiddletermthecauseoftheconclusion,toStoiclogic(Cf.Detel,aristotle’slogicandtheoryofscience,andIerodiakonou,stoiclogic,inthisvolume).Inmedicine,itcouldbesaidthatHippocraticmedicineisnotasymptom-centeredmedicine,whichsoundsparadoxical,insofaraswesupposeallmedicineshouldcleavetosymptoms.TheweaknessesofthetheoreticaltreatisesintheHippocraticcorpus,fromthemodernscientificviewpoint,stemespeciallyfromtheiraspirationtoaccountforthecausesofmorbidstates,causestheydiscern,forexample,inhumoralmovements.Torejectetiology,fortheEmpiricistsandtheMethodists,istorefuseto“descend”fromcausestoeffects,andistoputthesymptomatthecenterofmedicalpracticeandtheory.ThisisclearinthecaseoftheEmpiricists,sinceforthemitisamatterofnotingtheusuallinksbetweensymptomandtreatment.TheMethodists,whoindeedhaveakindofetiologicalschema–sinceallillnesscomesfromacompaction,arelaxation,oramixtureofthetwo–neverthelessinsistonthepointthattheillnessisitselfindicativeofthetreatment.Evendogmaticphysiciansinferredthenon-visiblefromthevisible,andwerethussemiologistsratherthanetiologists.ThisestrangementofphysiciansfromthecausalapproachalsorevealsitselfinthenewfacethatmedicineshowsattheendoftheHellenisticperiod.Wespokeaboveabout“themedicineofthesectsandnosographies,”andwehaveseenwhattherewereinthewayofsects.Nosographiesaretreatisesthatnameillnessesandclassifythem,allowingthephysiciantodeterminewhatconditionhispatientsuffersfrom,basedonthesetofsymptomshepresents.Thispracticeendureduntilthenineteenthcenturyandintoourowndayinpsychiatry.These,then,aretreatisesonmedical11.Thetextisuncertain.IreadangeiOnwithKalbfleisch;HervetsuggestsreadingarthrOn“ofarticulations,”BekkeraitiOn,“ofcauses.”681ACTC3468120/03/2006,04:22PM\npierrepellegrinsemiology,whichmustnotbeconfusedwiththesymptomaticdescriptionsofconcretecasesthatcanbefoundintheHippocraticEpidemics.Thesymptomdefinestheillnessanddeterminesthetreatment.Wecanmakeout,inthebackgroundofsuchtreatises,alongpracticeofobservationandofrecordingcorrelationsbetweensymptomsandtreatments,asadvocatedbytheEmpiricists.Now,commentatorshaveoftenconcluded,fromSextus’statementthatitwasthe“dogmatists”whointroducedthedistinctionbetweenindicativeandcommemorativesigns,thatthisdistinctionwasofphilosophical,probablyStoic,origin(Brunschwig,1980;Burnyeat,1982).Butnotextstatesthis,whileoursourcesattibutetheappealtothesetwosortsofsignstothemedicalschools.Herearetwoparticularlydefinitetexts:“TheEmpiricistssaythat,amongthethingsthataregrasped,somearegraspedbythesenses,suchasredness,othersbymemory(hupomnEstikos,whichistheadver-bialformoftheadjectivehupomnEtikostranslatedaboveas“commemorative”)insuchawaythattheyaregraspedthroughcertainsigns;bycontrast[accordingtothem]nothingisgraspedinanindicativeway(endeiktikos)”asamongtherationalistphysi-cians(Ps.-Galen,Opt.sectaadThrasybulum([Gal.]14=Opt.Sect.I,149K);“thecom-memorativesign,accordingtowhattheEmpiricistssay,issomethingapparentandknownfromapreviousobservation,usefulfortherememberingofsomethingknown”([Gal.]Def.med.176=XIX,396K).Thatthedistinctionbetweenindicativeandcom-memorativesignsisofmedicalorigin,andentersphilosophythroughSextus,isthusnotanabsurdhypothesis.Itmaybeconcludedfromallthisthat,ifphilosophyandmedicinetogethertooka“semiologicalturn,”medicinewasnotthelittlesisterimitat-ingherelder,butrathermadeamajorcontributiontothetheoryofsigns.Presum-ably,itwasmedicalpractice,andtheirfamiliaritywithsymptoms,thatenabledphysicianstodothis.EthicsandMedicineFinally,thereisonelastdomaininwhichtherelationsbetweenphilosophyandmedi-cineshouldbedelineated,andtowhichwehavealreadyalludedseveraltimes:thatofethics.Inthedomainofethics,indeed,itmaybefrommedicinethatcameoneofthecommonviewsbestestablishedamongtheancients,namelythatthepassionsaretheeffectofcorporealdispositions,andespeciallyofacharacteristicmixtureofbodilyhumors.Fromamongagreatmanytexts,wemayciteaveryclearlytitledlittleworkbyGalen:Thehabitsofthesoularetheconsequenceofthedispositionsofthebody,whichattributesthisthesistothegreatestphilosophers.Galenclaims,moreover,tohaveestablishedexperimentallythatthisdoctrineistrue“ineveryinstance.”Aremarkableillustrationofthispsychologicalmaterialismisfoundintheconceptiontheancientshadofwhatwecallmentalillnesses.“Mania,”forexample,whichbecomes,intheperiodofnosographicalmedicine,aparticularnosologicalentity,butwhichprevi-ouslydenotedalltypesof“madness,”isafundamentallysomaticaffliction(cf.Pigeaud,1987).Since,onthegeneralviewoftheancients,masteryofthepassionsisthemainconditionforthevirtuousandhappylife,itcouldseem,andactuallydidseemtomany,thatconsultingaphysicianwasamoreeffectivemeanstoethicalprogressthanrecoursetothemoralist.682ACTC3468220/03/2006,04:22PM\nancientmedicineanditscontributiontothephilosophicaltraditionItishardforpeoplewho,likeus,havebeenshapedbyaJudaeo-Christianmorality,particularlyinitsKantianversion,tounderstandthefoundationsofancientmorality.Letusrecalltwopointsthattheancientsregardedasakindofcommonground,andthatwillbeofgreatconsequencefortherelationsbetweenethicsandmedicine.First,moralvirtueisanaturalstate,whileviceisastatecountertonature.Thisprincipleisenoughtoestablishastrongparallelbetweenvirtueandhealthontheonehandandviceandillnessontheother,ofwhichthemostfamousexpressionsareundoubtedlySocrates’sclaimsthatthewickedshouldbehealed,thathewhoactsbadlyhashissoulinabadstate,andsoon.ItmightberepliedthatthesethesesseemedparadoxicaltothecontemporariesofSocrates,whichshowsthattheydidnotrepresentthemajorityviewoftheancients.ButwhatshockedpeopleinSocrates’timewashisclaimthatcriminalsarenotresponsible(“nooneiswickedofhisownfreewill”).Theideaofthenaturalnessofvirtuewouldhaveseemedmoreacceptable,andatanyratewasdefendedbyallthephilosophers,perhapswiththeexceptionoftheSkeptics.Thesecondpointisthatoncethisstateofvirtueisestablished,thesubjectattainsastateofhappinesshehasnoreasontoleave.Onceinastateofvirtuousfelicity,theancientsageisnottemptedtoleaveit,astheChristiansaintistemptedbytheattractionsofevil.Heretoothemedicalcomparisonsuggestsitselfalmostspontaneously:onceweareingoodhealth,onlysomeexternaleventcanforceusoutofit.Ifweconnectthesetwoancient“commonpositions,”wereachapointofcontactbetweenmedicineandphilosophythatLudwigEdelsteinhasveryrightlyemphasized.Notingthat,atleastsinceHomerictimes,popularmoralityregardedhealthasthe12sovereigngood,Edelstein(1967)takesaimatthepretensionsofcertainphysicianstoanannexation,pureandsimple,ofethics.HecitesinthisregardHerophilus’state-mentinhisworkOnRegimen,reportedbySextusEmpiricus:“wisdomcannotdisplayitselfandartisnon-evidentandstrengthisunexertedandwealthuselessandspeechpowerlessintheabsenceofhealth”(S.E.M9.50,trans.Bury).Theretortofthephilo-sophersisusuallytoaffirmthathealthisnotanendbutameans.Twoexamples:forAristotle,“noartasksquestionsabouttheend”andthephysician’staskisnotwhetheroneoughttobeingoodhealth,butwhetheroneoughttowalkinordertobeingoodhealth(EEII.11,1227b28);andtheStoicstookgoodcaretodistinguishgoodsfromthingstobepreferredwheninsistingthathealthisamongthelatter.Asagainstmedicine,then,philosophyisneitherconqueringnorre-conquering:itisonthedefens-ive.Thisproblemofthereductionofethicalproblems,andespeciallythatofmoralresponsibility,tomedicalparameterswillreappearthroughoutthewholehistoryofthought.WecancertainlynotagreewithGalenthatPlatotookfromHippocratesthegreaterpartofhis“dogmas”(Gal.DeUsuPartium1.8=III,16K).ButitisnolongerpossibletoacceptunwarilyLudwigEdelstein’sstatementthat“theassumptionofaninfluenceofGreekmedicineonGreekphilosophymustberegarded...ashistoricallyincorrect”(1967,p.354).Philosophywasquestionedbymedicine.Inthestrategiesitadoptedtofacethischallenge,itprofoundlytransformeditself.12.Edelstein(1967)citesSextusEmpiricusinthisconnection:“thathealthisagood,andtheprimegood,hasbeenaffirmedbynotafewofthepoetsandwritersandgenerallybyallordinaryfolk”(S.E.M9.49).683ACTC3468320/03/2006,04:22PM\npierrepellegrinBibliographySourcesCaeliusAurelianusDrabkin,I.E.(ed.andtrans.).(1950).CaeliusAurelianus,OnAcuteDiseasesandOnChronicDiseases:Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.GalenKühn,K.G.(ed.).(1821–33).(citedasK).Galen.Operaomnia.MedicorumGraecorumoperaquaeexstant.(20vols.).Leipzig:Cnobloch.Repr.Hildesheim:Olms,1964–5.Singer,P.N.(trans.).(1997).Galen.SelectedWorks.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Walzer,R.andFrede,M.(eds.).(1985).Galen.ThreeTreatisesontheNatureofScience.(Introduc-tionbyM.Frede.)Indianapolis:Hackett.HerophilusvonStaden,H.(1989).Herophilus.TheArtofMedicineinEarlyAlexandria.Cambridge:Cam-bridgeUniversityPress.HippocraticsFestugière,A.-J.(1948).Hippocrate.L’anciennemédicine.Paris:Klincksieck.Jones,W.H.Setal.(ed.andtrans.).(1923–88).Hippocrates.LoebClassicalLibrary.(6vols.).(vols.1,2,4byW.H.S.Jones;vol.3byE.T.Withington;vols.5and6byP.Potter).Cambridge.Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress/London:Heinemann.Jouanna,J.(ed.andtrans.).(1988).HippocrateDesvents.Del’art.Paris:LesBellesLettres.——.(ed.andtrans.).(2003).HippocrateAirs-Eaux-Lieux.Paris:LesBellesLettres.Littré,É.(ed.).(1839–61).Oeuvrescomplètesd’Hippocrates.(GreektextandfacingFrenchtrans-lation.).(10vols.).Paris:Baillière.Lloyd,G.E.R.(ed.).(1978).HippocraticWritings.London:Penguin.WorksCitedAllen,J.(2001).InferenceFromSigns.AncientDebatesabouttheNatureofEvidence.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Barnes,J.,Brunschwig,J.,Burnyeat,M.,andSchofield,M.(eds.).(1982).ScienceandSpeculation.StudiesinHellenisticTheoryandPractice.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress/Paris:MaisondesSciencesdel’Homme.Bourgey.L.(1953).ObservationetexpériencechezlesmédecinsdelaCollectionhippocratique.Paris:Vrin.Brain.P.(1986).GalenonBlooletting.AStudyoftheOrigins,DevelopmentandValidityofHisOpinions,WithaTranslationoftheThreeWorks.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Brochard,V.(1923).LesSceptiquesgrecs.Paris:Alcan.2ndedn.Paris:Vrin.(Firstpublishedin1887.)Brunschwig,J.(1980).“ProofDefined.”InM.Schofield,M.Burnyeat,andJ.Barnes(eds.),DoubtandDogmatism:StudiesinHellenisticEpistemology(pp.125–60).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.——.(2000).“Pyrrhon.”InJ.BrunschwigandG.E.R.Lloyd(eds.),GreekThought.AGuidetoClassicalKnowledge(pp.739–44).Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.684ACTC3468420/03/2006,04:22PM\nancientmedicineanditscontributiontothephilosophicaltraditionBurnyeat,M.(1982).“TheOriginofNon-deductiveInference.”InJ.Barnes,J.Brunschwig,M.Burnyeat,andM.Schofield(eds.),ScienceandSpeculation.StudiesinHellenisticTheoryandPractice(pp.193–238).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress/Paris:MaisondesSciencesdel’Homme.Deichgräber,K.(1930).DiegriechischeEmpirikershule:SammlungundDarstellungdesLehre.Berlin:Weidmann.Edelstein,L.(1967).AncientMedicine.SelectedpapersofLudwigEdelstein.Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.Frede,M.(1982).“TheMethodoftheSo-calledMethodicalSchoolofMedicine.”InJ.Barnes,J.Brunschwig,M.Burnyeat,andM.Schofield(eds.),ScienceandSpeculation.StudiesinHellenisticTheoryandPractice(pp.1–23).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress/Paris:MaisondesSciencesdel’Homme.——.(1988).“TheEmpiricistAttitudeTowardsReasonandTheory.”inR.J.Hankinson(ed.),Method,MedicineandMetaphysics(pp.79–97).Alberta1988(=Apeiron,SpecialIssue,21).Edmonton:AcademicPrintingandPublishing.Grmek,M.(ed.).(1995).HistoiredelapenséemédicaleenOccident.Paris:Seuil.Joly,R.(1966).Leniveaudelasciencehippocratique.Paris:LesBellesLettres.Lloyd,G.E.R.(1991).MethodsandProblemsinGreekScience.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Matthen,M.(1988).“EmpiricismandOntologyinAncientMedicine.”InR.J.Hankinson(ed.),Method,MedicineandMetaphysics(pp.99–121).Alberta1988(=Apeiron,SpecialIssue,21).Edmonton:AcademicPrintingandPublishing.Pellegrin,P.(2000,Frenchversion1996).“Medicine.”InJ.BrunschwigandG.E.R.Lloyd(eds.),GreekThought.AGuidetoClassicalKnowledge(pp.414–32).Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.Pigeaud,J.(1987).Folieetcuresdelafoliechezlesmédecinsdel’Antiquitégréco-romaine.Paris:LesBellesLettres.——.(1991).“Lesfondementsduméthodisme.”InP.MudeyandJ.Pigeaud(eds.),LesÉcolesmédicalesàRome(pp.7–50).Geneva:LibrairieDroz.Vallance,J.(1990).TheLostTheoryofAsclepiadesofBithynia.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.——.(1994).“TheMedicalSystemofAscelpiadesofBithynia.”ANRWII,37.1(pp.693–727).Vegetti,M.(1995).“Entrelesavoiretlapratique:lamédecinehellénistique.”InM.Grmek(ed.),HistoiredelapenséemédicaleenOccident(pp.67–94).Paris:Seuil.Vernant,J.-P.(1965).MytheetpenséechezlesGrecs.Paris:Maspero.FurtherReadingCooper,J.M.(2002).“MethodandScienceinOnAncientMedicine.”InH.Linneweber-LammerskittenandG.Mohr(eds.),InterpretationundArgument(FestschriftforGerhardSeel)(pp.25–57).Würzburg:KönigshausenandNeumann.ReprintedinJ.M.Cooper(2004)Knowledge,Nature,andtheGood(pp.3–42).Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Gill,M.L.(2003).“Plato’sPhaedrusandtheMethodofHippocrates.”TheModernSchoolman,80,295–314.Hankinson,R.J.(1998).CauseandExplanationinAncientGreekThought.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Jouanna,J.(1999).Hippocrates.(trans.M.B.DeBevoise).Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.(OriginallypublishedasHippocrate1992.)Lloyd,G.E.R.(1973).GreekScienceafterAristotle.London:ChattoandWindus.——.(1979).Magic,ReasonandExperience.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.685ACTC3468520/03/2006,04:22PM\nianmueller35GreekMathematics(Arithmetic,Geometry,ProportionTheory)totheTimeofEuclidIANMUELLEREuclid’sElementsTheearliestGreektextswhichweclassifyasmathematicaldatefromthelatefourthcenturybceshortlyafterthedeathofAristotle,and,therefore,afterthedeathofthetwoancientGreekphilosophers,PlatoandAristotle,whosewritingsrelatingtomath-ematicshave–anddeservedlyhave–attractedthegreatestattentionfromscholars.ThemajormathematicaltextwhichisbroughttobearindiscussionsofthosetwofiguresisEuclid’sElements,conventionallydatedat300bce.SinceitisalsothebasisformuchofthediscussionofthehistoryofearlierGreekmathematics,Iamgoingtoframemydiscussionofthesubjectintermsofit.TheElementsisoftenthoughtofasageometricalwork,butitisclearlymorethanthatsinceBooksVII–IXareaself-containeddiscussionofarithmetic,andBookVisaself-containedpresentationofageneraltheoryofproportion,thatisofexpressionsoftheform“aistobascistod.”ItisnowgenerallyagreedthatnothingofgreatmathematicalsignificanceintheElementsistheinventionofEuclid.SomescholarstreattheElementsasessentiallyacompilationofpreviouslyexistingworks,whichtheytrytoidentifyatleastbyspecifyinganauthor;forsuchscholarsEuclid’scontributiontooktheformofrelativelyslightandsometimescarelessrevisionsaimedatincorporatingthetreatisesintoaunifiedwhole.Otherscholarsaremoregenerous,butgenerallylesspreciseinwhattheyattributetoEuclid.ParticularlyimportantinthisconnectionforstudentsofphilosophyisthequestionofwhethertherelativelyhighdegreeofrigorandstylisticformalizationintheElementsissomethingwhichonlycameintomathematicsinthelatefourthcenturyorwhetheritissomethingthatcanbesupposedtohaveexistedintheearlierfifthorevenlatersixthcentury.FirstPrinciplesEuclid’sfirstprinciplesAtthebeginningofBookIEuclidlistsaseriesofdefinitions(horoi),postulates(aitEmata),andcommonnotions(koinaiennoiai).ListsofdefinitionsalsooccuratthebeginningofBooksII,III,IV,V,VI,VII(wheretheyareobviouslyintendedtocoverVIIIandIXas686ACTC3568620/03/2006,04:22PM\ngreekmathematicstothetimeofeuclidwell),X,andXI(wheretheyareobviouslyintendedtocoverBooksXIIandXIII),andtheyarethemostcommonkindof“firstprinciple”tobefoundinGreekmathematicaltexts.Noothermathematicaltextinantiquitymakesdistinctionsamongthekindsofassumptionsitemploys.Euclid’sspecificallygeometricoperationsaregivenbythefirstthreepostulates,whichlicensetheconnectingoftwopointswithastraightline,theextensionofafinitestraightline,andthedrawingofacirclewithagivencenterandradius.Onecanthinkofthesepostulatesasrestrictingthemeansofconstructiontoanunmarkedrulerandacompasswhichcollapseswhenitisraisedabovetheplaneofreference.Totheseconstructionpostulatesareaddedtheassertionthatallrightanglesareequalandthefollowingversionoftheparallelpostulate(seeFigure35.1):IfanglesCAB,DBAtogetherarelessthantworightangles,thenifACandBDareextendedpastCandD,theywilleventuallyintersect.CDABFigure35.1SincethepostulatesandtheirBookIconsequencesareappliedinlaterBooks,itisreasonabletosaythatthepostulatesunderliethewholeofEuclid’sgeometry.IncontrastafterBookInewtermsareintroducedindefinitionsonlywhentheyrelatetoanewtopicbeingintroduced.Butevenwhenthedomainofdiscussionisexpandedtosolidgeometryorextendedtonumbers,Euclidneverintroducesanynewassumptionsotherthandefinitions.ThisfactsuggeststhattheideaofpostulateswasrelativelynewinGreekmathematicswhentheElementswerecomposed.Themanuscriptsarequitediscrepantintheircommonnotions,andthistextualuncertaintymakestryingtogiveanaccountofthecommonnotionsespeciallyprob-lematic.FivecommonnotionsareprintedinthestandardeditionoftheElements.Theusualexplanationoftheirpresence,whichhasitsrootsinAristotle’sPosteriorAnalytics,isthattheyaresupposedtoembodyprinciplesofreasoningapplicabletomorethanonesubject–intheElements,then,toatleastnumbersandgeometricmagnitudes.Thisexplanationappliesbesttothefirstthree,whichalsohavethestrongestclaimtoauthenticity:1.Thingswhichareequaltothesamethingarealsoequaltooneanother;2.andifequalsbeaddedtoequals,thewholesareequal;3.andifequalsbesubtractedfromequals,theremaindersareequal.687ACTC3568720/03/2006,04:22PM\nianmuellerItperhapsfitsthefifthcommonnotion,whichsaysthatthewholeisgreaterthanthepart,butthefourthseemstobepurelygeometric,sinceitassertstheequalityofthingswhichcoincidewithoneanotherandseemstoenvisagethefittingofonegeometricfigureonanother.AristotleandPlatoonfirstprinciplesTheearliestauthorweknowtohavedistinguishedamongkindsoffirstprinciplesisAristotle.Plato’smostexplicitdescriptionofmathematicalfirstprinciples,whichhecallshypotheses,comesinthefamousDividedLinepassageinBookVIoftheRepublic,whereSocratesisdescribingacognitiveconditionwhichhecallsdianoia(thinking)andassociateswiththosewhodealwith“geometriesandcalculations,andthelike”:[Thesepeople]hypothesizetheoddandtheeven,andthefiguresandthreekindsofangles,andotherthingsakintothemineachinquiry,as[if]theyknowthem,andtheymakethemhypothesesanddon’tthinkitisnecessarytogiveanyaccountofthemtoeitherthemselvesoranyoneelse,as[if]theyareevidenttoeveryone.Beginningfromthesetheymoveonthroughotherthingsandendupinagreementatthethingwhichtheysetouttoinvestigate.(Rep.VI,510c–d)IfoneweretointerpretSocrates’remarkaboutmathematicalmethodasadescriptionofEuclid’sElements,onewouldpresumablyhavetosaythattheexamplesofhypothesesaredefinitions,thedefinitionsofoddandevennumbersatthebeginningofBookVII,offiguressuchasthecircle,semicircle,equilateraltriangleinBookIandoftheright,obtuse,andacuteangles,alsoinBookI.AndwecancertainlysayofthesedefinitionsaspresentedinourtextsoftheElementsthattheyarenotexplainedorjustifiedandeventhattheyarenotevidentsincetheyareexplanationsofwordsthatarenotknown(atleastwithspecificprecision)toanaudience.However,thisseemsanartificialcon-strualofthemethodofmathematics.Thedefinitionsaremoreplausiblyconstruedaswaysofmakingpreciseforpurposesofargumentthemeaningoftermswhicharealreadyunderstoodbythemembersoftheaudienceeitherbecausetheyarealreadyfamiliarwiththemorbecausetheycanbemadefamiliarwiththeminaninformalway,saywithapicture.Itdoesnotseemthatonecantalkofsuchhypothesesasnotunderstood,sincenodeductionsfromthemwouldbepossibleiftheyweren’tunder-stood.Nordoesitmakesensetospeakofthemasbeingknownornotknownsincetheyarejustindicationsofwhatcertainwordsmean.ItseemstomemorelikelythatweshouldtakeSocratestobethinkingofamath-ematicsinwhichcertainthingsaresetoutassubjectsofdiscourse,oddandevennumbers,variousfigures,right,acute,andobtuseangles,itperhapsbeingtakenforgrantedthatthekindsofnumbersandanglesareexhaustedbythepossibilitiesmentioned.Thesethingswouldbeexplainedinthesensethattheirnaturewouldbeindicatedinaninformalway,butthoseexplanationswouldnotapproachthedetailofargumentsforpropositions,suchasthatthesumoftwooddnumbersisevenorconstructions,suchasproducingonastraightlineanangleequaltoagivenone.orastep-by-stepcalculation.688ACTC3568820/03/2006,04:22PM\ngreekmathematicstothetimeofeuclidThereareseveralpassagesinwhichAristotleespousesatrichotomyoffirstprinciples.Thepassagesdonotobviouslyallespousethesametrichotomy,butIaminclinedtothinkthatthefollowingpassageexpressesthecoreAristoteliandoctrine:1Everydemonstrativescienceconcernsthreethings:(a)thethingsithypothesizestobe(theseconstitutethegenusofwhichitstudiestheperseproperties(pathEmatOn));(b)theso-calledcommonaxiomsfromwhichfirstthingsitproves;(c)andthirdtheproperties(pathE)ofwhichitassumeswhateachsignifies.(APo.I.10,76b11–16)ThefactthatAristotleespousesatrichotomyofprinciplesandEuclidpresentsoneinthefirstBookoftheElementshasledscholarstoinquireabouttherelationbetweenthetwotrichotomies.ThemoststrikingcoincidencebetweenthemisAristotle’scommonaxioms,oneofAristotle’sexamplesofacommonaxiombeingEuclid’sthirdcommonnotion.Moreover,Aristotlespeaksoftheseaxiomsinawaythatsuggeststheyareaknownfeatureofmathematics(“so-calledcommonaxioms”inthispassageand“whatarecalledaxiomsinmathematics”atMet.G.3,1005a20).SoitseemslikelythatbyAristotle’stimesomemathematicianswerebeingexplicitaboutgeneralquantitativeassumptionstheyweremaking,afeatureofmathematicsofwhichwefindnocleartraceinPlato.However,Aristotlealsomentionsasexamplesofcommonaxiomsthelawsofnon-contradictionandexcludedmiddle,thatis,fundamentallogicallaws.Itseemsprimafacieunlikelythattheseaxiomswereevermadeexplicitinmathematics;iftheywere,itisunclearwhywehavenotraceoftheirpresenceinmathematicaltexts.HenceIaminclinedtothinkthatAristotleexpandedamathematicalpracticeofmakingexplicitprinciplescommontoallquantitativeargumentationtoincludethemostgeneralprinciplesofall,logicalprinciples.Ifthisisright,thenitseemsfairtosaythatAristotle’strichotomyisnotjustadescriptionofmathematicalpractice,butalsoaphilosophicallybasednormativeaccountofwhatdemonstrativescienceoughttobelike.Ofcourse,theextenttowhichhisaccountdepartsfrompre-Euclideanmath-ematicalpracticeisnotpossibletodeterminewithanyprecision.ItisstrikingthatAristotlespeaksoftheaxiomsasiftheyweretheonlypremisesofmathematicalproof:ademonstrativescienceprovesthattherelevantpropertiesholdofobjectsinitsgenusfromthecommonaxioms.ItwouldseemthatinthemathematicsAristotleknewtherewerenootherstartingpointsthatAristotlewaswillingtoidentifyasassumedpropositions.Nowitseemstomeentirelyunlikelythatmathematicseverhadanykindofarticulateddeductivestructurewhichdidnotinvolvedefinitionsofsomekind,somekindofexplicationofthenatureofthethingsbeingtalkedabout.Thewords“whateachsignifies”inthedescriptionof(c)justquotedmakesclearthatAristotleassociatessomeformofassumptionaboutmeaningwithwhathecallsproperties.Andthematerialimmediatelyprecedingthequotationshowsthatthesameistrueof(a).ForthereAristotlesaysthatascienceassumesaboutitemsin(a)boththattheyare(exist)andwhattheyareorsignify,whereasaboutthosein(c)itassumes1.Aristotleisofficiallyconcernedwithmorethanmathematicswhenhetalksabout“everydemonstrativescience,”butitisclearthatinthepassageswhereheisdiscussingthetrichotomyofprinciplesheisbasinghisdiscussiononapictureofmathematics,mainlygeometryandarithmetic.689ACTC3568920/03/2006,04:22PM\nianmuellerwhattheysignifyandprovesthattheyexist(i.e.,thattheyapplytoobjectsinthegenus).ItseemstomeveryunlikelythatAristotlewouldonlytreatthecommonaxiomsasassumptionsifhewerereflectingonatextlikeEuclid’sElements,wheredefinitionsandpostulatesarelaidoutinparallelwithcommonnotions.ThelikelihoodseemsrathertobethatAristotleandpresumablyPlatoaswellarereflectingprimarilyonoralpresentationswhichhadsomehowevolvedtothepointofarticulatinggeneralquantitativeassumptions,butstillreliedoninformalexplicationsofterminology.Ifthisisright(andourdateforEuclidisapproximatelyright),thentheextentofreduc-tiontofirstprinciplesthatwefindinEuclid’sElementsistheculminationofarelativelyrapiddevelopmentofthelasthalfofthefourthcentury.InthesequelIshallassumethatthecommonnotionswefindintheElementsareafourth-centurydevelopmentandthatpriortothefourthcenturyitwassimplytakenforgrantedthat,e.g.,thingsequaltothesamethingsareequaltoeachother.Thesituationwith(a)isstillmoreperplexing.Aristotlegivesasexamplesofthingsthatarehypothesizedtoexistmonadsorunits(onceplural,oncesingular)inarithme-tic,andpointsandlines(or,inanotherpassage,magnitude)ingeometry.ThereisobviouslyageneralsenseinwhichEuclidassumestheexistenceofthesethingsintheElements,buttheassumptionsarecompletelytacit,sothatnoattempttocorrelate(a)withEuclid’spostulatescancometogripswithAristotle’sexamplesinasatisfactoryway.Aristotle’sfailuretomentionanythinglikeEuclid’spostulatesasfirstprinciplesconfirmsthesuggestionoftheprevioussectionthatpostulatesareaquitelatedevelop-mentinGreekmathematicsandanotherexpressionoftheincreasedinterestinexplicitformalization.ThefirstthreepostulatesareincludedintheElementsbecauseanalysisofalargenumberofgeometricconstructionsledtotheconclusionthattheycouldbebuiltupoutofthesethree,andthatthesecouldnotbefurtherreducedtoothers.Thepresenceoftheparallelpostulateappearstohavethesamekindofexplanation:atsomepointinthefourthcenturyitwasrecognizedthatonecouldnotprovesuchtheoremsastheequalityoftheinterioranglesofatriangletotworightangles(I,32)2unlessonemadesomesuchassumption.Ishalldiscussthereasonfortheinclusionof3thefourthpostulateonpages691–4.Evenifthepostulatesarepost-Aristotelian,theremightstillhavebeensomeotherkindofmathematicalassumptionthatledAristotletointroduce(a).However,thenotionthateverydemonstrativesciencedealswithasubjectgenusseemsmorelikelytobea(verypossiblycorrect)Aristoteliananalysisofmathematicalpracticethanareportonsomeexplicitstartingpointadoptedbymathematicians.ItisAristotlewhoseesademonstrativescienceasdealingwithagenustheelementsofwhichitassumestoexist,andasprovingpropertiesofthoseelements.ThischaracterizationismorecloselytiedtoAristoteliantheoriesofpredicationandthesyllogismthanitistoEuclid’sgeometry,inwhichobjectsareconstructedoutofmoreelementaryobjectsonthebasisofthreefundamentalconstructionsandpropertiesareprovedofthoseobjectsonthebasisofthedefinitionsandthecommonnotions(andinsomeimportantcasesthefifthpostulate).2.SeeHeath(1949,pp.27–30)andVitrac(1990–2001,vol.1,pp.306–10).FortheproofofI,32seepages691–4.3.Thepostulateis,infact,provable;see,e.g.,Hilbert(1971,pp.20–1).690ACTC3569020/03/2006,04:22PM\ngreekmathematicstothetimeofeuclidInthepreviousquotationfromPlatoIputtheword“if”insquarebracketstoindicatethatitisnotclearwhetherSocratesisassertingorquestioningthatthehypothesesareknownorevident.Itseemsmorelikelythatheisquestioningtheirstatus,sincehecallsthemhypothesesandisintheprocessofcontrastingdianoiawithahighercognitiveconditionwhichhecallsnoEsis.InPosteriorAnalyticsII.19Aristotlegivesaverybriefandcrypticdescriptionofourknowledgeoffirstprinciplesandassociatesitwithaconditionwhichhecallsnous,atermwhich,likenoEsis,isgenerallyattachedbyphilosopherstocognitionofthehighestorder.Onthewhole,theauthorsofmathematicaltreatisesgivenoindicationofthecognitivestatustheyassigntoeithertheirfirstprinciplesortheconclusionsdrawnfromthem,anditwouldbeeasytoinferfromtheirsilencethattheytookbothtobeunquestionable.However,inaprefacetotheSectioCanonistheauthor(thetreatisecomesdowntousasaworkofEuclid)saysthatthefundamentalassumptionthatconcordantpairsofnotesstandinratiosoftheformn+1tonorofnto1hasbeenmadereasonable(eikos);andinaprefatorylettertotheQuadratureoftheParabolaArchimedessaysofa“lemma”(theso-calledaxiomofArchimedes:givenafiniteareaFandtwounequalareasAandBwithAgreaterthanB,thensomefinitemultipleofA−BisgreaterthanF)whichhehasusedinhisquadraturethatitwasusedbyearliergeometerstoprovetheorems(theexampleswhichArchimedesgivesareall4foundinElementsXIIanddodependonsomethingessentiallyequivalenttohislemma)whichhavebeenbelievednolessthanthoseprovedwithoutthelemmaandthatitissufficientifhisresultisaccordedthesamesortofbelief(tanhomoianpistin).Thesetwoexamplessuggest,althoughtheyhardlyprove,thatmathematicianswerenotsodogmaticabouttheirfundamentalassumptionsasPlatoandAristotlesuggest.AspectsofEuclid’sPlaneGeometryTheequalityofthethreeanglesofatriangletotworightangles5(ElementsI,32)MajorresultsofthefirstbookoftheElementsincludetheconstructionofaparallelogramequaltoanygivenrectilinealarea(I,45)andthePythagoreantheorem(I,47),accordingtowhichthesquareonthehypotenuseofaright-angledtriangleisequaltothesquaresontheothertwosides.Euclidalsoprovesthattheinterioranglesofatriangleareequaltotworightangles(I,32)ormoreexactly(seeFigure35.2):Aa′Eab′bBCDFigure35.24.Seepages712–15.5.WiththissectionseealsoMueller(2003).691ACTC3569120/03/2006,04:22PM\nianmuellerIfACBisatriangleandBCisextendedtoDandCEisdrawnparalleltoBA,∠ACD=∠ABC+∠BAC,sothat(sinceanglesACB,ACDtogetherareequaltotworightangles)anglesACB,ABC,BACtogetherareequaltotworightangles.Theproofinvokestheequalityof∠ACEto∠BACandof∠ECDto∠ABC,equalitieswhichdependonI,29,whichitselfrequiresthefirstapplicationoftheparallelpostulate.I,29says(seeFigure35.3):IfBAFandGCEareparallel,then:(a)∠BAC=∠ACE,(b)∠HAF=∠ACE,and(c)anglesFAC,ECAtogetherareequaltotworightangles.HAb′BFa′c′aGECcIFigure35.3AnyofI,29(a),(b),and(c)impliestheothertwoontheassumptionsthat:I,13Anglessuchasb′andc′(“adjacentangles”)togetherareequaltotworightangles.I,15Anglessuchasa′andb′(“verticalangles”)areequal.EuclidderivesI,15,whichfollowsfrom1,13pluscommonnotions,usingpostulate4.For,byI,13anglesb′,c′togetherandanglesa′,c′togetherareeachequaltotworightangles;soifallrightanglesareequal,thetwopairsareequaltoeachother,and∠a′=∠b′.HenceI,29andI,32ultimatelydependonlyonthefourthandfifthpostulates,I,13,andcommonnotions,anditseemslikelythatthetwopostulateswereintroducedtogetheraspartoftheproofofsomethinglikeI,29.Toproveequality(a)ofthispro-positionEuclidassumesthat∠a′isnotequalto∠aandtakes∠aasthesmaller.Then,byI,13,∠a+∠c′islessthantworightangles,andbytheparallelpostulateBAFandGCEextendedwillmeet.I,13is“proved”withapicture(seeFigure35.4).If∠FAHisequalto∠FAC,thenbythedefinitionofarightangle,eachisarightangle.Iftheyareunequal,thenletJAbe692ACTC3569220/03/2006,04:22PM\ngreekmathematicstothetimeofeuclidJFb′c′HACFigure35.4drawnatrightanglestoHAC.Then∠FAH+∠FAC=∠JAH+∠JAC,andthelatteraretworightangles.WithI,13allofthefollowingareequivalent:I,29(a),I,29(b),I,29(c),I,32,andtheparallelpostulate.InhiscommentaryonBookIoftheElementsProclus,citingAristotle’spupilEudemusasauthority,creditsthePythagoreans,standardlytakentobePythagoreansofthelatersixthorearlierfifthcentury,withthediscoveryofthetheoremthattheinterioranglesofatriangleareequaltotworightangles.ProclusgivesthePythagoreanproof,aEuclidean-styledemonstration,butavoidingthepreliminaryassertionoftheequalityoftheexteriorangleACDtotheinteriorandoppositeanglesBAC,ABC(Figure35.2).InFigure35.5FAGisparalleltoBC,andtheresultisinferredinwhatamountstotwoapplicationsofI,29(a)fromtheequalitiesof∠ato∠a′and∠a*to∠a*′.AFGaa*a′a*′BCFigure35.5Thisproofis,ofcourse,essentiallyequivalenttoEuclid’s,butitseemsunlikelythatearlyPythagoreanswouldhaveprovedI,29(a)andhenceunlikelythatthattheyenun-ciatedtheparallelpostulate.Aristotlereportstheexistenceofapetitioprincipiiinthetreatmentofparallelswhenhesaysthatsomepeoplewhothinktheyaredrawingparallelsassume,withoutbeingawareofit,thingswhichcannotbeprovedunlessthereareparallellines(APr.II.16,65a4–7).ItseemsprobablethatAristotleisreferringtopeopletakingforgrantedatleastoneofthepartsofI,29,andthemostlikelyoneistheapparentlymostobviousone,I,29(b)whichassertstheequalityofangleslikec′andcinFigure35.3.ButevenifI,29(b)andI,13(orpostulate4)weretakenforgranted,aproofofI,32wouldstillseemtorequireI,15,and,althoughtheargumentforI,15issimple,itdoesrequiretheabstractstepofsubtracting∠c′fromthetwoquantitiesconsistingofanglesb′,c′andanglesa′,c′.IfweacceptProclus’claimaboutthePythagoreanoriginsofaproofofI,32,weare,Ithink,ledtoplacethebeginningsofsuchabstractgeometricalreasoninginGreecebacktoatleast500.Itisalsosignific-antthatI,32,unlike,say,propositionsabouttheareaoffigures,wouldseemtobea693ACTC3569320/03/2006,04:22PM\nianmuellertheoremof“pure”geometry,ofinterestforitsownsakeratherthanforitspracticalsignificance.Ofcourse,thereremainsamajordifferencebetweenageometryinwhichproposi-tionslikethecommonnotionsandpostulatesaretakenforgrantedormadetorestonperceptionorintuition,andoneinwhichtheyareexplicitlyformulated,astheyareintheElements.Iaminclinedtothinkthatthecodificationofassumptionsandpermissiblemethodsofargumentationandtheformalizationor,atleast,stylizationoftheformofpresentationofmathematicsrepresentamorefundamentalaspectofthefifth-centurydevelopmentofmathematicsthandoesanymovefrommoreintuitivetomoreabstractreasoning.GeometryandalgebraAlthoughthePythagoreansarenotexplicitlycreditedwiththediscoveryofhowtoconstructaparallelogramequaltoagivenrectilinealarea(I,45),Proclusbeginshisdiscussionoftheprecedingproposition(I,44:toagivenstraightlinetoapply,inagivenrectilinealangle,aparallelogramequaltoagiventriangle)bysayingthat“theapplication(parabolE)ofareas,theirexceeding(huperbolE),andtheirfallingshort(elleipsis)areancientdiscoveriesofthePythagoreanmuse.”Proclusgoesontoexplaintheseterms(seeFigure35.6):Forwhen,givenastraightline[AE],youmakethegivenarea[ABCD]extendalongthewholeoftheline,theysayyouapplythearea[case(a)];whenyoumakethelengthoftheareagreaterthanthestraightlineitself,thenitexceeds[case(b)];andwhenless,sothatthereisapartofthelineextendingbeyondtheareadescribed,thenitfallsshort[case(c)].(InEuc.419.24–420.6)DCDCDCAB(E)AEBABE(a)(b)(c)Figure35.6CommentingonI,45Heathwrites:WecannowtakestockofhowfarthepropositionsI,43–45bringusinthematteroftransformationofareas,whichconstitutessoimportantapartofwhathasfitlybeencalledthegeometricalalgebraoftheGreeks.Wehavenowlearnthowtorepresentanyrectilinealarea,whichcanofcourseberesolvedintotriangles,byasingleparallelogramhavingonesideequaltoanygivenstraightlineandoneangleequaltoanygivenrectilinealangle.Mostimportantofallsuchparallelogramsistherectangle,whichisoneofthesimplestformsinwhichanareacanbeshown.(Heath,1926,vol.1,pp.346–7;Heath’sitalics)HereHeathmakestwomoveswhicharepartofahighlyinfluentialinterpretationofacentralpartofGreekmathematics,aninterpretationsummedupintheterm694ACTC3569420/03/2006,04:22PM\ngreekmathematicstothetimeofeuclid“geometricalalgebra”:thereplacementofEuclid’sgeneralterm“parallelogram”withthemorespecific“rectangle”(andtherebytheeliminationofthephrase“inagivenrectilinealangle”);andtheintroductionofthewords“havingonesideequaltoanygivenstraightline,”whichhavenocorrespondentinI,45andthatdeliberatelyso,sinceEuclidcouldhaveaddedthewords“onagivenstraightline”atthebeginningofI,45hadhewishedtodoso.With“rectangle”substitutedfor“parallelogram,”propositionsI,42–45become:I,42rToconstructarectangleequaltoagiventriangle.I,43rInanyrectanglethecomplementsaboutthediagonalareequal.I,44rToagivenstraightline[AB]toapplyarectangle[ABCD]equaltoagiventriangle.I,45rToconstructarectangleequaltoagivenrectilinealfigure.AsHeathindicates,I,45followsfromI,44andthefact(seeFigure35.7)thatanyrectilinealfigurecanbedividedintotriangles(t,t′,t″,...).I,44includesthewords“toagivenstraightline”becauseeachoftherectanglesafterrhastobeappliedtothesideoftheprecedingrectangle.t″trr′r″t′Figure35.7TheproofofI,44rmayberepresentedasfollows(seeFigure35.8):FEKBCGHADFigure35.8Construct(byI,42r)therectangleEBGFequaltothegiventrianglewithBEinastraightlinewithBA.CompletethefigureABGH,andextendHBandFEtomeetatK.(Euclidusestheparallelpostulatetoprovethattheymeet.)CompleteFigure35.8,whichisarectangleFHDKwithdiagonalHBKdividedintofourrectanglesintersectingatB.In695ACTC3569520/03/2006,04:22PM\nianmuellerthefigureABCDandBEFGarethecomplementsaboutthediagonal,whichareprovedequalinI,43.ThisequalityfollowsfromI,34,whichassertsthatadiagonalofaparal-lelogrambisectsit.Asaresultthefollowingtrianglesareequal:HKFtoHKD,HBGtoHBA,BKEtoBKC.HencesoisHKF−(HBG+BKE)equaltoHKD−(HBA+BKC),thatis,thetwocom-plementsareequal.ItremainstoestablishI,42r.InFigure35.9thesideGMofthegiventriangleGLMisbisectedatB,FLisdrawnparalleltoGM,andtheperpendicularsGFandBEareerected.FELGBMFigure35.9Theresultfollowsfromthefactthataparallelogram(BEFG)withthesamebaseandheightasatriangle(GBL)hastwiceitsarea(I,41)andthattriangles(GBL,BML)withequalbasesandthesameheightareequal(I,38).ThepreviousquotationfromHeathcontinues:Sincearectanglecorrespondstotheproductoftwomagnitudesinalgebra,weseethattheapplicationtoagivenstraightlineofarectangleequaltoagivenarea[asIhaveindicated,notsomethingEuclidspecificallyshowshowtodo]isthegeometricalequivalentofalgebraicaldivisionoftheproductoftwoquantitiesbyathird.Furtherthanthis,itenablesustoaddorsubtractanyrectilinealareasandtorepresentthesumordifferencebyonerectanglewithonesideofanygivenlength,theprocessbeingtheequivalentofobtainingacommonfactor.(Heath,1926,vol.1,p.347;Heath’sitalics)TheidealyingbehindHeath’srepresentationhereisthatagivenrectilinealfigurecorrespondstoaquantity(whichwemightcallarealnumbera),thegivenstraightlinerepresentsanotherquantity(whichwemightcallarealnumberb).Thefindingofarectanglewithsidebandareaaisthesolutionoftheequation“bx=a”orthedivisionofabyb(seeFigure35.10).Moreover,whenwethinkofquantitiesasrect-anglesa,a′withsidesoflengthbandx,x′thentheirsumisbx+bx′=b(x+x′)andtheirdifferenceisbx′−bx=b(x−x′),whereinbothcasesbisthecommonfactorofwhichHeathspeaks.696ACTC3569620/03/2006,04:22PM\ngreekmathematicstothetimeofeuclidxx′baa′x′bxFigure35.10The“geometricalalgebra,”ofwhichI,42–45areonlyrudiments,goeswellbeyondanyevidencewehaveaboutGreekmathematicsandfliesinthefaceoftheEuclideanpropositionsthemselves,whichareformulatedintermsofparallelograms,notrect-angles,andhavenothingcorrespondingtobintheessentialI,45.AllI,45showsishowtoconstructarectangleequaltoagivenrectilinealarea.TheonlydeterminatesolutiontotheproblemoftransformingareascomesinII,14whereEuclidshowshowtoconstructasquareequaltoagivenrectilinealareaor,aswecannowsay,givenrectangle.Euclid’sproofofII,14isveryclever,butisunlikelytohavebeentheoriginalproofoftheproposition,whichprobablydependedonideasofproportionality,aconceptwhichEucliddoesnotintroduceuntilBookVanddoesnotapplytogeometryuntilBookVI.HeretooEuclidusuallyspeaksintermsofparallelograms,butitiseasiertodiscusswhathesaysintermsofrectangles.Thefundamentalresultis:VI,14r(=VI,16)RectanglesABCDandEFGHareequalifandonlyiftheirconsecutivesidesarereciprocallyproportional,thatis,e.g.,ifABistoEFasFGistoBC.IABFD(E)CGHFigure35.11Proof.IftherectanglesareplacedasinFigure35.11andtherectangleADFIiscompleted,then:697ACTC3569720/03/2006,04:22PM\nianmueller(i)RectangleABCDistorectangleADFIasABistoAIasABistoEF;(ii)RectangleEFGHistorectangleADFIasFGistoFIasFGistoBC;(iii)therefore,rectangleABCD=rectangleEFGHiffABistoEFasFGistoBC.(i)and(ii)areconsequencesofVI,1,whichIdiscussonpages701–2.Itsaysthatparallelograms(andtriangles)withthesameheightaretooneanotherastheirbases;(iii)followsfrom(i)and(ii)usingelementarylawsofproportion.InVI,17EuclidconsiderswhatforusisthespecialcaseofVI,16inwhichEFGHisasquare.InthatcaseEF=FG,sothatsquareEFGH=rectangleABCDifandonlyifABistoEFasEFistoAD.Hence,thetaskoffindingasquareequaltotherectangleABCDisthatoffindingameanproportionalEFbetweenABandAD.IfBA,ADareplacedinastraightlineBADasinFigure35.12,theproblemissolvedbyfindingarighttriangleBDKwithrightangleatKandtheperpendicularfromKtoBDintersectingBDatA(VI,13),ForthenBKD,BAK,KADaresimilartriangleswithBAtoAKasAKtoAD,sothatAKistherequiredmeanproportional(VI,8withporism).TheonlyproblemistheconstructionofthetriangleBDK,butthatissolvedbyconstructingacirclewithdiameterBDanderectingaperpendiculartoBDatAandintersectingthecircleatK.Fortheangleinasemicircleisalwaysright(III,31).KBDAFigure35.12Itwillbeseenthatthiswholeargumentreallydependsonlyon(1)thereciprocalproportionalityofthesidesofequalrectanglesand(2)thefactthataperpendicularfromtherightangleofarighttriangletoitsbasedividesthetriangleintotrianglessimilartoitandtoeachother.Withthesethingsrecognizedtheproblemreducestofindingtherelevantrighttriangle.ThepointIwishtostressisthatthereisnoreasontoreadtheconstructionas“theequivalentoftheextractionofthesquarerootorofthesolutionofthepurequadratic2equation‘x=ab’”(Heath,1926,vol.1,p.410).Itisinsomesensethe“equivalent,”butnotinasensethatshouldmakeusinterpretwhatgoesonintheElementsandelsewhereasanalgebraindisguise.ImplicitandoftenenoughexplicitinthealgebraicrepresentationsofGreekgeometryarenumericalnotionswhichwedonotfindinthemathematicaltexts.Thereisnothingnecessarilyillicitintranscribinggeometricalpropositionsintoalgebraicformulas,butthosewhohavedonesohaveconsistently698ACTC3569820/03/2006,04:22PM\ngreekmathematicstothetimeofeuclidusedtheformulasinconnectionwiththeimportationoftheforeignnumericalideas.Forallwecantell,theGreekswereinterestedintherepresentationofareasassquares,possiblyasawayofcomparingthem,althoughfromanumericalpointofviewsquaresarenotnearlysodirectlyusefulasHeath’srepresentationofthemasrectangleswithacommonlength.Euclidprovidesafullsolutiontothequadratureproblemforrectilinealfigures,andweknowthattheGreekstriedtosolvetheproblemforcirclesandmanagedanumber6ofnon-elementarysolutions.Ishalldiscusscertainaspectsoftheproblemofquadratureonpages712–15.The“Pythagorean”theoremWearenottoldhowPythagorasorthePythagoreansprovedthePythagoreantheorem,andinthenineteenthcenturyEuclid’sproofbecameanotoriousexampleofaproofwhichgavethereadernounderstandingoftheresult.Heath(1921,vol.1,pp.148–9)givesthreeproportion-basedproofsofthetheoremwhichheindicatesthatPythagorashimselfmighthaveused.Igivethefirst,whichdependsonmaterialsintroducedintheprecedingsection,herebecauseitismostcloselyrelatedtoEuclid’sproof,whichproceedsasfollows(seeFigure35.13).AccordingtoVI,8,ifBDKisarighttrianglewiththerightangleatKandDKLM,BKJI,andBDFCaresquares:ABistoBKasBKistoBD,andADistoDKasDKistoBD.HencebyVI,17:(a)SquareBKJI=RectangleABCE,and(b)SquareDKLM=RectangleAEFD;and(c)SquareBKJI+SquareDKLM=RectangleABCE+RectangleAEFD=SquareBDFC.JLIKMBDACEFFigure35.136.ForadescriptionoftheseresultsseeHeath(1921,pp.220–35).699ACTC3569920/03/2006,04:22PM\nianmuellerInprovingI,47Euclidestablishes(a)bydrawingKCandDIandarguingthattriangleBDI=triangleBCKbecauseBD=BC,BI=BKand∠IBD=∠KBC(sinceeachisarightangleplus∠KBD).ButtriangleBDIishalfofsquareBKJIbecausetheyhavethesamebaseandheight,andforthesamereasontriangleBCKishalfofrectangleABCE.Theprooffor(b)usestrianglesMDBandKDFinthesameway.ItispossiblethatEuclidchosetoreformulateproofsusingproportionalityasproofsavoidingitforpedagogicalreasons.Butitseemslikelythatthetheoryofproportionitselfunderwentchangesinthefourthcentury,changeswhichmayhavebeenrelatedtouncertaintyabouthowtoproveinaproperwayquiteordinarylawsofproportion,traditionallytakenforgrantedinmathematics.ProportionalityThedefinitionofproportionalityinBookVoftheElementsProportion,whichEuclidintroducesinBookV,playsafundamentalroleintheGreekmathematicsofwhichwehavedirectknowledge,and,aswehavejustseen,thereisgoodreasontothinkthatproportionwasalwaysafundamentalpartofGreekmath-ematicalreasoning.Theuseofthetheoryofproportionissimplytheapplicationoflawsofproportionalitytomanipulateproportions,e.g.,togofromthefactthataistobascistodtothefactthata+bistobasc+distod.Euclidhimselfdoesnotproveeverylawofproportionthatheuses,andhedoesnotuseeverylawthatheproves.Itseemsoverwhelminglylikelythatthelawsofproportionalitywerepartofamathemat-ician’sstockintrade,thingswhichthemathematiciancoulduseasfreelyasweuseelementarylogicallawsornumericalcalculations.However,touselawsofproportionisnotthesameastohaveatheoryofproportion.Onewaytoproducesuchatheoryistoassumesomelawsandprovetherest.ThisisnotthewayEuclidproceeds.Ratherhegivesadefinitionofproportionalityandderivesallthelawsfromthat.HisdefinitioninBookVcanbestatedasfollows:V,def.5.a:b::c:difandonlyifforanymultiplesm⋅a,m⋅c,n⋅b,n⋅d,ifm⋅a>n⋅bthenm⋅c>n⋅d(andsimilarlyfor“=”and“<”).HereEuclidtakesforgrantednotionsofmultiplicationandcomparisonofsize,which–likethenotionofmeasurementand,toalesser,butstillsignificant,extent,additionandsubtraction–arepartoftheunexplicated“logic”oftheElements.Judgedintermsofmodernlogicandfoundationsofmathematics,BookVisprobablythehighpointofGreekmathematics.Thedefinitionofproportionality,whichisthoughttobeduetoPlato’scontemporary,Eudoxus,containsthefundamentalideathatDedekindusedindefiningtherealnumbersas“cuts”intherationalnumbers.AndthederivationofthelawsofproportionfromthedefinitionisinaclasswithPeano’sreductionofclassicalmathematicstonumbertheoryorFrege’sreductionofnumbertheorytologic.ButafterBookVthedefinitionisinvokedonlyonce,inthefirstpropositionofBookVI;otherwiseallthatmattersarethelawswhichareappliedinthe700ACTC3570020/03/2006,04:22PM\ngreekmathematicstothetimeofeuclidproofofparticularpropositions,asintheexampleswesawonpages694–700.ThereisnoreasontodoubtthatmanyofthosepropositionswerefirstusedindependentlyofanythinglikeBookVandperhapsnotprovedonthebasisofanytheoryofproportionatall.AdefinitionofproportionalityinAristotleThefirstpropositionofBookVIsays:VI,1Trianglesandparallelogramswhichareunderthesameheightaretooneanotherastheirbases.Euclidderivestheparallelogramcasefromthetrianglecase,usingthefact(I,41)thataparallelogramwiththesamebaseandheightasatriangleistwiceitssize.ForthetrianglesEuclidimaginesACBandACDarrangedasinFigure35.14withBCDextendedineitherdirection.Onemultiplies,e.g.,CDbymarkingoffsegmentsDK,KL,etc.ontheextensionBDLofBD,andbecausetriangleswithequalbasesandheightsareequal(I,38)onemultipliestriangleACDbyconnectingKA,LA,etc.Euclidassumeswhathecouldeasilyprove,namelythatoftriangleswiththesameheighttheonewiththegreaterbaseisgreater.FromthisandI,38itfollowsthatifthemultipleofCDisgreaterthan(equalto,lessthan)themultipleofBC,themultipleoftriangleACDisgreaterthan(equalto,lessthan)themultipleoftriangleACB.AIHGBCDKLFigure35.14ThistheoremisofconsiderableinterestbecauseintheTopics(VIII.3,158b24–35)Aristotlesaysthattheversionforparallelogramsisimmediatelyevidentwhenthedefinitionofsameratioisstated,thedefinitionapparentlybeingthataistobascistodifandonlyifa,bandc,dhavethesameantanairesis.Ishalltranslatethistermas“alternatesubtraction.”Itiseasiesttoillustratealternatesubtractionusingnumbersbecauseitisequivalenttothemethodweusetofindthegreatestcommondivisoroftwonumbers.Inthecaseof27and87alternatesubtractionproceedsasfollows.Onesubtracts27from87giving60,andthen27from60giving33,andthen27from33giving6.Onecannotsubtract33from6soone“alternates”andsubtracts6from33.Butbeforewedothisonenotesthatthreesuccessivesubtractionsof27wereperformed,andonecalls3thefirstalternatesubtractionnumberfor27and87.Workingwith6701ACTC3570120/03/2006,04:22PM\nianmuellerand33onegetsthesuccessiveresults27,21,15,9,and3wheresubtractionstopswithasecondalternatesubtractionnumberof5.With3and6onegetsathirdaltern-atesubtractionnumberof2,andthereisnothingmoretodo.Nowtosaythata,bandc,dhavethesamealternatesubtractionistosaythatthesequenceofalternatesubtractionnumbersfora,bisthesameasthatforc,d.Inthecaseofnumbersthesequencealwaysstops.Inthecaseofgeometricquantitiesthesequencemightgoonforever,butthedefinitionwouldstillapply.ThereisnotraceofthealternatesubtractiondefinitionofproportionalityintheElements,althoughEucliddoesusealternatesubtraction(whichhereferstowiththeverbanthuphairesthai)toproducethegreatestcommonmeasureoftwonumbersormagnitudesifitterminates,andheproves(inthecaseofmagnitudes)thatthereisnocommonmeasureifitdoesn’tterminate.ButtheAristotlepassageshowsthatpriortoEuclidtherewasanotherabstractand,infact,morecumbersomedefinitionofpro-7portionality,whichAristotlecouldtreatasthedefinition.Thisfactsuggeststhatthenotionofproportionalitywasconsideredinsomewayproblematicbeforethemiddleofthefifthcentury.Presumablytheprobleminvolvedafeltneedtoprovecertainlawsofproportionality.ProportionalityinthearithmeticbooksoftheElementsBeforediscussingthecharacterofthatproblemIwanttomentionthatatthebeginningofthearithmeticbooksVII–IXEuclidintroducesandsubsequentlyusesaseparatedefinitionofproportionalityfornumbers:VII,def.20.Numbersareproportionalwhenthefirstisthesamemultipleorthesamepartorthesamepartsofthesecondthatthethirdisofthefourth,thatis,ignoringcertainformaldifficulties,(m,n)=(i,j)ifandonlyif,ifm=k⋅n,i=k⋅j,andifn=k⋅m,j=k⋅i,andifmisklthsofn,iisklthsofj.HereIusethenotation“(m,n)=(i,j)”andnot“m:n::i:j”toindicatethattheconceptofproportionalityintroducedinBookVIIisapparentlydifferentfromtheoneintroducedinBookV.TheBookVIIdefinitionmakesclearthatthereisarealsenseinwhichthefoundationofEuclid’sarithmeticisarithmeticitself,althoughinthefoundationthearithmeticishiddenbehindthewords“multiple”or“part”(orequivalently“measure”)or“parts.”TheissuewhichhasbeenofmuchmoreconcerntoscholarsistherelationofthisdefinitionofproportionalityfornumberstotheBookVdefinitionofproportionalityformagnitudes.Onewouldsupposethatmagnitudesandnumbersandproportionalitiesinvolvingthemaredifferentkindsofthingstobetreateddifferently,but,then,there7.ThedefinitionisstandardlyassociatedwithTheaetetus,thetitlecharacterofaPlatonicdialogue.702ACTC3570220/03/2006,04:22PM\ngreekmathematicstothetimeofeuclidwouldbenowaytosay,e.g.,thatonemagnitudehastoanotherthesameratioasafirstnumberhastoasecond.However,inBookXEucliddoesexactlythatwhenheproves,e.g.,that“commensurablemagnitudeshavetooneanotheraratiowhichanumberhastoanumber”(X,5).ThefactthatEuclidprovesthiswithoutexplainingtherelationshipbetweenthetwodefinitionsofproportionalityisamajoriteminthecaseofscholarswhoviewtheElementsasabadlyassembledpatchworkofindependenttreatisesrestingondifferentideas.Since,however,thepatchingneededhereisnotenormous,itisdifficulttobesurehowmuchevidentiaryweighttoassigntothisalleged“gap”(seeMueller,1996).IncommensurabilityItisnowwidelyassumedthattheBookVIIdefinitionofproportionalityfornumbersisanancestorofamoregeneraldefinitionforgeometricmagnitudesandnumbersandperhapsotherquantitiessuchasweightsortimeperiods.Thisdefinitionwouldnot,ofcourse,applytoincommensurablemagnitudes,butastandardstorysupposesthatearlierPythagoreansassumedthatallmagnitudesofthesametypewerecom-mensurable,sothattheirratioswereallexpressiblenumerically,theseideasbeingsomehowconnectedwithabeliefintheuniversalityandcosmicpowerofnumber.Thediscoveryofincommensurabilitywouldthenbethedownfallofthisdefinition,whichwouldbereplacedfirstbythedefinitionintermsofalternatesubtractionandthenbythelesscumbersomedefinitionwefindinEuclid’sElements.Euclid’suseofthisdefinitioninBookVandofthedefinitionofproportionalityfornumbersinBookVIIwouldthenbeexplainedbyhisrelianceondisparatesources.TherehasbeenmuchdiscussionofthequestionwhenandinwhatconnectiontheGreeksdiscoveredthefactofincommensurability.Thetendencyofmorerecenthistoriographyhasbeentopushthediscoveryintothelaterfifthcentury,althoughthesuggestionoftheearlierfifthcenturycannotbediscounted.Inanycaseitistobeexpectedthattherewouldbeatimelagbetweenthediscovery,thedisseminationofthediscovery,andthedevelopmentofamathematicscapableofdealingwithitinaformallysatisfactoryway,e.g.,intermsofalternatesubtraction.Astothequestionofhowincommensurabilitywasproved,itispossibletoimagineapurelygeometricproofofincommensurabilityinwhichitisshownthatthealternatesubtractionoftwomagnitudesneverterminates.VonFritz(1945)describedwhatIthinkisthesimplest“proof”ofthiskindbasedontheregularpentagonandthestarorpentagram,aPythagoreansymbolformedbyconnectingalternatingverticesofthepentagon.IdescribetheargumentintermsofFigure35.15.ThemagnitudesforwhichoneseeksthegreatestcommonmeasurearethesideABandthediagonalACoftheregularpentagon.NowAB=AE′,sothatAC−AB=CE′.ButCE′,thatis,integerssatisfyingthe“Pythagorean”formula“n+k=m.”WhenvanderWaerdenascribedthelastpartofBookIXtoearlyPythagoreanshewasfollowinginthefootstepsofOskarBecker(1936),whoarguedthatthewholeofthesequence,includingtheresultaboutperfectnumbers,couldbeunderstoodasanexampleof“pebblearithmetic.”LaterBecker(1954,p.41and1957,pp.51–2)offeredanargumentusingthesepebblestoestablish–touseourterms–theirrationalityofthesquarerootof2,thatistoestablishthatthereisnosquarenumbertwiceasbigas22anothersquarenumber,thatisnon=2m.Figure35.18makesclearthatthesquareofanevennumber(anumberdivisibleintotwoequalparts)isevenanddivisibleinto224equalsquarenumbers.Supposenown=2m,thentheleftandrighthalvesofthe222figureareequaltom,andclearlym=2⋅(n/2).Sowenowhavetwosmallernumberssatisfyingtheoriginalequation,andwecanmakethesameargumentwithrespecttothem,gettingtwosmallernumberssatisfyingtheequation,andsoonindefinitely.Butaninfinitesequenceofsmallerandsmallernumbersisnotpossible.nnFigure35.18IhavementionedtwopassagesinwhichAristotlesayssomethingapparentlyrelatedtotheconcreterepresentationofnumbersasconfigurationsofdiscreteunits.OtherAristotelianpassagesaboutthePythagoreanshavebeeninterpretedinthesameway,andontheirbasistheoriesaboutearlyPythagoreancosmologyhavebeenelaborated708ACTC3570820/03/2006,04:23PM\ngreekmathematicstothetimeofeuclidinconjunctionwithaccountsoftheearlyhistoryofmathematicsandphilosophy.Whateverthestatusofthesedoctrines,itdoesnotseemthattheideaoffiguratenumbershadanyinfluenceonthewayPlatoorAristotlethoughtaboutthesubjectofarithmetic.Theybothacceptthenotionthatnumbersarecollectionsofunits.However,Aristotleexplicitlydeniesthattheseunitshaveaposition.And,althoughPlatodoesnotdosoexplicitly,everythinghesaysiscompatiblewithAristotle’sview.Indescribingarith-meticintheRepublic(VII,522e–526b)Socratesstressesthefactthattheconceptionofaunitisoneoftheideaswhichleadthemindawayfromthesensibleandtotheintelligibleworld,sinceanysensibleobjectisbothonethingandmanythingsanddoesnotsatisfytheconditionofabsoluteindivisibilityimposedonunitsbythosewhoconcernthemselveswithpurearithmetic.ThestyleofEuclid’sarithmeticTheconceptoffiguratenumberisnotpresentinEuclid’sElementseither,although,inspeakingofnumbers,hedoesusetermslike“square,”“cube,”“plane,”“solid,”and“similar,”whichpresumablyhavegeometricroots.Euclid’svocabularyinthearithmeticbooksisquiteabstract.Inthediagramsunitsandnumbersarerepresentedbystraightlines,and,althoughitwould,Isuppose,bepossibletoarguethatthisrepresentationshowsthatsomekindofspatialthinkingisinvolvedinEuclid’sarithmetic,theargumentwouldquitemissthemark.Euclid’sreasoningispurelycombinatorial;thediagramscontributenothingtothereasoning.Asanexample,Igivehisproof(VII,16)thatmultiplicationissymmetric,i.e.,thatm⋅n=n⋅m:LetA,Bbetwonumbers,andletAbymultiplyingBmakeC,andBbymultiplyingAmakeD.IsaythatCisequaltoD._______A_________B____________________________C____________________________D_____EForsinceAbymultiplyingBhasmadeC,thereforeBmeasuresCaccordingtotheunitsinA.ButtheunitEalsomeasuresthenumberAaccordingtotheunitsinit;thereforetheunitEmeasuresAthesamenumberoftimesthatBmeasuresC.Therefore,alternately,theunitEmeasuresthenumberBthesamenumberoftimesthatAmeasuresC[bytheprecedingtheorem].AgainsinceBbymultiplyingAhasmadeD,thereforeAmeasuresDaccordingtotheunitsinB.ButtheunitEalsomeasuresBaccordingtotheunitsinit;thereforetheunitEmeasuresthenumberBthesamenumberoftimesthatAmeasuresD.ButtheunitEmeasuredthenumberBthesamenumberoftimesthatAmeasuresC;thereforeAmeasureseachofthenumbersC,Dthesamenumberoftimes.ThereforeCisequaltoD.Thediagramplaysnoroleintheproofhere,andonecouldnotinferthecharacteroftheprooffromit.OnemightusethediagramasareminderofwhatA,B,C,D,andEare,butonecouldnevercallthediagramarepresentationoftheproofinthewaythatageometricdiagramfrequentlyisorcaneasilybeseenasone.Thereasonforthis709ACTC3570920/03/2006,04:23PM\nianmuellerdifferencebetweenarithmeticandgeometryisnotcleartome.Itwouldnotexistifarithmeticargumentationwascarriedonbymanipulationofconfigurationsofmonads,sincesuchmanipulationsarequiteofapiecewithgeometricconstructions.Thesamewouldbetrueifmultiplicationweretreatedastheformingofarectanglewiththestraightlinesrepresentingthenumbersmultipliedassides.Itappearsthattheturningofarithmeticintoadeductivesciencealsoturneditintoamoreabstractsciencethandeductivegeometry,whichretaineditsconnectionwithintuitivelygraspedspatialconfigurationsandtheirmanipulation.IncommensurabilityagainTocompletethisdiscussionofarithmeticIwouldliketosaysomethingabouttheotherproofofincommensurabilitywhichImentionedonpage704.IshallrefertoitastheAristotelianproof,sinceAristotlereferstoitatAPr.I.23,41a26–27whenheillus-tratesreductioadabsurdumbyreferringtotheproofthat“thediagonalofthesquareisincommensurablebecauseoddnumbersbecomeequaltoevensifitissupposedcom-mensurable.”Becker’sarithmeticproof,givenonpage708,mightbethoughtofasarisingfromthesearchforPythagoreantriples.ItdoesnotdiffersignificantlyfromtheAristotelianproof,althoughthatproofismostnaturallythoughtofasanattempttoexpresstheratioofthesideofasquaretoitsdiagonalnumerically.AversionofitoccursaswhatisuniversallythoughttobeaninterpolationattheendofthemainGreekmanuscriptsofBookXoftheElements.Theproofrequiresatheoryofproportionalitywhichappliestobothgeometricmagnitudesandnumbers,andusesthefactthatasquareACEFconstructedonthediagonalofagivensquareABCDistwicethesizeofABCD(cf.Plato’sMeno82b–85b)(seeFigure35.19).EDFCABFigure35.19Suppose,then,thatACandABarecommensurable,i.e.(X,5),havetheratioofa2222numberntoanumberm.ThenACEFistoABCDasntom,sothatn=2m.AtthispointonecouldproceedasintheBeckerproof,butintheproofinourmanuscriptsoftheElementsreferencetotheimpossibilityofinfinitelydescendingsequencesofnumbers2isavoidedbyassumingthatnandmareinleastterms.Sincenisevenbydefinition,710ACTC3571020/03/2006,04:23PM\ngreekmathematicstothetimeofeuclid222222soisn(IX,23),andmmustbeodd.Letn=2k.But(2k)=4k,so2m=4k,m=2k,2misevenandsoism,contradictingtheclaimthatmisodd.SinceAristotlereferstothisproofwecanassumeitisnolaterthanthemid-fourthcentury.InPlato’sTheaetetusat147dsomeonenamedTheodorus,forwhomwehavenoclearlyindependentevidence,isrepresentedasdescribingonacase-by-casebasistheincommensurabilitywithaunitlengthofthesidesofsquareswithareasof3,5,andsoonupto17.Theaetetusisthoughttohavebeenbornnoearlierthan420,sothatthelessonwhichheattended,ifitisanythinglikeahistoricaloccurrence,canbeplacedaround400.ThefactthatTheodorusstartedthatlessonwiththecaseof3ratherthan2suggestsstronglythathetookthelatteraswellunderstood,andbecausehedealtwiththesidesofsquaresthereisreasontothinkthatsomeversionofproofwehavejustgivenwasaroundatthattime,andhencethattheproofitselfcomesfromthelatefifthcentury.Butwedonothavetosupposethattheproofinvolvedreductiontoleasttermsratherthanthedenialofinfinitelydescendingnumericalsequences.Moreover,wehavenogroundsforrulingoutasearliertheproofspresentedbyvonFritzandBecker.OntheHistoryofGreekGeometryThalesOnpage693ImentionedattributionsofgeometricresultstoPythagorasorthePythagoreansfoundinProclus’commentaryonBookIoftheElements,ourmajorsourceforthehistoryofGreekmathematics.Theotherearlypersonwhofigurespro-minentlyinthecommentaryisThales,standardlysupposedtohaveflourishedc.585.ThalesisfirstmentionedinabriefhistoryofgeometryusuallythoughttobeimportantlyderivedfromEudemus:Thales,whohadtraveledtoEgypt[allegedtobethebirthplaceofgeometrybecauseofaneedforaccuratedeterminationsoftheareasofplotsofland],wasthefirsttointroducegeometryintoGreece.Hemademanydiscoverieshimselfandtaughthissuccessorstheprinciplesformanyotherdiscoveries,treatingsomethingsinamoreuniversalway,othersmoreintermsofperception.(Proclus,InEuc.65.7–11)Proclus’historyisdominatedbytheideathatgeometrywasbroughtintothescientificformwefindintheElementsmainlybecauseoftheworkofpeopleassociatedwithPlatoinonewayoranother,andheclearlywantstostressthesomewhatrudimentarycharacterofThales’approachtothesubject.However,itisverydifficulttodeterminewhatProclusorhissourceknewaboutThales.InthecourseofthecommentaryThalesiscreditedwithprovingthatthediameterofacirclebisectsit,anassertionwhichEuclidincludesinhisdefinitionofthediameter(I,def.17)atInEuc.157.10–11;withdiscoveringtheequalityofthebaseanglesofanisoscelestriangle(ElementsI,5)atInEuc.250.20–251.2;withdiscoveringbutnotprovingscientificallythefactthattheverticalanglesmadebytwointersectingstraightlinesareequal(I,15;seepp.691–2,thisvolume)atInEuc.299.1–5;andwiththetheoremthatpairsoftrian-gleswithtwoanglesandonecorrespondingsideequalarecongruent(I,26)atInEuc.711ACTC3571120/03/2006,04:23PM\nianmueller352.14–18.InthepassageonthelastoftheseaccomplishmentsitispointedoutthatthetheoremispresupposedbyThales’methodfordeterminingthedistanceofshipsatsea.ThishasledsomescholarstosupposethattheascriptionstoThalesareinferencesbasedontheideathathemusthavejustifiedhismethodsbyprovingtheresultsthattheypresuppose.ButallfouroftheresultsascribedtoThalescanbemadeplausiblebysimpleoperationssuchas“folding”acirclearounditsdiameterorplacingonetriangleontopofanotherinanappropriateway.AnditseemspossiblethatThalesmighthavejustifiedpracticalproceduresbyinvokinggeometricalassertionsandjustifyingthembymeansofsuchsimpleoperations.Suchprocedureswouldconstituteastarttowardafullydevelopeddeductivegeometry,butwouldcertainlynotconstitutesuchageome-try.InthisrespectThales’geometrymighthavebeenquiteliketheoneweascribedtothePythagoreansonpages691–700.OinopidesofChiosThaleswasdeadbytheendofthesixthcentury,andPythagorasdidnotlivefarintothefifth.ThenextfiguresinProclus’historyofgeometry,AnaxagorasofClazomenae,OinopidesandHippocratesofChios,andTheodorusofCyrene,Theaetetus’teacher,areallfromthelaterfifthcentury.Ofthesepeopleweknowmostaboutthemath-ematicalachievementsofthetwoChians.Oinopidesdidsomeworkinastronomy,andaccordingtoProclus(InEuc.283.7–10)heinvestigatedtheproblemoferectingaperpendiculartoagivenstraightline(ElementsI,12)“becausehebelieveditwasusefulforastronomy.”Proclus(InEuc.333.5–9)alsogivesOinopidescreditforthediscoveryofanotherelementaryconstruction,thatofanangleequaltoagivenone(ElementsI,23).ItisdifficulttobelievethatOinopides’concernwiththeseconstructionswasofapracticalnaturesincetherearesimpleinstrumentsforcopyinganglesanderectingperpendiculars.SoitseemslikelythatOinopides’concernwaswithjustifyingtheseconstructionsonthebasisofsimplerones.ButtheseconstructionsarethemselvessosimpleastomakeitquitelikelythatOinopideswasdoingsomethingverylikethereductiontostraightedgeandcompasswhichwefindintheElements.Becauseoftheabsenceofhistoricalevidenceitisnotpossibletosayhowthiscameabout,butifwearewillingtoattributesomenotionofthejustificationofgeometricalpropositionstoThalesandearlyPythagoreans,theideaofagradualevolutionseemsveryplausibletome.HippocratesofChiosThecorrectnessofthisdescriptionofOinopides’concernsistosomeextentconfirmedbyProclus’statement(InEuc.66.7–8)inthehistorythatOinopides’fellowChianandapproximatecontemporary,Hippocrates,wasthefirsttocomposeanelementsofgeometry.Moreover,Simplicius(InPhys.60.22–69.34),writinginthesixthcenturyce,preservesforuswhathecharacterizesasanexpandedversionofareportbyEudemusofargumentsofHippocratesshowinghowtosquarecertainlunes,thatis,planefigurescontainedbytwocirclearcs(seeFigure35.20).Thedoublyfilteredpresentationmakesitimpossibletosaythatwehavehereafifth-centurymathematicaltext,butsomeconclusionscanbedrawnwithvaryingdegreesofconfidencefromwhatwedohave.712ACTC3571220/03/2006,04:23PM\ngreekmathematicstothetimeofeuclidFigure35.20AristotlerefersinseveralplacestoHippocrates’quadraturesasiftheywereafalla-ciousattempttosquarethecircle.IhavenodoubtthatHippocrateswasinterestedinsquaringthecirclebecausethereissubstantialevidencethatthiswasamatterofgreatinterestinthelaterfifthcentury.ButtheattempttoinferthatthecirclecanbesquaredfromthequadraturespresentedbySimpliciuswouldbeagrosslogicalfallacy,onewhichhistoriansofmathematicsarereluctanttoascribetoHippocratessincehisquadraturesofthelunesthemselvesarequitefinepiecesofmathematicalreasoning.ThelimitationsoftheevidencealsomakesitimpossibletobecertainabouttheexactnatureofHippocrates’styleofargumentation.ButthereisnoreasontodoubtthathededucedhisresultsinawaythatisnotsubstantivelydifferentfromEuclid’s.However,whateverHippocrates’elementswerelike,thereareseriousproblemsindeterminingwhatthefoundationsofhisquadratureswere.SimpliciusfirstsaysthatHippocratestookasaprincipleforhisquadraturestheassertionthat:(i)Similarsegmentsofcirclesaretooneanotherasthesquaresontheirbases.ButhethenimpliesthatHippocratesprovedthisasaconsequenceofsomethingelseheproved:(ii)Circlesaretooneanotherasthesquaresontheirdiameters.(ii)ispropositionXII,2ofEuclid’sElements.ItisprovedbyasophisticatedprocedureofindefiniteapproximationthoughttobeduetoEudoxus,thegrandfatherofBookV.Theproceduredependsonaresultnowthoughtofasaprinciple,butwhichEuclidpurportstoproveas:X,1Letx1andy1betwomagnitudeswithx1greaterthany1;letx2=x1−z1,x3=x2−z2,etc.andletzialwaysbegreaterthanhalfofxi;thensomexiwillbelessthany1.Euclid’sproofofX,1dependsonanequivalent,apparentlytacit,assumptionthatdif-fersonlyslightlyfromtheaxiomofArchimedes,mentionedonpage691,thatifxisgreaterthany,somemultipleofyisgreaterthanx.EuclidprovesasalemmaforXII,2XII,1,whichassertsthatsimilarpolygonsPandP′inscribedincirclesCandC′aretooneanotherasthesquaresSandS′onthediametersofthecircles.HethenarguesindirectlyforXII,2,assumingthecasethatCistoanareaC*

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